Fourth Generation Warfare and Its Impact on the Army

A Monograph
By
Major Robert B. Polk
United States Army

School of Advanced Military Studies
United States Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

Second Term AY 99-00

SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES

MONOGRAPH APPROVAL

Major Robert B. Polk

Title of Monograph: *Fourth Generation Warfare and Its Impact on the Army*

Approved by:

_____Monograph Director
James Schneider, Ph.D.

_____Director, School of Advanced
Col. Robin P. Swan, MMAS   Military Studies

_____Director, Graduate Degree
Dr. Robert Berlin, Ph.D.   Program

Accepted this 8th Day of May 2000

ABSTRACT

Fourth Generation Warfare and Its Impact on the Army
By Major Robert B. Polk , 53 pages

Many Americans associate the fall of Rome with Alaric and the Visigoths and other warrior peoples from the north, but serious students understand that Rome's decline was slow and from within. Ralph Peters writes, "In its confident years, the Roman Empire had been absorptive and tolerant. For centuries, these qualities lent strength and co-opted new subjects—but ultimately core identities and commitments to the Roman idea were fatally diluted. It was those who refused to be absorbed and who rejected toleration…who outlasted the greatest empire the earth knew until our own century." Peters goes on to say in his thought provoking essay, *Our New Old Enemies*, that Pontius Pilates's refusal to face the difficult choices by wishing away the problem was symbolic of what was wrong in Rome even at its apex of power. A cancer had already invaded a society more content in debating than deciding. Ultimately, the "Romans were chronically late to respond to challenges…" and torn asunder by their declining self-confidence in their own ideals, self-identity, and self-imposed ignorance to the real threat from within. Are there parallels to American history? Some would say so.

In 1989, the authors of an article entitled, *The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation*, offered a glimpse of the future rooted in the past. They postulated an America in crisis conditioned over time to accept tolerance and reject its unifying Western identity in favor of a new order of multiculturalism. Their position initially found little traction until such notables as Martin van Creveld, Samuel Huntington, and Robert Kaplan independently confirmed in the 1990's what the authors of the article had been saying all along.

The authors of *The Changing Face of War* argued that the decline of the West in a world rife with cultural conflicts and the powerful influences of a form of cultural Marxism known as political correctness were combining in America to create conditions for a new generation of warfare. Their vision included a form of warfare that bypassed the military altogether to strike directly at the culture itself. They believed that the abandonment of Western, Judeo-Christian culture in lieu of a multicultural state where individuality was prized above national unity risked internal divide and eventual collapse of society. This fragmentation left the national military wanting in both strategy and structure. The resulting decay would generate the conditions necessary to facilitate the aggressions of the modern day Visigoths.

This paper looks at some of the issues in this proposal and asks whether the Army is doing enough to address these serious threats. It reviews the scholarly theories presented by a number of notable futurists in an effort to measure the influences of such forces on the American State, its institutions, and its traditional philosophy of war. In the end, the author concludes that America is indeed in transition with an Army unable to grasp that the greatest threat to its existence is the loss of its culture. Unless steps are taken to stem the hemorrhaging of American culture both in the Army and the society at large, it will also find itself "chronically late" and torn asunder by its conflicting interests and lost identity.

In the end, it may surprise many to learn that the most potent weapon in the American arsenal in dealing with these issues in the next century will be education. The informed and determined mass man will always trump technology. America and its Army can ill-afford to turn a blind eye to the vulnerabilities being created in society. A majority of the world population resists the order we as Americans are intent on imposing. These many would content themselves to strike at those vulnerabilities given the right conditions.

History teaches that through years of internal denial, Roman society conditioned itself and its grand army to succumb to the final external onslaught. America should heed history's lessons not for their past relevance but for their immediacy. Education will be the key to informing the process of change and preventing these conditions from ever appearing. When honestly assessed,

the message of history is brutally clear. It is the very psychological nature of man that stands most starkly in defiance of peaceful progression and it is "he" on which we must apply our greatest resources through education.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SECTION I

INTRODUCTION

The task here is difficult. To debunk Clausewitz, attack what is politically correct, and suggest the obsolescence of the United States Army in the twenty-first century is quite an undertaking in a single paper. As unpalatable as it may seem, the message here deserves consideration. If true, the following details a possibility that is both imminently real as it is threatening. By taking a well-read position postulated by Martin van Creveld on the decline of the state and state sponsored wars, this study adds to it the contributions of Robert Kaplan, Samuel Huntington, Paul Kennedy, William Lind and others in describing the combining forces that are reshaping our Western society. This study looks specifically at the combination of these sublime forces to suggest that the reshaping will eventually change forever the role of the Army. The Army as we know it may lose its central role in state politics as the national and international security environment demands a refocus from the external threats abroad to the internal threats from within. The new internal threat directly attacks both its culture and its organizations in ways scarcely noticed and without fear of reprisal. As these forces shape society so will it shape ideas of security and protection of what Americans hold dear.

This short study does not pretend to fully address nor discount the complex systems of change impacting on Western and American society. Rather it argues that these factors are combining to bring about a broad and important transformation of American and Army culture which, left unabated, could lead to serious consequences. The author attempts to avoid an alarmist tone ascribing instead to a reformist platform advocating prudent measures rather than drastic and hasty changes in human behavior.[1] The study begins with the article that started it all.

In 1989, the authors of *The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation*, postulated that the development of warfare into the modern era could be chartered by its evolution through three distinct generations:

> **First generation** warfare reflects tactics of the era of the smoothbore musket, the tactics of line and column. These tactics were developed partially in response to technological factors—the line maximized firepower, rigid drill was necessary to generate a high rate of fire, etc--and partially in response to social conditions and ideas...Vestiges of first generation tactics survive today, especially in a frequently encountered desire for linearity on the battlefield.[2]

Second generation was a response to improvements in the rifle and indirect fires. Tactics were based on fire and movement but remained essentially linear with greater reliance on the effects of indirect fires. Massed firepower replaced massed manpower. In spite of the best intentions, second generation tactics are still practiced by most American units in the field today.

Third generation warfare was born in response to increased firepower but the driving force was ideas rather than technology. The Germans spearheaded this change in WWI realizing the futility of over reliance on firepower alone to win against foes of equal or superior quality. The resulting nonlinear tactics later coined as *Blitzkrieg* shifted the basis of operational art away from place (as in Lidell-Hart's indirect approach) to time (as emphasized in by Col. John Boyd and his theory behind the OODA loop). While the U.S. Army struggles to understand, let alone implement the important lessons of third generation warfare (the subject of a previous article by the author), forces are at work shaping and designing a new face of warfare that may overwhelm any known conceptions of current Army operations.

While technology was the primary driver of the second generation; ideas the primary driver of the third; new ideas in both the domestic and international arena may drive the Army to confront a fourth generation of warfare. For the past 500 years, the West has defined warfare. The West, however, no longer dominates the world. "A fourth generation [of warfare] may emerge from non-Western cultural traditions, such as Islamic or Asiatic tradition." Fourth

generation may render traditional armies obsolete as insidious unseen forces nearly impossible to target emerge to attack directly at our greatest center of gravity—our culture.

Terrorism represents only a spasmodic eruption of the larger forces at play in fourth generation warfare. William Lind characterized the **fourth generation** as warfare resulting from a combining of three significant changes in the world: 1) the breakdown of the state, 2) the negative impact of multiculturalism on Western culture especially as seen in the United States, and 3) the shift to a world of cultures in conflict. Many of the aspects of change in all of these areas currently exist.

These changes have led to new ideas. That conflicts will be waged outside of the nation-state framework (non-trinitarian) is the first idea shaping the fourth generation. The *return* to a world in cultural conflict shapes the second element of the fourth generation warfare. It reflects the idea that the West's response to the increasing encroachment of non-Western culture into its heartland (Europe and North America) since the end of WWII has amounted to little more than cultural suicide. The third and perhaps most significant and intractable aspect of fourth generationist's view of the world is the notion of a kind of cultural Marxism practiced in the United States that threatens to bring this new warfare to America's doorstep with all the impact of a full scale armed invasion. Fourth generationists contend that the abandonment of Western, Judeo-Christian culture in lieu of a multi-cultural state where individuality is prized above national unity risks internal divide and eventual collapse. The fragmentation leaves the national military wanting in both strategy and structure. Are these the forces at work shaping the international and domestic security environment? If so, is there anything the Army can do to prepare for such events? That is the focus of the present study.

SECTION II

THE RISE AND DECLINE OF THE STATE AND TRINITARIAN WARFARE

As the Army restructures with such radical initiatives as replacing its tracked fleet with wheeled vehicles, excitement abounds. On both sides of the issue, pundits are lining up to weigh in with their views. The debate continues but consensus remains on at least one issue—the need for change. As always, the survival of both the military and the society from which it emanates depends on an ability to respond to the leading indicators of change. This challenge has never been more difficult than at any other time in history. Yet with the increased pace of change, few seem to understand exactly where everyone is heading in such a hurry.

Entering the 21st century, America continues to figure prominently in this furious tempo of change with its involvement in a range of emerging advances from cyberspace to biotechnologies. If for no other reason but its share in world economics, America will cast its long shadow over such globally significant evolutions and revolutions far into the foreseeable future. But the reasons for America's role as a leader in the world arena traces to much more than its spirited entrepreneurship, its dominance in technology, or even its democratic ideals. Unrecognized by many, America continues to make its greatest contributions to the world, as it has during the greater part of the last century, as the predominant leader of Western civilization. Few, however, consider this a laudable or even important contribution. With this attitude in mind, it is not difficult to understand how defending its culture, let alone its place in Western civilization accounts both for America's past success and its eventual decline as a nation-state. The loss of will to defend its civilization signifies a lapse in cultural identity with grave implications. The national military as one of its most important and venerated state institutions, must worry about any such decay of national conscience as its very sustenance derives from the strength of the people and the culture it protects. A loss of cultural identity could spell disaster

4

for the Army and the nation. This idea provides the starting point for an exploration into issues of great importance to the future of America and its Army.

In 1991 and again in 1999, Martin van Creveld writes what only few considered before. In *Transformation of War* and *The Rise and Decline of the State*, he argues that the world is experiencing a transformation to a future reminiscent of the past—a time before nation states—a time before the peace of Westphalia in 1648. In this new world, he postulates that warfare in the modern sense may soon find itself reminiscent of pre-Westphalian, non-trinitarian conflicts acted out by both state and non-state actors noting,

> ...the modern paradigm for warfare, in which nation-states wage war for reasons of state using formal militaries that fight other organizations similar to themselves with people supporting both but also distinguishable—the 'Clausewitzian Trinity'-- is historically unusual.[3]

Van Creveld further suggests that armies in this new world may likely "...be replaced by police-like security forces on the one hand and bands of ruffians on the other..." Such statements as these in support of his broader thesis on the changing nature war have met with considerable resistance from many scholars. On the other hand, his words strike a cord with others begging recognition and further explanation. Such an explanation must begin with an understanding of his view of the rise and decline of the nation-state itself.

The Rise of the State:

Van Creveld argues that the state exists as only a modern convention and certainly not the only or necessarily the most desirable form of governing as one looks to the future. He elucidates this contention by reviewing and highlighting past forms and methods of governing beginning with the tribe.

Perhaps the most basic of communities is the tribe. In the most primitive form of tribes, "government both began and ended within the extended family, lineage, or clan. Thus there were no superiors except for men, elders, and parents..."[4] Position was determined by the relationship to families, sex, age, and marital status. Every adult male viewed himself as equal to each other

5

without a right or need to issue orders to others. A council of elder statesmen settled issues of community concern but the idea of a *public* with authorities beholding to it did not exist.[5] As tribes progressed into organizations with rulers, class distinction became more acute and division of labor in society more accepted. Chieftains often exercised despotic powers over their subjects retaining accumulated wealth to engage and maintain larger and more distributed organizations.[6] The Chieftain owned "his" subjects and they in turn owed their loyalty to him. "Political" rule in the modern sense of that term did not exist.[7]

Warfare also had its unique characteristics in the tribal society. Reason of war included exacting vengeance for physical injury, theft, damaged property, honor, or simply to gain booty in the form of goods or women. Tribes with rulers were capable of actual conquest. In primitive tribes without a centralized decision-making body, war was defined "less as a deliberate political act than as the characteristic activity of adult males..."[8] Even in highly sophisticated tribal societies with established hierarchical development, the act of war never emanated from the "interests" of a represented public or state. In any case, there were no distinctions between the army and the people. In fact, societies as such, had no armies--they *were* the army.

In great contrast to the agrarian based tribal societies, city-states grew from communities rooted in permanent urban settings. Leaders were chosen or appointed by the people in city-states.[9] This was a very important distinction from tribal society but from van Creveld's point of view, the single most important political invention credited to this segment of societal history was the notion of the distinction between government and ownership. In this was born the clear and separate understanding between free citizenship and servitude. This was important as societies progressed away from the ideas of individual and absolute rule to a system of the people. This shaped the way the society viewed its military as well.

Armies were raised as necessary from the citizen population but according to rules and procedures. There was no concept of a professional army separate from the citizenry but rules of

fairness did exist to alleviate the burdens to society as appropriate. Such ideas as choosing soldiers from lists of volunteers or from those who had less than the maximum number of campaigns before resorting to general conscription exemplified this institutionalized order. Van Creveld notes that even in such societies, the military "did not lead a separate existence as an organization, nor consequently was it able to develop a militarist esprit de corps."[10] Only in Sparta can ancient history offer an exception of note. Sparta used its Helot slaves to free its citizenry from daily toils. This allowed the citizen population to tend to the affairs of war on a nearly full-time basis. Elsewhere, war was carried on "mainly by semi-trained amateurs..."[11]

The city-state came close to the modern definition of sovereignty with its territorial based society exercising freedoms in both external and internal affairs free from service to a higher authority. Yet, it never achieved the conceptualization of the state itself as an abstract entity or legal identity unto itself since the vital aspects of war were made by the people themselves rather than the magistrates on behalf of the people.

Empires in contrast to city-states, developed into mighty organizations. Some were homogeneous, others not. Unlike the city-states, the empire did not expect citizens to participate directly in the affairs of governing. Consequently, there was no need for its citizens to live near the ruling center. Empires stretched far and wide with a developing administrative and cultural system to aid in ruling.

Empires usually adopted a form of ruling elite associated with divine descent. They often existed as god's themselves or at least as the head of their religious establishment. Ideologically speaking, they instituted doctrines "whose purpose was to confirm the subject population in its obedience to the powers that be."[12] The Army and the bureaucracy emerged as the twin pillars supporting the imperial rule with the first real professional army commanded by officers who served for long periods of time and whom the imperial treasury paid. The Chinese and Ottoman empires differed from Rome by relying on feudal arrangements to provide professional soldiers

when needed in return for land and tax relief but the basic concept of a professional army

remained essentially the same. [13]

During this period, the nature of wars fell short of the Clausewitzian model. According to

van Creveld, to speak of war in the Middle Ages,

> ...as something made by the state for political ends is to misrepresent reality.
> For a thousand years after the fall of Rome, armed conflict was waged by
> different kinds of social entities. Among them were barbarian tribes, the Church,
> feudal barons of every rank, free cities, even private individuals...War was
> waged by shoals of retainer who donned military garb and followed their lord. [14]

The notion of an army as an arm of some governmental body representing the people did not

exist. Citizens as such were often considered scarcely human. "So little did feudal war concern

itself with the protection of the population at large that the garrisons of besieged castles often

expelled noncombatants regarding them as so many useless mouths."[15] Though other scholars

dispute it, war in the Middle Ages, according to Van Creveld, was considered the business of the

ruler and the military and not of the people. The Clausewitzian trinity did not exist.

The Western European State emerged following the end of the 30 Years War. The peace

treaty of Westphalia in 1648 marked the beginning of a new era in which the great monarchs of

Europe successfully rose to dominate both the church and the last vestiges of the surviving

emperors. The imperial territories were partitioned and the monarchs moved to consolidate their

powers over the competing nobility in their midst through marriage or conquest of a different

sort. Government became more centralized and bureaucracy flourished. Politics changed

accordingly and the role of the monarchs in battle also changed. In contrast to the medieval

ethos of Kings leading their armies into battle, monarchs increasingly chose to leave the affairs

of battle to field commanders. This was symptomatic of a larger change in which monarchs and

their governments became increasingly "sedentary" preferring to establish larger administrations

to reign in citizens within established territories. This led to a system from feudal lords to direct

government exercised by salaried officials on the king's behalf.[16] The eventual organization of

bureaucratic government whereby instruments were created " that would enable the state to…squeeze its citizens as never before" took form.[17]

The *state* as an "abstract organization with its own persona separate from that of the ruler"[18] would take years to form completely. In order to wield the civilian and military aspects of the power they were creating, the monarchs developed "an impersonal bureaucracy as well as the tax and information infrastructure necessary for its support. Once the bureaucracy was in place, its own nature—the fact that the rules of which it consisted could not be arbitrarily violated without risking a breakdown—soon caused it to start taking power out of the ruler's hands and into its own, thus spawning the state proper."[19] The state was born.

The Decline of the State and State Sponsored Warfare

The relation between the state and war was and is symbiotic according to van Creveld. War post-Westphalia needed the state with its burgeoning bureaucracy to woo its citizenry in support of warfare. The state needed war as an emotionally unifying factor for consolidation of its power. As long as the state maintained the strong appeal of emotions by whetting the appetite of its warriors from time to time in defense of the state, the state retained the loyalty of its citizens. Van Creveld suggests that this may be changing. Citizens are increasingly distant from concerns over national vital or survival interests. If true, the state is losing its most basic reason for existence as the protector of citizen welfare. Concerned more for prosperity than protection, citizens may soon find themselves predisposed to rely on other corporate entities for their basic needs with little consideration for issues of national security. In the modern case, he argues that this transformation is already taking place as big corporations and other non-state actors are competing successfully for this loyalty. Van Creveld provides an important perspective on this phenomenon.

Van Creveld's concern about the decline of the state begins with an observation about the nature of the state as it relates to the modern security environment. His entire argument for the

9

imminent decline of the state rests on the premise that the state is losing its monopoly over the security of its people. The loss of state monopoly over such security issues derives from the deterrent effect of nuclear weapons on large-scale inter-state wars.[20] Since the state's *raison d'être* is the security of its people, and the real threat to that security is seemingly reduced to small scale conventional foes, many citizens in large states are less concerned about supporting national security institutions.

Indicators suggest that the international environment is undergoing a security correction of sorts in response to this phenomenon. For example, global powers continue to decrease the sizes of their militaries. This change has occurred for at least two reasons. First, conventional militaries have become prohibitively expensive to maintain. Secondly, nuclear weapons and the changing nature of warfare has rendered large massive armies obsolete.[21] Additionally, the international security environment headed by the UN no longer tolerates territory as a right of conquest.[22] This alone signals a remarkable and fundamental shift in the purpose of most large-scale wars for the past thousand years. The increased acceptance of global conventions to limit warfare is not without it shortcomings. Some argue the fact that President Bush only succeeded in the Gulf War with the acceptance of the U.N. as reminiscent of a time when medieval princes appealed to the pope for permission to pursue war.[23] To its proponents, however, the conventions note a new high water mark for civilization in which the very attraction of war and its lust for booty in all its various forms has become less attractive.

With the premise that the nuclear age has rendered large scale conventional wars obsolete, van Creveld argues that conflict has moved to lesser forms of conventional and non-conventional aggression however brutal. The threats from within these environments are well known ranging from international crime and terrorism to local insurgents using various weapons from chemicals and bombs to computer viruses. Van Creveld notes hauntingly that,

> ...there has scarcely been an 'advanced' government in Europe and North
> America whose armed forces have not suffered defeat at the hands of under-

10

> equipped, ill-trained, ill-organized, often even ill-clad, underfed, and illiterate
> freedom fighters or guerrillas or terrorist…who were short on everything except
> high courage and the determination…[24]

Unfortunately, the trend is towards more not less violent activity of this sort.

Recognizing the frustration of traditional state armies to combat these threats effectively, states seem more reluctant today to put their reputations on the line by committing their own forces to the fray. The risk of failure is high and many states can ill-afford any loss of faith by the public. Today, states prefer instead to provide resources and training to other forces to do their fighting. Van Creveld observes that this inclination has spawned an entirely new security industry separate from traditional state apparatuses. He reports that private firms exist that presently command armies numbering in the thousands. Additionally,

> In the developing world, notably New Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Liberia,
> mercenaries have already been used to stage coups and countercoups. While
> mercenaries do not yet threaten the political stability of developed countries, the
> range of services they offer to others is as astonishing as it is frightening. They
> include research and development, both of weapons and of scenarios; recruiting,
> training…[25]

The implications of such arrangements while far off in the minds of most Americans may prove a serious challenge to the traditional way wars are fought.

In the absence of such large-scale war, evidence suggests that the great states have turned their energies inward in an attempt to replace their guarantee of security with something else worthy of their citizens' loyalty. Nation-states understand that their survival depends on the loyalty of their citizens and for many, the interim surrogate for providing defense has become welfare. Some suggest that by monopolizing key and essential services, states believe that they may use economic security to maintain citizenry acceptance of its ruling authority. Unfortunately, there are also indications that states may soon be unable to sustain the façade of the welfare agenda. [26] As large wars decline and the welfare system collapses of its own weight so too may states unless they find another surrogate for citizen loyalty.[27] The competition for

this loyalty is increasing. Citizens are already seeking new political, social, and economic allegiances as they interact freely and directly with global actors.[28]

The shift to global markets brings with it second and third order affects. In a world of reduced inter-state war, multinational corporations such as the World Trade Organization, World Economic Forum, and other large international businesses are wielding their influence over states as never before. With the opening of markets and exchanges, states find themselves with less ability to manipulate even their own monetary policies. "Under the new liberal economics… citizens and foreigners act with equal ease, ignoring their respective governments while moving money in and out of any given country by pressing a button."[29] In a future world where such time-honored ideals as sovereignty come in many shades of gray, citizens may rightly come to view these multinational corporations as the real defenders of their vital interests.

The state's ability to protect what it provides in such a world where the permeability of the nation's borders increasingly allows foreign corporations to influence internal social, economic, and political order may now seem in question. These corporate influences include both governmental and territorial designs. Some seem political in nature, while others are "dedicated to different ends such as making money, protecting the environment, spreading some religious message, or propagating some special cause which may range from reducing pollution to animal rights."[30] These corporations do not intend on replacing the state, but their actions may force the state to relinquish its monopoly on power and influence over its citizens. The void left between what the state used to provide and what it may be able to provide in the near future will be filled either by the citizens in private arrangements or by a new breed of corporate security forces. If true, the state's loss of monopoly over security would have serious consequences for both America and the world at large. After all, Thomas Hobbes wrote that *the* most important function of the state is the provision of security to its citizens and institutions.[31]

Paul Kennedy opines similarly that the power of the nation-state has experienced decline in past years. He argues that both the state and its security are potentially threatened by such global trends as new non-local arrangements for production and labor.[32] He notes that various trends from 24-hour-a-day trading to global warming are also by nature transnational rendering borders less important. He also notes that many of the global challenges ahead may threaten the use of traditional responses including military force. He adds that many of these new threats, rather than replacing old threats are more accurately described as "coming along side" [33]the older and more traditional threats. The implications suggest that the usefulness of the nation-state in response to these additional threats may indeed be in question. Kennedy argues that evidence suggests that "civilization" is not keeping pace with those trends that are transforming the planet.

He concludes, however, in a more positive tone than van Creveld, that the nation-state, in spite of these erosions of power, remains today and into the foreseeable future the primary locus of identity of most people. Simply put, "no adequate substitute has emerged to replace it as the key unit in repsonding to global change." [34]

Non-Trinitarian Warfare

As the nature of war changes, so too must the theory that supports it. To date, within Western society, war has chiefly been guided by theory as presented by the likes of Clausewitz and Jomini. Clausewitz's *On War* has by far exercised the greater influence in the modern West, Sun Tzu notwithstanding. As Clausewitz reflected on the lessons of his experience his intellect, great as it was, could only fathom the problem through the prism of his own culture. That culture was Western and the setting was the state. *On War* gives timeless, sage insights from that perspective alone. Yet that perspective has pervaded western thought about warfare for the past century and few have challenged its theoretical premise of war comprised of the trinitarian interaction between people, the government, and the military.

That the trinity is only a modern convention and certainly far from the only convention for theorizing about warfare has not been lost on van Creveld. He posits that Clausewitz's trinity is simply one of many possible forms of war noting that recently, while the superpowers contented themselves with trinitarian warfare in the late twentieth century, others were busy fighting in bloody non-trinitarian contests for survival all around the world.[35] Van Creveld argued at the time of his 1991 publication that none of the conflicts around the world at that time were being fought by trinitarian methods. In these conflicts the belligerents actually strove to drive away the distinctions between the people and the military in such places as Kenya, Rhodesia, Algeria, and Vietnam.[36] More importantly, they recognized intuitively the advantages of waging war free of unwanted interference from civilian concerns. They understood that trinitarian war was about rules while non-trinitarian was about blowing those rules out of the water.

Thucydides observed that wars were fought out of fear, interests, and honor. Clausewitz, of course, argued that wars were fought only for the interests of the state. Van Creveld suggests that wars have often been fought for all these reasons in combination but none in exclusion. Fighting for interests alone implies rationality not always present in such wars of religion, culture, or simple existence. Interests, then, as a conception of Clausewitzian warfare may fail to address the modern security environment holistically.

Van Creveld suggests that the whole notion of fighting for reasons of policy or interests,

> ...is both Eurocentric and modern. At best it is applicable only to the period since 1648, when war was conducted predominately by sovereign states...to believe that justice and religion are less capable of inspiring people to fight and die than is interest is not realism but stupidity.[37]

At its most basic, men never fight for interests. "A person may well lay down his life in the name of God, king, country, family" or friend but not for some interest."

One of van Creveld's most ardent critics, Professor Michael I. Handel of the U.S. Naval War College, presents an opposing view. "Van Creveld's argument is not convincing for the role of the people, the military, and the government can be identified—even if in a rudimentary form –

in every state, society, or group."[38] He offers the writings of Machiavelli and Sun Tzu as

evidence of authors giving credit to the interrelationship of all three prior to 1648. He adds,

> In every conflict or war, some of the people do the fighting while the rest
> provide other forms of active and passive support. All of the people cannot
> fight, even if they so desire, because of such reasons as age, relative strength, or
> skill. Consequently, the distinction between the people (or society) and the
> military (or warriors) is universal as well as eternal.[39]

Handel, in addressing "civil strife, civil wars, and low-intensity wars," admits that

Clausewitz's analysis does not pretend to address the topic of conflict within states, but rather

examines conflict between societies and states. He adds, that Clausewitz would probably

classify the issues cited by van Creveld as problems for the police, perhaps supported by the

military. He also notes that "...theory cannot be applied to problems it was never intended to

explain..." These statements stand in contradiction to his earlier attempts to discredit van

Creveld's critique of Clausewitz. It seems that Handel agrees that in some instances,

Clausewitz's theory may not be appropriate. There is room at least for consideration of other

possibilities.

Robert Kaplan agrees with van Creveld's conclusions that forces working outside the state

framework have encroached upon the conduct of war in a way that challenges the traditional

view that war is a simple extension of state politics. Kaplan notes the number of truces and

cease-fires in Bosnia where one field commander often ignored a cease-fire agreement brokered

by another as exemplary of a new type of warfare. In this new age of non-trinitarian conflict, ties

to family and guerilla comrades will trump loyalty to a state or larger society.[40]

In perhaps his most controversial position, van Creveld moves beyond mere dismissal of

Clausewitzian reasons of waging war to suggest that war itself is an end rather than a means to

something more important. He argues that war is the one activity most capable of causing the

difference between means and ends to disappear.[41] Handel retorts,

> The absurdity of this proposition becomes obvious if one imagines the President
> of the United States declaring war on Canada, Mexico, or Cuba to provide the

America public with 'panem et circenses' to substitute for a strike in the baseball league.[42]

The scenario offered by Handel seems equally absurd. Who could imagine a situation where a *friendly* nation declared war on another friendly nation for pleasure? His rebuttal seems petty and ignores the myriad of past examples and future possibilities of fighting between non-state and state entities.

Kaplan with his years of world travels agrees with van Creveld's position on war as an end in of itself. He cites examples in Sierra Leone, Somalia, Chechnya, and Haiti where the masses actually find liberation in violence. "In Afghanistan and elsewhere, I vicariously experienced this phenomenon: worrying about mines and ambushes frees you from worrying about mundane details of daily existence."[43] It is difficult for affluent societies to fathom the imbedded loss of hope found in the vast majority of the peoples on earth. Yet facing danger and the glory and honor that it brings to oneself and community has long been esteemed as an end rather than a means to anything more important in most societies however well off. Van Creveld notes,

> What makes coping with danger so supremely enjoyable is the unique sense of freedom it is capable of inspiring. As Tolstoy notes of Prince Andrej on the eve of the Battle of Austerlitz, he who has no future before him is free of care; which is why the very terror of fighting is capable of inducing excitement, exhilaration, even vertigo. Fighting demands the utmost concentration...In the whole human experience, the only thing that even comes close is the act of sex, as is also evident from the fact that the same terms are often used to describe both activities.[44]

As both activities generate insatiable demands, one may only wonder of the alternatives.

SECTION III

THE DECLINE OF WESTERN CIVILIZATION

Samuel P. Huntington, author of *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, offers a way of looking at the world that compliments van Creveld's study. Noting that no paradigm is good forever, Huntington admits that his "civilization paradigm" is but one way

to view the interaction of the world in an organized fashion in order to study it and draw some conclusions as to the future of such interactions. He begins by defining his paradigm approach.

A civilization approach holds that the central distinction in the world today is between the West as the hitherto dominate civilization and all the others...in short the world is divided between a Western one and a non-Western many. He adds that nation states are and will remain the most important actors in world affairs, but their interests, associations, and conflicts are increasingly shaped by cultural and civilizational factors. Finally, Huntington observes that the world is anarchical, rife with tribal and nationality conflicts, but the conflicts that pose the greatest dangers for stability are those between states or groups from different civilizations.[45] This provides an able starting point for review of Western culture in and about the U.S. This view will assist in making sense of van Creveld's claim of the decline of the state and in drawing conclusions as to its impact on the U.S. Army.

According to Huntington, civilization is the broadest cultural identity. Within a civilization there may be many individual cultures identified by region, village, etc.., but a civilization such as Chinese or Western are not part of any broader identity. "They constitute the highest cultural grouping of people and the broadest level of cultural identity people have short of that which distinguishes humans from other species."[46] They endure and evolve. Acting as cultural not political entities, they may contain many political units. Among the civilizations are: Western, Latin American, possibly African, Islamic, Sinic, Hindu, Orthodox, Buddhist, and Japanese.[47]

With this as a foundation, Huntington lays down his argument for the decline of the West. He begins by countering the idea of an emerging universal civilization as some have prophesized with the onset of globalization. According to Huntington, this idea is founded on three false assumptions. First that the collapse of the USSR and communism meant the universal triumph of western democracy. He argues that to suggest the only alternative to communism is liberal democracy is sheer hubris. There exist many alternatives to such ideologies including religion,

17

nationalism, corporatism, and market communism (as in China). It is unlikely that Muslims, Chinese, Indian, and all others will rush to embrace Western liberalism just because the Soviet Union broke apart.[48]

The second false assumption is the notion that increased international trade and technology will bind us as never before into a global village. If the lack of ensuing peace following the record high international trading in 1913 fails to highlight the fallacy of such an assumption then perhaps social psychology can offer another view. These psychologists suggest that people define themselves by what makes them different. Said differently, people define their identity by what they are not. As globalization attempts to pull societies closer, people increasingly accord more, not less, relevance to their civilization identity.[49] This phenomenon holds true all over the world.

The final false assumption behind the idea of a universal civilization is the notion that modernization will take over and homogenize communities. Here, Huntington points out that for all the barriers that it does break down, modernization cannot erase the past. What binds us by civilization runs deeper. In his words, "The West was the West long before it was modern."[50]

So if one is most interested in the West and the future of Western civilization, one may ask what exactly is Western culture? Huntington defines it as the following: 1) The Classical legacy as inherited from previous civilizations of Rome and Greece. Such legacies include Greek philosophy and rationalism, Roman law, Latin, and Christianity. 2) Western Christianity in the form of Catholicism and Protestantism is perhaps the West's most important characteristic. 3) European languages as grouped into Romance, Germanic and Latin. This distinguishes the West from other civilizations that rely predominantly on a single language. 4) Separation of spiritual and temporal authority. Separation of church and state is not just American tradition but fundamentally Western as well. By contrast, "In Islam God is Caesar; in China and Japan Caesar is God; in Orthodoxy God is Caesar's junior partner."[51] 5) Rule of law. This tradition born in

Rome and developed into common law in England became the traditional basis for the West's constitutionalism. 6) Social Pluralism. What is distinctive about the West "is the rise and persistence of diverse autonomous groups not based on blood relationship or marriage."[52] 7) Representative bodies and, 8) Individualism. This remains a distinguishing and proud feature of the West.

The decline of the West has three major characteristics according to Huntington. First, that it is a slow process beginning around the turn of the twentieth century and perhaps extending into the next one or two centuries.[53] Second, that the decline will not proceed in a straight line. "The West has great capacity for renewal."[54] The tide of state dominance will likely rise and fall over time but the erosion will continue nonetheless. Third, that the West's share of social, economic, political, and military resources relative to the rest of the world has declined since 1900.[55] The bottom line is that power is shifting and dispersing among the core states within the Western and non-Western civilizations.[56] The distribution of cultures follows the redistribution of power. As the West recedes, other cultures will reassert themselves.

Immanuel Kant observed that nature employed two means to separate peoples: "differences of language and of religion," both tending to produce "mutual hatred and pretexts for war."[57] Paul Kennedy added that while Kant had hoped the progress of civilization would finally lead to peaceful agreement among all, evidence suggests that the world has a long way to go. The history of Islam and Christianity as two of the most assertive religions in the world today certainly serves to prove Kant's point. Yet in the context of preserving the West, Huntington argues that Islamic resurgence amounts to the greatest single attack on Western culture and is akin to the significance of the American, French, or Russian revolution and its import on society at large. He warns that in the long run, Mohammed is likely to win out over Jesus in the quest for followers noting that, "Christianity spreads primarily by conversion, Islam by conversion and reproduction."[58] In fact, the percentage of world population adhering to Islam is projected to

19

surpass Christianity by 2025. Some suggest that this resurgence is an effort to find an Islamic solution to the world's problems by embodying an "acceptance of modernity, rejection of Western culture, and recommitment to Islam as the guide to life in the modern world," to achieve a broad, cultural, social, and political movement of which fundamentalism is only a part.[59] It is achieving this with a thrust northward into Europe, the heartland of Western culture.[60] According to some experts, America's most recent response to this movement has been to,

> ...condemn European measures to control immigration, threaten the Serbs with war on behalf of the Bosnian Islamics, and caution Russia against any attempt to reassert control to her south. At the very least, this represents a failure to comprehend a changing strategic situation. Some call it a cultural death wish.[61]

These same experts suggest that a situation of a similar sort but no less threatening is occurring in America today.

In the U.S., the issue revolves around the assimilation of Mexican immigrants. Despite the rise in anti-immigration sentiment and legislation directed chiefly at Mexico, demographers still project that by 2050, one out of every four Americans will be Hispanic. The political and social forces on both sides are lining up to do battle both for and against this tide. Those in favor suggest a racist platform is behind the stem of immigration. Through such tools as *political correctness*, they make the argument against the maintenance of Western civilization. These opposition groups argue, as does Huntington, that the *Latin Invasion* exudes a new and frightening lack of assimilation of immigrants into American culture.[62] Those opposed to immigration suggest this as a direct attack on the West and the United States.

From Asia to Latin America, the West will continue to meet the rest along various cultural fault lines as the clash of civilization continues. To the extent that the West fails to adequately address these challenges, western ideals may equally suffer a decline in popularity and credibility. The decline of the West would bring with it an emboldened threat and an embattled United States as its leading member. Should the U.S. and its nation-state status falter, so too may its state-sponsored institutions and the ideals and traditions upon which they stand.

SECTION IV

A NEW AMERICAN CIVILIZATION – CULTURAL MARXISM AT WORK

As Huntington admits, the issues of moral decline, cultural suicide, and political disunity in the West is far more significant to the long-term health of the West and indeed the U.S. than any issue of demography or economics.[63] ·How the U.S. successfully responds to these threats will largely determine the fate of the West. According to Huntington, the increasing resistance to assimilation by immigrants is at the root of the problem and suggests the likelihood of a "cleft" country of which the outlines may be seen even today. In such a country, geographical regions aligned with economic, political, ethnic, cultural, and religious identities fail to merge within the greater society and instead become separated. The natural tensions that may rise from such competing interests and ideals could savage the American dream of a united society. Americans somehow believe they are immune to such possibilities but, as it has happened here before, the U.S. must be on guard to the shifting sands of change in the twenty-first century.

Theodore Roosevelt said, "The one absolutely certain way of bringing this nation to ruin, of preventing all possibility of its continuing as a nation at all would be to permit it to become a tangle of squabbling nationalities."[64] Roosevelt and others at the turn of the 20th century understood that in order to prevent such squabbling, America would have to unite under the American Creed of liberty, democracy, individualism, equality before the law, constitutionalism, and private property to survive. Yet, some suggest that the collapse of American culture is occurring not because it failed, "On the contrary, it has given us the freest and most prosperous society in human history…it is collapsing because we are abandoning it." [65] They argue that in the name of multiculturalism, America risks internal divide by promoting individual cultural identity over the assimilation of various cultures under a common American identity. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. notes that in America today, leadership across the country with good intentions

"have not only permitted that [squabbling] but assiduously promoted the diversity rather than the unity of the people they govern."[66] He adds that,

> ...multiculturalists are very often ethnocentric separatists who see little in the Western heritage other than Western crimes...their mood is one of divesting Americans of the sinful European inheritance and seeking redemptive infusions from non-Western cultures.[67]

Kennedy reports that "Schools and colleges, already grappling with the demands to teach both multiculturalism and Western civilization may come under further social and cultural pressures as the demographic tide advances."[68] According to some, these forces at work are those of new form of Marxism—Cultural Marxism-- organized and led by those intent on cultural revolution.

Cultural Marxism emanated in Europe following the failure of Marxist ideology to produce the promised worldwide revolt of the working class. In spite of the set back, many ardent believers continued on their path to discovery in search of the engine for revolution against the imperialist Western establishment.

In 1924, a persistent group of 24 Marxist intellectuals founded a think tank for the advancement of Marxist thought called the Institution for Marxism in Frankfurt, Germany later referred to simply as the Frankfurt School. They strove to convince others that the current social, economic, and legal order in Europe was oppressive and should be challenged. They faced the problem of an America boasting of its "roaring" successes in capitalism. Believing capitalism as inherently oppressive to the average citizen, the search was on to develop and export a new Marxism that could bring down capitalism before it was too late.[69]

The challenge was to find the new instrument for revolution given the failure of traditional Marxism. A breakthrough came when the founders of the Frankfurt school crossed the theories of Marx with Freud to develop a new hypothesis for revolution. From Freud they were able to argue that within a culture, everyone lived under a constant state of psychological suppression. This was an insight into the mind of the mass man that provided a necessary vulnerability for exploitation. They realized that the solution for change would not merely derive from a political

22

position but from a cultural position as well. Freud gave them the idea of exploiting the wants

and needs of the most psychologically suppressed in society—minorities-- to create a social and

cultural revolution. These disaffected communities of disgruntled minorities around the world

would act as the surrogate for the working class using cultural loyalty rather than class-

consciousness to fuel the movement. [70] A fledgling Cultural Marxism was born.

The final advancement of Cultural Marxism came from Herbert Marcuse, an original

member of the Frankfurt School, with his presentation of Horkeimer's and Ordorno's *Critical

Theory.*[71] Building on an insight that America as a growing multicultural society was full of

disassociated minorities of all kinds, he developed a theory of social revolution in the 1950's and

60's while instructing at the University of California, San Diego. *Critical Theory* suggested that

the best way to tear down a society is to criticize its institutions incessantly but in a way that

disguises its nihilist motive. By using the disaffected minority groups as the base, the movement

gained strength in the late twentieth century.

Through such publications as the *Studies in Prejudice—The Authoritarian Personality* by

Ordorno, the movement was able to gather a large following in the 1960's criticizing America as

full of fascists who must be brought to truth through sensitivity training. They integrated

environmentalism as a way to wrap the message of *Critical Theory* in a "politically correct" (PC)

message blending the nurturing of nature with the nurturing of the human kind. The allure of this

message proved an effective if not irresistible methodology of highlighting the oppressiveness of

society at large.

Simultaneous with these developments was the rallying of supporters behind the ideas

espoused in Marcuse's book, *Eros and Civilization.* Building off of the earlier ideas of Fromm,

Marcuse used Freud to condemn all restrictions on sexuality as a way of suggesting a

polymorphous perversity. The idea was that while young, "man" is open to less restrictive

notions of heterosexuality and homosexuality. The idea continued that since this was true and

23

natural, man should extend this into adult life and remain open to sexual possibilities. Only by liberating oneself from the culture's sexual restraints could one ever hope of reaching the natural state intended by nature. This, it was assumed, would lead to utopia.

According to David Horowitz from the Center for the Study of Popular Culture, the ideas espoused in *Eros and Civilization* figured prominently in the foundation of the sexual and feminist revolutions of the 1960's and 70's. He contends that this publication helped to raise social consciousness for considering such ideas as gender bending, neutralizing gender roles, accepting sexual deviance, and eliminating customary courtesies between men and women. The new ideas coupled with the crisis of national conscience over the Vietnam War and civil rights provided the fertile ground for planting the seeds for cultural revolution. The Vietnam War also provided the catalyst for a continuing legacy of struggle against the American establishment that continues to this day in the hearts and minds of many touched by the experience of the so-called movements.

Those in support of cultural revolution in the 1960's and 70's used the political correctness as a powerful new agent for this change. PC first found its official voice in an essay late in the 1960's by Marcuse entitled *Repressive Tolerance*. The dominant idea in the essay was tolerance of all beliefs. The message sounded good but in practice amounted to little more than totalitarian tactics. If one could find the strong notion of what was politically correct (rather than what was necessarily right morally or otherwise), then one could use that belief to repress other beliefs. By excluding other opinions, PC shut down debate on traditional values using Freud's psychoanalysis to create an environment in which anyone on the wrong side of the PC agenda was made to feel illogical and guilty. The resulting effect was a silencing of dialogue. Marco Diani observing this phenomenon noted that "...the future lies inside the silences [of its people], inside the very uncomfortably sensitive issues that people are afraid to discuss at dinner parties for fear of what others might think of them..."[72] With the stage set, the aim of PC then was to

engender public agreement to a specified social agenda (most likely multicultural) at the exclusion of any traditional social positions. Through constant conditioning over time, PC created individuals more affable to social and cultural change.

The description of cultural Marxism and PC can seem a bit conspiratorial and over reactionary but the threat of these issues to the Army has foundation. They are made all the more potent in the fecund soil of prosperity and peace in the West. Ortega y Gassert writes that as the "mass man" becomes more concerned with the comforts of life, "he develops a profound lack of interests in civilization itself."[73] One can see this phenomenon exacerbated in the mass media with its defaulted coverage of entertainment news for lack of real life-and-death issues on which to report. In good times, the media and the mass man have less accountability. This creates a national conditioning for political correctness to disseminate its message to an "imperfectly educated audience" using the media and various pressure groups.[74] These groups "create mass hysteria over single issues by the crude dispersion of facts untempered by context."[75]

Kaplan adds his own perspective on this phenomenon. He reports that the apathy in time of peace for all things governmental is caused precisely because national security is assumed. He also points out that this, "...leads to a preoccupation with *presentness*, the loss of the past and a consequent disregard of the future."[76] One of the second order effects of this narrowness of vision is a difficulty in determining a prudent course of human events. Kaplan points out that "avoiding tragedy requires a sense of it."

Kaplan also joins in the concern that political correctness may lead the nation towards unwanted consequences as it struggles to find its niche in the post Cold War era. Some have suggested that the time has come to seriously consider merging U.S. security capabilities with that of a universal world organization such as the U.N for a global force for peace. The debate on this issue has ranged far and wide but Kaplan uses the notion to remind readers that, "rather than a better version of humanity, a world body [would] merely reflect the global elite as it is."[77]

25

As it would also require a rule by consensus, Kaplan warns that such an arrangement should give

pause to any serious proposal to do so. He notes, "We think we know what political correctness

is: we have no idea how intensely suffocating public discourse could become in a truly unified

and peaceful world."[78]

In review of the issues a bit closer to home, Stephanie Gutmann, in her 2000 book entitled,

The Kinder Gentler Military addresses one of the most politically, socially, and culturally

charged issues in America when she writes about women in the military. As an award-winning

freelance journalist whose written extensively on sexual politics for publications ranging from

the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal, Gutmann presents a viewpoint in direct

challenge to political correctness. She writes,

> ...something new happened in the nineties in respect to the way the military
> handled 'women's issues'...their goals changed from making good use of the
> relatively small number of women the military had been attracting over the
> years, to achieving what President Clinton and Secretary of the Army Togo West
> have called 'a force that looks like America.'[79]

She adds that changes encouraged by the PC movement resulted in the Army adapting to the

female recruit instead of the other way around. The old military might say,

> Here's the way we do things; we do things this way because we think they are
> morally right and because centuries of experience have told us they
> work...whereas now the official line is something like 'We want you to join us;
> we want you to stay with us. Tell us what you don't feel comfortable with so we
> can change it.'[80]

In the hurry to get the numbers up in light of a state run bureaucracy fearing its loss of power,

"...the brass handed over their soldiers to social planners in love with an unworkable vision of a

politically correct utopia..." In the end, it is women who are speaking up as one female marine

sergeant remarked, "Truth be known, that's one of the reasons I'm getting out. It's all too

PC...Whatever happened to simply training Marines?"[81]

Gutmann supports women in the military but argues for setting realistic boundaries to

preserve the appropriately male dominated warrior culture of which women, in proper balance,

may participate honorable and effectively. The issue taken in balance falls short of controversy, but the forces of PC pressing for even more changes and integration of women and gays continues to chip away at the foundation of American and U.S. military cultural identity. Francis Fukuyama, author of *The End of History*, shares this frustration in a review of Gutmann's work, noting that "the military has become one of the most politically correct of all American institutions." PC is clearly seen by these authors as a divisive rather than positive force of change.

SECTION V

COULD IT REALLY BE HAPPENING HERE IN AMERICA?

If the theories of van Creveld, Huntington, and dead Marxist intellectuals seem unconvincing Robert Kaplan offers a grass roots perspective to compliment their assertions. In his 1998 *An Empire Wilderness*, Robert Kaplan does a masterful job of presenting America in its raw form. Traveling through the Midwest, Southwest, Mexico and Pacific Northwest, he uncovers an America not unlike that envisioned in the works of van Creveld and Huntington. One of his first and most enduring insights into the American landscape derives from his observations of modern urban sprawls he dubbed as "urban pods." Unlike the sprawl concept of the 1970's and 80's where people retreated from the city's poor by night to their bedroom communities and returned by day to complete their daily tasks, the new urban pods host the workplace. These new urban centers operate as self-sufficient sub communities drawing business away from downtowns in spite of their popularized tourist makeovers. As a result, the centrality of the downtown as the societal hub of the community has forever faded.

Kaplan's observations of the modern urban environment holds significance as it supports an assertion that the urban pods, coupled with changes in the way people communicate through information technologies, have served to further isolate communities from social interaction as they prefer to spread out more and interact less. He adds,

27

> ...educated Americans may have more in common with (and ultimately, more loyalty to) their highly educated friends and counterparts in Europe, Latin America, and Asia then they do with less educated fellow Americans a few miles away.[82]

Consequently Kaplan warns,

> The same spirit of individualism that helped build the nation may henceforth deconstruct it, as new worldwide settlement patterns link similar communities by computerized technologies and air travel while traditional states defined simply by geography wither.[83]

Kaplan argues that as American citizens become increasingly disconnected from one another and what is important, the state concept itself may find great difficulty in maintaining identity and unity of spirit.[84] The price for this may be greater than the institution can bear in the long run leading to eventual decay and even collapse.

The problem and prediction is not altogether new. Alexis de Tocqueville and others warned that material prosperity in America might ultimately breed withdrawal. James Kurth observed that whereas homogeneous societies are "built around a mass conscription army and a standardized public school system, 'multicultural regimes' feature a high-tech, all-volunteer army and private schools that teach competing values operating in a culture in which the international media and entertainment industry has more influence than the national political class."[85] Kaplan adds to this that, "The signs hardly need belaboring: racial polarity, educational dysfunction, social fragmentation..."[86] While America has made advancements in racial harmony, it has failed to integrate in its dwellings. American urbanization trends obscure the fragmentation and white lie facades of the city. Racially, Americans prefer to coexist together than to truly assimilate into a common cultural base. Consequently, instead of a melting pot, America has become a community of communities.

According to Kaplan, as communities segregate, corporate fortresses are filling in the gaps in societal cohesion with a form of surrogate influence. In the process, these corporate influences are forever changing the state of American culture.[87] Coupled to the increased influence of big

money on community makeup and activities, there exists a growing trend in bi-national

organizations. [88] Businesses today in the Southwest of the U.S. are developing cross-border ties

whose purpose is, "to blow the border apart and link communities on each side."[89] The

unmistakable signs of this are clearly found between Phoenix and Guaymas, Tucson and Los

Mochis, Dallas and Chilhuahua City. [90] Again, the assertion remains that the growth of external

influence such as these further dilutes American and Western values and traditions.

Few influences impact more dramatically on a nation's landscape than its immigration

policy. As did Huntington, Kaplan also observed the failure of American policy to integrate and

assimilate Latin American immigrants over the past several decades. The failure has led to a

host of new concerns not the least of which involves the future of American culture itself in

many parts of the U.S. Kaplan notes that,

> Latinos often intermarry and welcome U.S. citizenship, yet they believe
> fervently in retaining some degree of bilinguality, rather than melting into
> America...The Latino experience suggests that 'being American simply means
> buying a house with a mortgage and getting ahead.' There is no agreement
> anymore on culture, only on economics.[91]

According to Huntington, this is very different from immigrants arriving less than a century ago.

The fear is that Western identity is fading in America as even the idea of patriotism is being

replaced by a culture increasingly unconcerned about the greater good of a uniquely western

national conscious. Stanely Hoffman observed that these concerns, "...are based on genuine

cultural clashes and worries about national identity."[92] When asked whether the citizens of the

affluent urban pod of Orange County would fight for this country, a native of the county said,

> Loyalty is a problem...So many people here are from somewhere else, whether
> from the U.S. or the world. People came here to make money. In the future,
> patriotism will be more purely and transparently economic. Perhaps patriotism
> will survive in the form of prestige, if America remains the world economic
> leader.[93]

Kaplan reports that many in these prosperous and urban pods act as "resident expatriates, even if

they were born in America, with their foreign cuisine, eclectic tastes, exposure to foreign

languages, and friends throughout the world.[94] To these citizens, service to country may seem as foreign as their tastes.

Kaplans warns that the increase in derisive issues ranging from drugs and increased citizen apathy towards national security to growing bi-national corporate influences signals a thinning of American culture.[95] Left untreated, these issues combined with the rise in urban pods linked directly to global marketplaces may widen the gulf between the citizen and the bureaucratic overseers in Washington.[96] In some cases, simple geography drives the changes. According to Kaplan, the real battle in America,

> ...is not ideological but economical and cultural. It has nothing to do with different interpretations of nationalism and everything to do with something more meaningful now that traditional nationalism is receding: the fate of the land itself.[97]

America has enjoyed a geography to match its free expression of western and American ideals. Yet signs of change loom in the foreground. As in Europe in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Americans are now becoming more aware of this limited resource.[98] Additionally, America seems poised geographically, socially, and economically to reorient in the coming century from its traditional industrial east-west orientation to a more north-south orientation complimented by bi-national relations. Evidence exists that this realignment is occurring already. The Pacific Northwest shows signs of regionally aligning among the Portland, Seattle, and Vancouver area just as British Columbia seems more ready than ever to peacefully separate from the eastern provinces. Northeastern U.S. continues to assert its historical orientation towards eastern Canada while Mexico lays claims to the U.S. Southwest. If true, the ramifications of such transformations will certainly drive change in many of America's venerable institutions not the least of which is the Army.

SECTION VI

WRAPPING IT UP: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE U.S. ARMY IN THE NEXT CENTURY

The time has come to look deeper into this issue armed with a better understanding of the coming anarchy. Van Creveld offered the notion that the state, as a form for governing is on the decline. Huntington suggested that with the decline of the state, Western civilization shows signs of decay with a likelihood of being replaced by a world dominated less by ideology than by cultures in conflict. Kaplan revealed that these forces are indeed moving in our midst here in America. And finally, Lind and others argued that the ideas fomented by a form of cultural Marxism known as *Political Correctness* is acting as one of the primary instruments for this change in American culture. These forces are combining to redefine the landscape of the American State and with it, one of its most important institutions—the Army. It is the Army that perhaps best represents the power and authority of the modern state.

The authors of the originating document on Fourth Generation Warfare suggest that a new generation of warfare is emerging from the conditions set by this changing security environment. The generational approach allows the authors to project more than a single form of warfare in the same pre-industrial, industrial, or post-industrial era. As an example, aspects of each generation, whether of massed armies, massed firepower, or massed effects from both maneuver and firepower, manifest in today's information age. The authors also note that each generation has to a greater or lessor extent in each of these eras relied on changing ideas and technology with ideas as the primary driver of change in the third and fourth generations of warfare. Yet, while third generation warfare bases on ideas, it assumes the existence of actors on opposing sides. The focus is easier to deal with—actor to actor. Fourth generation is focused less on actors and more on ideas attacking ideas. It manifests as open conflict with conventional force on force only when the ideas cause one party to take up arms. In the former case, it is possible for such wars to rage on impervious to military might. The Army must learn to recognize the ideas that trigger both kinds of wars. Winning the battle of ideas, then constitutes America's and the Army's best opportunity to influence the new forces of change.

Sociologists understand that it is in this domain that real changes in nations and civilizations take place. Yet today, many military pundits consider technology as the most important catalyst for change. The literary world is awash in futurists bent on solutions wrapped around technological advantages even when the problem set includes recognition of the cultural aspects. To be certain, in the study of war, many acknowledge the moral and social dimensions but they also fail to raise consciousness to an appropriate level to effectively respond to its influences. It often seems out of reach as a practical solution to change. Technology on the other hand may superficially address the real threat. The American experience in Vietnam illustrates well the narrowness of concluding innovations or revolutions in technology as the most important component of the war experience. As arguably one the single most influential events in American history, the true legacy of Vietnam includes the variety of moral, social, and cultural concerns still unsettled. These concerns contribute daily to the action and inaction of American politics and military policy from casualty aversion to social experimentation and exemplify well the true vulnerability of an American military to a culture distracted from its core value system.

The decay of a core value system concerns everyone but the military can expect the erosion to take a considerable toll on its effectiveness if left unchecked. Col. (Ret.) John Boyd, father of the modern maneuver warfare movement of which the current Marine warfighting philosophy is based, certainly understood the power of the moral domain of war. He postulates that warfare exists in one of three major types: attrition, maneuver, and moral. Boyd notes that moral conflict as practiced by the Mongols, most guerilla leaders and Sun Tzu create dilemmas for individuals and units. These dilemmas include, menace or the impression of danger to one's well-being; uncertainty or the atmosphere generated by events that appear ambiguous and chaotic; and mistrust that loosens bonds among members of an organic whole. Left alone, "These dilemmas leave an army faced with a loss of cohesion, fear, anxiety, and alienation; render an army

incapable of functioning as whole; and raise internal concepts friction to an unbearable point."[99] The impact of the moral domain on the military seems clear.

The question then becomes whether morality is a viable national security issue? The authors presented here would answer in the affirmative especially if substituted by tolerance. It is certainly not the only issue of national security concern. Ralph Peters does a great job identifying many of the most commonly expected threats of the future security environment including incompetence of the state, cultural failure, wealth polarization, social division, rise of the anti-state, decisive technologies, resource scarcity, gross overpopulation and plagues to name a few. This study does not fail to ascribe due importance to these and other potential threats facing the Army and the rest of American security apparatus. This study does, however, suggest exception to the present emphasis on the RMA and its proposed focus for solutions—technology. In what is essentially a human endeavor, conflict along the entire spectrum must be recognized by its symptoms but treated according to its root cause. Solutions to past generations of warfare lent themselves to technological responses because they came about in a world defined by nation states. "In contrast, fourth generation is coming of age during a period of exponential increase in the number and type of players on the international scene."[100] Technology addresses some of the symptoms but utterly fails to address the real issues in the cultural, social, and moral domains of war.

The New Environment

History cautions against over-optimism of world peace. Periods of great peace have always been followed by bloody upheavals as the "tragic cycle of historic self-correction" takes place. Unfortunately, the only way to recognize amoral behavior is to have something to compare it against. Is America on the verge of losing history and its ability to recognize amoral behavior in time of extended peace? The truth is that the realist perspective wins out in the long run over the idealist as history suggests that true peace "is obtainable only through a form of tyranny,

33

however subtle and mild." Adherence to Western civilization at the expense of some freedoms and expressions may seem tyrannical to many but as Henry Kissinger once opined, "disorder is worse than injustice. Injustice merely means the world is imperfect, but disorder implies that there is no justice for anyone."[101] The PC culture would have Americans believe otherwise.

The post Cold War environment is teaming with conflict, disorder, and injustice. This is unlikely to change. If left to its own designs, universalism would spread its message of multiculturalism supported by PC as a replacement ideology for much of the world's perceived ailments. Kaplan would argue that the search for this more perfect and harmonious world may ultimately end in frustration because it is struggle that actually defines and binds a civilization rather than peace and harmony alone.

> Struggle causes us to reflect, to fortify our faith, and to see beyond our narrow
> slots of existence...We should be skeptical of the benefits of a world at peace
> with unlimited natural resources. As Orgega y Gassert reminds us: 'nobility is
> synonymous with a life of effort.'[102]

Yet, as Kennedy points out, the reactionary response towards protectionism, anti-immigrant policies, or finding new enemies should also be discouraged. The truth is that the future of America and the Army cannot afford a polarized debate. "Clearly, a society which desires to be better prepared for the twenty-first century will pay a price to achieve that transition; it will need to retool its national skills and infrastructure, challenge vested interests, alter many old habits, and perhaps amend it governmental structures."[103] America needs the long-term vision.

Given this environment and in the spirit of reform, the dilemma for the Army appears broadly to be two-fold: First, to further adapt to the wide range of threats for which there are military solutions; Secondly, to survive against an even greater threat from within for which there are few direct military solutions. In the first case, the Army is right to continue its quest to improve doctrine and force structure in line with threats to its vital interests by conventional forces at home and abroad. As admitted by all, the decline of the state and Western culture will

34

not occur in a straight line. In order to preserve order during the transition, the U.S. must keep in place the forces necessary to avoid appeasement of any kind. Moreover, the Army must understand that during this transition it now faces second, third, and fourth generation warfare all at the same time to which there are military solutions but to varying degrees. It should improve its long-standing aversion to adaptation and continue with initiatives for change however painful or incremental.

The second step in preparing itself for fourth generation warfare includes recognizing the threat to its existence posed by the authors in this study. If the culture at large decays and loyalties to nation are replaced by loyalties to transnational, regional, and non-state actors, the U.S. Army as an instrument of the traditional state, may face its own obsolescence in the long term unless its adapts appropriately. While there are many forms of warfare facing the U.S. in this next generation, the first and most important battle must be won at home—the fight to save Western and American cultural identity. A strong cultural identity may protect against internal divide and anarchy. Without it, no community may long survive. It is of interest to note that after 490 pages of in-depth study of the reasons why the South lost the Civil War, the authors of the book by the same namesake concluded that it boiled down to one main issue. In spite of the myriad of contributing factors, the South ultimately lost because of its insufficient nationalism and crumbling morale. The lack of feeling of oneness, "that almost mystical sense of nationhood"[104] determined the outcome even before the war began. "The Confederate nation was created on paper, not in the hearts and minds of its would-be citizens. These deficiencies reflected a national will that did not equal the demand placed upon it."[105]

Of course, the Army faces its own internal challenges as well. In the February 2000 Report of the CSIS International Security Program on American military culture in the twenty-first century, the authors noted that while currently strong, the U.S. military is feeling great strains caused in part to the demise of the society around it.

> Societal pressures and the ramifications of government policies—although
> independent of military affairs—have a major impact on the current climate
> within military units and an obvious potential for affecting the underlying
> culture.[106]

The directors noted that readiness, morale, recruiting, and retention have all become more

problematic adding, "there is little doubt in the minds of the study participants that conditions

within the armed forces are far less favorable than they were a decade ago."[107] With careers in

the military less satisfying in times of plenty, the Army can ill-afford to ignore the warning signs

of decay in preparation for the future. The conditions are being set to create tremendous

vulnerabilities in the Army's ability to serve the nation in the twenty-first century.

Part of the problem stems from the Army's inability to break the grip of occupationalism

brought on in part by the civilianization of the military. Charles Moskos points out that the

Army has increasingly felt the tension of balancing its desires for institutional integration with

"societal trends that push toward identification with like occupational groups in the larger

society."[108] This civilianization has and will continue to affect mission performance, motivation,

and professional responsibility adding,

> The issue of 'who is the military' and 'what the military does' is no longer clear.
> This confusion provides the opportunity to replace military expertise and values
> with the more widely accepted management principle and ethic characteristic of
> the occupational model.[109]

Moskos observes that mission performance suffers as the Army takes on occupational attitudes of

demanding "employees" to do what they are told vice the institutional approach of motivating

members to do more than they are supposed to do. An occupational approach reduces

motivation to extrinsic rewards brought about by pay rather than intrinsic rewards based on

personal values.[110] Professionalism also takes a precipitous decline in value under an

occupational mentality where soldiers are expected to reduce decision-making to a cost-benefit

analysis.

At some point the cross-over between professionalism and occupationalism occurs as service commitment begins to weaken. The real danger occurs when the once dominant warrior culture shows signs of fracture.

In the midst of transition from its current nation-state configuration, society must make a fundamental choice about its participation in this changing security environment as well. It must determine how much liberty it is willing to sacrifice for security. Part of the answer to this question may reveal the level of public commitment to the concept of state sponsored protection. America may find that it needs to redefine its traditional use of state-sponsored militaries. In doing so it must also decide to what extent should the warrior culture extend into its civil security forces. This truly gets at the heart of the question of liberty vs. security. Dangers lurk when the distinction between civil and military forces blur. The price for a warrior culture empowered to know and act decisively to internal threats has historically been higher than American citizens were willing to pay. America's geography has made this an easy balancing act for two centuries as the sheer vastness of the nation allowed its citizens eliminate friction through migration. But as geography shrinks from population increases and borders dissolve in meaning through direct global linkage, the liberty/security equation becomes more complex. More people from all over the earth competing for resources in time and space creates new stresses on the systems of liberty and security. Cultural and economic influences will continue to cause citizen loyalties to shift increasingly from national to local and transnational arenas creating an international security environment along the way more defined by local events with global implications.

As the focus of state power shifts from national to transnational centers located in local areas, so too will those seeking to influence this power. Threats will increase locally placing demands on regional security forces to develop capabilities to quickly respond to components of such external attacks as informational, financial, or cultural terrorism to name only a few.

Terrorism will also find itself adapting as it seeks new decisive points to reach its desired endstates recognizing that it must address itself where the true power for change resides. Even issues such a nuclear deterrence may one day rest in the realm of local security as the power to create and employ such weapons may one day reside within the capabilities of a single individual.

As local security concerns grow correspondingly to the power and influence of corporate giants as well as governmental and non-governmental organizations, the state monopoly over protection of its citizen's welfare may no longer be assumed. The prospect of private or contract security forces capable of responding to a range of military and policing operations beholding to corporate powers rather than national ideals is real. The use of such forces stretchs Clausewitz's intent behind the trinity very thin indeed. Should either the corporate boss or the hired gun ever lose its connectivity to its regional or national constituency, then the whole façade of trinitarian war in America would come crashing down. After all, it is only when the people have a veto in the affairs of war that the trinity applies at all. Misplaced citizen loyalty in trinitarian societies such as America may create dangerous vulnerabilities for exploitation by non-trinitarian aggressors. Naturally, the very nature of being a state with citizens in a protected status creates vulnerabilities but America should not add to this dimension with folly. In the end, the people of this nation must decide how it wants to separate its policing and military functions in support of their interests. The Army as an obvious stakeholder in this process should begin immediately the necessary dialogue to shape this debate before it ever reaches the state of crisis.

The Solution

In the final analysis, education emerges as the single most important and powerful part of a solution to the vexing problems facing the America and the Army during the transition era. Paul Kennedy concluded as well when he said,

> If my analysis is roughly correct, the forces for change facing the world could be so far-reaching, complex, and interactive that they call for nothing less than the reeducation of humankind. This is not a new conclusion. Social thinkers from Wells to Toynbee have repeatedly argued that global society is in a race between education and catastrophe; and those stakes are higher at the century's end, simply because population pressures, environmental damage, and humankind's capacity to inflict mass destruction are all far greater. [111]

In the context of the American Army, education is the key to the process of informing both the servant and the served and in ultimately preventing the two from drifting apart. This education begins by recognizing that the free access to information drives the process of change in the security environment. As information flows, so too knowledge in its various forms all competing for relevance and beholding to the power it informs. Power, in this sense, may be defined as any entity best positioned to use and exploit this knowledge. The Army must form a new coalition with America to be an active part of this information exchange between the servant and the served. It can no longer rest on the expectations of its laudatory past accomplishments for support from a community increasing disaffected from its purpose. Education of both its own members and those external to it must reach a new standard of inclusiveness.

As an organization that seeks to embrace change and one that has historically led other services in its efforts to educate its professionals, the Army must again lead in this endeavor. This time, it must draw on its savvy to reach beyond its traditional means and purposes to bridge the divide between itself and that, which gives it sustenance—the people. The Army must not only look over the horizon but it must go there first and lead others to follow. Understanding the constellation of issues where others only see stars in the future means recognizing the second and third order effects of any action and articulating this to its constituents. This will be an important

contribution to the process of informing America that the relationship of citizenship and security to nation or a Kaplanesque "league" or "federation" of states remains symbiotic.

The challenges in maintaining a national conscience of service increased recently when the Army endorsed a policy to limit National Guard and Reserve duty to not more than 180 days in response to an outcry from employers. Some would observe this as symptomatic of a deepening decay in national attitudes on security issues and service to the nation in general. The solution lies in many places but one component must be a radically new and aggressive engagement of corporate America in an educational process to leverage their influence in building a national conscience of service. If Kaplan is right, these corporations will indeed become the de-facto civilian masters of the Army of the twenty-first century.

As the Army actively participates in this educational process, it must make a conscience effort to reinvigorate the warrior culture to its once cherished status in the public eye. In a recent speech at Ft. Leavenworth, on the occasion of his induction to the Army Hall of Fame, General (Ret.) Colin Powell remarked that the very sole of the armed forces must always be the maintenance of its warrior culture. The Marines have been more successful at carving a niche in the public's mind that justifies preservation of a warrior culture. The Army has acquiesced to the forces of PC in this fight complaining that its vague and complex mission fails to sell along the lines of a warrior ethos. Nonsense. The real issue here is whether the Army understands what the warrior culture means anymore and whether it is willing to step up to the task in the face of great opposition from American culture. Liang suggests that the new warrior includes hackers of various persuasions and other non-state organizations "whose very mention causes the Western world to shake in its boots."[112] This new non-military warrior must be included in a broadening perspective of the term to be sure, but the notion can not be separated from the common and purposeful image about which citizens romanticize. Education is the key.

Fourth Generationists warn of the combination of 1) a decline of the state, 2) the rise in cultures in conflict at home and abroad, and 3) the decay of Western Culture at home brought about by the influences of multiculturalism fueled by PC. The popular television commentator John Chancellor, once put it well when he said,

> The strength is there, but it is being sapped by a combination of weaknesses—a thousand wounds we find difficult to heal. We have weakened ourselves in the way we practice our politics, manage our businesses, teach our children, succor our poor, care for our elders, save our money, protect our environment, and run our government.[113]

Others have noted "The crisis...is within us. The society we have constructed has given us the education we deserve." Kennedy adds that this has resulted in a "trivialization of American culture emphasized by consumer gratification, pop culture, cartoons, noise, color, and entertainment over serious reflection."[114] Ultimately, the clash remains between the multiculturalists and the defenders of Western civilization and the American Creed. Arthur M. Schlensinger, Jr., reminds American citizens that Western civilization is valuable not because it is universal but because it is unique.[115] As Huntington poses, "Are we Western people or are we something else? The future of the U.S. and of the West depends upon Americans reaffirming their commitment to Western civilization."[116] Education is the key.

War will remain a staple of human existence. The national authorities led by both its civilian and military experts must assume leadership through the transition as it did following the Civil War for the changes are no less dramatic and important in consequence. We can only wonder if the nation will ever recapture the spirit inscribed on President Eisenhower's tomb: "The real fire within the builders of America was faith—faith in a Provident God...faith in their country and its principles that proclaimed man's right to freedom and justice."[117] The fourth generation does not require an abandonment of present paradigms but rather the inclusion of new ideas in preparation for the coming anarchy. The Army must learn to lead from a different place—a place no citizen has yet seen—by stepping into that unknown, turning around, and motioning others to follow.

The opportunities for the Army are limited only by its imagination. With an outward focus and an open mind, the Army may begin a new century as a positive force for change in America.

ENDNOTES

[1] Paul Kennedy, Preparing for the Twenty-First Century, (New York: Random House, 1993), 345. This statement by the author is an attempt to communicate a similar disclaimer, as did Paul Kennedy recognizing the plethora of doomsday writers past and present. He uses the example of Thomas Robert Malthus, who in 1798 wrote Essay on Population in Malthus predicted a troubled future for Britain as a world power due to over-populations among other causes. Others ringing the proverbial bell of alarm warning that the new troubles will most certainly cause decay or decline in society have sense been compared to Malthus as neo-Malthusists and such. Both the author of this study and Kennedy prefer to distance themselves from this association to those prognosticators of doom.

[2] William S. Lind, Col. Keith Nightengale, USA, Cpt. John F. Schmitt, USMC, Col. Joseph W., Sutton, USA and LtCol. Gary I. Wilson, USMC, "The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation,"Marine Corps Gazette, (October 1989), 23.

[3] William S. Lind, Maj John F. Schmitt, USMCR, and Col. Gary I. Wilson, USMCR, "Fourth Generation Warfare: Another Look," Marine Corps Gazette, (December 1994), 34-37.

[4] Martin van Creveld, The Rise and Decline of the State. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 2.

[5] Ibid, 4. The absence of a public or formal authority of course did not exclude the need for some conformity. Order was established not by laws, "in the sense of a manmade, formally enacted, and binding set of regulations that prescribe the behavior of people or groups," but by custom. When violated, tribal elders prescribed punishment. The real matter was decided ultimately by the manner of ones family standing in the community. Justice as always had its extenuating and not always fair influences.

[6] Ibid, 19 Chieftain authorities varied by tribe and civilization from ceremonial to dictatorial but the end result was the same. Through coercion of one type or another, "chiefdoms were able to introduce hierarchy instead of equality; permanent authority instead of temporary leadership; tribute instead of more or less voluntary presents; and judgement...instead of simple restitution and compensation that were the result of mediation by the village council." Warfare evolved with the introduction of conquest, subjugation, and domination of one group over another in addition to the usual booty of war.

[7] Ibid., 23. Van Creveld adds, "In all these societies there were some persons who exercised authority over others, whether as simple lineage heads, as big men, or as full-fledged chiefs. However, without exception, they did so not as 'public' officials but as individuals who, owing to their sex, age, divine descent, or some combination of these, were considered elevated over the rest and hence *deserved* to rule."

[8] Ibid., 7

[9] Van Creveld, The Rise and Decline of the State, 23. Van Creveld notes, "In other words, we are talking here not of rulers but of magistrates." He adds that the city-state did institute the popular assembly that met at the direction of the magistrates. It also established a council to deal with much of the daily business and administration. The council exercised varying degrees of authority. While no single unitary court system existed, several separate bodies were established to entertain grievances appropriately.

[10] Ibid., 31

[11] Ibid.

[12] Ibid., 39. Van Creveld observed that the Chinese instituted Confucianism with its paternal and legal forms. The former engendered piety from subordinates to its elders, the latter emphasized discipline. The Arab, Ottoman, and Persian empires used Islam in similar ways. Ancient philosophies such as cynicism (to compensate for loss of freedom, man should give up his

possessions and withdraw from the world), epicureanism (man in oppression should withdraw and focus on enjoying themselves), and stoicism (emphasized endurance and service to fellow man when things become too hard to bear) grew out of city-states and in reaction to despotism.

[13] Ibid., Both systems worked for a time but in this feudal network of extended provinces with its growing bureaucracies were sewn the seeds for greed, insubordination, and disruption. A more formalized system of feudalism would eventually fill in the void left behind by the crumbling empires as it did in Europe. Heavier investments by these breakaway governments in military defiance of the emperors and in protection against rivals cost the citizens dearly. The result was an overall decline in services such as roads, transportation, and other communications to the point of near collapse. These were the dark ages indeed.

[14] Van Creveld, The Transformation of War, 52.

[15] Ibid., 53.

[16] Ibid., 128. Van Creveld notes in describing the rise of the bureaucratic system that, "…no ruler in charge of a political unit larger than a family can operate without subordinates who look up to him, and in one way or another, are dependent on him." He adds "Thus the history of political communities—including the one known as the state—almost amounts to the story of the growth in the number of executive, the way they were organized, and the way they received their living or were compensated for their efforts…"

[17] Ibid., 154.

[18] Ibid., 126.

[19] Van Creveld, Rise and Decline, 415.

[20] Ibid., 341. "In the absence of a defense capable of effectively protecting demographic, economic, and industrial targets, nuclear weapons present policy-makers with a dilemma." This seems reasonable for rational state actors but not for less rational non-state entities. Yet for van Creveld's argument to hold, it need only apply to large state actors. The fact that warfare is pushed into the realm where such non-state actors play a greater role makes his point exactly. We are left with certain logic that indeed, the days of large state-to-state wars between more or less equal opponents on the order of the USSR and the US are now a thing of the past.

[21] Ibid., 344.

[22] Ibid., 346. Van Creveld reports that in no war since WWII has a first or second-rate power seen a large-scale military operation waged on its territory. In almost all other wars between smaller countries, no territorial claims have been made of any significance either. Nuclear weapons cannot accept the credit for this alone of course. Since the signing of the Kellogg-Briand Pact in 1928 in which the France and the US agreed in principle "to renounce war as an instrument of national policy" the UN has adopted a similar stance in Article 2(4) of the Charter. Complimenting this legal precedence was the adoption of UN Resolution 2734 in 1970 resolving all nations to eliminate the use of force to alter frontiers. More than mere statement of policy, the UN has used it to leverage forceful compliance from nations in defiance. Such pressure was used effectively against India's 1971 land grabs in Pakistan and against China for its invasion of Vietnam in 1979. The right of conquest is no longer accepted in the world today as exemplified by the Gulf War.

[23] Ibid., 353.

[24] Ibid., 394.

[25] Ibid., 405.

[26] Ibid., 359. States actually began the process of increasing its internal controls post WWI when it seemed that the "war to end all wars" had actually succeeded in its purpose. Nationalization of the economy became one of the logical first steps of a somewhat subtle method by the state to reassert authority over its citizens. Unfortunately, it was also used by some as a clever ruse to nationalize the military industrial complex for future war use as was the case of Germany and

Italy. Yet in country after country from Britain to Mexico, and even to some degree in the U.S., nationalizing such large-scale functions as Amtrak's rail transportation system became the norm. In almost every case the result was disaster. By stagnating competition while drowning in bureaucracy, the corporations doomed themselves to inefficiency and decay. States were forced to reprivatize services beginning in the 1970's. The message was out—state government could not deliver on its promises to provide the best services to it citizenry. The state turned to the modern welfare state concept to win back its citizen loyalty. The hard sell of nationalized economy was replaced with the softer message of providing welfare services to all its citizens. Again the state attempted to sell the idea that what the state offered could not be found elsewhere and was absolutely essential to the survival of the citizen. This continues to resonate with many today. The message remains—citizens need federal government.

[27] Van Creveld and others believe that the state will ultimately fail in its endeavor to find another surrogate. Evidence exists that they may be right. Even such basic vestiges of state identity as currency are being subsumed by larger forces at work in places like Europe and South America. The EU is in the process as is MERCURSOR, of adopting a single multi-national currency. This is only one example of governments breaking down long-standing barriers of national identity to compete together in the global market, protect interests, and solve political and social problems together.

[28] Ibid., 55, 390. Adam Smith said that the one thing more important than opulence is defense, state leaders today believe that providing for national defense is less important to its citizens than attracting investments, providing jobs, and creating growth

[29] Ibid., 391.

[30] Ibid., 416.

[31] Ibid., 406.

[32] Kennedy, 128.

[33] Ibid., 129.

[34] Ibid., 134.

[35] Van Creveld, Transformation of War, 56. Van Creveld offers a brief note about the development and recognition of the term civilian and its important status in the nation-state trinity. Following the French Revolution, monarchs around Europe moved to restrain citizen activism less they consider revolt as well. Measures were taken to disarm the population and segregate them from the national military. State rulers signed a series of international agreements between 1859 and 1907 that codified the separation of citizen and soldier into positive law. Soldiers were defined as those individuals licensed by the state to wage war on its behalf. Any non-soldier engaging in war would be here after considered a criminal and duly punished. With the distinction came the term civilian and along with it a new genre of legal rights for so called non-combatants. The trinity and its variant form of state warfare was now firmly in place.

[36] Ibid., 59-60. Van Creveld add, "The news that present-day armed violence does not distinguish between governments, armies, and peoples will scarcely surprise the inhabitants of Ethiopia, the Spanish Sahara, or...those of Northern Ireland. Nor will it astonish the inhabitants, say , of Peru, El Salvador, and other Latin American countries who over the last few years have fought civil wars costing perhaps 70,000 in dead alone. It is hardly necessary to remind the reader that developing countries, the *locus classicus* of non-trinitarian war, have as their populations approximately four fifths of all people living on this plant."

[37] Ibid., 55.

[38] Michael I. Handel, Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought (Second Ed), (London: Frank Cass & Co. LTD, 1996), 262.

[39] Ibid., 262-263.

[40] Robert D. Kaplan, The Coming Anarchy: Shattering the Dreams of the Post Cold War, (New York: Radium House, 2000), 47. Kaplan cites the Periclean strategy not to leave the walls of Athens in spite of overwhelming opposition as further evidence of the Clausewitzian trinity alive and well pre-Westphalia. In contrast to van Creveld's claim that low intensity conflict epitomizes non-trinitarian warfare, Handel offers Mao's treatise on guerilla warfare as an example of the Clausewitzian trinity. Mao spoke of the Communist Party (the government) in charge of the gun (military), as the military hides in the sea of the general population (people). Handel presses the argument by suggesting that even in such chaotic cases as the leaderless and formless Intifada, "a locus of political control or a decision-making authority...sooner or later emerges."

[41] Van Creveld, Transformation of War, 170.

[42] Handel, 258.

[43] Kaplan, 45.

[44] Van Creveld, 165.

[45] Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996), 37.

[46] Ibid., 43.

[47] Ibid., African is listed as possible because of its current struggle between its Hindu and Western influences in recent decades.

[48] Ibid., 66.

[49] Ibid., 67. Huntington offers the example of two Europeans, one German and one French meeting. He argues that, they will identify themselves as German and French. When the same two meet an Egyptian and a Saudi, they each define themselves as European and Arab. To see this another way, one may note that Americans react much more negatively at a Japanese investment into real estate on the mainland than if it were a German or Canadian.

[50] Ibid., 69.

[51] Ibid., 70.

[52] Ibid.

[53] Ibid., 83.

[54] Ibid.

[55] Ibid., 90. In population alone, the West's share of world population has declined from 30 percent in 1900 to a projected 10 percent by 2025. In literacy, other civilizations are making a comeback to eventually eliminate one of the West's traditional advantages. In spite of the West's present quality advantages in technology, the fact remains that its share of the gross world product has declined from 64 percent in 1950 to a projected 30 percent by 2013. As far as militaries are concerned, while the West has uniformly decreased spending and its relative size of armed forces as with NATO's 10 percent reduction in force structure, East Asian countries have increased expenditures by 50 percent.

[56] Ibid., 93. "Western power in the form of European colonialism in the nineteenth century and American hegemony in the twentieth century extended Western culture throughout much of the contemporary world. [Yet now we see that] European colonialism is over: American hegemony is receding."

[57] Kennedy, 133.

[58] Ibid., 65.

[59] Ibid., 110.

[60] Ibid., 200. Huntington observes that fourteen hundred years of stormy relations between Christianity and Islam suggests that we had better pay attention. Furthermore, nothing in our most recent past suggests that the division has healed in any appreciable way.[60] Exacerbating the situation are the trends of population migration. In Europe the situation has risen to alarmist proportions. "There is a fear growing all across Europe of a Muslim community that cuts across

European lines, a sort of thirteenth nation of the European Community." In France alone, Islam has become its second largest religion. The immigration into France has been so massive that southern France now has more mosques than churches. "North African immigrants are now pouring similarly into Spain. In the Balkans, Moslem aid, including weapons and fighters is flowing into Bosnia. Islamic states realize, as we do not, that the Bosnian Moslems are strategically on the offensive, beginning a new Islamic thrust toward the Danube. Most disastrous for the West is the situation in the former Soviet Union. There, our entire flank from the Black Sea to Vladivostok is collapsing under Moslem pressure." (William Lind, Fourth Generation Warfare: Another Look, Marine Corps Gazette, December 1994, 37)

[61] William S. Lind, Maj John F. Schmitt, USMCR, and Col Gary I. Wilson, USMCR. "Fourth Generation Warfare: Another Look." Marine Corps Gazette, (December 1994), 37.

[62] Huntington, 206.

[63] Ibid., 304.

[64] Ibid., 306.

[65] Lind, Another Look, 37.

[66] Huntington, 306.

[67] Ibid., 304.

[68] Kennedy, 314.

[69] Ibid.

[70] William S. Lind, "Political Correctness: The Dirty Little Secret" (a video produced by the Free Congress Foundation and narrated by William Lind, Director of the Foundation's Center For Cultural Conservatism, 1994)

[71] Ibid.

[72] Ibid., 158.

[73] Kaplan, The Coming Anarchy, 173.

[74] Ibid., 174.

[75] Ibid.

[76] Ibid., 172.

[77] Ibid., 179.

[78] Ibid., 180.

[79] Stephanie Gutmann, Introduction from her book, The Kinder, Gentler Military, February 2000, http://www.simonsays.com/excerpt.cfm?isbn=0684852918 (March 14), 1-5.

[80] Ibid.

[81] Ibid.

[82] Ibid

[83] Kaplan, Empire Wilderness, 17.

[84] Ibid. Kaplan wonders if such an America, would eschew traditional patriotism as a waning formality, "as Earth Day becomes more significant for wealthier and more sophisticated citizens than Independence Day."

[85] Robert D. Kaplan, The Coming Anarchy: Shattering the Dreams of the Post Cold War, (New York: Radium House, 2000), 54.

[86] Ibid. 19. Kaplan wonders would the nation's military soon be wondering whom they are supposed to defend? Americans are not ready for such destabilizing conjectures. The very notion of internal upheaval is foreign to Americans. Unlike the Europeans, Americans may be ill prepared. "Europeans, with their intimate experience of occupation, annihilation, and the passing of one political order after another...know intuitively about historical change. They know how frighteningly adaptive human behavior can be... Americans, however, because we have had no experience of violent upheaval since the Civil War, lack awareness of historic mutation and thus

more easily imagine the future with optimism…History shows that such permanence is most unlikely." America had better listen to the realists call for adaptation.

[87] Ibid., 64. Kaplan relates a story about a local multi-billion dollar corporation in Omaha that effectively vetoed a bid by the University of Nebraska to prevent the construction of an Omaha branch School of Engineering. Afraid of losing its seat as the main campus in Lincoln, the University Board of Regents disapproved the Omaha branch from proceeding with the construction. First Data Resources, the largest processor of credit cards in the world, in a joint venture funded the project in Omaha against the wishes of the Board and in the ensuing agreement, helped design the curriculum. Kaplan adds that big money even influences immigration policy. "If they [corporations] need highly skilled workers in defense and software industries, they will recruit them in one form or another from Asia and other places."

[88] Ibid., 136. Kaplan quotes Rosa Caudillo, a Hermosillo psychologist and relief worker in Northern Mexico: "A progressive person today is binational…"

[89] Ibid, 137

[90] Ibid. Kaplan adds a sobering note when he observes, "…despite the noisy political war over immigration in California in the mid-1990's, the remelding of Texas and northeastern Mexico is history, quietly in the making."

[91] Ibid, 89.

[92] Huntington, 200.

[93] Kaplan, The Coming Anarchy…, 100.

[94] Ibid, 101.

[95] Ibid, 38, 135. Huntington warns that the moral decay of America, left unchecked, will eventually erode the ability of the culture to sustain a common keel through the tough times. Drugs have contributed to this decay. Kaplan notes that the war on drugs is increasingly a losing cause under present strategy. When a unit of substance that costs $2,500 in Turkey sells for $250,000 in the U.S., the incentive remains too high to ignore. This will continue until the nation stems the tide of moral and cultural decay in its own back yard. In truth, the majority of the drug traffic originates from Mexico. Between profits from the drug trade and the money sent home from relatives in America, Mexico depends on this profit for its very survival. The paradox is that to remove this source of income through tougher drug traffic enforcement would be tantamount to collapsing the Mexican economy. The resulting flood of economic refugees across the southern U.S. border would disrupt the strategic stability between the two countries. Unfortunately, the most effective Mexican immigration policy to date is the sustainment of the drug trade in America.

[96] Ibid., 186. Issues such a water in the Southwest will increasingly bring tension to the regions. Will the federal government and middle class retain the necessary authority to arbitrate successfully? Indian America is in the beginning stages of renewing long-standing tribal issues over land, resource, and gambling rights. Not unlike the Serbs and the Croats, many of the Indian issues date back thousands of years and the elimination of the Indian Bureau in Washington has freed the Indians to take issue with less fear of interference. These issues should not be trivialized. (Kaplan 186) To this day, Indians will tell you that they have served proudly in the U.S. military not because of allegiance to the state but to simply protect the mother earth of their homeland. Their ties remain with a past before the United States.

[97] Ibid., 283.

[98] Ibid., 298. Lincoln in his foresight wrote of this quality: "A nation may be said to consist of its territory, its people, and its laws. The territory is the only part that is of certain durability… That portion of the earth's surface which is owned and inhabited by the people of the U.S. is well adapted to be the home of one national family, and it is not well adapted for two or more." He understood that men were not permanent but geography was.

[99] Maj Jeffrey L. Cowan, U.S. Air Force, "From Air Force Fighter Pilot to Marine Corps Warfighting: Colonel John Boyd, his Theories on War, and their Unexpected Legacy," Master of Military Studies, Marine Corps University: Quantico, Virginia, (AY 99-00), 18.

[100] LTC Thomas X. Hammes, "The Evolution of War: The Fourth Generation," Marine Corps Gazette, (September 1994), 36.

[101] Kaplan, The Coming Anarchy..., 134.

[102] Ibid., 184.

[103] Kennedy, 344.

[104] Richard E. Beringer, Herman Hattaway, Archer Jones, William N. Still, Jr., Why the South Lost the Civil War, (London: The University of Georgia Press, 1986), 64.

[105] Ibid.

[106] Edwin Dorn and Howard D. Graves, Project Co-Chairs, American Military Culture in the Twenty-First Century, A Report of the CSIS International Security Program, Washington D.C.: The CSIS Press, (February, 2000), xv.

[107] Ibid

[108] Charles C., Moskos and Frank R. Wood, eds., The Military: More Than Just a Job?, (New York: International Defense Publishers, Inc., 1988), 4.

[109] Ibid., 30.

[110] Ibid.

[111] Kennedy, 339-40.

[112] Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare, (Beijing: PLA Literature Arts Publishing House, Feb 1999), 34-59. In their 1999 work entitled *Unrestricted Warfare: Assumptions on War and Tactics of Globalization,* Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui of China noted an interesting observation regarding the new face of war. From study of American actions in the Gulf War and laudable attempts by the U.S. to qualify the coming threats, they argue that precision and information warfare are far less important in U.S. military strategy than what is contained in the phrase "operations other than war." In this, they contend, lie the seeds of future warfare. After acknowledging America's contributions to this forward thinking concept, Liang and Xiangsui charge that the U.S. fails to comprehend the subtleties inherent in such a phrase. They suggest *Non-military operations* as a more appropriate description of future war presently lost in the generic term Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW). "MOOTW may be considered simply an explicit label for missions and operations by armed forces that are carried out when there is no state of war. The former concept, 'non-military operations' extends our understanding of exactly what constitutes a state of war to each and every field of human endeavor, far beyond what can be embraced by the term 'military operations." According these authors, this new concept of war far exceeds the current grasp of American strategists and includes organizing activities across the spectrum of national power into a more coordinated and unified action. Nuclear and precision weapons are being replaced by "hyperstrategic" weapons found in financial, ecological, trade, network, drug, international law, and yes, cultural wars.[112] The combination of these forces in aggressive non-military action even in times of relative peace is war none-the-less with military and non-military implications.

[113] Kennedy, 303.

[114] Ibid., 308.

[115] Ibid., 311.

[116] Huntington, 307.

[117] Ibid., 264.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BOOKS

Beringer, Richard E., Herman Hattaway, Archer Jones, William N. Still, Jr. <u>Why the South Lost the Civil War</u>. London: The University of Georgia Press, 1986.

Bolger, Daniel P. <u>Savage Peace</u>. California: Presidio Press, 1995.

Booth, Ken and Moorhead Wright. <u>American Thinking About Peace and War</u>. New York: The Harvester Press, 1978.

Clark, Asa A., Peter W. Chiarelli, Jeffrey S. McKitrick, and James W. Reed, eds. <u>The Defense Reform Debate</u>. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984.

Clausewitz, Carl Von. <u>On War</u>. eds. Michael Howard, and Peter Peret, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989.

Davis, Jacquelin K. and Michael J. Sweeney. <u>Strategic Paradigms 2025: U.S. Security Planning for a New Era</u>. United States: Svec Conway Printing, Inc, 1999.

Goodrich, Thomas. <u>War to the Knife</u>. Pennsylvania: Stackpole Books, 1998.

Grimsley, Mark. <u>The Hard Hand of War: Union Military Policy Toward Southern Civilians, 1861-1865</u>. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995.

Handel, Michael I. <u>Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought (Second Ed)</u>. London: Frank Cass & Co. LTD, 1996.

Hamilton, Alexander, James Madison, and John Jay. <u>The Federalist Papers (1787-1788)</u>. New York: Bantam Books, 1982.

Hart, Gary and William S. Lind. <u>America Can Win: The Case for Military Reform</u>. Maryland: Adler & Adler, 1986.

Hippler, Jochen. <u>Pax Americana? Hegemony or Decline</u>. London: Pluto Press, 1994.

Holsti, K.J. <u>The State, War, and the State of War</u>. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

Hooker, Richard D. <u>Maneuver Warfare: An Anthology</u>. California: Presidio Press, 1993.

Howard, John R. <u>Fourteen Decisions for Undeclared War</u>. Washington D.C.: University Press of America, 1978.

Howard, Michael. <u>War and the Liberal Conscience</u>. New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1978.

Huntington, Samuel P. <u>The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order</u>. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996.

Jay, Martin. <u>The Dialectical Imagination</u>. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1973.

Kaplan, Robert D. An Empire Wilderness: Travels Into America's Future. New York: Random House, 1998.

Kaplan, Robert D. The Coming Anarchy: Shattering the Dreams of the Post Cold War. New York: Radom House, 2000.

Karsten, Peter, ed. Civil-Military Relations. New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1998.

Kennedy, Paul. Preparing for the Twenty-First Century. New York: Random House, 1993.

Kennedy, Paul. The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers. New York: Random House, 1987.

Liang, Qiao and Wang Xiangsui. Unrestricted Warfare. Beijing: PLA Literature Arts Publishing House, Feb 1999, 34-59.

Lider, Julian. On the Nature of War. England: Avebury, Gower Publishing Company Limited, 1987.

Lind, William S. Cultural Consevatism: Toward a New National Agenda. Washington D.C.: Free Congress Research and Education Foundation, 1987.

Lind, William S. Maneuver Warfare Handbook. Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1985.

Locke, John. Two Treatises of Government. New York: The New American Library, Inc., 1965.

Mathews, Lloyd J. ed. Challenging the United States Symmetrically and Asymmetrically: Can America Be Defeated?. Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 1998.

Mills, Wright C. The Power Elite. London: Oxford University Press, 1973 (1956).

Moskos, Charles C., and Frank R. Wood, eds. The Military: More Than Just a Job?. New York: Internaional Defense Publishers, Inc., 1988.

Naveh, Shimon. In Pursuit of Military Excellence: The Evolution of Operational Theory. London: Frank Cass Publishers, 1997.

Peters, Ralph. The War in 2020. New York: Pocket Books, 1991.

Piattelli-Palmarini, Massimo. Inevitable Illusions: How Mistakes of Reason Rule Our Minds. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1994.

Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr. The Disuniting of America. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1992.

Sun Tzu. Art of War. trans. Ralph D. Sawyer, Boulder: Westview Press, 1994.

Toffler, Alvin and Heidi. War and Anti-War: Survival at the Dawn of the 21st Century. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1993.

Triandafillov, V. K. The Nature of the Operations of Modern Armies. Oregon:
    International Specialize Book Services, Inc., 1994.

Van Creveld, Martin. The Rise and Decline of the State. Cambridge: Cambridge University
    Press, 1999.

Van Creveld, Martin. The Transformation of War. New York: The Free Press, 1991.

Wright, Quincy. Abridged by Louise Leonard Wright. A Study of War. Chicago: The University
    of Chicago Press, 1970.

REPORTS and MONOGRAPHS

Cowan, Maj Jeffrey L. U.S. Air Force. From Air Force Fighter Pilot to Marine Corps
    Warfighting: Colonel John Boyd, his Theories on War, and their Unexpected Legacy.
    Master of Military Studies, Marine Corps University: Quantico, Virginia AY 99-00.

Dorn, Edwin and Howard D. Graves, Project Cohairs. American Military Culture in the Twenty-
    First Century. A Report of the CSIS International Security Program. Washington D.C.:
    The CSIS Press, February, 2000.

Swain, Richard M. PH.D. Filling the Void: The Operational Art and the U.S. Army. Fort
    Leavenworth, KS: Command and General Staff College, 1989.

Tucker, Craig A. False Prophets: The Myth of Maneuver Warfare and the Inadequacies
    of FMFM-1 Warfighting. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Command and General Staff
    College, 1994.

MILITARY PUBLICATIONS

Training and Doctrine Command. Annual Report on the Army After Next (AAN) Project.
    Fort Monroe, VA: Training and Doctrine Command, 1998.

Training and Doctrine Command Pamphlet 525-5. Force XXI Operations. Fort Monroe,
    VA: Training and Doctrine Command, 1994.

Training and Doctrine Command. Force XXI: Land Combat in the 21st Century. Fort
    Monroe, VA: Training and Doctrine Command, 1996.

U.S. Army. Field Manual 100-5 Operations. Washington, D.C.: Department of the
    Army, 1993.

ARTICLES

Boyd, John. "Discourses on Winning and Loosing." Unpublished briefing slides archived at the
    United States Marine Corps Center for Doctrine.

Fukuyama, Francis. "The Great Disruption: Human Nature and the Reconstitution of Social Order." The Atlantic Monthly, May 1999, 55-80.

Gotowicki, LtCol. Stephen H. "Confronting Terrorism: New War From or Mission Impossible?" Military Review, May-Jun 1997, <http://-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/english/mayjun97/gotowick.htm>

Hammes, LtCol. Thomas X. "The Evolution of War: The Fourth Generation." Marine Corps Gazette, Sep 1994, 35-44.

Kaplan, Robert D. "Travels into America's Future: Mexico and the Southwest." The Atlantic Monthly, Jul 1998, 47-68.

Kaplan, Robert D. "Travels into America's Future: Southern California and the Pacific Northwest." The Atlantic Monthly, Aug 1998, 37-61.

Kaplan, Robert D. "Was Democracy Just a Moment?" The Atlantic Monthly, Dec 1997, 55-80.

Kipp, Jacob W. "Lenin and Clausewitz: The Militarization of Marxism, 1914-1921." Military Affairs, Oct 1985, 184-191.

Lind, William S. "Defending Western Culture." Foreign Policy, Fall 1991, 40-50.

Lind, William S., Col. Keith Nightengale, USA, Cpt. John F. Schmitt, USMC, Col. Joseph W., Sutton, USA and LtCol. Gary I. Wilson, USMC. "The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation." Marine Corps Gazette, Oct 1989, 22-26.

Lind, William S., Maj John F. Schmitt, USMCR, and Col Gary I. Wilson, USMCR. "Fourth Generation Warfare: Another Look." Marine Corps Gazette. December 1994, 34-37.

Morton, Oliver. "The Information Advantage." The Economist, Jun 1995, 5-20.