THE CHALLENGES OF ORGANIZATIONAL LEADER DEVELOPMENT FOR THE ARMY AFTER NEXT

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
General Studies

by

DAVID A. DANIKOWSKI, MAJ, USA
B.S., U.S. Military Academy, West Point, New York, 1989

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
2000

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The Challenges of Organizational Leader Development for the Army After Next

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13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words)
This research focuses on how the Army utilizes leadership doctrine to prepare mid-grade officers for innovative and adaptive organizational leadership required for the Army After Next. The research evaluates Army leadership doctrine and follows the leader development imperative through the Army Organizational Life-Cycle Model to influence the process of change. Leader development is one of the six Army imperatives (DTLOMS) which impact force development. Through extensive review of FM 22-100, Army Leadership, and literature on leadership theory and organizational behavior, the author addresses the human element of leadership as it applies to future organizational leaders.

The integration of Army values throughout leadership doctrine reflects the positive outcome of transformational leadership—which seeks commitment (identification and internalization)—by influencing attitudes and values. Preparing mid-grade officers for organizational leadership requires leader development, which has some shortcomings. Institutional training and education does not adequately address the totality of the leadership framework, specifically interpersonal and conceptual skills and improving actions. Organizational leader development programs vary too widely to result in recurrent positive outcomes, and the extent to which leaders become adaptive and innovative is a function of individual initiative (reflected in broad self-development) and aptitude (creativity and intellect).
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THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT

THE CHALLENGES OF ORGANIZATIONAL LEADER DEVELOPMENT FOR THE ARMY AFTER NEXT by MAJ David A. Danikowski, USA, 96 pages.

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I would like to acknowledge the patience and support of my entire research committee, Dr. Ron Cuny, LTC Don Craig, and LTC Rick Fagan, who collectively made this experience academically rich and intellectually rewarding. Without their valuable input and mentoring this product would not have come to fruition. I also must thank the research staff at the Combined Arms Research Library (CARL) and the staff of the Directorate of Graduate Degree Programs office for their valuable assistance. Finally, I thank my family: Sumi, Kevin, and Timmy for their understanding and support throughout this process of research and writing. They share with me the joy of every achievement.
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<td>Army After Next</td>
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<td>CONUS</td>
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<td>DA</td>
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<td>DTLOMS</td>
<td>Doctrine, Training, Leader Development, Organizations, Materiel, Training</td>
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<td>FM</td>
<td>Field Manual</td>
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<td>LDSS</td>
<td>Leader Development Support System</td>
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

"The U.S. Army exists to support and defend the Constitution of the United States. It does that by deterring war and, if deterrence fails, by providing Army forces capable of achieving decisive victory as part of a joint team on the battlefield--anywhere in the world and under virtually any conditions" (Field Manual (FM) 100-5 1993, 1-1). The six Army imperatives: Doctrine, Training, Leader Development, Organization, Materiel, and Soldier Systems (DTLOMS) provide a framework to identify requirements and address the impact of future concepts on the Army. “Each imperative affects and is affected by the other five imperatives. Allowing any one of the imperatives to get out of sync with the others can have major repercussions for readiness” (Caldera and Reimer 1999, 26).

The Army is in the midst of substantial self-evaluation, to determine the suitability of its doctrine and the relevance of the organization. The statement of how the Army intends to conduct operations is Army doctrine. “Doctrine permeates the entire organizational structure of the Army and sets the direction for modernization and the standard for leadership development and soldier training” (FM 100-5 1993, 1-1). The context of current operational doctrine evolved from the post-Industrial Age environment and post-Cold War threats to stability. The scope of the challenge the Army faces is on a scale that permeates the entire organization just like the doctrine it is evaluating. The Army has the opportunity to assess and evaluate history, which is instructive, but the past
is not necessarily prologue to the future. The changing environment and uncertain threat will require an adaptive organization with combat power to fight and win.

"The most essential dynamic of combat power is competent and confident officer and noncommissioned officer leadership" (FM 100-5 1993, 2-11). The standard for leadership development is operational doctrine, which is evolving to meet the challenges of the future operational environment. Change is necessary when a future requirement is projected which the Army cannot fulfill with current capabilities. A capability may be acquired by a change in doctrine, training, leader development, organization, materiel, or soldier systems (DTLOMS) or some combination of changes in two or more areas.

Figure 1. The Army Imperatives--Core Competencies (Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Pamphlet 71-9 1997, 6).
The capstone process to establish and field Army organizations is force management, which involves organizing, integrating, and executing all the elements of the Army Organizational Life Cycle Model (see chapter 3). In its simplest context, force management is the management of change (US Army War College 1999, 2-2). Change is warranted based upon the new environment, but due to the interdependence of the Army's six imperatives (DTLOMS) one must view the challenges holistically, in terms of the Army's interrelated systems. By focusing on the leader development imperative, the recent revision of Field Manual (FM) 22-100, Army Leadership, established the axiom: “Leaders of character and competence act to achieve excellence” (1999, 1-3). As the doctrinal basis for Army leader development, FM 22-100 is the focus for Army efforts to develop quality leaders to meet the leader requirements of the future.

Background

Leaders are a product of their upbringing (their education, training, and experience). Individual officers who are organizational leaders (battalion commanders through corps commanders) have generally served in the Army from approximately eighteen years to more than thirty years. The organizational leaders of today were primarily trained in an era characterized by the monolithic threat posed by the former Soviet Union. Army doctrine was focused on the patterns created by a rigid threat doctrine. Leadership doctrine flowed from operational doctrine and decisions were made based on evidence of variables to fixed patterns. Leaders created templates modeled on norms, and looked for and used quantitative data to judge capabilities. The Cold War ended on 9 November 1989, without the Army's operational and leadership doctrine
having to be tested against the Soviet Army on the battlefield. That same doctrine and training, however, received much of the credit for the success in the Gulf War, where Iraq modeled Soviet-style tactics.

The challenges now are different, and it is predicted that the challenges of the future will be ambiguous, diverse, and unlike those of the past fifty years. The monolithic threat is gone, and the capabilities-based force is a byproduct of a generation-long focus on doctrine applied against patterns, templates, and norms. The asymmetrical threats emerging today are similar to the threats anticipated for the coming generation—through the Army After Next.

The organizational leaders in the Army After Next will be the product of the education, training, and experience of today’s leadership doctrine. As patterns and trends become adaptive rather than fixed, leaders must meet the challenge and a different set of skills, knowledge, and attributes may be required. “In all fighting, the direct method may be used for joining battle, but indirect methods will be needed in order to secure victory” (Sun Tzu 1983, 187). As future enemies employ the indirect approach as described by Sun Tzu organizational leaders may require different information than that which they provided as junior staff officers years before. The absence of clear patterns and templates may better characterize the future of conflict, yet the mainstream doctrine is premised on a far more predictable environment than one can reasonably expect to encounter. Organizational leaders in the Army After Next may have to depend less on templated dispositions of massed troops and instead on cause and effect relationships and linked analysis of myriad data.
Thesis Question

Does the Army adequately utilize leadership doctrine to prepare midgrade officers for the innovative and adaptive organizational leadership required in the Army After Next?

Secondary Questions

1. How does the Army use leadership doctrine to prepare officers for future leadership challenges, and how well does it conform to the realities of the Information Age?

2. What is the operational environment of the Army After Next that defines the roles and responsibilities of the future organizational leaders, and what is different from the leadership required during the post-Cold War era?

3. Is leader development equal to other Army imperatives for the future force?

4. Is there too much emphasis or reliance on officer self-development in the leader development model?

5. Is there adequate emphasis on “how to think” rather than “what to think?”

6. What about trust and cohesion in the uncertain future of the Army After Next?

7. Should the Army consider shortening the life cycle development of organizational leaders—increase reliance on junior officers and NCOs for more responsibility and a broader range of actions, or eliminate the differentiation altogether?

Importance

There is a current knowledge gap among midgrade officers, concerning the leader development necessary to be most effective when they become senior leaders. If they do
the same things that their predecessors have done, then they too would be adequately prepared to fight Iraq in a repeat of the Gulf War. However, due to changing operational environments, changing organizations, and rapidly changing technology they face new and unique organizational leadership challenges that demand leader development changes. They have inherited historical cultural baggage associated with change. One needs to diagnose whether that baggage is problematic or adaptive. The recent update of FM 22-100 may address these anticipated changes, and this research intends to determine how well these anticipated changes are addressed.

Scope and Limitations

This research will focus on organizational leadership in the Army After Next. Leadership most certainly includes both officer and noncommissioned officer (NCO) leaders. However, the research will be limited to officers that will command organizations from battalion through corps and joint task forces. The thesis will focus on challenges to organizational leadership, recognizing that direct leadership and strategic leadership will also be challenged by the dynamics of the Army After Next environment. The particular concern is the Army’s use of leadership doctrine in preparing midgrade officers for the innovative and adaptive organizational leadership that will be required. With the implementation of Officer Personnel Management System XXI (OPMS XXI) the Army has established career fields—Operations, Operations Support, Information Operations, and Institutional Support. The research will be limited to commanders (battalion through corps and joint task forces) of the Operations Career Field. As discussed, Army leadership doctrine, will utilize FM 22-100, Army Leadership, June
1999. "[T]he capstone leadership manual for America's Army . . . [which] establishes the Army's leadership doctrine, the fundamental principles by which Army leaders act to accomplish the mission and take care of their people" (FM 22-100 1999, vii).

The most obvious limitation is the fact that the Army After Next exists only as a concept. In order to test and validate any conclusions, existing data from multiple Army After Next wargames, symposia, and conferences will be utilized. Where necessary for illustration, only generally agreed upon concepts will be presented. The thesis will not postulate future organizations and technologies except those that were used as part of the Army After Next Project. The ongoing development and experimentation with the digitized force at Fort Hood, Texas will have relevance beyond the 2010 timeframe and may provide the clearest picture of the operating environment of the Army After Next leader.

The former Strike Force project, which envisioned the interim step between Army XXI and the Army After Next, has relevance to this thesis in the following manner. The operational environment described for Strike Force, which delineates the roles and responsibilities of the Strike Force leaders, is the same operational environment for leaders in the Army After Next. The development of the medium-weight Initial Brigade at Fort Lewis, Washington, will have relevance as the leader development requirements are addressed.

Assumptions

There are several assumptions necessary to undertake this research. The assumptions are those self-evident conditions that are needed to complete the research.
The first is the perennial argument that leaders are born versus made and that argument has not been put to rest. In the introduction to *The Challenge of Military Leadership*, Lieutenant General (retired) Walter F. Ulmer Jr. states, “Our assumption is that behaviors can be taught and nourished. Whether those basic attitudes underlying leaders’ behavior can be greatly modified remains of major import to our leader identification and selection systems” (Matthews 1989, ix). The characteristics of leadership can be taught over time, and the best teacher is experience (tacit knowledge).

In order to provide an environment for leader development, learning organizations with an operational requirement will be the future of Army organizations. Organizations that are predominantly operational may lack the rapid development environment required for dynamic future leadership. In addition to the leader development process, the Army may need a leader selection process to help determine the probability of success early in officer careers. Mentors may be invaluable resources for developing leaders and also in identifying exceptional qualities. Effectively mentored officers and protégés can be better prepared for future organizational leadership.

Future leaders must be more intuitive, less reliant on processes and staff, and comfortable making decisions with uncertainty and without all the necessary information. They likewise must move from linear decision making to conceptualizing and visualizing. The After-Action Report (AAR) aspect of military training should focus more on rationale for decisions to perhaps incorporate into institutional lessons learned. Experimentation with leader development is one of the most important aspects of Army training and should be on par with experimentation in other aspects of training. The
Information Age provides technologies which are beyond that which could be comprehended a few years ago, and now these technologies are mainstream. However, analog skills are still important conceptual skills to master before moving to the digital skills. Leaders must be able to orchestrate a digitized fight (or still fight it in the absence of digital technology).

The Army leadership framework consists of four leadership dimensions--Army values, attributes, skills, and actions. Values, attributes, and skills can be developed, and actions can be practiced. Subsequent development and learning from institutional education and training (schooling), operational assignments, and self-development can further prepare leaders for expanded roles with greater responsibility. Important underlying assumptions are that leader effectiveness can be measured, and that existing statistical data on effectiveness is reliable and valid.

**Definitions of Key Terms**

The operational definitions of the terms used throughout the thesis will be critical to understanding, but also critical to answering the research question. The terms that are integral to this research are defined as follows.

**Leadership.** "Leadership is influencing people--by providing purpose, direction, and motivation--while operating to accomplish the mission and improving the organization" (FM 22-100 1999, 1-4).

**Army Leadership Doctrine.** "Army leadership doctrine is the [body of] fundamental principles by which Army leaders act to accomplish the mission and take care of their people. The doctrine discusses how Army values form the basis of
character. In addition, it links a suite of instruments, publications and initiatives to
develop Army leaders” (FM 22-100 1999, vii).

**Leader development.** Leader development has three pillars: institutional training
and education (schooling), operational assignments, and self-development. These pillars
rest on a foundation of training and education, expectations and standards, and values and
ethics (FM 22-100 1999, 5-14).

**Organizational leadership.**

Organizational leadership builds on direct leader actions, . . . but lead complex
organizations like brigades, divisions, and corps. . . . Leaders divide their attention
between the concerns of the larger organization and their staffs and those of their
subordinate leaders, units and individuals. . . . Due to the indirect nature of their
influence, organizational leaders assess interrelated systems and design long-term
plans to accomplish the mission. They must sharpen their abilities to assess their
environments, their organization, and their subordinates. Organizational leaders
determine the cause and effect of shortcomings, translate these new
understandings into plans and programs, and allow their subordinate leaders
latitude to execute and get the job done. (FM 22-100 1999, 6-2)

**Army After Next (AAN).** The Army After Next is the postulated force of the
future Army, circa 2020. It is characterized by knowledge, speed, and power which
exceed capabilities in the current force. The research for the Army After Next Project is
focused on four broad areas: probable geopolitical realities, evolving military art,
technology, and human and organizational behavior.

**Strike Force.** Strike Force was the interim force of unique structure that will
operate in a networked configuration and will routinely be dispersed over large
geographical areas to accomplish varied missions across the range of military operations.
Strike Force would have served as an experimental headquarters to bridge the gap
between Army XXI digitized forces and Army After Next forces.
Innovative and adaptive. Innovative and adaptive leadership means no checklist solutions or by the numbers responses. The fog and friction of war will always be present, despite advanced technology. As leaders are able to gain situational awareness (knowledge dominance) quicker, they will be expected to make decisions quicker. The organizational leadership environment will still be characterized by some volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity which will require leaders to think on their feet, come up with innovative solutions, and adapt to their holistic surroundings.

Midgrade officers. This research seeks the preparedness of future organizational leaders based on today's leadership doctrine. The group of officers who will be leaders at the organizational level in the year 2020 and beyond are the junior majors and senior captains of today with approximately eight-to-twelve years of service.

Anticipated problems and possible, likely solutions

In an attempt to delimit and constrain the scope of the research so that it will be feasible, the research is focused on organizational leadership. The term organizational leadership is new to this version of FM 22-100, and there may be little differentiation in existing literature between direct leadership, organizational leadership, and strategic leadership. The terms indirect and senior have been used frequently to differentiate from direct, face-to-face leadership. Caution will be used in this research to recognize the emergence and congruence of terminology. The ambiguity of terms will require that terms are defined clearly.

As recently as this spring, the Army After Next Project has been referred to as Army 2010 and beyond. Although the proponent for the project, Deputy Chief of Staff
for Doctrine, Headquarters Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) has not
officially changed the name, data from Army 2010 and beyond will be utilized as
congruent with Army After Next for this research.

Summary

The research begins with the interdependence of the six Army imperatives
(DTLOMS) and describes the relationship and interactions between operational doctrine,
leadership doctrine, and leader development. Operational doctrine is based on the
environment (geopolitical situation, the future threats, evolving military art, technology,
and human and organizational behavior). Leadership doctrine follows from operational
document and is premised on the axiom: leaders of character and competence act to
achieve excellence. Leader development has three pillars—institutional education and
training, operational assignments, and self-development—which work together to
continually produce leaders of character and competence to execute operational doctrine.

With rapid change in the environment—changes in the geopolitical situation, the
nature of future threats, the evolution of military art (maneuver versus attrition), and
astonishing advancements in technology—the leaders which command the organizations
of the Army's future force must be able to demonstrate innovative and adaptive
leadership as never before. The decision processes—critical reasoning and creative
thinking—that enable commanders to execute battle command and make better and more
timely decisions in battle will be as important (if not more so) as any time in history.

The thesis objective to determine how well the Army uses leadership doctrine to
prepare midgrade officers for innovative and adaptive leadership for the Army After Next
is attainable. Available data and information (and the learned opinion of experts) will be examined to describe the extent to which the Army can expect to be prepared for an uncertain future. The degree to which the military is successful in preparing leaders today for the challenges of the future, could make the difference between timely victory and stability, protracted warfare and misery, and potential, unthinkable defeat.
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

Background

The current state of publications is lively and relevant. The demise of the Soviet Union and the resulting change in the geopolitical landscape prompted symposia and conferences throughout the defense intellectual community, security institutions, academia, and military think tanks. The published papers, conference reports, professional journal articles, and transcripts of speaking presentations are many. No book-length treatments of this particular subject have been found, which allows the possibility that this research could identify knowledge gaps in the field.

The timeless publications on the history of warfare and the great writers of theory on war (Sun Tzu, Clausewitz, and Jomini) remind one that no matter what technological advances are envisioned for the Army After Next, war is still a human endeavor and the principles of leadership shall apply. Likewise, the extensive published material on military leadership, historical treatments of great leaders, and the Army's suite of instruments to develop leaders provide excellent resources for this research.

There are extensive works published on leadership in the business community as well as other aspects of society. Where these works relate to the Army leadership framework and where they go beyond mere management, their insights and research results have been used. Of particular interest are works in the areas of change and in dealing with ambiguous or volatile environments.
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7. Should the Army consider shortening the life cycle development of organizational leaders--increase reliance on junior officers and NCOs for more responsibility and a broader range of actions, or eliminate the differentiation altogether?

Foundation

This study includes an in-depth look at the Army's new capstone manual, FM 22-100, Army Leadership. The new manual provides a framework for army leaders,
establishes leadership doctrine for meeting mission requirements, establishes a unified leadership theory, and provides a comprehensive and adaptable leadership resource for the twenty-first century Army. In terms of leadership doctrine the manual establishes the fundamental principles by which Army leaders act to accomplish the mission and take care of their people. The doctrine discusses how Army values form the basis of character. In addition, it links a suite of instruments, publications, and initiatives that America's Army uses to develop leaders.

FM 22-100 supports the Army's keystone manuals, FM 100-1, *The Army*, and FM 100-5, *Operations*, which describe America's Army and its missions. "The 1994 version of FM 100-1 is the foundation for all Army doctrine. From our doctrine flows how we think about the world and how we train, equip, and organize our forces to serve the Nation...[and] along with the 1993 edition of FM 100-5 represent the continuing progression of the Army's intellectual adaptation to the changed strategic environment" (FM 100-1 1994, i). These keystone manuals are also significant in that they establish the institutional framework as well as the operational framework in which Army leaders will work. The revision and publication of FM 22-100 prior to the completion of FM 100-5 revisions is cause for some concern. "To maintain efficiency, any required revisions to existing doctrine should precede the fielding of major new pieces of equipment or the implementation of new organizational designs. This allows time for training Army leaders on how to conduct operations to maximize the effect of the new systems or organizations as well as ensuring that the soldiers receiving new equipment have time to receive training on how to operate and maintain it properly" (Caldera and
In fact, one of the challenges in evaluating leaders of the Army After Next is having to speculate what the environment will be as well as the operational doctrine those leaders will employ.

America's Army is a values-based institution. "The Army must preserve the fundamental values that are the bedrock for success in military operations. We must continue to ensure that American soldiers embrace the essential values that have been the soul of our Army since its birth. The values of loyalty, duty, respect, selfless service, honor, integrity, and personal courage have been the hallmark of the American soldier for over 223 years" (Caldera and Reimer 1999, xviii). FM 22-100 establishes and clarifies those values. Ten years ago, until the fall of the Berlin wall, the Army was a threat-based organization--focused overwhelmingly on defeating the threat posed by the Soviet Union in the Cold War. Then General Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, declared that the military was no longer a threat-based force, but a capabilities-based force. Without either threat or capabilities as the foundation, the military was "entering new territory" compared to the past fifty years. With Army values and leaders of character as the foundation, the Army is more inwardly focused and less encumbered with the threats it faces and the capabilities it possesses.

Establishing the Army leadership framework and reducing four other Army publications into a single comprehensive reference was quite an accomplishment. By simplifying the message and expanding its applicability to include all military and civilian leaders of the "The Army," the institution has come along way in providing additional data in answering a question, "how the Army uses leadership doctrine."
Continuing the theme of BE, KNOW, DO—that is, character, competence, and action—the Army leadership framework provides a single instrument for leader development. Individuals can use it for self-development, and leaders can use it to develop their subordinates. To develop character, the Army’s seven values are the foundation. The other aspects of character are the mental, physical, and emotional attributes of the soldier. Soldiers seek competence in interpersonal, conceptual, technical, and tactical skills. Finally, leader actions are comprised of those things the leader does to influence, operate, and improve the organization.

“The Army is a learning organization: we have learned to succeed across the full range of conflict and instability that may require military organizations and capabilities” (FM 100-1 1994, i). FM 22-100 serves as the basis for future leader development initiatives associated with the three pillars of the Army’s leader development model. The leader development model is made up of institutional training and education, operational assignments, and self-development. The manual emphasizes self-development and development of subordinates, which would naturally take place during operational assignments. This is best accomplished in learning organizations that provide opportunities for experiences and gaining tacit knowledge.

The final aspect of FM 22-100 is the outlining of the three levels of leadership—direct, organizational, and strategic.

Direct leadership is the work of first-line supervisors, whether they are corporals, captains, or colonels. It is the face-to-face communication from tactical-level teams through battalions, and higher level leaders with their staffs. Organizational leadership occurs at levels from battalion through corps within the military. . . . The operational leader’s influence is much broader when they operate increasingly through staffs to influence, operate and improve their outfits through programs, policies and systems. . . . Additional skills apply at the
organizational level. Leaders use 'systems thinking,' focusing more on patterns than discrete situations since successes and problems at this level often point to systemic strengths and flaws rather than individual human achievement or failure. The leader must be adept at filtering information, deciding how best to gather, analyze, and evaluate information. (FM 22-100 1999, 1-11)

Strategic leaders operate at the highest levels and provide vision to direct the force. From that vision flow the goals, plans and benchmarks that let people know they are moving forward. Strategic leaders also require the ability to achieve consensus and sustain coalitions (Smidt 1998, 85).

In "Leading in the Army After Next," Bernard M. Bass utilizes the theory of transformational and transactional leadership and "explains that leaders must mobilize their followers to go beyond their self-interests for the good of the group, organization and society, while building the self-esteem of the followers and keeping in mind their self-interests" (Bass 1998, 47). The three transformational factors he discusses are inspirational leadership, intellectual stimulation, and individualized consideration. The three transactional factors are contingent reward, active management by exception, and passive leadership. Bass describes how these factors are exhibited in leaders of varying effectiveness and how their organizations are effected by the varying levels of cohesion.

Bass using the operational environment of the Army After Next discusses effective war fighting leadership in 2025. He begins with the leader and unit cohesion as decentralization and "tele-teams" challenge the face-to-face contact of today's direct leaders. Consistent with the Army's leadership framework, Bass concluded by addressing ethical and moral issues, diversity, multiple goals and priorities (Bass 1998, 52).
The Army's leader development framework is presented in the article, "Designing a Battalion Leadership Development Program" by Donald M. Craig (1999). The author profoundly states, "Even if commanders do nothing to consciously shape subordinate leaders' growth, the operational environment provides the experience for leaders to learn and adequately perform their duties. However, commanders cannot leave leadership development to chance nor individual motivation" (7). The self-development pillar indeed permeates the other two pillars of "institutional training and education" and "operational assignments." Although self-development is not a formal element of leader development, it could easily be viewed as the most important and the "point of entry" for future organizational leader excellence. The leader development program characteristics of battle focused, comprehensive, inclusive, and supportive serve as an effective model for battalion commanders to develop adaptive leaders throughout the battalion.

Another key work is an article about U.S. Special Operations Forces called "Operation-Leadership" by Eli Cohen and Noel Tichy (1999). The authors describe the transformation already underway to redefine Special Operations since the fall of the Soviet empire. The Special Operations community has much to offer the Army After Next project. The *modus operandi* of Special Operating Forces today may be as close as one can get to the Army After Next operational environment. The first item the article addresses is to "focus your mission and define your identity." In order to build a unique, highly capable organization the Army must "pick the right people and build the right team." The desired capability of Army After Next forces may require a caliber of soldier and leader that the Army cannot mass produce. In terms of leadership and leader
development, the authors say, "to be a leader, demonstrate leadership. . . . [A]ction learning is the way to learning. . . . [M]ake everyone a teacher" (Cohen and Tichy 1999, 51).

This idea of making developing leaders into teachers is consistent with initial findings of the leadership development panel from the Division Commander's and TRADOC Commandant's Conference in 1998. Specifically when dealing with the institutional pillar of leader development, developing leaders who can discuss, experience, and teach leadership may have the highest payoff. Those who are only able to read, hear, and see as their method of learning leadership gain far less value from the experience. This is consistent with the Leader Development Research Office's work on tacit knowledge—a type of knowledge that is procedural in nature, practically useful in attaining valued goals, and acquired on one's own without direct help from others. This also applies to the operational pillar as developing leaders instruct subordinates during training. The Army must incorporate methods that provide the highest payoff at the earliest point in the officer's career and continue leader development throughout his or her service.

Another insight from the Army's two-star conference, dealt with changing leader requirements. Not only does the environment change, but so does the level at which decisions are made. In the Civil War, division and corps commanders made decisions that are routinely made by battalion commanders today. It is not unlikely that company commanders will make those decisions within the next decade. Because of this fact the Army may no longer have the luxury to invest eighteen years of training to produce
organizational leaders. The Army will have to compress the learning cycle in order to produce "leaders of character and competence who act to achieve excellence" at a level that was never required before.

This spring an article by the former Army Chief of Staff discussed how "leadership turns challenge into opportunity" and how "change is leader-intensive" (Reimer 1999, 3). Invigorating the force with timely and updated leadership doctrine is the catalyst to ensuring the Army does not become a hollow force following the Cold War drawdown. "We are already addressing the future requirements of Army leadership and the development process we will need for the Army After Next. We will use the newly designated Strike Force as a leader-development laboratory to explore and test leadership techniques and procedures that will provide the adaptable leaders, soldiers and units we will sorely need in the information age" (Reimer 1999, 3). The Army must not lose momentum in gathering that data, even in the pursuit of the medium-weight (initial-entry) force.

In the article, "Leadership and Doctrinal Reform," David R. Gayvert proposes a doctrinal differentiation between leadership, administration, and management. He states that by not defining "pure" leadership we credit other guidance-oriented responsibilities with the inappropriate label of leadership and thereby misidentify potential for future leader success. He also adeptly points out "if leadership is to be understood as a truly collaborative effort--a specific relationship distinguished from supervision and other related functions--then the current one-way, all inclusive definition is clearly unsatisfactory. . . . An organization in which vision, policy, and direction are largely
imposed upon and complied with, rather than co-created and deeply shared by the majority of its members, is ill suited to face the challenges waiting in the century ahead” (Gayvert 1999, 19).

Comparison of core competencies identified throughout the literature revealed the complexity captured in the Army’s leadership framework. Kenneth H. Pritchard advocates a competency-based system of leadership doctrine. The core competencies he includes are: tactical, technical and technological proficiency; cognitive skills and abilities (numerical comprehension, oral communication, and problem solving); interpersonal skills and abilities (human relations and teamwork); and personal characteristics, such as decisiveness and tenacity. The differentiating competencies are interesting: continuous learning, awareness, flexibility, resilience, initiative, creativity, entrepreneurship, influencing others, partnering, and organizational commitment (Pritchard 1999, 24-25).

The Officer Personnel Management System (OPMS) study group at the Military Academy published Leadership in Combat: An Historical Appraisal. Interestingly, they restricted their study to “actions in actual combat and that must clearly involve leadership not management. The characteristics found were indispensable to combat leadership, but not necessarily vital or sufficient to accomplish other essential military tasks” (Hamburger, 1988, 1). The study identified “five personal characteristics that were present in every case and disaster ensued in their absence. They were terrain sense, single-minded tenacity, furious audacity, physical confidence, and practical practiced judgement. . . . The sine qua non of almost every successful commander was
unquestioned integrity concerning his duties, coupled with a solid ethical foundation in matters dealing with combat or warfare” (Hamburger 1988, 9). Chapter 4, will make comparison of these and other competencies with those established in the Army Leadership framework in FM 22-100.

Relevant insights from business writings on leadership have been found during the research. Based on the Army definition of leadership, “influencing people--by providing purpose, direction, and motivation--while operating to accomplish the mission and improving the organization” can take place in any organization or group--not limited to combat or even hierarchical organizations like the military. In the book Transforming Leadership: From Vision to Results, author John D. Adams identifies one of the challenges of leadership as “to see a leader-follower equation at the center is a must. . . . To our detriment, we still see a leader as one person, sitting at the top of a hierarchy, determining, for a group of loyal followers, the direction, pace, and outcome of everyone’s effort. . . . Passive followership, although perhaps a traditional perspective, is neither functional nor preordained for today’s probabilistic world” (1986, 12). Just like Gayvert’s concerns about a too-inclusive definition of leadership, Adams advocates more inclusion of the led. “We can ‘see’ the emergence of a new way of operating and describing reality while education, socialization, and culture limit us to the ‘old’ ways of thinking and describing what lies ahead” (1986, 16). Pritchard also identifies that presentation method, particularly for Generation X and the Millennium Generation, “must be given in short bursts, with quick-cut, energetic video that is musically driven--MTV-style” (Pritchard 1999, 26).
The Center for Creative Leadership website has valuable information on organizational culture, change and growth. They see vision as an important aspect of effective leadership, particularly in changing organizations. The challenge is in the fact that “change is a leader-centric process” (Reimer 1999, 3). However, when organizations grow, their culture tends to change also. Organizations become more bureaucratic and management may become more controlling and allow less individuality. This can affect efforts to attract and retain employees.

There is utility in the extant works on leadership and the Army After Next. The concepts are evolving and being refined. The works are being taken seriously by the Army and the recent update of the Army’s leadership doctrine attests to that. The apparent trend in the scholarship is that the Army must act now to prepare future leaders for an uncertain future. The annual reports to the Chief of Staff of the Army on the Army After Next Project, entitled Knowledge and Speed, were the primary sources on the Army After Next. The reports are published by the Deputy Chief of Staff for Doctrine, Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) at Fort Monroe, Virginia, and they represent the latest insights from wargames, experiments, and symposia.

Summary

The literature review suggests there are many sources but no clear-cut answer to the thesis question. However, the literature does suggest ways the Army can use leadership doctrine to prepare midgrade officers for the innovative and adaptive organizational leadership in the Army After Next.
CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH DESIGN

Purpose

The purpose of the research design is provide focus in sifting through mountains of relevant (and not so relevant) materials, to ultimately lead to the sources that will provide possible answers to the thesis question. The thesis question focuses on only one problem. That problem is stated: with the recent update of FM 22-100, *Army Leadership*, it is unclear if the Army is adequately using leadership doctrine to prepare midgrade officers for organizational leadership in the Army After Next.

Thesis Question

Does the Army adequately utilize leadership doctrine to prepare midgrade officers for the innovative and adaptive organizational leadership required in the Army After Next?

Secondary Questions

1. How does the Army use leadership doctrine to prepare officers for future leadership challenges, and how well does it conform to Information Age realities?
2. What is the operational environment of the Army After Next that defines the roles and responsibilities of the future organizational leaders, and what is different from the leadership required during the post-Cold War era?
3. Is leader development equal to other Army imperatives for the future force?
4. Is there too much emphasis or reliance on officer self-development in the leader development model?
5. Is there adequate emphasis on "how to think" rather than "what to think?"

6. What about trust and teamwork in the Army After Next?

7. Should the Army consider shortening the life cycle development of organizational leaders—increase reliance on junior officers and NCOs for more responsibility and a broader range of actions, or eliminate the differentiation altogether?

The Analytical Model

In order to give structure to the research and guide the analysis, an established model was selected for the research design. The force management process, which involves organizing, integrating, and executing all the elements of the Army Organizational Life Cycle Model, is the Army’s capstone process for establishing and fielding a mission-capable organization (US Army War College 1999, 2-7).

Figure 2. The Army Organizational Life Cycle Model (US Army War College 1999, 2-8).
The Army Organizational Life Cycle Model had its genesis just prior to World War II when General George C. Marshall was the Army Chief of Staff. "In complex organizations, such as the Army, every action or problem will impact upon every function of the organization. As a result, systems working together within the management process are really systems of systems. These systems encompass the entire life cycle of the Army, from the earliest stages of force development to the final disposition of people, equipment and facilities" (US Army War College 1999, 2-7).

The systems which are integral to the force management process are: force development, acquisition, training, distribution, deployment, sustainment, development, and separation. The external influences on these eight functions are resources and collective command, leadership, and management. It is within the framework of the Army Organizational Life Cycle Model that this research will evaluate the Army’s leadership doctrine and its suitability in preparing midgrade officers for organizational leadership in the Army After Next.

The Analytical Plan

The research will examine available data and information (and the learned opinion of experts) to describe the extent to which the Army can expect to be prepared for an uncertain future. The degree to which the Army is successful in preparing leaders today for the extreme challenges of the future, could make the difference between timely victory and stability, protracted warfare and misery, and potential, unthinkable defeat.

The retrospective research will cover the evolution of Army leadership doctrine to the present. The beginning point is October 1983, clearly during the Cold War, and with
the publication of FM 22-100, *Military Leadership*. The end of the Cold War in 1989 and the introduction of the Army After Next Project in 1995 both sparked discussion and publications on the future of the military. Several developments in the late 1990s (Joint Vision 2010, Army XXI, OPMS XXI, Character Development XXI, and the publication of FM 22-100, *Army Leadership* in June 1999) have driven symposia, conferences, and articles that contributed to the body of knowledge on this topic. Finally, concept development work on the aborted Strike Force project produced insights which were critical for this research.

The entry point for the model is force development. Force development translates requirements into research, development, and acquisition (RDA) programs and force structure. There are five developmental processes in force development (figure 3).

![Figure 3. Force Development Processes (US Army War College 1999, 2-3)](image-url)
Combat development is the process of determining requirements (to determine a needed
capability) for the DTLOMS. For the purpose of this research, focus will be on the
doctoral requirements (which describe how the Army will fight), leader development
requirements, and training requirements (as they apply to leader development).

The force development process concludes (in the research areas) with published
document, tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) and with training and leader
development programs, methods, or devices. The Army has published FM 22-100, Army
Leadership, (which includes leadership doctrine), TRADOC Pam 525-5, Force XXI
Operations, and Knowledge and Speed: The Annual Report on The Army After Next
Project to the CSA, and is updating FM 100-5, Operations, each of which will be used in
extracting the requirements established for Army After Next leaders.

The acquisition process (for the purpose of this research) is the initial
procurement of personnel to fill the yet to be determined force structure. When speaking
of the demanding tasks the Army performs around the world, “Not just anyone can do
these things, nor can our Nation afford to send just anyone to do them” (Caldera and
Reimer 1999, xii). The research will look at selection and assessment of the Army’s
future leaders and investigate the relevance of the Special Operations Forces (SOF)
models and standards for performing their unique missions. Business and industry
outside the Department of Defense may also have relevant programs and practices for
acquiring personnel for leadership roles.
The training function is the means of transition for future leaders from civilian status to military life. The Army After Next soldiers may have completely new Military Occupational Specialties (MOSs) and (with regard to officer leaders) the training function includes transitioning graduates from the United States Military Academy (USMA), Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC), and Officer Candidate School (OCS) into officers through the basic course. The research must address the former Military Qualification Standards (MQS) and Officer Foundation Standards (OFS) (DA Pam 350-58 1994, 36). Organizational leaders must know and enforce standards to ensure excellence, and in an epoch of continual change, they cannot rely upon their experiences as junior officers and assume that all their subordinates are faced with the same challenges. Virtual training environments are likely to be commonplace and technological enablers will place the greatest demand for understanding on the generation which did not “grow up” in the adaptive and innovative culture.

The distribution function takes the newly trained leaders with basic skills and knowledge and assigns them to their initial organizations according to established priorities. Assignment policies and priority organizations dictate how officers are distributed. For this research, how and where those future Army After Next Leaders are assigned is worthy of investigation. Since tacit knowledge gained by experiences, combined with other attributes, may be crucial for successful leader development, job structures and learning organizations deserve some review. There is a dilemma in this function created by the fact that assignments drive leader development as opposed to leader development driving assignments. The significance of responsibilities given to
junior leaders (and performance demanded of them) simply means that everybody cannot
do every job. Selection and assessment programs will again be addressed during the
distribution function.

The deployment phase of the Organizational Life Cycle Model has to do with
deploying leaders and units throughout the continental United States (CONUS) and also
overseas in accordance with worldwide commitments. These commitments cover the
entire range of military operations from non-conflict disaster relief and humanitarian
assistance to war against potential adversaries of varying capabilities. The deployment of
Army After Next leaders will also include integrated operations with the reserve
components, joint operations with sister services, coalition operations with multinational
partners of varying degrees of cooperation, interagency requirements with civilian
government and non-government organizations, and the international media (which one
can hardly imagine what it will consist of in five to fifteen years). The physical
deployment of “capability” to meet a national objective is one consideration, but the
research also must consider the leaders behind the scenes that ensure the deployment is
executed as intended. This function also addresses the adaptability requirement for the
developing officer. Some leaders have had the opportunity to serve in assignments across
the full spectrum of operations. Many have had limited experience in anything outside a
narrow band of the spectrum.

The sustainment function of the model includes the training and maintaining of
people, equipment, and facilities. For the Army After Next leaders this is the heart of the
leader development model pillars. The institutional training accomplished in
Professional Military Education (PME) such as the Captains Career Course, Command and Staff College, and War College, provides the formal instruction and personal interaction among peers which has proven so valuable in the past. The operational assignments in which leaders lead (battle command, mentor, teach, train, coach) and undergo extensive training in diverse situations, performing to standards, warrants research. Since the goal is to develop leaders (of character) who can be innovative and adaptive, there must be performance measures that evaluate the thought process (or “how”) rather than just the results (the “what”). Finally, leader self-development programs and the leader development support system (LDSS) are critical for this research. Army leadership doctrine should provide the “road map” for every officer and leaders should assist their subordinates in their action plan. The institutional support for self-development must be realized before the Army can anticipate commitment “in the field.” There are opportunities for internet-based training yet to be fully explored. How well FM 22-100 does this very task could pre-determine success for some leaders while those less motivated could be destined for mediocrity.

The separation function of the model is designed to separate specific people and equipment from military control when they are no longer needed. In the context of this research, the separated people could continue to serve our leader development challenges by functioning as mentors. Particularly in the area of senior leadership, retired officers have vast experience and their potential as mentors for future leadership seems a natural progression.
With rapid change in the environment—changes in the geopolitical situation, the nature of future threats, the evolution of military art (strike versus maneuver), and astonishing advancements in technology—the leaders who command the organizations of the future force must be able to demonstrate innovative and adaptive leadership as never before. The decision processes—critical reasoning and creative thinking—that enable commanders to execute battle command and make better and more timely decisions in battle will be as important (if not more so) as any time in history.

The research will describe the relationship between operational doctrine, leadership doctrine, leader development, and their interactions. Operational doctrine is based on the environment (geopolitical situation, the future threats, evolving military art, technology, and human and organizational behavior). Leadership doctrine follows from operational doctrine and is premised on the axiom: leaders of character and competence act to achieve excellence. The Army also has training doctrine in the form of FM 25-100, *Training the Force* and FM 25-101, *Battle Focused Training* which address soldiers, units, and leaders. Leader development has three pillars—institutional education and training, operational assignments, and self-development—which work together to produce leaders of character and competence to execute the Army’s operational doctrine.

**Assessment Criteria**

The first criteria for assessment will be a simple determination if leader development was considered in the process. The interdependent relationship of the Army imperatives (DTLOMS) suggests that each imperative has equal ability to influence the process, yet each does not necessarily carry equal weight in its influence. At the risk of
making a judgment about relative value, the research will determine if the leader development imperative was a consideration.

If leader development was considered as a factor in furthering change, the research will then attempt to analyze it. The analysis will compare and contrast the change with other imperatives. The important analysis will also distinguish the leader development changes from change resulting from other factors.

In an attempt to synthesize evidence, the researcher may combine findings into logical groupings or a reporting construct to facilitate conclusions. For example, the categories of: unconscious-incompetence, unconscious-competence, conscious-incompetence, and conscious-competence could be used to group behavior done with or without forethought and with or without skill and ability. This synthesis of evidence may assist in making conclusions about the source of behaviors and the motivation for performing them.

The evaluation of the evidence in the research will first identify if the particular leader development requirement for the Army After Next requires progress or simply the status quo. The decisions leading to new leadership doctrine could be the result of extensive analysis of Army After Next leadership requirements. These requirements may be adequately achieved without substantial change to leader development. If such is the case, the researcher will report it so. If progress was indicated, however, then corresponding change in leadership doctrine should be evident. Changes to leadership doctrine may also occur independent of new requirements. These changes may just reflect style and packaging to better reach the intended audience.
Finally, the evidence should be weighed for its relevance for the Army After Next. The Army After Next project study areas will serve as the basis for this assessment. The first area is the probable geopolitical realities of the 2025 time frame. Any perpetual focus on a bipolar world, even a peer competitor, will be cause for skepticism. Second is the evolving nature of the military art. Warfare throughout history has sought a balanced approach of maneuver and firepower. Military history and the writings on the theory of war establish a baseline for reasonable analysis. Traditional warfare and Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) all have inherent to them, elements of battle command (leadership and decision making). Evidence that neglects the art for want of the science will warrant closer scrutiny. Technology will always have an impact on militaries. The Army After Next will be the most technological force the world has ever known. To assume away the technological advances, or to “put all one’s eggs in the techno-basket” would be ridiculous. Finally, human and organizational behavior is the heart of this research. Leader development requirements and changes must conform to the limits of human cognition and the realities of social behavior.

Summary

The objective to determine how well the Army uses leadership doctrine to prepare midgrade officers for innovative and adaptive leadership for the Army After Next is attainable. The researcher will utilize the Army Organizational Life-Cycle Model as the analytical model. The analytical plan will look at Army leadership doctrine from 1983 with the publishing of FM 22-100, Military Leadership through 1999 with the update of FM 22-100, Army Leadership.
The detailed look at the leader development imperative will be in relation to the other Army imperatives: doctrine, training, leader development, organizations, materiel, and soldier systems (DTLOMS). The research will follow leader development through the eight functions of the model as well as the external forces of resources, and command, leadership and management. The assessment criteria will start with a toggle to determine if leader development was considered. If it was considered then was a change indicated to meet a requirement or merely continuation of the status quo? The final criteria for assessment will be to relate the evidence to the Army After Next study areas of geopolitics, military art, technology, and human and organizational behavior.
CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

In order to analyze the data, the research model, analytical plan, and assessment criteria as described in chapter 3 have been applied. The analytical methodology is not exhaustive, and therefore the analysis is limited to the specific research areas. Using the Army Organizational Life Cycle Model as it applies to the leader development imperative the Army leadership doctrine has been analyzed in order to assess progress and relevance for the future organizational leaders of the Army After Next.

Doctrine: The Engine of Change

The researcher set out to analyze leadership doctrine beginning with the publication of FM 22-100, Military Leadership, in October 1983. The analysis began with the 1983 version because it was the first leadership manual published following the 1976 version of FM 100-5, Operations of Army Forces in the Field, which introduced the term Air-Land Battle for the first time and “was a deliberate attempt to change the way the U.S. Army thought about and prepared for war” (Herbert 1988, 9). According to Field Manual 34-1:

Doctrine is neither unchanging dogma nor the exclusive purview of an intellectual elite. Neither is it merely rigid adherence to a set of tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) that tell us “how to fight.” Doctrine provides a common, flexible framework of thought and expectations within which soldiers think about and debate the issues of our profession. Doctrines provides a basis for the institution to incorporate new ideas, technologies, and organizational design to help leaders become the adaptive, creative problem solvers that modern military operations require. . . . To change our doctrine is, therefore, to change the way in which we think about and debate the intellectual and physical means for ensuring our continuity of purpose. (FM 34-1 1994, iii)
The 1983 version of FM 22-100 was focused at Army leaders at battalion level and below (which by today’s definition falls within the realm of direct leadership only). In June 1987 FM 22-103, *Leadership and Command at Senior Levels*, was published. “With the adoption of AirLand Battle doctrine, it became clear that a doctrinal statement addressing the challenge of leadership and command at large-unit levels was needed. More than ever, execution of doctrine depends on skillful and competent senior leaders” (FM 22-103 1987, i).


It is worthwhile to interject that leadership doctrine is not the first step to providing a common, flexible framework of thought and expectations within which soldiers think about and debate the issues of the military profession. The precursor to doctrine is theory. Theory is “the body of systematically organized knowledge devised to analyze, predict, or otherwise explain the nature or behavior of specific phenomena” (American Heritage Dictionary 1982, 1260). True theory should stand the test of time while doctrine is commonly established by precedent, within a particular paradigm or
construct, which accommodates the environment in which one operates. Theory and
doctrine have common goals: (1) utilitarian—to improve performance or operations, (2)
pedagogic—to instruct, and (3) cognitive—to facilitate and frame thought. The difference
is manifest in that theory is pure while doctrine confines to the environmental construct.
This academic distinction is important because even though the Army claims that
doctrine is not prescriptive, departures from doctrine ought to still conform to theory.
Actions outside doctrinal “limits” and not supported (or explained) by theory could be
called absurd.

**Leader Requirements**

The entry point for the analytical model is the requirements determination process
which is a subset of force development. To start with the broad patterns of outcomes,
with regard to the requirements determination process, the researcher discovered multiple
“leader requirements” which could drive modification of leadership doctrine and hence
the publication of the new manuals. To add structure to the lists of leader requirements,
the researcher will first compare, contrast, and distinguish the characteristics. Then the
researcher will synthesize the lists by combining, creating and constructing categories for
analysis. Finally, the evidence will be evaluated by assessing the leader development
considerations and making judgments about relevance for future organizational leaders in
the Army After Next.

In the 1983 edition of FM 22-100, “traits such as courage, competence, candor
and commitment are crucial for all soldiers” (FM 22-100 1983, 90). The following traits
of character were considered important particularly for leaders: integrity, maturity, will,
self-discipline, flexibility, confidence, endurance, decisiveness, coolness under stress, initiative, justice, self-improvement, assertiveness, empathy or compassion, sense of humor, creativity, bearing, humility, and tact (FM 22-100 1983, 120).

The 1990 edition of FM 22-100 established nine leadership competencies which provide a framework for leader development. These categories of skills, knowledge, and attitudes defined leader behavior: communications, supervision, teaching and counseling, soldier team development, technical and tactical proficiency, decision making, planning, use of available systems, and professional ethics (FM 22-100 1990, 29).

Due to the fact that these earlier versions of leadership manuals focused principally on junior leaders at the battalion level and below (company grade officers, warrant officers, and noncommissioned officers) the researcher had to include the special characteristics of senior level leaders in order to address the research population (future organizational level leaders). FM 22-103 presented a model of senior leadership and command that looks much like a wheel. The hub of the wheel is vision. The senior leader’s ability to rapidly assess the situation and form their vision “with a tempo such that the unexpected and novel will be the norm . . . with a high tolerance for ambiguity and uncertainty . . . with confidence in their own technical and tactical competence . . . and having a capability to learn rapidly” (FM 22-103 1987, 15).

The spokes of the wheel are ethics (foundations, responsibilities, and moral toughness); skills (conceptual, competency, and communications); processes (command, control, leadership, and management); and organization (characteristics--adaptive, cohesive, components, and building teams). Senior leaders also required certain
attributes, imperatives, and perspectives to make sense of seeming chaos and to form their vision. The attributes were: standard bearer, developer, and integrator. The imperatives were: purpose, direction, and motivation. The perspectives were: history, operations, and organizations (FM 22-103 1987, 16).

The current edition of FM 22-100 established the Army leadership framework which depicts what leaders must BE, KNOW, and DO. The leader dimensions consist of Army values and subcategories: attributes, skills, and actions (FM 22-100 1999, 1-3).

Figure 4. The Army Leadership Framework (FM 22-100 1999, 1-3)
Clearly, these lists of leader requirements have remarkable similarity and there were few unique leadership requirements that had emerged to drive significant modification of leadership doctrine prior to 1999. The new Army leadership framework incorporates the character, ethics, beliefs, and norms of previous editions into the seven Army values. This plainly indicates the incorporation of transformational leadership theory at the very top of the Army, which will be discussed in detail later. The distinction separating values from attributes is new, and it more clearly describes what a leader should “BE.”

Even casual observation would detect the elevated importance (if not particular emphasis) on “values” in the Army of today. The Army values (represented by the easy to remember mnemonic LDRSHIP) are: loyalty, duty, respect, selfless service, honor, integrity, and personal courage. Character Development XXI was the initiative to codify the Army core values, incorporate those values into leadership doctrine (in FM 22-100, 1999), and incorporate values training into all aspects of the Army. Although the reception to the Army values program has been mixed (and somewhat cynical), character and values rightly sit at the foundation of leadership doctrine. “Leadership begins with values. Shared values express the essence of an organization. They bind expectations, provide alignment, and establish a foundation for transformation and growth” (Sullivan 1996, 11). The transformation and growth to which General Sullivan refers is the challenge for Army leaders. Poor leaders can expect marginal success based on their authority alone, but true gains belong to the leader who can transform the attitudes and values of an organization.
The current emphasis on Army values, separate from attributes (mental, physical, and emotional) can be traced from the greatest writers on war. Sun Tzu said, “By command I mean the wisdom, trustworthiness, benevolence, courage and firmness of the commander” (Sun Tzu 1983, 167). Antoine Henri Jomini wrote, “The most essential qualities for a general will always be: first, a high moral courage, capable of great resolution; second, a physical courage which takes no account of danger. His scientific or military acquirements are secondary to these. . . . Next in importance come the qualities of his personal character” (Jomini 1862, 46). Carl von Clausewitz wrote, “Courage is the soldier’s first requirement: courage in the face of personal danger, and courage to accept responsibility” (Clausewitz 1976, 10). Each of these great theorists listed values as the most important for greatness—other attributes, skills, and actions followed, but values are the foundation.

The long standing emphasis on “technical and tactical competence” now also includes interpersonal and conceptual skills. These skills have been addressed elsewhere, but now they are raised to a level on par with technical and tactical skills. This is an important addition to this category. These interpersonal and conceptual skills require training, practice, and mastery (“KNOW” skills) and are more than just “DO” actions. Important as well is to recognize the congruence with the purposes of theory and doctrine (utilitarian, pedagogic, and cognitive). The framework is not an exhaustive list of qualities, nor an old list with creative adjectives. It elevates ideas and concepts to improve performance, to instruct (new soldiers and seniors), and to facilitate thought.
In addition to the Army’s published manuals, there is other critical literature on leader requirements and characteristics. In a combat leadership study, “There were five characteristics that were present in every case [of successful combat leaders] and disaster ensued in their absence. They were terrain sense, single-minded tenacity, ferocious audacity, physical confidence, and practical, practiced judgement” (Hamburger 1988, 1). Terrain sense was the ability “to quickly, almost intuitively, tactically judge terrain.” Single-minded audacity was “the imaginative, driving intensity to accomplish the mission using everything that was available...tied to an unusually strong sense of moral courage and scrupulously ethical conduct.” Ferocious audacity was “the willingness to take reasoned but enormous risks” and physical confidence was accomplished through “vigorous, demanding physical activity either part of regular duties or as a pastime.” Practical, practiced judgement was “the most uncommon of virtues, common sense...to determine the vital from the unimportant, the immediate from the casual, and truth from deception, whether deliberate or accidental” (Hamburger 1988, 8).

Kenneth Pritchard argues that “leader selection, development and management should be integrated on the basis of leadership competencies needed along the leadership continuum” (Pritchard 1999, 24). Core competencies include: tactical, technical and technological (information and computer) proficiency; cognitive skills and abilities, such as numerical comprehension, oral communication and problem solving; interpersonal skills and abilities, such as skill in human relation and teamwork ability; and personal characteristics, such as decisiveness and tenacity. Differentiating competencies include: continuous learning; awareness of interrelationships affecting the organization;
flexibility—being open to change as an opportunity and having a tolerance for ambiguity; resilience in physical and mental stamina; initiative; creativity—providing insight, generating original ideas or innovative solutions; entrepreneurship—leading with a sense of ownership and identifying and taking prudent risks; influencing others; partnering; and organizational commitment (Pritchard 1999, 25).

Leader Requirement Insights

The utility of these “leader requirements” is the insight they provide for the force development process. The force development process has a mechanism for turning requirements into leader development programs called the LDSS (Leader Development Support System). However, this component of force development does not enjoy the resources or emphasis that the Army places on organizational and materiel solutions (of all the DTLOMS). The difficulty lies in establishing the linkage between traits, competencies, and characteristics to a leader development doctrine. “Leadership strikes many people as an elusive, hazy and almost mysterious commodity. So much of it is intangible, you can’t possibly define all the parts... Trait theory has been thoroughly debunked” (Cronin 1983, 7). “Individuals who possess leadership qualities do not necessarily become effective leaders. Our understanding of leadership is incomplete because of ambiguity, inconsistency, and paradox” (Taylor and Rosenbach 1996, 2).

Pure Leadership

This research focused on the adequacy of Army leadership doctrine to prepare future organizational leaders. One of the most basic discoveries has been the fog surrounding the functional definition of leadership. “[A]n often confusing aspect about
leadership is that leadership and management are often talked about as if they were the same. While it is true that an effective manager is often an effective leader and leadership requires, among other things, many of the skills of an effective manager, there are differences” (Cronin 1983, 9).

Much of the literature concedes the difference between leadership and management (such as supervision, administration, and organizational skills) but the Army seems to cling to the idea that Army “leaders” are leaders of everything related to mission accomplishment (including people, resources, and structures). Former Chief of Staff of the Army, General John A. Wickham Jr. said, “I think the Army would make a serious mistake if we made a distinction and said, ‘Your are a manager, and you are a leader.’ So my philosophy is that we are all leaders! We also must be responsible managers or stewards of resources entrusted to us. We would make a serious mistake to think that we could be one, and not the other” (FM 22-103 1987, 41). The dilemma arises not from making a distinction between leader and manager, nor from thinking that we could be one and not the other. Instead the Army lumps together essentially different functions all under the mantel of leadership “blurring the distinction between pure leadership and other leader-manager activities and may often lead to ineffective, or at least less-than-optimum, performance by those tapped to perform differing roles” (Gayvert 1999, 20).

There are indeed differing roles and these roles are not fixed. Every officer will serve in roles that require a wide variety of the competencies of leadership doctrine. Some of these roles require exceptional organization skills and cognitive ability but nearly none of the influencing people skills. Are these leadership roles? Similarly, “the
'one size fits all' lists also promote two pernicious notions—to be effective, one must master all enumerated skills—an unrealistic and counterproductive expectation for most soldiers—and perhaps even worse, the implication that if a soldier is particularly competent in one set of leadership skills [one role], he will prove similarly able in all others” (Gayvert 1999, 20).

The all too common example is the young captain who was an excellent staff officer who fails (or performs marginally) in command because he lacked the relationship skills to deal effectively with soldiers. Again the paradox confounds the rule since several great commanders were also great staff officers. “It is absurd to imply that skilled managers cannot be skilled leaders. On the contrary, leadership and management must be complimentary to create the climates from which high-performing units emerge” (Ulmer 1996, 197).

Leadership Definition

The current doctrinal definition of leadership is “influencing people—by providing purpose, direction, and motivation—while operating to accomplish the mission and improving the organization” (FM 22-100 1999, 1-4). It is worthwhile to expand upon the major ideas in this definition in order to answer the secondary question of how the Army uses leadership doctrine to prepare officers for future leadership challenges.

The definition begins with “influencing people.” At the heart of influence is communication. Communication can take several forms (verbal, written, visual, etc.) and includes the subtleties of non-verbal, unwritten, innuendo, and reputation, and others. Decision making and imparting motivation are also influencing actions. The most
understated aspect of influencing people is differentiating that which occurs because of rank alone and that which is achieved by pure leadership. The highest goal for Army leaders is to be the emergent leader—a function of group dynamics in which the leader emerges from among the group because of their relative worth in terms of group values and norms. “Leadership is essentially an influence process whereby one gains the trust and respect of subordinates and moves them toward goals without reliance upon positional authority. (Exercise of positional authority is of course legitimate and often necessary, but reliance on formal authority alone does not constitute leadership.)” (Ulmer 1996, 11, italics mine).

Leadership Style

In addition to the near inexhaustible list of traits, competencies, qualities, and attributes, leaders exercise varying styles to achieve influence. The comparison between autocratic and democratic leadership style is the simplest version. Much psychological and organizational dynamic research has been done to determine cause and effect relationships in human behavior. “The focus of leadership theorists and researchers has been on ‘situational,’ interactionist,’ or ‘contingency’ approaches to leadership. These approaches revolve around the notion of observing and changing behaviors. In such theories, leaders use different styles of leadership, depending on various situational characteristics which in turn would cause the followers to work more efficiently and get the mission accomplished” (Donohue and Wong 1994, 24). This is known as transactional leadership because of the “transaction” of behaviors for consequences.
In general, these theories assume that leaders control some potential consequences (positive and negative) for behavior and through the promise of or application of these resources (pay, rewards, time off, punishment, and others) the leader can change behavior. There is validity to the theories, and incentives or threat of punishment can and do motivate performance. The difficulty being that the motivation is hollow and will unlikely lead to internalization and sustained behavior. Also this type of transactional leadership has more to do with authority than the relationship between leader and followers.

When leaders seek to influence their followers there are limited possible outcomes. One outcome (the least desirable) is resistance. Followers refuse or resist compliance with the leader's request. The choice to comply with the leader's request can be affected by transactional leadership, as described above. But mere compliance may be transitory and the leader should seek commitment on the part of the followers. Commitment has two follower outcomes: identification and internalization (Burns 1978, 89).

“Identification is the acceptance of influence because the source is an attractive, likeable source, worthy of emulation. An attitude change in the follower due to identification may essentially resemble imitation, because the follower may wish to be like the leader” (Burns 1978, 106). This commitment may still wane and the follower may revert to previous attitudes (and behavior) when the leader is gone. The notion of identification is represented by common terms such as admiration, respect, loyalty, and cohesion (Donohue and Wong 1994, 26). “Internalization is the acceptance of influence
and consequent attitude change due to the intrinsically rewarding nature of the influence attempt. Followers take on the ideas and values from a trusted, sound leader because the followers see the wisdom in the attempt. The new attitude is durable and deeply rooted because it becomes ‘owned’ by the follower. Ideally, it becomes a value” (Burns 1978, 20).

Because the goal is transformation of attitudes, the theory is called transformational leadership. The outcomes of resistance, compliance, identification, and internalization must be considered by the leader (as well as the situation) when deciding upon the style of leadership to be attempted. For example, if mere compliance will suffice for the mission at hand and the time available to accomplish it, then transactional leadership may be entirely appropriate. However, transformational leadership is the means of securing commitment (identification and internalization) on the part of the followers.

The one factor yet to be discussed concerning transformational leadership is the charisma of the leader. The definition of the Greek work “charisma” is “divine gift.” The likelihood that the Army can develop leaders who garner magnetic appeal to their cause is debatable. However, there are certain leader behaviors that lead to charismatic appeal. The behaviors include, but are not limited to: developing and communicating a vision; using unconventional strategies; communicating high expectations and confidence; showing individualized concern; and showing self-sacrifice (Donohue and Wong 1994, 30).
There are several points to synthesize. They are: (1) the Army values, (2) seeking internalization through transformational leadership, and (3) the environment of change. First, as indicated before, Character Development XXI was an indication of a transformational leadership attempt at the top of the Army. Recall that in a successful transformational leader attempt, "the new attitude is durable and deeply rooted because it becomes 'owned' by the follower. Ideally, it becomes a value" (Burns 1978, 20).

"General Reimer, the former Army Chief of Staff challenged every officer at every level to understand, adhere, internalize, and 'live' the Army core values in word and deed" (Jones 1999, 90). This is only possible through transformational leadership, since the leader cannot offer the "consequence" of imparting values for "proper behavior".

The third point is that in an environment of change, institutions are shaken and individuals (and groups) start to question values, norms, and attitudes with which they were previously comfortable (when the environment was more stable). This is when the time is ripe for transformational leader attempts, and conversely when transactional leader attempts rarely succeed unless the consequences are pushed to extremes (out of proportion to the value or worth of desired behaviors).

The Operational Environment

Since leaders influence people--by providing purpose, direction and motivation--while operating to accomplish the mission, it is important to know what the environment will be that defines the roles and responsibilities of future organizational leaders. We must be leaders of change and the vision of our destination is perhaps the most important element. "Doctrine is the engine that drives change within our Army. That is so because
doctrine embodies our ideas, and ideas drive change” (Liddell Hart 1991, ix). The challenge for future organizational leader development is best described by this statement from *Force XXI Operations*. “There can be no single, prescribed, authoritative Army doctrine for this strategic period. Hence, in 1993 our Army adopted a doctrine of full-dimensional operations, stressing principles to be learned and understood, then relying on the art of battle command to apply those principles in scenarios as they occur--be they War or OOTW” (TRADOC Pam 525-5, 1-3).

The environment of uncertainty or acute crisis is the time when traditions, values, beliefs, and attitudes are questioned. Due to change and instability, transformational leaders can appeal to values and organizational culture to elicit behavior. “[There is] a profound shift from the relatively deterministic and very appropriate scientific approach of the Cold War, with its focus on Central Europe, echelonment and presentation rates, and precise-force-ratio analysis. [We] continue that shift, emphasizing a concept built on principles that must be translated to action in specific scenarios that cannot now be predicted with enough certainty to warrant a return to prescriptive doctrine” (TRADOC Pam 525-5 1994, 1-3). In the absence of prescriptive doctrine (though the Army claims to have no prescriptive doctrine) it should become all the more important then to base operations on the root theory that will solidify into doctrine once the environment becomes clearer. As stated at the beginning of this chapter, even when the Army has sound doctrine, departure from the doctrine should not depart from established theory (which exists independent of the environment).
The competing theories, which are consistent with the wargame insights from the Army After Next Project, are: (1) attrition warfare (based upon the dominance of precision strike or firepower) and (2) maneuver warfare (based upon the dominance of precision maneuver and positional advantage). Understanding these theories “allows a senior commander to break free from the constraining bonds of petrified instruction, obsolete doctrine, and slavish adherence to ‘how we fought the last war’” (Gattuso 1996, 7). Another critical reason to understand theory is because it effects the rest of the force development processes, which drive “the type, size, and character of force structure; the nature, quality, discipline, and morale required of personnel; and the type of support and direction needed from political authority” (Gattuso 1996, 8). Perhaps the smartest thing the Army could have done for leader development, in changing from a threat-based force to a force-projection force to a capabilities-based force, was to declare themselves a values-based Army. This doesn’t solve the problems of the other Army imperatives (DTLOMS), but for leader development, the Army can pursue leadership in its pure form--focused upon influencing people while operating to accomplish the mission and improving the organization.

Selection and Assessment

The selection and assessment of leaders is part of the acquisition process of the research model. The initial procurement of personnel to fill the yet to be determined force structure of the Army After Next encompasses more than just the future organizational leaders (which is beyond the scope of this research). However, all future organizational leaders went through the process of commissioning and designation of
branch or specialty. This process brings civilians under military control. Once under military control, the process for evaluating performance and determining potential for increased responsibility is the Officer Evaluation System. With the current FM 22-100, the Army leadership framework (organized around the leadership dimensions of values, attributes, skills and actions) is fully incorporated into the Officer Evaluation System by way of DA Form 67-9, Officer Evaluation Report and DA Form 4856-E, Developmental Counseling Form. However, this important integration of consistent leader development doctrine is not yet complete.

Since the research established earlier that values are the basis of character, and character is the foundation of Army leaders, Character Development XXI is the substructure for leadership doctrine. Despite the clarity of FM 22-100, this is not the general perception among a population of future organizational leaders (student officers at the Command and General Staff Officer Course) (Jones 1999, 67). The mistaken perception is that the emphasis on values is a reaction to the changing values in American society, a desperate attempt to ameliorate the recent improper behavior of several high profile "leaders," and a catchy "bumper sticker" to demonstrate that the Army's focus is right despite some anomaly scandals.

Appendix B of FM 22-100 lists eight pages of performance indicators for leader development and Appendix E establishes and explains a character development model which are both fully integrated into developmental counseling and the Officer Evaluation Report instrument. The inconsistency which remains relates to leader training which will be addressed below in detail. Suffice to say that performance standards found in existing
Mission Training Plans (MTPs), Programs of Instruction (POI) at Army schools, and other curricula still focus almost exclusively on technical and tactical competence (at the expense of interpersonal and conceptual skills). The assessment of leader qualities is more difficult to quantify because the bulk of objective data does not reflect the incorporation of current leadership doctrine.

"Leaders exist throughout society and we can identify them by searching in logical, practical ways" (Cronin 1983, 8). Leaders also exist throughout the Army, but it is a mistake to imply that every officer, by virtue of potential authority of their assignments, has equal potential to be a successful leader. The Army does not make this mistake explicitly--does not assume a baseline of leadership ability or quality--but the selection, development, and assessment systems pass up opportunities to truly measure leadership. Senior officers rate junior officers and conduct developmental counseling based upon observed behaviors and performance goals. Since the essence of pure leadership is in the relationship of the leader to follower, it is questionable whether the senior officer really knows the quality of his subordinate’s relationship with those he or she leads (beyond the results achieved). “Given that our standard mode of performance appraisal is exclusively superiors assessing subordinates, it is remarkable that we do as well as we do in selection and development. We would do much better by having subordinates augment the system with periodic input about their superiors” (Ulmer 1996, 199). This indicates some potential utility in a 360-degree evaluation tool which would allow peer and subordinate input about the quality of the leader’s influence attempts. Of course this data could be subject to misinterpretation or a vehicle for retribution from
disgruntled individuals, but with appropriate filters and judgement this might aid realistic
assessment (Gayvert 1999, 22).

The Special Operations Forces (SOF) community assesses officers not from
civilians but from the conventional forces already in the Army. “The Special Forces
Assessment and Selection (SFAS) process is conducted over a twenty-four-day period. . .
it was founded to identify soldiers who could be trained to perform effectively in
unpredictable, adverse and hostile environments, and be dedicated to their profession”
(Burwell 1999, 33). The purpose of SFAS is “to provide the operational force with the
appropriate soldier and prevent the Army from wasting resources on candidates who were
not compatible with Special Forces training” (Burwell 1999, 31). The training for SOF
soldiers is unique and the unconventional nature of their missions represents the
operational environment in which these soldiers work.

There are essentially two types of selection processes. “The ideal occupational
selection in the corporate environment is to find a ‘best fit’ between an individual’s
attributes and the requirements of a particular job. The successful match improves
employees’ performance [individual and organizational] and increases employee
satisfaction with the work” (Burwell 1999, 45). The other process is actually deselection
or elimination--which describes the SFAS process. The reasons for this approach are:
(1) it is easier methodologically, (2) it would be impractical to attempt an exhaustive
“rule-in” strategy based on the volume of applicants (over 25,000 annually), and (3) we
do not really know precisely what are the best attributes for “best fit” selection (Burwell
1999, 45). The SFAS process is generally successful in identifying attributes that are clearly incompatible with successful performance.

Finally, is the relevance of selection and assessment for future organizational leaders for the Army After Next. Current selection processes are a combination of decentralized and centralized methods. The decentralized portion of the process takes place at the local level with individual and unit performance reflected on the officers evaluation and effecting assignment to jobs within a command. This portion of the process is personal because of the interaction of raters with their subordinates. However, the shortcomings and subjectivity of the evaluation process where the rater’s actual knowledge of the officer is limited by the quality of data—particularly with respect to pure leadership.

The centralized selection process utilizes the input from the decentralized process and applies a relatively uniform standard to an inherently subjective process. Command selection boards (as well as promotion and school selection boards) rely little, if at all, on personal knowledge about the officer and attempt to construct a whole picture of the officer based on “the totality of their file.” The officer’s assignment history, manner of performance, and documented potential all effect their standing relative to the rest of the officers under consideration. The results seek a “best fit” solution while at the same time eliminating officers with incompatible “discriminators.”

If the nature of Army After Next units and the environment in which they operate resembles more the current Special Operations mission, there may be utility in a formalized selection and assessment process for organizational leaders. To the extent
that OPMS XXI partitions the Army officer corps into career fields (operations, operations support, information operations, and institutional support) the population from which to select future battalion and brigade commanders (and higher) is smaller. Also, with full implementation of leadership doctrine, the performance indicators will enable leaders to more comprehensively assess their own leadership as well as that of others.

**Leadership Training**

The training function of the research model is the means of transformation from civilian status to military life such as Initial Entry Training (IET) and officer producing programs (USMA, ROTC, and OCS). Leadership doctrine drives the training in this function, but is beyond the scope of this research except that organizational leaders need to know the level of exposure to leader development that soldiers entering the Army have had. The sustainment function of the research model includes the training and maintaining of people, equipment, and facilities. For the future Army After Next organizational leaders this is the heart of the leader development model pillars. The pillars are: (1) institutional training and education, (2) operational assignments—in which leaders gain tacit knowledge, and (3) self development, all of which are addressed below.

Recall that the goals of theory and doctrine are: (1) utilitarian—to improve performance or operations, (2) pedagogic—to instruct, and (3) cognitive—to facilitate and frame thought. Leader development, in order to be most effective, must address these three goals throughout an officer’s career. The researcher will analyze leader development by the three pillars (which is current doctrine) and relate it to the goals listed above. Finally, the researcher will assess the applicability to future organizational
leaders for the Army After Next. The foremost challenge for the research population (senior captains and junior majors) is in recognizing that their experience thus far in their careers has been almost exclusively at the direct leadership level. They now must consider their responsibilities as organizational level leaders.

Institutional Training and Education

The institutional training accomplished in Professional Military Education (PME) such as the Captains Career Course, Command and Staff College, and War College, provides the formal instruction and personal interaction among peers which has proven so valuable. The formal instruction is far more than just leadership instruction and includes a broader curriculum. This approach is necessary given the following: “Leadership now includes influencing both civilian and military people, goal achievement in a political-cultural setting that mitigates exclusively military solutions, the study of interpersonal relations and group dynamics, and understanding American liberal democratic values” (Vitas 1999, 48). The most important aspect of a professional officer’s education is moving from awareness to understanding of the world around them. “Every professional-military or civilian--must have an intellectual awareness of the world outside his profession. The military professional must have the intellectual sensitivity to assess the use of force, policy outcomes, and the domestic and international environment” (Vitas 1999, 49). Consistent with these insights, for example, the core curriculum for the current Command and General Staff Officer Course (beginning in 1998) includes:

1. Fundamentals of Warfighting (Tactics at brigade, division and corps)
2. Resource Planning and Force Management
3. Fundamentals of Operational Warfighting (Joint and Multinational Operations)

4. History of Warfighting: Theory and Practice

5. Leadership

The core courses deal with warfighting from a historical perspective, a soldier and leader perspective, an institutional perspective, and an international perspective. "Any complex activity, if it is to be carried on with any degree of virtuosity, calls for appropriate gifts of intellect and temperament. If they are outstanding and reveal themselves in exceptional achievements, their possessor is called a 'genius'...[this] refers to a very highly developed mental aptitude for a particular occupation" (Clausewitz 1976, 100). "By knowledge, I do not mean a vast erudition; it is not the question to know a great deal but to know well; to know especially what relates to the mission appointed us" (Jomini 1862, iv). The leadership block of instruction accounts for fourteen percent of the core curriculum (sixty hours of 438 hours) and students can select 324 hours of Advanced Application Programs. The leadership lessons include:

1. Leadership Doctrine (including critical reasoning and creative thinking)

2. Leaders of Character (Army values, moral choices, and command philosophy)

3. Creating a Positive Command Climate (and Army culture)

4. Know Your Soldiers--Respect (Multicultural and generational awareness)

5. Building Soldier Teams

6. Individual Leadership Development (including developmental counseling)

7. Organizational Leadership Development (Leader development programs)

8. Develop Battle-Focused Units (Training Management and Strategy)
9. Integrate Public Affairs

10. Applying Military Law

The course also includes leader panels and seminars with organizational level leaders and throughout the year a Leadership Lecture Series brings senior military, civilian, government, and industry leaders to address the students in a candid, not for attribution setting. The instruction and lecture series serve to illustrate the political, cultural, economic, and ethical factors that impact military operations. Likewise, the educational strategy seeks to impart broad understanding of the interrelationship of peace and conflict. Admittedly, officers who undergo this instruction do not all develop the same perspective and individual success depends upon more than this instruction alone.

The pedagogic, or instructional, function of the curriculum does not fully account for the learning that is the goal. Due to the fact that CGSC is an institution of higher education and the students are more experienced and mature than undergraduates, androgogy, or adult instruction, allows students time for discovery learning. Adult education models include time for thought and reflection, guided discussions in seminar settings, and developmental feedback mechanisms beyond knowledge recitation. CGSOC designs the learning objectives by the level of learning behavior based on Blooms Taxonomy: (1) knowledge, (2) comprehension, (3) application, (4) analysis, (5) synthesis, and (6) evaluation. Instructional methods include role playing, case studies, practical exercises and computer simulations. For organizational level leaders, this is appropriate but the responsibility for learning rests more heavily on the individual student.
The University After Next envisioned in 1997 as an Army After Next system is a
consortium of the Combined Arms Center (CAC) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, the U.S.
Army War College at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, the National Defense University
at Fort McNair, Washington DC, TRADOC schools and centers, and the Combat
Training Centers. The proposed mission is best described by the following:

Knowledge-based operations will accelerate operating tempos and decision
making rate in staffs. Success in the stressful environment will require a special
kind of leader, one who is technically capable in the tasks of digital decision
making, but who retains the reliance on, and understanding of, how to maximize
the unit's human potential. . . . Through reengineering of instruction at Army
schools and distance learning, the University After Next will institute student-
centered, interactive and technology-enhanced learning by maximizing simulation
and interactive multimedia. By using technology to bring subject matter experts
from the schoolhouses, Combat Training Centers, research centers and the outside
world to the commander, the University After Next will provide leaders with a
virtual extended staff to assist in the development of their plans, training, mission
rehearsals and operations. (Meigs and Fitzgerald 1998, 43)

The utilitarian function of institutional training and education is self evident.
Certainly improved performance is a desired outcome, but in many cases the behaviors
that are likely to be performed following instruction are different (at least at a different
level of responsibility) than those performed prior. Officers don't come to the Command
and General Staff College to return to the field Army as better company commanders.
They instead move on to field grade responsibilities and execute duties with new
behaviors. It is because of this that the cognitive realm of leader development must be
unmistakable in institutional instruction.

The cognitive process is how one acquires knowledge--through perception,
reasoning or intuition. Formal instruction on critical reasoning and creative thinking are
part of the CGSOC curriculum but only a small part. Particularly because of the

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uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity about the future, mental constructs and conceptual skills are crucial for future organizational leaders. The Army leadership framework brings together the mental and emotional attributes, conceptual and interpersonal skills, as well as influencing (decision making), operating (assessing), and improving (learning) actions to demonstrate that knowledge outside the confines of narrow experience is necessary for future Army leaders.

Operational Assignments

Operational assignments place leaders in positions to apply the knowledge, skills and behaviors they have acquired. By practicing the skills which the leader was only able to simulate in institutional training and education, the leader can hone the skills, sharpen the behaviors, and demonstrate the values and attributes of effective organizational leaders. Operational assignments are also where the leader must reconnect with followers—the human element of leadership with values, needs, emotions, intellect and spirit. “Consult the tactical series of field manual at any level. There you will find commanders described as planers, synchronizers, tacticians, and data processors—anything, in fact, but leaders who depend on flesh-and-blood soldiers to win their battles” (Eden 1999, 38).

Simulations and Role Playing

It is difficult (perhaps impossible) for simulations and role playing to model the human factor. Several theoretical points of Carl von Clausewitz are worth making here. First, “the object of war is to impose our will on the enemy, through means of maximum force, with the aim of rendering him powerless” (Clausewitz 1976, 75). The enemy’s
resistance is the product of his means (capability) and his will. Computer simulations are generally based on Lancastrian equations which model attrition and force ratios. No where here is the will of the enemy.

Second, "war is not the action of a living force upon an inanimate object (total nonresistance would be no war at all) but always the collision of two living forces" (Clausewitz 1976, 77). The colloquialism "the enemy always has a vote" must be taken seriously. In the Army's large exercise programs, the Battle Command Training Program (BCTP), the Army Warfighting Experiments (AWE), and Army After Next Wargames, the battles are always force-on-force, free play exercises against a thinking enemy (such as the World Class OPFOR). This takes into account a realization that no matter how much the Army plans and gathers intelligence, the enemy has an equal opportunity and desire to exercise resistance consistent with his motives for war. This still does not consider the followers (as individuals and units) which need leadership.

Third, the moral factors of "the skill of the commander, the experience and courage of the troops, and their patriotic spirit" for Army forces and the enemy cannot be discounted, nor can they be considered separately from the physical forces. "The effects of physical and psychological factors form an organic whole which, unlike a metal alloy, is inseparable by chemical processes" (Clausewitz 1976, 607). The point being that simulations (particularly computer driven) represent warfare in the aggregate and they truly only represent the physical forces and neglect (or significantly undervalue) the moral forces which challenge leaders at all levels.
From a pure leadership perspective, a leader learns by leading. Not as planers, synchronizers, tacticians, and data processors (which are skills for physical forces) but by influencing (communicating, decision making, motivating), operating (planning, executing, assessing), and improving (developing, building, learning) the soldiers and subordinate leaders in their charge. One “cannot understand leadership without understanding followership” (Taylor and Rosenbach 1983, 2).

“Training strategies that show promise in developing mature battle commanders include practical thinking and battlefield situation assessment skills, in concert with challenging work roles accompanied by solid mentor support and coaching” (Reisweber 1997, 50). The leader ability to rapidly form a situational assessment is a characteristic known as coup d’œil or quick survey. At a glance some leaders can know what is important in a set of circumstances. Clausewitz described it: “If the mind is to emerge unscathed from this relentless struggle, with the unforeseen, two qualities are indispensable: first, an intellect that, even in the darkest hour, retains some glimmerings of the inner light which leads to the truth; and second, the courage to follow this faint light wherever it may lead. This first term is coup d’œil; the second is determination” (Clausewitz 1976, 102).

Understanding the battlefield requires more than mechanical skills. “The diversity of operating environments, equipment sophistication, increased tempo, and substitution of situational knowledge for traditional physical control will place unprecedented demands on soldiers and leaders. To win on future battlefields, future leaders of all armies must be skilled in the art of military operations, capable of adjusting
rapidly to the temporal and spatial variations of new battlefields” (TRADOC Pam 525-5, 2-8, italics mine). This is not something that is necessarily innate, nor can it be simply taught. The development of these qualities requires a certain mental aptitude, study of history, understanding of theory and most of all experience in attempting this mental adaptability.

In the transformation from direct leaders to organizational leaders, some find difficulty adjusting to changing thought processes. As officers are learning their profession, they are surrounded by training aids, checklists, approved solutions, and pedagogic instruction. As field grade officers, learning continues but the developmental focus shifts significantly to thought processes (or “how to think”) rather than just the results (the “what to think”). Organizational leaders also assume responsibility for developing their subordinate leaders—an obvious mandate if the Army is to continue to thrive as an institution.

The leader development programs in operational assignments vary greatly because there is no Army doctrine which describes a formal process to reach the goal to master leader values, attributes, skills and actions.

In operational assignments, ‘developing’ leaders study leadership through discussions, observations, reading, education and their own experiences. After gathering information, leaders learn by analyzing information and identifying ways to put it to use. Leaders experience the majority of their development when they practice what they have learned during duty performance and receive feedback following that performance. This feedback comes from peers, subordinates, supervisors and self-assessment. Feedback provides developing leaders with more information to study, analyze and implement. (Craig 1999, 8)

The leader development program should be tailored to meet the needs of the unit and the individuals. The goals should address all leader dimensions of the leadership
framework. The overall program could consist of study programs, practice programs and feedback programs each with objectives required to meet the program goals. Operational units also have opportunities for developing leaders to meet and talk with mentors who can relate knowledge and provide feedback in a unique environment.

Self-Development

Leader self-development is critical especially as assignments become increasingly unique and as leader rise in rank. The Army leadership framework and leader dimensions serve as the foundation for all leader development programs. The process of study, practice and feedback applies for personal leadership development. The requirement for individual initiative in self-development applies throughout an officer’s career, including during institutional training and education and operational assignments. The fact that self-development is a separate pillar in the leader development model is somewhat misleading. Self-development must be continuous.

Organizational leaders should assist subordinate leaders in their self-development needs in addition to the overall unit needs. Making self-development a priority can serve as an example and in many respect may be the only process for growth the officer encounters (depending upon assignment and workload). The leader development support system (LDSS) is an organization that most officers have never heard of. The fact that leader development is viewed with such high regard, but so few resources is a paradox for developing Army leaders.

“Self-development is an important personal responsibility. Many of the most successful leaders of the American Army followed life-long patterns of reading, study,
and analysis of history and contemporary national and international affairs. A passion for self-development is equally important for privates, noncommissioned officers, junior officers, and senior officers” (FM 100-1 1994, 14). The institutional support for self-development must be realized before we can anticipate commitment “in the field.” There are opportunities for internet-based training yet to be fully explored. Complete understanding of FM 22-100 could pre-determine success for some leaders while those less motivated could be destined for mediocrity.

Assignment Policy

The distribution function of the research model assigns Newly trained personnel to their initial organizations according to established priorities. For future organizational leaders assignment to organizations as well as individual duty positions are important for continued development. Current assignment policies and priority organizations dictate how officers are assigned. With the arrival of OPMS XXI, officers will track in parallel career fields. All future battalion and brigade commanders will be in the operations career field. This has significant impact on future organizational leaders because of the limited breadth of experiences available. Functional area officers (not in the operations career field) will fill all functional area coded positions. Operations career field officers will gain depth in operational assignments instead, as they will rarely be assigned to a functional area job.

In some sense the leader development opportunities for all officers can be focused based on the requirements of the career field. There are certainly diverse leadership challenges facing all officers as the Army proceeds towards the Army After Next. The
future commanders, however, will be selected from among operations career field officers who will spend a greater portion of their developmental time in operational units prior to command. There is a benefit and tradeoff associated with the depth and breadth of experiences based on assignment opportunities. Assignments drive leader development, which seems appropriate. But should leader development requirements instead drive assignments to particular duty positions? There is somewhat of a development conundrum—the officer’s preparedness to do the job versus the valuable experience gained in doing something new for which they are unprepared. Since assignments are only tangentially related to leadership doctrine, this question is left for further research.

Since operational doctrine includes the spectrum of operations from stability and support operations on the low threat side to global war on the high threat side, leaders must develop the adaptability to operate effectively across the spectrum. In many instances the balance between peace operations and combat could be precarious. A unit could deploy to do humanitarian assistance, assist in some peacekeeping operations, become engaged in intense combat, and conduct peace enforcement activities all during the same deployment. The set of attributes, skills and actions necessary in each of these situations are diverse and formidable. The diversity of assignments, from a leader development perspective, provide more experience and information which the officer could study, practice and grow from as a result.

Future organizational leaders must also be concerned about the developmental assignments of their junior leaders. "Trends in military operations suggest that the
exercise of individual leadership will become increasingly important to junior officers and non-commissioned officers. All Army officers and noncommissioned officers, therefore, must mentor their subordinates in the profession of arms, seeking to develop in them the ability to take the appropriate action on their own initiative in support of the commander’s intent” (FM 100-1 1994, 28). If the Army is to maintain its reputation as the world’s finest land fighting force it must make leader development an institutional priority. That priority is not just “emphasis,” but the result of a transformational leadership attempt which inspires future leaders to commitment and internalization.

The great changes in human and scientific affairs have had a dramatic effect upon the actual practice of the profession of arms. The frontier militiamen defended hearth and home armed simply with musket and hatchet. His descendants control hundreds of times more killing power and find themselves defending American vital interests, common rights, and individual freedoms in remote corners of the world. Nevertheless, through all these changes, the basic leadership skills required of George Washington, Ulysses S. Grant, John J. Pershing, Dwight D. Eisenhower, or George C. Marshall have changed as little as the principles of war and the ethos and professional qualities inherent in the profession of arms. These skills remain the foundation of our doctrine and the unique American way of waging war. Similarly, previously unwritten principles have guided military leaders when engaged in operations other than war. (FM 100-1 1994, 5)

The Army faces both technical and social challenges. “The unique organization of the U.S. Army is founded on mission and [it] evolves based on need and resources available. . . . The reason the Army organization is ‘unique’ is based on the fact that it does not fit entirely into either the classic technical organization or social (human) organization model” (US Army War College 1999, 3-1).

Relevance for the Future Leader

Critical to the relevance for the future leader, is the future follower. Since history (ancient and contemporary) has proven that there is no ideal leader, only the right (or
wrong) leader for the particular organization in the particular circumstance. There will continue to be the intangible element of "best fit" of leaders (with values, attributes, skills, and actions) and style with the group of people they must lead.
CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Introduction

Leadership is the most important element of combat power and with regard to how the Army conducts the process of change, leadership doctrine and leader development are fundamental throughout the process. The Army Organizational Life-Cycle Model describes the functions and influences on the process of change. Leaders initiate the process, approve the requirements for new capability, steward resources during the transformation, and provide purpose, direction, and motivation to accomplish the mission and sustain the institution with the new capability. Leader development is only one of the six Army imperatives (DTLOMS) that impact future force development.

The organizational (and strategic) leaders of the future are the direct leaders of today. The captains and majors of the Army in 2000 will be the colonels and general officers of the Army After Next. The Army continually changes to meet the needs of the nation. Leaders must lead change by being “able, through professional development and competence, to provide the required direction, persuasion and instruction to seniors, peers and subordinates so that the requirements for and the acceptance of change is understood to be the normal condition, rather than the exception to the normal, in the accomplishment of assigned missions” (US Army War College 1999, 8-2).

The Army has a remarkable history of great leaders and an unrivaled reputation for producing those leaders. The U.S. position in the world today as the only superpower is due to leadership in the nation’s businesses, industry, academia, and military. It would
be absurd for any researcher to conclude that all that will end. For the Army, the leader
development challenge is continual since the organization is not static: soldiers enlist for
short duration, and leaders move through multiple jobs as they increase in rank and
responsibility. A Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of a corporation could serve until very
advanced in age (seventy, eighty, or ninety), while most soldiers retire after twenty years.
(Few stay up to thirty years, and only generals can stay longer than thirty, but most still
face mandatory retirement while still in their fifties).

With this dynamic sample population the Army faces a moving target when trying
to implement leadership doctrine. But despite the challenges, Army leadership doctrine
is sound (perhaps the best and most comprehensive it has ever been). Sound doctrine is
not perfect and given the perpetual nature of change, it never will be. Despite these rave
reviews, there are issues which this research discovered that need attention.

Conclusions

International officers warmly remark that the U.S. Army is a doctrine-obsessed
institution. The hundreds of manuals, pamphlets, and circulars which posit doctrine and
tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) leave one wondering if it will ever be possible
to synchronize all the publications (which are interrelated and frequently reference each
other). The framework, tenets, functions, and terminology evolve over time and the
Jominian inclination for principles and maxims finds an outlet in Army publications.

FM 22-100, *Army Leadership*, 1999 is among the first manuals to be published
electronically, to be accessed off the world wide web (http://www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi-
bin/atdl.dll/fm/22-100/toc.htm). This trend in publication is a harbinger of the future and
may be an answer to the synchronization of doctrinal manuals issue addressed above. The consolidation of several publications into the single-source reference is also a positive move which may foretell more for the future.

The Army leadership framework is the success story of leadership doctrine. The framework follows the familiar pattern (Be, Know, Do) and establishes the leader dimensions which apply to all Army leaders (direct, organizational, and strategic; military and civilian; active and reserve component). The incorporation of Army values (LDRSHIP), performance indicators, developmental counseling, and the character development model is in keeping with the fostering of institutional culture, and it represents transformational leadership--seeking commitment, even internalization, from leaders at all levels.

The most important “commodity” in leadership is people. The leader-follower relationship (which includes individual soldiers as followers and groups or units as followers) although implicit in “influencing people” is sometimes lost in the all-encompassing term “Army leader.” Army leaders lead people (by virtue of authority as well as pure leadership). Providing one-way purpose, direction and motivation is not treated differently from shared purpose, common direction, and spontaneous motivation. The former results from authority but the latter requires understanding of “moral factors” and theories of human behavior and group dynamics which are largely disregarded in the doctrine. “Doctrine must pay more than lip service to battlefield morale, both in human and organizational terms. Units must be structured and employed to minimize the stress placed on the soldiers who serve in them, not just to maximize their weapons’ destructive
potential. The segregation of tactics and leadership in our training publications is symptomatic of how deeply we neglect the human factor in war” (Eden 1999, 35).

The uncertain environment of the future organizational leader will require some exceptional leaders. “Battle Command will remain a combination of art and science. Yet the art will be more necessary now than before because commanders must apply principles and design considerations and frameworks in situations and scenarios we cannot predict with any certainty—truly a different demand on commanders than the relatively prescriptive and known scenarios of the Cold War” (TRADOC Pam 525-5 1994, 2-8). These challenges are not entirely new, but that doesn’t make them any less troubling. The combination of uncertainty in the geopolitical landscape, evolving military art, phenomenal advances in technology, and a significant generational change among the soldiers “born in the Information Age” pose real challenges indeed.

The operational doctrine has also changed. From the purely tactical focus of the Field Service Regulations, to the introduction of the term “operational art” linking strategy to tactics, finally to the draft FM 100-5 of today in which strategy is an integral part. “Strategy and doctrine are interrelated. Military doctrine must be capable of executing the strategy of its time. Thus, for our Army’s needs, doctrine in the present and predicted strategic environments will be much less prescriptive and much less given to precise, scientific analysis than military doctrine of the Cold War” (TRADOC Pam 525-5 1994, 4-1).

Developing innovative and adaptive leaders requires creativity and intellect. The culture within units must foster that creativity and nurture the intellect. “A willingness to
experiment and explore possible strategies even in the face of uncertainty may become a more pronounced characteristic of the creative leader” (Cronin 1983, 10). That willingness to experiment and explore possibilities can easily be crushed by a unit climate of over control and “micro-management.” With creativity will come some incredible insights which could make the difference for success in the uncertainty of the future. The same creativity will also birth absurdity which is the risk involved with change. All the more reason to nurture the intellect and reassure the emotions that risk doesn’t mean “your career is over.” The Army must foster the environment of a learning organization and recognize that the combination of creativity and intellect do not conform to a single path to victory. The Army should not seek a single path to victory since to block a single path requires only a single counter and a thinking enemy should not be underestimated in his ability to develop that single countermeasure.

The evolution of military art is hard to define, but this research showed that the Army After Next project had a far-reaching mission. The knowledge-based Army is a foregone conclusion. The U.S. will have a force with an unprecedented ability to know a great deal about friendly forces and the enemy. But the ability to know, without a corresponding ability to act is an academic exercise. The variable in the Army After Next equation is not only the ability to act, but also the speed with which we act. That speed is measured both as physical speed (moving across the deadly zone at speeds ten times as fast as today) and mental speed (faster processing, faster planning, faster decision making) (Knowledge and Speed 1998, 4-8). The neglected (or superficially treated) commodity, once again, is the human factor. Soldiers still must deal with
danger—the fear of violent death, the isolation of a dispersed force, and human limits such as cognition and fatigue.

The ongoing debate about offense versus defense, maneuver versus attrition (firepower), chaos theory, nonlinear dynamics, support and stability operations (SASO), limited wars versus total war (nuclear or conventional), will not be settled by this research. Suffice to say that future organizational leaders need to develop everything in the leadership framework and master the values, attributes, skills and actions to be prepared to perform, but more importantly to be prepared to enter the debate and provide rationed, reasonable leader advice about the future. If they can help shape the future, they will be better prepared for it.

The obsession with technology is exciting and frightening at the same time. Certainly the Army wants to capitalize on all that technology has to offer (today and in the future). The predicament comes from understanding what is driving the process. Organizational leaders must concern themselves with processes, cause and effect relationships, and interrelationships if they are to lead change. Doctrine is the engine of change. Yet force structure changes can occur because of resource constraints (without regard to doctrine) and organizations are redesigned based on technology enhancements and enablers which are not developed yet. Finally, leaders must be a part of the process of technological innovation. Equipment should support doctrine, technology should support soldiers, and leaders must take a systems approach to the challenges of the future. The system they create will be the system they must operate so it should be thoroughly tested and integrated based on rational input.
Answer the Thesis Question

The Army has a strong leadership doctrine including the leadership framework the leader dimensions (values, attributes, skills and actions). Does the Army adequately utilize leadership doctrine to prepare midgrade officers for the innovative and adaptable organizational leadership required in the Army After Next? To prepare midgrade officers for organizational leadership requires leader development. The Army leader development program has some shortcomings. First, there is no doctrine for leader development, only a goal to "master the values, attributes, skills and actions." The institutional training and education does not adequately address the totality of the leadership framework--specifically the interpersonal and conceptual skills, and improving actions. Finally, the extent to which leaders become adaptive and innovative (as required for the Army After Next) is a function of individual initiative (based on extensive self-development) and individual aptitude (creativity and intellect).

Secondary Questions

1. How does the Army use leadership doctrine to prepare officers for future leadership challenges, and how well does it conform to the realities of the Information Age? The Army uses leadership doctrine by integrating the leader development imperative throughout the entire Army Organizational Life-Cycle Model. First Army leadership doctrine is the result of the force development process (as is operational doctrine and training doctrine). The requirements determination process elicits the insights (requirements and future capabilities) on which the Army bases its doctrine.
The selection and assessment function is part of leadership doctrine in that officers undergo training and are evaluated by their superiors on their values (character development) and performance indicators which indicate potential for continued service.

Leadership training is both formal and informal. The leader development pillars provide domains in which to instruct officers on leadership doctrine to improve performance and foster the cognitive skills needed for future responsibilities. Professional Military Education (PME) is formal leader training and education and informal training results from operational assignments and varying degrees of self-development.

The Army assignment policy supports leadership doctrine by providing the operational assignments for officers to study, learn, and practice their profession. Acquiring tacit knowledge by actually performing as a leader is the most important experience for developing leaders in leadership doctrine. Developing leaders will not have the same experiences and because people learn differently, identical experience will not necessarily yield the same results in terms of values, attributes, skills and actions. For this reason it is important to vary assignments and experiences in order to expose developing leaders to multiple challenges in a learning environment.

How well leadership doctrine conforms to the realities of the Information Age is relevant to the extent that leadership doctrine includes more than just “influencing people.” The internet-based distance learning initiatives, CD-ROM based instruction packages, and high-tech simulations have provided new opportunities (and more yet to be discovered). The challenge that remains is the extent to which the Information Age moves the focus to anything other than the people of the Army. If leaders become
technical wizards capable of winning every computer-based simulation (based on attrition of forces) at the expense of developing trust among soldiers, building cohesive teams to accomplish missions (which has not been simulated in cyberspace), and building learning organizations that prepare future leaders, the Army will not have accomplished the goals of its leadership doctrine.

2. What is the operational environment of the Army After Next that defines the roles and responsibilities of the future organizational leaders, and what is different from the leadership required during the post-Cold War era? The operational environment is volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous. The changes in geopolitics (particularly the potential threats to U.S. national interests); changes in military art (the likelihood of fighting set-paced battles against an enemy who mirrors the U.S.); rapidly advancing technological developments (on which the Army could place too much reliance and be faced with disaster); and the realities of human and organizational behavior make military leadership a task for professionals. The organizational leaders of the Army After Next must be prepared to operate in such an environment across the spectrum of operations.

3. Is leader development equal to other Army imperatives for the future force?

Of the six Army imperatives (DTLOMS) leader development is not equal to materiel solutions or organizational structure which enjoy vastly more resources. “At the top levels of the Department of Defense in particular, fascination with technology, finances, and geopolitics continue to relegate human issues—except for a few pet social projects—to the back bench. In fact, any RMA [Revolution in Military Affairs] will sooner or later come to depend more on the sustainment of fighting spirit than on the utilization of
cyberspace” (Ulmer 1996, 199). The leader development imperative certainly has an equal opportunity to impact the effectiveness of the institution. For example, the unprecedented departure of junior and mid-career leaders in the past two years is largely attributed (although not completely) to Army culture, leadership climate, and career management issues (all within the purview of leadership). The Leadership Blue Ribbon Panel convenes in the Spring of 2000 to address these important issues. If they are indeed leadership problems, they will require leadership solutions (not organizational or materiel solutions).

4. Is there too much emphasis or reliance on officer self-development in the leader development model? The leader development model is an oversimplification of a complex, interwoven process. Utilizing three separate, parallel pillars for the domains of leader development is counterproductive and misleading. Self-development must be a continual process and it occurs during institutional training and education and during operational assignments. The leader development domains could be better modeled as a web or Venn diagram, which more clearly show the overlap and interdependence of the leader development domains.

Even with such a change in how the model depicts leader development, self-development would remain dominant. This indicates the debate about whether leaders are born or made. “Behaviors can be taught and nourished. Whether those basic attitudes underlying leaders’ behavior can be greatly modified remains of major importance to our leader identification and selection systems” (Matthews 1989, ix).
The propensity or inclination of a developing leader to excel as a future leader will be encouraged by leadership doctrine. Self-development will remain the centerpiece.

5. Is there adequate emphasis on “how to think” rather than “what to think?” The totality of the Army leadership framework (with the expressed integration of mental attributes, conceptual skills, and improving actions) adequately emphasizes the intellectual framework of how leaders think. The continued inclusion of technical and tactical skills is important (particularly at junior levels) as they establish the base for the profession of arms. The importance of cognition and teaching skills (while remaining an active learner) grows as organizational leaders take on higher responsibilities.

Practical soldiers perform tasks. Direct leaders perform critical leadership functions by influencing soldiers, operating systems, and improving the organization. Much of this can be done according to Jominian Principles of War, checklists, standards, and others. The influencing, operating, and improving at the organizational level requires some changes. The development of coup d’oeil or inward eye, enabling rapid situational assessment, vision, communicating mission-orders, and executing in real world danger, with group dynamics and human emotions involved describes the change. There are fewer “right” answers and standards for measuring success may only apply after significant time has elapsed. How to think rightly receives more emphasis than what to think.

6. What about trust and teamwork in the uncertain future of the Army After Next? To discount trust, teamwork, or cohesion would be to eliminate the human element of leadership--and pure leadership doesn’t exist without the human element.
“There is no effective leadership without trust. Leaders are dependent upon trust as a bond between them and their followers. . . Of all the modern organizations, there is none so dependent on the bonds of trust as the military” (Taylor and Rosenbach 1996, 2). No matter what the technological advances of the Army After Next and no matter how “empty” the battlefield becomes because of dispersion and weapons lethality, the leader-follower relationship must be built on trust. “Teams are not driven by the leader. Effective leaders create an environment in which people motivate themselves” (Taylor and Rosenbach 1996, 2). Particularly based on an uncertain future, where the path is not clear, leaders can only rely upon trust to lead soldiers to accomplish the mission. This has not changed, and will not change.

7. Should the Army consider shortening the life-cycle development of organizational leaders--increase reliance on junior officers and NCOs for more responsibility and a broader range of actions, or eliminate the differentiation altogether? The differentiation of the three levels of leadership (direct, organizational, and strategic) is an easy way to discuss increased responsibility and differing methods for influencing people, operating systems, and improving organizations. “Organizational leadership skills differ from direct leadership skills in degree, but not in kind” (FM 22-100 1999, 6-2). Junior officers and NCOs are already responsible for broader actions than those previously thought of as direct leadership. They are leading soldiers in operations across the spectrum and because of the environment, the “degree” of skills required is changed from the Cold War era.
Two issues deserve comment on the life-cycle development of organizational level leaders. First is the value of broad experience versus increased specialization. Upon commissioning officers receive specialized training in a branch. Often the technical nature of the training is necessary due to the role of the officer in their initial assignments. As the officer gains experience, they broaden their perspective and become more generalists. The generalist requires a comprehensive understanding rather than the specialized knowledge of the more junior officer. In some important ways this is changing. In the logistics field for example, officers must increasingly perform (at junior levels) as multifunctional logistics officers. In the “digitized division” 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized) the commander of a forward support company (a captain) is responsible for maintenance, ammunition, supply, transportation, medical support, and others. The likelihood that a captain could have the specialized training in ordnance, quartermaster, transportation, and medical service that would allow the generalized, comprehensive understanding necessary is dubious.

Second, with the advent of OPMS XXI, some officers will specialize as functional area officers in the operations support, information operations, and institutional support career fields. The officers that remain in the operations career field will be the future commanders of battalion and higher organizations but they will lack the broader, comprehensive perspective that could be gained from serving (for a time) in a functional area assignment. Perhaps the increased time spent in operational assignments will sharpen other skills but at the expense of broader experience.
These two issues lead to some insights about the life-cycle development of organizational leaders. If some officers are going to specialize as functional area officers under OPMS XXI then waiting until promotion to major may be late for that designation. In the first place, before an officer can assess into one of the other career fields they must be “branch qualified” in their basic branch. Branch qualification, in most cases, includes completion of the Captains Career Course (branch advanced course and the Combined Arms Staff Services School--CAS3) and successful company-level command. The company-level command opportunities are limited and the duration of commands is curtailed in order to maximize the availability of “branch qualified” captains. Future organizational leaders in the operations career field could command longer (at company level) if the career field designation process was completed earlier, and it was determined that only some of the other career field officers needed company command to branch qualify.

Second, the nature of the job and the scope of responsibility should match the experience of the officer, not necessarily based on rank. The multifunctional support company could be commanded by a major who has had the experience needed for a broader, comprehensive perspective. The same idea could apply in the Army After Next. If the combat unit of the future requires every leader and soldier to perform a variety of very complex missions, then the maturity and experience of every leader and soldier may be different from today’s organization. The entry-level positions in an Army After Next unit may be for sergeants and captains. Developmental positions will be in other
Recommendations

Due to the limited scope of this thesis there are some areas that the researcher did not include. To suggest further study the following insights may be of value. Leadership is a highly personal activity and some people with particular personality types may excel compared to others with a different personality type. The integration of personality type as it relates to the whole picture of the officer warrants research. Personality typing generally indicates an individual preference and provides information for the officer (on compensating behaviors) and others (subordinates and superiors) in tailoring methods of interaction. Leadership activities are people-intensive so better understanding people could make better leaders.

The former Officer Foundation Standards (OFS) and Military Qualification Standards (MQS) are areas which have been abandoned. These standards identified qualitative and quantitative measurements for officers (including officer candidates). Research into reestablishing standards or explaining the rationale for eliminating them would be valuable.

Teaching, coaching, and counseling are consistent leader development requirements throughout leadership doctrine (from 1983 to 1999). The 1999 version of FM 22-100 puts these activities and three others under the definition of “mentoring.” “Mentoring (in America’s Army) is the proactive development of each subordinate through observing, assessing, coaching, teaching, developmental counseling, and
evaluating that results in people being treated with fairness and equal opportunity.

Mentoring is an inclusive process (not an exclusive one) for everyone under a leader’s charge” (FM 22-100 1999, 5-16).

This totally inclusive leader development is aimed at providing all subordinates with the knowledge and skills to “be all they can be.” Interesting research could focus on the not so inclusive process of “mentors” and protégés in which the welfare, training and careers of exceptional subordinates are particularly influenced by close, informal relationships.

Final Thoughts

Leadership is a much talked about little understood aspect of the military profession. “The [FM 22-100] authors intentionally did not write the doctrine as theoretical in nature, in order to more effectively communicate with their target audience” (Jones 1999, 84). With this in mind, FM 22-100 does a good job of communicating leadership doctrine to Army leaders. However, this researcher sees a missed opportunity to link leader “charismatic” appeal to values (and attitudes) with transformational leadership theory. A clear definition of this linkage would ameliorate the cynicism associated with Army values and Character Development XXI.

Finally, as repeatedly indicated above, it is critical to differentiate pure leadership (based on relationship, trust, interpersonal skills, and influencing actions) from still necessary authority and other activities like supervision, management, and organization. Every officer activity is not leadership but every leader activity does involve people. As long as Army leaders focus on influencing people—by providing purpose, direction, and
motivation—while operating to accomplish the mission and improving the organization we will continue to thrive as an institution. The nation we serve asks no more and deserves no less than leaders of character and competence who act to achieve excellence by developing a force that can fight and win the nation's wars and serve the common defense of the United States.
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