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NAVAL PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY

BY

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Naval Preventive Diplomacy

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ABSTRACT

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Naval power, as part of a U.S. preventive diplomacy effort, can be flexibly mixed with political, economic, and informational power to intervene early in places of incipient crisis or before mass violence. Both the increased international demand for preventive diplomacy and the evolving threats in the littorals have combined to alter the operational environment of naval forces, yet the inherent strategic and operational reach, the flexibility, and the versatility of naval forces have much to offer if wisely employed. Naval leaders must therefore assess the evolving logic and strategies of preventive diplomacy and consider how naval forces may best be applied and developed. To enhance the naval effort in support of preventive diplomacy, three imperatives emerge: (1) to develop and deploy relevant naval forces; (2) to refine and broaden naval intelligence and information networks; and, (3) to educate naval leaders—as well as politicians and diplomats of the usefulness, limits and risks of naval preventive diplomacy.

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INTO A NAVAL 'NO MAN'S LAND'

Numerous recent violent and deadly conflicts have beckoned US political and military intervention in Somalia, Northern Iraq, Bosnia, Haiti, Rwanda, Kosovo, and East Timor. In the soul searching aftermath of these tragic episodes numerous policy and academic forums have rigorously examined these "deadly conflict laboratories" to determine what interventions worked, what didn't work, and what might work for the future.¹ A new theory of conflict prevention and containment--*preventive diplomacy*--has emerged from these high level dialogues to better inform political leaders and diplomats. While not a centerpiece of this dialogue, U.S. naval forces can play an increasing diplomatic role to prevent or contain incipient violent conflict in nations that border the world's littorals. This paper attempts to chart the stormy waters of preventive diplomacy amid the numerous rocks and shoals of political and naval risk.

The diplomatic use of naval forces has a long and storied history. In his seminal book, Gunboat Diplomacy, Sir James Cable cites 250 examples of such attempts-- some successful, some less so, and some fiascoes-- from 1919 to 1991.² He predicts that the use of naval forces, for limited ends or with limited means, will not only prevail but will likely expand. One possible expansive role is within a context of preventive diplomacy, because effective naval preventive diplomacy could obviate far larger interventions. A dialogue of this notion is perhaps undervalued and understudied due to our current emphasis on major theaters of war, battlespace dominance, and power projection.

Developing the strategic foresight to employ naval forces for preventive diplomacy is conceptually difficult and rife with risks of political or military costs or even failure. Much remains to be done to examine this emerging theory, to test its military assumptions, and to develop sensible doctrine for the changing political, strategic, and tactical landscape. As the littoral security environment evolves toward more and varied complications a new emphasis on earlier intervention may portend a new efficacy of naval preventive diplomacy.

CHARTING NEW WATERS: PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY

More should and could be done to prevent deadly conflict. Yet the challenge remains, however, to effectively combine the elements of US power to do so. The decision to use military force as a last resort, and a last resort only, may shape conditions such that only significant and costly use of military force may attain our goals. Or that such goals may become, in the final analysis, unattainable. Former President George H. W. Bush states:

“...We are becoming increasingly ambivalent about using our military forces, when the costs and risks of doing so seem so clear, and the consequences of inaction seem distant and elusive...I believe it is a mistake to treat military force as a last resort, which exists somehow outside policy. We need instead to treat the use of force as an integral part of policy and strategy, not because it is a decision to be taken lightly, but so that it does not become a *self-fulfilling last resort*. I am convinced that if military force is regarded as something that can only be brought into the equation after it seems that everything else has been tried and nothing else has worked – that is, force is to be considered only if and when policy has failed – we are more likely to face the stark choice between using force and failing to achieve our objectives...paradoxical as it may seem, a clear and convincing willingness to use force when necessary can be key to the prevention of deadly conflict.”³

A new understanding and development of naval preventive diplomacy could serve to provide policy-makers with better options—early resorts—in a crisis. So a new conceptual underpinning is a vital first step. Naval preventive diplomacy is:

A diplomatic effort, with the threat or use of limited naval forces, undertaken in vulnerable places and times—when violence appears imminent—to prevent states or groups from using mass violence or coercion to settle political disputes.⁴
5 6

A few things are important to note before we sail on. The term *preventive diplomacy* has been used broadly in the past ten years to include what is now understood as conflict prevention, peacekeeping, and peacemaking: this definition is too broad. In fact, a cursory Internet search on ‘preventive diplomacy’ revealed over 20,000 sites, thus attesting to its popular use. Next, the current DoD definition is far narrower than posed above and may require revision if we hope to encompass more naval activity in this effort.⁷ Finally, some notable criticism of preventive diplomacy as an oversold, fuzzy buzzword has been posited in prestigious journals, yet the interest in preventive diplomacy rages on.⁸ My above definition narrows the popular idea, expands upon the DoD idea, recognizes the critic’s disdain, and attempts to pose a concept for further study and evaluation by those who would practice it.

In sum, four ideas are essential to a concept of naval preventive diplomacy: (1) that naval force can be used in such a way as to exploit its presence and potential power, rather than necessarily expending force; (2) that diplomats will have the lead, and that naval forces likely will have a textual or an ambiguous role in the background of an overall political, economic, or information strategy; (3) that intervention could be directed either between or within sovereign states; and, (4) that intervention takes place before mass violence occurs.

SKIMMING THE POLITICAL AND DIPLOMATIC WAVETOPS

Preventive diplomacy presumes effective early warning of the incipient crisis; such warning can come from embassy or diplomatic sources, the international media, open sources, or national or military intelligence. Two challenges must be overcome to attain effective early warning: (1) obtaining accurate, timely, and sufficiently complete political and military information; and, (2) analyzing that information to produce 'actionable intelligence.' Analysis and assessment of the specific factors likely to precipitate mass violence are particularly difficult to isolate; they include the prophetic identification of the critical mass for credible warning, recognizing patterns of change that will lead to the acceleration of conflict, and assessing the likelihood that violent conflict will occur.⁹ Unfortunately, early warning does not necessarily make for easy response either: key political decisions must first be made. While discussion of political incentives to decide to act early are beyond the scope of this paper, an enhanced practice of naval preventive diplomacy could alter such political calculation by offering a better likelihood of success for early intervention and provide pragmatic early resorts to do so.

Preventive diplomacy cannot take a cookie-cutter type approach, but must artfully mix and apply elements of political, economic, informational, and military power. The case for mixed strategies is well delineated in recent studies with emphasis appropriately placed on dozens of political, economic, and information approaches, both deterrent and coercive, which should be first resorts to emerging crises.^{10 11} Of pertinence to this paper, Michael Lund asserts a long list of military approaches, which can be accomplished by naval forces, to include (1) the deterrent approaches of security guarantees, maintaining or restoring local or regional power balances, and use or threat of limited shows of force; and (2) the coercive approaches of establishing and monitoring arms control regimes, confidence building measures, non-aggression agreements, preemptive peacekeeping forces, demilitarized zones, arms embargoes or blockades, defensive force postures, and military-to-military programs.¹²

Several factors drive the success of preventive diplomacy. First, strategies that combine deterrent, reassurance, inducement and coercive measures create better options for diplomats. More options thus make for more flexibility in negotiating with states or groups in conflict. In many instances implicit muscle is good: a clear role for naval forces. Overt incentives can also be important but tend to work best when linked directly to specific conditions or are targeted to lead to specific compromises or concessions, and can be backed by coercive power if required: again an explicit naval force role. Second, the diplomat must shape negotiations so all parties can show gains to domestic constituencies, thus it may be important for naval forces to be less

coercive, more ambiguous in this regard. So naval forces may be used to tip the balances here or possibly play a backdrop role while the focus of effort centers elsewhere. Third, mediator credibility and character are even more critical in internal conflicts than in interstate conflicts, thus diplomats must be perceived as having decisive power or significant prestige and status. Naval measures to enhance status and prestige to support this perceptual effort is desirable and, at a minimum, must not work at cross-purposes in this regard. Fourth, success may hinge on early action, thus naval forces must be in or near the littoral of concern. If naval forces arrive too late then violence could transform the nature of the conflict, or worse, the basic fabric of society becomes shattered thus making any further intervention larger, costlier, riskier, or simply no longer feasible. A fifth factor concerns the usefulness of economic sanctions, a traditional task of naval forces. The threat of and the ability to enforce sanctions can be a pivotal part of a mixed strategy, so naval forces must be prepared. A sixth and final important factor is that the US may opt to support the leadership of regional organizations, other sovereign states, the United Nations, or even nongovernmental organizations in a preventive diplomacy effort. Naval leaders thus must understand the above factors as well as the specific international and strategic context involved to offer practical advice and employ forces effectively. Correspondingly, both political leaders and diplomats must have a common understanding of the limits and strengths of naval forces.

SAIL ORDERS: FULL STEAM AHEAD

SOVEREIGN SEA FORCES

“Other services have nothing so imposing as a man-of-war. When a surface ship is about there is little doubt it is there. It may assuage or alarm, be emollient or abrasive, but it will be noticed.”¹³

Immortalized since *Mare Liberum* of 1604, the concept that the sea outside a fixed distance from land is free to be used by all, in whatever manner they see fit, has been accepted as international law. Although nations have recently tried to extend territorial waters from 3 to 12 miles, the continuing utility of naval forces persists. “Maritime power is still highly useful, for it is part of the international language of force. Ironically it is in peacetime that it is most valuable.”¹⁴ “Warships will remain in business because naval diplomacy is ‘action language,’ even when force is not contemplated. Actions still speak louder than words, and it is a foolish government which denies itself affordable options.”¹⁵ Naval force is America sovereign power: right and might that can respond to far-flung events quickly and decisively or can shape

diplomacy. While US command of the seas lends stability to the shorelines, ports, and chokepoints through which most global trade passes and where most people live, the capacity to operate in international waters further foists upon naval forces a unique role as the embodiment of the state. Such naval deployments have come to be recognized as a statement of national commitment.¹⁶

Such free movement of sovereign power and commitment provides a great comparative advantage to naval forces for preventive diplomacy. "While land-based air forces and ground forces also have roles in supporting diplomacy, naval forces are particularly well-suited for the presence role, and U.S. presence overseas has rested historically with naval forces. In the case of friends and allies, forward-deployed naval forces provide a relatively unobtrusive means of building and reinforcing political ties. The inherent ability to avoid contentious sovereignty issues makes naval forces the least intrusive means by which to signal interest in a particular region while simultaneously demonstrating U.S. commitments to defend alliances."¹⁷ Unlike land and air counterparts, warships are floating US sovereign territory that are highly flexible, extraordinarily controllable, have long loitering endurance, can hover with clear or ambiguous intent in an international medium (the sea), and can quickly switch from a platform of diplomacy to one of war. Being there or being nearby matters. Forces deployed solely 'beyond the mind's eye' could never accomplish the goals of preventive diplomacy so effectively. In an environment in which regional powers may prey on weaker neighbors and in which religious or ethnic conflict erupts increasingly into localized violence, the psychological impact of forward presence cannot be overstated.¹⁸ It's one thing to say we'll be there when the conflict begins—it's another to be there. Naval forces are not just forward present; they are immediately employable at critical hot spots.

And the likely place of future hot spots will be in the world's littorals. Though only a tiny portion of the world's surface, littorals are homes to over three-quarters of the world's population, locations for over eighty percent of the world's capital cities, and nearly all of the marketplaces for international trade. Because of this, the littorals are where most of the world's conflicts will take place.¹⁹ Naval forces can reach any international littoral, areas that will hold most of the world's capitals, populations, and vortexes of logistics and transportation. If a place borders an ocean or a major sea, they are within the reach and influence of naval preventive diplomacy.

ENDS, WAYS AND MEANS

In that "no-man's" land between political and military decisions, a better understanding of the utility and potential influence of naval forces could alter the calculus of preventive diplomacy. Although the tools themselves should not determine the diplomatic vision, the tools can limit or enhance the achievability of any vision; and in a crisis, the tools of a trade on hand often dictate the trade taken up. Four distinct characteristics come to the fore in a crisis: (1) Press of Time; (2) Conflicting Interpretation; (3) Narrowing of Options; (4) Reliance on Preconceived Operational Notions.²⁰ Naval forces are or can readily be wedged in the political-military cusp of all four of these characteristics. Assuming their presence in or near a littoral (obviously without presence naval forces have no immediate role), then naval forces are more than just an enabler—naval presence is an important task in itself in that it promotes national influence and access to critical global areas. Presence permits intervention but is not itself interventionary. The ability of naval forces to remain on station in international waters for extended periods allows them to be present without being committed—which British doctrine calls "poise."²¹

Naval forces have long been used as diplomatic tools in situations short of war because in its ability to 'poise' or 'hover' outside national jurisdictions, naval diplomacy has no direct equivalent on land. And because power is exploited rather than force expended, naval diplomacy has a unique spectrum of force and intensity. Poise can be used to deceive or distract, to prevent an enemy from concentrating defensive forces or to deploy them to face threats elsewhere. In 1991 several Iraqi divisions were positioned to counter a threatened U.S. amphibious attack that never materialized. Furthermore, naval forces present in a littoral will invariably be engaged in surveillance—an essential component of any task, and one that may be a mission in its own right—for intelligence-gathering purposes.

Poise can be applied to friends and foes alike, to reassure or to deter, resting always on the potential for the use of force against *someone*. A recent example of this were strategies used in 1994-1996 toward North Korea where military threats supported an overall strategy that concentrated on economic and political instruments. Such approaches may be more appropriate, and more effective, than quick recourse to military force. Threats and limited military force have a clear role, but more as textual elements in policies dominated by economic, diplomatic, and political factors than as primary policy instruments.²²

So naval forces can be forthrightly or ambiguously present with diplomatic moves made psychologically by communicating that naval forces are there, just over the horizon. They can be purposely conspicuous or exceptionally difficult to detect. With the ability to cumulate or

disband forces, naval power can be adjusted or scaled at will, increasing or decreasing pressure as a diplomat chooses to raise or lower U.S. commitment.²³

VERSATILE, FLEXIBLE, AND ENDURING

"If flexibility is the key to success, then warships make excellent keys, having opened many a diplomatic and military door."²⁴

Naval forces can be poised as a single ship or as an armada. They can be benevolent and welcome visitors, sending their sailors and Marines ashore as ambassadors of U.S. interest and good will. Ships have historically manifested interests by repositioning at high speed to areas of immediate concern. The same ships can deploy Marines to embassies to rescue our citizens, to distribute humanitarian assistance, or to deter those who would harm others. Naval forces can be important platforms to gather intelligence and information to support preventive diplomacy. Ultimately, if required, naval forces can bring massive and precise firepower to bear and deploy Marines to deter or to go ashore. Because they can be assembled in increments, naval power can be readily calibrated. This scalability makes naval forces instruments of choice when situations are ambiguous, evolving, and volatile.²⁵

Naval forces can be used in a US unilateral effort, or flexibly combined with other forces in versatile roles such as preventive deployment, monitoring and early warning, and support roles to other agencies, military and civilian, engaged in conflict or peace restoration. Moreover, naval forces have the advantage of being a low-risk option, in both physical and political terms, particularly when compared with the option of committing ground troops.²⁶ A sea-based MAGTF on amphibious ships is not subject to the physical limitations and political constraints that can hamstring a force that is bound to bases ashore. Free of requirements for host-nation support...such a MAGTF can strike anywhere in the world's littorals - even where it is not wanted. When operating with Maritime Prepositioning Ships (MPS) stationed around the globe, a MAGTF can bring to bear an enormous range of mission flexibility, with an unrivalled capacity for self-sustainment.²⁷

Naval forces are inherently flexible as their nature can be changed without the vessel doing anything: political or diplomatic announcements about intent can be enough. Actual movements can start or stop on short notice, with diplomatic meaning, they can even be disavowed. "Obviously the flexibility of sea power, its range, speed, size and variety of payload, and its capacity to loiter off-shore or strike deep inland are qualities well-suited to help political leaders orchestrate the application of force to fit specific contingencies."²⁸ Potential foes recognize and respect the latent combat power of a force that never runs out of steam and

remains ready to face any contingency on a moment's notice. When deterrence fails, such a force possesses the operational resilience to adjust rapidly and confront a new threat.²⁹ While versatility means that a force can operate in any mission environment such as humanitarian assistance, peace enforcement, and combat, it also means that the same force can operate in all physical realms: air, land, and sea. Expeditionary forces must possess the capability to rapidly increase or decrease the combat power available in an area of operations, commensurate with political or military considerations.³⁰

Despite the manifold advantages of naval forces it must be noted, on balance, that they cannot act with impunity, so the application of naval forces must take careful consideration of the constraints and risks that infest their waters.

SHOALS AND ROCKS: LIMITS AND RISKS

Limits and risks have always constrained the use of naval forces in diplomacy. Although not all littorals are threat-laden and arguably every threat in the littoral can be countered, though not always without loss, it is important calculate the tactical threats, geographical constraints and political factors that will shape any particular preventive diplomacy effort. The naval juggling act occurs in trying to minimize naval force risk, while meeting mission objectives, and not to prejudice the political context. Such is the art of naval preventive diplomacy.

Such risk assessment is especially difficult to make in littorals given the possibility of disproportionate damage to high-value vessels from cheap shots, a risk that must be considered and mitigated because many of the 120+ littoral nations have weapons that can impose such disproportionate damage. Mines, short-ranged submarines, missile-firing attack craft, radar-controlled coastal artillery or missiles, and bomber aircraft, all are cost-effective in or near territorial waters...³¹ Relatively static and confined littoral operations are more susceptible to attack by weapons of mass destruction especially widely proliferated chemical weapons. The presence of nonstate actors, including terrorists and irregulars, adds a further dimension to the threat close to land.³² And at the regional level, small and medium navies have significantly modernized. This change in the distribution of naval capabilities has shifted potential operational scenarios from high-intensity open-ocean operations to low-intensity and broad-spectrum operations against smaller navies or pirates.³³ Thus the littorals are increasingly vulnerable to tactical threats.

The increase of these tactical threats is occurring in an environment that may be increasingly constrained. The strategic and operational mobility of naval forces, which is their

great strength and enables their deployment to littorals is not, once they are in these locations, matched by tactical mobility. Vulnerability may be increased by the readiness of some states of uncertain stability, intentions, and belligerence to exercise less target discrimination than Western practices and ROE require. For example in May 1987 in the Persian Gulf two Iraqi air launched Exocet missiles hit the USS Stark (FFG 31), apparently having been mistaken for an oil tanker; Iraqi targeting had amounted to no more than firing at the largest radar contact within a predetermined geographical area. Spasmodic and isolated attacks, whether as the result of maverick action or designed to apply pressure and inflict costs upon outside forces, may pose a particular threat to individual units without incurring a risk of overall defeat—provided political will perseveres. Maneuverability restrictions of naval forces can pose vulnerabilities that increase the risk to a preventive diplomacy effort.

As stated earlier, states continue to try to extend coastal waters for economic, environmental and security reasons. Such encroachment may have important effects on the use of naval forces for preventive diplomacy, as one author notes, "The military implications of creeping jurisdiction on naval diplomacy arise from the problems of access...which gives the sea its essential strategic quality...any threat to access seeks to limit the utility of warships in their diplomatic roles."³⁴ Thus in an overarching sense, we should pursue policies and standards to keep coastal waters as close to the coast as possible, but also recognize the reach and range of naval forces still provide good options in the right conditions and circumstances. Furthermore the littorals themselves can constrict naval flexibility. As one author notes, "Naval forces operate *in* and *from* littoral waters, influencing and controlling events on the landward portion of the littoral—but also, it may be argued, independent of the land dimension in some important respects. Because of the "interface" (land, sea, air) nature of the littoral, in operational terms it is increasingly a joint environment."³⁵ Thus, naval forces in the littoral will be influenced by joint operations from that shore; so a longer-standing definition of "inshore" operations—"where operations are significantly affected by the proximity of land"—demonstrates this other aspect of the littoral (a "from the *land*" point of view).

Geoffrey Till has identified a common theme which emphasizes this "adjacent to land" nature of littoral waters: "The common element in all . . . definitions is that of constraint, be it legal, geographic or technological . . . an area where naval operations are conducted under significantly more constraint than they are on the open ocean."³⁶

THREE NAVAL IMPERATIVES FOR PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY

DEPLOY AND DEVELOP RELEVANT FORCE PACKAGES

First, naval leaders should continue to develop and refine a menu of preventive diplomacy options for political leaders and diplomats; this would increase rather than narrow options during time-compressed crisis decision-making. Options can include: (1) the discreet or combined use of carrier battle groups or precision fires from surface ships; (2) the ambiguous use of naval amphibious forces or the precise landing ashore of easily scalable MAGTFs; or, (3) the use of ships as platforms to fuse information into useful diplomatic and military intelligence. Such naval forces can further be mixed and matched with other land, air and special operations forces as part of a US joint team. Better-refined naval tools, in support of an over-arching preventive diplomacy strategy, may not only change the calculus of belligerents, but of US decision-makers in the calculation of likelihood of success of intervention as well. Likely force packages can be tailored to conduct or contribute to security guarantees, restoring local force balances, shows of force, confidence building measures, preemptive peacekeeping forces, establishment of demilitarized zones, arms embargoes or blockades, or lesser forms of cooperation such as military-to-military programs or ship visits.

Naval doctrine and technologies must be developed to support preventive diplomacy, and can capitalize on current initiatives to increase the speed of command. With information superiority desirable for both diplomatic and military reasons, forward deployed naval forces can best be positioned to take advantage of the time factor. Forward presence allows us to close timelines to crisis points, change critical initial conditions, foreclose enemy options and prevent violent conflict before it starts. Speed of command well conceived and precisely placed can be leveraged into speed of diplomacy. Planning timelines can be dramatically compressed with the use of e-mail, video teleconferencing, and an intuitive graphics-rich medium instead of traditional message text. The result will be an ability to plan collaboratively and execute naval preventive diplomacy in a dynamic environment.³⁷

ASSIST IN EARLY WARNING

Naval intelligence activities can feasibly be expanded to support preventive diplomacy. Part of a solution here may involve embarking political or diplomatic analysts to work with naval experts in interpreting the political-military situation ashore. Another part is better integrating open sources, as well as informational support from allies, friends, and international and

nongovernmental organizations. Some of this effort is underway today in an effort to extract and edit useful information from current sources, but much remains to be accomplished. Initiatives to take the baseline intelligence infrastructure data and preposition it now, in peacetime, so that we don't have to scramble for it in a contingency, to include better tagging and access to what we already have is a good example of an effort that will support preventive diplomacy.³⁸

Additional factors must be added and integrated into naval intelligence to support preventive diplomacy, to include: (1) a broader analysis of non-military issues such as political groups, local media, third nation or outside support of belligerents, legal mandate, geographic boundaries, and best/worst case timelines and implications of them; (2) further analysis of the root causes, prospects for peace, branches/sequels resulting from diplomatic negotiations, belligerent commitment to peace, capabilities, belligerent possible courses of action; and, (3) identification of those who can spoil or foul the diplomatic process, threat courses of action, any belligerent actions that could violate the peace, response of other belligerents, likely responses to US actions, terrorist actions, response of locals to US actions, host nation and military responses, war gaming, and terrorist actions.³⁹

Although we live in an age of instantaneous communications, technical collection is not the only way to gather intelligence about an adversary. For instance, counterintelligence operations can neutralize and degrade an adversary's intelligence effort while human intelligence (HUMINT) can provide rarely accessible information about adversary activity—to include rare insight into his intentions. Recent operations demonstrate that naval forces need to have a strong tactical HUMINT capability, and must be expanded to meet the operational requirements of the future without decreasing the counterintelligence force protection role—collection, investigations, operations, multidiscipline analysis, and support to operations security. Employed as part of an all-source intelligence effort, HUMINT and counterintelligence operations provide the commander unique information.⁴⁰

Finally, the textual role of naval forces in preventive diplomacy demands an approach that integrates as many information sources as possible to include allies, the United Nations, NGOs, State Department, and US intelligence. Further, an on-site analysis of the land and littoral tactical situation would assist diplomats in determining the timing and methods of statecraft, or the use of diplomatic statements and actions to make an objective area more transparent and conducive to preventive diplomacy.

EDUCATE NAVAL LEADERS

Developing naval leaders must include the study of strategy and diplomacy at our war colleges, military schools and self-study. Such is in keeping with the current emphasis in which the littoral environment is characterized by a dynamic, fluid situation that requires leaders who can tolerate ambiguity and uncertainty and make rapid decisions under stress. Producing leaders who have the *experience* to judge what needs to be done and *know how* to do it can be accomplished only with an extensive amount of training and exposure to operational problems. We must have leaders who can operate effectively in spite of risks and uncertainty; we can develop these leaders by improving their capacity to identify patterns, seek and select critical information, and make decisions quickly on an intuitive basis. This intuitive-based decision making cycle will be enhanced by extensive investments in education, war gaming and combat simulation activities, and battlefield visualization techniques. These investments will produce leaders who can make informed judgments, take decisive action, and thus ensure that Operational Maneuver From The Sea can be successfully executed.⁴¹ Finally, continued investment in foreign area and regional officer experts will continue to build the knowledge base required to further understand what is going on in potential hotspots.

Next, we must develop the art of naval preventive diplomacy. This means developing naval leaders with an increased understanding of the political, social, cultural, and conflict situations in likely hotspots, with an emphasis on developing creative and effective options for preventive diplomacy. Such advice given to any diplomat would carry heavy influence, especially if the limits, risks and the importance of timing are well articulated. Shrewd analysis and risk-taking is key. Naval preventive diplomacy will be case specific, and depend on the particulars of time and place, much as it has always been, "the appropriate conditions for the exercise of limited naval force have always been both exacting and exceptional—it is seldom possible for warships thus employed to be successful. Gunboat [read now naval preventive] diplomacy is a screwdriver intended to turn a particular kind of screw. It is not a hammer that will bang home any old nail."⁴²

Creating both political and military effects is challenging, "the political utility and military effectiveness of armed forces exist in different worlds: one the world of appearances, impressions and culturally determined value-judgments of international politics; the other that of physical reality in actual warfare."⁴³ Results of those effects will depend on both the perceptions of the target and the credibility of the intervener: there will always be a filtering process between what one thinks may constitute military power and what actually does.⁴⁴ It will remain essential

to be willing and able to use any naval force threatened, or to be able to use naval forces to restrain a belligerents uses of armed force. Political will is imperative.

Equally important as diplomatic sophistication in naval leaders is the development of naval sophistication political leaders and diplomats. Prudent steps to do this include conferences, publishing studies and so on to expand traditional organizations--such as military, diplomatic, non-governmental, academic--to take on board new skills, and to consolidate new levels of cooperation, collaboration, and mutual understanding. Naval preventive diplomacy will be a team effort.

AND BACK INTO HARM'S WAY

"Because more states than ever now have seacoasts, navies, and maritime interests to quarrel about, political considerations make it likely that threats and/or uses of limited naval force will grow rather than decline for the rest of this century," and Cable further notes thus, "In the future, many governments are likely to regard the threat or use of limited force as preferable to war, because war has become increasingly unpredictable and is liable to lead to escalation. This preference for limited force on the part of assailants may even outweigh the increased political ability of victims to defend against limited force."⁴⁵ "Limited naval force has many advantages. Naval forces can threaten without commitment, and can be used on a basis of limited liability that is difficult for soldiers to manage. Warships can assemble on the high seas; they can wait and loom. If they have to take action, they are easier to withdraw, no matter what the outcome. Limited naval force is an appropriate instrument in only a few international disputes. When it is available, however, it offers a particular application of force that can be both more economical and more controllable than other varieties."⁴⁶

Forward presence naval forces need not be used as a last resort; they are ideal for a US early resort to incipient crisis thus nipping such conflict in the bud, and can serve as either an ambiguous or a blunt arrow in the quiver of diplomacy. The roles of sea control and power projection can be expected to be the focus of both programmatic and naval force structure efforts and naval deployments for some time to come. It will be the men and women on the ships, brave sailors and Marines who readily go in harm's way, who must execute any such limited naval efforts in support of preventive diplomacy. Naval leaders can play an important role in assisting political leaders and diplomats decide how to strengthen the persuasive role of US naval forces in deterrence, inducements and coercion to thus prevent deadly conflict.

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ENDNOTES

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² James Cable, Gunboat Diplomacy, (New York, St. Martin's Press, 1994). Will be cited as Cable 1.

³ George H.W. Bush, "American Leadership and the Prevention of Deadly Conflict," Essays on Leadership, Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, www.ccpdc.org/pubs/essays/esfr.htm, accessed 26 Nov 2000

⁴ Michael S. Lund, Preventing Violent Conflict: A Strategy for Preventive Diplomacy (Washington D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 1996), 31-33.

⁵ Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, Final Report (Washington D.C.: Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, 1997), 37 and 69.

⁶ James Cable, "Gunboat Diplomacy's Future," Proceedings, USNI, August 1986, 36-41. Cited as Cable 2.

⁷ The U.S. Defense Department defines **preventive diplomacy** as, "Diplomatic actions taken in advance of a predictable crisis to prevent or limit violence." While this definition suffices to succinctly define the limited military role of such activity, it fails encompass the entire gamut of political, diplomatic, economic and informational art and skill required to achieve the much broader aims discussed in the recent academic studies on preventive diplomacy.

⁸ Stephen John Stedman, "Alchemy for a New World Order, Overselling 'Preventive Diplomacy,'" Foreign Affairs, Volume 74 No. 3 (May/June 1995): 14.

⁹ Jentleson, 11.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Lund, 203

¹² Ibid. In Lund's appendix re: "Preventive Diplomacy Toolbox", he also includes several coercive diplomatic, economic, and moral sanctions; noncoercive judicial and nonjudicial measures; and numerous economic, social, normative programs; and, governing structures and other ways to promote peaceful conflict resolution.

¹³ J.R.Hill, Maritime Strategy for Medium Powers, (Croom Helm, London, 1986) 98.

¹⁴ Harold J. Kearsley, Maritime Power and the Twenty-first Century, (Ashgate Publishing Company, Dartmouth, 1992) 22.

¹⁵ K. Law Booth, Force and Diplomacy at Sea, (George Allen & Unwin, London, 1985) 210.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Barry M. Blechman, "Naval Diplomacy in the Twenty-First Century," Strategic Transformation and Naval Power in the 21st Century, ed. Pelham G. Boyer and Robert S. Woods, (Naval War College Press, Newport, R.I. 1998). 245.

¹⁸ Ibid, 244-245.

¹⁹ Lieutenant Commander Jeremy Stocker, Royal Naval Reserve, "Nonintervention: Limited Operations in the Littoral Environment," Naval War College Review, August 1998, <http://www.nwc.navy.mil/press/Review/1998/autumn/art3-a98.htm>, accessed 19 February 2001.

²⁰ Kearsley, 27.

²¹ Ibid 252.

²² Stocker.

²³ Department of Navy Posture Statement 2000, <http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/policy/fromsea/pos00/pos00-3.html>, accessed 27 November 2000

²⁴ Kearsley, 43.

²⁵ Vision...Presence...Power: A Program Guide to the U.S. Navy 2000, <http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/policy/vision/vis00/v00-ch1a.html>, accessed 27 November 2000.

²⁶ Stocker.

²⁷ General James L. Jones, "What's in a Word? – 'Expeditionary Means More Than Just Getting There Quickly'" from the Armed Forces Journal International, October 1, 2000, <http://www.usmc.mil/cmc/32cmc.nsf/alldocs/8CAA7919CEE61C6785256983006C948B?opendocument>, accessed 19 February 2001.

²⁸ L.W. Martin, "The Use of Naval Forces in Peacetime," Naval War College Review, Jan/Feb, 1985, p.12.

²⁹ Jones.

³⁰ Jones

³¹ Cable 2, 40-41.

³² Stocker.

³³ Tetsuro Doshita, "Sea Lane Oil Tanker Commerce and the International Framework for Coping with Potential Naval Incidents," www.glocom.ac.jp/eco/esena/resource/doshita/doshita.e.html, accessed 21 February 2001.

³⁴ Booth, 137.

³⁵ Stocker.

³⁶ Geoffrey Till, "Maritime Strategy and the Twenty-First Century," Journal of Strategic Studies, March 1994, p. 187.

³⁷ Vice Admiral A.K. Cebrowski, 1997 Congressional Hearings on Intelligence and Security, http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/1997_hr/h970320c.htm, accessed 17 February 2001.

³⁸ Vernon Loeb, "A Higher IQ Before the Marines Land," Washington Post, November 17, 2000, p.43.

³⁹ Naval Intelligence, Naval Doctrinal Pub 2,
http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/navy/ndp2.htm#c_1 accessed 17 February 2001, p.48

⁴⁰ Ibid, 57.

⁴¹ Charles C. Krulak, "Operational Maneuver From The Sea," MCCP-1,
<http://www.concepts.quantico.usmc.mil/omfts.htm>, accessed 20 February 2001.

⁴² Cable 1, 39.

⁴³ Edward N. Luttwak, The Political Uses of Sea Power, (The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London, 1974), 52.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Cable 1, 40.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

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