SANDHURST 2000 POLITICAL-MILITARY GAME

JUNE 2000
DISCLAIMER

The findings of this report are not to be construed as an official Department of the Army position, policy, or decision unless so designated by other official documentation. Comments or suggestions should be addressed to:

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This report documents the proceedings from the SANDHURST 2000 Political-Military Game that was held at the Center for Army Analysis. The purpose of the game was to prepare an American delegation for participation in the FOCUS 2000 Seminar. A primary objective of the game was to identify potential areas for standardization across the American-British-Canadian-Australian (ABCA) program armies, as well as to suggest improvements to the Coalition Operations Handbook. This report documents key insights produced by game participants during the SANDHURST 2000 event.
SANDHURST 2000 POLITICAL-MILITARY GAME

SUMMARY

THE GAME'S PURPOSE was to prepare an American delegation for participation in the FOCUS 2000 seminar.

THE GAME'S SPONSOR was the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of the Army for International Affairs, International Plans and Policy Integration Division.

THE GAME OBJECTIVES were to:

(1) Expose the FOCUS 2000 American delegation to key issues that would be examined at the seminar.

(2) Identify and record any potential areas for standardization across the American-British-Canadian-Australian (ABCA) Armies that emerged during game proceedings.

(3) Identify and record any proposed modifications to the Coalition Operations Handbook that emerged during game proceedings.

THE SCOPE OF THE GAME included the three phases of a peace support operation, as established by FOCUS 2000 seminar planners. These phases included planning and force construction, deployment and employment, and transition to a follow-on entity.

THE PRINCIPAL FINDINGS are a set of key insights that are documented in the main body of this report.

THE GAME EFFORT was conducted by Mr. Duane Gory, Conflict Analysis Center, Center for Army Analysis.

COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS may be sent to the Director, Center for Army Analysis, ATTN: CSCA-CA, 6001 Goethals Road, Suite 102, Fort Belvoir, VA 22060-5230.
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1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction

This report documents the proceedings from the SANDHURST 2000 Political-Military Game that was held from 28 through 29 March 2000. This game was the third in a series of events to prepare the United States delegation for participation in the FOCUS 2000 Seminar. FOCUS 2000 will be held at the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, in the United Kingdom from 26 April to 1 May 2000. SANDHURST 2000 was conducted at the Center for Army Analysis (CAA), Fort Belvoir, Virginia.
1.2 PURPOSE

To present key insights from the SANDHURST 2000 Political-Military Game

Figure 2. Purpose

The purpose of this report is to document key insights that occurred during the SANDHURST 2000 game and to record them for future reference.
1.3 Background

The aim of the FOCUS 2000 seminar is to assess the ability of the American-British-Canadian-Australian (ABCA) forces to conduct joint coalition operations, within the context of a peace support operation (PSO), in order to identify standardization opportunities.

The FOCUS 2000 seminar will be held at the Royal Military Academy in Sandhurst, the United Kingdom, from 26 April to 1 May 2000.

CAA has been designated by the Deputy Under Secretary of the Army for International Affairs (DUSA(IA)) as the executive agent responsible for preparing the US delegation for participation in the FOCUS 2000 seminar.

The FOCUS 2000 seminar is one of a series of biennial exercises that are conducted by the American-British-Canadian-Australian (ABCA) program. The purpose of ABCA is to serve as a forum for the participating nations (the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand as an associate member under Australian sponsorship) to move collectively toward the standardization of military equipment, training, doctrine, and procedures. This drive toward military standardization recognizes that the ABCA countries are likely to be partners in future military coalition operations, where certain commonalities across the member nation armies could be beneficial for mission execution. Participation in ABCA is not bounded by treaty, but instead exists through the voluntary cooperation of the member states.

The intention of FOCUS 2000 is to examine an international response to an intrastate complex emergency. The goal of the FOCUS 2000 seminar is to assess the ability of ABCA forces to conduct joint coalition military operations, within the context of a peace support operation (PSO), in order to identify potential standardization opportunities across the ABCA armies. FOCUS 2000 will be held at the Royal Military Academy in Sandhurst, the United Kingdom.
Army for International Affairs (DUSA(IA)) as the executive agent responsible for preparing the US delegation for participation in the FOCUS 2000 seminar.

1.4 Background-continued

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Figure 4. Background - continued

A series of events led up to the SANDHURST 2000 Political-Military Game. Preparation for FOCUS 2000 began in February 1998 at Planning Conference #1, which was held in the United Kingdom. The purpose of this first planning conference was to determine the broad outlines of the biennial event. Planning Conference #1 was followed by a second conference in February of 1999. The primary output of Planning Conference #2 was development of a series of purpose and objective statements for FOCUS 2000.

The Military Deputy to the DUSA(IA), MG von Kaenel, conducted a FOCUS 2000 planning meeting in August of 1999. Among other things, this meeting was intended as a preparatory session for a third planning conference that was held in Canada during September of 1999. The principal accomplishments of Planning Conference #3 were the identification of critical issues that needed to be addressed in FOCUS 2000 and the addition of certain factors that created a more challenging seminar scenario.

The Director of CAA, Mr. E. B. Vandiver, was briefed on the overall plan for FOCUS 2000 and CAA’s role in preparing the US delegation on 29 September 1999. A Work Group was conducted at CAA on 17 November 1999. The purpose of the Work Group was threefold. First,
the Work Group was tasked with identifying key peace support operation issues that would be addressed at a subsequent Issues Workshop. Second, the Work Group established an initial structure for the Issues Workshop, noting among other things some of the background briefings that would be required. Third, the Work Group formulated a draft definition for the term *multinational force compatibility*. Proceedings from the 17 November 1999 Work Group are documented in CAA Report CAA-R-99-2 and can be more fully examined there.

1.5 Background-continued

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Figure 5. Background - continued

The Work Group was followed by an Issues Workshop that occurred from 19-20 January 2000. This Issues Workshop was conducted at CAA and addressed the issues identified at the earlier Work Group. Deliberations during the Issues Workshop were always mindful to the identification of potential areas for standardization across the ABCA armies. Additionally, deliberations from the Issues Workshop were used to identify important topic areas within the context of a peace support operation that needed to be further examined in the subsequent political-military game (SANDHURST 2000). Proceedings from the Issues Workshop were also used to identify issues that needed to be raised with FOCUS 2000 Seminar planners at Planning Conference #4. Key insights gained from the January Issues Workshop are documented in CAA Report CAA-R-00-5.
The final event in the sequence depicted above is the SANDHURST 2000 Political-Military Game, which was held from 28 to 29 March 2000. Outcomes from this political-military game are the subject of the current report and are documented in the pages that follow.

1.6 CAA Game Plan

As previously mentioned, CAA has been designated the executive agent responsible for preparing the US delegation for participation in the FOCUS 2000 Seminar. In order to accomplish this task, CAA has established a four-phased plan. The first phase was conducting the Work Group of 17 November 1999. The second phase of the preparatory process involved the 19-20 January Issues Workshop. Phase III of the process involved execution of the SANDHURST 2000 game, which is documented in this report. The four-phased preparation plan will be completed by the provision of onsite analytical and administrative support to the US delegation at the actual FOCUS 2000 seminar in Sandhurst, the United Kingdom.
1.7 Analytical Architecture

Depicted in Figure 7 is the flow of CAA’s four-phased support plan. It begins with the Work Group of 17 November 1999. Starting with a set of key ABCA and PSO documents (such as joint publications on PSO and the Coalition Operations Handbook), the Work Group identified a set of key issues that warranted further examination at a subsequent issues workshop. These key issues are formally documented in CAA Report CAA-R-99-2 and can be more fully inspected there. The Work Group also developed a structure for the subsequent issues workshop.

Using the structure developed and key issues identified by the Work Group as a point of departure, the Issues Workshop examined potential areas for standardization across the ABCA armies. An important output of the workshop was the identification of issues that warranted further examination at a subsequent political-military game (SANDHURST 2000). Additionally, the Issues Workshop was the last opportunity to identify issues that needed to be raised with FOCUS 2000 seminar planners in the United Kingdom at Planning Conference #4. Key insights developed during the Issues Workshop were provided to FOCUS 2000 planners and ultimately used to add and modify topics that will be addressed during the April/May seminar.

Topics identified at the Issues Workshop, in combination with materials obtained from the FOCUS 2000 Seminar planners, were examined during the SANDHURST 2000 Political-Military Game. SANDHURST 2000 was the last formal preparatory event for the US
delegation prior to departure for the FOCUS 2000 Seminar and examined a series of joint, interagency, and multinational PSO issues.

Finally, CAA’s four-phased support plan will end with onsite support to the US FOCUS 2000 delegation. This onsite support will include analytical and administrative support.

1.8 CAA Products

![Diagram of CAA Products]

Figure 8. CAA Products

Figure 8 lists the principal products CAA will produce as a part of its four-phased support plan to the FOCUS 2000 event. First and foremost will be continual support to the US delegation so that it is fully prepared to participate in the PSO seminar. Throughout the process as a whole, attention will always be focused on identifying and recording standardization opportunities for the ABCA armies. Attention will also be placed on any opportunities for improvement to the Coalition Operations Handbook.

Two reports have already been produced that document the proceedings from the preparatory events that occurred prior to SANDHURST 2000. Proceedings from the November 1999 Work Group can be found in the CAA document CAA-R-99-2. Key insights obtained from the FOCUS 2000 Issues Workshop of January 2000 are available for review in CAA report number CAA-R-00-5. This report documents the proceedings from the SANDHURST 2000 Political-Military Game.
2 SANDHURST 2000 POL-MIL GAME

2.1 SANDHURST 2000 Pol-Mil Game

The purpose of SANDHURST 2000 was to prepare the US delegation for participation in the FOCUS 2000 Seminar. As can be seen in Figure 9, a diverse set of participants were involved. The objectives of SANDHURST 2000 are also listed in Figure 9. Again, emphasis was placed on the identification of standardization opportunities for the ABCA armies and potential modifications to the Coalition Operations Handbook.
2.2 Political-Military Game

Appearing in Figure 10 above is an overview of the SANDHURST 2000 game as it occurred on 28 and 29 March 2000. The morning of the first day, 28 March, was devoted to a series of background briefings that detailed the ABCA program and FOCUS 2000. Participants also received briefings on the Coalition Operations Handbook, US role in complex contingency operations, an overview of the SANDHURST 2000 game, and a brief review of the FOCUS 2000 scenario. A copy of this scenario briefing can be seen at Appendix C. The morning was completed by dividing participants into two teams and giving all individuals an opportunity to review the FOCUS 2000 Political-Military Plan (as provided by seminar planners) and other event specific documents. The opening situation document can be viewed at Appendix D.

The afternoon of 28 March was spent delving into Move 1, where each team discussed a set of charges that dealt with the planning and building of an ABCA force for the FOCUS 2000 PSO. Charges examined during Move 1 (as well as Moves 2 and 3) can be viewed in Appendix E. The ABCA FOCUS 2000 force is intended to participate in a PSO to a fictitious East African country called Abola. Abola has been wracked by an ongoing civil war, and the ABCA nations are asked by the United Nations to conduct a peace enforcement operation there. For more information on the Abola scenario for FOCUS 2000, see Appendix C of this report. The afternoon of 28 March was concluded with a plenary session, where each of the two teams briefed the other on key insights obtained while discussing the Move 1 charges.
2.3 Political-Military Game - continued

The second day of SANDHURST 2000 (29 March) began with Move 2, where the two teams examined separately a series of charges dealing with deployment and employment issues for the Abola PSO. Similar to the procedure exercised at the conclusion of Move 1, Move 2 was ended with a plenary session where the two teams were brought together and briefed each other on key insights obtained during deliberations. After breaking for lunch, the teams began Move 3 on the afternoon of 29 March. Move 3 charges examined issues dealing with the transition from a military peace enforcement operation to a follow-on force. Similar to Moves 1 and 2, Move 3 was concluded with a plenary session allowing each team to brief the other on important issues surfaced during move proceedings.

The capstone event of SANDHURST 2000 was the Senior Council briefing. This briefing gives each team the opportunity to present the most important insights it produced during Moves 1 through 3 to a set of key Army leaders. In the case of SANDHURST 2000, the Senior Council was composed of MG Sylvester (Head of US Delegation to FOCUS 2000), MG von Kaenel (Military Deputy to the DUSA(I&A)), and Mr. Vandiver (Director, CAA). The SANDHURST 2000 Game was concluded by the Senior Council briefing. Insights highlighted during the SANDHURST 2000 Senior Council included the importance of PDD-56 analyses prior to participation in a PSO and the need for improved interagency coordination within the United States government.
3 SANDHURST 2000 KEY INSIGHTS

3.1 Key Insights

This chapter presents, in the following figures, the key insights that were generated during the FOCUS 2000 game. Key insights are classified by area of significance, such as command and control, force protection, etc.

3.2 Key Insights-Strategic Guidance

United Nations Security Council Resolution 2099 is the foundation for this peace support operation (PSO)
- Resolution authorizes a Chapter VII PSO

Coalition force commander needs to consider national interests at stake for each country contributing troops to a PSO military force
- For the United States, this can be obtained from a Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 56 analysis

Strategic guidance should:
- Clearly articulate long-term military objectives and roles
  ✓ distinguish between events where military plays supported as opposed to supporting role
- Provide realistic and achievable implementation dates for all military tasks
  ✓ time schedule for Abola PSO appears too optimistic (unrealistic)
- Interpret the United Nations Security Council Resolution as it translates to the military mission
  ✓ phased end states—what are they and what are the priorities for tasks performed by the PSO military forces?

Figure 12. Key Insights-Strategic Guidance
3.3 Key Insights - Strategic Guidance, continued

- Strategic guidance should:
  - Identify any commercial-economic actors from nations contributing troops to the PSO military force that have interests contrary to the objectives of the PSO mission
  - Recognize interests that private sector actors in general have in the nation where the PSO is to be conducted

- Strategic guidance could be formulated by a PSO Coalition Council
  - Council composed of ambassadors from each nation contributing troops to the PSO military force as well as the force commander
    - Council is chaired by ambassador from the lead nation
    - In the case of the PSO to Abola, the United Kingdom (lead nation) would chair the Coalition Council
  - Council would address key issues
    - Drafting of the military PSO mission statement
    - A plan for disposition of belligerent forces
    - Formation of a transition strategy to a follow-on force that all contributor nations agree to prior to deployment of the PSO military force
    - Others as appropriate

- Bottom line: need a formal linkage between the PSO military force and the United Nations civil authority prior to deployment

Figure 13. Key Insights - Strategic Guidance, continued

3.4 Key Insights - Force Structure

- Need forced entry capability

- Need force enablers

- Need United Nations police units to support civilian police mission
  - 1 Military Police Company for Abola PSO, as currently assigned to ABCA force, is only sufficient for policing the ABCA force

Figure 14. Key Insights - Force Structure
3.5 Key Insights-Command and Control

- Separate Combined Joint Force Headquarters (CJFHQ) and Joint Force Land Component Headquarters (JFLC HQ) are preferred during the Chapter VII PSO to Abola
  - Advantage—without JFLC HQ, span of control for CJFHQ may be too large
  - Disadvantage—JFLC HQ provides additional layer of bureaucracy

- Proposed staff structure for Abola PSO
  - United Kingdom provides ABCA Force Commander
  - United States provides Chief of Staff
  - New Zealand provides G1
  - Canada provides G2 (intelligence)
  - Australia provides G3 (operations)
  - United States provides G4 (logistics)

- It should be recognized that national contingent commands are de facto in the chain of command and wield strong influence

Figure 15 Key Insights-Command and Control

3.6 Key Insights -Command and Control, continued

- There is a need for a coalition controlled logistics capability that can meet surge requirements throughout entire PSO area of operation (AO)

- There is a need for a robust rapid reaction force that is capable of operating throughout entire PSO AO

- Brigade boundaries may be too restrictive in PSO
  - Typically designed for combat operations
  - Should examine capability to deploy PSO military forces across established brigade boundaries on an as needed basis

Figure 16. Key Insights -Command and Control, continued
3.7 Key Insights-C4I

Communications and information systems infrastructure should be provided by the lead nation of a coalition operation.
- Common C4I problem is that the table of equipment and organization for a command headquarters is not geared toward coalition operations.
  - Command headquarters needs to be staffed and equipped for coalition operations.
- Compatibility of equipment and procedures.
  - Coalition Operations Handbook provides some guidance in this area.
- Need to form information sharing arrangements in advance of deployment to a PSO.
  - ABCA Program can serve as a good forum for member nations.
  - Other mechanisms needed for non-ABCA nations and NGOs, IOs, and others.
    - Probably done on an ad hoc basis; potentially personality driven.
- Need secure communications capability.
- Identify early what each nation’s intelligence responsibilities are and then delegate.

Figure 17. Key Insights-C4I

3.8 Key Insights-Deployment

Command and control at aerial port of debarkation (APOD) and seaport of debarkation (SPOD).
- Execute lead nation concept.
  - United States should be lead nation for Abola PSO, since Kamambe and Bukaluva are in the United States’ brigade sector.
- Management of APOD for use by IOs, NGOs, and other players.
  - At the strategic level: Interagency Standing Committee.
  - At the operational level: HOC.
  - At the tactical level: Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) at the airfield.
- Need one central authority for command and control of all transportation requirements.
- Management of NGOs and IOs use of airspace.
  - At the strategic level: Interagency Standing Committee to provide liaison function.
  - At the operational level: HOC.
  - At the tactical level: CMOC at the airfield.

Figure 18. Key Insights-Deployment
3.9 Key Insights-Logistics

- May want to form a multinational logistics command

- Combined Joint Force Command needs to write the overall logistics plan
  - Consider potential disruptions to the local economy
    ✓ inflation that emanates from procurement activities
  - Coordinate plan with other PSO actors (such as World Food Program)
  - Utilize contractor support
  - Military Civil Defense Assets (MCDA) can provide service modules for integration into the logistics plan
  - Logistics plan must consider mission as a whole, not just support for the force
  - May want to use the Coalition's Logistics Planning Guide logistics functions chart as a guide
    ✓ tailor the chart to specific situation

- Brigade commanders should have their own group of contracting officers and funds to meet mission requirements

Figure 19. Key Insights-Logistics

3.10 Key Insights-Logistics, continued

- Need to coordinate host nation purchases with Civil Affairs officers who have access to local services/vendors

- Responsibilities of the lead nation under lead nation logistics concept:
  - Movement control
  - Transportation
  - Engineer support
  - Medical support
  - Contracting

- Support for humanitarian relief
  - Stay in "wholesale mode"
    ✓ transportation
    ✓ food
    ✓ storage
    ✓ labor
  - Technical assistance—resettlement, processing, and transition centers for refugees and displaced persons; elections; other assistance
  - Facilitate de-mining operations

Figure 20. Key Insights-Logistics, continued
3.11 Key Insights-Status of Forces Agreement

☐ Status of Forces (SOF) Agreement for Abola PSO should be modified to include:
- ABCA Force commander as a signatory
- Status of government civilians and government employed contractors
- Clarify the tax liability of contractors to the host and supporting nations
- Freedom of movement issues

Figure 21. Key Insights-Status of Forces Agreement

3.12 Key Insights-Rules of Engagement

☐ NATO Release Authority Matrix - good tool for base line standardization of rules of engagement (ROE) across the force
- National forces can modify from this base
- ROE will change over time based on evolving threat

☐ ROE need to address operations that cross international borders
- Existence of bilateral agreements with neighboring states would be helpful

☐ ROE should specify how to handle war crimes/human rights violations

☐ ROE for Abola PSO very inadequate (particularly for ground forces)
- No rules on check points
- Does not define the terms of reference (e.g., hostile act)
- Lacks rules of contact for constabulary forces
- Does not address detention/incarceration of hostile actors
- Fails to address the conditions for use of weapons, both lethal and nonlethal

Figure 22. Key Insights-Rules of Engagement
3.13 Key Insights-Force Protection

- Armies will adopt own force protection policies
  - Influenced by domestic political pressures
  - Armies will base force protection levels on own intelligence estimates
- Perception of military force by the media, NGOs, and others may be negatively influenced if force protection levels vary greatly among troop contributing nations
- Force protection requirements for the military from nonmilitary organizations
  - Civil-Military Operations Center is clearing house for force protection requests from non-military actors
  - Types of requests include:
    - Establishment of secure lines of communications
    - Escort of food convoys
    - Protection of fixed sites
      - food warehouses
      - war crime sites
      - others
    - Internal noncombatant evacuation operations
    - Response to civil disorder

Figure 23. Key Insights-Force Protection

3.14 Key Insights-Protection for Nonmilitary Actors

- Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) is the organization responsible for addressing requests for assistance from nonmilitary actors
  - The CMOC will coordinate combat and humanitarian assistance missions
- Specific requests for assistance can include:
  - Establishment of secure lines of communications
  - Escort of food convoys
  - Protection of fixed sites (e.g., food warehouses)
  - Internal noncombatant evacuation operations
  - Civil disorder response (e.g., food riots)

Figure 24. Key Insights-Protection for Nonmilitary Actors
3.15 Key Insights-Medical Support

☐ CJF Command should write the overall medical (health service) support plan
  - Components include:
    ✓ Medical support to the military force
    ✓ Humanitarian assistance support to NGOs, IOs, host nation, and others
      * should be provided on a space available basis only
    ✓ Plan should include coordination mechanism with United Nations and other donor nations health organizations

☐ Medical support to nonmilitary actors should be limited
  - Provide from excess capacity
  - Priority always to military force

☐ NGOs and IOs have primary responsibility for medical assistance to local nationals
  - Provide security for NGOs and IOs, if required

Figure 25. Key Insights-Medical Support

3.16 Key Insights-Nation Building

☐ Two objectives of nation building activities in PSO
  - Projects should facilitate military operations
  - Projects should enable NGOs and IOs to execute their mission

☐ Dual use projects—host nation benefits from infrastructure projects the military force does to support itself during a PSO
  - Lines of communication projects—bridges, roads, railroads, etc.
  - Airport projects
  - Water and sewage systems
  - Electrical systems
  - Communications systems—radio, television, telephone

Figure 26. Key Insights-Nation Building
3.17 Key Insights-Nation Building, continued

- **Difficulties in the execution of civil support projects**
  - Availability of resources
  - Conflicting priorities
  - Perception of favoritism between former warring factions
  - Projects done in one area may be negatively perceived by neglected areas
  - Some military forces have limitations set at the national level on how they can be utilized

- **Logistic support for civil projects in Abola**
  - CJF Command drafts the Engineer Annex
    - annex establishes priorities of work and resources, balancing resources available with the mission essential engineering tasks
    - nation building activities conducted on a space available basis
    - may establish a Civil-Military Engineering Board
    - should examine possibility of leaving some resources for support to the follow-on forces

Figure 27. Key Insights Nation Building, continued

3.18 Key Insights-Transitions

- **Key criteria to define the end state for a PSO**
  - General compliance by all factions with terms of the peace agreement
    - allows transition to a follow-on force
  - Satisfactory progress on the disarmament of warring factions
  - A stable law and order environment
    - setting foundation for resumption of duties by civil police
    - public of host nation perceives a safe and secure environment
      - freedom of movement, commerce, etc.
    - conditions created to allow for the resettlement of refugees and displaced persons

- **Need transitional planning group**: does nothing but plan for future/transitional operations. Composed of:
  - Representatives from the PSO military force
  - NGOs
  - IGOs/IOs
  - Any other party with stake in follow-on operations

Figure 28. Key Insights-Transitions
3.19 Key Insights—Transitions, continued

- Need to plan from the beginning at CJFHQ a training plan/program to develop civil police capability

- For Abola PSO, need an exit strategy (not end state)
  - For a Chapter VII operation
    - cessation of hostilities
    - separation of forces
    - disarm belligerents
    - Political-military dialogue
    - prevent humanitarian disaster
    - law and order
      - viable police force
      - judiciary
  - For a Chapter VI operation (with November 2000 force transition date)
    - need to set conditions for transition to happen

Figure 29. Key Insights—Transitions, continued

3.20 Key Insights—Transitions, continued

- Criteria ABCA Force should adopt for supporting NGOs, IOs, and other actors
  - Forms a part of the CJF Pol-Mil assessment and subsequent planning
  - Examine NGOs, IGOs, and others to ensure support only goes to legitimate organizations
    - determine who is funding each organization and with what intent
    - has the organization signed the:
      - International Committee of the Red Cross's Code of Conduct?
      - Office of the Secretary of Defense (Humanitarian Assistance) can assist in this area

- In the initial phase of a PSO, may not be feasible to support NGOs/IOs—our focus is on separating warring factions, etc.

- Liaison between military and nonmilitary entities
  - At the tactical level: Civil-Military Operations Center
  - At the operational level: HOC
  - At the strategic level: Interagency Standing Committee

Figure 30. Key Insights—Transitions, continued
APPENDIX A  PROJECT CONTRIBUTORS

1. PROJECT TEAM

a. Project Director
   Mr. Duane Gory, Conflict Analysis Center

b. Team Members
   MAJ Gregory Barrack
   Mr. Robert Barrett

c. Participants
   Mr. Maxwell Alston, DUSA-IA (Civil-Military Emergency Planning)
   COL Clinton Ancker, Command and General Staff College
   LtCol Hank Andrews, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (SO/LIC-PKHA)
   Mr. Ed Balint
   Mr. Randy Cheek, National Defense University
   LTC Gordon Crom, Headquarters, ACE Rapid Reaction Corps
   Mr. Donald Davidson, DUSA-IA
   Mr. John Dickhute, Department of Army, Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics
   MAJ John Haynes, Southern European Task Force
   CDR Patricia Jackson, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Africa)
   Mr. Martin Lidy, Institute for Defense Analysis
   Mr. Bill McDonald, Camber Corporation (J7)
   Mr. Jim McNaught, Department of State
   Ms. Brenda Moore, J8 (Warfighting Analysis Division)
   Mr. Robert Perito, Department of Justice
   MAJ Kent Selby, Center for Army Analysis
   LTC Greg Stinner, Corps of Engineers
   MAJ Mark Stock, Department of Army, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans
   Mr. David Turek, Command and General Staff College
   LTC Mac Warner, United States Army Peacekeeping Institute
   LTC Ress Wilson, J3 (Special Operations Division)

2. PRODUCT REVIEW

   Mr. Ronald Iekel, TQM Specialist


## APPENDIX B  REQUEST FOR ANALYTICAL SUPPORT

<table>
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<td>Verbal</td>
<td>Mode (Contract-Yes/No):</td>
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<td>Acronym:</td>
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<tr>
<td>Title:</td>
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<tr>
<td>Start Date:</td>
<td>07-Feb-00</td>
<td>Estimated Completion Date:</td>
<td>29-Mar-00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Requestor/Sponsor (i.e., DCSOPS):</td>
<td>DUSA-IA</td>
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</table>

**Resource Estimates:**
- a. Estimated PSM: 3
- b. Estimated Funds: $0.00
- c. Models to be used None

**Description/Abstract:**
The American-British-Canadian-Australian (ABCA) program will conduct a Peace Support Operation (PSO) seminar in April-May 2000. The purpose of this seminar is to identify opportunities for the standardization of equipment, training, doctrine, and procedures across the ABCA armies. The April-May event will explore standardization opportunities within the context of a PSO. The Center for Army Analysis (CAA) has been designated as the executive agent responsible for preparing the US delegation that will participate in the ABCA exercise. As a final step in this preparation process, CAA will conduct the SANDHURST 2000 Pol-Mil game. SANDHURST 2000 will be the last formal preparatory event for the US delegation prior to participation in the April-May seminar.

**Study Director/POC Signature:** Original Signed
**Phone#:** 703-806-5367

**Study Director/POC:** Mr. Duane Gory

*If this Request is for an External Project expected to consume 6 PSM or more, Part 2 Information Is Not Required. See Chap 3 of the Project Directors' Guide for preparation of a Formal Project Directive.*

**Background:**
The Center for Army Analysis has been designated as the executive agent responsible for preparing the US delegation that will participate in the April-May ABCA standardization seminar.

**Scope:** Preparation of the US delegation will occur through a four-phase process: establishment of a working group; conduct of an Issues Workshop; conduct of a pol-mil game; and on-site support at the April-May ABCA standardization seminar.

**Issues:**
1) Address a set of charges related to issues that will be examined at the April-May seminar; 2) Identify and record issues that the US delegation believes warrants further examination at the April-May seminar; 3) Identify and record potential areas for standardization across the ABCA armies.

**Milestones:** Conduct the SANDHURST 2000 Pol-Mil game from 28-29 March 2000.

**Signatures**

**Division Chief Signature:** Original

**Sponsor Signature:** Original Signed and Dated

**Date:**

**Sponsor Concurrence (COL/DA Div Chief GO/SES):** DUSA-IA
The purpose of this appendix is to give an overview of the scenario that will be used at the FOCUS 2000 Seminar. In the scenario, ABCA forces are required to respond to an intrastate complex emergency in the fictional East African country of Abola. The remainder of this appendix will provide additional information about Abola's economic, political, and military conditions.
C.2 Abola - Background

Figure C-2 above shows a map of Abola. Abola has two significant bodies of water lying either within or along its borders. First there is the Indian Ocean, which lies along Abola’s entire eastern perimeter. The second significant body of water is Lake Ncube, which sits in the southwestern portion of the nation. Abola is bordered by four separate countries: Zambezia to the north, Chechecongo in the northwest, Chadofa to the west, and Nambazizi along the southern border.

There are four provinces in Abola. Lying to the northeast is Nyanga, which has a coastline along the Indian Ocean. To the northwest is Zambezi Province whose largest city is Mbarari. In the southwest lies the Ncube Province, which is home to the inland body of water Lake Ncube. Finally, the Katanga Province occupies the southeastern portion of Abola. The capital city of Abola is Ngumbo.
C.3 Background

**BACKGROUND**

- Independence from Arcadia in 1969
- Continuous civil war since independence
- Population
  - 6.8 million people in 1995
    - 2.3 million Abolans in refugee camps abroad
    - 1 million Abolans are internally displaced
  - Fourth highest population density in Africa
- Economy
  - Historically based on oil, coffee, and the extraction of mineral salts
  - Production and exports have plummeted throughout the war
  - Majority of rural population has returned to subsistence

**Figure C-3. Background**

Abola is a former colony of Arcadia. Independence for Abola was achieved through armed struggle in 1969, where two distinct military groups fought against the Arcadians. These two distinct groups failed to unify their forces after the Arcadians were defeated and never consolidated under one government. Instead of unifying for national reconciliation, the two groups turned on one another in a quest for absolute power, plunging Abola into a state of continuous civil war since the departure of the Arcadians.

The population of Abola was 6.8 million persons in 1995. Of this total, nearly one-half of the population was either a refugee or internally displaced in 1995. Economic activity in Abola has historically revolved around agricultural and mineral extraction activities. But due to the ongoing civil war, economic output has declined continually since independence, and the majority of the rural population has returned to a subsistence farming lifestyle.
C.4 Background - Continued

**BACKGROUND - CONTINUED**

- Political-Military groups
  - Patriotic Movement for the Liberation of Abola (PMLA)
    - internationally recognized government of Abola
    - founded in 1961 to oust colonial rule by the Arcadians
    - has become inseparable from state institutions
    - closely knit with the national army, the Peoples' Army of Abola (PAA)
  - Democratic Party (DP)
    - established prior to Abola's independence
    - preferred party of rule by departing Arcadians
    - military wing is the Democratic Front for the Independence of Abola (DFIA)
      - DFIA took up the military struggle against the PMLA after Abolan independence
  - Chechoni Resistance Movement (CRM)
    - much smaller than the DP/DFIA
    - tribal based secessionist movement operating in the northwest
    - desires to exploit potential oil wealth in Zambezi Province

Figure C-4. Background - continued

There are three major political/military groups in Abola. The first force is the Patriotic Movement for the Liberation of Abola (PMLA). This is the oldest and largest faction in Abola, being originally formed in 1961 to oust the Arcadians. The PMLA comprises the internationally recognized government of Abola and is closely intertwined with the national Army (the Peoples’ Army of Abola (PAA)).

The second major force in Abola is the Democratic Party (DP), which is the political wing of the largest rebel group fighting the government. The DP was established later than the PMLA and was the preferred post-colonial ruler by the departing Arcadians. The military wing of the DP is the Democratic Front for the Independence of Abola (DFIA), who has been in constant conflict with the PAA since Abola’s independence.

Finally, there is a small rebel group located in the northwest portion of Abola. Known as the Chechoni Resistance Movement (CRM), this group seeks separation from Abola and incorporation into the neighboring state of Chechecongo. The CRM is an ethnic-based movement and mostly engages in guerilla-type military actions.
C.5 Abola – Opposing Forces

Depicted in Figure 4 is the geographic location of the three principal opposing forces in Abola. The Chechoni Resistance Movement is located only in the northwestern part of Abola and is believed to be receiving covert assistance from the government of Chechecongo. Government forces occupy the central and northeastern portion of Abola, which includes the capital city of Ngumbo. The Democratic Front operates throughout the southern region of Abola.
C.6 Developing Situation: 1998 Through Mid-1999

DEVELOPING SITUATION: 1998 thru mid-1999

- April 1998 Aruzi peace agreement signed
  - Signatories include the government (PMLA) and DFIA
    - CRM not a signatory to the agreement
  - Agreement calls for a cease-fire and elections in January 1999
- January-May 1999
  - PMLA wins January elections
    - election irregularities causes rejection by DP/DFIA
  - Violence between factions continues
  - Abolan refugees abroad refuse to return home
- May-August 1999
  - Continued fighting worsens humanitarian situation in Abola
  - Aruzi peace agreement continually violated

Figure C-6. Developing Situation: 1998 through Mid-1999

In April 1998, the Aruzi Peace Agreement is signed between the government and DFIA. Significantly, the CRM is not a signatory to the agreement. The Aruzi Peace Agreement calls for a general cease-fire in all hostilities and the conduct of elections in January 1999. The January elections are held as scheduled, with the government (PMLA) winning all key positions. Election irregularities are reported by observers from the Organization for African Unity (OAU), and the opposition parties refuse to recognize the results. Thus, fighting between the factions continues throughout the spring and summer of 1999, and Abolan refugees in neighboring countries refuse to return home.
C.7 Developing Situation: Mid-1999 To Present

DEVELOPING SITUATION: Mid-1999 to Present

• August 1999 - January 2000
  - United Nations (UN) brokered peace agreement signed in Geneva
    • once again excludes CRM
    • agreement includes deployment of a UN peacekeeping force
    • violations occur immediately; fighting continues unabated
  - Countries providing troops for UN peacekeeping force refuse to send their troops into Abola
    • UN peacekeeping force does not deploy

• February 2000
  - Leaders from the PMLA, DFIA, and CRM meet in New York
    • peace agreement is signed

• April 4 2000
  - UN Security Resolution 2099 passed
    • accepts and authorizes the ABCA offer to conduct a peace enforcement operation in Abola
    • ABCA countries to meet in the UK in April/May 2000 to conduct contingency planning for a peace enforcement operation

In the summer of 1999, the United Nations (UN) brokers another peace accord between the government and DFIA in Geneva. This accord once again excludes the CRM and calls for the deployment of a UN peacekeeping force in Abola. Despite the signing of the accord, violations occur immediately, and the fighting in Abola continues unabated. Because of the increasingly violent nature of the conflict in Abola, nations contributing troops to the UN peacekeeping force refuse to deploy their forces out of fear for their safety.

The UN makes another attempt at ending the Abola conflict by bringing all three major factions (the government, DFIA, and CRM) to UN Headquarters in New York to negotiate another peace agreement. These talks result in a cease-fire agreement signed by all three factions in February 2000, known as the New York Peace Accord. In April the UN passes UN Security Council Resolution 2099 that accepts and authorizes an offer by the ABCA countries to conduct a peace enforcement operation in Abola. Representatives from the ABCA countries are to meet at the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, on 26 April to conduct contingency planning for the peace enforcement operation authorized by UN Security Council Resolution 2099.
C.8 Status of Abola’s Infrastructure

As would be expected during an ongoing civil war, Abola’s infrastructure is in poor condition. Approximately 80 percent of the nation’s electrical power generation capability is destroyed. The availability of water is low, and that which is available is of a poor quality. Telecommunications of all types have been severely degraded by the conflict and are virtually nonexistent in some provinces.

Most of Abola’s road network has experienced some degree of damage. Due to the ongoing fighting, the government has been able to perform only a minimal level of road maintenance. Banditry on roads has been reported in those areas of Abola controlled by the Chechoni Resistance Movement (the northwest). Railways are in a similar condition as the roads, where all lines have experienced some damage. There are two airports in Abola capable of receiving large cargo planes. None of Abola’s airports have operational nighttime navigation equipment.

Abolan ports have not sustained much damage from the fighting. In fact, all of the coastal ports are operational and open to shipping. Most inland waterway ports are also operational, but some are not accessible because the civil war has halted all river dredging activities.

Figure C-8. Status of Abola’s Infrastructure
APPENDIX D  OPENING SITUATION

SANDHURST 2000
Political-Military Game
(FOR WORKSHOP PURPOSES ONLY)

General Background

1. The country of Abola is situated in central-southern Africa. It was a colony of Arcadia until independence in 1969. Bordering Abola to the northwest is Chechecongo, a former colony of Greenland. Situated on Abola’s western border is Chadofa, a former colony of Burgundy. To the north of Abola is another former colony of Arcadia, the nation of Zambezia, while to the south of Abola lies the country of Namabazizi. Namabazizi has a large white minority population that previously ruled the country. See Figure 1 for a map of Abola and the surrounding region.

![Map of Abola](image)

Figure 1. Map of Abola
2. Abola is defined geographically by the Zambezi and Tonko rivers that run the full length of its northern and southern borders, Lake Ncube that straddles its western border, and the Indian Ocean that lies along its eastern perimeter. In the southeast of Abola, the highlands of the Katanga Mountains extend to heights of 1,800 meters. The majority of Abola rests on a relatively precipitous plateau of rich agricultural land.

3. At the end of the colonial period, Abola was at peace with an economy based on oil, coffee, and the extraction of mineral salts. Goods were exported to coastal ports by an efficient rail and river transportation network. Due to the civil war, most of the rail network is in disrepair, and rivers are impassable due to debris from military activities. Oil production is spasmodic, and mineral salts are sold to fund the warring factions within the country. As exports declined, an increasing number of the 6.8 million people of Abola have turned to subsistence farming, and the government relies upon international aid. It is estimated that 2.3 million Abolans are now living in refugee camps in neighboring African states and that a further one million displaced persons are living away from their original homes.1

4. The history of the Abolan civil war traces back to preindependence struggles for liberation from Arcadian colonial rule in the late 1960s. Early opposition to colonial rule centered on the Patriotic Movement for the Liberation of Abola (PMLA), which was founded on communist ideology and drew support from the Soviet Union and China. In opposition to the PMLA, and preferred for post-colonial government by the Arcadians, was the Democratic Party (DP). Despite the desires of the departing Arcadians, preindependence elections were won by the PMLA. The election results were not accepted by the DP and its military wing, the Democratic Front for the Independence of Abola (DFIA), and the DFIA took up arms against the PMLA and its army (the People’s Army of Abola (PAA)). A civil war resulted.

5. During the 1970s and 1980s, the conflict resembled many other civil conflicts in Africa: communist support for the PMLA was matched by the provision of arms and training for the DFIA by the United States and other pro-western African countries. The Abolan civil conflict became an extension of the Cold War, with both sides fighting proxy wars for the ideologically opposed super powers. As the Abolan civil war escalated there was clandestine and often open involvement by external powers. This involvement took the form of Soviet and Cuban advisors fighting alongside the PMLA and Nambazizian troops fighting with the DFIA. The end of the Cold War brought a cessation of outside support to the warring factions of Abola.

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1 The United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) defines a refugee as a person who, owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality. Furthermore, that person is unable to or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country. Displaced persons are individuals that may have fled their homes for the same reasons as refugees, but have not crossed an internationally recognized border. For more information on refugees and displaced persons, see the UNHCR web site at [http://www.unhcr.ch/un&ref/who/whois.htm].
6. In the immediate post-Cold War period, the Abolan combatants moved into a period of attrition warfare, with neither side sufficiently powerful enough to achieve outright victory. A massacre of hundreds of thousands of civilians took place in 1994 and 1995. These massacres occurred mostly along ethnic and tribal lines, although many were killed because of perceived support for a certain faction in the conflict or were a hindrance to the control of resources. The situation in the north of Abola has been further destabilized by the emergence of the Chechoni Resistance Movement (CRM), which is a secessionist insurge based on the Chechoni tribe. The CRM has been supported by the government of neighboring Chechecongo in retaliation for the support that the PMLA had given in the past to the antigovernment People’s Liberation Army (PLA) based in Chechecongo. An objective of the PLA is to overthrow the government of Chechecongo.

**Political Situation**

7. In February 1997, Zambezia, Chadofa, and Nambazizi joined together in an attempt to broker a solution to the Abolan civil war. These neighbors of Abola felt the need to end the conflict because of the increased instability Abolan refugees were causing in their countries. Peace talks were held in April 1997 at the city of Aruzi in Zambezia. An outcome of the peace talks was the agreement to a cease-fire between the PAA and the DFIA. It is important to note that the CRM was not a signatory to the cease-fire agreement. Additionally, the peace agreement scheduled Abolan elections for January 1999. The agreement reached in Aruzi also required significant demobilization of the PAA and DFIA, with an associated guarantee for freedom of movement throughout Abola for all parties.

8. As the elections of the Aruzi Agreement approached, there were persistent incidents of intimidation, numerous cease-fire violations, continued restrictions to freedom of movement, and no indication that either the PAA or DFIA were beginning to demobilize. The 1999 elections were won by the PMLA but denounced by the DP/DFIA as being manipulated, which was confirmed in some instances by election monitors from the Organization of African Unity (OAU). As a result of the election irregularities, the DFIA rejected the election results and the terms of the Aruzi agreement and threatened to return to full-scale conflict. Abolan refugees located in neighboring countries were not convinced that it was safe enough to return home.

9. In August of 1999, delegations from the Republic of Abola (i.e., PMLA) and the DFIA, under the auspices of the United Nations, held peace talks in Geneva, Switzerland. Delegates reached an agreement to halt hostilities within Abola and to the establishment of zones of separation (ZOS) between the warring factions. ZOS would be established and monitored by a peacekeeping force authorized by the United Nations (UN). There was also agreement to the re-establishment of a commission to supervise compliance with the peace agreement. Delegates further agreed to integrate the DFIA into the PAA, and a recommendation was made for the restructuring of the military and police force. Both the Abolan government and the DFIA agreed that their combatants would enter designated assembly zones (AZ) within 5 months of the agreement (by 23 January 2000) and adhere to a demobilization program supervised by the UN peacekeeping force in Abola. The delegations also agreed to release all political prisoners.
10. In November of 1999, the situation in Abola deteriorated rapidly and to such an extent that the UN authorized peacekeeping elements did not deploy. While nations contributing troops to the UN peacekeeping force agreed in principle to support the operation, most were unwilling to inject their soldiers into an escalating civil war that threatened to spill over into neighboring countries. The reluctance of troop-contributing nations to become directly involved was further reinforced by a series of violent acts in Abola, which included the murder of five monitors from the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR).

11. The Geneva Peace Agreement of August 1999 was more violated than complied with, and the UN Secretary General visited Abola last November. During this November visit, the UN Secretary General persuaded the various parties to hold new peace talks in New York. These talks were concluded with the signing of the New York Peace Agreement on 23 February 2000, with all parties (including the CRM) as signatories. As with other agreements in the past, immediate violations of the New York Peace Agreement occurred, and none of the warring factions in Abola have complied with the agreement’s terms.

12. As a result of the continued intransigence displayed by all parties in Abola, the UN passed a resolution on 4 April 2000 which accepts and authorizes the ABCA offer to conduct a multi-national force peace enforcement operation in Abola.²

13. **Note for US Delegation:** Joint Pub 1-02 gives the following definitions:³

   a. **Peace Enforcement.** Application of military force, or the threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order.

   b. **Peacekeeping.** Military operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement (cease-fire, truce, or other such agreement) and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement.

   c. **Peacemaking.** The process of diplomacy, mediation, negotiation, or other forms of peaceful settlements that arranges an end to a dispute, and resolves issues that led to it.

   d. **Peace Operations.** A broad term that encompasses peacekeeping operations and peace enforcement operations conducted in support of diplomatic efforts to establish and maintain peace.

**ABCA Force Mission**

14. **Strategic Considerations.** The situation in Abola is a threat to international peace and security. The deteriorating conditions in the displaced person (DP) and refugee camps, the

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continued areas of tension within Abola, and the worsening security situation in border regions demands attention. The international community cannot ignore the growing humanitarian crisis, nor the ethnic, political, and economic causes of the conflict. If the conflict is not resolved, the whole region of central-southern Africa may be engulfed in violence and instability. Steps must be taken to reduce the potential for regional conflict, reconcile the division within Abola and the surrounding area of central southern Africa, as well as ameliorate the worst effects of the humanitarian crisis.

15. Mission Statement. ABCA nations are to implement United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2099 in order to create the conditions for a more secure and stable environment in Abola. (Note to US Delegation - Planning notes by the ABCA Force Land Component Commander describes the mission statement as follows: ABCA Force land forces are to terminate the conflict between the belligerent parties in Abola, in order to create the conditions for a more secure and stable environment in Abola and a follow-on mission.)

16. Specified Political Military Tasks. At the request of the Abolan Government, the Security Council, by UNSCR 2099, has authorized the establishment of an ABCA Force (ABCAFOR) in Abola under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The United Kingdom is to take the lead in organizing and commanding the multi-national force. ABCAFOR is to:

a. Stabilize areas of tension.

b. Monitor and enforce the cease-fire.

c. Encourage and facilitate the voluntary and orderly return of refugees from neighboring countries and displaced persons within Abola by the UNHCR.

d. Facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid.

e. Prevent the supply of arms and munitions by air, land, or river to Abola.

f. Separate, if necessary, and supervise the demobilization, integration and professionalization of the PAA, the DFIA, and CRM and to assist with the development of an independent and unified police force.

g. Assist in the development of impartial and effective national institutions, civil, and economic society.

17. Political-Military End State. The UN’s desired end state is the construction of a more stable and economically sound Abola. This will be accomplished by liberalization of the political system, reform of the armed and police forces, and increased foreign investment. These actions will help to promote peace, prosperity, and security throughout central southern Africa.

18. Exit Strategy. The ABCAFOR mission shall terminate on 1 November 2000, unless the United Nations Security Council, on the basis of a report from the United Nations Secretary General (UNSG), determines that the objectives of the operation have been fulfilled at an earlier
date. The ABCAFOR commander is to submit a report to the UNSG by 31 July 2000 recommending a concept, mandate, structure, size, and duration of a follow-on peacekeeping operation. This follow-on operation will occur under Chapter VI of the United Nations charter and will oversee elections and the normalization of Abola.
APPENDIX E CHARGES

SANDHURST 2000
Political-Military Game

Move #1: Planning and Force Construction

Special Situation: Strategic Guidance and Planning

Charges

• Identify the essential strategic guidance the ABCA Force commander will need to have from the United Nations and the political authorities of the coalition contributing nations to effectively commence the estimates process. *(Was the Political-Military Plan sent in the read-ahead package sufficient or do additional items need to be added (or subtracted)?)* *(You may want to answer this charge in terms of questions that can be added to the various checklists in the Coalition Operations Handbook)*

⇒ Determine the key issues that need to be resolved at the political-military level before a comprehensive campaign plan can be produced for this ABCA operation.
⇒ Describe how the military can assist the political and diplomatic leadership in providing the necessary strategic guidance.

Special Situation: Command and Control

The United Kingdom has been designated the lead nation for the ABCA operation in Abola. As lead nation, it is recognized that British command and control procedures will predominate for ABCA Force. The command and control structure for ABCA Force is presented in Figure M1-1.

Charge

• Identify the essential staff cells that should be established in the Combined Joint Force Headquarters (CJFHQ) of Figure M1-1.

⇒ What functions should the CJFHQ perform?
⇒ Describe how the CJFHQ should be tailored to meet the needs of a peace enforcement operation as opposed to a warfighting mission.
Figure M1-1. ABCA Force Command and Control
As the lead nation, the United Kingdom will provide a divisional headquarters (HQ) as the Joint Force Land Component Headquarters (JFLC HQ) for the peace enforcement operation in Abola. This JFLC HQ is depicted in Figure M1-2. The Coalition Operations Handbook notes that depending on the size, complexity, and duration of the operation, staff augmentation from other national contingents in the coalition may be required to supplement the lead nation staff. This augmentation will ensure that the lead nation headquarters is representative of the entire coalition. Additionally, augmentation facilitates the planning process by providing the coalition commander with a source of expertise on coalition members. Capabilities possessed by a coalition partner may be required to provide support not found in the forces of the lead nation.

![Figure M1-2. ABCA Force Structure – Land Component](image)
Charges

- List any additional staff cells from the ABCA partner countries required to augment the United Kingdom JFLC HQ to make it work more efficiently as a coalition HQ for the peace enforcement operation in Abola.

  ⇒ If additional staff cells are needed, specify what the United States can provide.

- Describe what the United Kingdom might expect from the ABCA coalition partners in terms of manpower and equipment for the JFLC HQ.

  ⇒ Highlight the personnel or items of equipment that the United States could provide to support the JFLC HQ.

- Identify any modifications to the force structure depicted in Figure M1-2 that would enhance its capabilities for the peace enforcement operation in Abola.

- Determine the command, control, communication, computers, and intelligence (C4I) requirements that have to be considered in an ABCA coalition operation.

  ⇒ Outline any potential C4I compatibility problems that may exist between the ABCA nations (consider difficulties that have emerged in real-world military operations, such as those that recently occurred in Kosovo).
  > Highlight those compatibility problems that can be readily solved by a standardization agreement between ABCA nations.
  > How does the coalition integrate national intelligence resources for planning and operations?

  ⇒ Consider difficulties (such as security) associated with sharing intelligence and information across:
  > ABCA nations.
  > Between ABCA nations and non-ABCA players (nongovernmental organizations, United Nations organizations, private aid groups, etc.).
  > Between the United States military and other agencies and organizations of the United States government.
  > Suggest mechanisms or standardization agreements that might resolve any difficulties identified above.

- Examine whether it is desirable to establish a standard JFLC HQ that is utilized regardless of who the lead nation is.

  ⇒ If desirable, explore whether a standard JFLC HQ is feasible.

- Identify the pros and cons of a CJFHQ and a separate land component JFLC HQ.
What would be the advantages and disadvantages of combining the two HQ?

**Special Situation: Tasking Units Across Brigade Sector Boundaries**

The coalition commander must have a clear understanding of political and military constraints that may apply in exercising command over coalition forces from other nations. In order to maximize operational effectiveness, a coalition commander should be able to regroup forces for particular tasks and send them across national brigade boundaries while retaining operational control. A map of the different sector brigade boundaries for ABCA Force in Abola is presented in Figure M1-3. Note that Sector East is led by a United States infantry brigade, Sector Northwest is led by a Canadian infantry brigade, and Sector Southwest is led by an Australian infantry brigade.

Figure M1-3. ABCA Force Brigade Sector Boundaries
Charge

• Describe the overall command and control structure for tasking and controlling military units for operations across their national brigade boundaries.

⇒ What authority belongs to the coalition commander and what remains under national control?
⇒ Outline a standard procedure that can be used for tasking military units outside of their resident brigade boundaries during ABCA operations.

The Coalition Operations Handbook notes that command jurisdiction is the legal position of command by one commander over the soldiers of another nation. Each nation participating in a coalition is responsible to its own national authority for the conduct of operations. Thus, nations will view a given operation in terms of their own national interests. Coalition commanders will have to deal not only with the national contingent commanders, but also with the national command authorities of a given nation. This can lead to restrictions placed on the type of operations a given nation will allow its forces to engage in.

Charge

• List the criteria that the US contingent (sector) commander should use in deciding whether or not to challenge an operational decision by the coalition force commander for tasking US military units across their established brigade boundaries that may run counter to US national interests.

⇒ Should challenges be posed by the American contingent (sector) commander, Department of Defense, both, or another entity?
⇒ Specify how these criteria can be incorporated into the standardized procedures for tasking military units outside of their national brigade borders developed above.

Special Situation: Legal Issues

It is important that planners and commanders of coalition operations understand the legal basis for a peace support operation. All applicable laws must be obeyed, because forces conducting operations (even under UN mandates) do not have overall immunity under the law.
Charges

• Produce a brief list of national and international legal issues, including different views on rules of engagement, that need to be reconciled and incorporated into the political-military plan for ABCA Force Abola.

  ⇒ Show in which areas the coalition has primacy and in which areas individual nations retain primacy.

• In broad outline only, determine the Status of Forces Agreements that are needed between the ABCA nations.

  ⇒ Describe how differences in military law can be reconciled and under whose jurisdiction military crime will be prosecuted.
  ⇒ Determine if the draft Status of Forces Agreement in the read-ahead package is sufficiently comprehensive for the peace enforcement mission to Abola.
    > If not, identify what additional considerations need to be made.
    > Suggest any other changes that should be made to the draft Status of Forces Agreement.

• Identify the international and national legal authority required for the ABCA peace enforcement operation.

  ⇒ Examine whether United Nations Security Resolution 2099 is sufficient.
  ⇒ Discuss what domestic authority is required for US participation.


\[\square\] Identify and list key preliminary insights that will be briefed during the Move #1 Plenary Session.
Special Situation: Deployment

In the planning notes drafted by the ABCA Force land component commander (see Tab 11, page 3B-16 in the workbook), the concept of operations calls for an aerial port of debarkation (APOD) to be established at Kamambe and a seaport of debarkation (SPOD) at Bukaluva. The airfield at Kamambe is fast jet capable and can handle C130, VC10, TriStar, and C141 aircraft. Despite the ongoing fighting in Abola, the airfield at Kamambe is still suitable for large commercial traffic over a sustained period of time. There has been some damage to the air traffic control system as well as landing/lighting aids.

The seaport at Bukaluva is the main exporting center for oil and is dredged to accommodate tankers of all sizes. Potable water is available at the port, although the Abolan conflict has lead to periodical disruptions in power and sewage facilities. In general, the port at Bukaluva has remained relatively undamaged and is open to shipping.

Charges

• Describe the command and control arrangements for the APOD at Kamambe and the SPOD at Bukaluva.

  ⇒ How will operations at the APOD and SPOD be coordinated between the ABCA nations?
  ⇒ What is the command relationship of the APOD and SPOD with the CJF HQ?

• Identify what other organizations, including United Nations and national force contractors, will need to stage through and be supported from the bases at Kamambe and Bukaluva.

  ⇒ How will these organizations coordinate operations with the ABCA nations?

Special Situation: Logistics

The Coalition Operations Handbook discusses three methods for executing *cooperative* logistics in a coalition force.¹ Each of the three methods can be used singularly or combined. The three methods are:

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1. **Lead Nation Concept.** A single nation accepts responsibility for providing the framework for one or more logistic functions in support of the coalition force.

2. **Role Specialization Agreement.** A single nation accepts responsibility for providing a particular class of supply or service for all or most of the coalition force.

3. **Pooled Assets and Resources.** Two or more nations form an integrated logistic support structure to provide supply or support functions to the coalition force.

**Charges**

- Given the ABCA Force structure shown in Figures M1-1 and M1-2, list the responsibilities of a lead nation under the lead nation logistics concept for the peace enforcement operation in Abola.

  ⇒ In what areas would Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) need to be developed?
  ⇒ Examine whether the role specialization agreement method or the pooled assets logistic method would be preferable to the lead nation concept.

- Discuss whether there should be an overarching ABCA Force logistics plan.

  ⇒ If so, outline the key elements of this plan.
  ⇒ Who would be responsible for producing this plan?

- Determine what measures need to be taken between members of the coalition force in order to avoid duplication and waste in the area of logistics.

- Identify who will negotiate contracts for services from local vendors.

  ⇒ Describe the financial arrangements.
  ⇒ Examine what can be done to prevent each nation in the coalition from negotiating separate contracts with the host nation.
  ⇒ If the lead nation logistics concept is adopted, identify the lead nation’s responsibilities for contracts and liaisons with the host nation.
  ⇒ Determine which United Nations agency you would expect to be on the ground assisting in this matter.

- Outline the role/contribution of the logistic component of the ABCA Force to the humanitarian relief part of the overall operation.
**Special Situation: Rules of Engagement**

The COH defines rules of engagement as directives to military forces and individuals that define the circumstances, conditions, degree, and manner in which force or actions may or may not be applied. Although the members of a coalition force may have similar political mandates for participation in a given coalition operation, each coalition member national force is likely to come to the operation with a different national ROE reflecting that nation’s reason for entering the coalition or domestic political sensitivities. Some national ROE may be relatively free of constraint while others may be severely constrained. The coalition commander needs to reconcile differences as much as possible to develop and implement simple ROE that can be tailored by the forces of coalition members to their national policies.

For the individual soldier to understand and implement the ROE, they must be clear and simple. A draft set of ABCA Force ROE for the operation in Abola is included as a part of your workbook. These ROE are necessary to answer the following charge.

**Charge**

- Discuss the adequacy of the ABCA Force’s draft ROE for the peace enforcement operation to Abola.
  - Suggest changes that need to be made to the ROE, if any.
  - Describe in general terms which areas of the ROE have the potential to be standardized across ABCA nations and which areas should remain under national control.
  - Examine the ROE for the use of indirect fire.

**Special Situation: Medical Support to the ABCA Force**

The ABCA Coalition Operations Handbook notes that health service support plays a key role in developing and maintaining an effective military force and is a major factor in achieving strategic goals. The COH describes the health services mission as health promotion, casualty prevention, and the provision of medical units capable of responding to the challenges of worldwide deployment in a coalition force environment. A commander of coalition forces must be certain that medical care is delivered in a rapid, effective, and efficient manner without interfering with the coalition force mission. This requires coordination of health service support assets, a detailed health plan, and effective liaison between the senior health service officers of each coalition force nation. The COH also notes that the treatment of coalition force personnel from one nation should be possible in the medical facilities of another coalition nation’s facilities.
Charges

• The ABCA Force requires a field hospital. Abola will not be able to provide any support in this area. Determine the medical and legal issues for establishing a field hospital.

• Examine how the medical assets from the ABCA Force nations should be coordinated (Consider the ABCA Force structure of Figure M1-2).

  ⇒ Should an overall health service support plan be developed for ABCA Force?
  > If so, outline the key components of this plan.
  ◆ Who would produce this plan?
  ⇒ Should certain nations have specialized roles based on capabilities?
  ⇒ List any special provisions that are required for a soldier from one ABCA nation to receive medical treatment from a facility operated by another ABCA nation.
  > Consider financial implications, such as reimbursement or reciprocal agreements for services and how this would be handled organizationally.

Special Situation: Medical Support to Abola.

By mid-1999, the entire health system in Abola had collapsed. Many health professionals were either killed or fled the country. Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), United Nations agencies, and bilateral donors have recently reestablished basic curative services in urban and rural areas. Although NGOs have been instrumental in restoring primary health services, there has been much duplication of effort and waste of scarce medical resources due to poor coordination and planning. The Abolan Ministry of Health, in collaboration with the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), has reconstituted vaccine stocks and immunization equipment and has started an immunization program. The reestablishment of an uncontaminated blood supply is a high priority and the National AIDS Prevention Program is receiving some direct support from donors.

Charges

• Considering the ABCA Force structure of Figure M1-2, outline in broad terms the medical support the coalition force can provide to Abola.

  ⇒ Discuss the relationship ABCA should maintain with the local medical authorities.

• Describe any mechanisms or organizational changes that can be instituted to coordinate health service support activities across the ABCA coalition partners and non-ABCA players (such as NGOs, UN organizations, private aid groups, etc.).
Special Situation: Force Protection

The military forces of all nations have a concept of force protection. In a coalition environment, philosophies of force protection may vary widely. National force commanders will conduct force protection in accordance with policies established by their national command authorities.

Charge

- Describe the impact that varying force protection policies across ABCA coalition force partners may have on operations in the Abola peace enforcement operation.
  
  ⇒ Examine what constitutes “overly protective” force protection policies within the context of a peace support operation.
  ⇒ Outline the effect of overly protective force protection policies on relationships between a national force and coalition partners, the local national population, NGOs, and others.

- Outline the potential force protection requirements nonmilitary organizations (such as UN, NGOs, private aid groups, etc.) may request from ABCA Force during the peace enforcement operation in Abola.

Identify and list key preliminary insights that will be briefed during the Move #2 Plenary Session.
The United Nations desired end state for Abola is the construction of a more stable and economically sound nation. This desired end state will be achieved through political liberalization, reform of the armed and police forces, and foreign investment in Abola's economy. The ABCA Force mission will terminate on 1 November 2000, unless the United Nations Security Council determines that the objectives of the peace support operation have been fulfilled by an earlier date. By 31 July 2000, the ABCA Force commander will submit a report to the United Nations Secretary General recommending a concept, mandate, structure, size, and duration of a follow-on peacekeeping operation under Chapter VI of the United Nations charter. This subsequent PKO will oversee the conduct of elections in and the normalization of Abola.

**Charges**

- Determine the political and military end states that should apply in the peace enforcement operation in Abola.

  ⇒ List any suggested changes to the political-military end state for the operation in Abola appearing in the opening situation document (see paragraph 17).

  ⇒ Discuss whether there is a “generic” set of political-military end states that can be applied to most peace support operations.

- Identify the preferred logistic end state that will enable the efficient extraction of ABCA forces and smooth transition to a follow-on force.

- Describe the conditions that must exist before UN agencies, other governmental agencies, and nongovernmental organizations can recommence humanitarian operations in a UN Charter Chapter VI peacekeeping environment.

  ⇒ What are the UN agency, other governmental agency, and NGO coordination relationships with the military?

- List the major United Nations agencies expected to be operating in Abola.

  ⇒ Describe each organization’s function in general terms (*bulletized statements will suffice*).

  ⇒ Develop the criteria the ABCA Force should adopt for supporting these organizations.
⇒ Determine what entity in the ABCA Force is responsible for liaison with these organizations and where this entity rests within the chain of command or command and control structure.

**Special Situation: Nation Building**

As part of the transition from a peace enforcement operation to nation building activities, international peacekeeping forces are often criticized for devoting too much effort on sustaining themselves while losing sight of the original intention of the mission.

**Charges**

- Examine how much logistic support can and should be diverted to civil projects in Abola.
  
  ⇒ Outline the types of civil projects that can be feasibly done.
  
  > Identify what elements within ABCA Force would be responsible for execution of these projects.
  
  ⇒ Determine how these projects can be best sequenced and at what command level they should be controlled.
  
  ⇒ Identify the likely difficulties in execution of these civil projects and how they can be addressed.

Appearing in Figure M3-1 is the ABCA Force structure for the land component.

**Charges**

- Given the force structure in Figure M3-1, determine major infrastructure projects the ABCA Force can do in Abola.
  
  ⇒ Identify which projects should be coordinated by the military and which ones by the United Nations Department of Administration and Management.
  
  ⇒ Examine the criteria ABCA Force should adopt for providing infrastructure support for peace support operations.
Special Situation: Law and Order

There has been a total breakdown of law and order in Abola. One objective specified in the political-military plan for Abola is the reconstruction of an impartial and effective police force. According to the planning notes developed by the ABCA Force land component commander (see Tab 11, page 3B-17 in the SANDHURST 2000 workbook), key tasks are to: promote impartial and effective maintenance of law and order in Abola; monitor and advise local police; and assist with the development of a unified police force. These actions will permit ABCA force to transition the mission of ensuring freedom of movement throughout Abola to civil authorities. The planning notes call for the formation of police policy and management units to be based at the CJF HQ, the provincial government level in Abola, and the district level of government.
Charge

• Outline in broad terms how ABCA Force can support the development of an impartial and effective civil police force in Abola.

Identify and list key preliminary insights that will be briefed during the Move #3 Plenary Session.

Identify and list key preliminary insights that will be briefed during the Senior Council.