




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12 July 1978



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TRANSLATIONS ON USSR MILITARY AFFAIRS

No. 1362

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NEED FOR IMPROVING POLITICAL TRAINING OF WARRANT OFFICERS STRESSED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 2 Mar 78 p 2

[Article: "High Effectiveness in the Political Training of Warrant Officers and Extended Active Duty Personnel"]

[Text] The question of the work of Northern Group of Forces political organs and party and Komsomol organizations in raising the quality and effectiveness of warrant officer and extended active duty personnel political training has been examined in the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy. A report on this subject was presented by Lt Gen V. Danilov, a member of the military council and chief of the group's political directorate.

It was pointed out that considerable ideological, indoctrinational, organizational, and political work --aimed at increasing the role of warrant officers [praporshchiki] in solving the tasks facing subunits and units--is being performed among the forces of the group. The system for their political training has taken shape and been further developed during recent years.

During the discussion it was emphasized that the political training of warrant officers (praporshchiki) is most effective where regular and planned classes on the Marxist-Leninist training of officers are conducted; where the duty categories, general educational level, living and practical experience and the other distinctive features of this personnel link are fully considered when making up groups; and where the necessary concern for the ideological, theoretical and instructional methods growth of class leaders is displayed. The training of warrant officers (praporshchiki) and extended active duty servicemen from the ranks of the party and Komsomol aktiv within the party educational system, especially in the universities of Marxism-Leninism, has well proven itself. To aid political training, many units have begun to use more energetically the various forms of mass agitation work as well as the military press and cultural and educational institutions. The proven practice of conducting political information exchanges for warrant officers (praporshchiki) and presenting lectures to them on military pedagogic and psychological questions is having a positive effect.

Political training and all the ideological and indoctrinational work with warrant officers (praporshchiki) and extended active duty servicemen ensure an increase in their political awareness, activity and responsibility for the performance of their official duties. This is most clearly shown in the practical work of the majority of the warrant officers (praporshchiki) who are serving in the positions of unit commanders, technicians, secretaries of Komsomol activities, and those in flight crews.

Along with this, it was emphasized that the necessary systematic nature, purposefulness, and a differentiated approach are not provided for everywhere in the ideological and indoctrinational work with warrant officers (praporshchiki) and extended active duty personnel. Questions on raising the quality and effectiveness of political training are being solved in a number of units and subunits without the necessary persistence. Instances, which are not isolated, have been noted where classes are conducted at a low ideological, theoretical and instructional methods level, and where an organic union with problems in the moral and military indoctrination field and with those tasks which face specific categories of warrant officers and extended active duty personnel is not provided for. Some commanders, political workers and party organizations do not thoroughly analyze the substance of political training and do not always react sharply to instances of low quality in conducting classes and of poor attendance at them.

It was pointed out that mass agitation, cultural and educational work is in a number of cases still poorly directed toward the combined solution of tasks in the ideological, political, moral, military and legal indoctrination of warrant officers (praporshchiki) and extended active duty personnel. Few measures are being taken which contribute to the formation of high moral and combat qualities in warrant officers (praporshchiki) and the inculcation of a sense of pride for their profession and military rank. Here and there insufficient attention is being paid to the question of training warrant officers (praporshchiki) and extended active duty personnel, who do not have a completed secondary education, in general education schools.

The existing shortcomings in political training, ideological indoctrination and general educational training is having a negative effect on the professional formation of a position of the warrant officers, on the level of their skill, and on their performance of obligations in competition. The high influence of the work directed toward strengthening troop discipline and the strict observance of communist moral standards by each warrant officer (praporshchiki) and extended active duty serviceman have still not been provided for in all units.

The Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy has required the political directorate, the political organs, and the party and Komsomol organizations of the Northern Group of Forces to eliminate the detected deficiencies and, relying on the positive experience accumulated in a number of units, to ensure a further increase in the ideological and theoretical level and the effectiveness of the political training and indoctrinational work with warrant officers (praporshchiki) and extended active duty personnel.

It has been recommended that all political organs continue the active publicizing and through study of the decisions of the 25th party congress; the Constitution of the USSR; the works and speeches of comrade L. I. Brezhnev, general secretary of the CC CPSU and Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet; and the jubilee documents and materials devoted to the 60th anniversary of Great October and the 60th anniversary of the Soviet army and navy with warrant officers (praporshchiki) and extended active duty personnel. It is also recommended that more attention be paid to the indoctrination of warrant officers (praporshchiki) and extended active duty personnel in socialist patriotism and internationalism, the heroic combat traditions of the Soviet armed forces, and high political vigilance.

In doing this, the efforts of commanders, political organs and party organizations must be concentrated on ensuring high quality and a more effective influence of political training and all forms of indoctrinational work with warrant officers and extended active duty personnel on forming the necessary moral, political and combat qualities in them; on the growth of their military and technical knowledge, general educational training and cultural outlook; on raising their responsibility for the status of the combat readiness of subunits; on the irreproachable performance of official duties; and on their personal discipline.

In this connection, the need to provide a more differentiated approach to the organization of the political training and indoctrination of warrant officers has been pointed out. When determining the forms of political training and the staffing of groups, their level of training, service experience, and official categories must be more fully considered. It is necessary to improve individual indoctrinational work considering the specifics of the practical activity of warrant officers--commanders of subunits, crews and teams and Komsomol workers; and to continually arm them with knowledge in the area of military pedagogics and psychology.

It is important to improve in the future the basic form of political training--planned classes with warrant officers which include lectures and the holding of seminars; to devote great attention to the interesting and instructional methods aspect of the classes; to the achievement of greater persuasiveness and clarity in the exposition of the material being studied and of close ties to troop practices. It is also necessary to make more effective use of universities of Marxism-Leninism in the ideological training of warrant officers and extended active duty personnel who are party and Komsomol activists. It has proven advisable to place extended active duty personnel in separate groups within the system of political classes in the future. It is recommended that all extended active duty personnel and warrant officers receive a secondary education in the near future.

It is important that the combined approach be more actively incorporated in the training and indoctrination process; that such aspects as moral and military indoctrination be more fully reflected in it; that all warrant officers and extended active duty personnel without exception be embraced by political training and ideological influence; and that the entire arsenal of agitation, propaganda, cultural, and education work forms, technical

propaganda systems, visual aids, the military press, and artistic literature be used to the fullest extent. The independent study of the students must be organized more soundly and effectively.

The quality and effectiveness of political training will depend to a decisive degree on the propagandists who conduct the classes. Therefore, it is necessary to continually improve the theoretical and instructional methods training of the leaders of political training groups of warrant officers and extended active duty personnel and for political organs to conduct seminars and other measures especially for this category of propagandists, normally on the large unit or garrison level. Along with this it is necessary to regularly involve experienced instructional methodologists and indoctrinators from the ranks of highly trained commanders, political workers, T/O propagandists and staff officers in the presentation of lectures on the more important and complicated topics in the training plan. The non-T/O lecture groups and the agitation and propaganda collectives attached to political organs can make a large contribution to this. The military press has been called upon to publish material and instructional methods articles regularly to help in the political training of warrant officers and to cast light on progressive experience in organizing it.

The Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy has recommended to the political directorates of districts, groups of forces and fleets that they thoroughly analyze the status of political training and the ideological, indoctrinational, organizational and political work with warrant officers during the training year and that they determine and take specific steps to further increase its quality and effectiveness. It is necessary to analyze thoroughly the processes and phenomena which are taking place among this category of servicemen in the area of their service and day-to-day interests, to show daily concern for the further development of their public and political work, and to perform objective work in the selection of the best warrant officers for the ranks of the party, ensuring the vanguard role of young communists in combat and political training. It is also extremely important to strengthen political influence on the solving of personnel questions connected with the selection and assignment of warrant officers and on the improving of their professional qualifications and mastery of official duties. Together with commanders, political organs and party organizations have been called upon to raise the training level of warrant officers, their authority and role in solving the tasks assigned by the USSR minister of defense to the army and navy.

8802

CSO: 1801

TASKS AND CAPABILITIES OF CENTRAL MILITARY TRANSPORT SERVICE

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 4 Mar 78 p 2

[Article by Lt Gen Tech Trps A. Klemin, chief of the Central Military Transportation Directorate: "For the Sake of Combat Readiness"]

[Text] The military transport service.... Certainly each serviceman has had something to do with it. It is difficult to overestimate its role in solving the complicated and critical tasks imposed by the state on its armed defenders. Having begun its combat journey in March 1918, the military transport service has made and is making a worthy contribution to strengthening the defensive capabilities of the country of the soviets.

The service underwent several tests during the years of the Great Patriotic War, especially during its initial period. It is sufficient to say that from the beginning of the war to December 1941 alone the enemy made about 6,000 strikes on our frontline roads. Naturally, it was extremely difficult to ensure the timely movement of troops under these conditions. However, the railroad men and the personnel in the military transport service organs stood up to the testing. During the first 40 days of the war alone up to two and a half million individuals were transported to the front. By the end of the war the number of troop movements had immeasurably grown. For example, in 1945 while preparing for the Berlin operation, 287,000 railroad cars with military cargoes arrived at the railroad stations of Poland and East Prussia. Military transport service personnel are solving critical tasks under modern conditions. The experience of large scale exercises and maneuvers, conducted during recent years in the Soviet armed forces, showed that despite the growing movement capabilities of the forces, and their capability to successfully perform a move to a large distance on their own, the task requires the widespread use of rail, water and air transport to move them. This saves time, economizes motor resources, and permits vehicles to be protected from wear and tear, and the strength of personnel to be preserved for combat. The revolution in military affairs has also demanded from the military transport service the solution of a number of basically new tasks and problems.

The conditions of modern combat require that troops move under the constant threat of the enemy's use of a weapon of mass destruction, aviation, airborne

forces, sabotage and reconnaissance groups, etc. Under these conditions very much depends on military transport organs and on their ability to correctly solve all the questions connected with the preparation and combined use of different types of transport and with ensuring the survivability of lines of communications, and the continuity of transport. This is why the efforts of personnel in military transport organs during day-to-day training have been directed toward perfectly mastering every work method under conditions which approximate combat as closely as possible. Socialist competition which has become a powerful factor in raising the work quality and effectiveness of all links in the military transport service has also been subordinated to the solution of this task.

Commanders, chiefs, and party and Komsomol organizations in the military transport service for rail, water and air transport are performing purposeful work to intensify further the socialist competition which is directed toward improving the military transport support of the forces. The statement in the Letter of the CC CPSU, the USSR Council of Ministers, the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, and the Komsomol Central Committee concerning the necessity to achieve a decrease in empty runs and in the loss of loading and unloading time and to achieve full use of the load carrying capabilities of all types of transport has been adopted by the personnel as a combat program. An active struggle is taking place in military transport organs to incorporate very rapidly progressive methods in organizing and carrying out troop movements, to increase the daily speed of movement of echelons and transport, and to effectively use and economize material resources.

Noticeable results in competition have been achieved by the collectives headed by officers V. Shchetinin, A. Golikov and V. Ivanov. What determined their success? -- First of all, the fact that in the mentioned collectives very serious attention was paid to the composite provision of transportation, to improving the material and technical base, and to the struggle to decrease the time wasted by rolling stock during loading operations. The results of performing troop movements are regularly reviewed during service meetings where concrete measures are developed to prevent excessive idle time. Strict control is exercised over their implementation. The officers of the military transport organs carefully study the state of affairs with respect to the senders and receivers of cargo, participate in composite checks, and perform work in explaining the statements in guidance documents on organizing troop movements. The incorporation of progressive methods for organizing work and continual improvement of the material technical base also contribute to improving the qualitative work indicators and to lowering transport expenditures.

However, there are still shortcomings in organizing and performing troop movements. Most frequently of all they are shown in the excessive idle time of rolling stock during loading operations. For example, this happens in the collectives headed by officers V. Kovshov, N. Khatskevich and A. Zdanchuk. Here, they do not attach the necessary importance to ensuring the timely loading and unloading of railroad cars. The officers of the military transport

lines organs do not display persistence in the struggle to use rolling stock effectively. There is also quite a bit of wasted time in individual construction units and establishments.

Life confirms: The effectiveness in using rolling stock is normally lower where the necessary attention is not paid to the improvement of the material technical base used to support troop movements. This depends a lot on the commanders of units, and the chiefs of institutes and enterprises operating rolling stock. Some of them show poor concern for maintaining railroad spurs in constant readiness.

It has already been proven more than once by the experience of progressive collectives that with a wise approach to the organization of troop movements special expenditures are not required at times to increase the effective use of rolling stock. For example, at one of the enterprises they lengthened a spur several dozen meters and brought it directly to the depot. This permitted loading and unloading to be conducted according to the method: freight car - warehouse and back. The solution is a simple one. However, this method which was suggested by V. Filinov, an officer in the military transport service, permits significant state resources to be saved annually.

One of the most important factors which contributes to economy is the widespread use of container shipments. This increases the mobility of the rear area and ensures good stability of transport communications--of course, if unit commanders and the directors of institutions and enterprises pay the required attention to preparing warehouses and depots to receive and send containers and packages. In this regard, the outfitting of warehouse structures and their equipping with modern mechanization systems acquire special significance.

Improving planning is a very important condition for raising the efficiency of the entire transportation process. Very much depends, let us say, on the timeliness and accuracy of requests for rolling stock. Without this, the rhythmical work of transportation is impossible. That is why military transport service officers must provide thorough help to unit commanders and the chiefs of institutions in planning and organizing troop movements. In particular, it is incumbent on military komendatura officers to continually know the actual state of affairs in units and institutions performing a move so as to take timely steps to prevent excessive idle time.

Helping the forces to use every reserve to raise the quality and effectiveness of movements--the personnel of the military transport service see this to be their most important task.

8802

CSO: 1801

EFFORTS MADE TO IMPROVE SKILL OF MOTOR VEHICLE OPERATORS

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 5 Mar 78 p 2

[Article by Maj Gen Engr P. Sushinin, chief of the Motor Vehicle Service of the Central Group of Forces: "The Position Behind the Wheel"]

[Text] The military driver.... Much stands behind these words. The role and importance of this specialty in the life of the troops is constantly growing. Military drivers form a significant portion of personnel. The successful solution of tasks by units and subunits and their combat readiness depends to a great extent on the level of their professional and ideological training.

The work of improving the professional skills of automobile driver fighting men is discussed in the report published below.

The past months of the present training year have been distinguished by a further growth in the skill of military drivers. The work of preventing vehicular accidents and the preconditions for them has also been improved. A good basis for this was created during the past training year when a 50 percent decrease in them was achieved in comparison with the previous year. Quite a bit of fuel and lubricants has been saved. Of course, such results cannot help but make one happy. They would have been unthinkable without the painstaking work which commanders, political workers, party and Komsomol organizations, and specialists in the motor vehicle service contributed to the training and indoctrination of drivers.

One of the effective ways to increase the skill of drivers is regular courses of instruction. We conduct them monthly and at the end of each training period.

Undoubtedly these measures provide a great benefit. However, it is necessary to stipulate that they are meant for drivers who have a certain amount of experience. But what about those who still do not have sufficient practice in operating equipment?

In our progressive motor vehicle battalion the pre-training of young drivers is organized so that each of them is able to study the distinctive features in the construction and operation of the motor vehicles on which he has to work and so that he learns to adjust assemblies and units and make simple repairs under field conditions. Driving skills are first perfected on the vehicle driving range and then on country roads and on streets with heavy traffic. Training is conducted under the direct leadership of experienced specialists--Maj I. Demeshko, Capt. A. Krivchikov, and WO's [praporshchiki] A. Verbitskiy and M. Storchak. The training ends with the performance of a long move under difficult road conditions.

A good material training base plays an important role in the high quality training of young drivers. In the battalion mentioned above it is an object of pride for all personnel. With their own hands the fighting men created classrooms for studying the construction of motor vehicles and have outfitted premises for briefing drivers and vehicle commanders. They have also constructed a small vehicle driving range here. Now, it is no longer necessary, as it was before, to spend valuable training time on long trips. A trainer on driving motor vehicles will soon be set up in the classroom for briefing drivers and vehicle commanders. The complete illusion of a vehicle's movement is created on the screen and various road situations are modelled on it.

For the qualitative training of drivers--both beginners and those with some experience--it is necessary for commanders to improve their instructional methods and technical knowledge constantly. We regularly conduct demonstrations for this purpose. Recently, for example, they were held at the base of the N-skiy motorized rifle regiment. During these classes it is visually demonstrated what technical training systems should be in unit motor vehicle classrooms and it is explained which commander should work with what category of drivers. The classes end with an exchange of experience and the approval of the single most effective instructional methods recommendations.

The struggle for effectiveness in training drivers is impossible without well organized socialist competition between them. Our commanders have been convinced that rivalry, skillfully organized during classes, helps to make young fighting men ready more quickly and improves the skill of the more experienced ones. In the progressive units and subunits of the group a certain amount of experience has been acquired in this important task. The search to improve the organization of competition assumed a more purposeful nature after the publication of the Letter of the CC CPSU, the USSR Council of Ministers, the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, and the Komsomol Central Committee about spreading socialist competition during 1978.

High effectiveness distinguishes the competition of the drivers in the subunit headed by Lt Col I. Yerofeyenko. It has become a rule here that the commanders of companies and platoons prepare lesson plans--and without fail point out what will be done during a class to create competition and how it will be organized. They also approach the summation of competition results in a well-

thought-out manner here. A system of objective indicators has been introduced here to evaluate the work of each driver. In this regard, the period of service, the amount of fuel and lubricants saved, public work, and discipline are taken into consideration.

Special trainers are used to operationally sum up the results during classes on road movement rules and on the construction of motor vehicles. The director prepares cards with various questions in advance. Having inputted the program into the electronic self-tutoring examiner, the driver immediately receives a rating. At the same time he also sees on the display board the results received by his comrades.

Various methods are used in the battalion to ensure publicity and the moral stimulation of the competitors.

Without a doubt much has been done thanks to the persistent efforts of commanders and political workers to improve the training of drivers. However, there are still quite a few questions which have still not been solved. In some units and subunits new training tests and modern technical training equipment are still being incorporated slowly. For example, more than once it was necessary to direct the attention of officers A. Khanikayev and N. Borbat and other subunit commanders to the fact that in some classrooms for studying components there were texts on only one type of vehicle. Not all class leaders realize the necessity for practicing norms directly on components yet.

We, of course, know about these deficiencies and are trying to do everything to eliminate them as quickly as possible. However, there is another side to the problem of training military drivers. As is known, motor vehicle subunits receive replacement drivers from the ranks of young fighting men who are graduates of DOSAAF motor vehicle schools. The equipping of the forces with more modern equipment and the growth in the requirements for training drivers, in our opinion, requires the DOSAAF committees, under whose command the motor vehicle schools are located, to engage in searches for ways to raise the effectiveness of the training process.

It seems to us there is still something to work on here. In particular, we would like future fighting men to be acquainted in the motor vehicle schools with the modern motor vehicles which are in the armament of units and subunits.

8802
CSO: 1801

PROBLEM OF TRAINING MEDIOCRE SERVICEMEN DISCUSSED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 7 Mar 78 p 2

[Article by Lt Col N. Gavrilov, expert in combat qualification: "You Do Not Jump From a High Place"]

[Text] In the performance of my official duties I frequently have occasion to visit subunits during assemblies of personnel and meetings of officers, warrant officers (praporshchiki) and sergeants and when the results of socialist competition are being summed up. The discussions during these, of course, concerns what has been achieved, vital tasks and ways to solve them. The names of excellent soldiers and people, whose successes we are proud of, are mentioned with respect. And this is correct. In the Letter of the CC CPSU, the USSR Council of Ministers, the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions and the Komsomol Central Committee it says: "Honor and glory to progressive collectives, to the heroes of labor and the innovators of production!" In mentioning the names of excellent soldiers, commanders and political workers tell about their experiences and recommend it be incorporated.

During these measures, sharp criticism is normally directed to those lagging behind and this is necessary. It is necessary to pull them up to the level of first-rate soldiers by a word of criticism and by business-like help.

But during this discussion is there another category of people which is overlooked--the "average" ones? There is nothing to reproach them for but there is also nothing to praise them for--they haven't earned anything.

Let us look at this category of people more intently. The replacements for the ranks of excellent soldiers come from them. And this is justifiably so. However, it also happens that the growth in the ranks of unsuccessful and undisciplined individuals also occurs at the expense of the "average" ones. Why does this happen this way? Sometimes, an individual who has included himself in competition, assumes understated obligations and marks time and that is why he falls behind those who are irrepressibly moving forward. This is understandable; You do not jump from a high place. Effort and a running start are required.

It is necessary to work daily and painstakingly with the "average" ones. In my opinion, one of the essential reserves for increasing the effectiveness of socialist competition is forged here. I would like to support this conclusion with specific examples.

Let us compare two subunits. Officer V. Mogilin commands one of them and officer V. Teplinskiy--the other. There is a lot which makes these collectives similar to each other. First of all, they are completely identical in composition and are armed with the same kind of equipment. Finally, the commanders of both subunits are experts in a military qualification. But it is necessary to mention: The success in combat training is far from identical.

In the first, half of the specialists have improved ratings. The ranks of excellent soldiers are growing. This success has been achieved after only three months of the training year. Comrade Mogilin and the other officers seriously and thoughtfully work with the "average" ones and pull them up to the level of first-rate personnel. I will cite the example of Sr Lt V. Kostyuk, a specialist first-class. After school he had to take examinations three times on his firing skill at the range and invariably earned only excellent ratings. Along with the operators, he participated in the competition for the title, "Best Large Unit Crew" and took second place. Almost all his subordinates--soldiers and sergeants--were trained to the level of technicians. The secret of the success is simple: The officer worries about the training of the fighting men and their complete carrying out of their duties. I remember how much he worked with the "average" ones--Pfc V. Kustov and Pvt N. Losev--in explaining to them the fine points of working on the equipment. And he achieved his wish--he has brought them to the ranks of excellent ones, to the ranks of first-class specialists.

Several technical circles which literally embrace all the fighting men are operating in the subunit. The commander and party and Komsomol activists constantly check on the growth of the men's special training. A soldier has brought his training up to a certain level--go to another circle where the program requirements are a little higher. He passes the examination for second-class--don't stop for an hour, prepare for the next frontier in the rated qualification. That is how the work is arranged here. I believe that the subunit will become an excellent one. This is the main obligation of personnel during competition.

Now let us evaluate the state of affairs in the other subunit. There are a few excellent soldiers in combat and political training here. Incidentally, there is not a single officer among them. True, there are few laggards here. Who then forms the majority? The "average" ones. Work with them correctly and topically--and the greater part of them will become first-rate. Overlook them entirely and they will "begin to limp" as they say on both legs.

Staff officers recently conducted a training session in this subunit. First, they checked the individual training of each specialist. Everything seemingly provided a basis for thinking: Yes, the people know their job. The actions

of operators Jr Sgt F. Panfilenko and Pvts P. Sobyenin and G. Sokolov, who incidently became excellent soldiers based on the results of last year, made one especially happy. However, the work of the crew in the complex began and the picture radically changed. True, Private Sobyenin managed a good rating in the requirement but the work of his comrades was given a lower grade. And these are first-rate people. As you see, they had yielded their position.

Another example. Pvt A. Vorontsov, an operator of one of the systems, has served in the subunit from the beginning of the training year. He is a young soldier but intelligent and inquisitive and it should have been expected that he would master his combat profession quickly. But no. His formation as a specialist obviously was dragged out. During an inspection, the soldier displayed poor knowledge in a number of areas.

It is quite evident that in this subunit some officers do not want to trouble themselves with unnecessary cases connected with the training of specialists. Let us take this same Vorontsov. Sr Lt V. Boguslavskiy, a specialist first-class, should have been able to provide a lot of help in his formation. However, he, simply speaking, kept aloof from these cares. Everything turned on the officer's ambition. He resented his classmate at the school, Capt V. Zakharov, under whose command he now served. How is it: They promoted him but not me? He thought, don't expect zealous work from me.

The ranks of "average" ones are built up here for another reason also. A technical circle on the fundamentals of electronic radio technology has operated in the subunit for several years. It is now directed by Lt A. Skorokhodov. This, of course, is good. However, how does training turn out in this circle? Let us say a first year soldier copes with its program but what next? There is no where for him to go. During the second year of his service he again goes to this circle and in this way marks time. Is this not why the ranks of highly qualified specialists are filled up too slowly? Here is a specific example. In the spring Jr Sgt P. Sakhnevich must be released into the reserves but the badge of a specialist third-class still shines on his chest. Pvt V. Dresvyannikov is completing his service at the same time. He is an intelligent and good specialist but one must regret that he also did not rise to specialist first-class.

It turns out that they did not value and did not use the period of their service as they should have--they remained among the ranks of the "average" ones. Are only they quilty in this? No. Their immediate chiefs and the subunit commander overlooked them. They did not work with the "average" ones on an individual basis and were little concerned about the growth of their training.

Now, officers from the headquarters and the political section are helping comrade Teplinskiy to correct the state of affairs and eliminate the deficiencies. However, much depends on him and on his efficiency, initiative and persistence--and finally on his ability to master the experience of progressive commanders and use it in his own work practices.

I am convinced that if in all subunits they seriously undertake to work with the "average" ones, this will have an appreciable effect on the performance of socialist obligations during competition and the raising of combat readiness.

PROBLEM WITH INEFFICIENT JUNIOR OFFICER DISCUSSED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 12 Mar 78 p 2

[Article by Maj G. Miranovich: "Behind a Frequent Fact"]

[Text] En route from the range, the commander of a training motorized rifle battalion, Captain V. Dzhantemirov, discussed the officers of the subunit. I was already acquainted with some of them. The battalion commander talked about the others in their absence, and from the way he did so it was not difficult to guess which of the platoon and company commanders were favored.

Lieutenant A. Trifonov stood last in the imaginary formation. Mentioning his name, the battalion commander became thoughtful. And when he again began to speak, I no longer felt the former warmth in his chilled voice but faint notes of annoyance and bitterness were heard.

A year and a half had passed since the day when the graduate of the Leningrad Higher Combined Arms Command School imeni S. M. Kirov, Lieutenant Aleksandr Trifonov, arrived in the training battalion. During this time, many of his contemporaries had already brought their platoons up among the outstanding ones and some had been promoted in their duties. But he, meanwhile, in no way sparkled. Furthermore, as the battalion commander noted, Trifonov was not very concerned about platoon matters. He can be late for duty and, succumbing to his mood, can work in a slipshod manner.

Later, in talking with Aleksandr Trifonov, I heard: they overcome everyday difficulties, he says, but the command does not consider this. Just as any person who is beginning life in a new place, at first he actually had to encounter some difficulties. But these difficulties were temporary, and no special courage was required to overcome them without detriment to matters. Furthermore, both his chiefs and his fellow servicemen tried to help the lieutenant in every way. Both in word and in deed. He simply did not consider this. Furthermore, he regarded the confidence of his associates as giving him a free hand.

Thus, without having the appropriate documents authorizing him to drive a motor scooter, Lieutenant Trifonov nevertheless drives it. And he sees nothing blameworthy in this. And one day he did not report for duty, referring

to urgent personal matters.... No, in no way were there "everyday difficulties" here. The young officer simply does not have enough respect for military regulations, internal discipline, and the ability to subordinate his personal interests to the interests of the collective. References to inattention on the part of the command are only a screen. By the way, on the day when we were on the range we were unable to see Lieutenant Trifonov there. He again had "urgent" personal matters.

Service unconscientiousness What harm it brings to our cause, how far and strongly are the consequences of poor work felt. Captain G. Saprnov, who is serving in the Siberian Military District, is not acquainted with Lieutenant Trifonov but, in essence, his letter to the editors is also addressed to him, to his conscience.

The essence of the letter is as follows. Last December, Private Yu. Yartsev arrived at the unit where the letter's author serves. In the official performance report which he received in the training subunit it was stated: "He passed the graduation examinations with an overall grade of 'good'.... Can perform the duties of driver-mechanic of an infantry combat vehicle [ICV]." However, as soon became clear, the conclusions contained in the performance rating in no way corresponded to the soldier's actual level of training nor to the grades assigned in evidence of completion of the training subunit. Lieutenant Trifonov is directly involved in all this. Private Yartsev served in his platoon.

How could it happen that in a training subunit where all conditions have been created for the training and indoctrination of future specialists they were unable to train driver-mechanics in the proper manner?

"Service unconscientiousness of individual commanders is seen behind this particular fact," said the political officer, Lieutenant Colonel A. Starodub. "Those problems which we did not completely solve last year also made themselves known. And the main one is methodological training of officers at the platoon level."

The platoon level.... It brings the command so much trouble! And this is natural: here, we find mostly officer youth, and this means both more service problems and simply everyday problems, unresolved problems, errors, and failures. But at the same time, the platoon element is perhaps the most important element. In the training subunit platoon commanders conduct the majority of the lessons and the degree of their professional training determines in decisive measure the quality of the cadets' training. It is hardly necessary to say how important it is under these conditions to keep the command training of the lieutenants under a constant sight and to develop their independence and responsibility for the assigned matter in every way.

When we arrived at the mean line of fire for the ICV's, the lesson time was coming to a close. According to the plan for firing training the platoon commanded by Lieutenant A. Trush should have accomplished the firing exercises long ago. However, the platoon commander did not even think of starting

the firing. Distributing his subordinates among the training sites, he worked with a group of cadets in the repeated working out of problems studied earlier. And virtually all the training time allotted by the schedule was spent on this.

Important tasks were assigned to the platoon commander on that day: to improve the skills of the cadets in working with the armament of the infantry combat vehicle, accomplishment of the norms in fire training, drilling them in target reconnaissance by observation and determining ranges to them, in firing at disappearing and moving targets from in place and the adjustment of fire.... All this, of course, required that the officer have certain organizational and methodological skills. In Lieutenant Trush, they proved to be extremely weak. Even at the training site where he directed the lesson himself, not one of the cadets was able to explain clearly the tactical situation in which he was functioning and the "enemy" the platoon was to engage in a fire fight. Things were no better at other training points where the supervisors were sergeants.

Behind these shortcomings are serious shortfalls in work on questions of the professional training of platoon commanders. In talks with staff officers and political officers, one had the occasion to hear different opinions on ways to solve this problem. They said that it is necessary to improve the system for the selection of officers to be sent to the training subunits and not to hurry in appointing as commanders of training platoons graduates of military schools who do not have sufficient work practice among the troops. Others complained about a shortage of some textbooks, especially on the theory of firing from the infantry combat vehicle. The main conclusion was reduced to stating that livelier, more creative work is needed in the platoon element and more attention must be devoted to the development of platoon commanders.

Thus, everyone with whom I had the occasion to talk in checking the facts presented in Captain Sapronov's letter understands how much in the training subunit depends on the platoon element. And just what is being undertaken in order to pull this element up to the level of the high requirements imposed on it today?

It cannot be said that nothing is being done in this plane. Already in this training year, for example, several demonstration and training-methods lessons have been conducted with company and platoon commanders on tactical and technical training. A classroom has been set up to prepare young officers for lessons. Here we find examples of lesson plans on the basic subjects and various instructions which record the what, when, and how of what should be done in order, let us say, to organize competition in the platoon by tasks and norms or to train subordinates to perform guard duty. In the long term, it is planned to conduct a conference which will discuss forms and methods to improve theoretical knowledge and the methodological skill of the officers.

But evidently, it is not a matter of the number of common measures. The main thing is individual work. More than anyone else, the young platoon

commander needs the qualified assistance of his senior comrades, their participation, and their benevolent analysis of his actions. But this is just what is lacking. The methodological council which is called upon to assist in the growth of the platoon commanders' professional skill and the introduction of leading forms and methods into the practice of the training and indoctrination of the personnel has not yet had its say here. The methodological council does not even have generalized data on shortcomings in the training of noncommissioned officers and specialists which have been disclosed in the course of their service with the troops.

And the last fact pertaining to the effectiveness of work with the officer youth. It was learned that Komsomol Lieutenant Trifonov took no part in the majority of indoctrinational measures conducted recently in the battalion. And among these measures were talks about the honor and dignity of the Soviet officer and his role in strengthening military discipline. But one of those for whom they were intended proved to be a bystander. And, unfortunately, it cannot be said that this circumstance genuinely worried the command or the party organization. For without fixed attention to each platoon commander and without constant demandingness toward him it is difficult to attain high quality in the training of graduates of the training subunits.

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CSO: 1801

READERS REPORT ON CIVIL DEFENSE TRAINING

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 14 Mar 78 p 2

[Letters to the editor under the overall title: "Readers on Civil Defense"]

[Text] A Matter for the Entire Collective

The Frunze ambary plant is one of the leading enterprises of the republic's capital. Its harmonious collective has been entered on the Panel of Honor of the rayon and city. This enterprise is also among the best in the organization of civil defense. As a recent complex installation exercise showed, the personnel of the nonmilitary formations have profound knowledge and good practical skills.

The secret of the high level of ability is that the party organization, the factory committee, and the Komsomol committee are rendering daily assistance to the civil defense staff in the preparation and conduct of various measures. Many of the factory's communists and Komsomols are participating actively in propagandizing civil defense knowledge among the population. They include A. Ivlev, V. Safina, T. Gashchuk, L. Gusev, and others.

Colonel V. Yevstifeyev

Decision of the Institute's Council

A session of the council of the Tula Polytechnical Institute discussed the report of the institute's rector, Doctor of Technical Sciences and Professor F. Sedykin, on the status of civil defense in the higher educational institution and the tasks of the collective for its further improvement.

In its decision, the institute's council outlined a number of specific measures to improve the propagandizing of civil defense knowledge.

Colonel (Retired) V. Nazarov

By the Hands of the Skilled Workers

This training year, civil defense lessons at the Kerch' bread combine are taking place in a well equipped training center and training grounds. The skilled workers of the combine and civil defense activists worked diligently on improving the training-material base.

Lieutenant Colonel (Reserve) G. Feygin

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INCENTIVES FOR SERVICEMEN: GOOD AND BAD EXAMPLES

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 14 Mar 78 p 2

[Article by Lt Col V. Brykin: "Incentives...According to a 'Price List'"]

[Text] In the Lenin room of an aviation signal subunit, I had the occasion to become acquainted with the content of, I would say, a unique display board. It was a kind of "price list" which determines the number of credits necessary for the awarding of various rewards. Thus, in order to earn thanks, let us say, a specialist must support flight shifts in an excellent manner at least 25 times in a row. A certificate was authorized for 50, a short leave for 200, and so forth. In short, literally all types of incentives which are employed for the soldiers and sergeants proved to be "calculated out" with scrupulous thoroughness in accordance with this "handbook of prices."

The subunit commander defended the expediency of such "standards" hotly and in a concerned manner--he said that the expression of rewards through a specific number of services creates an atmosphere of competition. In this regard, my opponent had in mind only those services which concern the support of flights. Evidently, other distinctions which characterize the men morally were completely excluded as not provided for by the "price list." It was necessary to initiate a conversation about the role and place of incentives in indoctrinational work after which, it seemed to me, we came to a common opinion: a consumer attitude should not be stimulated toward military service.

The commander in this subunit was soon replaced. I believed that the "innovation" which he introduced was buried in oblivion. However, the secretary of the subunit's party organization, Captain Yu. Kostin, whom I reminded about the notorious "handbook of prices," said that as formerly it appears in a prominent place. They are in no hurry to get rid of it in the subunit.

In reflecting on this fact, you automatically ask yourself: and are all commanders making correct and complete use of their rights in rewarding subordinates? What place have they allotted to incentives in indoctrinational work with the men?

At times, one has the occasion to hear a rather unexpected judgment, the essence of which is reduced to the following. The commander and chief is

required not to leave one delinquency by a subordinate without exerting influence. As regards incentives then here, as they say, this is an administrative matter, optional: one can note the diligence of a serviceman or can abstain. But only those who have delved insufficiently into the essence of the requirements of Article 20 of the Disciplinary Regulation of the Soviet Armed Forces think in this manner. And it says in it that each commander or chief is required to reward subordinates for wise initiative, diligence, exploits, and distinction in service. Required! One must not fail to use in disciplinary practice incentives which are an important means for indoctrinating the men and maintaining firm military order. In combination with wise and strict commander's demandingness they provide a great indoctrinational effect. But in order to make incentives an actually reliable support in work with subordinates, the officers must improve their pedagogical skill on the basis of the leading achievements of military pedagogy and psychology. Here is one example of the skillful use of incentives.

In the company where Lieutenant A. Nekrasov is the deputy commander for political affairs one of the soldiers, Private V. Anikin, began to display a careless attitude toward service. Sometimes he was late to formation, sometimes he was negligent during lessons. Reproofs, reprimands just as, by the way, "heart-to heart" talks had no noticeable effect. The political officer was in no hurry to draw conclusions, assuming correctly that far from all methods of exerting influence had been utilized. He sent a letter to the enterprise where Anikin worked before being called up to the army with a request that they tell about how he worked and with whom he was friendly. He did not have to wait long for an answer. Anikin's shop comrades recalled him well, wrote that they have not forgotten him in the brigade, and that they are confident that he would bear the worker's honor high in the military formation.

One had to see how these few lines from his native kray excited the soldier and how they made him pull himself up. Private Anikin changed his attitude toward service fundamentally. He was one of the first to accomplish his personal obligations in competition. Soon another letter was sent from the subunit to the enterprise in which the commander reported to the worker collective about Private Anikin's successes in service and training. Before the letter was sent, the letter was read in a ceremonial atmosphere. This became an unforgettable and thrilling event for the soldier.

We could also refer to the example of thoughtful work with young aviators by the commander of the outstanding squadron, first-class military pilot Major V. Kornilov. Vyacheslav Arkad'yevich makes a deep study of his subordinates' characters. He has a cherished notebook--a kind of pedagogical diary in which valuable observations and thoughts are entered about the people in the subunit, their characters, inclinations, and individual abilities. Many lines in this diary are devoted to Lieutenant S. Yefremov. While still acquainted with him from his personal file, the major was alerted by the graduate's efficiency report. The shortcomings noted in it were soon confirmed. A fear even arose in Kornilov at times: will this pilot be able to go into formation at the established time? Nevertheless, Vyacheslav Arkad'yevich

tried to note the slightest effort of the young officer. Sometimes he speaks of him with praise, sometimes he gives him incentive. With such attentive support, Lieutenant Yefremov, figuratively speaking, quickly gained altitude, became a third-class military pilot, and presently is continuing to master successfully the combat capabilities of contemporary aviation equipment.

Let us note, however, that Major Kornilov in no way gave his subordinate any advances like the "standards" which had been devised from the "price list" which has been mentioned. Constantly impressed on Yefremov, just as on the other young officers, was the thought of the necessity for persistent mastery of the equipment in the name of the main goal--to increase the combat readiness of the squadron and regiment. The incentives proved to be a proper consequence of the expression of keen command attention to service zeal and the diligence of the subordinate.

In analyzing disciplinary practice in several subunits, unfortunately, it is necessary to note the random nature of some rewards. Such rewards do not serve as a means for indoctrinating the men. Before me is the service card of Private N. Novokshanov who served in the company for several months. He has no punishment. There were three rewards. All were announced by the deputy platoon commander. What kind of rewards are these? "For exemplary, excellent tucking of beds." Of course, when this is dictated by indoctrinational purposes, it makes sense to note any diligence by a subordinate. But the chief is required first of all to consider the serviceman's attitude toward the basic problems of combat and political training and his interest in the collective's affairs.

By the way, it became the fashion in this subunit to thank the men for tucking-in the beds and keeping the night tables in order. But you see, entries in the service cards about these rewards, as is authorized, are certified by the company commander. And a thought arose automatically: did Captain Yu. Irkhin who signed them really not ask himself such a question, and is not the reward thereby cheapened when command thanks are generously given out for such ordinary deeds as tucking-in the beds?...

In other subunits of this airfield maintenance support battalion, the following statistics attract attention. More than 200 awards have been announced here during a year. For performing duty and for high skill displayed in supporting flights and on tactical flying exercises. Of course, this is gratifying. But of the hundreds of these rewards only six are for initiative in social work. But you see, there are many activists here who render substantial assistance to commanders and political officers in indoctrinating the personnel and organizing socialist competition.

On the whole, many rewards are announced. And here, each chief should be concerned that the rewarding of a subordinate who has distinguished himself did not remain a brief joy for him alone but left a gratifying feeling in

the entire collective. Only in this case will incentive play its inestimable role in indoctrinating the personnel and in molding in the motherland's defenders lofty moral-political and combat qualities, the maintenance of firm military discipline, and the unity of the army family.

6367

CSO: 1801

MILITARY CAPITAL CONSTRUCTION: PLANS AND METHODS EVALUATED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 14 Mar 78 p 2

[Article by Lt Gen A. Sazanov, chief of Organizational-Planning Directorate for Capital Construction, Ministry of Defense USSR: "A Key Task"]

[Text] In implementing the historic decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress, the military construction workers of the Soviet Ministry of Defense accomplished the state plan for capital construction for the jubilee year of 1977 by 6 December. The highest indices were attained by the collectives of the construction administrations of the Belorussian, Moscow, and Carpathian Military Districts.

Much has been done, and the military construction workers have much of which to be proud. At the same time, the effectiveness of capital construction is being increased slowly in a number of districts and fleets. Not all organizations coped with the planned tasks. A large number of installations, especially those for cultural and domestic-services purposes, it turned out, were not put into operation (Transbaykal, Far East, Central Asian and other Military Districts).

In a number of places the quality of construction work still remains low and the practice is continuing wherein installations are accepted for operation and included in accountability having major imperfections and defects (Odessa Military District, Baltic Fleet, and others).

L. I. Brezhnev disclosed serious defects in capital construction deeply and convincingly in a speech at the December 1977 Plenum of the Central Committee CPSU. A new document, a letter of the Central Committee CPSU, Council of Ministers USSR, All-Union Central Trade Union Council, and the Komsomol Central Committee on the initiation of socialist competition in 1978 is again directing us toward the search for ways to increase the effectiveness and quality of work and disclose unused reserves.

The quality of planning of capital investments still does not meet contemporary requirements. Their dissipation is permitted. Some military construction organizations which have the necessary resources for the planned volumes of work are committing serious violations of planning discipline. In some

places the practice still occurs where the planning of capital construction is accomplished by the organs of the client without the participation of the construction personnel themselves although the title list of construction projects is the annual program for their activity. Now, it is especially important to ensure balance in the plan and tie it to the labor and material-technical resources.

The most serious attention of the supervisors of construction organizations should be directed toward the firmness of the plan and an increase in responsibility for its accomplishment and for rhythmic work during the entire year. We still have many collectives which are putting into operation in the first half year less than 27 percent of the annual plan for fixed capital. This pertains to the construction directorates of the Transbaykal and Far East Military Districts and the Northern Fleet. The task consists of ensuring the necessary tempo in work in 1978 and increasing started projects under the plan for 1979.

The creation of our own powerful production base and, primarily, for the development of house building has great significance for the successful accomplishment of the plan for the Tenth Five-Year Plan. It is precisely the production base which ensures the rhythm of construction and creates guaranteed confidence in the successful accomplishment and overaccomplishment of planned tasks. Therefore, instances of nonaccomplishment of plans for the construction of production enterprises by the construction organizations cause a sense of bitterness and concern. Here are some examples. Two brick works have been under construction for nine years. Capital investments for the development of their own production base have not been completely put into production by the organizations headed by officers P. Milogradskiy, V. Plisko, and S. Lobykin.

The basic direction for increasing the effectiveness of capital construction is an increase in the productivity of labor. But nevertheless, there are cases where the level of labor productivity is reduced in comparison with results which were previously obtained. Last year, for example, the productivity of labor was reduced in the construction organizations of the Baltic and Transbaykal Military Districts and in the collective headed by Comrade V. Orekhov.

The supervisors of the construction projects are trying to justify blunders in work by the specific nature of our construction. But at the same time, a large number of organizations which find themselves under the same conditions as those that are lagging have high results in the accomplishment of the tasks for a growth in the productivity of labor.

Therefore, the conclusion suggests itself--it is necessary to disclose production reserves more persistently and to find new ways to increase its effectiveness. The main one is technical progress in construction production: an increase in the proportion of completely prefabricated and large-panel construction and the degree of plant readiness of structural elements and parts, and the introduction of new progressive materials and mechanization

of work. But even with the presence of all these factors, high results cannot be attained if human and material-technical resources are not efficiently used. There is no need to look far for examples.

According to report data, the mechanization level of basic construction work exceeds 90-95 percent. At the same time, 40 percent of the workers are engaged in manual labor. What is the problem here? It turns out that more than a third of the working time is expended on bringing up and lifting construction materials, the manual preparation of concrete and slurry, and other auxiliary work. Work is accomplished in this manner in the collective headed by Comrade M. Aaman. In the Far East Military District, construction machinery is utilized primarily on one shift. Intrashift idling of the equipment comprises 12.6 percent, and the idling of machinery in repair exceeds the normative times by 75 percent. Volumes of manual plastering work increased by 22 percent, while available means for the mechanization of minor operations are not sufficiently utilized.

An analysis of these facts shows that a reduction in manual labor of only 10 percent will permit increasing labor productivity by 2-3 percent. Therefore, an increase in the share of manual labor at individual construction sites should be considered an emergency.

The December 1977 Plenum of the Central Committee CPSU and the letter of the Central Committee CPSU, the Council of Ministers USSR, the All-Union Central Trade Union Council, and the Komsomol Central Committee are oriented on the careful, efficient use of labor, material, and financial resources. And we also have considerable reserves here. One out of every four construction project installations is being constructed with an overrun of the planned cost. This is how matters stand in the construction directorates of the Transbaykal and Volga Military Districts and in many units under central command.

In the collectives that are lagging behind, proper attention is still not devoted to questions of the careful expenditure of materials, structural elements, and parts. Their storage, accounting, and expenditure are organized unsatisfactorily. So it turns out that one of the basic reserves for improving matters in the economy and accelerating its development is bringing the lagging collectives up to the level of the leaders. And this should begin with the strengthening of discipline--labor, technological, and planning.

The Zlobinsk method of brigade cost accounting in construction is a tremendous reserve for improving the organization of production and labor of the military construction workers. This remarkable initiative went beyond the framework of an experiment long ago and is being used skillfully by the leading construction projects of our country. But the capabilities for skillful and economical management are not being completely utilized by many construction project supervisors. Furthermore, some of them have a formal approach to the question of organizing and supporting the brigades with everything necessary, forgetting that the path to high labor productivity, to the lower cost price of construction and assembly work, to a reduction in times, and to an improvement in the quality of construction lies through the introduction of cost

accounting in all elements of construction production. There should be more complete use of the capabilities contained in the new system for planning and economic incentive.

The training of cadres of construction workers has great significance in the matter of using internal reserves. In practice, there are still many cases where electrowelders, machine operators, and assemblers are not used in their primary skill. Furthermore, they are even retrained in another specialty instead of increasing their qualification in their basic specialty. This leads to a reduction in output and the quality of work performed.

In the training of military construction workers on our construction projects, a special place belongs to the workers of the Soviet Armed Forces. They have shown themselves to be excellent teachers of the young replacements. However, at a number of installations there is still a clear shortage of them and their turnover is high. Broader measures should be undertaken to keep cadres of highly-qualified workers, using for these purposes 10 percent of available housing and funds for economic incentive. A special role in production training is now allotted to the foreman. It is in the foremen that we should see the true assistants in the upbringing of the youth. They should be given constant assistance and there should be concern about their authority.

Questions of domestic arrangements for our military construction subunits also have great significance. There are exemplary ones among them such as, for example, the cantonments of the military construction detachments commanded by Lieutenant Colonels V. Babenko and N. Demchenko. But nevertheless, it must be said that the leaders of some collectives resigned themselves to serious shortcomings in the accomodation of the military construction workers and in organizing their feeding, clothing, medical, and post exchange support.

As we see, there are many reserves in our work. It is only necessary to use them skillfully and wisely as required by the decisions of the December 1977 Plenum of the Central Committee CPSU and the letter of the Central Committee CPSU, the Council of Ministers USSR, the All-Union Central Trade Union Council, and the Komsomol Central Committee. The use of these reserves is the key task of administrative activity at the contemporary stage. Its solution depends to a great extent on how widely and effectively the army-wide competition of military construction workers which was begun on the initiative of the construction workers of the Carpathian Military District will be initiated.

The military construction workers are answering the call of the party and the government: every strength will be devoted to seeing that the lofty socialist obligations assumed in the year of the 60th anniversary of the Soviet Armed Forces are accomplished with honor.

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CSO; 1801

COMPLAINT ABOUT ON-THE-JOB TRAINING DISCUSSED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 17 Mar 78 p 2

[Article by Maj V. Borisov: "How Probationers Were Greeted"]

[Text] The letter from students in the school for warrant officers [praporshchik] to the editors was short but filled with bitterness and bewilderment. They were sent to the N-th Tank Regiment to perform their probationary work. They travelled there with the hope of consolidating the theoretical knowledge which had been received with practice and of gaining experience. But here is what happened....

When the spokesman for the warrant officer school reported the arrival of the probationers to the acting regimental commander, Lieutenant Colonel A. Zhusov, the latter said curtly: "Wait in the club...."

Fatiguing hours of waiting stretched on. It was only toward evening that the probationers were finally remembered and they were assigned the room which had been allocated to them for quarters. In the room there were 12 beds for 18 men and, what is more, not all of them had mattresses, pillows, and bed linens. So they established themselves the best they could and spent the entire next day bustling around to "scrounge" the necessities for normal life and work: tables, stools, night tables, and bedding. Officers from the district political administration who were working in the unit helped them. After their interference, the probationers were issued the bedding which they were short, blankets, a table (one for all of them), three night tables....

This, in general outline, is the picture of the indifferent attitude toward the material support of future warrant officers and rear services workers. But, perhaps, would things be better in accomplishing the training plans for the period of performing practical work in the unit?

Some were actually fortunate. Cadets A. Kucheryavenko and A. Savin immediately began to work assisted by Warrant Officers M. Olinkovskiy and S. Anokhov. The experienced specialists familiarized their wards with the plans for probationary work, gave them assignments, and helped them to understand everything.

But the cadets who were to do probationary work in the duties of company first sergeants actually proved to be out of the running although the regiment has a need for just this category of warrant officers. They were presented to the personnel and commanders of subunits only on the third day of their probationary work, and they were limited to this. The commanders worked in accordance with their plan while the probationers did whatever they wished. For example, they could not "assign" Cadet V. Samorodiyev even by the end of the third day.

They proceeded differently in the motorized rifle regiment whose chief of staff is Captain G. Tyshkovskiy. Here, the probationers were presented at a meeting of officers and warrant officers and they were distributed among the subunits. Supplied with all necessities, the cadets immediately joined in the work under the command of experienced comrades.

Both regiments are guided by the same written directions of higher headquarters: "The unit commander is to monitor strictly accomplishment of the program for troop probationary training. Do not permit the disruption of lessons with the personnel and appoint the best trained officer as the supervisor."

Everything specific and clear. Only one thing remains--to execute them. But how differently this requirement was implemented! In the tank regiment there was neither monitoring on the part of the command nor lessons conducted by the cadets. There was a formal approach to the appointment of a supervisor of the probationary work in the regimental headquarters. They appointed an officer who was not suited for this role in his professional and moral qualities.

The derangement of the first days of probationary work by the cadets from the warrant officer school in the tank regiment was the occasion for a serious conversation in the large unit's political section. There is no doubt that some staff officers and political officers of the unit could have corrected the situation in the remaining days. However, there were no changes for the better. Even the efficiency reports which should have been given to each cadet reached the warrant officer school after the former probationers had been graduated. It was necessary to literally "pry them loose." In this regard, they were prepared in a stereotyped manner and some of them were not even signed by anyone.

The probationers left the regiment with a sense of bitterness although they were invited to return to this unit after assignment and bright pictures of future service were drawn....

6367

CSO: 1801

IMPORTANCE OF RADIO-TELEGRAPH OPERATORS DISCUSSED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 12 Mar 78 p 2

[Article: "Rulers of the Air"]

[Text] Letter to Editor

Dear Editors!

My oldest son Viktor is serving in the Red Banner Far Eastern Military District. I also have five other sons. They all have to look forward to service in the armed forces -- one soon, the others later on. As best I can I am preparing my boys for carrying out their honorable duty. I advised my second son to learn to be a tractor driver, so that he would be useful in the army, perhaps as a tank driver.

But I am worried about Viktor. He became a soldier without having acquired a useful trade. Now he is serving as a radio-telegraph operator. He almost never writes about his life. Is it possible that this army specialty is not held in very high esteem? Please tell me about the work of radio-telegraph operators and, if only briefly, about communications troops.

Yours truly,
Serafima Maymesku
Kokchetavskaya Oblast

Correspondent's Reply (Maj G. Ivanov, Red Banner Far Eastern Military District)

Considerable operational activity was in progress at the command post. PFC Maymesku was bending over a telegraph form near a radio receiver with a multitude of levers, dials and indicator lights. From the sonorous stream of Morse characters emanating from the headset, he easily distinguished the combinations of dots and dashes and quickly entered in the logbook the letters and numbers which made up the radiogram.

When the pressure of operational work had subsided somewhat, PFC V. Maymesku talked about himself and his specialty. He was serving his second year in the communications platoon commanded by Senior Lieutenant A. Kulikov. He had attained the level of first-class specialist. In the beginning it was

difficult for him to copy Morse. On the advice of the platoon commander an experienced specialist PFC V. Sardushkin provided Viktor with assistance voluntarily.

Viktor showed me the training equipment on which he and his colleague spent a great deal of time learning to distinguish the letters, not by the number of dots and dashes, but by the tune. Now Viktor can even remember numerical groups without writing them down. During our talk he read in Morse several incoming radiograms.

His success in socialist competition also testifies to the growing skills of this radio-telegraph operator. A board reflecting the results in carrying out combat-training assignments hung next to the receiver. For Maymesku 75 percent of his grades were excellent.

During our conversation the sounds of Morse traffic poured out over the radio receiver.

"My home-town buddy Leonid Kosynkin went into communications," Viktor said, "and he is reporting the situation."

The subunit in which Private Kosynkin is serving is located in a remote hilly area, in the taiga. It is possible to reach the site only by helicopter. But reliable, continuous communications are maintained with this distant post thanks to PFC Maymesku and his fellow radio-telegraph operators. This enables the subunit to actively participate in carrying out the overall military mission.

Communications personnel have been provided with up-to-date automatic equipment employing the newest in microelectronics. The most complex in makeup is the radio station at which the outstanding crew headed by secretary of the party organization Warrant Officer O. Barkashov works.

We went into the control room. There was electronic equipment everywhere. And this equipment, of course, was made up of tens of thousands of component parts. Barkashov became a first-class radio-telegraph operator as an enlisted man. During his 17 years of service he thoroughly studied the design and rules of operation of radio stations. He does the job of a technical officer. Now his primary duty is maintaining the communications equipment in a state of constant readiness and monitoring its operation. During preventive maintenance periods he adjusts and tunes the equipment. Dependable communications depend primarily on precise tuning and careful adjustments. A thorough knowledge of electronic processes found in the equipment and servicing techniques, discipline, and internal maturity help Warrant Officer Barkashov to constantly maintain the radio station in good working order. And Viktor Maymesku and his colleagues are acquiring the experience of these skilled workers.

Battalion commander Lieutenant Colonel V. Shepetov is pleased with his communications personnel. Recently competition scores indicated that they had the best platoon.

Comments of Chief of Signal Troops (Mar Sig Trps A. Belov)

"I hope, my dear Serafima Timofeyevna, that from the journalist's account you have gained an insight into the work of your son, work which is interesting and very necessary for our troops. I want to assure you that the speciality of radio-telegraph operator is held in high esteem in the military. Together with servicemen in other specialties involved with communications, radio-telegraph operators fulfill an important mission: they ensure the control of units and subunits. To a great degree success in battle depends on reliable control. Moreover, its significance continues to increase. And control in modern warfare is accomplished primarily by radio. Thus, it is clear what an important role is played by radio-telegraph operators who are charged with ensuring uninterrupted, reliable communications for the commander.

Numerous exceptionally skilled people -- officers, warrant officers, NCO's and enlisted men -- are serving in the field of communications. The military work of many of them has been acknowledged through USSR orders and medals. A large group of communications people were decorated on the eve of the 60th anniversary of the Soviet armed forces. They included: battalion commanders Lieutenant Colonel G. Korovin and Lieutenant Colonel T. Semiletov, company commander Captain N. Savel'yev, and Senior Lieutenant V. Zaboburin.

Your son, PFC Viktor Maymesku, and his comrades celebrated the jubilee with outstanding results and new successes in the mastering of their specialty and in socialist competition. They are continuing the heroic traditions of past generations in a fitting way. Military service is an excellent school of life, a training school, for every serviceman.

The first subunits and units of signal troops were formed in 1918. Together with all our armed forces they have had a long and glorious record. They immortalized themselves with their heroic deeds during the years of the Great Patriotic War. I am proud that I had the opportunity to cover thousands of kilometers along front line roads in communications subunits, and to be a witness to the gallant acts of signalmen.

I remember well the brave deed of the deputy political commissar of the 415th Signals Battalion A. Meri performed in the Baltic area. On 17 July 1941 a handful of soldiers led by him, after ensuring communications, spent several hours repulsing the attacks of superior enemy forces. A. Meri was wounded several times, but did not leave the field of battle. For his courage and heroism this brave signalman was awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union.

The feat of Sergeant M. Putilov at Stalingrad is widely known also. While repairing damage to a communications line he was wounded. Not having succeeded in joining the break, Matvey Putilov put the ends of the wire in his teeth and returned the enemy fire down to his last cartridge. He was killed having carried out his duty to the end.

During the years of the Great Patriotic War 294 signalmen became heroes of the Soviet Union. Some 106 men were holders of the Order of Glory, while

600 signal units were decorated with military orders, with many of them receiving honorary designators and being awarded the title of guards units.

Now, of course, among the troops it is quite different from those war years. The equipment is new, of high quality, and more reliable. It embodies the latest scientific achievements and the dedicated labor of our workers, and is in capable hands. The majority of military communications personnel who have been assigned to the reserve are using their knowledge and skills successfully in many branches of the national economy -- in the extensive and highly developed system of enterprises and organs of the Ministry of Communications USSR, Ministry of Civil Aviation, DOSAAF organizations, and in sea and river transportation, geology, meteorology, etc.

I was very happy to learn, Serafima Timofeyevna, that you are making every effort to prepare your sons for military service. This is conclusive and concrete proof of the thorough understanding by all Soviet people of the article of our constitution which states that the defense of the socialist homeland is the concern of all the people. I want to wish your remaining sons success in their future military service. If they become communications specialists, let them, as have Viktor and his colleagues, be real rulers of the air. The better job your sons, and the sons of all mothers, do in the military and the more thoroughly they master their specialties, the better we will be able to defend our country against the encroachment of any aggressor.

6754

CSO: 1801

ACTIVITIES ABOARD CRUISER VISITED BY BREZHNEV

Crew Impressions of Visit

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 11 Apr 78 p 1

[Article by Captain 3d Rank A. Zlydnev, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent:
"On Oceanic Watch"]

[Text] In the book of honored visitors of the cruiser Admiral Senyavin, on the first page, there is an entry made 7 April 1978:

"Dear Comrades seamen, petty officers, warrant officers, and officers!

"With great satisfaction, I have observed the exercises of ships of the Red Banner Pacific Ocean Fleet. You have displayed good naval training and the skill to be able to use modern weapons and equipment.

"You are worthily carrying on the traditions of Soviet sailors who covered our navy with everlasting glory during the Great Patriotic War.

"I wish you success in the further development of combat skill and in carrying out military duty for the Motherland.

"Good sailing.

"L. Brezhnev"

Your correspondent met with the participants of the cruiser's voyage under the flag of the Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet and asked them to share their impressions of this important event in the life of the ship's crew.

"The heart of every Pacific Ocean Fleet troop overflows with a feeling of great pride," says Captain 2nd Rank A. Bosalygo, commander of an outstanding combat department [chast']. "Our ship's crew had the high honor to take part in exercises which Marshal of the Soviet Union, L. I. Brezhnev--General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Chairman of the Presidium of the

Supreme Soviet of the USSR, and Chairman of the USSR Defense Council--supervised."

All the members of the crew understood perfectly the great responsibility and acted precisely, nimbly, and faultlessly in the exercises. A new surge of effort and creative energy was provoked by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev's address in which he expressed firm confidence that Pacific Ocean Fleet personnel will henceforward carry out their sacred duty with honor, and will reliably safeguard the national interests of the Soviet Union. The high appraisal of the Pacific Ocean Fleet troops' military labors inspires us to excellent service and in achieving new successes in socialist development and in raising the combat readiness of our navy.

It was especially pleasing to me to realize that our combat department--"outstanding" for five years running--also occupies the lead spot aboard ship in the 60th Anniversary Year of the Soviet Armed Forces. The main role in this success belongs to the communists. Such comrades as Lt. A. Koval', Warrant Officer A. Chuvashov, and CPO V. Rybakev give the lead in carrying out official and party duty.

"Listening to the address of Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev aboard our ship," says Warrant Officer S. Nikitin, supervisor of an "outstanding" crew, "we were surprised how he is able to describe in simple and easily understood words the complicated international situation and show the titanic efforts of the CPSU and the Soviet Government in staving off the threat of thermonuclear war. Especially remembered are the words, 'We threaten no one. Talk of the so-called Soviet threat is the obvious invention of opponents to lessening of international tension and no more. We are perfecting our defense with the sole purpose to reliably protect the accomplishments of Great October and simply safeguard the peaceful work of the Soviet people, our friends, and allies. The troops of the Soviet Army and Navy serve this noble goal.'"

"I had the honor," says PO 2d Class A. Patsyn, "on behalf of the crew, to welcome Comrade L. I. Brezhnev--General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. Leonid Il'ich listened attentively and watched me warmly. I sensed his simplicity and cordiality and was proud that I am a candidate member of the CPSU, at the head of whose Central Committee stands the distinguished statesmen of the present, L. I. Brezhnev."

Our excellent engine group functioned with confidence. We all understand that only through a conscientious attitude towards the matter is it possible to prepare well for war. That is why L. I. Brezhnev's appeal to improve military skill and combat training, develop political training, and carry the banner of the Soviet Armed Forces with honor is so close and comprehensible to us.

Training Activities Described

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 30 Apr 78 p 1

[Article by Capt 3d Rank S. Bystrov, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "Course of the Cruiser Admiral Senyavin"]

[Text] We would very much like to learn about the cruiser Admiral Senyavin, aboard which L. I. Brezhnev put to sea, the crew of this ship, and the successes with which the Pacific Ocean Fleet troops are welcoming May-day.

Capt N. Tsotsorin

Lt V. Korolev

The sailors of the cruiser Admiral Senyavin listened with emotion to the speech of L. I. Brezhnev at the 23rd Congress of the VLKSM [All-Union Leninist Young Communist League--Komsomol]. Recalling his own trip to the East, he said, "...I became acquainted with how the protection of our borders is set up and with those who bear their duty there--the glorious servicemen of our Army, Navy, and our border forces. I tell you one thing, comrades: the borders of the Motherland are reliably protected from any unexpectedness and the business of her defense is in experienced and loyal hands." The troops of the Senyavin have proved themselves as experienced and loyal defenders of the Fatherland in exercises which Leonid Il'ich observed and appraised.

On 7 April 1978, the flag of the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR was raised on the main topmast and was caught up by the ocean wind. At that moment, L. I. Brezhnev stepped onto the deck of one of the best ships of the Red Banner Pacific Ocean Fleet. The cruiser, which has been in the Pacific Ocean Fleet many years and has carried out a great number of the most diverse exercise combat missions, has covered more than 200,000 miles in ocean sailing.

The address aboard her of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev--General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR--will enter the cruiser's history as a golden page. In this address, the steady principles and goals of our government's peace-loving policies were once again layed out and tasks set forth for further strengthening the defensive might of the Motherland.

The men of the Senyavin, who had arrived from combat posts still excited from the recent exercise battle, and who brought with them the gunpowder smell of artillery salvos, listened to the words of Leonid Il'ich, in which their military labor was appraised.

The crew of the cruiser Admiral Senyavin is numerous and made up of hundreds of men. At this time, however, thousands again felt themselves as Senyavin men--all those who had once served on this cruiser, who designed, built, and

mastered it, and who sailed on this cruiser in the warm waters of the Indian Ocean. The cruiser has a rich history. It has made good will visits in many countries and participated in the navy's gunnery championship competition and came out among the prize winners. The ship's name appears among our Armed Forces' best military collectives which have been awarded the USSR Ministry of Defense pennant for courage and valor.

Many of those who have served on the Admiral Senyavin in other years are still loyal to the Pacific Ocean Fleet. Rear Admiral V. Varganov, who made a speech in response to L. I. Brezhnev, was the senior assistant to the commander of this cruiser for three years. Today he commands a sea force [soyedineniye korablyey]. From former troops of the Senyavin have come military leaders, ships' captains, distinguished Soviet workers, scientists, and cultural workers. Today's crew remembers their service in the matter of creating and strengthening the ship's glory. It remembers and carries on the cruiser's finest traditions. When the Admiral Senyavin was visiting Port Louis, the Prime Minister of the Government of Mauritius, who visited on the cruiser, noted in the visitor's book: "I am delighted with the visit of Soviet ships where a warm welcome was shown me. Your visit will remain forever in the memory of our people and will further the strengthening of friendship between our countries. Long live the USSR and Mauritius! My great thanks to you." "Russians are a people of the future," wrote Mauritians who had become acquainted with the men of the Senyavin. It was several years back that the Admiral Senyavin had just been awarded the title "Excellent" and today the men of the Senyavin are struggling for award to the ship of the title "Best Ship of the Pacific Ocean Fleet".

Four-year-old Lena Spitsin, on arriving at kindergarten in the morning, enthusiastically told everyone, "Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev gave Papa a watch." Lena's papa, Capt 3d Rank Ivan Spitsin, is the deputy commander for political matters of the Admiral Senyavin. He, like Capt 2d Rank V. Plakhov, the cruiser's commander, was awarded a watch inscribed with his name from Leonid Il'ich for high achievements in training the crew and for the excellent conduct of the ship during the exercises which L. I. Brezhnev observed.

Ivan Ivanovich Spitsin, a bit embarrassed, showed me the watch with pride. On the back of the Commander watch is the engraving, "From L. I. Brezhnev, 1978."

This year began with difficulty for the commander, political deputy, and the entire crew. The cruiser had just come out of overhaul. This means that the men of the Senyavin had to work in a most strenuous manner in order not to fall behind the other ships in combat training.

Aerial gunnery with a dual-purpose gun became a strict combat check of the Admiral Senyavin.

The ship's commander, Capt 2d Rank V. Plakhov, had long before begun preparation for the cruiser's first firing. He began by gathering all of her

immediate participants to the ward room. Here, working out the organizational side of the firing, he saw how one understands him, how he reacts, and how quickly and correctly he acts. Ordinarily all this animated chain of firing is concealed from a commander's eyes by decks, bulkheads, and armor plates. Now, it was occurring before his eyes with all its own merits and demerits.

Much was also done for mobilizing the moral adjustment of the crew for selfless labor. And when the salvos of the dual-purpose guns fell silent and the commander announced receiving an "excellent" appraisal, the ship again shook--from the sailors' "Hurray!".

Everything on this cruiser turns out as though it were easy and simple. Departments with other ships come here to study the procedure for training organization. Many are surprised. The ship is complicated, the crew is large and almost all of the officers are young. However, the men of the Senyavin are always first in everything.

But aboard the Admiral Senyavin they say the cruiser struggles persistently for the title of "Best Ship" because the sailors are confident--and this is within the power of every crew. When the Admiral Senyavin--aboard which were L. I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR; Marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. Ustinov, USSR Minister of Defense; and Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union S. G. Gorshkov, Commander-in-Chief of Navy of the USSR--took a course to sea for participation in exercises, the men of the Senyavin understood well that the honor of the ship today is also the honor of the whole fleet. Elevated responsibility gave them solidarity. The crew acted skillfully and with fortitude, as becomes any military collective of our Armed Forces.

Now the cruiser Admiral Senyavin is again at sea. Aboard the ship strenuous activities and drills are going on. The men of the Senyavin are perfecting their combat skill and are learning to reliably defend the Motherland and her strenuous everyday working life and bright holidays. The impressive address of Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev aboard the cruiser Admiral Senyavin and his brilliant speech at the 28th Komsomol Congress inspire the men of the Pacific Ocean Fleet--and indeed all Soviet troops--toward the achievement of new bounds in military and political training and in socialist competition.

9047

CSO: 1801

USSR ARMED FORCES SERVE POLICY OF PEACE, INTERESTS OF SECURITY

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 22 Jun 78 p.1 LD

[Editorial: "In the Vanguard of the Struggle for the Security of Peoples"]

[Text] The date 22 June 1941 will never be erased from memory, that day when Soviet people's peaceful labor was interrupted by the perfidious attack by Hitler's Germany. We did not know then that we would have to pass through 1,418 long and difficult days to reach victory over the aggressor. But that this victory would come nobody doubted, because our cause was just. "The Great Patriotic War," Comrade L. I. Brezhnev said, "was for us Soviet people a struggle not only for freedom and our motherland's independence, it was at the same time a battle to save world civilization and for a just world in the future." And we were victorious. The Soviet people and their armed forces, led by the wise Leninist party of the communists, saved their country and all mankind from the threat of Fascist enslavement.

One-third of a century has passed since our great victory. In this time the planet has changed beyond recognition. The mighty socialist community has been formed and consolidated and is continuing to acquire new forces. The colonial system of imperialism has collapsed. The class struggle has intensified considerably in the countries of capital.

Reactionary imperialist circles do not want to reconcile themselves to these changes. They aim the spearhead of their struggle above all at the Soviet Union and the entire socialist community. The salvos of World War II had hardly died away when they launched the "Cold War" against us, knocked together the NATO bloc and a number of other aggressive military political alliances, started to surround the USSR and other socialist community countries with a chain of military bases, and launched a frenzied arms race.

The policy of blackmail and pressure on the world of socialism has not been, and could not be, crowned with success. Moreover, thanks to the purposeful efforts of the Soviet Union, the fraternal socialist countries, and all who hate war, a turnabout has been achieved from the confrontation between state with different social systems, which was typical of the first two postwar

decades, to the relaxation of tension, which has now become the leading trend in international development. Detente already has much to its credit. Implementing the foreign policy course defined by the 24th and 25th CPSU congresses, our country persistently and consistently fights to consolidate and augment what has been achieved in this direction, to supplement political detente with military detente, and to reduce the danger of a new world war. A brilliant example of this is the program of concrete measures for arms limitation and disarmament put forward by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev in his speech at the 18th Komsomol Congress.

But the opponents of detente have by no means laid down their arms. Recent acts testify that. For instance, in the United States, where this is not the first year that a bitter struggle has been taking place around questions of detente in government circles, more and more indications are building up that the supporters of a return to the "Cold War" and to new confrontations and unrestrained military rivalry are starting to gain the upper hand in this struggle. The world public placed a high evaluation on the well-argued reply to the attempts by certain U.S. circles to undermine detente given in the editorial article in the Soviet press "On the U.S. Administration's Present Policy."

As in previous times, the present opponents of peaceful coexistence conceal their aggressive designs behind shouts about the "Soviet military threat." Also as in previous times, they are counting on the ordinary Western person's lack of information as to who is really threatening peace on earth. But there are fewer and fewer such people. In spite of all the ideological obstacles erected by the imperialists, the truth about the land of the soviets, about its system, its policy and its practical deeds in the struggle for peace and international security, is reaching the most remote corners of the earth.

And it--this truth--is that our country is a peace-loving country. And its love of peace stems from the very nature of socialist society, the supreme goal of which is concern for the welfare and happiness of the working people. We have no classes, social strata, or professional groups that have an interest in war or in the preparation of war with the hope of making a fortune from this. There is no task that we have any intention of solving by military means. There is no state against which we are making territorial or any other claims fraught with the danger of a military clash.

It--this truth--consists of the fact that our fundamental policy is one of peace. It is not fortuitous that the first legislative act of the world's first socialist state was the decree on peace written by V. I. Lenin. The Soviet foreign policy course formulated in this decree has subsequently been confirmed repeatedly by laws and by the decisions of party congresses. It is now enshrined in the new USSR Constitution. Our party and state have always followed, and do follow, this course unswervingly.

This truth, finally, consists of the fact that the Soviet country's military might serves the interests of peace and of the security of the peoples. We are proud of our achievements in this sphere. The Soviet Armed Forces have the most sophisticated combat equipment and excellently trained personnel at their disposal. Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, who visited a number of military units and subunits during his recent tour of regions of Siberia and the Far East, rated highly the combat skill and combat readiness of the motherland's defenders.

Everything that is being done here in the military sphere is being done in order to make ourselves and our socialist friends secure from possible aggression wherever it may originate. The USSR Armed Forces' duty to the people is to reliably defend the socialist fatherland and to be in a state of constant combat readiness, guaranteeing an immediate rebuff to any aggressor. The Soviet Armed Forces have always been, are, and will be a reliable defender of the socialist gains and peaceful labor of the Soviet people and of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of our state. Together with the armies of the fraternal socialist countries, they are vigilantly standing guard over the security of our peoples and are the bulwark of world peace.

The Soviet country, which has reached the pinnacles of developed socialism, is confidently marching forward toward a communist future. All the countries of the mighty socialist community are gripped by the enthusiasm of great creativity. No one and nothing is capable of deflecting us from our chosen path. We shall continue to follow this path, increasing our efforts in the struggle for the triumph of the cause of the social progress of mankind and the cause of peace and security of all peoples.

CSO: 1801

USSR ARMY PAPER SEES HISTORICAL LESSONS OF GERMAN INVASION

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 22 Jun 78 p 3 LD

[Col A. Leontyev article: "The Past Teaches Vigilance"]

[Text] The Great Patriotic War is retreating further and further into history.... One-half, if not more, of Soviet people already know about the last war only from books and movies. But the memory of it still lives. It is not subject to time.

The bright day of victory, which brought mankind deliverance from the horrors of Fascism and the boundless joy of freedom, will never die in the hearts of contemporaries and their descendants. Our memory will also preserve the bitter day of 22 June 1941, when our country and its flourishing cities and villages were suddenly set on by a more than 5-million strong Fascist army with 4,000 tanks, nearly 5,000 combat planes, and more than 47,000 guns and mortars.

Of course, there are people in the West who would like to consign that date to oblivion. "The half-forgotten date of 22 June no longer has anything to say to our time," the West German journal WEHRKUNDE reassures itself. No, gentlemen, people are not so forgetful. The day of 22 June, deafening with the explosions of bombs and shells and the screech of tank tracks, shrouded in the smoke of fires and bathed in blood, has a great deal to say to us. This day says to each of us: "Remember the war, so that it should never be repeated. The past, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev stressed when speaking on FRG television, prompts the peoples to draw lessons from recent history and strengthens the desire to live in peace and prevent a new tragedy.

The past helps us to understand the present better and to find a true path to the future. For the intrigues and arguments of the enemies of peace are seldom notable for their novelty. In fact, what is new in the hypocritical cries of Western propaganda about the "Soviet military threat" or in the attempts of certain Western politicians to incite some people to military conflict with the Soviet Union?

All this has happened before. The enemies of socialism were already making a fuss about the "Soviet threat" immediately after the October Revolution, and continued to shout about it in the subsequent years. And nearly four decades ago imperialism decided to try to stifle the Soviet Union by means of Hitler's Germany. The Western moneybags supplied it with money and helped it to rearm its army, supposing that the cannons would only be aimed in one direction. And they made a cruel mistake, their nursling went and struck at Western countries to begin with. The Dunkirk catastrophe, the goosestep of Fascist soldiers under the Arc de Triomphe in Paris, the ruins of Coventry, empty window-frames in London--that is what became of the attempts by certain shortsighted politicians to direct German aggression against the East. It would do no harm for this to be remembered by those who are now undertaking similar efforts and cherishing similar illusions.

The designs of the Fascist aggressors were not restricted to the Soviet Union. They dreamed of world rule, their actions threatened all countries and peoples of the world. This was shown by the Hitlerites' occupation of many European countries even before they marched East. As early as spring 1941 the Nazis had elaborated the secret directive No 32--"Preparation for the Period After the Implementation of the Barbarossa Plan." The directive demanded the completion, in the fall of the same year, of the campaign of the Soviet Union and that the fulfillment of a new program be embarked upon--the seizure of the British colonial possessions and several independent states in the Mediterranean Basin, Africa, the Near and Middle East, invasion of the British Isles, and the launching of military operations against the United States.... Former U.S. secretary of state, E. Stettinius wrote: "The ability to forget the events of the past quickly is a human weakness and the U.S. people must remember that they were on the brink of catastrophe in 1942. If the Soviet Union had not been able to hold out on its front, the Germans would have had the opportunity to capture Britain. They could have occupied Africa and in that event they would have been able to establish themselves in Latin America."

It was precisely the Soviet soldier who with his body shielded the whole world against the mortal peril, offering fierce resistance to the enemy. It was precisely here, on Soviet soil, that Fascism was halted. "Properly speaking the way really began only on 22 June. Our previous campaigns were mere sports events compared with that war," the German newspaper DAS SCHWARZE KORPS complained at the time. Former Hitlerite general Guderian recalled: "Frederich the Great said of the Russian soldier that he must be shot twice and then pushed for him to finally fall.... In 1941 we were forced to reach the same conclusion. These soldiers held their positions with unbending staunchness."

The first stones were laid under the foundation of the great victory in the tenacious fighting at the walls of Brest and Smolensk, at Moscow and Leningrad, and on the Volga and Malaya Zemlya.

The Soviet Armed Forces displayed mass heroism and unprecedented valor and courage in this war. We did not fight alone, but it was our people who bore the main brunt of the war and our country which paid the highest price for peace. We defended the cause of Great October, our own government, our socialist system and the future of all mankind. The great goal engendered great energy and elevated people to accomplish the feat. That is why there was not then, is not, and will never be a force capable of overcoming us. The results of the Great Patriotic War are a terrible warning to present-day aggressors and a severe lesson to all lovers of military adventures.

And there have been many of these lovers even after World War II. The victory salutes had hardly died away before certain Western figures began machinating against their former ally. They declared a Cold War on us, surrounded us with blocs and bases, kindled military conflicts and threatened us with atom bombs. Former Pentagon consultant D. Ellsberg points out in an article published in the journal THE NATION on 27 May that the United States has "been very close to using nuclear weapons" on a number of occasions since World War II. In 1950 Truman publicly announced the possibility of their use in Korea. In 1953 Eisenhower "issued threats of a similar kind." In 1954 Secretary of State Dulles offered Prime Minister Bidault three atom bombs "for the protection of French troops at Dien Bien Phu." In 1958 Eisenhower advocated the use of nuclear weapons off the coast of China. In 1961 "the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended President Kennedy to be prepared to use nuclear weapons in Laos." In 1968 the United States considered a variant of the use of nuclear weapons to "rescue the U.S. troops surrounded at Khe Sanh" (North Vietnam). And, finally, in 1969-1972 the United States threatened repeatedly to use these weapons against Vietnam. And, if the bombs were not dropped, this was primarily because, given the new correlation of forces in the world arena, the aggressor could no longer count on impunity. Our people did everything possible to liquidate the United States' nuclear monopoly.

The great community of socialist states has done everything to prevent a new war, to extinguish centers of military conflagration and to achieve the relaxation of international tension. "This is already the fourth decade that the skies over Europe have been peaceful.... Never before, it seems, has history presented the peoples of our continent with such a long peace. And...this is largely and even to a decisive degree a result of the fact that half of Europe is now living under conditions of socialism," L. I. Brezhnev said in Prague. "Peace in Europe is largely the result of your and our common efforts and the concerted foreign policy of the Warsaw Pact states."

The socialist countries are continuing the struggle for detente and, primarily to end the arms race, as attested by the specific, comprehensively weighted and constructive Soviet proposals advanced at the UN General Assembly Special Session on Disarmament.

However, the enemies of peace and detente are stubborn. Through their influence the international situation has once again been complicated. Sinister cold war winds have again blown from across the ocean. Propagandists and even some Washington officials are experiencing another attack of anti-Soviet hysteria, trying to interfere in our internal affairs, resorting to gross slander against our socialist system and Soviet foreign policy and to hostile attacks and, in point of fact, even ultimatums against the Soviet Union. A U.S. politician has even been keen enough to climb up on the Great Wall of China and pronounce anti-Soviet tirades there.

People are having to observe a strange and shameful sight. Washington figures recently increased the Pentagon Budget to a new record sum, almost \$130 billion; have forced through NATO the biggest rearmament program in the history of this bloc; and are expressing readiness to supply Peking with weapons for the struggle against the "common enemy." And these same gentlemen accuse us of an "excessive buildup" of defense potential!

There is no need to prove the falsity and hypocrisy of these allegations--they are self-evident. There is just one thing that is worth saying: It is not for you gentlemen to determine the size of the Soviet Union's defense expenditure or to lecture a country which lost more than 20 million people in the war against Hitlerite fascism.

The Chinese leaders are forming a bloc with aggressive imperialist circles. They are sniping equally fiercely at detente and the socialist community. Peking is intensifying its preparation for a new war, is carrying out an accelerated buildup of all types of armaments including nuclear missile armaments, is calling for the creation of a "united front" against the USSR, is advocating the strengthening of NATO and other aggressive blocs and the preservation and expansion of the U.S. military presence in Europe and Asia, and is supporting the interventionists in Zaire. Along with the West German revanchists, the Maoist leadership is fighting for the "absorption" of the GDR. Under the spurious pretext of "protecting" people of Chinese nationality Peking is blatantly interfering in Vietnam's internal affairs.

Washington is striving to utilize the "Chinese card" in its global game--something attested to by its latest intrigues or, more accurately, "little games" surrounding China. But it is forgetting that its Chinese "friends" are playing their own game dictated by great-power interests. Their aim is to exacerbate relations between the USSR and the United States to the utmost. Soviet-American confrontation or, still better, war--that is Peking's desired dream.

The complex international situation reminds us of the need to maintain high vigilance, to watch vigilantly the intrigues of the enemies of peace and socialism and together with the soldiers of the fraternal armies to do everything to insure that the peaceful labor and security of the socialist community peoples are reliably defended. The grim lessons of the Great Patriotic War oblige us to do this. The memory of the war is also a weapon which must be cared for.

FRENCH ADMIRAL STRESSES IMPORTANCE OF EXCHANGE VISITS

Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0927 22 Jun 78 LD

["Contribution Toward Development of Relations"--TASS headline]

[Text] Sevastopol, 22 Jun--Mutual naval visits serve the cause of strengthening friendly relations between countries, Vice Admiral De Bigault de Cazanove, commander of a Mediterranean squadron of the French Navy, stressed in a talk with a TASS correspondent. He is in Sevastopol as head of a detachment of French vessels on a return courtesy.

The vice admiral said: I am one of those people who think that mutual understanding breeds respect and respect breeds friendship. I believe that our present visit will make a worthy contribution toward the development of relations between our countries and navies.

The sailors of the detachment are happy to be in Sevastopol and give their due to its courageous defenders. Frenchmen admire the feats of the Soviet Army's soldiers who were victorious over the Fascist occupiers. Everywhere we sense the pride of Soviet people in the feat which was achieved and in the contribution made by Sevastopol toward the smashing of Fascism.

Vice Admiral De Bigault de Cazanove noted the high level of the reception afforded the French visitors by the inhabitants of Sevastopol. The French sailors are continuing to acquaint themselves with the sights of the town and are participating in friendship soirees and sports competitions.

CSO: 1801

CORRESPONDENT DESCRIBES SOVIET-POLISH JOINT EXERCISES

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 25 Jun 78 p 3 LD

[Our correspondent, Lt Col A. Pimenov report: "Combat Fraternity"]

[Text] Northern Forces Group--Strong ties of combat fraternity bind the troops of the Northern Forces Group and the Polish Forces. They frequently take part in joint tactical exercises and training maneuvers, exchange combat and political training experiences and spend spare time together. In recent years joint exercises in field camps lasting many days have been held increasingly often.

Recently one such camp of Polish and Soviet artillery troops was visited by Reserve General W. Sawczuk, Polish deputy national defense minister and chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Polish Forces; Gen Div H. Rapacewicz, commander of the Silesian Military District; and Lt Gen V. Danilov, member of the Military Council and chief of the Political Directorate of the Northern Forces Group. They familiarised themselves with the study, life and daily routine of the troops in field conditions and attended artillery practice.

Living and studying in joint camps enriches our experience and helps to strengthen fraternal friendship and combat community--such is the unanimous opinion the Soviet and Polish servicemen expressed at the meeting at the base.

CSO: 1801

OGARKOV CONGRATULATES GRADUATES AT GENERAL STAFF MILITARY ACADEMY

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 28 Jun 78 p 3 LD

[Report by Lt Col V. Seledkin, under general heading: "Graduation at Military Academies"]

[Text] A new detachment of highly qualified military specialists has completed training at the USSR Armed Forces General Staff Military Academy imeni K. Ye. Voroshilov. Marshal of the Soviet Union N. Ogarkov, chief of Armed Forces General Staff and USSR first deputy minister of defense, came to present graduation diplomas and badges.

At the ceremony Army Gen I. Shavrov, the head of the academy, read out a letter of congratulations from Marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. Ustinov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR minister of defense, and also the graduation order.

Marshal of the Soviet Union N. Ogarkov warmly congratulated the graduates on their successful completion of training and wished them successes in further strengthening the defensive might of the Soviet motherland and the socialist community countries.

Maj Gen Yu. Vorobyev and Lt Col T. Szegedi of the Hungarian People's Army cordially thanked the Communist Party and Soviet Government for giving them the opportunity to study at the academy. On behalf of the graduates they gave assurance that the pupils of the academy would devote all their efforts and knowledge to the further development of military affairs and to the defense of the great gains of socialism.

CSO: 1801

YEPISHEV ADDRESSES NEW GRADUATES AT MILITARY-POLITICAL ACADEMY

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 28 Jun 78 p 3 LD

[Report by Maj V. Zhitarenko, under general headings, "Graduation at Military Academies"]

[Text] A ceremony has been held devoted to the graduation of students from the V. I. Lenin Military-Political Academy. The ceremony was addressed by Army Gen A. Yepishev, chief of the Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Directorate. He congratulated the graduates on behalf of marshal of the Soviet Union, D. F. Ustinov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR Minister of Defense. Army Gen A. Yepishev wished the political-worker officers major successes in practical work of the forces.

The head of the academy, Ye. Maltsev, and graduates Maj S. Posokhov and Polish Army Captain K. Kludczynski expressed cordial gratitude to the Communist Party and Soviet Government for their great concern for the training of highly-skilled political-worker officer cadres and assured them the academy's students would devote all their efforts to improving the combat readiness of units and ships and to strengthening the combat fellowship of the socialist countries' armies.

CSO: 1801

USTINOV ADDRESSES MOSCOW RECEPTION FOR GRADUATES OF MILITARY ACADEMIES

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 29 Jun 78 pp 1-2 LD

[Unattributed report: "Selflessly To Serve the Party, Motherland and People"]

[Excerpt] A festive atmosphere reigned yesterday in the halls of the Great Kremlin Palace. A reception was held here in honor of graduates of military academies, organized by the USSR Ministry of Defense and the Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Directorate. The reception was attended by generals and officers of the Soviet Armed Forces and of the armies of the fraternal socialist countries who have successfully completed their studies in our higher military educational institutions. Together with their students were the professors and teachers who have insured the training of ideologically tempered, highly skilled cadres for the army and navy.

The reception was opened by Marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. Ustinov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR defense minister.

The reception was attended by L. V. Smirnov, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers; N. I. Savinkin, I. D. Serbin and Ye. M. Tyazhelikov, chiefs of CPSU Central Committee sections; B. N. Pastukhov, first secretary of the Komsomol Central Committee; USSR ministers and chairmen of state committees; V. F. Promyslov, chairman of Moscow Gorispolkom; Marshal of the Soviet Union N. V. Ogarkov, USSR first deputy defense minister; Marshal of the Soviet Union V. G. Kulikov, USSR first deputy defense minister; Army General A. A. Yepishev, chief of the Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Directorate; Army General I. G. Pavlovskiy, Marshal of the Soviet Union P. F. Batitskiy, Chief Mar Avn P. S. Kutakhov, Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union S. G. Gorshkov, Army General S. K. Kurkotkin and Engr Col Gen N. N. Alekseyev, USSR deputy defense ministers; and also Army General I. N. Shkadov, marshals of the Soviet Union I. Kh. Bagramyan and V. I. Chuykov, chief marshals of the categories of troops, generals, admirals and officers.

Those assembled were addressed by Marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. Ustinov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR minister of defense, who was warmly greeted by those present. He cordially congratulated the

graduates and all the personnel of military academies on this latest graduation of highly skilled specialists for the army and navy.

Today we are honoring officers of the Soviet Armed Forces and the armies of the fraternal socialist countries who have graduated from our military academies, Marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. Ustinov said. When I informed Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, of today's reception, he asked me to convey to you his cordial congratulations in connection with finishing your studies and wishes for great successes in your further service!

Our party's Central Committee, the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium and the USSR Council of Ministers have sent a greetings message to the graduates of military academies, the USSR minister of defense continued. I have been entrusted with reading it out. I fulfill this assignment with great satisfaction.

Then Marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. Ustinov read out the greetings message, which stated that the military academy graduates have completed their studies at a portentous time, when our country has adopted the new USSR Constitution--the fundamental law of the socialist state of the whole people--and solemnly celebrated the 60th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution and 60th anniversary of the armed forces. The socialist competition for the fulfillment and overfulfillment of the plans of the 10th Five-Year Plan and for the successful implementation of the 25th CPSU Congress decisions is now spreading throughout the country with unprecedented enthusiasm.

Cordially greeting and congratulating the generals and officers on successfully graduating from the military academies, the CPSU Central Committee, the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium and the USSR Council of Ministers expressed firm confidence that the detachment of graduates, like all officers in the army and navy, will continue to work with a sense of high responsibility on fulfilling the 25th CPSU Congress decisions on strengthening our country's defense capability.

The participants in the reception greeted these parting words from the Communist Party and the Soviet Government with tumultuous, prolonged applause.

Every word in the greetings message, the USSR minister of defense said, addressing those present, is imbued with the tremendous concern of the party and its Central Committee for the steady development and improvement of the armed forces and the training of highly skilled officer cadres. I think I will be expressing your common opinion if I say that the military academy graduates will respond to this concern by devoting all their strength, knowledge and energy to the noble cause of instructing and educating personnel and to indefatigably enhancing the combat readiness of the army navy.

Marshall of the Soviet Union D. F. Ustinov went on to say:

You have graduated from military academies and are setting out for units and ships at a noteworthy time. Our country has approached the middle of the 10th Five-Year Plan. This important point is marked by great successes in resolving the tasks set by the 25th party congress. The daily practice of communist building convincingly confirms that the course formulated by the congress is the correct course. It insures the fullest utilization of the economic, moral and political potential of developed socialist society in the interests of our motherland's all-round prosperity. Closely rallied around the party of Lenin, the Soviet people are confidently traveling the road of communism and struggling in an inspired manner to scale new heights in economic and social development.

Our armed forces are resolving their responsible tasks in the reliable defense of peaceful labor in a united rhythm with the whole country.

Effecting the leadership of the country, our party, its Central Committee and Comrade L. I. Brezhnev personally devote unflagging attention to creating favorable foreign policy conditions for communist building. They are doing tremendous work to implement the program of further struggle for peace and international cooperation and for the peoples' freedom and independence adopted by the 25th CPSU Congress. Relations of close friendship are continuing to strengthen and develop among the fraternal socialist states, their influence on the whole international situation has increased.

Positive changes have been achieved in the world arena as a result of the active peace-loving policy of the Soviet Union and the other socialist community countries. The Soviet Union's initiatives, which Comrade L. I. Brezhnev launched during his trip to the regions of Siberia and the Far East, at the 18th Komsomol Congress and during his visits to the FRG and the CSSR, as well as on presenting the award to the hero-city of Minsk, have made a great new contribution to the cause of strengthening peace and international cooperation. The bold and at the same time realistic program for bringing the arms race to a full stop, which the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries advanced at the UN General Assembly session, has elicited a tremendous international response.

However, many obstacles have to be surmounted in the struggle for the deepening of detente and for peaceful cooperation. Consistently pursuing a policy of peace, the party's Central Committee and the Soviet Government are vigilantly following the development of international events and are constantly concerned to insure that the Soviet Armed Forces unconditionally meet the high demands of insuring the security of our motherland and all the socialist community countries. Together with the other Warsaw Pact states the Soviet Union is doing everything necessary to strengthen this defensive organization.

Within the walls of military academies you, dear comrades, have acquired rich political, military and specialized knowledge and received sound ideological training. But studies in an academy represent just one of the stages on the way to mastering high combat skill. Military affairs do not stand still. Weapons and combat materiel develop; military art improves; and new people join the army and navy. And it is necessary constantly to replenish your knowledge in order to be always equal to the demands of the time. Military practice will now become your chief teacher, and life itself will be a strict examiner. Improve your professional skills on exercises and voyages, in a complex situation made as close as possible to real combat conditions. Teach yourselves while instructing troops. Never be satisfied with what you have achieved. Be persistent and inquisitive, show initiative and creativeness, thoughtfully study the experience of older comrades and rely on it in your activities.

Among the troops and in the fleets, Marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. Ustinov continued, interesting and strenuous work await you. It demands of officer cadres a high degree of organization, responsibility and selflessness. Officers with higher military education must be champions of everything new and progressive; set an example in mastering modern weapons and materiel; conduct a tireless search for the most efficient ways and means of their combat application; and make their contribution to further improving tactics, operational art, party political work and the methods of training and educating personnel.

Work with people is the most important thing for the military leader. It is precisely people--ideologically tempered, infinitely devoted to the cause of the party and to the people and who have mastered first-class combat materiel--who decide the success of any matter. Never forget this. Be exacting and solicitous chiefs and be constantly attentive toward the needs and requirements of subordinates. In training and educating them, strive for strong military discipline and organization and for high vigilance. Make all possible use of the strength of the military collective and employ socialist competition skillfully to achieve high results in combat and political training.

The success of the political, military and moral education of personnel depends to a decisive degree on the standard of the ideological and theoretical training of cadres. Grudge no time to raise it! Make an in-depth study of Marxist-Leninist theory, V. I. Lenin's military theoretical legacy, the 25th party congress decisions and Comrade L. I. Brezhnev's works.

Leonid Il'ich memoirs "Malaya Zemlya" and "Rebirth" have become tabletop books for every commander, political worker, engineer and technician and for every officer in the army and navy. It is necessary to turn more frequently to the wisdom and the ideological wealth contained in these books. They teach us how to live and work in the Leninist style and foster high party-minded principledness, human kindness and loyalty to the heroic traditions of the Soviet people.

The communist party's leadership is an inexhaustible source of our army's strength and might. You are setting out among the troops, the USSR minister of defense emphasized, not only as military specialists but also as the party's ideological fighters. Implement CPSU policy unswervingly and consistently. Rely skillfully on party and Komsomol organizations in your work and direct their efforts toward enhancing combat readiness and scaling new heights in combat and political training.

Marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. Ustinov went on to address words of warm greeting to the officers of fraternal armies who have graduated from Soviet military academies and wished them fruitful work in strengthening the might of their armies and the unity and cohesion of our combat community.

Every graduation from the academies, the USSR minister of defense continued, is a portentous and solemn event not only for those who have completed their studies but also for commanders, political workers and the professional and teaching staff of military educational institutions. They have not only given the students sound knowledge but also given everyone a particle of their heart and soul and done a great deal for their moral improvement and to strengthen the life position of their students. Allow me, on your behalf and on behalf of the leadership of the USSR Ministry of Defense, to congratulate your teachers on the graduation of a new detachment of officer cadres and to express cordial gratitude to them for their honorable and noble labor. There is no doubt that they will continue to raise the quality of the training and educational process and persistently develop Soviet military science.

Concluding his speech, Marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. Ustinov expressed confidence that the military academy graduates will honorably justify the high trust of the Communist Party and the Soviet people, occupy a worthy place in the army system and make a weighty contribution to the cause of further enhancing the combat might of our glorious armed forces and strengthening the security of the Soviet motherland and all the fraternal countries of socialism.

CSO: 1801

ARMY GENERAL'S BOOK RECALLS PRE-WWII FAR EAST BATTLES

[Editorial Report] Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 29 June 1978 publishes on page 2 a 1,000-word book review by candidate of military sciences, Lt Gen B. Dzotsiyev, entitled: "Guarding the Homeland." The book being reviewed is Army General G. Khetagurov's "Execution of Duty" [ispolneniye dolga], published by the Military Publishing House in 1977. The major part of the review is devoted to the author's World War II reminiscences, but it also mentions the first chapters in the book dealing with the Special Far Eastern Army, in which Khetagurov began his service as an artillery commander. The review states that "at that time Chinese militarists, generously equipped with weapons and ammunition by U.S., British, French and Japanese imperialist circles, unleashed a military conflict in the Far East. The author initiates the reader into the plan of the Manchouli-Chalainoerh offensive operation [1929], which was brilliantly carried out by units and formations of the young Red Army. Chiang Kai-shek's numerically superior troops were unable to withstand the heroism of our Far Eastern soldiers, augmented by high training and force of arms, and they laid down their arms. Gen (Lyan Chzhu-tszyan), commander of Chiang Kai-Shek's troops, was captured with his staff. Before this he had boasted: 'I do not doubt that we will smash the Red Army and reach China.' The Chinese Government was forced to agree to peace negotiations." Later on the reviewer points out that "the author shows how our troops routed with a crushing blow in an unprecedentedly short time the chief mainstay of Japanese imperialism on the Asian continent--the Kwantung Army--and thereby extinguished a very dangerous hotbed of World War II and made a serious contribution to liberating the Chinese people from the fetters of external and internal reaction."

CSO: 1801

CHANGES IN COMBAT TACTICS OF FIGHTER AIRCRAFT DISCUSSED

Moscow AVIATSIYA I KOSMONAVTIKA in Russian No 3, Mar 78, and No 4, Apr 78
signed to press 1 Feb, 2 Mar 78

[Article by Col V. Dubrov: "How Has Air Combat Changed?"]

[No 3, Mar 78 pp 14-17]

[Text] 1. Search

Air combat involving supersonic aircraft in Vietnam and the Near East differed appreciably from combat characteristics of fighters of preceding generations. The influence of equipment and armament which were new for that time touched upon almost all elements of tactics.

Increased speeds and consequently turn radius expanded the spatial framework of combat and made it necessary to revise methods of combat control. Subsequent breakdown of the combat formation placed an imprint on organization of coordinated action between groups of differing tactical designation. The development of guided missiles led to an increase in the area of potential attack and enhancement of the role of fire in comparison with maneuver. Equipping of aircraft with radar aiming systems made it possible to destroy targets beyond visual observation. The task of hindering this was assigned to electronic countermeasures, utilization of which entered firmly into combat tactics.

Performance characteristics which had been considered the most important for a fighter were revised in local wars. Certain tactical concepts which had been formed in peacetime, as well as modes of performing traditional combat missions failed to stand up to the test. New demands were imposed on the pilot's tactical thinking and the quickness of his reaction to a flow of diversified information. Selection of the most advantageous devices and combat maneuvers began to be made in the course of modeling with simulation of the adversary's actions.

The traits of fighters involving "gaining air supremacy," which differ appreciably from the earlier-generation multirole aircraft, were determined

on the basis of amassed experience abroad. In the tactics elaborated for the new fighters, interception from all angles of approach (combat at ranges of 5-50 km) is combined with close-in maneuver combat in visual contact with the adversary.

It is expedient to examine all changes comprising the substance of recent combat experience by stages of air combat. The number and content of stages have been determined on the basis of descriptions of concrete events in the air and their evaluation, published in foreign periodicals.

What has changed in air combat?

Based on the experience of local wars, foreign experts began more and more frequently considering search to be the first stage of air combat, dividing it into two principal elements -- detection and identification of the adversary. The West German magazine FLUG REVUE stated in this regard: "The ability to detect and identify a target directly influences the character of air combat and its initial phase. If these operations are performed sooner than they are accomplished by the adversary, then during the time available following identification one can execute a 'surge' -- quickly accelerate to the speed required for initiating closing, or climb, that is, obtain an initial advantage in this situation."

This view revised theory of air combat, which claimed that for the current stage in the development of technology, when effective weapon range is significantly less than the range at which the enemy is detected, closing is considered to be the first stage of combat. However, the direct influence of the results of search on the outcome of combat was always acknowledged. It is appropriate at this point to recall the well-known expression: "The first to spot the enemy wins!"

Specific rules and procedures of search for a single aircrew and a group of fighters were elaborated in the air-force manuals of various countries. U.S. pilots in Korea, for example, employed the "hands of the clock" rule, which was also employed in World War II. One pictures an enormous clock, facing upward, with the pilot positioned right in the center. Maintaining observation on all 12 clock hour bearings, but with a sector of responsibility in the right rear quadrant, he would divide it from three to six. He would report spotting an enemy aircraft as follows: "Four (five) o'clock high (low), range...."


A Saber (U.S. F-86 fighter, which saw action in Korea) pilot had a 360° field of observation. But the pilot and systems operator of a Phantom, to quote observers, "had a clock which indicated only from 9 to 3." This meant that in contrast to the Saber, the Phantom was blind to the rear, and the pilot could search only in the forward hemisphere.

The aircrew of this aircraft, which was optimized for intercepting high-speed nonmaneuvering targets, was "tucked away" into the fuselage. In the opinion of the designers and customers, there was no reason to "open up" the cockpit

canopy for observation to the rear quadrant if no other aircraft could overtake the Phantom. But the tactics of interception excluded the conduct of maneuver combat. But in Vietnam the Phantom was pursued and also forced to wage close-in air combat, the course of which depended in large measure on the size of the angular field of view and the capability of maintaining visual contact with a maneuvering adversary.

In order promptly to undertake a defensive maneuver, it was necessary to spot an attacker as early as possible. The pilot needed to be assisted by an on-board radar and a special tail protection device, which warned when the aircraft was being painted by hostile aircraft radar. The detection system, however, did not distinguish a target against the earth background, the "friend or foe" system did not reliably identify the target, and the warning system gave a warning on every aircraft coming into its effective range, including friendly aircraft.

After two friendly aircraft were downed in initial engagements, the U.S. pilots ceased to have faith in the imperfect equipment and established identification of a detected target visually. But this required permitting the adversary to approach to a range corresponding to the pilot's visual acuity. Thus the advantages of radar search could not be fully utilized. Ground and air control facilities came to the aid of the pilot, however, monitoring the situation with more reliable radar equipment. An important role was played by prompt information transmitted by radio.



Detection of Low-Flying Aircraft by Combat Patrol Fighters

Key:

- | | |
|---------------------------------------|--|
| 1. Doppler pulse radar | 4. Average electronic countermeasures conditions |
| 2. Radar with moving target selection | 5. Visual visibility (average conditions) |
| 3. Visual search (clear sky) | |

In instances not requiring delay, information was of a command nature, that is, the fighter would turn toward the adversary and would be given range to the latter. The search sector would be narrowed to a minimum, with increased probability of detection and identification. The ground command

post was more and more deeply invading the air combat area and was decisively influencing the modes of its conduct. Even before the pilot spotted the adversary, the ground team would be giving a target designation on the basis of air situation analysis and was able to suggest an expedient closing-in variant.

After receiving information on the adversary, the pilot would often initiate closing-in not immediately, but would initially execute a maneuver to ensure concealment of plan or the element of offensive surprise. This would be achieved by various devices, including descending to low altitude, sending out a diversionary group to cross the adversary's path at 90°, etc. Consequently, vigorous actions involved in the engagement plan would begin even prior to initiation of closing. It was precisely this which was used to substantiate the conclusion on the necessity of designating search the first stage, on the results of which much depended. Air combat was not like interception, although it did include elements of interception, and the air defense mission was not the sole mission of fighters.

What conclusions can be drawn from the results of analysis of the first stage of air combat between supersonic fighters?

In the first place, responsibility for the outcome of combat was now evenly divided between the pilot and ground control facility, since airborne search equipment and the ground target identification and guidance system possessed differing capabilities to detect a target and establish its identity. Smooth coordination and clear-cut distribution of duties between them predetermined the success of combat at the first stage.

Second, modes of conduct of search began to be more sharply divided into search over friendly territory and search in enemy airspace. In the former instance fighters usually were performing the mission of providing cover for ground troops or installations and were being monitored by friendly radar. The aircrew was a component of the overall search system and received information up to the moment a hostile aircraft was detected. The pilot had time to analyze the situation and to make a well-substantiated decision.

The situation became considerably more complicated when the mission required penetrating enemy airspace and going beyond the range of friendly radar. The U.S. fighters which provided cover for bombers flying barbarous raids onto the territory of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, became strongly convinced of this. Here the roles were reversed: the Vietnamese were utilizing all ground and air means of search, while the fighters had only their on-board radar system. The initiative in selecting efficient tactics was on the side of the defenders, if intensive jamming was not employed. However, organization of electronic countermeasures in Vietnam airspace involved great difficulties. Pilots could count only on their own low-power on-board jamming transmitters, which were individual protective devices, not means of active effect on the enemy. To quote some foreign observers, the situation was

reminiscent of the beginning of a bout between two boxers, one of whom had been put into the ring blindfolded. While possessing no less striking power than his opponent, he did not know where to direct it.

In this case, in the opinion of U.S. pilots, at least their hands should be untied, that is, they should have freedom of maneuver. Such freedom was usually received by one of the covering groups ("long-range intercept"), which would withdraw from the bombers beyond visual contact and would act in coordination only with the immediate escort group. Its function included conduct of active 360° search with maneuver in any direction, which was out of the question for the other escort cover groups. This far from new technique, however, was usable only with an adequate surplus of forces.

In the third place, experience indicated that for the successful conduct of search as an element of air combat it was necessary not only to see a great distance or promptly to spot the enemy. Fighters should maintain a formation and flight conditions in conformity with the situation. One could be the first to receive information but not extract any benefit from this, since the position occupied during search or slow speed made it impossible to initiate closing immediately, while the enemy could seize the initiative during those seconds which were lost. Local wars provided many examples of situations where a fighter seeking to spot the enemy would be attacked by the enemy first.

The formation employed during bomber cover escort (the most complex variant) would be constructed on the following principle: flank groups would maintain greater speed and would frequently maneuver through the entire depth of the overall formation. The lead fighter groups, with some support from the rear, would focus their main attention on search in the forward hemisphere. The escort cover aircraft bringing up the rear would be stacked and frontally disconnected in order to maintain surveillance of the rear hemisphere and to repulse attacks from the most dangerous directions. Foreign experts note that a combination of radar and visual search was the most difficult action for pilots in this position.

Continuous switching of attention from the radar screen to visual airspace surveillance required skills which are developed in the course of long practice. In addition it was necessary to search in the process of maneuver in altitude and heading, while maintaining one's position relative to the escorted aircraft.

Statistics indicate that although everything was done according to procedures, the percentage of surprise and effective attacks by enemy aircraft operating over their own territory was quite high. U.S. military leaders acknowledge that the North Vietnamese fighters, in spite of their small numbers, obtained a great advantage from receiving information from their ground control facilities. Earlier identification enabled them to be the first to spot and attack. The numerical inequality was thus compensated by seizure of the initiative.

Fourth, local wars restored the importance of visual search, which had been neglected after fighters were equipped with on-board radars. An aircraft's weapons fired only forward, however, and yet the region of potential attack remained to the rear. The adversary was able to penetrate this area much more frequently than had been assumed. The prevailing situation was assessed as follows by the magazine FLUG REVUE: "Good all-around visibility from an aircraft's cockpit in all directions should be provided, even at the cost of increasing drag. Unrestricted search forward and to the rear is essential for visual detection of a hostile aircraft with the intention of attacking from the tail, as well as observation of the adversary throughout the entire air engagement."

The canopy on the fighters replacing the Phantom are high and teardrop in shape, which should enable the pilot to conduct 360° visual search. Proper attention is being devoted to this element, since electronics, as experience has shown, is not as reliable as the human eye, and frequently fails at the most critical moment.

According to information published in foreign periodicals, there is presently occurring further division of search functions among fighters, ground and airborne control facilities. The AWACS air target early warning system has been developed, based on the E-3A aircraft with on-board surveillance radars and reconnaissance data processing and transmitting equipment. Identification is transmitted both to ground fighter control facilities and to the crews of airborne aircraft.

There has been an improvement in the radar search and detection gear on the new F-15 Eagle fighter, the first subunit of which is already based in West Germany. On test flights the pilot spotted air targets at a range of up to 150 km, then locked on, identified with the aid of a "friend or foe" interrogation system, and fired an AIM-4F Sparrow missile from a range of 37 km (in the magazine AVIATION WEEK).

At the present time fighter "gaining air supremacy" tactics are at the simulation stage. How is the amassed experience of local wars utilized in constructing models of air combat?

First, the combat study involves the search stage with two principal elements -- detection and identification of the adversary. An optimal search variant is selected, depending on the conditions of mission execution. The duties of the aircrews and fighter groups which will be operating beyond friendly radar coverage are distributed particularly carefully and thoroughly.

Second, the following principal search modes are examined: directed radar search (after receiving from the ground information on the adversary's coordinates), independent surveillance radar search, and visual search. Hostile aircraft radar detection, identification and visual contact points are established.

The journal AIAA PAPER published the following results of engagement simulation taking into account probability of radar and visual detection for different numbers of fighters engaged in air patrol. The accompanying figure shows an interception variant for low-flying bombers (tactical fighters), where W_{DOB} -- probability of spotting one enemy aircraft; D -- density of escort cover -- one aircraft for a segment 10 km in length; radar surveillance range 15 km in the lower hemisphere against a target with a reflecting surface of 2 m^2 .

Third, points of communication of information on the adversary to the fighter are determined. Prior to entry into the search zone, the pilot should receive and evaluate identification data from the system of ground and airborne forward posts. This is followed by target designation from control system ground radars for selection of on-board radar operating mode. And only after target lock-on -- initiation of automatic target tracking -- does closing with a concrete adversary begin. The flight plan specifies the pilot's actions at each of the above-enumerated points.

Can air combat begin at once with closing, that is, from the second stage? It can, just as search does not necessarily lead to engagement in air combat (the pilot should be prepared to engage at any point, omitting actions at the preceding point).

Fourth, detection of an enemy aircraft by ground or airborne radars is nevertheless considered basic at the search stage. The pilot switches over to visual observation when time indicates that the target should be at close range, with radar search producing no results. This last variant is most probable when intensive jamming is clogging the radar sight screen. (To be continued)

[No 4, Apr 78 pp 44-45]

[Text] 2. Closing

Based on the experience of air combat in World War II, closing was characterized as a maneuver executed from the moment an enemy aircraft was detected to the time when the most advantageous position for attack was reached. In a situation which did not require an immediate attack, closing could be of extended duration, but with observance of all measures ensuring concealment. If the situation did not permit concealment, a fighter would close as rapidly as possible, utilizing superior speed or altitude.

Thus concealment and swiftness are the two principal elements of the second stage of air combat -- closing with the adversary. They fully retained their importance in air combat between supersonic fighters in local wars. However, methods of taking a position most advantageous for attack changed. The content of this stage became different, since conditions for swiftness improved, but conditions for concealment became worse. The terminology employed in describing the elements of this stage also changed, although essence of the stage remained the same.

The magazine FLUG REVUE states its position on modern combat as follows: "At the closing stage it was necessary to secure genuine superiority over the adversary in greater thrust and taking of a favorable position because of this. In conformity with these requirements the fighter, after spotting the adversary, while still in the process of the first stage -- search -- should possess a specific level of energy to be able to count on swift closing."

The pilot knows that in the past fighters were altitude-echeloned on patrol in order to acquire a potential speed superiority. The spotted enemy would be attacked by the top group, which would pick up speed on descent. If there were not enough aircraft available for stacking, the aircraft would alternately descend and climb. Sometimes this technique was called "rocking the cradle."

Supersonic fighters would also frequently stack on patrol, but would leave the flight profile almost unchanged, remaining at an optimal altitude from the standpoint of best search. Usually transonic speed would be maintained, most favorable for maneuver and rapid acceleration by switching on the afterburners. Primary reliance was on radar search and identification from the ground, since with visual target detection distance to the target did not allow development of the thrust needed for closing.

From the standpoint of tactics of combat following timely spotting of an enemy aircraft, it was also necessary to store up energy for a swift "lunge." This can be compared with combat with fixed bayonets, where the soldier, prior to jabbing the bayonets, first draws the rifle back and then forcefully lunges forward. He requires one or two seconds to wind up. The pilot should have at his disposal the maximum possible time for ensuring swift closing after spotting the enemy.

This time is not measured in flicks of the eyelash even with new aircraft. For example, according to the magazine AVIATION WEEK, an F-15 aircraft, beginning to accelerate from a speed of $M=0.9$, reached at an altitude of 9,750 m, with afterburners on, a speed of $M=1.1$ in 10 seconds and $M=1.2$ in 20 seconds. Experts believe that with such a rapid rate of accumulation of energy and the high thrust-to-weight ratio of modern fighter aircraft, one can give less thought to superior altitude prior to closing. In addition, high altitude under conditions of airspace surveillance by hostile radars appreciably diminishes the chances of achieving the element of surprise in an attack.

There have appeared in foreign publications several calculations of possible closing with a target flying at various speeds. The conditions of engagement were simulated with the aid of a interceptor model for a fighter on patrol. The accompanying figure shows the relationship between probability of successful closing with a target, averaged for initial ranges, angles of lead or trail. The capability of the attacking fighter to accelerate is a variable quantity. The model was constructed on a variant of penetration by an

intruder aircraft of a patrolled area and closing with the target by an interceptor up to entry into the area of potential attack (if the intruder becomes aware of the imminent attack -- up to initiation of a defensive maneuver).

Simulation results indicate that the main "technical" indicator ensuring swiftness of closing with the adversary is an aircraft's high thrust-to-weight ratio. For example, a Phantom fighter, with a thrust-to-weight ratio close to 0.8, intercepted a target traveling close to the speed of sound (M close to 1) with a probability of 0.5. A modern F-15 "air supremacy" fighter, with a thrust-to-weight ratio exceeding 1, would intercept this same target (under identical initial conditions) with a probability of 0.8. An aircraft's maneuver characteristics, the principal indicator of which is wing loading, play a less important role here.

Thus the principal factors exerting direct influence on swiftness of closing are great range at which the hostile aircraft is detected and the aircraft's high thrust-to-weight ratio. If the fighter's radar "sees" further than the hostile aircraft's on-board radar, and the aircraft has better acceleration (high thrust-to-weight ratio), chances of winning the second stage increase sharply.

In order to realize existing "success potential," two additional conditions are necessary: pilot tactical skill and organized ground monitoring of the adversary's actions. The pilot should have the ability to utilize those advantages which his equipment gives him, while the ground control facility must warn the pilot in advance on the approach (location) of a hostile aircraft.

The second principal element of closing is concealment. In practical combat activity this is defined as a group of measures which deprive the adversary of the possibility of obtaining accurate data on the air situation. Concealment prevents the adversary from establishing the character of fighter actions and usually leads to a delayed or faulty decision. In the general case concealment is the endeavor to keep one's combat plans secret as long as possible. The main thing which must be taken into account from acquired experience is the following: closing undetected by the adversary has usually resulted in a successful attack. The end goal of combat was achieved in this instance in the third stage, if the pilot possessed marksmanship abilities.

Methods of achieving concealment in combat between supersonic fighters have changed considerably. Concealment against the background of clouds and sun as well as utilizing the cover of darkness no longer could ensure the element of offensive surprise. The airspace in which engagements were fought were under surveillance by ground radars. Beyond the zone of radar coverage, only interception of a low-flying target over friendly territory was possible.

How is it possible to gain the element of surprise and avoid revealing one's plan of engagement while under observation by the enemy? Fighters worked persistently to resolve this complex problem in local wars, seeking new

methods and tactical devices. Observers noted that an answer could be found only after seeking and selecting an optimal closing variant rigorously in conformity with the situation. But the situation could be clear only with precise radar reconnaissance data at the moment of engagement. Without analysis of enemy radar coverage it was impossible to formulate combat tactics. In the past fighters have continuously supported reconnaissance aircraft, providing escort cover over enemy territory. Now it was time to repay the debt. When radar reconnaissance discovered gaps in enemy radar coverage, they would be utilized for organizing fighter ambushes. There was greater probability of undetected closing with the enemy from ambush. The absence of shadow zones in the airspace under hostile radar surveillance made it necessary to seek other methods or tactical devices.

Foreign periodicals note that utilization of natural conditions for concealment was sometimes practically impossible. This was the case in the Near East, characterized by predominantly flat terrain and cloudless skies. Under these conditions principal attention was focused on efficient formation of fighter groups prior to engagement. Formations were divided conditionally into approach and combat. Approach formation was compact, the groups close to one another, with the aircraft positioned at minimum spacings and intervals. Freedom of maneuver was limited in the interest of observing radar concealment.

They were counting not on the enemy failing to spot fighters in the air but on preventing the enemy from promptly figuring out the engagement intentions. On the radar screens the close-packed formation was observed as a single blip, and therefore the operator was unable to determine the character of deployment of enemy forces or the adversary's plan.

But in order to engage, that is, just prior to initiating closing, the formation was to stack and break up in depth. Only after this would the radar operator, based on separation of returns on the screen, understand the tactical designation and intentions of the fighter groups. More precise information made it possible to reach a decision conforming to the situation. Absence of or delay of information forced the defenders to remain passive and eliminated the possibility of situation prediction.

In order to achieve the element of surprise, the shift from approach to combat formation would be delayed as long as possible. Advance to a position convenient for attack would begin at the least possible distance from the adversary. By the moment the combat formation was established (initial position prior to engagement), speed would be brought up to the required level. Experts emphasized that the effect of swiftness was determined by how quickly the fighters re-formed during closing, and the effect of concealment was determined by the re-forming pattern (if it terminated with advance into an advantageous position for attack).

The ability to deploy forces prior to engagement in such a manner as to initiate swift closing from a sector poorly observed by the adversary reflected the tactical skill of command personnel. If in addition they were able to

confuse the situation with feints and diversions, the enemy would have inadequate time to elaborate requisite defensive measures. Following seizure of the initiative, bringing the stage to successful completion was a matter for the equipment.

However, success was achieved in taking the enemy unawares with concealed maneuver alone only if this maneuver was nonstandard and forced the defender to solve an unfamiliar problem. It was impossible to use new closing techniques in each subsequent engagement. Therefore new modes of support were frequently utilized, most frequently involving active jamming of hostile radars and jamming of fighter control frequencies.

Jamming was produced both by special aircraft equipped with electronic countermeasures gear and from mobile ground facilities. Thus new means had been added to the air combat system, which influenced the selection of tactics in general and methods of closing with the adversary in particular.

Jamming would be coordinated with the dynamics of combat and would begin not immediately after the interceptors had taken off but at the moment of combat formation redeployment. This prevented the adversary from undertaking defensive measures -- from building up before the attacking fighters reached a position convenient for attack. Loss of control could be of brief duration and incomplete, but a minute of confusion was sometimes sufficient for execution of concealed closing.

It is characteristic that premature as well as belated initiation of jamming not only failed to promote achievement of a tactical advantage but sometimes disclosed intentions to the enemy. Therefore pilot, control facility, and electronic countermeasures aircraft (or ground jamming station) had to operate on a single schedule, taking into account incoming data on situation changes.

As experience indicates, "the game was worth the candle," but it required precision and strict coordination by equipment not previously employed in conducting air combat. Today new "air supremacy" fighters are provided with externally-mounted noise jamming or response-pulse jamming equipment in detachable containers. Some observers noted that in organization air combat was more and more beginning to resemble combined-arms combat, where success depends in large measure on coordination between preliminary artillery bombardment and airstrikes and initiation of the assault by tanks. Problems of coordinated action begin to be examined much more broadly, and now include not only coordination of the efforts of groups of differing tactical designation. Now air combat tactics began to be elaborated taking into account the features of conduct of electronic warfare.

What can be called characteristic of the second stage of air combat between supersonic fighters, based on the experience of local wars?

First of all, the foundation for successful closing was laid at the first stage (according to the classification recently adopted by foreign experts) and depended entirely on the effectiveness of preparatory work. Prompt detection of hostile aircraft as a result of intelligently organized search ensured optimal conditions for closing.

Second, the preconditions for successful closing were established following analysis of the capabilities of the equipment. The greater an aircraft's thrust-to-weight ratio, the greater the probability of air target interception (advance into the area of potential attack without considering the conduct of maneuver combat). The experience of local wars indicates, however, that air engagements, just as in World War II, were fought by fighters of a single category without clearly-marked performance superiority of one over the other. Superiority in thrust-to-weight ratio was more clearly indicated in engagements between fighters and enemy bombers, which were conducted by the intercept method, that is, included four stages: search (ground guidance), closing, attack, and disengagement.

Thirdly, the above-listed four stages could also apply to air combat between fighters, when one of them succeeded in closing with the adversary undetected. If the defending aircraft failed to detect the attacking aircraft before the latter entered the area of potential weapons employment, closing frequently ended with a successful attack. Elements of swiftness and concealment ensured "early" conclusion of combat without the maneuver stage (close-in maneuver combat). Thus success of the second stage depended both on the superiority of the equipment and on the pilot's skill to utilize these advantages.

At the present time the following view is frequently expressed in foreign military publications in regard to air combat of the future: "But will it be necessary to close with the adversary when carrying medium or long-range missiles?" For example, the magazine FLUG REVUE states: "If identification systems are improved, it will be possible to attack with long-range missiles from distances exceeding the visual detection range. In this case the attacking aircraft need not execute maneuvers, since the missile itself will take the requisite position in the target pursuit trajectory following lock-on."

The magazine AIR FORCE in turn states the following: "Under actual combat conditions there frequently develop situations whereby prompt detection and identification of a hostile aircraft is impossible as a consequence of its sudden appearance. In such a situation it is essential to defend vigorously or attack immediately, following the pattern of the classic air engagement, in spite of long-range missile armament."

Currently the second concept is dominant abroad in simulating air combat with new-generation fighters, but the first concept is also possible, which determines the possibility of combat at medium range. (To be continued)

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CIVIL DEFENSE TRAINING AND RELATED ACTIVITIES

Reply to Query About Training Aids

Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT in Russian 29 Mar 78 p 3

[Article: "Civil Defense: You Ask--We Answer"]

[Text] N. M. Tulin from Stavropol', S. A. Bakhtinov from Novosibirsk, A. I. Tangyan from Yerevan and other readers ask about the procedure for acquiring civil defense training aids and literature.

The RSFSR CD Staff announced the following:

Civil defense training aids and literature are acquired through the existing system of book trade with the timely submission (before 14 June each year) of requisitions through channels of the USSR MO [Ministry of Defense], Voenizdat and the Izdatel'stvo DOSAAF, through trade directorates of military districts (fleets) or through the nearest military bookstores; and through channels of other publishing houses ("Znaniye," "Vysshaya shkola," "Atomizdat" and so on) through book trade directorates of autonomous republics, krays and oblasts and through bookstores.

In drawing up the requisitions it is advisable to make use of literature publication plans (synopses) made for the following year available locally in book trade organizations.

After selecting the literature you need as offered by these plans, fill out the post card for each publication being ordered: give your address on its face and on the reverse side give the author's name, the title of the book (visual aid), year of publication, publisher and serial number according to the plan. Send the postcard order to the store.

Civil defense literature and visual and training aids published in central izdatel'stva can be acquired on requisitions by C.O.D. in the following stores:

1. Literature and posters:

"Voyennaya Kniga--Pochtoy," Moscow, 113114, Danilovskaya naberezhnaya, 4a.

Military bookstore, Moscow, 107053, Sadovo-Spasskaya, 3.

Store No 108, Moscow 123317, Krasnogvardeyskiy bul'var, 9. "Books by mail" department.

Military Bookstore No 1, Moscow, 121002, Arbat, 21.

Military Bookstore No 2, Moscow, 123007, Khoroshevskoye shosse, 49.

2. Posters and models on medical subjects:

"Meduchposobiye" Store, Moscow, 127322, ul. Dobrolyubova, 20.

3. Slides.

"Diafil'm" Store, Moscow, 103009, Stoleshnikov pereulok, 5/20.

4. Slides and projectors:

Aprelevka "Rosposyltorga" Base, city of Aprelevka, Moskovskaya Oblast, ul. Lenina, 4.

Films on Civil Defense

Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT in Russian 5 Apr 78 p 3

[Article by Col V. Rodin: "Civil Defense: Amateur Film Festival"]

[Text] Around 70 works were presented at the 2nd All-Union Amateur Civil Defense Film Festival dedicated to the 60th Anniversary of the Soviet Armed Forces. Its results attest to the increased expertise of creators of CD film aids and their wide use in training personnel of nonmilitarized formations and the populace.

We should note the creative cooperation of CD staffs and DOSAAF committees of the RSFSR and the LASSR in creating amateur films. They are distinguished by a high ideological-artistic content and current nature of topics and are being successfully used to propagandize knowledge and practical skills in defense against mass destruction weapons.

First place was awarded to the film "At A Civil Defense Training Point" (GESSR, author Yu. Fednev). Second place was shared by the films "Measures to Increase Plant Stability" (RSFSR, authors M. Savin and V. Ul'yanov) and "A Rural Rayon Goes Out On An Exercise" (BESSR, authors N. Nedbaylo and A. Platonov). Third place was awarded the films "Installation Exercise In A Sovkhoz (KASSR, authors R. Valiyev and R. Musin) and "Individual Protective Gear" (ESSSR, author F. Vysotskiy).

Prize places among the slide films were taken by works of L. Rustamov and N. Kozin; I. Semashko, V. Fomchenko and V. Polishchuk; and L. Poddubnaya.

Arm Gen A. T. Altunin, Chief of USSR Civil Defense and Deputy USSR Minister of Defense, awarded festival winners with Honor Scrolls, diplomas and monetary prizes.

At A Factory In Pervomaysk

Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT in Russian 21 May 78 p 2

[Article by Ye. Dyrdin, deputy chairman of DOSAAF committee of a sewing factory in city of Pervomaysk, Nikolayevskaya Oblast: "Civil Defense: Capabilities of Factory CD"]

[Text] The DOSAAF committee of our factory constantly assists civil defense. This work by the committee is planned for each quarter. In addition to the DOSAAF activists, members of the party bureau, workers of the CD staff and the Komsomol committee take part in drawing up the plan. Such an interested approach helps resolve many tasks with high effectiveness.

Take, for example, propaganda of CD knowledge among workers and employees. The committee planned to give a series of lectures over the local radio network entitled "Role of Civil Defense in Protecting the Populace in a Contemporary War." DOSAAF member A. Khotsenovskiy was made responsible for organizing these radio broadcasts. He coped well with the assignment. Our lecturers, party members A. Chernetskiy, N. Bocharova, Ya. Makarenko and others spoke 12 times before the microphone. Their lectures were heard with interest and were of unquestioned benefit.

A film lecture group works successfully at the factory. Each month films on CD topics are shown for each shop and department. Commentary on them is given by DOSAAF activists or staff workers.

DOSAAF activists regularly hold talks on CD topics in shops and departments, during which the workers and employees often make interesting suggestions. During one such talk sewing machine operator N. Kuts suggested including CD norms in the program of annual games. The DOSAAF committee and CD staff adopted this suggestion. As a result, practical skills of personnel of nonmilitarized formations rose considerably.

Civil defense knowledge is propagandized in wall and photo newspapers, operational news sheets and "express" editions which are put out during exercises and competitions. DOSAAF members B. Fedorov and N. Levitskiy, artist N. Nikityuk and others show a great deal of creative imagination in telling in an interesting manner about the experience of the best personnel and commanders and in revealing shortcomings in training.

Much is being done to improve the CD training facility. The DOSAAF committee and DOSAAF activists helped the factory CD staff in constructing a training compound for preparing nonmilitarized formations. V. Sosnovskiy, M. Rudenko, V. Shostak, L. Tsayger and others showed much imagination, inventiveness and initiative in outfitting the training areas.

As can be seen from my narrative, the primary DOSAAF organization has many opportunities for making assistance to civil defense continuous and fruitful.

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