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**EXPLOITING PEACE OPERATIONS TO REDUCE RISK IN THE
SECOND MAJOR THEATER WAR**

BY

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by

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ABSTRACT

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Current National Security Strategy commits the US military to fighting two nearly simultaneous Major Theater Wars (MTW) and concurrent small scale contingencies. This strategy causes the second MTW to be one of high risk. This high risk can be mitigated by primarily engaging in peace operations specifically linked to an MTW region to delay, diffuse, or eliminate potential conflict. This will require a more circumspect approach on what peace operations the US commits to and will necessitate a strategy of placing greater US reliance on allies to burden share peace operations in regions where the US cannot commit assets that may be needed to fight two MTWs.

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EXPLOITING PEACE OPERATIONS TO REDUCE RISK IN THE SECOND MAJOR THEATER WAR

"The supreme excellence in war is to attack the enemies plans...next best is to disrupt his alliances...the next best is to attack his army."

— Tu Mu

Currently the US military is organized and committed by policy to fight two nearly simultaneous Major Theater Wars (MTWs) in addition to an unspecified number of Small Scale Contingencies (SSCs) around the world in pursuit of US national security.¹ When comparing this mission to available US forces, there is a possibility of a shortfall in combat and logistical support forces to accomplish these tasks, resulting in increased risks of successful mission accomplishment.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Henry Shelton, reported to congress last year that given the current world situation and state of the US armed forces, the risk of fighting the first MTW was moderate but, "lower readiness levels of later-deploying forces combined with capability shortfalls in our lift and other critical force enablers result in high risk for the second MTW." He went on to say that the rapid withdrawal from a commitment like Bosnia or Kosovo to support a major theater war would require a quick decision by the National Command Authorities (NCA) to allow time for units to withdraw, retrain, redeploy and be used effectively. He emphasized this could result in the late arrival of some forces for MTW employment.² General Shelton added that peacetime military engagement did not supplant the core requirement to have a military capable of deterring and, if necessary, defeating nearly simultaneous large-scale, cross-border aggression in more than one theater, in overlapping time frames. The defense of America's lives, territories, and interests is, and must remain, a cornerstone mission of the Armed Forces.³ Finally, General Shelton concluded that US forces would prevail in both contingencies, but that longer timelines would increase the potential for higher casualties. There is an opportunity for the US to mitigate the risk level of this second MTW from its current high level to a more moderate level of risk by leveraging highly selective Peace Operations (PO) — focused on complementing, not competing with fighting the MTWs. Complementary Peace Operations have a defined end state and a finite method for achieving disengagement that supports that end state by incorporating multi-lateral military efforts and close cooperation with international civilian authorities and relief agencies.

Current Policy for Fighting Major Theater Wars

The current policy on major theater warfare is articulated in the 1999 US National Security Strategy (NSS) which states in part, the US, preferably in concert with its allies, must have the capability to deter and if deterrence fails, defeat large-scale, cross-border aggression in two distant theaters in overlapping time frames.⁴

This entails three challenging requirements. First, maintain the ability to rapidly defeat initial enemy advances short of the enemy's objectives in two theaters, in close succession. Second, the US must be prepared to fight and win under conditions where an adversary may use asymmetric means – unconventional approaches that avoid or undermine US strengths while exploiting its vulnerabilities. Third, the US military must be able to transition to fighting major theater wars from a posture of global engagement – from substantial levels of peacetime engagement overseas as well as multiple concurrent SSC operations.⁵

The 1997 Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) states that in the event of one MTW, the US would need to be extremely selective in making any additional commitments to either engagement activities or SSCs. The US would likely also choose to begin disengaging from those activities and operations not deemed to involve vital US interests in order to better posture forces to deter the outbreak of a second war.⁶

Why Does the US Get Involved in Peace Operations?

Participating in peace operations gives the US the opportunity to play a major role in shaping and influencing global events and to be a significant player in regions of interest. Additionally, getting in early to stabilize a region that is given a prognosis of widening into a serious conflict and becoming a major theater war if unchecked cannot be overemphasized. To remain a viable instrument in supporting national policy, the military must remain prepared to execute the full spectrum of peace operations. The military's presence as a force-in-being is in itself a stabilizing factor.

Across the full spectrum of peace operations there is a distinct difference between peacekeeping operations (PKO) and peace enforcement operations (PEO). PKO and PEO take place under different circumstances; characterized by three critical factors — consent, impartiality and use of force.⁷ Peacekeeping operations are characterized by consent of the parties involved in the conflict to cease hostilities and cooperate to maintain a stable and

peaceful environment. The requirement by a third party, such as the US, to separate the belligerents by use of military force and compel them to comply with whatever the requirement is, such as following a specific United Nations (UN) resolution to cease hostilities, is characteristic of peace enforcement operations.

When a combat unit conducts a peace enforcement mission, these same forces can transition to a peacekeeping mission once the region is stable. The situation may determine that these forces maintain the capability to return to immediate, high intensity conflict as required. Since that is their primary mission as combat units, this transition is not that difficult and illustrates the dual role required for a military unit to rapidly shift to a full combat posture if the need quickly arises to enforce the peace through military strength. Thus a combat unit possesses this unique capability to rapidly transition to both ends of the PO spectrum.

The QDR details the US policy on participation in SSC and peace operations. The United States will seek to prevent and contain localized conflicts and crises before they require a military response. If, however, such efforts do not succeed, swift intervention by military forces may be the best way to contain, resolve or mitigate the consequences of a conflict that could otherwise become far more costly and deadly. The QDR adds that US forces must also be able to withdraw from SSC operations, reconstitute and then deploy to a major theater war in accordance with required timelines. Although in some cases this may pose significant operational, diplomatic and political challenges, the ability to transition between peacetime operations and war fighting remains a fundamental requirement for virtually every unit in the US military.⁸

The US is not consistent in its engagement in peace operations and its direct relation to US national security. Occasionally the US will respond to a foreign crisis that appears to be humanitarian on its surface, but is in fact a peace enforcement mission in disguise that can be a tar pit to whomever intervenes, pulling the interloper inexorably deeper into it. During the Cold War, the US could resort to multi-lateral peace operations only in the few cases when the interests of the Soviet Union and the West did not conflict, such as in the Sinai. In the new strategic environment, characterized by improved US, European and Russian relations and shared interests, such operations can serve more often as a cost-effective tool to advance American as well as collective interests in maintaining peace in key regions and create global burden-sharing for peace.⁹ Peace operations focus on deterring war, resolving conflict, promoting peace and supporting civil authorities. The use of military forces in peacetime helps keep the day-to-day tensions between nations below the threshold of armed conflict or war and maintains US influence in foreign lands.¹⁰

In his posture statement before congress last year, General Shelton explained why the US continues with engagement activities such as peace operations.

“Peacetime military engagement (PME) can help ameliorate potential sources of conflict, promote more efficient operations among participating nations, and ensure access to key infrastructures. Through these means, PME assists in reducing response requirements while supporting the fundamental, overarching purpose of the US military – to fight and win our Nation’s wars.”¹¹

Current Policy for Conducting Peace Operations

“He who excels at resolving difficulties does so before they arise.
He who excels in conquering his enemies triumphs before threats
materialize.”

— Tu Mu

US military participation in peace operations supports the National Security Strategy, National Military Strategy (NMS) and US policy. The US approach is to provide effective policies and strategies that combine the four instruments of national power – diplomatic, economic, informational and military. With the careful orchestration of these instruments, in conjunction with other international resources, the peace process may be effective.¹² United States policy on Peace Operations is articulated in the 1999 National Security Strategy and in the three Presidential Decision Directives, PDD-25, PDD-56, and PDD-71.

The National Security Strategy

The NSS discusses three core objectives of engagement: to enhance America’s security, to bolster America’s economic prosperity and to promote democracy and human rights abroad.¹³ NSS also states that many US security objectives are best achieved – or can only be achieved – by leveraging US influence and capabilities through international organizations, alliances, or as the leader of an ad hoc coalition formed around a specific objective.¹⁴

Peace operations are one of the primary tools to enhance US security. Any overseas military or political crisis, humanitarian or natural disaster can have the potential effect of destabilizing a country or region. If left unchecked, these situations can spin out of control, consuming the area in a conflict that may threaten US vital national interests and in turn may require massive military intervention to regain stability. Even at the most benign end of the scale

peace operations may require at least the logistical support of humanitarian, non-combat operations. The military is well organized to deploy logistical and other support units and equipment to rapidly set up operations. Currently, the military continues as the best-suited force or organization to be a primary executor of these missions. It is self-contained in terms of personnel, equipment, global lift capability, communications, command and control and rapid deployment and can provide for its own security. At the other end of the peace operations spectrum, the military is also fully prepared to conduct peace enforcement. These same combat forces can prove very effective in stabilizing an area and preventing further widening of a conflict. Their flexibility and lethality ensures military domination if conditions dictate.

Presidential Decision Directive-25

Released in 1994, PDD-25 reforms multi-lateral peace operations. Elements of the policy include three rigorous standards of review for US support for or participation in peace operations including whether or not the US will vote for new UN operations, contribute US troops and commit these troops to missions that might involve combat.¹⁵

The policy also addresses the role of regional organizations in peace operations; steps to reduce US and UN costs for UN-sponsored peace operations; a clear definition of the command and control of American military forces in UN peace operations; initiatives to reform and improve the UN's capability to manage peace operations; and how to improve cooperation between the Executive and Legislative branches of the federal government and gain the support of the American public for peace operations.¹⁶

PDD-25, as the base peace operations document, states that peace operations are not and cannot be the centerpiece of US foreign policy. When interests dictate, the US must be willing and able to fight and win wars, unilaterally whenever necessary.¹⁷ This PDD also points out the necessity to be selective in what missions the US accepts to prevent overextension of forces rendering the US incapable of fighting two MTW's.

Presidential Decision Directive-56

Presidential Decision Directive 56 published in 1997, lays out the Clinton Administration's policy on managing complex contingency operations. PDD-56 advocates improved planning and coordination practices among US government agencies and

international organizations engaged in complex contingency operations. In particular, the directive emphasizes the need to create coordination mechanisms at the operational level.¹⁸

Recognizing that it is preferable to conduct peace operations as part of a multi-national effort, PDD-56 addresses the requirement for improved planning and coordination between the US and other nations. Multi-national operations share the burden in both manpower and cost, assist in legitimizing an operation by conducting it under an international cachet and provide assets and expertise the US may not possess. This document also recognizes the criticality of multi-national peace operations not only in terms of the military involvement from various countries, but the participation of civilian support agencies and the long term peace and stability they provide in follow-on nation building activities. The rapid stabilization of an area and the promise of future stability because of governmental and community rebuilding in the long term, is a goal the US military wants to achieve quickly in order to disengage forces from that duty to prepare for either an MTW or another regional conflict.

Presidential Decision Directive-71

The final directive in this series is PDD-71 which was issued in February 2000 and deals with Administration policy on strengthening criminal justice systems in support of peacekeeping operations. The intent of PDD-71 is to improve the Executive Branch's capacities to participate in rebuilding effective foreign criminal justice systems.¹⁹

This policy recognizes that for a government or sovereign nation to function properly, its criminal justice systems must be sufficiently operational. Many times they are not and illegal influence and activities are such a detriment to law, order and governmental activity. The result is little progress made in stabilizing and rebuilding the communities, the institutions of legitimate government and rule of law, thus promoting democracy, in turn producing stability resulting in the departure of US forces. This policy also broaches the need for a constabulary force described as a paramilitary unit that can maintain order and fill the vacuum while local police forces are rebuilt and trained. This sort of formation should augment but not replace regular combat troops, at least initially. This is a good example of where another nation can contribute an asset the US does not possess, in this case a standing formation of professionals who can perform law enforcement activities including effective crowd and riot control.

Current US Peace Operations Impacting on the Two MTW Scenario

Currently the US is involved in two major peace operations, in terms of troop commitments, in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo in addition to a variety of smaller operations. According to the UN, these and other missions have helped nurture new democracies, lower the global tide of refugees, reduced the likelihood of unwelcome intervention by regional powers, and prevented small wars from growing into larger scale conflicts with much higher costs in terms of lives and resources.²⁰ Bosnia and Kosovo each require the commitment of a US division headquarters (HQ) and a combat brigade or equivalent, in addition to other Army and joint assets. The other peace operations the US participates in worldwide require significant investment of specialized, low-density military occupational specialty troops, combat and transport aircraft and other equipment. Bosnia and Kosovo represent two divisions engaged and unavailable for immediate use in an MTW because the deployment of the division HQ with each brigade on peace operations will jeopardize its availability for timely participation in an MTW. The brigades left behind will have no higher command and control element and although they may deploy separately with another unit, cannot deploy and fight as a division (as explained below).

There is not an articulated end state or exit strategy linked with a timeline for either Bosnia or Kosovo. Bosnia's original twelve-month commitment from its start in 1995 has been extended indefinitely. Likewise, there is no timetable for departure from Kosovo and rotations to both areas are currently planned out to 2005. It is conceivable that the world situation dictates US involvement in more peace operations while it is still in the Balkans. If the US becomes involved in one or even two more SSCs, using the current model, then almost half of US active ground forces could be engaged.

The NSS asserts that the US must accept a degree of risk associated with withdrawing from contingency operations and engagement activities in order to reduce the greater risk incurred if it failed to respond adequately to major theater wars.²¹ The option of 'just pulling out' will be challenging. In many cases, it is the US presence that plays the catalytic role among coalition nations and indeed, many times the US serves as the controlling headquarters. Pulling out could jeopardize the entire operation. Even if the units were pulled out, their availability for immediate combat deployment would be severely constrained as they have lost their skills on their combat vehicles that were left behind in their original home garrisons. Although the greater risk is in not addressing the MTW, it is potentially perilous to double task units that may be pulled out of peace operations and flung into combat less than fully prepared.

A further challenge to the two MTW and multiple SSC policy, as it is currently being executed, is the logistics and air and sea lift realignment that will have to take place over a short time span to deploy active component divisions. Operation Desert Shield/Storm showed the timelines needed to mobilize and train up Army National Guard combat units was lengthy and would not be deployable in time to affect the critical early days of the fight. It is also possible that some of the SSCs that the US is engaged in are solidly linked to the MTWs that are occurring either by geography or situation making it nearly impossible to withdraw without making a bad situation worse. The current method of delinking the SSCs from the MTWs and imagining that they can be done either simultaneously or even sequentially in a compressed timeframe remains high risk. There are currently ten active Army and eight National Guard combat divisions that can be committed towards the national defense. A peace operations mission involving the one year deployment of one active division (which includes two consecutive, six-month brigade deployments one brigade at a time) can in effect take that division 'off line' and thus unavailable for an MTW for upwards of two years.²²

Take the example of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd ground maneuver brigades of a combat division. While the 1st brigade is preparing to deploy with the division headquarters, the 3rd brigade is committed to assist in its training, to the detriment of its own. Once the 1st brigade is deployed, the 3rd brigade with little respite now trains the 2nd brigade for its deployment and assumption of the 1st brigade's mission in six months. The 1st brigade stopped its MTW supporting heavy maneuver training and began peace operations training months before its peace operations deployment and has few resources such as vehicles, land, ammunition and time while deployed to stay competent in heavy operations. The 3rd brigade stopped their heavy training at the same time to assist in training the 1st brigade. After a slight respite, 3rd brigade now helps train and prepare the 2nd brigade for deployment. Once 2nd brigade deploys, 3rd brigade can now focus on training itself back to standard for heavy combat with the now redeploying 1st brigade hard on its heels to do the same. It can take from four to seven months for a redeploying brigade to train up and complete a culminating event such as a brigade rotation to a combat training center.

It can take almost two years for a division from the time it began training the first brigade to deploy to the last returning brigade being fully ready to support an MTW. Gratuitous participation in peace operations can then erode forces needed for rapid and moderate-risk execution of two MTWs and SSCs. Logistics and low density military occupational specialty support is just as challenging. Elements of theater level logistics, military intelligence, transportation and airlift units as an example are committed to peace operations but are also needed for MTWs. There are only a small number of forces available that are critical to both

peace operations and an MTW, including Low Density/High Demand (LD/HD) assets such as U-2 and RC-135 surveillance aircraft and crews, Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) and Civil Affairs specialists.²³

The US military is designed to fight major wars; the last one was Desert Shield/Desert Storm over ten years ago, Vietnam almost thirty. Since Desert Storm the US has deployed on numerous SSCs. The trend is the US will deploy on many more before fighting another major ground war. Since the future holds more SSCs than MTWs, focusing on the SSCs can potentially get more impact for the effort. The US recognizes that peace operations support strategic and policy objectives.²⁴ This policy results in the US possibly participating in a broad spectrum of peace operations and humanitarian assistance operations that have specious linkage to national security objectives, or to US policy of fighting and winning two MTWs in two specific theaters.²⁵

Fighting one MTW while using SSCs and participating in peace operations to reduce the risk level of a second MTW may be a better use of resources. At the same time it enhances the flexibility to commit forces to peace operations that may not have a direct connection to the NSS, but for political or humanitarian reasons are required for continued US engagement abroad.

Identify The Threat and Prevent the Crisis

To maximize the use of existing forces, peace operations should be linked as much as possible to the NSS, which is founded on the two MTW model. The US should retain the ability to conduct PO wherever the NCA deems appropriate, whether it is linked or not to an MTW. Such unlinked missions, however, should remain the exception. The NMS states that the challenge the US faces now for any future major theater wars is in the Arabian Gulf region and in Northeast Asia.²⁶ The threat that peace operations would be oriented towards is anything that affects or is affected by these two regions. The focus of linking peace operations to the MTW threat is imperative to get the most out of a finite force structure. The future MTW threat may shift to other countries and regions and if so, US peacekeeping focus and missions must shift with it. The solution to peace operations is crisis prevention. An oncoming crisis usually has the telltale signs of economic or political instability or natural disaster or some other indicator. Economic or political instability can be tracked through detailed intelligence gathering and candid analysis and understanding of that analysis by the NCA and other national decision

makers. (A discussion of options if an occurrence of a likely crisis takes place outside of an area the US is willing to get involved in is addressed in the following section).

As an example, the US failed in Iran twenty years ago to understand the implications of the Pahlavi* regime misrule and Khomeini's influence over the population with the resulting political and societal meltdown catching the US unable to react, thus losing a valuable ally and a major oil resource that was a vital national interest. Rapid and accurate intelligence is essential for the US to apply the instruments of national power in enough time to diffuse the situation. The US must also have a clear-eyed view of the competence and constancy of the political leadership in an allied or aligned country to aid in predicting their stability. An early decision must be made by the NCA to determine what if any steps the US will take to intervene and be able to clearly state the case for intervention, in whatever form, with the nation's political leaders and citizens. One of the key questions is how the situation is linked with US national interests and security and why is it important to divert resources to it.

The NSS states the decision to employ military forces is dictated foremost by national interests. In those instances where US **vital interests** are at stake, use of force will be decisive and unilateral if necessary. Use of military force for **important national interests** should be selective and limited. Employing US military forces for **humanitarian and other interests** will be of limited duration, have a clearly defined mission and end state, entail minimal risk to American lives, and be designed to give the affected country the opportunity to restore its own basic services.²⁷

The term 'selective and limited' is key. Realistically, there should be latitude for carefully considered exceptions. In the case of operations in the Balkans, if the crisis there were left alone, it could have flared out of control and affected NATO countries. NATO and the defense of Western Europe is a vital US national interest. The US and NATO were in the best position at the time to stop the crisis, so US involvement in the Balkans was reasonable and necessary. This same argument may be used for other areas in the world, but the argument must be used sparingly.

Historically, executing the elements of limited duration, defined mission and end state has not been easy because the US has no direct policy linkage and the terms 'selective and limited' and 'clearly defined mission and end state' are unclear. The two-MTW policy based on protecting vital US interests is articulated in various controlling policies, but when it comes to peace operations, engagement criteria are broad. Many times national leaders are driven on an

*Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, Shah of Iran until his overthrow in 1979 by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.

emotional basis, prodded in some cases by media reporting, to commit military resources to a region, no matter how compelling, that is insignificant in a US national security context.

The Importance of Selective Engagement

"Dig the well before you need to drink."

— Unknown

The US policy of selective engagement must truly be selective and is one key factor for apportioning forces worldwide. The US must strive to conduct peace operations where it is linked to the two critical theaters, with very few exceptions, and then use it to mitigate a war in at least one of those theaters. If the US had to choose where its assets are committed, it should be overwhelmingly to the theater that will get the best results.

At issue with US involvement in regions that are not MTW related but still have vital or lesser national interest may be pursuing other options regarding the level of US participation in relation to multi-national involvement. US dependence and reliance on its allies is absolutely paramount for the national strategy to work, but agreements must be made beforehand, as much as is practicable, which nation will share what burden in what geographic area. Because of NATO commitments and a need for European engagement, the US can expect to pull a share in the Balkans, but the level of commitment there now in these SSCs is probably near its maximum. National leaders can respond to news reports generating public opinion and feel pressure to commit the nation's military resources to a land and situation that has little or no impact on US national security but the effect of the commitment does influence national security in terms of committing and then fixing a force in place on peace operations that may have to be dedicated to an MTW. The US can be engaged and aid efforts on the African continent, South East Asia and other regions with the first three instruments of national power — diplomatic, economic and informational. The fourth element, military power, must come from another source. There may come a time in the near future when the Europeans will be able to conduct expeditionary peace operations within Europe and relieve the US of this requirement.

Napoleon Bonaparte failed to achieve lasting victory on his Russian Campaign for many reasons, but one was that in addition to over 200,000 troops committed in Spain, he was also forced to divert a significant number of front line troops to guard the many depots and lines of communication across the vast Russian plains.²⁸ Troops he desperately needed when he fought the Tsar's armies near Moscow. The extra troops in the right place may have moved

Bonaparte's high risk to a moderate one. Similar uninhibited US commitment to SSCs can cause the shortfall of forces when they are the most needed.

The Criticality of Disengagement

Another imperative to succeeding in peace operations is a solid plan for disengagement from an operation. This is the crucial element for knowing when a divisional-sized unit can be available for follow on MTW participation. The need for an end state is understood and much of US policy recognizes and emphasizes the need to disengage, but offers little in the way to achieve it.

Just as the US should work with its allies to allocate trouble spots for burden sharing, it should do the same with worldwide humanitarian organizations to organize US military forces for entry and more importantly, exit from a SSC once hostilities have been contained. There is a time when military dominated peace operations are ending and civilian nation building is beginning; this is the time for US forces to depart. Assuming the US is a multi or unilateral force under the international mandate of either the United Nations, NATO or other like organization, the disposition of local entity and indigenous armed and paramilitary forces, agencies and populations should be clearly specified. US governmental agencies are bound by PDD 56 and will ultimately respond to the NCA, so they will not be an issue. Although there may be friction between agencies, there is at least this framework to resolve it. It is frequently the case however, in the aftermath of a conflict that triggers peace operations, that there will be a deluge of international organizations, mostly humanitarian but some military that are not addressed in the mandate. Some may have been in the country conducting operations for many years prior to US involvement.

The most dangerous are the armed forces from another nation that does not have a history of cordial relations with the US and is present in a spoiling role. If this situation could not be predicted and sorted out beforehand, their unexpected insertion into the region must be handled quickly, preferably diplomatically and in a way that leaves the US dominant and some degree of face saving for them if appropriate. The preferred method to prevent the unplanned intervention of armed forces from another nation is anticipation and prevention using both diplomatic and physical means. Physical means include seizing air and seaports and blocking key roads, coupled with aggressive ground, air and space reconnaissance.

The most common outside entities faced will be the non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and international organizations (IOs). Most will chafe at taking any form of direction

from the US, but will expect assistance in terms of assets or protection. Harnessing their energies and funding with a US or multi-national military presence working towards common goals within an agreed framework could stabilize the region much more rapidly and ultimately enable forces to disengage sooner.

Dealing with NGOs and IOs is not as clear. Paradoxically, the more of them that are in country the better, because they are the ones who need to do the follow on nation building, not US forces which must disengage at the earliest opportunity. It is the timing of their arrival and their relationship with the military and international civilian authority (such as the UN) that is critical. Prior to military entry, the charter the forces are working under must specify the relationship to one another and then the civilian relief organizations are accredited and credentialed, including those already there.

The home office of the NGO/IO must be engaged to ensure their cooperation and compliance and that of their subordinates. If there is no home office, the commander on the ground must use appropriate means to ensure cooperation. Ultimately there must be the capability to eject them. Pressure on these organizations to comply can take many forms. What is critical is that an international agreement that spells out what is expected of these organizations in relation to the controlling international authority, including sanctions that may be taken against those who fail to comply, be drafted as soon as possible, and not as an after thought once the mission is underway. Even the broadest agreement reached with the full involvement of international relief agencies, would be more than exists now. The final piece to ensure compliance is the provision for the termination of their activities, or a similar onerous penalty, in the region in question. This type of consequence is not something either side should want and all parties will no doubt work hard to prevent it, but for those who refuse to act in good faith and are jeopardizing the mission, this sanction is available. This would be a tough call and its first use no doubt controversial and public, but in the due course, organizations will want to remain viable and answer to their constituents and donors so if done properly this threat of sanction will harmonize relations and efforts in the long term.

Such a charter can be the basis for a plan for the integration of NGO/IOs that they are bound to before going in. They should be there under UN or like auspices and answerable to them as outlined in any agreements that may exist. Peace enforcement operations should begin with the military commander dominant of all agencies with a planned trajectory for handover to civilian international authority for nation building. It may be more appropriate for military authority to take a more subordinate role when conducting peacekeeping operations, either way, all subject to agreement prior to beginning the mission.

Types of Units Suitable for Peace Operations

The range of force composition in support of PO is broad. The most palatable is the multi-lateral force within existing or newly formed coalitions and alliances. This classic burden sharing is politically feasible not only for donor nations, but to the nation entered as well. An excellent example is in Bosnia where the SFOR has placed Turkish troops in a Bosniak (Muslim) sector and a Russian unit in a Serb (Orthodox Christian) sector.

From the US side, there is the option of using active, reserve, National Guard or a combination of these forces. There is public discussion and proposals in the US on creating special peace operations or constabulary forces composed of non-conventional troops such as paramilitary forces. France for example has its Gendarmerie and Italy has its Carabinieri forces which are more of a separate, heavily armed law enforcement and special tactics type organization than a traditional military combat formation. Any one of these units or a mixture of several types may be appropriate based on the possible threat faced in the worst case. The US has no standing formation such as the Carabinieri and to create one would draw away manpower and resources from the armed forces and law enforcement agencies. An alternative would be to rely on those nations that have these type forces already in existence to provide them as the US would provide combat forces. This what is the current paradigm in Bosnia, with Italian and Argentine paramilitary forces formed into what is called the Multi-national Specialized Unit primarily used for crowd and riot control.

Condoleeza Rice, speaking at a time when she was favored to be the new National Security Advisor, indicated the creation of special peacekeeping units or "intermediate forces" was a viable option.²⁹ There is some discussion on the creation of units that conduct peacekeeping exclusively and thereby save conventional combat units for a possible MTW. In addition to the resource issue, the formation and deployment of these types of units would be very risky in that a combat unit can cross train for peace operations and still be able to rapidly escalate back to, and function in, an armed conflict. A peacekeeping unit will have already hit this 'iron ceiling' and not be able to escalate, becoming ineffective and jeopardizing the entire mission. The US does not need to create additional formations; it must use the ones it already has effectively and rely on allies and international partners for the types of forces and capabilities they can provide.

Preparing for the Future

A way to prepare for a future of uncertainty is to reduce the prospect of a second MTW that in the words of the General Shelton is a high-risk operation. Focusing on vital US interests—defined by the two most likely sources of major conflict, the Middle East and Northeast Asia, concentrates US resources to reduce any threat of escalation in these regions. The US can scarcely afford any additional drawing off of resources on operations that affect the core elements of US security strategy, combat divisions and their supporting components. The use of highly selective peace operations, while permitting only minimal other SSCs could be the best path to take.

This disciplined approach will keep the US postured to fight two MTWs that can both be of moderate risk and not hindered because there are multiple divisions committed across the globe that cannot be retrieved in time to ensure overwhelming force at the outset of an MTW resulting in rapid and decisive victory. The US engaging its allies up front and explaining what the US can and cannot commit to in the future lessens the discord and political sniping in front of the world over participation in every mission. The US will have to contribute in other ways that are satisfactory to its world partners to include assisting them in building their own deployable forces capable of PKO and PEO. This may mean more humanitarian missions, equipment use, outright cash payment and diplomatic effort. Added to this basic policy for engagement is a blueprint for disengagement that is the most critical element. The reality is the US will be constantly called upon to commit forces to peace operations. The sooner these can withdraw, the sooner they can re-engage another force in a another locale while still maintaining a potent force for two wars.

The US has a love-hate relationship with peace operations. Although there is national security policy in place to guide decision makers through peace operations commitments, actual implementation has not always followed the policy. Peace operations and SSCs must be viewed not as an unpleasant dalliance until the 'big one' occurs, but as a very definite means to prevent at least one MTW from occurring at all, or at the very least minimizing its risk and possible sequencing when it is fought- something other than simultaneously with the first MTW.

Despite the aversion of some military leaders to participate in peace operations, a majority of the US population and enough political leaders insist that US forces do them. This requires a national leadership that can make the tough decisions to commit or not commit and be able to clearly explain why a decision was taken or should be taken. Sometimes why the US is not committing troops is more difficult to explain than why it is. If there is a focused peace

operations strategy, that is a start, but in situations where troop commitment is not in the best US interest, there are many alternative ways to be involved as already discussed and these options expressed and offered up.

A calculated risk now has to be taken to commit forces to focused peace operations with the intent of directly influencing the mitigation of the two-MTW scenario. A risk because these are the same soldiers that would be fighting the MTW if it were to occur. As these peace operations then become more of a routine than a novelty the armed forces must be proficient in them, organize for a steady rhythm of deployments that have clear objectives leading to finite disengagement and are still able to support the strategy of two major theater wars, but now at a more moderate risk.

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ENDNOTES

¹William J. Clinton, A National Security Strategy for a New Century. (Washington, D.C.: The White House, December 1999), 18.

²Henry H. Shelton, "Posture Statement of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff before the 106th Congress Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate," 8 February 2000; available from <<http://www.dtic.mil/jcs/core/Posture00.html>>; Internet; accessed 18 November 2000.

³Ibid.

⁴Clinton, A National Security Strategy for a New Century, 19.

⁵Ibid.

⁶William S. Cohen, Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review. (Washington, D.C., May 1997), 13.

⁷Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Peace Operations, Joint Pub 3-07.3 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 12 February 1999), I-10.

⁸Cohen, 12.

⁹The American Society of International Law, "Administration Policy on Reforming Multi-lateral Peace Operations," May 1994, available from <<http://www.kentlaw.edu/academics/courses/admin-perritt/pdd-25.html>>; Internet: accessed 19 November 2000.

¹⁰Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War, Joint Pub 3-07, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 16 June 1995), I-1, II-1.

¹¹Shelton.

¹²Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 3-07.3, I-2.

¹³Clinton, A National Security Strategy for a New Century, iii.

¹⁴Ibid., 3.

¹⁵Michael Renner, "In Focus: Peacekeeping and the United Nations," Volume 1, Number 28, December 1996, available from <<http://foreignpolicy-infocus.org/briefs/vol1/unpeace.html>>; Internet; accessed 26 September 2000.

¹⁶David J. Scheffer, "United States: Administration Policy on Reforming Multi-lateral Peace Operations," May 1994, available from <<http://www.kentlaw.edu/academics/courses/admin-perritt/pdd-25.html>>; Internet; accessed 2 October 2000.

¹⁷Renner.

¹⁸Thomas Gibbings, Donald Hurley, and Scott Moore, "Interagency Operations Centers: An Opportunity We Can't Ignore," From Parameters, US Army War College Quarterly-Winter 1998, available from <<http://Carlisle-www.army.mil/USAWC/Parameters/98winter/Moore.htm>>; Internet; accessed 26 September 2000.

¹⁹William J. Clinton, Presidential Decision Directive 71, White Paper, The Clinton Administration's Policy on Strengthening Criminal Justice Systems in Support of Peacekeeping Operations. (Washington, D.C.: The White House, February 2000).

²⁰UN Fact Sheet, "US Participation in UN Peacekeeping," 10 January 2001; available from <<http://www.un.int/usa/iofact3.htm>>; Internet; accessed 24 January 2001.

²¹Clinton, A National Security Strategy for a New Century, 19.

²²Department of the Army, 1st Cavalry Division Long Range Training Calendar FY 1997-1999.

²³Shelton.

²⁴Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 3-07.3, I-3.

²⁵John M. Shalikashvili, National Military Strategy of the United States of America. (Washington, D.C., 1997), 15.

²⁶*Ibid.*, 15

²⁷Clinton, A National Security Strategy for a New Century, 19-20.

²⁸David G. Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon. (New York, N.Y.: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1966), 854-857.

²⁹Vince Crawley, "Bush Advisers Propose Allies Form 'Intermediate' Peacekeeping Force," Air Force Times, 4 December 2000, p.16.

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