

# **The Army's Gambit: Dislocation Theory and the Development of Doctrine for the Interim Brigade Combat Team**

**A MONOGRAPH  
BY  
Major Kenneth P. Adgie  
Infantry**



**School of Advanced Military Studies  
United States Army Command and General Staff College  
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

**First Term AY 00-01**

Approved for Public Release Distribution is Unlimited

## REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

<b>1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY)</b> 01-01-2001	<b>2. REPORT TYPE</b> Monograph	<b>3. DATES COVERED (FROM - TO)</b> xx-xx-2000 to xx-xx-2001
<b>4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE</b> The Army's Gambit: Dislocation Theory and the Development of Doctrine for the Interim Brigade Combat Team  Unclassified		<b>5a. CONTRACT NUMBER</b>
		<b>5b. GRANT NUMBER</b>
		<b>5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER</b>
<b>6. AUTHOR(S)</b> Adgie, Kenneth P. ;		<b>5d. PROJECT NUMBER</b>
		<b>5e. TASK NUMBER</b>
		<b>5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER</b>
<b>7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS</b> USA Command & General Staff College School of Advanced Military Studies 1 Reynolds Ave. Fort Leavenworth , KS 66048		<b>8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER</b>
<b>9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME AND ADDRESS</b>  		<b>10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)</b>
		<b>11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)</b>
<b>12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT</b> A PUBLIC RELEASE  		

**13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES****14. ABSTRACT**

This monograph analyzes whether dislocation theory is an appropriate military theory for the Interim Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) to use in developing its warfighting doctrine. It argues that the IBCT's unique mission, force structure, strengths, and weaknesses requires its leaders to mentally shift from the tactics, techniques, and procedures of legacy, firepower based forces. Dislocation theory's strength is that it does not focus on the destruction of the enemy force, but deters the enemy through combat potential, making it a suitable theory across the spectrum of conflict. This monograph reviews the purpose of studying theory and the positive impact it has on leaders, soldiers, and units. The evolution of U.S. Army doctrine from 1939 to the present is analyzed to determine how political decision, the threats, and technology influence doctrine. Field Manual 3-0, Operations, is reviewed and concludes that the emerging Army doctrine not only supports dislocation theory, but each share similar concepts. The four components of dislocation theory ? positional, function, temporal, and moral ? are defined. Combining dislocation theory with the IBCT's unique design parameters demonstrates the potential usefulness. This monograph concludes that dislocation theory is appropriate when used by the IBCT as a shaping operation. First, the study of dislocation theory helps the commander explain how subordinates are nested in the overall concept of operations by creating a shared understanding on what must occur. Second, dislocation theory is a useful tool to solve the challenge of the use of force in a Small Scale Contingency because it does not rely on firepower and destruction to achieve its purpose. Third, dislocation theory assists IBCT leaders in analyzing their situation, and applying combat power at decisive points by separating a complex battlefield into manageable parts. Fourth, dislocation theory assist the IBCT commander in visualizing how he intends to shape the battlefield by emphasizing the relationship between enemy and friendly forces, each sides strength and vulnerabilities, and how the effects created by friendly action contribute to the decisive operation. Finally, dislocation theory allows subordinates to anticipate changes by creating a common culture among leaders and subordinates.

**15. SUBJECT TERMS**

Interim Brigade Combat Team (IBCT); dislocation theory; doctrine

<b>16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:</b>			<b>17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT</b> Same as Report (SAR)	<b>18. NUMBER OF PAGES</b> 58	<b>19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON</b> Burgess, Ed burgesse@leavenworth.army.mil
<b>a. REPORT</b> Unclassified	<b>b. ABSTRACT</b> Unclassified	<b>c. THIS PAGE</b> Unclassified			<b>19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER</b> <b>International Area Code</b>  <b>Area Code Telephone Number</b> 913 758-3171 <b>DSN 585-3171</b>

### *Abstract*

The Army's Gambit: Dislocation Theory and the Development of Doctrine for the Interim Brigade Combat Team. By Major Kenneth P. Adgie, USA, 56 pages.

This monograph analyzes whether dislocation theory is an appropriate military theory for the Interim Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) to use in developing its warfighting doctrine. It argues that the IBCT's unique mission, force structure, strengths, and weaknesses requires its leaders to mentally shift from the tactics, techniques, and procedures of legacy, firepower based forces. Dislocation theory's strength is that it does not focus on the destruction of the enemy force, but deters the enemy through combat potential, making it a suitable theory across the spectrum of conflict.

This monograph reviews the purpose of studying theory and the positive impact it has on leaders, soldiers, and units. The evolution of U.S. Army doctrine from 1939 to the present is analyzed to determine how political decision, the threats, and technology influence doctrine. Field Manual 3-0, Operations, is reviewed and concludes that the emerging Army doctrine not only supports dislocation theory, but each share similar concepts. The four components of dislocation theory – positional, function, temporal, and moral – are defined. Combining dislocation theory with the IBCT's unique design parameters demonstrates the potential usefulness.

This monograph concludes that dislocation theory is appropriate when used by the IBCT as a shaping operation. First, the study of dislocation theory helps the commander explain how subordinates are nested in the overall concept of operations by creating a shared understanding on what must occur. Second, dislocation theory is a useful tool to solve the challenge of the use of force in a Small Scale Contingency because it does not rely on firepower and destruction to achieve its purpose. Third, dislocation theory assists IBCT leaders in analyzing their situation, and applying combat power at decisive points by separating a complex battlefield into manageable parts. Fourth, dislocation theory assist the IBCT commander in visualizing how he intends to shape the battlefield by emphasizing the relationship between enemy and friendly forces, each sides strength and vulnerabilities, and how the effects created by

friendly action contribute to the decisive operation. Finally, dislocation theory allows subordinates to anticipate changes by creating a common culture among leaders and subordinates.

## *Contents*

I.	INTRODUCTION.....	1
II.	MILITARY THEORY.....	6
III.	THE ROLE OF DOCTRINE.....	11
IV.	DISLOCATION THEORY.....	18
V.	THE INTERIM BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM AND DISLOCATION THEORY.....	30
VI.	CONCLUSIONS.....	39
VI.	ENDNOTES.....	46
VII.	BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	53

## **I. Introduction**

*Gambit. A chess opening in which a player voluntarily risks one or more pawns or minor pieces to gain an advantage in position. A calculated move, maneuver, or device.<sup>1</sup>*

- Webster's Third New International Dictionary

*The presence of a strong force, even though inferior, near the scene of operations will produce a momentous effect on the enemy's action.<sup>2</sup>*

- Alfred Thayer Mahan

The threat of the Soviets 8th Guards Army attacking through the central plains of Germany has been gone for a decade. The titanic struggle between the world's two superpowers ended with a default victory for the United States and initiated the Army's search for a new mission and identity. Futurists and Pentagon strategic planners never predicted that Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo would have been waypoints along this journey. As politicians sought a peace dividend, the Army's size shrank and our forward-deployed Army became a power projection force. The Army's continual search for strategic relevance as part of the national military strategy prompted its leadership to examine the doctrine, organization, and equipment needed to satisfy the needs of the warfighting CINCs.

The mission of the Interim Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) is to provide the CINCs a force that is capable of responding to the full spectrum of contingencies.<sup>3</sup> Its strengths are its strategic, operational, and tactical mobility designed to fight in complex and urban terrain. The IBCT is designed primarily for Small Scale Contingency (SSC) operations where immediate U.S. presence might halt the escalation of violence. The IBCT's major fighting component is its three combined arms battalions possessing a robust dismounted infantry capability. Undeniably, this organization is a compromise between the Army's heavy and light divisions. The design parameters of strategic responsiveness, reduced sustainment requirement, and smaller logistical footprint forced a reduction in the level of firepower and survivability enjoyed by heavy divisions.<sup>4</sup> Conversely, light divisions are incapable of the lethality, mobility, and survivability needed for battlefield dominance. The base organization and structure of the IBCT, except specific vehicle platforms, is set. The question of mission and most likely employment scenarios are answered, yet a

fundamental question is still outstanding. What theory, doctrine, and tactics will the IBCT commanders use to fight and win on the twenty-first century battlefield?

The significance of this problem is not obvious at first glance. The majority of leaders in the Army have spent years practicing their craft and training soldiers. Unfortunately, their formative experiences of Panama, Desert Storm, the National Training Center, and the Joint Readiness Training Center has left them with lessons learned and tactics relevant to an armored or light infantry force. The IBCT is an organization that cannot be fought as a mechanized brigade due to its firepower and survivability limitations. The superior agility of the IBCT places it in an entirely different category than dismounted infantry. The experiences of both heavy and light forces need not be forgotten, but rather synthesized into a coherent concept of warfighting that enhances the IBCT's strengths while protecting its vulnerabilities. Possibly, a more significant challenge is that Army doctrine relies on overwhelming firepower to facilitate its maneuver. Conceptually this is appropriate, but in the IBCT's most likely deployment scenario the use of firepower will be limited by rules of engagement. What military theories will the IBCT commander use to understand his environment and accomplish his mission is an important question to ask during the development of the IBCT's doctrine and tactics. To resolve this question theory must be defined, its scope and practical value codified, and its relationship to doctrine established.

Dr. James Schneider defines military theory as a professionally justified, reliable system of beliefs about the nature of war.<sup>5</sup> Military theory provides the intellectual framework that allows the professional soldier to understand the complexities of the battlefield and to grasp why events occur. It is not a collection of principles that predicts with scientific accuracy. Theory allows the professional to determine discreet patterns and an understanding of how and why things interact. A thorough understanding of theory, combined with a study of history, enables leaders to apply the intellectual rigor needed to make decisions in a dynamic environment. Theory is useful in educating a commander to make

quantifiably better decisions than the threat. Theory alone cannot be used to train units to fight and win on the battlefield, but theory creates a more tangible tool – doctrine.

Doctrine provides the link between theory and practice.<sup>6</sup> Webster’s dictionary defines doctrine as “something that is taught, put forth as true and supported by a leader, a position on the body of principles in a body of knowledge.” It is derived from the Latin word *doctrina* meaning doctor or teacher.<sup>7</sup> Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operation, defines doctrine as the “concise expression of how Army forces contribute in unified actions in campaigns, major operations, battles, and engagements.”<sup>8</sup> In simpler terms, doctrine can be described as how the Army fights. Doctrine is neither ephemeral nor is it written in stone, but evolves with the nation’s security needs, perceived threat, force structure, and technological advances.

Theory has been likened as the railroad tracks that carry a train.<sup>9</sup> The tracks themselves do not provide power or braking ability. That is left to the locomotive. The tracks do not decide which spur to take or how fast to travel. That is the responsibility of the conductor. The tracks provide a guide for the system to operate as designed. Tracks are always present and necessary for the train to function properly. Without the tracks the locomotive will function, but become less effective. This description holds true for the IBCT and its developing doctrine. If the underlying theory and associated mental models are based on a force that has different equipment, force structure, and mission the unit will function but not to its fullest potential. A theory is needed that amplifies the IBCT’s capabilities of enhanced maneuverability, unparalleled situational understanding, and a robust command and control network while simultaneously shielding its vulnerabilities of reduced firepower and survivability. Determining the theories that influenced FM 3-0 is debatable. However, what is being trained and executed in the field is closer to attrition theory than any other.

Attrition theory is based on the premise of destroying enemy resources faster than he can replace them.<sup>10</sup> Firepower is used to create the opportunity to maneuver. The recent campaign in

Kosovo carried attrition theory to its logical extreme and employed no maneuver forces during the seventy-eight day campaign. Air power theorist hailed Operation Allied Force as a turning point in the way the U.S. wages war. Unfortunately, the combination of political environment, strategic objectives, and caliber of opponent in Kosovo are not likely to be repeated. The IBCT's mission profile describes its most likely employment as a deterrent or peace making force in complex and urban environments where the risk of collateral damage and civilian casualties limits the use of overwhelming firepower.<sup>11</sup> What the IBCT must do is overwhelm the enemy with combat potential, operating at a tempo that leaves the enemy with few viable options. In this type of unstable, dynamic, and cluttered battlefield the IBCT must stress its strengths: technological overmatch, decentralized operations, and the leadership and initiative of small unit leaders. These characteristics are the foundation of dislocation theory.

Dislocation theory seeks to position friendly forces in a relative position of advantage over the enemy and use surprise, shock, and overwhelming military capability to limit the enemy's courses of action and cause physical or psychological collapse.<sup>12</sup> What separates dislocation from other theories is the means used to achieve the desired ends. Massed fires, precision engagements, and symmetrical battles are not eliminated, but are no longer the decisive action in dislocation operations. Overwhelming the threat's capability to react shapes the battlefield. High tempo operations are designed to influence the threats decision-making cycle, and simultaneous lines of operations are created to threaten multiple decision points throughout the threat's battle space.

To prove dislocation theory is appropriate for the development of IBCT doctrine, several questions must be answered. First, theory is defined and shown to be a useful tool in the development and continuing education of leaders. The relationship of theory and doctrine is explored and examples from Clausewitz, Jomini, and Corbett provided to demonstrate how military theory has influenced our war fighting doctrine. Second, the Army's keystone doctrine, *Operations*, is examined from the World War II era version to the current FM 3-0 to determine the external factors that shape how the Army fights, and if

critical concepts of dislocation theory pertaining to leadership, decision-making, and campaign design are present. Third, dislocation theory is presented as an alternative for commanders to assist them in visualizing the possible employment of their force, and its applicability in decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations. Finally, the components of dislocation theory are combined with the IBCT's mission profile and force structure to explore the usefulness of using dislocation theory to develop IBCT doctrine.

The criteria used to assess the validity of the research question are based on Dr. James Schneider's criteria on assessing the reliability of a theory along with an analysis of the most likely environment for IBCT operations.<sup>13</sup> First, does the study of dislocation theory help the commander *explain* how subordinates are nested in the overall concept of operations? Second, is dislocation theory a useful tool to *solve* the challenge of appropriate force usage in a Small Scale Contingency? Third, does dislocation theory assist IBCT leaders in *analyzing* their situation, and applying combat power at decisive points? Fourth, does dislocation theory assist the IBCT commander in *visualizing* how he intends to shape the battlefield? Finally, does dislocation theory allow subordinates to *anticipate* changes that inevitably occur in a dynamic environment.

## **II. Military Theory**

*Give me a fish and I eat for a day. Teach me to fish and I eat for a lifetime.*  
- Japanese proverb

Military theory has been covered in a shroud of mystery since Clausewitz's faithful wife posthumously published his unfinished manuscript in 1832. His dense writing style and dialectic approach to uncover the fundamental truths of war caused misunderstanding, skepticism, and a sense of extremism that would not help the commander fight and win on the battlefield.<sup>14</sup> Today his complex thoughts and convoluted methods for approaching a concept still cause many to doubt the utility of studying theory, relegating it to academia and classroom discussion. The fundamental difficulty military leaders have with theory is that they expect tangible facts and answers to their questions. Clausewitz wrote, "The purpose of theory was to clarify concepts that have become confused."<sup>15</sup> He understood that the myriad sources of friction and endless combinations of factors would render any theory obsolete if it attempted to solve every problem. Theory was a tool to assist the mind in applying critical analysis to develop practical solutions to a problem.<sup>16</sup> Theory shapes the individual's perspective, but only the individual can wade through the chaos of battle and find solutions. The purpose of this section is to explore the benefit of using theory as a tool to enhance leader education, development of a commander's warfighting style, and providing a shared vision to the organization.

Jomini, Clausewitz's competition for the title of the U.S. Army's most influential theorist, disagreed with the Prussian on style and methodology and believed that there existed a set number of

principles that when applied correctly led to victory.<sup>17</sup> He saw a more practical application of theory but also wrote of its limitations.

Theories cannot teach men with mathematical precision what they should do in every possible case; but it is also certain that it will point out the errors which should be avoided. This is a highly important consideration, for in the hands of skillful generals commanding brave troops these rules thus become the means of almost certain success<sup>18</sup>

Clausewitz and Jomini agreed that theory helps commanders understand their environment through the vagaries of combat, but the expectations of solutions must be tempered. Is theory merely a prism to view the world, or are there practical reasons for soldiers to study theory?

Theory by itself has never synchronized an armored attack through restrictive terrain, nor has it ever defeated a cavalry charge on an unnamed ridge in the heartland of Europe. Both of these actions required the skill, experience, and leadership of the commander to visualize his forces arrayed in time and space against a thinking and determined enemy. Studying theory allows the commander to recognize discreet similarities and patterns in his environment, and weave a common thread throughout his operation. Accurate and timely pattern recognition skills can be developed by multiple iterations of an event, but this is ineffective for two reasons. First, history rarely repeats itself. The subtle nuances of terrain create unique opportunities and challenges for every mission. Force ratios fluctuate during campaigns and weapon systems evolve with time and technological advances. Secondly, time and money are finite resources that cannot be expended on rote training events to teach leaders the intricacies of combat. A more efficient technique is to teach a soldier how, not what to think. This is the basis for military education and leader training.

Military education is the foundation for developing leaders, but this invaluable training cannot be limited to the teaching of definitions, sequential tasks, or battle drills. The societal and technological changes occurring today and for the near future are occurring at an exponential rate and demand adaptive leaders who understand their environment.<sup>19</sup> It is insufficient to teach only how to conduct a task, but also

to teach the why. The starting point for understanding the why is theory and military history. History places into context the ends, ways, and means that our military forefathers used in a particular circumstance. It facilitates an analysis of why the great Captains of history acted as they did. In depth study creates a familiarity with the subject and permits a critical scrutiny of the participants and results of the battle.<sup>20</sup> Applying intellectual rigor to analyze history has been a common trait among the great leaders in the US Army. Puryear's *19 Stars* examines Marshall, MacArthur, Patton, and Eisenhower's style of leadership and concludes they all passionately studied war. Only MacArthur, who graduated first in his West Point class, showed natural intelligence as an undergraduate. The other three persevered through a combination of reading, staff rides, and hard work during their company and field grade years to excel in their profession and graduate top in their General Staff College class.<sup>21</sup> Patton's World War I experiences and his quest for self-improvement led him to the writings of Liddell Hart and Fuller and their thoughts on employment of tanks in battle, and du Picq to understand the moral domain. Patton disliked Clausewitz's *On War* not because of its substance, but its style.<sup>22</sup> Puryear also quotes General Omar Bradley who was asked how a leader develops a sense for combat:

You first study the theoretical handling of troops; you study the principles of war, principles of tactics, and how certain leaders applied them. You are never going to meet with that exact situation, but when you know all these principles and how they were applied in the past, then when a situation faces you come up with a good solution.<sup>23</sup>

Understanding theory and in depth study of history are the tools needed to critically analyze the events from the past and apply them to the current situation and future events. Theory allows the military officer to mentally explore uncharted areas of his profession. This personal philosophy is the impetus behind leadership style, decision-making ability, and campaign design. In sum, theory shapes the individual's warfighting style.<sup>24</sup> This orderly and consistent arrangement of thoughts is not only useful for the commander, but creates a shared vision within the organization.

Units that have a common understanding of theory share a mental picture of the battlefield and serves as the initial point of departure in understanding their situation and shape future possibilities. Julian Corbett understood the practical value of large organizations sharing a common theory and thought process due to the extended distances and independent action expected of the Royal Navy:

Its [theory's] practical utility however is not any means confined to its effect upon the powers of a leader. It is not enough that a leader should have the ability to decide rightly; his subordinates must seize at once the full meaning of his decisions and be able to express it with certainty in well-adjusted actions. For this every man concerned must have been trained to think in the same plane; the chief's order must awake in every brain the same process of thought, his words must have the same meaning for all.<sup>25</sup>

Corbett recognized the relationship between initiative and operating within the commander's intent was too important to be left to chance. Strengthening the bond between the two is possible by a thorough study of history and application of theory to stimulate debate. The importance of units sharing common understanding is increasing. The weakening of nation-states through ethnic, religious, or nationalistic hatred is increasing and clear delineation of friend or foe will be difficult. Technological advances permit units to occupy greater battle space denying the commander the opportunity to be at critical points on the battlefield. Subordinates' initiative and use of mission type orders will be imperative and only successful if built on a foundation of trust and common vision of the environment.

In the early 1980's, the Army experienced dramatic changes in force structure, equipment, and doctrine. The Army embraced the painful lessons from Vietnam and focused on defeating the Soviet attack against NATO. State of the art technology present in the Abrams, Bradley, Apache, and artillery systems were combined with a new doctrine promulgated by the 1982 version of FM 100-5. The Army leadership recognized the need for change, but the challenge was how to maintain the capability to defend our nations security interests during the inevitable turbulence.<sup>26</sup> Then a Lieutenant Colonel, Huba Wasse de Czege believed technological changes were to increase exponentially, but he was concerned that the army was forgetting that the soldier was the centerpiece of our force. He wrote, "Technological

superiority alone has rarely been decisive. What has been decisive has been excellence in the knowledge and application of the science of war”<sup>27</sup> This prophetic article is as relevant today as it was sixteen years ago.

Today the Army is undergoing a similar transformation. A peer competitor has been replaced with failed states, rogue nations, and asymmetric threats. Revolutionary advances in digital technology permit unparalleled communication and situational understanding. A new doctrine designed to sustain the Army through the development of the Interim Brigade and Objective Force recognizes the primacy of joint warfighting and stability operations. However, the commonality between the Army preparing for a Warsaw Pact assault and our current force remains the soldier. This dynamic and complex environment demands decentralized, non-contiguous, high tempo operations. Satellite links and digital screens cannot replace the leader on the ground acting in harmony with the commander’s vision of the operation.

Does theory assume a greater role than merely acting as a “whetstone to sharpen the mind,”<sup>28</sup> or to strengthen the intellectual bonds between superiors and subordinates? Theory determines not only the individual and units warfighting philosophy, but if adopted by the entire organization shapes doctrine. A cursory glance through history reveals nations creating militaries based on misguided theories. The German General Staff’s misinterpretation of Clausewitz’s theory of annihilation planted the seeds for the von Schlieffen Plan. Simultaneously, France accepted the teachings of Colonel de’Grandmaison and Foch and the superiority of the offense and developed Plan XVII to counter the German threat. Neither theory survived the summer of 1914.<sup>29</sup> If theory is used only to educate and understand war than a more authoritative tool is needed to define how we fight. That is the role of doctrine.

### **III. The Role of Doctrine**

*I am tempted indeed to declare dogmatically that whatever doctrine the Armed Forces are working on now, they have it wrong. I am also tempted to declare that it does not matter that they have got it wrong. What does matter is their capacity to get it right quickly when the moment arrives.*

*- Michael Howard*<sup>30</sup>

The epigraph introducing this section comes from a speech given by Michael Howard in 1973 titled *Military Science in the Age of Peace*. Howard differentiated between an age of peace and peacetime by stating peacetime is the interval between wars with the next war approaching and expected. He dismisses the notion that an age of peace is anything but peaceful,<sup>31</sup> and the army's experience in the 1990s validates his assertion. The demise of the Iron Curtain provided the impetus to reduce the Army's force structure from eighteen to ten divisions. Simultaneously, our commitment to long-term peace operations in the Balkans, Somalia, and Haiti and deterrence missions in Iraq increased the operational tempo of the Army to new heights. Smart bombs, which captured the imagination of both the public and our enemies, were followed by brilliant bombs and advanced cruise missiles. The debate over Army relevancy centered on its force structure, its ability to quickly deploy and provide a credible deterrence to the full spectrum of threats, and the logic of risking soldiers on the ground when the Air Force can perform

the same mission from 30,000 feet. The 1990s also introduced unparalleled advances in digital technology that promises to reduce friction on the battlefield by providing timely reports of enemy and friendly activity, and provide commanders the ability to see the entire battlefield for the first time since Frederick the Great. The purpose of this section is to examine the external factors that influence army doctrine, and analyze FM 3-0 to determine if the Army's emerging doctrine supports dislocation theory.

The Interim Brigade and Army transformation is not focused on building lighter vehicles, but views change holistically. Future political objectives require a full spectrum force capable of immediate and decisive action. Technology enhances the forces' capability to fight in joint and combined operations and dominate the information battlefield. These capabilities, insufficient by themselves, require a trained and ready force capable of executing a doctrine that encourages initiative, decentralized operations, and a shared vision. However, doctrine must be acutely sensitive to the political and technological dynamics occurring, and be a catalyst of change for the Army.

Trevor N. Dupuy wrote that theory's role was to explain war, and provide the intellectual foundation for the development of doctrine with its ultimate objective being success in combat.<sup>32</sup> The World War II era versions of FM 100-5 reflect the lessons of the previous war and the gradual emergence of air power and mechanization of the battlefield with only subtle references to military theorists. Each manual discusses battlefield geometry in Jominian terms with the theater of operations, combat zone, and communication zone defined and provide as a framework for further discussion.<sup>33</sup> The introduction of Clausewitz's concept of friction, destruction of the enemy's armed forces as the ultimate objective of military operations, and that objective directly linked to the national aim emerged in the 1939 version of FM 100-5.<sup>34</sup> However, the vast majority of the manual focused on the tactical level of war and the techniques and procedures small unit leaders should apply. An assumption is both Jomini and Clausewitz's theories had relatively little impact on Army doctrine as the manual's organization and content were directed

toward an inexperienced officer corps leading an Army comprised of draftees who needed simple procedures vice heady concepts.

America's Korean War experience and the flourishing Cold War with the Soviet Union crystallized the relationship between military and political aims. Army doctrine recognized the relationship of military power, the enemy, and the enemy's political structure and states "military forces are justifiable only as instruments of national policy in the attainment of national objectives. Since war is a political act, its broad and final objectives are political."<sup>35</sup> Clausewitz's concepts were advanced further in 1962 when FM 100-5 defined national objectives, national policy, national strategy, and the elements of national power. This manual also introduced limited war as "a war that does not involve the unrestricted employment of all available resources."<sup>36</sup>

The Army of the mid-1970s was an organization searching for answers. The overwhelming number of tactical victories earned during the Vietnam War could not overcome the fact that our decade long struggle in Southeast Asia was a strategic failure. Internal turmoil expressed in the form of drug abuse, poor morale, and low retention and enlistment rates were combined with the undeniable fact that the Warsaw pact was steadily increasing its force structure and capability in Europe. General William E. Dupuy, Commander of the Army's Training and Doctrine Command recognized the Army's challenges. Dupuy considered doctrine as an institutional tool that could change warfighting techniques by influencing the procurement process, military education, and every manual in use. The 1976 edition of FM 100-5 was a dramatic departure from previous versions. Colored graphs and pictures replaced black typeset. The increased lethality of the battlefield was portrayed in charts to explain new concepts such as probability of hits and kills, maximum effective ranges, and the ever-increasing size of the battlefield.<sup>37</sup> However, the manual was criticized for being too analytical, too defensive, and disproportionate to the European theater. The elimination of the principles of war and the extensive use of McNamara type charts seemed to many that the Army had lost focus. The 1982 and 1986 versions of FM 100-5 were more culturally acceptable

than the 1976 version.<sup>38</sup> Charts and graphs were replaced with historical vignettes and maps to illustrate concepts. The Army's narrow tactical focus was replaced by acknowledging the existence of the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. Classical theorists such as Clausewitz, Jomini, and Sun Tzu were cited and their concepts such as centers of gravity, decisive points, and lines of operation defined and explained. Dr. Richard Swain attributes the increase in doctrinal debate and interest in the Napoleonic era theorists to the 1976 publication of the Paret and Howard translation of Clausewitz's *On War*.<sup>39</sup> The 1993 version acknowledged that the Army must be a power projection force to meet the requirements of the national military strategy, and stated all future Army operations would be under a unified combatant commander conducting the full range of military options. Operations other than war were introduced to the Army, albeit for only eight pages.

The changes in national security policy in the period 1939-1993 forced changes in Army doctrine, and the largest influence were political decisions on where to fight the next war.<sup>40</sup> U.S. Army doctrine has changed not on a regular basis, but changed to meet new conditions. The 1950's doctrine changed to meet the challenge of a nuclear battlefield, the 1960's toward counterinsurgency operations, and the 1970s doctrine toward a conventional or nuclear war in Europe. A survey of the twelve versions of FM 100-5 reflects each publication date is linked to a significant event in our national security.<sup>41</sup>

Doctrine is influenced primarily by political decisions, the perceived threat, and emerging technology. Doctrine absorbs these inputs and affects missions and training, force structure, and the procurement process. Examples of political decisions affecting doctrine are the Vietnam War and the development of counterinsurgency doctrine; the defense of Western Europe and AirLand Battle; and peace operations in Bosnia, Haiti, and Kosovo. The Army's assimilation of political decisions into doctrine created training events such as REFORGER and the Mission Rehearsal Exercises. The perceived threat to our national security influences doctrine by determining force structure. The counterinsurgency operation in Vietnam created an increased need for Special Operation forces. The perceived instability of

Central and South America led to the creation of light infantry divisions, and the Soviet threat in Europe created an increased need for the firepower and mobility of armored and mechanized infantry divisions. Today's threat is ambiguous and asymmetrical. Terms such as failed states, nationalism, and ethnic cleansing have required the U.S. to intervene in unexpected areas, but the Army legacy force structure has constrained deployment parameters. The paramount requirement of reacting swiftly and decisively has led to the creation of the IBCT.

It is unlikely that future adversaries will repeat Iraqi's mistake of allowing U.S. forces months to build combat power and shape a theater of operations. Few, if any, will attempt to engage the US military in a contest of material, but attempt to defeat the political will of our nation or coalition. FM 3-0 anticipates that future adversaries employ asymmetric tactics augmented with readily available technology to disrupt permissive entry operations at points of debarkation, and to use force oriented tactics to inflict the maximum number of casualties. Once Army forces are established in the area of operations, the threat will avoid decisive battle by hiding personnel and equipment in urban areas. The threat of collateral damage and loss of innocent lives limits US firepower superiority, and increases the likelihood of soldier to civilian contact and potential incidents. Non-linear, non-contiguous operations in complex terrain will be the norm.<sup>42</sup> These types of operations will occur in the full spectrum context and place a premium on decentralized operations conducted by small unit leaders relying on information supremacy to maintain the initiative on the battlefield.

Unfortunately, doctrine does not change as rapidly as technology. Mahan wrote, "An improvement of weapons is due to the energy of one or two men while changes in tactics [doctrine] have to overcome the inertia of a conservative class.... History shows that it is vain to hope that military men generally will be at pains to do this, but the one who does will go into battle with great advantages."<sup>43</sup> The reluctance of cavalryman to exchange their horse for armored vehicles on the eve of World War II is similar to the current debate involving the IBCT selection of track or wheeled platform. Throughout

doctrine's dynamic life cycle, there is an ongoing tension between political decisions and missions, threat and force structure, new technology and procurement. A constant factor in this sea of variables is how the individual, the unit, and the Army interpret their mission and visualize how they can accomplish their purpose at the least cost. These mental models on how we fight find their genesis in the application and understanding of doctrine.

FM 3-0 outlines the Army doctrine intended to lead the force through transformation during a time when there is no peer competitor threatening our national security. Unlike its predecessors, a perceived adversary, political mandate, or defeat in the first battle of a war does not force significant changes on the Army. This manual recognizes the dynamic political changes occurring in our country and the globalization of the entire world. United Nations, NATO, and multi-national coalitions conducting deterrence missions or peace operations will become more frequent. Instantaneous telecommunication portraying suffering in the world's troubled areas will accelerate the call for prompt and decisive military action. Its analysis of the threat and future Army mission states that our future adversaries and operations will be vague and place increased demands on subordinate leaders. FM 3-0 reminds its reader that "land combat continues to be the salient feature of conflict"<sup>44</sup> and that the ultimate demonstration of U.S. resolve is the deployment of soldiers to a foreign land.

The 1993 version of FM 100-5 introduced the concept of power projection to the Army, and FM 3-0 increases the requirements for the twenty-first century. The Army's current deployment sequence of alert, upload, deploy, train, condition setting, and finally conduct combat operations is insufficient. This methodology is replaced by a deploy, shape and conduct decisive operations in a more compressed timeline.<sup>45</sup> This doctrine provides the Joint Force Commander with a responsive force capable of decisive operations immediately upon entry into the area of operations. A highly mobile force capable of rapid distributed operations provides the combatant commander with operational options unavailable with legacy forces. However, the need for a responsive force limits the organic firepower deployed. The IBCT's

connectivity with other joint forces is expected to offset this reduction, and the headquarters' reach back capability to strategic and national intelligence sources enable the commander to make quantifiably better decisions than his opponent.

Arguably, the most significant change introduced by FM 3-0 is the interpretation of battlefield organization. The linear mindset of the Cold War created a deep, close, and rear compartmentalization of the battlefield. The range and lethality of modern weapon systems has continued the historical trend of an ever-increasing empty battlefield. Liddell Hart's theory of surfaces and gaps has begun to assume less of a spatial quality and more of a temporal quality. The relationships of discreet operations nested by purpose is now conveyed as decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations. The temporal characteristics of the twenty-first century are elaborated further in the elements of operational design. Intellectually challenging concepts such as center of gravity, lines of operations, and operational reach are placed in context that imply most future operations entail simultaneous actions throughout the depth of an area of operation, and attack multiple decisive points to overwhelm enemy forces.<sup>46</sup> The two forms of operational approach, direct and indirect, are defined and present the opportunity for the creative application of Army doctrine.

FM 3-0 is unique when compared to earlier doctrinal manuals in that it discusses the impact of technology on Army operations. Soldiers and leaders at all levels must harness the dramatic advances in digital technology to achieve situational understanding. This understanding allows the force to operate at a higher tempo, more precisely, and with greater independence than ever before. These changes are not limited to only having more information on friendly and enemy forces, but potentially change the paradigm of how we fight. Commanders no longer have to develop a situation with a maneuver force but use advanced Command, Control, Communication, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) assets to determine the enemy disposition and array forces out of contact.<sup>47</sup> The commander's ability to understand his situation in relation to the enemy allows him to dominate greater battlespace, and share with subordinate's timely and accurate information. Their knowledge of friendly and enemy activity,

combined with mission type orders and intent, increase the subordinates initiative and permits non-contiguous operations that strike the enemy from unexpected directions regardless of spatial orientation or proximity.

The discussion on the origins and history of the U.S. Army doctrine and the external factors that shaped its development demonstrates that political decisions, threat, and emerging technology shape how the Army fights. FM 3-0 embraces this tradition, but anticipates the future requirements of the force. Specifically, our doctrine understands that future political considerations require a strategically responsive Army capable of full spectrum operations. The future threat is neither predictable, nor fully understood, demanding soldiers and leaders capable of high tempo, independent operations using action and initiative to impose their will on the enemy. Finally, technology is not a panacea but an enabler that increase the effectiveness of well-trained units.

These factors shape our doctrine and how we fight. Theory shapes how the mind thinks about fighting and is the creative and imaginative force that designs campaigns while operating within the parameters of doctrine. Deterrence missions, complex environments, and precise rules of engagements demand a theory and doctrine that provides a new perspective. The principles of dislocation theory are present in FM 3-0: mission type orders, surprise, tempo, indirect approach, freedom of action, and distributed operations. Combining dislocation theory with the fundamental concepts professed in FM 3-0 creates opportunities for decisive operations sooner at less cost to soldiers.

#### **IV. Dislocation Theory**

*The only thing harder than getting a new idea into a military mind is getting the old one out.”<sup>48</sup>*

*- B.H. Liddell Hart*

America's armed forces have historically relied on overwhelming firepower to fight and win. America's two world wars required brute force to defeat a determined enemy. Surprisingly, the North Koreans did not flee in the face of U.S. soldiers, and the penchant of our opponent to employ men in lieu of material required overwhelming firepower to achieve a draw. Vietnam was America's first taste of defeat at the hands of a determined and resourceful enemy fighting asymmetrically against a

technologically superior nation. Desert Storm was an easy victory, though intense from the perspective of the individual, and a near certainty after the air campaign inflicted complete paralysis over the Iraqi army. Unfortunately, all indicators anticipate future conflict against opponents applying both direct and indirect methods to avoid our strength and attack our vulnerabilities, and full spectrum operations imply judicious or extremely regulated use of firepower. The purpose of this section is to explain dislocation theory, and explore how the four components – positional, functional, temporal, and moral - provide commanders a viable alternative to overwhelming firepower in full spectrum operations.

The development of the IBCT and introduction of FM 3-0 intends to change how the Army meets new threats, but evolutionary changes in doctrine and force structure alone cannot suffice. Webster defines *metanoia* as a “fundamental transformation of mind or character” and aptly describes the cognitive process needed to change the Army.<sup>49</sup> An inherent danger of change is that people might use the new lexicon and employ new equipment, but maintain the time-tested techniques they are comfortable using. Peter Senge wrote of this phenomenon and the characteristics of a learning organization, and believed that “learning eventually results in changes in action not just taking in new information and forming new ideas.”<sup>50</sup> Leaders and soldiers who train and fight the IBCT under the mental models developed in light infantry and armored units risk little but gain less. A gap between new capabilities and tradition, information supremacy and hierarchal command and control, flexibility and rote drills will occur. Dislocation theory is an alternative capable of reducing this gap.

Dislocation theory seeks to replace what the enemy thinks should be occurring with something that is happening faster than he can understand. Basil H. Liddell Hart, in his seminal work *Strategy*, examines the history of warfare from the Greek Wars through the end of the Second World War. His conclusion and thesis of the book states:

...throughout the ages effective results in war have rarely been attained unless the approach has had indirectness as to ensure the opponents unreadiness to meet it. The indirectness has usually been physical and always psychological. ... In most campaigns the dislocation of the enemy

psychologically and physical balance has been the vital prelude to a successful attempt at his overthrow.<sup>51</sup>

Dislocation theory requires arraying forces on the battlefield in time, space, and purpose to shape the battlefield for decisive operations. Liddell Hart believed that shaping the battlefield through dislocation theory established the conditions for decisive operations.

Preventing the enemy from using all or part of his force as planned is the essence of dislocation theory and occurs by creating an asymmetric advantage in position, function, time, or moral resistance. Accomplishing this cannot be done in a single stroke, but necessitates shaping operations that force the enemy to operate at a location, condition, or tempo for which he is unprepared. Liddell Hart understood the relationship between the enemy's psychological and physical balance, and setting the conditions for decisive operations when he wrote, "...instead of seeking to upset the enemy's equilibrium by ones attack, it must be upset before a real attack is, or can be successfully launched."<sup>52</sup> This concept is present in the Army's emerging doctrine. FM 3-0 defines battlefield organization as "the arrangement of forces according to purpose, time, and space to accomplish the mission", and categories this into decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations. Shaping operations "create and preserve conditions for successful decisive operations by affecting the enemy's capabilities and forces, or influencing the opposing commanders decisions."<sup>53</sup> Shaping operations can occur before, during, or after the decisive operation, and this sequencing creates Liddell Hart's concept of only striking an unready enemy.

Positional dislocation occurs when friendly maneuver prevents the enemy from using all or part of his force as planned.<sup>54</sup> In chess, a piece is considered pinned when its movement exposes a more valuable piece to capture. The lowly pawn, if positioned correctly and supported by another piece, can threaten the queen with impunity. The enemy queen, the most powerful force on the black and white battlefield, is rendered irrelevant. Joint Vision 2020 develops this construct in the context of distributed operations and dominant maneuver that forces the enemy to fight from a position of disadvantage.<sup>55</sup> The end state of dominant maneuver is to retain freedom of action while simultaneously denying the enemy

that same freedom. Dominant maneuver alone is insufficient, but must be focused at the decisive point in the operation, or creating opportunities and conditions for action at the decisive point. Nested purposes that support decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations begin to create a scheme of maneuver that prevents a quantifiable portion of the enemy force from influencing the decisive point.

Positional dislocation's goal is to prevent the enemy from bringing his mass to bear in relation to the decisive point. This can only be accomplished by conducting operations throughout the depth of the enemy's battlespace and disrupt the synergy between his elements. TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5, Force XXI Operations, describes distributed operations as "operations conducted exactly where and when they will be decisive or contribute to the execution of decisive operations – without geographic constraints."<sup>56</sup> Dr. Schneider provides a more comprehensive definition, "an ensemble of deep maneuvers and distributed battles extended in time and space but unified by a common aim, namely the retention or denial of freedom of action."<sup>57</sup> Both definitions imply similar attributes required for success. First, the purpose of the maneuver must support a desired effect on the decisive point. Precision, in both fires and maneuver, must deprive the enemy his ability to synchronize his forces. Second, the freedom of action desired from distributed operations can only be achieved if Clausewitz's concept of relative superiority is achieved.<sup>58</sup> This superiority concerns the density of forces. Finally, since the enemy is fighting to retain freedom of action, the concept of simultaneity is needed to disrupt multiple points throughout the enemy battlespace, causing the enemy to deal with more challenges than his command and control structure can resolve.

Conducting distributed operations on a non-contiguous battlefield is considered a critical characteristic of the IBCT.<sup>59</sup> Shaping operations that separate the enemy mass from the decisive point is possible through two distinct forms of relative maneuver. Distributed operations that avoid the enemy's mass by using envelopments or turning movements force the enemy to fight at a time and place of the friendly forces choosing. The focus is maintaining freedom of action. Distributed operations that prevent the enemy from influencing the decisive point by isolating the battlefield, occurs through economy of force

missions. The focus is denying the enemy freedom of action. Both concepts manipulate density of forces and exploit simultaneity of action.

Regulating the density of forces flowing into an area of operations exploits the dichotomy between concentration and dispersion.<sup>60</sup> Increasing the density of friendly units in an area forces the enemy commander to concentrate his forces and react to the threat. Maintaining freedom of action with a concentrated force operating deep within the enemy battlespace denies the enemy those areas, and begins to create a physical barrier between combat forces, command elements and support units. Interposing a concentrated mass where the enemy did not expect decrease the synergy and effectiveness of the enemy force.<sup>61</sup> An example of maneuvering with a concentrated force to avoid the enemy's mass is VII Corps turning movement against the Republican Guard. Conversely, decreasing the density of friendly units by increasing their spatial relationship forces the enemy commander to react to multiple threats in his battlespace. Denying the enemy freedom of action by maximizing contact between units denies the enemy the opportunity to reposition reserves or reinforce his main effort. Economy of force missions accomplishes their purpose by preventing the enemy from synchronizing the effects of his mass, and the main effort contends with fewer enemy forces. Peace enforcement operations in Bosnia used blocking positions at Weapon Storage Sites during times of heightened tension to ensure various factions could not influence events.

Creating a relative superiority at discreet points on the battlefield by regulating the density of friendly forces is insufficient. Designing a campaign plan that addresses the enemy formation in its entirety creates a cumulative effect on the enemy's cybernetic and physical systems. FM 3-0 addresses simultaneity as "employing combat power against the opponents entire system. Army forces concurrently engage multiple decisive points...[that] exploit depth and agility to overwhelm enemy forces."<sup>62</sup>

Simultaneity creates the relationship between decisive and shaping operations. The term, attributed to Soviet theorist in the 1920s and 30s, envisions the enemy as a system that must be attacked throughout its

depth, maximizing contact areas, and causing paralysis of the system.<sup>63</sup> Shimon Naveh wrote that simultaneity imposes four conditions on the enemy. First, it limits enemy maneuver and the synergy between reserves and the forward echelons. Second, retrogrades, counterattacks, and repositioning are disrupted because the planned maneuver areas are occupied by forces in contact. Third, a resourcing dilemma occurs when both front and rear units are expending material, and the physical and mental enemy needed for combat. Finally, the enemy command and control system react to multiple threats in a condensed period.<sup>64</sup> The enemy cannot employ his mass as he wishes, and he cannot protect his decisive points.

Functional dislocation occurs when friendly action significantly degrades an enemy capability.<sup>65</sup> Ineffectiveness is forced upon the opponent through asymmetric action or sensor disruption. Asymmetric action requires an understanding of both friendly and enemy capabilities and vulnerabilities, and how each are further exploited by terrain. Asymmetric action orients toward the physical domain. Sensor disruption seeks to degrade the enemy's ability to understand his environment in a timely and accurate manner. It occurs during a specified period of time that supports the overall concept of the operation. Sensor disruption orients toward the cybernetic domain.

Functional dislocation using asymmetric action occurs when dissimilar weapon systems are used to an advantage, terrain is used to an advantage, or the enemy transitions to a vulnerable formation. In chess, the knight has both a unique capability and vulnerability. He is the only piece that moves over and around other pieces yet is susceptible to attacks on its immediate flanks. Its ability to move indirectly on a cluttered battlefield is a unique strength when positioned correctly. Symmetric engagements (tank vs. tank, infantryman vs. infantryman) negate the inherent strengths and weaknesses of systems, and become a contest of individual skill and technology vice imposing the commander's will on the enemy through superior application of combat power. Functionally similar engagements offer little advantage to either

side, and attrition of systems becomes the only measure of effectiveness.<sup>66</sup> The classical paradigm of victory belonging to the side with bigger battalions occurs.

Asymmetric action occurs by applying the strength of a system or unit against an enemy vulnerability. Light infantry is vulnerable to artillery fire, but artillery pieces in their firing position are vulnerable to an infantry assault. Army aviation can strike any formation on the battlefield, but while grounded is easily damaged by enemy contact. Armor vehicles' direct fire systems can destroy anything for several kilometers, but are vulnerable to a lone infantryman behind it. The goal is to create such an unfair advantage the enemy is incapable of protecting itself. Unfortunately, a thinking and determined enemy will rarely allow this type of engagement to occur. Striking the enemy with dissimilar weapon systems while in a vulnerable formation enhances asymmetric action.

Military formations have been used throughout history to command and control the masses, to increase the effectiveness of firepower, and provide protection via mutual support. The factors that dictate which formation is most appropriate are the enemy situation, the terrain, and the desired movement rate. The type of threat expected – artillery, air, direct fire, hostile crowds – modifies how forces are arrayed in relation to each other. The restrictiveness of terrain expands and contracts the formation's relationship of individuals to the unit, and the unit's ability to fully employ its firepower or protection. Speed balances the urgency for a unit to move between two points within the possibilities of terrain and the risk of enemy contact. Exploiting the vulnerabilities inherent with movement formations adjusting to the threat, terrain, and speed increases the effectiveness of asymmetric action and functional dislocation.

Determining how to dislocate functionally an enemy force through asymmetric attack requires the arrayal of the most appropriate force at a time when the enemy formation is most vulnerable. An enemy artillery unit, augmented with air defense, in its firing position is prepared to shoot counterbattery fire or defend against air attack. However, its organic weapons systems, dispersion, and soldier skills make it extremely vulnerable to an infantry assault. Mechanized or motorized units prefer a wedge formation for

best all around protection and firepower projection, but the nuances of terrain, speed requirements, or being unaware of the threat forces the wedge to contract to a column. Templating where that transition occurs and arraying the optimum weapon systems to take advantage of the formation's vulnerabilities creates the synergy needed for asymmetric action.

Sensor disruption prevents the enemy's cybernetic assets from operating as designed. This occurs through passive and active action. Passive sensor disruption prevents the enemy from understanding the friendly forces in his environment. It seeks to deny him timely and accurate reports of friendly locations, strengths, and intentions. Camouflage varies in sophistication from nets and tree limbs that visually break up outlines, to stealth technology that delay identification. Stealth technology does not render an aircraft invisible, but its small cross section and radar reflective surface make timely detection improbable but not impossible. Operational security conceals friendly intentions and shapes the battlefield through surprise and freedom of action. Active sensor disruption physically prevents the efficient flow of information between nodes. The purpose is to prevent the sensor from cueing a response from another more lethal system. Jamming air-defense radar dishes does not prevent the weapons from firing, but its accuracy is degraded. Influencing communication between observers and shooters does not physically damage the guns, but prevents responsive fires.

A notional vignette that elaborates the potential of functional dislocation is instructive. An enemy rocket battalion is twenty kilometers behind the forward lines of troops, and the enemy reserve brigade is a further fifteen kilometers away. Shaping the battlefield by defeating both units is necessary for the decisive operation. Both possess strong air defense capability and any aviation attacks are high risk-low payoff ventures. Friendly forces conduct an infantry air assault followed by a five-kilometer infiltration to attack the rocket battalion. The enemy commander decides to commit an armor battalion to assist the beleaguered fire support assets. The armor battalion moves in column because speed is essential. Simultaneous to the light infantry assault, friendly attack helicopters depart their staging areas and occupy

an air battle position over watching the road the reserve must use to reach the rocket battalion. Friendly infantry defeat the rocket battalion because the enemy was not prepared to defend against a close in assault. The attack aviation engages the reserve while moving in column and devoid of its air defense. Collection and directional finding intelligence assets detect an increase in radio communication at the maneuver command post and artillery headquarters. Artillery is counter-fired against the command post to eliminate effective command and control, and the artillery headquarters communication is jammed to prevent synchronization of additional fire support assets. The battlefield is shaped for decisive operations.

Robert Leonhard defines temporal dislocation as “rendering an enemy force irrelevant through the manipulation of time,” and is created by situational understanding and tempo.<sup>67</sup> Situational understanding allows the friendly commander to make quantifiable better decisions faster than his opponent, and to eliminate viable counteractions available to the enemy. Action, both friendly and enemy, dictates tempo. Controlling the tempo of operations forces the enemy to react to the commander’s will. In chess, white and black alternate moving one piece at a time. Either side would gain an enormous advantage if they could conduct multiple moves without their opponent’s knowledge. Castling is the only move in chess that contains two separate moves. Castling protects the player’s center of gravity by isolating the king while simultaneously freeing the combat power of the rook for deep attacks. Temporal dislocation not only seeks a time advantage, but to induce a physical condition upon the enemy. Ultimately, temporal dislocation creates an asymmetric advantage by conducting operations against a surprised and unprepared enemy. Tempo is the rate of military action, but is more complex than just a known rate of movement.<sup>68</sup> Tempo contains all the physical actions and cognitive processes that permit military forces to move in a specified direction, act in harmony with other units and events on the battlefield, and sustain themselves at an appropriate level that prevents culmination. Richard Simpkins wrote that tempo is regulated by seven mutually supporting elements: physical mobility, tactical rate of advance, quantity and reliability of information, C3I, times to complete moves, combat support, and logistics.<sup>69</sup> Simply, it is all the action

required to plan, direct, support, and sustain an operation. Practical examples of actions that influence tempo are movement rates, the horizontal and vertical exchange of information, distribution of orders, time for fires to influence the battlefield, and refueling requirements. If the definition of tempo per FM 3-0 is written mathematically it is action over time. This means that the more “actions” a unit conducts over a given time, the greater the tempo. Unfortunately, this is false and proven by substituting refueling operations in lieu of actions. Acceptance of this statement forces a reexamination of the definition of tempo.

Friendly units must conduct numerous actions ranging from rudimentary to the complex that increase the likelihood of success. A thinking and determined enemy wants to dictate the tempo on his terms, and has similar requirements to control and sustain his operation. Ultimately, both friendly and enemy action collides on the battlefield, and a clash of wills and endurance occurs. Translating these myriad acts into manageable portions reveals four distinct categories of action:

1. Friendly actions to conduct continuous operations ( $F_a$ ).
2. Friendly actions in response to enemy operations ( $F_r$ ).
3. Enemy actions to conduct continuous operations ( $E_a$ ).
4. Enemy actions in response to friendly operations ( $E_r$ ).

Mathematically this becomes

$$\text{Tempo} = \frac{(E_a + E_r)}{t} - \frac{(F_a + F_r)}{t}$$

Friendly tempo increases when the enemy is forced to conduct more frequent actions for continuous operations and when forced to react to friendly demands. Conversely, friendly tempo decreases when Simpkins’ seven categories are conducted, or when required to react to enemy action. How does a commander incorporate this theory into his war fighting doctrine and plans?

Rendering an enemy unprepared for operations by manipulating time through temporal dislocation is possible by targeting the four categories of action. Each requires distinctly different methodologies. The simplest category to control is friendly action required for continuous operations ( $F_a$ ). Time spent waiting for information and orders must be decreased, and subordinate initiative encouraged. Command,

control, and communication must be streamlined and possess absolute connectivity to allow both efficient and effective information exchange. This quantifiable better information permits precision in the use of lethal and non-lethal fires, precision maneuver to the most advantageous position, and making decisions faster than the enemy. Reducing the frequency of logistical operations while simultaneously increasing this efficiency is accomplished by decreasing consumption rates and maximizing through put of essential supplies. The endurance needed to conduct continuous operations without being tethered to a static logistical base is imperative. Minimizing friendly reaction ( $F_r$ ) to the enemy begins with denying the enemy information on the friendly situation. Operational security, a robust counter reconnaissance effort, and operational variety to prevent pattern development conceal friendly intentions.

Increasing tempo by increasing the frequency the enemy must act to sustain his operation ( $E_a$ ) is possible by disruption of his cybernetic functions, logistical system, and through information operations. Deception, electronic attack, and psychological operations all target the human leadership and decision-making process of the adversary. The goal is to create doubt in the commander's mind, and to force him to work harder at controlling his unit. Increasing tempo by conducting offensive action throughout the enemy battlespace in time and geography force the enemy to react multiple, simultaneous problems ( $E_r$ ). Overloading the enemy command and control structure with numerous threats to his critical assets forces him to act. Dictating enemy action allows commanders to shape the battlefield conditions and create opportunities for decisive operations.

Moral dislocation seeks to accelerate the enemy's culmination by breaking his will and convincing him that further resistance is futile. The enemy no longer has the desire to continue the struggle and he capitulates.<sup>70</sup> A combination of rapid maneuver that imbalances the enemy, information superiority that denies the enemy knowledge of friendly plans while simultaneously exploiting the enemy's plans, and tempo that denies the enemy time to react accelerates culmination. Liddell Hart wrote, "Psychological dislocation fundamental springs from the sense of being trapped."<sup>71</sup> In chess, a player yields when he

realizes his material disadvantage is insurmountable, or his opponent has a superior position and nothing can be done. Check mate is inevitable. The challenge commander's face with operations directed at the enemy's moral domain is an inability to quantifiably measure progress or results. Clausewitz concluded that material and moral elements were woven together, but difficult to predict. Increases and decreases in the moral domain could be felt, but not classified.<sup>72</sup> Using the moral dislocation of the enemy to shape the battlefield requires the commander to understand the key components that strengthen the moral domain, and how to use that knowledge to accelerate the enemy's moral collapse.

Ardant du Picq's theoretical writings focused on the moral domain of individuals and units. His thesis was that technological changes through the ages increased the lethality of weapons, but "one thing does not change, the heart of man."<sup>73</sup> His study centered on discovering what made men fight or flee in the face of the enemy, and how leaders could enhance a soldier's performance. He concluded that a fundamental requirement was the development of doctrine that provided organization and structure to the army, unity of effort between individuals and units, and discipline within the ranks.<sup>74</sup> Understanding doctrine throughout the ranks minimized fear and uncertainty. Central to du Picq's argument is the concept of mutual surveillance.<sup>75</sup> Men remained in position and fought because their peers and leaders could physically see them. Individuals and units continue to fight if they feel, either physically or cognitively, they are not alone and their flanks are protected. Nineteenth century advances in range, accuracy, and rate of fire for artillery and infantry weapons forced the dispersion of units, and hindered the leader's ability to control formations, and individuals to know where their commander was located. Leaders maintaining command of their organization by their ability to effectively control their actions, combined with subordinates who understand their spatial relationship with adjacent units, prevents the feeling of isolation and minimizes the desire to flee in the face of the enemy.

S.L.A. Marshall's post-battle interviews during the Second World War, Korea, and Vietnam continued du Picq's investigation into the moral domain. Marshall elaborated on the concept of mutual

surveillance and discovered that individuals were less likely to fire their weapons than soldiers who operated crew served weapons. The training and discipline required to operate as part of a team increased the effectiveness of individuals. His interviews with survivors of retreats, and of commanders who received remnants of units concluded new individuals did little to help the organization, but when integrated by crews, squads, and platoons fought effectively.<sup>76</sup> The linchpin to an effective unit is not the skill of the individual, but the mutual support provided by an experienced team. Marshall also wrote of the paramount importance information and situational understanding had on the performance of soldiers in combat, “It is information which will enable the unity of strength....Strength will multiply and decisive action will become possible at the rate information flows to all concerned.”<sup>77</sup> Marshall’s analysis of information flow focused not on the vertical passage of information to higher headquarters, but the lack of situational understanding between adjacent units in an engagement. Specifically, the location and situation of flank units, and the status of support units created an environment where units felt part of a larger organization, and prepared for greater action. Information enabled better control, and permitted leaders to make quantifiably better decisions because they possessed an accurate picture of the battlefield.

If the components of the moral domain consist of a doctrine that creates mutually supporting teams, information that flows vertical and horizontally to prevent the feeling of isolation, and situational understanding that allows rational decisions based on fact, than how does a commander dislocate the enemy’s moral?

Moral dislocation is not theoretical alchemy that promises bloodless battles, but the use of combat power that suddenly places the enemy commander in a difficult and unexpected position. FM 3-0 defines surprise as “striking the enemy at a time or place or manner for which he is unprepared...Factors contributing to surprise include speed, information superiority, and asymmetry.”<sup>78</sup> Surprise is gained by delaying detection of friendly forces, and once detected accelerating the tempo of operations.<sup>79</sup> The psychological impact of surprise exponentially increases with the increased importance the enemy places

on the threatened area. Rear and flank attacks heighten the enemy's anxiety by isolating forces from their lines of communication and adjacent units. Action directed at communication nodes and headquarters elements interdict the vertical and horizontal information flow, and decreases the enemy's ability to understand his environment through factual reports, or control his units to respond to new or imagined threats. Determining the timing of the surprise is as important as choosing the location. Clausewitz believed that blows against the enemy flanks and rear were most effective when conducted late in the engagement. The enemy's cybernetic functions are at their peak at the beginning of the battle, and the cumulative effects of friction and the fog of war increase the effectiveness of surprise blows.<sup>80</sup>

Clausewitz, du Picq, and Marshall agree that the timely and precise introduction of a fresh reserve to the engagement accelerated the enemy's moral collapse.<sup>81</sup> Commitment of reserves exploits success and potentially turns a tactical win into a decisive victory. Fresh units capable of pursuit sustain friendly momentum, and force the enemy to operate in an unforeseen manner. Early commitment of the enemy reserve leaves him with few options or forces capable of influencing the battlefield. FM 3-0 considers the size and location of the reserve a shaping operation that becomes part of the decisive operation once committed.<sup>82</sup>

du Picq wrote, "Moral effect inspires fear. Fear must be changed to terror in order to vanquish."<sup>83</sup> and aptly explains the brutal reality of the modern battlefield. Moral dislocation occurs when the threat is either perceived or actual, but must possess a sense of permanence. FM 3-0 states that surprise is "only a temporary combat multiplier" and the highly lethal effect of artillery, air power, and precision guided munitions are temporally finite. The threat the enemy perceives must be tangible and always present, and only ground maneuver forces produce that effect. Operation ALLIED FORCE consisted of a seventy-eight day air campaign that endured minimum flight ceilings that protected pilots, and a crafty enemy who hid his vulnerable armor force inside urban areas. Serbian forces respected, but never feared allied air power, and the absence of a credible ground threat allowed them to endure the

temporary discomfort of bombing. Serbian forces never lost their mutual support, felt isolated, or devoid of information. Moral dislocation requires the “up close, personal, and brutal”<sup>84</sup> ability of Army units to force the enemy into submission.

Dislocation theory seeks to gain a marked advantage over the enemy, and shape the battlefield for decisive operations. This theory does not focus on the destruction of the enemy as the sole means to achieve the desired ends, but provides an alternative to overwhelming firepower. The IBCT’s mission profile anticipates its use in Small Scale Contingency operations that vary in scope from peace operations to deterrence missions, and demands that its leaders possess the cognitive ability to apply force commensurate with the situation. Combining dislocation theory with the unique force structure and advanced technology in the IBCT presents leaders with an opportunity to shift from a Cold War mind set to a mental model that encompasses the entire spectrum of conflict,

## **V. The IBCT and Dislocation Theory**

*Leaders in the IBCT will have to understand a new way to fight and be motivated to fight that way to provide the adaptability and versatility the Organization and Operational*

*concept demands.*<sup>85</sup>

- Major General James Dubik  
*TRADOC Deputy Commanding General for Transformation*

All indicators point toward the nation's future threats ranging from an authoritarian regime striving for a regional hegemony, rogue actors denying freedom to oppressed people, to a weather-related catastrophe causing suffering amongst an ally. Appropriately, the IBCT's strategic responsiveness ranges from acting as the initial entry force that demonstrates U.S. commitment until legacy forces arrive, to peace operations. The Army's Cold War legacy forces remain the best in the world, but their usefulness has been questioned for nearly a decade. A replacement peer competitor is not foreseen for another decade. Ten years seems brief in the Army's two hundred plus years of service, but immense changes can occur in short periods. The technological revolution of the 1990s is comparable to the changes that occurred between FDR's first term and his last. The Depression was ending in 1935; the greatest war the earth had ever experienced ended with atomic weapons in 1945. Leaders capable of adapting to new and unforeseen situations require a broader and deeper knowledge base to understand their situation, accomplish their mission, and preserve the nation's treasure. The purpose of this section is to investigate how the IBCT could use dislocation theory to shape the battlefield for decisive operations.

Positional dislocation seeks to prevent the enemy from using all or part of his force as planned. Central to this theory is discerning the decisive point in relation to the enemy's force. Avoiding his mass or preventing his mass from interfering with the decisive point all require similar attributes. First, the enemy's location and disposition must be known. Understanding the enemy set allows the commander to design an operation that exploits positions of advantage or prevent mutual support. Second, subordinates must possess a common operating picture that enhances their understanding of the friendly purpose, and how conditions and situations evolve over time. Finally, the friendly force needs a mobility superior than the enemy. Speed, endurance, and survivability are attributes that influence mobility and freedom of action.

The Army envisions the IBCT's area of operations to be 2500 square kilometers.<sup>86</sup> That volume of battlespace and the need to understand the environment requires a comprehensive and redundant reconnaissance effort. The IBCT's Reconnaissance, Surveillance, Targeting, and Acquisition (RSTA) Squadron combines traditional cavalry operations with enhanced technological systems and diverse military specialties. Knowing the location of the enemy is not the RSTA squadron's sole focus, but non-military factors such as political, cultural, economic, and demographic factors are also collected to provide the commander a richer mosaic to base decisions. Its ability to integrate intelligence gathered from soldiers, unmanned aerial vehicles, and echelons above the IBCT, provide the commander a greater understanding of his environment. These assets, more effective in urban terrain where contact with civilians is sought not feared, uses human sources, counter intelligence, and civil affairs specialist that are far more effective in a SSC in gathering "grass roots" information than legacy ground based sensors.<sup>87</sup> A challenge that the IBCT commander faces in a SSC is not only determining where the enemy is located and what are his potential courses of action, but also determining what constitutes the enemy force. Key leaders, hostile crowds, and uninformed civilians each possibly fit into that category. Fortunately, the intent of positional dislocation remains the same: shaping the battlefield by preventing a portion of the enemy's force from influencing the decisive point.

The IBCT's three maneuver battalions are designed to exploit the intelligence gathered by the brigade's reconnaissance assets. Combined arms companies have assigned mortars and a robust infantry capability. This combination of capabilities gives platoon-sized elements the lethality and self support necessary to conduct distributed operations across the brigade battlespace. Adjusting the number of platoons and companies focused in a specific area of operations varies density. The maxim of marching separately, but fighting united concentrates platoons and companies from divergent areas to specific points of advantage. Maintaining divergent routes and simultaneously executing economy of force type missions

maximizes the amount of enemy forces in contact, and begins to isolate the battlefield for the decisive operation.

Gathering information and regulating the density of friendly forces on the battlefield cannot exploit the brigade's full potential unless every subordinate has a common operating picture (COP). FM 3-0 defines COP as "an operational picture tailored to the users requirement, based on common data, and information shared by more than one command,"<sup>88</sup> and is far more than friendly and enemy grid coordinates. A critical component of maintaining a COP is soldiers having an intimate understanding of the Commanders Critical Information Requirements. Soldiers must understand how specific enemy actions cause the commander to make decisions, what information must be protected to maintain freedom of action, and how the ever evolving friendly situation impacts on future operations and purpose based missions. This complex process requires graduate level analysis and application, and is only achieved through focused training at the lowest levels.

Positional dislocation of enemy forces in depth requires velocity, endurance, and survivability. Minimum time spent waiting for information, supplies, or proper conditions begins to reduce time spent waiting. The reduced platform size and weight permits intra-theater mobility via C130 airplanes providing the Joint Force Commander an operational mobility exceeding legacy forces.<sup>89</sup> The IBCT Organizational and Operational concept acknowledges that survivability is a challenge, and intends to meet these challenges through a:

... holistic application of a variety of capabilities including early warning, situational understanding, the avoidance of surprise, deception, rapid mobility, signature control, non-templatable operations, avoidance of enemy fires, mutual support, use of cover and concealment, and the implementation of innovative tactics techniques and procedures.<sup>90</sup>

These statements taken individually have been the goals of military forces for centuries. Making each a necessity to ensure survivability is a difficult task. An additional concern in this organization is its scarcity of engineers and mine detection/mine clearing equipment. A few well-placed mines deny the mobility necessary to conduct distributed operations.

The IBCT is well suited to dislocate functionally an enemy. Degrading an enemy capability through asymmetric action takes advantage of the organizations combined arms companies and its ability to understand its environment. Legacy forces made contact with the enemy developed the situation in contact, then conducted decisive fire and maneuver to defeat the enemy. The IBCT's C4ISR capabilities allows it to develop the situation out of contact, array friendly units in the optimum locations with the best weapon systems, and then initiate contact at a time and place of its choosing.<sup>91</sup> The combined arms companies attack the enemy with a variety of direct and indirect systems. These systems, internetted down to company level, provide a "point and shoot" link between maneuver and firepower based forces permitting precisions engagements.<sup>92</sup> Choosing the location of the engagement enhances the weapon systems capabilities by exploiting terrain and its effects on the enemy's formation. In a SSC, these combined arms companies provide the commander an assortment of systems that can escalate the use of force commensurate with the situation. The robust infantry capability provides the commander sufficient soldiers on the ground to dominate key terrain in an urban center. However, weaponsystems alone are insufficient. Shaping the SSC environment through asymmetric action requires a holistic approach. Degrading the enemy through Information Operations using media, public affairs, and negotiations de-emphasizes the use of force on both sides and increase the stability of the environment.

The IBCT force structure demands a high degree of passive sensor disruption, but possesses a limited capability for active sensor disruption. Its survivability limitations require stealth, camouflage, dispersion, and operational security to prevent enemy acquisition and targeting. Its electronic sensors can conduct limited collection on enemy communication, but must use the reach back capability of the Military Intelligence Company and S2 cell to coordinate active sensor disruption. However, active sensor disruption is not limited to electronic systems, but includes targeting the man in the loop. Information operations that actively seek to distort enemy data collection using deception, psychological operations, and

public affairs influences the adversaries perceptions, isolates leaders from their power base, and present confusing information that delay the enemy commander's decisions.

The IBCT's use of temporal dislocation to manipulate time is centered on the brigades advanced C4ISR resources. The commander has the ability to make better decisions faster than the enemy does. Gaining a situational understanding permits the commander to adjust the tempo of operations to suit his concept of operations and desynchronize the enemy plan. Controlling the tempo by streamlining friendly operations, preventing the enemy from disrupting operations, forcing the enemy to work harder at controlling his environment, and overloading the enemy's command and control by forcing him to react to simultaneous problems all create favorable conditions and tempo.

Streamlining friendly action through collaborative planning reduces the time required to plan and disseminate orders, increase the coordination between command levels, and produces a higher quality order. The process begins with understanding the current friendly and enemy situation. The IBCT's proposed C4ISR suite of linked systems allows commanders and staffs to spend less time gathering the status of their units and more time focused on the execution of the current plan and shaping future operations.<sup>93</sup> Electronic decision making tools facilitate virtual staffing between non-contiguous command posts and agencies. This commander centric process focuses on the information he needs to make timely and accurate decisions. Video teleconferencing and "white board" technology allow several levels of command to participate in the planning process, reduce time spent developing plans, and increasing the input of subordinates.<sup>94</sup> The commander, the most experienced and skilled leader in the unit, becomes a virtual liaison officer if he desires. Collaborative planning and continuous updates increases the fidelity of the plan by providing more accurate and timely information increasing the precision of the soldiers.

Reducing time spent needing, waiting for, or conducting logistical operations increases friendly tempo. The C4ISR system that enables collaborative planning also provides detailed information on the logistical status of friendly combat forces, logistical units, and assets located outside the theater.

Connectivity between users and providers allows logistical leaders to accurately anticipate requirements. On board sensors provide total assets visibility of classes of supply facilitating dynamic tasking and prioritization of assets.<sup>95</sup> However, the smaller logistical footprint requires a more agile system, and the responsiveness needed for strategic relevance limits the quantity, but not quality of the IBCT logistical system. The reduced sustainment needs creates a proportional reduction in logistical footprint creating a tension between requirements and capacity. Additionally, austere operational environments potentially limit the host nation support available. Intra-theater aircraft and army aviation resupply enhance the brigade's organic assets, and enable non-contiguous operations throughout the depth of the area of operation.

Temporally dislocating the enemy by increasing the number of tasks he must execute to conduct continuous operations targets his cybernetic and logistical systems. Degrading the enemy command and control structure that supports his cybernetic functions targets what information the enemy is receiving. Disrupting enemy communication encompasses jamming of transmissions and physical destruction of command posts, antennas, and facilities. Broadening this destruction from the tactical to strategic level limits the enemy's ability to use television, radio, and print media for negative propaganda. Influencing the information the enemy receives by providing false and misleading facts distort the enemy read of the battlefield. Practicing operational security that denies the enemy information on friendly locations and intentions, forces him to commit greater assets to understand his environment, and delays his ability to deliver a decisive blow.

Forcing the enemy to commit resources in vain also creates a negative tempo for the enemy. Reconnaissance assets that detect enemy intentions and friendly decisions that position forces to avoid its effects cause the enemy to expend greater resources with minimal reward. Decreasing the enemy precision through unpredictable patterns of operation, and a reduced signature of unit areas and command posts decrease the likelihood of successful enemy attacks. Information operations that favorably

manipulate civilian sentiments, increases the friendly intelligence gathering process while simultaneously denying it to the enemy.

The IBCT's high tempo and action oriented operations induce complexity and confusion into the enemy plans, and begin to physically and psychologically imbalance his operation. These are the initial steps to moral dislocation. Conducting operations against an unready enemy or that he cannot react to in a timely manner creates surprise. FM 3-0 cites speed, information superiority, and asymmetry, as key factors contributing to surprise.<sup>96</sup> The goal is to gain a temporary advantage over the enemy by conducting operation in an unexpected area, react faster than the enemy thought possible, or possessing greater combat power than the enemy anticipated. Surprising the enemy requires the IBCT's reconnaissance assets to gain accurate information allowing the commander to understand his environment. The collaborative planning tools in the IBCT command post create opportunities for hasty planning conferences and issuance of new orders. Internetted communication links to company level permit the new orders to immediately reach the executing units. The logistical systems flexibility enabled by on board sensors and enroute retasking systems gives subordinates the operational reach to execute no notice, opportunistic missions. Finally, the combined arms platoons and companies possess the operational endurance, organic systems, and common operating picture tools to accept new missions in a dynamic environment.

Combining the IBCT's superior mobility and situational understanding permits distributed operations throughout the depth of the enemy battlespace. Threatening the enemy's rear areas disrupts his lines of communication, and reduces his ability to sustain his operation. Separating forward units from their support base begins to create the feeling of isolation necessary for moral dislocation. Distributed operations directed against the enemy's tactical and operational reserve deny the enemy commander his primary tool to influence the battle, and begin to eliminate viable courses of action. Operations conducted in the enemy rear area also deny the enemy maneuver space to accomplish withdrawals that trade space

for time. Actions directed against the flanks of adjacent units prevents mutual support, potentially interdicts lateral communication, and decreases the confidence level enemy soldiers have in their higher headquarters.

Situational understanding provided by the C4ISR suite enables platoons and companies to dominate a geographically greater battlespace than legacy forces. Fewer units committed to the initial shaping operations present the opportunity for each level of command to maintain a reserve. These reserves give the commander a tool to exploit unforeseen opportunities or successes; increase the density of forces conducting decisive maneuver; overwhelm the enemy with the introduction of fresh forces; and maintain the endurance to conduct continuous operations, exploitations, or pursuits.<sup>97</sup>

Combining the IBCT force structure with dislocation theory reveals several themes common to all four components. First, the IBCT must gain and maintain situational understanding of their environment. Survivability constraints limit the volume and duration of enemy firepower it can withstand, and its austere logistical system can ill afford friction. The brigade cannot afford to be surprised. Second, the IBCT must ensure that the situational understanding gained by its various sources is collected, processed, and transformed into pertinent intelligence. This intelligence cannot remain in the main command post, but passed to the lowest levels ensuring soldiers have a common operating picture. Third, the IBCT must operate at a tempo significantly greater than the enemy must. Its strategic responsiveness requirement mandates that it immediately begins shaping the theater commanders battlespace, yet judiciously employ lethal means. Deterrence through precise application of combat potential, not destruction through firepower is needed. Finally, the IBCT must conduct small unit, decentralized operations. Its most likely employment scenario is urban and complex terrain. Its predicted area of operations is both large and probably non-contiguous. The training of platoon sized elements to operate in a dynamic and isolated environment requires the initiative of junior leaders, and the confidence and support of commanders.

## **VI. Conclusion**

*The Army's deployment is the surest sign of America's commitment to accomplishing any mission that occurs on land.*<sup>98</sup>

- General Eric K. Shinseki  
U.S. Army Chief of Staff

The dawn of the new millennium ushers in a world full of promise, but fraught with potential danger. Technological advances in computers, communication, and information exchange has solidified relations between some states, yet increased the differences between first and third world nations. This tension created by an international caste system makes the world a complicated and violent place. Nations attempting to improve their standing through force creates a multi-faceted but faceless enemy. The Army must change to meet these smaller, but no less lethal threats. The Army's relevance in this ambiguous and dynamic environment is based on its ability to solve national security problems. Historians will judge the effectiveness of Army transformation after its first test. If wrong, the wager lost is measured in soldiers' lives and the nation's security. The IBCT mission and probable environment is time sensitive and result oriented with few opportunities for second chances. Clausewitz scoffed at the notion of bloodless engagements, but Small Scale Contingency operations demand that battle.<sup>99</sup> Opponents of maneuver warfare theory claim that the promise of rapid victories fails in decisive combat. They are probably correct. The usefulness of dislocation theory resides in its ability to shape the battlefield to establish conditions before decisive combat, with the application of force situationally dependent. The purpose of this section is to frame the discussion of dislocation theory and the IBCT within the context provided by Dr. James Schneider's criteria of assessing the reliability of a theory.

First, the study of dislocation theory helps the commander *explain* how subordinates are nested in the overall concept of operations by creating a shared understanding on what must occur. Theory assists in the recognition of similarities and patterns occurring in a dynamic environment, and helps leaders develop practical solutions to problems. Understanding how to think about war vice what to think develops the internal warfighting style of leaders. Sharing this mental picture of the battlefield promotes initiative within the confines of the commander's intent. Corbett's writings focused on the action of the Royal Navy, but are applicable to the IBCT. Non-contiguous operations were the norm for British sailors, and expected of the IBCT. Distributed operations, fundamental to positional dislocation, are possible when subordinates understand how their action relates to the overall scheme of maneuver. Generating this common operating picture is the IBCT's suite of C4ISR systems. Subordinates monitoring the action of their flank and higher units accept friction and chance in their problem solving process, but use initiative to remain nested with the overall concept. Execution-centric processes such as collaborative planning permits higher tempo operations and the opportunity to temporally dislocate the enemy. Operations within a battlespace larger than legacy forces limit the commander's ability to influence events solely by his presence. Gaining situational understanding, and shaping the battlefield through a common operating picture permits the geographical isolation of units, but allows them to maintain the cognitive awareness of mutual support.

Second, dislocation theory is a useful tool to *solve* the challenge of the use of force in a Small Scale Contingency because it does not rely on firepower and destruction to achieve its purpose. Michael Howard's notions of the subtle dangers that persist during an "age of peace" provide a suitable context to explore Army transformation. The lack of peer competitors is not synonymous with an absence of threats to our nation's security. Doctrine provides the structure that connects the cognitive purpose of theory with the reality of procedures. Doctrine is influenced by political decisions, the perceived threat, and technological innovation, but it is theory that provides the perspective to view these factors. The nation's

leaders view the Army as a tool to achieve political objectives, and these objectives span the spectrum of conflict. Dislocation theory provides a cognitive process flexible enough to operate in stability, support, or higher spectrum conflicts. Its founding premise resides in arraying forces at points of domination that limit the enemy's options, systems, action times, or soldier confidence. Deterrence and coercion is created by the capacity to escalate force, not the use of force from the beginning. The IBCT force structure supports the flexibility inherent in dislocation theory by providing a mix of combat forces, intelligence collection, civil affairs, and psychological operations units. Understanding both military and non-military factors permits the IBCT commander to craft the appropriate response. The paramount requirement of understanding the environment depends on the synergy between well-trained soldiers and technological advances.

Third, dislocation theory assists IBCT leaders in *analyzing* their situation, and applying combat power at decisive points by separating a complex battlefield into manageable parts. Applying the components of dislocation theory to create effects against specific portions of the enemy force focuses units, their purpose, and limited resources. A synergy between ends, ways, and means occurs with ends being the effect on the enemy, ways being the type of dislocation, and means created by the IBCT's unique systems. Functional dislocation requires commanders to consider enemy capabilities, when they are most vulnerable, and what friendly system is most appropriate. The IBCT's ability to array forces out of contact amplifies the goal of creating an asymmetric advantage. Temporal dislocation requires a comparison of friendly to enemy operations, and determining what actions are necessary to create a tempo that the enemy is unable to maintain. The mobility and communication packages provide the IBCT an opportunity to conduct decentralized operations. The mental model of numerous platoon-sized elements conducting distributed operation using the principles of density and simultaneity maximize the main efforts decisive operation.

Fourth, dislocation theory assist the IBCT commander in *visualizing* how he intends to shape the battlefield by emphasizing the relationship between enemy and friendly forces, each sides strength and vulnerabilities, and how the effects created by friendly action contribute to the decisive operation. The commanders conception begins with sharing a common understanding of the current situation, what the desired end state looks like, and what enemy capabilities must be changed to maximize friendly operations. It is in the arena of changing the enemy that dislocation theory flourishes. Moral dislocation accelerates the enemy culmination and will to fight by inducing physical change on his system: isolation of units, denying mutual support, and introduction of fresh reserves to exploit opportunities. FM 3-0 reminds leaders that tempo is useful only when discussed relative to the enemy. Describing how to create a temporal advantage by inducing friction in the enemy system while simultaneously protecting friendly operations illustrates to subordinates how their actions contribute to the overall objectives. The mental model created by commanders seeking to achieve an asymmetric advantage cannot occur solely by “white board technology” and greater bandwidth, but rather superiors and subordinates sharing a common picture of how individual actions are nested within a complete scheme of operations.

Fifth, dislocation theory allows subordinates to *anticipate* changes by creating a common culture among leaders and subordinates. Dynamic environments demand rapid decisions making, and improving the accuracy of those decisions is possible when leaders have a shared understanding, proactively seek information, and use their initiative. Dislocation theory creates a common understanding because it is an information-based theory, and is successful when the enemy disposition is known, the enemy systems are understood, or what stimulus will most effectively disrupt his organization. A continuous cycle of determining what information is important, and sharing that information throughout the organization creates mutual understanding between command levels. That situational understanding permits proactive operations. Dislocation theory also embraces the ideal of a dynamic enemy parrying friendly action. Functional dislocation creates a tension in the enemy decision process by sensor disruption that denies or

distorts information, or targeting a formation that the enemy will transition to in the future. Positional dislocation that denies the enemy freedom of action is focused not where he is presently located, but preventing him from moving to a point of advantage. Understanding what future conditions must occur, and relating friendly actions to creating or denying those possibilities is the essence of dislocation theory, and possible only through initiative and a common vision.

Examining the purpose of theory revealed that it forms the basis of the military education system. Theory with history provides the context and granularity to consider how similar complex situations could be solved. Leader development, central to MG Dubik's vision of Army Transformation, builds individuals who apply the fundamental truths of war to an ever-changing situation. Leaders build a skill set that shapes their personalities. Similar to an orchestra, subordinates recognize the subtle movements, anticipate requirements and decisions, and prepare themselves for the next action. Initiative is built by knowing what the leader would do if he were present combined with unhesitating execution in his absence. Multiple subordinates acting in harmony with the leader occurs only with a shared culture confident in each other's skills and capabilities, created through an exacting and demanding training regime.

U.S. Army doctrine exists within the tension between the external factors of political decisions, threat, and technology, and internal factors of how of how the Army fights. Political decisions direct where the Army fights, and usually results in a less than ideal location or enemy. It is unlikely that the Army's next battle will occur in a first world nation.<sup>100</sup> Weak or non-existent infrastructure, a challenging environment, and an adaptive enemy will be the norm. The enemy, realizing a fair fight with U.S. forces is not in his best interests, will use asymmetric means to delay the final decision in the hope that public and political support wanes. Doctrine must embrace technological changes, but never rank it higher than the skill of leaders and soldiers. Recent events in Kosovo proved that mock tanks and burning tires could still fool a dazzling suite of sensors. Cheap, off-the-shelf technology can interfere with acutely sensitive systems, degrading the effectiveness of smart weapons. The ultimate dumb weapon, the pressure land

mine, exists by the million in the worlds trouble spots, costs only dollars to manufacture, and causes any vehicle to stop.

FM 3-0 embraces the traditions of the Army, but faces the threats of the twenty-first century with bold new concepts. The threat has become less definable in the last two decades. The Army's mission has changed from the bipolar world of defeating a Soviet horde on the plains of Western Europe to regional security, peace operations, and humanitarian relief. All are less definable, less predictable, and have no clear solutions. This nebulous, violent, and complex world demands a force capable of decentralized operations down to platoon level in a non-contiguous environment.<sup>101</sup> The vast increase in battlespace and the pace of events requires a force that exploits every opportunity through situational understanding. Major theaters of war, by far the most lethal, are also the least likely. Firepower dominance must be maintained as a guarantor of force, but information dominance becomes more useful in shaping the battlefield. Freedom of action, the ability to dominate battlespace by positioning forces that exploit every advantage while simultaneously denying the enemy to complete his plans requires decentralized units operating under a common vision and plan. Initiative, not battle drills, driven by knowing the friendly situation and how each is nested by purpose is key.

General Shinseki's vision statement places the national treasure – the men and women of the armed forces – first in his priority. Well-trained, thinking, adaptive leaders are the critical component to Army transformation.<sup>102</sup> Metanoia, the fundamental transformation of mind or character, is needed to complete the Army's march toward the IBCT and Objective Force. Dislocation theory alone cannot create well-trained units capable of success in all missions. Its potential lies in its ability to understand how to shape the battlefield for decisive operations. Combining dislocation theory and the IBCT's force structure and mission profile reveals an exciting and potentially productive way of thinking and executing warfighting missions.

## *Bibliography*

### *Government Publications*

Department of the Army. *Field Manual 3-0, Operations*. Washington, DC: DRAG Edition, June 2000.

\_\_\_\_\_. *The Interim Brigade Combat Team Organizational and Operational Concept*  
Washington DC, 18 April 2000.

Department of the Army. Training and Doctrine Command Pamphlet 525-5, *Force XXI Operations: A Concept for the Evolution of Full Dimensional Operations for the Strategic Army of the Early Twenty First Century*. Fort Monroe, Virginia, September 2000 (DRAFT).

Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Vision 2020: The American Military Preparing for Tomorrow*.  
Washington,  
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2000.

### *Articles*

Bulloch, Gavin. "Military Doctrine and Counter Insurgency: A British Perspective." *Parameters* (Summer 1996): 4-16.

Downing, Colonel Wayne A. "Firepower, Attrition, Maneuver – US Army Operations Doctrine: A Challenge to the 1980's and Beyond." *Military Review* (Reprinted, January 1997): 144-150

Gattuso, Commander Joseph A. "Warfare Theory." *Naval War College Review* (Autumn 1996): 112-122.

Goulding, Vincent J. "From Chancelorville to Kosovo: Forgetting the Art of War." *Parameters* (Summer 2000): 4-18.

Hooker, Lieutenant Colonel Richard D. "Theory and Doctrine in Twenty First Century Land Warfare." *Military Review* (March 2000): 85-87.

Howard, Michael. "Military Science in the Age of Peace." *Journal of the Royal United Services Institute for Defense Studies* (March 1974): 3-11.

Leonhard, Robert L. "Force XXI and the Theory of Winning Outnumbered." *Army Magazine* (June 1976): 56-64.

\_\_\_\_\_. "The Death of Mission Tactics." *Army Magazine* (July 1994): 15-19.

Starry, Donn "To Change an Army." *Military Review* (March 1983): 20-27.

Tooke, Lieutenant Colonel Lamar. "Blending Maneuver and Attrition." *Military Review* (March

2000): 7-13.

Wass de Czege, Huba. "How to Change an Army." *Military Review* (November 1984): 32-49.

### *Books*

Bateman, Robert L. *Digital War: A View from the Front Lines*. Novato, California: Presidio Press, 1999.

Bellamy, Christopher. *The Evolution of Modern Land Warfare: Theory and Practice*. New York, New York: Routledge, 1990.

Clausewitz, Carl von. *On War*, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984.

Corbett, Julian S. *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy*. London, England: Longman, Green and Co, 1911; reprinted Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1988.

Crevald, Martin Van. *Command in War*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1985.

\_\_\_\_\_. *The Transformation of War*. New York, New York: The Free Press, 1991.

D'Estes, Carlo. *Patton: A Genius for War*. New York, New York: Harper Collins, 1996.

du Picq, Ardant. "Battle Studies: Ancient and Modern Battle," trans. John N. Greely and Robert C. Cotton in *Roots of Strategy Book*. Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: Stackpole Books, 1987.

Dupuy, Trevor N. *Understanding War: History and Theory of Combat*. New York, New York: Paragon House Publishers, 1987.

Fuller, J.F.C. *The Conduct of War 1789-1961*. 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. New York, New York: DeCappo Press, 1992.

Hooker, Richard. *Maneuver Warfare: An Anthology*. Novato, California: Presidio Press, 1993.

Jomini, Antoine H. "Summary of the Art of War." ed. J. D. Hittle. *Roots of Strategy Book 2*. Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: Stackpole Books, 1987.

Keegan, John. *A History of Warfare*. New York, New York: Vintage Books, 1993.

Leonhard, Robert R. *The Art of Maneuver Warfare*. Novato, California.: Presidio Press, 1991.

\_\_\_\_\_. *Fighting By Minutes: Time and the Art of War*. Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Publishers, 1994

Liddell Hart, Basil H. *Strategy*. New York, New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1968.

- Lind, William S. *Maneuver Warfare Handbook*. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1985.
- Luttwak, Edward N. *Strategy and History: Collected Essays Volume 2*. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Books, 1985.
- Marshall, S.L.A. *Men against Fire: The Problem of Battle Command in Future War*, 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition  
Glouster, Massachusetts: Peter Smith Publishing, 1978.
- Naveh, Shimon. *In Pursuit of Military Excellence: The Evolution of Operational Theory*. Portland, Oregon: Frank Cass Publishers, 1997.
- Puryear, Edgar Jr. *19 Stars: A Study in Military Character and Leadership*. Novato, California, 1971.
- Schneider, James J. *The Structure of Strategic Revolution*. Novato, California: Presidio Press, 1994.
- Senge, Peter M. *The Fifth Discipline: The Art and Practice of a Learning Organization*. New York, New York: Currency Doubleday, 1994.
- Simpkins, Richard E. *Race to the Swift: Thoughts on Twenty-First Century Warfare*. 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. London, England: Brassey Defense Publishing, 1986.
- Webster's Third International Dictionary*. Springfield Massachusetts: G and C Merriam Company, 1976.

### *Papers*

- Doughty, Major Robert A. *The Evolution of U.S. Army Tactical Doctrine 1946-76*. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, August 1979.
- Funk, David E. *Tactical Dislocation: Force XXI Doctrine or Just Another Pretty Theory?* Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: School of Advance Military Studies, US Army Command and Staff College, 1998.
- Herbert, Major Paul. *Deciding What Has to be Done: General William Dupuy and the 1976 Edition of FM 100-5, Operations*. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and Staff College, 1988.
- Schneider, James J. *How War Works: The Origins, Nature and Purpose of Military Theory*. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and Staff College, 1995.

Schneider, James J. *Cyber Shock: Cybernetic Paralysis as a New Form of Warfare*. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and Staff College, 1995.

Swain, Dr. Richard M. “*Filling the Void: The Operational Art and the US Army*” Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and Staff College, Undated.

---

<sup>1</sup> Webster’s, *Third International Dictionary* (Springfield, Massachusetts: G and C Merriam Company, 1976), 972.

<sup>2</sup> Alfred Thayer Mahan, *Naval Strategy Compared to the Principle of Operations on Land* (London, England: Sampson, Low, Master, 1911), quoted in Richard Simpkins, *Race to the Swift: Thoughts on Twenty-First Century Warfare* (New York, New York: Brassey’s Defense, 1985), 141.

<sup>3</sup> *Interim Brigade Combat Team* is the name assigned to the force that leads the Army through Transformation to the Objective Force. The first two brigades undergoing Transformation are stationed at Fort Lewis, Washington and are designated the *Initial Brigades*. Department of the Army, *The Interim Brigade Combat Team Organizational and Operational Concept* (Washington, DC: Version 4.0, 18 April 2000), 5.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, 12.

<sup>5</sup> James J Schneider, *How War Works: The Origins, Nature, and Purposes of Military Theory* (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: School of Advanced Military Studies, US Army Command and Staff College, 1995), 7.

<sup>6</sup> Richard Hooker, “Theory and Doctrine in the Twenty First Century,” *Military Review* (March 2000): 85.

<sup>7</sup> Webster’s *Third International Dictionary* (Springfield, Massachusetts: Merriam Company), 666.

<sup>8</sup> Department of the Army, *Field Manual 3-0, Operations*, (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 15 June 2000), 1-7.

<sup>9</sup> Joseph A. Gattuso, “Warfare Theory,” *Naval War College Review* (Autumn 1996): 113.

<sup>10</sup> Richard E. Simpkin, *Race to the Swift: Thoughts on Twenty First Century Warfare* (London, England: Brassey Defense Publishing, 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition, 1986), 20. Simpkin discusses at great length the “types” of warfare, and builds his argument against NATO’s General Defense Plan against the Soviets as attrition based and intellectually bankrupt. However, FM 3-0 dismisses the argument that there exist two diametrically opposed theories of war – attrition and maneuver warfare.

<sup>11</sup> Department of the Army, *Interim Brigade Combat Team Organizational and Operational Concept*, 7.

<sup>12</sup> This monograph discusses dislocation theory as it pertains to the tactical level of war. The operational level of war requires a separate analysis. For the tactical level warfare and dislocation theory see Robert R. Leonhard, *The Art of Maneuver Warfare* (Novato, California: Presidio Press, 1991), 65. For the operational level of war a more precise term is needed. Shimon Naveh defines this as operational shock, and takes a systems approach to his analysis of nineteenth century warfare, Soviet Operational thought, Blitzkreig, and the U.S. Army’s Airland Battle. See Shimon Naveh, *In Pursuit of Military Excellence: The Evolution of Operational Theory* (Portland, Oregon: Frank Cass Publishers, 1997).

- 
- <sup>13</sup> Schneider, *How War Works: The Origins, Nature, and Purpose of Military Theory*, 8.
- <sup>14</sup> Jomini, Liddell Hart, and most recently John Keegan are some of the more famous military historians who misquoted Clausewitz, and did not recognize his attempt to develop the relationship between absolute and real war. See Liddell Hart, *Strategy* (New York, New York: Frederick Praeger Publishers, 1968), 352-357; Jomini, "Summary of the Art of War," ed. J. D. Hittle in *Roots of Strategy Book 2* (Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: Stackpole Books), 436-437, 487, 494, and 546; John Keegan, *A History of Warfare* (New York, New York: Vintage Books, 1993).
- <sup>15</sup> Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press), 132.
- <sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, 141.
- <sup>17</sup> Antoine H. Jomini, "Summary of the Art of War," ed. J. D. Hittle in *Roots of Strategy Book 2* (Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: Stackpole Books, 1987), 553.
- <sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, 558.
- <sup>19</sup> Huba Wass de Czege, "How to Change an Army," *Military Review* (November 1984), 35.
- <sup>20</sup> Clausewitz, 141.
- <sup>21</sup> Edgar F. Puryear, *19 Stars: A Study in Military Character and Leadership* (Novato, California: Presidio Press, 1971), 378-379.
- <sup>22</sup> Carlo D'Estes, *Patton: A Genius for War* (New York, New York: Harper Collins, 1996), 120.
- <sup>23</sup> Puryear, 367.
- <sup>24</sup> Gattuso, 114.
- <sup>25</sup> Julian Corbett, *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy*, (London, England: Longman, Green and Co, 1911); reprinted (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1988) 7.
- <sup>26</sup> Donn Starry, "To Change an Army," *Military Review* (March 1983): 20-27.
- <sup>27</sup> Wass de Czege, 33.
- <sup>28</sup> Schneider, *How War Works: The Origins, Nature, and Purpose of Military Theory*, 8.
- <sup>29</sup> Michael Howard wrote in "The Doctrine of the Offensive" that faulty doctrine such as "no law save the offensive" were only partially responsible for the tremendous casualties suffered by all sides. He also blames the lack of experience and skill needed to control large formations and a failure to adjust tactics to the new weapons on the battlefield as other factors. Also, see Gordon Craig's essay "Delbruck: A Historian" for insight into the German interpretation of Clausewitz. Both essays are found in *The Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1986). See also J.F.C. Fuller, *The Conduct of War 1789-1961* (New York, New York: Decapo Press, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition), 122-129 for an excellent analysis of Frances drift toward the offensive and the superior moral of their soldiers.
- <sup>30</sup> Michael Howard, "Military Science in the Age of Peace," *Journal of the Royal United Services Institute for Defense Studies* (March 1974): 7.

---

<sup>31</sup>Ibid., 4.

<sup>32</sup> Trevor N. Dupuy, *Understanding War: History and Theory of Combat* (New York, New York: Paragon House Publishers, 1975), 79.

<sup>33</sup> The World War II era version of FM 100-5 that discuss battlefield geometry in Jominian terms: 1923 version on page 2, 1939 version on page 4, 1941 version on page 1, 1944 version on page 2, and the 1949 version on page 1.

<sup>34</sup> Department of the Army, *Field Manual 100-5, Operations* (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1939), 27.

<sup>35</sup> Department of the Army, *Field Manual 100-5, Operations* (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1954), 7.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid., 5.

<sup>37</sup> Chapter 2 of the 1976 version of FM 100-5 focuses on the lethality of the modern battlefield and relies heavily on the results of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. The chapter details the trends modern weapons systems: tank lethality and ranges on pages 2-2 to 2-6, trends in infantry and anti-armor systems on pages 2-7 to 2-10, and artillery ranges and average guns per kilometer on pages 2-12 to 2-16. Chapter 3 discusses the probability of kill (PK) and probability of hit (PH) of the Soviet AT Sagger versus the M60A1 on page 3-13.

<sup>38</sup> Dr. Richard M. Swain, *Filling the Void: The Operational Art and the U.S. Army* (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, nd), 28.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid., 34.

<sup>40</sup> Major Robert A. Doughty, *The Evolution of U.S. Army Doctrine 1946-1976* (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1979), 46.

<sup>41</sup> The 1941 version was published after the war in Europe and the Pacific had begun but before Pearl Harbor. The 1944 edition reflects a mid war azimuth correction and incorporates lessons learned especially concerning air power, mechanization, and anti-tank weapon systems. The 1949 version captures the lessons of World War II but is limited in its discussion of the Soviet threat. The 1954 version incorporates Clausewitz's relationship of policy and the military, psychological warfare, and has the first mention of fighting on a nuclear battlefield. The 1962 version admits that the days of US nuclear supremacy are gone and is heavily influenced by the threat of nuclear war with the Soviet Union. The 1968 version outlines the initial lessons of the Vietnam War and dedicates a chapter to counterinsurgency. The 1976 version was Dupuy's attempt to refocus the Army away from the problems of Vietnam and toward the Soviet threat in Europe. The manual develops concepts such as Active Defense, synchronization of weapons systems, and mutual support. The 1982 and 1986 version introduced the concept of the operational level of war and how divisions and corps commanders could fight and win against a numerically superior opponent. The 1993 manual was spurred by the end of the Cold War and a shift from a forward deployed force to a power projection one, identification of full spectrum operations, and joint warfare. The 2000 version of FM 3-0 reinforce joint, combined, and interagency operations while laying the groundwork for future technological advances and the Army After Next.

<sup>42</sup> FM 3-0, *Operations*, 1-8.

<sup>43</sup> Alfred Thayer Mahan, "The Influence of Sea Power Upon History," ed. David Jablonsky in *Roots of Strategy Book 4* (Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania: Stackpole Books, 1999), 64.

<sup>44</sup> FM 3-0, *Operations*, 1-10.

<sup>45</sup> Ibid., 3-2.

---

<sup>46</sup> FM 3-0 defines the elements of operational design as end state, center of gravity, decisive points, objectives, lines of operation, culminating point, operational reach, operational approach, operational pause, simultaneous and sequential operations, linear and non-linear operations, and tempo. FM 3-0, *Operations*, 5-6 to 5-12.

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*, 7-28.

<sup>48</sup> Basil H. Liddell Hart, *Strategy* (New York, New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1968).

<sup>49</sup> Webster's, *New Third International Dictionary*, 1420.

<sup>50</sup> Peter M. Senge, *The Fifth Discipline: The Art and Practice of the Learning Organization* (New York, New York: Doubleday, 1994), 202.

<sup>51</sup> Basil H. Liddell Hart, *Strategy*, (New York, New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1968), 25.

<sup>52</sup> Liddell Hart, 164.

<sup>53</sup> FM 3-0, *Operations*, 4-22.

<sup>54</sup> Leonhard, "Force XXI and the Theory of Winning Outnumbered", *ARMY Magazine* (June 1996): 60.

<sup>55</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Vision 2020: The American Military Preparing for Tomorrow* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2000), 13.

<sup>56</sup> Department of the Army, *Training and Doctrine Command Pamphlet 525-5: Force XXI Operations: A Concept for the Evolution of Full Dimension Operations for the Strategic Army of the Twenty-First Century* (Fort Monroe, Virginia, September 2000 Draft), IV-4.

<sup>57</sup> Schneider, *The Structure of Strategic Revolution* (Novato, California: Presidio Press, 1994), 35.

<sup>58</sup> Clausewitz, 197.

<sup>59</sup> Department of the Army, *Interim Brigade Combat Team Organizational and Operational Concept*, 25.

<sup>60</sup> Schneider, *The Structure of Strategic Revolution* (Novato, California: Presidio Press, 1994) 32.

<sup>61</sup> Shimon Naveh, *In Pursuit of Military Excellence: The Evolution of Operational Theory* (Portland, Oregon: Frank Cass Publishers, 1997), 213.

<sup>62</sup> FM 3-0, *Operations*, 5-11.

<sup>63</sup> Simpkin attributes simultaneity to Tukhachevskii and the need to bring the maximum number of troops into contact at the same time. It is considered a principle of Soviet Deep Operations theory. *Race to the Swift: Thoughts on Twenty-First Century Warfare* (New York, New York: Brassey's Defense, 1985), 39, 145-148. Naveh includes it as a component of operational maneuver and focuses his discussion of the terms on its importance in synchronizing friendly operations on a common scale. *In Pursuit of Military Excellence: The Evolution of Operational Theory* (Portland, Oregon: Frank Cass Publishers, 1997), 187, 215-216.

<sup>64</sup> Naveh, *In Pursuit of Military Excellence: The Evolution of Operational Theory*, 215-216.

<sup>65</sup> Leonhard, "Force XXI and the Theory of Winning Outnumbered", *ARMY Magazine* (June 1996): 56-64.

- 
- <sup>66</sup> Edward N. Luttwak, *Strategy and History: Collected Essays Volume 2* (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Books, 1985), 177.
- <sup>67</sup> Leonhard, "Force XXI and the Theory of Winning Outnumbered," *ARMY Magazine* (June 1996): 60.
- <sup>68</sup> FM 3-0, *Operations*, 5-12.
- <sup>69</sup> Richard Simpkins, *Race to the Swift: Thoughts on Twenty-First Century Warfare* (New York, New York: Brassey's Defense, 1985), 106.
- <sup>70</sup> Leonhard, "Force XXI and the Theory of Winning Outnumbered," *ARMY Magazine* (June 1996): 60.
- <sup>71</sup> Liddell Hart, *Strategy*, 340.
- <sup>72</sup> Clausewitz, *On War*, 136-138, 184.
- <sup>73</sup> Ardant du Picq, "Battle Studies: Ancient and Modern Battle," trans. John N. Greely and Robert C. Cotton in *Roots of Strategy Book 2* (Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: Stackpole Books, 1987), 135.
- <sup>74</sup> *Ibid.*, 73.
- <sup>75</sup> *Ibid.*, 142.
- <sup>76</sup> S.L.A. Marshall, *Men against Fire: The Problem of Battle Command in Future War*, 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition (Glouster, Massachusetts: Peter Smith Publishing, 1978) 151.
- <sup>77</sup> *Ibid.*, 128.
- <sup>78</sup> FM 3-0, *Operations*, 4-13.
- <sup>79</sup> Leonhard, *Force XXI and the Theory of Fighting Outnumbered*, 62.
- <sup>80</sup> Clausewitz, *On War*, 242.
- <sup>81</sup> Clausewitz, 206; du Picq, 149; Marshall, 187.
- <sup>82</sup> FM 3-0, *Operations*, 4-23.
- <sup>83</sup> du Picq, 150.
- <sup>84</sup> "Up close, personal, and brutal " was a favorite saying of Major General Carl Ernst while he was the Commandant of the U.S. Army Infantry School from 1997-1999. The quote appeared numerous times in Infantry Magazine and was the title of his state of the Infantry presentation at the 1998 and 1999 Infantry Conference at Fort Benning.
- <sup>85</sup> Major General James Dubik, "IBCT at Fort Lewis," *Military Review* (September 2000): 22.
- <sup>86</sup> The Organizational and Operational concept anticipates the IBCT area of operations to be fifty kilometers by fifty kilometers; with augmentation that could double. The RSTA Squadron is structured to simultaneously reconnoiter nine separate routes or conduct continuous surveillance on eighteen named areas of interest. Department of the Army, *Interim Brigade Combat Team Organizational and Operational Concept*, 21-33.
- <sup>87</sup> *Interim Brigade Combat Team Organizational and Operational Concept*, 37.

---

<sup>88</sup> FM 3-0, *Operations*, 11-14.

<sup>89</sup> Department of the Army, *Interim Brigade Combat Team Organizational and Operational Concept*, 13.

<sup>90</sup> *Ibid.*, 16.

<sup>91</sup> Michael Mehaffey, "Vanguard of the Objective Force," *Military Review* (September 2000), 6.

<sup>92</sup> Department of the Army, *Interim Brigade Combat Team Organizational and Operational Concept*, 36.

<sup>93</sup> *Ibid.*, 29.

<sup>94</sup> *Ibid.*, 28-30, 48-51.

<sup>95</sup> *Ibid.*, 49.

<sup>96</sup> FM 3-0, *Operations*, 4-14.

<sup>97</sup> Department of the Army, *Interim Brigade Combat Team Organizational and Operational Concept*, 36.

<sup>98</sup> General Eric Shinseki and the Honorable Louis Caldera, "Army Vision: Soldiers on Point for the Nation...Persuasive in Peace, Invincible in War," *Military Review* (September 2000): 3.

<sup>99</sup> Clausewitz, 75.

<sup>100</sup> Michael Mehaffey, "Vanguard of the Objective Force," *Military Review* (September 2000), 25.

<sup>101</sup> Department of the Army, *Interim Brigade Combat Team Organizational and Operational Concept*, 36.

<sup>102</sup> General Eric Shinseki and the Honorable Louis Caldera, "Army Vision: Soldiers on Point for the Nation...Persuasive in Peace, Invincible in War," *Military Review* (September 2000): 2-5.