

12 August 1977

SUBVERSION

Uruguayan Armed Forces Summary of Subversive Movement in Latin America

Part II

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A
Approved for Public Release
Distribution Unlimited

20000329 138

U. S. JOINT PUBLICATIONS RESEARCH SERVICE

REPRODUCED BY
NATIONAL TECHNICAL
INFORMATION SERVICE
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
SPRINGFIELD, VA. 22161

Reproduced From
Best Available Copy

NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

PROCUREMENT OF PUBLICATIONS

JPRS publications may be ordered from the National Technical Information Service, Springfield, Virginia 22151. In ordering, it is recommended that the JPRS number, title, date and author, if applicable, of publication be cited.

Current JPRS publications are announced in Government Reports Announcements issued semi-monthly by the National Technical Information Service, and are listed in the Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Indexes to this report (by keyword, author, personal names, title and series) are available through Bell & Howell, Old Mansfield Road, Wooster, Ohio, 44691.

Correspondence pertaining to matters other than procurement may be addressed to Joint Publications Research Service, 1000 North Glebe Road, Arlington, Virginia 22201.

12 August 1977

SUBVERSION
URUGUAYAN ARMED FORCES SUMMARY OF
SUBVERSIVE MOVEMENT IN LATIN AMERICA

PART II

Montevideo LA SUBVERSION in Spanish Jan 77, pp 1-776 (First Edition printed June 1976)

[Book published by Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Uruguayan Armed Forces]

CONTENTS	PAGE
I	
FOREWORD	1
INTRODUCTION	2
PART 1: CONTINENTAL SUBVERSION	
I. Communism and Subversion	14
II. Cuba, Focus of Continental Subversion	94
III. Guerrilla Warfare, a Tactical Tool	171
IV. Events	212
II	
PART 2: URUGUAYAN SUBVERSION	
V. Instrumentation	377
VI. National Treason Movement (Tupamaros)--Emergence-- Misdeeds--Decline	449

CONTENTS (Continued)	Page
VII. Structure and Organization	466
VIII. Goal	540
IX. Strategy	557
X. Urban Struggle	566
XI. Rural Struggle	598
XII. Struggle on the Masses Front	629
III	
XIII. Action	655
XIV. Events	712
XV. Future	987

[Continued from Part I]

PART TWO: URUGUAYAN SUBVERSION

Uruguay, with an economy that is based exclusively on cattle raising, seems to have discovered the art of living without a government and to manage in this manner with constant lack of preoccupation, in spite of chronic inflation. In this bantering country, which needs everything, and which is open to all new ideas, if suddenly a guerrilla movement were to emerge, overnight everyone, full of enthusiasm, would become a guerrillero, and then would return to the same former problem.

Jean Larteguy,
"Los Guerrilleros"

V. Instrumentation

1. Means

2. Political Groups

- a. PCU [Partido Comunista del Uruguay--Communist Party of Uruguay]
- b. MRO [Movimiento Revolucionario Oriental--Oriental Revolutionary Movement]
- c. PS [Partido Socialista--Socialist Party]
- d. Movimiento Socialista [Socialist Movement]
- e. Agrupacion Batllista Avanzar [Batllista Advancement Group]
- f. Movimiento del Pueblo [People's Movement]
- g. Movimiento Batllista 26 de Octubre [26 October Batllista Movement]
- h. APUM [Agrupacion Popular Unitaria Maldonadense--Unified Maldonado People's Group]
- i. AUS [Agrupacion Unitaria Sanducera--Unified Sanducera Group]
- j. UP [Union Popular--Popular Unity]
- k. INI--Grupo MARCHA [Izquierda Nacional Independiente--Grupo MARCHA; National Independent Left--MARCHA Group]
- l. POR [Partido Obrero Revolucionario--Revolutionary Workers Party]
- ll. Agrupacion Neuvas Bases [New Bases Group]
- m. FAU [Federacion Anarquista del Uruguay--Uruguayan Anarquist Federation]
- n. PDC [Partido Democrata Cristiano--Christian Democratic Party]
- n. FIDEL [Frente Izquierda de Liberacion--Leftist Liberation Front]
- o. FAR [Frente de Avanzada Renovadora--Front for Renewed Advancement]

- p. MIR [Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria--
Movement of the Revolutionary Left]
- q. CAP [Centro de Accion Popular--People's Action
Center]
- r. MUSP [Movimiento de Unificacion Socialista
Proletaria--Proletarian Socialist Unification
Movement]
- s. MAPU [Movimiento de Accion Popular Unitario--
Unitary Popular Action Movement]
- t. MPU [Movimiento Popular Unitario--Unitary
People's Movement]
- u. CJUA [Coordinador Juvenil Unitario Anti-
imperialista--Anti-Imperialist Unitarian Youth
Coordinator]
- v. MURP [Movimiento Unificato Revolucionario
Popular--People's Revolutionary Unified
Movement]
- w. ROE [Resistencia Obrero Estudiantil--Student-
Worker Resistance]
- x. Liga Espartaco [Espartaco League]
- y. MURAN [Movimiento de Unidad Revolucionario de
Agrupaciones Nacionales y Populares--Revolu-
tionary Unity Movement of National People's
Groups]
- z. FA [Frente Amplio--Broad Front]
- z¹ Movimiento de Independientes 26 de Marzo--
26 March Independents' Movement
- 3. Socio-Cultural Groups
 - a. Uruguayan Club
 - b. Uruguayan Peace Movement
 - c. People's Congress
 - d. Uruguayan Committee of LASO [Latin American
Solidarity Organization]
 - e. National Committee for the Defense of Freedom
 - f. Editorial Board of DE FRENTE
 - g. Committee in Support of the Cuban Revolution
 - h. Committee in Support of Vietnam
 - i. Uruguayan Branch of the Bertrand Russell
Foundation
 - j. Other movements
- 4. Religious Groups
 - a. The International Front
 - b. The Domestic Front
 - 1) Camilo Torres Command
 - 2) Camilo Torres Revolutionary Movement
 - 3) Christian Revolutionary Group

- 4) Christian University Movement
- 5) CIAS [Centro de Investigaciones y Accion Social--Center of Social Investigation and Action]
- 6) MFC
- 7) Judeo-Christian Brotherhood
- 8) PAX Romana
- 9) Fraternity of French Dominicans
- 10) SIC
- 11) Pastoral Group of the Archdiocese of Montevideo
- 12) IDO-C
- 13) Uruguayan Ecumenical Group
- 14) ISAL [Iglesia y Sociedad para America Latina--Church and Society for Latin America]
- 15) Evangelical Institute
- c. Ecclesiastical Anarchy
- 5. Seditious Groups
 - a. OPR-33
 - b. FARO [Frente de Accion Revolucionaria Obrera--Revolutionary Workers' Action Front]
 - c. FRT
 - d. 12 December Movement (Tupamaros)
 - e. The Guerrilla
 - f. GAU [Grupos de Accion Unificadora--Groups for Unified Action]
 - g. CAP [Centro de Accion Popular--People's Action Center]
 - h. "Alcides" and "Franco" Groups
 - i. Red Groups
 - j. FAP [Armed Popular Front]
 - k. MLN-T [Movimiento de Liberacion Nacional--Tupamaros--National Liberation Movement--Tupamaros]
- 6. Results

INSTRUMENTATION

1. Means

151. National subversion to a great extent was brought about by communism, which made use of all the available means which the unaware democratic society put within its reach during more than 50 years of unprejudiced coexistence: political, administrative, educational, labor union, religious, cultural, publicity, commercial activities; all became contaminated and corrupted by the constant erosion of Marxism-Leninism.

The result--it could not be otherwise--was a society in a situation of crisis that grew worse with each additional crunch of the communist pincers that closed over it. This was a crisis deliberately provoked in order to upset a defenseless society and create a general state of discontent and subversion, which was astutely portrayed as being caused by a crisis resulting from "capitalist structures," when in reality it was solely the result of the operation of the two masterful parts of a single, destructive plan of communist imperialism on its march toward world domination.

Thus, subversion is nourished by the crisis that for more than 30 years has been afflicting the country; and, in turn, the crisis has been feeding and impelling subversion. In this manner and in unhappy brotherhood, both assist each other in jointly bringing on national destruction. Subversion and crisis, crisis and subversion are the two gloomy faces of the same interminable, disintegrating process which keeps Uruguay on the crest of a gigantic, dangerous wave in search of a way out or of a definite rupture.

In another part of this publication a general picture is traced of the Uruguayan crisis and subversion--its causes and its effects, with specific reference to the historical circumstances that determined the irruption of the armed forces in the business of the nation.¹ Here, the manner in which subversion was carried out will be indicated; mention will be made of the main groups responsible for the critical situation that they generated by their antipatriotic conduct.

152. All of those groups may be included in two broad categories: those who operate openly in the public, "legal" sector of the country; and those who operate in the illegal and clandestine sphere--that is, the seditious sector. This formal classification is valid only for expository purposes and does not mean that a specific "legal" group cannot at the same time be subversive, or vice versa. On the contrary, as will be seen, the undisguised, official activity of those groups often is simply a cover for seditious activity, their best support and defense within the legal front. Perfectly coordinated and coupled, both forms of activity pursue to the utmost the same aim of attacking and destroying it--one from outside the government and the other from within. As Mercier Vega observes, this

is the innovative idea of the present guerrilla theory, "the anti-State idea, which replaces the traditional socialist concept of anti-Society."²

The four main groups that had the greatest and most direct effect on subversion are presented to the reader, as follows: political groups, socio-cultural groups, religious groups, and seditious groups--visible agents, each in its own field, but all united for the purpose of bringing about Uruguayan deterioration.

2. Political Groups

153. This heading includes more than 20 non-violent groups that have two main common characteristics and that fall into the broad category that they, themselves, designate as the "antiimperialist Left": a persistent, importunate, and manifest "antiimperialism"--expressed, naturally, in terms of opposition and intense hatred for the United States and favorable disposition toward, or complicity with, the USSR--and its Marxist-Leninist ideologies.

The differences between them are merely of shades and are apparent from the greater or lesser degree of relationship and affinity with international communism, in a broad range that goes from flirtation to respect, admiration, reverence, and/or devotion, even up to the most servile fawning and submission.

It is in this extreme degree of degradation and alienation of nationality and independence of the country that a vernacular communism is encountered, an inexhaustible quarry from which all the other groups, including the seditious and terrorist, emerge or are influenced.

The differences between these latter groups and the other Uruguayan leftist groups do not stem from ideology--all have the common objective of a socialist state, a mere stage in the Utopian journey to the paradise of communist society--but rather from procedure--the method or manner of attaining that objective.

Actually, they are not philosophical discrepancies, but discrepancies of convenience, in which communism, itself, shares--contradicting or denying its "permanent and inviolable principles", depending on how it suits them, or paying tribute to the "bureaucracy" or "fossilization" of their elite leaders.

154. I have here the "principles": "The overthrow of capitalist power and the conversion of social property cannot be achieved through any peaceful means; the working class will achieve this only through revolutionary violence against the bourgeoisie and through proletarian revolution, with the dictatorship of the proletariat taking over political power..."

For history to carry out this function, it is necessary to adapt to the permanent and inviolable principles established by Marx, Engel, Lenin, and Stalin for the triumph of the revolution." Those permanent principles "are written in the 'History of the Communist Party (B) of the USSR' and in that of the 'Communist Party of Uruguay'."³

I have here the "revisionist" denaturalization of those "principles": without abdicating the revolutionary role of communism, the acquisition of power can, and must, be achieved in accordance with conditions that are appropriate for each country or social milieu. Both violence and legal means are suitable, according to the circumstances. One form does not exclude the other, but the party leaders (that is, Moscow) are the ones to choose and determine the tactic to be used. Of course, this "revisionist," or convenient, tactic of hiding the wolf in sheep's clothing, postpones or evades violence, which, as has already been seen, constitutes the marrow of communist theory, an evasion which the opportunistic invocation to "the circumstances" does not succeed in dissembling, thus creating an interminable controversy between militants, with the natural opposition of the most impatient or "radical" individuals. The seditious groups will feed on this class of nonconformists or radicals.

The participation of communism and other movements inspired by it in the "legal" political life of the country means, then, that it is a grotesque farse, since it does not respond to any democratic conviction or to any motive of loyalty to the State, but rather to opportunism. It takes the fullest advantage of all circumstances, whatever they are, legal or illegal, in order to destroy institutions and to establish a dictatorship of the proletariat, with all the consequences that the communist doctrine entails.⁴

a. PCU (Communist Party of Uruguay)

156. Constituted initially around a branch that had separated from the PS, headed by Eugenio Gomez, the PCU was formally established in 1920 by the VIII Congress of the PS, when the majority choice at this meeting, by 1,927 votes against 175 and with 257 abstentions, resolved to become affiliated with the III International that was founded by Lenin on 5 May 1919. In November 1922, the International Communist Congress that was held in Moscow accepted the affiliation of the PCU.⁵ In 1919, JUSTICIA made its appearance. This was the journalistic voice of communism in Uruguay, successor to BANDERA ROJA, founded by Gomez in 1917 upon losing the columns of EL SOCIALISTA as a consequence of the above mentioned separation.

157. In 1957, JUSTICIA was supplanted by EL POPULAR and Gomez was ousted from the leadership of the PCU by Rodney Arismendi. He was finally expelled, along with his son, Eugenio Gomez Chiribao, in 1954. In the preface of the above mentioned publication, the former mournfully referred to the intrigues and slanders of the second, and also to the destructive task accomplished by the "revisionist plague" of Trotskyism, violator of the communist "Principles," which, having spread throughout the world had also reached Uruguay, etc.⁶

158. In accordance with Soviet ideology--to which the PCU, as well as the other CP's throughout the world that are subject to Moscow, give strict obeisance--every marxist-leninist party, or "new-type party," is "a voluntary association of persons with a commonality of ideas, committed to implement the marxist world concept and to accomplish the historical mission of the working class." Its members must differentiate themselves from other workers by their sense of responsibility, resoluteness of ideas, revolutionary spirit, and by always being ready to take on responsibilities. Every CP must be characterized by three essential features: it must be an irreconcilable enemy of capitalism and fight as vigorously as possible to overthrow the capitalist society and to impose a dictatorship of the proletariat; it must proceed according to the revolutionary theories of marxism-leninism and must distinguish itself by firmness and unity of action, as well as by flexible tactics; it must be the vanguard of the working class, its teacher, leader, and guide, and be able to mobilize the people for the purpose of overthrowing capitalism and establishing socialism.⁷

In order for the working class to differentiate itself from any other class, its party must also be different from all the others, both in its objectives and in its organizational structures. The universal historical mission of the working class--conquest of power and revolutionary transformation of society--cannot be realized through just any political party, but through a new-type party, which can be embodied only in the CP. The organizational structure of the CP is democratic centralism, according to which all of the directive organs are elected from the bottom up. The organs must periodically render an account of their activities to their organizational units. All members must observe the strictest discipline, the minority complying unconditionally with the majority. The decisions of the higher organs are absolutely binding on the lower ones. According to Lenin's words, "indispensable centralization and strict discipline of the proletariat are basic conditions for triumph over the bourgeoisie."⁸

The result of all of this is that the CP is an organization that is semi-military in nature, hierarchically directed from above, whose members are obliged to carry out the decisions of the supreme command. The above mentioned democratic centralism is clearly a dictatorial centralism. The

purpose of this doctrine of the new-type party is none other than to provide a semi-military and servilely obedient ideological basis for CP's that are subordinate to Moscow, and to justify the subordination of their members to the leaders.

With a tough organization based on these principles, the CPU will gain standing with the passing of time. The organizational aspect is zealously guarded by the CPU directorate, which will not neglect it for even a single moment. The XVI Congress, held in 1955, "conceived the matter of the party as the cardinal business of the Uruguayan revolution...In establishing its course of action, the Congress stated that the advancement of the revolution in Uruguay depended on forming a vanguard political organization based on the working class, strong in the great proletariat industrial centers, bound to the people by very extensive ties, established on the principles of leninist organization."⁹

But even when for purely material reasons a revolutionary process leads mankind toward an inevitable communist society, communism--in accordance with the Marxist-Leninist doctrine--tries to actuate that process. Therefore, by making practical application of the flexible and opportunistic philosophy on which it is based,¹⁰ communism instigates the proletariat to discontent and rebellion, taking advantage of any propitious opportunities that arise, and even creating opportunities, as a means of accelerating the process of world revolution.

One of those opportunities will be the Cuban revolution, because of the indisputable influence which it radiates throughout Latin America, with its inducement of a tangible, concrete reality. Solidarity with the Castro-communist government since the decade of the 1960's thus became a bond. International communism, being neither timid nor negligent, saw an opportunity and is trying to obtain the greatest possible advantage from it. Consequently, on the decision of their superior organs, communist parties throughout the world, but especially in Latin America, support the Cuban revolution and are identifying themselves with it.

The XVIII Congress of the CPU, held in Montevideo in July 1962, attended by delegates of other continental and extracontinental communist parties, used that identification in particular as one of their basic themes and conclusions. One year before, the official organ of the CPU had categorically stated: "The Cuban revolution is the revolution of the peoples of Latin America."¹¹

Communism and Cuban revolution, Cuban revolution and communism, then, are two sides of the same medal--of greatest importance for acceleration of continental subversion and, therefore, of Uruguayan subversion.

During the CPU Congress of Zonal Committees of the department of Montevideo, held at the beginning of 1962, Gerchuni Perez, the then secretary general of the above mentioned department, gave a detailed report on the importance of the zonal organizations and the prospects that their proper operation presented for the realization of the aims of the party. Among other things, he said: "The revolution for which we were born 41 years ago is now a task which is planned not for our children or our grandchildren, but for this generation of Uruguayan communists, as well as for the present generation of communists throughout the world. How this policy crystallizes depends to a great extent on us. We have a decisive influence in the main trade unions. There are hundreds of communists in metallurgy, construction, textiles, port, wool, transportation, air conditioning. We have influence among retirees, in state organizations, among students. However, it depends on us. We must strive for revolutionary orientation from above, but resolve to implement it from below--within the factories and in worker concentrations. That is why we must establish zonal unions in each zone, which will group together all the forces of each area. That is why we must heighten the activity of our revolutionary groups in the enterprises and support the movement of solidarity with the Cuban revolution with much more vigor--affirming it more within the factories. As the Plenary Central Committee noted, we plan to greatly increase our preparatory work, by including all levels of party activity, developing schools, intermediate and short courses, conferences, increasing the distribution of ESTUDIOS and the REVISTA INTERNACIONAL. To do this, we must form youth committees within the labor unions and in the districts. We now have an aggregate of workers, but in the party groups where we have many affiliates, it is most important to assign the young militants of those enterprises to the work of establishing Centers of Revolutionary Instruction for the communist youth," etc.

In accordance with these directives, the CP and the UJC [Union of Young Communists] tireless work to attract and recruit young Uruguayans, from the age of eight years on, in order to strengthen their basic framework and to solidly establish the revolution that international communism pursues throughout the world.

A veritable "kindergarten" of communism, the UJC is, as is known, a complementary organ of the CPU, but of the greatest importance, since it makes it possible to implant in children and adolescents of both sexes, by taking advantage of their ingenuity and idealism, the disciplined and servile personality of future party members. Under the direct tutelage and control of the party, which benefits from the vigor and restlessness of young people by using them in various capacities, the UJC is a constant ferment in the communist masses. According to the statutes of the CPU, "the UJC is an active auxiliary of the party in the search for, and

mobilization of, young people. Since the UJC works along with the leadership organs of each party instance, the respective UJC organs must be accorded full political support from party organizations. Following the political line of the party, the UJC will display the utmost spirit of political initiative with respect to the unity and organization of young people and their incorporation into the overall movement of the working class and the people. The UJC trains its affiliates in the ideology of the proletariat--that is, Marxism-Leninism.¹²

159. The above mentioned book by Gomez, as well as "Communism In Uruguay" ("El Comunismo en Uruguay"), also previously mentioned, records and explains in detail the evolution of the CPU, its internal organization--patterned on the CPSU [Communist Party of the Soviet Union]--its organs and functions, relationships and ties with other groups; front organizations; infiltration of education and of cultural fields--theater, movies, music, painting, sculpture, printing, literature, chess, and photography; and infiltration of sports, the press, radio, television, and publications; also, the christian field--Catholic and Protestant; the trade union movement; the foreign communities located in Uruguay--containing Spaniards, Portuguese, French, Italians, Germans, Jews, refugees, and other Latin American residents. It details pro-Red China activities and those of the cultural, trade, etc. missions of communist countries accredited to the country.

The report of the Inter-American Confederation for the Defense of the Continent, published in 1957, sketches various highly illustrative episodes carried out by the CPU,¹³ and the book by Diogenes Cano gives biographic highlights and the background of many of its most conspicuous members.¹⁴ Finally, the compilation of political parties published by the Foundation for University Culture supplies an abundance of examples of criteria and references on the ideology of the CPU and of the majority of other political groups mentioned below.¹⁵

Since it is impossible to explore all of those aspects here, the above mentioned publications should be kept as reference sources.

160. In a recent statement, subsequent to its dissolution,¹⁶ the CPU called for popular unity "to overthrow the dictatorship" and proclaimed full continuance of the FA [Broad Front], which no one will be able to prevent from executing the protagonist role reserved to it," etc. ¹⁷

Since 7 March 1974, the date of its first issue, the CPU has clandestinely published a leaflet entitled, CARTA SEMANAL DEL PARTIDO COMUNISTA [WEEKLY SHEET OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY], which criticizes and attacks the authorities in every possible way, using the previously mentioned weapons of intrigue, lies, and affronts, at which communism is expert, but without making any kind of impression. Every Saturday, in the program ,

"15 Minutes With Uruguay," which Radio Central of Moscow devoted to Uruguay, there were broadcasts of messages and communications from the dissolved party and also dissertations now and then from its leaders, like those made by former Senator Enrique Rodriguez, etc.

b. MRO (Oriental Revolutionary Movement)

161. Founded in April 1961 by Ariel Collazo¹⁸ and Armando Cuervo,¹⁹ when the former returned from his trip to Cuba during the first part of 1961, where he had gone to operate as an agent of Castro-communism in national politics. As Collazo, himself, said, the MRO emerged "as a result of the eclosion produced by the Cuban revolution and has always continued along that same line. It published the periodical, REVOLUCION, and the theoretical magazine, AMERICA LATINA. The young people of the MRO published the periodical, PRINCIPIOS.

The primary task of the MRO "is to maintain constant contact between the CPU and Cuba." In addition, the MRO tried to attract Catholics in particular, even though the PDC, especially the Christian Democratic Youth, also gave evidence of a marked pro-communist tendency. As a means of attracting Catholics, the MRO utilized Juan Carlos Zaffaroni, a priest.²¹ On various occasions, the MRO proved to be pro-China, and Ariel Collazo made an extended trip to communist China at the end of 1965."²² During his sojourns in Cuba, Collazo and other members of the organization took courses in Marxism-Leninism and in revolutionary warfare. In addition to Collazo and Cuervo, Luciano Da Silva and Juan Antonio Trimboli formed part of the leadership.

c. PS (Socialist Party)

162. It was established by Emilio Frugoni in 1910. Ten years later, there was a schism, which gave rise to the founding of the CPU, as previously mentioned. In spite of this, and without further alternatives, it has been a long-standing critic and intermeddler in the activities of traditional parties.

The 1958 and 1962 electoral results stirred up profound internal dissension, which plunged many of its members into very serious skepticism with respect to the democratic prospects of the movement. The efficiency of the Cuban revolution and other contemporary examples had shown how it was possible to achieve power by less evasive, and more direct, ways than legal ones. As has already been seen, one of those who was most convinced of the futility of peaceful means was Raul Sendic, a PS militant and one of the founders of the MLN-T.²³ In document I of this seditious organization, reference is made to this "ideological" division within the leadership of the PS and to the rise, in 1962, of the "coordinator," through whom an attempt was made to bring together militants of other equally radicalized leftist groups for the purpose of seeking a solution through violence.²⁴



Uruguayan Deputy Ariel Collazo (3rd), engaged in guerrillero training in Minas de Frio, southern part of Oriente Province, Cuba.

164. In the same year, 1962, the PS established a common front, the UP, with the Agrupacion Nuevas Bases, the FAR, and the followers of Enrique R. Erro (National Party deputy, expelled from the government in 1961 as minister of industry and labor and who, resentful, abandoned the traditional banner), and some other discharged political figures. "What in the beginning seemed a blunder from the electoral viewpoint, later proved to have been a clever ruse to put the PS into extremist hands. To the latter, the number of votes that a party is able to obtain matters little, since in any case they preach a change of government and structures by means of violence."²⁵

165. In the 1966 national elections, the PS had already publicly manifested that division, presenting itself under two sub-banners: "Socialist Movement," list 3,000, and "National Left," list 90, headed by Jose Pedro Cardozo, Vivian Trias, Jose Diaz Chaves, and Guillermo Bernhard.

166. In December 1967, it contracted an alliance with other pro-China groups in order to overthrow institutions by violence, and it publicized that pact in the weekly, EL SOL, which up to then had been the official organ of the PS, and in the daily, EPOCA. This caused the closing of both journalistic organs and the dissolution of the PS.²⁶

d. Socialist Movement

167. This is the minority sector of the PS, to which Frugoni's group was reduced. After the 1962 elections, Frugoni formed the Reorganizing Junta of the PS and in 1966 established the Socialist Movement, with the traditional orientation of social-democratic parties. Its candidate to the House of Representatives was Jorge Andrade Ambrosoni, socialist councillor of Salto, who did not win enough votes to be elected.

e. Batllista Advancement Group

168. Founded in Montevideo in 1929 by Julio Cesar Grauert, it emerged from the Colorado Party in 1961.

Its leaders were: Carlos D. Elichirigoity, municipal councillor of Montevideo, Raul Davino, and Clemente Soca. It published the periodical, AVANZAR, and adhered to the Cuban revolutionary line.

169. In July 1968, it joined the 26 October Batllista Movement, forming a single group with it, called the "Batllista Federation." Its leaders were the above mentioned Elichirigoity and Davino, the former as secretary general, and Armanda Tardaguila de Roballo, Alberico Lopez, Juan Francisco Montedonico, Jose Ferrer, Pedro Sastre, Jose Cabrera Duran, Angel Timote, Roberto Retamar, Rosendo Fernandez, etc.

f. The People's Movement

170. It emerged from the Batllista Avanzar Group of Paysandu. It was created in 1965 under the leadership of Rogelio Cabrera Aloy, municipal councillor, and always operated independently of the previously mentioned Montevideo group of the same name.

171. In 1965, it became known as the People's Movement and was characterized by its adherence to the Cuban revolution. Cabrera Aloy was also the correspondent in Paysandu for the CPU daily, EL POPULAR. Other leaders of the movement included Juan Dominguez, also of Paysandu, and Hector Bertiz, of Salto, a department that this group tried to attract.

172. The People's Movement joined the FIDEL, from which it separated in October 1966. Two months later, it joined the MIR, the FAU, and other pro-China groups.

g. 26 October Batllista Movement

173. It was established in 1961, and in the beginning was part of list 15, of the "Batllismo" Colorado Party. Its main leader was Victor Roballo, brother of Alba Roballo, at that time member and leader of the above mentioned list. The latter died in 1967.

APUM (Unified Maldonado People's Group)

174. Established in 1966, its leader was Jose A. Frade, lawyer in San Carlos, Maldonado, who up to 1950 militated in the MARCHA group, directed by Carlos Quijano. Its most conspicuous members included Carlos Julio Barrios, Adalberto Gonzalez, Socrates Martinez, Julio Vidal, and other residents of the above mentioned department and of Punta del Este.

i. AUS (Unified Sanducera Group)

175. Founded in 1966 in Paysandu, its leader was Ruben Obispo, leader of the banking association that presided over the Inter-Labor Union Executive Board of the above mentioned department.

j. UP (Popular Unity)

176. This was Enrique R. Erro's group. After the 1962 elections, Erro separated from the socialists, from the Agrupacion Nuevas Bases, and from the FAR--or they separated from him. His group retained the symbol.

k. INI--MARCHA Group (Independent National Left)

177. The MARCHA group formed a nucleus around the weekly, MARCHA, published regularly since 1939, and its manager, Carlos Quijano.

In the 1920's, Quijano studied economics in France, where he made connections and, with respect to the anti-imperialist and anti-North American line of Latin America, he rivalled the later Peruvian founder of APRA [American Revolutionary Popular Alliance], Victor Raul Haya de la Torre. On his return, he militated in the National Party and was elected its deputy for one term. He later separated from this traditional political group. He then founded the Social-Democratic Nationalist Group which, without any roots or popular conviction, disappeared in the same manner that it had appeared. Having a preference for socio-economic themes--a field in which he had taught for many years as a professor in the School of Law in Montevideo--all of Quijano's activity and preachment were characterized by a profound aversion to North American imperialism and the United States. He published a book on this topic, with specific reference to Nicaragua.²⁸

178. On 7 May 1966, several friends of his and of MARCHA--the connecting umbilical cord that had an obvious influence on a select group of representatives of the Uruguayan "intelligentsia"--tried to revitalize the above mentioned extinct group, by convening a "Preparatory Assembly for an Independent Movement," which later was named INI.

Containing leftist members of various shades, including Protestants, the INI strove to become integrated into a united Left through the so-called "Board for Unity of the People," established the preceding year, and also the pro-China PS, the Socialists of Frugoni's old guard, part of the PDC, and the FIDEL.

The most significant members of the INI were: Julio Castro, Carlos Maria Gutierrez, and Hector Rodriguez, who created a "University Committee," and a "Labor Union Committee," and various other committees. These did not succeed in joining the FIDEL, which avoided any possibility of pro-China infiltration that could possibly destroy the relative unity that it had been able to maintain.

The last manifestation of INI's activity occurred on 18 November 1966, that is, 9 days before that year's primaries, when it published an exhortation to the citizenry to support the FIDEL, or the PS, or the Socialist Movement.

179. MARCHA, on the other hand, loyal to a deep-seated pro-communist position, imperturbably pursued its subtle psycho-political work of dividing Uruguayan society and of inciting sedition. Its pages contained a hybrid hodge-podge of contributions from: intellectuals, journalists, and politicians of the national or foreign Left; writers who apparently, or actually, were not committed to communism; open, or disguised insurrectionists. There were also other persons--individuals who were sincerely

taken unawares by the repeated, snobbish, misleading, and at times contradictory preachment that sprang from an affected, pseudo-liberal, and aggressive attitude which, over a period of 35 years, permitted this weekly to throw heaps of wood on the fire of sedition and national dissolution, kindled by communism, for the consumption in particular of small, but active, apatrid university and intellectual circles.

The sporadic closures ordered by the authorities served only to provide supposed evidence of victimization or a chance to upbraid the government on grounds of violating freedom of the press. One of the most recent closures was not of an activity which for years had engaged in profound and deliberately anti-national pursuits and which should have been closed a long time ago, but was an interdiction of the publication of a consciously loathsome and obscene story--the winner in a literary contest. The manager, the jury, and the editorial staff were detained under remand. A justice that exists in limbo and which takes pleasure in making judgments according to technical refinements far removed from the actual reality of the country and of the world absolved them. This gave them another opportunity to appear as victims of an arbitrary persecution and confirmed the impossibility of countering the anti-Uruguayan objective of the preachment of surrender to communist imperialism: "Now, more than ever, we cannot desert, default, betray. MARCHA is tied to its destiny."³⁰

180. In addition to the manager, there was an assistant manager, Julio Castro, and an editor-in-chief, Hugo Alfaro. Its editorial staff included an extensive list of contributors: Adolfo Aguirre Gonzalez, Arturo Ardao, Hector Borrat, Oscar H. Bruschera, Carlos Martinez Moreno, Hector Rodriguez, Paulo R. Schilling, Maria del Huerto Diaz, Maria Teresa Quijano, Alfredo R. Castellanos, Julio Cesar Castro, Guillermo Gonzalez, Guillermo Ramirez, Julio Rossiello, Mario Benedetti, Jesus Bentancourt Diaz, Guillermo Bernhard, Alberto Couriel, Roque Faraone, Raul Gadea, Haroldo Galeano, Gloria Galvan de Porta, Juan Arturo Grompone, Eduardo Jaurena, Juan E. Pivel Devoto, Efrain Quesada, Guillermo Chifflet, Jose Maria Barrientos, Oscar A. Buttinelli, Eley Eyherabide, Federico Ruggero, Jose Wainer, Coriun Aharonian, Ines Blixen, Pablo Dalvin, Isabel Gilbert, Hugo Gilmet, Mario Handler, Juan Jose Iturriberry, Mario Jacob, Ariel Martinez, Roberto Meyer, Nilda Muller, Rosalba Oxandabarat, Gabriel Peluffo, Conrado Silva, Washington Torres, Carlos Troncone, Daniel Viglietti, Leonel Hainintz, Enrique Hetzel, Jesus C. Guiral, Sayd Codina, Juan A. Oddone, Mario H. Otero, Jorge Ruffinelli, Hugo Achugar, Heber Raviolo, Jose Pedro Barran, Mario Arregui, Washington Benavidez, Carlos Gurmendez (h), Alcio Cheroni, Enrique Elissalde, Roberto Ibanez, Washington Lockhart, Pedro Gatti, Sylvia Lago, Graciela Mantaras, Jorge Onetti, Juan Carlos Onetti, Cristina Peri Rossi, Angel Rama, Mercedes Rein, Pablo A. Troise, Idea Vilarino, Ida Vitale, Mario Silva Garcia, Pedro Scaron, Ingrid Tempel, Sylvia Warren, Mary Marshall, Carlos Carvalho, Jorge Centurion, Yenja Dumnova,³¹ Domingo Ferreira, Eduardo Fornasari, Anhele Hernandez, Francisco

Graells, Francisco Lorenzo, Heber Freddy Marchisio, Carlos P. Pier. The following were foreign correspondents: In Argentina--Eduardo Galeano, Daniel Goldstein, Lucien Mercier, Gregorio Selser, Rodolfo H. Terragno, and Rodolfo Walsh; in Bolivia--Augusto Cespedes and Rene Zavaleta Mercado; in Cuba--Roberto Fernandez Retamar and Jorge Onetti; in Czechoslovakia--Luis C. Turiansky; in Chile--Joaquin Andrada, Hans Ehrmann, Jorge Irisity, and Gonzalo Rojas; in Ecuador--Benjamin Carrion; in Spain--Alfonso C. Comin, Juan Garcia Grau, Gabriel Garcia Marquez, Juan Goytisolo, Cristina Peri Rossi, Mario Vargas Llosa; in the United States--Luis Camnitzer, Antonio Frasconi, Mauricio R. Muller, James Petras, Manuel Maldonado Denis, Paul M. Sweezy; in France--Luis Campodonico, Sophie Magarinos, Nardo Zaldo; in Great Britain--Walter Acosta, Maruja Echegoyen; in Italy--Jose Maria Podesta; in Mexico--Luis Cardoza y Aragon, Mario Guzman Galarza, Adolfo Gilly, Daniel Waksman Schinca; in Peru--Jose Miguel Oviedo; in Porto Rico--Manuel Maldonado Denis; in Sweden--Susana Diaz; in Switzerland--Arno Fabbri; in Venezuela--Angel Rama, Marta Traba, and Ugo Ulive.

1. POR (Revolutionary Workers Party)

181. This was the Trotskyite Party that adhered to the IV International that was founded in 1938 by Leon Trotsky. It was established in 1944 under the name of POR. Its principal members were: Jose Posada, Luis Eduardo Naguil, J. Sanguinett, and Zulma Nogara.

When Fidel Castro attacked the Guatemala 13 November Movement, POR declared itself firmly against it.

It published the weekly, FRENTE OBRERO (formerly, VOZ PROLETARIO, which in 1966 appeared for some time as a one-page supplement in the daily, EPOCA, under the management of Zulma Nogara), and maintained a radio receiver at CX-30, Radio Nacional, which is the radio broadcaster par excellence of communism.

POR participated in list 871 in almost all national elections and obtained a total of 213 votes in 1962.

11. New Bases Group

182. Constituted in 1960 by a majority of former leaders of the FEUU [Federation of University Students of Uruguay], including Helios Sarthou, it joined the UP in 1962, from which it separated 2 years later.

m. FAU (Uruguayan Anarquist Federation)

183. The FAU, an anarchist labor union, emerged from the old anarchist organization, FCRU [Uruguayan Regional Workers Federation], which published the periodical, VOLUNTAD, and which declared itself against Fidel Castro.

The FAU, whose main nucleus was rooted in the National School of Fine Arts, experienced a schism at the end of 1963 because of a conflict between

two groups—one, an anarchist student group led by Jorge Errandonea, and the other, a communist workers group led by Gerardo Gatti, a former student leader and member of the Graphic Arts Union.

Both groups agreed to divide the benefits of the FAU and not to use the insignia FAU.

The former again took the insignia ALU for its name [expansion unknown], which the anarchists had previously used.

The second group, closely linked with CAP, adhered to the pro-China line and, violating its agreement, continued to call itself the FAU. Before long it practically absorbed the ALU.

184. The FAU is one of the pro-China groups that united to publish the daily, EPOCA, in its second period. Also, it is one of the main recipients of funds from China. In addition to the previously mentioned Errandonea and Gatti, the following militated for it: Carlos Garcia, Dante D'Ottone, Ruben Prieto, Daniel Costabile, and Jorge Amilcar Manera LLuberas, civil engineer, professor in the School of Engineering and Land Surveying and one of the principal leaders of the MLN-T, previously mentioned.³²

n. PDC (Christian Democratic Party)

185. It claimed to be the "heir" of the extinct Catholic UC [expansion unknown], a claim that it utilized to capture the votes of the believers of that faith, even though in reality it had nothing to do with that party or its traditions.

Its platform postulated the necessity of establishing a "communitarian society" and other ambiguities and, when mention was made of a communist danger, it resorted to the argument of "humanitarianism" and "self-determination." The youth group of the PDC, the JDC [Christian Democratic Youth], was constituted practically in whole from the Castroite pro-China apparatus. Gutemberg Charquero, a Maoist agent, wrote signed articles for DE FRENTE, the extinct PDC semi-monthly which Federico Fasano Mertens published. It is suspected that funds for this acquisition came as much from Havana as from the Chilean leftist christian democrats, directed by Radomiro Tomic (whose influence had already been felt among "progressive" Uruguayan Catholics). Shortly after the national authorities interdicted the daily, EXTRA, DE FRENTE replaced it. It was the organ of the group called "Movement For the Defense of Freedom and Sovereignty," a communist attempt to form a "popular front".³⁴

186. The advancement of "progressivism" among European and Latin American christian democracies and the culmination of worldwide Marxist "liberation movements" in reality are what really impelled and fully inspired the present political position of the PDC, which invoked Jesus Christ as a means of imposing a Marxist belief.

The doctrinarian expressions of this trend, which caused so much confusion among Christians, are explained in: the "Theology of Liberation" by the Brazilian, Hugo Assmann, the Peruvian, Gustavo Gutierrez Merino, both leaders, and the Chilean Jesuit, Gonzalo Arroyo, of the "Christians for Socialism" movement; in the "Liberator Education" by the Brazilian, Paulo Freire; in the "Message to Latin American Christians," issued in Cuba in March 1972 by the Chilean clerical group of "the 80"; the "Days of the Escorial," in July of the same year, etc. All of these manifestations, which sought the protection of the cloak of the church, agreed that christian faith involved a Marxist revolutionary commitment and that the christian missionary had an obligation to stimulate the revolutionary conscience of Latin American peoples, to promote the struggle against legal structures, and to cooperate in the various stages of the revolutionary movement, including armed conflict, to achieve the overthrow of power by the peoples' organizations, as will be seen more fully in the treatment of the religious movements.³⁵

187. The PDC intervened for the first time as a "new" party in the 1962 primaries, obtaining approximately 35,000 votes. When the PCU, in 1970, initiated the work of constituting a desired "common front," to permit a repetition in Uruguay of the Marxist triumph that had occurred in Chile, the PDC (presided over by Juan Pablo Terra, architect, deputy, and effective communist collaborator during his entire legislative term), went on to integrate the FA. The conglomerate of Marxist forces thus constituted then took the party insignia of the PDC.

Upon the dissolution of parliament at the end of June 1973, the PDC was used as a screen to cover the surreptitious activity of the PCU and other displaced leftist political groups.

n. FIDEL (Leftist Liberation Front)

188. Formed in 1962, it answered to the old communist idea explained by George Dimitrov concerning "peoples' fronts," which was ardently advanced by the PCU in Uruguay. Without an electoral body, but with a strongly disciplined organization, the PCU tried to bring together and influence the greatest possible number of people, since it was certain of the sorcery of its dialectics, the solidarity of international communism, its unswerving tenacity, and, in short, that it was the group with the greatest possibilities of retaining the reins of any movement within which it acted. The utilization of "people's fronts," "national fronts," "unity fronts," or the

"united fronts" is recorded in the communist strategy concerning the policy of alliances, in accordance with Lenin's concept of making agreements, even with the enemy, and taking advantage of them to attain the aims of the PC and of world revolution, but rupturing those alliances as soon as it is advantageous to do so.³⁶

According to Soviet doctrine, this tactic responds to the concepts of "unity of action" and "democratic unity," by means of which communism masks its true objectives and subtly exploits the cooperation of other forces and parties, through the advocacy of the working class that is directed by the PC.

The policy of "unity of Action" is defined in texts on the theory and the tactics of world communism as the effort by PC parties to "cooperate with all worker organizations, independently of whatever the religious beliefs of the members of these organizations might be"; and the policy of "democratic unity," is expressed as "the effort of PC parties to create unity of action and cooperation with all national and democratic forces, to which end it obtains the union of all social strata on the basis primarily of democratic requirements and solutions."³⁷

In accordance with this doctrine, the salaried workers and workers in general, regardless of their affiliation--communists, social-democrats, or members of organizations of ecclesiastical influence--as "exploited People" have mutual interests, which they must use to advantage in order to strengthen the potential of the working class and increase their gravitation toward the PC. They must concern themselves with the requirements of the allied groups, choosing a common platform, make commitments, make necessary concessions, and structure a solid organization under the protection, more or less dissembled or open according to the circumstances, of the PC. The function of the communist leadership within the bloc of the thus formed "democratic Unity" must be implemented not by dictatorial pressures or methods--which could result in the loss of support from the allies and which could isolate the PC--but through an appropriate policy that takes into consideration the political-social milieu of each country and that is acceptable to the people.

Having constituted the "democratic unity" bloc and having affirmed the "unity of action," there then will be time to abandon by the wayside, or to eliminate, those allied groups or leaders that are not acceptable to the PC or that resist its directives. The eliminator method is known as the "tactica del salchichon" [sausage tactic], an expression used for the first time by Rakosi, chief of the Hungarian PC, on 29 February 1952, in a lecture at the party institution of higher learning, in which he described in detail the results of this method³⁸--widely applied in Spain, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Romania, Bulgaria, etc.

According to Leonhard, the doctrine of "unity of action and of democratic unity was conceived as a guideline for PC parties, in countries of industrial development in particular. In spite of fine expressions describing mutual trust and the altruism with which communists represent the interests of other social strata, it is not a question here of genuine efforts to obtain mutual objectives through a sincere allinace, but rather a question of attempting to convince and to exploit other political forces in order to obtain the aims of the party. In substance, and according to what the author, himself, observes, PC parties within the Soviet sphere "obviously no longer expect to win an influence in their own name that will set the standard or be very decisive." They hope to achieve the influence through this group of unitary organizations, in order to acquire an authority which they, alone, cannot attain.³⁹

The policy of "dialog" with Marxism-Leninism, observed contemporaneously by other political and religious trends in various non-communist countries, rests on these ideological directives. And it is in accordance with them that the following, which will be referred to later, have been established in Uruguay: the FIDEL, the People's Congress, the National Committee for the Defense of Freedom, the Committee In Support of the Cuban Revolution, the Editorial Board of DE FRENTE, the FA, etc.

189. In the above mentioned year of 1962 there was a public manifestation of Sino-Soviet antagonism, and the communists who acknowledged Peking began to establish their own front.

The communists who remained loyal to Moscow for their part worked to strengthen their front and succeeded in reintegrating in the FIDEL not only the PCU, which retained the leadership, but also the following groups:

- MRO
- Batllista Advancement Group
- 26 October Batllista Movement
- AUS
- MPU

190. In addition, the FIDEL counted on 5 "committees" which augmented the above mentioned groups, namely:

- 1) University Committee.

191. Created in 1961, it was initially called "For the Unity of Leftists" and then "of the FIDEL"--with which it actively participated. Its leaders were: Luis Echave, Jose Jorge Martinez, and the principal leaders of the UJC, which constituted its majority nucleus.

2. Workers' Committee

192. Founded in 1963 and consisting of leaders of the CNT [National Convention of Workers], predominantly those of the PCU, including Roberto Prieto, of the food industry workers, and other sectors, such as the Federation of Glass Workers, with Juan Antonio Iglesias, the MRO, with Luciano Da Silva, also a leader of municipal employees, and Carlos M. Britos Huertas, another leader of municipal employees.

3. Agricultural Workers' Committee

It was a part of the FIDEL since the creation of the latter. Its principal members were: Luis Pedro Bonavita, Edmundo Soares Netto (who became president and vice president respectively of the FIDEL) and Luis Gil Salguero (all three recently deceased).

4. Committee for Retired Persons

194. It was created in 1964 by members of the General Confederation for Rights of Retirees. Its leaders were Paulino Gonzales and Hector Cerruti, a member of the PCU.

5. National Womens' Committee

195. As in the case of the preceding, this also was founded in 1964. The following were representative members: Julia Arevalo de Roche and Sonia Lialous de Dutrenit, both affiliated with the PCU, Lyda Diaz, Reina Reyes, Elina Crottogini de Restuccia, Elsa Marenales, etc.

196. In 1965, the FIDEL established the so-called "People's Unity Board," with the aim of obtaining the affiliation of other groups that were not a part of it, by striving to incorporate the following:

- PS
- INI
- FAR
- People's Movement
- MAPU
- FAU
- MIR
- Socialist Movement
- MUSP

197. The political organization of the FIDEL is favored to a great extent by the PCU. Almost all of the committees and clubs of the FIDEL are in PCU headquarters. The following are in operation in Montevideo: 143 committees; 29 workers' committees; 24 women's committees; and 53

district committees; 14 retiree committees; and 10 agricultural workers movement committees; not counting the premises of other groups that adhere to the FIDEL.

198. The FIDEL organized and maintained the CEPS [expansion unknown], where classes were held in sociology, history, natural sciences, art, and partisan and ideological indoctrination, and where national and foreign communist conferences took place.

199. In the 1962 national elections, the FIDEL obtained 40,000 votes; and in the 1966 elections, 70,000 votes. In the 1971 elections, it was integrated with the FA, the new "communist broad front" that was ably orchestrated by the PCU with other Marxist groups.

o. FAR (Front For Renewed Advancement)

200. Formed in 1960 by a leftist Catholic group, including Omar Castro Bianchino, Oscar Galli, Nelson Brindisi, Oscar Balbi, Fernando Bauza, Jose Claudio Williman, and Eduardo Paysee Gonzalez, it published the magazine, POLITICA, of frankly pro-Marxist orientation, under the leadership of the last named.⁴⁰

p. MIR (movement of the Revolutionary Left)

201. As a result of the Sino-Soviet rivalry, a group belonging to the UJC withdrew from the UJC and became partisans of the Peking line, forming the MIR, at the end of August 1963.

An opponent of all "revisionism" it published the periodical, VOZ REBELDE, and later, VOZ OBRERA. It also issued weekly statements in the daily, EPOCA, to which it contributed in the latter's second period.

202. The most significant leader of the MIR was Julio Arizaga, OSE [State Board of Sanitation] engineer, an important former member of UJC, from which he was expelled for being pro-China and a former professor of UTU [Labor University of Uruguay], and Washington Rodriguez Belletti. The latter also militated in the UJC and later became involved in the labor union organization of the sugar workers who joined the UTAA [Artigas Sugar Workers Union], given a pro-China orientation by Raul Sendic.

The MIR strongly attacked the MUSP and the "orthodox" communists in EPOCA. Even harsher replies came from the columns of EL POPULAR, the official organ of the PCU.

203. MIR members included persons who were in charge of the ICUCH and the HSIN-JUA China News Agency, from which many of the members of the MLN-T came.

On the occasion of the 1971 national elections, it defined its position thus: "We Marxist-Leninists are seeking the destruction of the oligarchic and imperialist social system which reigns in Uruguay, because we wish to replace it with a new system based on national independence, on development of an autonomous economy which will open paths to socialism, and on support for the revolutionary struggle of the peoples of Latin America and the world against imperialism and social-imperialist revisionism."⁴¹

Later it stated: "Events have shown that the overall line that the movement established at the beginning of 1968 is basically correct. We very briefly summarize it as follows: mobilize the masses, building the party through the struggle; gradually determine its direction in order to organize, prepare, and guide the masses toward a people's war as the way to overthrow the government, for the purpose of driving out the imperialists and their lackeys and installing a National Democratic People's Government under the leadership of an organized proletariat, with the revolutionary PC in its vanguard. In order to win this Marxist-Leninist revolution, we will follow these three standards:

--Construct a proletariat party guided by the Marxist-Leninist thinking of Mao Tse-tung.

--Undertake armed struggle through a people's war.

--Establish a united revolutionary front based on an alliance of rural workers, under the direction of the working class.

In essence, our strategy is based on establishment of the people's revolutionary power, our preparatory tactics, and the outbreak of the people's war."⁴²

q. CAP (People's Action Center)

204. Founded at the end of 1963, it followed the pro-China anarchist line and consisted of some revolutionary youths who had no political conviction and by some "Catholics."

Its leaders were: Jose B. Gomensoro (director of the GACETA DE LA UNIVERSIDAD), Miguel Angel Pareja, Roque Fardone, Federico Rodriguez, Patricio Rode, and Alfredo M. Errandonea.

It published some issues of the monthly magazine, TAREA, managed by Ruben Prieto, and CUADERNOS DE ACCION POPULAR.

r. MUSP (Proletarian Socialist Unification Movement)

205. Founded at the end of 1965 by some ultra-radical members of the PS youths, including Felix Vitale, Julio Louis, Lujan Molins, Sila Contreras, Anibal Lopez Perez, and others, it was characterized politically by its open opposition to various of the remaining leftist organizations and, with respect to labor unions, against the orientation of the CNT [National Convention of Workers].

In December 1965, in the daily, EPOCA, it accused the PS of "trying to co-exist with the bureaucracy of the PCU and of the FIDEL," thus starting a furious animosity between the MUSP and the PCU. The MUSP was generally opposed to other pro-China groups.

s. MAPU (Unitary Popular Action Movement)

206. Constituted in 1966 by a Catholic student group known as the "La Teja Group,"⁴³ its leaders included Ricardo Vilaro, Victor Bacheta, Gustavo Cosse, Luis Eduardo Casamayou, Martin Ponce de Leon,⁴⁴ Luiz Labat, etc., and its center of gravitation was from the School of Engineering and the Secretariat of the FEUU[Federation of University Students of Uruguay].

The MAPU was part of EPOCA in its second period and maintained relations with the MLN-T.

Dissolved by executive power on 12 December 1967 along with other subversive groups, it resurged in 1969 under the name of GAU.⁴⁵

t. MPU (Unitary People's Movement)

207. Another small dissident group, separate from the PS but incorporated with the FIDEL, in July 1966 formed the MPU, led by Alberto Caymaris, Carlos Bouzas, Eduardo Platero, Anselmo Dorta, Rafael Bega, Alberto Rodriguez, Ariel Alvarez, and Oscar Cabrera. The latter was leader of the ICUCN [Expansion unknown].

The "splits" seemed to be more a matter of opportunism for those who thought they would find better possibilities within the FIDEL than within the pro-China PS.

208. The Revolutionary Christian Group of the MPU was constituted at the end of 1967 and was also integrated with the FIDEL. It was directed by Hugo D'Mattias, Julio Torres, and Ernesto Signorelli, lay director of the Malvin Methodist School.

u. CJUA (Anti-Imperialist Unitarian Youth Coordinator)

209. Formed in December 1966 with the youths of the PS, the FAU, the MRO, and the MIR, it published some manifestos⁴⁶ and then became extinct.

v. MURP (People's Revolutionary Unified Movement)

210. This was a small group that participated in the 1966 national elections in list 1818 in the Department of Montevideo and list 2020 in San Jose, obtaining a total of about 250 votes. Its members included militants of the MUSP and of some other organizations, such as Support For the Cuban Revolution, and Against Reform of the Constitution, etc.

w. ROE (Student-Worker Resistance)

211. This group sought in the resistance of existing worker, student, and district organizations that were united with the new political structures that had emerged with the formation of the FA the basis for "a political-social movement that would really be an alternative to the oligarchy."⁴⁷

Thus, just as for "revolutionaries there could be a free, socialist Uruguay integrated into a liberated continent, for a small group of exploiter bankers who are in power there is a lush Uruguay--a secure financial market for foreign monopolist capital that is linked to North American imperialism--an exporter of some few items that are of interest on the international market; and this Uruguay is inhabited by an impoverished, captive people whose blood they suck like leeches."⁴⁸

From 1967 on, it was possible to create a basic infrastructure.. "The new, the most important, the governing phenomenon of these recent years has been the worker and student struggle, the resistance, the action of the revolutionary organizations." Now a qualitative leap must be made; that is, at the level mainly of worker and student forces, which have been basic elements, together with vanguard revolutionary organizations that are operating at various levels.⁴⁹

x. Espartaco League

212. Created in July 1971, its founding manifesto, dated in Montevideo, August 1971, proclaimed the "anti-imperialist, anti-capitalist, and international nature of the revolution...The government is in the hands of the oligarchy, which uses power for its affairs. It concentrates all sectors of the bourgeoisie into the only bourgeois policy possible in the international capitalist system that is directed by imperialism, and gradually establishes a dictatorship...No country that breaks with imperialism can develop within the international capitalist system. Expropriations are

effective if no payment is made and if the enterprises and resources go not to national capital, but to the State. Also national development cannot be achieved in an isolated manner, but must be carried out by the worker classes through their national planning. Worldwide confrontation and the overthrow of imperialism and capitalism are the means of supporting national offensives of the revolution. The Espartaco League is being organized to apply marxist-leninist concepts...All the forces that desire an effective struggle against imperialism and capitalism are our allies...The reality of the revolution and the maturity and objectives of various worker and anti-imperialist movements make it urgent and possible to form a marxist-leninist party of the masses, through the United Revolutionary Front and fraternal discussion."

The Espartaco League declared itself solidly for the FA, for an anti-imperialist revolution, and for the formation of a Marxist-Leninist Party of the Masses, in the following terms:

--"For the Broad Front: in order to overthrow the dictatorship and to advance toward national and social freedom, through intensification of the political role of labor unions.

--For the Anti-Imperialist and Anti-Capitalist Revolution: through the United Socialist Revolutionary Front and the Broad Front and labor unions.

--For the formation of a Marxist-Leninist Party of the Masses." It announced the forthcoming appearance of a periodical, entitled COMBATE, etc.

y. MURANP (Revolutionary Unity Movement of National Peoples' Groups

213. Led by some MUSP members, such as Sila Contreras, Anibal Lopez Perez, and Lujan Molins, it pursued, as its ambitious title suggests, the "unity" of the remaining revolutionary groups.

z. FA (Broad Front)

214. In the 1971 national elections, with the conviction of being able to repeat Allende's successful Chilean experience, the FA appeared as a new constituent political conglomerate of a broader joint "front" to bring together the entire Left.

Contacts and lobbying for the formation of the FA were begun at the end of 1970 by the PCU (which on 4 September of that year received Salvador Allende, candidate of the Chilean UP, with great clamor, in Montevideo and continued up to the first days of February 1971, when it was formally made official.

215. The FA competed in the 26 November 1971 primaries under the banner of the PDC and obtained a total of almost 305,000 votes, which gave

them a strong parliamentary representation in both houses. One of the reasons for this result must be attributed to the efficiency of the FA's publicity and propaganda apparatus, to which reference is made later in connection with the Editorial Board of DE FRENTE, one of its most representative journalistic organs.³⁰ To a great extent, that propaganda, which presented the FA as the only choice capable of overcoming the deterioration of the country, took advantage of the growing decline in the prestige of the irresolute, titular, traditional parties of the governmental apparatus, whose neglect and inability to solve national problems resulted in a considerable loss of popular support.⁵¹

The CPU managed to install in the leadership of the new front persons who concealed the definitely Marxist-Leninist nature of the conglomerate to the electorate. Thus a military man, retired General Liber Seregni, was selected as president, and Dr. Juan J. Crottogini, a gynecologist and known pro-communist sympathizer, was selected as vice president. Both were presented as representatives of "independent" persuasion.

216. Some renegade political leaders of traditional parties also adhered to the FA: Zelmar Michelini and Alba Roballo, former leaders in list 15 of the "Batllismo" Colorado Party; Abraham Francisco Rodriguez Camusso, of the National Party, and various others.

217. The parliamentary representation of the FA was made up of the following: Senate--Enrique Rodriguez, A. Francisco Rodriguez Camusso, Enrique R. Erro, Zelmar Michelini, and Juan Pablo Terra; House of Representatives--Daniel Sosa Diaz, Oscar Bruschera, Carlos Baraibar, Hugo Batalla, Rodney Arismendi, Edmundo Soares Netto, Jaime Gerschuni Perez, Wladimir Turiansky, Juan R. Chenlo, Jorge Duran Matto, Luis Imas, Isidro Etchegoyen, Vivian Trias, Walter Martinez Gallinal, Carlos Texeira Varesi, Sebastian Elizeire, Ariel Diaz, and Antonio M. Carachu.

From these privileged positions the Marxist-Leninist front operated in behalf of the insurrection and attacked the government and the armed forces as much as possible. In particular, it tried to obstruct the struggle that the latter was carrying out against subversion and to present them as committed to a campaign of sadism and cruelty, including horrible tortures--in order to destroy their prestige.

After presenting the FA electoral issues in the 1971 primaries, that is, the "parliamentary road to socialism"--in the Chilean manner--its leader made a trip to the various "socialist" capitals of the continent, in order to see results first hand and to strengthen Latin American leftist relations--a tour that the frontist press discussed with enthusiasm, etc.



Seregni talks for three hours with Allende in Santiago.

z. 26 March Independents' Movement

218. It was established at the beginning of 1971 as an instrument within the legal front—at the labor union, social, and parliamentary levels—to express the political line of the MLN-T. It officially denied being a political party, but rather a "movement that grouped militants committed to carry out a task with certain minimal postulates and with a common plan of action within the framework of the FA, developing a parallel, close cooperation with all sectors, without exception. This pursuit did not involve a definite ideology, nor a strict discipline similar to what was required by the existence of a party, etc."⁵²

8255

The creation of the 26 March Movement was a result of that "critical support" given by the MLN-T [National Liberation Movement-Tupamaros] to the FA [Broad Front], seeking as has been seen to rally all of the Uruguayan leftist forces in a single group in order to decide the 29 November 1971 elections in their favor. Therefore, its coordination and integration with the FA, with the base committees of which it worked, was the basic guideline imposed by the MLN-T on this movement.

219. In December of 1971, one of its leaders, Mario Benedetti, boasted of the determination and creativity with which the militants in the 26 March Movement worked in the base committees, as well as in the student and worker sectors.⁵³

The executive committee of the 26 March Movement, or a part of it, met periodically with members and representatives of the MLN-T in the premises of the ASU [Uruguayan Trade Union Action] on Lavalleja Street, and in the home of Daniel Vidart, at 1117 Zubillaga Street. These meetings were regularly attended by members Mario Benedetti, Daniel Vidart and Domingo Carlevaro Bottero.⁵⁴ The movement was the means used by the MLN-T to send messages to Seregni, president of the FA, or to receive them from him. When it officially became a part of the FA, Carlevaro and Benedetti were its representatives to this group. Carlos Reverdito Viano, dean of the Faculty of Architecture and a collaborator of the MLN-T from the beginning, also contributed to the creation of the 26 March Movement.⁵⁵

Referring to the electoral support provided by the MLN-T to the FA, a later commentary by the seditious organizations said that this support was "contingent," and set forth other considerations of value as evidence based on real knowledge: "But it was on condition that base committees

would be created, by neighborhood or economic or professional units, which would make it possible for the first time to undertake a semilegal politization effort, leading to the creation of a mass movement. To the general surprise, these neighborhood committees multiplied throughout the whole country with the speed of light, and they won the participation of popular sectors which until then had shown no interest in any political action: artisans, pensioners, housewives, workers, shoulder to shoulder with members of the liberal professions, office workers, university and secondary school students. A month before the elections, there were in Montevideo 300 neighborhood base committees and 150 action committees. The movement, it is true, developed in less spectacular fashion in the interior of the country. Seeing the scope this undertaking was acquiring, all the leftist parties assigned militants to the base committees. These committees then became the forum for intensive ideological debates. Everything was discussed there, from the foreign indebtedness of the country to family problems. These committees organized their own financing, their self defense (often armed), their own day nurseries. Above all, the line of the militants close to the MLN was to allow the popular sectors to express their demands and then to lead them to the discovery of the ways to win their satisfaction. Thus it was that the problem of armed struggle was very often the heart of the discussion, and it was undoubtedly the line of the Tupamaros, expressed through a party: the '26 March Independents' Movement' which implemented it. At the time of the elections, the MLN controlled about 50 percent of the base committees and exerted influence over the others. The '26 March Independents' Movement,' because of the quality and quantity of its members, became the most important popular force in Uruguay except for the PC [Communist Party]."⁵⁶

Stripped of its self-congratulatory opinions and the exaggerations intended to impress foreign readers, the evaluation cited is eloquent concerning the political action carried out by the MLN-T through the vast apparatus set up in conjunction with the forces of the FA. This is a case of the practical application of the infectious power of the "focus," in accordance with the special meaning attributed by the MLN-T to the focus theory, as indicated by the author of the commentary quoted above, relying on the opinion of leader of the Argentine seditious group: "A member of the leadership of the FAR [Renewal Advance Front] has told us in effect: "We know that there is a deviation toward focus involving an effort to develop an isolated struggle of the masses. But what the Tupamaros have taught us precisely is that the focus cannot be called that, particularly if it is developed within the mass movement. The focus is the creator of awareness, of revolutionary conditions and organization to the extent that it simultaneously acquires the political experience of the masses."⁵⁷

It was precisely this role as a pathogenic agent for the masses that the MLN-T wanted to play, utilizing the 26 March Independents' Movement.

220. The varied range of groups which has just been seen was the result mainly of the atmosphere of unlimited political freedom in Uruguay which allowed all kinds of extremes and aberrations. But also, and as a

natural consequence, it was the result of old differences and the vacillating strategic and tactical approaches of the groups it inspired by the Marxist ideology as to the revolutionary path to be followed, and for a long time they made of these groups academies of sterile polemics, indicative in the long run of their lack of unity and competence, both cause and effect of their splintering.

When in the 1960's the path of armed struggle was implemented in practice by various guerrilla movements on the continent, but above all when the guerrilla fight was given a doctrinal body and organic structure thanks to the Tricontinental Congress and the LASO [Latin American Solidarity Organization], the revolutionary ferment latent in the national groups germinated in various seditious organizations, to which reference will be made farther on, and which, under the leadership of Castro communism, speedily embraced the path of armed struggle. This was the reason for the sudden proliferation of these organizations, which setting discussion aside began to be transformed into the revolutionary vanguards of the discursive political groups, rallying their more radical elements around the methods of direct action.

One of their theoreticians expressed this enthusiastically, in correcting the view of Debray about Uruguay and predicting the certain success of the revolutionary movement promoted from Havana, designed to internationalize subversion by integrating it in a process of continental scope: "...Only when the left launches armed revolution in vehement and forceful deeds, with a demonstrated and possible strategy, will the conditions be created for escaping the interminable discussions, the mutual recriminations, the monotonous theorization, the insults, the sensitivities, the hidden fears, the reciprocal mistrust. Until events come along and force polarization for or against, we will continue to witness the 'war of statements,' the contest of manifestos, the confrontations which are so negative today among leftist forces, and in the end, and this is the most serious thing, the prolongation in time of the hopes of the people... The guerrilla war which is coming ever closer forces the judicious theoretical discussions into the distance and demands a definition of those who want to regard themselves as in the vanguard of the struggle. In 1967, this is the case for Uruguay too. Urban insurrection or rural guerrilla warfare... What is not possible in an isolated Uruguay is on the other hand possible when integrated in the continental struggle... We Venezuelan, Ecuadorean, Chilean, Uruguayan, and Argentine brothers must unite in the revolutionary struggle to expel the Yankees forever from our land... The continental struggle opens up for our country vast possibilities, because in it we will overcome the peculiarities and the obstacles which, in an isolated Uruguay, led Debray to believe that we were an exception."⁵⁸

3. Socio-Cultural Groups

221. In this category there were a great variety of "front" groups (associations, movements, committees, institutes) which the communists constantly created and recreated for many varied purposes with their characteristic ubiquity. Among others, the following should be mentioned:

a. Atheneum of Uruguay

222. It developed as a result of a schism in the old Atheneum of Montevideo, which occurred between the noncommunists and the pro-communist members who had been infiltrating the institution since World War II.

It was the latter who, on 15 July 1961, founded the Atheneum of Uruguay, which subsequently served as the headquarters and tribune for widely different groups and representatives of domestic and foreign communist and pro-communist forces.

Among its key members were Eugenio Petit Munoz, Reina Reyes, Carlos Manuel Rama, Daniel Vidart, Ernesto D. Guerrini, etc.

b. Uruguayan Movement for Peace

223. An affiliate of the World Peace Council, its most important leaders were Ruben Fratelli and his wife, Leonor Susana Tuffano, Mario Garcia Dobal, Edmundo Soares Netto, Jesus Bentancourt Diaz, Victorio Cassartelli, etc. It had offices in the premises of the APU, notoriously communist oriented.

c. Congress of the People

224. Organized in the early months of 1965, the National Representative Assembly of the Congress of the People was held on 1 July 1966 in the Montevideo University Hall, with delegates from some 70 organizations of varied origins (trade unions, student, university, artistic, professional and other groups) attending. On this occasion, a National Coordinating Council of the Congress of the People was created, which brought out a number of statements pertaining to education, public health and other similar topics. On 17 November of that same year, 1966, the Congress of the People held another "Special Day." Active in its secretariat was Felix Diaz Clavijo, a member of the Central Committee of the PCU [Communist Party of Uruguay] and leader of the port workers, etc.

d. Uruguayan Committee of the LASO

225. Created at the end of 1966 under the sponsorship of Havana, this group underwent a contest between pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese factions to gain control of the leadership. The former predominated over the latter, in a ratio of 8 to 3, in the representation of 13 delegates attending the LASO Conference in July-August 1967. As was seen in Chapter 2, the pro-Soviet members included Arismendi, Caymaris, Gonzalez, Elichirigoity, Soares Netto, Bruera and Iglesias; and the pro-Chinese faction included Collazo, Baldovino and Diaz.

Although the pro-Castro line, represented at the conference by a majority of the delegates, won out at the conference, in Uruguay, the PCU, much more powerful and better organized than the pro-Castro or pro-Chinese groups, kept the tug of war for dominance in the local LASO committee latent.

e. National Committee for Defense of Freedoms

226. Created on 13 January 1967 by a widely diverse range of communist and pro-communist groups, it provided a sizzling fireworks display of communiques and manifestos in the publicity organs of the PCU, the PS [Socialist Party] EL POPULAR, EL SOL, and the pro-Chinese periodical EPOCA, and then sank into lethargy.

227. The pro-Soviet groups revived it in March of 1968, baptizing it with a new and more sonorous name -- "National Movement for the Defense of Democratic Freedoms." Its executive board was made up of the rector of the university, Oscar J. Maggiolo, the editor of MARCHA, Carlos Quijano, Socialist Party leader Jose Pedro Cardozo, the vice president of the FIDEL [Leftist Liberation Front], Edmundo Soares Netto, representative of the PDC [Christian Democratic Party] Daniel Sosa Diaz, member of the PCU and leader of the AUTE [Union of UTE [Uruguayan Workers Union] Workers] Wladimir Turiansky, the Catholic priest Mauricio Garcia, and the leader of the Evangelical Church, Julio de Santa Ana Sommaruga, who was appointed secretary general. Collaborators with this movement included deputies Hector Gutierrez Ruiz, Hugo Batalla, Jose Luis Massera and Juan Pablo Terra, Senators Alba Roballo, Abraham Francisco Rodriguez Camusso and Enrique Rodriguez, and various other individuals, including Manuel Andres Dibar Curuchet, Adolfo Aguirre Gonzalez, Jose D'Elia, Jesualdo Sosa,⁵⁹ Jose Alberto Arlas, Alfredo Gravin, Ricardo Caritat, Reynaldo Gargano, Haroldo Galeano, etc.

The communist maneuver to insure that this committee would lead to a "popular front" could not be crystallized because of the frustrated attempts at liberation from the Muscovite yoke which occurred in Czechoslovakia in August of 1968 and were immediately crushed by Soviet tanks. This led to internal dissension between those who approved the Soviet invasion and those who condemned it, etc.

f. Editorial Council of DE FRENTE

228. On 2 September 1969, another effort to create a "popular front," of which the communists dreamed, was undertaken, with the publication of the daily newspaper DE FRENTE, the editorial council of which was made up of representatives of the whole left wing: Abraham Francisco Rodriguez Camusso, Sergio Previtali Roballo, Emilio Castro Pombo, Luis Pedro Bonavita, Juan Pablo Terra, Arnaldo Spadaccino, Jose D'Elia, Roberto Ares Pons, Luis Faropa, Jose Alberto Arlas, Manuel Claps, Gustavo Beyhaut, Mario Benedetti, Julio Herrera Vargas and Carlos Real de Azua.

This conmingling of eloquence was to bear fruit a year later, with the creation of the FA.

The publishing enterprise for DE FRENTE was Alberbea, S.A., headed by the pro-communist Luis Alberto Viera, and the creator, promoter and executor of the publicity mechanism, Federico Fasano Mertens.

To a great extent, the rapid preelectoral projection of the FA was to be due to the publicity and propaganda activities of such daily newspapers as DEMOCRACIA, DE FRENTE, YA, EL ECO, etc., undertaken and managed with a bold, unbiased and sensationalist journalistic approach, in which the news technique exploiting typefaces, color, design and photography was combined with a search for the news, provocation of it and even in many cases its fabrication, without weighing the consequences in terms of insult or libel, but seeking a striking and devastating effect on the public and the winning of the market. This was a journalistic concept and policy which in practice had been unknown up to that time in the country, one based on a deliberate plan to forge and make available to the leftist groups a publicity tool for recruiting the masses such as to allow them to gain power rapidly. Without a doubt, the guiding spirit of this enterprise was the previously mentioned Fasano, of Argentine nationality, a law student who regarded himself as a disciple of Joseph Pulitzer, Natalio Botana and Moises Jacobi, having a background as a journalist with EL BIEN PUBLICO, the periodicals REPORTER and MERCADO COMUN, the Channel 10 daily telecast, the SODRE [Official Radio Electric Broadcasting Service], Prensa Latina, EL PAIS, LA MANANA, EL DIARIO, BP COLOR, the weekly DE FRENTE, EXTRA, etc.

Collaborating with Fasano, and/or closely linked by function, although not always necessarily adopting the same political or ideological position, was a varied complex of journalists whose activities with regard to subversion are reflected in various parts of this work: Gugemberg Charquero, Carlos Maria Gutierrez, Luis Koifman, Samuel Gonzalo Blixen Garcia, Eduardo Paysee Gonzalez, Elina Berro, Jose Ruben Bottaro Giordano, Adhemar Jorge Acerenza, Luis Alberto Etchepare,⁶⁰ Lil Gonella de Chohuy Terra, Romeo Perez, Luis Alberto Soria, Roberto Leal, Jorge Luis Orstein, Antonio Perez Garcia, Haroldo Galeano, Alberto Alonso, Roberto Copelmayer, Pedro Alfonso, Luis Iguini, Alvaro Sanjurjo, Roman Lopez Silveira, Carlos Galione, Armando Ubal, Enrique Berro, Roberto Zunini, etc.

Referring to the editorial council of DE FRENTE, Fasano himself said, in a skillful demonstration of the Marxist technique of self-praise, that in it "the four political parties which had won parliamentary seats, the two most important churches in Uruguay, the entire workers movement united in its Workers Center, and the most prestigious professors, economists, historians and writers were represented in it. The editorial council of DE FRENTE would have been a luxury for any newspaper. It was the first institutionalized seed of what was later to be that great popular movement which shifted the traditional parties on their foundations."⁶¹

Finally, to the arts inherent in their functions, this publicity and propaganda group of the FA added the skill of survival: when DE FRENTE was shut down, YA appeared; when YA was shut down, EL ECO emerged; all of them managed by the same team, headed by Fasano Mertens, and with the same orientation and techniques of scandal, until EL ECO was shut down on 30 December 1971. This time the measure also affected the workshop of the Alborada S.A. publishing house, where it was printed.

g. Committee for the Support of the Cuban Revolution

229. With some variations in its name, this movement succeeded in sustaining itself, beginning in 1961, being promoted by the PCU and other pro-Chinese groups which wanted people to see in Fidel Castro's Cuba an example of what they proposed for Uruguay. Thus there appeared and functioned a "Movement for Solidarity with Cuba" and a "National Coordination Committee for Support of the Cuban Revolution," which sponsored meetings and gatherings at which Cuban films were shown and Castro communist propaganda distributed, etc.

h. Committee for the Support of Vietnam

230. Founded in 1965, this group held an artistic festival called "The Night of Vietnam" on the esplanade of the Montevideo Municipal Administration. Participants included communist actors, dancers, singers and folk artists and there was a film exhibit. As in the preceding case, changes came about in the name of this committee: "Vietnam Committee," "Vietnam Day in Montevideo Committee," etc.

i. Uruguayan Section of the Bertrand Russell Foundation

231. It engaged in intensive activities from 1967 on, propagandizing the "genocide" in Vietnam noisily, along with other similar slogans. In that year it sponsored a visit to Montevideo by Russell himself, etc.

j. Other Movements

232. Finally, on the most varied pretexts, many other groups and committees were established, and through them the communists, implementing their well known strategy of deception, attempted to exploit popular support by taking over any symbol capable of achieving this result for it. These included the Feminine Movement for Justice and Social Peace, National Anti-racist Committee, Ana Frank Movement, Friends of Africa Cultural Association, Afro-Oriental Institute, Uruguayan Commission for the Defense of Hydrocarbons and Ores, National Tenants Front, Movement to Recover Salto Grande, Youth Movement for Rural Change, Popular Movement for the Liberation of the Social Fighters, Association for Lay Education, National Movement for the Support and Defense of Public Schools, etc.

233. There was also a series of committees "for the liberation of political prisoners," which in the final analysis were nothing but evidences of solidarity with communism in those countries in which it was suffering reverses: the Provisional Committee for Struggle for the Liberation of the Paraguayan Political Prisoners,⁶² Committee of Uruguayan Parliamentarians for the Liberation of the Political Prisoners in Paraguay, Movement for Solidarity with the Paraguayan People, Movement for Solidarity with the Arab Peoples, Uruguayan Commission on Solidarity and Cultural Exchange with the Spanish People, Commission on Solidarity with the Brazilian Refugees, Movement for Solidarity with the Brazilian People, Movements for

Solidarity with the Argentine People, Bolivian People, Dominican People, Revolutionary Government of Peru, Guatemalan People, Greek People, etc.

234. When the arrests of the first members of the seditious groups began in 1964, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Social Fighters raised a clamor over the three workers who robbed a bank; and with the intensification of anti-subversive action, a Committee for the Families of Political Prisoners was established. Its activities were designed to promote domestic and international propaganda in favor of sedition, and to denounce "arbitrary actions" and "torture" in order to discredit the FFCC [Carabineers' Forces], in cooperation with the leaders of the seditious organization. Extensions of this kind of movement, which on the basis of gross distortions and inaccuracies sought to exploit the popular credulity with the tale of the political prisoners included the various committees which the members of the seditious groups themselves established in those countries where, when the MLN-T suffered military destruction, they took refuge. Thus the Committee for the Defense of Political Prisoners in Uruguay was established in Argentina, engaging in propaganda efforts and promoting various gatherings, such as that held on 19 April 1974 in the premises of the Argentine Boxing Federation in Buenos Aires.⁶³ Others included the CDPPU [Committee for Defense of Political Prisoners in Uruguay], which functioned in France beginning in 1971, in conjunction with the Chilean, Latin American and Anti-Imperialist Base Committees, and their counterparts in Italy (CDDPPU), Switzerland (GRISUR), Belgium (CIRU), etc. The heads of the DCCPPU in France and Italy and the CIRU in Belgium were Alain Labrousse, Maria Sagastizabal and Roger Stecke, respectively. Consistent with the position of the MLN-T, the French CDPPU considered, for example, that "the military dictatorship in Uruguay cannot be vanquished except by violent struggle on the part of the Uruguayan masses. This is the reason for the proclaimed support of the revolutionary struggle of the Uruguayan people," etc.⁵⁴

235. Finally, reference should be made to the extensive series of ICUs [Uruguayan Cultural Institute], infiltration centers hiding behind the facade of "cultural" relations between Uruguay and various communist countries.

The ICUS [Uruguayan-Soviet Cultural Institute], established in December of 1945, at the end of World War II, profiting from the confusion created by the Soviet alliance with the western powers, is the oldest of all, even having branches in some departments in the interior, such as Paysandu, Rivera and San Jose. It had a long list of supporters, among whom the following should be mentioned: Osvaldo Luzardo, Maria Luisa Santamarina, Armando Rey Lopez, Alberto Capano, Zulma Amaro, Adolfo Bornstein, Maria J. Gelpi, Marcelo Sosa, Laura Maidana, Gualberto Urrutia, Francisco Bonilla, Lola S. de Buscarons, Isaac Crinstein, Luis Texeira, Osvaldo Codesido, Juan Carlos Badano, Chichi de Cerrutti Crosa, Miguel Sanchez Canosa, Juan Carlos Viera, Jesualdo Sosa, Sarandi Cabrera, Virginia Castro, Hugo Rodriguez, Marisa Viniars, Elder Cabrera, Gutemberg Martinez, Leonel Perdomo, Aramis Tavarez, Pablo Doudchitzky, Juan Larrosa, Orgelio Pisani,

Nilbia C. Arias, Wilson Armas, Olga Gleiser, Marx Shatz, Orleans Filgueiras, Hilario Lozaga, Atahualpa del Cioppo, Pedro Toledo, Lydia Chassale, Elbio Camerota, Alfredo Gravina, Ariel Badano, Pedro Ferreira Berrutti, Alejandro Magdalena, Guillermo Garcia Moyano, Atilio Trenchi, etc.

236. The ICUP, established in June of 1967, had among its members Rodolfo Talice, Carlos Alberto Herrera McLean, Luis Isern, Franciso Espinola, Paulina Medeiros, Maria Esther Gilio, Luis Alberto Varela, etc. In 1968, a branch of the ICUP was founded in San Jose.

237. The ICUB, the leadership of which included and/or includes Angel Maria Cusano, Daniel D. Vidart and Ruben Svetogorsky.

238. The ICURDA [Uruguayan-German Democratic Republic Cultural Institute], created in October of 1964, had among its members Guillermo Israel, Atahualpa del Cioppo, Jesualdo Sosa, Carmen Portela de Sosa, Dolores Castillo, Luis Hierro Gambardella, Celiar Garmendia, Norberto Costabel, Dalmiro Robledo, Elsa Antuna, Daniel Perez, Gerardo Fernandez, Maris Esther Gilio, Victor Brindisi, Carlos Casalis, Reina de Casalis, Lyda Diaz, Irma Laitano, Luis Silva Reheman, Raquel Cortinas de Vidal, Ignac Ruben Huguet, Sixto Barrios, Indalecio Buno, Muzio Marella, Kempis Vidal, Juan Protasi, Carlos Fossatti, Eugenio Darnet Caravia, Abraham Francisco Rodriguez Camusso, Luis Rinon Perret, Juan Carlos Fa Robaina, Juan Adolfo Singer, Jorge Chebataroff, Raul Ferreira, etc.

239. The ICUC [Uruguayan-Cuban Cultural Institute], created in 1967, maintained links with Cuba which were interrupted after relations were broken off in 1964. It showed Cuban films and held meetings and other Castro propaganda gatherings.

240. The ICUCH [Uruguayan-Chinese Cultural Institute], founded in 1959, had among its members Enrique Martinez Moreno, Zelmar Michelini, Abraham Francisco Rodriguez Camusso, Francisco Mario Ubillos, Glauco Segovia, Daniel D. Vidart, Raul Previtali, Sarandi Cabrera Pinon, Eliseo Salvador Porta, Ruben Nunez, Francisco Musetti, Felipe Novoa, Lirio Rodriguez, Emilio de Concilio, Ruben Yacovsky, Cesar del Castillo Lussich, Jose Luis Badano, Samuel Rey Vercesi, Guarani Cabrera, Alfredo Gravia, Julio Arizaga, etc.

The ICUCH exhibited Chinese films and organized lectures and trips to Peking. Among those who made such trips to visit China as special guests were Pablo Fierro, Daniel D. Vidart, Victor Brindisi, Lorenzo Pons, Sarandi Cabrera, Ruben Nunez, Zelmar Michelini, Severino Alonso, Milton de Martini, Luciano Da Silva, Luis Oribe Alemany, Carlos Gomez, Hector Rodriguez, Mario Benedetti, Ariel Collazo, etc.

241. The ICUCO, established in July of 1968, was headed by Lil Gonella de Chohuy Terra, Oscar Cabrera, Luisa N. de Cabrera, Francisco Espinola, Atahualpa del Cioppo, Jesus Bentancourt Diaz, Gerardo Fernandez, Enrique Rubio, etc.

4. Religious Groups

242. The promulgation of Marxist and guerrilla warfare theories which, resolutely promoting violence, sought to impose change on society had to be so forceful that its influence would not escape even the Catholic Church itself.

In a curious philosophical and practical alliance with Marxism, many priests, monks and lay personnel attempted in fact to mobilize the spiritual power of the church organization in favor of change and revolution. This mobilization was resisted by a tottering and ill situated hierarchy, in the light of the trepidation of a disoriented mass of believers who found themselves being imperceptibly moved toward a challenge of the very foundations of the institution.

The words of Lenin to the effect that "it is not necessary to confront the church, but to infiltrate it" are implemented in masterly fashion in the techniques proposed and utilized by certain Latin American religious movements, particularly the so-called "Christian or Socialism" referred to previously.

The theories of Paulo Freire, the Brazilian educator and ideologist, in his presentation of the "liberating education," the "theology of violence" or the "pedagogy of the oppressed" fall within this line, which was followed in Uruguay, for example, by the periodicals VISPERA and PERSPECTIVAS DE DIALOGO, sponsored by "Pax Romana" and the Jesuits, respectively, and also, with an equally "progressive leftist" attitude but not to such a committed extent, the Montevideo Ecclesiastical Curia publication INFORMACIONES.

If indeed the church does not have such decisive weight in a predominantly secular country such as Uruguay, and in addition suffers from internal schisms which weaken it, it nonetheless made its contribution to subversion. Not as an institution as such, but to the activities of certain groups of false Christians it sheltered.

The decidedly shocking thing about the personal attitudes on the part of priests, monks and laymen lies in their presumption in using the church as a tool of their political-social choices, an incipient trend which the institution was not energetic enough to neutralize. The errors and/or deviations by individuals cannot be blamed on institutions, although these latter should indeed be reproached when they do not correct what it is their duty to correct promptly.

What has been said about the Catholic Church could also be said of the other churches existing in the country, with minor variations.

Relying on the new movements toward fraternal cooperation, progressive action and dialogue with Marxism, a certain number of Uruguayan and foreign

priests active in the workers sectors adopted positions which allowed young Catholic militants to reconcile their faith and support of the armed revolution comfortably. A similar situation occurred with the Protestant congregations, in which some sectors tending toward subversion were concentrated in the Methodist Church.

It is obvious that these "modern" religious tendencies lead individuals to fall into the "old" traps set for the incautious by atheist-Marxist totalitarianism, already tested in earlier epochs and other places with equal opportunism and bad faith. The dialogue of the present is no different from the old slogan of "the open hand" from the 1930's, for the promotion of which France was chosen in that era, as more recently Italy was selected, and now the sights are being trained on Latin America, which shows that the communists carefully select the zones they regard as most favorable for the application of their demoralizing and destructive techniques.

The prophetic warning by Pope Pius XI went unheeded: "Communism is intrinsically perverse and it is not possible to accept collaboration with it on the part of those who want to save Christian civilization in any field."⁶⁵ Even the Second Vatican Council itself had to tolerate the innovation of urgings toward "modernized" reconstruction of the world proposed by those newfangled movements in some ecclesiastical sectors who were said by Pope Paul VI to "find beautiful, worthy of imitation and defense of all that they see abroad, and intolerable and subject to challenge or out of date everything which is our own,"⁶⁶ and who were condemned by Monsignor de Proenca-Ligaud, Archbishop of Diamantina, Brazil, who warned that the idea "of the reconstruction of the world is dangerous and may lead to catastrophe; the Tower of Babel, too, sought a new construction of the world."

As the Chilean Bishops Conference put it in the profound theological-pastoral commentary "Christian Faith and Political Action," which was approved at the ordinary plenary assembly in Punta de Tralca in April of 1972, a priest and/or monk cannot participate in the kind of movements which "seek to assign to the church tasks or to obtain intervention or support from it inconsistent with its own mission, and even distorting it in substantial aspects of the faith and evangelical morality."

This generalized situation in the current Latin American church is characteristic of Uruguay too, presenting a picture which Juan P. Fernandez summarized with clarity and wisdom in the following words: "Marxist infiltration in the Latin American church is a fact known to all. It has been denounced not only by the daily press on the continent, but also by authorized leaders of the Latin American church. It is possible to speak of a real Marxist clerical conspiracy of continental and intercontinental scope designed to bring about the triumph of the Marxist revolution. A cornerstone of the conspiracy is the "Christians for Socialism" Movement supported by Fidel Castro, which has had its headquarters in Santiago de Chile up to the present. This is an international group of priests, nuns and monks, laymen and Protestant pastors with connections, support groups and

influence throughout America and Europe, working openly to "launch the church and Christians into the struggle for Marxism and the Marxist revolution in Latin America," in the words of the Cardinal Archbishop of Santiago de Chile.

The movement as such acquired official public status on the occasion of the "First Latin American Encounter of Christians for Socialism," held in Santiago de Chile in April of 1972. Then came the meeting of the general staff in El Escorial, near Madrid, in July of the same year, and finally, at the Bologna, Italy, Congress. But its ideologists and adherents (Chileans, Peruvians, Brazilians, Argentines, Colombians, Uruguayans, Spaniards, Frenchmen and Italians) worked in skillful concert well before that, succeeding in infiltrating their ideas and their men into the pastoral movement of the church, both on the base and in the leadership level.

Some of the promoters, ideologists and supporters of the movement are well known: the Brazilian curate Hugo Assmann (today an apostate); the Peruvian priests Gustavo Gutierrez Merino and Segundo Galilea; the Chilean Jesuits Gonzalo Arroyo and Renato Poblete; the Belgian priest Joseph Comblin (expelled from Brazil); the Italian-French theologist Julio Girardi; the Argentine priests Aldo Buntig, Jose Miguez Bonino and Lucio Gera; the Uruguayan Jesuit Juan Luis Segundo and the so-called "Catholic" writer Hector Borrat (editor of VISPERA). Anyone reading the texts and publications in which the spokesmen of "Christians for Socialism" set forth their thinking will clearly perceive that the basic guidelines of the Montevidean pastoral action were dictated by the same inspiration, use the same language and slogans. He who reads the Document of the Chilean Bishops Conference will find subjected to strict examination by the bishops and harshly rejected concepts and attitudes which are commonplaces in the pastoral action, the catechizing and the preaching to which many of our priests have accustomed us.

The identification between the movement the Chilean bishops condemned and the pastoral orientation of these priests was no accident.

One of the main ideologists of the movement -- along with Julio Girardi and Gutierrez Merino -- an agent and activist on the continental level and a member of the sponsoring commission of the Santiago de Chile Encounter was the presentday apostate Hugo Assmann.

Hugo Assmann, a Brazilian curate of German origin, until 1969 a professor at the seminary in Porto Alegre, left Brazil when his links with Brazilian terrorists became known. After a brief stay in Germany, he resumed his work as an international agitator in Montevideo. In his stays there, his hosts were the Jesuits on Agraciada Avenue (Segundo, Cetrulo, the then Dario Ubilla and other "selected aides"). With the approval of the Archbishop Coadjutor Monsignor Parteli and the pastoral team, he worked effectively in indoctrinating laymen and priests. The MIEC [International Movement of Catholic Students], which worked in the realm of the university

parish under the direct jurisdiction of the pastoral team of the Archdiocese of Montevideo, undertook the publication of various of Father Assmann's opuscles, in which he set forth his Marxist interpretation of Christianity and Christian action. They were printed in the graphic workshops of the Community of the South, an anarchistic group closely linked with the cultural activities of the MIEC.

In charge of the MIEC (as adviser or consultant) was Father Juan Bosco Salvia. This was the same Father Salvia who just prior to the elections, appeared on the television channels publicly supporting the communist candidates. It was the same Father Salvia who, as pastoral vicar, directed the Montevidean pastorate as personal representative of the Archbishop and the successor to Father Spadaccino,

On the invitation of the Pastoral Team of the Archdiocese, Father Hugo Assmann inaugurated the "1970 Priestly Encounter" on the theme "Political Reality and the Kingdom of God" on 1 October 1970. The periodical VIDA PASTORAL (the official publication of the episcopate), in its issue No 21 (September-October 1970), pages 16-25, reports on Hugo Assmann's address under the heading "The political dimensions of the faith, as the praxis of the historical liberation of man" (the title itself is sufficiently indicative).

According to the Montevideo Archdiocese Organization Team for the 1970 Priestly Encounter, that talk by Father Assmann should not only serve as an introduction to the encounter but also as a frame of reference, as a "general context for all later works" (Prologue to the volume "Priesthood and Politics," p 10). The ideas of Father Assmann formed the "general context" of all the pastoral work done in the Archdiocese.

In the volume "Priesthood and Politics," Monsignor Haroldo Ponce de Leon, Vicario General of the Archdiocese, and a key figure in the pastoral orientation of the archdiocese, expressed his unconditional and enthusiastic support of Assmann's ideological system, referring to the "splendid and rich address by Father Assman" (that delivered on 1 October) (first column, p 59).⁶⁷

"The Marxist theology of Assmann is the pastoral theology of Monsignor Haroldo Ponce de Leon, Father Salvia and Father Spadaccino, and consequently, that which guides all the pastoral action of the church in Montevideo entrusted to them."⁶⁸

These statements point directly to the ideological infiltration by various members of the ecclesiastical leadership in Montevideo, but also, by natural gravitation, in many groups and movements, more or less "catholic" or "confessional," whose sociopolitical concerns copied the confusion in which many priests, monks and laymen lived.

Thus it is possible to explain the widely varied list of movements which sought the shelter of an avowed religious belief, and to understand the true dimensions and dangerous aspects of their activities, directed by those who knew how to use and profit from guileless individuals, but whose "guilelessness" in the majority of cases and in view of the results, is not valid as an excuse nor as justification.

Also it is only thus that one can explain the extensive collaboration and/or participation by priests, monks and laymen with the communists and the seditious organizations, and the state of uneasiness and anarchy this caused in the parishoners and within the church itself.

The meetings held at the beginning of 1970 in the Rosario de Livramento Church, a block from the Rivera International Park, between members of the MLN-T and priests Rangel and Bentancur are no fantasies. The former was the adviser to the JEC [Catholic Student Youth] in Porto Alegre, and the latter, in the parish of the Church of the Immaculate Conception in Rivera. Their meetings were for the purpose of learning about the goals of the seditious organization, supported by Rangel but not by Bentancur, who had reservations, the compatibility of the priesthood and guerrilla warfare even being discussed.

Toward the end of that same year, 1970, another similar meeting was held with the priest Dario Ferreira, of the Santo Domingo Church in Rivera, who supported the organization, but with reservations. And in the final months of 1971, a further meeting was held with the priest Solon Verissimo del Castillo who in the end joined the MLN-T and worked for the seditious group on the political level, supplying it with information. The priest Arambillete, of Minas de Corrales, adopted a position analogous to that of Bentancur and Ferreira. All of them participated in the smuggling of Brazilian terrorists and spiriting them into Montevideo. On the death of Marighela, a plan for secret crossings of the frontier ending in the Rivera parish of Santo Domingo was discovered. That was the parish where Verissimo was vicar, and the plan was drafted by Rangel, who was trying to introduce members of the vanquished guerrilla gang into Uruguayan territory. In Salto, the priest Manuel Dibar Curuchet worked for the MLN-T, with responsibility for the political sector, and his collaborator was Bishop Marcelo Mendiara himself. The same situation occurred with the priest in La Teja, etc.

These are only some samples of the participation of certain Uruguayan priests in seditious activities. But what is truly important does not lie here, but in the centers of ideological influence, the foreign and domestic seedbeds responsible for the germination of this action, without an understanding of which this cannot be understood or fully evaluated.

The fact is that, consistent with the well remembered Leninist decree, the communists pursued a patient and skillful work of penetrating the religious associations and structures through the so-called "Christian-inspired left," in which positions ranging from the "liberal Catholicism"

of Lamennais, through the "progressive Catholicism" of Maritain, to the modern "Marxist Catholicism" promoted by "Christian" ideologists" of the likes of Veckemans,⁶⁹ Illich⁷⁰ and Comblin⁷¹ alternated and intermingled, providing the major guidelines allowing the structuring of the international and domestic fronts of these movements,

Given the impossibility of an examination in depth of the complex network formed by the numerous institutions of the current "Christian" revolutionary movement, the more important ones will be listed below.

a. The International Front

243. The DESAL [Latin American Center for Socio-Economic Development], in Santiago, and the CIF [Intercultural Training Center], in Cuernavaca, and the Recife Theological Center referred to previously all had the advice and tutelage of the Belgian priest Franciso Houtart, of the FERES [International Federation of Catholic Socio-Religious Research Institutes] in Louvain, which had a branch in Bogota, where for a number of years the Colombian guerrilla priest Camilo Torres Restrepo worked.

All of these Catholic trends worked intensively on the trade union level by means of short training courses and study seminars, which adhered strictly to the orientational schemes formulated by their ideological centers, to bring about the political adaptation of the students.

Among the main Christian-Marxist ideological and political centers, the following should be mentioned:

244. The CLASC [Latin American Federation of Christian Trade Unionists], with its headquarters first in Santiago de Chile, and later transferred to Caracas, where it currently operates. The CLASC is the regional body of the IFCTU [International Federation of Christian Trade Unions], with headquarters in Brussels, directed by August Van Istendael and Franz Joseph Krefftmeyer, Belgians, who instructed and guided Jose Goldsack, in Chile, and Emilio Maspero, in Argentina, who, at the head of the CLASC, mobilized a substantial mass of workers and peasants toward the revolutionary sector.

245. The JUDCLA [Latin American Christian Democratic Youth], a branch of the UIJDCA [International Union of Christian Democratic Youth] had as its mission the supplying of the Christian Democratic parties with cadres from among the young people, and it was headed by Jean Paulo Moncaggata, of Ecuador, Bernardo Lelev Osuna, of Venezuela, and Hilarion Cardozo, of Argentina. The UIJDC, with headquarters in Rome, was headed by Angelo Bernasola, of Italy, and Estanislao Gevarth, of Poland, who was closely linked with Boleslao Piasecki, of the Polish PAX. Piasecki and PAX worked for years through the periodical INFORMATIONS CATHOLIQUES INTERNATIONALES, headed by the Christian Democrat Georges Hourdin, a Frenchman, and designed to bring about the conversion of French Catholics to Marxism.

246. The ORMEU, for a number of years under the jurisdiction of the ODUICAL, which in turn came under the CELAM [Latin American Bishops Council] and the International Commission of the PDC [Christian Democratic Party] of Chile, was another important body in this complex. Founded on the initiative of the Bishop of Panama, Marcos Graff, while he was secretary to the first president of the CELAM, Monsignor Larrain (deceased), both of whom from 1958-1959 on, encouraged the formation of "Christian-inspired" groups, the ORMEU had as its goal the organization of seminars and annual gatherings of Hispanoamerican students for the planning of joint and coordinated action on the university level, functioning under the leadership of Otho Bohle and Fernando Sanhueza, of Chile, under the guidance of the CPU, which in turn came under the CODACE, which is the body entrusted with receiving financial resources and distributing them among the various trade union bodies.

247. The IDEFEC, with headquarters in Caracas, headed by Aristides Calvani, the Venezuelan minister of foreign affairs, and Enrique Perez Olivares, also of Venezuela, maintained close links with the Eicholz political academy in Bonn, controlled by Peter Molt and K. J. Hahn of Germany, and operated a special type of "Itinerant Courses," involving tricks by paid propagandists to various countries to give political training courses.

248. The CMDC [World Council of Christian Democrats], which works in coordination with the ODCA [Christian Democratic Organization of America], of which all the Christian Democratic parties are members, meets every 2 years, one time in Europe and the next in America, to formulate joint plans for action and mutual aid. It is through this channel that very close relations exist among members of the UIJDC, the CISC, etc., such as Jean Lecanuet and Andre Colin, of France, Amintore Fanfani, Mariano Rumor, and Angelo Bernasola, of Italy, Peter Molt and K. J. Hahn of Germany, Rafael Caldera, of Venezuela, Eduardo Frei and Rodomiro Tomic, of Chile, etc.

249. When it came to the financing of these bodies and their activities, there were two kinds: as the groups moved away from the ecclesiastical order, they received money from the foundations of the German Episcopate: Misereor and Adveniat.⁷² Then, and as the trade union groups and social studies centers advanced, economic aid came from the following sources:

The International Solidarity Institute, with offices in Brussels, Bonn and Rome, with Augusto Van Istendael, Peter Molt and Estanislao Gevarth authorizing the subsidies;

The Institute for International Youth Affairs, with headquarters in New York, represented by Jaroslav Zichj and Janus Slezynsky;

The Ariel Foundation, with headquarters in London, etc.

250. The majority of the leaders of the Christian Democratic or Social Christian Parties of Latin America, the Christian trade unions, the similarly affiliated university unions and the so-called "prophetic" and "advance" groups passed through the training centers mentioned above, where they were inculcated in the "new" ecclesiastical doctrine which was to sweep them into the arms of communism, guerrilla warfare and continental revolution.

b. The Domestic Front

251. The international framework outlined above projected in action over the various countries in Latin America, including Uruguay, causing the outbreak of a conglomerate of movements and groups in the revolutionary or "progressive" "Christian movement," connected in one way or another with subversion.

In the following description of movements or associations with a religious denominational orientation or purely denominational, we will simply mention those which directly, due to their total politization, or indirectly, through quasi-politicized action, served to make possible, under the label of religion, the activities of subversive groups or the alteration of the thinking of many to the point of understanding or excusing these anti-national groups.

The purely "pastoral" action of the church will thus be seen to be compromised, up to a certain point, by a nonobjective interpretation of any given basic events, as occurred with the Second Vatican Council and the Medellin Assembly of the Latin American Bishops Council.

It was the twisted interpretation of the conclusions of these ecclesiastical gatherings which led to a series of distortions which, in Uruguay, were to be complicated -- or facilitated -- by the MLN-T and the preachings of the last electoral campaign.

Without any claim to completeness, the following is a list of the main national groups, which, behind the facade of religion and using the refined techniques of Marxism, sought to convert the church into a political force or to use its prestige to carry the masses along into vast compromise with subversion.

1) Camilo Torres Command

252. This organization was established by the Argentine Juan Jose Garcia Elorrio,⁷³ of the Polish PAX,⁷⁴ and the leadership of the Uruguayan sector was in the hands of Arnaldo Spadaccino and Mauricio Langon, a collaborator of the CIAS [Center of Social Investigation and Action] and information and doctrine secretary of the JDC [Christian Democratic Youth]. On 11 August 1970, Langon sent a letter to three militants in the PDC youth movement, of which he was a member, and which he had decided to leave

because "one can no longer regard the Christian Democrats as revolutionaries, but as allies of the oligarchy and imperialism, accomplices in repression, defenders of capitalism, enemies of the proletariat and therefore our enemies," after the party voted through the parliament to suspend constitutional guarantees, at the urging of the executive branch. "Thus," the lengthy letter ended, "the Christian Democrats I saw the other day attacking the legislative palace like true revolutionaries and shouting 'Tupamaros, yes, militiamen, no,' were attacking their real enemy, the class enemy, with whom there can be no dealing, and they were making a revolutionary choice," etc., which gives a clear notion of the position of the leaders of this group.

2) Camilo Torres Revolutionary Movement

253. Founded on 9 December 1967, this was the Soviet-inspired replica of the preceding movement. It was a part of the FIDEL, and its main leaders were Carlos M. Britos Huertas, Hilario Luis Pereira, Ramon Iglesias, Ruben Pereira, Ataides Tabarez and Fehsal Sabas Moreno.

3) Revolutionary Christian Group

254. Created on 14 December 1967 as an appendix of the MPU [United People's Movement], it has already been referred to earlier in dealing with this political group.⁷⁵

4) University Christian Movement

255. Formerly the JUC [Catholic University Youth] and the "University Parish," this movement was affiliated with the Roman PAX, with headquarters in Friburg, Switzerland, and had as its adviser Manuel Andres Dibar Curuchet.⁷⁶ When he was transferred to the Salto diocese, he was replaced in this post by Paul Dabezies, whose political position was analogous.⁷⁷ Other notorious members of this group were the priests Raul Sastre,⁷⁸ Juan Bosco Salvia,⁷⁹ Francisco Javier Artola,⁸⁰ Mauricio Garcia,⁸¹ and certainly the most notorious of all, although not the most important, Juan Carlos Zaffaroni Zubieta.⁸²

At the headquarters of the University Christian Movement and under the direction of Paul Dabezies, the weekly DOMINGO was published, beginning in the month of August 1968. Its main targets were young people and women.

5) CIAS [Center of Social Investigation and Action]

256. This center published the periodical PERSPECTIVAS DE DIALOGO [Prospects for Dialogue] under the direction of the Jesuits Juan Luis Segundo, Ricardo Cetrullo and Andres Assandri.

Cetrullo pursued intensive activity, projecting his "progressive" concerns to other Catholic institutions such as the ACDE, Juventus, the Catholic

Club, the Catholic Cultural Institute, the Association of Catholic Students and Professional Workers, etc., and wrote from time to time for the periodical published by the MIEC, VISPERA, etc.

Segundo, regarded by the Argentine periodical VERBO, No 84, as one of the leading figures in Uruguayan "progressivism," was also a contributor to VISPERA. Along with its editor, Hector Borrat, he represented Uruguay at the El Escorial Sessions in July of 1972 on "Christian Faith and Social Change in Latin America," at which he presented the reports "The Latin American Elites: a Human and Christian Problem with Regard to Social Change" and "The Religious Elites: Their Relation to Society and the Christian Community." With the establishment of the CIDOC [Intercultural Documentation Center] in Cuernavaca, under the direction of Monsignor Ivan Illich, Juan Luis Segundo, along with the priests Renato Pablete, a Chilean, and Segundo Galilea, a Peruvian, served as a part of its academic staff. In July of 1971, the CIDOC put out CUADERNO [Notebook] No 60, "Tupamaros," in which, on the basis of abundant documentation by the Tupamaros and in favor of them, a defense of the MLN-T was set forth, etc.

257. For his part, Borrat, who worked intensively with the Marxist groups to create the FA, was one of the most active organizers of the "Christians for Socialism" Congress held in Santiago de Chile in April of 1972. In issue No 3 of VISPERA, an article of his appeared entitled "With Joy and Hope?" which he signed, jointly with Segundo and Arturo Paoli (the latter a member of the "Little Brothers of Foucault"). Also with a certain frequency he published comments in his special field in MARCHA, of whose staff of collaborators he was a member, as has already been said, along with Juan Carlos Somma and Eduardo Paysee Gonzalez and the priests Cetrullo and Jean Baptiste Lassegue, etc.

6) MFC [Christian Family Movement]

258. This movement, founded by the priest Pedro Richard, MFC adviser for Latin America, very shortly slipped from the hands of its leaders into the control of the "progressive Catholics." Father Richard and the first directors of MFC, such as Federico Soneira, Adolfo Gelsi Bidart, etc., founded the CIEF in 1966 for the guidance and training of families.

The MFC functioned in full cooperation with the other "pastoral" groups. Enjoying basically optimal initial conditions, an admixture of socio-political interests developed which distorted its real direction.

7) Judeo-Christian Confraternity

259. An offshoot of the similar organization established in 1957 in the Republic of Argentina, and under the tripartite leadership of the priest Justo Asiain Marquez,⁸³ the Methodist pastor Emilio Castro Pombo⁸⁴ and a rabbi, this group attempted to explain, in ceremonies, meeting and lectures, how Christianity was consistent with revolutionary violence and the need for armed struggle in Latin America, etc.

8) The Roman PAX

260. Through one of its branches, the MIEC published a periodical VISPERA, mentioned previously, and was represented in Latin America by Cesar Aguiar Beltran, the son of Cesar Luis Aguiar. At the previously mentioned round table, Aguiar Beltran asserted that politically, Christians should accept Marxist leadership, "the only possible one in the world," etc.

9) French Dominican Community

261. Having come to Uruguay principally to serve the French residents and the Albi Dominican Community, of which the Santo Domingo Secondary School on Rivera Avenue was the most important institution, and after an early stage in which they devoted themselves truly to their specific mission, the members of this group then deviated from it and became truly politicized.

The first to sow the "political" seed among the young people were the priests Morelli and Hardindeguy, whom the government expelled from the country for their activities. The Holy See reported this decision, recommended by the then apostolic administrator for Montevideo, Monsignor Antonio Corso, with the support of the Apostolic Nuncio, Monsignor Rafael Forni. In the ceremony organized as a farewell to the two Dominicans in this connection, there were already visible clear evidences of the division existing within the church hierarchy. This farewell was attended, in clear defiance of Forni and Corso, by Bishops Alfredo Viola, Miguel Balaguer and Roberto Caceres, along with the most representative elements of the "Uruguayan Catholic left," particularly the young representatives of the PDC.

Those who were expelled were replaced by other priests with a similar socio-political orientation, including Jean Baptiste Lassegue and Vincent Daniel Gilbert, the latter being one of those who became a "worker priest," etc.

10) SIC [Catholic News Service]

262. A branch of the Uruguayan Catholic Action group, it published for a time an BOLETIN which was characterized by its stress on the "progressive" news as it occurred here and there, while leaving in the shadows other reports of the ecclesiastical teaching body when it did not fit with "Catholic progressivism."

After the weekly DOMINGO and the SIC BOLETIN ceased publication, the Ecclesiastical See of Montevideo published the fortnightly INFORMACIONES, under the direction of Paul Dabezies, with the same orientation as those which preceded it. It presented the "advances" of the church, ignoring all that might conflict with the "progressive" trend, dealing thus even with conciliar and pontifical documents themselves. This fortnightly was sold at the doors of the churches, in particular.

11) Pastoral Team of the Archdiocese of Montevideo

263. The team which organized the whole "ecclesiastical liberation" movement was headed by the Vicar General of the Archdiocese of Montevideo, Haroldo Ponce de Leon, his closest collaborators in practice being the majority of the parish priests of Montevideo, special mention among whom should be made of Arnaldo Spadaccino, Juan Bosco Salvia, Uberfil Monzon,⁸⁵ Conrado Mompetit,⁸⁶ Ricardo Cetrullo and others, such as Ciro Ceballos⁸⁷ and Silvio Frugoni.⁸⁸

A group of laymen worked with this team, and among these special mention is merited by Carlos Duran, Patricio Rode, Hector Borrat, Roberto Quagliotti,⁸⁹ Maria Elena Ponce de Leon,⁹⁰ Jose Claudio Williman, Diego Terra Carve,⁹¹ Fernando Oliu, Alberto S. de Zumaran, etc.

It was the Archdiocese pastorate which organized the "reflection groups," which in many cases functioned as real political and support cells for everything which meant or had the smell of subversion. This activity was based on the interpretation made of the guidelines set forth by the CELAM, which were approved at the Medellin meeting, and which had been referred to above.

In practice, almost all of the Catholic dioceses of Uruguay followed this same line, succeeding in creating a real disorientation in the masses who, in large part, abandoned the sanctuary.⁹²

12) IDO-C [International Center for Information and Documentation on the Conciliar Church]

264. Linked with the Polish PAX group mentioned previously, the movement promoted by the IDOC-C sought and achieved the radicalization and polarization of the Catholic Church into two groups, the "progressives" and the "conservatives" or "reactionaries."

The IDO-C established an efficient control apparatus in Latin America, centralized in the IDO-C/VISPERA Uruguayan "progressive" group which functioned in coordination with the IDO-C centers in Cuernavaca, Mexico, and the United States (Minola-Latin American Bureau).

265. The secretary general of the IDO-C was Leo G. M. Alting von Geusau, a world traveler who went from country to country setting forth the goals of the organization. In April of 1967 he was in Uruguay, giving a lecture in the auditorium of the Young People's Christian Association. Among the members of this executive committee was J. P. Dubois Dumee, of International Catholic Information, with headquarters in France. Another outstanding IDO-C figure was the priest Jesus Garcia Gonzalez, a member of the Mexican Social Secretariat and the Latin American Department of the Pontifical "Iustitia et Pax" commission at the Vatican. Co-author of the book "The Church, Underdevelopment and Revolution" and linked by close ties with the periodical VISPERA, in which his articles were published, Garcia

maintained essentially that "the Chilean, Cuban and Peruvian forms of socialism are attractive, and the establishment in America of regimes such as Allende's in Chile is viewed favorably, particularly since the Pope does not condemn socialism," etc.

13) Ecumenical Group of Uruguay

266. Made up of Catholics and Protestants, this group was established in 1969 for the specific purpose of attacking the emergency security measures and mobilizing the office and other workers in a strike and support of them.

In September of that year, this group organized a "fast" of solidarity with the individuals affected by such measures.

Among its leaders were the priest Carmelo Hernandez, the assistant to Arnaldo Spadaccino when he was vicar of the parish of Sayago, etc.⁹³

14) ISAL [Church and Society for Latin America]

267. The Uruguayan section of the JLAIS was a publicity organ of the evangelical church. To this end, it published the periodical CRISTIANISMO Y SOCIEDAD, with Hiber Conteris Sardo⁹⁴ in charge of the editorial secretariat initially, followed by Julio Barreiro.⁹⁵

The president of the editorial board of this periodical was Julio de Santa Ana Sommaruga,⁹⁶ and its members included Mauricio Lopez, Ruben Sabanes and Richard Shaull, with Luis E. Odell, general administrator of the Crandon Institute, as its executive secretary.

268. The ISAL repeatedly demanded an immediate cease fire in Vietnam on the part of the United States, and on 10 May 1968, under the direction of pastor Yamandu Rey, president of the General Council of the Evangelical Church of Uruguay, which had lent its premises to the Methodist Church of Cerro for the housing of the participants in the canegrowers' march, organized a "round table" in support of the cane workers on the grounds of the Central Temple of the Evangelical Church in Montevideo.

269. The Uruguayan Church and Society Movement was organized within the ISAL. It held its first assembly on 18 July 1968, with Washington Hourcade presiding. Other members included Victor Bacchetta, Violeta Greymonat, Nestor Castro, B. A. de Smith, Jose Claudio Williman, Iris Haberli, Carlos Delmonte, Herman Kruse, Gerardo Pet, J. L. Castro, Enrique Mendez, Julio Barreiro and Julio de Santa Ana Sommaruga, etc.

The World Council of Churches, with its main headquarters in Geneva, Switzerland, contributed to the financing of the activities of the ISAL, to which it gave a sum of approximately \$25,000 each year to carry out various programs, plus another \$9,000 for beneficent works. Acting as coordinating secretary, with administrative responsibility for the handling of the funds, was the pastor of the Baptist Church in La Teja, located

at the corner of Manuel Herrera Street and Obes, Jorge Enrique Valenzuela Nenateau, of Chilean nationality and a member of the MLN-T. Valenzuela provided aid to various members of the seditious organization who had gone underground and he facilitated their concealment. The premises of that church, which he headed, were used as a base of operations during the "La Teja Riot," on the occasion of the first massive escape from the Punta Carretas prison in September 1971, known as the "abuse."

It was Santa Ana Sommaruga who, through Elsa Dubra de Maynard, the well known leader of the so-called Committee of Families of Political Prisoners, and sister of Pedro Ignacio and Arturo R. Dubra Diaz, members of the seditious organization, supplied each MLN-T member who chose to leave the country for Chile with the sum varying from \$50 to \$100 from the ISAL fund he administered.

As a result of the investigations undertaken by the authorities in this connection, the ISAL decided to change its name to the Ecumenical Movement of Uruguay, and it transferred its offices from No 1255 Uruguay Street, where it had been functioning, to Rio Negro Street near 18 July Avenue, etc.

15) Evangelical Institute

270. In April of 1966 the Uruguayan Protestants created this organization, which functioned in Montevideo in the premises of the Lutheran Church at the corner of 8 October Avenue and Crocker, where lectures were given by various individuals of a known pro-communist position, such as Pastor Emilio Castro Pombo, Augusto Fernandez Arlt, Arturo Ardao, etc.⁹⁷

c. Ecclesiastical Anarchy

271. The Second Vatican Council caught the Uruguayan church in the midst of crisis. A disoriented hierarchy, without authority, was confronted by a nucleus of young people imbued with Marxism and entirely dominated by politics, bringing with them vast social concerns.

Fearful of being accused of "conservatism" or being "reactionary," the members of the church hierarchy yielded an ever increasingly lost status.

272. From the preaching of the French Dominican Morelli, Hardindeguy, Gilbert and others, the dialectics of Hugo Assman or the Jesuit Segundo or his confreres, Cetrullo, Asiain and others, from the "Pedro Fabro" Center and pages of Perspectivas de Dialogo, from the subversion for which the periodicals POLITICA and VISPERA (subsidized by the German bishops) laid the groundwork, from the devastating action of the priests Haroldo Ponce de Leon, Arnaldo Spadaccino, Bosco Salvia, Paul Dabezies and others, the Uruguayan church moved imperceptibly but rapidly to an advanced state of disorder and anarchy which served the purpose of sedition.

273. Little by little everything was destroyed; the secondary schools became centers of subversion; the churches and parishes emptied; the Catholic

associations were dying. The popular masses were set aside. The "reflection groups" and "base communities" were established, but they achieved nothing but the still greater separation of the Catholic flock. Bishops, priests, "committed laymen," all were used in this work of dissociation which made of the church a center of political indoctrination. This extended to the point of aberration, such that when the priest Indalecio Olivera died in the midst of seditious activity, his name and memory were promoted by certain church circles to the hero category. Seditious action and its philosophy of hatred and destruction even gained mastery of the minds of some bishops, such as the bishop of Salto, Marcelo Mendiharat, who fearful of being called upon for an accounting of his activities, remained outside the country in voluntary exile.

In the free electoral period, many pulpits became political tribunes and some churches were transformed into true political committees of the FA. Priests and monks openly and actively went to work in the press, on radio and television, as members of the Christian Democratic-Marxist merger, given the indifference of the hierarchy, whose members, like Pontius Pilate, washed their hands of the matter, stating publicly that Catholics could vote for any party.

The seminaries emptied. A number of their spiritual directors (Ortiz Amaya, Ferro) put away their cassocks and married. The monasteries and convents continued to function, but due to the abandonment of the religious vocation by many of their superiors, they were practically dying of inanition, given the lack of any further novices. By virtue of the same socio-political radicalization, the diocesan clergy suffered from an exodus of those who, with dispensation or without it, also sought in the institution of marriage a means of forgetting the inflammatory revolutionary preachings of an earlier moment.

274. The "Solis Theater riot," toward the middle of 1965, exteriorized a tension representing an important landmark in the process of the dissociation of the Uruguayan church. It was followed by many others, set forth clearly in Chapter 14, making it possible to explain the anarchy to which it found itself reduced and the tremendous involvement of many of its representatives in sedition.

5. Seditious Groups

275. Although differing in importance and activities, at least ten seditious groups promoted subversive struggle in Uruguay, to wit:

a. OPR-33 [33 Uruguayans Revolutionary Popular Organization]

276. Anarchistic in orientation, this organization was the armed branch of the FAU [Uruguayan Anarchist Federation]. It was established following a split within the MLN-T headed by Carlos Hebert Mejias Collazo, who became a part of its leadership, as did the well known Hugo Cores, of the AEBU [Association of Bank Employees of Uruguay] and Leon Duarte, of the FUNSA [Uruguayan Tire Plant, Ltd] trade union.

The digit "33" was meant to evoke the historic event of the past century which had as its protagonist 33 men who, under the command of Gen Juan Antonio Lavelleja, landed on the La Agraciada beach, an incident leading to national independence,

277. The holding of the 1971 elections was opposed, with the armed action line being imposed on trade union struggles. Among the assaults undertaken were the kidnappings of Dr Alfredo Cambon, of the board of directors of the FUNSA and CICSA, Luis Fernandez Llado, of the board of directors of the Model Cold Storage Plant, Jose Pereira Gonzalez, coeditor of the daily newspaper EL DIA, and Sergio Molaguero; the very "original" attack on the French journalist Michele Ray, wife of the film director Costa Gavras; the theft of the flag of the "33 Uruguayans," from the National Historical Museum; the theft of the weapons of the FUNSA night watchmen during a takeover of this plant, and various other robberies carried out to obtain money.

In its first public appearance, this group called itself the FARO [Revolutionary Armed Forces of Uruguay], but since the MRO [Uruguayan Revolutionary Movement] brought out its own armed group with this same name, it was decided to make it changed to OPR-33.

b. FARO [Revolutionary Armed Forces of Uruguay]

278. This was the armed branch of Ariel Collazo's MRO, in the leadership of which he was known by the pseudonym "Luis." Even before the "Abuse," the majority of its members had gone over to the MLN-T, except for Collazo and those other MRO members who were in prison. After the "Abuse," they tried to reorganize, but within a short time their premises were searched and their members arrested, which led to the practical disappearance of the group. Even its typewriter and mimeograph machine, which had been stolen during the robbery of the embassy, found their way to the MLN-T through members of the MRO in Paso de los Toros, etc.

c. FRT [Revolutionary Workers Front]

279. Established by individuals expelled from the MLN-T for "misconduct," at the end of 1970, this group had as its members, among others, Maria Elia Topolanski Saavedra de Martinez Platero,⁹⁸ "Raul," "El Flaco Rodriguez Larreta," "Coco," "Leonel," one of his aunts, and "Felipe." This last individual abandoned it shortly thereafter to found the 22 December Movement.

280. The FRT robbed an exchange agency on 18 July Avenue in Montevideo, and carried out various raids on the homes of officers in the FFAA [Armed Forces] and a collector in Carrasco, from whom weapons were stolen, and committed various other crimes. It engaged in particular in political work in the secondary student sector, where it was known as the FER [Revolutionary Student Front]. Under the name FER-71, it assassinated

agents of the GR [Republican Guard] on duty at the Pedro Visca Hospital, etc.

d. 22 December Movement (Tupamaros)

281. Established by "Felipe" when he left the FRT at the end of 1971, along with others, including "La Gorda Laura," a Rivera teacher who had previously belonged to the MLN-T, a brother of hers, "Enrique," a former soldier in the Blandengues Regiment, "Telmo," a native of Bella Union and a former nurse at the Military Hospital, and four or five others of a seditious tendency.

The name of the group was chosen to commemorate the death of the insurgent Carlos Flores Alvarez, which occurred on 22 December 1966.

282. The group carried out several robberies in order to subsist, sometimes leaving flyers bearing the symbol of the MLN-T, but calling itself the 22 December Movement. It set forth its disagreement with the "long term" goals of the MLN-T, urging steps of a more immediate nature and opposing the elections.

Of its deeds, that with the greatest repercussions was the blowing up of the Golf Club in the Punta Carretas quarter of Montevideo, because it was regarded as representing the "dominant oligarchy," etc.

e. The Guerrilla Force

283. This group was headed by a physician and surgeon, Ruben Mario Navillat Odriozola, who was trained in Cuba, and an old anarchist named O'Neill.

This group wanted to integrate with the MLN-T, but was rejected, being regarded as made up of "common criminals."

It engaged in all kinds of robberies, stealing from, among other places, a supplies station in Montevideo on Joaquin Requena Street, the IMPASA Sanatorium on Larranaga Avenue, and a notary's office in the old city, etc.

f. GAU [Groups for Unified Action]

284. This was the group headed by Hector Rodriguez, traditionally dedicated to the trade union struggles, above all, within the textile trade union. It had an armed group of some 25 men, and was believed responsible for the robbery of the Israelite Bank. Members of the GAU in addition to Rodriguez included a number of members of the former MAPU [Uruguayan Popular Action Movement],⁹⁹ such as Ricardo Vilaro, Luis Casamayou and Martin Ponce de Lon, and others such as Daniel Moretti, Enrique Rubio, Carlos Anido, Alvaro Jaume, Pedro Deaurecochea, Jose Arillaga, Juan Margenat, Liber Sanjurjo, Benjamin Nahoum Abonaf, Jose L. Genta,

Maria Amelia Brum Etchegaray, Jose Enrique Colombo, Gonzalo Ares, Miguel Volinsky Schwartz, Judith Josefina Colombo, Jorge Roland, Maria Isabel Alvarez Cerone, Ernesto Fermin Achkar Borrás, Salvador Alberto Rodriguez Peluffo, Leonardo Alberto Ferrer Mederos, Juan Alberto Arocena Real de Azua, Rafael Tabare Amen Pazos, Jose Pedro Davezies Massone, Juan Jose Vidal Rocatagliatta, Atilio Anibal Morquio Dobat, Raul Eduardo Brusco Paysee, Jaime Querol Sagredo, Emiliano Rodriguez Davila, Jorge Pascual Restuccia Crottogini, Gabriel Antonio Cebey Favale, Juan Antonio Carvalho Calcagno, etc.

During the 1971 elections the GAU joined the FA, but it did not nominate candidates, engaging in "seemingly legal" political activity.

It was just after the explosion at the Faculty of Engineering on 27 October 1973,¹⁰⁰ that the activities of the GAU were revealed to be those of a seditious organization.

Within the framework of its "legal" political activities, the GAU appeared to be governed by a congress, as the highest authority, which met annually, under which were the Central Committee and the executive secretariat, made up of militants coming from the zonal sections and having the duty of coordinating the work in the political, worker and student sectors, etc.

Within its "illegal" structure, the GAU operated on four different levels: A, B, C and D.

On level A, there were the well known "legal" leaders, who represented the movement publicly at ceremonies, in statements, manifestos, etc., maintaining relations with other groups.

On level B, there were leaders representing the organization in the trade unions, educational centers and political parties, being known in these sectors exclusively, but avoiding the appearance of their names in the press and/or coming to the attention of the police.

On level C, the militant no longer admitted being a representative of the GAU, while attempting to politicize and awaken the consciousness of the masses in the places where he worked and/or studied, or within the base levels of the FA.

Finally, on level D, there was a most hermetic compartmentation. Never was there an admission or indication of membership in the GAU, and those on this level made an effort to limit themselves to simple tasks in order to avoid attention, devoting themselves to the activities of the military and security apparatus of the movement, which were very often unknown even to their own comrades on the same level, not to mention those on others.

On the first three levels, some members knew of the existence of the fourth and some did not, and even among those who did, this knowledge was vague,

lacking any clear picture of what was being done. On the other hand, the key leaders on level A not only knew of the activities on level B, but guided and directed these operations.

Beginning some years ago, the GAU gained a majority in the Engineering and Land Survey Student Center, its most notable bastion, also exerting great influence in the textile sector.

Also participating in the GAU were the political groups of the radicalized left, such as the UP [Popular Union Party], the 26 March Independents Movement, the Socialist Movement, etc., all of them, along with the Michelini and Alba Roballo groups, making up what was called "La Corriente" [The Current].

Its publicity organ was the weekly RESPUESTA, printed in the workshops of the Alborada Publishing House, with Hector Rodriguez acting as managing editor, etc.¹⁰¹

g. CAP [People's Self-Defense Commandos]

285. These were groups made up basically of medical students who at the beginning devoted themselves to carrying out robberies. The "Los Bravos" group at the Faculty of Medicine, which functioned during the year 1968, was a part of the CAP.

Members of this group included, among others, Asdrubal Cabrera,¹⁰² and "Carlos," also known as "El Gallego," both members of the MLN-T. The former also was active in the Socialist Brigade.

h. "Alcides" and "Franco" Groups

286. Operating in the student sector, particularly the secondary school institutions, the members of these groups belonged to the MLN-T, from which they were expelled in 1969. They had their own premises and weapons and preached armed struggle.

i. Red Groups

287. Linked ideologically with the Chinese communists, these groups opposed the holding of the elections in 1971 and carried out robberies and other crimes of considerable importance.

j. FAP [Armed Popular Front]

288. This organization emerged in the early months of 1972, with the public claim of responsibility for an "expropriation" and "interrogation" of an industrialist of Jewish origin, and then disappearing without leaving any other evidence of its ephemeral presence. Presumably this was no more than a small group which attempted to capitalize to its own advantage

on the tense Arab-Israeli situation, or the first visible testing of public opinion by individuals linked with the fedayeen of the PLO [Palestine Liberation Organization], Al Fatah or the Black September Movement, benefiting from the great confusion created by the sedition which was then in full swing.

289. This at least is what one could conclude from the communique issued by the "provisional command" of the FAP on that occasion, in which it expressed the view that "the Zionists in Uruguay are participating in the Arab-Israeli War conflict, on the basis of their permanent and substantial economic contributions to the state of Israel. The FAP regards itself, in turn, as identified with the Arab cause as with all the revolutionary causes in the world..." The "expropriation" undertaken, as well as "those which may follow in the immediate future, are design as an attack on the Zionist economy, such that they can have no recourse to the safety mechanisms existing on the national and international level, being exclusively authorized to receive the contributions which may be arranged by way of compensation by the Zionist organizations. If our resolution is not heeded, we have decided to bring to justice two of the most outstanding economic leaders of Zionism in our country. In the future, the imperialist authorities of Israel will think twice before ordering that the people who only want justice be fired upon. Liberation or war," etc.

k. MLN-T [National Liberation Movement-Tupamaros]

290. This was the most important seditious group. By virtue of its weight in subversive action, and its survival, despite the defeat inflicted upon it by the FFCC [Carabineers' Forces] in the course of the year 1972, it will be dealt with at length in the following chapters.

6. Consequences

291. The activities of the 60-some groups we have just reviewed, each in its own sector and sometimes in concert, could not fail to yield some results: the general disarticulation and disturbance of the country, in all the realms of its activity.

With the ups and downs in domestic and/or foreign circumstances favorable to or exploitable for their purposes, the activities of these groups came to compromise the functioning and the very existence of the republic as a free and sovereign society to the point that we are still suffering today from the disorganizing consequences thereof.

Chapter 14 deals with how, in material and concrete form, events escalated to the point of producing a result as disastrous as it was predictable.

FOOTNOTES

1. Volume II, "The Political Process." See in particular Chapter I, Events prior to February.
2. Luis Mercier Vega, "Anti-State Technique. The Latin American Guerrilleros" ("Technique du Contre-Etat. Les Guerrilleros d'Amerique Latine"), EDITIONS PIERRE BELFOND, Paris, 1969.
3. "History of the Communist Party of Uruguay (Up to 1961)" ("Historia del Partido Comunista del Uruguay (hasta el ano 1951)", Montevideo, 1961, published by Eugenio Gomez, 1961, EDITORIAL ELITE, p 5.
4. Above, Chapter 1, "Communism and Subversion" ("Comunismo y Subversion").
5. Op cit., ps 49 and ss.
6. By "revisionism" the Soviet ideology means all the attempts "to discredit the marxist-leninist doctrine, stating that it is antiquated and claiming that it "has lost its significance with respect to social evolution." (Soviet Political Dictionary, op. cit., p 474).
7. W. I. Lenin, "State and Revolution, Selected Works" ("Estado y Revolucion, en Obras Escogidas"), Berlin, DIETZ-VERLAG, 1963, V. II, p 812.
8. "Leftist-radicalism, The Childhood Disease of Communism," W. I. Lenin, OBRAS, DIETZ-VERLAG, Berlin, 1956-1962, V. 31, p 8.
9. "Organization. Basis of a Great Party," Montevideo, January 1969. Report by Alberto Suarez and Alberto Altesor.
10. See Sir Percival Griffiths, "The Accommodative Philosophy of Communism" ("La Filosofia Acomodaticia del Comunismo"), Mexico, 1964. Spanish version by Ricardo Letona-Estrada, LIBREROS MEXICANOS UNIDOS.
11. EL POPULAR, 10 April 1959.
12. Arts. 42 and 43.
13. "Red Intrigues In Uruguay" ("Intrigas Rojas en el Uruguay"), Montevideo, November 1957.

14. "Red Leaders in Uruguay" ("Cabezas Rojas en el Uruguay"), Montevideo, 1963. See also the book by Floreal Bentancourt, "I Was a Witch Hunter" ("Yo Fui Cazador de Brujas"), Montevideo, 1974, which contains a collection of radial commentaries made by the author from the time of ANDEBU on the "Red Fifth Column," during the 1963-1967 period, etc.
15. "Political Parties and Social Classes in Uruguay. Ideological Aspects" ("Partidos Politicos y Clases Sociales en el Uruguay. Aspectos Ideologicos"), INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES, UNIVERSITY CULTURAL FOUNDATION, Montevideo, 1972, pp 113-155.
16. See Vol. II, "The Political Process" ("El Proceso Politico"), Chapter VI.
17. With a United and Fighting People. Down With Dictatorship!" ("Con el Pueblo Unido y Luchando. Derribar la Dictadura!"), EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, February 1974.
18. Active leader of the FEUU [Federation of University Students of Uruguay], he graduated as a lawyer in 1955. He militated in the National Party, the Fernandezcrepista section of the UBD [Blanca Democratic Union], entering the Chamber of Deputies in 1959. He left this party in 1965 and founded the MRO, of Castro orientation. In 1962 this group integrated with the FIDEL group. He was re-elected that year from the 1001 list of the CPU. In the 1966 elections, he was elected again. Upon the termination of his mandate in February 1972, the executive authority ordered his arrest on security grounds. In April of the above mentioned year, the House of Representatives requested information on the reasons for that governmental decision and, not satisfied with the explanations given, stated that "the reply of the executive authority, through the Department of Interior, constituted a violation of the legal statutes." In the answer sent by the above mentioned Secretariat of State, dated 23 June 1972, which is in file No 125 of 1972, office of the secretary of the above mentioned House No 193, the background that caused the arrest of Collazo and details of his various revolutionary involvements were clarified, etc.
19. A legal Uruguayan citizen, of Colombian nationality, he was an AEBU [Association of Bank Employees of Uruguay] legal advisor. A fervent Castro partisan, he was president of the MRO. In May 1961, he travelled to Havana. He was a candidate of the FIDEL group as 6th titular of the House of Representatives in the national elections of November 1962.
20. Ariel Collazo, "Uruguay Is Not An Exception" ("El Uruguay no es una Excepcion"), AMERICA LATINA, No 2, July 1967, p 20.

21. Juan Carlos Zaffaroni Zubieta, a Jesuit priest, belongs to the Revolutionary Christian Movement, which will be discussed later. He came from a family of comfortable means; studied theology in Argentina, France, Belgium, and the United States. On his return from this last country, he became a legal adviser of the ASU [Uruguayan Trade Union Action], a Uruguayan affiliate of CLASC [Latin American Federation of Christian Trade Unionists]; and established ties with Ariel Collazo and the MRO, within whose ranks he began to militate. Expelled from the order of Jesuits in March 1966, he was authorized to function as a working priest in the sugar mill of the Department of Salto. He did not do this, but worked in construction in the above mentioned department, which made it possible for him to become acquainted with conduit workers. A comrade of Father Jean Paul Bidegain, nephew of the Bishop of Salto Marcelo Mendiharat, who worked in the sugar cane crops in the vicinity of Bella Union, he acquired notoriety when, with the authorization of the above named bishop, he accompanied the sugar workers in a march as far as Montevideo. In June 1966, the Catholic publishing house, APOCE, managed by Domingo de Girolamo, a Jesuit, published his book, "Marxism and Christianity" ("Marxismo y Cristianismo"). In August of the following year, in the headquarters of the MRO, at 1417 Minas Street, Montevideo, he directed a conference on the guerrilla. He indicated that he was a partisan of the armed struggle, which won him the praise of the pro-China daily, EPOCA, which compared him to Camilo Torres. At the end of 1967, he travelled to Czechoslovakia, and from there to Cuba. On his return, in the first months of 1968, he directed a series of conferences on conduit workers and in May of this same year, on a television program, he stated that he was ready to bear arms in behalf of the revolution. This caused the attorney general to decide to request his appearance in court; but he objected to the department of justice on grounds that he was not being granted "freedom." In April of the same year, 1968, one of his articles on Camilo Torres and the youth of Uruguay appeared in the magazine, CRISTIANISMO Y REVOLUCION, in Buenos Aires. Three months later, his book, "Priesthood and Revolution in Latin America" ("Sacerdocio y Revolucion en America Latina"), was published, and the weekly, MARCHA, published his article, "Violence and Christians" ("La Violencia y los Cristianos"). In 1968 he abandoned the MRO, characterizing it as "not very revolutionary" and he joined the MLN-T [National Liberation Movement-Tupamaros] with an armed group which was the basis of the 6th Column, and became a member of a directive organ similar to an executive organ, from which he aided the organization. Later he withdrew from the seditious organization because of disagreements with his leaders. In Document I of this organization, reference is made to the internal difficulties he created because of his "personality," etc.

22. "Communism in Uruguay" ("El Comunismo en Uruguay"), cit., p 15.
23. Chapter II, 2, a, No 35.
24. The "Coordinador" derives its name from the "National Coordinating Committee in Support of the Cuban Revolution," which operated at No 1282 Convencion Street, for the purpose of "coordinating" the activities of the various Uruguayan Castro-communist groups, in full motion during that era. Concerning the "coordinator," see the opinion of the MLN-T, itself, in Chapter VI.
25. "Communism in Uruguay" ("El Comunismo en el Uruguay"), cit., pp 47, 48.
26. Above, No 10.
27. In the subsequent 1966 elections, Erro, who formerly was deputy for four terms, the first three for the National Party and the last for the UP, was not re-elected, obtaining barely about 3,000 votes. In the 1971 elections, he was elected senator for the FA [Broad Front], owing chiefly to the radicalism of his propaganda and to the notoriety that he acquired on the occasion of a duel in which he had engaged a short time before and to which the leftist press gave spectacular publicity. Tied in with Leonel Brizola--with whom he publicly indicated solidarity and whom he visited in Rio de Grande do Sul before the fall of the government of Joao Goulart--and with the group of Brazilian exiled persons of the DIALOGO publishing house, his resentment and emotions put him at the disposal of the seditious groups, which infiltrated the UP and derived new members from it. Erro aspired to carry out the role of political-parliamentarian representative of the insurrection, to which end he executed all kinds of gyrations, collaborating with the MLN-T, with many of whose members he maintained close relations and contacts. One of his sons joined the insurrectionist organization and, when he was arrested, he offered to serve as a "courier" with the protection of his legislative immunity, between the members at the front of the MLN-T and the arrested leaders. His parliamentary activity in this period was characterized by an ardent defense of the insurrection and the insurrectionists and constant attack against institutions, the government, the police, and the armed forces, an attitude shared by other members of the FA, such as Zelmair Michelini, Juan Pablo Terra, Abraham Francisco Rodriguez Camusso (another National Party renegade), Jorge Duran Mattos, etc. Known by the insurrectionists as "the old Erro," he was the main spokesman in parliament for the maneuver conceived by them in order to denounce the activities of a supposed "death squad," based on statements obtained from Nelson Bardesio, a police official, during his sequestration, and to thus confuse public opinion. This maneuver was set up with a great display of sensationalism and legislators of the UP, of the FA, and of other sectors collaborated with it. With restoration of Peronism in the Argentine

Republic, he intensified the flirtation initiated some time before with its representative groups and along with various members of the FA assisted in the transferral of power. When, after a long and ostentatious legal procedure, parliament turned a deaf ear to the request for a suspension of legal proceedings, so that a military court of justice could investigate the charges made against him because of his connections with the insurrection, and a short time before the dissolution of parliament, he fled to Buenos Aires, from which place he pursued his anti-national activities, coming to a complete agreement with Michelini and members of the 26 March Movement, of the PCR [expansion unknown], of the ROE [expansion unknown], and of the MLN-T, etc.

28. "Nicaragua: United States Imperialism" ("Ensayo Sobre el Imperialismo de los Estados Unidos"), Montevideo, EDITORIAL SANDINO.

29. The beginning of the story, according to the attorney general of the 4th district court, "is based on what happened to former Police Inspector Hector Moran Charquero (deceased in 1930)." Its text consists of oneiric images of an anonymous police employee, who died, or was mortally wounded, in an ambush representative of his evil life and of his very bad career, under the protection of an influential politician, who converts him into his bodyguard. As for its development, rather than being a story by esthetic definition, it is a diatribe, of the "racconto" [story] type movie, which begins with the ending, without repeating it. Images pass in review, generic imputations of criminal or corrupt qualities, rather than specific deeds, related to victims and not to the police institution. The vocabulary is obscene and scatological, abounding in the crudest of native Argentine slang expressions." "The account of the legal proceedings, while objectively obscene, is not subjectively so, since it has an artistic purpose, following the realistic or true-to-life literary school." The district attorney clarifies here that "between the extreme theses that 'the obscene never is art' and 'art is never obscene, we decided on the intermediate thesis that considers the purpose of the work," which, after other technical considerations, is what the file of the proceedings led us to believe—an opinion accepted by the 3rd district court judge.

As will be seen from the text, the above named police employee did not merely "die," in the euphemistic manner stated by the district attorney, but was "killed" by an insurrectionist group. If the beginning of the story is based on this murder, one wonders how anyone who reads it can separate the personality of the victim from the disgraceful abjectness with which the diatribe or the movie "story" defiles the victim, defaming his relatives and the institution in which he discharged his duty during his lifetime. Therefore the academic arguments of the attorney

general that "all the later situations are fictitious, that they do not tend to discredit any person or institution" are not convincing, since a reader logically connects the vicissitudes and criminal or corrupt qualities of the character in the story with the murdered employee and with the public institution which, notwithstanding such culpable moral attributes, keeps him on its staff and raises him to the highest hierarchy in the administrative career. And neither will anyone be able to understand, unless he applies the rules of the art of magic, the strange logic of the attorney with respect to the objectivity and subjectivity of obscenity, etc. Incongruities of this type—which can be explained only by any one of the triple hypotheses of coercion, or fear of retaliation—the "demonstrated inability" of which Kahn and Brucebriggs speak—or open, unadorned complicity with the insurrection—are what have permitted and encouraged the culmination of the terrorist bands, which could be rendered harmless only through the intervention of military justice. It will be a matter of drastically breaking away from such dangerous incongruities and leniency, if one wants the state to be in a position to prevent those bands from rising from their ashes.

30. 24 May 1974 issue. Concerning this group, see also "El Comunismo en Ueuguay," cit. pp 18, 19 and 22-25.
31. "The Russian." Artist, landscape painter, professor at ICUS, designer. Of Russian nationality, she arrived in Uruguay as a result of a marriage in Russia with Mario Jaunarena, who travelled to the USSR as Emilio Frugoni's secretary when the latter was ambassador at the Kremlin. In his book, "The Red Sphinx" ("La Esfinge Roja"), Frugoni alludes to this marriage and the difficulties he had to overcome to obtain permission for "The Russian" to leave. Affiliated with ICUCH [expansion unknown], she espouses the FIDEL and the XVIII Congress of the CPU, and is a partisan of Cuba. An assiduous contributor to MARCHA, she contributed as a designer to the success of the first issue of EL SOCIALISTA. Friend of "Leonel," toward the end of 1971, there were meetings of the executive board of the MLN-T in her residence at No 2940 Scoseria Street, 10th floor, where at times some clandestine insurrectionists, like "Octavio" lodged or spent the night, etc.
32. See "Communism In Uruguay" ("El Comunismo en el Uruguay"), pp 26, 49, 54-58.
33. Chapter II, 2, a. No 35.
34. "El Comunismo en el Uruguay, pp from 133 on.
35. From Nos 242 on.

36. Above, No 6. "Only one who does not have confidence in himself can fear temporary alliances and with persons who are not trustworthy. Nevertheless, without such alliances, no political party could exist." (Lenin, "Was tun?" in "Selected Works," T I. p 187).
37. "Grundlagen des Marxismus-Leninismus," Lehrbuch, DIETZ-LERLAG, Berlin 1960, pp 418, 440.
38. After the success of our counterattack, of March 1946, we continued to tirelessly unmask, separate, and isolate the reactionary elements of the party of small farmers (who had joined the Hungarian PC within the framework of a coalition bloc); there was a constant exclusion of compromised members, at times a group, at other times, individuals. This type of small-scale activity was called a sausage tactic—a tactic whereby, day after day, we cut off a link of the hidden opposition, etc. (Matyas Radusi, Nepi demokratiank utja, in TARSADALMI SZEMLE, Budapest, February-March 1952).
39. G. A. Wetter and W. Leonhard. "Sowjet ideologie heute," FISCHER BUCHEREI, KG, Frankfurt en Mein, 1962; Spanish version by Luis Santiago de Pablo, "The Soviet Ideology" ("La Ideologie Sovietica"), Barcelona, EDITORIAL HERDER, 1964, pp 395, 397.
40. Contributor to MARCHA, enthusiastic pro-Castroite from the beginning and having personal ties with Fidel Castro, Paysee Gonzalez was editorial secretary of EL CIUDADANO, organ of the UC [expansion unknown] Catholic Party and later of the PDC. Assigned by Castro in 1959 to administer the passage of a visit to Cuba of a group of 32 Uruguayan parliamentarians, he made his own selection. However, when he tried to do the same for members of the UC, the latter expelled the travellers from its ranks, which resulted in Paysee Gonzalez having to leave the editorial office of EL CIUDADANO, etc. For additional information, see "Communism In Uruguay" ("El Comunismo en Uruguay"), pp 25, 112, 113, 116, 136, 137.
41. VOZ OBRERA, No 1, July 1970.
42. VOZ OBRERA, No 3, March 1971.
43. Thus called because various of its members lived in a communistic system in a district of Montevideo having that name.
44. Nephew of Haroldo Ponce de Leon, Vicar General of the Catholic Diocese of Montevideo.
45. See below, 5, f, Seditious Groups, No 284.
46. EPOCA and FRENTE OBRERO, 13 January 1967, and MARCHA, the 20th of the same month and year.

47. Hugo Cores, COMPANERO, No 16, 29 December 1971.
48. RESISTENCIA, No 8, February 1970.
49. COMPANERO, Nos 16, 20, 29 December 1971 and 20 March 1972.
50. No 228, below.
51. See, concerning this aspect, Vol II.
52. CUESTION [Question], No 4, interview with Kimal Amir and Jesus Ayala. CUESTION was an MLN-T periodical which was published in the workshops of MARCHA until it was refused permission to continue printing there in April of 1971. The complete names of those interviewed are Kimal Nur Eddin Amir Percel, a member of the Works Group (mass front), the MIR, and a member of the leadership of the 26 March Movement, and Jesus Gabriel Ayala Faval, alias "Marcelo," general coordinator of the political sector, North Column Commando Group, Artigas zone, of the MLN-T.
53. "12 With the Bases in Struggle, a Document for the Whole FA," December 1971 (pamphlet); Mario Benedetti, "We Have Decided to Aid History."
54. "Mingo," one of the most active leaders, brother of Pablo Carlevaro Bottero, dean of the Faculty of Medicine. On 23 November 1962 he signed a UP manifesto; on 2 June 1972 he met with Enrique Rodriguez, Enrique Erro, Daniel Sosa Diaz and representatives of the movements headed by Wilson Ferreira Aldunate and de Rocha in the premises of that educational institution to discuss the subject "torture in military units," on which occasion those listed, who held a seat in the legislature, informed those present of the charges they were presenting in the parliament, etc.
55. Known within the MLN-T as "Roberto," Reverdito was involved in the university professors' communique in support of Cuba (1962) and another published on 12 December 1967, condemning the arrest of the members of the political leadership of the daily newspaper EPOCA, and the shutting down of this pro-Chinese journalistic organ. A candidate for municipal intendant of Montevideo on slates 177, 808 and 2001 in the November 1971 elections, he maintained contacts with MLN-T leaders in order to coordinate policy with the 26 March Movement. Moreover, he was adviser to the seditious organization, from the technical point of view, as was his wife, because they were skilled experts in the material strength field, which was of essential importance to the MLN-T team entrusted with the construction of hide-outs, etc.

56. "The April 1972 Turning Point: Materials for an Attempt to Interpret a Military Battle Launched by the National Liberation Movement (Tupamaros)," *Freres du Monde* [World Brothers], Bordeaux, 1973, No 83, p 93.
57. Ibid., "The Difficult Struggle of the Tupamaros," "The Infectious Potential of the Focus," p 91.
58. Ariel Collazo, "Uruguay Is Not an Exception," cited.
59. A member of the PCU, also known as Jesualdo, under which name he published a number of works, this individual gained a certain notoriety in the 1930's with his book "Life of a Teacher," a chronicle of the experiences of a rural teacher. He visited Red China and published his travel notes, in which he reported "with admiration and often real pleasure," as he puts it, the impressions resulting from learning about this country. (Jesualdo, "I Knew China in Autumn," Buenos Aires, 1958, Sociedad Editorial Latino Americana [Latin American Publishing Company].
60. Deceased.
61. Federico Fasano Mertens, "The Presses Have Stopped," Montevideo, 1973, Alborada, p 158.
62. This organization worked with the FULNP [Paraguayan United Front of National Liberation], in which the Paraguayan communist refugees were rallied.
63. Speakers at this gathering included Enrique R. Erro of the UP, Enrique Rodriguez of the PCU, a representative of the ROE, and a representative of the Committee for the Liberation of Latin American Peoples. Among those present were Maria Esther Gilio, Carlos Maria Gutierrez, Enrique Rodriguez Fabregat, etc.
64. *Freres du Monde*, "In Uruguay, Too... A World Campaign Against the Capital Army," Bordeaux, 1973, No 83, p 115.
65. 19 March 1937, "Enciclica Divini Redemptoris."
66. 30 March 1965 speech.
67. "Priesthood and Politics," Montevideo, 1971, included works by C. Parteli, P. Davezies, P. Rode, H. Ponce de Leon, A. Spadaccino, L. del Castillo, A. Assandri and S. Berlanda, all inspired by an obvious Marxist "progressivism."
68. "The Bishops and the Marxist Pastoral Purpose. The Church Condemns This Purpose, Along With the 'Christians for Socialism,'" Montevideo, 1974, Record Press, pp 7, 8. (Underlining copied from original.)

69. Rogers Veckemans, SJ, a Belgian, founder of the DESAL, with headquarters in Santiago de Chile, a member of the Bellarmino Center, inspirer of the periodical MENSAJE and technical adviser of the government of the former Christian Democratic president of Chile, Eduardo Frei, which paved the way for Allende's Marxist government. Veckemans tried to replace the characteristic Marxist terminology, adapting it into another more "acceptable" to Christian sensibility.
70. Ivan Illich, of Cuernavaca, Mexico, director and founder of the CIF and the CIDOC [Intercultural Documentation Center], with headquarters in that locality. The creator of courses in "intercultural sensitivization," he exerted a great influence on the priests of whom large numbers attended the CIF courses, along the lines of belief that their duty was to work for the proletarian revolution.
71. Joseph Comblin, a Belgian, director and founder of the Receife Theological Center, under the protection of the Brazilian bishop Helder Camara, who was the drafter of the document which served as a base for discussion for the work of the Medellin bishops conference, as well as various other documents in which he urged Catholics to participate in the Marxist revolution.
72. The work of modernizing the Pueblo Montes Church and Parish House in the department of Canelones, in 1972, totaling some \$5,600, where the parish priest, Benjamin Boscello, who had arrived in the country a short time previously, installed a social club, giving rise to an incendiary journalistic polemic (EL PAIS, 21 July, 2 December and 8 October. "Clarification by the Presbyterian Council of the Diocese of Canelones," 27 July, EL DIARIO, 11 September, MARCHA, 15 September 1972, etc.) was paid for by the Adveniat Foundation of Germany.
73. The Argentine delegate of the Christianity and Revolution Movement to the LASO Conference, he came to Montevideo in October of 1967 to organize a religious-political congress, under Cuban sponsorship, which was held in February of 1968. As a result of it, Garcia Elorrio was expelled from Uruguay. In Buenos Aires, this movement published the newspaper CHE COMPANERO [Comrade Che] and the periodical CRISTIANISMO Y REVOLUCION [Christianity and Revolution], which repeatedly carried contributions from Uruguayan priests and laymen who had adopted this ideological position.
74. A communist "front" organization with its main headquarters in Warsaw, the purpose of which was the infiltration of Catholics in the Central-Eastern European countries subject to communism. It was introduced into Latin America via Argentina, through Garcia Elorrio, and into Uruguay by Mario Garcia Dobal, who had very close affiliations of a commercial nature with East Germany. The IDO-C, a movement to which reference will be made farther on, functioned at the headquarters of the periodical VISPERA, and was closely affiliated with the Polish PAX.

75. Previous reference, 2, t, No 208.
76. Catholic priest, an adviser to the Roman IAA, Vicar of Salto and Fray Bentos, and correspondent for the daily newspaper EL PUEBLO in the first mentioned city, he held the chair of philosophy at the Interdiocesan Seminary, took part in activities organized by the Camilo Torres Movement and the University Committee, both of which were a part of FIDEL. Closely linked with the priest Juan Carlos Zaffaroni, he was a member of the executive body of the 26 March Movement in Salto, participating in the political sector which saw to all of the local CAT, etc.
77. Pablo Bernardo Maria Dabesies Antia, a priest in the Archdiocese of Montevideo, belonged, like Arnaldo Spadaccino, to the editorial board of the daily newspaper DE FRENTE (previous reference, 3, f, No 228), despite the prohibition on political activities by priests issued by the bishop. While directly active in politics in this way, he retained key posts in the leadership of the University Youth.
78. Secretary-chancellor of the Ecclesiastical Court of Montevideo, he later abandoned the priesthood.
79. Previous reference, No 242.
80. Now an ex-priest.
81. Known to have engaged in university activity along with communists, and with MLN-T affiliation.
82. Previous reference, 2, b, No 161,
83. A Jesuit priest, he preached a permanent line designed to demonstrate the compatibility of violence and Christianity, and to justify armed revolution against legally constituted governments. In August of 1968 he participated in a round table organized by the Communications Media Center of the Uruguayan Episcopate, being introduced by Dr Cesar Luis Aguiar as the "theologian" on the panel. Asiain stated there that the church was in a "deteriorated and decadent" condition. He was active and had such influence with the nuns of the Sacred Heart at Carrasco and 8 October Avenue that many of them left the religious profession, and those who remained ruined a large part of the youth. On 10 August 1970 he was arrested in connection with a confused action designed to achieve the liberation from the MLN-T of the individuals that seditious organization had kidnapped. Currently he is in Buenos Aires where, along with Bishop Mendiharat and the Don Orione priest Roberto Demarco, he is seeking to rally the exiles, etc.

84. A Protestant pastor, he was especially invited to tour various communist countries (USSR, Czechoslovakia, East German) in 1964; on his return, he justified and praised the communist systems in lectures, talks and sermons, urging that an intensive "cultural" exchange be undertaken with them. He participated in the so-called Congress of the People organized by the PCU in August of 1965. He maintained contact with the MLN-T through people working in El Cerro and La Teja, in Column 70. He chose trusted persons and sent them to Bella Union, defending the sugar workers and their marches. On 10 August 1970, he was arrested along with Asiain Marquez. After the murder of Prof Armando Acosta y Lara, on 14 April 1972, a deed perpetrated from the premises of the Methodist Church of which Castro was pastor, he disappeared from Uruguay.
85. At one time, arrested in Asuncion, Paraguay.
86. A Canadian Redemptorist.
87. In 1967-68, and due to his own timidity, he tried to attract the attention of the public from the pulpit of the cathedral.
88. From the parish church of San Antonio, on Cufre Street, he organized an FA political committee; he openly worked with the 26 March Movement and was affiliated with MLN-T members such as Raul Sendic, whom he was said to have hidden without hesitation in the church premises themselves, etc.
89. Deceased.
90. Sister of Haroldo Ponce de Leon.
91. Participated actively, since he was under secretary for foreign relations, in decreeing the Apostolic Nuncio, Rafael Forni, persona non grata.
92. For further references, see "Communism in Uruguay," cited, pp 134 and 135.
93. "Communism in Uruguay," pp 137 to 140, including along with the action of the groups listed thus far, that carried out within the groups or individually by many other priests and laymen, including: Juan Carlos Somma, Franciso Bardinias, Martin Lagos, Jean Paul Bidegain, Nelson Gallinares, Francisco Javier Artola, Francisco Renart, Jorge Iglesias, Jose Ignacio Laporta, Solon Verissimo Perez del Castillo, Conrado Ponce de Leon, Jose Maria Freire, Marcelo Sandoval, Jorge Ruggiero, Hender Salles, Benoit Dumas, Uberfil Monzon, Weiler P. Schiavone, Arnaud Aguerre, Luis Belando, Carlos M. Bernard, Jose Carcabelos, Omar Cornalino, Jose V. Couto, Fermin Gamberini,

Ruben A. Irureta, Luis Mazzarino, Enrique Pertusatti, Juan Carlos Renzo, Francisco Romero, Jose M. Zanetti, Juan Zordan, Jose Luis Sanchis, Hector Traversa, Rodolfo Katzenstein, Enrique Sobrado, Juan Pablo Terra Gallinal, Luis Cogorno, Daniel Sosa Diaz, Pedro Alfonso, Raul Bava, Romeo Perez, Hugo Bonilla, Ariel Diaz, Juan Pablo Corlazzoli, Hector Lescano, Federico Fasano Mertens, Juan Pablo Blanco, Anibal del Campo, Walter Cancela, Zoa Ferreira, etc.

94. Secretary of the JLAIS and the Social Studies Office of the Evangelical Church of Uruguay, a member of the Workers Culture Committee of the FIDEL and a friend of Fidel Castro, he was one of the signers in April 1964 of a "manifesto of Uruguayan intellectuals," rejecting the OAS resolution recommending the interruption of relations with Cuba (EL POPULAR, 4 April 1964). In July of the same year, he went to Havana at the special invitation of the ICAP [Cuban Institute for Friendship with Peoples] to participate in meetings of Latin American writers supporting the Castro communist regime. On his return, he participated in the first Progressive Intellectual Encounter held on 22 October 1964 at the main headquarters of the FIDEL, and at the end of that same year he participated in the lecture cycle in support of the Cuban revolution which was held under the sponsorship of the University Professors Organization at the headquarters of the weekly MARCHA. In January of 1965 he won a Casa de las Americas prize for his work "The Guerrilla Fighters," and was the winner of a literary competition organized by the weekly periodical mentioned. On 30 September of that same year, 1965, he gave an address at the ceremony held to commemorate the 45th anniversary of the founding of the PCU at the headquarters of that party. On 12 October 1966, with a grant from the World Council of Churches, he went to France, where he stayed more than a year. In August of 1967 he went from Paris to East Germany. In January of 1968 he went to Cuba as a delegate to the Havana Cultural Congress, taking advantage of the opportunity to serve on the jury of the annual Casa de las Americas competition. Author of the work "Malcom X," staged by the El Galpon Theater, he collaborated with the MLN-T, in which he was known by the pseudonym "Joaquin," serving in the action group of which "Octavio" and "Francisco" were members, etc.
95. Representative of the Methodist Church, he maintained close contact with the pro-Chinese daily newspaper EPOCA, in which he published articles, also publishing in MARCHA, etc.
96. The secretary general of the previously mentioned Movement for the Defense of Freedoms and Sovereignty, he traveled to Hungary and Cuba in October of 1965 and to Czechoslovakia in July of 1967. On a number of occasions he attended meetings of the Christian Peace Conference, communist-inspired, of which he was international secretary, as a representative of Uruguay. In 1967, on behalf of the Federation of Evangelical Churches of Uruguay, he sent a letter to the Peronist periodical JUAN in Buenos Aires, giving assurance of its sympathy and

efforts,"to promote it from this side of the water" (periodical cited, 5 July 1967). In the conference on Marxism and Christianity held in Geneva in the first fortnight of 1968 under the sponsorship of the World Council of Churches, he maintained that "Christians must collaborate in the development of Marxism, which is the most effective method of loving one's neighbor," etc. In August of 1969, along with Pastor Emilio Castro Pombo, he traveled to East Europe again, etc.

97. In the work cited entitled "Communism in Uruguay," pp 149 et seq., mention is made of various other Protestants, pastors or laymen, who acted along the same lines. Among the former were Jorge Iglesias, Oscar Bolioli, Wilfrido Artus, Carlos Delmonte, Delmo Rostan, Felix Morales, Miguel Brum, Roberto Mariano, Nestor Castro, Earl M. Smith. The latter included Jose Claudio Williman, Victor Bacchetta, Lawson Lee, Jorge Figueron, Carlos A. Wuhl, Felipe H. Paolillo, Oscar Bruschera, Dolores Castillo, Jose Antonio Rial y Costas, Francisco Guillermo Rial, Ariel Nieves, Roque Vega, Jose Luis Bula, Aracely Bula, etc.
98. "La Parda." A veteran member of the MLN-T, he held various responsible posts in that seditious organization, in columns 10 and 15, being expelled at the end of 1970 for violations of discipline. It was then that he formed his own organization with other dissidents, called the FER-71, which was later called the FRT, with a membership made up of secondary students belonging to the FER. After "La Estrella," he was allowed to leave and he returned to the FRT. Finally, he asked the MLN-T to reconsider his case and that he be allowed to go to Cuba, etc.
99. Previous reference, No 206.
100. See Vol II, Chapter V, 2, No 784.
101. Rodriguez (whose complete name is Hector Pio Rodriguez Da Silva) was active in the PCU beginning in 1948, even occupying a parliamentary seat representing the party in the period from 1946-1950, when he was expelled by decision of the convention on 17 March 1951, along with Antonio Richero Mendy, and he was removed from the leadership of the UGT [General Union of Workers] along with Cesar Reyes Daglio. His center of operations was the Textile Workers Union, in whose leadership he participated, and from which he gained considerable influence over the trade union front. In this connection, he made trips to the USSR (1956), Chile (1958), Switzerland (1963), Czechoslovakia (1965), Red China and Hungary (1966), etc.
102. "Aurelio" or "Joaquin."

VI. National Treason Movement (Tupamaros)--Emergence--
Misdeeds--Decline

1. History
2. Stages
3. Autobiography
4. Semantics
5. Military Defeat

NATIONAL TREASON MOVEMENT (TUPAMAROS)--EMERGENCE--MISDEEDS--DECLINE

1. History

292. From the vast series of events related to this seditious organization, it is possible to select some which because of their special significance serve as clear landmarks of its history, something like milestones in its eventful criminal existence, providing an overall notion of the path it followed throughout the period being examined.

293. An understanding of these events, which are documented more extensively and in greater detail in another chapter,¹ is of triple interest: because of their importance in themselves, because of the illumination they provide for the interpretation of many of the documents dealt with in the following chapters, and because they make it possible to identify the basic stages through which the seditious group proceeded.

Recognizing that there may be omissions and even errors in the selection of the events, the main ones are as follows:

First sugar workers march (April-May 1962).

First arrest of Sendic (11 May 1962).

Second sugar workers march (November 1962).

Attack on Swiss Gun Club (31 July 1963).

First "hunger command" (December 1963).

Attack on the Bella Union Customs Authority (January 1964).

Third sugar workers march -- theft of weapons and explosives (April 1964).

First criminal deeds by some sugar workers (June 1964).

First seditious crimes -- disorders following the break with Cuba (September 1964).

First arrest of Marenales, Manera Lluberas and Rodriguez Beletti (October 1964).

Arrest of Sendic by the Monte Caseros police (December 1964).

Robbery of the Bayer Company and appearance of a Tupamaros outlaw list (August 1965).

Attack on the Carpa FUTI (February 1966).

Robbery of the Workers Fund Bank (May 1966).

Death of Carlos Flores and Mario Robaina (22 December 1966).

El Pinar skirmishes (November 1967).

Appearance of the first public MLN-T document, an open letter to the police (7 December 1967).

Dissolution of subversive political groups and shutdown of the daily newspaper EPOCA and EL SOL (12 December 1967).

"Satan" Plan -- armed propaganda -- first kidnapping of Pereira Reverbel (August 1968).

Launching of attacks and robberies of banks on a large scale (September 1968).

Second arrest of Marenales -- Marquetalia fire (October 1968).

Arrest of members of the seditious group in Pando (December 1968).

Attack on the first session trial court (January 1969).

Attack on the Monty Financial Institution and the San Rafael Hotel Casino (February 1969).

Transfer of the members of the seditious gang to the Punta Carretas prison (March 1969).

Kidnapping of Pellegrini Giampietro (September 1969).

Pando action (October 1969).

First escape from the Women's Prison ("Paloma" [Dove], "Flight of the Little Dove") (March 1970).

Attack on the Mailhos firm -- murder of Moran Charquero (April 1970).

First arrest of Almiratti Nietto -- attack on the Naval Training Center (May 1970).

Kidnappings of Pereira Manelli, Mitrioni and Dias Gomide (July 1970).

Kidnapping of Fly -- second arrest of Sendic -- collapse of the MLN-T leadership -- assassination of Mitrione (August 1970).

Bowling Club blown up (September 1970).

Attack on the National Fund (November 1970).

Establishment of the 26 March Movement -- support of the FA (November-December 1970).

Kidnapping of Jackson (January 1971).

Kidnapping of Berro Oribe -- government program (March 1971).

Second kidnapping of Pereira Reverbel (April 1971).

Kidnapping of Frick Davies -- escape of Almiratti Nietto (May 1971).

Second escape from the Women's Prison ("Estrella" [Star]) -- escape of Bidegain Greissing (July 1971).

Establishment of the CAI [Committee for International Affairs] and Column 45 -- first mass escape from the Punta Carretas prison ("Abuso" [Abuse], "Asonada de la Teja" [La Teja Mutiny]) (September 1971).

Assumption of leadership of the antisubversive struggle by the Armed Forces (9 September 1971).

Assassination of Leoncino -- attack on the commissariat of the 27th section (January 1972).

Attack on the Macchi commissariat -- attack on the Soca commissariat -- kidnapping of Bardesio (February 1972).

Reorganization of the MLN-T -- implementation of the Tatu and Collar Plans -- discovery of the first Tatu Plan members (March 1972).

First attack on an armed forces officer (3 April 1972).

Second mass escape from the Punta Carretas prison ("Gallo" [Cock]) (12 April 1972)

14 April massacre -- searches in Amazonas and Perez Gomar and seizure of secret documentation of the seditious organization (14 April 1972).

Declaration of state of internal warfare -- fall of the MLN-T Information Center, with all of the documentation pertaining to the SIPI, the SIFA [Armed Forces Intelligence Service] and SIPE [Political-Economic Information Service] (15 April 1972).

Discovery of the "Complex" (14 May 1972).

Slaughter of four soldiers on Armed Forces Day (18 May 1972).

Discovery of the "People's Hospital" (23 May 1972),

Discovery of the "People's Prison" (27 May 1972),

Arrest of 40 sugar workers (15 June 1972).

Peace proposals by the seditious group (5 July 1972).

Final destruction of the MLN-T health network (14 July 1972).

Murder of Colonel Alvarez (25 July 1972),

Outrage against deputy Ferrer (6 August 1972).

Murder of Lieutenant Braida (18 August 1972).

Third arrest of Sendic (31 August 1972).

Joint statement by the ERP [Revolutionary People's Army] and the MLN-T -- explosion at the Faculty of Engineering (October 1973).

Dissolution of the PCU and other Marxist groups (November 1973).

Publication of the first issue of EL TUPAMARO in Buenos Aires (December 1973).

2. Stages

294. On the basis of the events listed below it is possible to outline four major periods of stages in the life of the MLN-T.

These stages have nothing to do, of course, with those defined by the organization itself with regard to the strategic process of the revolution, explained farther on.² Like the list of the main events set forth in the preceding section, these stages are solely designed to familiarize the reader with the synoptic picture with regard to the vital cycle through which the organization passed from its origins to the present.

1) Formation (1962-1967).

295. This covers the longest period, 5 years, in which the organization germinated and during which an effort was made to set up the minimal organizational apparatus, to collect funds, weapons and other war materiel and to consolidate the infrastructure,

Its main embryonic cell arose within the UTAA [Artigas Sugar Workers Union], established by Sendic, and its most important manifestations were the first two sugar workers marches on Montevideo, Sendic's first arrest, the attacks on the Swiss Gun Club and the Bella Union Customs Office, the first "hunger command," etc.

296. Between the midpoint and the end of this first organizational stage, the names "Tupamaros" (a contraction of Tupac Amaru³) and MLN first appeared, and were used from then on by the organization in its activities.

This stage ended with the shutting down of the daily newspapers EPOCA and EL SOL, and the dissolution of the subversive political groups which had joined together to overthrow institutions by means of armed struggle: the PS, FAU, MRO, MAPU, MIR [Movement of the Revolutionary Left], and the EPOCA Independents' Group.

2) Armed Propaganda (1968-1971)

297. This was the stage in which the seditious group made itself known and gained notoriety within and outside of the country, by the spectacular nature of a number of its actions.

These were a part of the Satan Plan, which was basically designed "to take the measure" of the government, and if possible, to enter into negotiations with it, on an equal basis, pursuing the theory of the "double regime" and thus giving the people an idea of its importance and weight.

Here the group was playing its cause to win over the masses and the popular sectors from the governing "oligarchy," by demonstrating its political competence and executive efficiency.

Winning great publicity, these actions were an attempt to present the methods of the police and the government, of which the organization seemed to be making fun, from a vantage point of cleverness and imagination, as stupid and inefficient.

This was also the stage of "revolutionary justice," of the "people's prison," of "harassment of the oligarchy," by means of attacks on its homes, places of recreation, etc., clearly expressed by the seditious group's slogan "no one will oversee this war," and of approach to the political groups affiliated with the FA, with a view to bringing about a public reversal with the November 1971 national elections in mind.

298. The basic events included in this second stage were the first and sensational kidnappings (Pereira Reverbel, Pellegrini Giampietro, Mitrione, Dias Gomide, Fly, Jackson, Frick Davies, Pereira Manelli, Berro Oribe); the first attacks and thefts of funds and equipment (Trial Court, Monty Financing, San Rafael Casino, Mailhos, National Fund, Naval Training Center); the Pando and Bowling Clubs actions; the first murders (Moran Charquero, Mitrione); the escapes from the Women's Prison ("Paloma," "Estrella") and the Punta Carretas Prison ("Abuso" and "Gallo"), laboriously planned from the prison itself on the basis of the plans referred to, some of which were based on the use of the sewage network; the establishment of the "legal political front" and of links with the party groups participating in the FA, through the 26 March Independents Movement, the arms branch of the MLN-T.

299. This stage was also the period of growth for the cadres of the organization, the personnel of which proceeded to multiply.

During this period the seditious group suffered the second arrest of Marenales, the first arrest of Almiratti Nietto, the Marquetalia fire, and the Pando arrest.

This second stage ended with the arrival of the armed forces on the scene, when they were called upon to take charge of the leadership of the struggle against subversion (9 September 1971).

3) Harassment and Tatu Plan (January-April 1972)

300. This was the shortest stage and was characterized by two main events: the internal reorganization of the MLN-T into a first or basic front, a rear guard and a second or auxiliary front; and the increasing harassment of the armed forces and the implementation of the Tatu and Collar Plans.

301. The Tatu Plan was characterized by an effort to draw the guerrilla war into the rural sector in order to keep the repressive forces of the interior occupied and eliminate any possibility that they could lend support to the forces engaged in the struggle in Montevideo.

The harassment was characterized by assassination and attacks on members of the Carabineers' Forces (Leoncino, Macchi), and there was also, on 3 April, the first attack on an armed forces official, and 11 days later came the massacre of 14 April, which aroused public indignation.

302. There also occurred the attacks on the 27th section commissariat in Montevideo and the commissariat in the settlement of Soca, Canelones, the kidnapping of Bardesio and the second Punta Carretas escape.

The murders on 14 April led to the declaration of a state of internal warfare and the Amazonas and Perez Comar conflicts.

From then on, the seditious organization, which from the beginning and to that time had maintained the initiative, began to suffer serious reverses, one after another, reflecting its decline and speedy liquidation as a military problem.

4) Defeat and Exile (May 1972-December 1973).

303. This was the last stage, as of the publication of this work. The seditious organization, which beat a retreat on the armed struggle front and the "legal" front, through the support given it from the parliament by the political sectors with which it was affiliated, made a desperate and vain attempt to deal some blows, such as the slaughter of four soldiers on Armed Forces Day and the later murders of Colonel Alvarez and Lieutenant Braida, a tactical error which sealed its fate, since it provided rude proof in the incredulous eyes of every last one of the members of the armed forces of the criminal fury of the enemy they were fighting.

304. Thus a chain of calamities occurred, one after the other (discovery of hideouts, places of concealment and centers of logistic and medical support, the collapse of the "complex," the "Caraguata" and the "people's prison," of the Tatu and other hideout in the interior, the arrest of Sendic and the large number of other members of the seditious gang, defeat of the columns operating in the interior and in Montevideo, etc.), which led to the formulation of peace proposals by the organization, which were rejected, such that the struggle ended with its total defeat on the military level, with a large number of its members in prison.

305. Those who succeeded in slipping through the iron blockade by the FFCC fled to Chile and Argentina. With the fall of the regime in power until then in the former country in September of 1973, they moved on to the latter, where they sought to reorganize their forces to launch the struggle again, working with the exiles who settled in Buenos Aires after the events of June 1973. The joint declaration with the ERP, the appearance of EL TUPAMARO and other later activities confirmed this.

3. Autobiography

306. Rather than describing the history of this seditious group in the form of a report from "outside," the technique pursued in earlier publications, this work seeks to present it from "within." To do so we have used what its own documents say, since to a certain extent, they are evidence which illuminates the intentions which motivated the group and the activities it carried out.

That this was a group established essentially on the basis of a small nucleus of angry "intellectuals" with the university background there can be no doubt, as is evidenced by the professions and occupations of those arrested.⁴ But if this were not known factually, as it is, in order to reach the same conclusion it would suffice to note the incredible

prodigality of the literature produced by the organization, and its nature, with a propensity for theoretical speculation, expressed in notes, memoranda, commentaries, reports, analyses and studies of all kinds, for the internal consumption of the leading cell and the militants.

Some of these documents are characterized by a pedagogical event. In others the intent is to recapitulate and synthesize what has been studied, as if to prevent forgetting the lessons learned, with a view to illustrating and catechizing the members of the subaltern cadres and the new recruits joining the organization. In almost all of the documents, a careless style, deliberately negligent, prevailed. Presumed to be "popular" and anti-bourgeois, it succeeds only in being vulgar, full of dropped letters, more or less esoteric names and phrases, referring to the existence of the "new man" of whom Che Guevara spoke and the "new thing": the guerrilla fighter and guerrilla war, or, which is the same thing, the revolutionary and revolution.

307. In general, this is the nature of the document in which the doctrine of the seditious movement, its intentions, its criticisms about what is evil in the hateful bourgeois society -- whose death it was planning with relish, its plans, its concerns, its potential, its prospects and difficulties, its successes and also its reverses, its "mea culpa" or self-criticisms, were developed.

In this respect there was no difference as compared with the other guerrilla movements on the continent, of which it emerged as yet one more variant.

Eagerness to carry out deeds with real repercussions, to formulate passionate statements, to merit headlines in the daily papers and news reports, to issue proclamations in tragic language denouncing the "intolerable" social situation to which the "redeeming" revolution will put an end is a consubstantial necessity for this kind of movement, which lives off its vanity and the urgent desire to win the support of the public to nurture its excesses.

But when we discover and individualize its agents, check on and break down its maneuvers, stripping them of the publicity-propaganda infrastructure -- press, news agencies, radio, television, parliament, university -- provided for the free by the "oppressive" democratic society, ready for use in its own destruction, these movements fade away and rapidly dissolve in nothing, which is inevitably their fate, provided two indispensable conditions exist: the presence of a government worthy of the name, in other words one which governs; and a general consensus of the people in support of that government.

308. No one can reasonably challenge the need to introduce speedy change in the underdeveloped societies, as demanded by human dignity and progress, and in certain parts of Latin America and the world, the need is urgent and imperious. But what can be challenged, because it is unacceptable and must be prevented, is the twisted effort to utilize this need to

establish the tyrannical communist society, sought by these movements, and their determination to impose it by blood and fire.

In reality, under the pretext of "change" and "revolution," this is only a degraded form of waging politics which can without hesitation be termed the political-revolutionary demagoguery of the 20th century, pursued by those who, lacking the competence to pursue this difficult art, want to impose themselves at some point and by machinegun bursts, an inclination reflected in the documents and attitudes of the "revolutionary" of the modern epoch.

4. Semantics

309. It is not easy for the uninitiated to understand many of the MLN-T documents, which are often punctuated with abbreviations, criminal slang, phrases and expressions which are not known to the general public. To some extent for reasons of security, and again because it "sounds good," giving a ring of mystery leaving the impression of efficiency with which the "revolution" is apparently being undertaken, the fact is that it is difficult to get ahead with the reading of the documentation of the seditious group, unless one is familiar with the meanings in their abstruse lexicon.

310. An effort has been made to overcome this difficulty by appending brief notes after each word, name, phrase or common expression, giving an explanation of its meaning. These notes appear where these terms are first encountered, and are not repeated again. However, the reader may at any time establish their meaning by consulting the auxiliary indices at the end.

5. Military Defeat

311. The seditious organization which was the scourge of Uruguay for years was rapidly crushed as a military force by the FFCC, as has been explained. Its strategy is the subject of a separate chapter.⁵ In this section, we will rapidly outline the counterstrategy of the FFCC and the landmarks in the countersubversive activity, with an indication of their results, reflected in the military annihilation of the MLN-T in the course of 7 months of a systematic offensive, and the neutralization of its political structure, along with other factors promoting subversion.

312. It was as of 9 September 1971, when the executive branch decreed the intervention of the armed forces and entrusted to them the planning, execution and conduct of the operations designed to put an end to subversive activities, that the military command defined its strategy and goals.

Seven objectives in all, all of them fully achieved, with the exception of the last, still being developed as this work went to press, were established by the FFCC, as follows;

First goal: to provide the necessary security conditions for the normal holding of the national elections. Strategic attitude: "defensive"; achievement -- 30 November 1971.

Second objective: to guarantee the regular handing over of power to the new government elected by the citizenry and to speed up the organization and training of the FFCC for the antsubversive struggle, an activity theoretically understood, but in which there had been no practical experience at all. Strategic attitude: "defensive"; achievement -- 1 March 1972.

Third objective: to guarantee the assumption of jurisdiction over crimes of subversion by the Military Penal Courts, and as a function of the training and competence for the antsubversive struggle, to launch the offensive operations as soon as possible. Strategic attitude: "offensive"; achievement -- 15 April 1972.

Fourth objective: destruction of the military apparatus of the seditious organization. Strategic attitude: "offensive"; achievement -- 15 November 1972.


Fifth objective: neutralization of collateral and related factors creating an atmosphere favorable to the development of subversion (administrative confusion, socio-economic crimes, public corruption, etc.). Strategic attitude: "offensive"; achievement -- 30 January 1972.

Sixth objective: Neutralization of the political apparatus of the subversives and their activities on the mass fronts. Strategic attitude: "offensive-defensive"; achievement -- action begun, 7 February 1973; neutralization of the political front, proscription of its activities and dissolution of the parliament, because of the extent of infiltration -- 27 June 1973.

Neutralization of the trade union front, dissolution of the infiltrated organizations, termination of the activities of the Marxist leaders and political strikes -- 30 June 1973; neutralization of the student front, with intervention in the educational institutions on all levels -- 28 October 1973; final neutralization of the political front, with the outline of the PC [Communist Party], the PS and other Marxist groups -- 28 November 1973.

Seventh objective (being developed): to provide a safe environment for the national development, sharing in the drafting and implementation of the National Economic and Social Development Plan and its sector programs. Launching of this activity (creation of the COSENA [National Security Council]) -- 23 February 1973. Main landmarks -- San Miguel and Colonia Suiza meetings, August-October 1973.⁶

Organization Adopted for the Antisubversive Campaign



313. It was in the 7 months period between 15 April and 15 November 1972 that the campaign to liquidate the MLN-T was carried out. The organizational diagram below illustrates the organic structure adopted for the implementation of this campaign,

During this period, the FFCC carried out a total of 7012 operations, with a satisfactory percentage of effectiveness. In all, 2,873 members of seditious groups were arrested and tried; materials seized included large sums of money and quantities of medical, communications, and propaganda materials, weapons (376 automatic weapons and submachineguns, 887 long weapons and 2,361 side arms, 39,000 projectiles of various calibers) and explosive substances (370 kilograms of gelignite and plastic explosives); two "people's prisons" and two subterranean "hospitals," 145 "berretines"⁷ and 121 "tatuceras"⁸ were discovered.

The operational summary shown in the tables below complete and differentiate in greater detail the results of the actions carried out by the FFCC in the period mentioned.

At all times the population was faithfully informed, through the communications media, press, radio and television, about the development of the antsubversive campaign, including in all 1,164 communiques and special bulletins issued by the Press Office of the Carabineers' Forces without interruption, from 9 September 1971 until 30 September 1974.

Antisubversive Military Campaign 15 April to 15 November 1972 Summary of Operations

A. Quantitative Summary

Period covered	Total number of operations	No of successful operations (1)	Percentage of success
15 April-15 May	862	77	9%
15 May-15 June	1,285	130	10%
15 June-15 July	1,160	174	15%
15 July-15 August	1,145	193	17%
15 August-15 Sep	1,053	190	18%
15 Sep-15 Oct	872	191	20%
15 Oct-15 Nov	492	97	20%
15 Nov-31 Dec (2)	143	31	205

(1) By "successful operation" we mean one ending with some enemy losses in personnel, materiel and/or infrastructure.

(2) The operations included in the period from 15 November to 31 December are not included within the framework of the military campaign because they involved solely a search for and arrest of marginal elements of minor importance.

B. Qualitative Summary

Type of operation	15 April- 15 May	15 May- 15 June	15 June- 15 July	15 July- 15 Aug	15 Aug- 15 Sep	15 Sep- 15 Oct	15 Oct- 15 Nov
Reconnaissance and patrolling of area or zone	24	18	12	10	8	8	8
Combing of area or zone	9	10	8	5	5	5	5
Surprise search of estate or farm	62	59	60	62	62	64	64
Laying of trap or ambush	2	3	5	5	5	3	3
Mass arrest for statements	3	10	15	18	20	20	20
Total successful operations ⁽¹⁾	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

(1) The table shows only the total number of successful operations in order to determine, on a percentage basis, what type of operation achieved the best results in the urban counter guerrilla actions.

Final Results

1. Casualties in Personnel
 - Insurgents killed in combat 62
 - Insurgents captured and tried 2,873
 - Insurgents sought who fled abroad 84
2. Losses in materiel
 - Submachineguns and automatic weapons 376
 - Long barreled weapons (rifles, muskets, shotguns) 887
 - Sidearms (pistols and revolvers) 2,361
 - Ammunition of various calibers 39,000
 - Plastic explosives and gelignite, etc. 370 kg
 - Large quantities of "money in various currencies, photography and counterfeiting equipment, medical equipment, communications equipment, clothing, accouterments, printing and propaganda materials, documentation, vehicles, etc.
3. Infrastructure
 - Underground "prisons 6
 - Underground "hospitals" 2
 - Underground hideouts ("berretines") 142
 - Underground rural hideouts ("tatuceras") 118

FOOTNOTES

1. Chapter XIV, "Events."
2. Chapter IX, "Strategy."
3. A descendant of the Incas, who was proclaimed the sovereign ruler of Peru in 1781, he was atrociously butchered by the Spanish. His name was used by the horsemen of the interior of Uruguay during the independence struggles, and from them the seditious organization took this name. See Boleslao Lewin, "Tupac Amaru," MARCHA Library, "Los Nuestros" [Our Own] Collection, No 5, Montevideo.
4. See "Seven Months of Antisubversive Struggle," previously cited, pp 337 et seq., a statistical analysis undertaken on the basis of the arrests made throughout the country from the first half of March to 31 August 1972, one of the most intensive periods of antiseditious action.
5. Chapter IX.
6. A detailed analysis of these goals is made in Vol II, to which reference is made.
7. In criminal slang, Berretin means a camouflaged hiding place in houses, furniture or other objects, in which papers, materials, weapons and other items are kept, and also, by extension, where even individuals are sheltered. The following is a list of the "berretines" located in Montevideo: 1440 Amazonas, 4392 Perez Gomar, 4259/61 Domingo Torres, 1323 Coronel Alegre, 1284-86-86 b Brito del Pino, 2197 Chana, 5859-57 Friburgo, 1512 Anzani, 1274 Isla de Flores, 4531 Iglesias (currently Basagoity), 6509 Montes Sosa Road, 1294 Democracia, 1263-65 Asencio, 3244 Tomas Gomensoro, 3222 Tomas Gomensoro, 1878 Anzani, 1278 Duvimioso Terra, 2659 Mariano Moreno, Apartment 17, 3099 Joaquin Nunez, Apartment 3, 2916 Mariano Moreno, Apartment 17, 2135 Guadalupe, 1425 Nicaragua, 5808 Lezica, 2255 Larranaga, 3089 Manuel Haedo, 747 Francisco Vidal, 1693 Joaquin Requena, 2163 Constitucion, 3671 Cubo del Sur, 5211 Lisboa, corner of Cuchilla Grande, Jose Maria Guerra (no number), Coraceros 3493, 1544 Mercedes, 1784 Agraciada, 1151 Arquimedes, 5554 Caramuru, 1286 Brito del Pino, corner of Echegoyen and Guerra, corner of Rio Negro and Agraciada, corner of Vidal and Fuentes (No 3139),

corner of Maldonado and Gaboto, 2137 Jose Culta, 2190 Garibaldi, between Fortin and Ganaderos on Camindo de las Tropas, 2210-06 Joaquin Requena, Caballero Pharmacy, corner of Maldonado and Ibicuy, 1363 Asencio, Apartment 15, office 5, 4072, between Petain and Rambla, 1192 Juan Paullier, corner of Millan and Clemenceau, 4937 Torriccelli, 1678-80 Martin Garcia, 194 Copiapo, Office 9, 5156, 3562 Genova, 2472 Carlos Berg, 395 Dionisio Coronel, 5634 Ariel Road, corner of Carrasco Road and Roosevelt Park, 179 Comercio, 1728 Alicante, 2693 Jujuy, 4575 Pedro Giralt, Apartment 2, 3731 Juan B. Morelli, 1780 Tacuarembó, 4086 Samuel Blixen, 2176 San Salvador, 2341 Acuna de Figueroa, 3945 Galvan, 5872 Coimbra, 4740 Verdi, 1669-71-73 Enrique Martinez, 2277 Colonia, Apartment 6, 1671 Martin C. Martinez, 3324 La Habana, 3331 Ruben Dario, 671 Francisco Vidal, 1837 San Fructuoso, 1435 Pablo de Maria, 3429-1 Arenal Grande, 294 Reconquista, 4210 Manuel Melendez, 981 P. Zufriategui, Ministry of Public Health Prophylactic Institute for Siphilis, 1139 b 28 de Febrero, 972 Maldonado, 617 Francisco Vidal, 1051 Medanos, Apartment 3, 2847 General Urquiza, 1416 Yatay, Apartment 3, 3315 San Martin, Apartment 9, 1305 Asuncion, Apartment 20, 14 kilometer marker, Highway 1, 1267b Jose Ellauri, 3277 San Martin, Apartment 15, 1183 Tomas de Texanos, 1843 Lavalleja, 1267 Sayago, 1354 La Habana, 935 Pablo Zufriategui, 5667, on the corner of Palmas and Ombues, 2460 Lindoro Forteza, 27 kilometer marker, Highway 1, 1605 Ceibal, 1916 Yaguari, 3417 Rafael, 4097 Humberto Primera, 3920 Cayetano Rivas, 1470 Maldonado, Apartment 19, 227 Zubillaga, 1560 Luis A. de Herrera, Ministry of Public Health, 2865 Official Football Field (20 meters), No 2080 124th Street, Block 4, 2nd floor, 1571 Ceibal, 23 kilometer marker, Highway 1, 2921 Calle (Colon) (20 meters), 1284 Ruy Barboza, 2733 Tomas Villalba, corner of Manuel Quintela and Spikerman, corner of Larranaga and Feliciano Rodriguez, 2687 Scoseria, Apartment 901, Cells 187 and 188, Miguelete Prison, 1297 Vazquez, 231 Atanasildo Suarez, Austria between 15th and 16th (Cerro), 1921 Santander, Apartment 4, 3498 19 de Abril, Riccini Avenue between Italia Avenue and Highway 101, 4340 Heredia, 1336 Asencio, 79 Ladines, Nuevo Paris, 5331 Puntas de Soto, 3394 Arechaga, 6255 Laguna Merim, 1495 Provincia Vascongada, Office 6, 1217 Bazo Valencia Quarter, 1307 Americo Vespucio, 1053 Juan M. Blanes, 6507 Santa Rosa, 225 Sarandi, 1027 Blanes (Casa de Salto), Punta Espinillo, 2997 Ramon Massini, and 2337 Taorminas.

8. "Tatucera"-- armadillo's cave, from which the usage of this term developed to designate the underground wells, shelters or storage areas created by the MLN-T in rural zones in accordance with the directives of the Tatu Plan, dealt with in Chapter XI, for the concealment of its members, weapons, materiel, food supplies, etc. The MLN-T built a wide variety of hiding places, "tatuceras," and "berretines" throughout the country, perfectly camouflaged, in the cities and rural zones, known to the members by the names which in many cases they gave them. The little "tatuceras" near the cities were called

"tarros" [jars]. By way of example we might mention the Aquino and El Galpon tatuceras in the department of Minas, Caraguata in the department of Maldonado, La Soledad in the department of Durazno, on the other side of the Yi River, La Escopeta, on the Interresort Highway, beneath a great mockup of a wine bottle displayed for advertising purposes, etc. A similar system was used for the berretines, among which we might mention the following: El Ombu, at the pharmacy on Brito del Pino and Rivera, "La Estrella" or "Berreta" on Constitucion Street, "El Complejo" in Villa Lezica, "Paturuzu," "Papagallo," etc.

The following is a list of the tatuceras and berretines which the FFCC discovered in the interior of the country: kilometer marker 331 on Highway 17, Sanz Station, Department of Treinta y Tres, city of Treinta y Tres, 122 Basilio Araujo (city of Treinta y Tres), Rosario Ravine and Route 2, Itacumbu Ravine, 5 kilometers from the mouth, San Salvador Ridge between Florencio Sanchez and Ismael Cortinas Station, city of Salto, 980 Agraciada and Democracia. Espinillar Ravine, Department of Salto, Highway 14, 10th Judiciary Section in the Department of Flores, city of Rocha, Highway 8 and Olimar River, kilometer marker 261, Route 8, kilometer marker 298, Punta Colorada and Piriapolis, Rural Establishment, 13th Judiciary Section in the Department of Cerro Largo, kilometer marker 86 and Route 12, La Cruz Ravine and Santa Lucia Chico River, Route 14, Department of Durazno, right bank of the Queguay River, Department of Paysandu, Los Indios site, Department of Rocha, Woods near the Cebollati River, Department of Rocha, 20 kilometers to the south of Cebollati, Rural Establishment, Route 9, kilometer marker 113, kilometer 1, milestone 13, Department of Lavalleja, city of Dolores, environs of the city of Salto, Coronado site near the city of Bella Union, and the establishments of the CALNU [Farm Cooperative of Northern Uruguay], 1153 Pioyenne, Pando, Office No 2 (no number), city of Paso de los Toros, city of Treinta y Tres and left bank of the Tacuari River, Route 57, 3 kilometers from the city of Trinidad, banks of the Chapicuy and Espinillar Ravines and Route 3, Department of Salto, confluence of the Queguay Grande and Queguay Chico Rivers, Department of Paysandu, El Bosque resort, Presidente Gestido Avenue, in the Department of Canelones, village of Cosmopolita, Department of Colonia, 213 Catalogne, city of Tacuarembó, 29 Plata Park and 729 Santa Rosa, Las Piedras, Department of Canelones, Interresort Highway, 43 kilometer marker, secondary road near the village of Soca, Guazu-Bira resort, 60 kilometer marker, El Bosque resort, city of Piriapolis, La Goleta and Paraguay, San Jose de Carrasco, Aurelio Carambula farm, Paso del Enano farm, near the city of Rivera, 9th Judiciary Section, Portones Negros site, Department of Rivera, Rincon de Pando farm, 729 Santa Rosa, city of Las Piedras, 1166 19 de Abril, city of Paysandu, 1104 Intendencia and Charrua, city of Paysandu, Route 3, kilometer marker 381, at the edge of the city of Paysandu, 1021 33 Orientales, city of Paysandu, Quebracho Ravine and Route 3, city of Paysandu, San Francisco Ravine, department

Paysandu, bank of the Uruguay River to the east of the railroad bridge, Department of Paysandu, Santa Elisa hacienda, Department of Paysandu, Quebracho Ravine, left bank, near the end of the railroad bridge,, Department of Paysandu, city of Rivera, Fortin Road, Atlantida hacienda, Valle Eden and Tambores Ravine, city of Fray Bentos, Route 5, kilometer marker 384, Tierras Coloradas, Department of Tacuarembó, Rincon de Barbato, Department of Tacuarembó, environs of the city of Tacuarembó, Espinillo Ravine, Juan Lacaze, Department of Colonia, city of Florida, home of "Victor," city of Florida, home of "Juan Jose," Costas de Arias, Department of Florida, city of Florida, city of Las Piedras farm, city of Las Piedras, 2415 Betete, Santa Lucia, Artigas and Cebollati (no number), city of Treinta y Tres, Florencio Sanchez and Batlle, city of Minas, home of Susana Irigoyen de Ciaran, city of Paso de los Toros, Route 5, woods to the north of the city of Tacuarembó, Interresort Highway, kilometer point 62.5, home of Eler Roqueta, city of Juan Lacaze, Dayman River, 1 kilometer to the east of the railroad bridge, Department of Salto, Cerro Bonito Canyon, Department of Rivera, Paso del Sauce and Cunapiru Ravine, Department of Rivera, Tacuarembó River, Department of Rivera, Atalaya Quarter, city of Colonia, Manuel de Lobo (no number), city of Colonia, Juan Lacaze (no number), coastal beach, city of Colonia, Carmelo Estrella, city of Colonia, Juan Lacaze Street (no number), Liberio Irizarri Street and Carolini Street, Santa Bernardina, Department of Durazno, 1003 Solis Street, city of Durazno, 33d Street (no number) and Rio Negro, city of Paso de los Toros, No 328 Gualberto Echeverry, city of Paso de los Toros, 587 Itapebi, city of Salto, San Eugenio and Santa Rosa, city of Salto, exit road and Garibaldi Avenue, city of Salto, Punta de Diamante [Diamond Point], on the Uruguay River, Fray Bentos, fields of Enrique Lavista, Fray Bentos, Route 2 and blast furnaces establishment, Fray Bentos, Route 20, kilometer marker 4, to the south of the bridge over the Totoral Ravine, Department of Rio Negro, Nueva Mehelen establishment, near the Uruguay River, Department of Rio Negro, 2131 Catalina, city of Tacuarembó, Batovi zone, Tacuarembó River, Tacuarembó Ridge, 339 Manuel Melendez, city of Treinta y Tres, Route 8 and Carretero Bridge, milestone 37, 646 Luciano Macedo, city of Treinta y Tres, Route 12, kilometer marker 6.5, Department of Lavelleja, Route 12, kilometer marker 2.7, Department of Lavelleja, environs of Laguna Negra [Black Lake], 4 kilometers from Route 16, Department of Rocha, La Paloma, Department of Rocha, Anaconda resort, Department of Rocha, city of Melo, home of Amilcar Perdomo Bica, city of Melo, home of Crisanto B. Rodriguez, city of Melo, home of Ruben Abreu Benitez, city of Melo, home of Pablo Daniel Orrambibide, 14 de Santa Rosa Road, city of Atlantida, Nico Perez and Batlle y Ordenez, Rincon del Bonete and Route 5, 391 General Flores, city of Paso de los Toros, Block 66, plot 7, Central Avenue, Punta Colorada, Piriapolis, Anibal Saravia establishment, Department of Cerro Largo, Route 13, Highway to Aigua, city of La Paz.

VII. Structure and Organization

1. Structural and Organizational Scheme
2. The "Gospels" of the Tupamaros
3. A Bit of History
4. Bylaws
5. Instruction of the Militants
 - a. General Instructions
 - b. Importance of the Data
 - c. A Specific Information Method: the Armed Forces
 - d. Security
 - e. Conduct During Interrogation
 - f. Handling and Care of Weapons
 - g. Various Offensive Practices
 - h. Plan of Attack
 - i. Practical Manual for Sabotage
6. Tupamaros Penal Code
7. The Role of Women
8. Characteristics of Recruiting

STRUCTURE AND ORGANIZATION

1. Structural and Organizational Scheme

314. Because of its clandestine nature, the MLN-T, like any other subversive organization, adapted its structure and organization to two vital requirements: security and decentralization.

The first concept covered not only the security of the seditious apparatus, meaning its various bodies as a whole, but also the security of each group (compartmentalization) and of each member of the organization, considered individually.

Touching closely on the preceding consideration at many points, the second concept was imposed by the need to protect the leading command of the movement, to prevent its discovery and annihilation. It was to this end that the organization implemented the system of administrative decentralization, through the operation of a system of cells and columns, based on collective leadership, with a certain degree of internal politicization and distribution or division of the work on the basis of three clearly differentiated tasks: the political, the military and technical or service work.

315. The harshness and the long drawn out nature of the struggle -- this was a confrontation with the regime which the seditious organizations expected to be cruel and prolonged and full of alternatives -- were such that many militants fell by the wayside. As a result, the leading teams could only survive and the struggle could only continue if there were a potential for immediate replenishment, that is, if there were replenishments to allow the rapid filling of the vacancies occurring in the vicissitudes of combat, which explains the desirability of collective leadership.

Even in isolation, the militants were expected to pursue the struggle without abandoning the general line of the movement, which would have been impossible to achieve without the minimal political level for all of them, which in turn justifies the need for internal politicization.

The division of labor became indispensable when a certain level was reached in the complexity and volume of work, which normally occurred on the column level, and never, or very rarely, that of the cell.

316. Inherent in the political work was the handling of recruiting, the minimal training of the militants, action on the mass fronts, the periphery, and the development of military or technical actions involving those groups which had no structure or were functioning under the jurisdiction of another.

The military task involved the handling of combat groups, instruction, training, cadre training schools, operational bases, guard duty and the supervision of the combat equipment and the action itself.

The technical or service aspect covered the distribution of tasks to the entire column, logistics, the management of specialized equipment and materiel, the supply of technical resources for military and political tasks, supplies, etc.

317. In accordance with the internal bylaws of the organization, as will be seen in another section, the MLN-T had as its maximal authority a national convention, a body meeting periodically, at which the various lower bodies and members of the organizations were represented.

There was in addition an executive commission which, between conventions, took charge of the executive administration of the movement. Its membership was decreed by the convention, and could only be changed by it, or by unanimous decision of the executive committee itself, in extreme situations and with responsibility to the convention, etc.

318. The column was a political-military body invested with full autonomous powers, with an infrastructure, action and service groups, such as to be capable of pursuing the struggle on behalf of the organization, even if the rest of it had been wiped out, with the internal means necessary to rebuild what was destroyed and, should the case arise, in a position to exercise full autonomy. The number of members in each column varied between 25 and 150.

319. The cell was the base organism of the organization, specialized in function and lacking in autonomy. Each cell had a minimum of two members, and could be established and operated anywhere. Each cell had to have a leader and a substitute to replace him, both designated by the executive committee, etc.

Each cell was linked with the executive committee directly or through intermediary bodies, or again through liaison personnel, also designated by the committee, with the precise intention of making the unity of horizontal and vertical links among the various bodies effective. There were in addition the so-called "peripheral cells," made up of individuals who were not in a position to join the organization, due to their position or their responsibilities, and who are referred to specifically in Article 20 of the bylaws.

320. Within this general organizational scheme, headed by the national convention, which was the political-strategic body, and by the executive committee, which was the collegiate body responsible for putting the policy established into execution, the other bodies and services of the MLN-T function.

This scheme was not a static but a changing one, adaptable to the requirements and realities of the various stages through which the movement passed.


321. In order to obtain an approximate notion of this development, we might consider certain events which defined the stages referred to, six in all, from the founding of the movement to the present time.

A first stage, prior to the year 1970, reconstructed on the basis of the statements of members of the seditious organization, was that covering the establishment of the minimal organizational apparatus, on the basis of the general orientation of line "H."¹

In this first stage and under the direction of the executive committee, there existed action groups (made up of the military cells, the recruiting and instruction cells, and the CAT, or Tupamaros Support Command), and the political action sector, based on active elements who had infiltrated the PS. Fig No 1 below illustrates this first stage graphically.

Figure 1. Known Organization of the MLN-T Prior to 1970 (from statements)

(Minimal organic apparatus according to "Line H")



322. A second stage, from September of 1971 to March 1972, was that of the functioning of the organic apparatus allowing the seditious movement to put into execution the theory of the "double regime" or "parallel regime," as well as pursuing the next objective, in accordance with the line "H" to which we have already referred.²

In this second stage one can see the existence of the executive secretariat, with jurisdiction over the information, finance and international relations work; the general command in Montevideo, with columns 10 and 15; the general command of the interior with its columns 20 (North) and 30 (South); columns 60 (which handled the "legal" political action, basically through the 26 March Movement) and 7 (base for the Collar Plan).³ Fig No 2 summarizes this stage.

323. A third organizational stage, covering April and May of 1972, was the period when the FFCC launched their military campaign, coinciding with the organic restructuring which the leadership of the seditious movement planned and carried out a month earlier, in March of that year, having decided to extend the guerrilla war into the interior of the country.

This stage is of particular interest because the organization being shaped was that developed to wage the rural struggle and intensify subversive action in general, or, conversely, it was this which the FFCC had to face at the beginning of the antisubversive operations in those months.


It is useful therefore to note briefly the basic ideas which governed the organizational restructuring referred to, and which the seditious movement tried to implement with regard to four main aspects, to wit: the first front, the rear guard, the second front and the leadership.

324. On the first front, and with a view to transforming it into the embryo of a real "national liberation" army, the reorganization pursued three basic goals:

The traditional columns of the Montevideo Command, Nos 10 and 15, were to make way for two new types of organization: the special detachments or groups making up the vanguard of the movement, whose members were the most capable and experienced individuals of the military sector; and the so-called training sector, made up of action groups with little experience and the best action groups making up two columns, which would have the goal of acquiring training to swell the ranks of the special detachments and to pursue the aforementioned urban guerrilla action. Among the plans to be carried out by the special detachments was one calling for the establishment of action groups all along the Montevideo sewer network, specializing in functioning from there, a plan drafted by the members of the seditious organization incarcerated in the Punta Carretas prison, first launched with the sewer links among various hideouts and "berretines."

The training of auxiliary groups for special detachments, experts in mobilizations and operations in the periphery of the department of Montevideo, concretely implemented in the Collar Plan through Column 7.

Figure 2. MLN-T Organization from September 1971 to March 1972
(Organic apparatus permitting the establishment of the parallel regime and serving as a base for seeking the following objective according to line "H")



The conversion of Column 70 into a kind of major filter, to provide the rest of the organization with contingents through the instruction and training of recruits; the creation of a self-defense apparatus for the 26 March Movement, and other organizations with a similar perspective, given the name "Crazy Little Army,"⁴ to function in a form similar to that used on 6 September 1971 at the time of the first mass escape from the Punta Carretas prison, in the so-called "La Teja mutiny."⁵

325. In the rear guard, the reorganization pursued three goals:

The creation of Column No 45, for service, designed to concentrate the MLN-T services in a single hierarchic and administrative command, bringing together the technicians previously dispersed in various bodies in order to achieve greater productivity in all directions. Among its assigned tasks, the production of weaponry: grenades, T1, machineguns and explosives, had priority.

The creation in Montevideo of the supply service for the interior columns entrusted with the implementation of the Tatu Plan.

326. On the second front, the reorganization called for the establishment of seven columns with respective leadership bodies and operational zones. The basic plan to be followed was the aforementioned Tatu Plan, involving, in broad synthesis, the establishment of Tatu action groups in the foothills, made up of approximately 10 members each, and organizing each city on the basis of recruiting to be carried out and the logistic support tasks to be provided to these Tatu groups (delivery of foodstuffs, provision of information, etc.). The creation of these columns was a consequence, in the final analysis, of the old organizational criteria of the rural guerrilla "focus," very different from those of the first front. While in the latter the thinking was adapted to that of a traditional army, in the interior this thinking developed in accordance with the coordinates of traditional "guerrilla warfare."

327. In the leadership, the reorganization was carried out on the basis of the theoretical approach of greater decentralization, on the basis of equally greater specialization. In other words, the reorganization was not to be reflected in an executive committee with specialized individuals, but in the establishment of a leading command based on a central leadership, a national leadership and a leadership for the fronts of struggle, viewed in the following way:

The central leadership, made up of a kind of body replacing the national convention for which the bylaws of the organization called but for which practical functioning was very difficult, when the organization grew, for obvious security reasons, since at the convention there was one delegate for each cell. The new body was made up of the national leadership (executive secretariat, general interior command and general Montevideo command), plus the representatives of the column commands and other members to be elected.

The national leadership, made up of four leading bodies: the Montevideo general staff or general command, entrusted with the administration of the first front and a part of the rear guard; the general staff or general command for the interior, in charge of the second front; the general command for legal political action, which was then to become the National Liberation Front, in charge of everything pertaining to the 26 March Movement, the UP, Column 70, the "crazy little army," etc.; and the executive secretariat, which in part replaced the earlier executive committee, being entrusted with implementing the political line, relations and concern with the secretariat, the intelligence service and the CAI.

The leadership of the fronts of the struggle, entrusted with the administration of these three labor fronts: the interior, Montevideo in the military and legal politics aspect. The executive secretariat had the task, in addition to its specific ones, of coordinating these fronts, etc.

328. These in summary were the basic guidelines of the March 1972 MLN-T reorganization.

On this basis there were in this stage, under the guidance of the executive secretariat, the SIM [Military Information Service], the SIPE [Political-Economic Information Service], the CAI [Committee for International Affairs] and the finance service; column 60, for legal political action, and column 70, a new one created to take charge of recruiting and training; the general Montevideo command, with military columns 10 and 15, and column 45, for service, and 7, military and liaison, of the Collar Plan; and the general interior command, in accordance with the directives of the Tatu Plan,⁶ with its liaison groups, and seven new columns, Nos 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26 and 27. Fig No 3 clearly shows this organizational stage, while No 4 shows the typical organization of a military column.

329. The fourth stage covered the month of November 1972, which was when the military campaign of the Carabineers' Forces ended.

During it, the organizational structure of the movement, under the leadership of the executive committee, had four arms: the military apparatus, which continued to function in Montevideo with the special detachments Nos 6 and 7 (made up of their respective action group, on the basis of selected cells and their collaborating nuclei); column 7, "Collar," which operated in the Montevidean periphery; column 70, which operated in the trade union and student sectors of the mass front; with their respective columns and collaborating nuclei, and in the service sector, particularly in the printing and propaganda area; and the column known as "Guacha," referred to previously, which operated in Chile, under the direction of the members of the seditious organization who had at that time sought asylum in that country under the protection of Allende's Marxist government. Fig No 5 graphically illustrates the organization of the MLN-T in this stage.

Figure 3. MLN-T Organization in April and May 1972
(Beginning of the Armed Forces Campaign)




Figure 4. Typical Organization of an MLN-T Military Column





Figure 5. MLN-T Organization in November 1972 (end of the military campaign)



330. The fifth stage was that which the organization entered in the first half of 1973, when without prejudice to maintenance of a broader formal structure, its operations were limited basically to legal political action and action on the mass front.

In this stage and under general leadership, the seditious organization manifested itself in the activities of three major branches: the logistics sector⁷ (involving supply, workshops, medical aid and counterfeiting of documents); the CAI (extending throughout two regions, that of Buenos Aires and that of Santiago, through the Guacha column); and the internal action apparatus made up of military detachment No 1 (with its action groups and cells), column 7 (Collar) and 70 (mass front, with its trade union, student and service sectors), and the legal political action sector (which promoted a more accelerated level of "redeeming" infiltration in the parliaments and in legal political factions, through the FA, UP, 26 March Movement, the PCR [Revolutionary Communist Party], and the ROE). Fig No 6 clearly shows the organization in this stage.

331. Finally, the current organizational stage began in the first quarter of 1974 when, its military defeat complete and its paths of legal political action and activity on the mass front blocked, the MLN-T found itself forced to effect a strategic retreat.

In this stage, the organization took on the following functional structure: a central committee, operating from the Buenos Aires regional base, and a revolutionary junta, representing the legal front, direct and guide the activity of the political commission, which is responsible for two main tasks: that covering the actions of the military, political and propaganda sectors, carried out on the basis of five zones or geographic operational areas, covering Montevideo and its environs, one of which, the last, covers Collar; and the work pertaining to functions of the logistic service, covering central technology, workshop, printing and counterfeiting. Fig No 7 clearly shows the organization of the MLN-T in this stage which, as has been said, is the last to be adopted by the subversive movement up to the time this work went to press.

In the sections which follow, the reader will have an opportunity to penetrate deeper into many of the aspects mentioned thus far, on the basis of the texts of the internal documents of the seditious organization.

2. The "Gospel" of the Tupamaros

332. The MLN-T sought to write its own history by drafting some sort of "sacred" documents capable of passing on the doctrine and the achievements of the organization to new members and posterity in convincing fashion, for which purpose it appointed special commissions to draft them.

As usually occurs in such cases, the picture painted is a far cry from reality, which is seen as adapted and distorted to make it acceptable.

Figure 6. MLN-T Organization in the First Half of 1973 (legal political action and action on the mass front only)

Approximate strength
(excluding individuals abroad): 350,
of which 5% in military support,
15% in Column 7 (liaison),
25% in political action, and
55% in mass action






Figure 7. MLN-T Organization as of First Quarter of 1974 (Strategic Retreat)

Approximate strength
(excluding elements abroad): 120,
of which 5% in military support,
20% in Collar, and 75% in political
action, propaganda and rumors





Title Page of Pamphlet on the Second MLN-T Convention
(Two themes of the Second National Liberation Movement Convention:
1. Problem of Action 2. Questions on Strengthening and Organization)

Therefore, although one cannot give them full credit, particularly when the bare facts reveal the criminal intent of the organization and belie the false halo which the members sought to give themselves as "apostles" of noble causes, the documents nonetheless constitute evidence of interest for the clarification of the threads of the conspiracy plotted against the country.

333. Practically the totality of these documents is known. They were kept by the organization in strict secrecy and then seized by the FFCC from their hiding places and shelters, some of them numbered and dated, dealing with the multiplicity of subjects: internal organization and regulation of the status of the bodies and members, regulations on security and discipline, recruiting, finances, procedures, training of the militants, their "morale," instructions on conduct during interrogation in the event of being arrested, information, maintenance of documents, handling and care of weapons, code of "revolutionary justice," role of women, program of government, armed struggle, concrete tasks to be carried out, situational evaluations and assessments, criticisms and "self-criticisms," and many more other aspects.

In this and the following chapters, various of these documents are quoted and interpreted, with brief comments and notes clarifying their meaning, whenever necessary for their proper understanding. The dates given in the footnotes place the events referred to in the text in time, with a view to reference to the chronology of these seditious activities summarized in Chapter 14.

3. A Bit of History

334. In the so-called "document 1,"⁸ seized toward the middle of 1971, a history of the movement is sketched which is illustrative of the adaptation and development it underwent from the time of its origins in 1962 until May of 1970.

In general terms, it can be seen from document 1, which is reproduced in full below, that:

1. The movement was established in 1962 by militants of the PS of a radical orientation, around whom rallied equally radicalized individuals from other leftist groups.

2. The movement was known to the PS and other legal groups, which supported it in the belief that eventually it might serve them as a shock force, although officially they did not recognize it, in order to keep the path of their own "legal" political activities clear and free of any difficulties.

3. In 1965, after 3 years of discussion, the first national convention of the movement was held, after which the independent action by the group which adopted MLN-T as its permanent name began.

4. The successive "sugar workers marches" were prepared for and carried out on the inspiration and in accordance with the directives of the MLN-T for the achievement of its own goals.
5. In 1965, the activities of the CAT⁹ were launched, for the purpose of winning the liberation of the members of the seditious organization who had been arrested, and to serve as a tool for the recruiting of new members.
6. At that same time, the pro-Chinese daily newspaper EPOCA specifically endorsed the cause of the CAT and provided meeting places for the theoretical discussions of the line to be pursued.
7. At the end of 1966, the MLN-T suffered the first major blow, with the death of Carlos Flores and the consequences thereof, which threatened its survival. While other leftist parties washed their hands of it, the PCU was the only one to come to its aid.
8. In 1966-1967, an active exchange with members of seditious groups in other countries began, "especially" the Argentines who came to Uruguay to acquire certain types of training, from which we can conclude that there was an influx of other nationalities, too.
9. In 1967, the MLN-T carried out its first reorganization, in order to recoup after the crisis referred to in No 7.
10. In February of 1968, the second national convention of the movement was held. Beginning with that event the MLN-T started to escalate its activities.
11. In September of 1968, the MLN-T adopted the column system, each column being structured something like the organization on a smaller scale. Initially there were only two, but some 2 months later, thanks to subdivisions of the existing columns, and not exclusively to growth, there were seven. This was the era in which "the curate Zaffaroni" joined the MLN-T with his people.
12. Various problems existing at this time in the leadership of the columns required the dissolution of several of them.
13. Another of the columns gave rise, in 1969, to the CAP,¹⁰ which operated mainly on the trade union level, attempting to win the support of the masses. The CAP engaged in intensive but ephemeral activity.
14. In April of 1969, the massive incorporation of the MRO members grouped in the MR8.
15. The drafting of document 1 can be placed in the middle of 1970, since the last specific date mentioned in it was in May of that year. As repeated mention is made of document 4, whereas there is none of document 5

(believed to have been drafted in December of 1970) the fact that the history of the movement did not develop during this period becomes clear. However, a later "touchup" was introduced, for in referring to the emergency security measures imposed in 1968, it is mentioned that they remained in effect "to the present," specifying that the year was 1971, etc.

16. As a reading of it will show, document 1 included a number of errors in the discussion of the events it mentioned.

335. The following is its text:

"Document One. Structure of the Orga.¹¹

"In 1962, an internal schism came about in the PS, resulting in the formation of a more radical group of militants who, without officially resigning from the PS, formed a body within it called "the coordinator." It rallied around it the most radical exponents of other leftist groups and the PS itself. Although the latter did not allow reference to it, internally it supported the group, glimpsing the possibility of capitalizing on this trend to its advantage. The same occurred with other groups such as the MIR (recently separated from the PC), the MAPU, the MAC [Peasant Support Movement, and the independent FAU. This is why the PS did not recognize it, for despite the fact it was seeking an armed branch, as the other parties also were, it continued with its program and made use of the "coordinator," conceiving of it as a shock force. During this period the Coordinator carried out some activities. In 1962 the first sugar workers' march took place.¹²

336. In 1963 the Coordinator engaged in its first actions (Swiss Gun Club-defense equipment).¹³ As a result of this undertaking, some Cros¹⁴ were arrested, and B¹⁶ went into hiding.¹⁵ That same year weapons were stolen from the Bella Union Customs Office,¹⁷ and at the end of the year the second sugar workers' march took place.¹⁸ Here the most important differences between the Coordinator and the leftist parties developed.

337. Beginning in 1964, the main activities pursued were the acquisition of material and supplies and finances.¹⁹ Three Cros of the COOR²⁰ "caen en cana" [dark gray hair]²¹ for 8 months and then were released.²² This was the great blow suffered by the COOR, because it had a centralized leadership, on the basis of which various cells functioned (for example, the Cros of the MRO were in one cell, those of the PS in another, and so on). In 1965 these differences led to a crisis, and after interminable discussion, the first national convention was held, with the resulting split in the COOR with all of the other parties which were a part of it and its creation as an independent movement, when it took its present name -- MLN-Tupamaros.

It was then that the people defined their position, both on the one side and on the other. Within this framework the third sugarcane workers' march was held, and three Cros of the orga fell. All of this led to the establishment of the CAT for the liberation of the Cros, and it was these CAT which did the task of recruiting, including the daily newspaper EPOCA.

338. The structure of the movement after the division was as follows: the CE²³ and around it cells which were very homogeneous in their membership were formed. In other words these cells were made up of Cros who came from a given leftist party, for which reason strategic preparations were delayed. The CE was directly linked with the cells.

Premises were used or rented in the homes of legal Cros for use as operations bases, for example, that in La Teja belonging to Pinella,²⁴ that of J. L. Terra, etc. The serious problem which developed was the achievement of compartmentalized planning, since the Cros who came from various parties were decompartmentalized. The meetings were held at the EPOCA premises in 1966, the year of the greatest theoretical discussion. In that year, too, the first major financing action was undertaken (100,000 pesos in national currency,²⁵ when we began to be truly independent economically. Also in that year major defense equipping actions were undertaken (CARPA FUTTI,²⁶ the El Cazador Gunsmith Shop on Uruguay Street). Also there were some assaults, such as that on Radio Carve,²⁷ where a bomb was placed but did not explode, and that against Bayer,²⁸ and also against Ballestrino, who was head of the republican guard and Aguerondo, of the army.

339. With all of this the structure of the Orga continued to be centralized with military operations based on training the Cros who were already members, rather than recruiting. Contacts were maintained with the Cros in other countries, such as those in Argentina, with an exchange of militants, especially Argentine citizens coming here so that we could provide them with certain training. This exchange continued until July of 1967, when two Argentine Cros were killed,²⁹ and for security reasons the contacts were interrupted.

340. And so we reached 22 December 1966, the day of the death of Carlos Flores,³⁰ followed in 2 days by that of Mario Robaina.³¹ Flores' girl friend brought a number of individuals to the prison, and it was then that Mario Robaina fell at the farm, and about 30 Cros went "clande," and still no infrastructure had been created. At this time it was important to see how the parties of the left would react. The only one to help was the PC.

The Cros with some money went off to establish hideouts in the bathing resorts. At that time the legal liaison was established so that the Cros could communicate with those abroad. The centralism of the leadership was maintained. It was then that the cadre schools in the cantonments developed and they were most complete. Certain departments developed,

including laboratories, documentation, weaponry and the workshop service which had already been created. As to recruiting, each comrade was responsible at his place of work or membership, and they operated peripherally. At the beginning of 1967, Marquetalia, which was one of the most important cantonments, developed. It was here (in 1967) that the internal change and the restructuring of the Orga took place. In that year there were no arrests, but Neil Tachi³² was killed and others went "clande" (Neil Tachi was an Argentine citizen).

341. On 5 December 1967, after the death of Gestido,³³ the police discovered one of the hideouts in Pinar,³⁴ a comrade and a policeman were wounded, and the former went into hiding. It was in connection with this incident that we brought out a letter to the militiamen³⁵ and because they published it, EL SOL and EPOCA were shut down, and the leftist parties, the PS and the MRO, etc., were outlawed.³⁶ Then Bocha³⁷ came into power, and the period in 1968 which must have been most important for the Orga began. In February the second national convention was held with one representative for each cell attending. For about 3 days, the methods of work were discussed and security errors analyzed.


As a result, commissions for drafting documents (document 1) were appointed.

The existing leadership was renamed, the strategy for the armed struggle, etc., was approved (document 2), and some security aspects were altered. The line adopted called for relying on the interior as a rear guard area and for logistic support. On the basis of the work method of the second C. Nal,³⁸ some financing actions were undertaken as well as an attack on Radio Ariel.³⁹ Prior to the decentralization, a political official and a military one had been appointed for each cell, and in the Eje,⁴⁰ a military official, a political official and a service official were appointed. The Eje had four members (B took part in everything).


At about the middle of 1968, the security measures, which have continued intermittently until today (1971) were imposed.

342. The Orga set out to take a political step forward, and the kidnapping of Pereira Reverbel took place,⁴¹ the most important step up to that time. Various factors came into having an infrastructure which would make it possible to tolerate the repression, and also for the people to understand the action (Ute prisoners).⁴² It was not possible to sustain it for more than 4 or 5 days.⁴³

The world prestige of the Orga was at stake here. In addition to the radicalization on the mass level, repressive steps were taken against the students, and this was when three died, Liber, Hugo and Susana,⁴⁴ The government took over the university.⁴⁵ Then Pacheco announced his hard line. He criticized the Orga, because it was not taking action at that time when the students were suffering repression. In reality it was not in a position to make use of the masses. The internal consequences of the action were:



View of Pando farm



Part of the supplies seized on the Pando farm

1) greater proportional growth, because perhaps numerically there had been more at some other time, but proportionally it was larger. In addition, the infrastructure did not allow acceptance of all the people. 2) With the PR affair,⁴⁶ it was demonstrated that the Orga could be destroyed, because there were no organizational bodies. It was then that the discussion on decentralization began. The survival of the Orga was posed as the fundamental concern. First it was necessary to guarantee the work method and to train Cros. The other position balanced the two things. If indeed they saw that a loss in the quality of the actions was possible, there would be a guarantee that the Orga would not be destroyed. In September 1968 a symposium was held at which, in addition to a series of internal problems, the subject of decentralization was discussed. As a result the Orga was divided into columns, with a comrade from the Eje in charge of each one of them. Each column was the Orga in miniature. At that time two columns were established, one in which all the members were "clande," those who made up the military group, while the other took on the political task and covered the periphery. Between September and November it decided to divide or adjust the mechanism more. What corroborated the decentralization was the seizure of the light truck (Marenales, Martinez Platero and Rodriguez).⁴⁷ The Cros who were in the commands decided to burn Marquetalia,⁴⁸ evacuate what they could and to burn the rest (first time that the commands acted autonomously, without a decision by the executive body). Then it was decided to divide the columns up more as a way of absorbing the growth, and with this division seven columns were created, No 1, Montevideo, No 2, now the 15th, No 3, now No 70, trade union par excellence.

The fourth fell the week it was established (Pando), and the fifth and sixth were made up of curate Zaffaroni's people, later dissolved. The seventh was in the interior. The fourth was the first to be dissolved above the 10th -- on 8 December, in connection with the raid on the Pando farm.⁴⁹ Then came the Carrasco Casino action,⁵⁰ which was important because it was carried out by new Cros. The sixth joined the Orga with Zaffaroni and a number of people he brought in. A line problem developed, moreover, because Zaffaroni was very individualistic, and did not fit in, and with him many militants were lost. The third underwent a trial, when it was headed by M. Collazo⁵¹ (he was expelled), being in charge of the CAP [People's Self-Defense Command], small action groups functioning on the trade union level. They were created as a means of utilizing the masses (document 4). They were made up of people who were not members of the Orga, but were selected by it. What it succeeded in doing was carrying the organization beyond the Orga.

The problem was that the CAP were not being used wisely, and the comrade began to take the matter personally. What this experience showed was that MC⁵² was not properly trained to lead the trade union militants.

When the leadership learned of this it sanctioned him and thus the first experiment on the trade union level came to an end, and the CAP lost their importance.

The problem of the fifth was that it was made up of Cros on the command level, with no political identity among them. There was one comrade who was a trade unionist who wanted the Orga to devote itself to recruiting, completely neglecting the military. There was another who assigned great importance to the military, to the point of subjectivism. In March of 1969 a comrade in the Eje stepped in to resolve the problem. The comrade of the fifth (trade unionist) and the Eje comrade were ousted. It was at the time of the seizure of the Colorado farm that Almiratti and the one from Talcahuano (Maneras and the trade unionist) went underground. A new command was appointed and in April of 1969, the whole group of comrades who had been in the MRO joined en masse.

These Cros had the petit bourgeois intellectual vices, spending their time exclusively in coffee house talk and discussions of the "political club" sort. Then a new command was incorporated. The column was very difficult to manage. The Eje was going through a very agitated phase and somewhat lost control of this column. The comrade in command was too subjective and began to disagree with the leader of the Orga.

The Eje Cros began to meet with those in the command, but this occurred very slowly, and then it was decided to dissolve the fifth. Column 25 was created and it absorbed the ailing group of the fifth (Recordar).

343. The first experiments undertaken on the column level were the Carrasco Casino action, the theft of weapons from the court,⁵³ the financing company,⁵⁴ and the San Rafael Casino.⁵⁵ The San Rafael Casino action was a very good experience, because prior to this a cadres' school where the comrades were trained both politically and militarily was established. Thus far, then, we have, organizationally:

CE (executive committee)

GCC [Central Command Group]⁵⁶ -- representing the leadership, informing it of the concerns on the base level, and in turn handing down the judgements of the Eje to the base level.

An Eje comrade went down to staff each column. Document 4 proposed a form of organization calling for the specialization of three sectors in each column -- one military, one political, and one for service, while in turn the command would be specialized in the three sectors.

Each sector had to have its own infrastructure, human resources, hardware,⁵⁷ services, mass front and periphery. What took longest to create was the specialization of services. Some of the changes which occurred were:

- 1) Creation of the intermediary bodies between the command and the base.
 - a) With the command, the first experiment was with column 3 and then the fifth, and what was sought was to train the future cadres for command.
 - b) Coordinators with the command sought to standardize criteria on the labor sector level, applied in the 15th.

2) Specialization of the command. For example, in the column in the In,⁵⁸ specialization of the command level was replaced by the following: in May of 1970 an administrative command was created, which was not specialized but covered the two sectors, both military and service. (B)

3) Political command. The political sector underwent many changes based on document 4. It was believed that much strength was being lost (unity was weakening). It was decided to unify the unions, the trade union sectors which were strategically important to the Orga, such as, for example, the students, the ANCAP [National Administration of Fuels, Alcohol and Cement],⁵⁹ etc., each column staffing one of these sectors.

4) On the level of the periphery, various changes were also made. There were columns which worked with the periphery, providing a cadres' school, and then individuals who passed on to the sector where they would be most productive (15-60).

5) Existence of a recruiting service, and at the same time the military sector, with its own periphery."

4. Bylaws

344. The internal bylaws of the MLN-T constitute another document which contributes to an understanding of its goals and purposes.

In this connection and as an observation of the general nature, we reiterate that the statements, both idealistic and theoretical, show a notable contrast with the facts as they occurred in practice.

It is on the basis of this fundamental reservation that this, like the other documents of the seditious organization, must be judged.

345. Attention should be called to the possibility of the existence of members who carried out their activities individually or who were not in a position to join the organization, making up the so-called "peripheral cells," whose links with the group were insured by means of "personal" contacts,⁶⁰ which explains the presence of persons apparently alien to the movement, but who in reality were collaborators with and/or workers for it.

346. It is of interest to note also the euphemistic fashion in which the document deals with "finances," which it represents as provided by contributions, donations or "other activities or campaigns," about which it explains nothing, but which were nothing other than the frequent and systematic thefts and robberies carried out by the organization, which, along with the resources it received from abroad, allowed it to cover its expenditures and budget.

The material extent of the depredations for which the seditious organization was responsible in the period during which it remained active was definitely considerable.

An approximate idea can be obtained from the fact that, between 15 May 1966 and 24 November 1973 -- dates which in the chronology of subversive action set forth in Chapter 14, marked the first and last robberies, the members of the seditious gang perpetrated 93 actions in which their plunder totaled \$10,245,584 in cash, a sum calculated on the basis of the rate for the Uruguayan peso in that period.⁶¹

If we take into account the fact that the account of the events given is not exhaustive and that loot in merchandise or other goods (weapons, explosives, electrical, photographic and printing equipment, machinery, vehicles and various tools, etc.) was not taken into account in the calculation, nor were the estimates of damage done to private and public property, we must conclude that the total cost of the depredations and damage done by the seditious groups was truly significant.

347. On the basis of the documents seized and statements by the members of the organization, other references of interest about the MLN-T budget and the "financial system" by means of which it was covered are given in the footnote which is provided by way of clarification in connection with the text of VIII of the bylaws.

348. Finally, the last aspect to be stressed is the "dialectical" effort of the organization to establish a regulatory "moral" concept based on the violation of the "bourgeois morality." The indescribable picture of corruption characterizing life within the MLN-T shows again the gap existing between the "exemplary conduct" this document posulates and the reality.

349. The text of the bylaws is as follows:

"I. Purposes

Article 1. The MLN seeks to be the organized vanguard of the exploited classes in their struggle against the regime: it is the voluntary and combative union of those who are aware of their historic duty.

Therefore the MLN attempts to guide the Uruguayan people along the true path of its deliberation of the entire American continent.

II. Members

Article 2. Any person accepting its program and these bylaws, acting within it in organized fashion, can be a member of the MLN.

The approval of the executive committee is required for acceptance into the MLN.

Article 3. Any individual joining the MLN accepts a pledge not to withdraw from it without the consent of the executive committee.

III. Rights and Duties

Article 4. The members of the MLN have the following duties:

- a) To participate actively in the political life of the MLN and to struggle for the implementation of its resolutions,
- b) To act as members in the place and fashion and at the time indicated by the MLN.
- c) To observe the discipline of the MLN, which is obligatory for all, independent of merit and position.
- d) To be sincere and honorable, allowing no one to ignore or destroy the truth.
- e) To make use of criticism and self-criticism to bring to light errors and successes in the work and to struggle to eliminate the former, always setting aside any consideration of personal friendship or fidelity.
- f) To raise their political and technical levels and aid others to raise them.

Article 5. The members of the MLN have the following rights:

- a) To elect members of the leadership or be elected as such, and to elect or be elected as representatives of the national convention.
- b) To participate in the political life of the MLN, at its meetings or in its communications media.
- c) To set forth criticisms of any comrade or member of the organization at the meetings of the MLN, as well as to present proposals, suggestions and observations concerning defects in the work, to any higher body.
- d) To require the functioning of all of the MLN bodies.
- e) To participate in the meetings at which decisions on the work are discussed or approved.

IV. Structure and Functioning

Article 6. The nature of the MLN is clandestine, for which reason its structure must be adapted to its character.

Article 7. The base organism of the MLN is the cell. A cell may be established anywhere. The minimum number of members required is two.

Article 8. Each cell must have a leader, and to provide for his absence, a substitute leader, both appointed by the executive committee.

The cell may request the removal, on the basis of the conduct or errors in leadership.

Article 9. The leader must call meetings of the cell to determine activities, receive reports, approve suggestions, criticisms, etc., and in such cases the cell will function as a collegiate body to carry out the activities approved by the CE or the cell, and in cases or situations of emergency, the leader or in his absence his substitute will have authority over the other comrades in the cell.

Article 10. The cells will be linked with the executive committee directly or through intermediary bodies, or in their absence by a liaison officer appointed by that body.

Article 11. The executive leadership of the MLN will be carried out by the executive committee, the membership of which will be established, and can only be changed, by the national convention, or by a unanimous vote of the executive committee itself.

Article 12. The executive committee must provide for the appointment of one of its members to assume leadership of the MLN in case of emergency.

Article 13. The executive committee will direct the MLN in the time between the holding of one national convention and the next, and must answer to it for its actions.

Article 14. The executive committee will have full authority to:

- a) Expand, create or dissolve the bodies it deems necessary.
- b) To establish military privileges within the MLN.
- c) To divide the MLN into sectors and to delegate authority.
- d) To establish the degree of autonomy for each sector and the method of its leadership and functioning.
- e) To create or dissolve bodies intermediary between it and the cell.

Article 15. The maximal authority of the MLN is the national convention. At it all the bodies and members of the MLN must be represented, in accordance with suitable representation norms, consistent with the historical conditions in which it will be held, and adapted to the safeguarding of its internal security.

The participants in the national convention will be designated by the cells.

Article 16. The tasks of the national convention are:

- a) To amend the bylaws.
- b) To draft the program of the MLN.
- c) To dissolve the MLN.

Article 17. The national convention must meet:

- a) Every 18 months, provided circumstances so permit.
- b) At the request of the executive committee.
- c) At the request of a third of the members of the MLN, when any body petitions for a meeting of the national convention.

This petition must be sent to all MLN bodies, accompanied by the reasons justifying the convocation.

Article 18. There may be within the MLN members who pursue their membership activity individually.

They will be linked with the executive committee like the cells (Article 10) and they must be guaranteed the right to participate in the national convention.

Article 19. The MLN must be prepared to implement the principle of strategic centralism, whenever necessary, with tactical autonomy, such that each sector and each organism must be in a position to function autonomously.

V. Peripheral Cells

Article 20. These cells may be created:

- a) With the membership of individuals not in a position to join the movement.

They will carry out support, growth, propaganda, finance, information tasks, etc.

They will be linked with the organization by personal contacts authorized by the executive committee, and they will not be governed by these bylaws nor will they be regarded as members of the MLN.

- b) They may engage in semisecret or public work with members of the MLN, if the executive committee deems it desirable.

VI. Security

Article 21. Compartmentalization is one of the basic principles for the security of the movement.

It must be implemented even among the members and for the tasks of the given body.

It will also be practiced on all levels of the MLN.

Article 22. The leader of the cell or, where it is concerned, the executive committee, will decide which things will be compartmentalized.

Article 23. It is the duty of the executive committee to provide all the bodies and comrades, in organic form, with all information which is not compartmentalized.

Article 24. The base organisms of the movement or the isolated militants will have the right to present criticisms and suggestions in writing, which will be circulated throughout the movement, provided this does not represent decompartmentalization of information.

VII. Discipline

Article 25. Each member of the organization must observe the strictest discipline, equally binding upon all.

This discipline presupposes the obligation of the member to implement the decisions of the corresponding bodies with speed, determination and precision.

Article 26. Each member has the right and duty to discuss all matters in his organization and to maintain his point of view, but once a decision has been adopted, its implementation is compulsory. To fail in its implementation is to violate discipline and to become subject to sanction.

Article 27. The lower bodies will be subordinate to the higher body.

The directives of the latter will be binding upon the former. Failure to implement them constitutes a violation of discipline, and similarly the minority in any body must carry out what is approved by the majority.

Article 28. Sanctions will be justified by the violation of the program or bylaws, failure to implement resolutions, divisiveness and any attack upon unity, lack of honesty and sincerity, the spreading of slander, criticism outside the proper bodies, moral corruption, indiscretion, vice, betrayal, and anything which does harm to the movement or its authority with the people.

The loss or destruction of materials supplied by the movement or owned by a member of a cell, due to negligence, improper use or activities unrelated to membership in the movement.

Article 29. Depending on the seriousness of the fault committed, the corresponding bodies may impose the following sanctions:

- 1) Censure.
- 2) Return of materials to its jurisdiction or possession.
- 3) Removal from a post occupied.
- 4) Withdrawal from the MLN.
- 5) Expulsion from the MLN.
- 6) Special measures.

Article 30. Measures 1, 2 and 3 may be imposed by the leader of a cell or by the cell itself by a simple majority vote, without requiring ratification by the executive committee.

Measures 4 and 5 must be approved at a cell meeting, unanimously, and must be ratified by the executive committee.

Article 31. The executive committee may impose any sanction.

The member involved may appeal to his cell, which will rule, by unanimous vote, only in the case of the imposition of sanctions 4 and 5.

Article 32. All of the members may offer background information for the discussion of the conduct of any member of the MLN.

Members may not maintain relations with persons expelled from the movement.

Article 33. In the event of dispute and for all purposes exceeding the provisions of these bylaws, arbitration courts may be established, with members designated on an equal basis by each of the parties, and with one member appointed by the executive committee.

VIII. The Finances of the MLN

Article 34. The financial resources of the MLN are obtained from:

- a) The monthly dues paid by its members, proportional to their income and in accordance with the scale established by the cell.
- b) Donations and other activities or campaigns the bodies involved agree to carry out.⁶²

IX. Moral Regulations

Article 35. In revolutionary action, it is inevitable that we will violate the bourgeois morality, but this does not mean that we should act without any guide or norm of a moral nature. On the contrary, a revolutionary militant must act in his daily life in accordance with the principles he maintains or defends in political action.

It is not enough to have a revolutionary ideology, for one must live like a revolutionary.

This principle is valid not only for the authenticity and integrity of the militant, for its implementation is important to the health of the organization.

In the event of a clandestine militant, this is because neglect of these norms of life affects the proper functioning of the nucleus of comrades with whom he shares his life.

In the case of the legal militant, this is because the prestige of the organization rests with his exemplary conduct, expressed in all the manifestations of his life.

In the course of our struggle we must undertake actions which as isolated events could be considered as crimes, even within a socialist society.

We must then have a clear awareness that these actions are justified because they are essential to the achievement of the changes we seek.

Otherwise, we would fall into deviations or simple criminality.

X. Expropriations

Article 36. We must make a clear distinction between the meaning we must assign to bourgeois property and the property of the workers, small businessmen and producers.

We must proceed with absolute respect and, when for reasons of force majeure, we find ourselves forced to use it, we must create a repayment mechanism to serve this purpose.

XI. Assaults

Article 37. By assault we mean any action directed against the physical integrity of an individual or individuals.

Such actions can only be undertaken after a most conscientious, exhaustive and detailed analysis.

They can only be justified to preserve values very important to the revolution.

A variation on the assault is the terrorist attack, in which many persons are affected indiscriminately.

This form of assault is excluded as being inhuman, since it takes innocent lives and has a negative political effect.

XII. Sabotage

Article 38. We distinguish two types of sabotage here:

- 1) That seeking only political agitation ends; and
- 2) That motivated by the requirements of military tactics.

Political Sabotage

Such actions will be carried out after a careful study of the circumstances, seeking to assess its results with absolute objectivity, and thus to prevent the effect of reactionary propaganda efforts from making these results negative.

Special precautions will be taken in order not to endanger human life in implementing this type of action.

In carrying any type of sabotage, special care will be taken to avoid the blocking of any sources of work, totally setting aside in such cases any desire for propaganda effect.

Military Sabotage

When such operations are carried out, they will be dictated by exclusively political considerations."

5. Instruction of the Militants

350. An analysis of the internal documents and circulars in which instructions and suggestions of various types are given to the members of the MLN-T makes it possible to assess, from this special point of view, the methodological and operational practices of the seditious organization.

From the abundant materials seized, we have selected and reproduce below various documents which provide a broad picture of the profuse activities of the organization, to wit:

- a. General instructions.
- b. On the importance of information.
- c. On a specific type of information; the armed forces.
- d. On security.
- e. On conduct during interrogation, once arrested.
- f. On the handling and care of weapons.

- g. On various offensive practices.
- h. On the "plan of attacks."
- i. Practical manual for sabotage.

The text of each of these documents is given below.

a. General Instructions

351. "The Tasks. The Orga is a work team, like a great factory in which we all have a responsibility, a function to fulfill. Whether the revolution advances more or less depends on whether we carry out our functions conscientiously or not. The tasks of the Orga are many and the tasks of each comrade agent in his cell, too, are many. The majority of the tasks are small, insignificant if viewed separately, but it is necessary to watch over doing them and doing them well day by day, for example, cooking, cleaning, guarding the hideout and all of the compromising material to be used later, transmitting information, making a hideout, destroying the evidence after passing on information, using the code, walking several blocks before reaching the cantonment, etc., etc. The security of each comrade, that of his group and that of the Orga depend on whether each comrade fully carries out these small tasks, as does the harmonious functioning of the cell, and we must all see to the small things and the large. It is in the complex of these small everyday tasks and some larger ones from time to time that the militant becomes a veteran, that the new man is formed, that training is acquired for dealing with all situations, for there has been and there will be many times in which all is victory for the Orga, just as there have also been and will be difficult times of blows and perhaps sustaining optimism in the bad times and pushing ahead.

352. Political Discussion. There are two deviations among all the others to which we will refer here:

A) The tendency of many militants, above all, those coming from student or intellectual sectors, to engage in discussions from which they derive no practical conclusions, typical barroom discussions.⁵³

B) The opposite tendency toward "la fierrera"⁶⁴ (violence) on the part of some militants who believe that any type of discussion is sterile, presuming that politics is a task which falls more to the cell. However, for this to have positive results it is necessary to select the subjects to be discussed correctly at the time it is necessary to discuss them, and when there are no more urgent tasks, and to exercise control over the time put into discussion. First of all, it is necessary to begin with the premise that not everything is subject to discussion, as the practice of the Orga shows that many matters should be the subject of discussion by the higher bodies exclusively. Otherwise we would have created a very democratic organization but a paralyzed one. Secondly, it is necessary to discuss all the matters which are the cell's responsibility, such as implementing

certain tasks, who takes charge of each, why a given thing was done badly or another was not done at all, thinking of ways of operating differently in the realm of cover, vigilance, security and many other things, in such a way as to be constantly creating. Thirdly, there must be profound discussion of documents of the Orga, and fourthly, there must be discussions of the actions the Orga is carrying out in the framework of the current political situation and the line of the Orga, and an analysis of the consequences.

A) As a way of understanding the political process in the country and the Orga itself. B) As a way of homogenizing the political ideas of all the Cros, and to the extent that this is done correctly, it is also possible that new ideas will emerge and be maintained within the cell, and a spirit of initiative. Fifthly, it is necessary to be aware that there are times for discussions and times when all discussions should be set aside, for example, during an action there is no discussion. The leader makes decisions and all abide by them. If there is any error on the part of the leader, the group meets after the action is terminated, the facts are analyzed and the proper criticism is made. This is a clear situation, but there are others which are less clear, when there are a number of urgent tasks which must be carried out without delay, either for reasons of security, protection of a comrade or cantonment, or in order to carry forward the plans of the Orga in the realm of action or for any other reason, and it makes no sense to postpone their implementation while on the other hand undertaking the discussion of the document, analyzing the action of the day before, or meeting to criticize a comrade at that precise moment. In sixth place, it is necessary to learn how to discuss and there is much to be done. In seventh place, this should be done with a method. Discussion is productive when each comrade listens to the one who is speaking and draws from what has been said the good things, when each says concretely what he thinks without meeting arguments or ideas already set forth, without making a barricade statement of his exposition, when each comrade goes into discussion to derive the best idea, and not to impose his ideas. Finally, discussion should be carried on in such a way as to derive conclusions once it is finished. There should be some concrete resolution. It is not possible to hold a meeting, spend hours talking and finally produce nothing concrete.

353. Manual Labor. Manual labor is very important work: 1) because every militant should have or acquire manual skills for doing many small things which throughout his activity as a member will occur. An example of this is the loading and unloading of a "fierro"⁶⁵ (weapon), changing a burnt-out fuse, making a shelf which is needed, a hideout, fixing some small problem with an auto. 2) Because it develops a spirit of initiative and creativity. 3) As a means of correcting theoretical distortions, the organization always has a need in this connection for manual work, such as digging a well for a hideout. This work should be done by all the comrades in the Orga, for which reason it is desirable that those less active and more theoretical comrades or groups dig the well.

354. Personal Initiative and Life. All the cells have tasks entrusted to them by the command, the instructor, or the pertinent body. The specific way of carrying these tasks out is normally determined by the cell itself, and whether they are done well or poorly, whether new or old criteria should be applied is the responsibility of the Orga itself, and first of all, of the leader.

5157

In addition to the work assigned there is always a certain margin of tasks which fall to the initiative and responsibility of the cell itself. This spirit of initiative should be fostered and channeled; the cell cannot limit itself to doing only what it is ordered or entrusted to do. If there is time left over, new tasks that are useful to the organization and appropriate to the moment must be developed. Each cell must always keep itself active 1) because the organization depends on the initiative and activity of all its members, 2) because inactivity leads to demoralization, to all sorts of distortions and, at best, is useless. Activity must be kept up even in static periods, but this is the **exclusive** responsibility of the individual member. Members should not complain in that situation because they are given nothing to do; instead they should think about how they can be more useful in that situation. Naturally, things done on the initiative of each comrade will **often** be of little or no use, and therefore the initiatives should be analyzed by the head person or whoever so that such efforts are as useful as possible to the organization. Here are some examples of tasks that always need to be done: 1) relief duty; 2) Asking the information service for data; 3) Obtaining complete "sosias"* for comrades in the underground; in addition to identification card data this means obtaining: home address and telephone number at work, with whom he lives if married (name of spouse), children's names, if any, and complete "sosias" for vehicles; 4) Learning to drive a friend's car; 5) Sewer survey.

Planning of Tasks and Evaluations

355. To be effective each cell must meet one to three times a week. Each meeting should have an agenda drawn up by the person in charge. The first point on the agenda should always be the specific tasks for the days to come. As a means of self-guidance, each meeting should deal with the tasks to be completed in the upcoming days, set a **deadline** for doing them and put someone in charge of each one. Experience indicates that when everyone agrees to do something and no one is put in charge of it, normally everyone forgets about it.

*sosias: a non-standard word commonly used to mean "same, alter ego, very similar to or capable of replacing someone because of likeness."

356. Delegation of Responsibilities—There is a certain natural tendency within the cell for the head to take on a number of tasks, such as preparing material for the group, making contacts, copying things. Consequently, the cell leader normally ends up overloaded with work. It is important for the cell and the leader to be aware of this and for some tasks to be delegated to group members. Thus, work capacity increases, each task can be done better, and responsibilities can be delegated to others. This provides an opportunity for the group to develop and for the comrades to prove themselves. Let's get to work!

This Material Cannot Fall...*

Montevideo, 16 October 1971"

b. Importance of information

357."Comrades, we need information.

All comrades know of the daily need for information. They also know of the moral responsibility of each Tupamaro to be watching, listening and informing all the time.

For information to be valid, it must be objective, clear, as complete as possible and absolutely accurate.

Each member is an informer—The progress of the revolution depends on his eyes and ears also. This means that we have to be in a constant state of alert. No Tupamaro can stop watching and listening to what happens around him and might be of interest to the movement.

Information is a defense against the enemy and a source of support for our activities as well. But a piece of information that might come into our hands is not enough. We must seek out information, investigate in our surroundings, dig up things, put two and two together. Information is a dynamic factor, as dynamic as the entire struggle.

There are no small or big pieces of information. Only the information service, because it has an overview of the situation, can determine the importance of information. An isolated piece of information, an apparently small detail could be fundamental to the movement.

Information must always be one or several steps ahead of the enemy. This can be achieved only with the active contribution of all Tupamaros. The specialized service evaluates, processes and distributes information. The living part, the intelligence service, is the responsibility of us all. In any situation there is a quota of responsibility for espionage.

* This is a recommendation to take special care with the document.

We thus have to formulate a series of minimum criteria for conveying information.

358. We must inform:

- a) Immediately—Quickness is part of our success.
- b) Objectively—We should look with our eyes, listen with our ears and even smell information, if possible.
- c) Clear and Concise Presentation—Size does not matter; what matters is that there should not be errors of interpretation.
- d) As Completely As Possible—The service has matches to burn what is not useful and a file to keep what is valuable.
- e) Absolutely Accurate—We must confirm information before passing it on. If this is not possible, this must be clarified in the report, with an explanation of the reason for taking this into account. Providing appropriate information is part of our political awareness. The guidelines for information include the following basic aspects.

A) **Repression**—Our constant enemy, from the most insignificant soldier up to the brand new "commander," Jorge Pacheco Areco. In this regard we must be on the alert for the daily changes in enemy tactics. We cannot be subjective. We must determine on an ongoing and objective basis the dimensions of enemy action and pass on recorded data to all comrades.

B) **The Political Line of Our Activities Today**

Propaganda—Everywhere people get together and where the MLN-T [National Liberation Movement-Tupamaros] can already explain the reason for its armed struggle.

Finances—Wherever there is money: exact location, date, where the money is going; we cannot take money that directly affects the people.

Supplies—Anything that is useful to us in waging war, especially weapons.

Harassment—Repression. Especially "The Metro"* as a body.

Oligarchy—Our underhanded enemy that sustains repression.

C) The above political line is especially important with regard to the sphere of action of our column and its most outstanding characteristics. Let us remember the strategic reason for our column.

* The Metro: short for the Metropolitan Guard (GM), Montevideo police shock unit.

D) Information that might be valid as part of future guidelines (e.g., corrupt politicians, diplomats, crooks, connections with imperialism, internal interference, etc)

E) Other Information. The Entire Population. In connection with the information that supports our activities and defends us against the enemy, we must be receptive to all contributions that the people make to us and we must teach how to contribute effectively (To teach by learning). We must accept and respect everything that the people give us positively and creatively.

The struggle of the people is a Tupamaro struggle. Each member is part of our Tupamaro people."

c. A specific form of information: the Armed Forces (FFAA)

359. The MLN-T is the closest example of the famous Trojan horse, in other words, the enemy that enters one's home and while pretending to be another member of the family attempts only to betray and destroy it.

There is an unending series of reports about this moral perversion and true Marxist-Leninist fanaticism that rules out a dialog and is closed to persuasion because their mental and moral framework is completely incompatible with ours.

In line with our intention of giving the reader a direct look at reality through the organization's own documents instead of through statements or value judgments, there is nothing more illustrative of Tupamaro domestic destruction, of the calculated, systematic hate that it has created in its members, of the absence of all ethical and patriotic feelings, of submissiveness to the cult of underhanded treason in service to outside interests, than the subtle espionage apparatus set up to annihilate the FFAA.

In this sense the MLN-T has become a perfect emulator of the totalitarian mentality, whether communist or Nazi, that destroyed the structure, the coexistence and the family of society by turning children into informants against their parents, brothers into enemies, and spouses into traitors and renouncers.

The document that we will present is the basic organizational element in the operations of the so-called information service on the FFAA, or SIFA, and clearly shows the above characteristics.

Even at the risk of going into small details that could be considered superfluous, we felt that it was essential to reproduce the document in its entirety, so that the reader can appreciate the real degree of mental corruption, of menace and of antipatriotism that this movement of treason against the Uruguayan nation has reached, a movement that hypocritically tried to achieve public support with false cries of patriotism.

The FFAA, police, state services, administrative and government authorities, political parties, associations of all types, families, in one word, the entire Uruguayan society, were subjected to a system of accusation and treason similar to the one presented here as an example, through a truly incredible network of accusation and espionage, which the timely intervention of the FFCC [expansion unknown] did not allow to develop and which was in the end completely broken up.

The document in question comes from the information service of Column 60 and reads as follows:

"Topic: Armed Forces

In summary form the service proposes to study the following points:

- 1) Persons
- 2) Bases
- 3) Opinion trends (by branch and in the Armed Forces as a whole)
- 4) Mobility, means of transportation and tactics of the FFAA
- 5) Military instruction received by the FFAA
- 6) Logistics

In addition to the material that is within the scope of the service, bits of information that do not pertain to this or another topic also are received, such as reports on activities, alerts, gossip, etc.

360. Sources of Information

We propose to have three permanent sources of information:

- 1) The informants:

They must be urged to refine the quality, quantity and format of the information that they send in. The cards published by Central Information are extremely useful in this regard, to which could be added any other special recommendation for achieving greater clarity in information and greater ease of processing the information by the service. For example:

- a) It should be written on only one side of the paper;
- b) Clearly written;
- c) Without abbreviations;
- d) Clearly specifying what information is being conveyed;
- e) It should be complete, in other words, not only the primary information is transmitted; all necessary and/or known (or knowable) data should be included, except--naturally--if the information is urgent, in which case

partial information is acceptable, but it must be rounded out later. The complementary part of the information must contain a summary of the initial part and so mention;

f) It should list name, sector (P-S-M [expansion unknown]) and column;

g) Dates; this is essential. It should contain the date on which the information is being sent and, where applicable, the date on which the subject matter took place (e.g., such and such happened on such and such day).

Although the manner of making the report should be perfectly known to all members of the movement, the group leader, to whom the report is submitted for delivery to the service, should be even more aware of the above requirements, so that the initial filtering and correction operation can be performed on the report in order to reject incomplete information.

2) Publications that circulate regularly in the country (newspapers, magazines, specialized publications, etc). From them we can obtain:

a) Photos of persons or things that might be of interest to the service. Every service must have a complete collection; in other words, it must clip out from all circulating publications the appropriate photos and file them as it sees fit.

b) General information: The most practical system might be distributing the publications by column, with each column in charge of extracting the information and sharing it in accordance with the criteria used for the common information that reaches the movement.

In these efforts (a and b) uniform criteria must be drawn up and the groups in charge instructed properly in order to take advantage of these publications as fully as possible.

3) Information sought out by the service:

This method has not been developed much, and therefore experience is lacking in this area. In any case we feel that the means must be sought and a certain group given specialized instruction, because this is one of the most positive methods of obtaining information.

361. Method of Obtaining Data from the Service

It has been thought appropriate to divide the 'subject matter' to be developed into various 'categories,' utilizing the criteria of the service's effectiveness and flexibility. The categories are:

1. Persons

In this category we will process everything connected with the members of the FFAA; in other words, who they are and what each one of them is like. Working with this category will include:

A) Data card

The exact form of the card is still under study, but the general principle has been established.

The card will be 'multiple entry'; in other words, a manual selection system for the card will be used in accordance with the various categories that involve the 'entries.'

Various holes will be made on the edge of the card, corresponding to each 'entry,' and when the desired card is needed, it will be pulled out by means of a needle that will fit into the appropriate hole. It is this point (selection) that has not been determined precisely yet, and two similar systems are now being studied to establish which is more streamlined. Its precise mode of operation will be explained at the opportune moment.

The card will be filed alphabetically and it will be assigned an arbitrary number.

The card will contain:

- First and last name.
- Address
- Age
- Marital status and spouse
- Family members
- Vehicle, if any
- Post
- Command
- Any complementary information (schedule, friends, habits, etc)

The 'entries' on the card will be:

--Branch: In other words, army, navy or air force.

--Rank: A system will be used in conjunction with the above entry. The card will contain the ranks for the branch that presents the greatest possibilities, and the same hole will be used for the other branches. If cards are desired for certain ranks, the rank will have to be selected and then the branch, or viceversa.

Ideology: (Political tendency of the person on file) Only three entries will be used: left, center and right. If possible, additional details will be specified on the card itself or on a separate sheet.

Special Courses: This entry is optional. This entry was chosen because it was thought useful to know what individuals have taken this type of courses. Such courses include those taken in the country or overseas and mainly those connected with guerrilla warfare.

B) List

A list will be made of the possible posts (place where each branch serves). Under each post will be noted the number of the card for each one of the FFAA members that serve on that post. In order to find out who are working at a given post, this list is consulted, and the card numbers for each one are selected; List C provides the names and thus the personal card of each military man.

C) List

This list contains numbers with the name of the person on file beside each number, so that the name and number coincide with those on card A.

This list is designed only to facilitate the use of the previous list and the card file.

Under this system we can obtain:

--Branch to which the soldier belongs: an 'entry' on the card;

--First and last names: the cards are in alphabetical order;

--Rank: an 'entry' on the card;

--Post: if we want to find out where a well-known military man serves, we go to the individual card A, where it is listed;

--If we want to find out what military personnel serve at a given post, the post is noted on List B, and the card numbers for the men working there are noted; then, going to List C (which gives the name of the soldier), we are referred to the alphabetical file.

--Address: if we want to know where a serviceman resides, we go to card A, where it is listed;

--If we want to find out whether a serviceman lives in a specific place, we refer to the map department, which is in charge of pinpointing residences on the maps. For this system to work, a practical method must be sought that is common to both services. However, we feel that

the easiest way might be to send the map service lists with the address and card numbers so that it can point out with the appropriate symbols that a serviceman with a specific number in our file lives at a given place.

Ideology: an entry for each one of the three main categories (left, center and right), with appropriate, short clarifications on the card or with a reference to Category 3 for more information.

Command: the influence or number of men under an officer's command. This information is listed on the card but is not an entry. We can get an approximation of the number of man in a command by the rank and/or post.

Special courses: an optional entry on the card. If included, the appropriate details will be provided.

In connection with the above, we feel that the card file and the two lists are enough to record all the reports that come in for each serviceman. But this does not preclude the preparation of a folder, if each report has to be expanded upon, with separate pages (starting with the name of the serviceman and placed in alphabetical order). This would include the rest of the personal information that could not be listed on the card because of reasons of space; in this case, a reference to the folder should be included on the card.

362. 2. Bases

This category will include anything connected with the locations in which the FFAA serve, in other words, airports, quarters, barracks, ports, fixed posts, etc.

In working with this category folders will be used with information listed according to bases and including the following sub-categories:

- a) Description: in other words, the diagram or layout of the building;
- b) Men serving there (number, rank, time of service, etc); these are permanent data which are not concerned with who is serving on the base, inasmuch as this information is obtained through the methods explained above;
- c) Armaments: arms (number and type) and munitions (idem);
- d) Vehicles: number and type, permanent or not;
- e) Guards: distribution, number, schedule, individual characteristics...
- f) Communications: with other bases, with vehicles, with higher-ups; type (radio, telegraph, telephone...).

In addition, the location of each military base will be indicated on a map.

363. 3. Opinion Trends

This category will involve anything connected with how the FFAA think, how they react, as well as the various states of mind of the troops and officers.

This category will be handled in a folder, which will contain a transcription of all reports coming in, cross-referencing and interpreting them.

Since this category is closely connected with what each member of the FFAA thinks as an individual, study of it, on an individual basis, will be done with the classification of the report included in the folder, independently of the collective reports, for example, as a second part of the folder.

364. 4. Tactical Movements

In this category we plan to study:

- Number and type of vehicles;
- Mechanical features (defects, spare parts, shops, importers), distribution at sites and in zones;
- Drivers and occupants (under normal and exceptional conditions);
- Quickness of response;
- Anti-guerrilla and conventional tactics.

This category will be processed in folders as practically as possible, in accordance with the type of information that comes in.

365. 5. Military Instruction

This includes the types of courses that are offered to officers, cadets and troops, their content and results.

This category will be processed in folders as practically as possible, in accordance with the type of information that comes in.

366. 6. Logistics

This includes anything that supports the Armed Forces, such as equipment, suppliers, supply centers, etc.

This category will be processed in folders as practically as possible, in accordance with the type of information that comes in.

There are two categories that we have not been able to determine whether this service should handle or not. They are counterintelligence and communications (the technical aspect). We feel that it might be proper for the former to be centralized and the latter to be handled by 'radio,' without preventing this field from being handled jointly.

367. 7. Actions

The service frequently receives proposals for action. We realize that the service has to process these data too, and--what is more important--the service itself has to propose actions and goals.

Therefore, what we generically call 'actions' should be classified in a useful fashion, to which end we propose:

- 1) A prior classification of the action in accordance with its importance; 'important' actions should be handled by the central service, 'normal' actions by the services of the columns.
- 2) Then they should be divided according to the matter involved. Thus, an action against a barracks would be handled by our service; an action against an informer, by the corresponding column, etc. These actions should be handled by the services in charge of the field.
- 3) Other actions should be apportioned according to zones in line with the 'jurisdiction' of each column.
- 4) The rest of the actions, which could be called miscellaneous, should be handled by the service that receives them.

In addition, every action that is proposed should be reported to Central Information so that two copies of the action are available.

The above information on actions should not be interpreted as a military limitation on each column; in other words, it does not mean that each column can process only the actions that its information service handles, merely that this is a way of handling delicate information in a practical manner.

368. 8. Alarms-Rumors-Bulletin

Neither alarms nor rumors should be processed by the information service, but rather by another department that is in charge of the movement's security. In turn, it could take charge of issuing a periodic bulletin with information on movements and actions by the repression, which will facilitate and safeguard movements of Tupamaro militants.

This department can be an arm of the service or not, but it is clear that neither alarms nor rumors should be processed directly by the service.

Carla⁶⁶
Ortiz⁶⁷
Marta⁶⁸
Efrain⁶⁹
Javier⁷⁰

Montevideo, 15 February 1971"

d. Security

369. The complex issue of security involves a series of aspects that can be summarized in three large interrelated groupings:

- 1) Personal security
- 2) Group security
- 3) Organization security

Seditious documents reveal their views on each one of these aspects.

1) Personal security

370. This first grouping can be divided into six specific points:

- (a) Carrying of Weapons
- (b) Possession of Documents
- (c) Identification
- (d) Relations with Family
- (e) Pursuit
- (f) Residence

371. This is what the MLN-T says in this regard:

"(a) Carrying of Weapons. In general no legal comrade should carry weapons, except when considered necessary, such as in executing actions, when going into action, when materials are being transported, in the accompaniment of illegal individuals, etc.

When the use of the weapon is not imminent, it should be carried as discretely as possible, in anticipation of potential confrontations with patrols. It might help to carry the weapon in a small briefcase. Until now, the police have searched only persons for arms, not packages.

When stationed at a place and keeping guard, etc, the safest and most accessible spot should be found for the weapon in case a patrol is sighted (possibly the fork of a tree, a balcony, etc).

During actions the weapon should logically be carried on one's person, although hidden under clothing.

Expropriated weapons and compromising materials should not be kept in personal residences.

If there is no other alternative than to carry them because they are in transit from one place to another, maximum security measures should be taken, mainly in connection with the person who might be collaborating in the transfer. If possible, this person should not know what is involved. Although this is a generally applicable measure, take greater precaution with comrades that are still borderline.

372. (b) Possession of Documents. A general rule that must always be taken into account is to keep homes free from papers and documents. Any document that is unnecessary or that has performed its function should be burnt. Another general rule is never to carry compromising documents on one's person. If papers and documents have to be kept, they should be put in a safe, hidden place, all together, in a bag or briefcase so that they can be unloaded quickly. They also have to be kept in a place that can be indicated to someone else so that he or she can unload them in case the comrade is unable to do so. If these documents have to be carried on one's person, it should be for as brief a time as possible. When comrades are traveling in vehicles, mainly on motorcycles or bicycles, they should take into account that, in case of an accident in which they are injured or knocked unconscious, someone could check packages or clothing in search of identification papers and find compromising documents.

373. (c) Identification. Every comrade must have a pseudonym, which should be used in dealing with other comrades. At times pseudonyms other than the one usually employed among comrades in the movement should be utilized with borderline individuals or friends of the organization or with outside contacts. Only in case of extreme need should the real name of another comrade be revealed. If it has to be written down, it should be done in code and hidden in a safe place. Only in case of extreme need should a comrade's real name be communicated.

If possible, each member should have a false identification document. This document will be kept in reserve and never carried together with the genuine document.

The use of the false document is authorized only by the cell leader, after analyzing the real need for this.

Personal photographs generally kept at home should be destroyed.

374. (d) Relations with Family. This is a very delicate matter. Each case must be resolved in accordance with the circumstances. As a general rule

Reproduced from
best available copy.



República Oriental del Uruguay — Policía de Montevideo

Cédula N°

1.182.078

Cabello Blanco

2.380.602

Ojos Castaño

Indiv. Doct.

V.2443

I.4442

OAA

CERTIFICO que esta Cédula de Identidad, pertenece a quien
HA ACREDITADO SER OCTAVIO OLIVERA.....
BURGOS-.....
nacido en Rivera-R.O.del Uruguay.....
21.3.1914. *Octavio Olivera*
Fecha *Octavio Olivera* Firma habitual del Identificado
Observaciones:
Por el Jefe de Policía y por su orden.
Montevideo, 19.2.1968..
Vence 19.2.1978..
ALFONSO C. ARISMENDI

Rodney Arismendi's phoney identity card

family members should be absolutely unaware of a member's activities. But since it is impossible to satisfactorily justify activities with alibis that are not always enough, it is important to do political work in order to achieve a favorable place among family members. This is extremely important in the case of wives. Wives come to realize that a comrade is involved in "something." Thus it is necessary, when the time comes, to recognize an activity without mentioning where or with whom nor letting the slightest reference slip out. Wives should become accustomed to not asking or wanting to know. If a family member is also a militant, he or she should be treated as the rest. There are no relatives or friends in our ranks, only comrades.

375.(2) Pursuit. A member should always keep in mind that he might be followed by intelligence agents that are using him as a means to find out about other members or places that he visits. When on a mission and when designated places have to be visited, maximum precautions have to be taken, and a member must make sure that he was not followed.




Surveillance can be done in various ways. There could be some suspicion about the member, and he could be watched to find out about what he does with his time, to monitor his usual movements, to see who he associates with, what friends he has, where he works, etc. The most rudimentary form utilizes a single person who follows the person under surveillance at a short distance. It is relatively easy to tell with this method that you are being followed. It is more difficult to tell when an alternating team is used, which might even be employing vehicles. Every member must be on the alert and be as careful as possible. We can set down three general rules:

a) If a member realizes that he is being followed, he must act naturally and even in trying to lose the tail he must not let him know that he has been discovered. If he cannot shake off the tail, he must not go to appointed places. It is preferable to not make a contact and go somewhere innocuous like a store, etc.

b) A member who is aware that he might be followed during his contacts or movements, even though he has no objective proof, should take the following precaution: at the moment of entering a house or making contact with another person, he must make sure that no suspicious persons or vehicles are in sight.

c) Do not go to places under surveillance.

376. (f) Residence. Residences cannot be known by anyone in the membership. The custom of giving addresses to everyone must be eliminated. A friend today could be a comrade tomorrow. Neighbors should not be allowed to smell out any political activity. If a previous political activity has become known, try to spread the rumor that it has been abandoned.

República Oriental del Uruguay		Policía de Montevideo	
Cédula de Identidad N°		Fotografía Electrónica N°	
778.793		55.967	
Cutis blanco		castaño	
	Indice Dactil.		
	E.3333		
	L.1222		
	78		

CERTIFICO que esta Cédula-Identidad se expide A QUIEN
ACREDITO SER **MARIA LUISA FATTORETTI**
AGRADEÑO,

nacido en **Montevideo, R.O. del Uruguay**



16.5.1937 *x MARIA Fattoretti*
Fecha Dpto. o Prov. Pais
Firma titular del identificado

Observaciones:

Por el Jefe de Policía y por su orden,
[Signature] Montevideo, 28.2.1959...
Vence 28.2.1979...

Phoney identity card of "Mercedes," "La Flaca," or "Renee"

República Oriental del Uruguay - Policía de Montevideo

Cédula N° 1.241.699	Registro Fotográfico N° 1.702.151
 M.B.	

CERTIFICO: que esta Cédula de Identidad, perteneciente a quien

HA ACREDITADO SER **-FRANCISCO GARCIA**

PARA -

viviendo en **LUGO**

República

29-7-936

Fecha

Dono, o Pro.

Francisco Garcia
Cédula de Identidad N° 1.241.699

Observaciones:

Por *[Signature]* de *[Signature]*

Montevideo, 15-7-936

Phoney identity card
of "Silva," or "El
Negro"



Manual
práctico
para el

SABOTAJE

Cover of the "Prac-
tical Manual of
Sabotage"



2) Group Security

377. The general principle of security in collective work is compartmentalization. This means not spreading and disseminating information and dividing into small sectors the knowledge of certain things that are needed only by those who are in contact with those sectors. As a general principle no one should say anything to anyone, except if it is necessary for our operations. This rule applies even in dealing with cell comrades. Members should discipline themselves and become used to being "close-mouthed." Only pertinent information should be communicated and only to the person in charge of receiving it. In regard to papers, documents, materials, arms, etc, the same precautions as in individual cases apply. Meeting places for groups should be free of compromising elements. Cell members should always have individual and group alibis to justify their movements. This even includes a justifiable occupation, because it is very important to demonstrate an honest livelihood.

In regard to actions, precautions should include cleaning out each member's pockets of papers or objects that could identify him. Only personal documents should be carried in a buttoned pocket to prevent loss. Carrying documents makes movement possible with fewer problems (in case of an encounter with a police patrol) during the time prior to the action. This is especially true when vehicles are not being used. Likewise, an alibi should be established for the operating team, one for each of the members and a group alibi in case anyone is arrested. Each member must be aware that in ignoring security not only he but the entire group is endangered.

3) Organization Security

378. Each member of the organization has a great responsibility that goes beyond personal matters. The security of the entire organization depends on the security of each of its members. A member who does not follow security regulations runs a personal risk and endangers his comrades.

Compartmentalization must apply at all levels: individually, collectively, among the rank and file, the leadership, etc.

There comes a moment in revolutionary work when security undergoes a severe test: the moment when a member of the organization falls prisoner to the enemy.

There is only one way to behave in such a situation: stick to the alibi that had been established and then...remain silent.

Experience shows that when something is mentioned, no matter how minimal, it encourages the interrogators to try and ask for more information based on what was said.



CARLOS MARTINEZ - CELDA 347 - LE FALTA BLOQUEAR LA MARCHA MARXISTA
 VICTOR DE SILVA 232 - BUENA DISPOSICION PERUO CANTINERO
 MIGUEL SOSA - CAN - NO COCHERO E FUMI, AC.
 DOMINGO DIAZ 230 - POLA PREPARACION - EN OBSERVACION
 DOMINGO DOMINGUEZ 246 - BUENA DISPOSICION
 PERITO 24 - NO PUEDE GUARDAR - CONVICION DE DOMINGUEZ
 JULIO MORALES 247 - EN PREPARACION
 PERITO 24
 PERITO 24 - EN PREPARACION (LOCA) - ESTA BIEN
 PERITO 24 - EN PREPARACION (LOCA) - ESTA BIEN
 PERITO 24 - EN PREPARACION (LOCA) - ESTA BIEN

PERITO 24 - EN PREPARACION (LOCA) - ESTA BIEN
 01 Rodriguez Luna
 02 Chuchin
 03 Cardoso
 04 Cruz
 05 Espinoza
 06 Vera
 25 POCHENO
 26 CHAMARO
 27 ANTONIO
 28 JULIO (MORALES)
 RESPONSABLES:
 GRUPO D
 RESPONSABLES: 25, 26, 27, 28
 29 ESPINOSA
 30 VERA
 31 CHUCHIN
 32 BARVOSA
 33 CRENE

Hand-written notes of the seditionaries about the recruitment of "soldiers of fortune" in the Punta Carretas Prison

Every revolutionary militant knows, should know, that the revolutionary cause even demands giving one's life. It is better to die than to betray.

N.B. Instead of destroying this type of document, which is practically of permanent application, return it, if possible, to the person who gave it to you so that it can continue performing its function in a controlled fashion. If this is not possible or very difficult, then destroy it."

e. Behavior during interrogations

379. This point is dealt with at length in the "Interrogation Manual," a small book of more than 20 pages neatly printed up by the MLN-T in successive, improved editions. It teaches members about how to escape from the clutches of criminal law and judicial proceedings in a systematic way and with a display of cleverness and legal expertise that reveals the hand of experts. The first known edition of this document is dated November 1969; the latest, expanded one is from November 1971. The following is a very brief summary of this latest manual.

380. It consists of an introduction and nine chapters in the following order:

--Introduction

Basically:

--Don't say anything

--Never confess

--The truth of bourgeois police and justice "is not our truth."

--"Do not betray even at the cost of one's life."

--Chapter 1. How to testify

--Chapter 2. A practical example of interrogating an underground member

--Chapter 3. Special technique for difficult interrogations

--Chapter 4. Example of special techniques

This chapter deals with a series of techniques that are commonly employed in this type of interrogation and then examines the so-called "counter-techniques" to offset the former.

--Chapter 5. Technique for the use of emotional and logical interrogation methods

This chapter examines the theoretical bases, stemming from a study of each arrested individual, that the police uses to stress the emotional or logical aspect of an interrogation.

--Chapter 6. Techniques to check the truthfulness of an arrested person's statements

The following are examined in this order:

--checking

--the lie detector and style of truthfulness

—style of truthfulness at home

—Chapter 7. Considerations of specific types of subjects

A series of subjects are analyzed successively in accordance with a classification based on temperament and fundamental characteristics:

—the charlatan

—the born liar

—the subject with friends or relatives involved in the incident

—the reserved subject

—Chapter 8. Security elements: alibis

—Chapter 9. Some bases for judicial interrogation

The ninth and last chapter examines a series of articles in the criminal and procedural codes and ways to avoid or neutralize them during interrogation before the competent judge, etc.

f. Handling and care of arms

381. In a special bulletin the MLN-T distributed to its members the following circular, which because of its technical nature and clarity requires no comment:

"Care of Arms

Weapons are precision instruments and as such require thoroughgoing attention in order to function at top efficiency.

Since they are a valuable investment and of incalculable usefulness, we feel that the least we can do is take care of our weapons.

The following are some general rules that should be observed in taking care of weapons:

1) After use, clean the weapons as soon as possible; otherwise damage could be permanent.

2) Keep your weapon clean and lightly oiled. Don't let the oil get thick with age.

3) Don't put your weapon on the ground, where dirt or sand could get into the barrel or the internal mechanism.

4) Don't press the trigger and let the hammer fall when the weapon is partially taken apart.

- 5) Don't keep the weapon indefinitely in a leather case. The weapon will rust because steel, although apparently dry, absorbs humidity from the atmosphere.
- 6) After each firing with a semi-automatic or mechanical weapon, you should let go of the trigger enough for it to engage with the firing mechanism again.
- 7) Don't plug up the barrel of the weapon with cloth, paper or other material. You might forget to take it out before firing and thus damage the barrel.
- 8) In order to take out unfired bullets from semi-automatic weapons, remove the cartridge clip entirely and then, pulling the carriage of the weapon backwards, take out the individual bullet.
- 9) Avoid dents or damages to the weapon carriage. They usually occur when the magazine falls to the ground as it is being removed from the weapon.

When inserting the cartridge clip into the magazine, make sure that it has been secured with the corresponding bolt. Never insert the cartridge clip with a sudden jolt of the hand. The base come loose, or its upper edges could be damaged.

The cartridge clip should be inserted with a quick, continuous movement.

Do not burn this bulletin. It could be of permanent interest.

g. Various offensive practice techniques

382. This document and the two following ones are programs or outlines for practicing various exercises that are thoroughly offensive in nature: weapons firing, climbing, hurling bottles and grenades, marches and sabotage against basic objectives, etc.

"Practice with firing weapons, in accordance with a plan of instruction.

Practice hurling bottles and grenades or equivalent objects.

Climbing on ropes with knots every 40 centimeters. Climbing on branches. Moving along horizontal ropes.

Running with body low to the ground. **Crawling** on stomach.

Long and high jumps, jumps over ditches, if possible.

Hurling Practice Bottles and Grenades or Equivalent Objects

1. Standing up, on flat ground, towards a target, which could be two concentric circles drawn on the ground.

2. Standing up, hurling the object towards a target but with an obstacle in the way; in other words, throwing it over a small hill or over trees.

3. Hurling from a protected spot. A good method for this exercise would be to have the grenadier run towards a presumed guarded objective. The guard (pick a comrade to do this) can clap his hands each time that the grenadier offers a target during his movements. This forces the grenadier to cover himself and look for the best spot from which to hurl the grenade."

h. Outings program

383. This is a program of field outings to carry out military exercises that will train the recruits; it provides an effective cover, the harmless look of excursions to the country. The famous "sugar cane marches" and the "marches on foot," which were done as protest and/or publicity acts, are basically revolutionary training and gymnastics exercises to train militants in a knowledge of the terrain and the techniques of guerrilla warfare, and they can be accomplished calmly, without the authorities having a clear idea of what is behind them.

The "program" transcribed in this section illustrates the point well enough.

"A program of outings to the country by the groups serves various objectives: creating an esprit de corps, practicing firing exercises, physical training, organization of tasks. Precautions should be taken to make the outing look like a picnic or something similar. We must prevent people from having suspicions. Even the quartering site must be known beforehand to avoid going to places that are too crowded. Do not use gaudy equipment.

Equipment

Individual: bag, hunting knife, plastic bag or canteen, pitcher, bowl, spoon, fatigue clothes, short pants in the summer.

Group: Pot, ladle, food to cook, axe, rope with knots every 40 centimeters.

If Staying Overnight: sleeping bag and, if possible, a tent.

Outings Program

A 5 kilometer hike should be used to reach the quartering site; in other words, you travel in your vehicle to a point 5 kilometers from where the camp is to be set up, and then walk.

When the group is very large, it should be divided into smaller groups. One group will begin the hike 5 kilometers before the other, converging on the site where the camp will be set up.

Suggestions for a 1 Day Program

700 hours—hike to camp begins

900 hours—exercises

1100 hours—food preparation

1400 hours—exercises

1700 hours—hike begins back to the vehicles for the return."

i. Practical manual of sabotage

384. This document gives precise instructions on how to sabotage "certain basic objectives."

- Telephones, poles and wires, terminals
- Telegraphs
- Electricity lines
- Railway telegraphs
- Railway signals
- Combustible materials storage sites
- Government vehicles
- Sites and warehouses of Yankee companies
- Wool depots
- Road systems
- Roadway obstruction

6. Tupamaro Criminal Code

385. This document reflects one of the pillars of "revolutionary justice." Its five chapters, the last one unfinished, are the "judicial" symbol of the savagery that began to occur in the country through the following real events:

- The "people's jails"
- Kidnapings
- The "executions" that were publicly announced and carried out, as is well-known.

386. The following conceptual considerations should be stressed:

- The death penalty is instituted "temporarily."
- This penalty can be carried out at any time by any seditionary on behalf of the "court."
- If the various punishments ordered are not carried out within 10 days of the publication of the "sentence," the next level of punishment automatically goes into effect, and so forth. This means, for example, that the violation of disqualification to hold public office could eventually mean the maximum penalty for the person so convicted.

387. "Chapter I. General Part

Article 1) Any action or omission expressly established in this Revolutionary Criminal Code is a counterrevolutionary crime.

Article 2) All counterrevolutionary crimes committed within the territory of the republic by nationals or aliens will be punished in accordance with this Revolutionary Criminal Code.

Article 3) Counterrevolutionary crimes committed by nationals or aliens in Latin American territory will not be exempt from the application of the Revolutionary Criminal Code.

Article 4) The principle of retroactivity for the Revolutionary Criminal Law will not be recognized, except for extremely grave counterrevolutionary crimes; each individual case will be dealt with by the Revolutionary Court after the accused individual is notified personally.

Article 5) No one will be punished for an act or omission stipulated by the Revolutionary Criminal Law as a counterrevolutionary crime unless it intentional, ultra-intentional or criminal and, moreover, committed consciously and willingly.

Article 6) An error in law stemming from ignorance of this Revolutionary Criminal Code will in no case be an exemption from punishment, and only in very special cases will it be taken into account as an extenuating circumstance.

Article 7) The following constitute extenuating circumstances for crimes stipulated in this Revolutionary Criminal Code: a) minority; b) good prior conduct; c) having effectively tried to repair the damage caused; d) public confession of the crime; e) obedience to superiors as long as it does not come within the definition of accomplice or complicity; f) any other circumstance that in the opinion of the Revolutionary Court is equivalent or similar to the above.

Article 8) The following are aggravating circumstances for the crimes stipulated in this Revolutionary Criminal Code:

a) breach of trust; b) the interest motive; c) causing unnecessary harm; d) premeditation and deceit; e) abuse of force; f) taking advantage of the public office held by the guilty party; g) the motive of ignominy; h) abuse of authority; i) second offense.

Article 9) The attenuating and aggravating circumstances will be of use to the Revolutionary Court in lessening or increasing penalties by noting the nature of such circumstances and the conclusions stemming from them with regard to the greater or lesser responsibility of and the danger posed by the agent.

Article 10) All persons who intentionally take part in committing crimes stipulated in this Revolutionary Criminal Code, whether as a co-perpetrator or accomplice, will be considered liable for them, in addition to the perpetrator.

Article 11) The following are perpetrators: a) those who actually commit the crime; b) those who appoint non-imputable or non-punishable persons to commit the counterrevolutionary crime.

Article 12) The following are considered co-perpetrators:

a) those who, outside subsection b of the previous article, appoint others to commit the crime; b) those who because of their function or position have to prevent, uncover or punish the crime and who promised to conceal it before it was committed and to confirm it; c) those who cooperate directly during the period of commission; d) those who cooperate in carrying out a counterrevolutionary crime, whether during the preparatory stage or in its execution, by means of an act without which the crime could not have been committed.

Article 13) Those who are not included in the previous article and who cooperate morally or materially in the counterrevolutionary crime by means of acts prior to or simultaneous with the execution of the crime but but unconnected with and prior to its completion will be considered accomplices.

388. Chapter II. Revolutionary Criminal Proceedings

Article 14) Official persecution of counterrevolutionary crimes
Article 15) Arraignment
Article 16) Official defense action
Article 17) Sentencing
Article 18) Publication of the sentence in the press
Article 19) Appeals process (through the press)
Article 20) Final judgment and publication of same
Article 21) Application of the sentence

389. Chapter III. On Punishments

Article 22) The counterrevolutionary crimes stipulated in this Revolutionary Criminal Code will be punished by:

a) imprisonment; b) exile; c) disqualification for public office;
d) disqualification from holding a given academic, commercial or industrial position; e) suspension from public office or an academic, commercial or industrial position; f) fine

Article 23) Imprisonment can be for a maximum of 30 years in preferably rural jails where the prisoner will do forced labor.

Article 24) The penalty of exile means the expulsion of the criminal from the national territory and a ban on returning for the period of the sentence.

Article 25) Disqualification for public office means that the criminal must resign from the public office that he holds.

Article 26) Disqualification from engaging in a given profession, trade or industry means that the criminal must give up said occupations.

Article 27) Suspension from public office or an academic, industrial or trade position means that the criminal must abstain from engaging in the post or profession for the period indicated by the sentence.

Article 28) Fines will be in the amount established by the Revolutionary Court and will be paid in the manner it decides upon.

390. Chapter IV. Administering the Punishments

Article 29) The punishments listed in Article 24, 25, 26, 27 and 28 will be carried out voluntarily by the guilty party, prior to the assumption of power by the Revolutionary Government.

Article 30) In view of the difficulty of administering the punishment in Article 23, it is temporarily replaced, until the people take power, by the death penalty.

Article 31) The enforcement of the sentence referred to in Article 30 will be handled within 10 days after its publication by the members of the movement that the court appoints. Nonetheless, any revolutionary is empowered to enforce the sentence, acting on behalf of the Revolutionary Court.

Article 32) In connection with the punishments mentioned in Articles 24, 25, 26, 27 and 28, refusal to accept and voluntarily carry them out within 10 days after the publication of the sentence will automatically mean that the next level of punishment applies, and so forth until reaching the punishment referred to in Articles 23 and 30.

Chapter V. Special Section on Crimes

Article...(unfinished)"

7. The Role of Women

Many women join the seditious movement, which is concerned about giving them "a well-defined place" in it by letting them operate in the varied sections of the organization as well as in the various phases of its operations. The MLN-T insists, above all, that it is "a good thing"

for certain tasks in the urban struggle to be performed by women. The lists of persons arrested as well as several episodes show to what point and to what extent women have joined seditious activities. Once trapped, they are unable to escape the humiliation and slavery to which they are reduced.

The letter from a repentant Tupamaro woman, which was made known to Congress by the interior minister in mid-1972, revealed to many for the first time the sordidness and moral degradation into which the life of many Uruguayan women fell who with good faith believed in false revolutionary redemption. Harboring illusions about an unreal world of deceitful promises, at the end of the road they met only the empty bitterness of a frustrated future, a ruined home, of dignity and freedom exchanged for blind obedience and inhuman insensitivity, placed in the service of the sadism and terror of a handful of criminals. "Once they had recruited the two of us," she said, referring to herself and her husband, "they forgot about all the people they boasted of defending and they no longer spoke about ideals. Strengthen yourselves mentally and physically so that you can kill efficiently" was the slogan repeated over and over again to form the new revolutionary "personality" in their consciences. When, like a wounded animal, frightened and disillusioned by the reality of the situation, she wanted to leave her hell, it was already too late; she received threats against herself and her children from her husband, who was completely dominated by the terrorists, etc.

The seditious documents do not mention this total abdication and abandonment of the timeless protections for women. Instead, they insist on the usefulness of their services, recognizing that "they are usually good soldiers," and mentioning as a tribute to their presence "the feminine touch," with a carefully prepared and timely meal.

392. Perhaps no other document summarizes as precisely and eloquently the major role that the MLN-T has assigned women in its ranks as the fragment that follows.

"As a social being who sees and lives injustice, a woman takes on the political commitment that the moment demands. This commitment, above and beyond education, culture, sex, etc, stems from the inner reaches of her soul, the awareness that her own reality creates in her, the awareness that she needs to be a revolutionary. In that sense, women are additional combatants with all of the potential to contribute to and develop the ongoing revolutionary process. Not without a struggle, the MLN today offers membership to women without prejudice, and only as a function of achieving what is best for the revolution. We have said, not without a struggle, with a view towards the process that that membership position undergoes through time. In fact, in order to become another group of combatants, women have had to overcome and are overcoming some obstacles.

First of all, capitalist society assigns a place to women and educates them for that place. Few elements can be salvaged from that upbringing for an average woman in Uruguayan society to become a member in a political-military organization. A disregard for physical training and dependency on others to resolve practical problems (economic, family, mechanical, etc) limit their creativity, initiative and even aggressiveness as time passes. The first difficulty then that holds back women's place in the organization and thus a break with society is to make a break with an upbringing and a culture that make women spectators of history made by men. The difficulties go beyond the area of political options. Having joined our political-military organization, a woman must create and develop the internal conditions that will overcome the limitations that are inherent to her position in this society.

It is essential for a woman member to find that her revolutionary comrades have a just understanding of her shortcomings and inabilities, so that her membership post can be effective, so that team work can overcome prejudices, and so that there are no longer male and female tasks but rather the cooperation that is necessary for all revolutionary tasks.

To summarize, a woman must wage two battles: first, hasten her political placement by making the commitment; and second, once the commitment has been made, overcome whatever shortcomings she has in order to serve the revolution with all her potential.

The experience of many women has been paving the way, and although each new woman member has to wage that dual battle, we can state that today women have a well-defined place in the MLN. This process, carried out simultaneously on two fronts, strengthens the firmness of her commitment. Thus we have women who are disciplined, hardworking, sensible, secure, clever in the face of repression, with good roots in the people, with wideranging possibilities for political work, not as daring or with great initiative in the military sphere for now, but, in general, what could be termed good combatants.

Since it has to be pursued in the midst of enemy ranks, the urban struggle has shown in practice why it is good for certain tasks to be performed by women. We can mention some, without exhausting the list. As a go-between: because they are women, comrades of all ages are very effective in carrying messages and objects. Their appearance, modified by clothes, personal preparation, etc, make them appropriate for various physical or social areas and thus make possible easy disguises, which enables us often to elude the efforts of the agents of repression. An innocent appearance, together with a spirit that is the fruit of her conviction and commitment, has often solved problems involved in underground operations with great efficiency and at a low cost. Although the enemy knows of this, it has been a very important ally for the organization because the enemy is a victim of its profound prejudices against women.

393. As a cover for locals:

No matter what area of the city an organization local has been set up, the presence of a woman is essential.

She is the one who makes the local look like all the other houses that surround it. Her duties as a supposed "housewife" enable her to get acquainted with the neighbors and thus determine possible enemies nearby. shopping activities enable her to become familiar with normal movement in the area as well as to detect unusual movements, all of which helps to strengthen security mechanisms, which are never enough in urban guerrilla war.

394. As a member of service teams:

In these teams, the logistic bases of the armed struggle, women have a real chance to apply the know-how and techniques acquired in factories, schools, etc to the development of the guerrilla struggle. In silent, painstaking, constant and patient activities women have had and still have their place in the struggle.

395. As a member of an action team:

Today almost all action teams have a woman in their ranks. Longstanding experience has demonstrated the usefulness of this practice. In the beginning, women took part in military actions only circumstantially, to fulfill a specific function. At present, women take part in the preparation, planning and execution stages of the actions, thus acquiring an overall military experience, which makes possible the utilization of their personal attributes in the military sphere also. In obtaining information, in planning an action, women have better access to various places under certain circumstances. Their concern in planning generally constitutes a valuable contribution. During the action itself women usually turn out to be good soldiers because of their discipline and team spirit.

396. In political work:

In this area women have made various contributions: a) as work organizers at all levels, internally or on the people's front; b) as guides in the political training of new MLN members, conveying the basic elements of underground operations in a complete and disciplined manner.

Last but not least, a woman, by her very presence, introduces a very important element for the unity and camaraderie of the revolutionaries. The feminine touch that Che mentions in guerrilla warfare (see note) occurs on various levels, be it in a meal that a woman can prepare in careful and timely fashion, a gesture of brotherhood that alleviates the tensions brought on by the struggle, or her constant attitude of human closeness that helps those around her to deepen the identification of their comrades

with the revolution. Often, her affection and that of her children become an important part of the emotional life of the people with whom she lives. This attitude, to the extent that it is not part of a forced duty but rather is accepted by the woman militant, is ultimately the most eloquent manifestation of the total commitment that the Uruguayan woman has taken on at this stage of the revolutionary process."

8. Recruitment Characteristics

397. The MLN-T's recruitment is selective, not open, and is after quality rather than quantity. Numbers can be good for political parties but not for a revolutionary organization. This aristocratic approach, which reveals the role that the movement assigns to the masses whom it pretends to be serving, is also a reflection of the "intellectualism" of its leaders, who are vainly proud of their "natural" wisdom and superiority.

This approach is clearly expressed in the critical thoughts and advice contained in a document of the seditious organization whose main paragraphs are reproduced here:

"Bourgeois reformist parties recruit anyone. The more members, the better. This approach is valid only when the plan is to enter elections indefinitely, where the only thing that counts is numbers (the quantitative element), not who the voters are and what they are like (the qualitative element). If the intention is to pursue another kind of struggle, if other things are being attempted in other areas, then the existence of a certain level of quality in the cadres is vital.

Who would be enthused about doing something more or less compromising in an open, amorphous organization, where people are constantly coming and going and you never know who is who?"

398. The selective approach is fading a bit, as can be seen in certain special recruitment moves such as the one that the MLN-T is pursuing among the prison population.

The movement is trying to win over followers into its ranks wherever it can and is choosing convicts and defendants who, because of their talents or know-how, could be useful or simply provide "mass" support for the revolution. This explains the presence in the organization of many common criminals and also why several of these criminals that originally did not belong to the organization were part of escapes from jail. For example, in the escape of 12 April 1972, of a total of 25 escapees, 10 were not part of the seditious group.

Among other evidence, two documents confiscated at the Punta Carretas prison in January 1972 offer interesting indications of this manner of proselytizing.

399. The first is a demand from a common criminal recruited by the MLN-T as a "coordinator" of the group in the above jail for information on "the support that we can be given." "We need," the "coordinator" said, "accurate information on the MLN's street activities, all of the material that will enable us to speak with facts to our comrades, to those who are undecided. Don't promise anything to anyone if you're not sure of keeping your word; we were referring to escapes, contacts, lawyers, rescues, so that when you say 'yes' it's with complete assurance of accomplishing it, and the same when you say 'no.'"

400. The second document is an illustrative report on "how the yard operates." "In the yard there are fabulous human resources that have to be used, that serve our ends." But since there are some that become demoralized, it's necessary to give them some sort of "incentive." The report then asks: "Do you think that a man who's in for 20 years wants to hear about politics? With what do I stimulate him? With grass? With a lawyer who calls on him once and then forgets about him? I think that we have to win over the yard because there are people there who are very important for the revolution. I'm not promising them anything but I'm going to keep working as I have been, and time will tell, and I'm asking for time," and so forth.

401. These paragraphs underscore the "fabulous" importance of the patio as an easy place to get new members and explain the complaints and protests of the recruited rebels, who on occasions even go on "hunger strikes" when they are denied access to the yards together with the rest of the prison population.

The concentration of rebels in common jails was an obviously erroneous government decision, since it facilitated subversive operations.

That decision, made on 7 March 1969 "for security reasons," to prevent escapes and freeings, gave rise to a situation of extreme insecurity and difficulty. Not only did it not prevent escapes, which occurred anyway and in truly unusual circumstances, but it also enabled the jails to become centers of indoctrination and recruitment, as we have just seen, and, what is more important, it enabled the heads of the organization, from the jails, to continue formulating plans and guiding and monitoring external activities with complete impunity.

402. A long history of official neglect with regard to the incredible conditions, from any viewpoint, of the national prison system, including the lack of security at the institutions themselves, was the prime shortcoming in the inadequate handling of the anti-subversive struggle.

The reality of this situation was summarized perfectly in the decree of the executive branch on 14 April 1972, which authorized the ministries of the interior and national defense to take opportune measures "to guarantee the protection and integrity of places of detention for

persons arrested for subversive activities, with additional authorization to overhaul whatever establishments are needed to achieve this goal anywhere in the nation." The whereas section of the resolution-decree reads: "The repeated escapes from prisons and the numerous attempts at escape frustrated recently by the authorities...have been provoked by subversive organizations acting within and outside the prisons. The various summary proceedings opportunely revealed: a) that the presence of prisoners belonging to those organizations has altered and subverted prison discipline; b) that places of detention have become centers of indoctrination and recruitment for common criminals; c) that existing jails, planned and organized to house common criminals, are not secure and do not meet the demands posed by the internment of persons involved in subversive activities, who make crime a tool in their declared struggle against national sovereignty, the constitution of the republic, the structure of the state and the rights of its inhabitants...The security and surveillance of persons interned for subversive activities require, in the present circumstances, that they be placed under the control of the Armed Forces, to which the executive branch entrusted the handling of anti-subversive activities, through the military commands acting in cooperation with police personnel, and therefore it is within the competence of the respective ministries to take all necessary measures to prevent possible escapes by prisoners."

Thus the foundation was laid for reorganizing, on a different basis than before, the imprisonment and treatment of persons involved in subversive activities, with a minimum of security and guarantees for effectiveness.

403. With regard to the calamitous material situation, the deficient operation of the jails and the various problems created by the presence of individuals arrested for acts of sedition, a good source of information is the report given on 20 March 1972 by the minister of the interior to the Senate Commission on the Constitution and Legislation.⁷¹

404. These subversive related problems were overcome as recently as mid-1972 when a special establishment was set up for the imprisonment of seditionaries, pursuant to the provisions of the decree of 14 April of that year.⁷²

FOOTNOTES

1. With regard to this line, see Chapter IX, "Strategy of the MLN-T."
2. Concerning this theory, see Chapter X, 3, "Tactics."
3. With regard to this plan, see Chapter XI, 3.


4. A reference to the Nicaraguan guerrilla war in the 1920's, when a force under the command of General Sandino defended the territory of Nicaragua against the intervention by the United States, an episode outlined by Selser in a book by that name. (Gregorio Selser, "The Crazy Little Army, Mexican-Nicaraguan Operation," Buenos Aires, 1958, Triangulo Publishing House.)
5. See Chapter XIV, 2, "Chronology," No 639/1452.
6. Concerning this plan, see Chapter XI, "Rural Struggle."
7. Known among the members of the seditious organization as "La Tita" [Auntie].
8. Along with documents 2, 3, 4 and 5, it constitutes the basic text in which the MLN-T set forth its ideological and program postulates, as well as the strategic guidelines for action. Knowledge of it was limited to members of the organization.
9. Tupamaro Support Command.
10. People's Self-Defense Command.
11. Abbreviation for "the organization."
12. April 1962.
13. 31 July 1963.
14. Comrades.
15. Clandestine or clandestinity.
16. "Bebe," one of the pseudonyms of Raul Sendic.
17. 1 January 1964.
18. 20 February 1964.
19. Reference to the robberies and thefts committed by the MLN-T to "finance" its activities, also called "expropriation."

20. Coordinator.
21. In criminal slang "cana" meant prison, and "encanado" to be in prison.
22. 11 June, 14 and 15 October, and 16 December 1964.
23. Executive committee.
24. Eduardo Pinella. A construction worker who came from the La Teja quarter, he died on 13 August 1963 from a fall from a scaffold while he was doing repair work on the clinical hospital building. A founding member of the MRO, from the ranks of which he went into those of the MLN-T, he participated in the attack on the Swiss Gun Club. The text refers to the premises Pinella built in the quarter referred to for the activities of the cell which he formed and headed. A definite partisan of armed struggle as the only way to bring about social change, he spoke in his personal notes of an Peasant Support Movement, the name which was given to the group mentioned after his death. It strengthened rapidly and by 1964 was in a position to carry out various actions. It was from this group precisely that the MLN-T later developed, such that Pinella can be termed one of its first leaders.
25. 13 May and 22 November 1966.
26. 18 February and 30 March 1966.
27. 14 September 1967.
28. 9 August 1965.
29. 4, 17, 21 and 26 January and 14 July 1967.
30. Carlos Flores Alvarez, also from the La Teja quarter and a member of the MAC, established by Pinella, to which we have already referred. Refer to the date mentioned in Chapter XIV.
31. Called "Tarta" [Stutterer], in reference to a defect in his speech. A native of the same quarter as the last mentioned individual, and like him, a member of the MAC. See the dates 22, 26, 27 and 29 December 1966, 12 January, 16 March, 29 and 30 November and 7 December 1967.
32. 14 July 1967.
33. Oscar D. Gestido, elected president of the republic in the last general elections in November of 1966, took office on 1 March 1967 and died on 7 December of that same year, being succeeded by the vice president, Jorge Pacheco Areco, who held that post until the end of the term, 1 March 1972, on which date President Juan Maria Bordaberry took office.

34. 29 November 1967.
35. 7 December 1967.
36. 12 December 1967. The dissolution of the subversive political groups to which the document referred was not due to the publication of the "Letter to the Militiamen," as is stated, but to the agreement made by those groups to overthrow institutions by means of armed struggle, as emerges clearly from the text of the resolution promulgated on the date mentioned.
37. Nickname given to President Pacheco.
38. National Convention.
39. 1 July 1968.
40. Executive committee.
41. 7 August 1968.
42. UTE [General Administration of State Electric Power and Telephones].
43. 11 August 1968.
44. 12 and 15 August and 20 and 21 September 1968.
45. 9 August, 10 September and 7 October 1968.
46. Pereira Reverbel.
47. 8 October 1968.
48. 13 October 1968.
49. 10 December 1968.
50. 29 November 1968.
51. Carlos Hebert Mejias Collazo. One of the founders of the MLN-T. Anarchistic in inclination, he held command posts in Column 10, in addition to heading the CAP. He disagreed with the organization and left it. When he was arrested and imprisoned, his former comrades, also serving sentences made a point of avoiding him, regarding him as a traitor to the movement. After his escape, he became a member of the OPR-33, etc,
52. Mejias Collazo.

53. First Session Trial Court, 1 January 1969.
54. 18, 19 and 20 February and 4 and 16 March 1969.
55. 18, 19 and 20 February and 4 and 16 March 1969.
56. Central Command Group.
57. Weapons.
58. Interior.
59. National Administration of Fuels, Alcohol and Cement. State body.
60. Articles 18 and 20.
61. On the financial market, the American dollar was quoted as follows during this period, in relation to the Uruguayan peso, according to the Economic Studies Department of the BROU: 1960 -- 11.30; 1970 -- 250; 1971 -- 250; 1972 -- 534.89; 1973 -- 865.82; showing a sharp rise from then on.
62. The documentation seized by the FFCC and the testimony of the members of the seditious organization make it possible to obtain an approximate notion of the finances of the MLN-T. Income, whatever the origin, went into a common fund from which the needs of all the columns of the organization were covered, retaining a certain percentage as a reserve fund. The needs were determined in a monthly budget established by the executive committee on the basis of the development of the organization and the plan of operation, and varying with the columns, since they were not equal either in number of members, nor premises, nor services. The commands of each column distributed the money on the basis of the criterion for the use of these funds established by each. In the course of 1970, the organization attempted to establish general criteria for distribution, establishing priority, but there were always columns which obtained better results than others in terms of the yield on their investments. Theoretically, the resources came from the executive command to the commands of each column, being passed on by them to the subcommands or individuals in charge for each sector (military, political, service), being passed on by them to the leaders of the action and labor groups, and by them to those responsible for the premises and militants. The following chart illustrates this, and is moreover a reflection of the internal structural lines of the MLN-T.

Executive Command of the Column



Theoretically there was also a monthly rendering of accounts, operating in the reverse direction, from the bottom to the top. At a given moment it became necessary to turn in an accounting for the month passed before receiving new allocations, and it was even required that the pertinent receipt be submitted, or lacking that, a clear description of the use of the money spent. In practice, the control exercised varied, and the farther up the hierarchy scale one went the more verbal he became. In July of 1970, when the allocations for the interior of the country were still limited, the monthly budget of the 45-North column was some 2 million pesos, while columns 10 and 15 had a budget in excess of 5 million, not including the payment for new premises, vehicles, etc. Up to that year, finances depended on the action, that is to say, the robberies, what was obtained sufficing to meet the needs. 1971 brought, along with the great growth in the organization, a great increase in expenditures, which were affected by the plans and budgets pertaining to the escape of prisoners that year, the departure of the members of the seditious organization released from prison to Chile, and the "scholarships" to Cuba to obtain military training. To the extent that it was not possible to carry out major financing actions (one of the most important in that year was the robbery of the Tacuarembó branch of the BROU), the organization had recourse to raise the budget to the commission of thefts and robberies on a small scale, for which the GAF were responsible, being given orders to carry out at least one such action per week. 1971 also marked the beginning of income from royalties for the authorship of books, publications, films and TV strips. These sales were made in Europe, Japan and Buenos Aires. The organization ended the year 1971 with a conviction that it could not move ahead nor continue its operations on the basis of the traditional income and that brought in in that year by the "exchange" of some of those kidnapped. Therefore, 1972

marked the beginning of foreign aid in money. This came from the Cuban Government and parties and movements in other countries. The new "exchange policy" inaugurated in 1971 was implemented in connection with Dias Gomide, Berembau and Ferres. The ransom for the second of these individuals was set at 100 million pesos to be paid in 3 months in installments of approximately 30 million each. Another of the "financial plans" approved by the leaders serving sentences in the Punta Carretas prison involved the counterfeiting of paper currency on a large scale -- travelers checks and foreign bills. This was a very ambitious plan for which connections in many countries were necessary in order for it to be truly profitable. Responsibility for these connections was assigned to Machado, an escapee from the prison who was arrested as an anarchist but emerged as a Tupamaro, and who because of his previous activities had knowledge of the people with whom he would have to establish links, etc.

63. "Boliche" or "tabernucha" -- low class bar.
64. Advocate of offensive action, using weapons, violence.
65. "Fierro" -- word meaning sidearm -- pistol or revolver, as explained previously.
66. "Carla" or "Paula": pseudonyms for Susana Iglesias Rodriguez. An employee at the Hospital de Clinicas and a companion of "Leonel," she was part of the MLN-T secretariat and the head of all informants on the judiciary. Arrested on 9 August 1972.
67. "Ortiz": pseudonym of Ruben Harveg Laino Estevez, a doctor and the head of an MLN-T health group that operated on Tuesdays. Arrested in June 1972.
68. "Marta": an alias of Maria Elena Gomez Haedo Fugasot, a member of Column 7, Zone 1. Provided cover for the local known as "Nahuel" or "de Omar," chalet "Car-Fot-Sul" in the Bosque de Solymar baths (Presidente Gestido Street and Los Eucaliptus Avenue), where she created an atmosphere of obsession and was later to be arrested, etc.
69. "Efrain": an alias of Fernando Luis Flores Morador. Provided cover for an MLN-T local that operated out of his own home at 1420 Arenal Grande Street, Apt 501, Montevideo. There he harbored Graciela Darre Francia, a revolutionary who had escaped from the Women's Jail, etc.
70. "Javier": an alias of Leonel Raul Martinez Platero, an architecture student and a member of the MLN-T from its outset. The husband of "La Parda" and later a companion of "Cecilia," he performs leadership tasks in the seditious organization. A member of the Executive

Committee, he took part in the action against the Soca site. Arrested on 8 October 1968; before his escape from the Punta Carretas Prison, he was part of the movement's leadership group that was set up there by the revolutionaries, etc.

71. Senate, Commission of Constitution and Legislation (integrated), File No 199/72, Distribution No 88/72. See also "Law of Public Order, Suspension of Individual Security and State of Internal War," Montevideo, 1972, a publication of the Interior Ministry, pp 44 and ff, and 96 to 122.
72. Decrees Nos 567/72 and 622/72 of 15 August and 19 September 1972, respectively.

VIII. Goal

1. Intermediate: Government Program
2. Immediate: Armed Struggle
 - a. At the national level
 - b. At the continental Level
3. Implicit Goal

GOAL

405. The MLN-T's goal is well-known, and at this point in our expose it is unnecessary to repeat it. However, it is useful to delve further into this aspect from the standpoint of the group's own philosophy, as expressed in the main documents in which the organization discusses the topic.

The revolutionary organization's goal is twofold: an intermediate and an immediate objective.

The intermediate goal is the "government program"; the immediate goal is military action, the internal armed struggle that the MLN-T has been waging and which complements the continent-wide activities carried out by other similar "liberation" movements with which the Uruguayan subversive organization aligns itself.

Lastly, there is another implicit goal to which the documents do not refer but which comes as an obvious conclusion.

These three goals are discussed herewith:

1. Intermediate: Government Program

406. From its inception the MLN-T was characterized by a complete lack of any specific goal in terms of a political platform. The efforts of the group were almost completely aimed at a straightforward take-over of power, as can be seen in the various statements made by its members to national and foreign newsmen and in its documents. Afterwards, "we would see about things."

It is only quite recently and under the pressures of domestic political events that it has been forced to specify attitudes and decisions in the governmental sphere.

Such a fundamental vacuum gave rise to many criticisms, both from its adversaries and from its sympathizers.

The former, after analyzing the information that had come to light up to that point on the revolutionary organization, pointed out: "Whether leftist or rightist, the Tupamaro movement is without doubt a terrorist movement of negation. The activities pursued by its groups and the fragmentary exposition of principles that can be culled out after reading the documents that its members themselves have thought it timely to reveal,

enable us to state that they are seeking merely chaos for chaos's sake, without anything to succeed it, not even a single statement on the order that will come after the objective is achieved. The MLN must publish its program manifesto as soon as possible. The conditions are right for it; moreover, it is essential."*

407. The answer was heard just 2 years later, when in March 1971 the MLN-T revealed its "revolutionary government program," which was to be carried out immediately after victory was won over the "bourgeois state," which, it felt, would be soon in coming.

It was an election year in which, according to the constitution, the authorities were up for election again in November. It was also a time when the left-wing, spurred on by the PCU [Communist Party of Uruguay], was thinking about joining forces in the FA [Broad Front] to take over power. The MLN-T supported the FA publicly, temporarily halting terrorist activity.

And thus the "government plan" appeared, in which for the first time the revolutionary organization dealt publicly with topics such as the agrarian reform, industry, trade, credit, planning, foreign capital, wages, education, public health, old age and disability, justice and defense of the revolution.

408. The following is the text of the program:

"The National Liberation Movement (Tupamaros) has summarized the main points of a revolutionary program that can be carried out only by a revolutionary government that draws its inspiration from that ideology.

The issuance of this program does not mean that we cease supporting any other transition program that aims at the same goals, such as the ones brought forth by the CNT [National Convention of Workers] and other forces of the people.

The MLN-T has put out a short six-point platform that could have normalized the country's situation, but it was rejected by the government. It included the restitution of freedoms, unfreezing wages, the reinstatement of those who were dismissed because of security measures, the freeing of political prisoners, etc.

Our main points for the stage of reconstructing the country through a revolutionary government are:

a) Agrarian Reform

1. Large livestock holdings, large plantations and large dairy farms will be expropriated and they will be run by the workers.

* LA MANANA, 16 January 1969

2. On the premise that the country's main wealth comes from the land, its exploitation will be capitalized and mechanized in order to increase production rapidly.

3. The small, rural enterprise will be reserved for those who work it. Rural workers who today have no legal title to land, such as tenants, workers and middlemen, will be given working rights to the land: "The land for those who work it."

4. There will be the best possible technical assistance for all rural producers, as well as fertilizers, seeds, wire and other instruments for better farming.

b) Industry

1. Large factories will be socialized and will come under the administration of the workers.

2. Domestic industry (meat, wool, leather, oleaginous plants, etc) will be promoted and protected; this also includes any other industry that has good prospects in the domestic or foreign market.

c) Trade

1. Imports and exports and foreign trade in general will be administered directly by the government.

2. Wholesale trade, large supermarkets, warehouses, stores and meat markets, etc, will be socialized and administered by their workers.

d) Credit

Savings and loans will be centralized by the state, which will channel investments into productive sectors and into constructions and services that are of interest to the society.

2. Luxury mansions will also be expropriated and used for cultural purposes or other public utility objectives.

3. The construction of housing with sanitary facilities for families that lack them will be given priority in economic planning.

e) Planning

Production, trade, credit and the economy in general will be meticulously planned in order to finance production, completely eliminate superfluous middlemen and speculation.

f) Foreign Capital

Large industries, trades and banks wholly or partially owned by foreign capital will be expropriated without indemnization.

g) Wages

1. The standard of living of all workers will be increased, based on an equitable distribution of the nation's wealth and the rise in domestic productivity.
2. To the extent that the rise in production so permits, the following standard for distribution will be observed: "To each according to his needs."

h) Education

1. The state will insure that education is completely without cost by furnishing materials to students until they conclude their studies.
2. Education will be aimed at the special areas that involve highly technical production.
3. As in other areas of domestic activity, education will be administered by the people involved in it.

i) Public Health

The best technical methods of treating patients will be placed at the disposal of all the people without distinctions. For example, private hospitals and large laboratories producing pharmaceuticals will be expropriated.

j) Old Age and Disability

Any person unable to work will be supported in all his needs.

k) Justice

1. Present codes, which were conceived to uphold private property and the capitalist system in general, will be replaced by others that take into account essential human values.
2. Efforts will be made to rehabilitate criminals through education and work, both before and after their release.
3. Criminal sentences handed down by bourgeois justice against individuals who committed so-called common law crimes will be reviewed in their totality, as will be the pardons for crimes that have been committed by figures in the regime.
4. All persons who collaborate in the counterrevolution, for example those who have carried out assassinations or other crimes in service to the current regime or who used the press to slander the cause of the people, will be imprisoned in accordance with the gravity of their crime.

1) Armed Defense of the Revolution

The rise to power and the ultimate attainment of the revolution's objectives can be guaranteed only by arming the people to defend them."

2. Immediate: Armed Struggle

409. The essence of the MLN-T's philosophy of the armed struggle has already been made clear in the chapter on guerrilla warfare (Chapter III, 6, Uruguayan Guerrillas, Nos 137 and ff).

That view will merely be corroborated by citing the organization's major documents dealing with the topic specifically, as divided into the domestic and the continental struggle.

a. The national level

410. The subject was considered by the Second National Convention of the MLN-T in January 1968, topic 205. The following document is so explicit that it needs no comment:

"1. The MLN is not a finished, static organization; it is dynamic and it is a school in which we all train ourselves for the struggle and the new society. We come from a given society and therefore we bring with us an entire ideology of great distortions. Within the movement there must be a constant struggle against those distortions in order to create the man of tomorrow in each comrade. That struggle is beginning today in revolutionary organizations and will be continued tomorrow in the socialist society. That struggle is, in all truth, the highest form of the class struggle. All ideas, all mental frameworks (which are reflected in actions) that we carry over from the old society must be fought and overcome by each one of us and in each one of us as well as in each comrade so that socialist ideas triumph.

Therefore, all of us within the organization must be inclined towards change. We must be willing to change and to help to change. We must not become scandalized or disheartened when we witness major mistakes and failings in our comrades. This is a characteristic of those who want to see the movement as something perfect, finished and therefore static. That is idealism, not reality. We have a mechanism to pursue this struggle within the movement: self-criticism. It should be used loyally, with an understanding that the struggle is not against our comrades but against certain ideas, against the failings and mistakes in our work and, inversely, to stress successes. This is the way it always should be among those whom the movement considers comrades. No one, absolutely no one, has the right to decide for himself who is a comrade and who is not within the movement, who is useful and who is not. Those are the enemy's ideas; that is being individualistic and, paradoxically, means at best not being useful.

411. Centralism, Discipline, Democracy

The political-military nature of our movement makes difficult an understanding of what our general organizational criteria should be. In order to have a reference point and define our position, we are stating that our organizational concept should be the Leninist concept. In our view, this is because experience tells us that it is the best approach.

The principles of our movement should be those of democratic centralism, tailored to each historical stage in which we must pursue our activities. We have said "tailored to each historical stage" because their application must be analyzed concretely, not abstractly. Democratic centralism as an organizational system implies an insoluble contradiction between centralism and democracy, a contradiction that is not and cannot be antagonistic because it occurs within a revolutionary organization or a socialist society. The ideal is to have a balance between the two poles of the contradiction.

However, at given historical stages or moments there must necessarily be an imbalance between them. For example, at the present moment centralism should predominate over democracy in the movement. Why? Because we are a persecuted movement in the midst of a struggle against a powerful enemy, and we have a vital need to act quickly. We could add many specific facts and details known to all comrades that restrict the possibilities for fully developing internal democracy and that force us to employ a marked centralism in organizational matters.

Obviously, our attitude would be different if we were building a socialist society after having defeated our enemies militarily. In those historical conditions we could indeed guarantee an almost flawless application of the principles of democratic centralism. But even in those conditions, and since the class struggle does not end when a socialist society is being built, there are well-known examples that show that specific levels have to be established and that therefore, to be precise, democratic possibilities have to be limited.

Nevertheless, the problems that perhaps could not be discussed before the revolutionary triumph could be discussed afterwards with full participation by all and with mechanisms suitable for the proper exercise of democracy.

Of course, there could be other historical stages in which the principles of democratic centralism might or might not be practiced in a thorough fashion.

Debray says this about the problem: "the reconversion of the party into a guiding and effective organization that is equal to the historical moment also means that it has to break with the plethora of commissions, secretariats, congresses, conferences, plenums, meetings and assemblies at all levels, national, provincial, regional and local, to cite the major ones. In an emergency situation and facing a militarily organized

enemy, this apparatus is at best paralyzing and at worst suicidal. It is the source of the vice of deliberation that Fidel talks about, which is opposed to centralized, vertical methods, combined with the tactical independence of the subordinate organizations that ask to perform military operations. This conversion requires the temporary abolition of the rules of democratic centralism that guarantee 'internal democracy' in the party, thus suspending it provisionally. Even when and more so than ever when it is voluntary and conscious, party discipline becomes military discipline. Once the situation is analyzed, democratic centralism serves to establish a line, to elect a leadership staff and is then suspended in order to implement the line. Subordinate organizations go their own way and cut their contacts with the leadership to a minimum, according to the traditional rules of the underground, and make the best possible use of the greater degree of initiative that they are given to put the general line into practice."

And Lenin says: "we will call the organization of the German Socialist Party democratic because it does everything publicly, even the sessions of its congress, but no one will call an organization democratic if it hides behind the veil of secrecy from all who are not its members. Therefore, what is the sense of proposing 'a broad democratic principle' when the basic condition of that principle is impossible for a secret organization? The 'broad principle' turns out to be mere words, loud but empty. Moreover, the words show a complete misunderstanding of the urgent organizational tasks of the moment..." Can we perhaps reconcile that "everyone who accepts the principles of the party's program and helps the party to the extent he can" should control each step of underground revolutionaries? That all should elect one person or another among the latter when because of his work the revolutionary has to hide his true personality to nine-tenths of them? Reflect for just a moment on the true meaning of Rab. Dielo's words and you will see that "a broad democracy" of a party organization in the shadow of autocracy, when the police are the ones who do the choosing, is nothing more than a vain and damaging triviality. It is a vain triviality because in practice no revolutionary organization has ever been able to apply broad democracy, nor can it do so, no matter how much it might want to. It is a damaging triviality because the attempts to apply in practice a "broad democratic principle" only make police dragnets easier and make a permanent fixture of the prevailing primitive work methods by distracting the attention of members devoted to the practical, serious and urgent task of becoming professional revolutionaries and diverting them into detail work and "bureaucratic" regulations for electoral systems. Only in other countries, where often people get together who cannot find genuine work to do, has this "democratic game" been possible in one place or another, especially among various small groups.

We should add one last factor: the circumstances in which we are moving towards a wide division of labor and towards a quick execution of tasks. Because of this—among other things (such as the organization's own shortcomings)—it is often inappropriate, if not impossible, to have a

broad, lengthy discussion. Internal democracy, rather than a formal matter, is an attitude on the part of the rank and file and the leadership.

There could exist polished statutes that theoretically guarantee the full exercise of democracy, but if there is not a favorable attitude towards it, there will be a wide gap between theory and reality. We need only remember the fine statutes of the Socialist and Communist Parties and even the Constitution of the Republic and then look at the reality of those parties and of the country.

There is no perfect democratic system; it is senseless to demand that our movement have one.

In the future each comrade must realize that while this situation lasts he will relinquish many democratic possibilities.

Primarily, new members should realize this clearly. It should be a condition for membership. This way we won't be fooling anyone and we will avoid major problems. In the same way the concept of discipline must be made clear, as well as the need to protect and preserve it permanently as the only guarantee for effectiveness. We are facing a powerful enemy organized on the basis of extreme discipline. We cannot allow the enemy any advantage in this area.

In any case, both aspects, centralism and democracy, cannot be imposed by anyone; that is impossible. They both presuppose unanimous agreement and conscious respect and therefore the exchange of ideas and discussion.

In summary, there are no organizational mechanisms or operational regulations with their respective sanctions that can guarantee by themselves the unity of the movement and a respect for democracy. Each one of our comrades among the rank and file and in the leadership must have a clear awareness of and a firm resolve to defend internal unity, to observe discipline and to give his all for them.

Discipline must be conscious and voluntary; it must always have a reason.

412. 3. Training of Comrades. In approaching the topic of the training of the comrades that make up the movement, we could begin by giving an idea of the type of **member** that the movement needs. The political-military nature of our movement is the basic determinant of the characteristics of members. Therefore, the militant revolutionary within the movement must be an individual who is aware and convinced of the struggle that must be waged and technically trained to carry it forward.

A revolutionary leader must:

a) have the political training that will enable him to understand and at the same time explain what the current political situation is and how to deal with it.

b) give everything he has to the development of the struggle, thus expressing his revolutionary will.

c) have the technical training and the experience that comes from the activities that he must perform to instill his ideology.

To the extent that these conditions are present, the member of the movement will be in the process of becoming a well-rounded revolutionary leader. This is what we must aim at when we try to train a comrade.

Comrades enter the movement from a society that has trained them for its own ends. They bring with them a series of shortcomings with regard to what a member should be. From this stems the need to train comrades who have become aware of the injustice of the regime and have reached the conclusion that the only way to eliminate it is through armed struggle. These shortcomings will occur both in the ideological sphere and in the practical or military sphere. In the realm of ideology we can cite as examples: individualism, verbalism, distortions produced by other organizations, the lack of minimum training, etc. In the practical or military area we can point to deficiencies in physical and technical training.

How then does the movement specifically propose to carry out this training? By training in practice. This is our overriding principle. In specific terms it should include four basic aspects that are to be developed in as balanced a manner as possible: training, political preparation, work style and experience under fire.

Training includes the physical and military aspects.

Political preparation comprises the elements that are essential for an accurate view of a given situation: information, background, ideology.

Work style is to an extent the experience that the movement has gathered in 5 years and which characterizes its everyday activities; it is important to convey this experience. It has shown us that heroic moments are few and that most of our time is taken up with the dark and silent activities that are essential for creating the apparatus that will provide an understanding of our goals. Experience under fire is the training of the combatant's psychology above all, the psychology that is molded only in direct action. However, it must be clarified that direct action doesn't have to be of enormous importance to fulfill its purpose. Everything from the smallest to the most important action will bring in new elements.

The above considerations are merely broad guidelines that have come out of the major demands which have arisen during our 5 years of work. They are broad guidelines because it is impossible to formulate a highly detailed plan without taking into account the material problems that confront the movement every day.

Plans that are consistent with each situation are being worked out for those principles and for the movement's needs and potential.

Our movement, which is in a struggle in the midst of a capitalist society that is attacking us and that we must defeat, has pressing needs and has to face obstacles that are difficult to overcome and that will unavoidable condition any plan that we formulate.

Therefore, there will be a time when a great deal of energy is devoted to internal training, and there will also be times when it will be necessary to suspend training completely in order to perform more urgent tasks.

413. 4. Some Specific Ongoing Tasks. We would like to point out some specific ideas here on operations.

In the first place we think that the aspiration of each group in the movement should be to transform itself by its own efforts into a small organization that can carry out by itself as many tasks as possible, armed with the appropriate practical elements and the necessary technical capacity. This will enable each group or cell to develop its initiative to the maximum and to operate autonomously. In addition, it will help greatly to eliminate the danger that the repressive forces might eliminate the movement in one fell swoop, since each of its branches will be capable of carrying the work forward and rebuilding what has been destroyed. In any case, each group, each cell must begin to develop its initiative from this moment on and not wait for leadership groups to do everything. At times only one part of the movement is in a position to see or note a need that the rest can neither see or note. There is a whole series of activities, specific tasks, propaganda, etc that are designed to and must be handled on the basis of the initiative of each MLN branch.

Moreover, within the movement there are a series of ongoing tasks that alone could occupy most available energy; let us look at some of them:

414. Training: the arduous task of becoming revolutionary leaders takes up more time and energy than at first seem necessary. The movement's experience over the last 5 years of uninterrupted work enable us to make this statement and to realize exactly how difficult it is to become a revolutionary leader, how difficult it is to win over the mind of combatants. It involves a practical and an ideological task. Previously we spoke about the task of creating new men within the organization. The task of training is nothing less than that.

415. Information: Although there is a specialized team for this task, everyone realizes that each member must become an informant, because of the lack of teams on the one hand and because of the possibilities that each and every one of us can develop on the other.

This implies a constant state of alert as well as a basic and minimum task: knowledge of the terrain in which each comrade or group operates, area relief, in-depth knowledge, etc. The ideal would be for our Information

Service to be receiving all types of objective, precise reports from all comrades every day. Things that are not important to a comrade could be, and greatly so, for the movement.

In this task the room for initiative is unlimited.

416. Recruitment: Growth is vital to the movement. A revolutionary organization that does not grow perishes. Growth can take place in various ways, such as new comrades, new collaborators or simply additional support for our struggle in new sectors of the population. Our movement must have eyes, ears and a voice in all mass organizations, if possible, and comrades must know how we pursue our work in those organizations and how, without a public locale, a legal paper, hearings, etc, we can capitalize on growth in them and exert influence.

Moreover, this is not something that we have demonstrated; history has demonstrated this with the example of underground organizations that had no other way to pursue their work with the masses.

Our objective must be to gain new leaders and extend our "territorial waters."

417. Supplies: The movement has many material needs that can not always be covered with our finances. Therefore it is an ongoing concern of its members to furnish it with all types of goods. There are certain categories that are of particular importance because they affect operational potential. These include hideouts, vehicles and documents. Obtaining any one of these is a major victory in the work of any MLN group.

418. Propaganda: We are aware of our limitations in this regard and of the need to spread our ideas as widely as possible. Because of these limitations, because of the risk involved in distributing our propaganda, we must educate ourselves in the task. Initiative is unlimited in this field as well. The more propaganda we can "place" whenever necessary and the better we "place" it, the more we will be helping to reduce our isolation, to enter into the interest of our people and to achieve good results from this. The limitations mean that we have to come up with new methods of dissemination, and the initiative of each and every one of us becomes especially important in this.

419. Finances: We must suitably exploit the possibilities of "legally" gathering finances. This gathering has occurred spontaneously, and experience indicates that it could be very important. Here then is an ongoing task for all comrades.

We should continue detailing other similar aspects of equal importance, but we cannot extend ourselves too much.

In concluding this subject we should say that we must all be aware that for the National Liberation Movement the struggle has already begun.

For us the battleground is right here every day, and we don't have to go anyplace else.

Every day, overcoming distances, we will venture into a small 'Moncada.'"

b. At the continental level

420. The revolutionary struggle is unfolding with a continental framework as well.

The LASO [Latin American Solidarity Organization] conference was the highest level advocate of this line as a supranational attempt to organize and direct revolutionary activities on a continental basis, through the growing unity of anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist movements in Latin America.

The organizational entity that was set up to centralize and further this continental movement is AALAPSO [Afro-Asian Latin American People's Solidarity Organization], and the method of struggle chosen was guerrilla action.

This precisely is the innovative or peculiar mark of the current guerrilla struggle, as far as we can determine, that despite its being as old as man himself, it was chosen, organized and internationalized, replacing any other policy, to achieve one goal: the take-over of political power. But this battle being waged in each national sector and whose eponymic representative in theory and in deed was Che Guevara, is continental as well as national.

421. The MLN-T reflects this "continental outlook" in its internal documents, in which it analyzes the strategy of urban and rural struggles, the mass front, the revolutionary organization, organizational structure and operations, etc.

The first point in Document 1 is entitled "continental outlook" and it asks "revolutionary organizations to collaborate as much as they can in building and working out a continental strategy." Elsewhere it adds: "the revolution must not be stopped by national borders."

This stand is affirmed by the presence of foreign revolutionaries operating in Uruguay together with MLN-T members, as in the cases of Jose Baxter Denaro, Jorge Andres Cataldo, Patricio Errecalde, Ruben Daniel Rodriguez Primon and Jose Luis Nell Tacchi.

The arrest of Argentine Silvio Halperin when he tried to bring weapons into the country for the MLN-T is another example.

The activities in Argentina of Uruguayan revolutionaries is the other side of the same phenomenon. At the appropriate moment Argentine

authorities officially told Uruguayan authorities that the revolutionary Maria Teresa Labroca Ravelino was wanted in Argentina for holding up the Bank of Galicia and Buenos Aires as part of a group that identified itself as "Descamisados (literally, the shirtless ones; the proletariat) PV."

422. Another example can be seen in the letter sent to the MLN-T from Bolivia in July 1970 by "Chato Peredo," the text of which follows:

"Bolivia, July 1970.

MLN Comrades (Tupamaros):

This is the official establishment of relations that in fact had already been begun by you in the most beautiful and marvelous show of solidarity, even though they have to begin on the unfortunate occasion of the death of a comrade.

I want to stress the invaluable cooperation that you have given to our movement and I say invaluable because your help enabled us to hasten our retreat to the mountains, not to mention the moral encouragement that it gave to all our combatants.

There is now beginning an integration at the international level which will enable us defeat imperialism more easily. Moreover, it shows that not only the enemy is capable of uniting and that revolutionaries can also do away with artificial borders and that the ideas of Bolivar and Che are beginning to germinate.

In the immediate future we will have to provide more and more examples of integration, not only in the area of assistance but also in exchanging members. We are ready to carry out such exchanges as quickly and as practically as you see fit. Moreover, we think that such a form of international solidarity, which is now becoming a reality, should be made public so that the example multiplies.

We are aware of the importance of your struggle as the focal point for the peoples of Latin America. We think that in any case that focal point has its limitations, which are beyond your will and ours, and therefore we are convinced that another focal point is urgently needed, with a different struggle (in the mountains) from the one that you have been able to pursue with great responsibility and self-assurance. Our focal point should also spread and polarize, and it will be if we work together as much as we can.

These are brief and superficial proposals. As joint work goes on in the war, which is also a joint effort, these concepts will be worked out and defined. Meanwhile, the enemy strikes, and we must strike back.

The example of the glorious "Tupamaros" is an example to us and to all revolutionaries. We will try to follow it in a different location.

All of our combatants express their affection and admiration for all MLN combatants.

Victory or death in the mountains!

Chato Peredo

On behalf of the staff of the ELN [National Liberation Army]"

423. Nonetheless, the words of the MLN-T itself provide an outline of its position within a concerted revolutionary move with continental implications, as mentioned in the document referred to previously. The pertinent section is transcribed here:

"Continental Outlook

1. It is a right and duty for revolutionary organizations to collaborate as much as they can in building and working out a continental strategy.
2. National and international tasks are complementary. They have to be coordinated and linked. They must not be opposing.
3. Repression and the counterrevolution are becoming continental. The revolution must not stop at national borders.
4. Latin America and therefore our country are part of the world imperialist system. Thus their liberation depends on the continent-wide defeat of imperialism.
5. The continent-wide defeat of imperialism implies its definitive defeat.
6. Therefore imperialism is preparing to wage a battle to the death for its survival on our continent.
7. A long and hard struggle is therefore to be expected.
8. As long as this situation remains unchanged, liberation cannot be thought of in national terms independently of the rest of Latin America.
9. The possibility of imperialist intervention in any country, directly or indirectly, is for the moment indisputable.
10. Forcing imperialism to intervene directly might mean a temporary military setback, but it could also mean long term political gains and a military advantage.

11. We have to sink imperialism into a war of attrition in Latin America, transform each bit of land into a combat zone hostile to them, "create several Vietnams in America."

12. It is proper to orchestrate a continental strategy that will rationalize forces and resources wherever better results can be achieved.

13. Such a strategy should not impair, if possible, the struggles and efforts that have to be pursued in each country.

14. The successful development of the struggle in any country helps the development in other countries.

15. We agree with all the points of Guevara's last document.

16. The fact that we have two powerful military dictators as neighbors does not make the development of the struggle in our country impossible. (Cuba is 90 miles from the empire; Bolivia also borders Argentina and Brazil)

17. The best way to offset or lessen the negative consequences of imperialist intervention is to force the interventionists to cover many fronts.

18 Since it is a continental revolution, the strategy must be continental.

19. We are willing to put forth maximum effort to insert our national strategy within the framework of a joint continental strategy.

20. The United States domestic situation, its economic and financial situation, the burden of its role as world policeman, enable us to assert that it cannot come to the aid of Latin American traitor governments with loans or assistance that will allow them to truly overcome the economic crisis, spur development or gain more maneuvering room. On the contrary, everything indicates that it is preparing to plunder the continent even more by means of unfair investments and loans that, far from improving the situation in our countries, will make it even worse.

21. Current Soviet policy of granting economic aid to Latin American reactionary governments is not only an inappropriate way to supplant U.S. economic hegemony but is also a means of shoring up regimes that are falling apart from their respective economic crises.

22. Transforming Latin America into a battlefield of attrition instead of a convenient rear guard of supply will help to intensify the U.S. domestic crisis and possibly to precipitate the decisive struggle on its internal front."

424. Finally, when the seditious organization had been militarily disbanded by the FFCC and when its leaders who had managed to escape were

relegated to exile, in March 1974 they issued a "joint declaration" with other Latin American movements in which they asserted that their struggle was "anti-imperialist," that "Latin America was marching towards socialism, and they concluded by calling "the people of Latin America to arms."

In the introduction to the declaration the MLN-T, the MIR [Movement of the Revolutionary Left] in Chile, the ELN in Bolivia and the ERP [Revolutionary People's Army] in Argentina state that "they are signing this declaration to make known to workers, to poor peasant farmers, to the urban poor, to students and intellectuals, to Indians and to the millions of exploited workers in our suffering Latin American homeland our decision to unite in a Junta for Revolutionary Coordination."

"This major step is the result of a deep-felt need, the need to join our peoples in the area of organization, to unify revolutionary forces to face the enemy and to wage the political and ideological struggle against bourgeois nationalism and reformism more effectively.

"This important step is the fulfillment of one of the main strategic ideas of Commander Che Guevara, the hero, symbol and forerunner of the continental socialist revolution. It is also a significant step in that it renews the brotherly tradition among our peoples, who were able to unite and fight as one against the oppressors of last century, the Spanish colonialists."

The declaration uses the following paragraph from Guevara's message to the Tricontinental Meeting as its start and its motto: "It is the path of Vietnam; it is the path that the people must follow; it is the path that America will follow with the special feature that groups in arms could set up something like coordinating juntas to make the repressive task of Yankee imperialism more difficult and their own cause easier."

3. Implicit Goal

425. In the Tupamaro causality and in their activities there is also an ultimate and obvious goal, as can be seen in their philosophy and actions, and which we should stress here so as not to get lost in the jumble of their dialectic. That goal is none other than to serve as a parallel vanguard of Marxism and the expansionary goals that it pursues.

Because of its origin, because of its objectives, because of the methods and the means that it uses, the MLN-T, like other seditious organizations in Latin America, with which it has joined and which it slavishly imitates under the banner of would-be liberation movement, has no other goal than to contribute to the triumph of communism in the world by handing over the country in which it operates, tied hand and foot, to its hegemony.

In this sense, the MLN-T is a genuinely treasonous movement of incalculable danger, tied to communist imperialism, which is in fact responsible for its emergence and which subtly encourages it as one more resource among the many that it impassively utilizes to make a reality of its dark plans for world conquest.

426. In order to combat poverty, backwardness and social injustice we do not need bandits. The Uruguayan people not only doesn't need them, it doesn't want them. Long before they made their tragic appearance on the national scene, the republic, through a freely made popular decision and through the instrument of reason and the law, was able to forge institutions that further its culture, its means of security and its social progress.

No matter what motives might be invoked, terror and its sordid aftermath intensify rather than diminish condemnation because of the unspeakable crime of aggression and treason against the nation, against its institutions and against the entire people, who are deprived of their liberty of conscience and action and who become the moral hostages of insecurity and fear in an atmosphere unnerved by the threat of new attacks.

It is futile to expect any justice, any achievement or any liberation from people who act arbitrarily, spurred on by deviant Marxist violence, which is only prone to unleash more violence and more injustice.

For this reason the anti-subversive struggle has not concluded, and it continues openly on the domestic and international level. And it will not cease as long as communism continues as the formidable threat that it is to Western, Christian civilization.

The fate of the MLN-T, defeated or rebuilt, or of other similar movements that will re-emerge as long as the conditions that favor them persist, depends ultimately on the understanding of this problem on the part of those who are to lead the country in the present and in the immediate future, and on the degree of intelligence or obtuseness of the attitudes that adopt with regard to this far-reaching problem.

IX. Strategy

1. Foundations

2. Plan of Action: Line "H"

STRATEGY

1. Foundations

427. The MLN-T's strategy has been clarified primarily in the document called "January 1968 supplement," which expands upon and clarifies the concepts contained in "Document 1," which we have cited previously (Chapter VII, 3, A Bit of History, Nos 334 and ff).

Various other documents of lesser importance round out the seditious movement's theoretical and practical views on this matter.

The study of the paths that events should or are supposed to take is the subject matter of strategy.

This chapter contains the aforementioned supplement, which specifically takes up this topic and in which the movement, after considering the factors that condition it, reaches certain conclusions, among them that the only means of achieving "national liberation and the socialist revolution" is armed struggle, which in turn must be "the main form of struggle of our people" and to which "all others must be subordinated."

In plain language, the MLN-T's strategy is merely the Castro-Communist theory of guerrilla warfare and the revolutionary "focal point" which was ratified in LASO.

428. This gives rise to the immediate need not to strengthen existing political parties nor to form a new one, because they do not work, but rather to create a revolutionary political-military organization, the MLN-T, whose activities should be linked with those of similar revolutionary movements in Latin America.

The urban struggle, the rural struggle and the struggle on the mass front are the specific expressions of that strategy and with which they are closely and inherently linked. They will be dealt with in the following chapters.

429. The aforementioned "January 1968 supplement" reads:

"Characteristics:

1. Since this is being formulated prior to events, we must be prepared to modify and correct it. It is useful as a hypothesis, is worked out with experience and is rectified or confirmed through experience. It should be subject to ongoing reassessment.

2. Strategy guides our actions in all fields.

3. Strategic concepts do not come from laboratories; they come from experience.

4. A study of historical experiences can give us basic ideas or concepts that led to victory, as well as general principles that might not teach us how to triumph but at least will help us to avoid failures.

Principles:

1. Strategy is determined:

a) by the specific historic situation;

b) by the economic, social and political situation (in our case, the national and continental situation);

c) by the geographic and demographic characteristics of the revolutionary organization(s).

2. We must not confuse strategy with forecasts or prophecies. Strategy can and should provide only guidelines, which are valid for the moment when they are issued.

3. This is because a strategy is formulated on the basis of actual facts, and reality can change independently of our will. These are real, basic facts that condition our national strategy:

1. Economic Crisis:

- a) stagnant production
- b) foreign debt
- c) pressure from and dependence on economic imperialists
- d) financial crisis
- e) devaluation-inflation

2. Social Crisis

- Unemployment
- Increased cost of living
- Drop in real wages (loss of buying power)
- Drop in the standard of living of the eight percent of the people who lived on a fixed income
- Underemployment
- Social security crisis
- Poverty in vast sectors of the population
- Intensification of social tensions and the spontaneous radicalization of certain sectors

3. Political Crisis

- Inability of the ruling classes to provide a solution to the crisis
- Inability of the oligarchy's political parties to govern the country and solve their problems
- Growing division, internal crises and corruption in the oligarchy's political parties

4. The crisis is getting worse every day; it is our best ally.
5. There will be growing poverty and unrest among the people.
6. The high degree of unionization among Uruguayan workers.
7. Not only unions possess a high degree of combativeness--whether because of their make-up or their leaders--but the mere fact that almost all of the state's basic services are union organized is a highly positive and exceptional factor in Latin America.
8. The weakness and atomization of leftist forces.
9. There is a representative democracy, a "legal" regime and an elected government.
10. The concealment of exploitation, violence and class dictatorship behind legal constitutional forms, etc, a tactic which has worked for the oligarchy for nearly a century in our country, is one of the major factors preventing large segments of the population from achieving a revolutionary awareness. Recently it has become harder and harder for the oligarchy to maintain this masquerade in light of pressure by the people and because its only way out is to thrust the consequences of the crisis on the people. This vicious circle will create greater pressures by the people in light of the greater poverty that the oligarchy seeks to apportion, as well as greater repression and thus greater risks for the existing legal system.
11. The triumph of the constitutional reform and of Gestido created hopeful expectations in the people which froze their unrest and the revolutionary awareness of broad segments of the population. The thaw is occurring gradually, and this situation will likely not last long.
12. A minority--600 families--controls most of the country's economic resources, land, industry, finances, foreign trade. That minority is represented in the government by the traditional parties that have more than a majority say in it and are close allies of imperialism.
13. An infrastructure that is incapable of maintaining a superstructure built on periods of boom and bonanza. A false superstructure that is today falling apart.
14. A superstructure that is preventing and halting the development of the forces of production.
15. The country has no geographic sites that are impregnable or that make possible the establishment of a rural guerrilla focal point that can last.

16. There is a 300 square kilometer city that contains more than 70 percent of the capital, communications and transportation and more than 50 percent of the population in the country. The country's population is 64 percent urban, 65 percent of whom live in Montevideo and the surrounding areas.

17. Uruguay is located between two enormous countries controlled by military dictatorships.

18. Our country is a natural refuge for revolutionary militants and combatants from neighboring countries. This will give rise to increasingly bold intervention by the neighboring military dictators and by imperialism, as well as greater pressures to adopt a stand favorable to the internationalization of repression.

19. International revolutionary solidarity can be expected to play a major role in our country. The development of revolutionary struggles in the other Latin American countries and the increased intervention of imperialism will be factors in clarifying and creating awareness.

20. The army has little to do with political affairs. It is bureaucratic and has a civil law tradition, with majority internal factions that are legalistic in nature.

21. The machinery of repression is relatively weak (compared to the rest of Latin America), since the army, navy and air force comprise 12,000 men, 6,000 of whom are stationed in Montevideo. They are organized for a traditional war. Recruitment is done mainly among unemployed rural dwellers. There is no obligatory military service, which means that there are no reserves that can be mobilized. They depend totally on foreign sources for supplies. The police—22,000 men—has three militarized corps that comprise a total of 1,300 men.

General Conclusions

1. There are objective conditions in our country for revolutionary action.
2. There are no subjective conditions in our country (awareness, organization, leadership).
3. Subjective conditions are created by the struggle.
4. We reject the possibility of a peaceful transition to power in our country (we are thinking in terms of years, not centuries).
5. The only path to national liberation and the socialist revolution is armed struggle. There are almost no possibilities of radicalizing the class struggle that do not end up in violence. The true solutions for our country involve a direct and violent confrontation with the oligarchy and its means of repression. Armed struggle is not only possible in Uruguay, it is essential and the only way to make a revolution.

6. Armed struggle will be the main form of struggle for our people, and other forms must be subordinated to it.

7. The armed struggle will not only be the instrument to attack bourgeois power but will also be the best instrument for the mobilization of the masses and for the creation of revolutionary conditions here and in the rest of Latin America.

8. The fact that there is a popularly elected government is a drawback in justifying the need for an armed struggle among the masses, but even this situation is not a permanent one because in recent years Uruguay has often been on the brink of a military coup d'etat, nor does an elected government always wield authority. For us it is more a problem of government prestige, aside from its forms. The main thing is to create an awareness in the people through armed struggle and other forms of struggle, to create an awareness that without a revolution there will be no changes.

9. It is necessary to create a revolutionary political-military organization. It will be built during the struggle.

10. The current situation is merely an interval before the final confrontation. The new constitution and the new administration do not mean any in-depth change. The current legal system will wear away as repression is practiced against the sectors that are hard hit by the crisis.

11. In Uruguay also--in Debray's words--"the main emphasis should be placed on the development of guerrilla warfare, not on the strengthening of existing parties or on the creation of new parties. The work of rebellion is today's number one political work."

12. In Uruguay "the decisive element for the future is the opening of military, not political, focal points. We go from a military focal point to the political movement."

13. We understand that revolutionary organizations have to transcend the framework of manifestos, declarations and theoretical pronouncements on the revolution, etc; revolutionary actions are fundamental because they precipitate revolutionary conditions.

14. Today's fundamental task is to construct an armed apparatus."

430. A summary of the above concepts provides the following basic conclusions on the seditious organization's strategic philosophy:

1--There are objective conditions in Uruguay for revolutionary action (economic, political and social crisis)

2—On the other hand, the subjective conditions do not exist (awareness, organization, leadership).

3—The subjective conditions are created in the struggle.

4—The possibility of a peaceful transition to power should be rejected in Uruguay.

5—The only path to national "liberation" and the socialist revolution is armed struggle.

2. Plan of Action: Line "H"

431. In accordance with these pronouncements, the MLN-T adopted a single strategic line of action called line "H" the most obvious meaning of which is "harassment" of the state structure with the ultimate goal of taking over power.

All other lines are an indirect development of line "H," which will thus take on certain tactical characteristics according to the period.

432. The concept of this line could be summarized in a rising arrow or column, starting with the origin or founding of the movement and moving towards four basic strategic objectives, namely:

1—setting up a minimum organizational apparatus and the guerrilla "focal point" (1966/1968)

2—establishment of dual power or parallel power (1970/1972)¹

3—Governmental alternative of the people (...?)

4—Assumption of power (...?)

The origin of the movement is linked to domestic elements and foreign elements. The domestic ones include the economic and social crisis, the political crisis, the moral crisis or the breakdown of values, aspects that are analyzed elsewhere.² The external factors include the actions of international Marxism and the policy of exporting the Castro-Communist guerrilla warfare, which is examined in previous chapters.

The tactical lines of the first objective (setting up the minimum organizational apparatus and the guerrilla focal point) consist of supplies, finances, armed propaganda, recruitment, as well as initial manifestations of harassment against the Armed Forces and reprisals.


The lines of the second objective (dual power) are the same as for the first one, plus "revolutionary justice," the "people's jail," the "Cacao" Plan and harassment of the Armed Forces.³

The lines of the third goal are the same as before, with the following variations determined by tactical diversification: emphasis on political power, congressional action, mass action, nationwide revolutionary struggle, expansion of the organizational apparatus (the March 1972 restructuring)⁴ and the "Tatu" Plan.⁵

Finally, the fourth and last period (totally theoretical) is characterized by the emergence of an increasing state of mass poverty, political and institutional crisis and mass agitation, which will unavoidably lead to, in Lenin's theory, a definitively revolutionary situation ("Hippopotamos" Plan)⁶ that will push the movement on to the assumption of power, the ultimate strategic objective.

433. The following drawing provides a quite exact graphic idea of line "H":

CHART OF THE MLN-T STRATEGY
DEFINITION OF LINE "H"



FOOTNOTES

1. Concerning "dual power" see Chapter X, 3, Tactics.
2. Volume II, The Political Process.
3. See Chapter X, 5, a, Nos 471 and ff.
4. See Chapter VII, 1, Nos 323 and ff.
5. See Chapter XI, 2, Nos 491 and ff.
6. Ibid., 4. During the period between the second and third objectives, in April and May 1972, the FFCC, which had been entrusted with the handling of the anti-subversive struggle 7 months previously, broke the organization militarily, thus interrupting the steady progress of line "H."

- X. Urban Struggle
- 1. General Remarks
- 2. Characteristics
- 3. Tactics
- 4. The Urban Guerrilla
- 5. Plans
 - a. "Cacao" Plan
 - b. "Nandu" Plan
 - c. Other Plans

URBAN STRUGGLE

434. Although we have outlined previously the MLN-T's concept of guerrilla war,* this point should be made clear once and for all through the words of the seditious organization itself.

Its viewpoints on the urban struggle stem logically from the movement's strategy as put forth in the previous chapter, and are supported by various documents.

This chapter will deal exclusively with the documents that most clearly reflect its opinion on urban guerrilla war.

The most superficial analysis of such documents reveals the, in many cases, slavish repetition of ideas and concepts that are common to Latin American guerrilla theory, to which we referred in the first part of this book.

435. The following text belongs to the aforementioned "January 1968 supplement."

It reads as follows:

1. General Remarks

"1. The need for and viability of urban guerrillas in our country stems from a specific analysis of the situation, of international experiences and of our own experience.

2. Our own experience shows that we have emerged from the stage of extermination before birth. We have organized ourselves without means,

* Chapter III, 6, Uruguayan Guerrillas, Nos 137 and ff

with assistance; without experience we have learned from failures and successes, but above everything else we have been able to keep going, to last and still operate. This is a principal aspect of revolutionary warfare. Under the most difficult of circumstances our organization has overcome the stage in which most revolutionary organizations are destroyed, the stage during which they did not succeed in attaining deep roots among the masses. There are abundant examples on the long-suffering Latin American scene that show how many similar organizations have fallen beneath harsh repression, with the terrible toll of many martyrs and greater difficulties in beginning anew.

3. However, our experience is limited; it can explain how an armed movement can be organized; it cannot explain how to win over the support of the people, of the masses; but it can explain how to win over the support of the more combative and enlightened sectors.

4. We cannot reduce the objective conditions for the revolution to mere geographical conditions. Uruguay is not suitable geographically for rural guerrillas, but the revolution should not wait because of this. In this regard Douglas Bravo says: "nonetheless, we cannot therefore uphold the theory that guerrilla warfare will not play a major role in countries in which the peasant population is not in the majority."

5. It is not our purpose to discuss what the factor should be in the urban guerrilla-rural guerrilla relationship in each Latin American country; what we are trying to show is that armed struggle is possible in Uruguay and that the conditions are there to intensify it. We are taking for granted that in Uruguay the armed struggle cannot be tied to traditional strategic concepts.

6. It is possible to find refuge in the city, and even real areas of refuge in places where there is little police surveillance.

7. It will be difficult, but not impossible, to transform urban guerrillas into a regular army. We must keep in mind the continental nature of the process and that that transformation is possible only in the final stage.

8. Although we cannot operate with large units in the city, we can use small units to concentrate as many combatants as desired at a specific point, as long as we observe the general tactical laws that we feel govern the urban struggle.

9. The city offers us favorable conditions for communications and liaisons, with the proper use of public services for these purposes.

10. Enemy forces concentrate most of their army and police strength, logically, in the city. However, their strength is similar to that of a gigantic siege immobilized by a static defense. Almost 50 percent of enemy troops are paralyzed in the protection and defense of fixed objectives.

11. The city offers a solution to the logistic problem that is less complex than in the country. Supply networks are unnecessary; food supplies are all within reach of the guerrillas.

12. A combatant "works by day and fights by night." He carries on a normal life. This characteristic of countries with a high rural population density and in which the peasants collaborate and take part in the struggle, is of vital importance.

13. A combatant does not move into an area that is hostile to him. He is accustomed to the environment and in most cases can fend for himself.

14. Living in locals means sticking to the terrain of no more than one guerrilla camp, if careful surveillance is established inside and out to watch out for suspicious movements.

15. Adaptation to the terrain is the most difficult for guerrillas, and the city has its specific laws; this is the stage to learn about security rules, accidents, initial encounters, severe carelessness. The underground is not as heroic as it seems and is full of small responsibilities and tasks that seem insignificant and tedious. In the city everything happens more quickly, and (but) mistakes are paid for dearly."

2. Characteristics

436. "Tupamaro Notes," a document written by the revolutionaries while in jail and later published and which we have had a chance to mention before, contains a series of thoughts on the characteristics of the urban struggle or guerrilla war, including losses, compartmentalization, prior secrecy, recruitment, reserves, duplication and material infrastructure.

Their views, which are reproduced below, give a brief and precise idea of the peculiar characteristics of the urban guerrilla as the MLN-T conceives and uses him.

437. "There are certain inherent characteristics of the urban guerrilla group that condition its organizational set-up and modes of action. The primary characteristic is perhaps the geographic and military relation between the enemy and the guerrilla, in other words, the terrain on which the struggle is waged.

Contrary to the guerrillas that operate in wide and favorable spaces, urban guerrillas must operate in quite limited spaces that are also saturated with repressive forces.

From an exclusively military viewpoint, urban guerrillas are in a situation similar to that of the advance guards of a conventional army that have infiltrated enemy terrain. All of this means on the one hand a precarious

situation for the establishment of the guerrillas but on the other hand a privileged situation with regard to an attack.

Urban guerrillas do not use uniforms or identification symbols—except in very special cases and almost always for brief periods—, and this is an obvious defense measure, but an attack measure as well, all of which clearly points to their peculiar situation.

These characteristics condition, as we have said, many organizational measures as well as the main tactical elements, as we will now see:

438. In the area of organization we must face a most serious phenomenon, the high percentage of losses. This phenomenon is a law of the urban struggle: no matter how many precautions are taken, no matter how well work is done, the amount of casualties can be lessened but soon after the repressive machinery begins to operate sufficiently, the percentage of blows will be high compared to other areas and forms of struggle. This problem requires a great number of measures to overcome it.

439. Compartmentalization: this is the organization's main tool of defense. It is a vital requirement; without it urban guerrilla warfare is seemingly impossible. The importance of this single measure to the urban struggle can be compared to the importance of mobility and sentries to the rural struggle.

Each group must be compartmentalized off from the rest, each sector of the organization from the others, each comrade from the rest. It should be taboo to know or reveal the real names of combatants, residences and organization sites. Each comrade, each group, each sector must know only what is essential in order to operate, nothing more. Compartmentalization must of course apply to leadership groups as well, but in the other direction too. In order to make a decision a leadership group doesn't have to be familiar with the rank and file and their locals, residences, etc. They might even not know where the group meets. Comrades in leadership posts and even entire branches are often brought blindfolded to specific meeting places.

We can say today that in the MLN no individual leadership group—and all groups operate without direct connections—not even the supreme command, knows more than a minute part of the organization, in the sense of names, residences, location of locals, etc. Obviously this situation is much more serious if we take each member of those groups separately, inasmuch as they are comrades in the groups.

In short we are trying to see to it that no one can provide the enemy, even in the worst of circumstances, with decisive information. This is valid for an individual comrade or for an entire branch, whether of the rank and file or of the leadership.

Compartmentalization, to be sure, makes immediate operations slower but in the long run it streamlines them, to the extent that it precludes blows from the enemy. We can summarize the experiences of other organizations thus: even though at first it seems that compartmentalization makes operations troublesome, in reality there is convincing proof that things are not that way; little by little, once the organization adapts to the system, it operates very smoothly.

440. Prior secrecy about the very existence of guerrillas is vital at the outset of the struggle. Like every guerrilla, the urban guerrilla is highly vulnerable initially. Experience indicates that most attempts to organize the struggle are frustrated during that very stage of the process. Therefore, the more secrecy there is—the ideal is that it be complete—the more time will be gained to avoid the initial repressive blows stemming from the first few struggles. Once a minimum organization is consolidated, once a minimum of experience is gained, and once the minimum of ties with the people are established, then guerrillas can take the hardest blows with much risk.

441. A factor offsetting the high percentage of losses is that the city offers good recruitment possibilities, soon after the guerrillas achieve their initial successes. A recruitment apparatus must be developed that, while being both cautious and aggressive, can more than make up for the losses that will necessarily occur. At the same time, an organizational network must be set up surrounding the core of the guerrilla unit, which in turn will handle its ties first with the most important social sectors and then with the people as a whole. This network is also a link to and from the guerrillas; it is protection; it is source of supplies, of recruitment, etc. It is obvious that the guerrillas will have growing support—if their line is correct and the work successful—even though it must be kept in mind that not all those who get in touch can become combatants or members of the core unit. On the contrary, it is perfectly logical that there should be different levels of commitment and various possibilities for cooperation. It is for this reason that the network is needed, since it is essential to take maximum advantage of the various forms of support available.

442. Reserves. This means never risking all of the available forces. It also means keeping entire sectors of the organization, as well as key services, out of compromising tasks, as long as a development has been achieved that permits this. In other words, at a certain stage of the process, and more so if it has been successful, the conditions could be present to keep entire groups in reserve. This could even become a necessity when the environment in which we operate, as well as conditions, cannot absorb too many underground members; in other words, when the terrain is saturated.

443. Duplication in the movement's divisions means that even if most of them are destroyed, the rest can pursue the struggle in its totality.

For this reason the MLN is divided into columns. The purpose of this is, in light of any unfavorable eventuality, any column can handle the responsibility for the entire movement. To this end it has all the needed mechanisms within it: recruitment apparatus, information connections with the necessary peripheral links, military apparatus, technical services apparatus, intermediate leadership divisions in which various comrades learn to perform that function.

Leadership tasks, like all others, are like relay races in the urban guerrilla struggle. Each comrade must be ready to carry the torch for a given distance and to pass it on without risk to the organization if he should fall. In this regard the organization must take the same approach to preparation on all levels. There can't be technical secrets in one single band; there can be no irreplaceable comrades or divisions. These are the premises for the duplication of divisions and functions. Thus, when a new discovery is made in tactics, in the shops or in organizational methods, it must be spread around and at the same time applied throughout the movement.

For the same reasons, leadership divisions, whatever their level, must be on a group basis; this has been vital for the existence of the MLN.

In the same way, a system of automatic replacements must be established for all comrades that perform key functions. These replacements should be informed as to essential matters in order to take up the baton without major difficulties when the time comes.

The diagram of the organization should not look like a truncated pyramid; it should be like several pyramids of that type, so that each one of them is a miniature organization.

444. Material infrastructure. What a favorable geography provides for the rural guerrilla struggle must be built up patiently in the urban struggle: places to sleep and eat in comfort, places to treat wounds, meeting places, space for shops, deposit sites, etc.

The visible part of an urban guerrilla's struggle, which comes to public notice when spectacular victories or defeats occur, is minimal compared to the silent and difficult struggle that is waged every hour of every day to maintain contacts, get refuges, hold meetings, operate shops, etc. We can say without exaggeration that the overwhelming majority of efforts are taken up by that constant battle. In order for a group of 10 combatants to carry out a successful or thwarted action, an action that lasts a few minutes, a great many members have worked silently for days, weeks and months.

In addition, this infrastructure must be disguised, and enormous energies and materials are consumed in this task.

Disguise is an inherent part of the urban struggle. To insure its protection members, vehicles, weapons, locales, absolutely everything, must be used.

When the struggle intensifies, it will be unavoidably necessary to resort to hideaways of all kinds, whether for materials or for comrades. This means that a great deal of talent and manpower will have to be used. Small hideaways as well as spacious holes and tunnels—this depends on the objective in mind—are resources to which we must unavoidably have access when the repression unleashed in all its fury seems to be 'combing' the city constantly.

To summarize, the urban guerrilla struggle involves a great, everyday organizational feat."

3. Tactics

445. This same source reveals the revolutionaries' view of urban guerrilla tactics through an analysis of these points: sabotage, attacks on members of the repressive forces, reprisals, dynamite attacks, kidnappings and the revolutionary jail, supply operations, raiding of houses, armed propaganda operations.

446. "The urban guerrilla war as an instrument of armed struggle has been widely used throughout history by forces that are relatively inferior in number in their confrontation with greatly superior forces. A basically tactical concept, it was in the Chinese Revolution that it was elevated to a strategic military concept, and during a long period of the struggle it bore the entire weight of the war. During the Cuban Revolution guerrilla warfare was both a tactical, strategic concept of the armed struggle as well as the main instrument for politicizing the masses and creating an awareness in them. Guerrillas cannot exist without the people's support, and it is precisely in the search for that support that guerrillas, during their lengthy existence as revolutionary instruments, have essentially political objectives. This strategic political concept of the guerrilla struggle is the valid one for the urban guerrilla struggle of the MLN. This has not prevented guerrillas from operating on the purely military level along with this; on the contrary, it is in this area that the tactical elements of a political military strategy are applied.

The guerrilla struggle is essentially a struggle of harassment. Since its main objective is to change the correlation of forces from unfavorable to favorable, it has two tactical objectives: a) to grow; b) to weaken the enemy. The first objective is politically based; the second is based on political and military aspects. Harassment is a basic principle of guerrilla strategy and tactics. Harassment wears the enemy down, not only because it seeks to annihilate its human forces but also because it demoralizes it and intensifies the objective conditions for the revolution. Since the revolution can have many objectives, the entire apparatus of the regime is shaken and convulsed.

Its forces of repression, the judicial system, the corrupt press and all the instruments that uphold and operate the system are held in permanent check, which prevents the reactionary government from freely carrying out its functions.

A kind of dual revolutionary power coexists side by side with the power of the regime.*

*The "dual power" to which the text alludes was analyzed by the MLN-T during the period immediately before the national elections in November 1971 in an extensive internal document entitled "application of the thesis of dual power to the current situation." It was seized by the FFCC in April 1972.

The basic idea that is put forth is that "the road to revolutionary power is not accomplished by urban guerrillas--military organization--nor by a political party--civilian organization--but rather by a seed of state power within the state power...The struggle of the dual power to become the sole power, the revolutionary and people's power, has many aspects: military, political, cultural, psychological and social, doctrinary, ideological. In taking a weapon away from the official power, a dual action is involved because it weakens the repression to the extent of that weapon and at the same time it strengthens the revolution with the weapon. When an awareness is switched, this also has a dual effect. The force of the state is not merely its repressive force. Its repressive force is totally ineffective without the subservience of the people, without the people's acceptance of the status quo stemming from upbringing, customs, tradition, effects of the constant, massive propaganda, ideologies, prejudices, economic and class subordination, etc. The dual power must then take these subjective forces away from the power of the oligarchy by pursuing a multilateral strategic plan by which it can operate simultaneously and consistently in the military, political and ideological spheres. If the strategy is not multilateral, the conception will be guerrilla, partisan revolutionary, selective, etc, but not a conception of dual power in action. The dual power manifests its power and increases it by means of military actions with political objectives, by means of propaganda disseminated through mass organizations, unions, popular and student organizations, of which it is the leader because of its philosophy, because of the acceptance of its solutions and by means of its non-public organization of core groups, etc."

447. Selection of Tactical Methods for Pursuing This Strategy

Urban guerrillas have practically all enemy objectives within reach for a surprise attack. For example, ambushing and annihilating enemy contingents—an arduous maneuver for rural guerrillas—would be a simple, everyday operation for urban guerrillas. All of the regime's agents, beginning with the president and his ministers, are exposed to an annihilating ambush by urban guerrillas. Its systems of communications, its strategic facilities are all within reach of the explosives of an urban movement that does not hesitate to sacrifice lives to achieve its objectives.

Nevertheless, urban guerrillas do not make indiscriminate and constant use of the methods which their position in the midst of the enemy provides them. Their actions are conditioned by their strategic objectives (military and political), for example, not using all their forces in an action so as not to compromise their continuity in the future, or not rushing into excessively bloody actions when the awareness of the people is not sufficiently aroused against the regime or outraged by its crimes.

There are no general rules that are always valid for the selection of tactical methods. It is equally counterproductive to use certain very drastic methods while preparing the revolutionary conditions as it is not to use them during a period of violence or when clarifying the struggle. Each guerrilla, but especially the urban guerrilla, who is fighting practically within the multitudes and in close contact with the masses, is in a political war. Any mistake in the use of tactical methods, any action whose objectives are not clearly defined, could mean a great delay in the supreme strategic objectives. This means that the selection of tactical methods must include a precise evaluation of socio-political, geographic, etc conditions so that they do not become counterproductive. Their validity is always a function of time and place.

In its environment the MLN has tried various tactical methods and has drawn some conclusions.

448. 1. Sabotage

There are three kinds of sabotage: a) those that involve the destruction of a source of jobs for workers or that harm an important sector of the population; b) those that harm only some capitalist or the state without directly affecting the people; c) sabotage against military installations.

Naturally, the second and third kinds enjoy greater popular acceptance than the first. But in general sabotage of any kind does not sit as well with the people as other revolutionary actions during periods in which guerrillas are not in the midst of the widespread battle, in which the destruction of the enemy apparatus is justified for tactical reasons.

During the latter stage we can clearly see that the cutting of telephone or electricity lines or blowing up railroad tracks or bridges used by enemy troops are attacks that force the enemy to disperse; this is also the stage to produce certain strategic articles, set up military bases, etc. In other words, this is when the struggle becomes dramatic. There is also the case of a foreign invasion, when sabotage is an extreme and legitimate recourse. Of course even in a situation like that sabotage must be appropriate for the goal involved; in other words it should have the continuity and scope that are needed to disrupt enemy operations. At a given point in the period of harassment it could still be a drawback to cut telephone, electricity and railway lines, etc because the regime could restore them. The people might see these operations as a stupid boycott with no strategic objective, and in some cases the government will be reestablishing a public service that guerrillas took away from them. Sabotage that harms only the government, the FFAA or some capitalist is acceptable to the people, such as against official buildings, military or police installations, warehouses for manufactured merchandise, etc. This is useful in underscoring repudiation for a specific attitude on the part of the direct victim and are valid as long as the objectives are made clear. There are two other secondary drawbacks to sabotage: it tends to reinforce the image of the 'terrorist' that the government and its press want to create concerning guerrillas (to offset this sabotage should be carried out in a commando operation by taking the objective before destroying it) and often it cannot be done without threatening contiguous zones (possibly buildings), which creates feelings of fear among the population in general towards guerrilla actions. In general sabotage operations must be explained as well as possible through propaganda, and from this stems the need for an appropriate apparatus to see to it that it is sufficient to balance out the campaign that the regime's press will wage by stressing the negative aspects of such actions.

449. 2. Attacks on Members of the Repressive Forces

As we said, urban guerrillas have many opportunities to use the most common tactic of the rural guerrillas, ambushing the enemy's armed forces.

Ambushes and surprise attacks against armed contingents in order to annihilate them, or seizing and disarming them, are methods that can be widely used. Attacks on the regime's repressive forces are certainly the most direct form of harassment. They strike at the very basis of the regime, at the apparatus that supports it. The breakdown of the FFAA could bring about its automatic fall.

Now then, since revolutionary war is a political war, the consequences of this tactic must be analyzed properly before it is used. For example, if there is a well-founded hope that a sector of the FFAA will join the patriotic cause, we should carefully calculate whether harassment will help it to complete this process or whether, on the contrary, it will

put it in the enemy camp. Harassment in the urban environment has an enormous psychological impact on the members of the FFAA; when they get hit with an enemy bullet in their own bodies they begin to reason politically and to wonder whether it is really worthwhile to die for the regime. At times they even get interested in the guerrilla program and see themselves as mere pawns of a policy. In reality they 'joined up,' that is to say, they entered the police or the army because they needed to work somewhere and thought that they were defending the country or fighting crime. When they are placed in a different situation, they usually have varied reactions: collective demand for better wages, special statutes, refusal to carry out certain orders. In other words, when they turn from passive to active agents of an unjust regime, they begin to have an awareness of their role in social struggles, and then one of two things can happen: either, as we have said, they agree to continue defending the oligarchic regime (after pay is boosted and working conditions improved for this 'dirty' work) or they merely refuse to do so and even become guerrillas, which means the disintegration and even the breakdown of the FFAA. This favorable effect could be spoiled by bad handling of the tactic of ambushing the repressive forces. Once again there must be the political evaluation that we stress with regard to sabotage; a cold-blooded ambush of annihilation at a time when we have been branded as 'violent' or before the struggle has taken on the dramatic overtones of a civil war, usually has effects opposite to those intended. Soldiers and police feel unjustly attacked and react out of indignation and esprit de corps not their adherence to the regime. It is very important to determine whether the FFAA member realizes that he is taking part in a civil war or whether he sincerely thinks that he is combatting bank robbers or the traditional 'bomb throwers.' Even in a stage during which this attitude is not yet present but when actions have attained the degree of drama which we mentioned, the attack should be carried out in accordance with the tactic that has come to be called 'indirect approximation.' This involves an attack on enemy objectives without considering the police and soldiers defending them. In other words, the attack—during this stage—is not against the person of the agent but against the objective that he is guarding, which is an indirect attack on the agent. Although psychological impact on soldiers and police is also achieved, it should not be by means of an attack that seems unjust to them. A form of 'indirect approximation' is the disarming of agents. As long as this operation can be carried out without loss of life (capture with great numerical superiority and the element of surprise), it could be part of this tactic, but there is a risk in this regard, because it is tactless in that it is an act of aggression that is out of proportion to the limited objective in mind. In other words, the tactic of 'indirect approximation' requires major and clear objectives, and methods that are consistent with them.

450. 3. Reprisals

For agents of the regime the explanation of why they are being attacked becomes clearer when the attack is in response to an unjust act that they

have committed, for example, torture, killing, an arbitrary judicial decision, arbitrary firings by an employers' association or state leader, etc. It is also easier for the people to absorb revolutionary violence, even in the initial stages of the guerrilla war, if the violence appears as a response to arbitrary actions by the enemy. With regard to the police and the army in particular, we can say that, even more than 'indirect approximation,' reprisals make it possible to exert the pressures of revolutionary violence on them, while assuming a complete justification for such actions.

But in addition, reprisals achieve another strategic objective: they sap strength from the regime. Any revolutionary movement that acts prudently to confront growing violence (in which it has a chance to win because it can ambush a visible enemy) must impose its rules of war through reprisals. All it must do is keep its machinery ready to respond with all due speed to each arbitrary act by the enemy and prepare a suitable study of possible objectives for such an eventuality. But in addition to eliminating torture and killings, urban guerrillas can set a more ambitious objective for themselves through reprisals as well: punish the police, the army, the rulers, the oligarchy, the representatives of imperialism and of hated regimes for each prisoner they take and for each revolutionary they kill (even if in combat), etc and punish judges for each indictment, newsmen for their slander, witnesses and informants for their statements against revolutionaries, and representatives of the government and capitalism for their unpopular measures.

Guerrillas not only sap strength from the regime, they dissolve it entirely. This creates insoluble problems for the government in its task to execute its anti-people plans and its repression and is therefore a political way of carrying out a higher form of harassment.

In conclusion it should be noted that reprisals should be consistent with and tailored to the arbitrary enemy action that is to be punished. An excessive reprisal is also tactless.

451. 4. Dynamite Attacks

This type of operations is unlikely to produce political results for guerrillas. An explosive charge with a time fuse used in a public place could produce innocent victims among the population. If material damage is the goal, it is preferable to seize the place, which yields better results and avoids many dangers. If persons are to be attacked, it is preferable to detain them and act directly.

452. 5. Kidnapings and the Revolutionary Jail

This is another tactical method that urban guerrillas have used to a limited extent. The notorious kidnapings are merely a modest example of

the incalculable possibilities offered by the revolutionary jail, where government figures, repressive police henchmen, foreign representatives and key regime figures in general can be kept for an unlimited period of time. When they are in the hands of guerrillas it guarantees the physical integrity of revolutionaries in prison and a certain degree of restraint in the repression's procedures. It creates an enormous dispersion of forces to guard each of its leading figures in their homes and on the street. It forces the enemy to put forth enormous, ongoing efforts to look for the prisoners of the guerrillas. And all this doesn't take into account the tremendous dilemma and the pressures that are exerted every time an exchange is proposed.

Kidnaping and the revolutionary jail can also be used, for example, against stubborn employers during conflicts with personnel. Revolutionary prisons—which can be one of the ways of carrying out reprisals—have shown in practice that they are one of the most effective ways to disrupt the regime's plans, more effective than other traditional methods such as harassment.

453. 6. Supply Operations

Much more so than the rural guerrilla, the urban guerrilla needs a solid and constantly renewed infrastructure of locales, technical equipment and other resources in order to keep going while support from the people can't provide most of them and legal resources can't be used to handle this situation. In regard to weapons the principle here is the same as for rural guerrillas: live off the enemy. Given the circumstances of the struggle, locales and vehicles become strategic elements that are as important as weapons.

When preparations for action begin, guerrillas must take care of expropriating large sums of money, because money buys the 'Sierra Maestra' of the urban guerrilla, that is to say, places with good cover, in addition to work shops, technical equipment and at times even weapons. In addition, strategic supplies should be expropriated, such as machinery, vehicles and weapons. In moving from the preparatory period to the stage of guerrilla action, it could be difficult to make the people understand that these expropriations, which are traditionally condemned and seen as criminal acts, are legitimate resources of a revolutionary movement. The first requisite that must be strictly met to facilitate their understanding is to expropriate only from capitalists or the state, underscoring this principle with the return of goods or compensation for damages in case the interests of the workers were affected. This should also apply in the case of vehicles and other supplies. Understanding will come when we move into direct action to harass the regime.

Guerrillas on the offensive justify the expropriations since they are showing that an expensive armed apparatus is being used.

454. 7. Seizure of Homes (Raids)

The repression has used raids on the homes of revolutionaries as a way of bringing intimidation into their midst and among their families. Urban guerrillas can do the same with the homes of members of the repression, the government, the oligarchy, foreign imperialists, etc. This could become one of the main tactics of harassment; it brings the war in contact with the peaceful and untouchable mansions of the regime's figures themselves. The enemy must then disperse in order to guard thousands of objectives. The regime's people are thus subjected to a sort of life in the underground, full of anxiety and their movements are restricted by the permanent guard force, even in their own homes.

This is a very different situation than in those lovely days when the oligarchy sent out its soldiers to fight against far-off enemies in far-off lands, mountains or forests. Seizures of homes could be used as reprisals, as a way of showing the agents of the regime (police, the military, judges) that they are vulnerable and of inculcating in them the idea of the dual power created by a second armed apparatus in the country that is as vigilant and as prepared to punish excesses as the army that pays their wages.

455. 8. Armed Propaganda Operations

Guerrillas express themselves basically through their armed maneuvers, although at times they use other means of communication with the people, such as newspapers, fliers, radio broadcasts, radio interference and TV interruptions. One of the forms of armed propaganda is the seizure of radio or TV stations to transmit announcements. Another method that has produced good results is the seizure of a factory and a meeting with all its personnel--making the appropriate distinctions between the personnel attached to the employers' association and the workers--in order to engage in conversation with them.

There can also be seizures of movie theaters, in which slides can be shown, manifestos projected on the screen, read out loud over the speakers or handed out to the spectators in the form of leaflets. Vehicles with public address systems can also be seized and, while their occupants are being detained, left at a selected site to play a prerecorded tape, with threats of explosions written on the doors of the vehicle to lengthen the duration of the operation.

There are other types of propaganda activities, such as the distribution of groceries taken from the vehicles transporting them or from warehouses among certain very poor sectors of the population.

But in general, the best "armed propaganda" arises from large-scale military operations. During them we must not miss a single opportunity

to put the ideological seal of the guerrilla on the smallest detail: treatment of workers, attention towards a person who might suffer a nervous breakdown, etc. The return of money belonging to employees, is it has been mistakenly carried off together with capitalist money, and the repair of damage caused inadvertently to an unassuming individual will do more to define the guerrilla ideology to the people than the most eloquent of manifestos.

Now then, if there is anything that requires a proper political approach, it is the use of armed propaganda. A guerrilla movement that abuses propaganda activities to the detriment of basic military operations loses prestige in the people's eye (in other words, it becomes counterproductive, giving the false impression that it is seeking publicity rather than the defeat of the enemy). Armed propaganda becomes especially important in certain stages, such as the initial revelations of guerrilla activity. It is also important when positions are being clarified for the people during the periods in which it must take drastic measures that are not sufficiently illustrative of their purposes and are thus difficult for the popular mentality to understand."

4. The Urban Guerrilla

456. The concept of the urban guerrilla, the methods that he must use and the way in which he must operate in cities are contained in an MLN-T booklet, so titled, that was seized by the police in July 1970 and that was intended exclusively for the members of the seditious organization.

With teaching and training instructions on how urban guerrillas should look and act, the text of this document contains eight headings dealing with the following aspects in this order:

- 1) what is an urban guerrilla
- 2) who is he
- 3) how is he trained
- 4) when can an individual consider himself an urban guerrilla
- 5) how does he disguise himself
- 6) the means at his disposal
- 7) his habitat
- 8) his equipment

As can be seen, it has great parallels and similarities with Carlos Marighela's mini-manual that was discussed previously (Chapter III, 5, b, Nos 125 and ff).

457. "1) He is the citizen, the inhabitant of a country who, having realized that the social system around him is denigrating and with an understanding that there is only one way to make society just, trains and

specializes in the use of arms and takes to the streets as in a true 'asphalt jungle,' where he will fight the enemy, who is totally confused in this environment.

458. 2) He is no **superman**, nor is it necessary to be young or old, male or female. It is any person who feels within himself, even though he does not know how to express it in words, what true revolutionaries feel and who, breaking with the 'legal system' that surrounds him, is capable of and has the moral worth to become another member of the armed branch of the people.

459. 3) It is both easy and difficult, according to how instruction is handled; the degree of difficulty is directly proportional to the desire and cunning with which the urban guerrilla can train himself.

Physical conditioning is easily achieved if a strict exercise program is followed. This will predispose the guerrilla to endure strenuous training and at the same time give him self-confidence in an armed confrontation.

Technical instruction on handling weapons, explosives, etc is laborious because there must always be an eye out for strange movements or noises, but work with locks, driving, personal defense, use of bayonets, shooting calisthenics with firearms, etc and the theoretical part mentioned above do not require much fuss, but curtains should be drawn, and there should be music and quiet talk to cover up the noises that might come from any instruction at home.

But obviously practice requires open and free spaces that are, however, isolated and when possible shielded from curious eyes. Such places will be revealed beforehand by the leader of a group of urban guerrillas in training or by persons so appointed. What is taught and proposed in theory will not always be possible in practice, but one thing to keep in mind is to try and arrive at the site clean, in other words, like a real camper, fisherman, Sunday stroller or some kind of amateur scientist (paleontologist, entomologist, etc) and to know beforehand what materials to be used are carefully hidden and where. This equipment should be brought there beforehand by someone who entered and left the area without being noticed. In case this was impossible and the urban guerrillas themselves have to bring their own equipment, they should take the greatest precautions in order to pass a visual inspection or a superficial physical one.

It should be kept in mind that a group with an equal number of men and women does not arouse suspicion, but a group with more women seems strange, and a group with more men is perhaps even stranger, although an all-male contingent goes unnoticed as long as there are not too many of them.

Moreover, consider the nature of the mixed group's visible activity; if you go out on a camping trip, choose the site well, because women do not usually camp in isolated, wild places. Two small groups camped at a site where there are similar camps, who arrive separately and act as if they don't know each other and then meet at a far-off, isolated place go totally unnoticed, and in such cases it is not difficult to take along a revolver or a grenade hidden among the food.

In the case of practice with long weapons, remember that a shotgun or a 22 rifle, with its guide (and the owner with a hunting license) and with its parts separated (ready for use in the war) in addition to a reasonable amount of ammunition (at least visibly) is something that during the time prior to the beginning (illegible)...of the residence or place of stay, during the night in areas that are not watched they can use lamps, signs, abandoned houses, etc as targets while training.

A couple of magazines or cylinders emptied successively or simultaneously on a target does not take up much time, and the area can be evacuated before the curiosity of neighbors sounds the alarm and the repressive forces arrive to investigate.

It should be taken into account that the urban guerrilla rarely works alone, that in training and in action it is advisable, we would almost say obligatory, to set up small, stable groups of four to six comrades, who will develop, despite the rules of compartmentalization, a profound esprit de corps and consolidate their mutual confidence to the point of achieving, if possible, communication through natural facial gestures, glances or specified movements.

When the group is training itself, instructors who are knowledgeable in the various subjects must discuss theory with the group in advance. Practice is part of the guerrilla group's activities, and therefore it is the group's decision as to how, when and where. When there is outside teaching, the time involved is lessened considerably for various reasons, if we discount the delays that might occur in waiting for the instructor.

Comrades should not display anything other than harmless rifles, whenever possible, at camp sites and should never make the mistake of using confiscated weapons. It is always preferable to carry a weapon that was smuggled into the country and without a guide. Never hold group gymnastic sessions in the open and even in the mountains, place lookouts, especially when practicing bayonet fencing or personal defense.

460. 4) It is not so difficult to become one. It is sufficient to be politically aware, with well-founded concepts and clear ideas ready to be carried out, to be in satisfactory physical condition, to have the basic knowledge in handling weapons, notions of attack and retreat (the quick hit) and to feel 'comfortable' in the streets, in other words, knowing shortcuts, hideouts, medical centers, etc.

But the basic thing is to know how to overcome fear and to have an iron-like will to triumph over all hardships and failures. When our spirit, above and beyond the physical condition we are in, enables us to do things like jump 4 meters from a balcony to the street, evacuate a house through a risky maneuver along rooftops or by jumping on to a distant tree from a street that we are fleeing along, pull a trigger without closing our eyes, not become paralyzed with blind fear when the repressive forces are advancing and recognize that we can die and kill with an awareness that if we die we will die with dignity and if we kill it is out of duty, then we can consider ourselves true urban guerrillas and revolutionaries, because a person cannot be the former unless the latter quality is inherent in his character.

It is not too much to repeat for our own satisfaction and to the embarrassment of the enemy that a person is not a true guerrilla unless he is a revolutionary and that a person who is not a revolutionary and who pursues the activities of a guerrilla is merely a mercenary or a slave to his ideas.

461. 5) Two personal aspects are important here: clothing and speech. We cannot let ourselves be impressed with an heroic idea of the bearded guerrilla with his beret and khaki shirts and boots. And for certain activities neither can we 'look like the opposition,' in other words, like a student in a demonstration, which is an expression that we frequently hear mentioned.

We should wear tailored or sports suits, normal shoes, no commando boots or ankle boots; women comrades in simple garb or inconspicuous pants suits. In all cases we must see to it that our clothing allows us freedom of movement, that our shoes aren't too tight or too loose, that we're not bothered by things like shawls or scarves and that weapons are not seen because of the thinness or cut of the cloth. Confusion is created whenever possible by smiling at neighbors, being ambiguous or terse in replies and opinions and, even better, by not contradicting anyone and pretending to be a bitter enemy of all those 'sly fellows.' Don't turn your house into an obvious arsenal, but keep weapons hidden in various ways and have them and the clothing fit the occasion. In short, disguise yourself by pretending to be merely a bourgeois citizen without a penny but content with the prevailing 'democracy.'

In leaving the site of an operation, confusion is created by putting distance between the guerrilla and the theater of activity. Logically, you should see to it that you have not been followed, wiping off or covering with a fold or a newspaper any stains or rips in clothing, shining your shoes, not looking nervous or on the contrary being so enthusiastic over the success achieved that you talk about it out loud, and making sure that your weapon is secure in its belt so that a sudden brush against a fellow passenger in a bus doesn't make it inadvertently visible or merely fall to the floor.

462.....common name and provide his own equipment. Let's say that he isn't provided with equipment and we'll see what everyday objects he can use for defense or attack.

Bottles of gas lit and thrown from tall buildings; bottles placed on portable stoves to heat them; bottles with kerosene, flammable insecticides; fire extinguishers; non-insulated electrical wiring in corridors; boiling water or oil; dust clouds formed by emptying out the bags of regular vacuum cleaners, etc, etc; all of these are more defensive in nature than anything else. But for attacks, in addition to using the above items, we should arm ourselves with several lethal weapons, with an additional something: discretion and cunning, which enables us unarmed to attack an isolated or distracted enemy and disarm him. This was seen at the peak of the fierce repression against student demonstrations in 1968; there is always an enemy who remains isolated or is distracted, and it could happen nearby.

But there are other, more finished things that urban guerrillas can get hold of, such as hand grenades or, in the very remote case that this is absolutely impossible, bladed weapons or fishing spears. We will not deal with the manufacture of grenades because there are manuals that discuss the subject in depth.

The objection could be raised that it's too much to expect to find an enemy that is isolated and distracted, just like a 20th century guerrilla can't obtain a firearm any other way (confiscation, check of battle site, purchase, etc).

Every day you see objects that at a crucial moment could be useful to you as defensive and even attack weapons. The skill with which these everyday objects can be used for the war is an individual matter.

463. 7) In the case of the legal urban guerrilla it could be any house in the city. However, that house, which should not look at all different inside and outside to the extent possible, must have certain determined means of escape and normal features (windows closed or open in such and such a way, drawn curtains, etc) that will prevent us from falling into traps. The house should have hiding places that cannot be found by any search short of an excavation, which can be used to keep compromising objects.

Doors and windows should not be kept barred in such a way that they can't be opened instantly, nor should there be objects leaning against walls and fences that make an escape difficult. Likewise, walls with windows up above to prevent robberies should have a place to support hands and feet without injury. Lights should not be kept on during the night, because they would make us an easy target when escaping while possibly blinding us. If we live in a tall apartment building, we should provide for some kind of escape route by emergency stairs, service elevators or

exposed piping that reach to where we can jump to the street or nearby rooftops. We could also anticipate an escape by means of rope, for which we would obtain a sufficiently strong one with loops or hooks to secure it.

The operating area of underground urban guerrillas will depend on the prevailing strategic and/or tactical situation (taking into consideration the activities pursued by the forces in conflict). In this case we could even resort to the sewage system.

464. 8) Whatever equipment is used, it must not be totally or partially unfamiliar to the guerrilla. The urban guerrilla and his equipment must be one. He should be thoroughly versed in the use and operation of his weapons, machines, etc.

As a general rule we should think of equipment as having two basic categories: weapons and tools.

It is practically impossible to make guerrilla armaments uniform since they come from sources such as commercial gunsmiths, collections, military deposits, etc.

Therefore the guerrilla should know enough about weapons to identify models and make them work. Along with the weapons goes the ammunition, which is never too much unless it impedes freedom of movement.

Especially in the case of rifles, it is important to know what cartridge and what kind of bullets are militarily appropriate (3B, 4B, 5B, CG, CSG, rifle bullets, incendiary ammunition) and what range and accuracy a guerrilla can manage with his own rifle.

If you're using a 22 caliber long rifle, remember that it is not a weapon of war and that in order to be sure about your victim you should fire again, unless you have hit a vital spot.

When hurling a grenade, be careful that comrades or even you yourself are not exposed to the shrapnel.

The tools that we use can be ordinary ones, but could also include special scissors to cut wiring, machines for drawing wire or any other complicated device. In this case you must have a great deal of practice operating it, because with a weapon we know that by pulling the trigger the bullet will come out, but with a tool, the situation is different, because we might not even know how to hold it correctly.

465. In Summary

This is not a treatise, not even a short analysis, but it is useful for guerrilla groups that are starting out and are not aware of what a guerrilla is. It will help them not to get caught up in the faulty idea of

the superman and to realize fully that no one is born a guerrilla but that everything is possible when there is a need. Perhaps it also gives rise to the feeling that an urban guerrilla fighting in a very hostile environment could emerge at any moment of the struggle and that ordinary, everyday elements in a city can be used for combat purposes or at least for the harassment of the repressive forces."

466. As a summary of the above concepts, the following are the main conclusions concerning the MLN-T position on the urban struggle:

- 1--Uruguay lacks the geographical conditions appropriate for rural guerrilla struggle.
- 2--The struggle in the rural environment will fulfill auxiliary tasks.
- 3--It will be difficult, but not impossible, to transform urban guerrillas into a regular army.
- 4--The city offers good conditions for communications and connections.

467. In regard to the characteristics of the urban struggle, these points are considered by the organization in this order:

- 1--Organization (the problem of losses)
- 2--Compartmentalization
- 3--Secrecy
- 4--Recruitment
- 5--Reserves
- 6--Duplication
- 7--Material infrastructure

468. The tactical problems posed by the urban struggle are analyzed by the seditious group in detail, according to the following topics:

- 1--Sabotage
- 2--Attack on FFCC members
- 3--Reprisals
- 4--Dynamite attacks
- 5--Kidnapings and the "revolutionary" jail

6--Supply operations

7--Seizures of homes

8--Armed propaganda

469. The following issues are examined with regard to the conditions for urban guerrillas and the resources that they have available for their activities:

1--What is an urban guerrilla?

2--Who is he?

3--How does he learn?

4--When can an individual consider himself an urban guerrilla?

5--How does he disguise himself?

6--Means within his reach

7--His "habitat"

8--His equipment

5. Plans

470. In order to achieve the goals of the urban guerrilla struggle, the MLN-T plots and executes a large variety of plans. Since it is impossible to refer to all of them here, this section will present only a few examples taken from the seditious organization's own documents.

a. "Cacao" Plan

471. This plan advocated dynamite attacks on buildings and installations, such as the one that caused the fire at the warehouses of the Sudamtex de Uruguay, S.A. company, among many others.

The "Cacao" Plan was formulated by the leaders of the MLN-T that were being held at the Punta Carretas Prison and considered the following goals:

"a--Show that the movement still exists as a military organization.

b--Carry out activities that do not require a large organizational setup, which is proposed as a step backwards in order to make possible another step forwards.

c--Avoid potential losses of members, keeping in mind recent casualties and the intensity of the repression.

d--Hit the economic infrastructure, thus intensifying the contradictions in this regard.

e--Carry the class struggle and our attack on the bourgeoisie and the oligarchy one step forward.

f--Try to soften the government's hard-line position, with the view that any concession, no matter how minimal, means a defeat."

472. In a later document, dated 14 September 1970, entitled "Some clarifications on the present moment and our work," modifications are proposed for the "Cacao" Plan, specifically:

"I--Analysis and report to the rank and file concerning the movement's internal and external situation, including self-criticism of the Satan Plan.

II--Discussion of the political and strategic line at all levels.

III--Formulating a short-term plan, with regard to goals and duration, at the leadership level, taking into account the need for immediate action in order to maintain our presence on the street as well as our infrastructure. We could define it as a defensive attack.

Its result must be to put us in a good position to begin a longer range plan.

Since some of these procedural concepts were not taken into account, errors were committed in the formulation of the Cacao Plan.

The following operations were emphasized in the plan:

Armed propaganda activities; Carrasco Objective; Viglietti Objective; Hot Summer Objective."

Herethe document begins a lengthy commentary, the content of which can be seen in the following paragraphs:

"The regime has two legs to stand on, the economy and the repression. We must strike at each of them alternately or together. However, too comprehensive an outlook could lead us to underestimate subtleties that a given moments could constitute major contradictions introduced into the system..." "We have to think about what will happen when we carry out actions like the Carrasco, Viglietti* and Hot Summer objectives,

*Reference to the operation of that name, also termed "Desalambrar." It consisted of attacks on the Prado Rural Exposition and the thoroughbred animals being shown there, as advocated by the "Nandu" Plan.

in which the objectives might not be seen clearly and even go beyond the class that we want to attack. It's not 'overestimating the petite bourgeoisie' if we realize that the ideals and ways of life of most of our people are based on petite bourgeoisie models, that although they can be changed, we should keep them in mind even after taking power, and that as the dominant feature and superstructural remnant of 'embattled Uruguay,' they go beyond the framework of the class that they come from. Thus we should think about how the majority of our people, emerging from that culture with their values still intact, will react to a 'Hot Summer' Plan, for example. No doubt we are going to annoy the oligarchical 'lizards,' but we will be economically almost liquidating thousands of families who will point to us as the cause of their ruin, not to the regime. Thus we'll be throwing sand in the eyes of the people."

"Another aspect in which we see a permanent shortcoming is propaganda. We have to evaluate correctly the work of the entire press in the Mitrione case and think about how it could work under the Cacao Plan. We are not prepared for the struggle on this front because it is here that the organization is most lacking. And it's not enough to just do more; rather we must define what has not yet been resolved, such as our policy for the masses (see study 69)."

"As a corollary of this, we have to be more precise in choosing our objectives, which with the exception of armed propaganda are directed against the bourgeoisie and the oligarchy. We must try to strike directly at the most widely known representatives of the ruling oligarchy, not at an entire social class."

473. As was pointed out in the preceeding chapter, the "Cacao" Plan is part of the MLN-T's general tactical strategy, which is designed to attain the second objective on Line "H" through the establishment of the "parallel power" or the "dual power," which, according to that line, should be set up in the period from 1966/68 to 1970/71.

Through the "Cacao" Plan and its other tactics of harassment the organization tried to "soften" the regime, wear it down and obtain, as it says, any concession, no matter how small, which will mean a defeat. Meanwhile, it would have the time needed to reorganize its infrastructure and, by virtue of the government "softening," it would manage to put forth a semblance of "pacification" that would hold the FFAA back from entering action or acting at all.

When the organization deviated from the plan and tried to punish in advance an entire social class, the bourgeoisie—which the revolution must destroy, not in this stage but later on when it has the power in its hands—, this was an error that the document of 14 September 1970 wanted to correct, because "we must see clearly that from now until the taking

of power, this sector will be the largest one, and we must try to turn it, as a no man's land, towards our side, not the enemy's. When we strike at an entire social class, we must know beforehand what we are looking for. If we are trying to "take one step further in the class war against our class enemies, and this means a move to destroy them, we are combining the characteristics of the different stages of the revolution; the destruction of the society of classes is accomplished when we have in power and not before, when we are trying to take power. Now we must try to neutralize the maximum number of elements in the enemy class, which we will later eliminate." This is the reason for choosing the "most widely known" representatives of the bourgeoisie and the oligarchy, etc.

474. The so-called "Hot Summer" Plan is the part of the "Cacao" Plan that includes various terrorist activities against police officials.

b. The "Nandu" Plan

475. Although it was a later plan (February-August 1971), it has the same tactical orientation as "Cacao." In it we can see an intensification of selective harassment against the representatives of the oligarchy, "on which the regime is based," and therefore it has a harsher line of "political attack" against both corporations or institutions and physical persons. At the same time other complementary goals are pursued in the areas of logistics, infrastructure and on the mass front.

476. As the document containing the "Nandu" Plan states, basically it advocates "the political need for action to rescue the political fabric of the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR)."

The strategical goal being pursued is specified in the following four points:

"a--self-financing on a major scale for

1--development of logistics

2--development of infrastructure

3--development on the mass front

b--harassment of the FFAA (Read: Harassment of the Military Forces: Metropolitan Guard, Republican Guard and Specialized Police Units. For the moment hit only these sectors unless others take the initiative or in the case of an unavoidable confrontation stemming from the war)

c--development of political attacks

d--weapons supply

477. In reference to the importance that the seditious organization attaches to this plan from the political standpoint, these five characteristics are mentioned:

"a—Carry out FAR activities in order to draw nearer to the people (become a household word)

b—Consolidate our line with a planned, ongoing struggle

c—Establish a political-military line on many fronts

d—Develop the concept that the FAR are operating militarily with consistent political motives

e—The far-reaching importance of military actions on the mass front (Read: Political Option)."

478. The following three aspects are stressed with regard to the military importance of the "Nandu" Plan:

"a—activity planning as a working method

b—gradual development of the military apparatus in accordance with political needs

c—qualitative jump in activities."

479. The plan will be self-financing through one of these two methods:

"a—major expropriations (which would be the ideal thing since it would facilitate operations and planning and insure the attainment of Point A of our strategic goal)

b—minor, ongoing expropriations (this has the drawback of using up the apparatus for secondary operations)."

480. The "Nandu" Plan does not include "military operations to confront the repression, inasmuch as our forces are still not ready for it. Therefore we are carrying out a progressive series of activities that must be part of a comprehensive plan, in order to develop our line."

The activities to be carried out under this plan with regard to corporations and institutions include political attacks against "the Bunge and Born group's oligarchical, imperialist complex," with the following specific objectives:

"(A) Montevideo Bank; (B) Gramon S.A. (C) Cousa; (D) Thread and Bag Factory; (E) Wool Warehouses (Rondeau)

For the final stages of the plan, since the machine will most likely be well-oiled enough, we thought that we could try a combined operation with small, independent groups:

a--Prado Rural Exposition. A place where the oligarchy shows its wealth. (This takes place during July and August, more or less) At night: taking and evacuation of the premises. Set loose and frighten the animals on exhibit throughout the Prado.

A lamb on exhibit is taken away in a vehicle. The premises or the major most important part of it is dynamited and destroyed. The lamb is set loose in a central location after hanging an appropriate sign on it.

b--Golf course. A place where the oligarchy spends and enjoys its wealth. At the same hour another group takes over and evacuates the premises, rescues the national symbols it finds and dynamites the building or part of it.

c--Carrasco Polo Club. Prado Rural Exposition Area. This part includes entertainment sites and places where the oligarchy exhibits its wealth.

As we can see, this is the part that requires the greatest use of technical methods and therefore the greatest care."

481. "As an appendix to the above, we feel that it is appropriate to call to mind certain operations that could come up during the execution of the plan:

a--taking of the Aeronautical Museum (expropriation of arms) See Camilo

b--we can send data on weapons collector

c--we insist on ONDA [expansion unknown] (we don't know what is happening)

d--Maciel is still in effect in all its terms (a variation tailored to the supposed changes could be examined)

e--Do not use "Uruguayan" FAR in attacks against the judicial branch. We are proposing: commandos of revolutionary justice or commandos of the people's justice, or something similar to underscore the total confrontation of the two powers and to avoid promoting reprisals against prisoners.

f--begin contacts to acquire: 45 or 9 millimeter pistols (40,000 pesos each) PAM or Halcon submachine guns (100,000 each). The price includes the package, which could amount to 500 each. Keep it in mind for immediate expenses.

g--Decovid: We lack information, but it is obvious that Jose's action in that group is fundamental. We think that the FAR have more than enough weapons and posts for the struggle."

482. Activities to be carried out against individuals and enterprises that they own also include attacks that the document divides into three parts (second, third and fourth) as follows:

"Personal political attack--Part Two

Method: raid, material destruction and publicity.
Locate a series of oligarchs, for example:

Bankers: Hamm, Frick Davies (Credit Bank); directors of the commercial bank.

Landowners, Cattlemen: locate by means of a rural association magazine or through general information.

Businessmen: Aznares, Aldao, Angenscheidt, Soler

Industrialists: Manzanares, Martinez Reina (in conflict), etc.

Political attack--Part Three

Method: fire

We are proposing an attack on the tobacco trust:

Tobacco company, Abal, Mailhos, La Paz: Rondeau Zone

This third part includes blowing up offices and whatever **fine points** come out of **actions similar** to Part One (Parallel operations)

Political attack--Part Four

Method: Blowing up

Golf Club
Carrasco Tennis Courts
Del Cerro Golf Club."

483. Under the subtitle of "general considerations," the document stresses these other characteristics:

"1--The basis of this plan is an attack on the oligarchy (the ultimate upholder of the regime) individually and as a group.

2--We feel that it can be carried out in 3 to 6 months.

3--It promotes the technical knowledge of the members and a development of the corresponding services.

4--It insures the permanence and continuity of the FAR with little investment.

5--It is part of the rallying cry of: the country for all or for none.

6--It fulfills the strategic principle of the political attack.

7--If the political conditions persist, this plan could culminate with the kidnapping of an oligarch.

8743

484. Without going into detail on every operation, something that would be inappropriate for us in view of our objective¹ situation, we think that certain observations which the various objectives that have been proposed have evoked from us may be of interest.

In the political attack, third part: the complete burning (Sudamtex [South American Textile ?] style) is based upon the geographical location of the targets, since they are typified by:

- a. An area isolated from groups of occupied dwellings.
- b. Buildings owned by the firm being attacked.
- c. Areas completely isolated from the city, but located within it.
- d. Old, highly combustible premises.

We also think that this method (arson) should be carried out completely. Hence, we must be guaranteed a considerable quantity of naphtha, and two or more types of starters (chemicals, electrical devices), always leaving the manual system (cocktail) for last, and making certain before leaving the premises that the fire is out of control (watch the smoke from the naphtha, remember Bowling).

485. In the political attack, fourth part: The five targets that we propose have several things in common:

- a. Sites where the oligarchs meet.
- b. Buildings located on open sites.
- c. Solid construction.

This means that they can be totally destroyed (blown up) without great danger to individuals.

This attack may be carried out in two ways:

- a. On the same day.
- b. In consecutive stages.

486. When we take this operational sequence into account, we find:

Positive: That, on the same day, the attack would have tremendous political repercussions if the goal were attained (blowing up a branch of the Bank of Montevideo, the Gramon offices and COUSA [Urban Projects Corporation ?]; complete burning of a wool warehouse and a pocketbook factory storage facility).

Negative: The operational capacity of the FAR [Armed Forces ?].

Positive: In stages, every action is "guaranteed."

Negative: If it is carried out in stages, the Bunge and Born group might be discovered; hence, the latter system would be dangerous.

487. In our opinion, it should be executed:

- a. In stages.
- b. Within a period of 2 or 3 months.
- c. As part of other attacks.

If we operate in this manner, every action will afford other kinds of contributions:

- a. Concurrent expropriation of funds.
- b. Concurrent expropriation of documents.
- c. Concurrent expropriation of machinery (mimeograph machines, typewriters, etc.)
- d. Sign painting and the destruction of property, vehicles, etc.

c. Other plans

488. The MLN-T has devised several other plans to achieve its goals, which generally include partial aspects of the foregoing ones, or which represent a development of them.

In addition to the "Verano Caliente" [Hot Summer] plan, calling for attacks on police personnel, which has already been mentioned, we can cite the "Manganga," "Estrella," "Paloma," "Abuso" and "Gallo" plans relating to escapes from the Punta Carretas and women's prisons, some based upon the use of the sewer system; and the "Gato" plan, likewise associated with a specific escape plot; as well as the "Satan" and "Pajarito" plans, relating to abductions; the "Telex" plan, involving swindling, whereby this system would be applied to the transfer of bank funds; the SINOCA plan, to hold up the Piriapolis Casino; the plan to blow up the engine room and fuel storage plant of the UTE's [General Administration of State Electric Power and Telephones] Batlle y Ordóñez Powerplant; the phony household poll plan, to obtain information on private residences and their occupants; the plan to abduct the landed property owner of the "Nueva Melhem" rural establishment; the "Neron" plan to blow up the entire National Navy fleet and obstruct the port of Montevideo, etc.²



Graffiti on the inside of the property at No 3339 Juan Carlos Blanco Street.

FOOTNOTES

1. The "Nandu" plan, like many others, was devised by members of the subversive movement confined in the Punta Carretas prison; hence the allusion to "our objective situation," and also the statements made elsewhere claiming "we are sending a consecutive set of actions..." (No 480), "we can send information..." (No 481), etc.
2. These and many other subversive plans exposed by the Combined Forces are described in the book entitled "Uruguay, 7 Months of Antisubversive Struggle," Montevideo, 1972, p 127 and ff, published by the Ministry of Interior, where they can be examined.

- XI. Rural Struggle
- 1. "Document 1"
- 2. "Tatu" Plan
- 3. "Collar" Plan
- 4. "Hipopotamo" Plan
- 5. Military Planning

RURAL STRUGGLE

489. As may be observed in the preceding chapter, the MLN-T is aware of the advantages of the urban struggle in Uruguay, of the difficulties involved in taking that struggle to the outlying regions of the country, an issue on which there have been many discussions and a great deal of vacillation among its leaders.

It was after the FA's [Broad Front] defeat in the national elections of 29 November 1971, which proved that it was impossible to come to power through democratic channels, that the movement decided to embark upon rural guerrilla warfare and opened the so-called "second front."

Fidel Castro's cautious statements which have been recalled elsewhere helped to formulate this decision in favor of those who, like Raul Sendic, upheld the need for initiating operations in the interior: "Violence is the only way of winning power in Uruguay." (1)

To illustrate the movement's views on rural guerrillas, this chapter will quote from four documents dealing specifically with the subject: the aforementioned "Document 1," the "Tatu" plan, the "Collar" plan, the "Hipopotamo" plan and an article on military planning.

1. "Document 1"

490. This document expresses the MLN-T's views on rural guerrillas in six points:

"1. Our rural area cannot be used to set up a permanent guerrilla center; it is perfect for use as a hiding place, for recruitment and for military operations involving dispersion and harassment.

"2. A constant ovine and bovine population throughout the country (150 sheep and 50 head of cattle per square kilometer) solves the difficult logistical problem for operational groups which has been resolved elsewhere only through the complicity of the populace and a vast supply system.

"3. A low population index in the large estate areas (two thirds of the country), with an average of 0.6 inhabitants per square kilometer, and one house per 142 square kilometers, affords the movement of contingents without their being spotted.

"4. Although there are not sufficient mountain ranges, the country has uncultivated woodlands which afford precarious shelter and which, when combined with artificial means of defense, may prove quite useful in the rural struggle.

"5. It is in the rural area that the low level of repression is evident: a military contingent amounting to 200 men per 10,000 square kilometers. The seacoast is guarded by 600 men from the superintendency, 400 of whom are stationed in Montevideo.

"6. The dreadful living conditions of the rural wage-earners, some of whom are organized into unions, have created a spontaneously rebellious sector which could prove highly useful in the rural struggle."

2. "Tatu" Plan

491. Devised by Sendic and Zabalza in the Punta Carretas Penitentiary, and taken out of the prison premises in June 1971, this plan has been discussed at plenary meetings and by commissions of the MLN-T's leaders gathered on these occasions, with contributions of the information on rural affairs which insurrectionists who have also been imprisoned, such as Bentin (2), Malikowsky (3) and Bandera (4), have in their possession.

As background information for devising the "Tatu" plan, they took into account the experience cited in the Greek General Grivas' book on Cyprus (5), wherein the use of "Tatuceras" [armadillo caves] (6) is described; Che Guevara's "Guerrilla Warfare;" the "gusanos" [worms] guerrilla war against Fidel Castro in the Escambray region of Cuba, which made use of excavations and underground storage places for 5 years, and was only defeated through infiltration and torture; and the experience with the cane workers, and the tours and hikes through woodlands and interior regions by Sendic, Malikowsky and Estevez (7) themselves, which enabled them to become familiar with and to survey uncultivated areas of the interior without arousing suspicion.

The experience gained by the organization in actions carried out in the interior, such as those at Tiro Suiza, the Customs Receiver's Office in Bella Union and the Tacuarembó branch of the BROU [Bank of the Eastern Republic of Uruguay] and the column's operation in the interior, as well as at bathing resorts and in the vicinity of the departments of Montevideo and Canelones, etc., also helped to facilitate the preparations for the "Tatu" plan.

492. The fundamental objectives of the "Tatu" plan are: to neutralize all the FFAA [Armed Forces] dispersed in the interior of the republic insofar as their potential capacity to support the Montevideo forces is concerned; to lend a national character to the guerrillas; to nullify the FFCC's [Combined Forces] knowledge and experience regarding urban guerrillas, forcing them to concentrate on combating a specific rural guerrilla center.

493. Following is the statement made in the plan in question regarding this second guerrilla front that was opened in the early part of 1972:

"Note: This material is the initial plan devised as a guide for the struggle in the interior. Experience has proven that this is substantially a document of extreme significance to the progress of the second front. Some of its points may not be valid, which is why we are submitting it for discussion today. Through our concrete experience, we shall discover what its shortcomings and virtues are; and thereby eliminate the one, and develop the other to the utmost degree."

Tatu Guerrilla: Strategic Ideas on the War in the Interior

From the press reports, which are not completely trustworthy, we gathered that the tactical status of the operation conducted at the Tacuarembó Bank of the Republic was quite similar to that of others experienced in the past, which we shall cite, since they provided the guidelines for carrying out the action in the interior.

In July 1963, weapons were expropriated from Tiro Suiza in Colonia, and were taken along Route 3 to Paysandu, in a car which overturned on the embankment (8). From nearby, a phone call was made to a comrade in Paysandu who, upon being searched a long distance away, was arrested as being suspicious (9).

Another comrade went underground in Paysandu, but he had to remain concealed in a house and was unable to leave the city because there was complete surveillance of the access roads, while the army, wearing civilian garb, kept a lookout at every corner. In order to get out, he had to put on a mock gun-battle as a diversionary maneuver, and walk through the Queguay woods as far as Rivera, because it was risky to involve other people in the journey along the highway.

494. In January 1964, weapons were expropriated from the Bella Union customs house (10), and the situation in that city was identical to that in the aforementioned location. We must take into consideration the general lack of protection surrounding these targets, the fact that the Tupamaros were completely unknown, and therefore the shock was enormous; and also the fact that the police were not a tenth as streamlined as they are now.

While the organization underwent the well-known vicissitudes until the first convention in July 1966, there were comrades touring the entire interior, reconnoitering woods, making camps in them, and seeking safe places in which to retreat (two comrades died in Montecaseros, Argentina); (10) because they had in mind the classic system of rural guerrillas. The proposal that we made was that any long-term operation would entail combing the woods and ambushing the first patrol; but then, where would we go? At the convention, one of the comrades reported on the results accrued during those 2 years of busy activity in search of some loophole that would enable a group to operate in the interior. All that the comrade said was: "We are getting nowhere." (12)

495. After 22 December 1966, (13) the comrades in the interior supported the new members of the underground, and played a major role in the construction of cantonments. But, even so, their numbers were not large, there were only isolated contacts and one cell or another in various cities. With the status of the organization such as it was, it was foolish to head for the interior when it was treading on such dangerous ground. When the columns were formed, it was no coincidence that the one in the interior had Montevideo and the bathing resorts in the east as its zones of operations. The difficulties in operating, the internal situation which suggested a reinforcement of the capital and the fact that the most important targets for supplies and armed propaganda were located in that area prompted the decision.

At the same time, the organization of cells and reserve services in the cities and towns where it was possible, something which now exists in the north and south, was suggested.

496. Anticipating the familiar problems, when the San Rafael Casino operation was carried out, (14) pits were dug for the money and the members of the underground, while those with legal status took refuge at ONDA (15). We paid the price of having one comrade arrested, an individual who was found out because of the fact that he was the only leftist among the Casino's personnel (16). We learned how a very small spearhead in the interior could be used to resolve the situation.

At that time, the Salto, Treinta y Tres and Paysandu coordinators proposed that action be taken at every contact and, in order to secure an infrastructure that would facilitate such endeavors, they began digging pits, one of which is still in existence.

During one of the actions (involving a collection agency in Salto), a comrade was recognized despite the fact that he was not from that city; and another was arrested when his vehicle was searched on the bridge.

Months later, in the same city of Salto, the Bank of the Republic operation and the jail break confirmed the fact that, if there are safe hiding places with false bottoms the difficulty in retreating is eliminated, even when the level of repression in the cities of the interior is as great as it is now.

497. Another big military problem in the interior was been the training of cadres. There have been instances of time wasted; some comrades have been taken to the zones of operations to gain experience, and their immigration has ended at Punta Carretas, where over 50 imprisoned comrades deny that there are no people willing to give up everything in order to come and make war. It is the same spirit that must be sought out, so as to locate people who will become involved in the "Tatuceras."

498. We wish to offer a description of the military progress in the interior, without considering the rate at which the work is being done (by the others) in Montevideo, something which has been publicized more.

Experience is not just what each individual gains from practice.

In devising a military theory, we cannot underestimate the experience that others have accumulated in the past. Both mistakes and achievements have occurred in all phases of the column's development; the constructive kind of action is to draw conclusions which can be used to increase the success.

Without fear of being tedious, we repeat the study of a military situation in a city of the interior, as it was observed previously and as it recurred a short time ago.

A. Montevideo is a concrete jungle; whereas the cities and towns of the interior are only thickets, and very sparse in some instances.

They can only withstand a limited number of movements (remember the downfall of the comrades at Fray Bentos), a fact which is exacerbated by the situation whereby everyone knows and is familiar with what others think; the work of the police is easy, despite their slight supply of technical facilities.

B. Since the cities in the interior have but few exits, in most instances they are very easy to close off. On the other hand, we must bear in mind the fact that any attempt to break this encirclement will bring us into a direct confrontation with the Armed Forces which have thus far tried to avoid.

C. The cities are located far apart; and therefore we can anticipate that our operational groups will be isolated. The communications with Montevideo will also be hampered.

D. In planning an operation in the interior, the problems involving in approaching the target and coordinating the groups with one another can be readily solved, using the guidelines that we apply in the large city. The main problem is retreating, wherein we have three different courses open to us:

1. We can do so in the direction of the same city in which the action was taken, which would be possible during the early phases of the struggle, if we have available good, easily accessible hideouts and alibis for those with legal status who remain behind or travel for express purposes. There is by now sufficient experience in this respect, and it may be assumed that in times of major warfare, this type of evacuation will be extremely difficult.

2. We could retreat to another city fairly close by, by using the outworn system of transferring groups of operatives between cities for actions. This may be considered to be a possibility during the early periods, although there may be some problems stemming from the coordination between the forces of repression in all departments in closing highways and borders (the police chiefs hold meetings for this purpose).

3. We could be evacuated to the woods, which would be quite safe owing to the enemy's problems in combing a forest; since it would have to concentrate sufficient troops, hence alerting us. But, once the group has been discovered, they calmly surround the area and force us to leave. A group in the woods is not difficult to spot, whether by an informer or by air observation (the AT [tactical aircraft ?] from the base in Durazno can reach any part of the country in half an hour), or simply because we have left traces and cannot hide ourselves completely.

From the tactical analysis, we may conclude that we must be particularly cautious about the problem of retreating, which will become more risky as the rate of the actions increases.

III. Out of the headaches and self-criticism during the years of work in the interior the "Tatuceras" have emerged as a tactical means of flexibly and successfully operating in any kind of strategic situation; because it represents a safe retreat in a rural environment, on the one hand, and because the capture of the group that is operating does not jeopardize the rest of the organization, on the other. The "Tatucera" works like the Sierra Maestra in Cuba from a tactical standpoint, or like the inaccessible jungle of the Vietnamese; however, they keep it filled with pits to make it safer. The "gusanos" used it in Cuba to take the place of the popular support that they lacked. On the island of Cyprus, which has half the area of the department of Tacuarembó, a population of 500,000 and a British army of occupation numbering 50,000 troops, the "Tatuceras" in the countryside were the EOKA's [National Organization of Cypriot Fighters] most effective weapons.

In order to seize power in South Yemen, a small country the size of Canelones, the revolutionaries used "Tatuceras" in the desert environment. As a result, under quite varied conditions the pit has already been used successfully as a tactical means of taking action and of safeguarding the rest of the organization.

499. For the purpose of setting up "Tatuceras," the experience gained in the urban guerrilla movement must be utilized, and geared to the requirements of the rural environment.

As a general rule, legal shelters must be used, but in some of the wooded and mountainous areas, the rustic "Tatuceras" should not be abandoned.

The comrades should train for action in the pit, and return to the pit; learning how to use ambushes, to travel by night, and to survey the terrain and potential targets, always with the idea of the Tatu guerrilla. They must learn how to travel about, with the use of cover, on horseback, on foot, on a bicycle or in a car, unarmed; forgetting the legendary guerrilla fighter with a rifle on his shoulder. We Tupamaros will have the Garands well oiled in the "Tatucera" gun-racks.

We shall learn all this from practice. We cannot propose the construction of "Tatuceras" a priori, because they would be different in the northern woods, on the shores of Colonia, on the small farms in the south central area and in the Minas mountains, owing to the different opportunities for movement, the supplies of personnel and materials and the varying levels of organization.

500. There are two factors which could limit our construction of "Tatuceras":

a. The slight progress that has been made in the technique for building the covers; because simple ones can be tried (and have already been attempted), and the flaws in them can be observed. In order to learn how to build "Tatuceras," one must make them; the launching of the Tatu guerrilla movement cannot depend upon whether or not a technique for covers has been perfected or whether there are supplies of skilled labor available.

b. The people available for this kind of guerrilla activity. We might add that cane workers are not needed for every combat post; we must test those who are willing, who have always proven to be far numerous and from many other locations, in the action groups.

501. Finally, another point to be considered is the strategic placement of the "Tatucera," that is, in locations that are within the reach of several targets, or a 2 or 3 night march away, at most; with plans for the construction of "Tatucera" stations and a "Tatucera" depot for intermediate shelter. This type of "Tatucera" may be an individual unit, or simply a chilca [resinous composite plant] plantation, in which to spend the day until resuming the march by night.

A "Tatucera" located at a point equidistant from two or three cities can madden the forces of repression, which would look for us in the cities, on the highways and in the woods, but never underground. That is where none of the technical facilities that they have at their disposal: radios, helicopters, airplanes, heavy weapons. etc., will do them any good.

502. IV. We have organized much of the interior with a good logistical infrastructure and an excellent potential capacity for operations. But, is this organization fit to engage in combat? Are the present methods valid for expanding the war? We daresay they are not and, furthermore, that we run the risk of losing what we have if we embark upon a struggle that will totally endanger what has been organized. The enemy is playing its cards, and the success of our military strategy depends upon our ability to deal them.

The organization must be geared to the operation of the "Tatu" guerrilla movement as a means of carrying ahead the armed struggle in the interior.

We do not term it a rural guerrilla movement, because it is not the traditional type; but it is on the basis of this "guerrilla method" that the action groups that will develop and enhance it in a practical way will come into existence. After the years of experience with other different methods, and their achievements and mistakes, we have arrived at the "Tatu" guerrilla theory, which must again be confronted with experience that will be the only criterion for the truth.

There has been no concrete experience in this new type of guerrilla movement; hence, the main effort must be directed at the creation of the groups that will be engaging in it. There are dozens of different areas in the interior; we cannot transfer systems. The important thing is for the entire organization to focus its sights on providing for these groups. The "Tatuceras" have become the dynamic focal point of the MLN in the interior; they are the military apparatus, the GA [Vanguard ?]; and, therefore, they are the chief concern of the leadership. The entire zonal organization must revolve about the most highly developed "Tatuceras," because the very status of the organization depends upon the latter's operational potential.

503. The cities are the base of logistical backup and liaison centers; their political task is aimed at recruiting for the "Tatu" guerrilla movement, at making propaganda among the masses, and at the latter's action. In this respect, half of the political work will be to organize the 80 percent of the capitals, towns, rural settlements and trade unions in which our influence is lacking and from which the extra Tupamaros will emerge.

As the base for backup, the cities will direct the existing services toward the "Tatu" guerrillas. There are three services that we call "operational," which must acquire a flexibility that they lack at the present time, and which must be directly subordinate to the military apparatus. They are:

1. The communications service, specializing in the use of radio, and also employing all the facilities that are in use at present.

2. The intelligence service, which must put in order the entire store of information and data from which we are not benefiting because of organizational flaws, in addition to surveying the targets and areas for the purposes of the operational groups. Moreover, in the city, they will check the movements of the army and police, so as to have advance knowledge of the combing of rural areas, based upon the concentration of personnel and preparations that are made.

c. The health service will have to be geared to the new times.

The services such as shops, laboratories, technical facilities and infrastructure will give priority to the construction of hideouts with false bottoms, "Tatucera" covers, mines for rural use and papers for moving about in the countryside. The general criterion is to gear the effort to the "Tatu" guerrilla movement, for which a "supply" service will have to be added to accommodate the "Tatuceras" that will not have storage places nearby. The "training and information" service will engage in the task of preparing political material and internal bulletins for the comrades in the "Tatuceras" who will be rather isolated in this respect. We may possibly have to create a recruitment and propaganda service for the aforementioned political organization task.

The city, as a liaison center, will act as a kind of military or intercolumnar coordinator in Montevideo, for which purpose we shall have to prepare the necessary mechanisms in the suburban areas, with the pertinent shelters and hideouts suited for those functions.

In this way, the "Tatu" guerrilla movement will dynamize the entire organizational structure in the interior, and will put it in a permanent state of readiness for combat, with the positive results that are to be expected.

504. V. In analyzing the political situation in the interior of Uruguay, we must be extremely careful not to dissociate ourselves from the reality demonstrated to us by a population which has observed the historic process from afar virtually since 1904, despite the rather large mobilizations in 1968. Even the most radicalized sectors have been used to depending upon the orders coming from the capital, with the honorable exception of the UTAA [Artigas Sugar Workers Union]; and this habit has been passed on to sectors which have varying degrees of affiliation with the MLN.

The leftist groups have neglected the political work in the rural departments; but we have many points of support, and the reputation that we have earned in 9 years of struggle. (17)

However, the number of sectors which the feats of the Tupamaros have reached moderated by the political distance is far greater. Of course, this panorama is not uniform; there is an entire mosaic of situations, from Bella Union

to Melo, and from Juan Lacaze to Rivera; although the overall climate among the population makes them seem peaceful and placid in comparison with the volcano of Montevideo. And we shall take into account the fact that, whereas in some locations the development of the organization is crying aloud to proceed to higher levels of action, there are others in which we have not met the people's expectations, even with propaganda.

From these standpoints (the customary calmness and the development of the MLN), we realize that we cannot analyze the interior and plan our work with the same outlook with which we won over Montevideo.

505. We shall explain further: In the capital, at first our goal was to win over the vanguard sectors; and, beginning with Pando, we can say that we began to direct the operations based upon the pulse of extensive popular sectors in the capital. Day by day, we are becoming concerned with the broadest popular sectors in the interior, those who have never been reached by the left wing. Hence, the armed propaganda line used to penetrate them must be very precise. We need not win over the vanguard; we are the vanguard, and we are working for the country's nearly 3 million inhabitants.

The pressure which the ruling classes exert on the people is stronger in the countryside, where many of the political relationships are tinged with paternalism which enables the oligarchy to keep the people of the interior as a political reserve, for virtually its own exclusive use.

We must be very careful in handling the many Broad Front functions and assemblies, because they gather together those who have vested their hopes for peace in the holding of elections. They are the petit-bourgeois sectors in the cities of the interior that were followers of Gestido and Gallinal (18) in 1966. They are qualitatively different from the Broad Front's backers in Montevideo, without overlooking the fact that to attend a function of the most progressive party does not mean that one is in agreement with the armed struggle; and the statistics even prove how the percentage of sympathizers with the MLN decreases when there are reprisals or kidnappings of diplomats.

To put it briefly, we cannot gage our influence in the population centers of the interior part of the country by the multiplicity of FA functions, which is only an indication that affords us no reason to become allured, although they are excellent breeding places for potential Tupamaros. It depends upon how we approach them. Our political objectives in the interior must be, on the one hand, to extend the organization geographically so as to create a network of backup points; and, on the other, to convey the chaotic situation that exists among the population, the sensation that the government is giving hysterical commands but is actually not governing, but prosecuting Dual Power actions that the largest possible number of people in each particular area accept and understand (19).

On the military level, the interior has also served as a reserve for the oligarchy. One need only recall the situation on 7 August of last year, when the barracks in the capital were filled with troops from the barracks of the departments south of the Rio Negro, so as to make possible the vast combings and other operations at the time. It should be added that the open slots are filled with a high percentage of people from the interior.

506. VI. Let us attempt to apply our imagination to some very concrete realities and describe some measures that will be adopted for combat when the rate of our blows in the interior so demands. The army has taken to the streets, assuming the task of repression, blocking the exits from the large cities and towns with barriers, patrolling the outskirts with dogs and the roads and highways with jeeps, and stopping any vehicle with pincer tactics, without any prior planning.

All the bridges are cut off, and we shall have to cross the Rio Negro; telephone and telegraph services are under surveillance, the ONDA [buses] (20) and trains are being searched, and the potential targets are being very carefully guarded. These are conditions under which the unexpected becomes a natural incident in the evolution to plan an action.

It is true that, upon dispersing, there is weakness in regard to numbers and firing power, presenting likely targets, because every patrol is a candidate for ambush, and every target that is guarded may be the victim of reprisals. But we must consider what is to be gained from the mobilization and coordination of facilities such as radios, airplanes and helicopters, to set up devices for encirclement which could prove effective, as they were in Pando and Quebrada de Hue. The tactic which the green berets teach and the dependent troops use is simple: to gain mobility, so as to detect a group and cut off its retreat right there. The army is not going to confront us with large concentrations of personnel, but rather will give its groups of riflemen autonomy, multiplying the number of patrols.

In the cities, on the other hand, the police will be concentrated, and the isolated detachments and lesser police headquarters of the countryside will disappear, because they will be weak and ineffective after we attack the first dozen of them.

Every suspicious house will be readily checked, and the search of the neighborhood will be more complete than in Montevideo, since the life and habits of every individual on the census list, including political trivia, are known. Informing will operate in all its splendor, and it will be harder for us to eliminate it than in Montevideo, because the reactionaries will organize groups of which the JUP [Uruguayan Youth on the March] (21) is only a sample. Finally, we shall have many members of the underground, either as a precautionary measure or because they have been "burned" (22), and we do not know where to put them.

If we find the appropriate method, all of that will prove futile, as will the surveillance that may be carried out by the troops from Brazil that have invaded in hopes of acting as saviors. On the basis of the latter hypothesis, we find that the "Tatu" guerrilla movement has become valid and essential in all respects. We cannot underestimate the enemy from a tactical standpoint; the reactionaries are organized, those engaged in repression have learned, and we must be aware of the fact that we have lost the strategic element of surprise in the interior. They are waiting for us, and any mistakes in assessing the enemy's forces will be paid for in fatalities and imprisonment; furthermore, the enemy is convinced that we are going to operate as we did in Tiro Suiza, San Rafael, Salto or Tacuarembó. The development of the "Tatu" method will not only make their advantage with respect to material facilities and men futile, but will also "surprise them." It will confuse them, and put them in the same state of uselessness that they were in when faced with the People's Jail and the urban hideouts. (23)

Moreover, as we have already noted, when confronted with the predictable situations in the future that we have tried to describe, to operate on the targets in the interior from the cities will be impossible, or extremely costly.

507. VII. The "Tatu" Guerrilla Movement

To summarize, it consists of:

- a. A tactical method, the "Tatuceras," which makes it possible to insure retreat to the maximum extent.
- b. A role for the city, the base of support, which is geared to its tactical situation.
- c. A guerrilla method that is a strategy in itself, because it constitutes a flexible weapon which will enable us to deal with any politico-military situation that may arise.

VII. In conclusion, the columns in the interior must begin to determine how many concrete groups they have for proceeding with the "Tatuceras;" just as in Cuba, when the people headed for the Sierra. Then, they must provide those groups with the weapons, ideas, infrastructure, contacts, information, supplies, etc., that will enable them to embark upon the feat of taking the armed struggle to the countryside through the "Tatu" guerrilla movement.

They must create the mystique of the pick and shovel, with each group building its complement of "Tatuceras," and every cell discussing in depth the concept of the guerrilla method as a means of training the comrades, and as a way of executing this task.

They must consider regional scouts, islanders and backwoodsmen as individuals suited to perform this work; but they must instill in the cadres military criteria that have already been established, so as to achieve optimal homogeneity among the operational group.

Conversely, these groups will dynamize the rest of the columns in the interior; they will be the focal point of their concern. Everything, absolutely everything, must revolve about them and their potential for action. Everything must be placed in their service: the recruitment, the CAT [Tupamaro Support Group], the shops, the services, etc.

They will have to be the center for the columns, because they will be the nucleus for their military apparatus, the voices and hands with which the interior columns will express themselves in action, and through which, sooner or later, the masses in the interior will be expressing themselves, without doubt.

Today, they must be the object of greatest affection among the Tupamaros and those devoted to the Tupamaros; just as they will be the object of greatest affection of the gaucho people tomorrow, as interpreted through the action carried out by those groups, just as the Vietnamese guerrillas or those in the Sierra Maestra were an expression and hope of the people. After the available groups have been determined, they must be set up so as to make the first weapons and finish building the infrastructure and the organizational apparatus that will guarantee their operations and will act as a new apparatus placed at the disposal of the action and the groups which will be executing it. The rural combatant in the "Tatuceras" cannot be a "leisure time" combatant; he will more closely resemble the guerrilla fighter going to the mountains than the urban combatant.

He will have his own means of existence, his own conditioned reflexes, and his physique will be toughened and accustomed to that artificial jungle of pits and hideouts by night, and to the protective woods, that he will often have to construct with his own hands. It is this type of Tupamaro that the combat in the interior demands today. It is evident to us that there are already sufficient numbers to begin, even though there are not many. Later, there will be large numbers, when they prove that they are indestructible, as has already happened in Montevideo. Therefore, a few groups for the entire interior will be adequate.

Has anyone ever considered what a few properly backed groups with a good infrastructure and a good organizational apparatus would be capable of accomplishing? They would have to fight 24 hours a day, with good bases to relieve them and an organizational apparatus (which, in fact, already exists, but merely needs to be adapted) to protect and supply them, and to seize upon the political results of their action.

Has anyone ever considered the dynamics and mystique that the entire Tupamaro apparatus in the interior would acquire, after it provides shelter, support, recruitment, the training of extra members, etc., so that those combat groups may continue to operate and agitate the entire country? It must be done: pick and shovel.

Liberty or death."

3. "Collar" Plan

508. This plan was also devised at the Punta Carretas Penitentiary, between late 1970 and early 1971; and it relates to a period of heightened activity and increasing harassment, for which purpose it was decided to extend the geographical range of subversive operations to a suburban area surrounding Montevideo with a radius of approximately 70 kilometers.

It was confiscated by the Combined Forces in April 1972, together with the "Tatu" plan and other subversive documents.

The MLN-T attaches particular significance to the "Collar" plan. It is not just another plan (a paragraph in this document states) "among many, because, in the near future, the armed struggle will be the result of a good interrelationship between three great key components: the urban, as it has been to date (increased), which will be the principal focal point; that of the interior, based upon plans that are already known; and the sub-urban, in the area around Montevideo, which we have discussed in this report."

509. The plan "relates concretely to the situation that will be created during a period of direct harassment. To understand it, one would have to imagine what the struggle will be like during direct harassment accompanied by a dreadful increase in repression, but, at the same time, with a consequent increase in the number of potential tactical targets. Comrades who are from that area and who have made it into an underground have collaborated on this report. We recommend Grivas' little book, and everything relating to the experience of the 'gusanos' in Cuba."

Then the document analyzes the area, the advantages and disadvantages that it offers, the "modus operandi," the method of initiation and the phases of the action.

510. Following is the text:

"The area:

"1. We have established it as a radius of 70 kilometers around Montevideo. This is merely an approximate plan.

"2. From a geographical standpoint, it is varied: there are woods, beaches, uncultivated land, one-horse towns, small farms, villages, towns, cities, bedroom communities, cattle ranches, sections that are densely and sparsely populated, and highways and roads of all kinds. This affords a variety of shelters and movements.

"3. From a demographic angle, it is varied, but most of the population consists of workers from Montevideo of the most 'jodido' (24) [downtrodden] type. There are people who are completely or partially unemployed, students and small

producers. It is assumed that comrades are living there, including peripheral types, sympathizers, labor unionists, leftists, etc. It has the highest density (including the capital, it far exceeds 60 percent of the total population).

"4. Economically and militarily: The repressive apparatus is now weak, in comparison with that in Montevideo; all the supplies are taken to and from the capital for the entire collection of highways, railroads, energy facilities, telephone and telegraph communications and key posts. Major military garrisons and industrial units are located there; it is dotted with an infinite number of relatively isolated small towns; many oligarchs live and have property there, including explosive storage facilities and factories, armories and banks.

"5. Special sites: bathing resorts: the principal base at the beginning of the plan because of: the low price of land, rentals and construction; facilities to be built: a floating population which accepts 'strange' movements: an area containing many trees and good vegetation; sandy ground that may readily be used for all types of false-bottom hiding places; a large variety of potential shelters; a great deal of public land (the entire shore, for example); many leftists, etc.

"Las Piedras, with its growing belt of slums and satellite districts, the second largest city in the country; Canelones, Santa Lucia, Pando, Montes de Santa Lucia and Pando [sic].

"6. The outskirts of Montevideo are a good site for contacts and support: Cerro, La Teja, La Paloma, Colon, Mililla, Camino Maldonado, etc.

"7. The border area is very heavily guarded; an attempt would be made to encircle that encirclement. Many soldiers live there, and could be harassed in their homes or be the subject of political work.

"511. Advantages, disadvantages and modus operandi

"1. Experience has proved how difficult it is to establish a cover in the area. This explains the principal shortcomings. We are rather annoyed about them, but that attitude is incorrect, since the 'area's own laws' are not upheld. There is quite a positive balance which we sometimes forget: In 1966, when things were becoming difficult, we had to 'rajar' (25) [flee] from the city, and it was that area which saved us. Of course, when things became more lively, the situation became difficult; but we did not change our views, and that was the mistake. The cover must be legal, and well established; and that establishment takes time. The clandestine status must be tight. It is in those three "cosos" (26) [things] that the difficulty and the crux of the entire plan lie.

"That is why we think that we should not begin with individuals having legal status exclusively, and, if possible, with comrades from the area.

"2. Good false-bottom hideouts for a tight clandestine arrangement will be the main weapon, and they take time and labor.

"3. We must uphold all these precepts; otherwise, all the failures will discourage us and prevent the creation of the 'mystique' of the 'Collar' plan. That mystique must create an attitude similar to the one that exists with regard to the hideouts. We think that the same thing will happen in the 'Collar' plan: At first, only a few individuals observed it clearly and were enthusiastic; now everyone observes it. It would be 'jodido' (27) [unpleasant] if the experience which forced us into an urgent 'Collar' plan had to be different now.

"4. If we have good hideouts and cover, we are sure that it will be possible to move combat groups of four or five comrades by night in any kind of vehicle, or on foot, with any type of weapon, including long-barrelled ones. We consider this to be one of the best methods of militancy for the clandestine members who are being hunted down forcefully, in view of the turn that events have been taking. That will not be the fate of those underground; if we want them to produce to the maximum extent, let us not burn those with legal status.

"5. The enemy's entire communications system loses its efficiency in these larger areas or those most far removed from their nerve centers. We do not depend so much on vehicles. How long would it take to concentrate their personnel to respond to a night-time raid on the Soca police station? How many men would they need to surround two groups of five men who took off first in a vehicle, and later on foot, crossing familiar fields until they reached their permanent or temporary shelters?

"6. A variety of shelters or hideouts are possible: houses, small farms, country houses, ranches, weekend or abandoned houses, construction projects, pits in suitable areas without a cover on top, false-bottom hideouts for groups, individuals or material, etc.

"In the case of legal shelter, it may be used to seal the opening to the hideout, and therefore, it may be omitted in some locations.

"7. Legal cover should comprise 75 percent of the human investment, and the work involved in it will also include a series of 'services' for the action groups: liaison, tactical reports, the guarding of targets and defunct shelters, food, etc.

"8. From an organizational standpoint, this plan must include a special column for administration, services, resources and its own personnel and a satisfactory autonomy. It will be different from the current ones, for various reasons, owing to the specific task. The action groups must enjoy a great deal of autonomy within the area assigned to them, and in the general plans that have been devised.

"9. The establishment of armed groups in concrete areas will be the rule for this plan, despite the fact that raids will be made in other areas, or may be concentrated among several groups, to hit a target.

"10. The 'aprete' (28) [seizure] of houses, vehicles, telephones, etc., in order to operate from the area, will be an easy method, in view of the isolated nature of chalets, small farms, country houses, etc., with good large-sized and small trucks.

"11. The use of the red light for transmitters, hideouts, services, etc., is quite possible; and the use of vehicles with hiding places is essential.

"12. Finally, this plan is never a waste of time, because it is being used for the struggle in the focal point. It always results in a positive balance, even when carried out halfway.

"512. How to begin

"First stage:

"1. Appoint a team to become centralized and specialized (three or four comrades).

"2. Compile all the available information on the area, and classify it according to sub-areas; start making a complete survey.

"3. Study the area and its political, economic, military and social aspects. Look at statistics and censuses; for example, see a film that is suitable for penetrating the small producers (a difficult sector, influenced only by Nar-done (29); almost no one else is familiar with their needs and problems.

"4. Make a survey of the peripheral comrades, sympathizers and leftists who live in the area, or who have assets (such as land, small farms, etc.), for the purpose of totally or partially associating them with the plan to improve information in the future.

"5. Find out who can offer shelter, and what kind; and then assign them to the endeavor. A good way of gaining entry is to obtain work in the area: in a country house, sugar harvesting, truck driving, etc. This affords information, is less suspicious and allows for easy entrenchment later on.

"6. Up to this point, everything can be done using the present columns as executing branches, inasmuch as each one is responsible for every suburban area, and there is no reason why these tasks should 'joder' (30) [interfere with] the plans that are already under way.

"7. When the first safe shelters are available, start the first false-bottom hideouts which will be essential for proceeding to the second phase. We think that it would be possible to begin with three good hideouts which can

hold 15 comrades (at a time), and which are well located (for example, one in Rincon del Cerro, another in Las Piedras and a third at the bathing resorts), as a minimum.

"8. Designation of the Cdo. (31) [command], and assignment of the comrades and resources; in other words, the formation of the column. This will be the longest phase.

"513. Second stage:

"1. Setting up the three groups (obviously, if more are possible, all the better) in the hideouts.

"2. Survey of the terrain by the GA (32) [armed group] by night, on foot, clocking the time. To be done by the legal members at any time.

"3. Improvement of the hideouts and the construction of others for personnel and materials, defunct ones for permanent use, for emergency, etc.

"4. Survey of friendly homes in the area; accumulation of material; mounting of the 'apparatus' and certain essential services: explosives, small shops, health, liaison, administration, etc.

"5. General training of the legal and clandestine apparatus; adjustments and sham battles. Since this stage is dangerous, it affords an opportunity to gain preliminary experience and make corrections.

"6. A series of hideouts and shelters of all kinds must be set up throughout the entire area. The most suitable method seems to us to be that of establishing a good central hideout, and a group of friendly houses, emergency shelters, hiding places for materials, etc.

"7. The major construction must be done during this stage, because it will be hard later on. It must not be forgotten that labor will be available, because the armed groups will be assigned to build those shelters. Subsequently, there will have to be a permanent service for new shelters; but, in general, this should be the result of the recruitment and political work in the area.

"8. This stage should be as brief as possible, because it is already dangerous, and time is spent on every aspect.

"514. Third stage: the action

"1. At first, the action should be cautious, and carried out in waves, attempting to conceal the fact that the operations are being conducted from the area, something that need not be suspected in view of the proximity to Montevideo (they can be thrown off the track in this respect). We would thereby gain time so that the groups could have their first experience with a certain amount of ease, and could correct mistakes, improve the infrastructure. etc.

"2. Later, the period between waves may be shortened, until constant harassment becomes possible.

"3. The legal members providing cover must not engage in action of any kind, to preclude serious risks; because no movement is possible without them.

"Their tasks will be: tactical and political information (what are the people saying? was there a police raid? what weapons did a certain detachment have? etc.). Liaison: between one group and another, between the command and the comrades, with the rest of the organization, etc. Messages in mail boxes, sentry duty, external guard duty and provisions for hideouts with or without personnel, etc.

"4. The possible types of action: a. direct harassment using typical guerrilla tactics (ambushes, snares, fisticuffs); b. armed propaganda; c. collecting tolls and taxes; d. Revolutionary J. (33) [justice], people's jail; e. occupation of cities and towns; f. expropriation, etc.

"5. The political work will be done through the CAT, etc., but specific visits will be made: to people, small restaurants, small farms, houses, popular dances, etc.; giving the line, but concrete assistance, specifically, as in the rural guerrilla movement.

"In other words, today I visit a small farm owner; if he does not inform on me, I have a good chance to consider him a future friend, and why not; a comrade, with a hideout in his house, etc.

"6. So that this plan may give its best results, the action should be simultaneous in the area, and coordinated with the other actions. In this way, we shall not be isolated. The more groups there are operating in the area, the better; because it would not be easy to detect one, surround it and neutralize it. So that the output may be maximum, a group should, as a rule operate at a distance from its group of shelters, but no farther than it can travel in one night. Sooner or later they will realize that the fate of each group depends upon the quality of its cover and hideout, its ability to avoid encirclement and the harassment that the other groups maintain.

"7. They will make police raids, combing areas, searching neighborhoods; and they will use dogs (study this), helicopters. etc. In such instances, the group involved must 'hold on' until the storm passes. It is not in our interest to deal blows at all costs; but rather to harass, and create an awareness of the fact that we are indestructible here as well. The very fact that they have to assign men and facilities to comb the area and guard it will be an objective achieved, because we shall be taking the war elsewhere, and easing the pressure on another area.

"P.S. It would be a good idea to study the options relating to dividing the 'Collar' plan according to columns (one suburban area for each one, as is now the case); so that each column would have combined attack and rearguard areas, and the complication of making a new column could be avoided."

4. "Hipopotamo" Plan

515. This plan relates to the types of insurrection considered by the organization and, in particular, a special type of insurrection that is, theoretically, the "greatest," or "maximum" kind for seizing power: the "insurrection of insurrections," from which it gets its name, as well as other more restricted or partial types of insurrection, with limited targets, but linked with the former.

The "Hipopotamo" plan was confiscated by the Combined Forces during the early part of 1972 and, together with the "Tatu" and "Collar" plans, comprises a trilogy aimed at putting direct revolutionary action into operation.

The foregoing was clearly stated by the executive secretariat of the MLN-T in the "bases of discussion" prepared in March of that year, wherein these plans were analyzed in the light of the new or more significant events on the international or domestic scene.

516. In view of the prospect that the movement would become bogged down in the repetition of activities that had already been performed up until that time, it was necessary to "become renovated" and "proceed toward something else."

Therefore, this document maintained that new incidents had to be created, and that the military action had to be given dynamism: "If we do not give our military action its polarizing, definitive and dynamizing quality again, and if we do not create new incidents, we shall be sterilizing ourselves, and allowing deceptive solutions to continue to be offered to the people. At this stage, we cannot jeopardize our vanguard status, by abandoning it; nor can we cease to be one of the clearcut poles into which the country is divided. The people must clearly understand (we cannot leave any doubt in their minds) that what we propose is the revolution. This involves, purely and simply, proceeding to the direct, systematic harassment of the forces of repression as a principal method of military and political action. So, we propose taking this issue from the realm of theoretical perspective and putting it in the realm of immediate tasks; etc."

517. The text of the "Hipopotamo" plan is as follows:

"General Statements

"1. In the military plank of draft Document 5, we mention the possibility of an insurrection as a supplement to the other types of armed struggle, for the purpose of seizing power and to gain other objectives. We also mention the need to prepare for it. Through this plan, we shall try to adapt and develop our thinking on the subject as concretely as possible.

"2. To be quite exact, let us say that what concerns us is not only the typical format of an insurrection, consisting of a great blow in the midst of a

propitious situation, aimed at seizing power; but we are likewise concerned about creating the ideas and other forms of insurrection that could occur in a different context, with other more limited objectives.

"3. In other words, we think that insurrectional or semi-insurrectional formats could be used in a variety of instances and circumstances.

"For example, to seize power, to proceed to higher levels of struggle and decision, to accompany a sudden increase in popular incidents, to react to reprisals at times, to counter a right wing coup d'etat, to oppose or precipitate foreign intervention, etc.

"4. Now then, as we consider and prepare for the 'maximum' insurrection, that is, the one aimed at seizing power, we shall be in a position to confront, consider and prepare for partial insurrections with limited objectives.

"5. To put it briefly, the insurrection or 'insurrections' will become part of the whole group of potential actions or types of action to which the organization can resort during the struggle in these new times.

"To be exact, we think that it would be a good idea to ask ourselves questions such as these: What politico-military distance is there between an action such as that at Pando and a similar one in Montevideo? How many men would be required? How many weapons? How many explosives and homemade weapons? What organizational structures? How much time would we need to move the organization toward one or more targets? etc.

"6. In 1965, owing to the rumors of a coup d'etat, the organization prepared a theoretical plan for immediate resistance for the sake of its prestige at the time; distributed concrete tasks and targets based upon that plan, which was the focal point of all the militants and cells; and went so far as to carry out a surprise sham battle based upon the plan. All of that was very useful in detecting flaws, shortcomings and requirements, and in making organizational adjustments and devising clearcut plans and directives for work of various kinds and on various levels.

"7. We are likewise certain that we shall soon be embarking on the phase of theoretical preparation of the 'Hipopotamo' plan, wherein we have already accrued positive results; because we shall continue to notice flaws, requirements, etc., and we shall continue to gain clearcut perspectives on the work on all fronts: for example, the value of political work in the UTE, the ANCAP [National Administration of Fuels, Alcohol and Cement], the AFE (34) [State Railways Administration], etc; the concrete minimal requirements for T-1, T-2, mines, etc.; organizational adjustments that are essential from the standpoint of the future; the real value of long-barrelled weapons, etc.

"518. Definition of the plan and description

"1. The Hip. (35) plan is aimed at preparing the various plans and tasks that must be carried out from now on for the widespread insurrection designed to seize power, and for other types of partial insurrections with limited targets.

"2. Concrete example of a limited action. (The sole purpose of this example is explanatory; hence it suffers from schematism.)

"Plan: On 20 December, the organization begins to concentrate on sites. At 0300 hours at dawn on 1 January, a contingent seizes trucks from storage facilities where they are available. Another takes over the Platense Patin Club, or a similar establishment. Another cuts off the lights and telephones in the downtown area, at Punta Carretas and in key districts. Another cuts off the communications of the repressive forces, or jams them on radio waves. Still others make a good 'roundup' of agents of the repressive administration (both police and military), as well as of the political administrators, and puts them in the Platense Club. Another attacks the PGM (36) [General Maritime Prefecture], in order to confiscate its weapons and destroy their material effects. Another attacks the Bank of the Republic, to seize the funds. Another attacks Punta Carretas. There is a variety of fronts. We must also consider the problems stemming from the need to promptly lead and make cadres of large human contingents in plans of this scope.

"3. We can cite some new methods of forming cadres and gaining members that are afforded in plans of this type. There are, and will be, increasing numbers of individuals approaching us, ready and able to brandish a weapon, but unsuited for constant, clandestine militancy (people from Cerro or Teja, shaggy types, etc.). In actions of this type these comrades may be concentrated on sites for this purpose, and assigned targets within the framework of the action, or they may be used to reinforce permanent groups, etc.; but they must later be disbanded to await another 'patriotic action.'

"4. Whatever be the targets and plans that we devise for ourselves, in absolutely all of them we must take into account and prepare properly for the possibility of a retreat; because considerable forces which cannot and should not be completely jeopardized have been invested.

"5. As we noted in the 'example,' we must bear in mind the ability to make choices. In other words, we can initiate an action with concrete, limited objectives, but with the optional objective of detonating a situation that would foster an intensification of the advancement. Tasks such as health service, coordination, liaison, infrastructure, etc., assume an importance that converts them into new problems in plans of this type, problems that we must continue to study.

"6. In conclusion, we must add that this plan does not appear to us to be rash, at least in the form in which it has been proposed (as a thing or a problem for continued study and preparation), in view of the large size of the organization. Furthermore, at worst we are not wasting time; because bringing up these matters forces us to review what has been done, and to dream of, or imagine the future, and hence infer tasks, prospects, adjustments, etc. These are necessary and useful now. Moreover, the process can, at any point, confront us with the obligation to carry out actions such as

those cited herein, which, as we can observe, is something quite difficult to improvise. So, we would do well to become fully aware of this necessity and of that possibility as well. And this is one of the purposes of this publication, because, as each and every one of the comrades continues to 'pelotear' (37) [master] these things, we run less of a risk than we would if we were the Galician who, upon seeing a hippopotamus, said: 'That animal does not exist.' It can exist, and it can carry us on its back at any time, if we are not prepared."

5. Military Planning

519. The foregoing plans are supplemented with a very lengthy document, without a title, consisting of seven chapters filled with politico-sociological observations wherein the MLN-T lays down the general lines and concrete rules that must govern the military operations.

Since it is impossible to reproduce the exact text of this document, owing to its length, we have summarized it as follows:

520. The first chapter analyzes the need for a study of military planning, the essential reason for which is attributed to the increase in operational requirements resulting from the "sudden heightening of the class struggle (economic, political and ideological struggle) that Uruguay is experiencing."

The MLN-T proved that "its language, the method of armed struggle, was viable in the national situation," and, therefore, "it must increase until it is on a par with the historical circumstances." The government's capacity for repression increased, and the subversive movement likewise grew, establishing itself as a "politico-military organization" which must be strengthened by giving its members military training: "...Since ours is a politico-military organization, it must combine with the mutual concepts of political affairs a military mentality that will guarantee that we are building on secure ground, whatever the work front may be. The armed struggle is the decisive form in which the movement expresses itself politically. And, like any other human discipline, it needs educational and practical guidelines so as to be geared to the objective requirements of any given moment. Our movement uses the method of guerrilla warfare as an expression of armed struggle." One of the forms of guerrilla warfare is the rural guerrillas, in which there have been countless experiments. Another form is the urban guerrillas, in which there have been "very few successful experiments, such as the ones conducted with the notion of being an auxiliary to the rural guerrillas or regular armies." In this connection, the fact that the movement adopted the urban guerrilla method from the outset gave it an inferior status with respect to other expectations of armed struggle on the continental scale. It started from scratch and, little by little, an organization was set up which used an original method: the urban guerrillas." Since it was impossible to create a "school for military studies...we can afford schools of instruction, and we have them. We can and must multiply those schools in which simple courses which systematize the organization's experience are taught," an experience

which "is quite replete in such areas as military action, the labor union struggle, services, recruitment, security, political development, etc. (38)."

521. The second chapter discusses the operation which "is a form of political expression more than anything else...; when revolutionaries make an expropriation, or execute or arrest an oligarch, they are expressing the essential content of a class response (that of the proletariat) to the bourgeois society in one of their different types of expression. So, an operation is a concrete form of the class struggle, a political expression of the class struggle. Politically, the movement represents the historic interests of our nation's workers; since it is struggling to liquidate the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie and to set up the dictatorship of the proletariat in its place. Therefore, the movement represents the workers in one of the forms of class struggle: political struggle. And that political struggle is waged by exercising revolutionary violence, by using it as a response to the violence of the ruling class." In addition to being a form of political expression, the operation, "by its very nature, constitutes a form of military expression." Since the political objective requires a medium in which to materialize, "that medium, from our standpoint (that of the movement, which uses the method of armed struggle essentially), will be a military operation, an instrument serving a political purpose. From the military standpoint, we define the operation as a break in the equilibrium." In other words, the conflict that occurs when the equation of exploiters and exploited, which is expressed historically in the economic, political and ideological realms, begins to break down.

Now then, "the break in the equilibrium entails the creation of dynamics by means of the struggle, creating a situation that is different from the previous one." For example, "a kidnapping, or a series of kidnappings, results in dynamics of a political and repressive sort. And it is these results that must be analyzed when an operational plan is being devised. We must anticipate the dynamics that we shall be creating when we break the equilibrium in any area, and the obligations of all kinds that the new situation will impose on us."

522. The third chapter deals with security relating to the operation's attainment of results: "An abortive execution does not achieve the political objective that was sought; just as an expropriation or abduction that fails weakens the organization politically in the eyes of the people."

The concept of security is developed here in connection with the members of the organization themselves, the "comrades" and the "entourage;" in other words, the individuals other than the operative, the population in the broadest sense, those whom "we must gradually win over...to our political objectives, as a means of changing the correlation of forces on the national scale. And it is not a matter of winning their sympathy and surviving; it involves something far more important." It involves leading them "from nonrevolutionary, conformist positions to positions of membership and active participation

in the struggle for liberation," by means of these two integrating factors: "a progressive political education that is expressed in the understanding of the new revolutionary methods (conscientization) and a revolutionary practice that is on a par with their political consciousness. Both factors are part of a single process: the revolutionary process of a people. And, as such, it contains phases that may be accelerated, but never skipped." Hence, this entails "taking into account the methods of associating the population which is in the vicinity of an objective, and gaging the degree of participation that we should impose upon it with our revolutionary practice," without losing sight of the "historical dynamics" in general and those of each social sector "resulting from its experiences;" in other words, "the changes that have been occurring both among the population as a whole and in each one of its sectors."

523. The fourth chapter deals with the operation as a break in the equilibrium, based upon the aforementioned concepts, with a detailed analysis of the favorable factors (which are those relating to the subversive organization's clandestine status, and the element of surprise; that is, the when, how and where); the unfavorable ones (which stem from various elements, such as the armed patrols carried out by the public security entities, the impossibility of anticipating all the variations that may occur among operations, the unpredictable reactions of those receiving the effects of the operation, panic, informing mistakes, hesitation, etc.); and the method for achieving a correlation favorable to the operation.

524. In its fifth chapter, the document examines the objective from the standpoint of the factors which could be advantageous to the organization, the information about it which is essential to have, and the static and dynamic assessment of that objective.

The factors that could prove favorable include: routine, the chain of command, personal and class conflicts, too much confidence in the equipment, the human factor, the numbers or the weapons.

As for the information, a distinction is made between general information, that relating to the interior of the target (physical plant, number of individuals associated with it, schedules, habits, functions, communications media, likely access and exits, and associations with the outside), and that connected with its exterior or environs. Since "the target is something living insofar as its functioning and parts are concerned, we must try to reconstruct that life...both the internal life and the association with its environs." This entails an assessment of the target both statically and dynamically; that is to say, discerning how it operates and also what could hypothetically occur while it is operating, so as to have a rather clearcut notion of the target "in its most likely and most dangerous respects, leaving the rest in the hands of the comrades' ability to resolve unforeseen situations."

525. In the sixth chapter, an analysis is made of the group in action, through a study of the human resources, the logistical resources and that group's static and dynamic potential.

The human resources must be distributed in accordance with the nature and plan of the operation, which will be what indicates the concrete figure. But, apart from this, an evaluation must be made of the minimal personnel (a critical figure in the operation-security equation, so as not to carry it out "under rash conditions"), the maximum personnel (which, "on the contrary, is based upon an assessment of security for the operation") and the tactical reserves (which will make it possible "to unbalance in our favor an adverse situation under any circumstances that may prevail in guerrilla warfare").

The logistical resources are regarded as being associated with the weapons, the vehicles, the implements and their users, which are fundamental aspects; since the commando action, a basic element in guerrilla activity "is marked by its great efficacy, its speed and the economy of forces that it affords."

The static potential of the action group is the real, concrete combination of a set of factors which include: the number of members, weapons, auxiliary items (implements, etc.), vehicles, the operational plan, and the military experience, tactical capacity and political training of the members. The dynamic potential is a hypothetical assessment that makes it possible to cope with two operational demands and handle a hypothesis relating to the behavior of the action group. This involves an analysis of various points, such as "the political awareness and military experience of the group and of each member, the esprit de corps, the combined militancy, and the political and emotional harmony within the group. Based upon these factors, it is feasible to make a hypothesis regarding the action group's behavior when faced with adverse circumstances," a hypothesis which will also be useful when self criticism is made of the operation, "to try to discover what the action group's dynamic potential is. And, if the group is not involved, to discover it among the outstanding combatants. Because, among other reasons, it is feasible to find among the group of comrades in the military apparatus those who are most outstanding, so as to promote them to a position of responsibility that demands a reaction capacity superior to the average."

Finally, the seventh chapter describes the planning of the operation, in an attempt to "systematize the methodology that the organization uses in planning its operations," based upon the experience that has been accumulated throughout the years.

The first point that is analyzed is of a political nature: "We can never place too much stress on the need for making a political analysis prior to any operation," in "a political organization which engages in armed struggle as a means of accruing results, and not for the sake of the armed struggle per se. ...Although it may seem unnecessary, we must assert that no operation is conducted by the organization without political justification."

Next, the document examines the general plan, that is, "the total view of the operation," wherein preponderant significance is attached to time, to the duration of the operation. "In addition to affording a total view of the operation, the general plan determines the priorities with respect to targets," which may be political or military priorities, although the one kind is never separated from the other. When the priorities have been set, "then the principal targets will emerge. For example, in occupying a barracks, we would have indicated the military aspect as a priority. Therefore, the principal targets will be determined by the number of weapons, ammunition and all types of military supplies that are kept there, which we must take away with us. In the event of the occupation of a factory, we have established the political priority of the operation and, as part of it, and as a principal target, discussions with the workers, for example." The secondary targets "are in descending order of priority;" for example, in the case of the barracks, a discussion with the military; but "we will hold it or not, depending upon whether the principal target is being attained without obstacles," and there will always be a previous stipulation "of the time taken to attain each target, whether it be principal or secondary."

It then discusses matters pertaining to the number of actions that comprise the general plan, the logistical resources (weapons, implements, operators and vehicles), the human resources, the commands (which, unlike their status in the police or army, where they always give the orders, in the organization they can always be challenged "before or after" the operation, since this is a politico-military organization, but never "during" its progress), the coordination (of the teams, or combat and command groups), the health (the main principle of which is, from the organization's standpoint, that "in all instances, the wounded must be considered seriously"), the prior concentration, the approach to the target (wherein the element of surprise acts as a disorganizer of the enemy's defense systems), the external checking of the target, the start of the operation, the evacuation and the security measures that will insure its normal progress, the encirclement situation (a danger that the enemy can always inflict), the final check of the operation and, lastly, the self-criticism.

"Self-criticism is...the final phase of an operation, and failure to make it cannot be justified with any excuse. The group as a whole can consider itself very capable or rather incapable." The operation is always the "criterion of the truth." Through it, "we know what the action group is really like: whether its performance is better or worse than its own evaluation of itself." In the self-criticism of the operation, "all the comrades without exception must participate. In instances wherein the action group is composed of several combat groups, that self-criticism will be conducted step by step, so as to avoid unnecessary overlapping, etc."

527. To summarize the views of the subversive organization regarding the rural struggle, two phases predominate:

1. In the first, which was described in "Document 1," although certain factors are considered positive for its development (good opportunities for food, small concentration of residents), which would force the small repressive forces to disperse and facilitate the movements and support (as a matter of principle) from the rural proletariat, it was concluded that this should not be changed from the category of auxiliary forces.

2. In the second phase, which took place in the early part of 1972, the subversive group decided to open a second front, for diversionary purposes, for which purpose it implemented the "Tatu" and "Collar" plans. In other documents, it also considered using a variety of forms of insurrection to produce "new incidents" (the "Hipopotamo" plan), and analyzed the military planning of the operations through a study of the operation, the security for attaining the sought-after results, the operation as a break in the equilibrium, the target, the group in action and the planning of the operation.

FOOTNOTES

1. Chapter II, 3, a, Official Statements, p 40 and ff.
2. Felix Manuel Maidana Bentin, alias "Juan," cane worker, resident of Bella Union; took part in the San Rafael Casino holdup; arrested on 3 June 1970 in a police operation at 4300 Bernardo Berro Street, Montevideo; was tried and then released. Arrested again under the emergency security measures; chose to leave for Chile on 12 February 1972, and thence to Cuba with other subversives; specializes in guerrilla techniques, intelligence, communications, urban struggle, etc.
3. Ruben Malikowsky Trey, alias "Wara," one of the founders of the MLN-T. With Sendic, toured nearly all the interior of the country and Uruguayana, acquiring detailed information on the uncultivated areas which enabled him to collaborate on the preparation of the "Tatu" plan.
4. Antonio Bandera Lima, alias "Pedro," "Bandera," "Coco Morales" and "Rosen-do;" member of the Column 23 command, serving as chief of the military sector and general coordinator; member of the group which threatened the life of an armed forces officer in Mercedes; arrested on 31 May 1970; escaped in the "abuse;" head of the group which killed Private Godoy of the Naquina detachment, etc.
5. Georgios Grivas, "Guerrilla Warfare," Buenos Aires, 1969.
6. "Tatucera," the lair of the "Tatu," a special variety of armadillo rather common in the Uruguayan countryside; about 50 centimeters long; using its strong front claws, it can quickly dig deep holes in which it usually lives.

7. Jesus Nicolas Antonio Estevez, alias "Alfredo," "Colacho," "Humberto" and "El Flaco" [Skinny]. Arrested in July 1969; also escaped in the "abuse;" was arrested in 1972 in the section of Diego de Rivera known as "Bajada de Pena," etc.
8. 1 August 1963.
9. 6 and 9 September 1963.
10. 1 January 1964.
11. 16 December 1964.
12. In Lunfardo [underworld slang]: uselessly, without any result.
13. Date of the death of the subversive Carlos Flores and the beginning of a severe police roundup conducted against the organization at that time. See also: 14, 26, 27 and 29 December 1966; and 3, 4, 5, 6, 12, 17, 21 and 26 January 1967.
14. 18 February 1969.
15. National Bus Organization, a private passenger transportation firm which runs service between Montevideo and all the other departments in the interior of the country.
16. Alejandro Grieco Nieves. See: 20 February and 16 March 1969.
- 16.[sic] Nickname. given to cane workers.
17. This reference, which dates back to 1962, again confirms the date on which the subversive group came into existence, which was cited conveniently.
18. Candidate of the majority sector of the National Party in the elections of that year.
19. Concerning "double power," see Chapter X, 3, Tactics, No 446.
20. The aforementioned National Bus Organization.
21. Uruguayan Youth on the March, an anticommunist youth organization.
22. "Quemadas," in Lunfardo, compromised, used up, identified by the police.
23. A boastful allusion to the "inaccessible" safe position in which those premises of the subversives remained for a long time.
24. In Lunfardo: downtrodden, in poor financial straits.
25. In Lunfardo: flee, shoot, escape danger .

26. In Lunfardo: the masculine form of "cosa" [thing].
27. In Lunfardo: ugly, repulsive, shocking.
28. To "pinch," seize, take over a house or a vehicle, etc. for use in an emergency or action; and even the very act of keeping its owners under guard, or "pinched," while the action is under way. The "pinching" of vehicles has been a device used constantly by the MLN-T, and its occurrence is an indication that some kind of attack is being planned. There is even an internal document of the organization, consisting of 6 pages, and entitled "Methods Used for Pinching Vehicles," in which there is a lengthy description of the methods used, depending upon whether taxicabs, taxibuses, private vehicles or ordinary vehicles are involved; including houses with vehicles, searches in streets, and garages for automobiles and other vehicles of "legal" members of the organization; describing the number of vehicles to be "pinched," depending upon the action that is to be carried out; the type of vehicle, treatment of the owners or drivers of the "pinched" vehicles, etc.
29. Benito Nardone, labor leader of the Federal League of Rural Action who, for over 20 years, has engaged in an intensive action for information and training over Rural Radio, which have him a great deal of prestige among the rural workers. His affiliation with a sector of the National Party during the 1958 elections resulted in that party's victory, etc.
30. In Lunfardo: to damage, upset.
31. Command.
32. GA: armed group.
33. Justice.
34. AFE: State Railways Administration.
35. Hip: abbreviation for "Hipopotamo."
36. PGM: General Maritime Prefecture.
37. From Lunfardo, a common expression in soccer games: handling, practicing, training.
38. The holding of these courses is a result, among other factors, of the "Cadre School programs" of 15 November 1971, which are listed below by way of example:

"General level: course in tools, course in explosives, reading and discussion of materials, political line, revolutionary organization, democratic centralization, what is a Tupamaro.

"Level in charge of a GA and GAF [trained armed group ?]; Cadres School, group leadership, methods, planning, what is a GA leader, what is an instructor, the training.

"Subcommand and command level: the tasks of leadership, inspection, organizational system, history, political tactics and strategy, military tactics and strategy.

"Material: Documents 1, 3 and 4; draft of Document 5, Bylaws, Statement on the Broad Front, Communique on Jackson Amnesty, group leadership course, Urban Guerrilla Handbook, democratic centralism, Mao: 34-39, evaluation techniques, Giap: people's war, people's army."

XII. Struggle on the Masses Front


1. Workers Front
2. Employees Front
3. Students Front

STRUGGLE ON THE MASSES FRONT

528. The title reiterates a typical expression of the MLN-T which, in turn, took it from Marxist-Leninist terminology in which the term "masses." instead of "people." is given particular preference. Although it is subtle, the distinction is important, because "masses" is an impersonal group, shapeless matter obedient to the designs or the gestures of whoever is controlling it; whereas "people" reflects the individuality and spirit germane to each member, without subjugation to any chief or master.

In discussing democracy in his Christmas message of 1944, Pius XII accurately depicted this contrast: "The 'people' and the amorphous multitude that is generally called the 'masses' are different concepts. The 'people' live to the fullest the lives of the individuals that comprise them, each one of them, in his own place and manner, being a person aware of his personal responsibilities and of his own convictions. The 'masses,' on the other hand, impassively await impulses from outside, and are an easy plaything of whoever exploits their instincts and impressions, willing to follow one cause today, and another tomorrow." (39)

529. As an authentic Marxist-Leninist group, the MLN-T expresses concern over gaining the adherence of the "masses," rather than the people, a goal that it has never succeeded in attaining.



Title page of an MLN-T internal document on the strategy of the trade union movement.

In its activity, it attempts to control, in succession, the workers front, the employees front and the student front.

From the abundant subversive literature, one infers that, as a rule, the movement tends to consider the workers sector and the employees sector as being combined from a trade union standpoint, possibly because both have been coordinated by the CNT [National Convention of Workers]. It attaches considerable importance to the students sector, which it studies as "something separate."

This chapter discusses the "mass" action carried out by the subversive organization in connection with each one of these fronts.

1. Workers Front

530. The position of the MLN-T regarding this sector emerged mainly from a document prepared during 1967, entitled "The Tasks on the Masses Front," and confiscated in a police procedure carried out in January 1968.

Its text, which is quoted below, clearly establishes the ideas of the subversive organization:

"1. For the present, the labor movement is the principal form of organization among the Uruguayan masses.

"2. The CNT is the highest degree of organization achieved by the labor movement in its history.

"3. It assumes major importance if one considers the fact that there are participating in it, in addition to organizations of industrial workers from private industry, labor organizations of the middle class (public and private employees, students, teachers, and workers from government agencies), which have joined the struggle because of the crisis that has impoverished them.

"4. The chief objectives in the CNT's struggle have been wage demands, but they have included in their program demands of a political type and substantial solutions to the nation's problems, which have been the cause of some major mobilizations.

"5. The government has countered the labor movement with violence on many occasions, and has not succeeded in destroying its organization (recently).

"6. The program which the CNT is currently executing involves a direct confrontation with the regime which cannot be resolved without violence.

"7. We are witnessing an increasingly spontaneous radicalization of the struggles because of the economic situation produced by the crisis.

"8. The CNT has among its members workers (both laborers and employees) from the key sectors of the bourgeois state. Hence, the state's key resources are represented in the CNT, through its workers. We have already witnessed serious confrontations between the latter and the state on account of wages, which

have brought about an immobilization of facilities that are vital to the country, and therefore have prompted greater repression.

"9. Even with their current limitations, the labor unions have committed and can commit the majority of the working population to a head-on struggle against the government which the latter has often resolved by calling upon the armed forces. If a revolutionary organization with a potential for taking the class struggle to higher levels existed, we could have a struggle under better conditions, with a large portion of the population in our favor, and with the state's resources declining.

"531. 10. When the assertion is made that the labor movement is now controlled by "reformist" groups, in our opinion, the following explanations are in order:

"a. Lately, we have been observing the casual, indiscriminate application of that term to all or nearly all labor leaders, something which we consider erroneous and undesirable, and which necessitates greater accuracy in this regard.

"b. The objectives of the workers' struggle are nearly always circumstantial, and could be met by the ruling classes. The organization of the workers has been geared to their temporary and mainly economic goals. It is sometimes possible to organize or mobilize a labor union exclusively on the basis of economic demands. The labor union becomes strong through the struggles for economic and social demands.

"c. The predominantly economic content of the workers' struggle only reflects the world around us. The working class, by itself, is incapable of going beyond that struggle; therefore, other elements must be added to it, and attached to it, in order to enhance it. The latter is the responsibility of the revolutionary organizations.

"d. The methods of the workers' struggle are predominantly peaceful. Violence, when it appears, is spontaneous and irrational, and does not constitute a method. The phases of the working classes' struggle that are approaching have already been marked by the violence of the ruling class, which will be met with spontaneous types of violence on the part of the workers. The task of the revolutionaries is to back that spontaneous violence, and become its support and its guide; and, when there is no spontaneous violence in a class conflict, to produce it. Violence as a method of backing the working classes is a tactical tool of the revolutionary organizations.

"e. The labor unions can take the struggle to the extremes to which the direct violence of the ruling classes is unleashed on them, even for economic demands, and they have done so. It is the responsibility of the revolutionaries to prepare the people and the working class to be able to carry out their struggle even in those extreme conditions, and to create the conditions for countering reactionary violence with revolutionary violence.

"532. 11. The 'reformist' groups which we have mentioned do not operate in accordance with these principles. They do not perform the work within the labor movement for purposes of revolutionary insurrection, but, on the contrary:

"They use it for election campaigns, as if it were no more important than four, five or ten congressional seats.

"They have kept it immobilized for months.

"They foster the economic spontaneity that breaks the struggle down into isolated battles.

"They preclude and hamper the real unity of the labor movement (through the rank and file).

"They, in fact, immobilize the implementation of joint plans for struggle on behalf of common goals.

"Since they fail to prepare the necessary conditions (by working without a revolutionary perspective), they have sometimes led the working class to dead ends, or defeats without struggle, which are extremely demoralizing.

"12. These groups are related mainly to the PC [Communist Party], and have established their control on a substantial, efficient bureaucracy. This bureaucracy will not be dislodged on the basis of radical statements and manifestos opposing it. It will not be dislodged through theory, but by making the revolutionary action of the most seasoned unions take precedence over its inactivity, forcing it, as has often happened, to take a stand in support of that action, or remain by the wayside; and by making the more effective work of the revolutionaries take precedence over the methodical and no doubt effective work of its agents and its apparatus.

"13. The struggle against these groups must not become an end in itself, forgetting who are fundamental enemies are. And, in this connection, we quote what Debray says:

"...If the armed struggle of the masses against imperialism is, of itself, capable of creating a vanguard able to lead the nations to socialism, over the long term, it cannot take a stand at present in relation to reformism, nor this or that political organization that is in existence, but rather in relation to imperialism, essentially. To regulate the pace of its action on the basis of the inactivity of the reformists not only means wasting time, but also paralyzing what is critical for the sake of what is secondary. Furthermore, the best way of putting an end to hesitation is to proceed to make a head-on attack on imperialism and its leaders, where the conditions are present. In this way, the problem is reversed. It will be up to those who are conciliatory to take a stand in relation to the revolutionaries, and not the other way around. It is they who will have to take a stand with regard to the realities, and in connection with a consummated deed. Either

join the struggle against imperialism, which is the best thing for everyone, or resist, which will be all the worse for everyone. History will be responsible for leaving them by the wayside. An ambush achieved, a torturer brought down, a supply of weapons recovered: these are the best responses to the reformist capriciousness that may arise in any American country. Since the Cuban revolution and since the invasion of Santo Domingo, a state of emergency has existed in America. The Marines fire on anything that moves, regardless of parties. Reasons of emergency and reasons of principle necessitate a revolutionary armed front. Wherever the battle has taken an upward trend, and wherever the popular forces have become geared to the emergency, they have entered the magnetic field of unity. Elsewhere, they have become scattered and weakened. Everything is being done in the practical organization of the armed struggle to contribute to a unity based upon the principles of Marxism-Leninism.'

"533. 14. In addition to the objectives already cited, the objectives for work in the labor movement and on the masses front in general will include:

"Leading the people to revolutionary positions; radicalizing their struggles; creating revolutionary conditions; intensifying the labor organizations.

"Providing shelter, information, facilities and personnel for the guerrilla movement.

"Making propaganda about the guerrillas and their action, in order to create the most extensive favorable climate that is possible.

"Associating and coordinating the guerrilla movement with all sectors of the people and their struggles.

"15. The people who are really opposed to the injustices of the regime, and who want a change, will more readily opt for the direct route represented by the armed organization and its revolutionary action, rather than for the unlikely and remote route that is offered them through proclamations, manifestos or congressional action.

"16. The labor unions must be strengthened, and their struggles must be radicalized and associated with the revolutionary movement.

"17. In Uruguay, the armed struggle will be predominantly urban. The struggle in the rural areas will engage in auxiliary tasks. Therefore, the bases must be created for conducting the war in both areas.

"534. 18. We could describe the line of our struggle as a strategy for prolonged war, a predominantly urban struggle wherein the rural guerrillas will play an auxiliary role. It will be a prolonged war because there are no conditions at present for a victorious insurrection, because the state has not been deteriorated by any military defeat and because the mass movement is not militarily prepared for an attack on the government. Hence, we must begin a struggle that will be long, and not entertain long-standing hopes for a war that will be short.

"535. 19. It is impossible to foresee whether a revolutionary situation may occur at the peak of a labor union conflict, a popular protest, a reactionary coup d'etat, foreign intervention, a world war, an invasion of Cuba, on the initiative of an armed group, etc. By revolutionary situation we mean the 'moment' at which we proceed toward superior forms of struggle, at which the equilibrium between the dictatorship, the oligarchy and popular pressure is broken; the moment that Guevara told us about when he said: 'This moment is important. In social processes, the difference between violence and non-violence cannot be measured by the number of shots that are exchanged; it relates to concrete, fluctuating situations. And we must know the instant at which the popular forces, aware of their relative weakness yet, at the same time, conscious of their strategic force, must force the enemy to take the necessary steps to prevent the situation from retrogression. The equilibrium between dictatorship, oligarchy and popular pressure must be upset. The dictatorship is constantly trying to act without the obvious use of force. Obliging it to show itself undisguised, that is, in its real nature as a violent dictatorship of the reactionary classes, will help to unmask it; and this will intensify the struggle to the point where it can no longer recede. The resolute initiation of a long-range armed action depends upon how the people's forces, engaged in the task of obliging the dictatorships to take a stand, perform their job.' Che.

"We cannot tell exactly when the armed struggle is going to begin in Uruguay, because it is useless to make strategic prognostications about a situation which is not contingent upon us.

"536. 20. Phases of the struggle: (We have arrived at a system only for reasons of clarity in the explanation. These phases should be regarded only as general features of the development, observed from a dialectical, dynamic viewpoint.)

"a. The principal task is to develop the armed apparatus, create the backup infrastructure, train and test the combat organization and arrange the fundamental services. It involves action relating to supplies, training, propaganda (aimed at winning support from the population, especially from its most aggressive contingents), association, support and radicalization of the class struggle (with the same objectives, and for the creation of subjective conditions). When there are prosecutions for incidents which upset the bourgeois legality, a consciousness is evoked, the apparatus is organized and the conditions are consolidated and developed to make possible the creation of the political movement which must surround the armed apparatus and which is its semilegal branch.

"b. The accomplishment of the foregoing phase means that the repression has become widespread and the apparatus has proceeded toward a direct confrontation with the agencies of the oligarchy's repression, intensifying its slogans; and, in the defense of the people's interests, and with their support, the armed apparatus will operate as a strategic defense, but with a constant tactical offensive. It will make a war of attrition.

"c. The third phase represents an inversion of the correlation of forces and a movement from the strategic offensive to the definitive attack on the government.

"We repeat that we do not think that the struggles are going to occur exactly according to this pattern, which we have established solely for reasons of clarity in the explanation.

"537. The preceding excerpt was supplemented by 'Document 3,' of May 1968, which devotes a special section, entitled 'Notes on the action of the mass front,' to emphasizing the effect that the armed struggle will have within the left wing, and the need for organizing an apparatus which will enable the MLN-T to operate in the labor union area and to assume leadership of the labor movement.

"Once the armed revolutionary action has begun, the other groups in the Uruguayan left wing and the people themselves, prevented from expressing themselves because of the repressive coercion that this action will evoke, will have no choice other than to give in to it or lose all their opportunities for control and participation with respect to the accomplished fact.

"Polemics are of no use; the essential thing is to 'launch the armed struggle' at the right time, and everything else will come later. It does not matter if some sectors raise a hue and cry, as the PCU [Communist Party of Uruguay] did on a previous occasion. Instead of revolutionary 'words,' we must opt for revolutionary 'deeds.'

"The fact that the labor organization in Uruguay is not prepared at present to operate underground for an indefinite period of time indicates how important the MLN-T's previously cited proposal is, one which will lead the masses during the foreseeable period of greater repression. What must be done is simply to accelerate the radicalization of the labor union struggle by transferring the technique for the armed struggle to that area. This is the slogan which the movement teaches to its members who are operating within the unions.

"538. The aforementioned 'notes' read as follows:

"Our strategy involves the establishment of the systematic armed struggle as soon as we are prepared to maintain it and there are conditions for it.

"This strategy determines our daily activity. Operating for a movement that proclaims the armed struggle and has also taken the initiative to prepare for it is not the same as operating for any other kind of movement.

"The strategy in question consists of the following plan: An armed group that is able to maintain a prolonged struggle; in other words, prepared so as not to be destroyed immediately, initiates the action.

"When confronted with the accomplished fact, the rest of the left wing and the people will find that they have the following options: either to join the armed struggle, or remain indifferent to it, or else to serve as a 'quiet soldier' of the counterrevolution. In order to observe what opportunities there are for upholding each one of these positions with self-assurance, we must take our place on the new political scene that the establishment of the armed struggle within the country will create. Also from a schematic standpoint, if the democratic facade is unbearable now during periods of crisis, then we cannot expect that strikes, demonstrations and labor union liberties will be allowed when we have proceeded to the phase of armed struggle.

"That will be when the forces of repression will not only strike out against the leftists who take up weapons, but also the labor union member, the mere striker and even just a demonstrator.

"539. Now then, if the time to unleash the armed struggle has been well chosen, if a phase of great poverty among the people has occurred and the popular strikes and demonstrations are unstable...in the particular instance of our country where the labor union apparatus is extensive, and where at every budgetary adjustment the unions bring a large portion of the state apparatus' functions to a standstill, then the option for the forces of repression is ironclad: either to oppose the armed struggle with the deteriorated state's apparatus, or to liquidate the unions, by persecuting their leaders and banning strikes and demonstrations.

"And, although to a lesser degree than in December 1966 (because the intelligence services have held firm), in the event of the outbreak of armed struggle, they will also strike out indiscriminately at anyone who has mentioned armed struggle.

"This means that the classic sequence of all the places where the strategy has been applied will occur: the armed group strikes at an extensive sector of the left wing, if not at the entire left wing.

"This makes the position of the leftists who have not chosen to back the armed struggle or join it quite uncomfortable. They are cut off from the real focal point of the class struggle and (yet) they suffer the consequences of it. From a political standpoint, history no longer takes them into account. It is no longer their public statement, their act of repudiation or their warning speech that arouses the attention of the discontented people, at a time when more effective measures for destroying the regime are already in progress.

"The alternative for these leftists is to join the convoy of the revolution, even if only as a caboose; otherwise, they will miss the train entirely.

"540. So, let us strive to initiate action that will create this situation.

"Our current action should be aimed at facilitating our future action, and not at hampering it.

"We should not organize overtly into labor unions or politically, even though it is now lawful and not punishable as a crime to engage in politics or labor movements. This will not be the case in the future and, if we do not take it into account, we shall be facilitating the work of our enemies. Through our current overt union members, they will have the list of those who are giving us backing and opportunities within the mass movement; and they will no longer be striking out indiscriminately. This means 'giving in,' out of a temporary zeal, to cadres that will allow the movement to grow at the worst periods in the battle, and offering a target for the blows of the forces of repression.

"At present, it would be more convenient, and easier for us not to organize the labor union members into clandestine cells, but rather in public ones; but that would eliminate our future.

"And it would likewise eliminate our future if we were to succumb to the temptation of participating in the perpetual trivial argument of our left wing, as any organization that has been in existence for over an hour has traditionally done. This does not mean that we do not have considerable differences with respect to many left wing political and labor organizations, but merely that we do not believe in polemics as a means of surmounting them. It is useless to dispute whether or not it is feasible to carry out mobilizations of the 'rural day laborers' march' type in order to demand land for farming. It must be done, and the very public upheaval that it creates will force the sectors with which we are vainly disputing to lag behind.

"It is useless to dispute whether or not we should launch the armed struggle.

"It must be launched, and then let them dare to dispute it. Polemics, especially when they use up 80 percent of our revolutionary energy, only serve to make the sectarians more recalcitrant.

"This is also a way of eliminating our future, because we know that there are assets useful to the revolution within any left wing force. And to fall upon those assets prematurely because of current issues means removing forces from a future endeavor that can only succeed with the effort of everyone.

"Those individuals are either immature or poorly oriented; but why isolate ourselves from them in an irrevocable manner because of their current positions if it is within our power to strike the hour of truth in the near future, when authentic revolutionaries will be able to reunite? Why create prejudice or precautionary measures against us because of the way in which the small struggles of the present time are being conducted when the great struggle for power in which unity will mean reducing bloodshed and sacrifice, and a greater possibility of success, lies ahead of us?

"We would, indeed, believe in objective, constructive polemics within the left wing; but, since we have never seen them practiced, we regard them as impossible. As the polemics are conducted at present, the chances are increasingly

remote that there will be a universal truth for our entire left wing; rather, each sector is proclaiming 'its truth.'

"541. The difference that could be admitted is that some sectors proclaim it with 10,000 voices, and others with only 100. Remember Arismendi's attack on the FAU [Uruguayan Anarchist Federation], accusing it of treachery and association with management in the FUNSA [Uruguayan Tire Plant Ltd] dispute. In that conflict, which was led by comrades from the FAU, a factory was occupied with resistance against the ejection by the police, but it ended with the decision about the dispute left to the Supreme Court of Justice, which imposed a fine on the union.

"This creates a second problem, that of economizing on forces; and it may be readily solved by applying military principles, such as that of fighting only when the sacrifice will not be completely futile.

"The foregoing is a futile argument of the left wing that we have refused to become involved in, not since December 1966, but in our 5 years of existence.

"December 1966 only enabled us to achieve partial success in this policy; the fact that we had not engaged in cultivating irreconcilable foes within the left wing through futile polemics enabled an incipient group to receive the backing of the most disparate sectors which, in fact, served as a shelter. This is, in itself, far more important and worthwhile than 400 revolutionary manifestos. In short: instead of revolutionary words, we propose to change people with revolutionary deeds.

"Now then, in everyday action, this might entail, for example, taking a position based upon struggle within a union, and the resultant polemic with other sectors. This is a necessary type of discussion which we regard as useful and fitting as part of our effort; because it tends to establish modes of action and concrete deeds, and because it tends to radicalize the struggle. And it has nothing to do with the old theoretical dispute tinged with an abundance of objectives which we cited previously.

"542. Reverting to military terms, we are not interested in a general battle in the realm of verbal polemics, because that is not the area in which the revolutionary vanguard or the revolution will be taking its stand; but we would, indeed, be interested in a skirmish in the area where we have some strength, in order to gain a position of concrete struggle. Not losing sight of the general strategy will enable us to solve a set of other problems that occur in the daily struggle of the masses.

"For example, if we know that, when the armed struggle is unleashed, the labor leaders may be forced to go into hiding and may be arrested by the forces of repression, then we must not attach so much significance to the negative influence that many of those leaders have at present.

"Their absolute reign ends with the status that exists between the classes. When the struggle moves to the violent phase, those leaders will lose control over the masses, and often even contact with them; because the labor union apparatus that exists in our country now is not prepared to operate in a clandestine fashion indefinitely.

"Therefore, it is more important to set up an apparatus to operate underground which will enable us to take action among the masses, which will not become indifferent to them, and which will keep them in the struggle even during periods of greater repression, without 'cornering' legal union leaders. We say that 'it is more important' in the sense that there is nothing despicable about the leadership of a union in which the struggles can be radicalized and the clandestine apparatus that will permit the latter to continue is created, without making the struggle for power in the unions the only objective for our members.

"543. Moving on to another point: For our comrades who have an influence in the labor unions the slogan is to help hasten the process of radicalization of the struggles. For this purpose, there is nothing more effective than transferring the technique of armed struggle to the labor union area.

"Two hundred sugar cane workers, acting as a focal point for active repudiation against the U.S. Embassy, forced a demonstration of thousands of workers on May Day into a confrontation with the police, when the plans of the seemingly omnipotent leaders of the CNT were quite the opposite. They even forced those leaders to restrain themselves for another day, upset all their plans and went so far as to demand a general strike for the following day. This is what we have termed a 'caboose,' so as not to miss the train entirely.

"Several hundred French students, acting at a propitious time, turned one of the usual clashes with the police into a bloody encounter. The next day, all the students were fighting the police in the streets of Paris. And then, a couple of idle labor confederations whose leaders had done nothing but adjust wages from time immemorial were forced to shake off the dust and order the biggest strike in the history of France.

"And the wave increased: the peasants joined the mobilization as well, and the government tottered.

"And it did not fall only because the movement did not have an organization behind it to attack the government in a definitive manner, at a time when the state was completely paralyzed.

"In short, this also illustrates everything that we have been saying about the relative importance of the fact that the labor leadership is retained when the struggle moves to another phase.

"In conclusion. our strategy has established a series of general guidelines for action on the front of masses to which we must stringently adhere.

"The fact that we do not engage in polemics with other left wing forces does not mean that we agree with their methods.

"We do not dispute, but demonstrate in practice that ours are better.

"The theory of Marxist understanding demands that every working hypothesis be compared with its practice, to prove its validity.

"We must do the same thing: observe the results of our working methods in the light of practice.

"To give an example in the labor union area: there is the UTAA's [Artigas Sugar Workers Union] action with respect to the action of other active minority groups, such as the Trotskiyites or the members of the MUSP [Proletarian Socialist Unification Movement].

"Experience has proven that, with the same effort, one movement expands, while others become idle and isolated.

"And that is the best proof of the correction in a labor union line."

2. Employees Front

544. Included, on the whole, with the workers sector, this topic was not dealt with specifically by the MLN-T as relating exclusively to the employee sector, and, in fact, only incidentally. However, among a large collection of documents confiscated during the early part of July 1971, one contained this paragraph relating to employees:

"Those with the greatest political accomplishment in recent times are associated with the students."

But they attach a military value to them, mainly because of the information that they control and the fact that they are specifically associated with key resources in the economy.

3. Students Front

545. The significance which the MLN-T attaches to the student sector may be inferred from the lengthy document that is reprinted below, after having been confiscated from it in 1969:

"Introduction

"This report is part of a series of measures that the organization has adopted for the purpose of lending more organization to the work on the masses front. Its specific aim is to try to develop the criteria for our members' action in the student movement.

"We urge the comrades associated with the student movement to discuss and promptly disseminate their criticism, differences of opinion, observations and additions.

"The Tasks of MLN Members in the Student Movement

"Generally speaking, they may be summarized in four points common to the members of any sector on the masses front;

- "1. To radicalize the struggles;
- "2. To be the organization's eyes and ears in the environment in which they are operating;
- "3. To carry forward the organization's line in that environment;
- "4. To recruit new members for the organization.

"These permanent tasks of the organization's members on the masses front assume specific forms in the students movement, based upon the role which the student movement plays in the struggle for liberation, and on the precise historic circumstances that the student movement and the organization are experiencing.

"546. The Organization Under the Present Circumstances

"Now, it is a matter of operating on all the fronts of the struggle to attain just one objective: to attract and mobilize the people for and in the revolutionary armed struggle. This long-standing strategic objective of the MLN, now given top priority, will entail major changes of all kinds in the organization and the action.

"The masses will seek and find (even for the struggle on behalf of their most basic demands) new formats and methods that will be suggested by the violence of the confrontation; and, through those new formats and methods, in view of the conditions in the country, the sincere labor movement itself will transcend its specific framework and become something else: the armed, revolutionary, political struggle to overthrow the regime.

"We must 'cultivate' the MLN for the people themselves, outlining the necessary steps for this purpose. The task will involve creating a political infrastructure among the people themselves which will reduce the imbalance of forces, serve as the foundation for the MLN and cause the enemy's tactics to fail. This is the concrete manner in which we shall win over and mobilize the people.

"We must determine the current ways in which the people have expressed themselves in the past that have now collapsed, replacing them with new and different ones. By so doing, we shall obtain the provisions for the struggle, shelter, information, new cadres, etc.

"We must create methods, cadres, etc. We must create methods for the people's self-defense, the starting point for more conscious and organized military action. This will be the key to victory; this will be the main task of the MLN's political apparatus.

"547. Role of the Student Movement

"Its preeminent function is that of 'political denunciation,' and its essential method of struggle is agitation in the streets. This function and method of

struggle are common to every student movement in the world, and they are backed by all the experience in history, and, in particular, by the very tradition of the Uruguayan student movement.

"Part of this function, or a supplement to it, is the support given to the workers' struggle, as a natural consequence for a labor movement which is conscious of the fact that the fundamental contradiction in the class struggle occurs between workers and the ruling class and that, as a movement, it must play a lateral, though not unimportant role therein.

"The intermediate prospect for the student movement is to become involved in the process of armed struggle as an auxiliary to the political organizations that are carrying it forward. Our strategic objective is to give it ideological and organizational weapons with which to play that role.

"548. The Current Circumstances for the Student Movement

"The sudden exacerbation of the class struggle that occurred after mid-1968 represented, insofar as the student movement was concerned, a qualitative change in its methods of struggle and in the way in which its political-type slogans were expressed. It had personal experience with the intensification of the repression, it made spontaneous progress in expanding its action for agitation, it felt the need to associate itself with the workers movement more than ever before and, for the first time in its history, it had members killed by the forces of repression.

"Now, about July 1969, it is at the height of a period of transition, of assimilation of its recent experiences and of adjustment to the new conditions surrounding the struggle. Has the student movement reached an end? We think not. The experience from other revolutionary processes has taught us that the student movement has succeeded in surmounting similar conditions, surviving as such and continuing to contribute its action to the progress of the class struggle. The current experience associated with the underdeveloped countries which are undergoing similar experiences are showing us student movements that are continuing to play their role.

"But, in order to be able to embark upon this new phase in its struggle, the Uruguayan student movement must make changes in its methodology for work and in its organization. Internal conditions exist within the student movement to make such changes possible. It is the task of the MLN's members during this period of transition to promote the changes that will make our strategic objective possible.

"549. Toward New Types of Struggle in the Student Movement

"The types of struggle toward which we are aiming have an essential feature that differentiates them from the present ones: the clandestine status of the entities that carry them out.

"Making the associations 'clandestine' on all levels must be a primary strategic objective of our action in the student movement.

"Our chances of attaining that objective, either totally or partially, will depend upon the individual features of each educational institution. Our tactics must be based upon those features. So, the objectives to be attained during this phase in a particular location, and the manner in which we progress toward them, will be determined on the basis of an individual analysis of those features.

"550. To describe what the new types of struggle and organization will be like, and how the transition to them will be made, we shall cite some basic phenomena that will determine both:

"1. In all its branches, the student movement evinces a 'flexible' associative leadership that is not so centralized as that in most associative movements. This characteristic, combined with the constant and prompt renewal of its cadres, lends it greater pliancy with which to adjust to various situations as an association, without having to undertake major structural changes.

"2. The student movement has for some time been accustomed to acting 'illegally,' even though action on a lower level of 'subversion' may have been involved.

"3. The development of the associative entities is uneven in the various student centers.

"In some, the traditional forms have completed their development phases, and have resulted in failure. They can no longer be revived, and the transition to the new forms has tended to occur dissociated from the traditional ones.

"In others, the traditional forms have completed the development phases, but have evolved toward new forms through their own internal dynamics. There is a possibility of proceeding in that direction without an abrupt break. In other cases, the traditional forms of the association have just begun to be institutionalized. Corners could be cut to arrive at clandestine forms, without undertaking the consolidation and development of the traditional association. But there is the obstacle of slight availability of the masses for embarking upon the new path.

"4. There are various political forces within the mass of associates. The organization is not operating in the student movement alone. In the first place, this entails limitations in applying our principles; and, secondly, it entails a consideration of the fact that, on a certain level of the new organizational structure, the entities will include those members of other political organizations.

"5. Since an attempt will be made to make cadres of the student masses in the new forms of organization, we shall have to consider various levels of political consciousness and of militant commitment. That difference in levels is present in any student association. In most instances, the gradation

manifests itself according to this structure: a. the nucleus of most aggressive members; b. the 'independent' group; c. the active militant mass in the association; and, d. the inactive mass. We could compare that structure to a network of concentric circles. The possibility of influencing each one of those circles varies in accordance with our militant potential and the correlation of political forces operating on the various levels.

"The ideal thing would be to be able to devise a clandestine organizational scheme that would unite all the circles, and to operate on all levels, causing a constant movement from the periphery to the center. If we have this general view of the strategic range, our action must be aimed at attaining the objectives that are within reach of our forces.

"6. We must start with the fact that the student movement has been infiltrated by the police on the rank and file level; and that, owing to the very flexibility that we mentioned, that infiltration could at times reach the level of the leadership entities.

"551. The Formation of Clandestine Cells With the Most Aggressive Members

"Our starting point for the establishment of new organizational forms for the student movement must be the consolidation of clandestine cells with the most aggressive members, who will be the embryo that will foster the change. This tactical measure applies to all student centers. It is the common denominator of our action.

"Those cells will be the first link that will unite the MLN's cells with the associated masses. They will be permanent in nature, and their action will be coordinated by the MLN.

"For the work with these groups, the minimal group training program proposed in the UTAD [Durazno Rice Workers Union ?] documents is appropriate: 1. opportunities for action; 2. familiarity with the methods of the forces of repression; 3. minimal training; 4. planning of operations; 5. minimal technical training.

"We must add one point to that program: political training. The number of members will vary according to the individual circumstances in each place where they are set up. The optimal number for proper functioning would be between four and six members.

"Depending upon those same individual circumstances, the cells will be formed exclusively with comrades from the organization and its periphery (a preferable solution), or with members of other political organizations.

"The consolidation of these cells is of fundamental significance to our strategy. But our action must include other areas. To consolidate a group of this type, parallel measures on different levels may even be necessary.

"552. The Associative Groups

"A widespread phenomenon in all branches of the student movement is the existence of associative groups, consisting of cells of members with a certain degree of ideological affinity who unite for action within the framework of the association (elections, representation on the directors' committee, influence on the assemblies, etc.).

These entities are the real promoters of the association's action and, as the process of radicalization intensifies (and, with it, the internal political differences), they become increasingly important. Moreover, these entities almost automatically reflect the combination and division of the left wing political forces operating in the country. For example, in nearly all the student centers in all branches of education there appear groups of the FIDEL [Leftist Liberation Front] persuasion, and the so-called 'independents' (which, with slight variations, include members of the FAU [Uruguayan Anarchist Federation], the MIR [Movement of the Revolutionary Left], the PS [Socialist Party], the MRO [Uruguayan Revolutionary Movement], the independents and possibly the GAU [Groups for Unified Action]).

"The most aggressive and radicalized members cluster around these 'independent' groups. It is virtually impossible for militants of this type to exist who are not associated in one way or another with the 'independent' group at their educational center.

"This makes our work within them a necessity.

"553. But, in order to channel our work, we must bear in mind the fact that those groups are public, in an infiltrated environment. Hence, for the immediate work within them, we must adopt certain security measures, both our own and those of the group itself.

"1. To assign for the group's public work the number of comrades that are absolutely essential for performing the four tasks of MLN members.

"2. To dissociate the comrades who are not essential from the 'critical work.'

"3. To organize the group so as to be able to stagger its activities with mechanisms that will afford an opportunity to affiliate and create new members and, at the same time, provide standards of security for the action of the stronger members.

"Our strategic objective is the transformation of the associative group into a clandestine entity.

"These general guidelines presuppose an appropriate internal environment in the group. In some instances, however, the conditions that would make that internal environment possible may not exist. The correlation of forces in the group and its composition based upon political sectors are essential factors. There have been instances wherein ambitious work plans have been

thwarted by the sectarian action of certain groups. It is our task to create an atmosphere of unity of action among those groups, and not to succumb to futile battles over petty matters. In instances wherein this is impossible owing to the destructive action of other groups, the work will be organized in a different way (avoiding the associative group).

"554. The Active Militant Mass Which Relates to Our Persuasion

"The group should direct its efforts toward that mass, and try to organize it, forming small groups linked with the group, and assigning them concrete tasks in keeping with their commitment. It will gain new members in this way, and will take the maximum advantage of the potential of each individual. It will seek in that 'less dossierized' mass the means of supply with respect to meeting places, storage for association documents, the training of personnel, etc.

"555. The Association's Inactive Mass

"As the radicalization of the struggle increases, the gap between the militant mass and the inactive mass becomes more noticeable. Insofar as possible, the association's action should aim at precluding that gap on the association level, and at staggering the association's activities down to the rank and file.

"556. The Associative Organizations of Students

"On the level of higher education, there is an organization (the FEEUU [Federation of University Students of Uruguay]) with a long tradition as an entity representing the entire university student body and that of the 'Artigas' Teachers Institute. That long tradition, combined with the flexibility of its decision-making mechanisms, has conferred upon the entity an authority that no one can deny. Its crises are only a reflection of the crises in the student movement. However, its structure still retains the vices of the old associations. Its political orientation fluctuates with the impetus and the decline in the conflicting political forces.

"Recently, the conditions for the struggle themselves have caused the student centers to acquire a certain amount of autonomy for their struggle, dispensing with a centralized orientation handed down by the federation. The FEEUU has established a very general line and, from now on, it will be the centers which carry out the mobilization.

"For these reasons, it should be our intention to work within the FEEUU, but directing our efforts not at the federal structure, but rather at the student centers, which are the 'live' portion of the student movement. Only occasionally, in connection with rather concrete measures, would work in the central entities be feasible.

"557. In the CESU [Council of Uruguayan Secondary Students] and the UTU [Labor University of Uruguay], the situation is different, and our tactics should be different as well. There is no really representative federation with institutional prestige like the FEEUU. The CESU, the entity which attempts to

associate the secondary school students, is only a balloon inflated by the PC to convey its line to the secondary students movement. In addition to that organization, there have recently emerged a number of 'independent' associative groups which operate apart from the CESU.

"558. Organization of the Association

"The already apparent trend of organizing the student associations on the basis of rank and file cells should be supported and promoted. This form of organization makes it possible to equip the association, to a large extent, to function under the new conditions for the struggle. It is a good step toward being able to operate without the increasingly less 'autonomous' school premises which, in the future, will surely be subject to direct intervention by the political authorities. It is, in addition, a good method for promoting the masses' active participation in the decisions, discussions and implementation of the action. And it has the advantage of offering a fruitful area for the action of the most militant members and their groups.

"559. Radicalization of the Struggle

"The new circumstances surrounding the repression have prompted changes in some of the statements made in the UTAD's report. We shall make a brief analysis of those new circumstances:

"1. The forces of repression now have new technical facilities that they will gradually put into operation (paralyzing gases, gases that affect the digestive system, new highly mobile vehicles, an organization that enables them to reach any point in the city within a few minutes, and teams of specially trained personnel for taking action against demonstrations).

"2. The possibility of using firearms against demonstrations is a fact. This fact has caused a substantial change in the tactics of the flash demonstration; because it has forced the trend toward a refined 'hit and run' action, rather than remaining in an area.

"It should be our intention to work with those groups on the secondary school level. In the case of the UTU, no individual features have appeared. The associative organizations exist in every educational center, and 'independent' groups have also cropped up among them.

"560. Link with the Unions

"The link between associations and persuasions within the associative movement is an essential activity for the student movement during this phase. We must have a good idea of its scope so as not to succumb to idealization.

"1. Support to the struggling unions

"It is both possible and important, when a union has been mobilized, for the student sector to act as a support for the development of that struggle. The

opportunities are very extensive: financial collaboration (money and provisions), collaboration for agitation and propaganda (disseminating propaganda about the conflict and engaging in agitating action with regard to it), joining the union's activities, performing tasks that the union could delegate to the students, etc. These activities may be carried out with contacts between associations, and may be given an incentive with ties between one persuasion and another. They are important to the progress of the union struggle and helpful in the internal environment of the student movement for promoting an acquisition of awareness among the less politicized masses, and for bolstering the more committed members.

"2. Permanent work with the unions

"For some time, the idea of engaging in permanent work with the unions has been afoot in the student movement, and in many instances it has materialized. It consists of an inter-association link between each student center and certain unions, and the performance of joint activities (demonstrations, discussions, neighborhood action, etc.) This work generally encounters a series of problems of a political type which gives it a certain amount of discontinuity.

"The purposes of these activities are: 1. to help both masses acquire an awareness of the identical nature of the objectives of both movements; 2. to promote the 'proletarianization' of the sector of students working on the task; and, 3. to help enable the students to contribute their experience to the associative movement.

"It must be borne in mind that the orientation of the majority of union leaders and the ideological heterogeneity of the student movement limit the real opportunities for this type of work to a great extent. The three objectives that have been cited can only be met on a very general level. We must also remember that the student movement, as such, is only capable of propagandizing and agitating, but never of organizing the masses, especially not the masses who belong to unions.

"And it is important to recall these substantial limitations on the permanent work with the unions because there have emerged in the student movement certain groups of a 'labor-oriented' persuasion, who see in the labor movement the solution for a radicalization of the struggle which they are incapable of promoting in their own environment. And they consider that unity as being materialized in this type of joint permanent work. They exaggerate the positive results of this work, and idealize the role of the student movement, raising it to that of an 'organizer' of unaffiliated masses.

"561. The Politicization of the Student Movement

"We said that the exacerbation of the class struggle has led to changes in the way the student movement's slogans of a political type are expressed. Let us put it more clearly: The student movement is beginning to concentrate its mobilizations on preeminently political slogans. For the first time, a key budgetary issue of the university student movement has taken an obscure second

place in a mobilization (a budgetary debt of 1.3 billion owed to the university). This incident is part of a general trend in the student movement toward 'politicizing' its action, as the class struggle becomes more acute and the revolutionary process approaches the point of self-determination.

"This phenomenon is significant on the national level, because the student movement has begun to act overtly as a social (or political) force in the process. And it has an internal significance in the student movement, inasmuch as the 'politicization' of the slogans for the struggle offers an incentive for the ideological struggle and tends to foster a division between the militant masses and the inactive or apathetic masses.

"The process is irreversible; we are heading toward a student movement that will act on the political level. So, it is not a matter of attempting to turn back and prevent the internal divisions in the student movement as an association. It is a matter of gearing the student movement to that process, attempting to win over the largest possible number of forces within it, and assigning them to action on the national level. This entails an internal politicization, winning over those who are apathetic to the struggle and winning the ideological struggle with the other leftist sectors.

"The tendency toward politicizing the student associations should be supported (illegible).

"At the present time, the organization of the student movement's struggle in the streets must be based upon one main criterion: The student movement has completed the phase of spontaneous struggle, and must embark upon a phase of planned action. This means that every step must be based upon the greatest possible amount of prior planning, keeping the margin of improvisation to a minimum. Each organized group (UTAD) must have a specific mission at every step. And, on the basis of those organized groups and, possibly, the 'independent' groups, an infrastructure must be created which will provide information (knowledge of the terrain, targets to be hit and the whereabouts of the forces of repression); materials ('cocktails,' barricade material, tar bombs, rockets and petards); and treatment (mechanisms for hospital care and first aid services).

Two immediate and essential tasks stem from the foregoing: 1. planning the action and gearing the tactics to the new circumstances surrounding the forces of repression; 2. creating an infrastructure for the student movement.

"562. Expansion of the Student Movement's Sphere of Influence

"Everyone is well aware of the problems confronting the comrades in the interior in their associative and political action.

"It is an obvious fact that, whereas Montevideo is experiencing the materialization of the process, and is personally feeling the effects of the exacerbation of repression, the interior is carrying out a far slower process.

"The influence of the student movement in the interior is an important political factor that we must exploit in order to reduce the imbalance in forces.

"There is a huge mass of students from the interior in the student movement in the capital (mainly on the university level). During 1968, at the height of the student movement, there was a spontaneous flow of student propaganda (chiefly from university students) directed toward the interior, making a rather unorganized use of the potential of the students from the interior who assiduously commute to their local areas.

"There are student associations in several departments with headquarters in Montevideo.

"The implementation of the university decentralization plan has created new groups of university students who are situated, for their schooling, in cities of the interior (the agronomy station and university house of culture in Paysandu, the forthcoming agronomy station in Salto, etc.).

"There are teachers institutes in cities of the interior which may be affiliated with the Montevideo teachers institute (with a large membership recently).

"There are in the educational institutions in the interior groups of left wing militants who find their action hampered to a large extent because they are isolated in a hostile environment.

"All these factors comprise a good foundation for a strenuous endeavor which the student movement must undertake: spreading its organized influence to all parts of the country.

"The student associations in the capital must acquire an awareness of this problem and embark upon the task of lending an organized quality to the work in the interior: 1. by organizing the student groups in the interior who are attending school in Montevideo and who commute to their respective districts; 2. by operating among the student associations in the interior with headquarters in Montevideo; 3. by linking themselves with the student associations or militants who are located in the interior; 4. by properly organizing the work of the university students who live in cities of the interior (students of agronomy, law, nursing and probably medicine, in Salto, Paysandu, etc.).

"563. The Ideological Struggle in the Student Environment

"There are two quite distinctive aspects: 1. the ideological struggle with the FIDEL PC; and 2., the ideological struggle with the other left wing groups (which, with the independents, comprise what has been termed 'the persuasion'). The influence exerted on the MUSP [Proletarian Socialist Unification Movement] and the Trotskyites is slight, and it is not worthwhile expanding upon the views of the organization's members regarding them.

"1. This is a very important point that we must establish. The most bitter struggle in the entire student movement has occurred with the FIDEL. The organization's position in this respect is already well known. But we must delineate the position to be applied where the student movement is concerned.

"We must discard the anticommunist proposals calling for a 'systematic denunciation' of the PC's policy. We already realize that this would lead nowhere. But we can by no means stop waging the ideological struggle with the PC when the need to assume certain positions is involved. That ideological struggle must be waged with sincerity and serious arguments. It is not enough (and it is incorrect) to say that we are going forward and they are going backward. We must give grounds for our solution in every ideological confrontation. We must bear in mind the fact that the true path toward overcoming the PC's opposition is by channeling the student mobilizations with our views. The conditions for doing so exist, and we must make use of them, doing more than criticizing. We must create an infrastructure for the student movement, in spite of the PC; establishing the planning of actions as a rule, adapting the tactics for struggle in the streets, calling attention to the negative results involved in departing from such criteria, promoting the organization of associations based upon cells of the rank and file, implementing this wherever possible, and comparing results. We must support the action in locations wherein we operate as a minority, comparing the results accrued by our line where it is in the majority.

"Obviously, on some occasions we shall not be able to avoid the 'calentura' (40) [rancor] which leads to violent confrontations with the PC members. But, even in such instances, we must bear in mind our general policy: not to create problems over unimportant issues, and, in the important matters, to hold a serious, well founded discussion.

"2. In the ideological struggle with the other groups comprising the 'persuasion,' we must try not to be 'self-indulgent.' In minor issues that do not affect the general line to any great extent, it is preferable to compromise rather than remain adamant.

"We must try to keep an atmosphere of unity in the joint endeavor with those forces, and avoid discussing issues that could compromise us insofar as possible. That joint endeavor should involve all aspects of the 'legal' action of the associations and, before the methodology of the more 'subversive' endeavor is discussed with them, it is important that such a discussion be carried out with the more trustworthy comrades.

"564. Recruitment

"There are in the student environment two types of individuals who could possibly be recruited for the MLN: 1. the most aggressive militants, who are nearly always affiliated with an 'independent' group; and, 2. students who, for personal reasons, are well equipped to be members but are not.

"We must work on the former group through the organization of radicalized groups, and they could be trained as replacements for our 'visible' members.

"An individual, unobtrusive effort must be made with the latter group, in an attempt to affiliate them with the organization outside of the framework of the association's activity.

"565. Summary of the Tasks for This Phase

"In brief, and bearing in mind the fact that there will be some logical changes in this system depending upon the situation in each educational institution, the main tasks to be performed on the various levels of the student movement during this transitional period will be as follows:

"1. On the level of MLN members:

"a. To be the eyes and ears of the MLN;

"b. To recruit new members for the MLN;

"c. To form organized cells with the most aggressive members (CAP [Center for Popular Action]), and to train them both technically and politically.

"2. With the most aggressive groups of members:

"a. To radicalize the struggles;

"b. To create an infrastructure for the student movement, consisting of:

"I. Service for information: on targets to be attacked by the student movement; on the area in which student agitation is to be conducted; on those who have infiltrated the student movement.

"II. Service for planning action.

"III. Service for training members: 'cocktails,' petards, tar bombs, etc.

"IV. Service for medical care: mechanisms for treatment in hospitals and sanatoria; first aid services of their own.

"V. Premises for meetings, training members, storing documents and materials, issuing propaganda, etc.

"3. On the level of the associative group, with the most aggressive groups of members:

"a. To wage the ideological struggle against 'verbalist' and 'schematic' lines;

"b. To organize the groups, and arm them ideologically so as to adapt them to the new conditions surrounding the struggle;

"c. To stagger their organizational mechanisms, so as to assure the safe action of the most aggressive members and the incorporation and training of new members;

"d. To link them with the groups associated with the persuasion, in the rest of the student movement and in the associative environment.

"4. On the level of the association, with the associative group:

"a. To wage the ideological struggle against reactionary and reformist persuasions;

"b. To promote the establishment of the criterion for planning action involving agitation, and gearing it to the new conditions surrounding the repression;

"c. To promote the organization of the association based upon cells of the rank and file, and the establishment of a staggering of the associations' activities that will afford a compatible action on the part of the vanguard and the less committed members;

"d. To promote the politicization of the association and of its slogans for mobilization;

"e. To promote the expansion of the student movement's organized sphere of influence by organizing the work in the interior part of the country, based upon the support and action of the Montevideo student movement;

"f. To promote joint action with the associations that are engaged in struggle."

566. Two years later, in July 1971, the MLN-T prepared this quick assessment comparing the student and labor movements, which is included here as a supplement to the preceding statements:

"Student movement: Recently, it is the one that has produced the most with respect to recruitment and from a political standpoint. This is due, among other things (see special report), to the fact that, since it does not rely on wages and does not have the same high degree of commitment that the workers have, it can more readily make a determination regarding positions of revolutionary commitment, although that determination may possibly be less carefully thought out and less steadfast; and this may have an effect on the future of its revolutionary militancy. For this reason, and also because they are linked to production and have therefore gained experience on a higher plane, as well as better discipline and a better concept of team work, the workers 'delay' longer, but, when they finally make their decisions, their integration into higher forms of organization is more flexible and relaxed.

"Likewise involved is the cultural aspect, which enables students and employees to more promptly gain an intellectual understanding of the situation as a whole than the worker would; and this is an aid to their taking a stand more quickly. So, the student movement is of great political value to us, although we must beware of the 'embalajes' (41) [hasty decisions] and instability.

567. The conclusion regarding the subversive movement's action on the so-called masses front, concerning which it has shown a constant concern over attracting workers, employees and students, is as follows:

1. Workers front: The workers sector must be given an "awareness," and dynamics with regard to the revolutionary struggle, so as to form from it the basic cell for the future revolutionary army, the vanguard of which must always be the MLN-T. For this purpose, work must be done in the labor unions through the auspices of the CNT, bearing in mind that they must be urged to have more concern for the revolutionary struggle than for mere wage demands, making use of partial or total strikes at a constantly increasing rate, which will help to distort the national economy and to create more of the objective conditions for the armed struggle and the revolution.

2. Employees front: In analyses and reports on the workers, they are, as a rule, combined with the students, as the group with the greatest output "in recent times" (1971), plus the military value that they have as a result of the information that they handle and their link with key resources of the economy.

3. Students front: The one with the greatest output "recently" (1968-71) in the area of recruitment and from a political standpoint, owing mainly to the fact that:

- a. They do not depend upon wages;
- b. They do not have the same high degree of commitment as the workers;
- c. They are more readily inclined toward positions of a revolutionary nature;
- d. Because of their cultural standing, they gain an intellectual understanding of the revolutionary situation more quickly than the workers do.

As negative factors, on the other hand, they have:

- a. Instability;
- b. A tendency to make hasty decisions.

FOOTNOTES

39. Pascua de Guerra, "Kindness and Humanity," Book of Pontifical Documents, BAC Collection, Vol IV, 23 December 1944.

40. Tantrum, annoyance.

41. From Lunfardo: hastiness, making hasty decisions.