FORCE PROTECTION AND COASTAL SECURITY –
A NATIONAL CHALLENGE, A COAST GUARD RESPONSE

by

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A paper submitted to the faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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   Among the challenges facing the United States in the post-Cold War world is an emerging threat from trans-national or non-state actors who will elect to use terrorism to achieve their ends because of their inability to meet the United States face to face militarily. Recent studies have indicated that while the threat of terrorism has decreased some in recent years, the severity of recent terrorist acts has actually increased, and is expected to continue in that trend. In light of the current overarching U.S. military strategy of forward presence and global engagement, today's U.S. Naval forces are more forward deployed to a range of theaters than ever before. Such forward presence does not afford the luxury of forces being able to operate from the relative safety of "Blue Water", but instead requires that they be engaged in the complex--and sometimes highly dangerous--littorals. The threat today in the littorals from non-state actors is also increasing; and the recent attack on the USS Cole seems only the latest evidence. The U.S. Coast Guard--a unique instrument of national security--more than ever has the ability to demonstrate a greater role in the force protection of forward deployed naval forces. Additionally, the threat to U.S. coastal security, particularly in critical strategic commercial and military ports is also growing. The U.S. Coast Guard must also rise to new challenges in this arena by addressing with other agencies, and then taking firm action to safeguard the future security of U.S. ports and harbors.

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Introduction

"They came in from the north over the blue-green hills of Kahuku Point on Oahu. In steady waves, 181 Japanese fighters, dive-bombers, and torpedo planes roared across the island toward their targets. It was 7:40 A.M., the morning of December 7, 1941."¹ So began America's involvement in the war in the Pacific. But why was America brought into the war in this fashion—or more importantly—what was the strategic objective of the Japanese high command in executing such a daring attack? Today, it is generally agreed the Japanese attacked to drive the United States out of a corner of the world where its unwelcome presence threatened Japan's own, larger designs.

Sixty years later, while the actors, instruments, and tactics have all evolved dramatically, the intentions of those who choose to oppose us by force remains much the same—to reduce from certain corners of the world the presence of U.S. forces, which are viewed as perennially meddlesome to their own designs. Were not the bombings of the Khobar towers barracks and the attack on the USS Cole (DDG-67) only the latest examples? Some have argued, including former Navy Secretary James Webb that the Cole should not have been in Aden.² Moreover, others have argued that the concept of tasking a billion dollar "super-weapon" like the Cole to sort through freighter traffic in the Persian Gulf in hopes of stopping illegal cargo from reaching Iraq demonstrates a severe resource-to-mission mismatch.³ Whether or not the United States is executing the right strategy in the Persian Gulf is not the focus of this paper. Regardless, the fact remains that the guidance contained in our National Security Strategy and the direction contained in our National Military Strategy are fairly indisputable. Both the imperative of "engagement" addressed in the former and the strategy of "shaping" discussed in the latter highlight the necessity for a strong overseas presence for today's military. Thus, the
combined effect of these two important policy pieces is perfectly clear—U.S. forces will remain globally engaged "to help shape the international environment" for the foreseeable future. Additionally, for the U.S. Navy both ...*From the Sea* and *Forward...From the Sea*, two post-Cold War naval strategy documents that remain in effect, articulate the enduring need for ready U.S. Naval forces in the littorals of the world. But there exists a dilemma. Current U.S. strategies of forward presence and global engagement are clear and over-arching. But so too are the designs, not unlike those of the Japanese in 1941, of some contemporary non-state actors who neither wish for their corner of the world to be shaped, nor welcome the idea of U.S. global engagement. In this light, the historical facts are sad, but telling. More than twice as many U.S. service members were killed as a result of the terrorist bombings of the Marine barracks in Lebanon, the Khobar towers barracks in Saudi Arabia, and the USS *Cole* in Yemen, than were killed in action during all of Operations: Urgent Fury (1983 invasion of Grenada), Just Cause (1989 invasion of Panama), Desert Shield/Desert Storm, and Allied Force (1999 NATO operation to restore peace and stability in Kosovo)—combined! Worse yet, studies have shown that while the frequency of all acts of terrorism has decreased some in recent years, their lethality has only increased, and this trend is expected to continue.

As was done following the highly unexpected attack by the Japanese, the U.S. must adopt a more focused resolve to deter and defend against terrorist attacks by taking a fresh look at current force protection measures and capabilities abroad and at the need for improved coastal security in critical harbors and ports at home. The U.S. Coast Guard—a unique instrument of national security—must more fully demonstrate its relevant core-competencies in playing a greater role in the force protection of forward deployed U.S. Naval forces and in the maritime security of U.S. harbors and ports.
The Challenge for Deployed U.S. Naval Forces

Global engagement, as articulated in the National Security Strategy and the National Military Strategy, appears to be a policy that will remain in effect for the foreseeable future. For U.S. Naval forces operating in today's post-Cold War environment, the enduring implications of this maxim remain clear. They will:

- be forward deployed, performing forward presence missions, such as deterrence, exercising influence, and coalition building.
- be prepared to engage in combat operations when other forces are not available or appropriate.
- enable the introduction of heavier Army and Air forces. Maintaining the ability to seize a foothold is critical.
- guarantee the resupply and reinforcement of forces.
- ensure that military power remains on scene following the conclusion of combat to guarantee compliance with the terms of the peace settlement.
- be prepared to assume presence missions in areas beyond those involved in conflict. (emphasis mine)\(^7\)

Modern day naval operations required to perform these and other military missions may include: United Nations peacekeeping, non-combatant evacuations, shows-of-force, strikes against targets ashore, theater ballistic missile defense, amphibious assaults, and theater air defense. More significant however, is the important fact that to conduct these operations successfully, doctrine calls for U.S. Naval forces operating not from the relative safety of the open ocean but from the complex environment of the littorals.\(^8\) Moreover, unlike open ocean operations, those conducted in the shallow waters of the littorals mean that ship's defensive measures are more difficult to employ.\(^9\) More importantly, the littorals will continue to expose naval forces to a spectrum of threats. Such littoral threats can range from mine warfare as was witnessed by the USS Tripoli and Princeton during the Gulf War, to air launched cruise missiles as was witnessed by the HMS Sheffield during the Falklands War, to terrorist attack by small boat as was recently witnessed by the USS Cole.
While the conventional warfare threat to U.S. Naval forces operating in the littorals is already significant, adding to this the threat from unconventional or asymmetric warfare—particularly the kind that proved effective in attacking the Cole—simply heightens the dilemma. This led one observer to opine, "Navy assets that guarantee strength at sea become negligible—or even liabilities—closer to shore." \(^{10}\)

**The USS Cole Bombing – Force Protection and Lessons Learned**

- On 12 October 2000, between 1115C and 1118C, the Arleigh Burke Class Destroyer USS COLE (DDG 67) was attacked by terrorists while taking on fuel in Aden Harbor, Yemen. Two individuals maneuvered an approximately 35-foot boat, along USS COLE's port side, amidships, and exploded the boat. Seventeen crewmembers were killed and 42 others were injured....
- This was not a random act, but rather an attack resulting from careful, deliberate planning....\(^{11}\)

In light of the successful attack on the Cole, it would seem that the safety of U.S. Naval forces transiting today's hostile littorals will remain, for the foreseeable future, a significant operational challenge across the spectrum of force protection responsibility. Not surprisingly, in his endorsement of the USS Cole JAG manual investigation, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) concluded that the attack "revealed weaknesses in our force protection program, including inconsistent force protection schemes...." \(^{12}\) For example, at the time of its attack the Cole was at threat condition Bravo which required that unauthorized craft be kept away. It also required that that picket boats be on 15-minute standby and not necessarily in the water, which was the selected course of action.\(^ {13}\) Exactly why the Cole elected to implement only the more relaxed of these two conflicting measures (and for that matter, an "unstructured assortment of force protection measures" as a whole) cannot be known for certain.\(^ {14}\) It appears that due to the threat assessment in effect for Yemen at the time, leadership on the Cole determined that its small boats would suffice for their own waterside security, and that
additional expeditionary supporting assets, to include Coast Guard assets, were neither required nor desired.\textsuperscript{15}

In addition to the CNO’s conclusions regarding weaknesses in the Navy’s force protection program, the recently released \textit{Department of Defense USS Cole Commission Report} concluded that to more successfully protect our transiting forces, a major effort will be required to include “…more resources and, in some cases, a better use of existing resources.” Select findings of this report reveal several instances where the U.S. Coast Guard, because of its unique core competencies, can best provide the desired resources (see Appendix A). Specific recommendations will be offered later.

Looking ahead, effective protection from the threat of future \textit{Cole}-like attacks will only be possible if future security measures are implemented to counter both proven and unexpected small-boat terrorist tactics. Such unexpected tactics may include the use of high-speed small boats as is being done by South American criminal cartels smuggling illegal drugs to North America. Again, the Coast Guard, as it is successfully demonstrating in the Caribbean, may provide exactly the capabilities and expertise to counter just such a potential threat.

While the ongoing debate over whether or not the \textit{Cole} attack could have been prevented may continue, the important fact remains that in clear ways, U.S. Naval forces transiting and operating in the littorals are more vulnerable to asymmetric threats than ever before.

\textbf{Maritime Security – Threats and Challenges}

Today’s U.S. maritime borders are increasingly under siege from a broad spectrum of threats and challenges. Such challenges are no longer thought of simply in terms of direct military threats to America, as was the case during the period leading up to and during World
War II. Instead, modern challenges typically have a pronounced law-enforcement component and then transition to a threat to U.S. national security. Accordingly, today's concept of national security is no longer defined solely in terms of direct military threats to the United States but instead, has become far more complex and interconnected. Looking ahead, the security of maritime borders will remain of vital importance to the world of 2020, and particularly to maritime nations such as the United States.

In response to this emerging and evolving threat situation, several recently conducted assessment studies which have included a focus on maritime security identified those challenges which are expected to affect U.S. national security in the maritime environment (hereafter referred to as maritime security) for the foreseeable future. Among others, the more serious of these include:

- **Organized crime**, which will increase in influence and scope, and take advantage of a growing global maritime trade to move illegal products.
- **Non-state actors**, which will challenge state sovereignty and have a greater effect on international affairs. Those such as environmental activist groups, in particular, will have great influence in the maritime sphere.
- **Adversaries of the United States** which will be more likely to engage in asymmetric warfare but will not rule out the use of conventional maritime weaponry. (emphasis mine)

In an even broader sense, another assessment from a highly credible source has unmasked the following additional future challenges to U.S. maritime security:

Growing numbers of illegal migrants will seek entry into the United States, creating social, economic, and political problems and generating demands for expanded interdiction along our maritime borders. Similarly, the flow of illegal drugs will become harder to counter as global and regional drug cartels employ more advanced equipment and technology. Capabilities such as radar evading stealthy boats and aircraft and sophisticated counter-information technology will enable the cartels to challenge law enforcement organizations with greater daring.

Returning to the challenges of asymmetric warfare, essentially the use of terrorism to achieve military or political objectives, some consider these threats “Perhaps the most likely to
be faced by maritime forces through and beyond 2020." This type of warfare will be resorted to increasingly because of the inability of terrorists, or other non-state sponsored actors, to confront the U.S. in a symmetric manner or project conventional military power, naval or otherwise, beyond their own geographic regions. Accordingly, from a maritime security perspective, the majority of such future challenges—as was evidenced by the attack on the USS Cole—will originate from individual states or stateless organizations with naval capabilities ranging from a limited ability to operate within their own territorial waters to the almost nonexistent. Like asymmetric warfare, terrorism will also continue to proliferate on both the domestic and international scene to include the maritime environment “...placing a premium on our ability to detect, deter, and respond to such threats” and creating a critical need “…to safeguarding American ports and waterways from attack and sabotage in peace and war...”

Perhaps in recognition of this emerging maritime security challenge, President Clinton signed an Executive Memorandum on April 27, 1999 that established the Interagency Commission on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports for the purpose of conducting “an assessment of the overall state of security in U.S. seaports” among other mandates. Released in the fall of 2000, the report concluded in part that “The state of security in U.S. seaports generally ranges from poor to fair...” and that “while there is no evidence of an increased threat of terrorist attacks in America’s seaports, the vulnerability of those ports is high.” Of the report’s 20 findings, seven of these lead to recommendations specifically calling for or inferring Coast Guard action (See Appendix B). Recommendations will be offered later.
Force Protection and Coastal Security – an Historical Perspective

In the broadest sense, the Coast Guard’s responsibilities in the area of force protection and coastal security have been born out of its historical role as an armed force of the United States that dates back to 1790 when it was founded as the Revenue Cutter Service. In 1797, the early Coast Guard was thrust into its first “force protection” like duty when the impending Quasi-War with France caused its cutters to be assigned the responsibility for protection of merchant shipping and coastal defense; and the following year, to be placed at the disposal of the Secretary of the Navy.\(^{25}\) In the continuance of force protection support for the U.S. Navy, there is an historical connection, for example, between “the actions of the Revenue Cutter \textit{Hudson} in Santiago harbor during the Spanish-American War and the cutter \textit{Ocracoke} (WPB-1307) off Cap Haitien in 1994—both towed Navy ships out of harm’s way.”\(^{26}\)

In accomplishing force protection, coastal security, and other evolving defense roles, it was often necessary for the Coast Guard to adapt service-unique skills to achieve success. For example, early cutters that chased down small, fast vessels in 1798 were later able to adapt these practiced skills and apply them to wartime operations against privateering vessels. Additionally, almost 150 years later, Coast Guard coxswains were tasked to operate Navy landing craft during the invasion of Normandy because this proved an efficient utilization of skills developed at their peacetime small-boat stations. Finally, cutters conducting maritime interdiction missions during the Viet Nam war were highly effective because of the skills gained during peacetime Cold War patrols at home.\(^{27}\) “In short, by providing specialized capabilities or adapting to specialized missions, the Coast Guard has filled a vital role, serving as a ‘force-in-being’, responding as needed.”\(^{28}\)
From a modern day statutory perspective, Coast Guard force protection and coastal security responsibilities are derived from its national defense roles, missions, and functions that are based in U.S. law. The Coast Guard is, by statute, “a military service and a branch of the armed forces of the United States at all times” (14 USC 1). Further, 14 USC 2 states that it is required “to maintain a state of readiness to function as a specialized service in the Navy in time of war, including the fulfillment of Maritime Defense Zone command responsibilities.” Furthermore, it is specially authorized to assist the Department of Defense (as well as any federal, state, or local agency) in the performance of any activity for which it is especially qualified (14 USC 141).

Regarding the coastal or waterside security of U.S. seaports, the Coast Guard has maintained this responsibility since enactment of the Espionage Act in 1917 until today. “Initially viewed as primarily as a war-time function, the beginnings of the Cold War saw [port security] adopted as a peacetime program with resources dedicated to it in 1950.”

Regarding terrorism in a maritime environment, Coast Guard responsibilities from an operational law perspective are delineated as follows: “The U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) is responsible, within the limits of U.S. territorial seas, for reducing the risk of a maritime terrorist incident by diminishing the vulnerability of ships and facilities through implementation of security measures and procedures. The USCG is the lead agent responding to terrorist actions that occur in the maritime areas subject to U.S. jurisdiction.”

The Coast Guard and Maritime Security – an Evolving Posture

Recognizing the realities of the future security environment and the need for the Coast Guard to continue to support the Department of Defense within its areas of expertise, in 1995
the Secretaries of Defense and Transportation signed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) codifying mission areas where the Coast Guard will support the National Military Strategy. Accordingly, the U.S. Coast Guard remains fully prepared to carry out its "maritime security" responsibilities in fulfilling the needs of both the National Security Strategy and the National Military Strategy. To this end, the Coast Guard provides "critical, non-redundant, complimentary, and interoperable capabilities to the Navy and Marine Corps that are relied upon by the service chiefs and the geographic [commanders-in-chief] CinCs; [and] allow for the diversion of USN assets to higher priority tasks such as war fighting." Turning to specific defense or "maritime security" missions, Coast Guard assets and core competencies "lend themselves most effectively to Naval Coastal Warfare and combat support operations in the littorals, as well as force protection operations at the land-sea interface—protecting ports, over-the-shore logistics sites, and amphibious objective areas." Further focusing on coastal security operations from a purely Coast Guard perspective, the following elements and their respective core functions are revealed:

**Force Protection**

- Deter, detect, and defend against the asymmetric surface threat
- Support the combat logistics force and commercial shipping
- Escort sealift into/out of sea ports of debarkation
- Establish and maintain security zones

**Port Operations, Security, and Defense (POSD)**

- Ensure port areas are maintained free from threats to support the joint logistics/resupply forces
- Deter and counter hostile threats from special operations forces and insurgents
- Deter and counter terrorists
- Control port operations
- Provide expeditionary capability for coastal sea control/harbor defense in foreign areas
- Rapid response against surface threats to include "swift boats", jet skis, swimmers
POSID is specifically codified through Annex C to the 1995 DoD/DoT MOA on the use of Coast Guard capabilities and resources as follows:

Port operations, security, and defense is conducted to ensure port and harbor areas are maintained free of hostile threats, terrorist actions, and safety deficiencies which would be a threat to the deployment of military resources during contingencies, in both Sea Ports of Embarkation and Sea Ports of Debarkation.

Coast Guard port operations security and defense, and force protection functions in either an expeditionary environment or in the continental United States (CONUS) are conducted by Coast Guard Port Security Units (PSUs). These units, of which there are only six (all CONUS based, although deployable worldwide within 96 hours of notification) are normally staffed by 112 Reservists and five full time active duty personnel. PSUs currently operate small, armed, highly maneuverable, open-cockpit, 22’ to 27’ small craft. Among others, specific missions include: force protection; point defense; waterborne security for coastal warfare operations and logistics offloads; and support of coastal maritime interception operations.34

**Future Capabilities**

At present, the U.S. Coast Guard is acutely involved in preparing for the “largest and most innovative” recapitalization effort that it has ever undertaken. This program, known as “Deepwater,” will lead to the acquisition of a whole new highly integrated system of systems to include cutters, aircraft, sensors, communication suites, and logistics support systems.35 Similarly, and in parallel with “Deepwater”, the Coast Guard is also carefully assessing where it sees itself well into the 21st century so that it can make the right decisions with regards to its anticipated future roles, missions, and functions. In other words, it is carefully considering potential integrated “Deepwater” systems in light of future operational requirements through an innovative mission-based performance approach.36 At this point, some things are clear. First, Coast Guard “Deepwater” assets will be more joint, interoperable, flexible, and multi-
mission capable “to ensure that we are prepared to meet the full range of America’s maritime challenges.” And second, to a much greater degree than was expected of current assets, “Deepwater” assets will be expected to support the unified commands in fulfilling a range of “low-end” national defense roles, not the least of which will include force protection and coastal security.

**Recommendations for Force Protection**

The U.S. Coast Guard will continue to support the national military strategy by providing unique, non-redundant, national security capabilities to include expeditionary force protection among others. However, to do so, the assets that deliver these capabilities must be requested from appropriate authority (typically the naval component commander via the geographic CINC and the Joint Staff).

It is impossible to know for certain whether or not supporting force protection assets in Aden, or the *Cole’s* own small boats, if deployed, might have thwarted the attack. However, the CNO has judged that such assets establishing of a security perimeter “would have been the only measure that...would have protected the ship from a suicide attacker.” While a USCG Port Security Unit was never requested to support the *Cole* in Aden, assume that this was exactly the force protection resource needed and the only one available. Carrying this exercise one step further, assume that because of its presence, the attack had in fact been deterred. Based on the possibility of this hypothetical scenario and on the fact that a PSU could have been tasked to Aden to assist with the protection of the USS Cole, the following recommendation is made: Regarding improved force protection for forward deployed in-transit U.S. Naval forces in a low-threat rear area environment, the U.S. Coast Guard should: a.) continue to educate the geographic CINCs through the force protection inter-service link
which are the two Naval Coastal Warfare Groups; and b.) increase the number of PSUs to include at least one active-duty unit on each U.S. coast in anticipation of future increased demand for expeditionary Coast Guard force protection assets, and additional new tasking in the area of a larger homeland defense preparatory role.

Additional forward deployed PSU forces would supplement other Naval Coastal Warfare forces already in theater, if any, and more fully contribute to the Joint Vision 2010 operational concept of *Full Dimensional Protection*. This concept calls for a “multilayered offensive and defensive capability to protect our forces at all levels from attack while maintaining freedom of action during deployment, maneuver, and engagement.”

Justification for additional Coast Guard PSU forces can be supported through the following methodology. Comparisons should be made between the benefits of increased capability (which will accompany a stronger PSU force structure); inherent Coast Guard core competencies; PSU specific skills; and the proper application of tactics, techniques, and procedures (or the right combination of any of these) against the requirements of each of the six selected findings from the *USS Cole Commission Report* (see Appendix A). These findings are listed below in an abridged format. Additionally, it is important to note that none of the steps necessary to address these findings are unachievable.

- Transiting units do not have time or resources to focus on a series of locations... requiring these units to *rely on others* to deter, disrupt and mitigate terrorist attacks
- DoD needs to spearhead an *interagency*, coordinated approach to developing non-military host nation security efforts...
- Component Commanders need the resources to provide in-transit units with *temporary security augmentation*...
- Service AT/FP programs must be adequately manned and funded to support threat and physical *vulnerability assessments* of ports...that may be used by transiting forces.
- More responsive application of currently available *military equipment*, [and] *commercial technologies*...
- Military Services must accomplish *AT/FP training* with a degree of rigor that equates to the unit’s primary mission area.
For example, the first finding reveals that “transiting units to do not have time or resources to focus on a series of locations...requiring these units to rely on others...”.

Additional PSU assets could not only assist such units by providing value-added resources, but more importantly, they could easily determine the location-specific threats and vulnerabilities by deploying well in advance of the arriving naval combatants, and possibly further their effort by establishing constructive working relationships with host nation security details.

The fourth finding reveals the necessity for adequate manning to support vulnerability assessments of ports that may be used by transiting forces. As in the first example, forward deployed PSU elements, in the course of conducting actions required of the first finding, could also conduct the actions to correct this finding. Following this same approach, it can be seen that each of the remaining findings can be similarly addressed.

The report's last finding identifies the need for the services to accomplish Antiterrorism/Force Protection training with a degree of rigor that equates to the unit’s primary mission. To this end, elements from the new active duty or the Reserve PSUs should assist the Navy by offering to participate in work-ups for deploying forces in the area of waterside security. Leveraging the experience gained during their own deployments, PSU elements could eventually assist by participating in live drills as credible “red forces”, if other such assets are unavailable. Discussion of similar sound practices is described in Annex C to the MOA between the DoD and the DOT on the use of Coast Guard Capabilities. “Coast Guard participation in Port Operations, Security and Defense during contingency operations will improve mission effectiveness through the employment of trained and experienced Coast Guard forces. Combat effectiveness and overall efficiency is enhanced by Coast Guard forces complementing Naval forces in these Port Operations, Security and Defense missions.”

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During a March 1999 multi-service experiment designed to “test the Navy’s ability to respond to an insurgency in a nation friendly to the United States,” participating Coast Guard forces “…made a relevant and useful contribution principally to force protection missions that the Navy accepted and valued.” Demonstrating readiness to participate in future similar exercises and pre-deployment workups should also leverage visibility and acceptance gained through such exercises. In time, sizable Coast Guard forces could gain sufficient experience to make meaningful contributions in preparing for the evolving challenges of asymmetric warfare.

A potential negative aspect of these recommendations includes the possibility of mission creep. As such, the prospect of taking on too much too soon could lead to ineffectiveness and must be guarded against. Another negative aspect is the possibility of over-extending the PSU Reservists (nearly the current total force for the port security mission) to a point where retention degrades to a level insufficient to accomplish the mission.

**Recommendations for Coastal Security**

As it has done in the area of national defense, the Coast Guard will also continue to undertake, when requested or it sees fit, other emerging national security challenges in the maritime arena whenever its unique capabilities or innate adaptability permit it to do so. To this end, findings from the report of the *Interagency Commission on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports* (Appendix B), which led to recommendations specifically calling for or inferring Coast Guard action, are listed below in abridged form:

- The extent of coordination related to counter-terrorism *security measures*…was inconsistent….
- *Seaport security* has not been adequately addressed.
- No minimum *security standards* or guidelines exist….
- The *National Port Readiness Network/local Port Readiness Committee concept*…is fundamentally sound but in need of increased emphasis.
Information...is not integrated, nor is it always readily available.
The security of foreign seaports has a direct impact on the security of U.S. seaports....

Therefore, elements from the two new active-duty Port Security Units, if approved, should assist in undertaking a coordinated response to complete the recommended actions for each of the report's findings. Necessary supporting elements should be made available from the existing Reserve PSUs, the Marine Safety Offices, and the Captains of the Port, and other operational Coast Guard units. Recommendation support is justified from the results of comparing the sizable benefits to U.S. maritime security, against the opportunity cost to the Coast Guard of not using these resources elsewhere.

Examples of some of the more weighty recommendations corresponding to the report’s first finding includes: “On an expedited basis, the Coast Guard and the FBI...in coordination with other relevant agencies and the private sector, should develop a system for categorizing seaport physical and information infrastructure based on both vulnerability and threat.” Similarly, “Coast Guard Captains of the Port and the FBI should ensure that their respective Maritime Counter terrorism Plans and Incident Contingency Plans are updated and coordinated annually, and exercised regularly....”42 Again, these are simply two recommendations corresponding to the first finding listed above. Finally, as the Interagency Commission has recommended, the Coast Guard should conduct port vulnerability assessments with priority given to the “Strategic Seaports, Presidential Decision Directive 40 ‘controlled ports,’ and economically strategic seaports.... 43 Once the assessments have been completed, the Coast Guard, in concert with a host of other appropriate agencies, should develop Anti-terrorism/ Force Protection contingency plans for these ports.
Recommendations for Future Capabilities

In developing the “Deepwater” recapitalization program, the Coast Guard must ensure that it is truly prepared to meet the full range of America’s maritime security challenges to include the expected “growth areas” of force protection and coastal security. Additional Port Security Units are important and urgently needed, but to be fully prepared both overseas and at home, new cutters, patrol boats, aircraft, sensors, and communication suites will need to be designed with the capabilities and procured in the right numbers for a much greater asymmetric threat to U.S. military forces and rising vulnerability of the nation’s coastal environment, particularly in the area of port infrastructure.

Recommendation for new Joint Doctrine

Joint publications under Force Protection include everything from *Countering Air and Missile Threats* (3-01) to *Barriers and Mines* (3-15). Additionally, while Joint Pub 3-10 addresses *Rear Area Ops*, none of the ten existing or planned force protection joint pubs is dedicated specifically to port security or harbor defense. It is recommended that the Joint Staff (J-7) consider developing and produce a joint pub on these areas.

Conclusions

“As a maritime nation, our vulnerability lies within 20 nautical miles of the enemy’s coast. Time and again, through exercises, war games, and actual combat studies, we learn that naval power without proper force protection will watch helplessly as large chunks of combat power sink to the bottom within sight of enemy coastlines.” 44

The ultimate anti-terrorism end-state for U.S. naval forces in and around the world’s littorals and for U.S. harbors and ports must be one in which a potential terrorist planning an attack can clearly sense a new posture of heightened security so great, that he is not only deterred from carrying through on a notional underway operation, but also from considering
future attacks. To achieve such a state, everything must be fair game for reexamination with regards to what works and what does not in the force protection/coastal security arena. Therefore, in preparing for the asymmetric threat, success will only be possible if anti-terrorism force protection measures reflect forward thinking by all members having responsibility in this area. "We must now make a monumental leap in the attention we pay to this life or death issue." Only then will the likelihood and severity of future successful attacks by asymmetric challenges be reduced.

"We are in the midst of a sea of change. Since the end of the Cold War, the threat of asymmetric warfare and terrorism has increased greatly. Force protection must become an integral part of everything we do. [The attack on the USS Cole] was the first successful terrorist attack against a Navy vessel in modern times. It will not be the last attempt." To make matters worse, by every indication the threat to our forces is only worsening. To counter this growing threat, the U.S. Coast Guard, like other services, must more fully demonstrate its relevant core-competencies and its value as a unique instrument of national security by playing a greater role in the force protection of forward deployed U.S. Naval forces and in the maritime security of U.S. harbors and ports.
APPENDIX A

FINDINGS FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE USS COLE COMMISSION REPORT
FOR WHICH THE COAST GUARD CAN PROVIDE POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS

- Transiting units do not have time or resources to focus on a series of locations while in transit, requiring these units to rely on others to support their efforts to deter, disrupt and mitigate terrorist attacks.

- DoD needs to spearhead an interagency, coordinated approach to developing non-military host nation security efforts in order to enhance force protection for transiting U.S. forces.

- Component Commanders need the resources to provide in-transit units with temporary security augmentation of various kinds.

- Service AT/FP programs must be adequately manned and funded to support threat and physical vulnerability assessments of ports...that may be used by transiting forces.

- More responsive application of currently available military equipment, [and] commercial technologies...can enhance the AT/FP and deterrence posture of transiting forces.

- Military Services must accomplish AT/FP training with a degree of rigor that equates to the unit's primary mission area. (emphasis mine)\(^8\)
APPENDIX B

INTERAGENCY COMMISSION ON CRIME AND SECURITY IN U.S. SEAPORTS REPORT

FINDINGS CALLING FOR OR INFERRING ACTION BY THE U.S. COAST GUARD

- The extent of coordination related to counter-terrorism security measures (among non-law enforcement agencies and key private sector entities) was inconsistent at the 12 seaports surveyed.

- The federal government has established formal structures for coordinating government efforts and developed national strategies to address drug trafficking, terrorism, and other domestic and international crime; military mobilization at seaports; and airport security. Seaport security per se, however, has not been adequately addressed.

- No minimum security standards or guidelines exist for seaports and their facilities.

- The National Port Readiness Network/local Port Readiness Committee concept in the designated Strategic Seaports is fundamentally sound but in need of increased emphasis.

- Seaport security is a complex issue that involves federal, state, and local governments, port authorities, and hundreds of businesses; coordination related to seaport security measures is generally inadequate....

- Information about the movement of vessels, people, and cargo within seaports is not integrated, nor is it always readily available to government and private sector security organizations responsible for detecting, intercepting, and preventing terrorism....

- The security of foreign seaports has a direct impact on the security of U.S. seaports. Shipping and cargo originating in or transiting foreign ports provide an avenue for the introduction of transnational threats to the United States. (emphasis mine)
ENDNOTES


8 Strasser, 253, 259.


13 Ibid.
One possibility which was speculated was the fact that there was some confusion on the part of the Cole’s commanding officer with regards to perceived versus actual threat level for Yemen for the period when the Cole was to visit. Amplifying information in this regard is contained in paragraph 39 of this reference and reads as follows: “...just prior to arriving in Aden, Yemen, the Commanding Officer of USS Cole read an e-mail forwarding to him a Naval Criminal Investigative Service message describing the new Threat Level evaluation system promulgated by Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict. This was a policy message that did not contain real time tactical information for fleet units and it had not been implemented by U.S. Central Command. The Commanding Officer mistakenly interpreted the message to mean that the Threat Level for Yemen had decreased. While it is impossible to know the precise effect of this perception on the final outcome of events, it may have contributed to his lack of focus on Force Protection Measures in the Port of Aden.”


17 Office of Naval Intelligence and the U.S. Coast Guard Intelligence Coordination Center, Threats and Challenges to Maritime Security 2020, (Washington, DC: 1 March 1999), vii.

18 Ibid, viii.


21 Ibid.

22 Loy, 10.

24 Ibid., 63.


26 Stubbs and Truver, 72.


28 Ibid.


33 Ibid.


35 Stubbs and Truver, 94.

36 Ibid., 94.


39 Loy, 13.
40 U.S. Department of Defense and U.S. Department of Transportation, Memorandum of Agreement Between the Department of Defense and the Department of Transportation on the Use of U.S. Coast Guard Capabilities and Resources in Support of the National Military Strategy (Washington, DC: 3 October 1995).


43 Ibid., viii.


46 Ibid.


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