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STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

U.S. POLICY ON THE EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENSE IDENTITY

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL JOHN BROADMEADOW United States Marine Corps

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
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ABSTRACT

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
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This paper will examine U.S. Policy toward the emerging European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI). U.S. policy has often been contradictory, in part because many U.S. officials have felt that European consensus on security issues would be too difficult to reach. Therefore, the paper will evaluate the European Union's ability to develop common consensus on defense policy and develop forces suitable to support that policy. It will recommend a formal U.S. position that balances support for greater European military contributions within NATO against the potential of diminished U.S. leadership from increased European autonomy.

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U.S. POLICY ON THE EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENSE IDENTITY

During the first year of the Bush Administration, the United States will have to confront a variety of foreign policy crises. At the same time the Administration will develop a new National Security Strategy. Among the variety of issues and crises confronting the new administration, crafting a U.S. policy regarding the maturing European quest for unity and the ongoing refinement of the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) is one of the most important. Policy makers on both sides of the Atlantic must clearly define the mechanisms by which collective European political goals regarding security issues will influence NATO. Policy that clearly defines what mechanisms the U.S. finds acceptable will have significant long-term impacts on U.S. / European relations and will likely shape the future of NATO.

Throughout the 2000 Presidential campaign, President Bush said foreign allies should carry more of the military burden for crisis on their continent. During the campaign, Mr. Bush and the future National Security Advisor, Ms. Condolezza Rice, called for a new division of labor and greater burden sharing in the North Atlantic Alliance. While these proposals received significant criticism, particularly in the European press, they can be closely aligned with the European Union's (EU's) ideals for ESDI and represent an avenue to permit our allies to demonstrate commitment to their convictions.

Unfortunately much of the U.S. rhetoric concerning recent efforts by the EU to develop a rapid reaction force has been counter-productive to the goal of greater burden sharing and has been focused on the wrong aspects of ESDI development. Almost all of the arguments against ESDI have been directed against the creation of a rapid reaction military force within the EU. Pundits who argue that the creation of the EU's rapid reaction force somehow threatens NATO are missing the point. The forces are simply means toward accomplishing ends. Those ends could very well be the Bush Administration's goal of Europeans doing more with less reliance on U.S. forces. Those ends could also be autonomy of action by the Europeans with or without regard to NATO and transatlantic concerns.

ESDI involves not only creating cohesive military forces, but also, more importantly, creating mechanisms to develop common European political goals for security issues that will direct the use of those forces. These mechanisms are: 1) ways to achieve political consensus among the EU members and, 2) ways to translate that political consensus into military action, or an operational military planning capability. Policy regarding ESDI should focus on the ways that enable ends to be translated into action by the means. In other words, U.S. policy should encourage the development of EU military forces while at the same time clearly define what

mechanisms should be developed to ensure those forces are put to use supporting transatlantic security goals.

This paper proposes that the Bush Administration's development of a new National Security Strategy presents an opportunity to clarify the U.S. position on ESDI. Constructing a coherent, consistent, and transparent U.S. policy that encourages and enables Europeans to develop security goals based on transatlantic unity ensures the central position of NATO in European security affairs. The next version of the NSS is the best opportunity to define a path that ensures the United States' continued leadership within NATO and reaffirms our commitments as a European power while at the same time empowering our European allies to assume the Bush Administration's vision of a more co-equal partnership in meeting European security concerns.

This paper will first establish that ESDI will change the nature of NATO. Second, it will show that although there are difficulties in the details of European force development, the trend of the European Union's quest for autonomy in security and military affairs is a reality and cannot be ignored or wished away. Next it will analyze the potential impacts of both aspects (the forces and the mechanisms to determine employment of the forces) of ESDI on NATO. The paper will then summarize and assess various European positions on ESDI some of which compete with U.S. ends. Next the paper will provide some reflections on current U.S. policy and its evolution from an often silent, sometimes contradictory, and many times critical view of our allies' attempts. Finally it will propose the ends, ways, and means that should form the basis of U.S. policy to ensure integration of ESDI with NATO, continued strength of the Atlantic partnership and increased burden sharing among the NATO alliance.

By crafting U.S. policy that clearly defines how the U.S. envisions ESDI taking shape and what the U.S. finds acceptable in terms of European political will in security matters vis-à-vis NATO, the next version of the National Security Strategy will ensure that the North Atlantic alliance remains strong well into the 21st century.

EVOLUTION OF THE TRANSATLANTIC LINK AND EUROPEAN SECURITY

Without argument, NATO is the foundation of European security. The bedrock underlying that foundation, thus the inherent strength of NATO, is the close transatlantic tie between the European members of NATO and the U.S, and Canada. NATO's strength and resilience have been demonstrated by its ability to adapt and evolve throughout its existence. That evolution can be categorized into three distinct phases. In the first phase, from NATO's inception through

the Cold War, the transatlantic allies were united in purpose and ability toward countering the distinct threat from the Soviet Union.

The second phase, from the end of the Cold War until today, has been exemplified by a growing U.S. dominance in military capability, while our European allies have been focused on post-Cold War unification and consolidation. The growth and refinement of the EU, especially in areas of finance and trade, have been defining ends for the Europeans. Expansion of both NATO and the EU along with the struggle to define NATO's role in the absence of a clearly defined threat have raised questions about its utility in ensuring future European security.

With the maturation of the EU comes an increasing desire for unified political will among the member nations. This drive toward common European security ends marks the beginning of the third phase of NATO history. The Europeans are ready to reestablish parity with the U.S. in military means and desire a more co-equal status in the leadership of NATO. ESDI provides the European Union with the means to increase the European voice in the transatlantic alliance.

ESDI IS BECOMING A REALITY

ESDI is a concept designed to strengthen Europe's ability to independently respond to and manage crisis. The North Atlantic Council articulated ESDI in Berlin in 1996 by stating, "... this identity will ... permit the creation of militarily coherent and effective forces capable of operating under the political control and strategic direction of the WEU (Western European Union)"¹.

ESDI is gaining a greater degree of clarity through the development of two emerging European capabilities. These capabilities provide the EU nation-state-like features and are rudimentary means of meeting the ends of a unified European political will.

First, the EU is developing military structure to support crisis response capabilities. The determination of the EU to create autonomous military capability is not new. The WEU established several multinational military forces including EUROCORPS in 1993 and EUROFOR and EUROMARFOR in 1995. These forces "are salient in assessing ESDI because they were established outside of NATO; and although available to the Alliance, their priority is to the WEU."²

Recently even more overt steps have been taken to improve European military capability. At the December 1999 Helsinki Summit the EU established the Headline Goal Catalogue of Forces, which endeavors to be able to deploy a military force within 60 days and sustain it for up to one year. At a November 2000 meeting in Brussels, the 15 European Union defense ministers pledged to contribute 60,000 combat troops for the European Rapid-Reaction Force

(ERRF) designed as a concrete first step in meeting the Headline Goal. This pledge of specific military units will come largely from Britain, France, and Germany who have combined to pledge 40,000 troops. The remainder of the force will be made up of contributions from Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, Greece, Finland, Sweden, Belgium, Ireland, Portugal, and Luxembourg who will contribute from 500 to 6000 troops each.³

An important consideration is that these are not new forces or additional military capabilities that the EU members are pledging to contribute. In almost all cases, these forces are in fact double and in some cases triple hatted. In the case of non-NATO members, the EU forces pledged to ERRF are dual-hatted for defense of their own national sovereignty. For EU members of NATO, these forces are also wear a third hat in that they are the same forces that respond to NATO crises. These multiple hats can present problems or opportunities. ESDI can represent a division of scarce resources or a more efficient use of defense spending by the European nations.

Comparisons of the ERRF to the WEU and its lackluster performance as Europe's defense arm have been inevitable. EU members often criticized the complex and inept EU/WEU and NATO decision-making process for European military crisis management.⁴ However the ERRF is more credible than the WEU. Philip Gordon of the Brookings Institution sites three reasons why this latest initiative should be taken more seriously than its predecessors. First, the wholehearted participation of the United Kingdom lends credibility that had been absent previously. Second, Kosovo and the undisputed dominance of the United States brought home to the Europeans how dependent they are on Washington and have added incentive to the security effort. Third, ERRF is not a revival of the WEU but rather it is incorporated in a larger overall "plan to transfer responsibility for defense and security to the EU, an organization backed by real political will and momentum."⁵

Reinforcing this point, the second emerging capability lending credence to ESDI is the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), also referred to as the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), which is intended to develop and articulate the collective political will of the EU. The 1999 Treaty of Amsterdam added structural teeth by creating the post of High Representative for CFSP, notably filled by Mr. Javier Solana, former Secretary General of NATO.

At the Helsinki Summit EU leaders also formulated plans for a future defense structure by establishing three new political and military bodies within the European Council. First, the Political and Security Committee (PSC) is envisioned to deal with all aspects of the CFSP. The PSC will exercise political and strategic direction of European operations. Second, a EU Military

Committee composed of EU member Chiefs of Defense will give military advice and recommendations to the PSC. Third, a Military Staff will provide the Council with military expertise.

The formulation of this defense structure within the European Council, as opposed to the European Commission, is an important consideration in assessing the impacts of ESDI. EU military activity will be decided among the member heads of state and the defense ministers of the sovereign states rather than the still amorphous EU Parliament. This distinction is important because the decision makers are the same as those that make decisions within the North Atlantic Council, at least in regard to the nations who are both members of the EU and NATO.

POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF ESDI ON NATO

Since it is apparent that ESDI is going to come to fruition in some manner, U.S. policy cannot simply wish it away. U.S. policy can however, influence the way in which ESDI takes shape. In order for that policy to be effective in shaping ESDI, it is important to understand the components of ESDI and where U.S. policy should direct its efforts.

The value of ESDI should be measured by what its two components, the ERRF and the CFSP, bring to the transatlantic alliance. Analyzing how the two components can positively or negatively affect NATO will a basis for U.S. policy makers determining the course of U.S. policy.

HOW ESDI CAN STRENGTHEN NATO

Mechanisms for translating security interests into military actions that foster a united concept among EU members and are based in a transatlantic context can enhance the next phase of NATO development. If the CFSP enables Europeans to develop a unified security policy and bring that policy into the existing NATO operational planning structure, it will add significant value to the NATO relationship. A unified vision that avoids the situation which created acrimonious and fractured views of fighting the air war in Kosovo would be especially enhancing. It is not hard to imagine the benefits that would have been achieved if the European pillar came to the Kosovo fight with common political ends that could easily have been translated into operational actions by the NATO planning staff.

If, simultaneous to a unified vision, the EU provides NATO with the ERRF as a mission capable force, it offers NATO planners options other than absolute reliance on U.S. forces. If the ERRF further permits a more efficient use of scarce European defense funds by synergizing capabilities among participating nations, both the EU member nations and NATO benefit.

This is the "strong European pillar" envisioned by many ESDI and NATO supporters. When measured against the three components of the EU defense structure established in

Helsinki, this concept works well with two of them. The PSC and Military Committee seem to be well suited toward developing a common political and security vision among member states. However, the EU's desire for a Military Staff may be redundant to NATO and beyond the reach of ESDI, especially considering the limited increases planned in European defense budgets. Other structures already exist within NATO to enable this capability and are a more efficient application of scarce resources.

NATO has supported the concept of ESDI. It has always envisioned the evolving EU military capabilities operating under the purview of NATO's Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept. The CJTF concept endeavors to develop "lighter and more versatile structure with which to carry out its missions, ... permit the involvement of partners (non-NATO nations)[, and] ... enable our European allies to take principal responsibility for a greater range of operations through (ESDI)."⁶ With the CJTF concept, NATO is already capable of performing the functions envisioned by the EU's military staff. Further, development of European forces will fall under the auspices of NATO's Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI), which would coordinate, prioritize, and harmonize force development. It is through DCI that NATO envisions the EU meeting its "Headline Goal."

The operational linkage between the EU and NATO can also be enabled through the leadership of NATO. General Joseph Ralston, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR), has outlined a method by which the Deputy Supreme Commander (D/SACEUR) of the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) could be used as the "nexus for this new relationship. As the senior European commander in NATO, he acts as the focal point within the Alliance for European security issues."⁷ In his capacity as the nominal head of the ERRF, D/SACEUR will answer to EU Council of Ministers who will have to secure the permission of the North Atlantic Council to use NATO planning assets.

HOW ESDI CAN WEAKEN NATO

U.S. policy should not only accent the positive aspects of ESDI, but it should point a path away from potential negative impacts to NATO. As with the positive impacts, the harmful effects of ESDI can be measured in terms of the political will behind it, the mechanisms to translate that will into action, and the development of forces.

ESDI will diminish NATO if it brings a political will to the Alliance that is not unified or creates fractures among member nations. Not only must the EU members consider the goals of the EU, but their common political ends should, at the very least, complement non-EU NATO allies and European neighbors. Fissures will rapidly appear in the transatlantic alliance if the

CFSP causes EU members to develop a political will that is too continentally focused. Further, while the impact on NATO is the most important consideration of U.S. policy, a CFSP that minimizes the importance of a transatlantic vision for European security is not the only potentially harmful effect. If ESDI cannot encompass the historically strong transatlantic security vision because it is too inwardly focused, it will very likely leave the EU incapable of coping with the greater requirements of globalization and a broader view of world affairs.

ESDI will also weaken NATO if it is designed to weaken U.S. influence in Europe. Adopting ESDI simply as a means of EU self-assertion within NATO will undermine the strength of the transatlantic alliance. This self-assertion primarily manifests itself as a threat to U.S. leadership of NATO, potentially diminishing the U.S. influence through NATO in shaping a response to crisis. Regardless of the impressions of U.S. hegemony on the part of some EU members, U.S. capabilities do provide a strong pillar of NATO and will do so into the future if all members perceive its contributions as valuable. ESDI will weaken that pillar if one of its goals is to reduce U.S. influence. Additionally, European NATO members who have opted not to join the EU will also see EU self-assertion negatively.

The ERRF and a military planning structure developed under ESDI can also serve to undermine the alliance if it is developed solely to operate outside of, or redundant to, NATO. The likelihood of significant defense spending increases by any European country is remote and significant force structure increases are highly unlikely. As already established, most European forces wear multiple hats. Strictly autonomous defense capability within EU will cause some EU members to shed their NATO hat when forced to choose between contributing to NATO or contributing to an autonomous EU force, thereby undermining European contributions to NATO.

Finally, developing a EU force that is inadequately trained and equipped or incapable of operating with non-EU NATO members will only exacerbate the problems highlighted by the Kosovo operations. If ESDI does not provide an impetus for efficient and cohesive development of capable forces, its evolution will likely create additional and unfocused demand on already scarce European defense funds. Adoption of such a strategy will not only have serious negative consequences for NATO, but it will likely fail to strengthen the EU's military capability. This will create the worst of all scenarios, diminished capability across the board. Britain's Chief of the Defence Staff, General Sir Charles Guthrie summed up the danger by stating: "I maintain that a stronger European military capability will be good for NATO ... but Europe needs to deliver or NATO will be irrevocably damaged."⁸

EUROPEAN VIEWS: CONFLICTING IMPRESSIONS OF EU AUTONOMY UNDER ESDI

"The key problem of ESDI lies in the genetic clash between incompatible inheritances –the British and the French motives for wanting to build it. The British want ESDI to reassure Americans and thus extend the life of NATO. The French have in the past wanted ESDI as a counterweight to NATO and as an alternative to the U.S commitment and leadership, which NATO has embodied. The EU's diplomatic geometry on ESDI is therefore rather odd." Martin Walker⁹

Increasingly, the NATO / ESDI tie is being undermined by a desire on the part of some EU supporters to create ESDI under the rubric of the EU. Mr. Elmar Brok, Chairman of the European Parliament's Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defense Policy proposes; "we should be pragmatic and consider that the EU will be the basket in which ESDI will take shape. In fact, the EU can take over the responsibility for European-led operations, the sword being provided by EU Member States ... and/or by NATO."¹⁰ While Mr. Brok does not advocate a break between NATO and the EU, he reverses the U.S. concept that ESDI will provide a strong pillar for NATO by implying that NATO will be a good resource for implementing EU security policy.

Other EU members advocate more ESDI separation from NATO. "France, always an advocate of greater independence from the U.S., saw ESDI as a means of reducing American influence..."¹¹ Some of the more radical ESDI supporters advocate a complete break from NATO with European states preparing an autonomous military capacity for European controlled crisis response.¹²

Examining the results of two meetings held in December 2000 can summarize the polarity of European opinions on ESDI development. At the first meeting, a summit of EU heads of State in Nice, France formally announced the EU's intention to field the ERRF and formalize the troop contributions pledged by their defense ministers the previous month. During the course of the summit, divisions in the vision of ESDI among EU members became glaringly evident.

French President Jacques Chirac pressed for a capability separate from NATO. His vision was that the ERRF and other ESDI capabilities would be "coordinated, but independent" from NATO. Prior to the conference, a French parliamentary commission issued a report critical of the U.S. missile defense system and concluded it is "imperative for the Europeans to beef up their military capabilities independent of Washington." At the opening of the conference, President Chirac formalized France's position by announcing, "This European defense must, naturally, be coordinated with the alliance, but as far as planning and implementation is concerned, it must be independent of SHAPE."¹³

Britain countered the French position and upheld the Atlanticists' view for a European force closely linked with NATO. British Foreign Minister Robin Cook demanded and won removal of the French clause calling for "enhanced cooperation" or President Chirac's "coordinated but independent" view. Arguing that any development should complement and support NATO, not replace or compete with it has been a hallmark of British policy towards ESDI. To counter the potential negative impacts of an ESDI distinct from NATO, NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson developed three benchmarks for successful integration of ESDI, EU, and NATO. The "Three I's" of ESDI are Increased capabilities, Inclusiveness of all allies, and Indivisibility of transatlantic security. By consistently pushing the Three I's as fundamental to the development of ESDI, British policy has kept NATO as the cornerstone of European security.

Facing stiff opposition from Britain and Germany, France backed off its call for an independent force and accepted NATO dominance in military planning. The Nice Conference concluded with the EU leaders agreeing to give NATO the first right of refusal over military operations and relying on NATO planning structures to provide the ERRF its operational capabilities.

The second meeting, a NATO ministerial meeting in Brussels, is germane to understanding the concerns of non-EU NATO members. Bringing the results of the Nice Summit to Brussels, the NATO members of the EU attempted to begin working out the details of integrating the ERRF with NATO's planning institutions. Turkey, a NATO but not EU member, presented its concerns about the EU / NATO link by blocking attempts to give the ERRF assured access to NATO's planning facilities. The Turkish minister insisted that if NATO assets were to be used his country must be included in the EU's decision-making process rather than simply consulted as a NATO member. Turkey's concerns reflect those of many non-EU NATO members who fear a marginalizing of their influence within NATO.

The problems with Turkey's recalcitrance run deeper however. Supporters of close ESDI and NATO ties fear that refusal by non-EU NATO members to accept the use of NATO planning staff for EU operations could unravel the basis for close ties. This division could allow France to press for a separate European planning staff that could ultimately lead to the break-up of NATO. "The adoption of the European Union as the framework within which European efforts will be developed has resurrected fears that this could have adverse consequences for NATO through decoupling, division and duplication."¹⁴

US POLICY TOWARDS ESDI

"The United States welcomes European efforts to increase their contribution to collective defense and crisis response operations within NATO and to build a capability to act militarily under the EU where NATO as a whole is not engaged. These efforts are part of Europe's longstanding and natural trend toward greater cooperation and deeper union in economic, monetary, social, and political matters, a trend supported by the United States since the early post-World War II period. America's leadership role has adjusted before to changes in Europe, and we are prepared to adapt ourselves in the future to work with stronger, more versatile, and more united European partners." Secretary of Defense Cohen, December 2000.¹⁵

The Bush Administration inherits a National Security Strategy (NSS) of the United States that defines two strategic goals supporting our vital interest of European security and stability. First, "build a Europe that is truly integrated, democratic, prosperous and at peace." Second, "work with our allies and partners ... to meet the global challenges no nation can meet alone."¹⁶ These "ways" are consistent with the overall strategic concepts of the existing NSS; shape the international environment, respond to the full spectrum of crisis, and prepare for an uncertain future.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is defined as the anchor of American engagement in Europe. United States leadership in NATO and our forward based military personnel in Europe contribute to our ability to respond to crisis and are in keeping with our policy of acting in concert with the international community whenever possible.

With respect to the European Union (EU), the NSS "strongly supports the process of European integration."¹⁷ Economics, particularly promotion of market reform and investment in Eastern Europe, is the focus of the NSS's aim concerning the EU. The NSS recognizes the growing trend of political and economic integration of the EU.

Regarding EU defense issues, although supportive of the idea of a common European security policy, U.S. policy has, until recently, been characterized as "hands off" because "the shape of ESDI was seen, legitimately to be primarily a European concern. ... The result was a period ... where European proposals would be put forward with very little input from Washington..."¹⁸

However, toward the end of the Clinton Administration, the U.S. position on ESDI received significant visibility through statements made by several high-level U.S. policy makers. On March 24, 2000, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and Secretary of Defense William Cohen wrote in the Wall Street Journal Europe, "America's goal is clear. We want ESDI to succeed. Greater European military capabilities will make the Alliance stronger."¹⁹ On June 1, 2000, the

U.S. Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council, Ambassador Alexander Vershbow stated "ESDI, if it is done right, can strengthen – rather then compete with – NATO."²⁰ And on June 28, 2000, Secretary Cohen addressed the WEU and stated, "...the United States supports the (ESDI) and the European Security and Defense Policy in concept because we believe that a strong European pillar will mean a stronger NATO..."²¹

All three statements go on to caveat this support by stating that ESDI cannot compete with NATO or create a separation of U.S. and EU capabilities. The official U.S. position adopted Lord Robertson's Three I's (Increased capabilities, Inclusiveness of all allies, and Indivisibility of transatlantic security) as benchmarks. The Secretary of Defense included them in the <u>Report to</u> <u>Congress on Allied Contributions to the Common Defense 2000</u> when he reiterated the Three I's. He went on to say, "ESDI must reflect the interests of all Allies, including those who are not members of the EU. Secondly, ESDI is intended to reinforce and complement NATO's role in European security, not supplant it, and thus the U.S. is pressing for the timely establishment of NATO-EU ties ... Finally, ... the EU must now follow up on its admirable Headline Goal to make ESDI a reality." ²²

The Clinton Administration's growing acceptance of ESDI was ultimately validated with the publication of the 2000 National Security Strategy. Previous versions of the NSS had been silent on the inevitable development of ESDI, however in <u>A National Security For a Global Age</u>, the Administration voiced its support for development of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) and stated; "We support European efforts to increase and improve capabilities for collective defense ... including the capability to act militarily under the EU when NATO, as a whole, is not engaged."²³

The NATO ministerial meeting in February 2001 provided the new Bush Administration its first opportunity to present its insights on ESDI and their remarks raised significant controversy. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld publicly raised concerns that EU desires for an autonomous rapid-reaction force risked destabilizing NATO. Members of Congress also took a pre-summit meeting with Britain Foreign Secretary Robin Cook as an opportunity to express their concerns. A spokesman for Senator Gordon Smith, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee's European Affairs sub-committee said, "his main concern is that [ESDI] would compromise NATO in so far as it divides loyalties and separates allies. NATO is our most important strategic alliance and we don't want it divided into sub-alliances."²⁴ These statements seem to indicate a departure from past policy and raised significant concern in European governments and the European press. However, Secretary of State Colin Powell met with British Foreign Secretary Robin Cook and said the Bush Administration has a "very

good understanding of what [ESDI] is all about – an effort on the part of our European friends to increase their capability for rapid reaction in Europe and wherever else the need might arise – and we support that goal.²⁵ These divergent views demonstrate that the Bush Administration must come to grips with ESDI and develop a clear, consistent policy.

CONCLUSIONS

ESDI is no longer an amorphous concept and it will continue to be refined. In the near future it will provide the EU with a collective political will that can establish security policy objectives. The U.S. can no longer consider ESDI a European only issue and take a "hands off" approach toward its development.

Whether ESDI becomes a reality is no longer in question. The more pertinent issue is how ESDI will take shape and what will be the impacts for NATO and the trans-Atlantic alliance? ESDI can be good for NATO and strengthen the transatlantic partnership. Conversely, an ESDI separate from NATO will undermine the Alliance and diminish the U.S. leadership. Three scenarios are possible. First EU members will keep their existing force levels, remain an integral pillar of NATO, and use NATO command structure for planning and command and control. Second, the EU will not increase its military capabilities, pull out of NATO, and use their existing capabilities for European only military planning and policy requirements. Finally, EU members can significantly expand their military expenditures to build capabilities redundant to NATO. Since this final scenario is highly unlikely in the foreseeable future, U.S. Policy must encourage the first scenario for ESDI evolution; a scenario that enhances close linkages between NATO and EU policy developed from a transatlantic perspective. The most important element in establishing an effective linkage is the means by which EU policy ends are translated into action by a EU or NATO sponsored force. CJTF and DCI must be given the full weight and backing of the U.S. as the best means of influencing integration of ESDI into NATO.

European allies are divided in their opinions on ESDI evolution and purpose. U.S. policy must strongly support the positions of European allies that support close transatlantic ties. It must convince allies who envision ESDI as a means to lessen U.S. influence that U.S. involvement is an integral component of European security. Finally, the policy must reassure non-EU NATO members that ESDI will strengthen NATO and European Security. Lord Robertson's Three I's should be adopted into formal U.S. policy. They offer effective benchmarks to ensure ESDI evolves under the mantle of NATO and enhances rather than undermines the transatlantic alliance.

Finally, U.S. policy must be unambiguous and completely transparent. Our European allies, whether in the EU or NATO, members of both or neither, must know without a doubt what the U.S. considers acceptable in the evolution of ESDI. "American policies must help further ... favorable trends by maintaining a disciplined and consistent foreign policy".²⁶

Including a succinct policy statement outlining the ends, ways and means of the U.S. vision regarding development of ESDI in the next version of the National Security Strategy is the best way to provide the necessary transparency and unity of message. The policy should have, as its desired ends, a European security structure that is based on a transatlantic vision to achieve common democratic goals and foster economic cooperation. The best way to achieve those ends are to inextricably link the security and defense policies of the European Union and the United States through the time tested NATO alliance. Effectively shaping ESDI in a form that provides NATO a strong European pillar, with a unified European vision and strong capable forces, are the means by which the U.S. will enable a true strategic partnership.

Word Count: 5464

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⁶ "Report on Allied Contributions to the Common Defense 2000: A Report to the United States Congress by the Secretary of Defense," Chapter 2, available from <<u>https://wwwc.cc.columbia.edu/sec/ dlc/ciao/book/dod01.html</u>>; Internet; accessed 26 Sep 2000.

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⁸ Michael Evans, "Guthrie Seeks To Ease US Tension Over Euro Force," <u>London Times</u> February 9, 2001.

⁹ Martin Walker, "The European Union and the European Security and Defense Identity," <u>NATO Europe and the 21st Century</u> Conference Proceedings, 19 April 2000. Available from <<u>http://wwics.si.edu/organiza/affil/WWICS/ees/special/2000/apr00.htm</u> >; Internet; accessed 5 December 2000.

¹⁰ Brok.

¹¹ Barry, 65.

¹² Julian Smith and Martin Butcher, "A Risk Reduction Strategy for NATO," January 1999; available from <u>http://www.basicint.org/natorr6.htm</u>; Internet; accessed 1 October 2000.

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¹⁴ The North Atlantic Assembly, "An International Secretariat Background Brief on The European Security and Defence Identity / Policy (ESDI/P)," February 2000; available from http://www.naa.be/publications/special/esdi2000.html; Internet, accessed 30 September 2000.

¹⁵ William S. Cohen, <u>Strengthening Transatlantic Security</u>, <u>A U.S. Strategy For The 21st</u> <u>Century</u> (Washington, DC: The Department of Defense, December 2000), 18.

¹⁶ William J. Clinton, <u>A National Security Strategy for a Global Age</u> (Washington, DC: The White House, December 1999), 39 - 40.

¹⁷ Ibid., 46.

¹⁸ S. Nelson Drew, "NATO From Berlin to Bosnia," <u>McNair Paper</u> 35 (January 1995): Chapter 8.

¹⁹ Madeleine K. Albright and William S. Cohen, "Byliner: Albright and Cohen Commentary on ESDI," March 24, 2000; available from <<u>http://usa.grmbl.com/s20000324f.html>;</u> Internet; accessed September 30, 2000.

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²³ Clinton, 40.

²⁴ Toby Harnden, "Cook Fails to Ease American Doubts On EU Defence Plans," <u>London</u> <u>Daily Telegraph</u> February 9, 2001.

²⁵ Mike Collett, "Mediator Role Seen For U.S., Europe," <u>Washington Times</u> February 8, 2001.

²⁶ Condolezza Rice, "Life After The Cold War," <u>Foreign Affairs</u> 79 (January/February 2000): 12 – 20.

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