



**STRATEGY
RESEARCH
PROJECT**

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This document may not be released for open publication until it has been cleared by the appropriate military service or government agency.

THE CHANGING FACE OF SOUTH AFRICA'S MILITARY FORCES

BY

COLONEL J. J. STEYN
South African National Defence Force

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A:
Approved for Public Release.
Distribution is Unlimited.

USAWC CLASS OF 2001



U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA 17013-5050

20010605 183

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

THE CHANGING FACE OF SOUTH AFRICA'S MILITARY FORCES

by

COLONEL JJ STEYN
South African National Defence Force (Army)

Colonel T.A. Dempsey
Project Adviser

The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the Author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the South African Government, the Department of Defence, or any of its agencies

U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A:

Approved for public release.

Distribution is unlimited.

ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Colonel Jacobus J. Steyn
TITLE: The Changing Face of the South African Military Forces
FORMAT: Strategy Research Project
DATE: 20 March 2001 PAGES: 33 CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

The Changing Face of South Africa's Military looks at a military, that was tested during a twenty year conflict against querilla forces, terrorist groups and also conventional armies, and draws a line through its emerging in a new political environment to its future as the military pillar of South Africa in its role as Southern Africa's leading nation.

South Africa's transfer to majority rule in 1994 had some far reaching results and influenses, not only in the political sector, but also in the transformation of the nations military. In order to reflect the spirit of consolodation, the Military of the previous Government, the Military of the Homelands and the Armies of the Liberation Movements integrated to form the South African National Defence Force. The process however did not stop at integration, but went on to reflect the new approach of the politician to the military, civilian control over the military and the transformation to a "rainbow force".

In the disemination of the transformation which include the process of reflecting the demographics of the South African society, the paper deals with the difference between equal opportunities and confirmative action and the role it is playing in the new SANDF's manning process.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT.....	iii
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS	vii
LIST OF TABLES	ix
THE CHANGING FACE OF SOUTH AFRICA'S MILITARY FORCES	1
AIM	1
BACKGROUND	1
WAR YEARS	1
WINDS OF CHANGE	2
ESTABLISHMENT OF CIVIL-MILITARY STRUCTURES	3
STRUCTURAL DEFENCE TRANSFORMATION	3
POLITICAL CONTROL OF DEFENCE	4
THE SOUTH AFRICAN NATIONAL DEFENCE FORCE	5
PRIMARY TASK OF THE SANDF	5
CONSTITUTIONAL OBLIGATIONS	6
THE SOUTH AFRICAN ARMY	7
THE SA ARMY MANDATE AND IMPOSED TASKS	7
THE SA ARMY STRATEGIC PROFILE	8
SA ARMY VISION AND MISSION.....	8
IPAF STRATEGY ENDSTATE	8
SA ARMY VALUES, CHARACTERISTICS AND MISSION SUCCESS FACTORS.....	8
TWO -TIER STRATEGY	9
INTEGRATION AND MODELS	10
THREE MODELS	10
PROCESS	12
INTEGRATION AND TRANSFORMATION	13
ATTITUDES AND PROCEDURES	13
TRANSFORMATION PROBLEMS	13
TRANSFORMATION AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION	14
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION VERSUS INTEGRATION	14
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AS A CONCEPT	14
DISTINCTION BETWEEN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITY	15
WHY AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN THE SANDF?	16
IMPLEMENTATION OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION	17

STAFFING AND REPRESENTIVITY	18
REPRESENTAVITY AT GRASS ROOTS	18
RACIAL IMBALANCES	18
STAFFING PROCESS AND MEASSURES TO ADDRESS IMBALANCES.....	21
DOWNSIZING	22
REFLECTIONS	23
MANAGEABLE CONCERNS	23
TRANSFORMATION	23
COMPETENCIES	24
CONCLUSION	25
ENDNOTES	27
BIBLIOGRAPHY	31

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

FIGURE 1. TRANSITIONAL FORCE STRUCTURE: PERIOD OF VALIDITY11
FIGURE 2. INTEGRATION MODEL 12

LIST OF TABLES

TABLE 1. APRIL 1994 POPULATION DISTRIBUTION.....	10
TABLE 2. GROWTH RATE	18
TABLE 3. MIDDLE MANAGEMENT RACIAL IMBALANCES – BLACKS.....	19
TABLE 4. MIDDLE MANAGEMENT RACIAL IMBALANCES – COLOURED.....	19
TABLE 5. MIDDLE MANAGEMENT RACIAL IMBALANCES – WHITES.....	20
TABLE 6. MIDDLE MANAGEMENT RACIAL IMBALANCES – ASIANS.....	20
TABLE 7. MILITARY POTENCY INDEX.....	24

THE CHANGING FACE OF SOUTH AFRICA'S MILITARY FORCES

The creation of the South African National Defence Force has arguably been one of the most successful episodes in the transformation of the South African civil service. To appreciate the Republic of South Africa's (RSA) military system, it is necessary to recognize where it came from and what had to be addressed as a matter of political priority since the end of apartheid and the election of the Government of National Unity (GNU) in April 1994.¹ On the eve of that election, the South African Defence Force (SADF) was replaced by the South African National Defence Force (SANDF). In forging national unity, the statutory and non-statutory soldiers² who have been at war for 37 years, were expected to form the foundation of the new defence forces of the RSA. The crafting of a defence posture for the new South Africa had to be achieved within a demanding new political and ideological framework.

AIM

This paper seeks to address the background of the formation of the SANDF as well as the role and functions of this new SANDF. How does the current vision and mission of the SA Army, its values and mission success factors fit into this new Defence Force? What is integration in the Army and according to which models is it being done? The linkup between integration and transformation is described with emphasis on representivity and affirmative actions. In closing, the end-state of the SANDF will be looked at out of a realistic and obtainable viewpoint.

BACKGROUND

WAR YEARS

South Africa came out of the war in Namibia (South West Africa) and Angola at the end of 1988. During this time the army has expanded by means of conscription to about 70 000 men. With the end of the war in sight, looming peace in Namibia and the legalizing of the terrorist organizations of the African National Congress and the Pan African Congress on the horizon, the government demolished the conscription system in the SA Army and the Army went from a conscription Army to a voluntary Army over the period 1990 – 1993. This caused a drastic reduction in the numbers in the Army. The part of the Army that was the hardest hit by this was the Reserve Force (Citizen Force. Whereas previously all able bodied males did national service of two years, as well as a further obligatory duty for another 10 years, it changed overnight to a volunteer Reserve Force.

The years 1973 to 1992 have seen South Africa being involved in the following wars and military operations :

1. 1973 – 1978 : Mainly against SWAPO and in a lesser way MPLA in the northern part (Ovamboland) of South West Africa (Namibia) on behalf of SWA with occasional raids into Angola.
2. 1978 – 1984 : Mainly against MPLA. The MPLA was strengthened with Cuban and Russian advisors, pilots and specialist personnel. As a military force SWAPO was not a real threat anymore and was concentrating more on rear areas and soft targets in Namibia.
3. 1984 – 1989 : Mostly against conventional Cuban forces with strong Russian support and MPLA in a guerilla/non-conventional role.
4. 1970 – 1980 : Support and also troops to Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) in their war against Zanu PF.
5. 1980 – 1991 : An internal war in South Africa against APLA and MK. This counter-insurgency war starts out on a low key against strikes, rallies and violent mass marches, but developed into a drawn out battle.

WINDS OF CHANGE

Abovementioned underlines the reasons why the SADF (South African Defence Force) went from a draft model to a conscript model. All white citizens of South Africa had to do one year compulsory National Service, which changed to two years service in 1977. This system was in force until 1990. Black, Coloured and Indian as well as non-citizens could join the military on a voluntary base for either initial national service or permanent service. This was necessary in order to swell the number of soldiers available for the war effort. During this time the total Defence Force grew to a total of about 70 000 with 20 000 committed to Angola by 1984.

In 1980 a peace accord was signed in Rhodesia, elections were held, and Zanu PF came to power. The country's name changed to Zimbabwe. The New York Accord signed in 1990 between Namibia, South Africa, Cuba and Angola effectively brought the war in Namibia and Angola to a halt and after elections the SWAPO party came to power. While these actions took place, sanctions were still in place against South Africa. The internal unrest intensified mainly because of the dissolvent of the buffer zones around South Africa. Namibia, Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Lesotho were hosting and actively supporting MK and APLA troops from within their countries. The targets of the "freedom fighters" (MK and APLA) shifted from police stations and government installations to soft targets such as farmers, schools, shopping centers and churches.

With no external support, unfriendly neighbours, a paralyzing embargo, an unstable internal safety situation and a population who grew tired of war after 20 years, the time was ripe for President P.W. Botha to start official talks with the ANC and APLA. Unofficial talks were conducted as early as 1987. Nelson Mandela was released from jail on 11 February 1990.

After initial agreements between the parties and the postponement of hostilities, the Army starts with its downsizing. This was urgent because the size of the Army at that stage was already stretching the budget. The budget could not handle the growing personnel strength. The first big step was to put an end

to the conscription system. The second step was to put a moratorium on all the outstanding service of the Reserve forces. This was more a political move than anything else, because the citizens (Reserve Force) forms a big part of the active voters, and the government was beginning to look for support and votes. This marked the beginning of a voluntary force.

ESTABLISHMENT OF CIVIL - MILITARY STRUCTURES

Significant progress has been made in South Africa in, first, the integration of a large number of statutory and non-statutory forces into a single, cohesive defence force; and second, the institution of systems of civilian control over the defence force. The latter was not, of course, a feature of the "apartheid" regime, particularly in the 1980s, when the old South African Defence Force (SADF) played such a pivotal role in shaping its own political destiny.

The process of military integration began with the conclusion of negotiations between, principally, the ruling National Party government and Nelson Mandela's African National Congress (ANC), even before the watershed 1994 elections. The SADF was merged with forces of Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda, and Ciskei (the so-called TBVC states, or independent "homelands"), the armed wings of the ANC (MK, known as Umkhonto we Sizwe, or Spear of the Nation), and the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC, the forces of which were known as the Azanian People's Liberation Army). The KwaZulu Self-Protection Forces (KZSPF) were also accommodated, as a result of a last-minute deal to include the Inkatha Freedom Party of Dr. Mangosuthu Buthelezi in the 1994 elections. It should be noted that only around fourteen thousand of the non-statutory forces of the ANC and PAC presented themselves for integration although the figures that were given differ drastically from the Certified Personnel Register.³ The figures for the total military integration were (Note: not accurately. There is still uncertainty in the MK and APLA about the correct figures) SADF 110,000 / TBVC States 6,000 / MK(ANC) 26,000 / APLA (PAC) 6,000 / KZSPF 2,000.⁴

STRUCTURAL DEFENCE TRANSFORMATION

In times of constitutional change, the structures of government, including those pertaining to defence and security, have to be altered to reflect the new decision-making process, especially if they are to become democratic. In the wake of the formulation of South Africa's interim constitution, the ensuing democratic elections, and the formation of the new government, therefore, the immediate task was to address the imperatives of transformation, namely, integration and rationalization.⁵ This also had to take into account the future structure of the central organization of defence, its relationship to the democratically elected government and parliament, and a "continued and drastically reduced defence budget with the concomitant attenuation of its force structure."⁶ The first fruits of these organizational endeavors by the SANDF under the new minister of Defence and in association with other government departments were detailed in the 1994–1995 annual financial report of the Ministry of Defence, appropriately titled "The National Defence Force in Transition".

One focus of the structural changes was that of the central organization of defence—that is, the Ministry of Defence and the SANDF. These structural changes, approved by a Ministry of Defence steering committee, came into effect in March 1995. The outcome of these changes was considered a "balanced" structure. It was to be headed by the minister of defence, assisted by a deputy minister, who would exercise overall responsibility. The ministry itself was to encompass both the SANDF and the new civilian Defence Secretariat. The "balanced model" of the Department of Defence was essentially a bi-headed structure, with the armed forces (military) on the one hand and the Secretariat (civilian) on the other. The arrangement marked a radical departure from the past, when a civilian minister (often with prior military experience) had headed a ministry that had little civilian representation or involvement of any consequence, and was subject to virtually no effective system of financial or policy accountability.⁷ Most of these responsibilities were that of the Chief of the Defence Force in the pre-1994 system.

The new structure therefore clearly accommodated the need for a strengthened civilian input and checks on military influence. This was the objective and thinking behind the creation of a new post, that of a civilian defence secretary. The person holding this position would also serve as the Ministry of Defence's accounting officer; be the principal adviser to the minister on matters of defence policy; and be responsible for a 650-strong Ministry of Defence civilian bureaucracy and administration as well as for the efficient management of the ministry as a whole. Nearly four years after the democratic elections of April 1994 this balanced model appears to be a success, though many defence force members apparently share a sentiment that there is a lack of understanding in the Secretariat of military matters, given that the policy posts are filled by civilians.⁸ In short, the roles of the civilian secretary are the control of the total military budget, consolidation of the budgets of the services, procurement and management of logistical support in the defence force and management of all personnel matters in DoD. In summary, the Secretary is the support manager.

On professional matters of doctrine and strategy, the Chief of the National Defence Force (CNDF) serves as the Chief of National Defence Headquarters within a Department of Defence. The responsibility of the CNDF is to exercise overall command of the nation's forces; tender advice to the defence minister and president on matters of military strategy and doctrine, resource allocation, programs, and commitments; and also to plan, direct, and conduct military operations. Of particular significance is the CNDF's role with respect to the four branches of the South African armed services, and their collective need to prioritize future equipment and resource requirements in order to fulfill the policies and functions defined by the ministry and by the strategies and doctrines formulated within the military.⁹

POLITICAL CONTROL OF DEFENCE

In parallel with, but seemingly independent of these inter- and intradepartmental and ministry discussions and structural alterations, a second process was in train during the defence transformation. The political requirement of the Government of National Unity (GNU)(to be in existence for a maximum of five years from the 1994 elections) and its parliamentary representatives was to ensure greater

transparency and accountability in all matters pertaining to defence and security. The SANDF, even in time of transition, would not be trusted in the absence of strong checks and balances. One reason, less obvious but nevertheless present, stemmed from a natural tendency among those who have been denied power and influence and then gain it, to exercise it, for whatever motive, as widely and extensively as possible. Parliamentary committee review procedures and open consultative processes serve these personal agendas. Two parliamentary committees concerned with legislative oversight of defence were established in 1994: the Senate Select Committee on Defence, Safety, and Correctional Services, and the National Assembly Portfolio Committee on Defence. Both have "customary" powers, in that they were created from within each chamber, there being no provision in the constitution for their existence. They are also "portfolio" committees, in that they consider legislation governing defence issues and the defence budget, and pilot it through their respective chambers.¹⁰

These restrictions do not apply, however, to the larger Parliamentary Joint Standing Committee on Defence (JSCD). Provision for the JSCD was made through Article 228(3) of the interim constitution. The powers of the committee are extensive: it has competence to "investigate and make recommendations regarding the budget, functioning, organization, armaments, policy, morale and state of preparedness of the SANDF and to perform such functions relating to parliamentary supervision of the Force as may be prescribed by law."¹¹ This is retained in the final South African constitution (which was signed in May 1997).

The power of the JSCD extends further, for when Parliament is in recess, it is to this committee that the president has to account in the event that forces of the SANDF are employed for purposes or on operations associated with the terms of Article 227(1) (listed below) of the interim constitution. Today the JSCD's membership of forty, drawn from the National Assembly and the National Council of Provinces (formerly the Senate), includes members of all political parties holding more than ten seats in the National Assembly. The driving issue behind the establishment of the JSCD was the integration of the armed forces. When this became a matter of dispute, the JSCD became involved, requested reports on progress, demanded the right of access to the armed services, and made recommendations.

THE SOUTH AFRICAN NATIONAL DEFENCE FORCE (SANDF)

PRIMARY TASK OF THE SANDF

In terms of the constitution itself, the "primary objective of the defence force is to defend and protect the Republic, its territorial integrity and its people in accordance with the Constitution and the principles of international law regulating the use of force."¹²

CONSTITUTIONAL OBLIGATIONS

According to the constitution, the defence forces exist:

1. For service in the defence of the Republic, for the protection of its sovereignty and territorial integrity;
2. For service in compliance with the international obligations of the Republic with regard to international bodies and other states;
3. For service in the preservation of life, health or property;
4. For service in the provision or maintenance of essential services;
5. For service in the upholding of law and order in the Republic in co-operation with the South African Police Services under circumstances set out in a law where the said Police Service is unable to maintain law and order on its own; and
6. For service in support of any department of state for the purpose of socio-economic upliftment.¹³

The 1996 defence white paper "Defence in a Democracy" fleshes out, inter alia, the challenges of transformation, the role of defence forces, the nature of the strategic environment facing South Africa, human resource issues, policy relating to arms control and the defence industry, and the organization of civil-military relations in the new South Africa.¹⁴ The white paper notes that the ending of apartheid and the establishment of democracy have given rise to the dramatic changes in the external strategic environment from the perspective of South Africa. The country is no longer isolated internationally. It has been welcomed into many international organizations, most importantly the United Nations (UN), the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC). South Africa is in fact expected to play an active role in these forums, especially with regard to peace and security in Africa and in Southern Africa in particular. There are expectations that South Africa will become involved in peace-support operations on the continent. South Africa does not now, and will not in the future, have aggressive intentions towards any state. It is not confronted by an immediate conventional military threat, and does not anticipate external military aggression in the short to medium term (+/- 5 years).

The absence of a foreseeable conventional military threat provides considerable space to rationalize, redesign and "right-size" the SANDF. The details of this process will be spelt out in the Defence Review.¹⁵ The white paper notes that "the size, design, structure and budget of the SANDF will therefore be determined mainly by its primary function," although provisions will have also "to be made for the special requirements of internal deployment and international peace operations."¹⁶ As a result, the SANDF is to maintain a core defence capability, with the ability both to deal with small-scale contingencies and to expand in size should the situation warrant it. This includes the maintenance and, where appropriate, the adequate upgrading or replacement of military equipment. Indeed, the constitution notes that the SANDF "should be established in a manner that it will provide a balanced, modern and technologically advanced military force."¹⁷ In the absence of a conventional military threat, the SANDF is thus to comprise a relatively small regular force and a "sufficiently" large part-time force. The white paper

also notes that employment of the SANDF in support of the police is likely to persist, "because of ongoing public violence and the relative shortage of police personnel." ¹⁸

THE SOUTH AFRICAN ARMY

THE SA ARMY MANDATE AND IMPOSED TASKS

The Army mandate centers around the provisioning of combat – ready forces and the leading role it has to play in the development of the army component of the land ward defence capability.¹⁹ It must be noted that the role of the Army, or for that argument, any one of the services, differs quite drastically from that of pre - 1994. In the pre -1994 timeframe, the services were responsible for the training of combat-ready forces, as well as the deployment of such forces. The current mandate, including imposed tasks, constitutes :

1. The management of the army component of the land-ward defence capability.
2. The provision of the Army component of the land-ward defence capability. (Combat-ready US/HOUS supported to the 1st and 2nd line) (US – user system, companies and battalions, HOUS – higher order user system, brigades, task forces)
3. The administration of allocated GSB's. (GSB – general support base)
4. The management of all personnel under command of Chief of the Army.
5. The provision of qualified 1st and 2nd line support to deployed Army forces.
6. The closure of redundant SA Army structures.

The contrast between the current mandate and the pre-1994 mandate can be seen as the difference in doing thing unilaterally or joint. Before 1994, the Chiefs of the Services had full control over recruitment, training, allocation of soldiers to different branches, promotion issues, logistical issues and most important, the operational deployment of their forces. All this was done within the Defence policy and allocated funds. They had ultimate responsibility for the spending of their part of the budget. Although all non – routine troop deployments or deployment of forces outside the South African border had to be authorized by the Chief of the Defence force and the President, the Service Chiefs could authorize all routine deployments and relieves.

In contrast with the above-mentioned, the current Chiefs can only train the recruits that are being allocated to them with equipment that somebody else decide on and buy, although they have an input, and declare the troops ready for deployment. They also have only direct control over the training funds. This separation in functions goes down to battalion level. The main functions of training, operational deployment, logistics, personnel and finance are being divided between the Service Chiefs, Chief Joint Operations and the Secretary for Defence. This implies that to carry out the main function of any of the Services, a total commitment by all the role players is necessary, it must be truly a joint venture.

THE SA ARMY STRATEGIC PROFILE

The strategic profile of the SA Army, within the strategic management context, comprises the following elements:

1. The Vision of the SA Army.
2. The Mission of the SA Army.
3. The IPAF Strategy End-state. (IPAF - integrated provide Army forces)
4. The SA Army Values.
5. The Characteristics of the SA Army.
7. Mission Success Factors (MSFs) of the Army.

SA ARMY VISION AND MISSION

SA Army Vision. The SA Army, our people one in spirit, has the commanding presence and power of a pride of lions. We are an excellent military force, forever professional and ready, making a difference wherever serving South Africa.²⁰

SA Army Mission. The SA Army provides combat ready forces to C SADF, whilst playing a leading role in sustaining a credible, cohesive, joint land ward defence capability.

IPAF STRATEGY END-STATE

The IPAF Strategy End-state. The SA Army provides Army combat ready forces to be integrated into the SANDF Core Defence Capability, structured and prepared to execute the chosen SANDF concept of operations and doctrine appropriately supported in the most effective manner within the resource allocation. The IPAF Sub-system provides in the short, medium, long and extended long term:

1. Combat ready user systems (CRUS) and higher order user systems (HOUSE) supported to 1st and 2nd line.²¹
2. A One Force (approved Force Design and Structure); that is affordable and sustainable for multi-role application (inclusive of internal stability requirements); joint and combined operations and tailored in terms of technology and groupings for the future African combat space. The Force design provides for a core growth capability that can develop over the medium to the extended long term to a force which meets all contingencies.

The IPAF Strategy executes the Military Strategy by providing:

1. Conventional capability ensuring deterrence and participation in international peace and stability obligations.
2. Internal stability requirements which are satisfied and all forces collateral utility can be employed for ordered commitments and ad hoc tasks in the short to medium, term.

SA ARMY VALUES, CHARACTERISTICS AND MISSION SUCCESS FACTORS

SA Army Values. (The Big Seven).²²

1. Military professionalism.
2. Human dignity.
3. Integrity.
4. Leadership.
5. Loyalty.
6. Accountability.
7. Patriotism.

Characteristics of the SA Army. The SA Army will:

1. Possess a core growth capability for long term contingencies.
2. Be predominantly conventionally orientated.
3. Be able to project force and deterrent ability for strategic contingencies foreseen in the short and medium term.
4. Possess a flexible and rapid response capability.
5. **BE AFFORDABLE AND SUSTAINABLE.**
6. Possess an excellent training capacity.
7. Possess excellent leadership, command and management capabilities.
8. Effectively operate as one force.
9. Possess a multi-role capability.

Mission Success Factors. These are the premises on which the SA Army strategy and plan are based.

1. Sustainable force design and structure.
2. Quality people.
3. Sustainable force support.
4. Quality force preparation.
5. High morale.
6. Superior leadership.
7. Appropriate advance technology.

TWO – TIER STRATEGY

A Two – Tier Strategy. In order to extrapolate the IPAF strategy concept the SA Army has adopted a two-tier strategy that will deploy as follows:

1. Tier 1: A Short to Medium-term (Transitional) Strategy. The focus is on the creation of a firm base and the implementation of the transitional strategy and force design.
2. Tier 2: A Long to Extended Long-term IPAF strategy. The focus is on the creation of the Core Force. Stage 2 develops through two clearly defined phases:
 - a. Phase 1. The creation of a sustainable, affordable Core Growth Force.
 - b. Phase 2. The creation of a war force if the requirement should ever arise.

3. The long to extended long-term strategy covers a period encompassing the long to extended long term. The envisaged period for the purpose of strategy development is thirty years.²³

INTEGRATION AND MODELS

THREE MODELS

Prior to integration, there was no idea of the structure or model on which to staff the Army. The main reason for this was the uncertainty about the Certified Personnel Register. This register contained all the names of the former non-statuary²⁴ forces which were available for integration into the new structures. These names were not certifiable and are still today a bone of contention. As late as Sep 2000, Minister Mosiuoa Lekota (Ministry of Defence) acknowledged that the compiling of the Certified Personnel Registers was faulty, but too costly to go for a full audit. The termination of the Integration Intake Process Bill was tabled only during the 2000 session of Parliament – 6 years after the beginning of integration.²⁵ The names of the statuary forces were available as part of the payroll name list of the SADF and the TBVC armies. This uncertainty led to a superimposed system where personnel were put in over and above as well as shadow posts.

The strength of the Army prior to April 1994 was 55 722 (including civilians). The population distribution was:

RACE	TOTAL
Blacks	28 720
Whites	18 854
Coloureds	7 984
Asians	164

TABLE 1: APRIL 1994 POPULATION DISTRIBUTION

In April 1994 the armies of the former South Africa (SADF), Boputaswana (BDF), Venda (VDF), Transkei (TDF), Ciskei (CDF), Kwa Zulu (KZSPF), African National Congress (MK), Pan African Congress (APLA) as well as the soldiers who joined the SADF between the start of the integration process and the actual integration itself (SANDF) integrated to form the new South African National Defence Force (SANDF). The end result of this integration was that the SANDF (Army) went up from 55 722 to a total of 75 000 (including civilians). This amount of soldiers was not economically affordable and the restrictions on the budget were of such a nature that rationalization was urgent.

Three models were accepted for implementation.

1. The "approved" model where the army wants to be – 32 000.

2. The "transitional" model – 35 000.
3. The "crunch" model – 24 600.

The transitional model was agreed upon in order to provide the Defence force with ready troops during the transition to the new structure. The motivation for the Transitional Strategy was:²⁶

1. To ensure that the SA Army has the resources to provide the force levels to the DOD in accordance with C J Ops short and medium term requirements.
2. To ensure combat ready forces.
3. To ensure command and control for the +/- 8000 non-staffed members in the SA Army.
4. To enable the SA Army to close down force structure elements as required.
5. To obtain approval for the Reserve Force design.
6. The Transitional Force Structure is valid for a period of two years from the date of approval of the new DoD force design as derived from the Military Strategic Appreciation.²⁷




FIGURE 1: TRANSITIONAL FORCE STRUCTURE: PERIOD OF VALIDITY

PROCESS

Although the “Transitional model” is the model that is currently used, the Army is striving and working towards the “Approved model (Core force)”. More detail will be given to this in the last part under Transformation and Downsizing. It is however necessary to keep the “Crunch model” in mind. This model will have to be implemented if the defence budget is being cut more than expected – which is not impossible. The implications of such a drastic step will be dramatically and far-reaching. Whereas the DoD hope to upgrade from a “Approved model/Core Force” to a “War Force” in 5 – 7 years if such a threat arises, the Army will not be able to upgrade in time if they have to downsize to the “Crunch” model.

The integration process that is used in order to reach the models is shown in the graphic layout.




FIGURE 2: INTEGRATION MODEL

INTEGRATION AND TRANSFORMATION

ATTITUDES AND PROCEDURES

Attitudes and Procedures. Military merging and force restructuring was a priority. It met a political and symbolic need to bring two sides together in a manifestation of national unity and the practical expedient of coping with thousands of armed ex-guerrillas. However, these requirements were not just military matters. Once merging and integration had been achieved, the task was to transform the SANDF's attitudes and procedures and restructure the South African armed forces in a way that maintained their combat integrity and was consonant with the new South African GNU's defence policies. The exercise of merging and transformation was undertaken as a political imperative, independent of the processes of defence policy formulation and the exercise of SANDF force structure and operational review.²⁸

The task of merging has almost been accomplished but the transformation process will not be completed until entrenched attitudes have been excised. In a media briefing during September 2000 the Minister of Defence, Minister Lekota, pointed out that the whole process of integration went down much better than the general public expected. In six years only two tense situations, Tempe and Phalaborwa, erupted.²⁹

TRANSFORMATIONAL PROBLEMS

In the Setai Committee's report and the interim report of the Ministerial Enquiry after the Tempe shootings, the following problems were brought to the front. Most of these issues, if not all, are an indication of deep-trenched attitudes which will take a long time to change. A few of the more serious that are mentioned here point to a very big divide in not only different social and ethnic cultures, but also in military cultures.³⁰

1. Racism in the form of not empowering people, reducing job responsibilities and excluding troops from the life and activities of the unit by not letting them participate in decision processes.
2. Not resolving of black troops grievances by senior white members.
3. Job assignments, use of Afrikaans, medals, poor accommodation and difficulties in attendance of colleagues and family.
4. Lack of chance of self expression.
5. Difference in culture. Ex-MK and ex-APLA soldiers point out that as much as they are soldiers, they came from a culture where they were allowed to articulate their views within a democratic setting. They could hear and be heard. This is not the case in the SANDF.

TRANSFORMATION AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION

AFFIRMATIVE ACTION VERSUS INTEGRATION

The current debate in defence circles focuses mostly on integration. Little attention was initially been paid to representivity and the management of diversity within the South African National Defence Force (SANDF). The assumption was made that integration will legitimize the SANDF in the eyes of the majority of the populace. While the process did offer some possibilities towards this end, it was not sufficient on its own.

Military analysts tend to regard affirmative action within the context of the integration process. The two processes, however, are not the same and should not be confused. Integration refers to the merging of different armed forces, each with its own traditions, cultures and norms. Affirmative action on the other hand, refers to the redressing of historical imbalances. It identifies employment positions that have been inaccessible to disadvantaged groups and launches special recruitment drives for these groups, as well as engaging in training and development. If affirmative action is addressed within the integration process, it will only benefit members from the guerrilla forces and to a lesser extent from the former TBVC forces (Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei). It will do little for black members of the old South African Defence Force (SADF) and women who have been historically deprived of rightful opportunities. Integration might lead to senior members of the guerrilla and TBVC forces occupying senior positions in the SANDF, but it will not address other historical imbalances. For instance, the old SADF's promotion system was discriminatory, resulting in the leadership being predominantly white. Women in the SADF, but also in the guerrilla and TBVC forces were generally excluded from senior leadership positions. Integration alone did little to address this imbalance.³¹ Only a formalized affirmative action process, which is correctly designed and implemented, will be successful. Affirmative action must not be confused with equal opportunities.

AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AS A CONCEPT

Affirmative action has become a contentious issue in the United States as a result of historic problems. This has caused reluctance on the part of South African organizations to use the concept for their own cross-cultural integration processes. It also appears to form the basis of many organizations' uncertainty in defining the concept and embarking on a process to achieve equality. Furthermore, in the United States minority groups are negotiating a "place in the sun" from the majority who set the norms and standards. Contrary to this, South Africa faces a reversed situation where the majority was disadvantaged and the minority set the norms and standards.³² Most of the research on affirmative action has been done by whites from a "white" frame of reference. Black people argue that the ethnocentric nature of white management does not take African values into account. As a result, they question the legitimacy of white "experts" defining norms for organizational culture in a country where the majority of

people are black, often with different norms and values. A new paradigm needs to be found which would integrate appropriate norms and values from the whole spectrum of the South African populace.

DISTINCTION BETWEEN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES

Affirmative action as a concept was first introduced in the United States by President John F. Kennedy in 1961, but only legislated by President Linden B. Johnson in 1965. It is based on provision of the U.S. Constitution which gives it legal value. It originally came from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, formulated in the 1940's by the International Labour Organization, which states that "everyone is entitled to pursue his/her material well-being and spiritual development in conditions of freedom and dignity without discrimination on the basis of race, sex, colour and language". It concentrates on the employment, development and promotion of disadvantaged groups. It allocates resources to the disadvantaged and prescribes corrective action to be adopted by organizations to redress inequalities. Proponents see it as a means of curing the scars inflicted on individuals through discrimination and transforming institutionalized processes that have perpetuated the low status of disadvantaged groups. Opponents see it as reversed discrimination which contributes to discrimination in group status. It is felt that awarding jobs and benefits according to group statistics rather than on individual merit, is unjust and lowers standards and organizational effectiveness.

Equal opportunity should be seen as the point on the continuum where affirmative action has eliminated all inequalities between diverse members of an organization such as the SANDF, and all staff members have reached a level where they can compete equally. The provision of equal opportunities can be implemented without embarking on affirmative action, and does not in itself imply the emergence of genuine economic, political and social equality. Those traditionally privileged may continue to enjoy inherited advantages and such continuing advantages are usually achieved through the exercise of skills derived from experience. To avoid this, affirmative action measures should be employed to empower the disadvantaged.³³

Affirmative action has an element of preferential treatment, while merit is one of the main criteria in the provision of equal opportunities. Affirmative action serves initially as impetus for improving capabilities, until every staff member is properly prepared to compete on an equitable basis in an environment where equal opportunities for advancement exist. While affirmative action favours and empowers historically disadvantaged groups, equal opportunity simply provides the opportunity without distinction to everyone and without any commitment towards the empowerment of disadvantaged groups.

On a symbolic level, any political party that has won elections and becomes part of the government of the day, would like to be seen as liberated from the institutions of its predecessor. An integral part of the symbols of independence and power, is the visible presence and representation of the ruling party's constituency in the civil service, including the SANDF. The priority at present, is to restructure these institutions in a manner reflective of the country's diverse demography. Secondly, as Maj. Gen. Bantu Holomisa put it, "we must accept and understand that, in certain areas, any future

government will have to find posts for certain people who played a strategic role in helping them to win elections".³⁴

On a political level, the security forces were perceived to be strongly partisan. A great amount of power and patronage was associated with them, primarily as a result of their strong links with the National Party. It was feared that the restructured SANDF might include reactionary groups who would frustrate reform initiatives by the Government of National Unity. The emphasis was thus be on a more representative SANDF, which would be in line with the requirements of restructuring South Africa according to the current political view.

WHY AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN THE SANDF

Issues of Race. The old SADF's traditional promotion system has resulted in the organization's leadership being predominantly white. In 1991, all officers in the top five salary scales of the Permanent Force (PF) were white. At lower levels of command, there were 25 Africans, 14 Indians, 123 Coloureds and 7,191 white officers up to and including the rank of colonel.³⁵ In 1993, the most senior African army officer was a colonel in the Chaplain's service.³⁶ However, these imbalances will not be adequately addressed by the integration process, which only involves members of the non-statutory forces (NSF). NSF members should not be the only beneficiaries of affirmative action. In fact, the real beneficiaries are suppose to be those black members of the former SADF who have been historically deprived of opportunities and who are presently being marginalised by the exigencies of the integration process. Although senior members of the guerrilla and TBVC forces have the potential to become officers in the SANDF, they do not necessarily have the technical and other experience to fill top management positions. Black members of the former SADF have been serving the conventional force for half of their lives, and some of them have long since acquired the necessary experience to make them eligible for promotion. It seems as if these officers are not being considered for promotion, despite many years of loyal service and adherence to the same traditions and values which the SANDF upholds.

Gender. Defence forces throughout the world are monopolized by males. In South Africa, the debate on the integration process paid little attention to this issue. Over the past two decades, male conscripts comprised the majority of SADF personnel. In 1991, women made up fourteen per cent of the Permanent Force and a minor proportion of the officer corps : 103 commandants (LtCol), ten colonels, and one brigadier general. In the same year, women constituted twenty per cent of MK, with only one in a formal leadership position.³⁷ In 1994, the TEC Sub-Council on Defence and the JMCC were comprised exclusively of males. Female members of the former SADF, guerrilla and TBVC forces were not allowed to occupy combat positions and were excluded from direct combat. Against this background a policy of affirmative action for women was being implemented in 1996 in the SANDF.

Standards will be lowered. Following the multi-party negotiations and the JMCC process, senior military personnel of the former SADF repeatedly emphasized the need for an integration process with acceptable professional standards as a condition. The assumption was that guerrilla and TBVC forces

lack the requisite professional standards.³⁸ These same officers also oppose uncontrolled affirmative action on similar grounds, namely that it will lower standards and affect combat effectiveness, but the political decision was made that professionalism should not be measured in technical qualities such as course qualifications and experience, but in political and ethical dimensions.³⁹

IMPLEMENTATION OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION

There are specific skills which can only be acquired after long term training and through experience, but there are certain levels within the defence force hierarchy that offer possibilities for the full implementation of affirmative action. The first level comprises "operators" who maintain and operate tanks, radar and weapons systems. This does not have to present long term problems for new entrants, since the requisite technical skills can be gained with adequate and proper training within a number of years. The South African did incorporate the soldiers from MK and APLA as early as middle 1994 into this area with good results. The technical level operators took longer and it is only since 1996 that this areas could be filled with black soldiers. On the second level, the "commanders" who effectively run the armed forces on a daily basis in times of war and peace are encompassed. They are responsible for developing doctrine and designing relevant systems and training programs. These are battalion commanders, technical experts and intelligence, operations and logistics staff officers. These positions cannot be filled easily or quickly, since they depend on training and extensive practical experience in a variety of roles. At this level, new entrants should be supervised and trained by senior staff for a given period of time while doing qualifying courses where necessary. The third level is made up of "generals": heads of the army, navy, air force, and medical services, the chiefs of major staff departments and some other senior officers. These positions should present little difficulty for new entrants since they entail a mixture of military and political skills and require "defence generalists" rather than "defence specialists". In theory this works well, but in reality, most generals are being appointed on political grounds without the military background or knowledge. In the former non-statuary forces the now – generals were mostly "political commissars". The appointments of new entrants to the general staff served to satisfy the political and moral imperatives of the new South Africa. Special attention had however been given to strengthen the infrastructure with able staff officers.

Affirmative action failed in many countries and organizations because of an obsession with quick solutions. Organizations seemed to be involved in a race to produce black officers and results are expected in an inordinately short time. Affirmative action, however, is a process, not a historical event. Whereas the military know this and understand the danger of quick solutions, the political pressure to change quickly is very important. This manifested in the replacement of Minister Modise with Minister Lekota by President Mbeki to speed up the enhancement of Black representivity. The SANDF needs to equip itself to manage cultural diversity. There are forms of behaviour that may indicate normal assertiveness in one culture, but in another would be absolutely offensive. If there ever was a melting pot, South Africa is one - it contains the good, the bad and the ugly of Africa, Asia, Europe and America.

British historian Paul Johnson sums it up as follows: "South Africa is a microcosm of the global problems which confront humanity in the 1990's".⁴⁰

Diversity in the SANDF is a strength to be harnessed, not an obstacle. An affirmative action program, therefore, should not be designed with the purpose of transforming blacks into whites or the rid the SANDF of whites. It must attempt to bring out the best in an individual without corroding that individual's self-identity. This is an important lesson for the SANDF, as some senior officers would merely like to monitor the numbers. The adequacy of support mechanisms is not evaluated.

STAFFING AND REPRESENTIVITY

REPRESENTIVITY AT GRASS ROOTS

Within the rank groups private, lance – corporals and corporals, the SA Army is predominantly Black – 90% Black with is a huge misrepresentivity towards the White and Coloured side – less that 1% is White and about 4% are Coloured. Currently the imbalance in this group enjoys no attention from the senior Army officials or Government.

The SA Army middle management level (Sergeant – Colonel) is more white that black (38,62% Black, 47,11% White, 13,96% Coloured and 0,31% Asian). The present natural attrition rate of the Army is about 2,000 members per year (70% Black, 20% White, 9,7% Coloured and 0,30% Asian).⁴¹ Compare this with the annual recruitment figure (since 1996) of only 500 members per year (64% Black, 24% White, 10% Coloured and 1% Asian) the SA Army has a negative growth rate with regard to the enhancement of representivity. The comparison with regard to the inflow and outflow as indicated below clearly illustrates this phenomenon. See Table 2. What is needed to rectify this situation is an annual recruitment figure of about 2,000 members to at least maintain the present representivity rate!

Population distr.	Natural attr per year % (Ave 2000)	Growth rate	lms recruitment per annum (Ave 500)
Blacks	70% - 1400 members	- 1 076	324 members = 64, 68%
Whites	20% - 400 members	- 279	121 members = 24,35%
Coloureds	9,7% - 194 members	- 143	51 members = 10,22%
Asians	0,30% - 6 members	- 2	4 members = 0,75%

TABLE 2: GROWTH RATE

RACIAL IMBALANCES

Stipulated in tables 3 to 6 are the present representivity rates wrt Black, White, Coloured and Asian within the Middle Management Level:

Rank Gp	Number of Posts Available in The Transitional Model	Number of Posts to be Staffed by Blacks to Reach an EAP of 64%	Number of Blacks Presently Available in the SA Army	Black Shortages To reach an EAP of 64% (per rank group)
a	b	c	d	e
Col	115	74	22	- 52
Lt Col	421	274	78	- 194
Maj	774	501	179	- 322
Capt	1 088	704	345	- 359
Lt	822	532	516	- 16
WO1	525	340	52	- 288
WO2	670	433	163	- 270
SSgt	1 793	1 160	442	- 718
Sgt	2 939	1 901	1 379	- 522

TABLE 3: MIDDLE MANAGEMENT RACIAL IMBALANCES - BLACKS

Rank Gp	Number of Posts Available in The Transitional Model	Number of Posts to be Staffed by Coloureds to Reach an EAP of 64%	Number of Coloureds Presently Available in the SA Army	Coloured Shortages To reach an EAP of 64% (per rank group)
a	b	c	d	e
Col	115	12	1	- 11
Lt Col	421	43	16	- 27
Maj	774	79	59	- 20
Capt	1 088	111	65	- 46
Lt	822	84	143	+ 59
WO1	525	54	88	+ 34
WO2	670	68	167	+ 99
SSgt	1 793	183	226	+ 43
Sgt	2 939	300	394	+ 94

TABLE 4: MIDDLE MANAGEMENT RACIAL IMBALANCES – COLOURED

Rank Gp	Number of Posts Available in the Transitional Model	Number of Posts to be staffed by Whites to reach an EAP of 64%	Number of Whites Presently Available in the SA Army	White Shortages To reach an EAP of 64% (per rank group)
a	b	c	d	e
Col	115	28	88	+ 60
Lt Col	421	103	270	+ 167
Maj	774	188	343	+ 155
Capt	1 088	264	536	+ 272
Lt	822	200	452	+ 252
WO1	525	128	475	+ 347
WO2	670	163	356	+ 193
SSgt	1 793	436	680	+ 244
Sgt	2 939	716	707	- 9

TABLE 5: MIDDLE MANAGEMENT RACIAL IMBALANCES - WHITES

Rank Gp	Number of Posts Available in the Transitional Model	Number of Posts to be staffed by Asians to reach an EAP of 64%	Number of Asians Presently Available in the SA Army	Asian Shortages To reach an EAP of 64% (per rank group)
a	b	c	d	e
Col	115	1	0	- 1
Lt Col	421	3	0	- 3
Maj	774	6	1	- 5
Capt	1 088	8	4	- 4
Lt	822	6	1	- 5
WO1	525	4	3	- 1
WO2	670	5	4	- 1
SSgt	1 793	13	7	- 6
Sgt	2 939	22	6	- 16

TABLE 6: MIDDLE MANAGEMENT RACIAL IMBALANCES - ASIANS

STAFFING PROCESS AND MEASURES TO ADDRESS IMBALANCES

The SA Army, currently 40,974 strong, is presently staffing an approved transitional structure consisting of 33,922 posts. This staffing process will hopefully be completed by 31 March/30 Apr 2001. Present predictions indicate a surplus of about 7,000 members at the end of the staffing process.⁴² However, this will not be the case as a result of area-boundness, unpopular units, members only applying for promotion posts, EAP guidelines not followed, guidelines per former force not followed or no invitation of Black candidates. Such a result will force the SA Army into further staffing phases. These phases can include the possibility of the implementation of special measures.

Educational Levels of Predicted Non-staffed⁴³ members. The approximately 7,000 non-staffed members will mainly be Blacks with about 3,000 in the PSAP (civilian) environment and about 4,000 in the uniform environment. In both cases the educational levels are low. Such members can hardly be considered as a first priority pool to staff the SA Army and the options of re-mustering and retraining is also not considered viable.⁴⁴ The solution lies in the early upliftment (ABET) of these members to a higher educational level to prepare them for further vocational training and possible retrenchment.

Fast Tracking. The concept of fast tracking to enhance Black representivity can successfully be implemented in the Army and in reality is already been done. However, to have the most influence, this concept must be supported by means of an annual inflow of about 2,000 IMS (Initial military service) candidates to combat natural attrition alone. The approach to fast tracking should be to educate or train members with potential, thus creating a pool of empowered members ready for promotion when posts become vacant as a result of natural attrition, VSP or EMF.

DoD Affirmative Action Plan.⁴⁵ The DoD AA Plan does not make provision for the implementation of "special" or "extreme" measures such as the staffing⁴⁶ and/or promotion of Black members into posts recently staffed with White members. Presently this is not the "spirit"⁴⁷ of the AA Plan and the result of the staffing process remains the method to determine the baseline of Black representivity. The introduction of such a "special" measure must be avoided, as such a process will be harsh and painful to the white members involved. As it is, unions already start taking steps over the so-called "reverse discrimination".

The VSP Mechanism. The VSP (voluntary severance package) remains a mechanism to enhance Black representivity. It is a less painful method than the introduction of a "special" measure. This mechanism was introduced in 1996 and worked so well that most of the competent white senior members left the Army, only to leave behind gaps of such dimensions that parts of the Army were falling apart. VSP was stopped in 1999, but the SANDF should endeavor to re-instate this mechanism with the main aim to enhance Black representivity within the SA Army. If the VSP is re-instated, more White middle management will use this opportunity to leave the SANDF, thus creating more posts for the other groups.

Shadow posts. The creation of temporary shadow posts to enhance Black representivity can be considered as an option. Together with the necessary mentor-ship this can be a solution, however, not many serving officers would like to participate in this solution because of a "who's doing the work and who's looking, and who gets the post in the end?" attitude.

DOWNSIZING

As already mentioned, the SA Army is working toward the "Transitional model." Due to the sensitivity around the layoff of Blacks who can't be staffed⁴⁸ in the model according to present force levels, the Government will not lay off any un-staffed soldiers. The exercise of downsizing and restructuring the armed forces is underway, driven by a five per cent reduction in the defence budget during the past seven years to today's level of 1.5 per cent of GDP.⁴⁹ The way that the rationalization was to be carried out was natural attrition and voluntary severance packets. However this takes time and also has negative influences.

If downsizing is allowed to carry on as is, with natural attrition and VSP of 200 – 250 members per year, with no recruitment, the Transformation model can be reached in 2003. Implications:⁵⁰

1. No maintenance of Black representivity.
2. Only downsizing and no rightsizing.
3. Application of VSP will enhance representivity.
4. Further deteriorating of the already skew age/rank pyramid.

If recruitment is allowed as well as VSP of 500, the Transformation model will be reached in 2005. Implications:

1. Longer period, more money, to reach model.
2. New Blood to rectify present skew rank/age pyramid is allowed on an annual basis.
3. Current budget availability?
4. Lesser enhancement of Black representivity, the 1000 members per year on natural attrition still deteriorate the enhancement.

The reality option entails that the ever decreasing budget for the short/medium term is the point of departure. VSP of 500 per year will be given selectively to whites. Recruitment out of the short and medium term members of about 1, 000 a year. Implications:

1. Transitional structure will be reached by 2004.
2. Enhancement of black representivity in a lesser extent maintained.
3. The most affordable option.
4. VSP will enhance black representivity.
5. Still a negative growth of 1000 members per year.

REFLECTIONS

MANAGEABLE CONCERNS

In the first instance, there must be recognition for the importance of the SANDF in completing its integration process. Most of the practical difficulties of integrating the formerly adversarial forces have been overcome, and the remaining challenge can be regarded as "manageable concerns"

For some time to come, the SANDF and the SA Army in particular, will have to cope with inexperienced commanders and staff officers in the middle and top management. Coupled with a ever declining budget, the growing obsolescence of operational main equipment and the challenge of training and manage the new Army into a coherent, professional machine, the aspects of experience and capability will be of major concern in the military. While it is not a hopeless situation, the future will depend on clever, efficient and dynamic management of funds, technology, manpower and equipment. Officers can never act with confidence until they are masters of their profession.

TRANSFORMATION

On reflecting about the transformation process in the Army many critical things come to mind. One of the main issues is how will South Africa be able to project force in such a way that a credible deterrent to a future enemy is effected, and simultaneously act as a hub of regional military safety while it is in the midst of a painful, yet necessary transformation process. This process is likely to remain a long - term activity in the Army. The argument can also be used that the SA Army by now suffers from a severe case of transformation fatigue, institutional over-stretch and very poor role-definition.⁵¹

It is clear that transformation is strongly, if not madly, concerned with a representative force. In fact, the impression is created that transformation, originally conceived as a change in policy, ethos and structure, has gained a different content, namely, that of Representivity. Like all state organizations, the SANDF must respond and adapt to the socio-political pressures imposed upon it. While the Department of Defence has risen boldly to the challenges posed by the new political dispensation, it still faces a number of obstacles with respect to the implementation of policies on equality. Representivity and employment equity are difficult to achieve in the military profession, which requires lengthy training and education to progress through the various ranks. Rapid promotion to correct past imbalances is often associated with a decline in standards. Although active steps are being taken to achieve Representivity without undermining standards, concern is often expressed that the Affirmative Action policies of the Dept of Defence have a negative impact on the competency of the SANDF. Whether this is true, or merely opinions generated as a result of so-called reverse discrimination, it is of great importance to cohesion and the future effectiveness of the SANDF.

It must also be clear that the transformation process is far from over. Clear goals have been set regarding the demographic composition of the SANDF as a whole. Although substantial progress has been made in this regard, imbalances remain, with White officers dominating the middle management rank groups except for the lower ranks. Inevitably, an outflow of White middle-rank non-commissioned officers and officers from the Army in the months and years that lie ahead will continue to be the order of

the day. This will undoubtedly impact upon the operational effectiveness, and possibly discipline, in the Army.⁵²

COMPETENCIES

Above all, the challenge to retain, change and develop appropriate competencies for the future Army is great. The aim is to balance a representative force with organizational requirements to maintain combat effectiveness. In view of the challenges ahead, one must agree with the views of analysts⁵³ who assert that institutional stability within the SANDF is undoubtedly some years off, as is the final transformation of the force into a disciplined, motivated and operationally effective force capable of performing its key functions.

According to General Nyanda, .. [a] prime feature of transformation is to produce a Defence Force that meets the requirements of our time and is affordable. Our expenditure on personnel is too high at the expense of operating costs and capital expenditure. Similarly our low allocation for capital expenditure has led to depleted stock levels, equipment obsolescence and maintenance backlogs. We have to rationalize and bring down the personnel/strength and cost to its correct proportion of the budget.⁵⁴

It is true that a major portion of the defence budget is consumed by personnel costs and operational costs, which are impairing the SANDF's need to replace aged equipment. At the same time, rationalization must also be assessed in the context of South Africa's declining defence capabilities. In fact, based on the military potency index published in London in the New International Security Review 1998, it is justified to assert that the country's position as a military power is on the wane.⁵⁵ Although the index is said to be a fairly subjective evaluation, it nonetheless has some validity and confirms what many officers in the Army have long maintained. South Africa's defence status is directly related to its defence budget which has seen many years of consecutive cuts. Note the first ten positions in the table below:

RANK	COUNTRY
1	US (10.08)
2	China
3	Russia
4	France
5	United Kingdom (8.24)
6	South Korea
7	North Korea
8	India
9	Saudi Arabia
10	Japan (8.65)

TABLE 7: MILITARY POTENCY INDEX

With a current potency of just more than six points, South Africa's drop in potency is the worst, followed by Mozambique. Globally, the country's decline was fourth-worst after Croatia, Belarus and the former Yugoslavia. Again, it must be clear that the SANDF is not in a hopeless situation. A look at the overall rating of South Africa in the region reveals that there is no country in Southern Africa which comes close to South Africa's potency. The closest are Angola and Zimbabwe, with 4.88 points each. Botswana, Zambia, Mozambique, Malawi and Lesotho all score below four. In Sub-Saharan Africa, the only country that comes close to South Africa's potency is Nigeria, with a score of 5.46. This would imply that South Africa could afford to allow its potency to slip further without being seriously challenged by any of its neighbours.⁵⁶ At the same time, it should be realized that since the advent of a new dispensation in South Africa, expectations in Africa and elsewhere have steadily grown regarding her potential role as a peace-broker in African conflicts. To this end, it can be concluded that the SANDF has regional responsibilities and for that, the country needs a core capability and competence that will allow them to take action in the region if required to do so. The decline, therefore, is indeed cause for concern.

CONCLUSION

The past decade has not been easy for the SANDF and the SA Army. The roles had to be redefined and structures transformed to meet the demands and pressures from political role-players and society at large. The SANDF is also charged with an increasing responsibility towards the maintenance of security in Sub-Saharan Africa. As far as the future is concerned, it is clear from the above that the challenges facing the SANDF are immense. Given the lack of sufficient funds and the problems of a drawn out transformation process (with strong emphasis on human resources), the responsibility and burden on the leadership of the SANDF are overwhelming.⁵⁷ In the final analysis, the question remains as to what extent the SANDF will be able to project force in such a way that a credible deterrent to a future enemy is effected, and simultaneously act as the hub of regional security, while still dealing with the continuing transformation process in the context of an under funded budget. This question, however sensitive it might be for the SANDF and the relevant policy-makers, is real and relevant. Whether the SANDF will be able to respond to future challenges will depend on the outlook and managerial vision of the relevant policy-makers and generals. One can only hope that wisdom and sound judgement will prevail at all decision-making levels.

WORD COUNT = 10 163

ENDNOTES

¹Martin Edmonds, "Global Defence"; available from < <http://global-defence.com/99/1998/97/SouthAfricanDefence.html>.>; Internet; accessed 28 December 2000.

²The term statutory forces is being used in the SANDF to describe all forces that was part of a government regulated by a constitution. Non-statutory forces refer to all freedom-fighter armies and private armies.

³"Soldiers popping out of woodwork"; available from < <http://www.iol.co.za/archieves/1998/9807/29/bot.html>.>; Internet; accessed 2 December 2000.

⁴Greg Mills, <<http://www.nwc.navy.mil/press/Review/1999/winter/art4-w99.htm>> Internet; accessed 17 December 2000.

⁵Rationalization in the context of this sentence means downsizing or rightsizing.

⁶South African Ministry of Defence (SAMOD), The National Defence Force in Transition: Annual Report Financial Year 1994-1995, (Johannesburg: 1st Military Printing Regiment 1995), 17.

⁷Ministry of Defence, Annual Report FY 1995/96, (Johannesburg: 1st Military Printing Regiment 1996), 25.

⁸The defence secretary, Pierre Steyn, noted in mid-1997 that defence was in his opinion not yet under the control of civilians, as the white paper and Defence Review had not been translated into a manageable defence plan, program, and budget for strategic decision making, performance, control, and accountability. Moreover, General Steyn noted that his dependence on military staff and the weakness of his civilian staff undermined the performance of the civilian defence secretariat. He argued that civilian control would become a reality only when the boundary between the defence secretariat and the SANDF was clearly drawn, leaving a balanced distribution of functions between the secretary and the chief of the SANDF; when the line and staff capacities of the secretariat and the SANDF were constituted with predominantly civilian and military capacities, respectively; and when separate career, management, and development systems for civilian and military functionaries under the control of the secretariat and the SANDF, respectively, had been commissioned. See *Citizen* (South Africa), 16 April 1997.

⁹James Winkates, "The transition of the South African National Defence Force: A good beginning," Armed Forces and Society (Spring 2000): 5.

¹⁰Greg Mills, "SANDF, between downsizing and new capabilities"; available from <<http://www.nwc.navy.mil/press/Review/1999/winter/art4-w99.htm>>; Internet; accessed 06 January 2001.

¹¹Republic of South Africa, Government Gazette, vol. 343, no. 15466, 28 January 1994, 150.

¹²Constitution of South Africa, Chapter 11, Article 200(2).

¹³Interim Constitution of South Africa, Article 227(1).

¹⁴ Defence in a Democracy: White Paper on National Defence for the Republic of South Africa, May 1996.

¹⁵South African Ministry of Defence (SAMOD), The National Defence Force in Transition: Annual Report Financial Year 1994–1995, (Johannesburg: 1st Military Printing Regiment, 1995), Chapter 4.

¹⁶*Ibid.*, Chapter 5.

¹⁷Defence in a Democracy: White Paper on National Defence for the Republic of South Africa, May 1996.

¹⁸*Ibid.*

¹⁹Official briefing by the SA Army to the Foreign Military Attaches on the Transformation Force Preparation and Application of the SA Army; Pretoria; 11 October 2000.

²⁰*Ibid.*

²¹1st and 2nd Line functions are the first and second echelons. First line units/systems can also be seen as a battalion with its inherent logistical and technical capabilities. A 2nd line unit/system will typically be a Field workshop (technical) or a Maintenance (logistical) unit.

²²Official briefing by the SA Army to the Foreign Military Attaches on the Transformation Force Preparation and Application of the SA Army, Pretoria, 11 October 2000.

²³*Ibid.*

²⁴Non – statutory forces are those military forces belonging to the ANC, PAC and INKATHA.

²⁵Ministry of Defence media briefing, available from <http://www.pmg.org.za/Briefings/000918defence.htm>; Internet; accessed 16 January 2001.

²⁶Official briefing by the SA Army to the Foreign Military Attaches on the Transformation Force Preparation and Application of the SA Army, Pretoria, 11 October 2000.

²⁷Military Strategic Appreciation; CJ OPS/C/302/2 DD 18 May 2000 [Confidential].

²⁸M. Edmonds and G. Mills, Uncharted Waters (SAIIA/ CDISS: Johannesburg, 1996), 2-4.

²⁹“Tempe victims’ dependents sue SANDF for R5.1 mil,” 15 March 2000; available from <http://www.dispatch.co.za/2000/03/15/southafrica/SANDFSUE.HTM>; Internet; accessed 27 January 2001.

³⁰Minister of Defence briefing, available from <http://www.pmg.org.za/Briefings/000918defence.htm>; Internet; accessed 20 January 2001.

³¹V. Maphai, “Civil service and affirmative action,” Indicator SA 3, no. 4 (1992): 46.

³²Pule Zwane, African Security Review 4, No. 1 (1995).

³³V. Maphai, "Civil service and affirmative action," Indicator SA 3, no. 4 (1992): 46.

³⁴B. Holomisa, speech held at SANCO conference, Port Elizabeth, 1990.

³⁵Cape Times, 23 February 1991.

³⁶SADF Advertising Survey, Argus, 10 September 1991.

³⁷J. Cock, Colonels and cadres: War and gender in SA, 1991.

³⁸L. Nathan, Changing the guards, unpublished article, 1994.

³⁹ Pule Zwane, African Security Review 4, No. 1 (1995).

⁴⁰P. Johnson, A history of the modern world from 1917 to 1990, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993).

⁴¹SA Army report on the Enhancement of Representivity; ARMY OFFICE/D HR PLAN/512/2 DD Oct 2000.

⁴²Ibid.

⁴³"Non-staffed" means those members who do not have a post in the approved transitional structure.

⁴⁴Decision briefing for C Army on Enhancement of Black representivity; ARMY OFFICE/D HR PLAN/106/30 DD Sep 2000.

⁴⁵Ibid.

⁴⁶"Staffing" means the process of placing the successful candidate in the post for which he/she did applied. This process will take into account the guidelines of representivity, experience, guidelines on gender and qualifications.

⁴⁷The "spirit" of affirmative action is currently to try to staff the best candidate in the post, while keeping in mind the percentages of colour in ranks.

⁴⁸As already mentioned, there is not enough posts in the transition model for the current members on strength. The problem is that all these "non-staffed" soldiers are Black and privates (there are 3,000 too many privates).

⁴⁹Martin Edmonds, "South African Defence," available from <[http://www.global-defence.com/99/1998/97/SouthAfrican Defence.html](http://www.global-defence.com/99/1998/97/SouthAfrican%20Defence.html)>; Internet; accessed 03 February 2001.

⁵⁰HR Support work study to determine option for downsizing; HR SUPP/101/1 DD Nov 2000.

⁵¹J. Cilliers, "Continuity in change: The SA Army in transition," ISS Monograph Series, no. 26 (August 1998).

⁵²L. Heinecken, "Social equality versus combat effectiveness: An institutional challenge for the military," African Security Review 7, no. 6 (1998).

⁵³Ibid.

⁵⁴"Address by CSANDF on SANDF' fifth birthday anniversary," SANDF Bulletin, (01 May 1993).

⁵⁵L. Scheepers, "The SA National Defence Force of the future: Asset or monument? The responsibility of South Africa towards a volatile continent," African Armed Forces Journal (September 1998).

⁵⁶T.G. Neethling, available from <http://erlsrv.sun.ac.za/AAJ/March2000/reflections_on_crucial_defence_i.htm>; Internet; accessed 03 February 2001.

⁵⁷T. Neethling, "Non-traditional military tasks: the Defence Force in policing and peacekeeping," Crime & Conflict, no. 13 (Spring 1998).

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Njanda, Genl. "Address by CSANDF on SANDF' fifth birthday anniversary." SANDF Bulletin, (01 May 1993).
- "The way of the military." Cape (SA)Times, 23 February 1991.
- Chandler, Norman. "Proposal to revamp SANDF." 19 May 1997. Available from <
<http://www.iol.co.za/archieves/1997/9706/9revamp.html>>. Internet. Accessed 20 January 2001.
- Chandler, Norman. "No more commandos' in SANDF." 1999. Available from <
<http://www.iol.co.za/archieves/1999/9905/13/rese.html>>. Internet. Accessed 20 January 2001.
- Cock, J. Colonels and cadres: War and gender in SA, 1991.
- Constitution of South Africa, Chapter 11, Article 200(2).
- Decision briefing for C Army on Enhancement of Black representivity; ARMY OFFICE/D HR PLAN/106/30 DD Sep 2000.
- Edmonds, Martin. "South African Defence." Available from <<http://www.global-defence.com/99/1998/97/SouthAfricanDefence.html>>. Internet. Accessed 03 February 2001.
- Edmonds, Martin."Global Defence." Available from <<http://global-defence.com/99/1998/97/SouthAfricanDefence.html>>. Internet. Accessed 28 December 2000.
- Edmonds, M. and Mills, G. Uncharted Waters. Johannesburg: SAIIA/ CDISS, 1996. 2-4.
- Hadland, Adrian. "Soldiers popping out of woodwork". 1998. Available from <
<http://www.iol.co.za/archieves/1998/9807/29/bot.html>>. Internet. Accessed 2 December 2000.
- Heinecken, L. "Social equality versus combat effectiveness: An institutional challenge for the military." African Security Review 7, no. 6 (1998).
- Holomisa, B. Speech held at SANCO conference, Port Elizabeth, 1990.
- HR Support work study to determine option for downsizing; HR SUPP/101/1 DD Nov 2000.
- Cilliers, J. "Continuity in change: The SA Army in transition." ISS Monograph Series, no. 26 (August 1998).
- Interim Constitution of South Africa, Article 227(1).
- Johnson, P. A history of the modern world from 1917 to 1990. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993.
- Ludski, Henry. "SANDF ghosts draw salaries." 20 March 1997. Available from <
<http://www.iol.co.za/archieves/1997/9703/03/26%20MAR/bogus.html>>. Internet. Accessed 28 Dec 2000.
- Maphai, V. "Civil service and affirmative action." Indicator SA 3, no. 4 (1992): 46.
- Mills, Greg. "SANDF, between Downsizing and New capabilities." 1998. Available from
<<http://www.nwc.navy.mil/press/Review/1999/winter/art4-w99.htm>>. Internet. Accessed 06 January 2001.

- Ministry of Defence. Annual Report FY 1995/96. Johannesburg: 1st Military Printing Regiment 1996.
- Modise, J. "Media briefing." Available from <<http://www.pmg.org.za/Briefings/000918defence.htm>>. Internet. Accessed 20 January 2001.
- Modise, J. "Parliamentary media briefing." 14 February 1997. Available from <<http://www.sun.ac.za/local/library/john/army/briefing.htm>>. Internet. Accessed 21 November 2000
- Nathan, L. "Changing the guards." Unpublished article, 1994.
- Nathan, Laurie. "An Agenda for State Demilitarization?" February 1997. Available from <<http://www.q.co.za/news/2000/08/000816-ncglesadfletter.htm>>. Internet. Accessed 28 December 2000
- Naidu, Edwin. "Guerrilla army integration into defence force completed." 25 April 1997. Available from <<http://www.iol.co.za/archives/1997/9704/Apr%2029/armyenaidu.html>>. Internet. Accessed on 20 January 2001.
- Neethling, T.G. Reflections on Crucial Defence Issues, March 2000, available from <http://erlsrv.sun.ac.za/AAJ/March2000/reflections_on_crucial_defence_i.htm>; Internet; accessed 28 December 2000.
- Neethling, Theo. "Non-traditional military tasks: the Defence Force in policing and peacekeeping." Crime & Conflict, no. 13 (Spring 1998).
- Otto, Reg. "Armies in an era of change: South Africa." Military Technology (Bonn) 22, no. 6 (Jun 1998).
- Prabhakara, M.S. "Tasks of Transformation." 5 Nov 1999. Available from <<http://www.frontlineonline.com/fl1622/16220610.htm>>. Internet. Accessed 28 Dec 2000.
- Republic of South Africa. Government Gazette 343, no. 15466 (28 January 1994):120 150.
- SA Army official briefing to the Foreign Military Attaches on the Transformation Force Preparation and Application of the SA Army; Pretoria; 11 October 2000.
- SA Army report on the Enhancement of Representivity; ARMY OFFICE/D HR PLAN/512/2 DD Oct 2000.
- SA Defence in Democracy: White Paper on National Defence for the Republic of South Africa, May 1996
- SA Government. "White Paper on South African Participation in International Peace Missions." 21 October 1998. Available from <http://www.polity.org.za/govdocs/white_papers/peacekeeping.html>. Internet. Accessed 28 December 2000.
- "SADF Advertising Survey". Argus (SA), 10 September 1991.
- SA Military Strategic Appreciation; CJ OPS/C/302/2 DD 18 May 2000 [Confidential].
- Scheepers, L. "The SA National Defence Force of the future: Asset or monument? The responsibility of South Africa towards a volatile continent." African Armed Forces Journal (September 1998).
- Shelver, Carrie. "NCGLE call on Minister of Defence for judicial inquiry into human abuses." 14 August 2000. Available from <<http://www.q.co.za/news/2000/08/000816-ncglesadfletter.htm>>. Internet. Accessed 28 Dec 2000.

- South Africa Ministry of Defence. "Media briefing." 18 September 2000. Available from <<http://www.pmg.org.za/Briefings/000918defence.htm>>. Internet. accessed 16 January 2001.
- South African Ministry of Defence (SAMOD). "The National Defence Force in Transition." Annual Report Financial Year 1994–1995. Johannesburg: 1st Military Printing Regiment, 1995.
- "Tempe victims' dependents sue SANDF for R5.1 mil." 15 March 2000. Available from <<http://www.dispatch.co.za/2000/03/15/southafrica/SANDFSUE.HTM>>. Internet. Accessed 27 January 2001.
- Uys, Fanie. "The SANDF Transformation Process." 1997. Available from <<http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/ASR/6.1/Uys.html>>. Internet. Accessed on 28 Dec 2000.
- Van Niekerk, Cor. "Defence union warns SANDF to put halt to restructuring." 1998. Available from <<http://www.iol.co.za/archieves/1998/9812/19/02Alanis6.html>>. Internet. Accessed 22 December 2000.
- Van Staden, L.B. "Rationalization in the SANDF: The Next Challenge." 1997. Available from <<http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/ASR/6.2/van%Stade.html>>. Internet. Accessed 28 Dec 2000.
- Williams, Rocklyn. "How primary is the primary function?: Configuring the SANDF for African Realities." African Security Review 8 no 6, (1999).
- Winkates, James. "The transition of the South African National Defence Force: A good beginning." Armed Forces and Society (Spring 2000): 1 – 13.
- Zwane, Pula. "Challenges Facing the SANDF: From Integration to Affirmative Action." African Security Review 4, no. 1 (1995).