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**THE IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME ON  
U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY**

**BY**

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On U.S. National Security Strategy**

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## ABSTRACT

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International organized crime is a growing problem that poses a direct threat to the stability of many regions throughout the world. It challenges the viability of nascent democratic states and undermines their economic prosperity. As such, international crime organizations endanger important U.S. national interests and must be given serious consideration by those who make or implement our national security policy. Any national security strategy that ignores the pervasive effects of this threat, or fails to recognize its transnational nature is, "fundamentally flawed and doomed to failure."



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## THE IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME ON U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

*"International criminals jeopardize the global trend toward peace and freedom, undermine fragile new democracies, sap the strength from developing countries, and threaten our efforts to build a safer, more prosperous world."*

—President Bill Clinton  
Speech to the UN  
October 22, 1995

As America enters the new millennium it is faced with an entirely new set of national security challenges. No longer confronted with the monolithic communist threat posed by the Soviet Union, the United States has lost the focal point that drove its national security strategy since the end of the last world war. For nearly half a century, America's national identity was defined by this relationship with the Soviet Union.<sup>1</sup>

During the Cold War, military power had primacy. As a matter of national survival, each side of the conflict garnered immense military strength continually trying to improve its position relative to the other. The result was a back and forth struggle of *one-ups-man-ship*, that produced an arms race that strained the national treasuries of both the Soviet Union and the United States. The Soviet Union, however, entered the Cold War at a distinct disadvantage, one that doomed it to failure.

Crippled by a flawed political and social ideology, and hamstrung by the U.S. policy of "containment," the Soviet Union stubbornly clung to the hope of a victory that its anemic economic system simply could not deliver. In 1990 it imploded, vindicating the U.S. systems of capitalism and democracy. In the end, it was economic stamina, not military might, which determined the ultimate outcome of this contest.

In the post-Cold War period, national survival is not as much a matter of physical security, as it is a matter of economic well-being. Today, not only do economic interests drive U.S. foreign policy, but economic strength has become America's most relevant element of national power.<sup>2</sup> Edward Luttwak notes that, geo-economic priorities have become dominant in state action and that the military power is becoming less relevant. He further notes that "capitalist-based" competition has replaced military power in how we conceive of national security today.<sup>3</sup>

There is no peer rival that can challenge the still-relevant military might of the United States and none is expected for another fifteen to twenty years, if then. The direct threat previously posed by the Soviet Union has given way to a myriad of indirect



attacks coming from nearly every quarter. Ethnic nationalists, states-of-concern, religious fanatics, and terrorists groups headline the daily news as they try to advance their ideologies and political agendas by challenging the security of U.S. citizens and their property at home and abroad. Although none of these groups pose an imminent threat to the national survival of the United States, their combined effects have a significant impact on other, albeit less vital, interests. Their activities, either directly or indirectly, thwart America's efforts as it pursues one of its highest national priorities: economic prosperity.

Regarded as malicious as these rogue groups is another, whose potential threat to U.S. national security and its economic interests is only starting to be understood.<sup>4</sup> Devoid almost entirely of ideological designs and motivated purely by profit, international crime organizations (ICO) contribute to a chaotic and dangerous post-Cold War world.

International crime organizations are a growing problem that poses a direct threat to the stability of many regions throughout the world. They challenge the viability of nascent democratic states and undermine their economic prosperity. As such, international crime organizations endanger important U.S. national interests and must be given serious consideration by those who make or implement our national security policy.

### **Purpose and Intent.**

International organized crime has long been viewed as a problem for law enforcement and almost entirely disregarded by the military community. The purpose of this paper is examine to the emergence of international crime organizations as a threat to U.S. national interests and provide an appreciation for the national security implications caused by their mounting activity. The intent is to provide a general understanding of the structure and operations of international crime organizations and relate those activities to actual, and potential, challenges to U.S. national interests.

### **Challenges to U.S. Interests.**

The Clinton Administration recognized the fact that international crime was a threat to the security interests of the United States and the interests of the other lawful nations of the world. In October 1995, President Clinton issued Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 42, which energized the interagency process and stepped up U.S. efforts against international organized crime. It directed all national agencies to

immediately "intensify their international crime-fighting efforts" by: increasing the priority and resources they dedicate to combating international crime; improving internal coordination and interagency coordination; and finally, improving cooperation with foreign governments in their efforts to combat this threat.<sup>5</sup> An important national security document, PDD-42 is a capstone document and clearly sets a foundation for future national policy and strategy on this issue.

Three and one-half years later, the Clinton Administration released another equally important policy document that represented the next step in an increased effort to combat international crime. For the first time in our national history, the executive branch published a separate strategy document on international organized crime. The International Crime Control Strategy, published in May 1998, sets forth the national objectives and strategy for combating this threat. This document defines the U.S interests that are challenged by international organized crime, the national objectives with respect to curtailing this threat, and the ends, ways and means to accomplish those objectives. In many ways similar to the National Security Strategy, the International Crime Control Strategy is another capstone document from which national agencies and policies makers derive their charters for action.

The International Crime Control Strategy defines the U.S. interests threatened by international crime in three broad categories: threats to Americans and their communities, threats to American businesses and financial institutions, and threats to global security and stability.<sup>6</sup>

### **Threats to Americans and Their Communities.**

One doesn't have to go far to see the impact of international crime on the streets of America. Drug abuse, prostitution, and ever more frequently, street violence, take a tremendous toll on American society. These activities are becoming evermore visible and evermore common. Aside from the human misery it inflicts, there are significant opportunity costs associated with crime. It is estimated that that the "social costs" of drug abuse alone amount to nearly \$70 billion annually.<sup>7</sup> That is a substantial diversion of tax dollars that could clearly be better used if it were not for the more pressing issues of cleaning up the effects of this criminal activity.

### **Threats to American Businesses and Financial Institutions.**

In a global economy, no one is insulated from the effects of international crime. With an estimated \$400 billion generated annually through illegal drug trafficking alone, it is a problem of astronomical proportions.<sup>8</sup> Money laundering, tax evasion, bribery and graft, counterfeiting, extortion, and fraud all undermine the public confidence in the global financial system and have far reaching effects on the global economy.<sup>9</sup> Regardless of where the crime is committed, the consequences are felt everywhere. In the boardrooms of America's largest corporations where its executives must deal with corrupt foreign bankers, down to the individual who ends up paying higher prices for imported materials, the effect of international crime respects no border.

### **Threats to Global Security and Stability.**

International crime undermines the governments of emerging or struggling states. Whether it's through the corruption of their local or federal leaders, compromising their financial systems, diverting millions of dollars from their tax base, or in extreme cases, entering into mutually beneficial pacts with insurgent groups bent on the subversion of the government, international crime organizations can rot away legitimate governments and their economies. International crime organizations are parasitic in nature. They seldom seek to kill the host. Their objectives are merely to weaken it to a point where it can no longer effectively exercise control over the illegal activities of these organizations.<sup>10</sup>

U.S. National Security Strategy asserts that America's economic prosperity is directly tied to the stability of key regions with which the United States engages in trade.<sup>11</sup> As the global market expands, increasingly smaller, less developed nations are becoming more important trade partners with the United States. Organized crime often either displaces the state in these societies, or corrupts the government to a point where it is no longer acting in the interests of the public, becoming the de facto agents of the international crime organizations.<sup>12</sup> Today's international criminal syndicates are powerful enough to challenge, destabilize, and occasionally control, small weak states.<sup>13</sup>

### **Defining the Threat.**

There is no consensus among the experts on an exact definition of international organized crime. In the words of Dr. Rensselaer Lee, a noted author on the subject, "it is an elusive phenomenon, ...one that is diffuse and ill-defined."<sup>14</sup> In fact there is not

even agreement on what it should be called. Most experts refer to it as international organized crime. However, there are those who argue that "international" implies a relationship between legitimate nation-states, and that "transnational" crime more appropriately and accurately captures the essence of the behavior of these non-state actors.<sup>15</sup> In either case, the nuances associated with either of these terms are not as important as understanding the underlying activities that these terms describe.

Despite the apparent confusion surrounding its name, there seems to be considerable agreement on what constitutes an international criminal organization and what activities conducted by these organizations constitutes international organized crime. Roy Godson and William J. Olson have identified eight characteristics of an organization that, regardless of what its called, make up an international criminal activity. In my research, I found this to be the most all-inclusive definition of this transnational threat and feel it is useful for a general understanding of its nature.

According to them, a criminal organization "is defined by a more or less formal structure, that endures over time, is directed toward a common purpose by a recognizable leadership operating outside the law, is quite often based on family or ethnic identity, and is prepared to use violence or other means to promote and protect common interests and objectives."<sup>16</sup> They further identify three characteristics that transform a criminal organization from a mere domestic threat to an international one; they are:

- (1) the ability to conduct criminal activity on a global basis,
- (2) an affinity for forming mutually-beneficial transnational links with other criminal organizations or other subversive groups, and finally
- (3) the power and resolve to directly challenge the authority of the state.<sup>17</sup>

These three aspects of international organized crime represent significant security challenges for those who develop U.S. national security strategy.

### **The Evolution of the Threat.**

International organized crime is not a new phenomenon. It has, however achieved greater significance within the past twenty years, particularly as it impacts on our national security. During this period of considerable global turbulence, two conditions arose that facilitated international organized crime's rise to become the menace it is today: globalization and the end of the Cold War.

## **The End of the Cold War.**

The end of the Cold War, or more accurately, the collapse of the Soviet empire, has had direct effect on the rise of international crime. Internally, "the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the collapse of its criminal justice system clearly produced conditions that were highly conducive to the consolidation of existing criminal organizations and the emergence of new ones."<sup>18</sup> No longer under the dominating control of an oppressive, authoritarian government, Russian crime organizations seized the opportunity to gain a substantial foothold in the national economy. Though the actual number of criminal organizations operating in Russia prior to the end of the Cold War is still not known, their current level of activity has clearly increased and has become much more visible. According to the FBI, there are somewhere between 5000 to 8000 organized crime groups in Russia today, most conducting transnational operations; and thirty of which are known to be operating within the United States.<sup>19</sup>

The sudden and unexpected collapse of the Soviet Union has had much the same effect throughout the former Eastern Bloc nations. The tremendous economic potential that was stifled under the communist/socialist economic theory was unleashed with the end of the Cold War, opening huge markets and opportunities for anyone willing to venture in. While these conditions are favorable to the growth of legitimate business, they are equally advantageous to international crime organizations. The Russian and Chechen Mafiyas, as well as other lesser-known groups, were in position and ready to rush into these lucrative new markets. With a better understanding of the domestic economy than most foreign investors and with an established network of contacts already operating within these countries, international crime organizations had a distinct competitive advantage. They are very agile organizations; often able to react much faster than legitimate business in overcoming the technical and bureaucratic challenges associated with conducting international operations.

With communist domination at ebb, there has been an emergence of democratic states where more authoritarian forms of government had previously existed. This phenomenon has greatly aided the growth and influence of international crime. Where centralized control and strict subordination to the demands of the state once prevailed, consensus rule and personal freedom are now the norm. "The triumph of capitalism and liberal democracy facilitated the introduction of entrepreneurial capitalism in Eastern Europe and in the former Soviet Union. At the same time these states failed to develop anything more than the most rudimentary mechanisms for regulating the kinds of

economic enterprises that were emerging."<sup>20</sup> More often than not, the governments responsible for law enforcement and regulating commerce to the welfare and the benefit of the general public were ill prepared to act as quickly as international crime organizations. This failure of government hindered only those who wished to operate within the framework of the law. The lawless thrived in this environment.

The end of the Cold War should have ushered in a new era of national self-determinism. With the demise of the Soviet Union, states previously under the centralized control of Moscow, should have realized a significant increase in the control and authority they exercised within their own borders. In effect, the sovereignty that the Soviet Union once seized from its satellites had been returned to the rightful seats of government. However, a phenomenon occurred that has somewhat mitigated this power of the state and eroded its ability to exercise as complete authority and control as one would expect.

### **Globalization.**

Globalization, "the process of reducing barriers between countries and encouraging closer economic, political and social interaction,"<sup>21</sup> has reduced the degree of influence a state has over its territory, economy, and people. Increasingly, the consequences of activities conducted outside of a state (those which it has little, or no, control over) are playing a more central role in determining outcomes within a state's sovereign borders. The growth of the global market, reduction in trade barriers, interconnected economies, networked information systems, mass migration of populations and the unprecedented freedom to travel internationally are as much the products of this phenomenon, as they are its root cause. As Professor William McDonald of Georgetown University notes, "the technological transformation of time and space together with the political realities of the post-Cold War world era have given new meaning to the nation state and its borders."<sup>22</sup> Globalization has reduced the ability of the state to influence events locally and plays favorably into the hands of crime groups, who thrive where legitimate authority either will not, or cannot, exercise control.

The relaxation of trade barriers and movement to a global market economy has resulted in a predictable explosion of wealth and opportunity. According to World Bank figures, the leading economic indicators of the world's most advanced economies have nearly doubled in the past decade, with remarkable increases in both real growth and standard of living.<sup>23</sup> However, what is even more dramatic is the growth in the

economies in the world's developing nations.<sup>24</sup> The rise in the prominence and wealth of these states directly coincides with the growth of the global economy, which has contributed at least in part, to their newfound success.

These are booming times for much of the global community and certainly a time of unprecedented opportunity to achieve true economic growth. However, this chance at prosperity does not come without an associated price. "The interdependence of the global economy also creates new security dilemmas for states as the health of a nation's economy is increasingly not in its own hands, but inextricably linked to the welfare of others in a system."<sup>25</sup> "In today's relentless competition, the market respects neither the borders nor the icons of the traditional Westphalian state."<sup>26</sup>

Another dimension of globalization exacerbating the rise of international crime is the unprecedented freedom to cross international borders- or more accurately, the inability of a state to control its borders. If a state is to be a player in the global economy it must access global markets and allow global access to its own. Open markets result in open borders, and vice versa. This freedom is not limited to the physical transfer of people and things, but just as importantly it encompasses the theoretical or virtual movement of ideas and information in cyberspace. With the increase in transnational interaction and the increasing "porousness" of the nation state, international organized crime naturally migrated from the national to the international level.<sup>27</sup>

As states find it increasingly more difficult to control their borders, crime groups are getting access to a virtually inexhaustible transportation network. International air, land and sea travel has increased exponentially in the past two decades and the amount of travel into, and out of, international hubs is beyond a state's ability to control it. U. S. Customs calculates that it can inspect less than 2 percent of the goods shipped into this country.<sup>28</sup> With the sheer volume of traffic crossing U.S. borders, the interdicting the illicit shipments of criminal organizations is quite literally like trying to find the proverbial *needle in a haystack*.

Criminal organizations now possess the ability to move across national borders almost at will. These borders have become little more than notional constructs of regulations and policies, and can no longer be considered the impervious physical barriers that once guarded access to a state. Borders today are effective only in *keeping an honest man, honest*, and are increasingly used to the advantage of the international criminal. They represent the legal limits of a state's legitimate authority. They "do not

constrict illegal activities, but often serve only to constrain law enforcement operations, thus becoming the de facto ally of the criminal groups."<sup>29</sup>

### **International Crime Organizations.**

For policy makers, security strategists, as well as military planners, a specific understanding of the dynamic of international organized crime is essential. International crime organizations directly compete with, and even supplant, legitimate businesses, governments, and militaries in many parts of the developing world.<sup>30</sup> Their ability to conduct global criminal enterprise and ally themselves with other subversive elements of international community is a direct threat to the regional stability and has far-reaching implications for U.S. national security. No longer restricted by conventional concepts of the state, international crime organizations exercise considerable power within their ever-expanding spheres of influence. While policy makers must consider the effects of international crime when developing domestic and foreign policy, the military planner must consider what impact of these organizations will have on military operations. With military deployments on the rise, the likelihood that U.S. forces will come into direct contact with international criminal organizations is increasingly likely.

**The Chechen Mafiya and Islamic Extremism.** One distinguishing characteristic of an international crime organization is its affinity to form mutually beneficial relationships with other criminal organizations or other seditious groups. The well-documented activities of the Chechen Mafiya in the Middle East and Central Asia clearly demonstrate the potentially disastrous consequences of these illicit relationships.<sup>31</sup>

Closely linked to, in fact often inseparable from, the Russian Mafiya, the Chechen Mafiya has several unique characteristics that make it of particular interest to policy makers and military planners. The activities conducted by this organization make plain the horrific security threat created when profit-motivated criminal organizations ally themselves with ideologically motivated terrorists groups and politically motivated rogue states.

Chechnya is an Islamic province of Russia and members of the Chechen Mafiya are almost exclusively Moslem, though largely non-practicing.<sup>32</sup> Despite the fact that the criminal activities carried out by this organization are entirely outside the teachings of Islam, this religious affiliation gives the Chechen criminals access to a community that is generally suspicious of non-Moslems.



In 1993, the Chechen Mafiya allied itself with the struggling Chechen military in its fight for independence from Russia. Hundreds of members of the Chechen Mafiya joined the ranks of the rebel forces.<sup>33</sup> In addition to providing a much needed influx of soldiers, the mafiya also underwrote a considerable portion of the war. Using their well-established connections and the proceeds from its criminal operations, the mafiya arranged for, and funded, the shipment of arms from Eastern Bloc and Middle East countries to the Chechen rebels.<sup>34</sup>

As might be presumed, they were not entirely motivated by patriotism. The Chechen Mafiya derives much of its income from its trade in heroin. Importing from the Golden Crescent area of northern Pakistan, the Mafiya transships the heroin through Afghanistan and other central Asian states to cash-rich destinations in Europe and the United States. In the summer of 1993, the *Taliban* regime commenced a major offensive operation to consolidate its control over the failing state of Afghanistan. This operation directly threatened the Mafiya's flow of heroin. The mafiya-infiltrated Chechen military was about to lose its primary source of funding.

In what could only be considered an act of desperation, the Chechen President Dudayev played the "Islam card" and declared *Jihad* against the Russian government. This act transformed what had always been considered a nationalist movement into an ideological "holy war" and assured the support of sympathetic Islamic states. The declaration of *Jihad* gave the Chechen revolt legitimacy within the Islamic community, despite that it's obvious connection to drug trafficking was at odds with core Islamic values.

The *Taliban* have long been considered the puppets of Islamabad, sponsored, in part by Pakistan's ISI (Inter-Service Intelligence)<sup>35</sup>. At the urging of the Pakistani government and equally eager to exploit any opportunity to export its Islamic revolution, the *Taliban* relented and assured that the flow of heroin was not interrupted.<sup>36</sup>

Out of this alliance grew an equally dangerous consequence. The *Taliban*, presumably with the support of Ussama Bin Ladin, have engaged in training Chechen rebels in terrorist techniques.<sup>37</sup> Trained in northern Afghanistan and operating throughout Russia, Chechen terrorists have added a new dimension to their struggle for independence. Responsible for assassinations, bombings and attacks on nuclear power stations, this ruthless organization moved further from direct confrontation with the Russian military to a more asymmetrical tactic against the general public.<sup>38</sup>

The relationship between the criminals, rebels, and terrorists is not unique to Central Asia. Similar relationships exist in South America, Africa, and elsewhere throughout the world.<sup>39</sup> This example was used to illustrate the deadly consequences when criminal greed, political fanaticism and religious extremism join forces.

**The Mafiya and the Russian Economy.** The Russian Mafiya has grown exponentially in power and prestige since the end of the Cold War. From 1990 to 1991 its earnings from illicit activities rose from a mere 1 billion rubles to 103 billion rubles; roughly the size of the Russian national debt and equal to the amount of Western aid Russia has received since 1990!<sup>40</sup> This powerful and ruthless organization dominates the Russian economy. According to Russian Interior Ministry, organized crime controls most of Russia's 200 banks and over half of its financial capital.<sup>41</sup>

This pervasive corruption of its financial institutions and businesses has had predictable and dire consequences for the Russian economy. Foreign investors who are not dissuaded by having to deal with the Mafiya-controlled financial institutions are faced with the abhorrent practice of paying anywhere from 10 to 60 percent of their pre-tax income in *krysha*, or protection money.<sup>42</sup> No longer able to attract foreign investment, Russia's economy is capital-starved. Without the foreign investment necessary to ignite the economic potential of this country, the only *business* that can survive in this environment is that of the international crime organization.<sup>43</sup> Unfortunately, the Mafiya is only concerned with maximizing short-term gains, and it does not reinvest its profits in the infrastructure of the former Soviet Union.<sup>44</sup>

One reason for the Mafiya's upsurge is its ability to attract skilled members. Literally thousands of former government workers and KGB agents have joined its ranks.<sup>45</sup> Dominated by former members of the Communist Party, the Mafiya has an unprecedented degree of access to Russia's government institutions. This is cause for considerable concern in the international community. Russia's arsenal of nuclear weapons is a ready-made source of capital for unscrupulous government officials. There have already been several thwarted attempts to smuggle weapons-grade materials and components of these weapons.<sup>46</sup> A group of Russian Generals and Admirals admitted that, "its not a matter of if, but a matter of when, a nuclear weapon will be stolen and smuggled out of the country."<sup>47</sup>

Having fallen from a position of global superpower to a position of global super-criminal, the former Soviet Union's future is inextricably linked to the security of the rest of the global community.

**The Global Influence of Italian Mafia.** Among the best known of all the international crime organizations, the Italian Mafia is also one of the most secretive and complex. Its strength is its ability to "penetrate the core of the political process", and buy government support at the local and national levels.<sup>48</sup> As deeply imbedded into the economy as they are into the Italian culture, the Italian Mafia has become institutionalized in much of Italy. Most of the Mafia's capital holdings are in the construction and tourism industries and are virtually inseparable from legitimate enterprises.<sup>49</sup>

The Italian Mafia is comprised of four distinct criminal groups, all based in southern Italy: *la Cosa Nostra* in Sicily, the *'Ndrangheta* in Calabria, the *Camorra* in Naples, and the *Sacra Corona* in Apulia. These groups specialize in the trade of arms, drugs (particularly heroin), and human beings (women and children).

Demonstrating their ability to exploit weak governments, the Italian Mafia now has extensive operations in both Albania and the states of the former Yugoslavia.<sup>50</sup> According to the *Carabinieri* (Italian National Police) the *'Ndrangheta* moves over 50 kilos of heroin a day into Albania and the *Sacra Corona Unita* is directly arming Kosovar Freedom Fighters.<sup>51</sup>

Under direct pressure from the Italian government's anti-Mafia efforts, these criminal organizations are becoming even more international; invading even the relatively strong states of Western Europe. Most of the narcotics trafficked in France, the Netherlands, Switzerland and especially Germany, originated with one of the four Italian Mafia groups.<sup>52</sup> Already one of the largest international crime organizations, the Italian Mafia is increasing its international influence.

### **Where Do We Go From Here?**

The break-up of the Soviet Union and the phenomenon of globalization have created conditions ripe for exploitation by international crime. Frustrated by an inability to exercise complete sovereignty within their borders and nearly powerless to control events abroad, many states are confounded by the ease with which international crime operates across borders. It "has moved between the gaps of our societies; filtering into

the uncontrolled spaces between nations, sliding between the jurisdictional cracks and moving into the vacuum left in the wake of social and political turmoil."<sup>53</sup>

As criminal organizations have been developing this global capability, law enforcement has not been as quick to act effectively. As a result, they are now playing a game of catch-up. "The long-term neglect of this problem means the world now faces highly developed criminal organizations that undermine the rule of law, international security, and the world economy and which, if they are allowed to continue unimpeded, could threaten the concept of the nation state."<sup>54</sup>

Any effort to rein-in international crime will take the concerted effort of the global community. According America's preeminent criminologist, Louise Shelley, "only bilateral and multilateral efforts will work effectively against transnational organized crime. For the strength of transnational organized crime is also its weakness. While it can exploit international gaps in legislation and enforcement, crime groups can also be weakened by coordinated actions taken by foreign countries. Its networks are brutal but fragile."<sup>55</sup>

The evidence is clear and notice has been served. International organized crime is growing menace that directly threatens important U.S. national interests. It challenges the stability of many regions of the world, subverts emerging democratic states and undermines international confidence in the global economy. It is a pervasive threat that calls for an integrated response by the international community. U.S. policy makers, as well as those of all law-abiding nations, have a responsibility to ensure that the effects of this threat are minimized. They must recognize the transnational nature of this threat and ensure that national policy advances cooperative solutions within the global community. For as Phil Williams notes, "any policy made without such an understanding is both fundamentally flawed and doomed to failure."<sup>56</sup>

WORD COUNT = 4852



## ENDNOTES

<sup>1</sup> Samuel P Huntington, "The Erosion of American National Interests," Foreign Affairs, (Sep/Oct 97): 30.

<sup>2</sup> John Ciccarelli, ed., "The Theory of Crime as a Security Threat" In Transnational Crime, The New Threat, (Canberra, ACT: Australian Defence Studies Centre, 1996), 6.

<sup>3</sup> Edward Luttwak, "From Geo-politics to Geo-economics" National Interest, (No 20, Summer 1990): xii.

<sup>4</sup> James H. Mittleman, The Globalization Syndrome. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 201.

<sup>5</sup> William J., Clinton, PDD-42 International Organized Crime, Available from <<http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd35.htm>>; Internet; accessed 25 Sep 00.

<sup>6</sup> William J., Clinton, The International Crime Control Strategy. (Washington, DC: The White House, May 98): 1.

<sup>7</sup> Rensselaer W. III Lee, "Transnational Organized Crime: An Overview" In Transnational Crime In the Americas, ed. Tom Farer, 1-38. (New York: Routledge, 1999), 11.

<sup>8</sup> U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. Committee on International Relations. Testimony from Louis Freeh and Louise Shelley on Threat from International Organized Crime and Terrorism, available from <[http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/1997\\_hr/h971001ls.htm](http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/1997_hr/h971001ls.htm)>; Internet; Accessed 1 Sep 00.

<sup>9</sup> Phil Williams and Ernesto Savona "Problems and Dangers Posed by Organized Transnational Crime in Various Regions of the World" In The UN and Transnational Organized Crime, (London: Frank Cass, 1996): 37.

<sup>10</sup> Ciccarelli, 7.

<sup>11</sup> William J. Clinton, A National Security Strategy for a New Century. (Washington, DC: The White House, Dec 99): 21.

<sup>12</sup> U.S. Congress.

<sup>13</sup> Roy Godson and William J. Olson "International Organized Crime," Society, (vol: 32, iss: 2, January 1995): 23.

<sup>14</sup> Lee, 1.

<sup>15</sup> Williams, 33.

<sup>16</sup> Godson, 21.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid., 22.

<sup>18</sup> Williams, 11.

<sup>19</sup> U.S. Congress.

<sup>20</sup> Williams, 9.

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