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**URBAN OPERATIONS IN CHECHNYA: LESSONS LEARNED AND
IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. URBAN DOCTRINE AND TRAINING**

BY

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ABSTRACT

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The threats of the 21st Century provide the Armed Services with unique challenges. Future enemies are predicted to utilize asymmetrical means and tactics to negate U.S. capabilities and overmatch technology. The rapidly growing global urbanization trend provides potential enemies with a complex environment that may counteract U.S. strengths, cause significant casualties and collateral damage, and prolong operations as they hide in plain sight or use the indigenous population as shields. Current assessments of the future threat predict that U.S. forces will fight in cities. This paper uses the recent Russian urban combat experiences in Chechnya as a vehicle to examine key doctrinal, training, and execution lessons and compare them with U.S. preparedness in these areas. The author determined that the joint community and individual services had indeed studied the Russian experience and incorporated several salient lessons into emerging doctrine. However, the author also found that preparedness is suspect at the operational staff level, higher and lower tactical unit level, and individual level due to limited joint combined arms urban training. The author concludes with several recommendations to improve urban combat training through a mixture of leadership, realistic training exercises, simulations, resources, unit reorganizations, and technology.

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PREFACE

I am sincerely grateful to members of the Combined Arms MOUT Task Force (CAMTF), the National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC), and the Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO) for their invaluable assistance on this project. Additionally, I would like to thank the staffs of the Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and the Army War College (AWC) at Carlisle Pennsylvania for all their superb support.

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URBAN OPERATIONS IN CHECHNYA: LESSONS LEARNED AND IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. URBAN DOCTRINE AND TRAINING

Urban operations are one of the most contemporary topics within the joint community, especially the Army, and Marine Corps. Mega-cities, built-up areas, towns, and villages are projected to figure prominently in future operations. Recent urban battles in areas such as Israel, Palestine, and Chechnya provide recurring lessons on the complexity of combat in cities and among their associated populations. These conflicts offer examples of low to mid intensity urban combat that U.S. forces are expected to encounter in the future. The Russian experience in Chechnya, and combat operation in Grozny in particular, offer several key lessons in the areas of doctrine, training, preparation, and execution for the high end of mid-intensity combat. This paper will use urban combat in Chechnya as a vehicle to compare and contrast U.S. doctrinal and training readiness for future conflict under these difficult and demanding conditions.

WHY URBAN OPERATIONS?

Urban warfare. Those two simple words are enough to raise hackles on the neck of almost any professional military officer. Urban terrain is a complex three-dimensional jungle that slows maneuver, degrades technology, and significantly impedes the employment of military force. Large noncombatant populations, concerns for combat induced collateral damage, and the potential for substantial civilian and military casualties make these types of missions a worst-case scenario for service-members and their leaders. Russian experiences with fighting in major built up areas in 1994-1996 and 1999-2000 lend credence to these perceptions. Perhaps, Sun Tzu summed it up best when he observed, "The best military policy is to attack strategies; the next to attack alliances; the next to attack soldiers; and the worst to assault walled cities. Resort to assaulting walled cities only when there is no other choice."¹

No doubt, these are words of wisdom; words the U.S. military as an institution embraces to this day. The Army's current doctrine (under revision) states: "Tactical doctrine stresses that urban combat operations are conducted only when required and that built up areas are isolated and bypassed rather than risking a costly, time-consuming operation in this difficult environment."² A 1993 refinement of this doctrine advised that the growth of cities made urban combat unavoidable.³ It went on to stress however, that urban combat should normally occur only when there is no bypass around a city, the city's placement on the route of advance won't facilitate its being surrounded or bypassed, or political or humanitarian concerns require the city's seizure.⁴ The Army's capstone field manual for conducting operations, FM 100-5 (also

under revision) provides a single paragraph on urban operations which notes that built up areas provide unique and complex challenges.⁵ Doctrinally the Army's current message is clear; stay out of cities. However, this message and the Army's doctrine are changing. Urban operations are expected to figure prominently in the future.

The Marine Corps has already accepted that it will conduct urban operations. Its current doctrine acknowledges the importance of urban terrain, the increasing likelihood of urban operations, and the necessity of being prepared to conduct combat in this environment.⁶ While the military has varying levels of doctrine to govern the conduct of urban combat, most military leaders maintain the philosophy that they would rather not. Given increasing global urbanization, this desire may no longer be a realistic option.

The U.S. military is primarily organized, trained, and equipped to fight in non-urban areas. Historically, examples from the 20th-Century indicate that prepared or not, the military is inextricably linked to fighting or performing military operations other than war in urban areas. The century dawned with U.S. Forces capturing the Chinese city of Tientsin and defending a portion of Peking. Urban operations in Aachen, Manila, Seoul, Taejon, Hue, Beirut, Panama City, Kuwait City, and Mogadishu followed. As the 20th Century closed, peacekeeping operations in urban areas of Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo, and internal support to civilian law enforcement agencies during the L.A. riots imply missions in cities will continue, and may in fact become the norm.

Some may ask whether growing urbanization will correlate to increasing incidents of urban combat? Others may argue that these historical examples are exceptions, not the rule. Exception or not, urban operations continue to be a persistent fact. Emerging Joint, Army, and Marine Corps doctrine confirms that the military expects to continue with varying levels of urban missions. This paper assumes that the U.S. military will continue to conduct varying degrees of combat operations in urban environments. These missions may range from limited duration precision operations, to short battles like Mogadishu, to forms of protracted operations similar to the Russian experience in Grozny.

GLOBAL URBAN TRENDS AND THE THREAT

The world is becoming more urbanized. The CIA's *Global Trends 2015 Report* predicts that by the year 2015 more than half of the world's population will live in cities.⁷ Other assessments forecast that 75 to 85 percent of the population will reside in urban areas by 2025. Cities will play an increasing role in the growing and interdependent global economy through political, financial, cultural, and informational ties⁸. The real or perceived promises of better

employment, increased standards of living, and enhanced services will continue to lure people into urban areas. Overcrowding associated with rapid growth will tax already struggling urban infrastructures, creating unrest and potentially creating humanitarian crises in less developed regions.⁹ Increased urban sprawl and massive suburban areas can result in a mix of modern construction and shantytowns. The complex urban environment can provide fertile breeding grounds for discontent and may increase the likelihood of conflict.

Future enemies will seek to counter American strengths by choosing asymmetrical means to attack them. One such method is to operate in cities. Believing the U.S. is unwilling to accept casualties and risk adverse,¹⁰ urban areas provide the threat with a counter to American technological capabilities and speed, thereby leveling the "playing field." The potential for substantial casualties to U.S. military forces and indigenous population and collateral damage in these operations play into the threats design to erode American will. The longer hostilities can be protracted, the better chance the adversary has of undermining U.S. resolve and support from the local inhabitants. The city environment limits the use of superior firepower and extended ranges found on most U.S. weapons. Simple armaments like Rocket Propelled Grenade-7 (RPG-7) and homemade Molotov cocktails are cost effective, easy to hide, and can be readily obtained or made. The battleground will necessitate close quarters combat increasing the potential for casualties.

WHY GO THERE?

Throughout history, cities have often, but not always, been the hubs of a nation's political, social, and economic power; the strategic center of gravity, whose capture ultimately breaks the enemy's will to fight. Knowing that future threats will employ asymmetrical methods in these areas one may ask why conduct urban operations at all? What strategic objective or vital national interest will necessitate the U.S. to commit forces to wage combat in urban areas outside of its own borders? What significant threat to national security justifies sending America's sons and daughters to fight in another nations cities? All of these are valid questions.

Some argue that future urban operations are not inevitable. A recent Massachusetts Institute of Technology Conference on urban operations concluded that these types of missions should be done by exception, with a limited scope that focuses on policing actions and precision type raids in urban areas.¹¹ Further, it found that having the Armed Forces prepare for sustained combat in cities is counterproductive and sends a false message to civilian leadership about the military's willingness and abilities to fight in urban areas.¹² Major General (Ret) Robert Scales, the former commandant of the United States Army War College, concurs. In a

recent article he highlighted the theory that urban operations played to an enemy's strength. He proposed preempting the threat's ability to use complex terrain through political and diplomatic means or providing forces, working in conjunction with coalition or host nation elements, to deny access to cities.¹³ Failing preemption Major General (Ret) Scales recommends an indirect approach that isolates the city, controls all facets of logistical support going into it, and using patience to allow the city to collapse on itself.¹⁴ While having many merits, this siege like method requires substantial numbers of ground forces to isolate a city. For example, Chechnya's capital, Grozny, had an estimated size of 68 to 100 square miles. At one point in time close to 100,000 soldiers (almost 20 per cent of the active U.S. Army and nearly 47 percent of the Marine Corps) were deployed into Chechnya with 50,000 in and around Grozny. They could not fully seal off the city. Another consideration is whether world public opinion would allow city inhabitants to starve or to be killed by the threat occupying the city if resources were constrained. Obviously, the nation must pick and choose its fights with great care. National leaders, with advice from senior military advisors, will make the ultimate decision as to the methods they may employ to counter a threat in urban areas.

While the military would prefer not to fight in cities, the old military axiom, "hope is not a method" comes to mind. Given the future threat analysis and the nation's past urban experiences, fighting in urban terrain is to be expected. As Somalia demonstrated, peacekeeping operations in an urban environment can turn into combat in the space of minutes. Urban complexities notwithstanding, the joint Armed Forces have the responsibility to ensure its members are properly trained and prepared to fight and win under these challenging conditions. Anything less is negligence on the part of military leadership. Having well-trained and disciplined units increases individual service member confidence, proficiency, and provides a clear deterrent message to potential adversaries. The nation cannot afford to encourage potential foes by giving them the impression that Americans are unwilling to fight wherever necessary-including cities. As *The World In 2020 Report* recommended, the military needs to realistically prepare for urban operations now.¹⁵

As America's military prepares for urban warfare it should consider the recent Russian experience in Chechnya. Three times during the last decade Russian forces found themselves engaged in extended combat in the capital city of Grozny. While the Russians ultimately won control of the city each time, it had to destroy Grozny to achieve accomplish this objective. Further, the Grozny did not prove to be the Chechen strategic center of gravity. A relatively modern and well-equipped force, the Russians had significant problems with the urban

environment. The urban warfare lessons they learned may provide several key insights as U.S. forces prepare for the future.

OBJECTIVE AND METHODOLOGY

The objective of this paper is to examine doctrinal and training lessons learned from Russian urban operations in Chechnya, and to identify potential implications for joint U.S. forces. Oriented towards ground operations, the paper focuses on lessons that are especially applicable for Army and Marine units. After examining the Russian experience an assessment of current U.S. doctrine and training is provided with recommendations for improvement.

An extensive review of existing open source literature provided the basis for this paper. Translated documents provided by the Federal Bureau of Information Services provided key insights into the Russian perspective and their assessment of their own performance. The Internet was used to explore both Chechen and Russian prior and ongoing informational warfare efforts. Interviews were conducted with subject matter experts at the National Ground Intelligence Center, Foreign Military Studies Office, Deputy Chief of Staff, Intelligence, United States Marine Corps Intelligence Activity, Army War College, Command and General Staff College, and the Combined Arms Military Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT) Task Force.

Faculty members of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Security Studies Program supported this research effort. National Security Studies Fellows from the Marine Corps, Navy, and Air Force provided service specific observations as well.

CHECHNYA GEOGRAPHY, POPULATION, AND THE ROOTS OF CONFLICT

GEOGRAPHY AND POPULATION

The Russian Republic of Chechnya (called the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria by separatist factions¹⁶) is located in the North Caucasus Region near the northwestern end of the Caspian Sea. Southeast of Russia proper, it is bordered by Georgia in the south, Dagestan to its east and north, Russia to its northwest, and Ingushetia and North Ossetia to its west. Roughly 6000 square miles in size (slightly smaller than the State of Hawaii¹⁷) it has rolling steppes in the north and wooded foothills of the Caucasus Mountains in the south. Chechnya has both oil and natural gas resources and sits astride key energy pipelines (Trans Caspian) from the Caspian Sea and within the region.¹⁸

The capital of Chechnya is Grozny. Located near the geographic center of the country at the base of the North Caucas Mountains, its approximate size is estimated to be 68 to 100 square miles (about the size of Las Vegas, NV¹⁹). In 1989 it had a population of approximately

420,000 people, (roughly equal that of Albuquerque, NM²⁰). For a Soviet-style city, it was relatively modern with suburbs, multiple story buildings, and substantial industry. The cultural and economic heart of Chechnya, Grozny contained key oil refineries and encompassed important road, rail, and energy networks.²¹

A 1989 census put Chechnya's population at 1,270,000²² (about the population of Maine.²³). Of that population, approximately 265,000 were Russians. For the most part, this minority got on well with the majority. Ethnic violence was minimal and there was no attempt at ethnic cleansing by the Chechens.²⁴ Most Russian civilian casualties occurred after the initiation of Russian combat operations and bombardments. Considered a key Russian border region, Chechen instability threatened neighboring countries of Dagestan, Ingushetia, and North Ossetia; all having internal issues involving their diverse multi-ethnic populations and strong Islamic movements.²⁵

ROOTS OF CONFLICT

Primarily an Islamic tribal/clan based society; Chechens have warred with their Russian neighbors since the mid-1500s. Finally occupied by the Russians in 1859, civil unrest continued throughout the remainder of the century and the 1900s. The Chechens never fully accepted Russian rule.²⁶ When the Germans invaded during World War II, Chechen rebels greeted them as liberators. The Russians viewed this as treason. As a result, a majority of the population was deported from Chechnya to other regions of the Soviet Union - many to Siberia.²⁷ Deported survivors were allowed to return home in the late 1950s.

As the Soviet Union was breaking up in late 1990, the Chechens unilaterally declared independence on November 27 and overthrew the remnants of the former Communist government.²⁸ Former Soviet Air Force General Dudayev was made President. Russia did not accept Chechnya's declaration of independence or the election of Dudayev. The new Russian President, Boris Yeltsin, ordered martial law.²⁹ However, Mikhail Gorbachev, the outgoing president of the Soviet Union and commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces, overruled Yeltsin ordering Russian forces not to become involved in Chechen internal affairs. The secessionist movement was allowed to grow. As Yeltsin came to power, other pressing issues at home consumed his attention and the Chechen situation grew worse. In 1992 Russian authorities withdrew their military forces from Chechnya, leaving behind most of their heavy military equipment.³⁰ Conditions within Chechnya continued to deteriorate. In 1993 President Dudayev used armed force to overthrow the Chechen Parliament establishing sole control of the government. Organized crime and violence grew. Many clans took over small regions of the

country with their leaders becoming de facto warlords. These activities began to impact Russian economic and national interests. The primary railroad for the region was often blocked, oil and natural gas was diverted or stolen, and foreign investors, desiring to exploit Caspian Sea resources, began to back away from the region because of the violence.³¹

The Russians attempted to resolve the problem through negotiation. Dudayev, however, opposed these efforts and the Russian Parliament was not inclined to act more forcefully. The Parliament became even less inclined to support President Yeltsin after he used armed force to subdue the Duma in October 1993.³² Other internal affairs eroded public and Parliamentary interest in Chechnya, but Yeltsin and his administration grew weary of the adverse economic impacts resulting from the situation. As 1994 began President Yeltsin and his senior advisers decided to begin covert operations to topple President Dudayev. In mid-1994 the Russian military began to provide clandestine aid to Chechen loyalist opposition groups.³³ When this element attacked Grozny to overthrow Dudayev in November 1994, they were soundly defeated. Russian complicity was publicly exposed. Humiliated, President Yeltsin and his senior advisers opted to use military force to resolve situation. Russian political and public support was divided, the military reported itself unready, and turmoil reigned. The stage was being set for armed intervention.

THE FIRST CAMPAIGN 1994-1996

Throughout 1994 and 1995, the upper levels of both governmental and military leadership faced significant challenges in forming a comprehensive national and military strategy to deal with Chechnya. With unclear policies, Russia and its Armed Forces became heavily involved in combat operations and were nearly defeated at the hands of a smaller Chechen force. Severe casualties, political disarray, public outcry, and world criticism resulted. Significant failures occurred in national strategy, doctrinal applications, and readiness. One may ask how the Russian Armed Forces, which prided itself on its operational/tactical doctrine and training during the Cold War, had sunk to such a state of unpreparedness? A review of these areas and events leading up to the 1994 New Years Eve attack into Grozny may put these issues into perspective.

STRATEGIC SITUATION

In the fall of 1994, Russian President Yeltsin, government officials, the Council of Federation (upper chamber of Parliament), and the State Duma (lower chamber of Parliament) struggled with the question of how to resolve the rapidly deteriorating situation in Chechnya. Most of Russia's leaders agreed that action was required. The rebellion threatened national

security and other vital geopolitical interests. Potentially, its success could have encouraged other nationalist movements. There were valid concerns that nationalist factions in areas such as Dagestan might follow the Chechens creating a "domino effect" of secessionist movements and destroying both the Federation and Yeltsin's government.

The majority of Russian public and political leaders believed that Chechnya was sufficiently important to justify a wide range of economic and political measures to ensure that it remained within the Federation.³⁴ However, the majority did not support an invasion by Russian forces. As one Yeltsin advisor commented, "he feared the political battle in Moscow over Chechnya more than the military's entry into the Caucasus."³⁵

The government's inability to reach consensus on appropriate measures plainly hampered the military's ability to plan for contingency operations. As a default, President Yeltsin initially chose to provide Chechen loyalists with clandestine military support during the late summer and fall. The military began planning, but they focused primarily on covert support to the loyalists, rather than full-scale military intervention.³⁶ The government believed the opposition element could overthrow Chechen President Dudayev from within.

These ill-conceived efforts were a disaster and culminated in a 26 November battle in Grozny. Decisively defeated, the Chechen loyalists took severe casualties. Their equipment was destroyed or seized. A number of Russian service-members were captured and paraded before the press.³⁷ Many Russian political and military leaders were embarrassed by the public exposure and outraged at the mishandling of these clandestine operations. The prospect of full-scale Russian intervention seemed inevitable.

After the stinging defeat of the loyal opposition, President Yeltsin, seeing no other recourse, and on the advice of many senior officials including his minister of defense, ordered Russia's military into action. On 9 December, he issued a Presidential edict sanctioning the use of force in Chechnya. In part it stated, "That the Government of the Russian Federation ... use of all the means available to the state to guarantee national security, legality, the rights and freedoms of citizens, the preservation of public order, and the fight against crime and the disarmament of all illegal armed formations."³⁸ On 11 December military units began deploying into Chechnya.

Was this edict the actual basis for Russia's national and military strategy to deal with Chechnya? From a U.S. military's perspective, political leadership defines national values and interests. A thorough assessment of these goals results in policies aimed at obtaining national objectives. These policies form the national strategy; an articulation of the use of the various elements of national power, including military force, to reach national goals. The Department of

Defense and the services devise a cohesive military strategy to provide guidance on employing the military to achieve these national policies. Russia and its army use a similar process. In this case though, it appears their process for adopting a cohesive national and military strategy was haphazard at best.

No doubt the failed November overthrow attempt and public exposure of covert Russian support spurred political desire to resolve this situation rapidly. In addition, President Yeltsin may have felt he was losing control of the situation. However, the Chechen state of affairs remained largely as they were when President Yeltsin came to power in 1991. His decision to order such a rapid intervention is disturbing, especially considering the conflicting reports about the preparedness of his military forces. Aimed at gathering public support his open declaration of intervention accomplished little and it negated the crucial element of surprise. The Chechens knew the Russians were coming and were prepared.

From President Yeltsin's edict one might conclude that keeping Chechnya in the Federation and restoring order were primary strategic goals. From an operational perspective, these goals may have translated to the destruction of the Chechen rebels, capture of Grozny, and enabling the installation of an acceptable pro-Russian government. While military field commanders may have understood the strategic goals, their limited resources and untrained forces led them to select an operationally unrealistic method to obtain them. The operation turned into a war of attrition; playing into Chechen hands by creating substantial military and civilian casualties. From the Chechen perspective, strategic goals appeared centered on an independent Chechnya and the ability to govern within their Islamic beliefs. Operationally, they equated to a protracted struggle. Using insurgent and asymmetrical methods to counteract Russian strength and firepower, the Chechens sought battle in difficult mountainous and urban terrain seeking to produce casualties unacceptable to Russia. The longer the fighting raged the better chance they had to cause the Russians to withdraw and recognize Chechen independence.

Russia lacked a cohesive national strategy to deal with the Chechen situation. The government's ambiguous policies: i.e. clandestine support switching to invasion in the space of several weeks, confused military leaders and failed to clearly articulate a realistically obtainable end-state. Both before and after the first Chechen campaign, military leaders angrily complained about a lack of strategic vision by civilian officials. Most believed military action would not resolve deep-seated Chechen nationalist and religious issues and felt the decision to conduct near immediate combat operations was unwarranted. Many perceived other elements of national power could provide constructive methods to resolve the situation. The military felt it

was pushed into a fight it was not prepared for.³⁹ Given the actual state of the military's readiness, it is questionable whether the Russian strategic goals were realistic.

PREPAREDNESS OF RUSSIAN FORCES

General of the Army Douglas MacArthur once remarked, "In no other profession are the penalties for employing untrained personnel so appalling or so irrevocable as in the military." In the fall of 1994 Russia's political leaders and its General Staff would have done well to recall those words. They should have adhered to the wisdom of their urban tactical doctrine that advises: "Combat action under conditions prevailing in the city requires thorough training of personnel and the ability to make the most effective use of weapons and display wise initiative and creativity in adopting a decision."⁴⁰ As the political and military situation in Chechnya continued to deteriorate, the Russian Armed Forces found themselves preparing for a "come as you are war." The Russian government and public soon learned what many military leaders already knew: the Armed Forces were unprepared to fight any type of war, much less one in a complex urban environment against a determined Chechen foe.

The U.S. military has an old saying that goes, "As you train in peace, so you will fight in war." Readiness of the Russian military had steadily declined since 1989. In 1991 the Armed Forces began working through the throes of downsizing and reorganization. Russia had begun to look at new national and military strategies. Withdrawal of forward deployed forces, reorganization from Cold War formations, and reductions in both strategic and conventional forces drove military reform efforts.⁴¹ Along with reform, the emerging military doctrine emphasized a mobile defense concept, constant readiness forces (capable of effectively influencing local conflicts), rapid deployment forces (supported by appropriate lift assets to rapidly reinforce readiness forces), and strategic reserves to be deployed in the case of war.⁴² While these reforms and doctrinal changes were sound, the Russian military was in no condition to implement them. Cutbacks in the size of the standing army and significant reductions in resources created an army grappling with day-to-day survival. Some division and regimental units actually collapsed from a lack of supplies, inadequate numbers of replacement conscripts, and officers selling off unit equipment and weapons.⁴³ More time was spent on eking out their daily existence than on training or employing tactical doctrine. The Chechen rebellion could not have come at a worse time. The Russian Army was caught between its past and future, having competence at neither basic nor urban combat skills.

Consistently short of resources and manpower, many observers believe that the Ground Forces had not conducted a divisional training exercise since 1992. Further, it was reported

that less than 25 percent of scheduled regimental, battalion, and company exercises were conducted during this 1992-1994 period.⁴⁴ Another source observed that in 1994, approximately 30 percent of scheduled training exercises were actually conducted.⁴⁵ Many battalion size units were reported manned at 55 to 60 percent strength.⁴⁶ Conventional forces found themselves playing second fiddle to the Strategic Missile Forces. As one Russian journalist noted, "Generals... gave their blessings to requests from the RVSN (Strategic Missile Force) and relegated the Ground Forces to the status of an orphaned stepson."⁴⁷

The Air Force was in little better shape. Hampered by chronic under-funding, limited training, and a lack of modern technology, it was poorly prepared to support combat operations especially in urban environments.⁴⁸ One Russian officer offered that none of the air force regiments met its flight training requirements and that pilot flight- hour training was cut to 30 hours instead of the required 100.⁴⁹

Readiness at the operational and higher tactical staff levels was dismal. With the sharp decline in the status of the post Cold War Army, a safe assumption is that many of the military's best and brightest staff officers either left the service or suffered sharp degradation in skills from non-use. Exercises were extremely rare. For example, in 1994 ground troops held over two hundred command post exercises; 60 percent of them looked at mobilization readiness while only 40 percent focused on command and control of combat operations.⁵⁰ Across the board, the military found itself with little hands-on experience at basic command and control, planning, and war fighting skills. While operational and tactical level staffs struggled, the lot of the individual soldier, junior leaders, and subunits was worse.

Two-year conscripts primarily manned the Army's Ground Forces. However, the conscription system was failing. From 1989-1992 many prospective conscripts avoided the draft and refused to report. Widespread media reporting on the negative aspects of military service, the soldier's mother's movement protests over soldier treatment, and resistance from state governments significantly hindered conscription efforts.⁵¹ In 1993 and 1994 from 50 to 70,000 conscripts refused call up and many who reported deserted; low morale was the norm.⁵² The Army was forced to accept many substandard conscripts to fill the ranks, bringing them into a system that had difficulty feeding, housing, and paying them, much less conducting effective individual training.⁵³

In 1993, recognizing the need to decrease reliance on conscription, the Ground Forces instituted a new system to improve professionalism within its enlisted and non-commissioned officer ranks. Called contract personnel, these soldiers enlisted for three years; receiving better pay, training, and assignments than conscripts. Roughly similar to the U.S. Army's volunteer

force concept its goal was to recruit and retain quality service members. However, most contract soldiers did not sign up to serve in positions within combined-arms subunits and their pay was insufficient to encourage reenlistment.⁵⁴

Whether conscripted or contracted, individual training was inadequate at best. Most soldiers received two to three months of initial training. Shortages of financial resources, ammunition, parts, oil, lubricants (POL), and manpower, in both training subunits and combat forces, adversely affected individual preparedness.⁵⁵ Colonel General Anton Terentyev, Chief the Main Directorate/Deputy CINC Ground Troops for Combat Training, observed that the 1994 training conditions of the Army hampered company level leader development, tactical preparation, command and control skills.⁵⁶ Manpower shortages caused training for key positions such as snipers, grenade launcher operators, and heavy caliber machine gunners to be curtailed in the training base; POL shortages made drivers training for tankers and armored personnel carrier (APC) crewmen ineffective.⁵⁷ Most armored vehicle crewmen had not driven their vehicles over rough terrain or fired its primary weapons system, while the average soldier had only rudimentary experience firing their individual and crew served weapons.⁵⁸ These observations plainly indicate a significant lack of preparedness at individual and small unit levels.

The large majority of junior NCOs were only senior conscripts themselves. Most had only several months of training and limited on-the-job leadership experience.⁵⁹ Often, these first-line supervisors mistreated newly conscripted soldiers. Hazing was commonplace. Clearly, this environment did not instill trust and confidence, desirable qualities for soldiers preparing for combat. Urban combat relies heavily on small unit actions. As one officer wrote, "... the effectiveness of employing combat teams largely is predetermined by the high level of morale and combat qualities of every servicemen, especially junior commanders, and by their ability to act in a nonstandard way that is unexpected for the enemy."⁶⁰ The Russian junior NCO Corps was not prepared to aggressively lead untrained and inexperienced soldiers into a demanding urban combat environment. This leadership failure had devastating consequences.

Junior officers had little more experience. Urban operations were discussed only in passing during training. Only five to six hours were allocated to urban warfare training at platoon and company level officers training courses.⁶¹ Practical experience and command and control opportunities during training exercises were extremely limited. As Colonel General Terentyev commented, "The degree of proficiency of company level officers is even more alarming. Some company and platoon commanders cope with their duties in exercises by exceeding established standards by only 2-3 times. In so doing they assigned nonspecific

missions to subordinates, disregard terrain and urban conditions, and forget about maskirovka, security, and protection against precision weapons."⁶² One regiment was reported to have entered Grozny with 49 out of 56 platoon leaders straight out of their basic schools.⁶³

Junior leadership inadequacy aside, even more significant is the almost complete absence of individual and small unit urban combat training. As one Russian officer commented, "... tactics and methods of conducting combat operations in the city found no place in combat training programs."⁶⁴ This same officer elaborated that there was no urban combat instruction allocated for training cadets and subunit non-commissioned officers.⁶⁵ The Russians were unprepared for room clearing operations and other associated urban TTPs. A Russian officer writing about the degradation of his army's urban combat skills asked, "Is it the first time we are assaulting major cities, fortresses, and fortifications in general? Who was keeping our commanders from training ... or at least studying the appropriate literature?"⁶⁶

Combined arms' training was almost non-existent. Dismounted infantry, APCs, and tanks had not worked together before. As one general staff officer found, "Skills in conducting combat actions... were weak, either individually or as part of the combat order."⁶⁷ Coupled with all other training deficiencies, this inadequate preparation for a combined arms urban fight produced catastrophic results as the Russian soldiers and leaders fought for their lives in Grozny.

In the late fall of 1994, with military action looming, operational level staffs began to bring forces together. Confronted with a large number of understrength units, they raised "composite units" from all military districts and the fleet.⁶⁸ Crew and subunits members were taken from whatever forces were available and assigned to fill vacancies within deploying units. Most learned their new duties (e.g., a cook being assigned as an infantryman) on the job.⁶⁹ To further complicate staff planning and coordination, units from the Ministry of Defense, Internal Affairs, and Internal Security were assigned to the operation. These diverse forces hadn't trained together causing friction, mistrust, complicated command and control procedures, and hindered a focused unity of effort.⁷⁰ Reports vary about the actual size of the ad hoc force deployed into Chechnya, but estimates range from 36,000 and 42,000 personnel. Of these an estimated 6,000 were involved in the initial fighting in Grozny.⁷¹

PRE-INTERVENTION MILITARY READINESS REPORTING: A LACK OF INTEGRITY

Many senior officers understood the true status of the military readiness. However, the Armed Forces senior military leader, Russian Defense Minister, General Pavel Grachev, either refused to believe the military's true readiness conditions or deliberately failed to report an

accurate assessment to political leaders. A staunch supporter of President Yeltsin, General Garchev, may have been a true "yes man". In May 1994, he publicly proclaimed that the military was ready for combat and was completing reorganization from Cold War Era unit structures.⁷² Throughout the fall, General Grachev, publicly touted the military's preparedness. However, the majority of senior military leadership understood the Armed Forces had problems in all areas, especially, operational, tactical, and individual training.

In November, General Grachev, openly assured President Yeltsin that the Armed Forces were combat ready and capable of carrying out assigned missions.⁷³ Later, he stated that he could take Grozny with a single airborne regiment. Yet only days before fighting began, he drafted a memorandum noting combat readiness of Russian forces as poor and operational planning capabilities inadequate.⁷⁴ Perhaps these previously stated assurances precipitated the choice to commit combat forces to Chechnya. General Grachev's leadership and integrity failures to honestly present an accurate assessment of Russian preparedness betrayed his nation and the members of the Armed Forces sent to do the fighting.

One general officer assigned to command the operation assessed the situation and reported it could not be executed because of poorly prepared forces.⁷⁵ Garchev asked him to resign which he promptly did. Upon the announcement to commit forces, eleven generals of the Military Council of the Ground Forces appealed directly to the Duma and Federation Council to protest the "absurdity" of the decision based on actual military readiness.⁷⁶ Parliament, while sympathetic, was unable to stop the deployment. The operation began with the majority of its military leaders in opposition. Russia and its Armed Forces were about to taste the bitter fruit of unpreparedness.

PREPAREDNESS OF CHECHEN FORCES

The Chechen Forces offered a stark contrast to the Russians. Estimates of the size of the Chechen force vary, ranging from 8,000 to 12,000 fighters with 3,000 to 4,000 initially located in Grozny.⁷⁷ However, the number is believed to have grown to between 12,000 and 15,000 fighters as the Russians advanced towards the city in December.⁷⁸ The Russians attacked into a city where they were outnumbered by at least two to one. World War II data recommended that when attacking a city, a force ratio of 6 attackers for every defender is desired.⁷⁹ The Chechens maximized this under-match. The attacking Russians suffered heavy casualties and were unable to initially overpower the defenders.

Many Chechen military leaders and soldiers were Russian/Soviet trained with combat experience from Afghanistan.⁸⁰ Others had gained experience during local fighting against the

Chechen loyalists. Previous service in the Russian Army provided the Chechens a unique understanding of its strengths and weaknesses.⁸¹ Most spoke both Russian and Chechen, giving them a significant advantage when communicating and conducting deception operations.⁸²

Fighting on their home territory, these soldiers believed in their cause. Intimately familiar with both the countryside and the villages and cities in which they would operate, most possessed the courage of their convictions and demonstrated a consistent willingness to take the fight to their enemies. Understanding the overwhelming Russian numerical superiority, they employed asymmetrical means to level the battlefield. Insurgent tactics, fighting in urban terrain and mountainous areas, and conducting limited visibility operations were common techniques used to counter Russian capabilities. When the Russians employed heavy artillery and mortar support, the Chechens moved into close proximity with them using a technique known as "hugging" to force the enemy to lift (stop) its supporting fires to prevent fratricides.⁸³

To support their tactics, they employed simple and cost-effective weapons. The RPG-7, AK47, and sniper rifles were tools of choice. Easy to use and replace, these weapons were cost-effective and ideally suited to urban terrain. The RPG-7 was especially effective when volley fired against armor in the closer urban terrain.⁸⁴ Trained to work in eight to twelve man units, these highly mobile teams moved to the "sound of the guns" to engage the Russians.

The Chechens took advantage of many off-the-shelf technologies such as Motorola radios, scanners, portable antennas, jammers, and computers for command, control, and information operations.⁸⁵ At the tactical level, the Chechens had better communications than the Russians.⁸⁶

With the impending outbreak of hostilities, the Chechens prepared Grozny for defensive operations utilizing the advantages offered by the three-dimensional urban terrain to the maximum extent possible.⁸⁷ They deliberately drew Russian forces into populated areas causing heavy casualties and openly violated the conventional rules of land warfare to which professional armies are accustomed.⁸⁸ In one instance, the Chechens located a command post in a hospital. Mutilated comrades welcomed Russian soldiers as they fought, psychologically affecting many untrained troops.⁸⁹ From the Chechen perspective, the end justified the means. Comments like, "Chechens have the will to take losses", and "For a Chechen at war, the highest reward is death,"⁹⁰ were not rhetoric. They welcomed a fight with the Russians and disdained their capabilities. As one Chechen fighter commented, "The Russians are cowards. They just can't bear to come out their shelter and fight us man to man. They know they're no match for

us. That is why we beat them, and will always beat them."⁹¹ Russian underestimation of this will, coupled with significant training deficiencies, made urban operations in Grozny a nightmare; a nightmare the Russians would relive in the summer of 1996 and again in January 2000.

RUSSIAN DOCTRINE

With unclear strategic level guidance, Russian operational commanders and staffs struggled to link the tactical employment of forces with ill-defined national objectives. Even in the absence of critical information, their military doctrine should have provided sufficient guidance to enable operational activities for deployment and employment of Russian forces.

From a U.S. perspective the purpose of doctrine is to provide the foundation for the conduct of military operations that accomplish the nation's interests. Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, defines doctrine as, "Fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application."⁹² Russia's definition of military doctrine is not as concise as the U.S. definition, but it is similar.

During the years following the end of the Cold War, Russia found itself trying to redefine its military doctrine to realistically deal with post-Cold War facts. Providing a widely accepted succinct definition of Russian military doctrine during these years is difficult. They were trying to redefine it themselves. In 1993 the Ministry of Defense provided a proposed interim doctrine to fill the gap between the Cold War and the future. From articles published during that time one may surmise the Russians saw military doctrine as dynamic in nature. It provided guidelines defining threats to the state and missions entrusted to the Armed Forces in the area of national security.⁹³ Further, it offered principles to organize and employ the Armed Forces and acknowledged that as threats and interests change, so must military doctrine.⁹⁴

To effectively employ doctrine, commanders and staffs must be well trained and experienced in its use. Most Russian operational and tactical commander and staff skills were so degraded that their capacity to analyze mission requirements, plan, and control operations were negligible. Very few had any experience with urban combat. Those who did remembered rapid motorized assaults that were relatively bloodless.

Assigned as the controlling headquarters, the North Caucasus Military District (NCMD) was hindered by inadequately trained staffs, under strength and hastily formed composite units, poorly trained individual soldiers and junior leaders, and a lack of planning and preparation time.⁹⁵ The NCMD was ill prepared to plan or execute a joint operation, especially one that involved the incorporation of units from other governmental ministries. As one Russian General

Staff officer found, "... there was no organization for cooperative interaction."⁹⁶ As a result, many of these forces were misemployed leading to unnecessary casualties, a lack of trust, and problems with unity of command. While Russian doctrine may have addressed joint interagency operations, most commanders and staffs were unprepared to apply it.

At the tactical level, the Russian Army possessed a very detailed and sound doctrine for the conduct of urban combat. Forged out of experiences from the Great Patriotic War (WWII), a 1975 study of Soviet doctrine established that these experiences permeate urban tactical doctrine.⁹⁷ Acknowledging great success during WWII the report found that Russian doctrine has a caveat very similar to that of the U.S., which advises, "Fighting in cities is neither a preferred tactic nor strategy for the Soviet Armed Forces. Soviet tactical doctrine, in the broadest sense provides that if possible, the attack or defense of cities is to be avoided."⁹⁸

Refined during the Cold War, the former Soviet Army successfully used this doctrine to swiftly capture cities such as Budapest, Prague, and Kabul. It specified two primary approaches for dealing with combat in cities. The first, known as the attack from the approach march, stresses speed of the attack and light enemy resistance. Approach march tactics specifically emphasize that this method should be used against a lightly defended urban area, or nuclear suppressed cities.⁹⁹ The second method is used against a well-defended city. It calls for the encirclement of the city to isolate it, followed by a deliberate combined arms attack preceded by heavy indirect and aerial supporting fires.¹⁰⁰ Russian tactical doctrine further prescribes several basic tenets for conducting urban operations. It stresses the importance of thorough reconnaissance, combined arms organizations, the use of dismounted infantry supported by armor, engineers, and indirect fires to conduct the attack.¹⁰¹

This doctrine, however, is primarily geared at the higher end of mid-intensity and lower end of high-intensity conflict. Specifically it provides detailed guidance for conducting combat operations. It does not offer alternative methods for military use when they are conducting urban missions under peacekeeping or stability and support operation conditions (SASO). As a result, this doctrine has the potential to cause tremendous collateral damage to the urban infrastructure and to have devastating effects on the city's population. Such was the case in Grozny during both campaigns. In addition to the heavy military and civilian casualties and the destruction of the city, second and third order effects of the fighting included alienating neutral citizens, stiffening separatist resolve, and providing the media with stories that led to world condemnation and generated sympathy for the Chechens. Both Russian civilian and military leadership saw this as a civil war situation that threatened the solvency of the Federation. The Chechens were fighting for their independence. Given the intensity of resistance shown by the

Chechens, the Russian military used any conventional means necessary to defeat the enemy. As casualties mounted, brute force through the use of massive firepower became the norm, often used to compensate for inadequately trained and led infantry.

Even though still largely Cold War based, Russian urban tactical doctrine remains valid for some situations. In the case of Grozny, however, this doctrine only provided two basic methods for dealing with urban areas, limiting Russian flexibility in dealing with the situation. Sound judgment is a critical factor in selecting and employing doctrine. Judgment is developed through many factors including education, training and experience. As with all subjects, doctrine as well as tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), must be frequently trained to retain proficiency. Since 1991 training in general had been minimal; urban combat training was virtually non-existent. This lack of training and experience coupled with poor doctrinal judgment would produce disastrous results.

JUDGEMENTAL ERRORS AND DOCTRINAL MISAPPLICATION

Russian underestimation of Chechen capabilities and resolve and failure to properly apply its urban combat tactical doctrine led to heavy casualties and an inauspicious beginning to a long and bloody campaign. Undoubtedly political considerations heavily factored into the decision to rapidly commit Russian forces to urban combat. Russian national leadership saw Grozny as Chechnya's political, cultural, and economic center. Chechen history and culture, however, indicates a strong sense of national will for independence. Taking the city may have been an attempt to accomplish portions of President Yeltsin's edict, i.e. restoring public order and suppressing crime, but it was unlikely to accomplish the disarmament of illegal formations or break Chechen resolve. The question becomes, knowing the complexities of urban warfare, why did the Russian military fail to apply its own doctrine correctly?

Political demands for rapid action, poor intelligence, contempt for the Chechens, and inexperienced Russian commanders and staffs appear the most likely answers. These factors contributed to an appalling misapplication of tactical doctrine during their first attempt to seize Grozny. A grossly overoptimistic intelligence assessment significantly underestimated Chechen strength, capabilities, and resolve. Widespread staff acceptance of this analysis was compounded by a failure to conduct further reconnaissance and intelligence gathering operations, one of the key urban doctrinal tenets, to confirm the estimate through other sources.

When selecting the attack from the approach march doctrine, three factors appear to have heavily influenced NCMD planners; President Yeltsin's demand for swift and decisive action, a significant intelligence failure which predicted light resistance instead of heavy opposition, and

overall inexperience. In the judgment of commanders and staffs, Grozny was lightly defended and the Chechens would collapse when they saw the Russian advance. In fact, Grozny was anything but lightly defended. Had the Russians followed their doctrinal tenets and confirmed the intelligence estimate and resisted political pressure they might have realized the true tactical situation doctrinally called for encirclement and deliberate reduction tactics. It is hard to understand how such a decision was reached even when exacerbated by faulty intelligence. This fact is especially troubling since Chechen loyalist motorized and armored forces, without enough supporting infantry, were soundly defeated in Grozny in late November, little more than a month before the attack.¹⁰² Perhaps successful experiences in cities during the Cold War unduly influenced the NCMD's commander and staff decisions. Disregarding many of its key tactical doctrinal tenets the Russian Army prepared to attack Grozny. This misapplication of doctrine proved very costly.

THE FIRST BATTLE FOR GROZNY

On December 31, 1994 the Russian Army executed a poorly planned, uncoordinated, non-mutually supporting, and unsynchronized three pronged mounted attack into Grozny. Moving rapidly, motorized forces and lightly armored paratroopers assaulted towards the city's center. Their intent was to quickly and decisively seize several key portions of the city. The railway station, Presidential Palace, radio station, and television buildings were perceived as centers of gravity for the Chechen separatist movement.

Once into the constrictive urban terrain the Russians were fiercely attacked from three dimensions: ground/street level, above ground/building level, and subterranean level. Attacks came from 360 degrees; there was no safe haven in the city. Meeting significant and unexpected resistance, the Russians found themselves without sufficient dismounted infantry and other combined arms assets to protect their motorized/armored units. Infantry and armor didn't fight well together and lacked adequate engineer, field artillery, and other supporting assets. Many composite units were destroyed piecemeal because they did not understand how to work together. Most engineers, crucial to mobility efforts in urban terrain, reached Grozny after several weeks of fighting.

Chechens armed with light RPG-7 anti-armor weapons systems, homemade Molotov Cocktails, and other explosive devices attacked savagely. As one Chechen commented, "The Russian soldiers stayed in their armor, so we just stood on balconies and dropped grenades onto their vehicles as they drove underneath."¹⁰³

Many units were surrounded, and nearly destroyed. One unit in particular, the 131st Miakop Brigade, entered the fight with approximately 120 armored personnel carriers (APCs) and 26 tanks. After three days of fighting, 102 APCs and 20 tanks were destroyed.¹⁰⁴ One source estimated that 90 percent of the Russian casualties in Grozny occurred during these first three days.¹⁰⁵ The Russians were soundly defeated. An intense and costly urban battle raged during January and February 1995. The Russians finally controlled the decimated city, but many of the Chechen fighters escaped. The Russian Army had again failed to follow its doctrine that specified isolating the city, and the enemy was allowed to slip away.¹⁰⁶ It was a hollow victory and insurgent warfare continued through the summer of 1996.

RUSSIAN INTRA-WAR TRAINING ADJUSTMENTS

During the January 1995 fighting in Grozny, Russian military leaders quickly assessed training deficiencies. To correct them, the NCMD established a training facility to prepare individual replacements and incoming units for urban combat. Called the Mozdok Training Range, it provided soldiers the opportunity to fire their weapons, drive their armored vehicles, and conduct limited small unit training in buildings to replicate conditions in Grozny.¹⁰⁷ As one naval infantryman commented, "Exercises and drills have been carried out here, and rifle marksmanship continues. Everyone has his specialties. We didn't have to go to the city before we came through here."¹⁰⁸ One platoon leader observed, "We have become very familiar with the peculiarities of combat operations in Grozny. While we had never trained as part of an assault group, neither had the naval infantry, tankers, artillerymen, or air defense gunners. Here each of us found out how to carry out their maneuvers and missions."¹⁰⁹

These comments provide a unique insight into the limited urban and combined arms training prior to the war and confidence that can result from a few weeks of training. Although Mozdok was a band-aid effort to provide basic combat skills, it provided invaluable training boosting individual and small unit confidence. The first units in Grozny could have greatly benefited from a Mozdok-like experience.

INTER-WAR TRAINING ADJUSTMENTS 1997-1999

A protracted insurgent campaign continued throughout 1995 and into 1996. It culminated in a surprise Tet style Chechen attack into Grozny in August of 1996. Causing an estimated 2100 Russian casualties, this surprise attack ended Russian political and public support for the war, much the same as the Tet Offensive did to U.S. support for Vietnam.¹¹⁰ Humiliated by Chechen success, and their subsequent withdrawal of forces from Chechnya in the winter 1996,

the Russian General Staff focused its efforts on correcting many of the training deficiencies observed during the war. Reform was the order of the day, but competing priorities made it difficult. Many politicians wanted to continue to reduce the military and its funding.¹¹¹ The military began to focus limited resources into areas they believed they could realistically repair.

A priority effort went into correcting operational command, control, and staff planning deficiencies. Numerous joint training command post exercises (CPX) were held to enhance teamwork and assist the effective integration of forces from all ministries.¹¹² Aimed at improving coordination, these CPXs focused on staff planning and assimilation of all forces within a military district. While helpful, friction continued to exist between ministries during the second Chechen campaign, but overall, joint operations improved.¹¹³ Staffs also struggled with the influx of new organizations that were unfamiliar with established procedures.¹¹⁴ However, when compared to the first war, operational and tactical staff planning and control functions, as well as unity of effort were markedly improved¹¹⁵

Recognizing the need to focus limited training resources, the Russian General Staff created new units called "permanent readiness formations". These organizations combined many understrength units (cutting force structure), and formed them into a permanent ready force that worked and trained together. Better resourced, and manned at approximately 80 to 85 percent strength, they provided the initial backbone for deploying forces during the second campaign.¹¹⁶ Training within these units was focused primarily at battalion level and below, with CPXs for high-level staffs.¹¹⁷ The results were somewhat better trained and disciplined units. Given the large number of conscripts that populated these formations however, personnel turnover was high, significantly affecting individual and small unit performance. Many of these conscript's obligation for military service terminated just prior to their units deployment to Chechnya which resulted in personnel turmoil.¹¹⁸

The Russians also revamped their Main Directorate of Combat Training (MDCT), which is equivalent to the U.S. Army TRADOC. Renamed the RF Armed Forces Main Combat Training Directorate (MCTD) in January of 1998, its mission was broadened to include standardization of operational, tactical and combat training; coordination of effective combat training for all Armed Forces branches; control of military educational institutions; and supervision of combat training.¹¹⁹ The MCTD faced many of the same challenges occurring in TRADOC today. Under resourced, one general officer commented, "... because of the lack of the necessary material, training is unfortunately simplified in some places, and does not always meet the requirements of real combat."¹²⁰ For example, in 1998 30 percent of battalion and 59 percent of company-

level tactical training exercises as well as 59 percent platoon live fires that the MCTD supervised were conducted without actual equipment.¹²¹ Cadre and qualified instructor shortages posed significant problems in conducting quality training at professional education institutions. Citing examples such as the curtailment of hands on training for drivers, inadequate resources for live fire, and an inability to correct training deficiencies, Colonel-General Golovnev, the MCTD commander, summed up the challenges facing his directorate by saying, "Unfortunately, I cannot speak about positive changes in combat proficiency of troops today."¹²² On the whole, individual service member proficiency improved very little and small unit effectiveness, primarily in permanent readiness formations, increased only slightly during the intra-war years.

In the face of significant training and resource limitations, it may be understandable why little effort was made to conduct urban combat training. When units could not perform basic tactical tasks to standard, asking them to increase training complexity by incorporating combined arms training in an urban environment was unrealistic. Perhaps military leaders felt the Chechnya urban experience was an anomaly. As one junior officer remarked about training after the 1999-2000 battle of Grozny, "The battle in the city. That was the hardest battle. I just finished the Leningrad VOKU [School] last year and, it would seem, I should have the freshest learning about how a battle must be conducted under conditions within the city. But I will tell you honestly that the highest degree of attention was not given to that topic in the school. It is necessary to establish all of the conditions for the study of the special features of combat in the city not only in the military institutions but also in each military district."¹²³ In short, while the Russians desired to improve military readiness, their ability to do so was limited.

THE SECOND CAMPAIGN 1999-2000

After Russian forces withdrew in disgrace in December of 1996, Chechnya was independent in almost every aspect except name. Economically decimated, it struggled to find external financial aid. Negotiated assistance from Russia never appeared and conditions within the country continued to deteriorate. Islamic law was adopted. Several public punishments and executions were held drawing world criticism. Crime, drug trafficking, kidnappings, and illegal arms dealings became commonplace. Rebel groups splintered and unity among these factions decreased. The flow of oil and gas through Chechnya was often interdicted. Many factions began conducting raids into neighboring states.

In Russia President Yeltsin was losing control of his government. The Russian military worked to improve its readiness, but still suffered from a lack of resources. In 1999 Acting

President Putin replaced Yeltsin. He viewed Chechnya as a continuing problem and began preparing the Russian public and Parliament for another intervention.

STRATEGIC SITUATION

In August of 1999 Islamic insurgents based in Chechnya conducted armed raids into Dagestan with the goal of creating an independent Islamic state.¹²⁴ Labeling them terrorist attacks, the Russian government responded with military forces from the NCMD to conduct anti-terrorist operations. By the end of August, they had driven the Islamic insurgents back across the border. Terrorist bombings occurred in Moscow at the end of August and during the first two weeks of September.¹²⁵ Speculated to be the work of Chechens, these bombings, coupled with the rebel incursions into Dagestan, galvanized public opinion.

Ordering his military into action, President Putin set clear strategic goals. Initially military actions were linked to repelling Chechen aggression into Dagestan and protecting the sovereignty of the Federation. After the September bombings a reassessment was conducted changing the goal to the total destruction of the terrorist, which in turn changed to preserving the integrity of the Federation including Chechnya.¹²⁶ In contrast to the first war, President Putin aggressively sought to win the support of Parliament, the public and the military. The executive branch's justification of its actions won widespread support and the first battles of the information war.

In the fall of 1999 the Russian Army began moving into Chechnya. As compared to the first Chechen campaign Russian strategic goals were clear. Destroy the Chechen terrorists by any conventional means necessary, isolate Chechnya economically, and keep casualties to a minimum¹²⁷. Throughout the second campaign, minimization of casualties, both military and civilian, was touted as a priority. This guidance led the military to employ tactical doctrine that used massive firepower against the Chechens to preserve Russian lives.

To accomplish these goals operationally, the Russians initially employed a bombing campaign focused on suspected rebel bases to weaken Chechen resolve. Once the bombing set favorable conditions a ground campaign followed in October. Designed to first isolate Chechnya, it sought to deny "bandit" mobility and fix them followed by the use of overwhelming firepower to destroy the rebels.¹²⁸ This time the military was given the flexibility to operate at its own pace. Chechnya was effectively surrounded and the Russians slowly isolated the capital city of Grozny during November.

PREPAREDNESS OF RUSSIAN FORCES

There was little change in the quality and readiness of Russian soldiers and junior leaders. Still primarily made up of conscripts and an inexperienced junior NCO Corps (most conscript veterans of the first Chechen campaign had left the service), morale and discipline remained weak.¹²⁹ As with the first war, Russian leaders were able to quickly assess training deficiencies and to establish interim measures to better prepare replacements and newly arrived units. Utilizing areas like the Mozdok Training Range again, soldiers conducted weapons familiarization, drove vehicles, and practiced TTPs in an urban environment.¹³⁰

Junior officers were still inexperienced. Given the lack of a professional NCO Corps, they performed both officer and NCO functions. The professional education institutions, resource constrained, short cadre, and lacking quality instructors, did little to prepare them for combined arms operations and urban combat. Permanent formations units attempted to focus tactical training at the battalion and lower levels. However, insufficient resources forced units to conduct most training without equipment as walk-through exercises.¹³¹

Perhaps the most significant training improvements occurred within operational and permanent forces tactical level staffs. Not as resource intensive as tactical training, CPXs, conducted during the intra-war years improved joint planning, coordination, and control that proved invaluable during the fighting.¹³² As a result, staffs produced better intelligence assessments, a solid operational plan, and provided effective logistical support.¹³³

Senior commanders also improved. Many had gained experience in the first war and understood the capabilities and limitations of their soldiers. For example, during the city fighting an experienced motorized rifle battalion fresh from mountain operations was ordered to attack into Grozny the day following its arrival. After conferring with the unit's leadership, the senior commander realized that while the unit was experienced, it was not prepared for urban fighting. He allowed them several days to train in urban terrain in order to rehearse and refine TTPs before committing them to the battle.¹³⁴ Such sound judgment was rare during the first war.

In many ways the Russians proved adaptive and trained to improve in several key areas. They embraced information operations as a combat multiplier. Understanding that they lost the information war during the first Chechen campaign, they worked hard to garner public and media support. The Russians trained to deliberately target the Chechen communications infrastructure in order to disrupt their command and control ability and to reduce their capability to use the media and Internet to generate sympathy. The Russians aggressively controlled media movement on the battlefield and increased censorship of reports on military action.¹³⁵ By contrast, the Chechens may have proven to be their own worst enemy in relations with the

press. During the intra-war years, many journalists were taken prisoner and ransomed by various Chechen factions. The invasion into Dagestan and the bombings in Moscow further estranged the media from the Chechen cause.¹³⁶ Ultimately such acts caused the press to be far less sympathetic to Chechen activities than it had been during the first war.

Another concentrated effort was made to improve communications equipment to facilitate command and control efforts. Following the Chechen lead, the Russians bought off-the-shelf secure Motorola radios and trained operators to enhance subunit communications.¹³⁷ They effectively utilized Chechen-speaking personnel to monitor non-secure rebel communications. Additionally, the Russians conducted deception operations on their non-secure nets to lure Chechens into ambushes similar to the Chechens having given Russian units false information during the first war.

Four months of combat operations prior to the urban assault on Grozny improved the experience level of the majority of Russian forces. While basic combat skills were superior to those in the first war, the majority of soldiers were still not adept at close quarters infantry combat. The resulting employment of massive firepower tactics in the city demonstrated that the Russians understood this deficiency and used it to minimize friendly casualties. Unfortunately, these tactics demonstrated an area where the Russians were not adaptive. Civilian casualties and collateral damage were still significant. As a result, the Chechen resolve remained strong.

CHECHEN TRAINING AND PREPAREDNESS

Chechen training and readiness for the second conflict remained at nearly the same level as during the first war. The individual soldier remained tough and resolved. However, the unity of effort exhibited by various Chechen factions during the fighting in 1994-1996 had significantly deteriorated. Warlord-like leaders with differing religious and political goals led many groups.¹³⁸ Many did not get along and cooperation was often limited.

Having lost most of their heavy equipment during the first Chechen campaign, they were more lightly armed. Initially they tried to defeat the Russians in open terrain and took heavy losses. Perhaps Chechen experiences in the first war and a general contempt for the quality of Russian soldiers created overconfidence. Whatever the reasons, they were no match for the Russian firepower and mobility in open terrain.

As the Chechens moved back into Grozny they conducted extensive preparations building trenches, subterranean positions, and fighting positions. Some analysts have equated the defensive preparations as similar to WWII Stalingrad. Chechen willingness to fight the Russians

remained strong as demonstrated by their use of hugging tactics, fighting at night, and raids out of Grozny into Russian rear areas. Their ability to coordinate and control their efforts, however, was not as effective as during the first war.

While both sides wanted to increase readiness during the years following the first war, they made limited progress. The Russians lacked the resources. The Chechens had similar problems coupled with internal bickering that weakened their unity of effort. Neither side was as prepared as they wanted to be.

RUSSIAN DOCTRINE

During the 1999-2000 battle in Grozny Russian strategic level goals led commanders to select doctrine that called for the encirclement and deliberate reduction of the city. The goals of isolating the city, denying rebel mobility, and minimizing friendly casualties were tailored made for its use. This time political micromanagement was kept to a minimum allowing the military to employ its doctrine to maximum benefit.

The doctrinal tenets of thorough reconnaissance, use of infantry heavy combined arms organizations, and massive supporting fires were effectively followed. The Russians divided the city, used massed fires to support maneuver, and deliberately cleared each section. One notable modification to doctrine dealt with the control of supporting fires. Historically, Russian fire support was under centralized control for planning and execution. Learning from their first Grozny experience, the Russians sought to improve control and responsiveness of fires to the ground units. To fix this weakness, artillery and mortars were placed under the direct control of attacking infantry and armor, to support each advance. Responsiveness and effectiveness were increased. The decentralization of fires was a major change in the application of tactical doctrine.¹³⁹

While this method worked tactically, conventional Russian infantry was still weak. The reliance of overwhelming firepower, to compensate for lackluster infantry performance, created significant casualties and collateral damage to Grozny. As in the first war, these actions invited criticism from outside observers. Due to a more effective effort information management campaign world and public outcry was notably less.

On the whole, the Russians utilized their urban tactical doctrine effectively. In some ways they proved adaptive to changing conditions in the urban environment by modifying or altering doctrine to maximize effectiveness. In other ways, such as the desire to reduce civilian casualties and collateral damage they were not adaptive. Perhaps the Russian perspective that

this was a civil war aimed at restoring the sovereignty of the Federation can explain the indiscriminate use of supporting fires. Whatever the reason, Grozny and its occupants suffered.

THE 1999-2000 BATTLE FOR GROZNY

The deliberate isolation of Grozny demonstrated that the Russians had indeed learned from the first battles in 1994-1995. There was no overall lightning armored/mechanized strike to seize Grozny this time around. One Russian armored column was ambushed and defeated in Grozny on December 14, but occurrences like this were the exception.¹⁴⁰ Operations focused on cutting the Chechens off from mountainous terrain, limiting their mobility and reducing their ability to hide from the Russians.¹⁴¹ It also provided staffs a chance to refine their planning and control skills and integrate new units. Commanders and staffs also proved more adaptive. Throughout the fall, as they deliberately secured the area around Grozny, there were several incidents where Russian forces worked with local civilian elders and Chechen rebels to avoid destroying towns and villages and in effect reduce Russian casualties.¹⁴² This initial willingness to avoid collateral damage and win local support was rare during the first war.

By late November Grozny was almost completely encircled. On 4 December, the Russians declared it blockaded and issued an ultimatum for the population to leave by 11 December. Warning the few remaining residents to leave, "Those who remain behind will be viewed as terrorists and bandits."¹⁴³ The international community criticized this "leave or die" demand since many of the inhabitants were aged or infirm with no place else to go.¹⁴⁴

On 13 December Russian forces began to retake Grozny. This time the Russians employed their tactical doctrine. Rigidly adhering to their strategic and operational priority of reducing friendly casualties they used massive supporting fires as a maneuver technique to destroy Chechen resistance followed by infantry assaults to secure the ground. They employed thorough reconnaissance to locate the Chechens and used intense observed direct and indirect supporting fires to neutralize enemy resistance.¹⁴⁵ This slower and more deliberate pace used standoff firepower to reduce close combat casualties. Grozny was turned into a free fire zone.¹⁴⁶

Deliberate, narrowly focused, and infantry heavy combined arms attacks followed massed fires to seize buildings and blocks. Labeled by the news media as the "salami slicing method," the Russians divided the city into sections, and the sections into subsections, effectively "slicing" up the city by clearing one section at a time.¹⁴⁷ To further assist operations, the Russians enlisted the assistance of the former Mayor of Grozny, Bislan Gantamirov, who raised several formations of loyalist Chechens to guide and fight alongside the Russians.¹⁴⁸ These

people were invaluable in guiding Russian units, providing key knowledge of subterranean areas.

The Chechens fought hard. At one point in the battle, a large force exfiltrated the Russian lines and successfully attacked supporting units. These raids furthered friction between the Armed Forces and other ministry troops who were suppose to secure these areas.¹⁴⁹ In early February, as Russian control of Grozny was nearly complete, many Chechens rebels tried to escape. The Russians used deception radio traffic to indicate a gap in their lines. When the Chechens tried to exploit this avenue the Russians ambushed them in a minefield causing heavy casualties.¹⁵⁰

Through brute force and overwhelming firepower, Russian forces were able to secure a devastated Grozny by mid-February of 2000. This hollow victory failed to resolve the core issue -- the Chechen nationalist desire for independence. As a result, insurgent fighting and terrorist activities continue with no end in sight.

LESSONS LEARNED AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES

Russian experiences in Chechnya highlight several key doctrinal and training lessons. Many of them have potential implications that are noteworthy as U.S. forces develop joint urban operations doctrine, revise individual service doctrine, and enhance training activities.

STRATEGIC LESSONS

Strategic goals and military capabilities must be compatible. During the first war competing national objectives, unclear intent, and a weak security policy adversely affected the Russian military planning efforts. It appears that careful consideration was not given to a wide range of possible political and economic measures short of military operations, or to the resulting consequences if military efforts were successful or unsuccessful.¹⁵¹ Military action by itself can seldom resolve deep-seated nationalist, ethnic, or religious issues.

The executive branch of government was not responsive to reports of military unpreparedness and demanded swift and decisive action. Military leaders were appalled by this disregard and perplexed by the overwhelming desire for swift action. Many Russian senior military leaders lost confidence in the government and ministry of defense officials. Later during the fighting in Grozny, there were presidential orders to stop bombings and restrict operations that created further mistrust. Micromanagement by both governmental and military senior leaders frustrated field commanders and broadened dissension.¹⁵²

Once military action was directed, the Russian parliament was constrained by its own Constitution and unable to reverse President Yeltsin's decision to use force.¹⁵³ Government

efforts to garner widespread public and media support were limited. As a result, the use of force was not supported by the public; thereby creating dissent at home while generating empathy for the Chechens at home and abroad.

During the second war the goals were clearer and the military was somewhat better prepared. Parliamentary and public support was favorable. Senior leaders were given the freedom to execute operations at their discretion. Micromanagement by the government was significantly reduced and military leaders were allowed flexibility in their decision-making. These changes clearly enhanced the effectiveness of the campaign.

Strategically, the first Chechen campaign captured Grozny. It was not, however, the strategic center of gravity for the Chechen separatist movement as the Russians anticipated. During the 1999-2000 campaign, Grozny was recaptured. Separatist forces were pushed into the countryside and mountainous regions of Chechnya. However, a protracted low-intensity conflict continues unabated. The strategic lesson that military force alone cannot resolve long-standing nationalist, ethnic, and religious issues remains obvious.

DOCTRINAL LESSONS

The Russian experience in Chechnya highlighted several key doctrinal lessons. One of the most critical was the importance of unity of command and effort. During the first campaign, the Russians had numerous short-duration commanders. This turmoil caused significant instability. Replacement of key leaders was kept to a minimum during the second campaign.

In the first war there was significant difficulty in conducting joint operations with other ministry agencies. This led to problems with unity of command and effort.¹⁵⁴ For the 1999-2000 Chechen campaign, the Russians worked hard to reverse this trend. Numerous joint command and staff exercises were held incorporating units from the various ministries. All participating forces were placed under a single commander. Friction continued however. For example, different ministry forces used differing methods to encode map coordinates causing serious communications and control problems.¹⁵⁵ Joint operations are by nature complex. Operational level commanders and staffs are key to maximizing effectiveness and minimizing friction.

From the tactical perspective, doctrine employed by Russian forces focused on urban combat against light or heavy resistance. This doctrine remained basically unchanged from WWII. In the first war the rapid attack from the approach march was initially used. The Russians failed to utilize key doctrinal tenets to confirm their decision to use this tactical doctrine and sustained heavy casualties.

Conversely, the way in which the Russians applied their doctrine changed significantly during the 1999-2000 campaign. They slowly isolated Grozny, confirmed the use of their doctrine by conducting effective reconnaissance and intelligence operations, and effectively employed combined arms organizations. Responsive and massive fire support was used to systematically destroy Chechen resistance and facilitate combined arms maneuver.

TRAINING LESSONS

Well-trained and disciplined service-members, units, and leaders are key to any successful military mission. Urban combat requires skilled infantry and aggressive NCOs and junior officers. The Russian experience in Chechnya clearly demonstrates that training failures in the any of these areas can have appalling results in combat.

Operational and tactical levels commanders and staffs require frequent repetitive training to maintain proficiency. Joint and combined operations are complex in nature; adding in urban conditions increases the level of difficulty. Command structures must focus activities and ensure unity of command and effort. Ineffective staff planning significantly contributed to overall poor Russian performance during the 1994-1995 battle. Training exercises and CPXs improved these areas for the second campaign, but problems continued.

Another key lesson the Russians learned was: train as you will fight. Initially, Russian training did not emphasize the key tenet of fighting as combined arms team. This failure had disastrous results during the first war and improved during the second.

Training base and home station preparation are critical for combat operations. For both campaigns, Russia's professional military education institutions and training base were ineffective. They couldn't sustain basic combat proficiency, much less prepare soldiers, leaders, and units for urban warfare. Russian home station training was inadequate at best. Limited resources, sub-standard soldiers and NCOs, inexperienced officers all played a role in these failures. While Russian forces prevailed in each battle poor training caused countless casualties.

IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. URBAN OPERATIONS

Current worldwide deployments find U.S. forces operating in urban environments on a daily basis. Peacekeeping/SASO missions in Bosnia and Kosovo involve extensive activities in cities, towns, and villages. The good news is that many service-members and leaders are gaining experience at working in urban areas among diverse national and ethnic populations. Conversely, while this experience is helpful, it does not prepare them for combat in this unique environment.

As Somalia demonstrated, SASO can rapidly turn into combat. Carefully developed and trained joint and individual service doctrine is key to conducting urban warfare or facilitating a rapid transition from SASO to combat operations. The message is clear. If the nation is going to continue to place the U.S. military in urban environments it must accept the likelihood that it will fight in cities. Arguably, short duration fighting may be the norm rather than a protracted Grozny-like experience. Regardless, units involved need the urban combat skills to survive and win; even the small fights. Once this likelihood is accepted the armed forces must go seriously about the business of exercising urban doctrine and training to develop the necessary combat skills. Using the excuse that it is too difficult to overcome the challenges, to find fiscal and material resources, and too inconvenient to conduct urban training will cost American lives.

Operations like those conducted in Grozny and Chechnya may provide U.S. political and military leaders a glimpse of the future of warfare in the 21st Century. To avoid many of the pitfalls the Russians experienced, careful consideration is required before committing U.S. forces to urban operations or peacekeeping/SASO.

Governmental and military leaders must set clear, realistic, and obtainable strategic goals for all deployments. Articulation of the strategic level desired end-state, how the political-military control of an urban area contributes to that end-state, and solid policy guidance is critical. An honest assessment of whether the desired end-state is obtainable remains key, balanced with an understanding of what actions are to be taken if, during the conduct of operations, it becomes apparent that the end-state cannot be achieved. Experiences in Vietnam and Somalia provide excellent examples of the necessity for a cohesive policy.

In conjunction with an unambiguous policy, the U.S. must critically assess the decision to commit military forces. Increasing global instability and the rise of nationalism present many opportunities for engagement. As the world's current superpower, many geopolitical, economic, and humanitarian issues will compel the nation's leaders to consider assistance. However, as the Russians found, military involvement is one of many political tools and should remain the last resort. Neighbors, other governmental, international, non-governmental, and private voluntary organizations are well suited to provide a host of political and economic support. In short, political and military leaders must carefully balance the real or perceived responsibilities that the titles "sole superpower" or "world leader" may entail. Political leaders must honestly assess the resources available and the potential costs associated with urban operations. The nation will have to make some very difficult decisions.

If U.S. forces are committed to urban combat every effort should be made to obtain public support. Political and military leaders must provide an honest and understandable rationale for

urban operations. More importantly, they will have to have the moral courage to admit urban combat operations may entail heavy casualties and stay the course once operations are begun. One can only speculate as to the remaining strength and resolve of the Aidid Clan after the October battle in Mogadishu. The abrupt cessation of U.S. tactical operations after the battle was clearly seen as an Aidid victory. Did a U.S. lack of resolve to continue operations rescue defeat from victory?

Future enemies will employ asymmetrical means like hiding in plain sight among a city's urban population to counter U.S. technological overmatch, cause high civilian and military casualties, erode public support, and break the American will to fight.¹⁵⁶ The threat perceives that the American public will not tolerate a prolonged conflict. In a 1997 *Parameters* article, LTC Ralph Peters proposed several tenets for future urban operations. Four of them, tell the American public that there will be friendly and enemy casualties upfront, develop rules of engagement (ROE) that support U.S. forces rather than the enemy, do the job fast, and take the combat power you'll need are key to public support.¹⁵⁷ A clearly defined ROE that empowers military members, rather than turning them into hesitant semi- policemen, will reduce casualties and build confidence.

Increasingly sophisticated command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) technologies enhance situational awareness. Conversely, political and senior military leaders must resist the temptation to micromanage operations; if not, operational and tactical leaders may perceive a lack of trust. As the Russians learned during the first Chechen campaign, second-guessing subordinate actions only creates frustration.

Finally, when a decision to conduct urban operations is made, national leaders must allow forces to deploy with all assets required to apply its doctrine. Both Army and Marine Corps current doctrine prescribes utilizing combined arms (infantry, armor, field artillery, engineers, aviation, etc.) assets to conduct urban operations.¹⁵⁸ Criticisms may arise from political leaders, regional members, and media about escalating tensions and sending threatening signals by employing these assets. Service-members are trained to employ combined arms doctrine and safely operate their assigned systems. Committing forces into a potentially hostile urban environment without their normal assets hinders force protection and the conduct of operations. One can only speculate how the fight in Mogadishu, Somalia would have turned out if the units there had been equipped with armored vehicles as called for by doctrine. Senior military advisors must ensure that political leaders understand why, regardless of the potentially damaging message, committed forces need to deploy with doctrinally stipulated equipment.

ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT U.S. DOCTRINAL READINESS

THE DEVELOPMENT OF URBAN DOCTRINE

At the joint level, the development of urban operational doctrine began in the mid-1990s. Prior to that, military doctrine for urban operations was primarily individual service focused. The main thrust of Army doctrine remained fixated on defeating the Soviet threat in a war of maneuver on the German plains not urban warfare. For example, in 1979 the Army got around to updating its manual for how to fight in cities, replacing a manual written in 1949. Some units, such as the Berlin Brigade, were well trained for these difficult operations (primarily urban defense because they lived and trained in an urban setting.) Most U.S. military leaders only discussed urban operations during military schooling. While the military talked a good game, the overarching mentality was to stay out of cities.

The '80s slowly began to awaken the military to the need for joint urban doctrine. Operations in Beirut, Grenada, and Panama, as well as numerous noncombatant evacuation missions, began to take on an urban flavor. The '90s found joint forces deployed in urban terrain in Kuwait City, Mogadishu, Port-au-Prince, Bosnia, and Kosovo. The line between military and police operations are becoming blurred. Growing urbanization increases the potential for joint urban operations during the next century.

JOINT DOCTRINE

In 1994, the Defense Science Board issued a report, "Military Operations in Built-Up Areas." It found that urban areas are the most resource intensive and complex terrain in which the military would fight and believed them the most likely battlefield of the 21st century.¹⁵⁹ This report served as a catalyst for the joint community to address urban doctrine. A DOD Urban Joint Working Group to develop doctrine was formed. Organizations such as the Military Operations in Urban Terrain Advance Concept Technology Demonstration (MOUT ACTD) began looking at technologies to enable U.S. forces to dominate the urban environment, develop TTPs for the use of this technology, provide interim capabilities, and enhance the rapid acquisition of MOUT technologies.¹⁶⁰ The MOUT ACTD has provided a wealth of tactical innovations, such as cutting tape to breach walls, which enhance Army and Marine capabilities.

The Joint Urban Working Group, established in 1998, was given the role of identifying doctrine, training, intelligence, and other critical mission requirements as well as assessing current capabilities and recommending actions to correct shortfalls in any of these areas.¹⁶¹ Since its inception, it has published the Handbook for Joint Urban Operations, 17 May 2000, and has completed the second draft of Joint Publications (JP) 3-06, Doctrine for Joint Urban

Operations 30 October 2000 (target publication date Fall 2001). Both publications specifically provide operational level joint staffs with guidance for conducting joint and combined military operations expressly targeted at a wide range of circumstances and missions that forces may encounter in an urban environment.

The recognition of the need for, and introduction of, specific urban doctrine is a major step forward. The joint services are well trained and experienced at rapidly forming, deploying, employing, and sustaining military forces globally. Contingency operations and training exercises keep the force proficient at power projection and associated deployment skills. Urban specific doctrine ensures joint forces have the framework to conduct effective operations in this complex environment.

INDIVIDUAL SERVICE DOCTRINE

The Army and Marine Corps have worked diligently to update their own tactical level doctrine. Acknowledging the requirement for improved urban tactical doctrine, the Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) formed the Combined Arms MOUT Task Force (CAMTF) in 1998. This organization, comprised of representatives from each individual branch, was chartered to develop tactical doctrine, training requirements, and resources necessary for conducting a broad spectrum of missions ranging from SASO to varied levels of combat in urban areas.

The CAMTF is the primary proponent for drafting Field Manual (FM) 3-06, Urban Operations the replacement for current urban tactical doctrine found in FM 90-10 (August 1979) and FM 90-10-1 (May 1993). A major step forward, FM 3-06 lays out the full spectrum of operations Army units, working as part of a joint force, may perform; such as, domestic support, humanitarian assistance, combating terrorism and drug trafficking, noncombatant evacuation operations, as well as offensive and defensive combat operations. It lays out a general operational concept comprised of four components: assess, shape, dominate, and transition.¹⁶² This concept encourages leaders to continuously assess operations, set the conditions to support the mission through shaping activities such as information operations, dominate the situation once operations are begun with decisive action conducted both simultaneously and sequentially, and then transition to other levels of military operations or to civilian or governmental agencies. Inherently flexible, FM 3-06 provides solid guidance for a wide range of missions performed in the urban environment. It offers a marked contrast to the combat tactical doctrine used by the Russians during operations in Chechnya offering other methods and techniques besides brute force and massed firepower.

The Marine Corps updated its tactical urban operations doctrine in 1998 with Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP 3-35.3), Military Operations on Urban Terrain (MOUT). Its primary focus is war-fighting tactics and TTPs for combat in the urban environment. However, one should not construe this doctrine to be the same as the Russians. The Marine Corps clearly understands the full spectrum of potential missions Marines may be called upon to perform in future urban operations. Former Marine Corps Commandant, General (Ret) Krulak, provided his vision of urban operations in his Three Block War analogy. In it he describes an urban environment that has military forces conducting domestic support operations on one block, keeping warring factions apart and conducting civilian law enforcement assistance on another, and conducting combat operations in the next.¹⁶³ During an April 1999 MOUT conference, the Assistant Commandant, General Dake, offered that commanders must approach cities as a living entity more than a battlefield and warned that the military could not afford to destroy cities to save them.¹⁶⁴

DOCTRINAL CONSIDERATIONS

While urban doctrine is being both developed and revised, a careful consideration of urban combat conditions is critical. For SASO and limited combat missions, U.S. use of Russian Grozny style tactics will, in most situations, be unacceptable. The TTP of using a grenade to clear a room before entering, or indiscriminately firing into a room after entering, may not be feasible in many future urban battles. Threat predictions project the enemy to hide among the city's populace using innocent bystanders as human shields to negate U.S. technology and firepower. The development of TTPs incorporating both non-lethal and lethal methods to subdue the enemy without causing unnecessary civilian casualties is key.

Techniques for using devices such as stun grenades, flash bang devices, directed energy weapons, Tasers, incapacitating gasses and foams must be refined and given to the force. The United States Special Operations Command (USSOC) has already developed many of these procedures. The MOUT ACTD and other agencies are working to develop new technologies. The next step is to train the conventional force on how to employ them.

As with any training there are associated costs. Conventional units must have the most current urban weapons and equipment with which to train. Time and resources are required to conduct training and sustain proficiency. Urban specific skills instruction will compete with existing training such as gunnery and mounted maneuvers. Leaders will have to make tough choices as to what they can and cannot do.

Overall, the military has made great strides in laying the doctrinal groundwork for operational and tactical level urban operations. A February 2000 Government Accounting Office report confirmed this progress.¹⁶⁵ Conversely, it found that this doctrine was untested and recommended joint experimentation to evaluate doctrine, organization, and equipment to identify shortfalls in interoperability and capabilities.¹⁶⁶ Clearly joint experimentation is desirable, and challenging training exercises are even better. However, without a firm commitment on the military's part to develop and train the force in urban operations, having realistic doctrine and TTPs will accomplish little. As the Russians found during their 1994-1996 operations in Chechnya, having solid doctrine means nothing if your forces are not trained and proficient in its use.

ASSEMENT OF CURRENT U.S. URBAN TRAINING READINESS

On the whole, the U.S. military possesses the most finely trained and equipped service members and units in the world. Made up of a quality all volunteer force and possessing a professional non-commissioned officer corps without equal, it conducts more training and deployments than any other nation's military. America's varied geopolitical objectives and interests, as well as substantial investments in material and fiscal resources provide the military with experience and unmatched training opportunities. The broad spectrum of national interests, however, increases the likelihood of military commitments abroad. These deployments raise personnel tempo and may take training resource funds to pay for unexpected contingencies. While these missions provide training, is it the type of training that prepares service members for their primary mission of fighting and winning the nation's wars? The recent example of the U.S. Army Third Infantry Division's combat readiness rating being lowered because brigade-sized elements, involved in SASO missions, were unavailable to practice war-fighting skills implies that individual soldiers and units are not fully prepared to perform their primary missions, much less demanding urban combat.¹⁶⁷

As the U.S. military marches into the 21st century, its globally deployed forces are operating in urban terrain on a daily basis. Many of these units conduct peacekeeping/SASO missions in potential flashpoint areas. The question becomes, are these forces ready to fight a "come as you are war" in an urban environment? The answer is probably not. A February 2000 report by the GAO suggests that the military must focus considerable attention at the joint operational, tactical, and individual levels of training to prepare for the challenges of urban combat.¹⁶⁸

JOINT OPERATIONAL AND SERVICE CHIEF LEVEL URBAN TRAINING

U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) is charged with training joint/operational level units within the continental United States. On any given day it oversees a multitude of joint unit deployments and training exercises. The joint and operational level staffs it controls are well trained and experienced at conducting most conventional operations. However, as the GAO report points out, no significant joint urban exercises have been conducted within the last five years and none were at that time planned.¹⁶⁹

This is not to say that exercises and simulations have not included urban conditions--they have. War games and simulations like Millennium Challenge 2000 and the upcoming Millennium Challenge 2002 have urban components, but they are primarily oriented to improving joint interoperability.¹⁷⁰ Other exercises like the Joint Contingency Force Advance War Fighting Experiment held in September 2000 have limited urban aspects. Aimed at exercising Army, Marine, and Air Force joint and technological interoperability, a subset of this exercise featured small unit urban operations. These primarily focused on the performance of an experimental rifle platoon equipped with the digital Land Warrior System fighting in an urban environment.¹⁷¹

While the joint community acknowledges the likelihood of urban operations and has taken positive steps forward by creating doctrine to support them, urban combat remains one of many competing joint challenges. Specific joint and operational level training for urban operations is almost nonexistent. As General (Ret) Krulak observed in a recent article, the joint military must go beyond talking.¹⁷² While joint forces can get to the urban fight, operational level commanders and staffs will be hard pressed to employ them to maximum benefit in municipal areas. The military's abilities to conduct joint urban warfare remain suspect because of the lack of focused training and training opportunities.

Individual services are also working to improve training for urban operations. The Army conducts several Army After Next (AAN) war games and simulations yearly. In the Spring 1998 AAN Exercise, participants were challenged when the opposing forces seized urban areas.¹⁷³ While the enemy was finally defeated, U.S. forces sustained significant casualties. Organizations like the MOUT ACTD are developing experimental technology and TTPs for testing during training.¹⁷⁴ Soldiers train at battalion and lower levels for urban operations during normal rotations to training centers. However, these exercises are small scale, emphasizing squad-battalion level operations with limited combined arms interaction, in training areas that poorly represent today's modern urban sprawl.

The Marine Corps has aggressively attacked urban operation challenges. Creating the Marine Corps War Fighting Labs Urban Warrior Experiments and Project Metropolis, they seek to gain firsthand experience in urban areas and apply concepts and technology developed by organizations like the MOUT ACTD. The Urban Warrior Exercises employed Marines in cities such as Oakland and Monterey, California, Chicago, and Jacksonville to grapple with the complexity of conducting operations in urban terrain among local inhabitants.¹⁷⁵ These urban exercises focused at battalion-sized Marine Air-Ground Task Force level. Project Metropolis continues to explore lessons learned from Urban Warrior and lays out subsequent experimentation and future urban operation exercises.¹⁷⁶

For both the Army and Marine Corps the frequency of urban training exercises and experiments may not be realistically adequate to maintain the high-level of proficiency required for conducting urban combat, or for developing higher tactical level brigade, divisional, or Marine Expeditionary Force commanders and staffs. Normally In both services, once units return from a CTC rotation or deployment, they experience substantial personnel turnover, thereby losing unit and individual proficiency at urban skills.

Perhaps the best-prepared force to deal with precision urban operations is the USSOC. Controlling their own resources, USSOC devotes substantial time and resources to preparing for precision missions in urban settings based on their requirements to meet future threats. Experienced and well-trained soldiers and leaders utilize specific TTPs and high technology to accomplish these missions. However, given USSOC size and other mission requirements, these forces are unsuited for protracted and sustained combat operations in urban areas.

As previously noted, many urban warfare activities are lumped under the umbrella of joint experimentation and training. Currently, there is not a cohesive strategy to focus joint training and layout a series of large-scale urban exercises and experiments to improve joint and operational level training.¹⁷⁷ As the Russians learned during their experiences in Grozny, trained operational level commanders and staffs are key to the effective integration and employment of joint and combined forces during the conduct of urban operations. At present, U.S. military skill remains unproven.

TACTICAL/INDIVIDUAL URBAN TRAINING

Light, airborne, and air assault infantry units conduct most urban training. Operations in constrictive terrain are one of their primary missions. As noted in the preceding section, most urban training is focused at the battalion and lower tactical levels. In some respects, this is understandable. Lessons from previous urban combat emphasizes the importance of squad

and platoon sized organizations. Competing mission priorities and limited home station urban training resources make larger scale training difficult at best.¹⁷⁸ The same is true for battalion, brigade, and divisional commanders and staffs.

From the Army perspective, deployments to Combat Training Centers (CTCs), such as the Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC) in Germany or the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) at Fort Polk, provide battalions and brigades an opportunity to plan and supervise limited combined arms urban operations every 12 to 18 months. Units may conduct some limited training prior to their CTC rotations, but being able to assemble all elements of the combined arms team to participate is challenging. Other urban training comes from experience garnered during actual deployments.

Divisions, primarily light, may conduct urban focused CPXs during divisional Warfighter Exercises. Concentrating on training divisional commanders and their staffs, Warfighters are normally conducted twice during a commander's normal 24-month assignment. Other divisional urban experience is gained when it deploys a forward headquarters and supporting elements to control the operations of organic units conducting peacekeeping/SASO operations in built up areas.

The Marine Corps approaches urban combat training from a similar approach. When a Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), normally a battalion sized combined arms task force, is preparing for a deployment it conducts urban training based on an assessment of the likelihood of performing these missions. Specific small units within the MEU are certified as Special Operations Capable, and conduct extensive precision oriented urban training prior to the deployment. In addition some Marine units participate in rotations to the JRTC and other urban experiments such as the Urban Warrior Exercises.

At lower tactical levels, company through squad, most light infantry units are unable to conduct effective combined arms training at their home stations. Often supporting arms, such as armor, are not organic to light units. Fighting as a combined arms team is an integral tenet of Army and Marine Corps doctrine. In both training and combat the combined arms team provides the basic organization for operations. Size of existing U.S. urban training sites, however, limits the employment of combined arms assets. Infantry is not well skilled at directing individual armored systems in urban terrain, the armor community objects to operating as individual vehicles, and artillery is normally not experienced at conducting direct fires. Most units have little with employing combined arms teams in a complex urban terrain with its associated inhabitants.

Many installations do not have adequate urban training sites. Most sites are small and fail to replicate the size and varied conditions found in the complex urban sprawl of today's cities. Instrumented training facilities that will effectively support mechanized combined arms maneuvers are limited to the CMTC and JRTC and select TRADOC training installations like Fort Benning and Fort Knox. The Marine Corps has the Camp Lejuene MOUT Facility (un-instrumented) and the Urban Close Air Support Bombing Range near the Marine Corps Air Station at Yuma, AZ. The premier Army mounted maneuver warfare training facility, the National Training Center, does not have an urban operations training facility. As a result, soldiers, Marines, and their leaders do the best they can with what they have. The frequency with which they conduct this training is dictated by their commander's assessment of the need for urban skills and how this need relates in importance to other competing mission requirements.

In mechanized and armored units, urban operations often have a low priority. Maneuver warfare skills, gunnery, and maintenance are day-to-day requirements leaving little time for urban training that some leaders may consider unlikely. Normally, company team sized mechanized or armed units deploy with light forces to JRTC rotations. Most heavy forces lag behind light units in urban training.

While ongoing peacekeeping/SASO deployments expose soldiers and leaders to urban conditions, mission requirements often find service members performing duties outside their particular skills. Instead of developing or practicing their normal urban war fighting tasks, tankers and artillerymen may conduct dismounted patrolling. These missions rarely facilitate the refinement of combat TTPs required to fight in cities and towns. Control of tank or Bradley direct fire, employment of artillery and supporting aviation, and use of both lethal and non-lethal weapons to defeat the enemy without causing unacceptable civilian casualties and collateral damage are seldom practiced. Planning skills required to reduce and clear large urban areas and to handle associated displaced noncombatants are seldom put to the test outside of pre-deployment Mission Rehearsal Exercises (MRE) or CTC rotations. Most pre-deployment training received during MRE focuses on peacekeeping, not urban war fighting.

Individual urban skills' training normally occurs as part of collective small unit exercises. Most small unit and individual urban TTPs and skills are not commonly practiced unless preparing for specific missions or training exercises. For example, during the 1999 Oakland, California Urban Warrior Exercise, one Marine observer commented that many Marines were simply trained incorrectly for city fighting and junior leaders needed intensive training in the basics.¹⁷⁹ Many conventional forces do not have the latest urban TTPs or equipment. Limited

resources and training time degrades their ability to practice war fighting urban TTPs. The decentralized nature of peacekeeping/SASO missions may instill self-reliance and confidence in leaders and service members, but one former divisional commander felt peacekeeping forces "lose their edge" in war fighting skills.¹⁸⁰ Proficiency at peacekeeping/SASO TTPs does not necessarily equate to urban combat proficiency.

Individual and unit proficiency results from intensive and repetitive training. Unfortunately, most units have more mission responsibilities than they can effectively train for. Given current worldwide deployments and contingency missions, how can units manage to train for every condition? As a default, many focus their limited time and resources on missions with which they are comfortable and not on demanding urban operations.

While the majority of individual service members are proficient at basic combat skills, these skills are not necessarily the appropriate skills for urban combat. Should U.S. forces find themselves in an urban flashpoint that ignites (i.e. Korea, Kosovo, Bosnia), their ability to fight and win without incurring significant casualties or creating substantial collateral damage is questionable.

Overall, the joint community and the individual services' conventional forces are marginally trained to meet the challenges of urban combat. If the military believes that these operations are indeed likely, it must aggressively begin to focus training efforts in this area. If not, now is the time to change these perceptions and advise the nations political leaders that large-scale protracted urban combat is not an option. The specter of Grozny should remind leaders of the cost of deploying unprepared forces into urban combat. The U.S. military can ill-afford a similar mistake.

RECOMMENDATIONS AND ONGOING URBAN TRAINING IMPROVEMENTS

The military is making limited progress in preparedness for urban operations. Future threat assessments predict combat in cities is likely. Accepting these assessments as valid, the military must push joint and individual service urban doctrine and training to the forefront of its many competing priorities.

URBAN COMBAT OPERATIONS-A NATIONAL STRATEGIC COMMITMENT

First and foremost, the nation's political leaders and military must closely work together to develop a realistic national and military strategy to deal with urban combat. Other elements of national power warrant careful consideration before using a military option. Complex urban terrain, its associated population, and the potential for casualties are conditions the nations leadership must be willing to accept prior to the commitment of force into these environs.

Workable ROE policy that empowers rather than constrains military action will be key. Public support and a resolve to see operations through are critical, even in the face of casualties, unfavorable media attention, and global criticism. Once the decision is made to commit military forces to urban combat, U.S. leaders must possess the resolve to see it through.

Next the military must decide whether it fully accepts that it will fight in cities. Current efforts provide the impression that the Armed Forces are busily working towards this end. However, as the GAO reported, the joint community lacks a cohesive strategy and strong leadership commitment to focus joint and service capabilities into a coordinated and comprehensive approach to urban warfare.¹⁸¹ Leadership is the key. The Armed Forces must begin a process to inculcate urban operations into its service members and leaders. As an institution, the military must change its mentality and accept that forces will be involved in urban combat operations in the near future. The Army in particular should take a strong and objective look as to how it approaches preparation for urban operations. While interviewing CAMTF members, one individual related the TRADOC Commander's comments concerning urban operations. The TRADOC Commander indicated that it was imperative to change the Army's aversion towards urban operations, because they represent the future.¹⁸² Since the late 1970s, the Army has focused on maneuver warfare. Its primary combat systems, doctrine, and training all focused on defeating a Soviet enemy on German Plains. Generations of officers were inculcated with maneuver warfare as the approved method for decisive operations. The concept of fixing and bypassing urban areas was ingrained in their psyches. Getting them to accept that U.S. military forces will deliberately enter and fight in urban areas will take an effort as revolutionary as the introduction of the AirLand Battle doctrine in the early 1980s. Leaders across the board have to be convinced that U.S. forces can fight and win in cities even with all the complexities and associated constraints. The Marines appear to be well on their way to doing this. The Army may need a stronger push. Asymmetry is the future threat's equalizer. Hiding or conducting operations in densely populated urban areas is projected to be the norm. It becomes clear that the military must break away from the existing paradigm of avoiding urban terrain.

BLUEPRINT FOR SUCCESS-DOCTRINE, RESOURCES, AND TRAINING

Joint and individual service doctrine must be completed, validated through simulation and exercises, and published. While the joint staff and individual services are working diligently to accomplish this task, joint experimentation on concepts and TTPs they contain, will assist in validation and refinement. Conducting this process prior to publication will facilitate rapid

implementation by the joint and individual service communities and minimize the necessity for subsequent changes. Incorporation of TTPs that provide both lethal and non-lethal methods for urban combat is critical. These TTPs provide a wide range of options that can be tailored to meet urban mission specific requirements

Once the doctrine is completed, the joint staff needs to develop, schedule, and execute a series of yearly operational/Joint Task Force level simulation and training exercises focused primarily on command, control, and execution of joint operations in an urban environment. All services must participate to refine joint employment procedures to be fully effective.

Next, joint and individual service professional education institutions must aggressively incorporate urban warfare into all facets of their training. To accomplish this mission, the training base must be adequately resourced. For example, the Army's TRADOC, which supervises the Army's training institutions and doctrinal development, has reported major shortfalls in its ability to conduct its mission.¹⁸³ Across the board, professional military education institutions must strive to prepare NCOs, officers, commanders, and staffs to conduct urban operations. The current method of training requires focused attention. An urban operations task analysis review was conducted by the CAMTF of programs of instruction at United States Army Infantry Center (USAIC). This review found that basic course officers received 37 hours of urban instruction, career course officers 30 hours, and an average of 4.5 hours (being increased to an average of 12.5 hours) for Advanced Non-Commissioned Officer Course (ANOC) attendees.¹⁸⁴ By comparison, the Army's Command and General Staff College offers approximately 36 total hours of instruction in urban operations spread across its Advanced Application Program (electives) that reaches an estimated 350 to 400 students who choose to take these electives.¹⁸⁵ While the USAIC hours touch every company grade officer and ANOC attendee, the Army's youngest field grade officers only receive urban operations training if they choose to take an elective. The last time many of these officers reviewed urban doctrine in a professional education setting was in their captain-level career course. Establishing urban operations training as an elective course of study clearly demonstrates a lack of urban operations emphasis at the training base level. The Army must set priorities for teaching urban operations in its training base and institutions.

Along with training base indoctrination, unit leaders must embrace preparing for urban operations at home station. Leaders must have access to adequate resources and training facilities to effectively train their forces. A blueprint for this has already been developed by the CAMTF. A resource requirements plan to build varying levels of urban operations training facilities at home station and CTCs has been funded and approved.¹⁸⁶ Approximately \$248

million has been allocated to improve urban operations facilities at home station¹⁸⁷ with more funding projected in the next year. The National Training Center will have a state of the art facility by 2007.

In the interim, Individual services must conduct brigade, divisional, and corps level urban simulation and training exercises to train key commanders and their staffs. Physical resources are limited making these types of exercises difficult to plan and execute. Several options warrant consideration. One option may be a Department of Defense level plan to develop a fully resourced, observer controller staffed, and instrumented Joint National Urban Training Center. Another alternative may be to lease vacant urban sprawl near military facilities. Many cities and towns have areas where economic conditions or age have left large sections unoccupied. Use of these areas may reduce construction costs and provide support to local economies.

Home station training provides the final element to prepare for urban combat. Commanders and leaders must nurture urban warfare skills by conducting activities such as officer and NCO professional development sessions, tactical exercises without troops. Once facilities are built, they must utilize these assets to conduct of offensive and defensive training. Priority must be given to adding combined arms urban operations to unit mission essential task lists (METL). Leaders will need to exercise sound judgment to balance the amount of urban operations training with other tasks based on their assessment of the likelihood of participating in urban missions.

OLD APPROACHES TO URBAN MISSIONS-THINKING OUTSIDE OF THE BOX

Several other alternate solutions may warrant consideration. As the Army shrinks in size, consideration should be given to more efficiently distributing unit core competencies. In the past, all units were expected to be able to perform any task. Careful consideration should be given to the possibility of designating selected units as urban warfare forces. One option is to designate a division to become the primary urban operations unit. Another option may be to permanently assign a brigade out of each division as the urban force. A Division Ready Force style schedule for these brigades would facilitate a constant ready force, units in training, and support elements.

Another solution is the reorganization of some units into infantry, armor, field artillery, engineers, and other elements into combined arms maneuver companies and battalions (CAMB) to fully integrate the "train as you will fight concept". These CAMB units, perhaps one per brigade, would focus on urban operations. Similar to cavalry troop organizations, these

forces would live and work together under a single chain of command. Nay Sayers might point to unit commanders being unable to effectively train so many disparate skills. However, if the military expects these units to fight in concert in combat, why not train them together now? The daily exposure of leaders to the capabilities of these combined arms assets will produce well-rounded leaders for the future.

The National Guard Enhanced Brigades (eBDEs) may provide an additional alternative. Re-designating several eBDEs as urban operations units may focus their efforts into areas in which many of their unit members have experience in from their normal civilian employment. While clearly not first to deploy forces, these elements could provide follow on forces for protracted urban operations.

Finally, technology, while very expensive, may provide another method to improve urban training. Virtual training simulations can enhance individual and small unit urban training. Trade-offs between resourcing hands-on training or conducting simulations are made on a daily basis. The same is true of developing high-tech systems to improve urban capabilities. The urban environment provides many challenges to high-tech sensors, robotics, and precision-guided weapons. The cost of some high-tech systems however, makes repetitive hands-on training cost prohibitive. As improved technology provides greater capabilities, its cost cannot be allowed to reduce the number of training opportunities needed to master new technological capabilities.

Success in urban warfare requires a multifaceted approach. Without a comprehensive strategy U.S. forces may be bound to the same fate as the Russians during the 1994-1995 Chechen conflict. Russian forces suffered an estimated 5,600 killed, 51,500 wounded or other illness or injury casualties,¹⁸⁸ and destroyed Grozny. Three years later the Russians found themselves conducting another urban operation in the same place resulting in an estimated 4,350 killed and 12,500 wounded with an insurgent war still ongoing. Can America afford a similar experience?

CONCLUSIONS

The U.S. military will do well to study the Russian experiences in Grozny and Chechnya. Urban operations may be the most complex a military can face. The Russians learned the hard way about the enormous cost of being unprepared.

In the first Chechen campaign the Russian military found itself transforming from a Cold War era organization, developing new military doctrine, and conducting minimal training. The Russian Army was untrained and unprepared for a come as you are war, much less urban

combat. Poor quality conscripted soldiers, a weak NCO Corps, and inexperienced junior officers, staffs, and commanders compounded a bad situation. Russian political leadership set unrealistic goals and Parliament and public support was nominal. The Armed Forces, knowing they were unready, struggled to select doctrine and tactics to accomplish the task at hand. A moral leadership failure by the highest-ranking military officer to portray an accurate assessment of military readiness provided the coup de grace. Russian soldiers found themselves in a two-month struggle fighting for their very lives. In the process they captured Grozny only to destroy it and a large segment of its population. In December of 1996 the Russian forces withdrew from Chechnya in defeat.

During the 1999-2000 battles in Chechnya, the military was better prepared, at the operational level, while remaining about the same at the individual soldier and junior leadership levels. National strategy and objectives were clearer. The military understood what was expected of it and selected sound doctrine to accomplish the mission. Armed Forces leadership set the pace of the campaign; political leaders let them do their jobs. The doctrine used by the Russians was tactically sound. They employed thorough reconnaissance and worked as a combined arms team to retake Grozny. Massive firepower compensated for weak infantry skill. Once again the Russians destroyed what little was left of Grozny to save it.

The U.S. military is clearly better prepared for general combat operations than the Russian Armed Forces were during the Chechen campaigns. When it comes to urban combat, however, U.S. readiness is questionable at best. Culturally, the military abhors the prospect of urban warfare. Urban training resources are scarce, ongoing worldwide mission deployments sap realistic combat training, and opportunities to conduct effective urban combat training are limited. Threat assessment projections show this situation as unsatisfactory.

Much of the military is in a state of substantial transition. In some limited aspects, this transition is similar to those of the Russian Armed Forces after the end of the Cold War. The services are working to divest themselves of Cold War doctrine and organizations. Transformation and modernization issues consume significant time and focus by national and senior military leadership. Training and educational bases are undermanned, poorly funded, and challenged to incorporate new or increased instruction on urban operations. Units and their leadership have more missions than they can handle. Deployments, peacekeeping/SASO training, gunnery, maintenance, new equipment training; the list of training requirements is endless. Competing priorities coupled with the lack of home station urban training facilities, often result in urban combat preparation being placed at the bottom of the priority list.

The U.S. Armed Forces are at a crossroad in determining how they will prepare for urban operations. Several options are available. First the military can conduct serious joint and individual service reorganization and training to prepare conventional forces for urban combat. The cost in resources and time will be significant. Other training will have to move lower on the priority list. If training is sacrificed, the potential for casualties and collateral damage may increase. The payoff is having well trained and equipped service members who can fight and survive in an urban environment. A second available option for the military is to adopt methods similar to those proposed by Mr. Press and Major General Scales. It can decide to do only limited precision urban operations, attempt to preempt urban threats before they happen, or isolate cities and conduct a siege until they collapse upon themselves. This group of options may limit U.S. casualties and collateral damage and reduce the fiscal resources and time requirements for urban training. A third option may be to relegate urban operations to the USSOC, deciding up front that our nation will only undertake limited duration precision urban operations. The only unacceptable option is for the military to do nothing and continue with a disingenuous recognition of the need to seriously prepare for urban combat.

The future enemy may seek to take advantage of limited U.S. urban skill and bank on its belief that America is risk adverse and will not tolerate casualties. The urban environment provides the threat with numerous opportunities to counter U.S. strengths, cause casualties, and prolong the fight. Normally, American forces will not have the luxury of using massive firepower to compensate for inadequate urban combat proficiency, unlike the Russian experience in Grozny. Will the military be prepared to handle this demanding task? Current indications create serious doubt about the preparedness of the military to face this challenging facet of the warfare spectrum.

Throughout history, America has fared poorly in most first battles. Kasserine Pass, Task Force Smith, and the Ia Drang Valley should be constant reminders to the cost of being unprepared. Might the first urban battle of the 21st Century be added to this list? The threat is watching and waiting. The U.S. military must decide to begin to seriously train for urban operations, or advise the national leadership that its ability to conduct them is limited and the cost of protracted operations can be high. America's sons and daughters will pay a terrible price if the military fails to act now to be ready, one way or the other, for the urban warfare situations that will surely come.

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