Competitive Military Recruiting — A Strategy of Institutional Fratricide

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ABSTRACT

Competitive Military Recruiting -- A Case of Institutional Fratricide By Major James F. Dickens, U.S. Army, 68 pages including notes and bibliography.

The U.S. military's system of duplicative and competitive active duty recruiting contributes to and perpetuates the failure of DOD-wide recruiting efforts. Given the significant changes in the U.S. economy, and the relinquishment of market-share by the military services associated with the military drawdown of the 1990s, the military's present recruiting strategy will no longer fulfill DOD's personnel readiness requirements.

The Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine recruiting forces have tried in vain to increase individual service market-share and the DOD-wide share within the greater employment market. Single-service efforts ostensibly aimed at increasing service market share predominantly impact upon other military services. Current marketing strategies and operations that are redundant and inefficient often cost the DOD more than the value gained in enlistment production increases. Small unit sales tactics and recruiting procedures encourage additional waste through the duplication of recruiting effort and negative military advertising.

This monograph concludes that DOD must modify the flawed recruiting strategy if it is to avoid the continuous erosion of personnel readiness into the future. Development and adoption of DOD-wide marketing processes would enhance recruiting force efficiency through effective distribution. The management of prospecting and telemarketing efforts must be centralized and commercialized to enhance recruiter productivity and minimize redundant or high pressure prospecting techniques. Finally, Parallel and competitive recruiting organizations must consolidate to eliminate internal friction.

Military readiness is the bill-payer for the inefficient and internally destructive recruiting systems allowed for under Title 10. The Secretary of Defense must exercise his authority under that same body of law to eliminate the destructive competition resident in the parallel recruiting systems of the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines.
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1999 proved an especially troubling time for the military services. It marked the second consecutive year in which the US Marine Corps was the only active federal service to achieve both its assigned enlistment and accession requirements for entry-level active duty personnel. Air Force mission failure -- a whopping 12.3 percent deficit, combined with the recurrent Army and Navy failures to mark a new era in military recruiting: An era when persistent hard times had finally come to fulfill the service's worst fears. Recruiting conditions turned decidedly against the fielded recruiting forces just as enlistment missions had begun to rise from the previous decade's declining quotas. Since then, the tireless American economy and its healthy and competitive job-market have combined to pummel military recruiting forces well into the new fiscal year. Through the first two quarters of Fiscal Year 2000 (FY 00), qualified youths increasingly chose against active military service despite sweeping changes in both military compensation and enlistment incentives and high public regard for the military. Prevailing economic conditions have created among recruiters the expectation of impending doom in their collective recruiting effort.

Singlarly undaunted among the four active duty services, Marine Corps recruiting remains consistently successful, though the Marines too are engaged in an increasingly bitter struggle to achieve their assigned quotas. A recent Marine Corps recruiting newsletter aptly sounded a call to arms for a renewed recruiting offensive:

"9th District recruiters now have an opportunity to earn awards for themselves, their [recruiting stations] and their district, all while battling the evil Apathetic empire. So run to your nearest grad location and help out in the war effort by sending those young Americans to boot camp. . . . prepare to fight off old Otto VonIndifference and his evil regime."

Even Marine recruiters and their leaders see their recruiting mission as a battle. Since accepting battle long ago, 'old Otto' has given no quarter. Field recruiters enter a new battle daily against their own 'Apathetic empire' which shows no inclination to be 'fought off.'

Recruiters, defense official, and analysts alike seem to agree that the recruiting challenge is a war without bullets and bombs. On one front in this war, recruiters aim at influencing the actions of
potential enlistees. There, recruiters struggle to gain the attention of America’s prospective youth by suppressing the allure of the robust private economy, and the appeals of college and corporate recruiters. On a second front, recruiting is a war to cultivate broad popular acceptance of military service as a meaningful career choice. Efforts on this front focus upon influencing broad public perceptions about opportunities within the military -- including the perceptions of both the prospective enlistees and their influencers. To accomplish this, recruiting forces conduct area canvassing and community relations’ activities to cultivate and sustain a positive image of military service within their local communities. They also focus advertising campaigns to reverse the erosion of positive enlistment propensity.6 Along these two recruiting fronts, recruiting policy makers and strategists have put forth complex plans improving the living conditions and remuneration of active duty service members, increasing military advertising budgets, and generally intensifying the recruiting effort. To date, America’s youth and those who influence them are generally unimpressed and unresponsive to DOD’s collective efforts.

RECRUITING’S THIRD FRONT

In 1999 and 2000 the four service chiefs and the Secretary of Defense proffered various recruiting strategies, each intended to concentrate and intensify their recruiting efforts. The strategies included programs to employ civilian role models as spokesmen and to bolster military advertising by adding corporate partners and private endorsements. Simultaneously, defense leadership secured and publicized substantial improvements in the quality of military life hoping that such changes would likewise improve the overall recruiting outlook.7 And, in fact, the services affected significant changes in the military’s public face through a widely publicized pay raise in FY 00. However, DOD stopped short of a complete overhaul in the military quality-of-life standards. These efforts were, therefore, less than decisive in helping recruiting forces achieve their stated objectives. As a result, the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines continued haltingly along the same old road to defeat

Defense leaders, strategists, and analysts seem to have neglected an important ‘third front’ in the recruiting war. The enemies on this front represent the single most nefarious yet controllable
threat to the success of the DOD recruiting effort. Military are entrenched in an endless pitched battle with the perceptive and determined recruiting forces of their sister military services. Taking control of the DOD-wide recruiting system and reducing the ill effects of inter-service competition on this third front may be the key to long-term military recruiting success.

By operating parallel and competitive active duty recruiting systems, the separate military branches commit their recruiters to a bitter and losing war with themselves.

**SEPARATE SERVICES ORGANIZE AND RECRUIT**

Under the provisions of US Code Title 10, Armed Forces, the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps must "organize, train and equip" the active and reserve components of their respective departments. Title 10 does not specify how the services will accomplish these tasks. In fact, it grants the service chiefs significant flexibility in the organization and management of their recruiting efforts. As a result, DOD operates its fielded recruiting forces through the separate services that have each developed different approaches to recruiting operations. Those forces consist of more than 15,000 active duty servicemen and women. Army recruiters make up about 40 percent of this total; the Navy, 31 percent; Marines, 17 percent, and the Air Force, 8. Each service also operates a significant reserve component recruiting force.

The separate services assign annual quotas to active duty recruiting forces based upon the congressionally mandated active force end-strengths and expected active duty attrition. These 'accession' quotas set the number of individuals who must not only sign an enlistment contract but also must report to active duty before the end of the fiscal year. Upon receipt of an annual accession quota or mission, recruiting force commanders develop quarterly contract missions that distribute the requirements across the fiscal year. This practice provides for a steady workload within the recruiting force and an even flow of trainees through the service's training facilities. Contract or 'enlistment' quotas are necessarily higher than the accession quota by a factor approximating the rate at which individuals who sign enlistment contracts will fail to report for active duty.
Services geographically distribute recruiting forces across the United States and its overseas possessions in the manner they see most appropriate for achieving long-range recruiting objectives. Where necessary for economic efficiency, all four major services may operate out of joint recruiting facilities, but always under separate command and control. The recruiters themselves operate as individuals and small units in an intensely competitive environment. They compete against civilian and corporate recruiting forces as well as the 2,400 plus military reserve force recruiters plus the separate Coast Guard, National Guard, and Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) recruiting forces. The size, distribution, complexity, and sophistication of the military recruiting system exceed that of any rival corporate or collegiate recruiting system. The importance of the military recruiting system's success is similarly unrivalled.

**MILITARY READINESS AT STAKE**

Early in 1999, the Pentagon published a high-priority personnel strategy. It consisted of three people programs intended to accent the critical link between personnel readiness and the overall fitness of the military services. This 'strategic triad' of people programs stressed the need for improvement to active service member benefits including the progressive elimination of the military-civilian pay gap, realignment of enlisted pay tables, and the repeal of the REDUX retirement program. Yet, changes in military compensation affected the recruiting effort only indirectly. And, though the authors of the strategy had identified the faltering recruiting effort as the key obstacle to achieving and maintaining personnel readiness, they proposed nothing to attack that particular obstacle.

Since the strategic triad's adoption, the service chiefs have taken several additional steps to improve the forecast for military personnel readiness. They added new recruiting incentives, and continued efforts aimed at improving military quality-of-life programs. Though all of these efforts consume an increasingly larger proportion of the defense budget, the service chiefs have only just begun to realize that solving the big 'people problem' may involve more than money. In fact, by overemphasizing the influence of money on the success of the DOD-wide recruiting effort, the
services may have actually made their people problem worse by making the recruiting process much less efficient.

Nonetheless, enlistment and recruiter incentive programs poured into each of the various recruiting commands throughout FYs 99 and into 00. Regrettably, the military recruiting effort at large did not adequately benefit from either its lofty priority among strategy issues or the intensified recruiting efforts. Despite "Herculean"\(^{14}\) efforts, the services entered the new FY 10,000 uniformed servicemen short of manning requirements and by the end of the second fiscal quarter, were well on their way to increasing or perpetuating that personnel shortfall.\(^{15}\)

At least one major force commander had recognized the negative effects of low recruitment before FY 99. Major General Simpson, Commander of U.S. Army Forces in Alaska indicated in an interview with *Army Times* that his command had reached the point where many of the infantry squads were so undermanned, they could not perform their war time missions.\(^{16}\) Since that time, worldwide military requirements have increased the demands on forces, and have stretched the thin military personnel resources much closer to the breaking point.

**FOCUS OF STUDY — IS THE COMPETITION TANTAMOUNT TO FRATRICIDE?**

Many factors indicate that the military's approach of such a readiness breaking point is unnecessary. Such a condition is indirectly the result of lost recruiting resources and defense dollars wasted in what amounts to institutional fratricide. DOD could unify the active duty recruiting forces and apply a service-wide systems approach to the military recruiting process that would take advantage of each service's character, regional appeal, and temporary recruiting momentum. Together, the four services would eliminate such waste to overcome prevailing market conditions and the fiercely competitive pressures of college and corporate recruiters. Yet, recruiting apart from one another, the military services destroy any opportunity for consistent DOD-wide recruiting success.

This is a study of the interaction between military recruiting efforts in the macro-economy of America's greater employment market, the micro-economy of the intra-DOD recruiting market, and at street level. It identifies military recruiting operations and practices that may have contributed to
DOD's collective recruiting failures in FY 99 and to date in FY 00. Attention is directed primarily toward Army recruiting, focusing upon the interaction between the active duty recruiting services in the US Army Recruiting Battalion, Kansas City (USARBKC) recruiting area. Nevertheless, the research provides insights into the general effects of inter-service competition on all services.

The military services currently struggle in vain to expand the DOD share of the prospective employee market relative to the share of their non-military competitors. Out of both design and desperation, the services habitually turn their recruiting concentration and intensification efforts inward. Turf battles and recruiting campaigns often meet their demise in the face of effective counter-campaigns by sister military services perpetuating a spiral of defeat which may ultimately prove fatal to the all-volunteer force. The inefficiencies resulting from the competition between military services can be quantified. The results of that quantification indicate that DOD would benefit substantially from the elimination of internally competitive recruiting processes.
RECRUITING'S COMMON MARKET

Active duty recruiting forces operate within a single and fully integrated market place in which there is no difference between military service recruiting requirements and collegiate or corporate demands for new workers. In fact, the active Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps share the market-place in large part with eleven other military recruiting forces and innumerable federal, collegiate, and corporate employers. That market has practical numerical limits, which persist despite great pressures to expand the number of eligible employees. Macro-economic conditions have sustained extremely low unemployment rates within the total employment market in large part because of steady job growth. As such, the tight employment market is completely unforgiving of any inefficiencies existing within organizational recruiting systems.

Employers seeking to increase their market-share of new employees must work to either expand the total eligible employment supply or directly attack the market-share of other recruiting forces. They must win positive career decisions in their favor, leverage the nominal potential for expansion of the market, and resist the counter-efforts of competing recruiters. For any one competitor, the market is potentially and temporarily expansible. Most commonly, that expansion occurs only at the expense of the other institutional recruiting forces. Employers and recruiters who fail at these tasks will fail to achieve their recruiting goals. The military is currently failing.

DOD-WIDE MARKET TRENDS AND PROJECTIONS

RAND Corporation has long kept tabs of market trends and enlistment supply for the Army in specific and the DOD as a whole. The RAND forecast has not been encouraging to DOD. At the request of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and of the Office of the Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA), RAND developed updated enlistment supply prediction models that eliminated some older and less germane market data collected in the 1980s. These updated models still confirmed what the older models had predicted. Although the enlistment supply was theoretically sufficient to support general military personnel requirements, the historical military recruiting strategies would not produce enough recruits to meet accession requirements in the upcoming years.
In a report named "Competing with College," RAND suggested what they thought to be a radical shift of the military recruiting strategy to improve DOD's lot. In this study, they strongly advocated a shift from focused recruiting among high school students to more aggressive pursuit of the college-bound and college-enrolled student populations. Yet, RAND's brief proposal could not predict the size of the recruiting gains that would result from such a shift in focus. Additionally, the study did not acknowledge the fact that the vast majority prime market military prospects actually are the college-minded, college-bound and or college-enrolled individuals in each cohort age group. Consequently, the RAND study was not entirely congruent with the realities of how and for whom military recruiters had been recruiting.

Contrary to RAND's analysis, military recruiting systems have long pursued any and all productive veins in the greater employment market of qualified 17 to 21 year olds. Through experience, they have simply found high school students and recent graduates to be the only segments of the recruiting market that consistently and sufficiently respond to the recruiting demand. And so, despite RAND's proposals, DOD recruiting forces strongly resist dramatic internal strategy changes as they continue to work steadfastly in those productive market segments for which they have come to depend for their past successes.

DEFINING THE NICHE FOR MILITARY RECRUITING

Based upon the 1990 census, the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) estimated that there would be 20 million individuals in the military's primary prospective employee pool by the year 2000. The estimate included all potentially qualified males and females between the ages of 17 and 21. Few recruiting efforts made by any public or private organization look elsewhere to acquire entry-level employees. In fact, many recruiting efforts aim directly at a narrow subset of this market segment who are most physically and mentally capable, and those who are motivated to work hard and succeed. The military services focus particularly on the male portion of that market subset. This is a difficult and evasive audience in that college increasingly prevails as the youthful path of choice toward insuring good jobs, big salaries, and personal economic success. And, it is much less likely
that these individuals will consider enlistment in the military once they enrolled in a college program, obtained a specific job skill, or received a credential through an educational program. Although the services do offer special incentives to skilled or experienced laborers, it is very difficult for them to compete with civilian compensation packages for comparably qualified workers.

The armed forces are further challenged to accommodate individuals who have accrued mental, moral, or physical deficiencies that make them ineligible for enlistment or unsuitable for the mental, physical, and moral rigors of active duty. As prospects age, they tend to violate laws, gain weight, develop injuries or expand their families and family obligations. All these conditions reduce individual eligibility and therefore the number of qualified prospects in any age cohort. Prospective enlistees also become harder to find over time because most individuals eventually move from their high school homes and find meaningful civilian educational opportunities or employment. It is, therefore, quite difficult to systematically recruit any group of prospects more than two years after their high school graduation because directory information typically available to military recruiting forces is a high school based directory. Prospects from outside this market segment do enlist in large numbers, but recruiters rapidly reach a point of diminishing returns in their active prospecting or telemarketing for such individuals. All of these factors cause the military recruiter's main effort to gravitate toward that most competitive sector of the market — the young, healthy, high school enrolled or educated male. Yet, the preponderance of that market is more interested in other opportunities.

In the midst of the difficult recruiting environment, the DOD annual recruiting mission is rapidly approaching 200,000 per year after a dip in accession requirements associated with the military drawdown. Given this, the active military recruiting force must capture one out of every twenty of the best and brightest members of each new high school class to achieve its mission. Failing that, recruiters must replace recent high school graduates one for one by recruiting among those still qualified graduates of preceding year’s cohorts, where and however they may be found.
AN ENVIRONMENT OF CONFLICT

Private employers do not focus as closely as the DOD recruiting services within the entry-level niche of the greater employment market. Corporations and for-profit organizations more often distribute their recruiting efforts between the unskilled and skilled, labor pools. Regrettably, diffusion of their recruiting effort provides little relief for the military recruiter because currently uniformed personnel are widely recognized as hot commodities in the skilled employee market place. Corporations entice thousands of active duty servicemen and women into the private sector each year, which indirectly increases entry-level military recruiting requirements by lowering active duty retention rates. Only new accessions can fill the void left by the lost active duty service members. Currently, the pool of available skilled employees outside the military is not keeping pace with corporate job market demands. And so, a failing supply of older or skilled prospective employees forces all recruiting competitors to intensify the effort in the battle for the attention of the qualified youth.

Unlike private demands for skilled workers, some external competition plaguing DOD's recruiting effort is the creation of the federal government. The government offers many jobs and educational opportunities that compete directly against DOD. AmeriCorps, a federally funded national service program, illustrates that self-imposed competition between America's military and the many other career and service opportunities within the high school market. Initiated under the Clinton administration, AmeriCorps allows young men and women to perform national service through local and domestic aid programs. In exchange, participants receive stipends and educational benefits surpassing many offered by the military services. Since its inception, AmeriCorps has actively recruited thousands of college bound, service-minded youths. In the eyes of military officials, AmeriCorps provided too many young men and women the valuable benefits of military service without requiring a comparable payback in terms of public service. Because AmeriCorps drained their enrollees directly from the military recruiting market, AmeriCorps received much criticism from military recruiters and politicians alike.
MILITARY ADVERTISING AND MARKETING

The Army has become so frustrated in their own attempts to overcome the challenges of the stubborn employment market that they have abandoned one of the most successful advertising partnerships in our nation's history. "We are making a wholesale change to our approach in communicating with America." According to the Army's Assistant Secretary for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, the Army severed its longstanding and successful relationship with the advertising agency responsible for coining the recruiting slogan "Be All You Can Be." The Army described plans to "tailor" its use of that slogan in the future to get away from its previous "one-size fits all" application of the message. The timing for the change was not altogether good as the Army then lacked both a cohesive marketing concept and an advertising agency at the same critical juncture in a new recruiting year.

Unashamed efforts continued by all services and the Secretary of Defense to obtain public sponsorship from prominent celebrities in an effort to entice eligible youth into considering a future in the military. Courting such celebrities as actors Will Smith and Tom Cruise, or actress Julia Roberts, Defense Secretary William Cohen sought their active public endorsements of military service and their representation of military values despite their lack of previous service in any arm of the military. Secretary Cohen's actions demonstrate a strange self-consciousness about the dubious connection between military experience and individual success in his own mind.

One RAND study indicated that DOD's sense of public self-consciousness may be unwarranted and that recruiting forces might be overstating their predicament. In their analysis, RAND seemed to believe that the military was doing just fine in the eyes of the public. Though positive propensity for enlistment had decreased markedly through the past decade, RAND established that the actual impact of this shift upon recruiting production was not as significant as it may have seemed. According to the study, individuals who were neutral or negative toward military service actually made up 46 percent of all military enlistments. A separate 1997 study validates
that, though youth propensity to join the military had declined by more than 25 percent between 1989 and 1996, strongly negative propensity had not significantly increased.

Thus, while the number of youths strongly inclined to enlist had declined, the number of youths hostile to military service had not grown. Consequently, most of the eligible youths seemed to be in the undecided middle. These conditions persist despite the broad changes in military advertising, Hollywood endorsements, and aggressive public affairs campaigns. Such an inability to increase the militarily inclined segment of the market leaves DOD in the position to consider other measures to artificially expand the enlistment eligible market population through the reduction of enlistment standards and/or quality caps.

**DUMBING-DOWN**

On 3 February 2000, Louis Caldera, Secretary of the Army announced an unprecedented program whereby the Army will assist high school dropouts in obtaining their basic educational qualification necessary for enlistment into the service. Initiated partly in response to the Navy's doubling of their GED enlistments in FY 99, Army officials dubbed the new program "GED-Plus." In this program, the Army pays selected high-school dropouts to attend classes toward achievement of their General Educational Development certificates (GEDs) making official a practice that had long been anathema to field recruiting forces.

Here, Army officials suggested a significant compromise on longstanding quality standards to achieve a direct expansion of the eligible recruiting market. Defending the new program, Mr. Caldera responded that the change would not "lower the bar" on enlistment standards, because those accessed through this must meet tougher mental category standards than the average enlistee. Mr. Caldera did not address the fact that the lack of a high-school diploma had never been a mental quality indicator. High school graduation has always been a very important indicator of individual tenacity and the possession of a high school diploma vice a GED reliably indicates that the enlistee is more likely to complete basic training and his or her initial term of enlistment. Several months before Mr. Caldera's announcement, Congress had indicated it did not want the Army to increase the number of high
school dropouts it enlisted. Many experienced recruiters and analysts are confident that many of the "GED-Plus" graduates will fail to successfully complete basic training and their enlistment terms at a much higher rate than their high school graduated peers. Nevertheless, the program will probably produce near-term improvements in enlistment production.

RAND Corporation has long analyzed recruiting initiatives like GED-Plus for their longer term effects on military readiness and has identified that many are detrimental to readiness within the services over time. GED-Plus may soon prove to have been such a mistake. Despite the affect such programs make upon recruiting market supply, DOD might have better spent its resources toward decreasing recruiting inefficiencies. Instead, GED-Plus program expenses will precipitate an internal transfer of market-share from one arm of DOD to another with only a nominal expansion of the DOD-wide market at a fixed cost to DOD readiness and the taxpayer.

UPPING THE ANTE FOR A ZERO SUM GAME

Individual services often make gains at the expense of one another in the common market place. Yet, they have found it much more difficult to achieve an expansion of their market-share relative to their non-military competitors. As a recent example, an FY 99 increase in Navy field recruiters led to 22 percent gains in both positive propensity for enlistment into the Navy and a 21 percent increase in Navy recruiting market-share. At the same time, the Army lost nearly 11 percent, the Marines lost 7 percent, and the Air Force lost 1 percent of their respective market-shares within DOD. At the same time, DOD lost a marginal market-share of about 1 percent to its civilian competitors. The Navy's gains seem to have come at the expense of all others in DOD.

Regrettably, the Navy's net gain did not outweigh the net loss to all other DOD competitors.

According to 1995 GAO data, more than 44 percent of DOD's total market-share eroded between 1980 and 1995 under similar circumstances. And, while much of the erosion must be attributed to lower DOD accession requirements during the drawdown, the continuing decline is difficult to explain, but suggestive of an internally destructive quality within the total military
recruiting system. DOD has simply failed to halt the gradual collapse of market-share to the point where it has finally receded below the level necessary to sustain DOD-wide personnel readiness.

In light of the DOD-wide failure to retain market-share within the greater economy, each active duty recruiting service has taken steps to expand their own internal market-share. Barring transfer of market-share from one service to another, short-term success in this endeavor might require a significant downturn in the American economy, or further reductions in military eligibility requirements. Of these, neither appear likely or beneficial to the long-term pursuit of military readiness. The intensification of recruiting efforts unaccompanied by an expansion of the military market-share makes it virtually inevitable that military recruiters must compete more intensely with each other. Nevertheless, increasing the internal recruiting intensity represents a zero-sum game in enlistment production where improvements by one service cause another to fail.

Military recruiters deal with constant pressures against and within their market. These pressures resist the efforts aimed at overall market expansion, and prevent the markets from turning irrevocably in favor of the military institution. As a result, DOD's niche in the common market is insufficiently productive and at risk of continued erosion to the benefit of DOD's non-military competitors. As the DOD position within the market becomes increasingly tenuous, it places personnel readiness highly at risk. Out of options, the services turn their efforts upon one another.
EXPANDING SERVICE SHARE WITHIN THE MILITARY MARKET

The competition within the military market is just as intense as that within the general employment market. Commonly, military services direct their recruiting operations specifically at other services' market-share, or toward defending their own. Recruiting forces make gains against others and prevent losses to others by securing productive market segments, increasing relative recruiter concentrations, and by counterattacking other service's successes with the expressed purpose of seizing back market-share. Less often, recruiting forces seek to increase market-share by penetrating relatively unexploited market segments through spot increases in recruiter concentration without regard for DOD production history. Regardless of the form service initiatives take, they expend significant resources to advance service interests at the expense of the taxpayer and of all other DOD recruiters. Only when these efforts succeed in penetrating new market segments does DOD obtain an appreciable return within the micro-economy of military recruiting. The current systems used by the services for market analysis do not encourage new market penetration.

RECRUITER MARKET ANALYSIS

Recruiter Market Analysis (RMA) is a biannual process whereby Army Recruiting battalions and brigades review enlistment productivity by region in order to adjust recruiter and recruiter resource allocations. The goal of the RMA is to optimize organizations and command and control structures to achieve the highest possible states of regional productivity. RMAs also seek to provide equitable opportunity for individual and unit recruiting success. All four military services conduct similar but separate markets analyses and periodically realign recruiting assets with the use of marketing data provided by the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC).

Because of the Army has the largest proportion of DOD recruiters, the Army's RMA process tends to heavily influence the marketing actions of the other services. This is especially true with respect to the placement and opening of new recruiting stations. The Army's RMA establishes a baseline for the placement of most of the DOD recruiting forces throughout the United States and her possessions.
In each RMA, recruiting headquarters review market statistics from the preceding three years by locality. The review reveals the service and DOD production trends. The US Army Recruiting Command (USAREC) then apportions Regular Army (RA) recruiters to each subordinate recruiting brigade based upon their budgeted field recruiter strength, and the region's historical proportion of DOD production. The brigades do the same with the recruiting battalions. Battalions ultimately execute the detailed market analysis.

As of January of 1999, the US Army Kansas City Recruiting Battalion's (USARBKC) market area produced an average of 2,597 quality enlistments for the active federal services per year. Based upon this level of productivity, USARBKC's region produced 22.27 DOD-wide quality contracts per authorized RA recruiter per year (22.27 DOD GSA). This compared to the Fifth Army Recruiting Brigade (5th Bde) average of 23.27 DOD GSA over the preceding three years. 5th Bde then calculated that USARBKC should plan to lose one RA recruiter and realign their recruiting station zones to account for minor shifts in DOD production. Relative to 5th Bde averages, the recruiting market in the greater Kansas City area was insufficient to support 114 RA recruiters.

After receiving general manning guidance from higher headquarters, units like USARBKC undergoing RMA conduct detailed analysis of recruiting station and company zones down to zip code and high school level. The analysis reveals relative production performance statistics for each subordinate station in terms of DOD-wide volume production, quality production, and Army market-share. Companies and stations then compare these figures with the mean performance of the battalion to determine whether the station's market is adequate to support the productivity of a designated number of RA recruiters. The following table demonstrates how units in USARBKC compared in the analysis preceding their RMA in January 1999. It indicates that few subunits in the battalion were "average" performers with respect to total DOD production or Army share.
Table 1 identifies eight stations as "markets of opportunity." These are areas in the market where DOD-wide quality enlistment production was high and the Army share of production was low. The stations associated with this category represented approximately 16 percent of the RA recruiting market within the USARBC area. Here the Army should have been able to capitalize on DOD-wide recruiting trends with relative ease. Table 1 also identifies six stations as "bread and butter" stations also representing approximately 16 percent of the RA recruiting market for the battalion. These stations were where both DOD quality production and the Army share of that production was high. Theoretically, the Army had only to sustain its competitive position, tactics and other advantages in these markets to maintain above average productivity. Recruiting units occupying areas where both the DOD quality production was low and the Army market-share was low were considered "low performers." Two companies and eleven individual station representing 32 percent of the RA recruiting market fit this description. Theoretically, any change in these markets would have proven for the better.

After reviewing the relative performance of all areas in the recruiting region, commanders review every locality for adequacy to their recruiting effort. This is measured first in terms of historical productivity for DOD, then in prime market population. Commanders allocate a fair share of productive zip codes associated with the high schools to each AOR. They base the precise amount
of territory allocated to an AOR upon the DOD GSA per recruiter planning factor used to allocate the
gross number recruiters within the battalion. By RMA guidelines, each On-Production RA recruiter
(OPRA) must have assigned to their recruiting area of responsibility (AOR), about 22.98 DOD GSA
and at least one historically productive high school with a total of between 200 and 800 enrolled
high school senior males (HSSM). After validating recruiter AORs, commanders identify necessary
adjustments to station zones and to company command relationships and pass these on to brigade for
review. Upon approval of their recommended adjustments by the recruiting brigade, battalions
implement the changes as quickly possible.49

RMA '99' in USARBKC resulted in a few important changes. The most significant of all
were the directed loss of a single recruiter authorization and the closure of a one-man rural recruiting
station in Ava, Kansas (Ava RS). These changes were simple to implement in that USARBKC was
already under strength RA recruiters, and the termination of the lease for Ava RS incurred no
additional cost to the government.50 The lost recruiter authorization constituted a fractional
withdrawal of RA recruiters from the battalion area. In this case, it equaled about 1 percent of
USARBKC's fielded recruiter strength.51 Regrettably for the Army, fractional withdrawal took place
concurrent with a large increase in Navy recruiter representation within the same market.

Another second significant change was the proposal to open a new one-man rural recruiting
station in Dodge City, Kansas (Dodge City RS). Since the battalion had been instructed to reduce
total recruiter authorizations, USARBKC planned to man this new station by transferring a recruiter
from another station area. The opening or closing of recruiting stations typically requires thousands
of dollars and sometimes months to implement and for these reasons, the Dodge City RS did not open
for business until well into FY 00. USARBKC also approved the opening of a satellite recruiting
station to provide temporary workspace for a recruiter already assigned to recruit within the area from
the Brookfield Kansas RS. The startup costs for these two stations exceeded $16,300.52

For most recruiters and stations in USARBKC, the RMA resulted in either marginal
concentrations or withdrawals of recruiters in selected AORs. In contrast to the nominal withdrawal
or reduction in recruiter concentrations across the battalion area, five stations concentrated recruiters within their zone by 5 percent or more. They accomplished this by transferring away responsible territory or high school populations to adjacent recruiting station zones.

Eleven months after completion of the RMA, Kansas City Recruiting Battalion had finally completed all of the required adjustments to recruiting stations and companies. They had also compiled six months worth of production data under the new distribution plan. The following table indicates the relative production status of the recruiting subunits at that time:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RELATIVE PRODUCTION 1 YEAR AFTER JAN 99 RMA</th>
<th>ARMY SHARE OF DOD PRODUCTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DOA QUALITY PRODUCTION</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>1 COMPANY 8 STATIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AVERAGE</td>
<td>1 COMPANY 2 STATIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>1 COMPANY 6 STATIONS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2 - RMA Station Analysis (After)

According to this analysis, no station or company achieved an average performance in either DOD-wide production or in Army market-share. One entire company and two additional stations had shifted into the high performing 'bread and butter' category, now representing 21 percent of the USARBKC's recruiting force. These units had outperformed all others through the six-month period under examination. Another company and two additional stations had moved into the 'markets of opportunity' category now representing 22 percent of the total recruiting force for the battalion. Two recruiting companies descended into the 'low performer' production category representing 29 percent of USARBKC's recruiting force. Significantly, the RMA process sustained only one of the original 'bread and butter' stations. None of the eight stations originally evaluated as 'markets of opportunity' improved their relative production statistics through the RMA process.
All of the effort the Army put into this RMA produced a net contraction of 9 percent in the DOD-wide quality production market. At the same time, the quality percentage of that DOD production dropped from a three-year average of 67 percent to below 57 percent.\textsuperscript{55} This particular decrease in quality is important because it demonstrates that the market is under significant stress and that DOD mandated quality floors are not likely to be achieved within the region.\textsuperscript{56} More than one year after completion of the RMA, USARBKC had sustained an Army market-share of 36 percent of total DOD production but had not otherwise benefited from the fine-tuning.\textsuperscript{57}

Interestingly, USARBKC's quality market-share decreased in every single station area in which the RMA increased recruiter concentration except Dodge City. In fact, the battalion lost approximately 30 percent of its historical quality production from those areas.\textsuperscript{58} In that light, it is commendable that battalion's quality market-share stayed at 36 percent throughout the post-RMA period changes despite the ground lost in DOD-wide quality production and in Army recruiter share within the region.

The Navy and Air Force strategies for the positioning and allocation of recruiters are roughly similar to the Army's. The combined recruiter distribution strategies place the preponderance of all active duty recruiters both where the Army is, and where the historical DOD production has been. However, the Marines position within the market in a wholly different manner. This may go far to explain their consistent and singular success.

Marine Corps recruiting strategy pays less attention to DOD historical production. They place Marine recruiters according to HSSM population distribution. Individual recruiters receive an allocation of at least 800 HSSM, dwarfing the market allocated to any one Army recruiter by as much a 300 to 800 percent.\textsuperscript{59} Because of this, USMC recruiters are more evenly distributed than those of any other service. They have nearly as many recruiting stations as the Army but have only 43 percent as many field recruiters.\textsuperscript{60} Marine distribution policy precludes gradual migration of the recruiting forces to the urban population centers unless there is documented evidence of a decline in rural high school population. This distribution strategy insures that the Marine Corps maintains contact with the
prime market in the most isolated and unproductive areas of America whether or not the Army, Navy
or Air Force want to show up and compete.61 This Marine Corps distribution policy may have been
the only thing sustaining the heart beat for positive propensity and enlistment potential in many far
flung high schools, towns, and counties of rural America.62

The grand tactics of the Army's RMA, and the other service's equivalents may be largely to blame for the erosion in the overall military recruiting economy. Recruiting forces use DOD
production statistics to apportion recruiters without regard for historical service-specific market-share. These recruiter distribution strategies largely disregard important indicators of enlistment production potential -- such as historically high single service market-shares. As a result, the services have little freedom to exploit their gains within a newly productive region.

RMA may appear to be a sound systems approach to military marketing but it proves to be quite self-defeating when executed separately by competitive forces. As services increase the competitive pressures within a single area, the market often does become more productive. But, in the end, the adjustments position an inordinate percentage of the recruiting force in central and productive areas and increasingly draw them away from remote but potentially productive areas.

BRIGHT LIGHTS – BIG CITY

Urban America tends to attract high concentrations of military recruiters. Interestingly enough, concentration of recruiting forces in the productive urban and suburban sub-regions of America is a practice, which the previously mentioned GAO report strongly encourages.63 Because of this, urban areas also prove to be the most productive regions for active service recruiting relative to HSSM population. Easy access to military recruiters and recruit processing facilities as well as the extra interest generated by military reserve recruiting efforts contribute to the increased productivity per capita. This increased productivity begins and perpetuates a cycle of concentration during subsequent RMA processes. The cycle ultimately produces an environment of highly intensified competition with increasingly tenuous productivity. Eventually, market failures occur which force the reallocation of recruiters to the less picked-over recruiting markets within the region.
Market failures resulting from over-concentration of recruiters may often appear to be an aberration, occurring only for a single recruiting season or a year. Because other urban and suburban recruiting stations are commonly located within commuting distance of the collapsed markets, urban and suburban stations easily absorb changes to recruiter authorizations without loss of representation in the market at large. Temporary market failures in rural recruiting AORs are another story. Market collapses in the rural areas can easily precipitate the Army's long-term withdrawal from that market with a long-term impact on local propensity and enlistment productivity.

In large part, this is because Army Recruiting Battalion commanders must periodically justify to their brigade commanders all one man recruiting stations. Generally, this justification is easiest when the area is productive. But, it is virtually impossible to justify maintaining a remote recruiting station when both Army and DOD production are unsatisfactory. And, brigade and battalion commanders can close recruiting stations at any time by conducting a formal or informal RMA. Consequently, recruiters are often withdrawn from rural areas because unusual conditions have caused a temporary drop in recruitment. Withdrawal from the failed rural market contributes then to decreasing DOD productivity and reinforces the decision to abandon that recruiting area.

In the end, the cycle of urban concentration creates conditions that, while urban recruiters might have intensely recruited areas with less than 200 HSSM populations, rural recruiters may have lightly recruited AORs with well over 350 HSSM. Rural RA recruiters do typically have much larger AORs, some covering thousands of squares miles. Nevertheless, with an inadequate number of recruiters to provide effective sales and customer service, very few of the rural recruiters' 350 HSSM will ever enlist for any service.

The Army has recently expressed an interest in embracing the Marine Corps strategy of recruiter allocation against high school population. USAREC announced that starting at the beginning of FY 00, it would open "105 new stations [in] predominantly rural and semi-rural areas." The Army seemingly believes that its recruiting efforts in the cities have culminated. Throwing more Army recruiting resources into the metropolitan centers seems unlikely to pay off in the near future.
Opening the Dodge City RS and increasing recruiter concentrations in rural stations demonstrated USARBKC's participation in USAREC's migration to the country. Interestingly, 5th Bde had not instructed the recruiting battalion to do so in their RMA directive. USARBKC based this decision on its own analysis. The production statistics for Dodge City RS as of February 2000 provide a faint glimmer of hope that this action may pay off for both the Army and DOD.68

GETTING BLOOD FROM A TURNIP

A 1995 General Accounting Office report indicated that only 1.06 percent of the youth population (calculated as 17 to 21 year olds) needed to enlist in order for DOD to meet its annual accession requirements.69 While this goal appears wholly achievable on the surface, it is much more difficult in practice. The 1.06 percent represents an annually recurrent requirement for men and women in five separate age group cohorts. The actual annual accession requirement is 5.30 percent when compared against the annual newcomers to the recruiting market. This statistical realities are often much more challenging than this for the collective recruiting effort in the USARBKC region.

The average RA recruiter AOR sees the enlistment of around 38.470 volume contracts for DOD active military services per year. That means that 38.4 individuals of all types join an active branch of the military each year from that zone. Given this, urban recruiters of all active services must enlist approximately 15.4 percent71 of the renewable portion of their market annually. Once again, recruiters can and do replace seniors one for one with the graduates of previous high school classes, but the resultant demand upon the latest class of high school seniors within the market is ultimately the same.

On top of the 15.4 percent required enlistment rate, is a significant reserve force and National Guard enlistment burden. This problem is peculiar to urban centers because of the high concentrations of reserve and guard units existing there. In some urban situations, reserve-recruiting requirements create conditions where more than one in every six high school seniors must eventually join some military branch or program. Such conditions exist in several regions of the USARBKC
recruiting area. Though the per capita enlistment percentage is much lower in the rural regions of the
USARBK area, none are as low as the miniscule 5.30 percent purported by the GAO.72

Even in the Kansas City Recruiting Battalion area, urban centers and metropolitan sprawl
increasingly represent the core of the Army and DOD recruiting efforts. Large and medium sized
stations in Greater Kansas City, Wichita, Manhattan, Topeka, Springfield and Saint Joseph comprise
nearly 55 percent of the total Midwest recruiting force. This concentration of recruitment efforts in
the cities ultimately ends in what one analyst group called "The Spiral of Defeat" where recruiting
forces expend more and more resources in return for poorer overall results.73

ACHIEVING THE EFFECTS OF MASS ON SISTER SERVICES

Throughout FY 99, both the Navy and Air Force placed their main recruiting emphasis upon
increasing the size and distribution of their recruiting forces. During that period, the Navy increased
the size of its active duty recruiting force by 25 percent. The Navy's increases accompanied a decline
in Army and Marine Corps market-share nation-wide. The Navy's production increased by 4,166
recruits, or about 8 percent from their FY 98 totals. This return required an investment of an
additional 913 new recruiters. The net loss to the other three services was equal to 2 percent of
DOD's total non-Navy production or 3,205 recruits. This was concurrent with a net reduction of 2
percent or 203 non-Navy field recruiters74. At the same time, the Air Force initiated plans to increase
the number of Air Force recruiting stations by more than 10 percent. The Air Force stationing
adjustments have yet to have an effect.75

In sum, the Navy changes were disastrous for non-Navy DOD production. Despite having
incurred an increase of 8 percent in the total of active military recruiters, DOD achieved almost no
increase in overall production. Though the costly efforts were sufficient for the Navy to achieve its
accession goals, they were insufficient for the Navy to achieve its enlistment mission for the FY.76

In early FY 00, the Air Force planned to increase their fielded recruiting force by nearly 25
percent, the Army by 4 percent, and the Navy an additional 12 percent. When effected, these
investments will probably achieve similar ends as the Navy's efforts in FY 99. The services will
simply steal success back and forth from one another until it finally slips beyond DOD's grasp. The Navy for one is "cautiously optimistic" about their potential for mission success in FY 00. Nevertheless, aside from the planned recruiter increases, the Army has a new trick up its sleeve for the summer of FY 00.

**ADDING INSULT TO INJURY**

Despite having done their utmost under the intensified pressure of the current market and having suffered the hardship of recurrent personal and unit failure, selected Army recruiters will be held hostage by USAREC through the peak summer months of FY 00. The forced stabilization will freeze the reassignment of approximately 350 additional effectives to maintain pressure and continuity throughout the marketplace. This stabilization effects a concentration representing nearly 8 percent more RA recruiters in the field than at the beginning of the FY, and a full 3 percent more than the total Army authorization. "We want to have more recruiters on the ground in the second and third [fiscal] quarters," which are regarded as challenging months for recruiting." By stabilizing these recruiters, USAREC signaled its resolve to shore up Army market-share against the Air Force and Navy concentrations through the critical recruiting months leading to the end of the fiscal year.

The summer period annually marks the dramatic revolution in the recruiting market. Many military prospects had postponed life decisions, but with high school graduation or the end of college terms, they then faced the new realities and responsibilities of adulthood. Some newly graduated seniors will go off to military service each summer. Still others will decide for college or non-military jobs and careers. A newly ascended senior class will suddenly find themselves eligible to choose military service and will do so in large numbers. In the summer of 2000, USAREC aims to dominate the other services during the market transformation by maximizing the number of active recruiters on the ground and in the market.

Many of these stabilized recruiters had seen their summer reassignment as both a reward and an escape to greener pastures or brighter career opportunities. Instead, these men and women will
press on to salvage the Army's slimming chance for recruiting success in 2000. By stabilizing this recruiting force, the Army may have created the conditions for what may prove to be the most intense period of recruiting competition the All Volunteer Force has ever witnessed.

The Army can be certain that the Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps will intensify their own recruiting efforts to counter this Army concentration during the same period. In their efforts to preclude Army gains, each separate service will adjust and intensify its own competitive activities. A self-neutralizing cycle of offensive/counteroffensive will surely ensue.

The Army even expressed optimism about their own prospects for success in FY 00: "We are fully challenged to meet this years accession mission, but we believe we will accomplish our 80,000 active mission." Maintenance of competitive pressure through the transitional period will probably produce appreciable results in the short run. It is unlikely that this tactic will be sufficient for FY success without severely depleting both the Delayed Entry Program (DEP) pool and the prospective enlistee market for FY 01.

RECRUITING GIMMICKRY

In addition to a general intensification of recruiting pressure, it has become more common for recruiting officials to take broad actions to influence their service's production. Many of these machinations produce limited effects upon localized portions of the market population. Typically, they elicit direct responses from the competing military services. As with recruiting force increases, these responses tend to negate the programs' intended benefits without mitigating its expenses.

These actions and incentives have included a variety of programs sponsored at the highest levels within the military. The Army Chief of Staff himself suggested several initiatives in his own effort to jump-start a recruiting juggernaut in early FY 00 including:

- Partnerships with Industry which guarantee civilian jobs to enlistees upon their completion of a military commitment
- Increasing autonomy and automation support to individual field recruiters
- Maximizing the employment of newly trained soldiers as Hometown Recruiter Assistants (HRAP)
Increasing the number of Corporal (or junior) recruiters
Improving Recruiter selection and training processes
Implementing the GED-Plus and College-First enlistment incentive programs

On top of the previously discussed bonus packages and recruiting force concentrations, the Army unleashed an impressive arsenal of programs and initiatives. All four services offer a multitude of similar recruiting gimmicks intended to attract eligible youth away from the other services. Many more ideas for incentives have come to the fore in the editorial pages of the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps Times. Some are quite novel, and may make a positive impact on both service and DOD production. Yet, these programs and options will never ultimately ease the woes of the self-defeating recruiting system. The large increases in both the Navy accession requirements and the Navy recruiting force indicate that the Navy is as hard-pressed and determined as ever. Moreover, because of the Navy's robust recruiting infrastructure, the Army sees them as the "greatest near term threat"84 to the short-term success of initiatives such as those advanced by the CSA. The Navy can and will quickly attack Army market-share with new enlistment incentives, spot advertising, and shipping bonuses.85

**MILITARY RECRUITING MARKET CONCLUSIONS**

Unlike most personnel procurement competitors, military recruiters work both for and against themselves toward a common objective -- joint military force preparedness. If the military's internally competitive structure cannot achieve higher efficiency and collectively dominate the external competition, then DOD needs to expand the market. This has proven to be nearly impossible to do. In contrast, uncoordinated strategies and counterstrategies by the separate services result in a wasteful pattern of self-destruction. Manipulation of the recruiting market and intensification of inter-service competition cannot positively affect the military's recruiting fortunes. These efforts will lead only to tenuously productive markets, and exhausted field recruiters.
BUILT-IN INEFFICIENCIES AND COLLATERAL EFFECTS

The internally competitive DOD recruiting system is wrought with technical inefficiencies and redundancies. These include not only the institutional and economic issues discussed previously but also problems best viewed at street level where recruiters actually compete for enlistments. The waste of substantial recruiting resources becomes readily apparent where recruiter man-hours and duplicative processing of applicants actually cost local recruiters their slim chance for success in past and future recruiting periods.

COSTS OF COMPETITION

At the recruiter level, there are two main causes for poor recruiting efficiency. First, the competition between service recruiters for a particular prospect alienates the prospect from enlistment in any service. Secondly, recruiters waste time by aggressively pursuing and processing applicants simultaneously with other service recruiters. Both of these dynamics bear examination, as they seem to indicate a cumulative effect sufficient to have precipitated DOD's recent failures.

Perhaps the most significant cost of competition between the services is the body of prospects and applicants who are alienated from further consideration of military service by aggressive recruiting tactics. While, High-pressure sales techniques are not new to the recruiting environment, but the costs borne by in the increasingly tight recruiting marketplace are increasingly important. The research neither substantiated nor refuted this particular theory but did provide some interesting observations.

Analysis of the applicant and enlistment processing reveals a significant overlap between recruiting efforts by the different military services. The overlap exists where each service simultaneously or sequentially pursues and processes the same individual for the separate military services. One of the most poignant and well-studied redundancies is the military telemarketing process through which recruiting forces acquire the vast preponderance of their enlistees. The same holds true for "cold house calls" or visits to home and mass mailings.
Frequently, the recruiters start their efforts to build rapport before the student's senior year in high school. All of the separate recruiting services contact potentially qualified individuals several times during their five years in the prime market. Highly qualified prospects that had once expressed positive intentions about military enlistment are among the most pursued of all. In fact, from eight to fourteen military recruiters may be attempting to contact any given lead at the same time creating an 87 to 95 percent level of DOD inefficiency during the first step of the recruiting process alone. A recent study by RAND Corporation suggests the necessity for consolidation and commercialization of DOD telemarketing efforts as necessary to the achievement of coordination and cooperation between recruiting services and elimination of this extravagant waste of recruiting resources.

One service might choose to terminate its aggressive pursuit of a particular high school student based upon the expressed unambiguous desire for that individual to be left alone. However, another service, or new recruiters from the same service may continue with their own aggressive pursuit, unaware of the hostile attitudes they may have fostered toward military service in general. Despite repeated recruiter contact, many of the apparently qualified young men and women never take any action to join any branch of service.

A 1994 RAND study presented evidence that positive propensity only leads to individual enlistments about 37 percent of the time. Most of these enlistments occurred within one year of the original expression of positive propensity. The researchers explained that the changes in heart are primarily due to changes in the educational opportunities. Any increase in college opportunities for an individual carries with it a significant downward shift in their respective propensity for service.

Research conducted as part of this study found that an individual's expression of positive enlistment intentions triggered a flurry of prospecting activity by multiple recruiting services. This flurry of activity may have influenced the decisions (or non-decisions) of some prospective enlistees. All of those interviewed seemed to remember the incessant phone calling and pursuit as the single most bothersome aspect of the recruiting process.
There is no centralized system whereby DOD catalogues prospecting efforts for any particular individual. Nor is there any system of military customer advocacy. It is therefore, impossible to accurately establish the extent to which the DOD-wide prospecting efforts are redundant. Nor is it possible to compute the overall effect of that competitive pursuit upon the attitudes of the target audience. A young prospect's letter to the Washington Post hints at the resources that he thought the military might have been wasting. The letter also suggests how these efforts shape the perceptions of other similarly pursued prospects.

For the past four years, the Navy has spent considerable time, effort and taxpayer money courting me. Only I didn't want to be courted... The search-and-recruit mission began innocently enough, with brochures about various Navy programs. Did I know about ROTC? Had I considered the GI Bill? Were there any acronyms they could explain for me? It was not unusual to receive several Navy mailings in the same week or even in the same day... Then the calls began. . .

The young college student articulated cynical amusement about the extremes to which the Navy went to interview him. For him, recruiter tenacity served only to highlight the Navy's desperation.

Typically, military recruiting forces maintain all leads while individuals remain in the primary market. This is despite that fact that Title 10 actually prohibits the maintenance of directory information for a period of greater than two years. Maintaining and updating prospect records in a decentralized manner creates a condition where both national level advertising firms and local recruiters will make numerous attempts to contact any one individual. These attempts will continue even after individuals express an absolute lack of interest in military service, or who when they have already been identified as unqualified by another recruiter or recruiting force.

Alienating the target audience is potentially quite harmful because so few of the eligible population are positively propensed. Efficient conversion of these particular individuals is vital to consistent DOD production. Hyper-aggressive and uncoordinated telemarketing expresses a lack of sensitivity to the responses and expressed needs of the prospect. This insensitivity may be a core issue in cases of prospect alienation.
S. Schiffman described a lead refinement technique used to reduce wasteful telemarketing efforts and prospect alienation by certain sales organizations. In an article for *American Salesman*, Schiffman discussed how certain businesses could categorize the total body of sales prospects into separate categories. This categorization would facilitate discrimination between truly interested prospects and those who are yet undecided or have insufficient basis for making a 'purchase' decision. Schiffman recommended dividing the total body of prospects into two categories:

- **Suspects** -- all those persons available for contact by the salesperson (or recruiter) who meet certain minimum qualifications

- **Prospects** -- All Suspects who have indicated a willingness to consider a purchase (or enlistment)

Applying these categorizations, an appreciable number of qualified 'suspects' may have been alienated by overzealous pursuit. Aggressive sales tactics discourage some positively propensed 'suspects' who respond by choosing not to become active 'prospects'.

All of the individuals questioned about aggressive recruiting tactics had been highly qualified and highly-propensed military prospects and applicants. Some of them were still in the DEP. Others had failed to fulfill their enlistment contracts and became DEP Losses. Still others had never completed the enlistment process. All of them had been subjected to some form of high-pressure sales tactics. The aggressive pursuit actually flattered some applicants. None, however, thought that the competition altered their own feelings about the military. All of these applicants overcame any negative feelings they might have had in order to enlist. Additional evidence acquired through the review of applicant processing records indicated that the negative effects of aggressive or coercive recruiting practices are much less important than originally expected. Applicants of all categories who were pursued by multiple services actually enlisted and accessed at rates nearly equal to those who had been processed only by a single service.
INFORMATIONAL COUNTER-CAMPAIGNS

Another element of inter-service friction arises from individual recruiter efforts to disparage another services' programs, benefits, and character. It is not the policy of any military service recruiting force to besmirch the image of another in their efforts to increase market-share. However, the hard working and increasingly desperate field recruiters, recruiter assistants and DEP members have no qualms about employing subtle smear tactics. Though ultimately compromising their own service's integrity, recruiters often find it necessary to vilify other services in order to win the attention of prospective military applicants.

When interviewed, most applicants who had been recruited by more than one service confessed to harboring negative feelings about one or more of the military services. The applicants confessed that much of the information on which these feelings were based came from recruiters and DEP members of another service. None would admit that the information represented a major reason for their enlistment into a particular service. In this light, one story of a USMC Reserve applicant is worthy of note.

While a senior in high school, Matt Stillman had hoped to attend the US Military Academy at West Point. After contacting the Army, Navy, and Marine recruiters, he found that he was too late to pursue his desire to attend any of the service academies. He continued to entertain the idea of military service, and so maintained contact with Army recruiters until he graduated. About nine months after graduation, Matt ran into a Marine Corps recruiter assistant who encouraged Matt to meet with a Marine recruiter. Matt did so, and decided to enlist in the Marine Corps Reserve. On his enlistment day, Matt indicated that he was proud to enlist as a Marine reservist and that he felt there was no other military service worth joining. Matt could not recall hearing any negative messages from any recruiter about any branch of the military services. He was questioned why he felt that the USMC Reserve was his only worthwhile enlistment option. He stated that, "Marines are Marines, but that all other services were just not as special." Upon further questioning however, Matt admitted that he had never really known anyone who had been a Marine and had learned all he knew about the
qualitative differences between Marines and all others from his Marine Recruiters. Matt was certain that he would never enlist for any other service, even if disqualified for the Marines. His attitude toward the other services seems altogether flawed when viewed in light of his specific personal interest in special and elite force units like Rangers or Green Berets. The Marine recruiter obviously left out how difficult it would be to pursue such Army specialties within the Marine Corps Reserve.99

The Marines are not alone in using smear tactics. The Army has its own way of making themselves out to be the service of choice. The Army's prime method is to demonstrate that the quality and specificity of Army enlistment contracts and or the opportunities for rapid advancement within the Army outpace those opportunities of other military services. Army recruiters gently besmirch the prospects' options within another military arm by conducting a carefully engineered comparison of service programs, options, and benefits.

All of this competitive sales activity eventually converts many thousands of prospects into military testers, applicants, and eventually enlistees for each of the services. The services centrally monitor the processing of all military applicants after the initial sales interview. The records of this processing reveal the extent to which the street level recruiters are engaged as much with one another as with their target audience through the remainder of the recruiting process.

**MIXED AND CONCURRENT MILITARY SERVICE PROCESSING**

The following data, collected from the records of both the Kansas City Military Entrance Processing Station (KCMEPS) and from the USARBKC indicate that a significant percentage of all military applicants actively process with more than one military service. Many more of these applicants process with multiple military services at exactly the same time.
Active processing by military applicants at this level of the recruiting process is predicated upon the cooperation of the applicant, the recruiter, and the recruiter's supervisor. Recruiters at this stage of the enlistment process must see the applicant as potentially qualified for military service and must take actions to schedule and process them for enlistment. This can be very time-consuming for the applicant and the recruiter. For this reason, supervisors closely monitor, direct, prioritize, and often schedule such processing actions.

In Table 3, the "mixed service processing" column reflects those applicants who actively processed with more than one military service during the preceding two years. This data is recorded in the applicant's record in the Military Entrance Processing Command (MEPCOM) Integrated Resource System (MIRS) database. In the random sample of records, 13.5 percent of all applicants had processed with more than one military service in the preceding two years. These records further revealed two separate though indistinct patterns of mixed processing. The first group mixed

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processing with multiple military services sequentially. The numbers of this group can be identified by subtracting the "concurrent processing" column of Table 3 from the "mixed service processing" column. These applicants experienced chronological breaks in MEPS-level processing of 90 days or more between different services. The second group of mixed service processing applicants processed concurrently with multiple services without a measurable break between services. The numbers of the second group are identifiable in the "concurrent processing" column of Table 3. Some applicant's records demonstrated both patterns in combination or repeated a single pattern within their individual processing history. This pattern is likely to have increased significantly, had the MIRS data reflected more than two years worth of processing history.102

Applicants at the MEPS level of processing must cooperate with all involved branches of service for concurrent or sequential processing to occur. Regeneration of applicant interest by a new service seemed to be the common cause for mixed service processing with individuals demonstrating the sequential pattern of multi-service processing. This was especially so when breaks between processing with separate services exceeded one year. For applicants demonstrating concurrent multi-service processing patterns, it was unclear whether the applicants were shopping around, or being fought-over by the separate services. Anecdotal evidence suggests that both of these were true in some cases.

**FIRE FIGHT FOR AN UNQUALIFIED APPLICANT**

On 30 March 2000, the Navy requested a "Service Processing For" (SPF) change through the records room of the KCMEPS. This request was intended to transfer ownership of MEPS records and control over processing from the Army to the Navy. The MEPS record room dutifully completed the SPF change request. Later that same day, the Army submitted a request for an SPF change back to the Army. By reviewing the applicant's processing history and the documents requesting the SPF changes, it was possible to reconstruct the sequence of mixed-processing events for this applicant:

- 16 July 1998 -- Applicant tests for the Army
- 2 November 1998 -- Applicant undergoes physical examination for Army enlistment
2 November 1998 -- Applicant is physically disqualified for military service

27 March 2000 -- Applicant signs USMEPCOM Form 714 A-E authorizing SPF change from Army to Navy

29 March 2000 -- Applicant signs USMEPCOM Form 714 A-E authorizing SPF change back from Navy to Army

30 March 2000 -- Kansas City MEPS receives and processes 27 March SPF request changing processing ownership from Army to Navy

30 March 2000 -- Army submits USMEPCOM Form 714 A-E requesting SPF change back to Army

In this case, the Army lost processing momentum for a significant period because the applicant had a disqualifying medical condition. The applicant record shows that the disqualifying condition was permanent but subject to medical reconsideration or waiver. The Army and the applicant apparently did not pursue efforts to complete the medical reconsideration process in a timely manner. The record does not show whether this was the fault of the applicant or the Army. Nonetheless, something reinvigorated the recruiting process in March of 2000 when the applicant agreed to active processing with the Navy. Less than forty-eight hours later, the Army had somehow reestablished contact with the applicant and won his decision to continue processing despite the seventeen-month hiatus.

In many cases of mixed service and concurrent service recruiting, the initiation of processing by another service appeared to be a strong catalyst for accelerated processing by the original service. This condition is also evident in the case of the above applicant. Finding out that this particular applicant agreed to process for the Navy caused the Army to reinitiate their own pursuit. The Army and the applicant then must have collectively reevaluated the merits of continued processing for Army enlistment. Then, despite the individual's commitments to the Navy recruiter on 27 March, the Army and the applicant reinvigorate their processing relationship. Scenarios such as this were common in the random sample, and occurred daily at KCMEPS during the conduct of research for this study.

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Table 3 also reveals that Army DEP Losses, Active Army Qualified Not Enlisted (QNE) and other active service QNEs have relatively high ratios of concurrent recruiting actions. All three of these categories represent individuals of extremely high intrinsic value to the recruiting system (see Appendix B, Table 4 and Table 5). Since only 39 percent of all QNEs subsequently enlisted and almost all apathy DEP Losses were total losses to DOD,\textsuperscript{104} this small sample still represents a significant loss to the local recruiting system in the USARBKC area equal to approximately 47.5 total military enlistments.\textsuperscript{105} QNE and DEP Losses are commonly thought to be "flaky"\textsuperscript{106} or less predictable than are typical applicants. It could not be determined if concurrent processing had any negative effect on the enlistment and or accession decisions of individuals in these three "flaky" groups. The data indicates that this as a distinct possibility.

Reinitiation of military processing by the same service after a significant break was also a common pattern exhibited in many applicant records. Although there is no evidence of tangible benefits arising from concurrent recruiting, the eventual regeneration of recruiting interest appears to be an extremely important element in the recruiting process. This is without regard for which service initiated or regenerated the interest. In fact, nearly 9 percent of all accessions indicated regeneration of processing interest by other than the original recruiting service. This research did not record to what extent reinitiation by the same service contributed to overall enlistment production. There are therefore, beneficial and harmful aspects of mixed recruiting.

The evidence indicates that concurrent processing is strongly associated with increased high-value losses to the recruiting system. Concurrent processing also implies a duplication of recruiter man-day resources applied toward achieving a single DOD accession. Though concurrent processing accelerates processing activity, it converts applicants to accessions at an appreciably lower rate than single service processing. In the USARBKC area, recruiters waste daily 7 percent of all processing dollars and recruiter man-days on concurrent applicant processing. Recall that DOD only missed its FY 99 mission by about 10,000 bodies or 5 percent.
On the other hand, regenerated processing interest appeared to be an important element in enlistment and accession of an appreciable percentage of all DOD accessions. The amount of mixed service processing would significantly diminish if the processing histories of applicants were immediately available to recruiting station commanders. Many of the applicants with mixed service processing histories terminated at exactly the same point where the regenerating services picked up the applicant, the point of the disqualification. With access to MIRS processing histories, station commanders could identify disqualifying conditions or patterns in an individual's processing past. Armed with that information, the station commander could discontinue military processing or specially manage the process. Nonetheless, this research concludes that limited sequentially mixed processing is marginally beneficial to DOD's recruiting effort. Concurrently mixed recruiting appears to be a total waste.

**IMPACT ON RECRUITER PRODUCTIVITY AND EFFICIENCY**

There is one final collection of intangible costs caused by competitive recruiting practices. These costs include the loss of recruiter productivity and efficiency resulting from their resentment of their mission and the recruiting system. This also includes inefficiencies resulting from recruiters failing to adequately cultivate their own markets because of urgent requirements to make up for short-range enlistment shortfalls. In times of increased small unit pressure, "the recruiter is naturally pushed to accomplish [the] measurable tasks" of telephone calls, contacts, and appointments. Because it is difficult to measure the benefits of fostering increased trust and integration into the community, these critical recruiting activities are neglected. In the end, the small-unit mortgages its recruiting future on an increment of increased production. During "Operation Teufelhunden II," even USMC recruiters turned their focus away from their prime market niche -- the senior high school class -- in order to meet such urgent accession requirements.

For Army and Navy recruiters, the mission has never been easy since performance nearly always lags behind the quantified requirement. Pressure to make up for those shortfalls becomes increasingly intense as fiscal quarters and years draw to a close. This cycle makes the recruiter's job
more difficult, and recruiters become discouraged and less successful. This self-defeating trend was analyzed in detail in a 1991 Army Research Institute study, and those recruiters interviewed in the USARBK C reinforce the importance of this dynamic upon the efficiency of individual and unit performance. These intangibles are reflected in but can never be fully accounted for in the conversion rates of recruiters, their stations or their parent organizations.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

There are major obstacles to improving recruiting conditions for the Department of Defense. First among many of these are the statutory provisions for the separate military departments to "organize, train, and equip" their forces provide for under Title 10. However, service-recruiting authority can change. Title 10 has been modified many times in its history to achieve efficiencies necessitated by developments within the individual departments or within the defense establishment as a whole. In fact, Title 10, Section 125 provides specific authority to the Secretary of Defense to reorganize military functions into a single inter-service agency where those separate functions overlap to the detriment of DOD. Therefore, DOD should not avoid consolidation of recruiting services in the name of statutory service responsibilities alone.

In 1990, a Defense Management Review recommended the consolidation of recruiting services under a single command in the name of cost effectiveness. At the time, each individual service had been consistently successful in achieving its annual accession mission and each feared that a major change might undermine its successful recruiting style. All four active-duty services dissented from the findings and agreed that the proposed changes were both unnecessary and inappropriate. The Army's response was representative -- any such change to recruiting organizations and responsibilities would result in a "major, radical change to our way of doing business" and combined with the turbulence of personnel reductions while entering an era of uncertainty (the drawdown)--"will surely disrupt mission accomplishment." The Navy also emphasized that multi-service recruiting would "erode [the] strong identification with service" in the new recruits and create an "atmosphere where quantity, not quality, is the major objective." Ten years later, what is clear is that, quantity has become a quality all its own. Presently, recruiting mission accomplishment is far from assured. Deference to service recruiting styles has failed. The 'radical change' shunned by the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines in 1990 is exactly what is called for.

All services must establish and maintain service consistent recruiter representation throughout the entire recruiting market in order to sustain or improve extant propensity levels.
Military recruiting institutions must distribute an equitable base of recruiters across all high school markets in order to gain and sustain a position of influence in every single segment of American society. This base distribution of recruiters and recruiting resources should seek to capitalize on all regional service strengths and mitigate regional service weaknesses. The primary mission of that recruiting force would be to nurture a basic level of respect for the military as a profession. They should also be the lead agents in prompting original interest in enlistment by enrolled students, dropouts and graduates alike. USARBK C's initial success with the Dodge City RS indicates that such a strategy is sound. USAREC and all DOD recruiting forces should continue to migrate to rural America where they can connect with that important renewable segment of the American employment market before they move from their homes to the brighter and more competitive opportunity environments of metropolitan America.

Separate recruiter allocation models should then be developed and applied which distribute graduate-focused recruiting forces in accordance with post-high school eligible population. These individuals should be experts in broader market cultivation and should work both in support of and to capitalize on the work of the high school recruiters. Recruiting force commanders could then apply such recruiters as needed to compete within the college and corporate communities or to reinforce high school recruiting efforts. Once again, analysts should refine those marketing models to account for regional service strengths or local services-of-choice. Understanding and capitalizing upon local propensity for one service would allow other services to focus efforts where they have a local advantage in propensity.

Management of prospect leads and telemarketing by the services deserves greater coordination and centralization. This research quite clearly shows that competitive marketing has a negative effect on recruiting resources. Central management of lead contact and processing data would reduce telephonic prospecting inefficiency. Central and periodic categorization or disqualification of leads would contribute further to recruiter prospecting focus. Additionally, telemarketing support could further refine lead data before a costly visit from a field recruiter.
The MIRS database constitutes an incomparable source of leads for qualified and nearly qualified military applicants. In the Kansas City MEPS alone, over 23,000 individual records exist with fully 9 percent of these reflecting a status of Qualified Not Enlisted or other individuals who apparently ripe for enlistment. Even given the deletion of such records after a two-year break in processing, these represent a resource pool of incomparable value to DOD. Because of the high intrinsic value of such well-refined leads, the MIRS database deserves very careful management by USMEPCOM and DOD. Some changes to the database are in order.

First, USMEPCOM should dramatically increase the length of time for which MIRS maintains applicant data to preclude the purging of QNE applicants who remain within the prime market for new recruits (i.e. 17-22 year males). Second, USMEPCOM should add data cells to allow for entry of service specific disqualification or termination data to preserve the rationale used for suspension of prior processing. USMEPCOM should require recruiting services to report such data to their servicing MEPS after 90 days or more of processing inactivity. Third, USMEPCOM should periodically evaluate all PNE and QNE records to determine a relative value of records to the various recruiting services. They should refine and update lead information for all high-value records. Finally, USMEPCOM should regularly disseminate updated contact information on all high-value records to the recruiting forces for the purpose of regenerating interest or confirming prospect individual termination status.

When asked about the prospect of obtaining information from the MIRS, one experienced Recruiting Company First Sergeant exclaimed that it would be a "recruiting gold mine beyond his wildest imagination." Careful prospecting within the MIRS database alone could provide all the leads and prospects necessary for FY 00 mission accomplishment for all the active recruiting services in the Kansas City area. Yet, no recruiting service has access to the database or to any individual records within the database. Recruiting services cannot leverage the database in any manner useful to their recruiting efforts.
During the conduct of strategic research through Harvard University and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, three Army colonels Marsh, Tymeson, and Samborowski concluded that the Army could only achieve recruiting efficiency and effectiveness by consolidating the active and National Guard recruiting forces. These colonels attributed USAREC failure through FY 98 to three primary causes:

A Robust National Economy
A Changing American Culture and Attitudes
Internal Recruiting Inefficiencies

These same three factors cause also for the military services as a whole. Moreover, of the three, only one factor is controlled by the defense establishment, internal recruiting inefficiency.

Colonels Marsh, Tymeson, and Samborowski found that the Army's consolidation of regular and reserve recruiting efforts under a single command in the 1980s bears this theory out. When the Army eliminated the competition between the regular and reserve recruiting services, overall production improved for both the Army and the Army Reserve. The colonels therefore, recommended that the Army extend its consolidation efforts to the Army National Guard. Their thesis predicted substantial resource savings, enhanced integration, improved customer service to prospects, reduced competition, reduced DEP Losses, consistent benefits packages, and increased trust within the recruiting establishment. An integrated multi-service recruiting agency might yield similar but exponentially greater benefits. Colonels Marsh, Tymeson, and Samborowski's recommendations deserve direct and immediate consideration as a guide for evaluating the efficacy of such a consolidation.

A "Seamless Total Force Recruiting Force" is the only hope for recruiting success. If such an agency were established, the collective recruiting expertise of each contributing service might prove to be sufficient to optimize the efficiency and eliminate the waste. Establishment of systems that discourage duplicative and concurrent processing of applicants would conserve considerable
recruiter resources. Adaptation of a Joint Recruiting Information System (JRIS) as recommended in the 1992 GAO report entitled: *The Department of Defense Should Stop Further Development of Duplicative Recruiting Systems*, would greatly reduce the amount of administrative waste occurring through duplicative processing of enlistee applications. The existing SPF control measure could be adapted with minor modifications to designate DOD-wide processing authority for each applicant.

**CONCLUSION**

Continuation of the current DOD recruiting system is tantamount to institutional fratricide. As evidenced by the stabilization of Army recruiters through the summer of 2000, the Army demonstrated that they would continue to place their main pressure for production improvement on the individual recruiter. Moreover, while the recruiter may be the point where recruiting’s success must be made, it is at the institutional level where it has long been broken.

There will always remain stiff competition for enlistees from the civilian work force, college, and even governmental agencies. Department of Defense must reengineer a recruiting system built for and around the honorable and faithful recruiters. The current duplicative system requires major changes to eliminate recruiting losses suffered through friendly fire. It is time to form a powerful alliance between the four most effective manpower procurement systems in the nation. It is time to declare peace on the 'third front' in the recruiting war and combine forces in a single Defense Recruiting Agency, armed and able to defeat "Old Otto Von Indifference" and his "Apathetic empire" at long last.
## APPENDIX A - ACRONYMS AND MILITARY CONTRACTIONS USED

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AOR</td>
<td>Area of Responsibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BDE</td>
<td>Brigade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRAC</td>
<td>Base Realignment and Closure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CGSC</td>
<td>Command and General Staff College</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNO</td>
<td>Chief of Naval Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMNAVRESFOR</td>
<td>Commander, US Navy Reserve Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSA</td>
<td>Chief of Staff of the Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEP</td>
<td>Delayed Entry Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DMDC</td>
<td>Defense Manpower Data Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY</td>
<td>Fiscal Year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GAO</td>
<td>General Accounting Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GED</td>
<td>Graduate Equivalency Degree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GSA</td>
<td>Quality Enlistment Contract</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HSSM</td>
<td>High School Senior Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HRAP</td>
<td>Hometown Recruiter Assistant Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JRIS</td>
<td>Joint Recruiting Information System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEPCOM</td>
<td>Military Entrance Processing Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEPS</td>
<td>Military Entrance Processing Station</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIRS</td>
<td>MEPCOM Integrated Resource System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSD</td>
<td>Office of the Secretary of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNE</td>
<td>Processed Not Enlisted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QNE</td>
<td>Qualified Not Enlisted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RA</td>
<td>Regular Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RMA</td>
<td>Recruiter Market Analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RS</td>
<td>Recruiting station</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPF</td>
<td>Service Processing For</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USARBGKC</td>
<td>Kansas City Recruiting Battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAREC</td>
<td>US Army Recruiting Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USMC</td>
<td>US Marine Corps</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX B -- RECRUITING RESOURCES

COST PER RECRUIT

In 1998, the Army expended more than $11,000 per individual military recruit. This represents an increase of more than 58 percent from the spending levels required in the 1994 General Accounting Office report to Congress on military recruiting. While other services costs are historically lower than Army costs, the figure represents a reasonable high-end estimation of cost per contract for DOD in the given four factors:

- Accession missions for all services are increasing to achieve the sustainment of steady-state active duty force levels
- The enlistment eligible population is increasing
- Popular opinion concerning the military service remains reasonably high
- Youth propensity for enlistment is relatively stable

Based upon market conditions and predictions analysis alone, it is impossible to accurately forecast the cost in dollars per military recruit during the upcoming years. Nonetheless, such a measure is necessary to assess the efficiency of recruiting efforts and provide a standard unit of measure to quantify recruiting resources wasted, expended in use, or gained through competitive recruiting practices. It is possible to assess both the inefficiencies and efficiencies arising from the interaction and competition between separate recruiting services using this measurement.

RECRUITING RESOURCES

"USAREC measures almost everything the recruiter does" as do the Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps. The results of recruiter efforts actually produce measurable and increasingly important and recruiting resources including: leads, referrals, contacted leads (or prospects), applicants, enlistees, and eventually accessions. In order to determine the relative value of each of these resources, formally tabulated conversion data are applied to predict the resources expected at the next level in the process once they progress or are converted through the system. This actually permits the comparison of leads, recruiter man-day, dollars and accessions against one another.
As of the month of March 2000, the conversion rates within the US Army Recruiting Battalion, Kansas City (USARBKC) were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STAGE OF RECRUITING PROCESS</th>
<th>CONVERSION RATE</th>
<th>RESULTING PRODUCT</th>
<th>RELATIVE VALUE</th>
<th>BY-PRODUCT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contract to Accessions</td>
<td>1.05 : 1</td>
<td>US ARMY ACCESSION</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>DEP LOSS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Floor to Contract</td>
<td>1.31 : 1</td>
<td>US ARMY DEP</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>QNE OR MEDICAL PNE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Test Pass to Floor</td>
<td>1.34 : 1</td>
<td>APPLICANT (PNE)</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>TERMINATED TEST PASS (PNE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Test to Test Pass</td>
<td>1.63 : 1</td>
<td>TEST PASS (PNE)</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>TEST FAILURE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appointment Conduct to Test</td>
<td>3.55 : 1</td>
<td>TESTER</td>
<td>0.126</td>
<td>TERMINATED PROSPECT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appointment Make to Appointment Conduct</td>
<td>1.47 : 1</td>
<td>PROSPECT</td>
<td>0.085</td>
<td>POSITIVE LEAD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contact Attempt to Appointment Make</td>
<td>6.3 : 1</td>
<td>PROSPECT</td>
<td>0.014</td>
<td>UNSCREENED LEAD</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ACRONYMS USED: DEP - DELAYED ENTRY PROGRAM ENLISTEE; QNE - QUALIFIED NOT ENLISTED APPLICANT; PNE - PROCESSED NOT ENLISTED APPLICANT.

ALL RECRUITING PROCESS BY-PRODUCTS ASSUME THE RELATIVE VALUE OF THE PRECEDING PRODUCT FOR PURPOSES OF COMPARISON.

Table 4 - Conversion Rates

Leads themselves even have an estimable intrinsic value. In a 1997 Issue Paper, RAND Analyst James R. Thomas calculated that a total of 653 telephone contact attempts were necessary to produce a single recruit. Given this, a single telephonic attempt at obtaining an appointment is worth .0014 accessions.

In November 1998, a single Regular Army accession was valued at $11,187 based upon the comparison of the US Army Recruiting Command RA Budget against the RA accession mission. Additionally, the contract write-rate, which accounts for recruiter net contracts per month in the USARBKC, was 1.2 for all of FY 99. Given this, the following chart (Table 5 - Recruiting Relative Resource Values) demonstrates the dollar value of various market resources in both dollars and in recruiter man-day equivalents.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RECRUITING RESOURCE</th>
<th>DOLLAR VALUE</th>
<th>RECRUITER MAN DAY EQUIVALENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACCESSION</td>
<td>$11,187</td>
<td>17.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEP</td>
<td>$10,627</td>
<td>16.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPLICANT (PNE)</td>
<td>$8,167</td>
<td>12.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEST PASS (PNE)</td>
<td>$5,034</td>
<td>7.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TESTER</td>
<td>$1,410</td>
<td>2.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROSPECT</td>
<td>$951</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POSITIVE LEAD</td>
<td>$702</td>
<td>0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSCREENED LEAD</td>
<td>$17</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Calculations based upon conversion data compared against Kansas City Recruiting Battalion Gross Regular Army Write-Rate for FY 1999.

Table 5 - Recruiting Relative Resource Values

Given these calculations it is possible to compare expenditure and losses to the recruiting market based in the recruiting process.
ENDNOTES

1 Accession mission is the numerical requirement to "access" or enlist onto active duty a particular number of military recruits.


3 Total DOD accession missions increased from about 175,000 in FY 95 to more than 200,000 in FY 00. This change represents a shift of recruiting requirements back to levels existing at the onset of the military drawdown from the early to mid 1990s. See Ibid., Slides 8 and 64. See also U.S. General Accounting Office, National Security and International Affairs Division, Military Recruiting: More Innovative Approaches Needed, (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1994) GAO/NSIAD-95-22, p. 26.


6 Propensity is an individual's expressed positive opinion concerning personal service in the military and is routinely measured through attitude surveys. It does not necessarily reflect individual action. Positive propensity is an expressly positive attitude about the idea of performing military service. Negative propensity is a negative expression concerning enlistment. Individual propensity can and does change over time. RAND surveys estimate that positive propensity for enlistment decreased from 32% to 25% between 1989 and 1992 and continued to decline through 1999. As of 1994, positively propensed individuals account for nearly 18 % of all active duty enlistments. Curiously, negatively propensed individuals make up 46% of the recruited population. Michael P. Murray, and Laurie L. McDonald, Recent Recruiting Trends and Their Implications for Models of Enlistment Supply, Report Prepared for the United States Army and the Office of the Secretary of Defense, (Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation, 1999), 8.

7 Service Chief's efforts and the Secretary of Defense's participation have been widely documented during 1999 and to date in 2000. See bibliography for multiple listing in Army Times, Air Force Times, Army Magazine, and AUSA News. Other recommended strategies appear in these same articles and editorials. One specific letter to the editor suggests sweeping recommendations to take care of people resources through implementation of a broad spectrum of compensation improvements, professional development systems, force reorganizations, reinvigoration of on-post life, and improvement of uniforms. Bradley T Gericke, and Robert Choppa, "To Fix the Army, Consider Working on Its Soldiers First," Opinion: Back Talk, Army Times (December 27, 1999): 54.


9 This number represents recruiters on production or field recruiters who actually recruit. It does not include those recruiters assigned for institutional or administrative support purposes. USAREC, "Tiger Team Assessment," Slide 5.
The service with the highest delayed entry program loss rate is the Marine Corps, which failed to access 25% of all contracted enlistees in FY 99. This is largely due to their emphasis on recruiting within the High Schools as a primary market. The lowest DEP loss rate in FY 99 came from the Air Force at 14%. Ibid., Slide 64.

As of January 2000, the total on production reserve recruiters for the four main recruiting services was 2,483. The numbers of on-production reserve recruiters for the other services was not immediately available. See Ibid., Slide 5 and GAO, More Innovative Approaches, 56.

The REDUX retirement program was a defense policy enacted as a cost cutting measure in the late 1980s. It reduced the amount of retirement benefits to which a twenty year military retiree would be entitled from 50 to 40% of the average base pay at the date of retirement. It had become widely unpopular with the affected service members and was finally repealed in FY 00.


Other military recruiting forces include the U.S. Coast Guard, the Army National Guard and Air National Guard, and the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) program. Additionally, active component recruiters work against the reserve component recruiters from the Army, Navy, and Air Force. All told, a highly qualified individual might be actively recruited by up to 15 military recruiters including military service academy recruiters.

Murray and McDonald, Recent Recruiting Trends, xii, 51.

RAND Corporation, RAND Research Brief: Competing with College -- Developing New Recruiting Options for the Military, (Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation, 1999), 1,2.

1990 U.S. census estimates of school year 1999/2000 high school senior class population, and the population of the preceding four years worth of graduates. Based upon service maximum age requirements, this population of the total prospective employee pool could be theoretically tripled by including all persons from 22 to 34 years of age. See GAO, More Innovative Approaches, 21 for primary market population data.

Only about 6% of all active duty enlistees in FY 99 had any college level schooling. USAREC, "Tiger Team Assessment," Slide 12.

23 In FY 99, about 20 percent of all military recruits were women and 19 percent were older than age 22. 35 is the maximum age for which most qualified military applicants must enter onto active duty. Exceptions exist for qualified professionals, certain officer specialties, and individuals with prior military service. Of total military enlistments in FY 99 these two groups comprised approximately 20% and 19% respectively. USAREC, "Tiger Team Assessment," Slides 12, 17. Qualifications as per U.S. Army, Headquarters, *Army Regulation 601-210, Regular Army and Army Reserve Enlistment Program*, Washington D.C.: (Government Printing Office, 1995 with updates through 1 April 1999), 3.


25 Accession missions for all services combined between 1995 through 2000 ranged from 175,000 to 197,000 recruits. USAREC, "Tiger Team Assessment," Slide 62.


31 Mchugh, "Army Seeks New Ad Campaign," 12 citing the Assistant Secretary for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, Patrick T. Henry.


33 Murray and McDonald, *Recent Recruiting Trends*, 8.


35 The services have enlisted non-graduates since the initiation of the All-Volunteer Force, and they have provided assistance to active duty service members in completing GEDs, they have never provided active assistance to individuals who required a basic educational credential before accession on to active duty is new.

37 Diane Tsimekles, and Jane McHugh, "Army Dangles Diplomas to Dropouts," Army Times (February 14, 2000): 8. Assisting applicants in completing a GED was previously cause for investigation as a Recruiting Impropriety and was punishable through both administrative action and through non-judicial punishment. The practice of assisting applicants in achieving minimum academic qualifications for service led to a process known as credential laundering and led recruiters to refer potential recruits to questionable academic institutions which were often referred to as diploma mills. U.S. Army, Headquarters, U.S. Army Recruiting Command, USAREC Regulation 601-101, Education Enlistment Credentials, (Fort Knox, Kentucky: USAREC, 1998), 5.


39 The Army does require GED-Plus applicants to score in the top 50th percentile of a separately issued reliability examination in order to mitigate the risks of excessive attrition in basic training and during the first term of enlistment. The AIM test (Assessment of Individual Motivation) provides an additional indicator as to the applicant's tenacity. Colin A. Agee, "Recruiters: 'Live Long and Prospect,'" Editorial AUSA News (April 2000): 5.

40 An example of RAND analysis of specific programs and options can be found as early as 1981 where the Veteran's Educational Assistance Program (VEAP) was determined to have a negative effect on retention. Gus W. Haggstrom, Thomas J. Blaschke, Winston K. Chow, and William Lisowki, The Multiple Option Recruiting Experiment, Report Prepared for the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense/Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Logistics, (Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation, 1981), Report R-2671-MRAL, p. v.


42 The term "quality" is used to describe the mental and educational qualifications of a non-prior service enlistee. Individuals having no prior military service who score in the top 50th percentile of the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) and possess a High School Diploma are considered Quality Contracts. DOD accepts the General Educational Development Certificate (GED) as a High School Diploma for purposes of accession.


45 By these calculations, the 5th Recruiting Brigade should have reduced the authorized recruiters in USARBKC by 4 if their sole objective was to reestablish equitable distribution within the Bde. Apparently they forecast that the market in the region had the potential to be much more productive than it had been in the preceding three years, or that other regions within the brigade area were headed for a production downturn. For data, see 5th Recruiting Brigade, "RMA 99," Slide 17.

"Markets of opportunity," and "bread and butter" markets are terms commonly used when conducting recruiter market analysis in accordance with USAREC Regulation 601-87 and periodic market share analysis. USAREC Regulation 601-87, Recruiter Market Analysis, (Fort Knox, Kentucky: USAREC, 1998), passim.

Historically productive High Schools are labeled "A" High Schools and are allocated to each individual recruiters area of responsibility (AOR). Less productive High School are labeled "B" schools or adjudicated as non-productive or "closed schools. Ibid., 4.


Authorized recruiters dropped from 114 to 113. 5th Recruiting Brigade, "RMA 99," Slide 10.


This fact is all the more alarming when considering that DOD had just lowered these standards from 67 to 62.5 percent in FY 99. USAREC, "Tiger Team Assessment," Slide 18.

An increase of approximately 6% in DOD volume contracts occurred during the same period accompanied by a 5% decrease in Army share of DOD volume contracts netting an increase of total contracts total regular Army enlistments for the Army of 16 or 1%. 5th Recruiting Brigade, "RMA 99," Slide 17 and USAREC, "Market Share Report -- FY 00 Through January."

The five stations include Warrensburg, Harrisonville, Hollister, Great Bend, and Dodge City Recruiting Stations. DOD volume increased significantly in all but one of these stations. 5th Recruiting Brigade, "Kansas City Recruiting Battalion Recruiter Market Analysis," Slide 17 and U. S. Army, Headquarters, U. S. Army Recruiting Command. "Market Share Report -- FY 99 Through September," and USAREC "Production Report: BN to BDE Year To Date," 1.
This is based upon the average HSSM population in USARBKC of 266 as of RMA 99. 5th Recruiting Brigade, "RMA 99," Slide 17.

Marines actually had 1302 recruiting stations as compared to the Army's 1600 in FY 99. USAREC, "Tiger Team Assessment," Slide 60.

Despite this, 77% of all USMC recruiting facilities are collocated with the Army in multi-service recruiting facilities. tiger Team Assessment, Slide 51. Captain Helton, Executive Officer of the USMC Recruiting Station, Kansas City suggested that many Marine Recruiters neglect some High Schools within their region because they can or do achieve high enough levels of productivity by working within 'favorite' schools. These 'favorites' may at times be located more proximately to the individual recruiters office or station. L. G. Helton, Captain, U.S. Marine Corps Recruiting Station, Kansas City, Kansas, Personal Interview, 30 March 2000.

Marine Corps Recruiting Stations numbered 1302 in early FY 00 compared to the Army's 1600. Ibid., Tiger Team Assessment, Slide 51 and Helton, Personal Interview. See also Jay Defillipo, Station Commander, U.S. Army Neosho Recruiting Station, Neosho Missouri, Personal Interview, 30 March 2000.

DOD correct GAO's assessment by clarifying that the principal driver for the geographic distribution of recruiting forces in the geographic distribution of the eligible recruiting population. GAO, More Innovative Approaches, 46, 76, 77.

USAREC, USAREC Regulation 601-87, 3.

High School populations of urban and suburban America tend often have significant proportions which are either unqualified, for military service, poorly qualified for military service, or negatively propensed. The reasons for these conditions are many but include the increased: incidence of teenage pregnancy; high school drop outs; drug use; lowered educational standards; and the presence of school districts and educational institutions which cater to the private, elite, or upper class segments of the greater metropolitan regions. All of these populations still count against recruiter HSSM averages unless formally adjudicated from the official High School List. U.S. Army, Headquarters, U.S. Army Recruiting Command. USAREC Pamphlet 350-13, School Recruiting Program Handbook. Fort Knox, Kentucky: USAREC, 1998. See also Defillipo, Personal Interview, and McKay, Donald First Sergeant, U.S. Army Recruiting Company, Manhattan Kansas. Personal Interview, 30 March 2000.

Neosho RS is a classic example of a rural recruiting station. It is located approximately 180 miles from any major urban center. The two assigned recruiters are responsible for a total of 516 HSSM spread over an area of 2176 square miles. There are no major population densities within the station area, but there are approximately 75 to 100 HSSM who go to such small and distant high schools, that the Neosho RS does not prospect among them very efficiently. Defillipo, Personal Interview.


USAREC, "Market Share Report -- FY 00 Through January."
GAO bases their estimation of target population on 1990 U.S. census data and military accession missions for FY 00 as projected in 1994. The actual mission in FY 00 was 5% more than forecast. Recruiting forces collect and compile high school populations from the school districts themselves and consolidate this information with the Defense Manpower Data Center. The difference between the two numbers is not significant. GAO, *More Innovative Approaches*, 24-26 and USAREC, "Tiger Team Assessment," Slides 52, 60.

This is based upon the 5th Army Recruiting Brigade Average of 38.42 DOD volume contracts per year per authorized RA recruiter during the USARBKC RMA of January 1999. 5th Recruiting Brigade, "RMA 99," Slide 17.

The figures estimate 80% male enlistments in keeping with DOD trends. USAREC, "Tiger Team Assessment," Slide 12.

An Army recruiter AOR with 320 HSSM and an historical DOD volume production rate of 40 would still have to enlist approximately 10% of the annual renewable portion of the market. This is calculating that 32 males and 8 females enlisted for all services and that females and that males comprised the senior class in equal proportions. Both the HSSM population DOD volume production used here and they are much higher than USAREC wide averages for FY 99. Calculating for the entire prime recruiting market including all females, this would still equate to a 1.25% enlistment requirement. Using 5th Army Recruiting Brigade's averages for FY 99 it would require 1.84%. See GAO, *More Innovative Approaches*, 26.


This decrease is somewhat deceptive in that both the Marine Corps and Army make heavy use of junior enlisted home town recruiter assistants and/or corporal recruiters which do not reflect in the on production recruiter totals. USAREC, "Tiger Team Assessment," Slide 21.

Ibid., Slide 54.

Ibid., Slides 13, 54, and 61.

Ibid., Slide 21.


Ibid., quoting Colonel Jeffrey Spara, US Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel.

A lead is a name or contact that has prospective value to the military recruiter. It is typically comprised of at least a name and a means of contact such as phone number, address, or place of work. Recruiters work to contact all viable leads multiple times in the process of prospecting in an effort to gain their agreement for a meeting and sales presentation. U.S. Army, Headquarters, U.S. Army Recruiting Command, *USAREC Regulation 350-6, Recruiter Production Management System*, (Fort Knox, Kentucky: USAREC, 1998), 4.


Ibid.

Prospecting is the term that represents the first step in the recruiting sales process whereby leads are converted to appointments. Recruiters prospect by attempting to make telephonic or face-to-face contact with leads.

For the Army this is established by review of Lead Source Analysis records. For the Marine Corps it is established in James R. Thomas *Reengineering DOD Recruiting*. RAND Issue Paper, (Santa Monica California: RAND Corporation, 1997), 2 and USAREC, *USAREC Regulation 350-6*, pp. 50-51.

Cold House Calls are an approved method of prospecting and follow-up for the US Army Recruiter according to USAREC, *USAREC Regulation 350-6*, p. 13.

GAO defines nine separate recruiting forces under DOD's specific purview. These are the Air Force, Air Force Reserve, Air National Guard, Navy, Navy Reserve, Marine Corps, Marine Corps Reserve, Army, and Army National Guard. Over and above these, Military Academies, ROTC, and the Coast Guard actively recruit among the same eligible population. GAO, *More Innovative Approaches*, 56.


As indicated by testing individuals on the School Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (SASVAB) and/or by accepting an appointment with a military recruiter of any service.


97 See note 105.

98 This can be seen in the data presented in Table 3 - Competitive Recruiting Overlap Analysis.


100 This chart is compiled from a review of 893 separate processing records. All of these records were randomly selected within the database and or records rooms with the exception of Active Army Shipper" and Active Army DEP Loss for Apathy" which were taken directly from the USARBKC shipper and DEP Loss files. Random samples taken from Kansas City MEPs files room individual processing records with social security numbers ending in digits 80 through 81, USARBKC shipper files for FY 2000 to date, USARBKC DEP Loss files for FY 2000 to date, and Kansas City MEPS daily processing logs for 1 through 30 March 2000.

101 For purposes of analysis, applicant processing for a service and its reserve component were counted as having processed for a single service. The MEPCOM Integrated Resource System (MIRS) database preserves processing data for each military tester and applicant for a period of two years unless that applicant is permanently disqualified. In these cases, the information remains on the system for an additional five years. There are certain technical exceptions to this. See Brad P. Newcomer, Executive Officer, U.S. Military Entrance Processing Station (MEPS), Kansas City, Kansas, Personal Interview, 6 April 2000.

102 MIRS maintains processing histories on normal applicants for a period of two years unless the individual is disqualified in the database in which case MIRS maintains the data file for up to seven years. There are exceptions to this.

103 SPF is a code used within the MIRS to reflect service of ownership for an applicants records. SPF is designated when the applicant agrees to testing or physical processing with a military service. SPF can only change if the applicant requests processing with another service.

104 Only .5 % of all accessions in the random sample were previous DEP Losses for any reason. "Apathy" DEP losses do reenlist irregularly. "Apathy" DEP Losses are individuals who terminate their enlistment contracts before accession for personal reasons not including enrollment in higher education programs or physical disqualification. Of all "Apathy" DEP loss records reviewed, only two reenlisted for another service. One subsequently fulfilled their contract

105 Using conversion data provided at Table 4, Appendix B.

106 Defillipo, Personal Interview and McKay, Personal Interview.

107 MIRS data is available indirectly to station commanders through the service "senior liaison" to the MEPS. In order to have access to the applicant processing history, the service must first gain processing rights to the applicant through the SPF change process.
Chonko, Madden, Tanner, and Davis, *Analysis of Recruiter Selling Techniques*, 32, 33.

Ibid., 41.


Chonko, Madden, Tanner, and Davis, *Analysis of Recruiter Selling Techniques*, 29, 30


Ibid., 38.

As indicated by a random sampling of over 400 records in the KCMEPS records room.

Title 10, section 503 should be modified to allow for the maintenance of useful directory information by both telemarketing agencies and by the military for as long as the individual concerned remains a legitimate prospect for military service.

McKay, Personal Interview.

Individual service liaisons do have limited access to the MIRS database upon request through the regional MEPS or MEPS record room. Their access is limited to records of applicants with their service-specific SPF code, and the access is read-only. USMEPCOM are the only users of the MIRS for the purpose of adding, deleting, or updating records.


Ibid., v., 31.

Ibid., Abstract.

Adopted from the general concept offered by Ibid., passim.


GAO, *More Innovative Approaches*, 18


Ibid..
129 5th Recruiting Brigade, "Mission Accomplishment Plan." The DOD wide write rate average for FY 99 was only 1.1. USAREC, "Tiger Team Assessment," Slides 13, 61.

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