



**STRATEGY
RESEARCH
PROJECT**

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**COMBATING TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME: AN
EMERGING SPECIAL OPERATIONS MISSION**

BY

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ABSTRACT

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Transnational Organized Crime abides by no known laws, respects no international boundaries, and has the ability to topple nation-states. Allied forces trained by U.S. Special Operations Forces battle enterprising organized criminal forces around the world today. On-going governmental analysis explores the strategic implications of transnational organized crime, validating the need for the United States to employ all elements of national power against this threat. Synergistically employed, each element serves to protect our national security and our national interest. Current and proposed strategic concepts, policies, presidential decision directives, and a reluctant use of our military forces all give evidence of our attempts to address this transnational organized criminal threat. A coherent National Security Strategy and a National Military Strategy citing increased military options are giving rise to an emerging Special Operations Forces mission.

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COMBATING TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME: AN EMERGING SPECIAL OPERATIONS MISSION

Nowhere is cooperation more vital than fighting the increasingly interconnected groups that traffic in terror, organized crime, drug smuggling and the spread of weapons of mass destruction. No One is immune. ... These forces jeopardize the global trend towards peace and freedom, undermine fragile new democracies, sap the strength from developing countries, threaten our efforts to build a safer, more prosperous world — President Clinton (1995)

Criminal Enterprise Armies (CEAs) and other nontraditional organizations can increasingly out-spend, out-maneuver, out-shoot, out-negotiate, and out-think established states and their tools for enforcing order. Relevant institutions of the U.S. Government must now re-define themselves vis-à-vis the rest of the world. However, we will probably fail to do this until the situation becomes so desperate it threatens our elites and the money-buffered enclaves in which they live, learn, and work. International laws, U.S. laws, and outdated diplomatic practices also cripple us in asymmetrical exchanges such as that which occurred in Somalia.¹

The West's victory in the Cold War and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union has opened a Pandora's box, the emergence of global Transnational Organized Crime (TOC). Globalized trade, advances in technology, and the breakdown of nation-states also contribute to this new strategic threat – a threat described by many as not abiding by norms of diplomacy, boundaries of sovereignty, rules of humanity, or international monetary regulations. This new global threat is now forcing nations to reconsider how they use their military, law enforcement, and judicial systems to protect their citizens, their economies, and their ways of life from transnational criminals. Responses to this threat will inevitably compare to current responses to limited war, requiring the full support of the nation's citizenry and commitment of elements of national power as characterized even by total war.

Today we are facing this threat with poorly coordinated policies, with occasional Presidential Decision Directives, with new laws, with increased law enforcement, and with United Nations resources. As we currently employ all the elements of national power in a non-synergistic effort to combat this threat the employment of military forces (i.e. special forces training of Columbian anti-drug troops and naval special operations support for the Joint Task Forces – JTF-4 and JTF-6) continues to increase, but without a mature National Security Strategy or a National Military Strategy. Fighting Transnational Organized Crime is thus becoming an Emerging Special Operations Mission.

As a nation-state, we play by the rules codified in our own laws or in international laws. When other world actors play by our rules, we can act positively and successfully to protect our national interest. Increasingly, however, the world does not give a damn about our laws, customs, or table manners. Further, emerging TOC players could care less about the way we divide responsibilities among diplomats, lawyers, soldiers, and cops — except when they can exploit those divisions. U.S. military forces cannot apprehend criminals or enforce civil laws within the borders of the United States (Posse Comitatus). The traditional sanctity of the nation-state restricts our behavior, while terrorists, drug traffickers, resource pirates, and post-Soviet crime networks operate freely and wantonly across continents and oceans. Criminal organizations are only one of the growing and largely ignored threats to our national security. Such organization now exercise more power than some failing states. Yet, we refuse to face the threats they pose, insisting that all crime is a “law enforcement problem.” The U.S. has always “looked outward” with the military and “looked inward” with law enforcement agencies taking care of domestic chores. This division of responsibilities has a powerful impact on statecraft and military activities, even where the United States is not actively engaged. The new threat puts this model at risk everywhere. In summary, we are constrained by a traditional model of what our armies do, what our police do, and what our governments legally do. Our newest adversaries carry have none of this baggage, whether they are drug-lords or warlords.²

BACKGROUND

We seek a climate where the global economy and open trade are growing, where democratic norms and respect for human rights are increasingly accepted and where terrorism, drug trafficking and international crime do not undermine stability and peaceful relations.— President Bill Clinton (1995)

TRANSNATIONAL CRIME

The growth of TOC has emerged as a major security issue in the post-Cold War era. Ironically, an increasingly globalized economy that features international commerce, travel, and free movement of goods and services is also allowing the easy passage of illicit money, narcotics, illegal aliens, and nuclear materials.³ Many organized crime groups are taking advantage of global communications and transportation advances to establish bases in multiple countries in pursuit of illegal profits. Russian crime groups, for example, are active in the Caribbean, Israel, Western Europe, and the United States, among other places. Colombian gangs have a presence throughout the Americas, including the Caribbean region, where they have reportedly forged alliances with their Russian counterparts.⁴

In general, organized crime syndicates operate for one primary purpose: to accumulate money or other forms of material gain. To garner these illicit profits, they engage in a number of criminal enterprises including narcotics and arms trafficking, human smuggling, prostitution, credit card fraud, extortion, gambling, contract murders, and other sleazy activities. In some cases, particular gangs will specialize in particular type of criminal enterprises. Nigerian gangs specialize in heroin trafficking, while Colombian syndicates focus on cocaine. Globally, narcotics trafficking are considered the world's third largest trading enterprise.⁵ In virtually every part of the world, drug trafficking is on the increase despite numerous campaigns at various levels designed to reduce it or eradicate it.

Like many forms of international crime, the narcotics trade has been an unintended beneficiary of the liberalization in global trade and looser border controls. In North America, for instance, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) has helped to transform the U.S. and Mexican border into one of the world's most active drug-trafficking corridors. Approximately 60 percent of the cocaine used in the United States—in addition to about 30 percent of the heroin—is smuggled across the U.S. and Mexican border.⁶

Transnational Organized Crime presents a real and protracted threat to the nation-state. It can undermine political institutions in countries with nascent democratic governments and foster mistrust of legitimate governments.⁷ Criminal activity can also cause widespread death and social destruction. In the United States, for example, tens of thousands of American citizens lose their lives annually because of the narcotics trade (including collateral violence and health impacts).⁸ Money laundering can threaten a nation's banking system and undermine confidence in the entire financial system. Many South Pacific island states have seen their banking sectors tarnished by allegations of laundering organized crime money, especially from Russian criminal groups.⁹

DIRECTIVES

PRESIDENTIAL DECISION DIRECTIVE – 42 (PDD-42)

Declaring International Organized Crime a threat to the national security interest of the United States in PDD-42, President Clinton ordered the Departments of Justice, State and Treasury, the Coast Guard, National Security Council, Intelligence Community, and other Federal Agencies to increase and integrate their efforts against international crime syndicates and money laundering. Essential components of the directive are: Impositions of sanctions under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), which blocks the assets of

leaders, cohorts and front companies of identified Colombian narcotics traffickers in U.S. banks overseas.

The Act freezes assets held in U.S. financial institutions, of nations and entities deemed to pose a threat to the national security, foreign policy or economy of the United States. In addition, PDD-42 bars U.S. individuals and companies from engaging in financial transactions or trade with those identified or linked to the Colombian Cali Cartel. "Criminal enterprises now move large sums through the international financial system that dwarf the gross national product of some nations,"¹⁰ says the directive.

In the 1997 National Security Strategy and the Quadrennial Defense Review the President, Secretary of Defense, and Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff address transnational threats. In the December 1999 National Security Strategy, transnational threats are designated part of the strategic environment. To promote further progress in implementing PDD-42, the National Security Council called upon the Department of Justice, State, and the Treasury to develop and implement a comprehensive national strategy to attack international crime.

EXECUTIVE BRANCH

The directive cites Transnational Criminal Syndicates as a "threat to U.S. national security," and to countries and regions all over the world.¹¹ The directive is addressed to the Vice President, Secretaries of State, Defense Department, Treasury Department, and the Attorney General. It is also forwarded to the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Directors of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Federal Bureau Investigation (FBI), Office of Management and Budget, Office of National Drug Control Policy and Drug Enforcement Administration, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

The National Security Council (NSC) oversees the implementation of PDD-42, specifically targeting international crime. To ensure sustained and focused attention to combating international crime, the directive established the Special Coordination Group (SCG). This interagency team is chaired by a senior member of the NSC staff and includes high-level officials from the Departments of Justice (including FBI and DEA), State, Treasury (including Secret Service), Transportation (including Coast Guard), the Office of National Drug Control Policy, and the Intelligence community.¹²

POLICIES

GENERAL GUIDELINES

The Departments of Justice, State, Treasury, Coast Guard, National Security Council, Intelligence Community, and other Federal Agencies are directed to step-up and integrate their efforts against International Crime Syndicates and money laundering. The Departments are further directed to aggressively seek all legal means to combat international organized crime. The Departments will assist and work more closely with other governments to create a global response to this threat and to eliminate privileged sanctuaries. Other Presidential guidance included denying visas to a broad range of organized crime members, transnational organized criminals and family members. An "International Crime" bill to be presented at the next session of Congress would bolster the government's ability to collect evidence and to prosecute those involved in international organized crime. PDD-42 calls for sanctions of against governments that cooperate with or provide sanctuary for transnational crime. Russia could be at the top of that list. Finally, implementation of PDD-42 will be reviewed every three months for the next year as directed by the president.¹³

POLICY OBJECTIVES (ENDS)

An objective must be attainable and consistent with the strategic vision it supports. It must be based on a prudent expectation that the ends sought can be achieved. Each of the objectives in PDD-42 is consistent with protecting our national interest (the well being of American citizens and enterprises) as part of our grand strategy. The Departments of Justice, State, Treasury, Coast Guard, National Security Council, Intelligence Community, and other Federal Agencies are directed to curb international crime syndicates and money laundering, an attainable objective.

PDD-42 also promises impose sanctions under the IEPA blocking the assets of the leaders, cohorts and front companies of narcotics traffickers in the U.S. and in U.S. banks overseas. Such sanctions thus provide a way for the U.S. to modify the behaviors of other countries that are aiding and abetting TOC.

Further, authority is granted to freeze assets held in U.S. financial institutions, against nations and entities deemed to pose a threat to the national security, foreign policy or economy of the United States, as well as to bar individuals or enterprises from engaging in financial transactions or trade with those identified individuals or enterprises linked to the Colombian Cali Cartel. These are also effective ways to combat TOC.

CONCEPTS TO ACHIEVE OBJECTIVES (WAYS)

PDD-42 concepts, like all other viable concepts, should be based on a detailed analysis or estimate of the situation. A search of the Internet reveals that there are over a hundred organizations and agencies with a concept for engaging TOC. However, there is no indication of this type of analysis in PDD-42. Congress passed a comprehensive package of legislation to assist U.S. law enforcement agencies in their efforts to combat drug traffickers, terrorists, and other international crime syndicates, as well as to counter money laundering. The International Crime Control Act (ICCA) enhanced the U.S. ability to detain and deter international criminals by vigorously investigating and prosecuting them, taking their money, and depriving them their ability to cross America's borders and strike at its domestic institutions. Thus, legislative power has been brought to bear on TOC.

POLICY (MEANS)

PDD-42 provided no start-up fiscal resources to support its policy goals. Agencies charged with enacting of the policy were required to resource their own requirements until proposed FY 2001 emergency funding is approved. Review of the White House, Clinton-Gore administrative FY 2001 Budget shows the following proposed allocations for PDD-42.

Nine-hundred seventy-four million dollars proposed for Expanded Threat Reduction Initiative (ETRI) to contain the spread of Weapons of Mass Destructions (WMD). This program will be administered by the Department of State, Defense, and Energy. The funds would support science centers, enhance border control and regional security efforts to decrease smuggling of technology or materials, expand protection of fissile materials, and accelerate closure of nuclear weapons production facilities.

Nine-hundred forty-five million dollars of emergency supplemental appropriations would increase Colombia Assistance Programs through 2001, with new funding in 2001 of \$381 million dollars allocated for international affairs and other budget areas. These funds will enhance alternative developments, strengthening civil justice and democratic institutions, and providing military assistance.

One-hundred ninety-four million dollars have been allocated to support international efforts to combat the spread of Weapons of Mass Destructions around the world. The Administration is also strengthening its fight against terrorism by increasing funding for new embassies overseas, upgrading physical security at most at-risk posts, further weapons buy-back programs will lead to the destruction of small arms abroad.¹⁴

PDD-42 directs U.S. departments and agencies to integrate efforts, but the directive does not identify any single force structure (civilian, law enforcement, or military) or force requirements to engage this international threat.

STRATEGIES

NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

Our current strategy calls for Forward Engagement and leadership abroad. We must be prepared and willing to combat appropriate instruments of national power to influence the actions of other states and non-state actors. Our strategy has three core objectives: enhance American security; bolster our economic propensity; and promote democracy and human rights abroad. Our engagement therefore must be selective, focusing on the threats and opportunities most relevant to our national interest and applying our resources where we can make the greatest difference.¹⁵ Our engagement imperative is design to enhance our national security through integrated approaches that allows the U.S. to shape the international environment, to respond to the full spectrum of crisis, and to prepare now for an uncertain future. Our strategic approach uses all appropriate instruments of national power to influence the actions of other states and non-state actors, to exert global leadership, and to remain the preferred security partner for the community of states that share our interests.¹⁶

The International Crime Control Strategy (ICCS) sets forth a plan of action developed under the guidance of the NSC. The ICCS articulates eight broad goals with over thirty related objectives as the blueprint for an effective, long-term attack on the international crime problem. The ICCS also expresses the nation's strong resolve to combat international crime aggressively and substantially reduce its adverse impacts on the American people.

THE INTERNATIONAL CRIME CONTROL STRATEGY: GOALS AND OBJECTIVES

Goal 1: Extend the First Line of Defense Beyond U.S. Borders

Objective 1: Prevent acts of international crime planned abroad, including terrorist acts, before they occur.

Objective 2: Use all available laws to prosecute selected criminal acts committed abroad.

Objective 3: Intensify activities of law enforcement, diplomatic, and consular personnel abroad.

Goal 2: Protect U.S. Borders by Attacking Smuggling and Smuggling-Related Crimes

Objective 1: Enhance our land border inspection, detection, and monitoring capabilities through a greater resource commitment, further coordination of federal agency efforts, and increased cooperation with the private sector.

Objective 2: Improve the effectiveness of maritime and air smuggling interdiction efforts in the transit zone.

Objective 3: Seek new, stiffer criminal penalties for smuggling activities.

Objective 4: Target enforcement and prosecutorial resources more effectively against smuggling crimes and organizations.

Goal 3: Deny Safe Haven to International Criminals

Objective 1: Negotiate new international agreements to create a seamless web for the prompt location, arrest, and extradition of international fugitives.

Objective 2: Implement strengthened immigration laws that prevent international criminals from entering the United States and that provide for their prompt expulsion when appropriate.

Objective 3: Promote increased cooperation with foreign law enforcement authorities to provide rapid, mutual access to witnesses, records, and other evidence.

Goal 4: Counter International Financial Crime

Objective 1: Combat money laundering by denying criminals access to financial institutions and by strengthening enforcement efforts to reduce inbound and outbound movement of criminal proceeds.

Objective 2: Seize the assets of international criminals through aggressive use of forfeiture laws.

Objective 3: Enhance bilateral and multilateral cooperation against all financial crime by working with foreign governments to establish or update enforcement tools and implement multilateral anti-money laundering standards.

Objective 4: Target offshore centers of international fraud, counterfeiting, electronic access device schemes, and other financial crimes.

Goal 5: Prevent Criminal Exploitation of International Trade

Objective 1: Interdict illegal technology exports through improved detection, increased cooperation with the private sector, and heightened sanctions.

Objective 2: Prevent unfair and predatory trade practices in violation of U.S. criminal law.

Objective 3: Protect intellectual property rights by enhancing foreign and domestic law enforcement efforts to curtail the flow of counterfeit and pirated goods and by educating consumers.

Objective 4: Counter industrial theft and economic espionage of U.S. trade secrets through increased prosecution of offenders.

Objective 5: Enforce import restrictions on certain harmful substances, dangerous organisms, and protected species.

Goal 6: Respond to Emerging International Crime Threats

Objective 1: Disrupt new activities of international organized crime groups.

Objective 2: Enhance intelligence efforts against criminal enterprises to provide timely warning of changes in their organizations and methods.

Objective 3: Reduce trafficking in human beings and crimes against children.

Objective 4: Increase enforcement efforts against high tech and computer-related crime.

Objective 5: Continue identifying and countering the vulnerabilities of critical infrastructures and new technologies in telecommunications, financial transactions, and other high-tech areas.

Goal 7: Foster International Cooperation and the Rule of Law

Objective 1: Establish international standards, goals, and objectives to combat international crime by using bilateral, multilateral, regional, and global mechanisms, and by actively encouraging compliance.

Objective 2: Improve bilateral cooperation with foreign governments and law enforcement authorities through increased collaboration, training, and technical assistance.

Objective 3: Strengthen the rule of law as the foundation for democratic government and free markets in order to reduce societies' vulnerability to criminal exploitation.

Goal 8: Optimize the Full Range of U.S. Efforts

Objective 1: Enhance executive branch policy and operational coordination mechanisms to assess the risks of criminal threats and to integrate strategies, goals, and objectives to combat those threats.

Objective 2: Mobilize and incorporate the private sector into U.S. government efforts.

Objective 3: Develop measures of effectiveness to assess progress over time.

The Strategy's goals are dynamic. They will evolve over time as conditions change, as new crime trends emerge, and as improved anti-crime techniques are developed. The Strategic Aims seek to improve international anti-crime efforts by strengthening the rule of law and fostering democracy, free markets, and human rights.¹⁷

NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY

Our National Military Strategy should complement the other elements of national power. Military support and engagements must support the NSS through selective implementation, focusing on the threats and opportunities most relevant to our national interest, and applying the proper military forces that can make the greatest difference combating TOC. That force today seems to be U.S. Special Operations Forces.

The big challenge for special operations forces will be relevant to the nation's security needs in a challenging world. I think the biggest thing we continue to have difficulty with is the mindset change that is required for the kind of world that we face. We still have some vestiges of thinking that have gone on for the last 50 years because of the Cold War. I think it is very difficult for large institutions to adapt to these kinds of changes. The changes need to involve more than getting lighter and faster. The threat of the future will be more like the attack on the USS Cole. They are going to attack our strengths. They are going to take advantage of the seams and all the things that are part of a free and open society. Military power is only one element of national power. These things all have to be worked in concert, the synergy that can be achieved if you really understand the art form. We tend to think of dealing with these things in isolation of each other or perhaps we need to be more adept and creative in how we bring these things together in the future. The future challenges include places like Colombia, where the lines blur between military and political objectives.— Gen Peter J. Schoomaker (2000)

The most likely future TOC threats or challenges will manifest themselves in two areas of strategic military concern – Transnational Organized Crime Alliances and CEA. We must avoid the pitfall of employing resources (SOF) against the wrong TOC Centers of Gravity while at the same time we seek to protect our elements of national power and our centers of gravity.

Transnational Organization Crime Alliances will create a critical new strategic wrinkle because TOC are essentially profit maximizing and risk-reducing entities. Therefore, it is hardly surprising that they too engage in strategic alliances. Cooperation among these organizations is a natural activity, particularly because they share the common problem of circumventing law enforcement and national regulations. Further, they have an added incentive for cooperation that stems from the illicit nature of their activities. Whereas transnational corporations are inclined to negotiate with governments in order to obtain access to new markets, TCO have to negotiate with illicit power structures. This again may hasten the propensity to create strategic alliances.¹⁸

Criminal, terrorist, or other armed non-state organizations have grown too powerful and adept – in extreme cases, we even see the emergence of CEAs. CEAs may not have the organization and hitting power of the U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM), but they are

increasingly more than a match for underpaid, under trained, and under equipped Third World cops – or even for regional militaries. We continue to question our allies and client's use of military means in almost any form to enforce domestic stability. Yet, domestic employment of the military appears an inevitable part of our own future, at least on our borders and in some urban environments.¹⁹

Therefore, what type of military threat can we expect to experience in the face of a Criminal Alliance employing elements of a CEA against elements of United States national powers. The time has come to acknowledge how these elements may employ asymmetric techniques, tactics and procedures against the United States, and how to counter these new and formidable threats.

A SCENARIO

THREAT STRATEGY (ASYMMETRIC)

“Freedom is unforgiving if entrusted to the weak and timid.” — President Eisenhower

The 2000 United States elections have ended. As the new President assumes his Office, a series of asymmetric events are beginning to take place. Wall Street Banks begin to have unexplainable transfers of multi-billion dollar accounts. The U.S. Postal System's computers automatically reroute all government mail to the Virgin Islands, while Federal Express shipping locators and government websites assignment routers malfunction. A series of bombs go off at the homes of deployed National Guards troops, and then a nuclear device explodes at the entrance of the Chesapeake Bay. At the same time, the National Command Authorities (NCA) receive military reports that enhanced satellite guided FROG missiles are being fired at troops in South West Asia (SWA), and four divisions of Iraqi armor push toward Kuwait. The NCA also receive U.S. PACOM reports of troop movements along the 38 Parallel and of anti-ship missiles fired at the Seventh Fleet from the friendly island of Taiwan.

Bombings of U.S. naval vessels, attacks on economic centers, aggression against allies and vital national interest all illustrate the asymmetrical threats that may not only overwhelm civil authorities but also lead to the defeat of forward deployed military forces. Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), civil emergencies, and major enemy asymmetric disasters challenge the current capabilities of federal, state, and local authorities. Clearly, military resources are required to supplement federal efforts to counter such plausible threats.

The passing of the command is completed; the forces/elements responsible for the asymmetrical acts are swiftly met by an overwhelming decisive response. Now all is well as our military and others elements of national power in accord with the NSS and NMS are brought to bear. Which will it be? U.S. capability to respond successfully to asymmetrical threats? Or TOC's capability to disrupt the U.S. economy, to disable U.S. infrastructure, and to jeopardize U.S. interests?

The United States is today's world leading global power because of decisive use of its elements of national power. U.S. synergistic uses of political, economic, informational, and military power has raised the nation to a position of world prominence and military dominance.

Yet, as we move into the 21st Century these same elements of power may become our Achilles heel. We are especially vulnerable if we do not articulate a clear NSS leading to a development of a resourced NMS to face the emergence of the asymmetrical threat. Who is actually going to protect the U.S. homeland against asymmetrical threats aimed at our elements of national power on American soil?

Ralph D. Sawyers warns that, "A knowledgeable commander seeking to exploit his power need only focus upon formulating the tactics necessary to gain positional advantage and thereby create the appropriate circumstances for victory." Our 1999 NSS does not explicitly speak of such threats as asymmetric, yet it does refer to threats against which we must be prepared to defend America, our allies, and our national interest. Current U.S. NMS concerns seem to focus on three particular asymmetric threats: Terrorism, potential WMD attack, and Informational Warfare, all which potentially threaten U.S. homeland, population, and overseas facilities, troops, and families. NMS defines the asymmetric threat as, "Unconventional or inexpensive approaches that circumvent our strengths, exploit our vulnerabilities, or confront us in ways we cannot match in kind."²⁰

We must be certain that our elements of National Power do not become centers of gravity that our enemies can asymmetrically exploit. Joint Vision 2010, "Adversaries will closely observe U.S. capabilities and tactics in an effort to exploit weaknesses by asymmetric approaches. These approaches may include attempts to inflict heavy casualties at home or abroad, to exploit the media, to conduct acts of terrorism and to defeat our national will." Potential asymmetric attacks against our elements of national power may take the following forms:

Political: The recent balloting problems of the presidential election have shown the impact such disputes can have on our nation during times of peace. What would be the impact of disrupting elections at the onset of a Small Scale Contingency (SSC) or a Major Theater of

War (MTW)? As we transfer to electronic media for elections asymmetric means of attacks and intrusion will increase. Global dissemination of misinformation about candidates, political appointees, or key cabinet level members at the outbreak of hostilities could delay uses of other elements of national power against a potential adversary.

Economical: Y2K provided a global scare that has opened the door for formulation of asymmetrical warfare against nations financial institutions. Collapse of either of the world trade centers at the onset of hostilities would have dramatically affected the nation's ability to wage war or resist an assailant. Consider the U.S. asymmetric attack to seize the bank accounts of known drug cartels in our fight against organized crime.

Informational: As we transition our combat services support activities to the global commercial markets, we also leave ourselves open to asymmetric opportunities of engagement. Disruption of Federal Express ability to move military equipment repair parts as forces prep for deployments could spell defeat for an initial entry force, especially if the part is critical to a follow-on that will relieve the entry force. Electronic and physical strikes against the major media corporations (CNN, CBS, NBC) would plunge the uninformed public some degree of panic, perhaps offering just enough time to allow an opponent an opportunity to accomplish his initial strategic objectives before he runs to the UN and lobbies for a cease fire.

Military: Any enemy observer can note that as the USAR/NG forces fight to procure resources, as the active component attempts to stabilize operational tempo, more USAR/NG soldiers are tasked to perform active missions (KOSOVO, BOSNIA). This is a role reversal for the nations' strategic reserve forces. A prime asymmetric target – NG troops abroad, NG CONUS facilities, and their families/businesses – allows an enemy to avoid facing a decisive force. Through such an attack, the enemy would seek to break America's public will to fight, and to disrupt the Whole Army concept.

Today the linchpin of the U.S. Army's Transformation is its ability to rapidly deploy a combat element to anywhere in the world within 96 hours. Rapid deployment hinges on our strategic mobility airlift, sealift, and pre-positioned stocks. What would be the impact if an alliance of TOC launched asymmetric attacks against these assets? What if our Army War Reserves (AWR) stocks in five locations throughout the world were contaminated by Bio-WMD? This disruption could spell the difference between a decisive U.S. military victory and our political submission to a less than desirable peace.

No enemy is willing to take the U.S. head-on in battle. All potential enemies know that even though the U.S. has the capability to wage unilateral warfare we will strive to face all opponents as part of a coalition in order to maintain world approval and support. Therefore, the

NSS and NMS must be address any possible asymmetric vulnerability. We can be certain that our potential enemies will attempt to create covert alliances to support two MTW or several SSC. He will continue to improve his ability to fight in urban environments, where collateral damage and public will to support war may offset our technological superiority. In addition, he will continue to look for opportunities to asymmetrically attack our allies to create confusion about U.S. resolve or to exploit our unwillingness to share innovative military technology.

The inherent risk of engaging TOC organizations with SOF resides in a complex security environment that transcends national borders. Human emergencies other than armed conflict; extremism, ethnic disputes, and religious rivalries; international organized crime, including illegal trade in weapons, strategic materials or illicit drugs, as well as piracy; mass refugee flows; and threats to the environment all have the potential to put the U.S. at risk. These challenges can obstruct economic growth and democratic development; they can lead to conflict. Complicating the situation is the continual blurring of the distinctions among terrorist groups, factions in ethnic conflicts, insurgent movements, international criminal organizations, and drug cartels. Failure to deal with such security concerns early in their development may require a more substantial response to a more dangerous problem later.²¹

CRIME GROUP VULNERABILITIES

In general, international crime groups share many of the same vulnerabilities as international criminals. By denying safe haven to international criminals, by striking at their assets and financial holdings, and preventing them from exploiting our borders, we can reduce their impact on American lives, communities, finances and security.

Concentrated action will surely be taken on several related fronts to respond to these disturbing developments, including cooperating with foreign partners in the investigation and prosecution of international crime groups and assisting our foreign partners in that endeavor by providing them with training and technical assistance in the recognition, investigation and prosecution of these groups.²²

PROponents FOR MILITARY STRATEGY

Proponents for military deployments argue against TOC that transnational security threats are the major security challenges to the nation-state in the 21st century. Given this reality, it is natural and appropriate to call upon military forces to address them. Some argue that in the post-Cold War era, the notion of security should be expanded to include issues that will have a direct impact on state stability and the welfare of individuals. In some countries,

transnational security threats constitute a greater threat to political stability than even traditional state-based military threats. Pakistan, for instance, arguably faces more dire consequences from the influx of narcotics and small arms from neighboring Afghanistan and the attendant violence it spawns, than from any nuclear or military threat posed by India. Because military troops are the ultimate tangible instrument of the state in maintaining its security, it is logical that military forces would be involved in combating such threats. Moreover, the likely scale of transnational problems in the future--mass migration, pandemics, and environmental catastrophes--requires a massive state response. In general, only the military has the ability to react quickly enough with adequate resources.

Another argument for military involvement concerns the nature of transnational threats. In general, transnational threats are driven by non-state actors, but occasionally there are situations in which governments act as the "hidden hands" behind transnational security events. Evidence has surfaced that North Korea engages in official acts of narcotics trafficking and money laundering. Similarly, Thai officials have claimed that criminal maritime piracy is sometimes sanctioned by Vietnamese officials. Mass migration events, moreover, are not always as accidental as press accounts might portray. There have been instances--such as the 1980 Mariel Boatlift to the U.S. from Cuba--in which a nation will encourage mass migration so that the resulting influx will destabilize or harass a neighboring country. Some health officials, meanwhile, fear that a massive infectious disease outbreak could be precipitated by a biological terrorist attack, which might be orchestrated (perhaps indirectly) by a hostile government. More broadly, in 1999 a popular Chinese strategic book urged that China engage in "unrestricted war" against the United States by employing various transnational threats such as information and biological warfare, drug smuggling, environmental attack, and other types of asymmetrical warfare. These examples suggest that it would be unwise for a government to simply downplay transnational threats as mere law enforcement or public health matters. Rather, a prudent response would be for governments to prepare to use their military forces to deal with these types of threats.²³

The forces most capable of performing these missions today are our nation's special operations forces, working concurrently with law enforcement agencies and all elements of national power.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES (SOF)

"I heard the voice of the Lord saying, 'Whom shall I send, and who will go for us:

'Then said I, Here am I; send me.'" — Isaiah 6:8

MISSION CAPABILITIES

U.S. SOF provide the NCA with unique capabilities not found in conventional units or forces of other nations. Such capabilities enable SOF soldiers to conduct missions of strategic value and importance in a permissive or non-permissive environment. SOF capabilities:

- Organize and rapidly deploy to provide a tailored response to many different situations
- Gain entry to operate in hostile or denied areas
- Provide limited security and medical support for themselves and those they support
- Communicate worldwide with unit equipment
- Live in austere, harsh environments without extensive support
- Survey and assess local situations and report these assessments rapidly
- Work closely with host nation military and civilian authorities and populations
- Organize indigenous people into teams to help solve local problems
- Deploy at relatively low cost, with a low profile and less intrusive presence than larger conventional forces

Stand-alone unconventional warfare, direct action, and special reconnaissance missions, such as insurgency, counter-terrorism, counter-drug activities, surgical counter proliferation, and counterinsurgency are missions best handled by such a force.²⁴ These same capabilities are required in the fight against transnational organized crime that threatens U.S. shores.

SOF OPTIONS

Transnational Organized Crime is akin to a non-state actor: If not engaged early on, TOC agents can become a state actor of significant power, require full scale employment of all aspects of U.S. military power to counter it. But SOF provide an option that can allow the U.S. and allies the opportunity to ward off the coming storm. SOF collateral options can transcend the organized crime strategic threat by maintaining:

- Ubiquitous Presence: Combat-ready SOF units are routinely deployed around the world to support peacetime engagement and to prevent conflicts. Should conflict arise, these "global scouts" can quickly transition to combat operations and spearhead a decisive victory.

- Strategic Agility: SOF will provide greater strategic and operational agility through the development of a more flexible and responsive force structure maintaining an unparalleled national mission capability and developing more robust theater special operations command (SOC).
- Global Access: Although theater engagement provides SOF access to most parts of the world, SOF must retain the capability to go where U.S. forces are unwelcome. The capability to conduct clandestine operations anywhere in the world in support of the NCA or theater CINCs is one of the defining attributes of SOF.²⁵

As the Army undergoes Transformation, SOF are also looking at special operations relevancy and the missions they must be able to accomplish to maintain U.S. national security. The threats posed by rising global TOC jeopardize NMS forward engagements. In addition, such threats detract from the CINCs and NCA efforts to maintain peace throughout the world. Consider the following SOF strategic view of the future environment.




FIGURE 1

RECOMMENDATION

Our NSS and NMS must address this 21st Century threat with appropriate elements of national powers. A simple beginning would be as depicted below. The matrix indicates those objectives and goals of the present International Crime Control Strategy that SOF can assist in achieving.

International Crime Control Strategy Matrix

GOAL & OBJECTIVES	DIPLOMATIC	ECONOMIC	INFORMATIONAL	MILITARY (SOF)
Goal 1: Extend First Line of Defense Beyond U.S. Borders				Objective 1: Prevent Crime & Terrorist Acts Planned Abroad Before They Occur
Goal 2: Protect U.S. Borders by Attacking Smuggling & Smuggling Related Crimes				Objective 1: Enhance Border Inspection, Detection, Monitoring Obj 2: Improve Interdiction
Goal 3: Deny Safe Haven to International Criminals				Objective 1: Create Seamless Web for Location, Arrest, Extradition International Fugitives
Goal 4: Counter International Financial Crime				
Goal 5: Prevent Criminal Exploitation of International Trade				Objective 1: Interdict illegal technology exports, improved detection, increased cooperation
Goal 6: Respond to Emerging International Crime Threats				Objective 1: Disrupt New Acts of Crime Organizations Objective 2: Enhance Intel Efforts Objective 3: Reduce Trafficking
Goal 7: Foster International Cooperation and Rule of Law				Objective 1: Estab Goals, Obj. Standards to Combat Crime Objective 2: Train Foreign Forces
Goal 8: Optimize the Full Range of U.S. Efforts				Objective 1: Enhance Risk Assessment; Integrate Strategy & Goals to Combat Criminal Threats

FIGURE 2

To provide the foregoing means of achieving 21st century strategic goals, we need legal guidance, we need political support, and we need public support to employ the full capabilities of SOF in accord and with national and international law enforcement and governmental agencies in the fight against TOC.

MG(R) Robert H. Scales in the Army War College Issue Paper No. 3 nicely articulates why we need to clearly be prepared and willing to use our military SOF capabilities in the war against TOC.

Our experience in recent war tells us that regardless of how intense the combat, cheap victories will come only if we change our war fighting doctrine to accommodate the new realities of the precision age. Modern weapons technologies have changed the dynamics of battle. The relationship between the dynamics of firepower and maneuver has shifted fundamentally. We must begin now to alter the way we fight in order to stay ahead of potential enemies who, as we have seen in Kosovo, already have begun to understand and exploit our tendency to rely on firepower alone to win on the battlefield.²⁶

To counter the threat of TOC, we should prepare and quietly deploy mission-ready SOF soldiers.

WORD COUNT = 6482

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¹⁰ William J. Clinton. "International Crime Control Strategy," Washington, D.C: The White House, June, 1998

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¹² Ibid.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ White House. "Clinton-Gore Administration FY 2001 Budget Maintaining Fiscal Discipline While Making Key Investments," Office of the Press Secretary, 7 February 2000

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¹⁶ USSOCOM. "United States Special Operations Forces," Posture Statement 2000, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict; Washington D.C.

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¹⁹ Peters, 4.

²⁰ White House. "A National Security Strategic Strategy for a New Century," Washington, D.C., December 1999

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²² White House. "International Crime Control Strategy," June 1998

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²⁴ USSOCOM. 2-3.

²⁵ Ibid,6.

²⁶ USAWC. "America's Army in Transition: Preparing for War in the Precision Age," Army Issue Paper No. 3; Joint Forces Quarterly, Issue Number 23, Autumn/Winter 1999-2000

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