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 E. S. JOHNSON
 Colonel, Infantry.

Instructions Reading Unit
 Name: *Hammerhead*
March 22, 1945
April 24, 1945
J. S. Dwyer, Capt.
Follow-up
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1 April 1945 - 30 June 1945

XXIV CORPS ACTION REPORT

17 AUG 1945

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FOREWORD

The accompanying report is a brief factual account of the participation of the XXIV Corps in the RYUKYU Campaign. It is believed that this campaign may be accepted as a preview of future action when JAPAN is invaded. Attempt has been made to present an unbiased picture of conditions, enemy reactions and our own difficulties and accomplishments together with certain comments and recommendations in the hope that others may profit by experience gained in what is believed to be the bitterest fighting encountered in the Pacific to date.

The successful capture of the strategically important enemy island of OKINAWA is an epic of teamwork and cooperation as developed and executed by the American Armed Services acting jointly. Great credit is given to the surface and aerial naval forces and to Marine Corps air units for their outstanding performance in the execution of protective and supporting missions for the ground troops. High praise is due the fine service troops of all echelons who kept up continuous supply and evacuation services throughout the campaign and made such great strides in the development of our most important base for the invasion of the Japanese homeland. But greatest tribute must go to those superb ground soldiers of the Army and Marine Corps who slugged it out on OKINAWA for almost three months, advancing yard by yard, through all the various adverse conditions of weather and terrain against strong defenses and fanatical resistance to eliminate well over 100,000 inspired sons of Bippin from the island and reduce all vestige of enemy resistance.

As for the performance of this command, no Corps Commander has ever been more fortunate in the high quality of training, the loyal spirit, the dogged perseverance, the superior teamwork and the strong will to fight displayed by the American fighting units assigned to his command. These qualities in our troops will crush Jap resistance wherever met.


JOHN R. HODGE
Lieutenant General, United States Army
Commanding

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CHAPTER I

PURPOSE OF REPORT AND SYNOPSIS OF MISSION ASSIGNED

1. This report of action against the enemy is submitted in compliance with AR 345-106 and Operational Directive Number 10, Headquarters Tenth Army, 24 January 45. It covers the participation of the XXIV Corps in the RYUKYUS Campaign.

2. The mission assigned the XXIV Corps was:

a. To mount out for the assault from LEYTE, P.I., where the Corps was located after participating in the Southern Philippines Campaign. In addition to mounting out the 7th and 98th Infantry Divisions and Corps Troops for operations under Corps control in the assault landing on OKINAWA SHIMA, the Corps was charged with mounting out the 77th Infantry Division, (reinf), for landing operations against KERAMA RETTO independently of the Corps.


b. To move as part of the Tenth Army (Lt. Gen. S. B. Buckner Jr., USA) under overall command of the Commander Fifth Fleet (Admiral Raymond A. Spruance, USN) to the RYUKYUS and land, on 1 April 45, on the west coast of OKINAWA SHIMA. (See Figure 1 on following page).

c. Supported by naval air and surface forces and elements of Corps Artillery to be previously landed on KETSE SHIMA just to the west, to seize an initial beachhead concurrently with the III Amphibious Corps (Major General Roy S. Geiger, USMC) on its left, advance rapidly eastward to cut the island in two, securing enemy airfields in its zone for our use, and to protect the right (south) flank of the Army.

d. Then to change direction to the south, advance and seize a limited objective to expand the initial beachhead and be prepared to continue the attack to the south on Army order.

e. To initiate development of the island in the Corps zone of action paying particular attention to rehabilitation of existing airfields.

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FIGURE 1

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CHAPTER II

THE TASK FORCE ORGANIZATION

3. g. The command organization for the assault on OKINAWA is indicated in Figure 2, following this page.

4. h. Complete organization of the Corps is shown in the following:

Incl. 1 - Troop List

Incl. 2 - Roster of Officers, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, XXIV Corps, 1 April - 30 June 45.

5. g. The Corps embarked for and landed on OKINAWA with an organization designed to make it initially independent. The Corps Shore Party and other service installations, including many of the units engaged in their operation, were progressively transferred to Army Garrison Force 331 (Major General F. C. Wallace, USA, Island Commander) as that command gradually assumed logistic responsibilities on the Island. Antiaircraft units which landed with the Corps and operated as a part of it eventually were detached and assigned to the 53d AAA Brigade (Brigadier General Morris C. Handwerk, USA), which was under Army Command.

6. The command organization does not indicate all of the naval and air forces which provided support to the Corps during this operation. The principal forces in this category were:


a. Amphibious Support Force commanded initially by Rear Admiral William H. P. Blandy, USN and eventually by Vice Admiral Jessie B. Oldendorf, USN conducted the preliminary bombardment and, from 11 June (upon relief of TF-55 - Rear Admiral J. L. Hall Jr.) to the end of the operation, was responsible for naval gunfire support of the ground operations. This force was designated TF-52 until 28 May when Commander Third Fleet (Admiral W. F. Halsey, USN) relieved Commander Fifth Fleet. At this time all subordinate naval units changed designations to the 30 series, TF-52 becoming TF-32.

b. TF-64 - 34 Gunfire and Covering Force (Rear Admiral Morton L. Deye, USN) provided the ships required for naval gunfire support.

c. Eastern Fire Support Group was activated on 7 May and was charged with direct naval gunfire support of the XXIV

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COMMAND ORGANIZATION

FIGURE 2

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Corps. It was commanded by Rear Admiral Peter K. Flachler, USN (7 May-12 May), Rear Admiral Charles T. Joy, USN (13 May-27 May), and Rear Admiral Ingram C. Sowell, USN (28 May to end of operation).

d. Gunboat Support Group (Captain Theodore C. Ayward, USN) provided gunboat support throughout the campaign.

e. Air support for the Corps operation initially was provided by the Carrier Support Group (Rear Admiral Calvin T. Burgin, USN), which handled air preparations and close support exclusively until unite of the Tactical Air Force (Major General Francis Patrick Mulcahy, USMC, initially, and later Major General Louis E. Woods, USMC), made planes available for close support missions. At various times planes of the Fast Carrier Forces, TF 58 (Vice Admiral Marc A. Mitscher, USN) were placed "on station" for close support missions.

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CHAPTER III

PRELIMINARY PLANNING

6. General

a. A warning order (CinCPac dispatch 060984Z, December 44) was received on 5 December 44 from the Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas (Admiral of the Fleet Chester W. Nimitz, USN) designating the XXIV Corps as part of the landing force for the assault on OKINAWA SHIMA, projected for 1 April 45.

b. At this time the Corps was heavily and widely engaged in a critical phase of the LEYTE, P.I., operation under the overall command of the Commander in Chief, Southwest Pacific Area (General of the Armies Douglas MacArthur, USA), to whom it had been temporarily attached in September 44. It was immediately obvious that the problem of preparing for the OKINAWA assault while completing the LEYTE operation was a formidable one.

c. The Corps was not completely released from tactical responsibility on LEYTE until 10 February 45 and did not complete the assembly of all its units in staging areas on LEYTE's east coast until 18 February 45.

d. Planning and preparation for the OKINAWA operation had necessarily been carried on concurrently with completion of the LEYTE campaign. The Commanding General, Pacific Ocean Areas (Lt. Gen. Robert C. Richardson, Jr., USA), the Commanding General, Tenth Army, and numerous staff officers from both headquarters as well as representatives of the Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas visited LEYTE and assisted in orientation and supply planning for the Corps. Rear Admiral J. L. Hall, Jr., USN (Commander Amphibious Group 12 and designated as Commander Southern Attack Force), moved with his staff to LEYTE in late January 45 and greatly assisted in planning the operation and in making necessary preparations. The Corps Commander flew to SCHOFIELD BARRACKS, T.H., in January 45 and joined key members of his staff already at Headquarters Tenth Army, in conferences which resulted in crystallization of plans. In late January this party returned to LEYTE where detailed plans were completed and disseminated. Availability of major echelon commanders and staffs greatly facilitated close coordination.

e. Final planning was complicated by the changing status of LEYTE as a staging and supply base and the retarded development of the base due both to the rapid advance of Southwest Pacific forces into MINDORO and LUZON and the difficulties

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of terrain, weather, and surf encountered in LEYTE.

6. Some details of planning activities of general staff sections follow:

a. G-1

(1) Administration. To obviate the disruption of administrative channels which the necessary tactical switching of units or elements thereof usually produces, the troop list for the operation was carefully studied so that as many as possible of the smaller units could be attached to an administrative headquarters for the duration of the operation. These attachments were published in general orders and included full administrative responsibility.

(2) Casual Camp. Experience at LEYTE proved the early necessity for a casual camp where men coming out of hospitals could be collected, re-equipped, sorted, and returned to units. Accordingly, the 20th Armored Group Headquarters Company was directed to provide and operate such a camp on the target. The overhead of two officers and 19 men was formed into a provisional unit which drew, packed and loaded sufficient equipment to operate a camp for 200 men.

(3) Command Post.

(a) Profiting by previous experience, the major portion of the Corps headquarters equipment was mobile, loaded on trucks. The advance party and its equipment was DUKW-loaded.

(b) From photographs of the designated location of the Corps command post, blow-ups and charts were prepared showing in detail the contemplated internal arrangement of the headquarters. Even though the exact site initially selected from photo reconnaissance proved unsuitable, this careful planning facilitated a quick transposition to another spot.

(4) Awards. As directed by higher headquarters, authority to award the Silver Star and Soldier's Medal was delegated to division commanders. Division G-1s were encouraged to devise forms and procedures which would expedite the actual award to the individual.

(5) Finance. In view of restrictions preventing the payment of troops until L plus 60, all possible measures were taken to have allotments filed, increased, or otherwise adjusted, and to bring all pay accounts up to date as of 28 February 45. All personnel mounting from LEYTE were permitted to carry aboard ship a maximum of \$10.00, to be converted into "occupation yen" prior to arrival at the target.

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(6) Graves Registration. Division Graves Registration Service officers were to work directly with Shore Party representatives in selecting cemetery sites which would not interfere with dumps or other installations.

(7) Military Government. To prepare for the care of an estimated 240,000 Okinawans of doubtful attitude was one of the major G-1 problems. A Military Government section of four officers and two enlisted men was created to supervise all military government units, activities and reports, to disseminate plans and orders, and to solve the supply problems. Military government units were assigned to each division, with other units assigned to Corps. For further details, see Chapter VII, paragraph 41, Military Government.

(8) Military Police. One Military Police Battalion was attached to the Corps primarily for use in controlling civilians. One company was further attached to each division while the remainder stayed under Corps control.

(9) Red Cross. Personnel assignments were shuffled to assure each regiment an experienced Red Cross man. Thereafter, the big problem was the handling of supplies, of which there were ample quantities. As initially received, the supplies were packed by item in containers too heavy to handle easily and too plainly marked as Red Cross supplies, inviting pilferage and looting. To correct this situation, an assortment of comfort items was figured out on the basis of the needs of 100 men. These assortments were assembled and packed in small boxes which could be handled by two men and were marked with code symbols. Other Red Cross supplies were similarly dispersed so that loss of any one box would not mean losing all of any one item.

(10) Replacements.

(a) Replacements received during the LEYTE campaign had been insufficient to maintain units of the Corps at full strength. This condition was aggravated by the short evacuation policy in effect on LEYTE and the slow return of convalescents from hospitals located on other islands. All available replacements in the Pacific Ocean Areas were allocated to the Corps and every effort was made to have all personnel ready for duty returned from hospitals. A streamlined procedure for obtaining direct commissions produced 174 second lieutenants from the enlisted ranks of combat units. Despite these efforts the divisions embarked with average shortages of 33 infantry officers and 1,000 infantry enlisted men.

(b) Tenth Army plans for OKINAWA provided for the arrival of the 74th Replacement Battalion with 1,200 replacements on L plus 10, and for the arrival of 3,000 additional replacements every 10 days thereafter to include L plus 50.

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(c) OKINAWA was designated as a Personnel Replacement Combat Zone under Pacific Ocean Areas regulations, which designation authorized units to requisition replacements immediately for all casualties evacuated from the island. A system was established to insure prompt notification to units of their evacuees.

(11) Reports. G-1 reports, revised in accordance with experience gained at LEYTE, were adopted for OKINAWA. A school for all G-1s and S-1s was held to insure familiarity with all forms and instructions.

b. G-2

(1) Preliminary Intelligence planning for the OKINAWA operations began upon receipt of the Tenth Army G-2 Estimate dated 15 December 44. Based upon this, the XXIV Corps G-2 Estimate was published 30 December 44. Additional information in the form of terrain studies, JICPOA bulletins, advance maps and a limited quantity of vertical aerial photographs were received early in January. Corps G-2 proceeded to Headquarters Tenth Army on 7 January and after conferences and collection of additional intelligence material returned to LEYTE on 23 January. The XXIV Corps G-2 Summary #1 was compiled and published on 10 February 45. A supplement (Summary #2) was published on 14 February 45 summarizing the additional target information to that date. On 20 February 45, appendices 4a and 4b to Summary #1 (photomaps of the HAGUSHI Beaches) were distributed. Distribution of models, operations maps and photographs was handled by Tenth Army; Corps' only function in this respect was verification of the quantities and delivery.

(2) Several deficiencies in delivery developed. Small scale models, for the most part, did not arrive in sufficient time for distribution to assault units who required them for planning. Many sections of the large scale model were of little use to Corps or Divisions, adding an unnecessary transportation burden to G-2 sections. The models covering the Corps beachhead were the last to arrive.

(3) Photo Interpreter and Japanese Order of Battle teams arrived 18 March, after troops had embarked, and were of little use to Division G-2s in planning. Equipment belonging to these teams was erroneously shipped to LUZON.

c. G-3

(1) The Corps G-3 accompanied the Corps Commander to OAHU, and became thoroughly acquainted with both the Army and Navy overall plans for the operation. Upon return to LEYTE and following conferences with Division Staffs, Tentative Field Order 45A was issued 8 February. Between this date and 5 March, when the final order, together with annexes, was published, many

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detailed conferences were held at LEYTE between Corps and Division Commanders and their staffs, and with Naval Task Force and Task Group Commanders and staffs. There was actually little material change between the tentative and final Field Orders although many of the details of the planning were worked out during this period. The presence of Commander Amphibious Group 12 (Rear Admiral Hall, USN) and staff at LEYTE up to the date of sailing resulted in the closest of cooperation and the speedy solution of joint planning problems.

(2) From the G-3 angle, intelligence, including maps and aerial photographs, was generally excellent and left little to be desired from the standpoint of planning the initial operations at Corps level. However, the incompleteness of maps and aerial photograph of southern OKINAWA was so great that the potentialities of this part of the island were not apparent prior to the landing.

(3) Perhaps the greatest difficulties involved in planning arose from an uncertainty up to the very last of shipping to be actually available, and the lack of correct ships' characteristics. The original shipping allotments were considerably decreased, several ships changed and many ships were found not to provide the space originally indicated in listed characteristics. This necessitated continual changes in tactical planning and prevented the final plans from becoming firm until the last minute, as well as causing later handicap in shortage of equipment needed.

(4) Troop lists will always change and that is to be expected in the planning of any operation. However, some difficulty was encountered in obtaining expected arrival dates at LEYTE of new units to be lifted in assault shipping. This, coupled with the fact that some units shipped from OABU to remain in assault shipping were utilizing far more shipping space than had been planned and allotted in assault shipping, created numerous minor problems.

d. G-4

(1) The logistic situation on LEYTE in December 44 when the CincPac warning order was received is summarized as follows:

(a) The Corps, disposed over a large portion of southern LEYTE, was engaged in effect in two separate operations - one on the east and the other on the west coast.

(b) The road system was being maintained with difficulty in a condition barely adequate to support operations.

(c) The meager port and service facilities of LEYTE were being strained to the utmost to support current operations and mount out units for the then imminent MINDORO and LUZON assaults.

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(d) A large part of the service units earmarked to accompany the Corps on the OKINAWA assault were functioning under Sub-Base "K" - the service command for southern LEYTE - in the operation of the Port of DULAG.

(e) All existing service command installations being on the east coast, the Corps was operating its own supply and evacuation point near GRMOC (on the west coast) in order to provide logistic support for the 80,000 troops which eventually were engaged in that vicinity. An auxiliary port at ABUYOG (on the east coast) had been organized 8 December 44 by the Corps to expedite unloading of rehabilitation shipping and as a supply base for overland support of west coast operations.

(2) The plan for mounting the OKINAWA operation provided that the local Southwest Pacific logistic agencies would provide the 30 days of supply of all classes to be carried in assault shipping, while equipment required for rehabilitation was to be shipped in by the Commanding General, Pacific Ocean Areas. A total of 31 ships were en route to LEYTE carrying rehabilitation and maintenance supplies and equipment. It was estimated that some 47,000 dead weight tons of supplies would have to be furnished the Corps from SWPA sources. A survey indicated that this was far in excess of stocks on LEYTE.

(3) In addition to the 31 shiploads of supplies and equipment being shipped in for the Corps, it was known that a substantial number of new units were en route to LEYTE for mounting out in the assault. Later developments established that these units were being transported on 21 large vessels, six LSMs and 24 LSTs, and that these vessels would all have to be unloaded in whole or in part. The magnitude of this unloading problem is apparent from the fact that when the last of the 32 vessels finally had been unloaded the tonnage discharged reached the figure of 120,406 weight tons.

(4) It was immediately apparent that the existing port installations in LEYTE would be unable to unload this tonnage in the time available in addition to meeting the requirements of current and projected operations. The development plan for LEYTE was behind schedule and its future was in some doubt. The end of Corps participation in active operations was not in sight nor could its date be foreseen.

(5) As the exact nature of the problem developed, a plan for accomplishing the Corps mission of meeting the target date for the new operation was developed in conjunction with various and widespread agencies involved. The salient features of this plan, which was executed in principle, were:

(a) The Corps Headquarters assumed responsibility for the unloading of supplies and equipment required, for their distribution and issue to units, and for loading out

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the assault shipping. This required the establishment of close control by Corps over the entire unloading and issuing operation. The Corps Headquarters, augmented by officers and men drawn from Corps troop units, took over the following missions:

(i) Arrange for troops and equipment to physically discharge the ships.

(ii) Maintain close surveillance over all shipping arriving at LEYTE to locate and take under protective custody all supplies and equipment consigned to XXIV Corps.

(iii) Receive all such supplies and equipment at one of the designated unloading points, unload it, inventory and issue it in accordance with priorities which had to be determined and kept abreast of the changing situation.

(iv) Stock loading areas with mounting out supplies for Corps troops.

(b) The port of DULAG - one of the two on LEYTE - was turned over to the Corps completely. Cargo was handled over open beaches exclusively at DULAG, there being no deep-water piers. Most of the service troops operating this facility were earmarked for attachment to the Corps for the OKINAWA operation and were scheduled for departure from LEYTE with the Corps.

(c) Corps units on the west coast of LEYTE were to be moved to staging areas on the east coast upon release from tactical responsibility.

(d) In order to augment the existing port facilities it was decided to establish with troops of the Corps two additional unloading and supply areas south of DULAG on the east coast.

(6) TQM planning started late in December with receipt of information of the general allotment of shipping and was not finished until the last units were loaded. The normal and unavoidable changes in shipping assigned to the Corps and difficulty in obtaining accurate ships' characteristics caused the usual series of compromises between the various requirements in order to obtain maximum utilization of available shipping. The ultimate shipping assignment is given in Chapter V.

(7) Supply planning had been started much earlier with the submission of estimated losses of equipment during the LEYTE operation. These estimates received continuing attention during the campaign and Pacific Ocean Areas was kept informed of the revisions necessary to keep the estimates up to date. In general, estimates proved to be reasonably accurate. Lack of information on equipment shipped proved a serious handicap. Contents of ships were often not known until the vessels actually

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arrived. Advance arrangements were made for last-minute air shipments to reduce shortages which might develop.

(8) A brief review of the plans of the various special staff sections follows:

(a) Medical

(i) Supply

(a) Medical maintenance was initially set up based on standard 30-day blocks for 10,000 men, but was corrected to conform with actual issues in the LEYTE operation.

(b) In order to resupply and re-equip division and corps troops, a medical issue point was established by Corps at DULAG. One storage and issue platoon and one supply team were used to operate this establishment and were reinforced as necessary with labor parties from the 71st Medical Battalion.

(ii) Equipment

(a) T/E shortages to 95% completion were filled by shipment from West Coast, Central Pacific Base Command and SoPac, supplemented by SWPA.

(b) Authorized excess allowances were unchanged from previous operation, except for additional litters provided field hospitals to prevent early break in exchange, and litters to absorb loss through lack of exchange on air evacuation.

(c) Aid station equipment of all amphibious tractor, amphibious tank and AAA battalions was converted to pack type, medical item No. 9727000.

(d) Major shortages upon completion of re-equipping were six lamps, operating; one tent, darkroom; 50% of all gas casualty equipment; two sterilizers, dressing and utensil; and a small number of dental chests. These shortages are not considered vital.

(e) Ambulances for each division were set up as follows: 10 ambulances, 3/4 ton; 32 trucks, 1/4 ton, equipped to carry two litter and two sitting wounded. Divisions were to make M-29-C cargo carriers available for transportation of wounded where necessary.

(iii) Evacuation: By divisions, to division clearing installations reinforced by portable surgical hospitals, T/O & E 8-6728 (two per division). By Corps Ambulance Company from division clearing stations to field hospitals. By corps collecting companies from field hospitals to holding

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stations near beach, operated by Corps Clearing Company. Evacuation of Corps Troops and stations by Corps collecting companies to field hospitals or holding stations, as applicable. Evacuation of holding stations to LST(H)s (for further transfer to ships) to be under control of Corps Shore Party Commander, using DUKWs. Corps ambulance, collecting and clearing units to be operated under the control of the Corps Medical Battalion Headquarters.

(iv) Hospitalization:

(a) Two portable surgical hospitals were attached to each division to reinforce clearing platoons and to provide early installation of surgical facilities ashore.

(b) Field Hospitals: One field hospital was attached to each division for transportation to and early employment on the target. Each field hospital, less one platoon, to be loaded as a unit. One platoon with each division to be loaded as an independent unit for early employment ashore, either as a small field hospital or as a clearing installation.

(c) Holding Stations: The two platoons of the Corps Clearing Company were set up each to operate a 150-bed holding station, near the beach to relieve field hospitals of the care of patients awaiting further evacuation and to have them readily available to the Shore Party for evacuation to hospital ships. One of these installations planned to move to an airstrip when air evacuation was initiated. Ultimately, one officer and eight enlisted men from a Corps collecting company coordinated air evacuation at MONTAN Airfield until Tenth Army assumed that responsibility early in May.

(d) Specialist teams: Eight specialist teams were provided by Army and disposed as follows: one orthopedic, one neurosurgical and one general surgical team to each field hospital. One orthopedic and one general surgical team to 71st Medical Battalion as reserve.

(e) Hospitalization of civilian wounded to be provided by one Navy C-6 hospital carried on Corps assault shipping.

(v) Sanitation and Health of Command:

(a) Inoculations: All troops were inoculated against typhus, cholera and plague. Other required inoculations were brought up to date.

(b) Sanitary regulations were promulgated, requiring the carrying of prefabricated box latrines and flyproof kitchens, prohibiting bathing in or use of water in streams, lakes or ponds, and covering other items of field sanitation.

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(g) Authorized allowances of standard insecticides and repellents and of the non-standard items, PDB and sodium arsenite, were provided by the Quartermaster.

(d) Clothing of individuals and one blanket per individual were impregnated with dimethyl-phthalate to minimize danger of mite-borne typhus.

(g) Shelter halves and mosquito bars were sprayed with DDT residual effect as additional protection against mosquitoes.

(g) One malaria survey team was attached to Corps and set up to operate under the Corps Medical Inspector to conduct entomological and parasitic surveys and to supervise mosquito control work.

(b) Chemical

(i) In December 44, Pacific Ocean Areas directed by radio that 16 periscope flamethrowers be installed in each tank battalion of the Corps. The flamethrower units, service kits, tools and accessory items together with personnel to install this equipment and to train armored force operators and maintenance personnel, were flown to LEYTE from OAHU arriving in late December and early January. The installation of equipment and the training of personnel were completed by the first of February 45.

(ii) The Corps Commander decided that "light weight" gas masks only would be carried on the coming operation. Assault masks were left in storage with the Corps Rear Echelon for shipment to OKINAWA.

(c) Quartermaster

(i) Estimates of quantities of supplies necessary to rehabilitate the Corps had been submitted in HAWAII in August 44 prior to the departure of the Corps. Upward revisions of the original estimates were submitted in November when it became apparent that the length of the LEYTE campaign would be much greater than originally planned. The supplies arrived in February 45, and in most respects were shipped in adequate amounts. One particular item which remained critically short was field ranges (and their maintenance parts).

(ii) Supplies for maintenance based on requisitions submitted to Quartermaster, USASCS became available about the first of February from local stocks, and divisions began drawing them. As additional supplies were unloaded from SWPA resupply ships and from POA ships carrying rehabilitation supplies, they were allocated to divisions and corps troops.

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(iii) Tenth Army logistics authorized various Class I "extras" such as bulk coffee, sugar and milk, bread components, hospital ration packs, fruit and fruit juices, dependent on availability. Only hospital ration and bread components were furnished by SWPA, all other so-called "bonus" articles being unavailable.

(iv) Only 50% of the packaged rations required could be furnished by SWPA, the balance of 30 days' requirements being made up from "B" ration components on hand or imported from New Guinea Bases. Under special arrangements with Tenth Army and Pacific Ocean Areas, two LSTs were provided to lift eight days' "K" rations, seven days' "C" rations and 14 days' ration accessory packs from a forward base and deliver them at the target.

(v) A streamlined individual clothing and equipment plan was adopted whereby only essential clothing would be carried by soldiers in the assault, the remainder to be packed in squad bags or carried in bulk by division quartermasters or unit S-4s. This plan was adopted in an effort to provide a cushion of supplies held in bulk to replace initial combat losses.

(vi) The Tenth Army Logistics Plan required mounting of all units with 10 gallons of water per individual. As no Navy 55-gallon galvanized iron drums and insufficient numbers of 5-gallon cans were available in LEYTE, it became necessary to divert 5-gallon fuel cans arriving on POA resupply ships to the carrying of water. This expedient proved unsatisfactory.

(vii) Requirements of grave registration service units were met by local manufacture, items placed on high priority air shipment from rear area SWPA bases, or set up through POA for direct shipment to the target area from a forward base.

(viii) Due to inadequate facilities the USASCS supply agency, Base "R", was unable to provide either sufficient 5-gallon cans or the mechanical means of filling them to meet the Tenth Army requirements of 35% of all POL in 5-gallon cans. Therefore it became necessary to reduce the amount of POL carried in 5-gallon cans.

(ix) Minimum Tenth Army POL requirements were met by SWPA except for grease, wheel bearing #3 for which grease, general purpose #2 was an enforced substitute.

(d) Ordnance

(1) Serviceability inspections were performed on all items of ordnance equipment as rapidly as combat conditions permitted. When possible, repairs were made by the

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inspecting teams. Items requiring overhaul were scheduled into ordnance shops. In general the limiting factor on repair was the availability of parts.

(ii) POA shipped major replacement items of ordnance in accordance with loss estimates and known T/E shortages. A system for receipt and issue was set up so that within three hours after any ordnance item was unloaded the ordnance office was ready to effect issue. There were over 31,000 ordnance major items placed in the hands of troops of the Corps.

(iii) By L-Day minus 60 identical 30-day maintenance requisitions had been prepared for each of three divisional light maintenance companies and requisitions covering Corps Troops' needs had been submitted to SWPA supply depots for filling. The use of identical requisitions enabled the depots to effect equal distribution of critical parts or cleaning and preserving materials without an elaborate priority system. These requisitions were filled as follows:

SNL Groups A and B	85% filled
SNL Group C	6% filled
SNL Group F	1% filled
SNL Group G - General purpose	95% filled
SNL Group G - Combat and special purpose	20% filled
Cleaning and preserving	90% filled

(iv) By L-Day minus 60 requests for initial assault supply of ammunition were submitted to USASCS. Since the troops were still in active combat and the weapons lists were not firm, periodic revisions were necessitated. The assembling of 19,200 tons of ammunition into the mounting out areas was a major problem since it was gathered from 15 locations and ships in harbor and transported many miles by truck and/or boat.

(e) Engineer

(i) To provide assistance in the unloading, storage and issue of rehabilitation supplies arriving at LEYTE, dump areas were improved and fenced under engineer supervision.

(ii) Temporary piers for loading landing craft were constructed. While these were useful, weather and surf conditions prohibited full use during loading operations.

(iii) During loading out the Engineer coordinated use of engineer equipment on the beaches.

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(iv) Due to one division departing ahead of the Corps, replacement supplies had to be issued to it on a priority basis. This required scrapping of the plan to issue shipments to units as earmarked. Allocations were made on a priority basis as the equipment became available.

(v) Arrangements were made to ship supplies and equipment arriving after mounting with the Corps Near Sobolon. An engineer supply officer was left behind to collect and ship this equipment.

(vi) Spare parts shipments in rehabilitation shipping proved inadequate and requisitions were prepared and shipment requested to OKINAWA.

(vii) Preparations were made to comply with the water purification standards established by Tenth Army operations plan by briefing the engineer water supply and medical personnel.

(f) Signal

(1) Plans were made for loading the 101st Signal Battalion on one LCM and two LSTs, with such a division of the battalion that the portion on any one of the three ships was capable of installing, maintaining and operating all agencies of communication.

(ii) The carrier platoon had been for several months operating fixed installations in the MARIANAS. A request was made to POA and approved by that headquarters, for the return of this platoon. It arrived in time to mount out, but was not allowed to bring any of its equipment.

(iii) Use of carrier equipment to all divisions on wire, with AN/TRC-1 radio equipment as standby, was decided on. Shortages of equipment in the early part of the campaign necessitated a priority allocation of this equipment so that it was used initially only to the divisions actually in the line.

(iv) Since much tactical wire was to be taken over by Army as consolidation phase wire, the 101st Signal Battalion was directed to make all wire installations of a semi-permanent type.

(v) Estimated rehabilitation requirements of signal equipment for a future operation were submitted to Pacific Ocean Areas prior to departure of the Corps on the LEYTE operation. These were supplemented by periodic reports of actual combat losses. When the list of authorized excess equipment became established, efforts were instituted to obtain it. However, because of changes in the supply responsibility for the Corps

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from Pacific Ocean Areas to Southwest Pacific Area and back to Pacific Ocean Areas, there was some delay in receiving supplies and there were shortages when the Corps mounted out, especially in repair parts. At the time of mounting, the elements of the Corps had on hand 85% of I/E signal equipment, 90% of authorized excess and 50% of the prescribed 30 days of maintenance and repair parts. The shortage of repair parts proved most serious.

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CHAPTER IV

TRAINING PHASE AND REHEARSALS

7. Training by the Corps (including the 77th Division) was limited by the time available to that obtained during the rehearsals for the operation. Divisions and other combat units utilized all opportunities for indoctrination and training of new personnel and for testing weapons. In anticipation of difficulties presented by seawalls backing up the OKINAWA beaches, techniques were devised and practiced for scaling these obstacles.

8. Full scale landing rehearsals (less firing) were conducted for the joint attack force by Commander Southern Attack Force (Rear Admiral J. L. Hall Jr.), in LEYTE GULF, 15-19 March. Except for 10 LSTs which had not completed loading, all ships of the transport squadrons and tractor groups mounting the 7th and 96th Infantry Divisions participated in these exercises with the bulk of the troops embarked. (The 77th Division rehearsed separately). A Corps field order was published covering the rehearsal landing operation, and a target square map similar to that to be used on OKINAWA was specially printed and used by all participating personnel. On the first two days all naval units rehearsed assembly, formation and movement to the beach. On the 17th a schedule of events exactly simulating those planned for the actual assault was carried out. Aircraft made dummy runs on the beaches, and destroyers and LCI gunboats simulated pre-H-hour bombardment. Assault regiments of each division were landed, advances inland of approximately 1,000 yards were made, following which the regiments were reembarked. The most important mistakes discovered were the necessity for delaying H-hour due to various difficulties and the failure of LVTs in the assault wave to reach shore on time. Reasons for these errors were determined and disseminated. Unit critiques were held on the 18th, and on the 19th the exercise was repeated with a greatly improved performance. In addition, during this last exercise reserve regiments were boated and began landing. Command radio circuits were in operation for all rehearsal exercises and each headquarters afloat was able to take part in the exercises. The Corps Staff was represented in the USS TETON (AGC 14) where it practiced the mechanics of the joint operation and familiarized its personnel with shipboard facilities. On the 21st a critique for commanders of all major Naval and Army elements was held aboard the TETON. This meeting was also attended by Commander Expeditionary Force and Commanding General, Tenth Army.

9. En route to the objective a combined Command Post Exercise was conducted on the TETON for the Corps Staff and the staff of Commander Southern Attack Force.

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CHAPTER V

LOADING AND EMBARKATION

10. From the total shipping assigned, the following was allocated Corps units, other than those attached to divisions, for lifting: 4 APA, 2 AKA, 1 LSV, 7 LST and 13 LSM. A summary of the detailed loading plan for Corps troop units is given in paragraph 18. Each division conducted its own loading out under the general supervision of Corps Headquarters, which also handled the details of spotting ships for loading as required. Figure 3 on the following page indicates the final distribution of the Corps in the assault shipping. The 77th Infantry Division is not included since it was not part of the Corps for the assault. In connection with the loading of Corps Troops, the Corps Commander at the beginning of planning reiterated very strongly his recommendations made prior to and during the LEYTE operation that the naval forces in major amphibious operations be organized so as to provide required shipping for Corps Troops entirely separate from transport squadrons and tractor groups assigned to lift the divisions. While this recommendation was not acted upon in its entirety, the Commander Southern Attack Force did organize a temporary transport division within the transport squadron carrying the 7th Infantry Division, and charged its commander with loading and unloading the transports and LSTs and LSMs assigned to lift the Corps Troops. Equipment and units not required in the assault or which could not be lifted initially were left in a rear echelon at LEYTE. The rear echelon was moved to OKINAWA by increment after the landing, closing in that place on 27 May 45.

11. Corps troops loading was all done from the beach at RIZAL, LEYTE. This loading area was similar to all others available in that it was completely lacking in pier facilities other than some small coconut piers erected by the Corps to handle LCMs and LCIs. Beaching of lightage was always difficult and at various times impossible, due to high surf. The cargo was stored in areas designated for each ship prior to loading. Each such ship's area was further divided into areas corresponding to ship's holds, into which the freight was stored in accordance with loading plans but necessarily piled in reverse order. This system insured proper allotment of ship's space and proved to be very satisfactory.


12. Overall control of the movement of all cargo entering and leaving the respective dumps was maintained by a Corps Regulating Officer. In addition to this control, each transport quartermaster assigned to a ship had a representative to receive

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**TASK GROUP 56.3
SOUTHERN LANDING FORCE
SHIPPING ASSIGNMENT**

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and dispatch cargo for each ship. In addition to control of the cargo the regulating officer maintained progress charts of the loading, called for required working details, and advised the Shore Party as to the amount and types of handling equipment needed for day-to-day operations.

13. Guard details and traffic control was handled by the Corps military police. A roving guard was placed inside the inclosure which contained bulk supplies and a stationary guard was posted at each entrance. During loading, the traffic on the shore road, which ran between the dump and the beach, was diverted to a bypass. The Shore Party for loading out Corps Troops was provided by the 1140th Engineer Group. The normal group of personnel required on each shift was one platoon, plus six crane operators and three dozer operators. Six cranes and three dozers were provided by XXIV Corps Engineer. Trucks for hauling general cargo were supplied from various units of the rear echelon. A beachmaster provided by the USS LAURENS for most of the loading phase set up ship-to-shore radio, flag, and light communications and controlled small craft operations.

14. LCVPs and LCMs proved to be the most satisfactory means of transfer of cargo from the beach to the ships. Three LCVs were assigned for movement of XXIV Corps cargo but did not prove very satisfactory due to the inadequate command channels and communications facilities used for their control. However, the smaller craft were able to beach satisfactorily and handled 95% of the cargo.

15. USS TETON was the Corps Command Post afloat as well as the Flagship of Commander Southern Attack Force. The Corps was assigned 52 officer spaces and 126 spaces for enlisted men, which were utilized as follows:

<u>Section</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>EM</u>
CG and C/S	5	3
G-1	1	2
G-2	6	7
G-3	4	6
G-4	3	3
AG	1	3
Surg	2	0
Engr	1	1
Ord	1	1
QM	1	1
Sig	3	3
Air	2	1
NGF	2	0
I&E	0	1
PRO	2	0
Corps Sh Pty	2	1
TQM	2	1

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<u>Section</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>EM</u>
CASCU	3	3
Obar	1	0
PM	0	4
Photographers	0	1
Hq Co	1	13
101st Sig	3	63
Corps Arty	6	8
TOTAL	52	126

The balance of the Corps Staff moved to the target in the USS OZARK (LSV 2). A division of the staff afloat will probably always be necessary due to lack of accommodations on ACCs and is highly desirable when ships are subject to attack. In this operation the staff aboard the TETON proved to be adequate. The cooperation received from the Naval staff aboard was outstanding. All facilities of the ship were made available to the Corps staff and proved of tremendous value, particularly in connection with the development of photographs and reproduction of printed material of all kinds.

16. A summary of the detailed loading plan for Corps Troops follows. This does not include units attached to divisions:

<u>Vessel</u>	<u>Unit</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>Vehicles</u>	<u>S/T</u>	<u>M/T</u>
APA 66, Appling	Corps Hq	29	194	48	432	1283
APA 69, Audrain	Corps Hq	32	24	63	321	800
APA 68, Butte	Corps Hq	39	421	58	683.8	1453
APA 183, Laurens	Corps Hq	114	825	98	392	1270
AKA 23, Aurelia	Corps Hq	7	231	44	755.9	1335.8
AKA 26, Corvus	Corps Hq	6	223	51	707	1523
LSV 2, Ozark	Corps Hq	84	464	31	961	2327
LSM 2	Corps Arty	4	58	13	234	950
LSM 30	Corps Arty	4	58	36	188	503
LSM 32	Corps Arty	3	57	24	173	658
LSM 35	Corps Arty	4	51	21	237	654
LSM 137	71st Med Bn	4	49	23	196	623
LSM 144	71st Med Bn	3	53	24	183	604
LSM 210	71st Med Bn	4	59	31	192	667
LSM 235	101st SigBn	4	52	24	180	591
LST 449	Corps Arty	17	235	49	472	1023
LST 532	Corps Arty	21	236	50	725	2817.5
LST 554	Corps Arty	22	273	98	778	1956
LST 556	101st sigBn	23	236	73	706	1690
LST 559	Corps Arty	24	275	65	624	1960
LST 693	101st SigBn	27	259	60	763	1813
LST 776	Corps Arty	18	12	3	333	690
TOTAL		500	4344	1040	10355.7	27276.3

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CHAPTER VI

MOVEMENT TO OBJECTIVE AREA

17. The Southern Attack Force, of which the XXIV Corps comprised the Landing Force, effected passage to the target in three groupments of shipping:

a. Transport Group DOG (Transport Squadron 13 -- Commodore M. C. Carlson, USN), which began assembly in LEYTE GULF 2 March 45, lifted the 96th Infantry Division (Reinf) in four Transport Divisions composed of 16 APAs, seven AKAs, one LSD and one LSV.

b. Transport Group EASY (Transport Squadron 14 -- Commodore Richardson, USN), which began assembly in LEYTE GULF 2 March 45, lifted the 7th Infantry Division (Reinf) in four Transport Divisions composed of 16 APAs, six AKAs and two LSDs.

c. The Southern Tractor Flotilla, which also began assembly at LEYTE GULF 2 March 45, was organized into Tractor Groups DOG, EASY and FOX, and lifted assault echelons of the 7th and 96th Divisions (both reinf), and elements of the Corps troops respectively. The Flotilla was composed of 49 LSTs, 23 LSMs, five LCIs and three LST(H)s.

d. Since no organic transport organization was assigned to Corps troops, large ships carrying these units were organized into a provisional Transport Division composed of four APAs, two AKAs and one LSV. These ships retained their positions in Transport Groups DOG and EASY for movement to the target and operated as a Transport Division for unloading on the target. The Corps Troops landing ships (LSMs and LSTs) were assigned to the Southern Tractor Flotilla for movement to the target.

18. Commander Task Force 51 directed that Support Carrier Unit Five also assemble at LEYTE by 2 March, participate in rehearsals in LEYTE GULF and operate to cover the movement to the target.

19. Assembly of the shipping groups was completed approximately on schedule, and movement began and proceeded precisely as planned. The Southern Tractor Flotilla cleared SAN PEDRO BAY, LEYTE by 1100I on 24 March 45, and Transport Groups DOG and EASY cleared SAN PEDRO BAY, LEYTE, by 1130I on 27 March 45. The initial speed of advance was set at 12.5 knots for transports and 8.5 knots for the tractor flotilla. Movement was approximately NE by K until a point about 300 miles generally

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south of OKINAWA had been reached, when course was changed to N by NW to target.

20. There were no attacks on the ships during the movement to the target. This was no doubt due in part to the heavy weather which prevailed during most of the voyage and to the preliminary activities in the OKINAWA area.

21. Troops enroute were given detailed briefing for the landing. Maps, relief models of the target, printed orientation brochures and lectures by officers on enemy dispositions, health conditions, native population and weather, were made available to all personnel. Exercise to maintain physical fitness was scheduled insofar as limitations of space aboard shipping permitted. Recordings of a speech by the Tenth Army Commander, Lt. Gen. S. B. Buckner, Jr., were played over public address systems on all ships. Army personnel detailed to man ships' antiaircraft guns and look-out posts received special training conducted by Navy instructors, and conducted firing on towed afloat targets daily after sortie from LEYTE GULF until L-1 Day.

22. During the movement of the Corps to its objective a preliminary Tenth Army operation by 77th Division to capture the KERAMA RETTO (off west coast of OKINAWA) was in progress. The 420th Field Artillery Group (Colonel W. C. Lucas, USA) went with this attack force and by H-Hour on L-Day had two battalions of 155mm guns from the Corps Artillery in position and registered on southern OKINAWA for support of the main landing. This Group remained on KERAMA RETTO until 11 May 45 when it was moved to OKINAWA due to threatened damage from an approaching typhoon. (See par. 25, Artillery Support).

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CHAPTER VII

THE ASSAULT

23. Narrative.

a. Additional details of the operation are included in following paragraphs of this chapter, in the orders of this and higher Headquarters, in the records of the various staff sections and in the reports of subordinate units.

b. Under cover of intensive surface and aerial bombardment by supporting forces of the Fifth Fleet, the transport squadrons and tractor groups carrying the Corps moved into their prescribed areas off the HAGUSHI beaches on OKINAWA SHIMA early on 1 April 45. LSTs carrying the eight battalion landing teams employed in the initial assault launched their LVTs loaded with the troops, and the LVTs were formed into waves and moved to the line of departure. To insure coordination in the landing, the first six waves were ordered to land according to the following schedule:

<u>Wave No.</u>	<u>Time</u>
1 (Amphibian Tanks)	H-Hour (0830I)
2	H plus 02 mins
3	H plus 06 mins
4	H plus 12 mins
5	H plus 18 mins
6	H plus 24 mins

This schedule was maintained with only minor local variations. The formation employed for the landing was divisions abreast, 98th Division on the south. Each division landed with two regiments abreast, each regiment having two battalions in the assault. Weather and surf conditions were almost ideal, presenting no obstacle to the landing operations. In general, the landing waves received little hostile fire. Occasional mortar and artillery shells fell on the beaches (particularly the Brown (South) Beaches) and offshore. The physical aspects of the fringing reef were not unexpectedly difficult and the seawall behind all the beaches had been adequately breached by naval gunfire. These favorable conditions permitted the landing of assault waves to proceed according to plan and on schedule. They also permitted the early landing of artillery and reserve units. The light field artillery battalions were put ashore in DUKWs. Reserve infantry elements were transferred from ships' boats before the boats reached the reef to LVTs which had been employed earlier

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to land the assault battalions, which then made additional passages with troops across the reef.

d. The scheme of maneuver and boundary between divisions are shown on Figure 4 which follows this page. The plan called for the 7th Division to seize KADENA Airfield quickly and drive to the east coast cutting the island in two. The 96th was required initially to capture the high ground commanding its beaches on the south and southeast and to drive rapidly down the coastal road, capture the bridges near CHATAN, and protect the right of the Corps. This division was then to continue its attack across the island and swing to the south securing the assigned beachhead by seizure of the L plus 10 line.

e. The assault echelon after landing moved rapidly inland against scattered resistance. KADENA Airfield was captured by the 7th Division by 1000I on the first day, and by dark an initial beachhead to an average depth of 3,500 yards all along the Corps front had been secured. This beachhead included the L plus 3 line on the north and the vicinity of CHATAN on the south. Rehabilitation of the airfield was started immediately and pushed until 6 April when the Island Commander took over responsibility for its completion.

f. The Divisions aggressively exploited the unexpectedly light resistance, the 7th Division reaching the east coast and cutting the island in half on 2 April while the 96th Division reached the vicinity of FUTEKA against increasing resistance and was approximately one mile west of UNJO. The direction of the Corps advance was then changed to the south on 3 April, the 7th Division relieving the eastern elements of the 96th. By dark on 4 April the assigned beachhead (L plus 10 line) had been seized with divisions abreast. Enemy resistance had increased considerably all along the zone of advance, and his artillery and mortar fire was reaching a fair density. In the meantime unloading had been proceeding satisfactorily despite the wide fringing reef along all beaches. The Corps command post was opened ashore about 1,000 yards south of KADENA Airfield at 1000I on 5 April 45, closing on board USS "Teton" (AGC 14) at the same time.


g. The Corps advance continued south against increasing resistance, particularly from hostile artillery and mortars, until by 10 April the enemy outpost had been driven in and the divisions were in solid contact all along the front with the main line of resistance of the first hostile major defensive position. This position with both flanks resting on the sea was skillfully located in a narrow part of the island on almost perfect defensive terrain centering on SHURI. The garrison of the island, consisting of the 24th and 82d Jap Divisions, the 44th Independent Mixed Brigade, and numerous artillery, mortar and other supporting units, was disposed for all-around defence of this area. (Chapter VIII - "Intelligence" - gives details of the enemy situation and the terrain. Enclosure 4 is a general

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PLAN FOR SEIZURE OF BEACHHEAD
SCALE 1:100,000



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FIGURE 4

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
map showing the progress of the Corps during the entire operation.)

g. Attacks against these thoroughly organized defenses extending entirely across the island, located in the extremely steep escarpments and on commanding hills, and defended by fanatical infantry supported by the most intensive and skillfully employed artillery and heavy mortar fire yet encountered by this Corps, were costly. A typical section of a major escarpment in this hostile position is shown in Figure 5B which follows. Both the 7th and 96th Divisions had arrived on OKINAWA about 1,000 men below strength in infantry. The casualties resulting from the bitter fighting which developed soon after turning south so reduced the infantry strength that these divisions had difficulty in exploiting the supporting fire power available. Further, the rate of arrival and discharge of artillery ammunition from ships had failed to keep up with expenditures, necessitating a command restriction on expenditure.

h. These conditions forced a decision to delay the coordinated attack by the Corps required to break the SHURI position until sufficient artillery ammunition could be unloaded and moved to ammunition supply points and battery positions, and until additional infantry strength could be made available through replacements and by the commitment of reinforcing fresh troops. The 27th Infantry Division (Major General George L. Griner, USA), which had been employed by the Tenth Army in earlier phases of the RYUKYUS operation, was landed over the HAGUSHI beaches, assembled in bivouac areas and began relief of the 96th Division in the western part of its zone on 9 April. During the same period additional artillery was made available and III Amphibious Corps Artillery and 1st Marine Division Artillery were moved into supporting positions. By 15 April the 27th was in position and ready for participation in a coordinated attack, although it was nearly 2,000 men understrength. Some 1,200 replacements had arrived on 13 April and had been assigned to the 7th and 96th to alleviate somewhat their depleted condition in infantry strength. Meanwhile maximum pressure was maintained against the enemy. The 7th and 96th Divisions constantly hammered at the Jap's defenses and on 15 April the Corps reached the line indicated on Figure 5 which follows.

i. On 19 April the Corps launched a powerfully supported attack with the 27th, 96th and 7th Infantry Divisions abreast supported by reinforcing artillery, augmented naval gunfire and heavy air support to break through the Jap's defenses and capture the NARA-YONABARU Road, running across the island just south of SHURI. Figure 5 shows the zones of action and scheme of maneuver proscribed for this offensive. The timing of the attack was echeloned from the left (east), that flank advancing 60 minutes ahead of the western flank. This was done in order to take advantage of successive massed fires of the artillery with the Corps in the preparation. Preceded by an intensive

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KAKAZU RIDGE, OKINAWA
This Ridge Located Just North Of KAKAZU VILLAGE In The Zones Of The 96th & 27th
Inf. Divisions Was The Key To The URASOE-MURA Hill Mass

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FIG. 5A



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URASOE - MURA ESCARPMENT, OKINAWA
Hill 156 Along Eastern Edge Of Escarpment
In The Zone Of The 96th Inf. Division.

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FIG. 5B

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preparation delivered by 27 battalions of artillery with the Corps, which included nine battalions on loan from the III Amphibious Corps, the attack was launched on schedule. The excellent air and naval gunfire support which had continued without reduction since the landing was intensified. Progress was slow but sure as the infantry advanced doggedly, foot by foot, fighting the bitterest kind of hand-to-hand battle to gain each of the many hills and the major escarpment in the enemy's position.

1. Preliminary to and during this attack both the 27th and 96th Divisions were engaged in particularly desperate fighting for KAKAZU RIDGE - a key position in the defenses of the northwestern approaches to SHURI. This ridge is depicted in Figure 5A. The ridge originally was in the zone of action of the 96th Infantry Division. The battle for this ridge commenced on 9 April and for 10 days it was the scene of repeated bitter attacks and counterattacks. On 10 April a toehold was established by elements of the 96th Division on the western nose of the ridge, but it was not until 19 April that this hold extended to include the entire crest. Even then five additional days were required before it could be reported that KAKAZU RIDGE was entirely cleared of the enemy. The fighting which ensued during the twelve days following the opening of the 19 April attack was exceptionally bitter in terrain greatly in favor of the defender. Every advance was made only by dint of doggedly killing all Jap occupants of the many strong caves and emplacements with which each key terrain feature was held. Casualties on both sides were substantial. During the period from the 19th to the 30th of April the Jap dead totalled 12,636, while the Corps incurred 5,831 battle casualties. Besides frequent local counterattacks in an effort to regain his lost positions, the Jap reacted to our steady advance with an unprecedented volume of artillery fire beginning on 23 April. The bulk of this fire was delivered on forward elements at night. By 25 April deep inroads had been made into the main hostile position - the Corps left rested on the highest terrain north of CONICAL HILL, the center was against the main URASOE-MURA escarpment (see Figure 5B), and the right flank was well advanced toward MACHINATO Airfield. On 26 April the 96th Division occupied portions of the URASOE-MURA escarpment, and on the 26th the MACHINATO Airfield was captured by the 27th Division, placing the Corps in greatly improved position for continuation of the attack on SHURI.

k. During the latter part of April, the 1st Marine Division (Major General P. A. del Valle, USMC) which had landed with the III Amphibious Corps on L-Day and had subsequently completed its operations in the northern part of the island was made available to XXIV Corps. This division went into action on the west flank by echelon as its elements became available, relieving the 27th Division which was scheduled to garrison the island. By the morning of 1 May, this relief was completed and the Commanding General, 1st Marine Division assumed command of the zone of action.

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Except for the Division Artillery (less one light battalion) which remained in position under Corps control, the 27th was relieved from attachment to the Corps, reverting to the Island Command. Meanwhile the 77th Infantry Division (Major General A. D. Bruce, USA) after completion of its operations on other islands of the RYUKYUS under Tenth Army direction, had completed assembly of its major units on OKINAWA by 29 April, and was attached to the Corps. It immediately began relief of the 96th Division in the center zone of action, and command of this zone passed to the Commanding General, 77th Division, on 30 April. The 96th Division, leaving its artillery in firing positions under control of the Commanding General, XXIV Corps Artillery, passed to Corps Reserve and began a short period of rehabilitation and absorption of replacements.

1. The attack of the Corps continued during these changes of units and a slow but steady advance was maintained against the same fanatical resistance and undiminished artillery fire which had characterized earlier phases of the action. Hostile counter-attacks, generally local in nature, were promptly and skillfully launched by the Jap in attempts to recapture each important hill taken in our advance. Early on the morning of 4 May, the enemy launched a general all-out counter-offensive all along his front with the immediate objective of capturing the FUTEMA area and the ultimate objective of recapturing KADENA Airfield. Plans for this counter-offensive included fleet and air support and probably attempted ground reinforcement. The bulk of the Jap 24th Division was moved into the line from the south and employed in this effort. A full strength battalion of special engineer troops attempted a counter-landing on the west coast during the night 3-4 May and succeeded in getting an estimated 500-600 troops ashore in the general vicinity of MACHINATO airfield where most of them were destroyed by an armored amphibian unit of the 1st Marine Division which was bivouacked near the point of landing. The few who escaped into the rear area of the 1st Marine Division together with infiltration parties which had landed as far north as CHATAN were soon hunted down and killed. On the east flank a similar force attempted a counter-landing near YONABARU airfield during the night of 3-4 May but was discovered and practically destroyed by naval forces and the Reconnaissance Troop of the 7th Division. Only an estimated 20 men of this force reached the shore and these were quickly destroyed. Both of these forces, according to information obtained from prisoners and captured documents, were instructed and equipped for damaging command posts, tanks, ammunition dumps and other important rear area installations and were ordered to converge on KADENA. During this night (3-4 May) the enemy fired an artillery preparation of some 7,600 rounds of all calibers, mostly directed against forward elements. On 4 May, approximately 8,600 additional rounds of artillery, together with a large volume of mortar fire, were delivered in support of the enemy attack.

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m. The enemy's counter-offensive was badly disrupted in front of our lines by our artillery and mortar fire. However, strong elements of the 24th Division reached our leading elements but were largely driven off or destroyed in savage close-quarter fighting. Some small units managed to infiltrate our lines, with one estimated enemy battalion reaching high ground in the vicinity of TANABARU along the boundary between the 7th and 77th Divisions. All infiltrating units were soon isolated, and were destroyed before they inflicted serious damage. This ill-fated counter-offensive cost the Jap at least 6,227 dead, five prisoners of war and 59 destroyed artillery pieces within a two-day period.

n. By 1 May it had become apparent that the entire III Amphibious Corps consisting of the 1st Marine Division (already committed as a part of XXIV Corps) and the 6th Marine Division, together with Corps Troops, would soon be available as a unit for operations in the southern portion of the island. Accordingly, on 5 May the Tenth Army Commander directed the Commanding General, III Amphibious Corps, to move the 6th Marine Division to the south and on 7 May to assume responsibility for the zone of action placing his Corps on the western flank of XXIV Corps where the 1st Marine Division was then operating. By the same directive the Army Commander announced his assumption of direct control of ground action effective 070600I May 45. The Army plan was to renew the coordinated attack with the two corps abreast to effect a double envelopment of the hostile position. The broken line on Figure 5 marked "7 May" shows the position of forward elements at the time the III Amphibious Corps was committed to action. The 1st Marine Division during its six days of action under the command of the XXIV Corps met extremely heavy resistance as it determinedly forced its way up the northern and northwestern slopes of the dominating hill mass just north of DAKESHI. At the time of the Jap counter-landing on the night of 3-4 May, this division quickly contained the enemy force which landed near MACHINATO Airfield and during 4 May killed at least 400 Japs in that area as well as several hundred others who had infiltrated the rear areas. Following this action, the 1st Marine Division pushed its attack south from the airfield and despite heavy enemy fire, especially from the high ground on its left flank, reached the north banks of ASA-KAWA (an estuary west of DAKESHI) on the evening of 6 May. The Division suffered 1,409 battle casualties, including 199 killed in action and died of wounds, during its action under XXIV Corps command.

o. The 96th Division, following its relief by the 77th, had been rested and brought approximately to strength by replacements, and was ready at this time to relieve the 7th Division on the Corps left. This relief was completed on 10 May, giving the Corps a comparatively fresh division with which to start the coordinated attack against the SHURI position. The 7th Division Artillery was retained in action under Corps Artillery control. During the entire period of regrouping the attack was continued all

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along the front. Gains were steady as the Corps slowly wrested from the Jap's possession first one strongly held terrain feature after another.

p. The Army coordinated attack was launched on 11 May. The XXIV Corps made its main effort on its left center with the relatively fresh 96th Division, while the 77th maintained maximum pressure by a continued offensive through the hills toward SHURI. The hill mass directly northwest of YONABARU (including CONICAL HILL) on the Corps left controlled the eastern approaches to SHURI, completely dominated the east coastal plain, and was the eastern anchor of the hostile main position. All feasible approaches to this rugged hill mass were under enemy observation, were covered by fire of all types of enemy weapons as well as defended fanatically. Against these approaches the 96th Division doggedly forced its way forward yard by yard, holding each advantage gained against almost continuous local counterattack. By afternoon of 21 May the 96th had gained control of the northern and eastern slopes of CONICAL HILL, and all observation on the supporting hills and ridges east and southeast of SHURI, denying the enemy any observation from the SHURI position on YONABARU and the east coastal area to the north. For all practical purposes the Jap defensive organization at SHURI was neutralized. The opportunity to complete the destruction of the hostile defenses having thus been created, the exploitation was carried out by committing the 7th Division through the 700-yard corridor between CONICAL HILL and the east coast to envelop SHURI from the south and east. The 7th, which had been out of the line for 10 days resting, rehabilitating and absorbing replacements, was comparatively fresh and near table of organization strength. The 96th made its main effort on its left to clear the western and southwestern slopes of CONICAL HILL and capture the high ground southeast of SHURI, while the 77th Division continued its attack to capture the high ground north and northeast of SHURI and to seize SHURI itself. At the conclusion of this operation the 77th Division would be pinched out, and the 7th and 96th would change direction to the south. Figure 6, following this page, shows the general scheme of maneuver and the progress of the attack. Figure 7 portrays the narrow corridor through which the 7th Division advanced. On 20 May the 7th Division began its assembly just north of CONICAL HILL, attacked at dawn on the 23d, quickly seized the dominating hill mass south and southeast of YONABARU to protect its left (south) flank, and on 23 May attacked in strength toward the west. This westward movement immediately met strong resistance, particularly from the hills just north of the YONABARU-NAHA Road. The 7th Division's initial breakthrough attack was inaugurated by a period of extremely heavy and continuous rain which began at this time and continued without abatement for over two weeks. This was by far the worst period of weather encountered in the entire campaign. Movement of vehicles became increasingly difficult even on well established roads, and in most of the forward areas impossible. Tanks and direct fire weapons as well as artillery needed to sustain a drive forward against the defensive position opposing our advance on the west were brought

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


FIGURE 6

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CONICAL HILL, OKINAWA

Looking South Toward Gap Through Which 7th Division Advanced On 20 May.
Conical Hill Is On The Right. Town Of Yonabaru Is At Base Of This Hill On The Beach.

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FIG. 7


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into position only after many hours of laborious effort or not at all. Supply and evacuation of the assault elements was almost entirely by hand carry. The road to YONABARU from the north - the only supply road from established bases in the 7th Division zone - soon became impassable to wheeled vehicles and within two or three days disappeared completely and had to be abandoned. To alleviate these conditions the Corps established a supply and evacuation point at YONABARU on 31 May utilizing water transportation to maintain elements of the 7th Division in the southern part of the island. In the interim, the 7th Division was supplied by LVT along the coast. As other roads deteriorated this supply point was amplified to assist in support of all troops in the forward area. On 10 June, the Island Command took charge of this activity, relieving combat elements. The delays caused by extreme weather and mud conditions gave the enemy time to evacuate most of his troops from the SHURI position, but little of his supplies and heavy equipment.

G. The Corps attack made progress in spite of all difficulties, although at a slow pace. The 7th and 96th Divisions, advancing abreast, reached the Corps boundary south of the 77th Division zone on 30 May. The 77th Division in the meantime had been involved in a direct assault against the inner defenses of SHURI. These positions located on extremely difficult terrain were defended in the usual desperate manner. Figure 8 following this page shows some of the terrain encountered by the 77th. On 30 May, this division entered SHURI from the north and soon after eliminated all enemy in its assigned zone. It then reverted to Corps Reserve, mopping up the SHURI area, moving major elements forward in rear of the advance of 96th Division to defend that division's open right flank until the III Amphibious Corps on the right could move abreast.

E. As soon as our threat to his east flank developed, the enemy initiated a withdrawal from the SHURI position to a new one located in the southwestern corner of the island. While some preliminary rearward movements had taken place just after our seizure of CONICAL HILL, the first major withdrawal south took place on 26 May. Taking advantage of our limited mobility due to mud and our limited observation and air support due to almost impossible flying conditions, the enemy was able to accomplish the abandonment of the SHURI position with the bulk of his forces. However, during infrequent periods of observation our air and artillery inflicted terrific casualties on the hostile troops - particularly artillery and vehicles - moving to the south. It was apparent in the last few days of May that our opportunity to isolate completely the main enemy force in SHURI had been lost to Generals Rain and Mud. Accordingly, following the collapse of the SHURI defenses the direction of the Corps main attack was changed, with the 7th Division being directed to push its attack due south to reach the coast, cut off the CHINEN Peninsula and prevent any elements of the main enemy force from reaching the rugged terrain of that area. The 96th Division turned south abreast and on the

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TERRAIN JUST NORTHEAST OF SHURI

Looking North In The Zone Of The 77th Inf. Division Showing Fortified Tomb Positions

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FIG. 8

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right of the 7th and relieved units of that division in its new zone. While the 96th Division changed direction and pushed its units into the southward drive, the 7th advanced rapidly and reached the south coast late on 3 June. On 4 June the 7th was in complete control of the CHINEN Peninsula and the Corps was able to shift its direction of attack to the southwest against the hostile final position. The Commanding General, Tenth Army moved the Corps boundary westward to capitalize on this capability. In the meantime the 96th had relieved the right flank elements of the 7th Division, and made rapid strides southward. By 5 June the 96th had captured the key road-center of IWA town and shifted its direction of attack to the southwest. Both divisions, meeting increasing resistance, reached the line indicated in Figure 6 on 6 June. While these events were taking place elements of the III Amphibious Corps had crossed the inlet south of NAHA and on 6 June that Corps was echeloned to the right rear of the XXIV Corps with elements heavily engaged in the cleanup of OROKU Peninsula. The 77th Division had completed the mop-up of the SHURI area and had one infantry regiment echeloned forward to IWA to protect the right and rear of the 96th until the III Amphibious Corps came abreast.

g. At this point it became definitely apparent that the Jap would make his last stand in the OZATO-TOMUI-MEDEERA hill mass. This dominant area in southwestern OKINAWA presented a most difficult physical barrier to the continued advance of the Corps. The boundary between Corps had been shifted on 4 June to the west to include this principal hill mass within the zone of XXIV Corps. Both the 7th and 96th Infantry Divisions found themselves facing an escarpment several hundred feet high in places, atop which there was a mass of rough, jagged coral formations full of caves and man-made defenses manned by the Jap in strength. The 7th Division had one narrow avenue of approach on its left center up the GUSHICHAN-NAKAZA Valley, flanked on both sides by formidable hills and observation. The 96th had no immediate avenue of approach except directly over the cliffs and craggy hills. The formidable character of this terrain is apparent from Figure 9 (following page). The period 6-8 June was occupied in intensive reconnaissance, regrouping forces, seizing positions from which to launch a coordinated attack against the escarpment, and in assembling the necessary supplies through the little port of MINATOGA which was established by the Corps on 6 June to provide logistic support for its troops in southern OKINAWA. The two weeks of rain that fell during the latter part of May and early June had by this time all but immobilized vehicular traffic on all roads to the south, and only after the first week in June were artillery and tanks able to displace forward to support adequately the assault on the escarpment.

h. On 9 June the Corps renewed its coordinated attack, and against fanatical resistance elements of both the 7th and 96th Divisions fought slowly forward in daily advances of a few hundred

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YAEJU-DAKE ESCARPMENT, OKINAWA

View Of Escarpment Just Southwest Of TOMUI In The Zone Of The 96th Inf. Division

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Fig. 9

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yards, established footholds on the escarpment and consolidated daily gains. On the Corps left flank the 7th Infantry Division pushed elements forward along the ridge which runs southwest along the coast, and up the GUSHICHAN-NAKAZA Valley. Elements engaged in the latter thrust finally gained by 12 June a tenuous hold on top of the escarpment just south of YAEJU-DAKE - the high point on the escarpment lying immediately southwest of TOMUI (see Figures 6 and 9). Meanwhile on the Corps right the 96th Division pushed against the northwestern face of the escarpment. In this area there existed a secondary escarpment - or step - about half-way to the top of the main plateau. On the second day of the renewed attack (10 June) the 96th was able to push a small force on to this step against intense hostile fire. Successive days were occupied in expansion of this hold. Taking advantage of the cover afforded by the 7th Division's hold on the escarpment southwest of TOMUI, the 96th Division on 13 June pushed its left flank to the top of the escarpment and on the following day wrested from the bitterly resisting Jap the highest peak within his position. During the actions to gain the top of the escarpment predawn attacks were successfully executed by both divisions to surprise the enemy before he occupied his daytime positions. Flamethrower tanks were of particular value during this fighting and throughout the remainder of the campaign. By 13 June the Corps not only held key positions on the escarpment but had also gained the strongly defended town of OZATO on the Corps right (west) flank. The attack on this flank was slowed considerably by minefields located in and around the town of YUZA, just north of OZATO and by strong enemy defenses in extremely broken and difficult terrain east and south of OZATO. During this attack, the enemy launched a number of desperate counterattacks, particularly against the 7th Division, with his last remnants of formed reserves. Although captured orders and prisoners of war indicated that a considerable number of Japs were involved, these counterattacks lacked real coordination and appeared to be local in nature. They were initially reported by front line troops as mass infiltrations. None succeeded in penetrating our lines. Units of the III Amphibious Corps had by now come abreast of the XXIV Corps and by 15 June were driving south with the main effort along the west coast to envelop the western spurs of the YUZA-DAKE hill mass and seize the MABUNI MURA hill on the southernmost tip of OKINAWA.

u. The Jap's stubborn defense which continued throughout this period with unabated suicidal ferocity was gradually overcome after much rugged close-in fighting. The entire plateau was overrun by our troops on 17 June. On the 18th, while observing the action of assault units in the III Amphibious Corps zone, the Army Commander, Lt. Gen. S. B. Buckner, Jr., was killed in action. Major General Roy S. Geiger, USMC, succeeded to command the operation. Through the use of loudspeakers mounted on LCI's operating along the southeast coast, and loudspeakers mounted on tanks, the 7th Division directed thousands of civilians and many soldiers cowering in caves to proceed to the safety of our lines.

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The 96th Division also obtained excellent results with the tank-mounted loudspeaker on several occasions. In spite of the delay that the resulting mass migration into our lines entailed, the attack southwest along the coastal ridge was pushed on to the capture of HILL 89 (near MABUNI), on 21 June.

y. On the Corps right, two pockets of resistance held out to the last. One of these pockets was in the southern part of the town of MEDEERA, and the other on a ridge just west of that town. The 96th Infantry Division (with the 305th Infantry, 77th Division, attached) attacked these pockets on 21 June and all resistance was broken by the close of the day. The island of OKINAWA was rightfully declared "secure" on 22 June. Even though there was no further organized resistance, many hundreds of ditched enemy soldiers remained scattered in hideouts through the southern part of the island. A thorough and coordinated mopping-up program commenced on 23 June to eliminate these remnants. This mop-up which included a thorough sweep of the southern part of the island, against solid blocking lines at two narrow necks of the island further north, was completed on 30 June, ending major tactical operations on OKINAWA.

24. Ship-to-Shore Movement and Shore Party Activities.

a. The ships and craft transporting the Corps arrived in their assigned positions off the HAGUSHI beaches on the west coast of OKINAWA on schedule early of L-Day - 1 April 45. Underwater Demolition Teams, operating under command of the Amphibious Support Group (Rear Admiral Blandy, USN) had removed existing beach obstacles during the period L-6 to L-1 and had completed a physical reconnaissance of the beaches. Reports of their findings, delivered to interested elements of the Corps at sea during the voyage, proved to be remarkably accurate and were invaluable to assault units.

b. The assault waves moved toward the beach under cover of intense naval gunfire, continuous bombing and strafing attacks by aircraft operating from CVEs, artillery fire from KERAMA RETTO, and rocket, mortar and automatic weapons fire from the LCIs. Under almost perfect weather conditions and against practically no initial resistance, the landing operation proceeded on schedule.

c. The reef along the HAGUSHI beaches proved to be as formidable as expected. Initially all cargo had to go ashore by DUKWs and LVTs. Continuing reconnaissance, blasting of channels, and installation of ponton barge causeways soon developed facilities capable of handling cargo direct from beaching ships and landing craft to trucks. Adequate beach exits to almost unlimited storage areas expedited clearing of beaches to such an extent that at no time was unloading delayed by beach congestion.

d. The Corps Shore Party, Colonel James A. Cunningham,

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CE, Commanding, established its headquarters on Beach Orange 2 on L plus 1, assumed command of the Corps Service Area at 0500 on L plus 2 (3 April) and began establishment and operation of Corps dumps. Issues from and internal arrangement of these dumps were controlled by the Corps Special Staff, utilizing service troops previously earmarked for this mission and initially attached to the shore party. Division shore parties continued to operate their previously established dumps concurrently. After 6 April no further supplies were placed in division beach dumps, which were then eliminated as rapidly as their supplies were exhausted, freeing all divisional organic service troops for use farther forward.

e. General unloading was initiated on L plus 2. Corps assault shipping, amounting to 195,000 MT, was completely discharged by dark on L plus 12. The unloading in this operation was accomplished in a particularly orderly fashion, cargo generally coming ashore at the desired time and place, and being moved to dispersal areas promptly. Unfavorable winds and high swells caused appreciable delays during this period.

f. Air raids directed primarily against the ships in the harbor were frequent and although casualties were inflicted did not cause vital delay to unloading. They did, however, cause several minor delays in unloading and the intense anti-aircraft fire from ships directed at low-flying attackers caused casualties and damage to supplies ashore.

g. Island Command, AGF 351, took over responsibility for unloading ships and operating beach dumps on 10 April 46. Most of the Corps service units engaged in the shore party and dump operations were transferred to the Island Command at the same time.

25. Artillery Support.

a. General

(1) The complete report of the Commanding General, XXIV Corps Artillery is contained in Appendix A to this report.

(2) Artillery played a major role in this operation. The strength of the enemy garrison, character of the terrain, the fanatical resistance offered by a well-armed, well-equipped foe fighting under intelligent and capable leadership, employing a comprehensive plan of defense which utilized the terrain to maximum advantage, all combined to require the expenditure of large amounts of ammunition under a carefully coordinated and completely integrated plan.

(3) The doctrines covering the tactical employment of large masses of field artillery set forth in our field manuals and other official publications and as taught at the Field Artillery School, were followed at all times throughout the battle.

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Technique of fire as developed and taught at the School obtained magnificent results. It was proven again and again during this campaign that our doctrines and technique are sound. The artillery was always prepared to deliver fire in large masses in support of the main effort of each major unit of the Corps, and did so, throughout the operation. Organization for combat was always devised to achieve this end. "Time on Target" concentrations by three to five artillery battalions were the rule. In one instance, a TOT of 22 battalions was placed without warning on a large number of the enemy in the village of MAKABE, using from three to ten volleys per battalion. In another instance a TOT of eleven battalions was placed upon HILL 89 where the last enemy elements had assembled in strength to oppose the 7th Infantry Division. Counter-battery fires followed a systematic procedure, employing all the facilities of the sound and flash battalion, ground observation posts, photo interpretation, and field artillery liaison aircraft. Destruction of the enemy artillery was the primary objective sought by the Corps Artillery from the beginning. Naval gun fires and strikes by supporting aircraft were integrated, when required or when appropriate, to achieve this end. Once a hostile gun was definitely located its complete destruction was assured, and it became only a matter of time before this gun was eliminated. The enemy recognized this fact and made every effort to hide his artillery weapons. Dummy guns were placed at likely locations, and false flashes set off where no guns existed were often noted by aerial observers. In "Combat Notes" issued by the Chief of Staff, Japanese 32d Division, is found the following statement: "Once our (Japanese) weapons begin firing, their continued existence is not permitted. Though cover may be 30-40 meters high, cooperating airplanes, naval gunfire, artillery, and tank guns destroy the weapons before they can participate in a fire fight." As a result, the entire Japanese artillery was destroyed during this operation, the mass of the weapons being destroyed prior to the enemy's retreat from the SHURI defenses. In addition, the Corps Artillery and the artillery with the various divisions integrated their fires at all times in support of the infantry action. Corps Artillery howitzer battalions always were assigned secondary missions of reinforcing specific divisional artillery units. Divisional artillery headquarters or divisional medium battalions called directly upon the Corps howitzer battalions for these fires. In addition, the remainder of the Corps Artillery was always prepared to furnish the fire of additional battalions whenever a real need developed, and did so frequently. At night, a complete and integrated program of interdiction and harassing fires was carried out, utilizing divisional artillery fires, Corps Artillery fires, and naval gunfire, all coordinated by the Corps Artillery Headquarters. The development and operation of the target information center was a major achievement during the OKINAWA operation. In reality it was nothing new, for all major artillery echelons have always maintained a target information center through the medium of the intelligence section. However, the expansion in personnel and concept which took place in preparation for this operation enabled the intelligence personnel to achieve more comprehensive

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and greater results. Great numbers of targets were obtained, evaluated, and dispatched quickly to appropriate artillery, naval and air units for attack. The work of this section in the Corps Artillery Headquarters was of major importance and made it possible to apply the most suitable type of fire from the most suitable type of weapon without delay at all times. The defenses encountered by this Corps on OKINAWA were extremely strong. All artillery was kept in caves habitually, sometimes firing from the mouths of the caves and sometimes being rolled outside on to gun platforms and then withdrawn into the cave at the conclusion of the fires. The hostile artillery was disposed in depth. Supply installations were located in caves and emplacements cut into the slopes of hills for miles in rear of the front lines. The various calibers and types of weapons in the artillery of the XXIV Corps permitted flexibility in the selection of the most suitable weapon for all targets located. The 155mm howitzer, M-1, is an excellent weapon for general support and reinforcing the fires of the divisional artillery at medium ranges. The 155mm gun, M-1, is invaluable for delivering high velocity fire against targets deep within the enemy's position, and was used on some occasions in direct fire against strongly fortified point targets in and close to the enemy's front lines. The 8" howitzer gave superb results to the limit of its range. It carried the major load of destroying enemy gun caves. It did this with remarkable accuracy. However, despite the fact that this weapon fires a 200-lb shell it frequently was unable to destroy heavily reinforced concrete structures, even though using the concrete-piercing fuze. The results achieved by our artillery are undoubtedly known to the Japanese high command in TOKYO. It is reasonable to presume, therefore, that in any future operation in which the enemy has had time and possesses the facilities to construct a heavily fortified defensive area, we shall encounter caves, gun emplacements, blockhouses and similar installations of heavy, reinforced concrete beyond the capabilities of the 8" howitzer. A heavier weapon must be available somewhere within the Army which can attack these targets successfully. The 240mm howitzer is believed to be the most suitable weapon for this purpose.

b. Artillery with the Corps: Initially, the artillery with the Corps consisted of the XXIV Corps Artillery and the organic artillery of the 7th and 96th Divisions. The XXIV Corps Artillery consisted of the Corps Artillery Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, 287th Field Artillery Observation Battalion, 418th Field Artillery Group (three battalions 155mm howitzers), 420th Field Artillery Group (two battalions 155mm guns), and the 748th Field Artillery Battalion (8" howitzers). It became apparent on 5 April 45 that additional artillery would have to be provided if we were to overcome the powerful enemy artillery and break through the strong SHURI defenses without undue loss of time. Accordingly, the Commanding General, XXIV Corps requested Commanding General, Tenth Army to attach all available III Amphibious Corps Artillery to the XXIV Corps. This was approved and a large mass of additional artillery, consisting of three 155mm howitzer battalions, two 155mm gun battalions, and the divisional artillery of the 1st Marine Division (one battalion 75mm howitzers, three

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battalions 105mm howitzers) was placed under XXIV Corps command. These units joined the Corps beginning 7 April 45 and remained with it until 7 May 45, when the III Amphibious Corps entered the battle and took over a part of the front. The 1st Marine Division Artillery was split up and attached directly to the infantry divisions of the Corps. The Marine Corps Artillery units were formed into groupments with the XXIV Corps Artillery units. In addition, throughout the campaign, whenever an infantry division was withdrawn from the front for rest and reorganization, the divisional artillery remained in action and reinforced the fires of one or more of the remaining divisions.

c. Divisional Artillery: Divisional artillery was habitually employed in the normal manner; that is, light battalions furnished direct support to infantry regiments and the medium battalion rendered general support to the division as a whole. The Corps frequently prescribed that one or more divisional artillery battalions would be prepared to fire on call in the zone of action of an adjacent division. Lateral communication was always established between the artillery headquarters of the various divisions. Emergency calls under this plan were seldom made during this operation, but the artillery units involved were always prepared to furnish such fires. On one occasion when the 77th Infantry Division relieved the 96th Infantry Division, the 96th Division Artillery furnished direct support to the 77th Infantry Division until the arrival of the 77th Division Artillery on OKINAWA. All amphibious tank units were attached to the infantry divisions and were employed under the direction of the division artillery commanders to reinforce divisional artillery fires. Antiaircraft artillery units attached to the divisions furnished artillery support and delivered many harassing fires at night under the direction of the division artillery commanders. No antiaircraft artillery units were attached to the Corps Artillery but arrangements were made with units in the vicinity of Corps Artillery battalions to execute night harassing missions assigned by the Corps Artillery Commander, in addition to executing their primary mission of providing antiaircraft defense.

d. Corps Artillery:

(1) The 420th Field Artillery Group (531st Field Artillery Battalion, 532d Field Artillery Battalion) (155mm gun) landed on the KEISE SHIMA islands approximately six miles west of OKINAWA on 31 March 45, over an extremely difficult reef, and were emplaced by daylight on the following day to support the main assault on OKINAWA which began at that time. This location permitted the Corps to deliver powerful long-range flanking fires not only in support of the divisions but throughout the depth of the area composing the southern half of the island. Excellent radio communications permitted the Corps Artillery Commander to assign fire missions with ease on any desired target in enemy territory. This Group was of the greatest possible assistance to the Corps during the entire month of April, disrupting enemy movement both day and night, causing the enemy numerous casualties in troops.

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units which attempted to move north to meet our forces, and destroying a large portion of the enemy's large caliber weapons. The Group was moved to OKINAWA early in May.

(2) The remainder of the Corps Artillery began landing on OKINAWA on 2 April 45. Most of the units were in position by dark that day. Survey parties from the Corps Artillery landed with the infantry assault elements, and established survey control, tying together all artillery units of the Corps, by 2 April 45. The 419th Field Artillery Group (145th Field Artillery Battalion, 196th Field Artillery Battalion, 225th Field Artillery Battalion) (155mm howitzer) furnished general support and reinforced the fires of the infantry divisions, as soon as ashore, and continued on these missions throughout the entire operation. The 8" howitzer battalion had difficulty in receiving its weapons and motor transport from the ships and was not completely in position until 15 April 45.

(3) For organization of the Corps Artillery for combat and assignment of missions: See Figure 10, 10A and 10B which follow this page.

(4) (a) Invaluable service was rendered throughout the operation by field artillery liaison aircraft. The first observation mission was flown on 31 March 45 by a liaison airplane launched from an LST equipped with the Brodie device. The Brodie device was used until 0600, 2 April 45, when an airstrip was completed on KEISE SHIMA Island by the Corps Artillery. At that time all liaison aircraft were ordered ashore from escort carriers and the Brodie device LST.


(b) All liaison aircraft of the Corps Artillery were grouped together and employed under centralized control habitually during the entire operation. The Corps Artillery Air Officer controlled all aircraft. On 8 April 45, the Corps Artillery, with the assistance of the 96th Division Engineers began the construction of a large airstrip in TA 8351J - 8362A. This strip was completed a few days later. A 1,200-foot runway, 80 feet in width, with 900 feet of double width aluminum Marsden mat was built. Hard packed finger coral was used for taxiways and standings, consequently this was an all-weather strip. In addition to the aircraft of the Corps Artillery this strip accommodated the liaison aircraft of all infantry divisions. Later, when the III Amphibious Corps entered the operation this strip was taken over by the Marines, and the XXIV Corps Artillery constructed a new airstrip in TA 8677. This field was built from clay and sand, with a usable runway of 1,000 feet. It stood up well throughout the remainder of the operation, during a period of very heavy rains, although all roads leading into the area were impassable. There were no operational losses or damage to aircraft after these fields were completed.

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HQ. XXIV CORPS ARTY.
 MAP. OKINAWA SHIMA 1/100,000
 GENERAL POSITION AREAS AND
 ORGN. FOR COMBAT FOR INITIAL
 ACTION OKINAWA
 FRIENDLY SITUATION 1800, 3 APRIL

NOTE: 749 F.A. BN. STILL AFLOAT

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2 BNS. 155 GUNS AND DET.
 287 OBSN. BN. GENERAL SUPPORT




FIGURE 10

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HQ. XXIV CORPS ARTY.

MAP: OKINAWA SHIMA 1/100,000
GENERAL POSITION AREAS AND ORGN.
FOR COMBAT FOR ATTACK OF
SHURI DEFENSES
FRIENDLY SITUATION 0600, 19 APRIL

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


FIGURE 10A

HQ. XXIV CORPS ARTY.
 MAP: OKINAWA SHIMA 1/100,000
 GENERAL POSITION AREA AND ORGN.
 FOR COMBAT FOR ATTACK ON
 YUZA-DAKE, YAEJU-DAKE ESCARPMENT
 AND TO INCLUDE FINAL PHASES
 FRIENDLY SITUATION 0600, 10 JUNE

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


FIGURE 10B

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(5) Ground Observation:

(a) Initially, the enemy held all the high ground and our forces had no ground observation whatever. As the attack progressed and dominating terrain features passed into our possession ground observation posts were established by all artillery units. Corps Artillery observers from howitzer and gun battalions were sent forward to infantry regiments to obtain close coordination and liaison with the artillery liaison officers from the division artillery. Close personal contact was established with the attacking infantry and the observers from the direct support artillery battalions. When the division artillery was unable to destroy heavy pillboxes and caves, the Corps Artillery took over these missions at once. Precision adjustments were frequently made with safety within 200 yards of friendly troops.

(b) The sound and flash observation posts of the observation battalion normally were established well forward with infantry elements. As a result, these observation posts furnished target information and general intelligence in addition to carrying out their primary mission of locating enemy artillery.

(6) Target Information Center: In order to assemble and have readily available the mass of incoming enemy target information, it became apparent early in the operation that the most practical method was to maintain a file known as the Enemy Installation File. This file consisted of a series of large cards on each of which was entered all reports of enemy activity and installations contained within a 1,000-yard target square. This system produced a complete history of each target square and, at the same time, discharged all the functions of the standard target cards which normally were used for this purpose. It was impossible to maintain a separate target card for each target discovered in view of the large number of targets involved. More than 2,000 separate locations pertaining to known and suspected enemy cannons alone were processed during the battle. A separate and complete set of target cards covering known enemy batteries was maintained to supplement the Enemy Installation File. The Target Information Center supplied data for Air and Naval gunfire in addition to the artillery.

(7) Locating Enemy Artillery:

(a) The means employed by the XXIV Corps Artillery to locate enemy artillery consisted of sound and flash ranging, air observation, ground observation, azimuths obtained from shelling reports, and photo interpretation. All means were dependent in some degree upon the other. Direct air observation was the most productive in obtaining enemy artillery locations. Photographic interpretation was less productive than had been anticipated inasmuch as the mass of enemy artillery was kept in caves habitually. Any small area frequently contained hundreds of caves. These positions were almost a complete countermeasure against air photography.

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(b) As soon as an enemy gun was located, neutralization fires, specifically three battalions shooting one volley TOT, were placed upon it immediately. This was followed as quickly as possible by an air search for the exact cave from which the gun had fired. Precision fire for destruction was then placed on the target.

(8) Attack of Targets:

(a) Enemy weapons and other installations being in caves caused the Corps Artillery Commander to initiate a program of cave extermination at the very beginning of the operation. Field artillery precision fire was coordinated with naval gunfire and air strikes, using the most effective weapon or combination of weapons. The Corps Artillery made precision adjustments on cave entrances and closed caves by precision fire for destruction. Concrete piercing fuzes were used habitually on caves in rocky hillsides or when reinforced by concrete. The enemy dug many closed caves open during the night. In these instances caves were again closed by precision fire; air strikes employing heavy bombs were placed on the area in some instances in an attempt to cause large land slides, after which the enemy generally abandoned the installation and made no further effort to open it.

(b) The attack of enemy artillery was always of major importance in the plans of the Corps Artillery. Most of the enemy artillery fire was received between dusk and dawn. It was deduced early that the enemy was pulling the pieces out of caves, firing a few rounds, and withdrawing into the caves. This was later confirmed by a prisoner of war who stated that his unit was ordered to fire 20 rounds per gun and then withdraw the gun to the shelter of the cave. He stated, however, that few pieces fired more than 10 or 12 rounds for fear of receiving American counterbattery fire. Various methods were employed to catch the enemy piece while firing outside the cave. For example, sound and flash locations were sent to units to prepare data and lay the guns on the target. When the enemy piece opened up again these units fired immediately.

(c) All sound and flash plots received during the night were assigned to air observers as search missions for the following day. This information was transmitted to a representative of the Corps Artillery located at the Corps Artillery airstrip. Pilots were briefed and, wherever possible, were given an opportunity to study stereoscopic photographs of the area, and carried marked photographs while in flight. Observers were never permitted to fly at will over target areas selected by themselves but were given specific missions to accomplish in specific target areas. Upon return from the flight, the pilot and observer were interviewed by the Corps Artillery representative, and all possible information obtained and forwarded to the Target Information Center.

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(9) Supporting Fires: During this operation, field artillery support was available to the Corps in quantities unprecedented in this theater. All Corps Artillery 155mm howitzer battalions were habitually assigned reinforcing missions and received a large proportion of their targets directly from the reinforced units. These battalions also were assigned normal close support barrages which were registered close to the front lines in anticipation of defensive call fire missions, particularly at night. It was found expedient to authorize the division artillery to call directly on the reinforcing Corps Artillery battalions. However, ammunition was never available in sufficient quantities to answer unrestricted calls for fire. Only one "general" preparation was fired during the operation. This involved all the artillery weapons with the Corps and covered a period of 40 minutes. It was ineffective. All Japanese troops and installations within the battle position were protected by strong overhead cover or were installed inside the earth in caves and tunnels. On other occasions during the operation local preparations were fired by divisions, reinforced by the Corps Artillery, using precision and observed fires on specific and suitable point targets. The character of the enemy defenses as used on OKINAWA completely nullified the effectiveness of a general preparation delivered over a large area. To be effective against such defenses, the preparation would have to be fired over a period of many hours, if not days. The ammunition supply available to the Corps precluded such a preparation.

(10) VT-Fuzed Ammunition: The best solution yet offered to the problem of obtaining air bursts at correct height during the hours of darkness or at extreme ranges, is the VT fuze. None of the artillery with the Corps had an opportunity to fire any of this type ammunition prior to the landing on OKINAWA. Moreover, ammunition ships containing most of our supply of this type ammunition were sunk by enemy action prior to unloading. Consequently, only a small percentage of the total ammunition was available to the Corps equipped with this type fuze. The problem was further complicated by the fact that a large proportion of this type ammunition which was available for the 105mm howitzer functioned improperly. This resulted in an excessive number of premature bursts on the trajectory with a resultant loss of confidence on the part of the infantry. The Corps Artillery employed VT-fuzed ammunition to excellent advantage but was restricted by the small number of rounds available. Premature bursts from the 155mm howitzer and 8" howitzer did not exceed experience tables issued by the War Department. Many more rounds could have been employed effectively, particularly on night interdiction and harassing missions. Captured enemy artillerymen stated that they had a greater fear of our air bursts than bursts upon impact, and that air bursts received at night when they were engaged in firing caused heavy casualties. It is essential that our infantry be indoctrinated with the value of this murderous type artillery fire. Additional indoctrination will be carried out within this Corps shortly. The effectiveness of the VT air bursts against

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enemy counterattacks and in night harassing fires cannot be over-emphasized.

g. Coordination of Artillery, Naval Gunfire, and Air Strikes:

(1) Coordination of artillery fires, naval gun fires, and air strikes was accomplished in accordance with Tenth Army Operations Plan 1-45 and XXIV Corps standing operating procedure. The Corps Artillery Commander was designated to coordinate the fires of these arms and services and did so throughout the operation. The Corps Artillery Commander, commander air support control unit (CASCU) and the XXIV Corps G-3 were located together in one room aboard the command ship during the assault. The naval gun fire control officer (NGF) could not be accommodated in this room. However, he maintained close liaison with the officers mentioned above. Complete coordination was possible at all times while aboard ship.

(2) Five CPX's, held between 13 March 45 and 1 April 45, attended by the Corps Artillery Commander, the commander air support control unit, naval gun fire control officer and their staffs eliminated bottlenecks and cleared up internal routine and procedure. Definite operating policies were established. As a result, all of these representatives functioned smoothly during the landing operations.

(3) The Corps Artillery command post was operational ashore on 3 April 45. However, the Landing Force Air Support Control Unit (LFASCU) was delayed in unloading through inability to get its equipment ashore from a number of different ships, and did not take over control of air support ashore until 7 April 45. Consequently, the Corps Artillery Commander remained on the control ship with a portion of his staff until that date, as otherwise he could not have coordinated the efforts of these various supporting agencies.

(4) Control was continued ashore without difficulty after LFASCU opened station. The LFASCU commander had moved to OKINAWA on the control ship and was familiar with the operational procedure followed aboard ship.

(5) Air request missions were received in the following manner:

- Preplanned missions desired by infantry divisions
- Preplanned missions prescribed by the Corps Artillery commander.
- Targets of opportunity received from the divisions.

Preplanned missions were especially successful. Missions from the divisions were transmitted to the Corps Artillery commander through

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the Corps Air Section. The target information center of the Corps Artillery evaluated the missions at once, produced photographs where possible, and submitted this information to the Corps Artillery Commander. When approved, the mission was turned over to LFASCU for execution. All air support during this operation was furnished by Navy or Marine Corps units. Some of these planes were carrier-based and some land-based. Pilots of land-based planes were briefed on the ground whenever possible and marked photographs were given to them. Pilots aboard carriers could not be briefed in this manner. A Ground Liaison Officer, on temporary duty with LFASCU from the Tenth Army, acted as liaison officer between LFASCU and the Marine Tactical Air Force. This liaison proved most satisfactory as the officer was able to brief the pilots personally in many instances.

(6) At times when the divisions had no air support missions which they desired executed, the Corps Artillery Commander furnished a list of preplanned missions to LFASCU. These targets were habitually well within the enemy position and were of a nature which could not be handled effectively by the Corps Artillery or naval gun fire.

(7) Call missions covering targets of opportunity picked up by air observers were never as successfully executed by the supporting aircraft as those missions which had been preplanned. Call missions were processed in the same manner as described above except that a complete evaluation was seldom made by the target information center due to the fact that this would have delayed the strike and the opportunity to hit the target would have been lost. These missions were approved or disapproved by the Corps Artillery Commander prior to their execution. In fact, no air strike of any kind was permitted without such approval.

(8) No difficulty was experienced in coordinating naval gun fires with artillery and air. Naval gun fire support was rendered quickly and effectively at all times whenever needed.

26. Naval Gun Fire Support.

a. Naval gun fire played a prominent part in the ROKUYUS campaign. It delivered the pre-assault bombardment and covered the landing and continued to render direct and general support, illumination, and deep harassing fires throughout the entire operation. Prisoners of war attested to its effectiveness by stating that naval gun fire was greatly feared. The availability of ammunition resupply in quantity, the efficiency of high-performance carrier-based observation planes, and the excellent radio communications available between the ships and the shore and between the ships and the air added to the effectiveness of this fire.

b. The L-Day bombardment in support of the landing was executed on schedule as planned. All assault shore fire control parties except one checked into the fire control net within one hour after landing.

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c. Fire support ships were assigned normally on the ratio of one per front line regiment, one per division, and one or more for the execution of deep support missions desired by the Corps Commander. Whenever possible, additional ships were assigned to the infantry division whose zone of action lay on the left (east) flank, in order to neutralize installations and gun positions on the CHINEN Peninsula, as this peninsula dominated the waters and coastline on this flank. Night illumination fires were furnished on the ratio of one ship per regiment; this was usually supplemented by one or more fire support ships who delivered night harassing missions designated by the Corps Artillery Commander. Types of support ships varied. During a typical day, three battleships, three heavy cruisers, one light cruiser and four or five destroyers would be assigned to support the corps. After the III Amphibious Corps entered the action on 7 May 45, this number was reduced to meet the requirements of the additional troops in the line. Hydrographic conditions and higher priority missions denied the use of gun boats prior to 19 May 45. From that date on, however, a number of these vessels were furnished. They proved to be highly effective in furnishing area neutralization using rockets and mortars, especially when a ground observer was aboard to point out the exact limits of the target area on which fire was desired. At night they worked close to shore and fired on targets of opportunity illuminated by star shells. They were a useful means for obtaining information of enemy movements in the vicinity of the coastline, and later were a valuable means for conducting psychological warfare through the medium of loud speakers mounted on their decks, broadcasting to enemy personnel and civilians hiding in caves along the south coast.

d. Ships assigned to furnish direct support to infantry divisions delivered both preplanned missions and fires on targets of opportunity. They were most effective when air spot planes were assigned by the navy to work with them. When the regimental ships were not engaged in supporting the infantry, they were given general support missions by the division artillery commanders.

Fire support ships delivered many deep harassing fires at night. Approximately 1,200 rounds were fired each night during the early stages of the operation. This was reduced later to 150 rounds per ship per night, with an overall total of approximately 900 rounds.

Night illumination fires were coordinated within each regiment by the regimental naval gun fire liaison officer. Initially some reports were received of star shells illuminating friendly troops or empty flare cases falling within friendly front lines. These incidents declined sharply after the first week. A large number of illuminating shells were used. As a result of heavy initial expenditures, it became necessary on 10 May 45 to reduce the Corps allowance of illuminating shell to approximately 120 rounds per division per night.

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27. Air Support.

a. Support aircraft were employed extensively in direct support of the ground operations throughout the campaign. Both carrier-based and land-based planes were used. All support aircraft, except a few photographic planes, were of the carrier type manned by Navy and Marine personnel. The photographic planes were Army.

b. Aircraft were effective in many instances in assisting the attacking ground troops. This is attested by the large number of missions requested by the divisions. A total of 617 strike missions were flown for the Corps during the campaign. During the first 70 days, an average of 12 strikes were flown daily; on one occasion 43 missions were executed in one day.

c. For a tabulation of their activity for the XXIV Corps, see the chart which follows this page. It should be noted from the chart that approximately one-half of the missions flown in support of the Corps were executed on the request of divisions, while the remaining half were either pre-arranged strikes or strikes against targets of opportunity. The largest single strike of the campaign was delivered on 19 April in support of the coordinated attack launched by the Corps that day against the SHURI defense position. One hundred thirty-nine aircraft were used. A large proportion of these planes were armed with 1,000 and 2,000 pound bombs.

d. Napalm bombs were of negligible value against cave targets. However, they gave good results against targets located in ravines, open targets on reverse slopes, personnel in villages, and supply dumps.

e. Since all aviation operated in the dual mission of general and direct support, availability of planes was frequently curtailed by the necessity of utilizing all or most of them to beat off massed enemy air attacks.

f. Shortly after the activation of the YONTAN airfield, the 23th Photographic Squadron (USAAF) arrived on OKINAWA and became available for missions. This unit performed excellent work. After its arrival, low level obliques of the area of operations were supplied in plentiful quantity and were made available to front line infantry commanders whenever desired.

g. During the latter half of May and the first week of June, when vehicular movement was practically impossible because of heavy rains, air support units supplied forward elements by air drop. This assistance was invaluable, and enabled our infantry to continue its operations and its forward movement in pursuit of the retreating Japanese forces. For a recapitulation of this action, see paragraph 23, Chapter VII.

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TABLEAU OF AIR ACTIVITY IN SUPPORT OF XXIV CORPS
 PERIOD - 1 APRIL TO 21 JUNE 1962

TOTAL PLANES BY TYPE			TOTAL EXPENDITURE OF AMMUNITION
VF	VB	VT	
3,597	1,444	4,233	
1 PRE-ARRANGED OR DEFP STRIKES			
CLOSE SUPPORT MISSIONS			
2 TARGET OF OPPORTUNITY REQUESTS-NOT-TENETRY			
3 REQUESTS FOR AIR OBSERVATION PLON			
REQUESTS FROM AFB WITH DIVISIONS			
TOTAL MISSIONS ACCOMPLISHED FOR DIVS			
WEATHER			82
AIRCRAFT NOT AVAILABLE			99
HIGHER HEADQUARTERS			36
COMDR SUPPORT AIR (GASBY, ETC)			18
REQUESTING UNIT			90
BOARDS (JMS)			3,982.7
MAPAIM (TANKS)			813
ROCKET PROPELLERS			30,492
.50 CAL OR 20MM MMO (ROUNDS)			4,497,838

TOTAL MISSIONS FLOWN
1,063

- 1 - INDICATES REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION OF SPECIFIC TARGETS ONLY.
- 2 - REQUESTS SUBMITTED BY CORPS.
- 3 - ALL TARGETS OF OPPORTUNITY OR REQUESTS BY CSA WERE FIRST CLEARED THROUGH CORPS INTY.

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28. Employment of Tanks, Amphibian Tanks and Amphibian Tractors.

a. General.

The Commanding Officer, 20th Armored Group, functioned as the Armored Force specialist on the Corps Staff and also as group commander of such tank and LVT units as from time to time were not attached to divisions. In this campaign all standard tanks were employed under division control. Amphibian units were employed under division control initially, thereafter under the Armored Group control except when required by divisions for particular missions. General comments on their employment are contained in subparagraphs below.

b. Amphibian Units.

Amphibian tank and tractor battalions were attached to divisions for landing operations and were employed in their normal roles. The reef conditions existing on the HAGUSHI beaches presented no unusual problem to these vehicles.

(1) The amphibian tank battalions were employed to lead assault waves onto the beaches and thereafter to support the advance inland by indirect fire from their 75mm howitzers. In addition, they were placed on the reef on both flanks of the beaches during the hours of darkness to protect the unloading activities from infiltrators. Only one amphibian tank was lost during the landing operation. This vehicle swamped because of surf and reef conditions.

(2) The amphibian tractors carried all assault waves onto the beaches from the LSTs on which they arrived in the objective area. Thereafter, they were used to transfer reserve units, equipment and cargo from ships' boats to the beaches. As the port facilities were improved, the requirements for this use diminished and eventually disappeared on the original beaches. Only one amphibian tractor was lost during the landing operation. It swamped because of surf and reef conditions.

(3) On 3 April, all the amphibian battalions except the 776th Amphibian Tank Battalion were relieved from attachment to divisions and were attached to the 20th Armored Group, which immediately instituted a program of rehabilitation carried out concurrently with such cargo transfer duties as were assigned initially by XXIV Corps Shore Party and later by Island Command units charged with operating the beaches.

(4) On 3 April, the Commanding Officer, 20th Armored Group, took over the defense of the HAGUSHI beachhead area under the Corps Shore Party Commander and utilized the 718th, 536th, 728th and 728th Amphibian Tractor Battalions, and the 780th Amphibian Tank Battalion to occupy defense sectors. Battalion commanders

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were designated as sector coordinators and commanders. Nine amphibian tractors were initially stationed on KADENA Airfield to assist in the defense of that installation.

(5) Throughout the entire operation amphibian units were employed on security missions in the Corps rear areas relieving divisions as they moved forward. Assigned tasks in this connection included establishment of beach defenses, reinforcing existing defenses of field hospitals, mopping up of extensive areas by foot patrols, establishment of a cross-island blocking line to prevent the northward passage of infiltrators from southern OKINAWA, and reinforcement of the local defenses of important Corps installations.

(6) Amphibian tractors were frequently called upon to assist in supply and evacuation when terrain and road conditions made adequate support by wheeled transportation impossible. Instances of this use were:

(a) 19-30 April: 715th Amphibian Tractor Battalion assisted in support of 27th Division on the west coast.

(b) 4-11 June: 536th and 715th Amphibian Tractor Battalions provided lighterage for the YONABARU supply point which was established when roads to southern part of the island disintegrated.

(c) 8-22 June: 715th Amphibian Tractor Battalion and 780th Amphibian Tank Battalion provided lighterage and security for the XXIV Corps supply point established at MIMATOGA to supplement logistic support of the assault of the final Jap position.

(7) On several occasions amphibian units were made available to Marine Divisions on request of III Amphibious Corps. Instances were as follows:

(a) On 29 May, the 708th Amphibian Tank Battalion was attached to the 8th Marine Division with a beach defense mission initially in vicinity of NAHA. Later the battalion supported the landing opposite the NAHA Airfield and took over beach defense as the front lines moved south.

(b) On 4 June, two platoons, 788th Amphibian Tractor Battalion, transported assault troops of 8th Marine Division in the landing opposite NAHA Airfield.

(c) During period 9-24 June, the 715th Amphibian Tractor Battalion utilizing two platoons, LST borne, transported daily, rations and ammunition from HAGUSHI beaches to ITOMAN for front line troops of the III Amphibious Corps. On the return trip civilians were brought back.

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(8) Additionally, amphibian tank and tractor units of XXIV Corps were employed in landing operations under Tenth Army control on smaller islands lying off OKINAWA as follows:

(a) On 8 April, the 780th Amphibian Tank Battalion and the 728th Amphibian Tractor Battalion completed loading aboard LSTs and moved out to KERAMA RETTO to join troops of the 27th Infantry Division for an operation to mop the enemy from TSUGEN SHIMA. Landing on that island was made against heavy machine gun and mortar fire without vehicular loss. One amphibian tank was lost as a result of mechanical trouble. The battalions returned to OKINAWA on 12 April.

(b) On 15 April, Companies A and C, 780th Amphibian Tank Battalion, were attached to the 27th Infantry Division and moved to vicinity of CHIYUNNA to support by indirect fire the advance of that division. These two companies remained in place and supported the 1st Marine Division during the period 1-3 May at which time they returned to 20th Armored Group control.

(c) One platoon, Company B, 718th Amphibian Tractor Battalion, and one platoon, Company D, 780th Amphibian Tank Battalion, embarked in LSTs, moved out from HAGUSHI beaches 9 May with troops of the 185th Infantry for an assault operation against TORI SHIMA. Two amphibian tanks were lost during the landing as a result of rough water and reef. No enemy opposition was encountered. Two amphibian tractors and crews were left on the island for an indefinite period with the mission of transporting supplies from ship to shore.

(d) On 20 May, the 3d Platoon, Company A, 788th Amphibian Tractor Battalion, embarked in an LST, moved to NAKAOSHI and CHICHIMA SHIMA, and reported to the 27th Division for an indefinite period to operate patrols to small islands off the east and west coast of northern OKINAWA. These units were mounted out at OKINAWA by the Corps, and upon completion of the operations were returned to the control of Commanding Officer, 20th Armored Group.

(9) On one occasion amphibian units were employed under Corps control to eliminate enemy activity discovered on a small off-shore island. On 23 April, the Commanding Officer, 20th Armored Group, organized and led a small amphibious force to TSUGEN SHIMA, an island lying off the east coast which had been assaulted some time previously by 27th Division units. Company B, 780th Amphibian Tank Battalion, and Company B (less one platoon), 728th Amphibian Tractor Battalion (dismounted), transported by one platoon of Company B, 728th Amphibian Tractor Battalion, landed on the island against negligible resistance, killed 433 Jap military and collected 422 Okinawan civilians. The latter were brought to OKINAWA.

(10) The armored amphibious units were kept fully employed in a wide variety of duties, and showed great versatility

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and the ability to give an excellent performance of any duty to which assigned.

c. Tank Units.

Details of standard and flamethrower tank employment will be covered in the reports of the tank units involved and the divisions to which they were attached for operations. The following general comments are made from the viewpoint of the Corps Commander:

(1) The campaign as it developed presented no real opportunity for exploitation of a breakthrough by armored forces. The SHURI position was definitely "poor tank country". The envelopment of the hostile east flank was initiated concurrently with a prolonged period of heavy rains which made movement of tanks extremely difficult over the relatively open terrain of the YONABARU-NAHA Valley and greatly limited their use. Nor did southwestern OKINAWA present suitable terrain or tactical conditions for employment of tanks in mass.

(2) The most frequent use of tanks (both standard and flamethrower) was in closely knit Tank-Infantry teams in the close-in reduction of hostile cave and pillbox positions. For this work tanks were invaluable. The Jap's great fear of flamethrowers was excellently exploited by the flamethrower tanks which were frequently able to drive defenders into the open for easy destruction by fire of the Infantry.

(3) Indirect fire by tanks was employed on some occasions with excellent results. By this method, massed fires were readily delivered and easily shifted as desired. Direct fire from turret defilade with an observer near the crest was also effectively employed.

(4) In several instances, friendly artillery or mortar fire was placed among the leading tanks to provide protection against enemy suicide demolition teams. Generally speaking, however, close support of tanks by artillery was confined to the normal support of artillery given to the Infantry-Tank teams. The value of artillery support in neutralization of antitank guns was largely nullified by the fact that these guns were well concealed in and well protected by caves.

(5) The hostile defense against tanks was excellent. Antitank guns were well sited in extremely well concealed positions to cover tank approaches. The Jap 47mm gun was very effective against our medium tanks, penetrating the turret with ease at short range. Artillery, mortar, and small arms fire were also directed against any visible tank. Individuals and small groups armed with satchel charges and Molotov cocktails promptly attacked any tank within range, especially if it were immobilized by terrain or by damage. Mines of various sizes were encountered

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in large numbers, particularly in defiles usually laid without pattern and in small "batches".

(6) Light tanks were seldom employed except as protection for medium tanks as they were inadequate both in armor and armament to meet the type of opposition encountered throughout this campaign.

(7) The detection and clearing of mines for armored units proved to be a most difficult problem. Often the tanks were forced to clear their own way through the mines because the infantry could not enter the area because of heavy enemy fire. In many cases the tanks could detonate mines in suspected areas by firing into them, but this means of mine removal was expensive in ammunition and was not very effective or dependable, particularly when the mines were well buried. Tanks often detonated mines unintentionally by overrunning them with damage as shown in the attached report on tank losses. Additional mechanical means and personnel are needed to detect and clear minefields under fire for armored units.

(8) Sufficient liaison personnel are not available in the tank battalions to provide close liaison with the infantry regiments. On this operation the tank company commanders performed liaison duties, but their presence at the regimental command and observation posts could not be continuous. At other times platoon leaders were used for this duty during which time, of course, they could not be present with their platoons.

(9) Replacement of tanks was effected in an efficient manner after the replacement tanks were available. However, at one stage of the operation it was necessary to transfer all the tanks from the tank battalion attached to a withdrawn division to the other three battalions in order to maintain unit effectiveness.

(10) Replacement of armored personnel was a difficult problem, particularly in regard to key personnel such as tank commanders and gunners. At one time it was necessary to transfer personnel from amphibian battalions previously trained on standard tanks to fill the immediate needs of the standard tank battalions.

(11) An analysis of tanks destroyed and temporarily put out of action appears below. These losses are not considered excessive in light of results obtained and in comparing losses of tanks and tank personnel with losses of equipment and personnel of other units.

(12) Results of Enemy Action against Tanks:

(a) Enemy action against friendly tanks during the period 1 April 45 to 22 June 45, inclusive, resulted in a total of 239 tank casualties. Of these casualties, 134 tanks or

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58% of the total were made serviceable and returned to duty; 105 tanks or 44% of the total were lost, although in many cases serviceable spare parts and equipment were salvaged from them.

(b) Damage and losses may be classified under the following headings:

(i) Mines.

Enemy mines were the cause for 74 tank casualties or 31% of the total. Nineteen tanks thus damaged were targets for subsequent enemy action, but 37 tanks were recovered and later returned to duty.

(ii) Antitank and Artillery Fire.

Enemy gunfire was the initial cause for 113 tank casualties or 48% of the total. Twenty-two tanks thus damaged were targets for subsequent enemy action, but 77 tanks were recovered and later returned to duty. Many of the tanks reported as being later damaged by burning were set afire by antitank and artillery fire after they were abandoned.

(iii) Satchel Charges.

Only six tanks or 2.5% of the total were disabled initially as a direct result of satchel charges. Three tanks thus damaged were targets for subsequent enemy action. Only one tank of these was recovered and later returned to duty. The enemy used this same means further to incapacitate 28 tanks damaged by other means of which only five tanks were recovered and later returned to duty.

(iv) Molotov Cocktail.

Only one tank was actually put out of action and lost initially as a result of a Molotov Cocktail. Some of the tanks reported as being later damaged by burning were set afire by Molotov Cocktails after they were abandoned.

(v) Sinking.

Two tanks were sunk during the initial landing both of which were lost.

(vi) Miscellaneous.

A total of 43 tanks or 18% of the total were put out of action as a result of thrown tracks or impassable terrain. Of these, 28 tanks were destroyed or damaged later mostly through the action of the enemy but in at least one case by friendly fire to prevent use by the enemy. Nineteen tanks were recovered and later returned to duty.

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(c) The tank casualties enumerated above were incurred in the total of four standard tank battalions and one armored flamethrower battalion employed during the period in the XXIV Corps, representing a total of 394 tanks of all types.

(d) Three standard tank battalions and one armored flamethrower battalion (less one company) were engaged at the end of the period. Due to highly efficient maintenance work and the addition of replacement tanks the standard tank battalions were able to operate against the enemy with an average of 96% authorized tank strength while the armored flamethrower battalion was able to operate against the enemy with 72% authorized strength. The latter strength was not due to excessive casualties but to the lack of any replacement flamethrower tanks.

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(13) TANK CASUALTIES

	INITIAL CAUSE						TOTAL
	Mine	A.F. Arty	Satchel Charge	Molotov Cocktail	Stuck or Thrown Tank	Sunk	
<u>RECOVERED TANKS</u>							
Repaired by Co. Maint.	11	26			12		49
Repaired by En. Maint.	23	28	1		5		57
Repaired by Ordnance	3	6			2		16
Salvaged	12	11			1	1	25
Total Recovered	49	68	1		20	1	139
<u>UNRECOVERED TANKS</u>							
Salvaged	25	25	5	1	25	1	80
Total Unrecovered	25	25	5	1	23	1	80
Total Unrecovered and Recovered.	74	115	6	1	43	1	239
* * * * *							

<u>LOST</u>							
Initial Damage-only cause:	16	20	2	1	1	2	44
Later Damage-added cause:							
Artillery		5					5
Burned	10	8	2		13		33
Satchel Charge	9	3	1		10		23
Total later damaged	19	16	3		23		61
Total Lost	37	36	5	1	24	2	105

<u>REPAIRED</u>							
Initial damage only cause:	37	71	1		16		125
Later damaged-added cause:							
Artillery		2			2		4
Satchel Charge		4			1		5
Total Later Damaged		6			3		9
Total Repaired	37	77	1		19		134
Total Los and Repaired	74	115	6	1	43	2	239

(14) PERSONNEL CASUALTIES

CAUSE	KIA	WIA	TOTAL
Initial enemy attack on tank	44	296	340
Enemy action against attempts to recover tanks or evacuate personnel.	6	64	70
Total	50	360	410

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29. Employment of Antiaircraft Artillery.

a. Two 90mm antiaircraft artillery gun battalions, two antiaircraft artillery automatic weapons battalions, and two antiaircraft artillery searchlight batteries (less two platoons) of the 97th AAA Group were attached to divisions for movement ashore and occupation of initial positions on OKINAWA. By L plus 1 (2 April) six automatic weapons batteries and four gun batteries were in firing position and by L plus 4 all Corps antiaircraft artillery was emplaced ashore, with the primary mission of protecting airfields.

b. The Commanding Officer, 97th AAA Group, assumed command of all Corps antiaircraft artillery on 5 April. Command of all antiaircraft artillery ashore on OKINAWA was assumed by Commanding General, 53d AAA Brigade, 20 April. The following table indicates the activity of Corps antiaircraft artillery units during the period while under control of this Corps:

SUMMARY OF AAA OPERATIONS * 6-19 April 45

Date	No of Red Alerts	No of Raids Engaged by AAA	Est No of Planes	Officially credited records		
				Destr	Probably Destr	Damaged
April 6	4	4	5	4	1	0
7	7	1	1	1	0	0
12	6	6	7	5	0	0
13	3	1	1	1	0	1
14	3	2	2	0	0	0
15	7	7	11	4	5	0
17	3	3	3	1	0	2
18-19	1	1	1	1	0	1
(Officially credited to automatic weapons)				7	4	0
(Officially credited to 90mm guns)				6	2	3
(Officially credited combined AAA weapons)				4	0	1
TOTAL	34	25	51	17	6	4

(*) XXIV Corps Antiaircraft Artillery.

- 97th AAA Group
- 502d AAA Gun Battalion
- 504th AAA Gun Battalion
- 495th AAA Automatic Weapons Battalion
- 861st AAA Automatic Weapons Battalion
- Battery A, 295th AAA Searchlight Battalion (-2d Platoon)
- Battery C, 294th AAA Searchlight Battalion (-2d Platoon)

g. During the period 1-19 April, Corps antiaircraft artillery received operational control commands and air warning from naval Combat Intelligence Center and Commander Support Air Fleet. This control functioned smoothly at all times, and the air warning provided was the most complete and accurate ever encountered by this Corps' antiaircraft artillery. The apparently

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negligible enemy air activity during the period 1-19 April is misleading, for during this period both our carrier and land-based aircraft on combat air patrol continually intercepted and beat off heavy enemy air raids well outside of the range of anti-aircraft artillery ashore. Therefore, the anti-aircraft artillery was called upon to engage only the few single enemy aircraft which succeeded in penetrating our friendly air cover. Further, it should be borne in mind that the primary targets for Jap air attacks were units of the fleet, many of which remained outside of the range of anti-aircraft artillery ashore.

d. Anti-aircraft artillery fire of 90mm guns was used throughout the OKINAWA operation to supplement field artillery harassing fires, particularly at night. It was not necessary to utilize any anti-aircraft artillery weapons in direct support of the Corps attack to supplement Corps and Divisional field artillery. Interdiction and harassing fires did, however, prove valuable, and throughout the operation close cooperation resulted at all times between units of the 97th AAA Group and this Corps.

30. Infantry Combat.

a. General.

(1) Infantry combat in this operation was divided into the following phases, which will be discussed in subsequent subparagraphs:

(a) Initial operations including the assault landing and the advance to develop the hostile position (1 April-10 April).

(b) Assault of an organized position (11 April-25 May).

(c) Pursuit (26 May-9 June).

(d) Reduction of final enemy position (10 June-20 June).

(2) Our infantry doctrine proved to be entirely sound, our equipment effective, and our training adequate. The courage and aggressiveness displayed by our infantry, often in the face of tremendous odds, were outstanding beyond description and were most important factors in the final and complete defeat of the Japs.

(3) In the final analysis, the battle was won by the close-knit coordination and teamwork of the small infantry units, closely integrated with their close-supporting weapons. Firepower of Air, Naval Gun Fire and Artillery softened the enemy, but in every case he had to be eliminated by the doughboy. This will be true of all ground combat against the Jap, and excellence

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in small unit training must be stressed if we are to gain success.

(4) The details of infantry combat are contained in the reports of subordinate units. The comments contained herein are presented from the viewpoint of the Corps Commander.

b. Initial Operations.

(1) The extensive previous experience of all units of this Corps in amphibious operations was reflected in the smooth manner in which the landing was executed. Despite the difficult beach backed by a substantial seawall, the infantry moved inland without confusion and without beach congestion. The light opposition encountered initially unquestionably facilitated this performance but the technique displayed approached perfection.

(2) The advance inland was made rapidly with units capitalizing fully on the opportunity created by the initial lack of resistance. The advance to solid contact was made on broad fronts with adequate security resulting in a prompt uncovering and determination of the hostile main line of resistance. As hostile artillery and mortar fire increased to a concentration never previously encountered by this command in the Pacific, the initial tendency unnecessarily to expose troop and vehicle movements as well as command and service installations was soon self-corrected.

c. Assault of an Organized Position.

(1) Once firm contact was made with the enemy, our infantry was faced with the problem of reducing an extremely strong hostile position with both flanks resting on the sea. Infantry combat was necessarily a deliberate process of successively capturing local objectives on key terrain. This was generally accomplished by closely-coordinated attacks supported by aircraft, artillery, tanks (including flamethrower tanks), and naval gunfire, as well as every available infantry weapon. This support usually produced sufficient neutralization to permit our leading echelons to reach the objective but never caused any extensive destruction of hostile personnel or weapons, which were habitually well protected in caves and underground emplacements. The assault almost without exception terminated in hand-to-hand fighting of the bitterest nature to kill or drive the fanatical enemy from his positions and then to hold our gains. In these close-quarters grenade, bayonet, and knife fights the enemy frequently placed indiscriminate mortar fire on the melees. The "normal" infantry technique in our assaults on caves and pillboxes was called a "straddle attack" and "infiltration" by the Japs who learned to fear it above all else. This involved assault by infantry-demolition teams coordinated with direct fire weapons, including tanks and flamethrowers. The destruction of cave positions was frequently accomplished from positions above the entrances, sealing the occupants in their fortifications. Since many of these

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underground shelters had numerous entrances, connected by veritable rabbit warrens of tunnels, their complete destruction was frequently a matter of days, during which survivors of the original garrisons occasionally popped up within or in rear of our positions.

(2) In these attacks, maximum use was made of every available direct fire weapon. Tanks (including flamethrower tanks which were available to the Corps for the first time), cannon company weapons, antitank guns, tank destroyers, and on occasion, conventional artillery moved to direct fire positions, were used whenever terrain and tactical conditions permitted their employment. A few 57mm and 75mm recoilless weapons, available on an experimental basis, proved their value in this type of fighting.

(3) Early in the campaign, our troops occasionally lost ground to determined local counterattacks soon after capture, due to lack of immediate reorganization for defense and/or lack of close-following reserves. However, all concerned quickly learned the necessity of immediate organization after capture to hold seized terrain and thereafter took steps for prompt organization of the ground and placed the necessary depth of infantry in their attacks to accomplish this end.

(4) Night attacks were employed on many occasions by units up to include the battalion. Capitalizing on the Jap's general laxity in regard to night security, these attacks were habitually successful in initially gaining the prescribed limited objectives. At daylight, the enemy reaction was swift and effective and on some occasions where sufficient follow-up reserves were not available, resulted in cutting off the assault echelon from its supporting units. In all cases, pockets of Japs developed in rear of assault units when enemy troops were left in bypassed caves and fortifications and mop-up troops had to clean up the area covered during daylight following the night attack. The experience gained in this operation indicates that freer use of night attacks offers a good possibility of success against the Japanese in "cave warfare" and that training in this type of operation is well worthwhile.

d. Pursuit.

(1) The enemy protected his forced withdrawal from the SHURI position by a covering force on his east flank and one that remained in the former main line of resistance. Our infantry in contact maintained heavy direct pressure on the rearward position, breaking through weak points and advancing rapidly to develop the new defensive position in the southwestern corner of the island. Due to extreme mud and rain our forces were unable to drive in the flank protection in time to trap the main force.

(2) The 7th Division, making the encirclement, moved very rapidly under the prevailing conditions of roads impassable to vehicles and mud that made footing extremely hazardous. These

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troops skillfully bypassed and contained local resistance encountered and, although unable to cut the enemy off from lower OKINAWA, promptly located the northeast flank of his final defensive position.

e. Reduction of Final Hostile Position.

(1) The enemy's final defensive position was located in terrain fully as rugged as that utilized for the defense of SHURI and was occupied by bitterly defending Japs who had no hope of any conclusion other than death or surrender. Our infantry again successfully utilized the tactics that had reduced the SHURI position. The cost to our troops was markedly less, due to the improvised nature of many of the enemy units and the greatly decreased amounts of artillery and mortars available to the defenders. On many occasions our assaulting troops were forced to use scaling ladders and ropes in reaching enemy positions located in the walls of the steep escarpment or in isolated coral crags.

f. Miscellaneous.

(1) Infantry operations in this campaign were characterized by complete absence of the old "shoulder to shoulder" advance and "tight perimeter" night defenses developed in jungle warfare and by absence of any great concern about the formerly feared Jap infiltration. Small units maneuvered freely, without tendency toward "shoulder to shoulder" tactics, and held positions both day and night with maximum use of fields of fire and minimum of manpower. The enemy used night infiltration to the fullest up to the end of the combat with but little success.

(2) It is definitely established that infantry attacking day after day, cannot make a dawn or early morning attack every day. Best results were obtained by varying the time of attack from predawn attacks to gain special terrain features, to avoid observation and to gain surprise, to attacks as late as noon, where special preparation and pre-coordination are required. The average daily time of repeated daily attack, in order to allow for supply, feeding, clearing out infiltrators, and get in a full day of work should be between 0730 and 0830. This permits men to be set to move out and to get in an efficient day's work in time to prepare night defenses before dark.

(3) There was one outstanding weakness of the infantry in this campaign; namely, all infantry units habitually operated at under strength from the time of the initial landing. The three divisions of the Corps landed out about 1,000 men each under strength while the 27th Division (under the Corps for a short time) was even more understrength. Most shortages were, as usual, in the infantry. The flow of replacements was totally inadequate for combat of this nature, and most of the time during combat infantry strength was inadequate to exploit supporting firepower and to take advantage of breaks. In many cases battalions were reduced

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to operating as provisional companies, and in one or two instances regiments operated as battalions. Both the 7th and 96th Infantry Divisions had one brief period, immediately following a ten-day break in combat, when they were given all the replacements available at the time and renewed operations at close to table of organization strength. Their increased power and effectiveness in combat until strength again dwindled was remarkable. It was not possible to give the 27th Infantry Division any material number of replacements during combat, to fill the 77th at any time, or to keep the 7th and 96th Divisions at near effective fighting strengths. The Corps Commander personally allotted all replacements received, basing decision of the strength of units, their current and planned employment and the expected arrival of additional replacements. About 10,650 infantry officer and enlisted replacements were received. Twenty thousand could have been used efficiently without wastage. The flow was too slow and too small.

31. Signal Corps.

a. Units:

(1) Communications in the Corps were provided by the Corps Signal Battalion (101st) and three Joint Assault Signal Companies (75th, 292d and 593d).

(2) The Corps Signal Battalion operated in a normal manner, except that wire construction was nearly all of a semi-permanent rather than rapid type, even in the early stages. This was possible because of known axes of signal communications and slowness of advance.

(3) Wire and radio teams from the signal battalion were attached to each division prior to mounting. These teams landed with the divisions. The radio teams opened immediately in the Corps Command net. The wire teams installed trunks from the initial location of the Corps Command Post to the divisions and had these lines in operation when the advance party of the Corps Command Post landed on L plus 1.

(4) Employment of joint assault signal companies differed somewhat in this campaign from their use in previous amphibious operations. The joint assault signal companies, less air liaison and shore fire control parties, were attached to the division shore parties. When the shore parties were consolidated under the 1st Engineer Special Brigade, this portion of the joint assault signal companies became part of the brigade organization. Use of air liaison and shore fire control parties with combat units was normal.

b. Facilities.

(1) Wire:

(a) For line route maps and circuit diagrams

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for wire installation at various periods of the tactical phase, see Figures 11 through 16, on pages following.

(b) Telephone Central Office Sets: A two-position TC-2, installed in a shelter, HO-17, was set up in the Corps Command Post on L plus 2. This switchboard has handled an average of almost 5,000 calls per day. The number of magneto drops proved inadequate and ten additional drops were added.

(c) Telegraph Central Office Set: One TC-3, with three local teletype machines, installed in a shelter, HO-17, was set up in the Corps Command Post. Switched teletype to all divisions was installed. A direct teletype loop between Corps G-3 and Division G-3a was standard, as was a teletype loop from Corps G-3a of the two Corps and the Army G-3. A direct teletype was installed between Corps G-4 and Corps Shore Party Commander from L plus 4 to L plus 20. These facilities proved to be of considerable value and well worth the effort of installation and maintenance.

(d) Spiral four and five and ten pair rubber covered cable were used extensively. They were suspended from #9 Japanese iron wire used as messenger. Because of the excellence of the original installation, maintenance was very limited and wire communication remained excellent throughout the operation.

(e) An extensive Japanese open wire pole line system existed on the island, following generally the desired axes of communication. Essentially all open wire was badly damaged by our artillery and naval gunfire as well as by apparent enemy action, but the wire was reinstalled for use as messenger as stated above. Relatively few poles were destroyed and these apparently were wrecked by our own artillery. Existing pole lines were repaired and supplemented using prefabricated steel poles, 4" x 4" x 24' stock lumber poles and salvaged Japanese poles removed from short unusable spurs.

(f) Carrier: The Corps started the operation with approximately 50% of authorized carrier equipment, but received essentially 100% from Army by L plus 20. CF-1 and CF-2 carrier, operated normally on spiral four or, in emergency, on AN/TRC-1 radio to all divisions from this time. There was, however, no spare or standby equipment under the small table of equipment allowance.

(g) Radio link: The Corps landed with major components of three AN/TRC-1s. By L plus 20, six AN/TRC-1s were on hand. These were used with CF-1 and CF-2 carrier bays in emergency installations to divisions or in the event of failure of wire to divisions. There were no working spares for this equipment.


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CIRCUIT DIAGRAM
HQ XXIV CORPS
Effective: 1600 - 15 April 75
CORPS ASTORRE - ARMY APT. OKI




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FIGURE 3011

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


LINE ROUTE MAP
HQ XXIV CORPS
As of 1600-5Apr45
CORPS ASHORE - ARMY AFLOAT
OKINAWA ISHIMA
Scale=1:50,000

FIGURE X 12

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CIRCUIT DIAGRAM,
FIG. XXV, COMPS
Effective: 1600-1 Apr-45

FIGURE 2013

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



FIGURE 14

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CIRCUIT DIAGRAM
HQ XMV C-293S
Effective 1700-21 June 49

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FIGURE 30215

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


FIGURE X 16

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(3) Radio teletype: Radio teletype, using ~~used~~ AM/TRC-1 with Navy equipment similar to "speech plus duplex" was initially between Corps advance ashore and Corps Command Post on the headquarters ship. About L plus 10, this service began net operation to tie in the two Corps ashore with the Army Command Post afloat. This facility proved to have considerable value.

(4) Radio:

(a) Diagrams showing Corps radio nets at various periods of the tactical phase are on Figures 17 through 19 (following this page).

(b) Radio nets were established on the headquarters ship (AGC) carrying the Corps Command Post using naval facilities and signal battalion personnel.

The following nets were guarded:

Expeditionary Troops Command Voice	2956 kc
Army Command CW	2450 kc
Corps Command Voice	29.8 mc
Corps Command Voice	1880 kc
Corps Command CW	1650 kc
G-4 Common (Included G-4s of Army, Corps and divisions operated by G-4 personnel)	27.5 mc

Air and Naval Gunfire Nets.


A special Corps Command Net in the SCR-284 band (4500 kc) had to be operated in the initial amphibious phase, until divisions could land SCR-193s.

(c) The Expeditionary Troops Command circuit (29.8 mc) was guarded by a G-3 officer who reported his observations of the landing from a control boat. The advance command post landed the morning of L plus 1 and entered the Corps Command nets on 4500 kc and 29.8 mc. Corps Headquarters ashore guarded the same nets as when afloat, except that the 29.8 mc net was closed on L plus 8 and 1800 kc was shifted from voice to CW.

(d) Radio throughout the Corps functioned well. Receiving and transmitting conditions were excellent. Attenuation was so low that unanticipated interference occurred on SCR-610 and 610 frequencies duplicated in the III Amphibious Corps, even though the nets were operated at distances of five to ten miles apart, and also on SCR-300 frequencies duplicated within the Corps. When the Corps front changed from two to three divisions abreast frequency allotments for the SCR-300 band had to be re-allocated to avoid mutual interference.

(5) Pigeons: Pigeons were available about L plus 40, but were not used because of the excellence of wire communications.

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
XXIV CORPS RADIO NETS

CORPS HEADQUARTERS ADVANCE INSTALLED ASHORE AS OF (L+4) 5 APRIL 1945

FIGURE 17

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
XXIV CORPS RADIO NETS

CORPS HEADQUARTERS INSTALLED ASHORE AS OF (L+I)
17 APRIL 1945

FIGURE 18

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XXIV CORPS RADIO NETS
AS OF (L+81) 21 JUNE 1945

FIGURE 19

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(6) Photography: One combat assignment team was attached to each division and one to the Corps. Although these teams were technically proficient and enthusiastic, their value was limited due to the fact that they had had little or no previous training in combat photography. From the viewpoint of the Corps, the most serious defect in the photographic coverage of the campaign was the fact that combat units were able to see only a small proportion of the prints of the still pictures taken and, to date, none of the motion pictures. An organization of photographic service which results in a speedy local processing of film and a prompt issue of prints to interested units would greatly enhance the value of the photography program.

(7) Signal Intelligence: Radio intelligence platoons of the 101st Signal Battalion operated throughout the campaign. These platoons effectively monitored the Corps radio nets and furnished some valuable information concerning enemy radio traffic. Other signal intelligence furnished by these units was negligible. This was partially due to the fact that they were organized hastily in June 44 and lacked sufficient numbers of qualified personnel to bring the performance of the units to a completely satisfactory degree of proficiency during the two campaigns in which they have operated. This headquarters is taking action to correct this condition. It is believed, however, that a closely integrated system of radio intelligence involving all naval, army, and airforce facilities is necessary if maximum results are to be obtained.

(8) Visual: Colored smoke, panels and pyrotechnics were used fairly extensively. Smoke and panels were effective, but pyrotechnics were not. Difficulty of seeing and identifying pyrotechnics continues to minimize their value.

(9) Cryptographic: Shackle code, converter, M-209, and joint assault code were used initially. Strip cipher was available for divisions and higher but was seldom used. SIGABA was used by Corps and higher headquarters after L plus 12, but was never authorized for divisions during the operation. Shackle code and CSP 1286 were used for authentication.

c. Equipment:

(1) Telephone Central Office Set, TC-2, proved inadequate in number of cord circuits and in number of magneto drops. Switchboards, BD-72, proved inadequate for infantry regiments and for antiaircraft artillery, engineer and armored groups.

(2) TC-3 Teletype Centrals and EE-97 Teletype Sets were of tremendous value. No failures of consequence were encountered.

(3) Wire: Of the spiral four and rubber cable received, approximately 15% was defective on the reels having opens and shorts, usually at the joints. Testing prior to installation

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is essential. This cable should be suspended on messenger for minimum trouble, and must be so suspended on long spans (over 150 feet). When properly installed, almost no trouble is encountered. Very little wire, W-143, was available and that only during the later stages. However, based on limited use it appears to be excellent. Wire, W-110, was used only for relatively short runs.

(4) Carrier: Both telephone and telegraph carrier bays performed well and only minor routine troubles were encountered.

(5) Radio link: AM/TRC equipment consistently outperformed rated specifications for quality, range and continuity of service.

(6) Radio: Radio performed very well when used, but was little used in higher echelon nets because of the excellence of wire communication. Frequencies were very limited and attenuation was exceptionally low. This resulted in excessive interference between nets, especially in the range 27 to 48 mcs.

(7) Enemy: Captured enemy communication equipment was of familiar types. New types of radar, including gun-laying radar, were captured. All enemy equipment was turned over to the Army Enemy Equipment Intelligence Service Teams.

d. Training.

(1) The Corps Signal Battalion, having just completed one previous operation (LEYTE ISLAND, P.I.), was in an excellent state of training.

(2) Six company grade officers, newly graduated from Officer Candidate School and Signal Corps School, were received during the latter half of the operation. They were well qualified in their specialties. The few enlisted replacements received were approximately equal to losses incurred. The Signal Battalion started the operation at about 12% understrength and remained in this condition throughout.

32. Supply and Logistics.

a. The OKINAWA operation was outstanding in Pacific Ocean Areas operations in heavy supply requirements, particularly in heavy ammunition. The large, strong and well integrated hostile position, well supported by artillery, required out-and-out assault tactics almost the entire operation. These requirements over the long period, plus the heavy requirements for early base development placed a heavy load on supply agencies.

b. The logistic plan as set forth in Administrative Order No. 10, XXIV Corps, initially attached the bulk of the embarked service troops to the divisions. This accomplished two

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purposes: First, it gave the division service troop support while the assault supplies were being landed. Second, it served to establish the service troops ashore in the installations they would operate when Corps and later Army took over logistic support. As soon as the divisions completed landing, the service troops and supplies were to revert to Corps control in place, and Corps would assume responsibility for continuing the unloading and operating the service installations.

c. Following the unloading of the Corps assault echelon and when Army troops began unloading, the plan provided for the 1st Engineer Special Brigade, as the Army-Island Command operating agency, to take over all service troops and installations. Thus, while there was a progressive assumption of control, service troops would continue to function in place without interruption to the primary mission of supporting the combat forces. The above plan was followed in its entirety except that the Corps arranged, upon the turnover to 1st Engineer Special Brigade, to retain one combat engineer group of three battalions, one quartermaster service company, one graves registration company less one platoon, and one ordnance medium maintenance company. It was considered advisable to retain these under Corps control in order to provide close support to the divisions at all times.

d. The Corps was also responsible for initiating base development in its zone. The chief mission assigned was to prepare immediately KADEMA Airfield for use by land-based fighters. An engineer aviation battalion was attached to the Corps for this mission, was unloaded by L plus 2, and immediately began work on the field. By L plus 6, KADEMA was operational and was turned over to Island Command control.

e. The excellent progress initially made by the combat troops uncovered sufficient area to provide for rapid and uninterrupted landing of service troops and supplies and early initiation of base development. On all beaches utilized, there were relatively slight losses of equipment and supplies in the landing itself, although some supplies were lost when transports were hit by suicide planes. The service troops mounted by the Corps landed with and assisted the division service troops during the division phase. On L plus 3, the Corps assumed control of unloading and all service troops passed to Corps control. During the period L plus 3 to L plus 9 the Corps assumed all responsibility for discharge, storage and issue of supplies on its landing beaches. On L plus 9 the 1st Engineer Special Brigade assumed the unloading responsibility. At this time the Corps became primarily a coordinating agency and began steps to assure that supply points would be pushed forward to support the combat troops as they moved south.

f. The first major supply problem of the campaign arose on L plus 7 when the Corps, advancing south, developed the YONABARU-SHURI-NAHA defense line. To penetrate this position, it became apparent that tremendous amounts of ammunition,

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particularly artillery, would have to be moved forward prior to any consolidated attack, and a steady flow thereafter assured. Accordingly, the attack was delayed until a minimum of five units of fire could be at positions on any date for a strong coordinated attack. With 27 battalions of field artillery, this requirement alone represented a total of 14,800 tons of artillery ammunition plus a maintenance of some 1,000 tons a day added. It was necessary for 1st Engineer Special Brigade to step up ammunition discharge to reach an average discharge rate of 3,000 ship tons daily. By L plus 18, when the attack was made, practically all ammunition requirements had been met. Despite heavy expenditures, comparatively few shortages developed thereafter. On L plus 20 a Corps forward ammunition supply point was established in the 96th Division zone and stocked with artillery ammunition. This installation was operated by Island Command personnel under Corps control. When a two-Corps front was established Island Command assumed complete control of all ammunition supply points.

g. Upon the movement of the III Amphibious Corps into the line, the XXIV Corps was assigned a zone on the eastern side of the island. This made Route 13 (the eastern coastal road) a Corps main supply road and Route 5 (in the middle of the island) a joint supply road with the Marines. (See paragraph 33 - "Engineers" for details). Upon request of the Corps, the 7th Field Depot was established along Route 13 on the east coast with an unloading point at KUBA. Unloading and issuing of supplies on the east coast was begun about the middle of May and supply lines to the combat troops were materially shortened.

h. Up to this time, the Corps had been favored by an adequate road net which made it comparatively easy to keep supplies moving forward. There had been some rain but never enough to close roads and interfere seriously with supply traffic. On May 20, heavy rains started and continued day and night for two weeks. Within three days, practically all roads in the Corps zone south of Route 30 (east and west through FUTEWA) were impassable quagmires, or on the verge of going out. Route 13, following the eastern coastal plain, had to be completely abandoned, and without it the 7th Field Depot became useless.

i. The SHURI breakthrough had started the combat troops moving rapidly south away from all established supply points. To solve the second major logistical problem of the campaign, supply by water and air became necessary in support of the advance. YONABARU had been previously chosen from map and aerial reconnaissance as a probable unloading point. Ground reconnaissance immediately after its capture confirmed its suitability and at the request of the Corps Commander, lighterage was made available by Island Command and the Navy to deliver necessary supplies and equipment. Ten LCTs were utilized and the first supplies arrived at YONABARU on 1 June. Close coordination was maintained by the Corps Special Staff and only selectively discharged supplies were delivered. In addition several LCTs were assigned to ferry service

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to move service troops and artillery forward and casualties back.

i. During this period the G-4 administrative radio net was the only available means of communication to the port and was extensively used with stations aboard ships being discharged and at all loading and unloading points. For example, an ammunition ship was provided selectively to discharge required ammunition. A radio was placed aboard with an ordnance representative. This enabled the Corps absolutely to control the discharge and get the right ammunition at the right time. An LST(H) was provided for evacuation from YONABARU and was brought into the radio net enabling the beach evacuation station to call for delivery of whole blood or a boat for evacuation at any time.


k. On 10 June, Island Command assumed responsibility for unloading at YONABARU and the Corps concentrated on a newly opened forward discharge point at MINATOGA. A reconnaissance of this point had been made by an officer of the G-4 section on 5 June at a time when the front lines were only 500 yards beyond the town. The 7th Division delivered some supplies by LVT to this point on 6 June. The initial shipment of four LCTs with Class I and III supplies and an LST with Class V arrived on the afternoon of the 8th. Forty-four selectively loaded LVTs were sent to MINATOGA by LST on 9 June. The LVTs were preloaded half with ammunition and half with needed Bailey Bridge totalling 750 tons. Shipments to MINATOGA were continued from both the east and west coasts by LST and LCT with the LVTs being used as lighterage from ship to shore. Water and air evacuations were instituted from MINATOGA by cub plane and LST(H). Up to the end of the combat phase the Corps supervised and handled the discharge of 12,270 tons of supplies in addition to supplies unloaded by Island Command, unloaded 42 LCT and 11 LCM loads of equipment and evacuated 3,672 casualties from YONABARU and MINATOGA by air and water.

l. Roads began to dry out about 10 June, but with the establishment of the YONABARU and MINATOGA water supply points, the Corps Engineer concentrated on rebuilding Route 5 connecting Route 44 with the north, and upon developing Route 44 and roads to the south. Route 13 north of YONABARU was not utilized again during the battle, since it required a complete reconstruction job and neither time nor engineer facilities permitted this.

The allotment of three engineer battalions and a group headquarters to the Corps allowed some close engineer support of the divisions throughout the operation but was never adequate for needs. A chart showing the maintenance responsibilities assumed by the Corps Engineer battalions is attached as Figure 20 (next page). None of the existing roads was capable of handling military traffic without extensive rebuilding. Only constant effort by the engineers maintained a tenuous road system in support of operations. The importance of adequate engineer troops for tactical support cannot be overstressed.


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
PROGRESSIVE ASSUMPTION OF RESPONSIBILITY
 FOR ROAD CONSTRUCTION & MAINTENANCE
 BY XXIV CORPS ENGINEER ON OKINAWA

MAP: RYUKYU-RETTO 1:100,000



PROGRESSIVE ASSUMPTION OF RESPONSIBILITY
 FOR ROAD CONSTRUCTION & MAINTENANCE
 BY XXIV CORPS ENGINEER ON OKINAWA

MAP: RYUKYU-RETTO 1:100,000




PROGRESSIVE ASSUMPTION OF RESPONSIBILITY
 FOR ROAD CONSTRUCTION & MAINTENANCE
 BY XXIV CORPS ENGINEER ON OKINAWA

MAP: RYUKYU-RETTO 1:100,000

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FIGURE 20

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
PROGRESSIVE ASSUMPTION OF RESPONSIBILITY
 FOR ROAD CONSTRUCTION & MAINTENANCE
 BY XXIV CORPS ENGINEER ON OKINAWA

MAP: RYUKYU-RETTO 1:100,000

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FIGURE 20

SCOM



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EFF. 0600 7 MAY 45

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EFF. 0600 24 MAY 45

EFF. 0600 3 JUNE 45


EFF. 0600 16 JUNE

PROGRESSIVE ASSUMPTION OF RESPONSIBILITY
 FOR ROAD CONSTRUCTION & MAINTENANCE
 BY XXIV CORPS ENGINEER ON OKINAWA

MAP: RYUKYU-RETTO 1:100,000

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FIGURE 20




PROGRESSIVE ASSUMPTION OF RESPONSIBILITY
 FOR ROAD CONSTRUCTION & MAINTENANCE
 BY XXIV CORPS ENGINEER ON OKINAWA

MAP: RYUKYU-RETTO 1:100,000

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FIGURE 20

NOTE: UNITS MOVED BACK DUE
TO HEAVY RAIN (22 MAY-5 JUNE)
IN ORDER TO KEEP OPEN MSRS




PROGRESSIVE ASSUMPTION OF RESPONSIBILITY
FOR ROAD CONSTRUCTION & MAINTENANCE
BY XXIV CORPS ENGINEER ON OKINAWA

MAP: RYUKYU-RETTO 1:100,000

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FIGURE 20

NOTE: ROUTE 13 (KUBASAKI-YONABARU)
ROUTES 32, 35, 133 SOUTH
ABANDONED 5 JUNE 45




PROGRESSIVE ASSUMPTION OF RESPONSIBILITY
FOR ROAD CONSTRUCTION & MAINTENANCE
BY XXIV CORPS ENGINEER ON OKINAWA

MAP: RYUKYU-RETTO 1:100,000

UNCLASSIFIED

FIGURE 20



PROGRESSIVE ASSUMPTION OF RESPONSIBILITY
 FOR ROAD CONSTRUCTION & MAINTENANCE
 BY XXIV CORPS ENGINEER ON OKINAWA

MAP: RYUKYU-RETTO 1:100,000

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FIGURE 20

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m. Working closely with the engineers and keeping constant check on road conditions, the Traffic Control Section of G-4 cleared and routed all convoys of 20 or more vehicles passing through the Corps zone of action. This section, by constant road reconnaissance and study of traffic densities, was able to route traffic over the best routes. Its work was particularly important during the period when roads were almost impassable. During the rainy period from 20 May to 5 June, continued gathering of road information and ability to keep abreast of road conditions enabled the Corps to use serviceable roads to the maximum, coordination of road use with greatest needs was possible and the Staff was prepared to take emergency action and use water transportation to bypass impassable roads. During the period in which Route 13 was impassable and Route 5 was being rebuilt, Route 1 along the west coast through the III Amphibious Corps zone became the only north-south supply road for both Corps. The Traffic Control Section coordinated and cleared all Corps traffic through the Marine zone. Only essential XXIV Corps traffic was permitted to move, and Corps military police assisted Marine military police in its control. This arrangement proved highly satisfactory to both Corps.

n. Water and motor transportation of supplies was supplemented by air delivery to both the 7th and 96th Divisions. Air delivery of supplies to these units was accomplished through the III Amphibious Corps air delivery section. The size and location of the drops to the Corps are shown in Figure 21 (next page). The tonnage of air-delivered supplies was small, but because of its emergency nature, importance of its delivery cannot be overestimated.


o. A few equipment shortages remained when the Corps embarked for OKINAWA:

(1) Probably the most important of these were field ranges and their maintenance parts. The mortality of this equipment in amphibious operations is high. Neither sufficient spare parts for normal maintenance nor complete replacement units have ever been available to equip and maintain the T/E level in the Corps. It is estimated that to keep the Corps completely equipped with T/E allowances of field ranges a replacement of at least 50 percent of the total allowance with a comparable increase in maintenance parts is necessary prior to each operation. At present, due to lack of previous replacements, requirements are much higher.

(2) Typewriter and office machine shortages were another chronic problem. These items are never available in sufficient quantities to replace those worn out or lost. Spare parts and repair facilities are totally inadequate. Paperwork never dwindles in combat, so lack of facilities to handle it only results in a tremendous backlog of administration facing the units during a rehabilitation phase.

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MAP: RYUKYU-RETTO 1:200,000

AIR DROPS

DROP NUMBER	DATE	UNIT	TA LOCATION	POUNDS	PLANES USED
1	21 APR	1 BN 106 INF	7876-M5	3770	10
2	21 APR	3 BN 106 INF	7876-N5	8930	12
3	2 JUNE	383 INF	8065-V2	11,420	17
4	4 JUNE	383 INF	7985-D	7881	10
5	5 JUNE	383 INF	7984-K	8000	12
6	8 JUNE	184 INF	8261-K	22,770	23
7	5 JUNE	383 INF	7763-N	7681	10
8	6 JUNE	383 INF	7763-W	10,414	14
9	9 JUNE	381 RCT	8066-T4	3000	4

FIGURE 21

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d. The G-4 administrative radio net played an important part in G-4's ability to control supply operations throughout the campaign. During the initial stages of the operation it provided a means of control for unloading and for ship-to-shore administrative communication during the movement of the command post ashore. By having a separate net for this administrative traffic, the already overburdened normal communications were freed of a heavy load. During the period of emergency overwater supply to YONABARU and MINATOGA, telephone communication was not available. The radio net connecting all points and operating directly from the G-4 office by remote control enabled the G-4 to take necessary action immediately and pass instructions directly to his representatives. Such a net, with adequate equipment for extended operation and a permanently assigned operating frequency, is considered essential to effective G-4 operation in any campaign.

33. Engineer.

a. For the assault landing and shore party operation, each division was provided with one engineer combat group. In addition, for initial base development work, part of an engineer construction group and an aviation engineer battalion were attached to the Corps. The latter units, however, were mounted in separate shipping and did not join until the Corps arrived at the target.

b. The mission of the aviation engineer battalion was to rehabilitate KADEWA Airfield immediately after capture. Landing on L plus 2 it had the field in operational condition for land-based fighter planes by L plus 6. At this time the field was turned over to Island Command and the engineers continued construction under that headquarters.

c. Shore party development proceeded rapidly and smoothly. Ample areas were available for dump developments, except on Brown Beach, and an adequate road net was promptly developed. On L plus 4 further development of roads inland became necessary as the divisions turned south after crossing the island. Accordingly two battalions of combat engineers were relieved from beach operations and made responsible for road and bridge construction within the Corps zone. On L plus 6 the landing of the construction group increased the available engineer troops by one battalion and one company. These troops were immediately assigned to road construction in areas taken over by the Corps.

d. On L plus 9 when the Corps was relieved of discharge and dump operation the engineer battalions operating the beaches reverted to the 1st Engineer Special Brigade, leaving the Corps two combat battalions. On L plus 12 the construction group reverted to Island Command but continued construction and maintenance of roads in the Corps zone. On L plus 21 attachment of an additional combat battalion and the 1140th Engineer Group Headquarters gave the Corps a combat engineer group of three battalions. This assignment

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of troops continued throughout the operation. With the above troops, the Corps was able to push a battalion forward in direct support of each division. As additional engineer troops became available, Island Command progressively assumed increased maintenance responsibilities and enabled the Corps engineer troops to keep well forward (Figure 20).

e. Existing roads were narrow and although hard surfaced were incapable of carrying the required volume of heavy American vehicular traffic. A major rebuilding job was necessary. The only material suitable for road metal, other than reef rock and sand, was a limestone coral limited to the highlands. The coral was very difficult to work, in that the surface had a high percentage of clay and the underlying strata blasted out in chunks too large for use on roads. This problem was solved in part by close supervision of quarry operations and extensive use of rubble from destroyed buildings and stone walls. A dry, loose coral sand and a wet, cemented finger coral proved to be very satisfactory surfacing material. As the combat moved south, the engineers encountered a definite lack of suitable road metal particularly on the east side of the island and were forced to rely extensively on rubble. For the rebuilding of Route 5, the stones of the SHURI Castle walls, which had been flattened by continuous artillery and aerial bombardment, were used. A rock crusher was secured to expedite use of these stones as surfacing material.

f. During the period 22 May to 5 June a 12-inch rainfall combined with heavy traffic forced the abandonment of the Corps main supply route - Route 13 - and concentration of construction and maintenance forces on a complete rebuild of the secondary north-south supply road - Route 5 - and east-west road, Route 44, while supplies moved around the severed link by water. At the end of the period Routes 5 and 44 were rapidly becoming excellent two-way all weather roads.

g. Bailey bridges were used extensively throughout the operation. Approximately 650 feet of single-single and 350 feet of double-single were installed by Corps Engineer to replace destroyed bridges. Much of this has since been replaced by other types, returning the Bailey to availability.

h. Water distillation units carried in the assault proved unnecessary. Initial reconnaissance uncovered sufficient water sources to supply all troops. Weekly inspections made jointly by engineer and medical officers insured the maintenance of high standards in water supply procedures.

i. Initial supplies of maps were adequate. As revisions were made, distribution was direct to divisions and Corps troops from the Army Map Depot.

j. An engineer depot company was activated on LEYTE for

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mounting with the Corps. This unit was assigned to the Island Command and attached to the Corps for movement and initial employment. It assisted in receiving and issuing rehabilitation supplies prior to mounting and, upon arrival at the target, served initially under Corps and after L plus 9 under Island Command.

k. All "critical item" requisitions were submitted by subordinate units through the Corps Engineer to insure an equitable distribution of available stocks. The most critical item of engineer supply throughout the operation was sandbags. This was caused primarily by non-availability of sufficient quantities for mounting and was aggravated by losses in shipping. Lumber remained a critical item throughout the operation. Hospital, cemetery, and general sanitary requirements were only partially met. On L plus 30 Island Command allocated 12 percent of all incoming dunnage to the Corps for reallocation to Corps units. This produced very little lumber and the allocation was rescinded. At the conclusion of the operation no lumber was being supplied to Corps units.

34. Medical

a. Organization of medical evacuation:

(1) Two portable surgical hospitals (T/O & E 8-5728) were attached to each division to reinforce the organic clearing platoons and provide for an adequate program of early life-saving surgery within the division echelon.

(2) One field hospital (T/O & E 8-510) was attached to each division for transportation and initial employment. These were to revert initially to Corps on its assumption of control ashore and later to Army.

(3) A detachment of a type No. 4 medical supply team was attached to each division to operate the division medical dumps so as to provide continuity in operation as the dumps passed initially to Corps and later to Army control. A second medical supply team type No. 4 was embarked on an early resupply echelon earmarked for Corps to operate forward dumps serving divisions.

(4) The Corps medical battalion consisting of one ambulance company, two collecting companies and one clearing company, reinforced by a surgical team and an orthopedic team, was utilized to evacuate from the division clearing stations to the field hospitals and to clear the field hospitals through holding stations to the shore party evacuation stations for evacuation to ships or through the air evacuation station to air ambulances (C-54) for further evacuation to rear areas. The shore party station was operated by medical personnel of the shore party engineers and the air evacuation station by the Corps medical battalion. Each platoon of the Corps clearing company was equipped to operate a 150-bed holding and sorting station and reinforced by the station section and the bearer platoon of one collecting company.

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(5) Schematic drawing of the Corps medical service appears on the next page (Figure 21A).

(6) Evacuation:

(a) A policy of immediate evacuation of all casualties to transports and AHS was followed in the initial assault phase. The use of LST(H)s both as sorting points for further evacuation to transports and to AHS, and for holding casualties, facilitated the transfer of patients from shore to ship and proved most satisfactory. AHS were available from L-Day on.

(b) By evening of L-Day, both portable surgical hospitals of the 7th Division were established on the beach, prepared to perform surgery on non-transportable cases and emergency surgery during the night. One clearing platoon of this division began to receive patients by noon of L plus 1. On the 96th Division's beachhead, the clearing station and portable surgical hospitals opened on L plus 2.

(c) Field hospitals mounted on division shipping came ashore on L plus 3. On L plus 4, a platoon of the 69th Field Hospital, supporting the 7th Division, began operation at a temporary site, permitting the division's clearing station to move forward. The remainder of this unit moved immediately to its permanent area and was ready to receive patients there on L plus 5. Delay in unloading and assembling its equipment prevented the 51st Field Hospital in support of the 96th Division from opening until L plus 5. By L plus 7, both field hospitals had expanded to their normal bed capacity.


(d) The Corps medical battalion began debarkation on L plus 2. The mounting of this unit on four LSMs (Corps shipping) was responsible for speedy unloading and facilitated the early employment of its various elements. On L plus 3, Corps ambulances began evacuating division clearing stations and one platoon of the Corps clearing company was open as a holding station for casualties en route to ships. On L plus 4, the other platoon opened in the same capacity. One Corps collecting company supported each holding station by performing further ambulance evacuation to ships.

(e) Air evacuation began on L plus 7. Daily allotment of casualty space was made by Army. C-54s (ATC and NATS) arrived each morning from GUAM at hourly intervals and departed on a similar schedule. A detachment of a Corps collecting company was established as an airstrip station to facilitate air evacuation. Patients were moved early each day from the Corps holding stations to this station where they were further checked before flight. Shelter, food and medical service were thus available when for any reason casualties were of necessity, held overnight.

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SCHEME OF EVACUATION

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FIGURE 21 A

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(f) Final recording of all casualties evacuated by ships was accomplished by the surgeon of the Corps Shore Party. In like manner, casualties returning from ship to shore were accounted for. Air evacuees were recorded upon leaving the holding station for the airfield. This system proved to be very satisfactory and accurate. Divisions and Corps troops were furnished daily lists of personnel so evacuated.

(g) No difficulty was encountered in ambulance service. During the major offensive which started on 19 April it became necessary to request additional ambulances. Army attached one Marine Corps ambulance section (ten ambulances) to the Corps medical battalion. During the same period, it became necessary to evacuate "white" cases (patients who normally return to duty within 14 days), both to ship and via air, in order to provide adequate bed space. Some of these were later returned from ships. The installation of division rest camps for battle fatigue cases assisted materially in preventing overcrowding of the hospitals. Two of the three divisions were successfully operating such camps by L plus 21. By L plus 15, the 68th Field Hospital, which came in with the 27th Division, was in operation under Corps control, allowing one field hospital in support of each division. On L plus 24, a fourth field hospital (Army) opened for neuropsychiatric patients. On L plus 34, Corps was relieved of the responsibility of operating the field hospitals, holding stations and evacuation stations and of evacuation beyond the field hospitals. Evacuation of division clearing companies continued to be a function of Corps collecting companies. At this time, the Corps clearing company resumed its normal function of supporting Corps troops. During the phase of regrouping to a two corps front, Corps ambulances continued evacuation of the 1st Marine Division until its own organic services became available.

(h) Evacuation of Army personnel off the island, during the period of XXIV Corps responsibility:

<u>Date</u>	<u>Ship</u>	<u>Air</u>	<u>Total</u>
April 1	151		151
2	123		123
3	41		41
4	96		96
5	184		184
6	162		162
7	166		166
8	69	45	114
9	247	140	495
10	68	143	211
11	255	92	347
12	447	136	583
13	85	151	236
14	38	124	162
15	24	113	137

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<u>Date</u>	<u>Ship</u>	<u>Air</u>	<u>Total</u>
April 16	41	94	135
17	50	99	149
18	5	46	51
19	93	50	143
20	257	97	354
21	367	179	546
22	177	223	400
23	57	244	301
24	38	105	143
25	108	92	200
26	106	86	192
27	152	91	243
28	129	103	232
29	140	98	238
30	77	106	183
May 1	96	40	136
2	110	58	168
3	138	33	171
4	186	28	214
TOTALS	4,483	2,824	7,307

(i) During the ensuing period through L plus 60, no difficulty was encountered in evacuation. The Corps medical battalion with 30 ambulances was now evacuating 26 Corps troop dispensaries in addition to their own clearing stations and those of divisions. On L plus 61, it became apparent that overland evacuation from divisions operating south of line NAHA-YONABARU would have to cease due to the heavy rains which made the roads impassable. A plan was instituted whereby casualties would be evacuated from YONABARU to KUBA-SAKI by water via returning supply boats. The 7th Division operated a clearing station at YONABARU and the Corps medical battalion operated a receiving station at KUBA, evacuating from KUBA to field hospitals by ambulance. On L plus 63, this plan was in operation and proved very satisfactory. On L plus 67, the Corps medical battalion took over the evacuation station at YONABARU to permit the 7th Division clearing station to displace forward. This station evacuated 7th Division, 96th Division and some Marine casualties. The receiving station, also operated by the Corps medical battalion, was moved from KUBA to AWASHI Peninsula due to failure of roads in the vicinity of KUBA. Evacuation was now from YONABARU to AWASHI by water, and AWASHI to field hospitals by ambulance. In the meantime, an LST(H) was stationed off YONABARU to receive serious cases and as a standby in event of overloading of evacuation facilities. It also served as a blood bank for division clearing stations.

(j) On L plus 76, evacuation of selected serious cases of the 7th and 96th Divisions from MINATOGA via cub plane was established. Patients were flown to a cub strip in the vicinity of CHATAN and further evacuated to nearby field hospitals by Corps ambulances. The LST(H) was anchored daily off MINATOGA from

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18 June to 30 June to receive patients from the 7th Division clearing station which handled 98th Division casualties in this area and each night moved to AWASHI to discharge patients.

(K) Evacuated beyond Corps and division clearing stations (L plus 34 to L plus 90):

May	5	336
	6	263
	7	109
	8	133
	9	174
	10	209
	11	338
	12	283
	13	351
	14	257
	15	222
	16	320
	17	213
	18	218
	19	235
	20	252
	21	355
	22	298
	23	321
	24	266
	25	274
	26	187
	27	215
	28	189
	29	201
	30	176
	31	175
June	1	132
	2	359
	3	185
	4	139
	5	125
	6	164
	7	233
	8	151
	9	204
	10	262
	11	217
	12	208
	13	239
	14	282
	15	281
	16	316
	17	313
	18	246
	19	308

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June 20	224
21	302
22	218
23	99
24	32
25	146
26	146
27	154
28	128
29	88
30	<u>84</u>

GRAND TOTAL 12,542

(l) Evacuation by small boat from YONABARU to receiving stations at KUBA-SAKI; or AWASHI (L plus 67 to L plus 90):

June 7	186
8	171
9	193
10	199
11	220
12	167
13	200
14	166
15	277
16	500
17	214
18	102
19	156
20	123
21	150
22	106
23	80
24	8
25	41
26	34
27	45
28	33
29	24
30	<u>24</u>

GRAND TOTAL 3,219

(m) Evacuation from MINATOGA via cub plane (L plus 75 to L plus 90):

June 15	5
16	14
17	57
18	37
19	52
20	85

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June 21	63
22	35
23	28
24	14
25	16
26	15
27	14
28	7
29	11
30	<u>10</u>
GRAND TOTAL	443

(n) Evacuated to LST(H) lying off MINATOGA
(L plus 78 to L plus 90):

June 18	66
19	89
20	107
21	81
22	65
23	72
24	42
25	64
26	90
27	59
28	50
29	54
30	<u>54</u>
GRAND TOTAL	893

(o) Throughout the campaign a determined effort was made to provide for adequate treatment and early return to duty of exhaustion, combat fatigue, battle neurosis, anxiety and conversion hysteria cases. Facilities were provided division clearing companies to enable them to hold such cases for periods up to five days, if return to duty could not be accomplished in a shorter period. Prior to embarkation trained psychiatrists were made available by Army for reinforcement of the field hospitals. The senior member of this specialist group was brought into the Corps Surgeon's Office and given overall responsibility for this program. It was soon apparent that the number and severity of the cases was to be much greater than in previous operations in the Pacific Ocean Areas due primarily to heavy hostile artillery and mortar fires and that measures were required to expand and increase the efficiency of the program. By L plus 15, both divisions and the Corps had established rest camps to relieve hospitals and clearing companies of those individuals who needed a few days additional rest but no further medical care other than group psychotherapy to be given by the division psychiatrists. As a further step in improving the service, Tenth Army on L plus 24 set aside one field hospital to be used exclusively for the care of this type of patient.

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The psychiatrists attached to the Corps and all the patients of this group in the three field hospitals under Corps control were transferred to the new installation. Thereafter, all such patients who could not be returned to duty in a reasonable period of time were transferred direct to the psychiatric hospital from the clearing stations. Every effort was made by all echelons to prevent the necessity of evacuating these cases from the Island. The results of the program were gratifying. Fifty-five percent of all admissions were returned to duty by the division clearing stations. Thirty-nine percent of those evacuated beyond the clearing stations were returned to full duty and an additional 16% to duty with service installations. An even better record would have been obtained had not the bed status become critical during the period L plus 18 to L plus 24, requiring administrative evacuation of several hundred individuals in the neuro classifications.

35. Ordnance.

a. General.

Ordnance support in this operation followed the general logistic pattern: that is, personnel and equipment to provide initial service landed with the assault echelon and began operation under control of assault units. This service was rapidly augmented by units lifted in garrison echelons of shipping and progressively reverted to Island Command control as the Corps advanced.

b. Troops.

(1) In addition to ordnance units attached to divisions, the following units mounted out with the Corps and operated initially under Corps control:

284th Ordnance Heavy Maintenance Company (Tank)
404th Ordnance Medium Maintenance Company
183d Ordnance Depot Company
Detachment, 363d Ordnance Company (AA)

(2) The bulk of the personnel together with their first priority equipment moved to the target in assault shipping, the balance loading into the first garrison echelon shipping which arrived at the target on L plus 10. This method of shipping ordnance troops proved to be entirely satisfactory.

(3) The depot company did not bring pre-binned stocks and for this reason was unable to operate at maximum efficiency for several weeks. In future operations, depot companies should come ashore with at least their fast moving items in bins ready for issue.

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c. Ammunition supply.

(1) Ammunition expenditures in this operation were on a scale unprecedented in the experience of this Corps. Over 64,000 tons of ammunition, of which 53,000 tons were artillery and mortar ammunition, were fired during the campaign. For various reasons, including the loss of two ammunition resupply ships, the initial stocks of five units of fire of all types taken ashore by assault forces could not be maintained except in the case of anti-aircraft artillery. It was soon apparent that if this level (which was considered the minimum necessary to provide an even flow and adequate reserves) were to be maintained, command restrictions on expenditures would be required. Consequently, beginning on 10 April daily artillery expenditures were limited by command decision. This limitation varied from time to time depending upon stocks and combat conditions. A coordinated Corps attack was launched on 19 April when the stocks had been substantially restored to five units of fire. The various command restrictions placed on ammunition expenditure of ammunition during the operation follow:

<u>DATE</u>	<u>RESTRICTIONS</u>
L plus 9 (10 April)	Artillery expenditures to be held to 0.2 U/F per day effective 1800 hours.
L plus 15 (16 April)	Except in emergency or by specific authority, artillery ammunition expenditures not to exceed 1.5 U/F on first day of attack (19 April) and 0.75 U/F per day thereafter.
L plus 26 (29 April)	Artillery ammunition expenditures not to exceed 0.5 U/F per day.
L plus 30 (1 May)	Effective 1 June expenditures of artillery ammunition for Corps limited to following averages: 75mm How 1 U/F 105mm How & 155 Gun 0.5 U/F 155mm How & 8" How 0.4 U/F
L plus 31 (2 May)	Ammunition expenditures not to exceed the following: 155mm How and 8" How 0.3 U/F Other calibers 0.5 U/F
L plus 49 (20 May)	81mm Mortar expenditure will be held to 0.4 U/F per day effective 21 May.
L plus 61 (1 June)	All restrictions on ammunition expenditures lifted. (Actual availability at gun positions, however, did impose serious restrictions.)

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(2) One factor in the difficulty experienced in maintaining ammunition stocks ashore resulted from the unbalanced expenditures as measured in CinCPOA units of fire. Artillery and mortar ammunition expended during the campaign totalled approximately 25 CinCPOA units of fire while the expenditures of some other types amounted to less than one-half this figure. Inasmuch as most of the ammunition resupply ships were loaded with four units of fire of all types for a reinforced division and for heavy and medium field artillery battalions, handling of types not immediately required was necessary in order to place sufficient artillery and mortar ammunition ashore. When it is considered that the average daily expenditure throughout the campaign - and in spite of restrictions - was over 800 tons of ammunition, and that on three days it exceeded 2,000 tons each day, the scale of effort involved is apparent. The basic data on ammunition expenditures is presented below:

BASIC DATA ON AMMUNITION EXPENDITURES DURING THE PERIOD 4 APRIL TO 21 JUNE 1945

(1) <u>TYPE</u> <u>AMMUNITION</u>	(2) <u>BN. GUN. OR</u> <u>DIV DAYS OF</u> <u>ACTION</u>	(3) <u>TOTAL RDS</u> <u>ALL TYPES</u>	(4) <u>% CINCPOA</u> <u>U/F PER DAY</u>	(5) <u>TOTAL</u> <u>TONS</u>
8" HOWITZER	75 (Bn Days)	19008	.21	2224.4
155mm GUN	216 (Bn Days)	79888	.31	5890.7
155mm HOW.	556 (Bn Days)	278946	.28	13702.06
105mm HOW.	866 (Bn Days)	792371	.30	28151.50
75mm HOW.	1449 (Gun Days)	179977	.83	2429.3
75mm GUN	9506 (Gun Days)	104893	.11	1520.8
57mm GUN	818 (Gun Days)	21997	.30	230.9
37mm GUN	13386 (Gun Days)	87193	.065	204.03
81mm MORTAR	194 (Div Days)	443589	.27	3672.00
60mm MORTAR	194 (Div Days)	521301	.23	1625.5
ROCKET, 2.36"	194 (Div Days)	20359	.10	61.98
GRENADE, Hand	194 (Div Days)	366744	.14	364.99
GRENADE, Rifle	194 (Div Days)	25670	.05	40.07
45 CAL BALL	194 (Div Days)	1461180	.07	35.17
CART., CARBINE	194 (Div Days)	2008597	.04	33.85
CART., .30 RIFLE	194 (Div Days)	9287923	.05	372.03
CART., .30 MG	194 (Div Days)	16285499	.16	627.45
CART., .50 MG	194 (Div Days)	786754	.03	137.47
TOTAL TONS				64324.00

NOTES:

Col. 1 indicates the Caliber or kind of ammunition.

Col. 2 is the sum of the number of Battalion Days, Weapon Days, or Division Days engaged during the period, that is, one Battalion engaged for one day equal one Battalion Day.

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NOTES (Contd):

Col. 3 lists the total number of rounds of the caliber or king without regard to type, that is HE, WP, Smoke, etc., are lumped together.

Col. 4 is the percentage of CinCPCA U/F.

Col. 5 is the tonnage represented by the figures in Col. 3.

(3) Ammunition supply service was inaugurated in this operation by the assault divisions, each of which had an attached ammunition company charged with establishing the initial ammunition supply points on the beaches. On 5 April these ammunition companies reverted to Corps which operated the ammunition supply points until the 16th when Island Command took over the supply points and the operating personnel.

(4) The timely establishment of an adequate system of forward ammunition supply points by the Island Command was prevented by the collapse of the existing road system. This situation was overcome, however, by having a type-loaded ammunition resupply ship carrying 7,500 tons anchored off the east coast as a floating supply point. Ammunition was allocated in the vessel on request of Corps units and divisions, loaded on lighterage, and delivered to the Corps supply point at MINATOGA where units drew directly from lighterage. In addition, three LSTs each solidly loaded with 1,500 tons of artillery and mortar ammunition were made available and were anchored off the Corps supply points at YOMABARU and MINATOGA.

a. Maintenance.

(1) General:

The Corps mounting out stocks of spare parts and maintenance supplies were substantially short of the prescribed 30 days of supply. However, with the exception of general purpose and tracked vehicles of all types, maintenance support was adequate throughout the campaign. This campaign has shown that failure to bring ashore at an early date Ordnance units equipped and stocked to provide immediately adequate vehicular third echelon support, to rebuild major unit assemblies supplementing stocks brought ashore, and to provide adequate evacuation and repair facilities to support the tracked vehicles of the Corps, will seriously jeopardize the combat efficiency of the Corps. The progressive deterioration of the materiel of this Corps due to inadequate Ordnance maintenance is illustrated below.

(2) General Purpose Vehicles and Tractors:

As the campaign progressed the lack of adequate third echelon maintenance and facilities for the rebuild of major

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unit assemblies (axles, transmissions, etc.) began to be evident in a general deterioration of all equipment and a marked increase in the number of vehicles deadlined for over three days for lack of labor, parts, and assemblies. This deadline in Ordnance shops jumped from 37 on 14 May 45, when deadline reports were initiated, to 115 at the close of the campaign, 39 days later. During the campaign, Corps Ordnance Service was able to perform only 426 third echelon and 15 fourth and fifth echelon job orders on general purpose vehicles and tractors in support of the divisions, which had an average total of 4,600 vehicles of this type. As a comparison to show the total work to be done, 2,439 third echelon and 30 fourth and fifth echelon jobs were done by Corps Ordnance Service for the 900 vehicles of this type in Corps troops.

(3) Tanks, LVTs and Self-Propelled Guns:

There were an average of 800 LVTs, 260 tanks and 65 self-propelled guns in the Corps, a total of 1,125 combat vehicles. Corps Ordnance Service was able to perform only a total of 71 jobs in support of the battalions and divisions, the vehicles deadlined in Ordnance shops over three days rose from one on 14 May 45 to 28 by the close of the campaign. Because of the inability to provide adequate Ordnance support to combat units, combat vehicle losses were higher than necessary. For example, the combat effectiveness of the Corps would have been materially reduced if the replacement tanks provided through normal supply channels had not been augmented by approximately 50 tanks from the 193d Tank Battalion attached to the 27th Division.

c. New Materiel.

Certain items of Ordnance materiel and ammunition were used for the first time by this Corps and are relatively new to troops of this theater.

(1) VT Fuzes.

An Ordnance Overseas Modification and Maintenance Team consisting of one officer and three enlisted men was attached to the Ordnance section throughout the operation. This team conducted the necessary instruction of artillery units and coordinated all matters pertaining to the utilization of VT fuzes. VT fuzes were employed in the operation.

(2) Illuminating Shell.

A small quantity of 155mm illuminating shell was available in resupply of ammunition. This shell was tested at the front and found to be extremely satisfactory. It was reported as being superior to the corresponding Navy 6" shell. This shell will become more important as operations take the front lines beyond supporting distance of naval gunfire.

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(3) Recoilless Weapons.

During May a demonstration crew from Army Ground Forces Headquarters, demonstrated the 75mm Recoilless Rifle T-21 and the 57mm Recoilless Rifle T-15. These weapons were subsequently used in the 7th and 96th Divisions in combat with considerable success but with extremely limited ammunition. They could have been tested more extensively if additional ammunition had been available.

f. Performance of Standard Materiel.

(1) Athey Trailers have not proved entirely satisfactory during this operation. For most efficient operation they should be used with low-speed tractors. On long hauls behind high-speed tractors they soon wear out.

(2) Cargo Carriers, M29C. There was little requirement for "Weasels" during the earlier phases of this operation. They were, however, very useful when roads and fields became saturated with water. They were particularly useful to signal units working cross-country through rice paddies and marshy land in laying of communication lines and in combat units for supply and evacuation in forward areas.

(3) Motor Carriage, 76mm Gun, M18, was well liked by the using units. Its high speed, low silhouette, light weight and ease of maneuverability combined with a hard-hitting weapon induced the Corps Commander to recommend this weapon be on Table of Equipment for infantry regimental antitank companies in future operations.

36. Quartermaster.

a. Quartermaster troops attached to the Corps were further attached to the divisions for initial employment. The Corps plan provided that when the Corps Shore Party assumed control of the beaches the Corps special staff became responsible for the technical operation of the dumps of their services.

b. On L plus 3 the Quartermaster became responsible for receipt, storage, and issue of all quartermaster supplies coming across the beaches. All quartermaster troops except the graves registration platoons and the section of the quartermaster service companies allocated for evacuation of dead reverted to Corps control. The quartermaster group headquarters attached to the Corps became the operating agency for the dumps. On L plus 9 the quartermaster troops and the dumps reverted to control of the 1st Engineer Special Brigade operating under the Island Command. The Quartermaster at once instituted action to insure that supplies were moved forward to support the combat troops.

c. Forward distributing points were established by the Island Command as the troops moved south. The first one located

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at ISHADO on Route 13 was abandoned when the road became impassable and a new one was established at YONABARU. At the close of the period stocks of Classes I and III were available at YONABARU for units in that area. During the final stages of the campaign an additional Class I and III unloading point was established at MINATOGA.

d. Ration levels, while adequate, never reached projected levels. "B" rations were issued to service troops on L plus 6 to conserve emergency rations for combat troops. Later, selective discharge of emergency rations from supply ships on the east coast was necessary to supply the combat troops.

e. Divisions were authorized to retain and move forward all initial stocks of Class II brought in by them. This insured them an uninterrupted supply until Island Command could establish its own dumps and prevented diversion to other units. Certain items of Class II became critical early. The Island Command Quartermaster placed these on a controlled item list and issues were made only on his approval. The shortages affecting the Corps most were all types of cooking equipment, BAR belts and small size HBTs.

f. Salvage activities were initiated on L plus 6 when a Corps salvage dump was opened. Salvage responsibility was assumed by the Island Command when they assumed control of service units.

g. Initially laundry service was provided only for medical installations by attachment of a laundry platoon to the Corps medical battalion. By the close of the period, however, sufficient laundry facilities were available to serve the combat units. Two fumigation and bath companies were attached to the Corps. Due to delayed unloading of equipment, the first unit was not in operation until L plus 40. By L plus 77 six of the eight available units were in operation serving front line units. Each unit had a capacity of 1,000 men per day. Because the units arrived without water storage tanks and chlorination apparatus, it was necessary for the divisions they served to provide this equipment. Figure 22 which follows this page shows locations of these units as well as laundries.

h. Throughout the operation, each division retained a graves registration platoon and section of a quartermaster service company for evacuation of dead and operation of the division cemeteries. This arrangement was very satisfactory and resulted in efficient evacuation and burial without requiring diversion of combat troops to this duty. A proposed reorganization of graves registration companies will provide for incorporation of sufficient personnel in the graves registration platoons to provide for the evacuation services now performed by the service company section.




FIGURE 22

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37. Chemical Warfare.

a. The Army operation plan provided for the attachment of a converted quartermaster service company and a provisional chemical detachment to the Corps as Chemical Warfare Service service troops. These troops did not mount with the Corps assault elements and were not available during the initial landing phase. Beach dumps were established and operated initially by the divisions. On L plus 3 Corps assumed control of Chemical Warfare Service dumps and the service personnel provided by Army arrived on the beach. Attachments were made to the divisions to assist in the collection and storage of Chemical Warfare Service equipment. On L plus 9 the Island Command assumed control of the dumps and service personnel.

b. In complying with Administrative Order No. 11, Headquarters XXIV Corps, 8 April 45, the 7th and 96th Infantry Divisions turned in their gas masks to their Chemical officers for storage. The 77th Division and Corps troops stored their masks in organizational dumps under supervision of the Corps and Division Chemical Officers.

c. On 18 April 45, the Chemical Officer, Tenth Army, delegated to the Chemical Officer, XXIV Corps, the authority to allocate all Chemical Warfare Service Class V supplies in Island Command dumps. On 10 May Chemical Officer, Tenth Army, assumed allocation control of Chemical Warfare Service Class V supplies in Island Command dumps.

d. After the expenditure of the five units of fire of 4.2" chemical mortar ammunition brought in by mortar companies, the resupply of shell varied from limited to critical. A major factor contributing to this condition resulted from receipts of shipments totalling approximately 35,500 rounds of HE shell of lot numbers the use of which was restricted to "military necessity" by Circular No. 29, Headquarters United States Army Forces Pacific Ocean Areas, 11 February 45, because the fuzes used on these lots were subject to possible muzzle bursts. At the request of XXIV Corps, Tenth Army secured a high priority air shipment of 6,000 replacement fuzes from OAHU. These fuzes were substituted immediately upon their arrival. Subsequent air shipments brought the total of replacement fuzes received on OKINAWA to 35,677. The shortage of ammunition was temporarily relieved on several occasions by transfer of HE shell from Navy sources. The total of such transfers amounted to approximately 27,000 rounds.

e. A major problem in connection with the supply of 4.2" chemical mortar ammunition during April and part of May was presented by the widespread scattering of this ammunition throughout Army and Marine ammunition supply points as it was unloaded from ships. This necessitated a continuous search of all such areas and a collection and transfer of ammunition found to the Chemical Section of ASP #1.

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f. Upon exhaustion of the five units of fire of flamethrower fuel brought ashore by organizations for portable and main armament tank flamethrowers Island Command Chemical Warfare Service Distributing Point supplied all fuel requirements. The majority of the flamethrower fuel mixed on OAHU for the 713th Tank Battalion was found on arrival to be too thin for tank use.

g. Mortality of 4.2" chemical mortars and portable flamethrowers was comparatively high during the operation, but replacements were at all times adequate to cover losses.

h. The table (Page 86) covers expenditure of Chemical Warfare Service Class V items for the OKINAWA operation.

38. Signal Supply.

a. Initial plans provided that Army depot and repair teams be attached to the shore parties to assist the divisions in the initial phases of the operation. These teams, however, were embarked in Army shipping and were not landed until L plus 4. This deprived the divisions of their assistance during the initial landings of assault supplies. Upon the arrival of the depot and repair teams, they took over the original division beach dumps and the divisions established forward dumps.

b. On L plus 12 the Army Signal depot was established. All incoming supplies were then diverted into the depot and issues from beach dumps were continued until they were exhausted. From the establishment of the signal depot to the end of the operation, signal supply operated in the normal manner. Some supplies arriving in LEYTE too late for assault shipping were shipped to OKINAWA in garrison shipping. The first shipment arriving on L plus 30 contained approximately 125 tons of maintenance supplies and batteries which the Corps had been short on mounting. Since the Army depot was supplying all of these items at the time of their arrival, all of this material was turned into the depot. The second shipment, arriving on L plus 40, contained major items for specific units and was taken direct to the Corps signal dump for distribution.

c. During combat the signal repair section of the Corps signal battalion repaired and returned to service an average of 600 major signal items per month. The quantity of work was limited by lack of parts. Loss of signal equipment by Corps troops was heaviest in the Armored Group and Corps Artillery. These losses included Switchboards BD-71 and BD-72; Radio Sets SCR 510, 525, 593, 610; Telephones EE-8, Handsets TE-13; Lance Poles PO-2; and Wire W-110.

39. Provost Marshal.

a. The Corps entered the operation with a battalion of military police - the 519th. For the landing and initial phases

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Item	Unit	7th Div	77th Div	96th Div	Corps Trs	Total		For
						Rds	U/F	
Fillings for port FT	5 gal	402	2336	1625		4363	10.9	100 FT
Fillings for Periscope FT	25 gal	0	7	0		7	-	
Fillings for Tank FT	290 gal	190	136	108		434	8.0	Tank FT Bn
Grenade, smoke MP, M15	ea	13440	16660	25825	1000	56925	32.8	1 Div
Grenade, Ined, AN-M14	ea	1431	2050	858	1800	6139	7.9	1 Div
Grenade, smoke Green, M18	ea	1635	700	1755		4080	20.4	1 Div
Grenade, smoke Orange, M18	ea	-	1500	875		2375	11.9	1 Div
Grenade, smoke Red, M18	ea	1910	2825	4200		8975	44.9	1 Div
Grenade, smoke Violet, M18	ea	750	2700	850		4300	21.5	1 Div
Grenade, smoke Yellow, M18	ea	1125	2975	975		5075	25.4	1 Div
Grenade, smoke White, HC, AN-M8	ea	425	112	849	100	1486	2.6	1 Div
Shell, 4.2" CM, HE	ea	(Expenditure of shell by 88th Cml mortar Bn and 91st Cml Mort Co in support of XXIV Corps)				61100	24.2	Cml Mort Bn
Shell, 4.2" CM, WP	ea					21360	19.8	Cml Mort Bn

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one lettered company of the battalion, less a platoon, was attached to the 7th and 96th Divisions, each. Missions of these companies included evacuation of prisoners of war and civilians and traffic control. The two platoons withdrawn from these companies were attached to the Corps Shore Party for traffic and straggler control in the beach areas. Also attached to the staff of the Shore Party Commander was one officer and six enlisted men from the Corps' military police battalion for coordination of military police functions and operation of information posts in the beach areas.

b. Tactical developments necessitated the continued attachment of military police companies with the two assault divisions through 29 April. In addition, it was found necessary to withdraw from the shore party the two platoons and form them into a provisional company for attachment to the 27th Infantry Division when the latter was placed under Corps control for the attack of 19 April. Initially Corps military police evacuated prisoners of war from the division stockades to Corps stockades. Later after Army took command of ground action evacuation was direct to Army stockades. Civilians were evacuated similarly, from forward "holding points" set up by divisions direct to military government camps established in rear areas.

c. Corps military police set up and maintained straggler control posts in rear of divisions. One distinct peculiarity of the campaign was the reversal in direction of the normal flow of stragglers. On OKINAWA most stragglers were moving toward the front, and the influx of souvenir-hunting, sightseeing "loose personnel" from Army, Marine, Seabee and Air units became so great as sharply to interfere with combat operations, particularly in areas of congested vehicular traffic. Traffic control posts were set up and sited to cope specifically with this problem, and all personnel not carrying passes from the division whose zone they sought to enter were turned back. Unauthorized personnel discovered within the division sectors by roving division military police patrols were arrested, their souvenirs confiscated, and personnel concerned put to work burying enemy dead for one day. This procedure of prompt and positive handling proved thoroughly effective, and within a few days after its inauguration the forward moving straggler problem was solved. However, the presence of sightseers and souvenir hunters near forward tactical observation posts resulted in many unnecessary combat casualties before this traffic was halted.

d. On 29 April all but one platoon was withdrawn from each division and thereafter until 17 June the Corps military police battalion operated under battalion control except for one platoon attached to each assault division and Tenth Army Headquarters. On the latter date two lettered companies were placed under control of Island Command to handle the large numbers of civilians and prisoners of war collected during the final days of the fighting.

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e. Military police details were used throughout the operation for collection of livestock in the Corps area for transfer to military government units and as guards at civilian enclosures until Island Command took over these activities.

f. Distinctive green and yellow "Information Posts" were established by Corps military police early in the operation. These were increased to cover all important traffic centers as the action progressed. These posts provided invaluable service in assisting drivers, maintaining current situation maps and handling re-routings of traffic required by impassable roads during severe rains in May and June.

g. The military police battalion was hampered by lack of transportation during the early phases of the campaign. Organic transportation, which was adequate, did not arrive until L plus 34, except for two 1/4 ton trucks per company and two for battalion headquarters which came in on assault shipping. Additional 2-1/2 ton trucks or weapons carriers were and will be needed by Corps military police for movement of civilians, stragglers and prisoners of war, when any of these classes of personnel are present in large numbers. Corps military police maintained guard and security details at permanent civilian camps in the Corps zone until Island Command assumed control of them.

40. Public Relations.

a. Annexes to orders of higher headquarters made it clear that virtually every news, magazine and photonews correspondent in the Pacific Theaters intended to cover some phase of the RYUKYUS Campaign. To assist the civilian writers and photographers in getting the news and pictures to the United States the Corps organized in late February a Public Relations Office (under the G-2 Section) consisting of one officer and one enlisted man, who were placed on TD with the Corps Headquarters, from units within the Corps. United States Army Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas, attached to the Corps a re-write team of one officer and four enlisted men to augment the PRO staff. In addition to rendering all assistance possible to accredited correspondents and photographers, the office was prepared to assist unit correspondents materially in the preparation and forwarding to United States newspapers of so-called "hometown" stories concerning individual soldiers fighting with units of the Corps.

b. Work undertaken to assist civilian correspondents consisted primarily of arranging briefings twice daily by the Corps G-2 or Corps Commander, evacuation of news and picture copy from division and Corps Headquarters to press boats and YONTIAN Airfield (most pix were flown out immediately), and provision within the Corps Command Post for living and working accommodations for as many as 30 correspondents at one time. Transportation was provided all correspondents needing it, and guides were provided as needed to direct them quickly to front line combat

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units. Foxholes and flak shelters were provided by the Corps headquarters commandant at the correspondents' "headquarters" in the command post during the period at NOZATO when there was daily and nightly need for such protection.

g. Immediately following the landing correspondents with the divisions evacuated their copy direct to press boats provided by the Navy at designated beaches at designated times. When the Advance Corps Headquarters was established ashore on L plus 3 day, the Corps Public Relations Office took over the job of collecting news and photographic copy from the division zones and delivering it to press boats four times daily. Picture copy, films and mail copy were delivered to YONTAN Airfield twice daily.

d. Before the Tenth Army assumed command of ground operations in the SHURI zone of action on 7 May, many correspondents maintained their living and working quarters at the Corps Command Post, and living, working, messing and transportation facilities were provided according to their needs. Some correspondents preferred to live and work aboard ships off the invasion beaches and come ashore periodically to glean their data for coverage of the ground operations. For these the PRO arranged for transportation to and from their debarkation beaches, meals ashore, and briefings as requested.

e. Briefings were normally conducted twice daily in the Corps Command Post by G-2. The Corps Commander conducted briefings covering important phases and changes in the operation, and when requested by the writers and photographers. He was usually available for interview on short notice.

f. During periods of impassable roads the Public Relations Office arranged for use of artillery spotting and liaison planes for transporting both correspondents and their copy to and from advance combat elements. Corps teletype circuits were made available for transmission of news copy whenever tactical requirements would permit it.

g. A list of civilian correspondents who were present with the Corps during the campaign is attached as Inclosure No. 3.

h. "Hometown" stories handled by the PRO re-write section during the campaign totalled:

Corps troops	1,852
7th Infantry Division	2,373
27th Infantry Division	526
77th Infantry Division	1,783
96th Infantry Division	1,951
TOTAL	8,485 (includes 457 "specials")

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i. The Corps obtained one press camera for use by the PRO in taking newspaper pictures for unit correspondents with the divisions and the Corps troops. Limited film processing facilities were available at the Corps Topographic Detachment. Photographic teams from United States Army Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas, were assigned to the Corps. These teams arrived at LEYTE just as the Corps was about to sail for the target, hence there was little opportunity to brief the photographers. It was too late in some cases to get the photographers disposed on the proper shipping. Much of the Corps team's valuable and necessary equipment was loaded on a 1/4 ton truck and trailer and shipped without escort to LEYTE. This equipment did not arrive on OKINAWA until about 1 May. Although it eventually arrived without loss, equipment of this type should always be shipped as security cargo accompanying the unit. Because these photo assignment teams had had no combat experience and had no concept of the nature of the operation, the G-2 section prepared detailed instructions in the form of a scenario as a guide for the photographers of the Corps team. This gave the expected chronology of the operation, the places where good combat photography might be obtained and the type of pictures which should be taken. From a public relations view, the present method of operation of the photo assignment units is not satisfactory. During the combat phase nearly all exposed film from these teams was evacuated to GUAM for processing. It took approximately three to four weeks to get single copies back to Corps. In order to get additional copies for press releases it was necessary to place an order for them. The best service obtained took two additional weeks if the negatives were still on GUAM. If processed film was shipped farther to the rear, additional delay was occasioned. By this time the pictures had lost virtually all news value.

j. The PRO was not equipped to originate news or photographic material for news purposes. It is believed that personnel and equipment adequate to originate professional news and photo copy would enhance measurably services provided civilian correspondents by the Corps.

k. It is still believed that if this Corps is to provide necessary and adequate assistance for civilian correspondents seeking to inform the United States public concerning activities of United States fighting forces in the Pacific a Public Relations Office should be made an organic part of the Corps Headquarters.

41. Military Government.

a. Military Government on OKINAWA was vested in the Commanding General, Tenth Army, as the Military Governor (with one Military Government liaison officer on his staff). Actual operation of Military Government was delegated to Commanding General, Island Command, AGF 331. There were no Military Government officers actually on the staff of Island Command, and Military Government functions were handled by CTU 99.3.1 (Island Command Military

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Government) with a large staff of trained Army and Navy personnel. CTU 99.3.1 had no command function however, and made requests to Commanding General, Tenth Army, who issued the orders. CTU 99.3.1 thus acted primarily in an advisory capacity until 30 April when he took over Military Government activities in the XXIV Corps rear area, operating through a district team (D-5).

e. To accomplish the mission of relieving tactical units of the administration and welfare of civilians, Military Government units were attached to the Corps as follows at the mounting area (LEYTE, P.I.) on 17 February 45:

3 "A" detachments	4 officers, 11 enlisted men each
5 "B" detachments	8 officers, 19 enlisted men each
2 "C" detachments	10 officers, 26 enlisted men each
1 G-6 hospital	15 officers, 158 enlisted men
9 G-10 dispensaries	1 officer, 6 enlisted men each

g. (1) The "A" detachments were attached to divisions on 17 February 45 for use as Military Government reconnaissance teams. In addition, their duties included posting proclamations, locating civilian food and medical supplies, establishing collection centers, and evacuating civilians (with the assistance of military police).

(2) Each division was also given a "B" detachment to assume control of collection centers established by "A" detachments in order to permit the latter to move forward closely behind the assault units. Corps "B" detachments were prepared either to relieve the division "B" detachments or to leap-frog them, whichever the tactical and civilian situation might require.

(3) The plan for the "C" detachments, each with equipment to set up a 10,000 capacity camp, was to select a site where a camp could be erected and to which the "B" detachments could evacuate their charges.

(4) The G-6 hospital was prepared to operate a 500-bed hospital. The G-10 dispensaries, equipped to operate 25-bed aid stations, were attached to the "B" and "C" detachments to provide emergency medical care.

(5) The plan called for district (D) teams to arrive on later echelons and take over (under Island Command) the "C" teams and civilian camps in rear areas, as the Corps moved forward.

d. Plans called for collection of civilians inside barbed wire enclosures. This proved impracticable because of the large numbers of civilians and shortage of labor available to construct fences. Divisions did construct small enclosures to facilitate collection, registration and examination, but the "C" detachments used existing villages for their camps. Military police and war dogs were used to keep the civilians within the village

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limits. In all cases under Corps control, however, male civilians between the ages of 17 and 45, were secured behind barbed wire from 1800 to 0800 daily.

e. On 17 February 45, Military Government units arrived at LEYTE, P.I., reported to the Corps, and were assigned as follows:

XXIV Corps: B-6, B-7, G10-1, 2, 3, C-2 and G-6-51
7th Division: A-4, B-4, G10-4, 5
77th Division: A-5, B-9, G10-6, 7 and C-13
(from SAMAR, P.I. on 12 February 45)
96th Division: A-6, B-5, G10-8, 9

From date of arrival until embarkation on or about 21 March 45, all teams were engaged in organizational duties, collection of supplies which had been widely scattered through incoming shipping, training and general preparation for the OKINAWA operation. Activities of units attached to divisions are not covered here, but will be found in division reports. All units were completely lacking in field training.

f. Military Government Detachments B-6 and G10-3 were ordered ashore on 3 April 45 and took over approximately 250 civilians in a temporary barbed wire enclosure at CHATAN which had been established by A-6 (96th Division) (See Figures 23 and 24 which follow). This camp reached a peak population of 2,000 and continuous evacuation was made to a semi-permanent camp which the 96th Division had established at NODAKE. Hospital cases were evacuated to G-6-51 hospital which Corps had established at KOZA. On 16 April, the 27th Division took over the civilian enclosure at CHATAN with its own teams, and Detachment B-6 then devoted its activities to collection of salvage and livestock. On 5 May 45, B-6 and G10-3 moved to ATANNIYA where they established a livestock collecting center and prepared a civilian collecting point for possible future use. On 6 June, B-6 moved to TOYAMA where they set up a receiving station for civilians collected in the 7th Division area. Medical care was furnished by one medical officer and three corpsmen loaned by D-5 (Island Command). All civilians were evacuated from TOYAMA to HYAKUMA where the Corps on 5 June had established a semi-permanent camp with a small hospital.

g. Military Government Detachment B-7 and G10-2 landed on 3 April 45 and took over the camp on Orange Beach 2 from Detachment B-4 (7th Division) and moved to NUGUN on 5 April, taking with them 490 civilians. Population of NUGUN reached a peak of 1,730, with continuous evacuation to Detachment C-2 at SHIMABUKU (see paragraph h). On 12 April 45, B-7 moved to TOBARU, relieving A-4 (7th Division). Peak population at TOBARU reached 5,064. This camp was turned over to C-6 (see paragraph i) on 24 April 45. B-7 assisted C-6 and conducted salvage operations until 7 May 45 when it was moved to ATANNIYA, preparatory to moving forward as required. On 4 June, B-7 and G10-2 moved to YABIKU and established a civilian camp (see paragraph p). They had received 4,390

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B-4(7TH) FROM LEYTE
2 APRIL 1945

A-4(7TH) FROM LEYTE
1 APRIL 1945

B-7(XIV) FROM LEYTE
3 APRIL-TO ISCOM
20 JUNE 1945

B-5(96TH) FROM LEYTE
3 APRIL-TO ISCOM
20 JUNE 1945

A-6(96TH) FROM LEYTE
2 APRIL 1945

B-6(XIV) FROM LEYTE
3 APRIL 1945


C-1(XIV) FROM
III PHIB CORPS
ON 16 APRIL-TO
ISCOM 30 APRIL
1945

C-(XXIV) FROM
USA-13 APRIL-TO
ISCOM 30 APRIL
1945

C-5(XIV) FROM
USA ON 13 APRIL
TO ISCOM 30
APRIL 1946

C-2(XIV) FROM
LEYTE 3 APRIL-
TO ISCOM 30
APRIL 1945

C-3 LOANED TO XXIV
CORPS 5 JUNE BY
ISCOM D-5. REVERTED
TO ISCOM 10 JUNE
1945



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DISPOSITION OF CORPS AND DIVISION
MILITARY GOVERNMENT DETACHMENTS.

FIGURE 23

G-10-4 FROM LEYTE
2 APRIL 1945

G10-5 FROM LEYTE
1 APRIL 1945

G10-2 FROM LEYTE
3 APRIL - TO ISCOM
20 JUNE 1945


G10-9 FROM LEYTE
3 APRIL - TO ISCOM
20 JUNE 1945

G10-8 FROM LEYTE
2 APRIL - TO ISCOM
20 JUNE 1945

G10-3 FROM LEYTE
2 APRIL - TO ISCOM
20 JUNE 1945

G6-51 FROM LEYTE ON
4 APRIL - TO ISCOM ON
30 APRIL 1945

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DISPOSITION OF CORPS AND DIVISION M. G. MEDICAL UNITS

FIGURE 24

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civilians by 10 June when Island Command took over the CHINEN Peninsula and operational control of B-7 and G10-2. On 20 June they were transferred to Island Command, along with one line officer, nine corporals and nine enlisted men who had been loaned by Island Command (D-5).

h. Detachments C-2 and G10-1 came ashore on 3 April 45 and began preparation of a permanent camp at SHIMABUKU. Civilian evacuees were received from division and Corps teams starting 5 April 45. A peak population of 10,785 was reached on 14 April and remained practically static from then on. Existing housing facilities were utilized, repairs being made as necessary. C-2 passed to control of Island Command on 30 April 45.

i. G-6-51 hospital came ashore on 4 April 45 and established a permanent location at KOZA on 6 April 45, initial patients being received the following day. Patients were received from Corps and division teams, reaching a peak of 480 on 30 April 45, when control passed to Island Command.

j. Detachment C-3 came ashore on 13 April 45 direct from the United States and moved into bivouac at SHIMABARU. On 24 April it took over control of the SHIMABARU camp from B-4 (7th Division). Evacuations were made to this camp from 7th and 96th Division teams and population reached a peak of 6,905 on 30 April 45 when control passed to Island Command. Housing was increased by 20% utilizing lumber produced by a local sawmill operated by natives. G10-5 was taken from A-5 (7th Division) and loaned to C-3 subject to recall. It was recalled on 5 June and placed in INASOMI with A-4 (now operational control of 96th Division). C-3 was loaned to the Corps by D-5 (Island Command) (see paragraph p) and established at HYAKUNA and SHICHIYA on 5 June. The civilian population of HYAKUNA and SHICHIYA (both C-3) was 8,061 on 10 June when Island Command took over operational control. G10-5 was transferred to Island Command on 20 June, along with six extra corporals loaned by Island Command Detachment D-5.

k. Detachment C-6 came ashore on 13 April 45 direct from the United States and went into bivouac at SHIMABUKU. On 19 April it moved to MAEBARU, began to receive evacuees from NODAKE and other division and Corps teams the following day, and on 24 April took over control of the TOBARU camp from B-7. Peak population reached 9,178 on 30 April when control passed to Island Command. G10-8 was taken from A-6 (96th Division) and loaned to C-6 subject to recall. Existing housing facilities were augmented by tentage for shelter of civilians.

l. On 19 April 45, G-6-54 was transferred from III Amphibious Corps to XXIV Corps and remained in bivouac east of KOZA until 30 April 45 when control passed to Island Command. Meanwhile, personnel of this unit was used to supplement medical facilities of C teams.

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m. On 19 April 45, C-1, located north of KOZA, was transferred from III Amphibious Corps to XXIV Corps. Civilians from Corps and division teams were evacuated to this camp and a peak population of 5,060 was reached on 30 April 45, when control passed to Island Command. A maximum use of tentage was required to augment limited housing facilities. Farm KOZA was established by C-1 on or about 21 April to receive livestock collected by Corps and division teams.

n. On 27 April 45, the first district team (D-5) arrived direct from the United States and reported to the XXIV Corps. The team was oriented and prepared for taking over operational control of the Corps G-6 hospital and C teams. On 30 April, however, Island Command took over the rear area then under Corps control and it was operated thereafter by D-5 under the control of CTU 99.3.1.

o. On 30 April, Island Command took over the rear area camps of KOZA (C-1, G-6-51), SHIMABUKU (C-2), SHIMABARU (C-3) and TOBARU-MAESARU (C-6), plus their Military Government military police. G10 dispensaries 1, 2, 5 and 8 remained with the camp teams, subject to recall by Corps. The above camps contained 32,096 civilians, collected by teams under Corps control from 1 April to 30 April. It is estimated that 10% were old men, 6% able-bodied men, 40% women and 44% children. First aid and clinical care were administered to approximately 13,500 by G10 dispensaries, and approximately 950 were hospitalized, the majority being evacuated to G-6-51. Incidence of communicable diseases was surprisingly low. A constant educational program was necessary to improve sanitation and personal hygiene. Civilian cemeteries were established by all teams in the vicinity of their camps.

p. By 19 May, it was apparent that a breakthrough of the SHURI-YONABARU line was imminent and with it would come a sudden influx of civilians. Corps immediately made plans to handle the situation. Detachment A-4 was alerted to move on a moment's notice to establish a collection point at YONABARU and moved there on 4 June. Because of the numbers expected, and the impassable roads, immediate evacuation to the north was impracticable and it was decided to move all civilians to CHINEN Peninsula when that area was secured. Detachments B-6 and B-7, dispensaries G10-2, G10-3 and G10-5 were alerted to be ready to move on call. It was estimated that 40,000 to 45,000 civilians remained in the uncovered portion of the Corps zone of action and, due to the intense shelling, it was expected that a high percentage would require medical treatment. The need for additional personnel, especially medical, was obvious, therefore tentative arrangements were made with district team D-5 to furnish necessary personnel. Due to impassable roads, resulting from the heavy rains, Corps arranged for movement of units by water from KUSA-SAKI and AWASHI Peninsula and to evacuate civilians from YONABARU by water until CHINEN Peninsula was open. During 3, 4 and 5 June, 1,106 civilians were evacuated by water from YONABARU and delivered to C teams controlled by D-5

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(Island Command). CHINEN Peninsula was opened on 5 June by Corps and camps were established at INASOMI, YABIKU, TOYAMA and HYAKUNA. These were augmented by one medical officer, one line officer, eighteen corpsmen and a GLO-x obtained from Island Command (D-5). The Staff Military Government Officer, 7th Division, was placed in charge of all units, under close supervision of Corps. On 10 June, OSHIMA was transferred to Island Command (D-5). From 5 June thru 10 June, 13,285 civilians had been evacuated to CHINEN Peninsula by Corps units. Corps then established augmented teams under the 7th and 96th Divisions at GUSHICHAN and INASOMI. Civilians encountered in the southern part of the island were in much worse physical condition than any previously seen. At least 30% required some medical care and hundreds of stretcher cases were received, given emergency treatment and evacuated to HYAKUNA. Therefore on 15 June, Corps obtained one medical officer, twenty additional corpsmen and extra equipment from Island Command (D-5) and moved them south to reinforce the medical units at GUSHICHAN and INASOMI. During the period 10 June to 30 June, Corps units collected a total of 28,194 civilians, practically all of whom were evacuated to CHINEN Peninsula.

g. During the entire campaign no military stores, except small amounts of salvage, were used by Corps or division teams to feed civilians. Sufficient native food was salvaged to maintain at all times a surplus of approximately ten days' supply. Other salvage - clothing, tools, building supplies and medical supplies - was not adequate but enabled teams to meet minimum requirements. All teams collected and evacuated livestock to C-1, C-2 and C-3, retaining small numbers for their own civilian requirements. Sufficient labor was available to conduct camp administration and to meet all requests from military organizations. 75,332 civilians were collected and processed under Corps and division control.

r. The original plan of three permanent civilian areas in the southern half of OKINAWA was abandoned early and all teams retained civilians only temporarily and evacuated to rear area or CHINEN Peninsula Island Command camps.

g. During the campaign, divisions frequently moved in and out of the lines, but Military Government teams remained in their already established locations and merely fell under different operational control. To compensate for this, Corps recommended a permanent Military Government officer for the staff of each division and this was accomplished with excellent results in the case of the 7th and 96th Divisions.

i. The table on the following page and Figure 25 indicate the magnitude of the civilian problem in this operation.

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XXIV CORPS MILITARY GOVERNMENT ACTION 1 April 45 through 30 June 45

<u>April</u>	<u>Received This Date</u>	<u>Total To Date</u>	<u>Total Evacuated</u>	<u>Total Died</u>	<u>Total Losses</u>	<u>On Hand</u>
1	500	500	0	6	6	
2	1850	2350	0	14	14	494
3	3550	5900	0	21	21	2336
4	4000	9900	0	28	28	5879
5	700	10600	0	33	33	9874
6	500	11100	0	44	44	10537
7	2750	13850	0	53	53	11056
8	1400	15250	0	61	61	13797
9	1497	16747	0	67	67	15189
10	5250	19997	0	78	78	16560
11	765	20762	0	85	85	19921
12	256	21018	0	97	97	20577
13	2946	23964	0	111	111	20921
14	1458	25422	0	121	121	23053
15	1933	27355	0	135	135	25301
16	578	27933	0	145	145	27220
17	477	28410	0	155	155	27788
18	22	28432	0	164	164	28258
19	691	29123	0	178	178	28268
20	39	29162	0	190	190	28945
21	36	29198	0	200	200	28972
22	42	29240	0	209	209	28998
23	39	29279	0	224	224	29031
24	38	29317	0	230	230	29055
25	534	29851	0	246	246	29087
26	75	29926	0	276	276	29505
27	255	30181	0	305	305	29650
28	532	30713	0	329	329	29876
29	1353	32066	0	363	363	30354
30	32	32098	31022	363	31385	31703
<u>May</u>						
1	30	32128	31022	363	31385	743
2	350	32478	31022	366	31986	492
3	45	32523	31739	366	32105	410
4	10	32533	31758	367	32123	418
5	0	32533	31771	368	32139	394
6	71	32604	31771	368	32139	465
7	17	32621	31771	368	32139	482
8	43	32664	31771	368	32139	525
9	32	32696	31771	368	32139	557
10	15	32711	31771	368	32139	572
11	0	32711	31955	371	32326	385
12	4	32715	31955	371	32326	389
13	69	32784	31955	371	32326	458

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
<u>May</u>	<u>Received This Date</u>	<u>Total To Date</u>	<u>Total Evacuated</u>	<u>Total Died</u>	<u>Total Losses</u>	<u>On Hand</u>
14	2	32786	31955	372	32327	459
15	180	32966	31955	372	32327	639
16	1	32967	32085	374	32459	508
17	17	32984	32085	374	32459	525
18	4	32988	32085	377	32462	526
19	127	33115	32085	377	32462	653
20	25	33140	32085	377	32462	678
21	1	33141	32085	377	32462	679
22	52	33193	32097	379	32476	717
23	7	33200	32164	379	32513	687
24	51	33251	32164	379	32513	708
25	0	33251	32341	381	32722	529
26	6	33257	32341	381	32722	535
27	46	33303	32341	381	32722	581
28	17	33320	32341	382	32723	597
29	38	33358	32344	383	32727	631
30	48	33406	32344	384	32728	678
31	71	33477	32420	386	32806	671
<u>June</u>						
1	57	33534	32420	390	32810	724
2	72	33606	32455	390	32855	751
3	69	33675	32480	394	32874	801
4	178	33853	32480	398	32878	975
5	1773	35626	32497	408	32905	2721
6	4706	40332	32497	411	32908	7424
7	1734	42066	32497	411	32908	9158
8	1245	43311	32497	413	32910	10401
9	1916	45227	32497	419	32916	12315
10	1909	47136	32765	423	33188	13950
11	75	47211	45270	424	45694	1519
12	245	47456	45958	431	46387	1071
13	543	48001	46429	438	46867	1154
14	294	48295	46845	445	47090	1205
15	199	48494	47076	453	47529	965
16	787	49281	47522	456	47978	1283
17	661	49942	48196	457	48653	1289
18	906	50848	48853	461	49314	1514
19	4270	55098	50955	467	51422	3673
20	3296	58394	56918	474	57292	1102
21	5618	64012	62386	484	62870	1142
22	3229	67241	65768	492	63260	981
23	5725	72966	70538	498	71036	1930
24	365	73331	72121	503	72624	1007
25	570	74201	73132	507	73639	582
26	683	74884	73245	510	73756	1129
27	61	74945	73887	512	74399	506
28	93	75038	73881	512	74403	635
29	211	75249	73922	513	74456	854
30	63	75332	73992	515	74507	825

MILITARY GOVERNMENT ACTION 1 APRIL TO 30 JUNE 1945

TOTAL CIVILIANS COLLECTED		75,332
TOTAL EVACUATED TO ISCOM	73,992	
TOTAL DIED	<u>515</u>	
TOTAL LOSSES		<u>74,507</u>
RETAINED BY CORPS & DIV MG TEAMS		825

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LEGEND:
 TOTAL EVACUATED TO ISCOM ----
 TOTAL CIV COLL -----
 TOTAL DIED



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42. Personnel.

a. Replacements.

(1) On 13 April 45 the 74th Replacement Battalion (under Tenth Army control) arrived from SAIPAN with the first group of approximately 1,200 replacements. Further shipments of 3,000 each arrived on 25 April and 2 May. All replacements were received and processed by the replacement battalion assisted by classification teams from the divisions. Allocations were directed by Army in accordance with the request of Commanding General, XXIV Corps. Average elapsed time between arrival of replacements and their delivery to units was 24 hours. The replacements were uniformly young, in good physical condition, well equipped, and mentally above average.

(2) Further shipments of replacements were received as follows:

8 May 1945 - 36 Officers - 1,482 EM
 12 May 1945 - 63 Officers - 2,099 EM
 28 May 1945 - 119 Officers - 486 EM
 25 Jun 1945 - 112 Officers - 816 EM

Several other very small groups were received, which are included in table below showing total replacements received.

(3) This table shows the distribution of the replacements:

	7th Div		27th Div		77th Div		96th Div		Corps		Total	
	O	EM	O	EM	O	EM	O	EM	O	EM	O	EM
Armd		123	4	106	12	22	1	128	14	160	31	537
CAG	3				5	20	4				12	20
Cav		24	1	2	2	26	2	21			5	73
CF	1	127	10	113	7	242	6	134	2	35	26	651
FA	11	155	7	51	13	141	16	101	3	110	46	572
Inf	104	3023	52	664	138	2614	137	3923	1	1	433	10224
SC	4	14	1	6	1	32		8	6	21	12	81
CMP				3			1	5		13	1	21
CWS	1					15			6	63	7	78
MC	18	97	6	54	12	122	14	100	12	11	62	384
Others	1				4	1		1	1		6	2
Totals	143	3573	81	999	194	3235	181	4429	45	414	649	12638

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NOTES:


1. The 27th Division was under XXIV Corps from 9 April 45 to 5 May 45, when it passed to Island Command and received replacements from the 23 April shipment only.
2. The 77th Division did not come under Corps control until 28 April 45, and participated only in the 2 May shipment.
3. Approximately nine-tenths of the replacements received on 25 ~~July~~ ^{JUNE, C.R.R.} were allocated to the 77th Division.
4. The Corps Commander personally allotted all replacements received, basing allotments on strength of units, tactical situation, duty of units at the time or contemplated, and adjusted to partially verified arrival of additional replacements.
5. a. Distribution of replacements as shown on chart resulted in all divisions completing the campaign with approximately the same effective strength.
b. Figure 26 shows relative rate of replacement of battle losses, and the rate of returns to duty of personnel hospitalized during the period. This chart does not show initial shortages of units at beginning of the campaign. To evaluate it properly in determining the combat status of any division it should be kept in mind that all three divisions were short approximately 1,000 men upon arrival on OKINAWA, and, that the great portion of all shortage was in the infantry units.
c. Figure 27 shows personnel shortage of divisions under Corps based on difference between table of organization and present for duty strength.

b. Losses.

(1) The losses of the XXIV Corps during the OKINAWA campaign for the period 010800 April to 302400 June 45 were as follows for Corps troops:

	<u>KIA, DOW</u>	<u>WIA, IIA</u>	<u>MIA, CAP</u>	<u>NBC</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Off	5	24	0	92	121
WO	0	1	0	10	11
EM	<u>60</u>	<u>310</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>1652</u>	<u>2024</u>
TOTAL	65	335	2	1754	2156

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7TH INF DIV 77TH INF DIV 96TH INF DIV

EXPLANATORY NOTE: DATES 21 JUNE AND 30 JUNE REPRESENT END OF ORGAN-
IZED RESISTANCE AND END OF OKINAWA CAMPAIGN
RESPECTIVELY. NO REPLACEMENTS WERE RECEIVED ON
THESE DATES. FIGURE 26

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PERSONNEL SHORTAGES IN OKINAWA CAMPAIGN

7TH INF DIV - - - - -

77TH INF DIV - - - - -

96TH INF DIV - - - - -

SHORTAGE FIGURES ARE BASED ON T/O STRENGTH
LESS PRESENT FOR DUTY STRENGTH AND INCLUDE
ONLY ORGANIC DIVISION TROOPS




FIGURE 27

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(2) Casualties in divisions operating under the Corps during the period were as follows:

	<u>KIA, DOW</u>	<u>MIA, IIA</u>	<u>MIA, CAP</u>	<u>NBC</u>
7th Division	1122	4943	3	5102
27th Division*	618	2413	32	761
77th Division**	748	2893	15	1279
98th Division	1506	5912	12	3097
1st Mar Div%	<u>199</u>	<u>1194</u>	<u>16</u>	<u>311</u>
TOTAL	4193	17355	78	11170
Total Battle Casualties		22028		
TOTAL ALL CASUALTIES		34952		

- * From 16 April to 30 April
- ** From 28 April to 30 June
- % From 1 May to 6 May

(3) (a) Figure 28 shows our total battle casualties and killed in action compared to Japs killed.


(b) Figure 29 shows the daily battle casualties (exclusive of MIA) suffered during the campaign and the relationship of casualties to the divisions in the line.

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TOTAL JAPS KIA _____
TOTAL AMERICAN BATTLE CASUALTIES - - - - -
TOTAL AMERICAN KIA
*ALL FIGURES ARE BASED ON TROOPS
OPERATING UNDER XXIV CORPS ONLY*



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FIG. 28

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DAILY CASUALTIES XXIV CORPS
SHOWING DIVISIONS IN THE LINE
DURING THE OKINAWA OPERATION




FIG. 29

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CHAPTER VIII

INTELLIGENCE

A. TERRAIN

1. Physical Aspects of the Terrain.

a. The Island of OKINAWA is essentially a rugged, escarpmented, coral-limestone mass, heavily wooded in the uplands and intensively terraced along the coastal flats and lower slopes of the hills. The ridgelines are discontinuous, often rising abruptly with almost vertical slopes particularly on the northern and southern faces. The ridge-pattern is transverse rather than longitudinal, forming successive natural lines of defense, full advantage of which was taken by the enemy. Although no elevation on the southern end of the island is above 600 feet, the precipitous slopes of the major hill masses, especially in the CONICAL HILL - SHURI, CHINEN Peninsula and ITOMAN - TOMAI areas, present a distinctly mountainous aspect. Due to the coral-limestone nature of the basic stratum, natural caves and fissures, easily developed into lengthy underground corridors and shelters, abound. Drainage in general is poor and heavy semi-tropical rains turn the island into a quagmire of deep, clinging clay-like mud.

b. For purposes of this discussion, southern OKINAWA is treated below as five areas, following the tactical development of the Battle for OKINAWA (See Plate A):

(1) The BEACHHEAD Area - HAGUSHI - KATCHIN PENINSULA - AWASE - SUNABE.

(2) The OUTPOST Area - SUNABE - AWASE - TSUWA - UCHITOMARI.

(3) The MAIN BATTLE Area - UCHITOMARI - TSUWA - YONABARU - SHURI - NAHA.



(4) The DELAYING Area - YONABARU - NAHA - MINATOGA - MEKA - IWA - ZAWA - ITOMAN.

(5) The FINAL DEFENSIVE Area - YUZA-YAEJU-DAKE Escarpment and Plateau.

NOTE: All Target Area references are for use in connection with Target Map, RYUKYU SETTO, 1:25,000, attached as Inclosure 5.

TERRAIN SKETCH
ISLAND OF
OKINAWA

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MAIN BATTLE AREA

DELAYING AREA

FINAL BATTLE AREA

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PLATE A

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2. Military Aspects of the Terrain.

a. The BEACHHEAD Area: From the defender's point of view, the attacker's Beachhead Area offered the defender excellent observation, good fields of fire along the beaches and extensive cover and concealment. The wide, rough reef and dominating SUNABE Hill mass were natural obstacles which could have been used as serious impediments on a defended beach. The seawall could also have been easily defended by the enemy. Behind the beaches, an extensive road net, adequately surfaced for light Jap transportation, afforded the enemy good routes of communication and the ability to shift reserves to meet any threat. From the beaches across the island to the eastern coast, the land is generally rolling, dotted with low hills and coral outcroppings, and liberally sprinkled with tombs which are set into every hillside. The coastal flats were given to rice while inland areas were devoted mainly to truck gardens of carrots, cabbage, sweet potatoes, small grain and sugar cane. All the area is extensively terraced but this offered little obstacle to the rapid cross-island movement of men and vehicles. The SUNABE Hills presented the only major obstacle to rapid movement. Composed of innumerable sharp ridges and deep ravines, the SUNABE Hills offered the enemy almost ideal terrain in which to fight a strong delaying action, had he so elected.

b. The OUTPOST Area: The terrain of the Outpost Area is essentially the same as the Beachhead Area, with heavily wooded uplands and extensively terraced and cultivated valleys and lower slopes. The hills and ridges are generally low except at NAKAGU-SUKU Castle (TA 8780-W) and surrounding peaks where excellent observation is obtained. Other than this one vantage point, observation southward in the Outpost Area is limited. From the enemy point of view, excellent visual observation of the Outpost Area could be maintained from the principal hill masses of southern OKINAWA: CONICAL HILL (TA 8271-K); HILL 179 (TA 8374-B, called HILL 175 on revised map); HILL 143 (TA 8175-N, called HILL 137 on revised map); and HILL 196 (TA 8075-L, called HILL 155 on revised map). Routes of communication were more than adequate for hostile light transportation but soon broke down under the heavy strain of American military traffic.

c. The MAIN BATTLE Area: Within the boundaries of the Main Battle Area as given in Paragraph A.1.b.(3), the highest and most rugged hill masses of southern OKINAWA are found. The dominating peaks noted in the previous paragraph form a rough half-moon from north of SHURI to the east coast of YONABARU. A connecting arc of peaks, not quite as high but nonetheless rugged, encompass SHURI around the northwest and west. From these primary outcroppings of steep, rugged, coral-limestone run innumerable ridges, subsidiary hills, vertical ravines and escarpments many of which had to be scaled with ladders and ropes. Natural caves and corridors run through this ground and were exploited to the fullest by

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the Japs who literally carved miles of underground passages and interconnected emplacements through every hill and ridge. In most cases tunnels ran from front to rear faces of hills and frequently two or more hills were connected by tunnels. The dominating ridges are so situated that they are naturally mutually supporting. In addition, the transverse nature of the ravines and ridges afforded the enemy an excellent opportunity to develop to its fullest his theory of reverse slope defense. The strongest natural defensive line was URASOE MURA HILL 196 - TANABARU - MINAMI UEBARU, with CONICAL HILL the eastern anchor of the inner SHURI defenses (See Plates B, C and D). Observation remained with the enemy until our capture of HILL 178, but full observation advantage was not gained by our forces until the fall of CONICAL HILL and the SHURI position. The ultimate collapse of the SHURI position was not due to any terrain weakness or error in position selection by the enemy. Rather, his reserves exhausted in holding his front intact, the enemy had no uncommitted troops left with which to stem our flanking breakthrough in the CONICAL HILL area and our swift envelopment of SHURI from the east (See Plate E).

d. The DELAYING Area: The OZATO-MURA Hill mass is the outstanding terrain feature in the Delaying Area. Its several high peaks and steep escarpment-like ridges were capable of being organized for a protracted defense which would have been difficult to overcome. The enemy made an effort in this direction, in an attempt to block our envelopment of the SHURI line, but was unable to move sufficient forces with sufficient speed to halt the rapid southward drive of our troops. Other than the OZATO-MURA Hill mass, the ground, although considerably cut with deep ravines and numerous sharp, knife-like ridges, did not reach the strength of the Main Battle area. The innumerable peaks, many of which were usually little more than limestone pinnacles jutting steeply up from the central plain, could have been integrated into a strong defense at several points. The enemy did attempt a hasty organization of the HILL 67 - CHAN - HILL 69 - TSUKASAN area where he delayed our forces while he completed his withdrawal from SHURI and partial reorganization further south. In general, the enemy made excellent use of the Delaying Area in pursuit of his plans to cover the establishment of his new line with strong delaying forces. If he had had the prime movers and trucks left with which to move his supplies and guns, the extensive roadnet in the area would have greatly aided his plans, but the materiel and equipment overrun by our forces indicated that the enemy had been unable to take advantage of this capability.

e. The FINAL DEFENSIVE Area: When his SHURI defense line was made untenable, the Commanding General, 32d Army was faced with the decision of choosing the location of his last stand. Major possibilities were the CHINEN Peninsula, the OROKU Peninsula or the YAEJU-YUZA-DAKE escarpment and plateau (See Plate F). The latter was chosen for several possible reasons. The plateau is centrally located and the terminus of all road nets. It was of sufficient distance from our forces to permit the enemy to

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
URASOE-MURA ESCARPMENT, OKINAWA

URASOE-MURA ESCARPMENT is a curved limestone hillside trending northeast to the coast. It begins in a 7078 to 10000 yard base 0. The town of HACHIMATO (1977 51), and extends in a northeasterly direction for a distance of approximately two miles to the town of URAE (1978 1). The ridge is heavily eroded and shows a steep slope to the cliff. It is a front

dissecting the ridge in the vicinity of URAE (1978 1). It is a little less than a mile long from HACHIMATO to URAE and a short distance south of URAE. The main highway south from HACHIMATO to URAE is a well-developed cutting through the western part of the ridge. The southeastern extremity of the ridge is situated on a road leading north from the town of KAKAZU (1978 6). A trail runs south from URAE to the town of URAE (1978 1). The terrain south of the ridge slopes gently but is irregularly dissected.




VIEW OF URASOE-MURA ESCARPMENT LOOKING SOUTH. HILL 156 IS IN THE LEFT BACKGROUND. GINOMAN-SHURI HIGHWAY IN THE FOREGROUND



VIEW OF EXTREME WESTERN SECTION OF URASOE-MURA ESCARPMENT. HACHIMATO-MURA HIGHWAY CROSSES THE RIDGE AT THE RIGHT

Prepared by P. I. G-2 Sec., XXIV Corps

URASOE-MURA ESCARPMENT, OKINAWA



CLOSE-UP OF THE EAST END OF THE URASOE-MURA ESCARPMENT. GINOWAN-SHURI HIGHWAY IS ON THE LEFT

REAR OF TUNNEL POSITION THROUGH HILL 188



CLOSE-UP OF ROCKY TERRAIN AT EASTERN END OF URASOE-MURA ESCARPMENT

URASOE-MURA ESCARPMENT, OKINAWA



CLOSE-UP OF FORTIFIED TOMB IN VICINITY OF HILL 158



RUGGED TERRAIN SOUTH FROM HILL 158



HEAVY BUNKER'S CAVE POSITION ON HANGING EDGE OF HILL 158

CONICAL HILL, OKINAWA

"CONICAL HILL" is a rugged limestone hillmass 478 feet high that guards the northern approaches to YONAHJANU. The entire hillmass is composed of three main ridges whose junction forms the cone which gives the hill its name. The northern ridge is high and steep near the summit branching out into smaller ridges as it descends into the coastal lowlands. The western ridge is short and rises abruptly to the peak. The third ridge descends crookedly southward to a small limestone peak at SA 3870 P2, which overlooks YONAHJANU.

This dominating hillmass stood as the eastern bastion of the JFEI fortified position. Its capture by the 96th Division started the disintegration of the JFEI defenses.

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LOOKING SOUTHWARD TO CONICAL HILL. WESTERN AND NORTHERN RIDGE LINES



VIEWPOINTS OF CONICAL HILL VIEWED TO THE SOUTH WEST

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YAEJU-DAKE, OKINAWA



THE SURROUNDING TERRAIN FOR THE WALLS

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 6.11.1945, BATH, DORSET

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prepare himself for the final all-out defense. Defending the plateau, the enemy would have a shortened front and secure flanks and rear. The face of the plateau is a 300-foot escarpment which rises vertically from the valley floor in a jagged coral mass. On top of the plateau, three major hills - YUZA DAKE, YAEJU DAKE and HILL 153 - cover all approaches from the north, east or west. An attempt to encircle the escarpment would meet the KUNISHI Ridge on the west and the MABUNI Ridge on the south. The escarpment and the major pinnacles thereon had already been prepared for defense against attack from the sea to the south, but the cave and tunnel positions were re-worked to defend from our northern and northeastern assault. Under any circumstances, the rugged, precipitous ground of the escarpment area would present a formidable position. Coupled with the suicidal defense of a trapped and desperate enemy, the terrain was capable of as strong a defense as any encountered anywhere during the campaign.

B. WEATHER AND ROADS.

1. Weather: Pre-L-Day predictions were that the climate of OKINAWA would be comparatively damp with frequent heavy rains. Advance reports also indicated fairly frequent tropical storms could be expected. In actuality, in comparison with other Pacific islands encountered the weather on OKINAWA was found quite favorable. Except for one period between 15 May and 5 June, the weather was generally dry with excessive humidity occurring during the month of June. Fortunately for the enemy, the period of our all-out assault against and envelopment of SHURI coincided with a period of torrential rains and limited visibility which not only slowed ground operations to the point of immobilization but also grounded all aircraft. Under cover of this inclement weather, the enemy initiated his withdrawal from the SHURI line with lack of full knowledge by our forces until a temporary break in the weather enabled aircraft to get off the ground and discover the enemy's movement.

2. Roads: An extensive road net was found on OKINAWA. As usual, the construction and surface of the roads were adequate for light Jap transportation but soon broke down under the heavy burden of our military traffic. Although the type of road was inadequate for our needs, no serious difficulties were encountered until the period of heavy rains when all roads broke down and our mobility was reduced to a minimum. The enemy derived tremendous benefit from this breakdown in mobility inasmuch as he was able to start his withdrawal to the south and reorganize without danger of close pursuit by our forces.

C. ENEMY OPERATIONS.

1. The Enemy's Defensive Plan.

a. The basic defensive plan of the enemy was fully outlined in a captured enemy map which showed the design to be a

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series of concentric positions with SHURI as the hub (see Plate I). The outer perimeter of the position extended to KAKAZU Ridge (see Plates G and H) (TAs 8077F-8077Y) and the high ground west of TSUWA (TA 8675). Although the plan envisaged defense in depth regardless of the direction of our attack, when our intentions became obvious and the enemy's need for reinforcements in the forward positions acute, he pulled up his rear to the general line YONABARU-NAHA generally along the trans-island highway.

b. The initial landings of our forces were virtually unopposed and it was not until our forces reached the general line SUNABE-AWASE that any organized defenses were apparent. The reason, as later disclosed by captured orders and interrogation of prisoners, was the fear of the devastating effect of our naval gunfire. The Commanding General of the 32d Army evidently felt that the losses his forces might have sustained in defending the beaches would not compensate for the damage which he could have inflicted on our troops. Actually, this was a false premise. Our naval gunfire was able to reach every point on the island and the enemy was never able to escape its effect. Had he elected to defend the high ground just inland of the beaches with the same tenacity which he later displayed at SHURI and the YUZA-YAEJU-DAKE escarpment, he would have made our landings extremely costly in men and materiel. Even after having been driven from the defenses opposite the beaches, he would still have been able to offer determined resistance on his SHURI position had his forces not been utterly destroyed when we reduced his beach defenses.

c. Regardless of the enemy decision as to the initial defense, General USHEJIMA's conduct of the defense of OKINAWA was generally well planned, tactically sound and well conducted.

2. Organization of the Ground.

a. General - Within the area circumscribed by his Main Battle Position, the enemy organized every inch of the ground with the ant-like industry characteristic of the Japanese. Caves, emplacements, blockhouses and pillboxes were connected with elaborate underground tunnels, the design and extent of which were indicative of high military engineering skill. Full advantage was taken of the character of the terrain to organize defensive areas and strongpoints which were mutually supporting and anticipated our efforts to maneuver around the enemy's flanks. In numerous captured documents the enemy troops were warned of our tank-led demolition attacks, the defense against which was to surround each fortification with infantrymen armed with rifles and automatic weapons. The higher enemy commanders early realized the weakness of cave defense which immobilized their troops and made them subject to serious losses as the result of a single well-placed artillery shell, one satchel charge or blast of a flamethrower. The Japs were ordered to prepare open and dispersed

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KAKAZU RIDGE, OKINAWA



KAKAZU RIDGE VIEWED FROM THE SOUTH



LOOKING SOUTHWEST TO KAKAZU RIDGE. NOTE THE CAVES IN THE CLIFF IN THE FOREGROUND

KAKAZU RIDGE, located North of KAKAZU VILLAGE, is a rugged limestone ridge 1300 yards long. The ridge was heavily wooded and contained many coral pill-boxes and caves.

A stream gorge 15 to 30 yards deep is located about 30 yards North of the ridge and provided a natural outpost for the defense of KAKAZU RIDGE. The cliffs of the gorge contained extensive caves and fortified tombs.




CLOSE-UP OF CAVES IN THE CLIFF

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
KAKAZU RIDGE, OKINAWA

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


CAVES IN RIDGE VIEWED FROM THE WEST FLANK OF KAKAZU RIDGE

The cave at 7778 WI was located between KAKAZU RIDGE and the URASOE-MURA ESCARPMENT. It formed the south bank of a stream gorge and contained many caves and looses. 400 yards southwest of KAKAZU RIDGE, it protected the west flank of the KAKAZU RIDGE defenses.



CLOSE-UP OF CAVE POSITIONS AT "A"




VIEW OF THE STREAM GORGE. URASOE-MURA ON THE HORIZON AT THE LEFT

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PLATE H

Prepared by P. I.
G-2 Sec., XXIV Corps



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Plate I

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defensive positions which they were to occupy as soon as our artillery concentrations were lifted. There was one excellent example of use of defensive wire by the Japanese. This occurred in the GINOWAN-KANIKU area where the enemy organized a strong-point of pillboxes, fronted by a deep anti-tank trench and protected by wire entanglements. Wire was used by the enemy in other areas, but less effectively.

b. Cave Defenses. The outstanding feature of Jap ground organization encountered on OKINAWA was the cave-type defense. As a result of the MARSHALLS and MARIANAS campaigns the Japanese Commander was reported to have decided to abandon the log-type pillbox in favor of one which would afford protection against allied naval gunfire, artillery and air strikes. The building of cave defenses on OKINAWA started in September, 1944, with considerable intensification of the program after December of the same year. Lt. Gen. CHO, Isamu, 32d Army Chief of Staff, according to one prisoner of war, was an exponent of the use of the cave-type defense and contributed materially not only to the preparation of the overall plan, but to the supervision of the actual building of the defenses.

Engineer construction units were responsible for the digging of caves which were to be used by headquarters and major rear echelon units. The construction of the main island defensive positions centering on SHURI followed an overall plan designed by the defense sector commander. Subordinate units, such as battalions, were assigned certain hill areas and were ordered to establish mutually supporting cave-type defenses thereon. Coordination of fire plans by adjacent unit commanders was an essential element of the ground organization. The troops on the ground, supplemented by Boetai (Okinawan soldiers) and quotas of villagers, actually performed the construction of the caves, under close supervision and frequent inspections by higher commanders.

Essential to this type of defense is protection of the cave openings. This was generally accomplished by siting the caves so that the fire of each would cover the approaches to at least one other cave. Well camouflaged open emplacements containing machine guns or artillery pieces were placed at considerable distance as added protection in case supporting caves were neutralized. The enemy's many mortars from defiladed positions performed a similar function. Enemy snipers in small caves or bottle-shaped holes were placed for close-in defense of the cave openings.

The caves proper consisted of an extensive cross-network of interconnected tunnels, with exits on the forward, reverse and flank slopes. These were often on two or three levels. Facilities such as sleeping quarters, cooking space and latrines for all troops manning the hill's defenses were installed,

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sometimes in one room but more generally in several small rooms. Machine gun positions and rifle slits were built into small rooms off the connecting tunnels which paralleled the slopes. Large supplies of ammunition, water and rations would permit a unit to hold its position unsupported for an extended period of time.

A crew-served infantry weapon was the principal weapon used in each cave opening. Outside of the forward exits "octopus pot" foxholes (bottle shaped) enabled the riflemen to carry out their close defense missions. Some of the company's automatic weapons were also placed outside. Each gun would have at least two alternate positions. The usual procedure was to shift positions each hour. Communications trenches both open and covered led from outside positions to the mouth of the cave.

A cave position as described above was the model which each unit endeavored to duplicate insofar as the terrain and labor permitted. In some instances individual defensive positions were not developed to this extent. A 32d Army Directive outlined the following advantageous characteristics of cave-type defenses:

- (1) "It affords all-around protection for ground troops from bombardment."
- (2) "It affords firing positions for small arms, automatic weapons and artillery."
- (3) "It provides space for headquarters, command posts and barracks which are relatively safe."
- (4) "It is a system of mutually supporting strong-points."
- (5) "It is a defense in depth, offering opportunities for withdrawal actions involving relatively small casualties."
- (6) "It offers good cover and concealment for individual riflemen and automatic weapons."

Jap tactical Standing Operating Procedure prescribed one-third of a unit would take outside positions while the others were to remain in reserve inside the cave. When a hill position was under artillery fire and bombardment, the outside troops were to withdraw into the cave, leaving 10 or 12 lookouts for each company. In the early stages of the campaign only two or three were left outside; this was found to be inadequate. Following a bombardment all external positions were to be manned at once via the communicating trenches. If a fire fight occurred and the position was endangered, the reserve was invariably to be moved out the flank and rear exits, enabling the enemy to circle around the sides of the hill to deliver flanking fire or mortar fire

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from the rear. Captured orders repeatedly warned against the tendency of too many men taking cover in the cave, the tardiness of the troops to man the outside defenses following shelling, and the inclination to divulge the location of the defense by premature firing. Contributing to our success was the fact that these deficiencies were never overcome.

The tactical application of the cave defense as encountered on OKINAWA was substantially the same as that met on PELELIU, SAIPAN and GUAM. The outstanding difference was the advance stage of development of the Okinawan cave system with closely integrated and highly effective defensive fires. The success of the cave defense is reflected in the bitter stand made by the enemy on his main defensive positions surrounding the town of SHURI. Although assaulted by two corps with five divisions supported by the greatest amount of artillery, air and naval gunfire ever concentrated by us in the Pacific, this position held out for approximately 32 days. Prisoners of war coming from units that were housed within the SHURI cave system stated that many caves were so deep that artillery and aerial bombardment were never felt.

The method of emplacing artillery and mortar pieces in camouflaged cave positions firing several rounds and then retiring back into caves was much the same as encountered previously. It is probable that the Japs fired many artillery pieces from within caves. This, of course, greatly limited fields of fire and range. One or more guns of 150mm caliber did, however, harass the KADENA Airfield area at nearly maximum range. The employment of antitank guns was almost entirely from deep cave positions. Air, artillery and naval gunfire had little effect on these positions and it was necessary to utilize precision fire of large caliber weapons or infantry assault teams with direct fire weapon support for final reduction. Some caves housed tanks which were driven out to fire on our approaching tanks, retiring when brought under fire by our weapons.

The use of the cave position for infantry action was negligible. The volume of fire of our supporting weapons kept the defenders well back in the caves which limited their fire against our forces. A tremendous number of caves and fortified tombs required individual reduction in order that progress could be made without murderous flanking and enfilade fire. It is estimated that several of the more strongly defended hill masses had as many as a thousand cave openings.

Cave warfare has inherent deficiencies which preclude a perfect defense. Prisoners of war stated that in the event of a rapid advance by the attacking force, cave positions were overrun and two-thirds of the defending force with its supplies and equipment were trapped in the cave and subject to complete destruction. Communication difficulties incident to

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cave warfare were never solved. Communicating trenches and tunnels permitted control of a particular hill position, but all too frequently higher commanders were unable to maintain contact with positions isolated by shellfire. Health and morale were serious problems for the defending force. Exercise was sometimes provided by emerging from the cave at night. All officers were charged with "spiritual training" to maintain morale.

Cave warfare as practiced by the Japs on OKINAWA was a type of defense extremely difficult to overcome, one that taxed weapons, ingenuity and the endurance of the attacking forces and resulted in heavy friendly casualties.

3. Supporting Weapons.

a. Infantry Close-Support Weapons: On all positions, the fires of supporting weapons were closely integrated and the locations of supporting weapons were well covered by sniper fire. This is the first time in the Pacific Area any troops of this command have seen the Japs use long-range (up to 1,800 yards) wide traverse machine gun fires. The enemy demonstrated anew his ability to appreciate terrain and take full advantage of its possibilities. Automatic weapons and direct fire battalion guns were emplaced on reverse as well as forward slopes, generally in caves, and sighted for interlacing cross-draw fires. In this manner, although masked to the front, the enemy was able to bring to bear flanking fire on both the forward and reverse slopes of adjacent ridges and hills. In numerous cases, the reverse slope positions caused our troops the greatest trouble.

Japanese Order of Battle studies and destroyed hulls indicate that the enemy had a considerable number of tanks on OKINAWA. However, as heretofore in American Pacific experience, he gained but small result from their use. Frequently they were used singly in caves, sallying forth individually or firing from the cave. Others were dug-in in sight defilade as pillboxes to cover selected field of fire. He frequently used tanks as mobile supporting weapons in counterattacks, but never in large numbers and never effectively. The tanks encountered were the old standard Jap medium and light tanks, easily destroyed or disabled by any of our standard antitank weapons.

b. Artillery: For the first time in the Pacific War the Jap showed an appreciation of the power of concentrated artillery fire. In previous campaigns his artillery had been located largely as individual pieces for direct fire. In comparison, it may be stated that the enemy on OKINAWA employed his artillery both intelligently and effectively. While he continued with his cave emplacement of artillery pieces, he so located them that it was possible to bring concentrations of batteries and battalions upon our troops. Further, his artillery fires were thoroughly integrated into the overall scheme of defensive fires. Throughout the

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earlier phases of the operation the Jap had the advantage of observation. This coupled with the fact that he had apparently made a complete survey and had registered in his artillery, added greatly to its effectiveness.

Once during the campaign the Jap varied from his practice of cave emplacement. This was for the 4 May counterattack. On this occasion he brought his artillery out in the open, covering it with a heavy concentration of antiaircraft fire. It is probable that he hoped for greater and more flexible artillery concentrations. Our assault echelons will furnish ample testimony that the enemy artillery concentrations were extremely heavy during this attack. In addition, and in anticipation of the success of his counterattack, the Jap probably desired to have his artillery disposed for rapid displacement. As a matter of fact, in his administrative order for the attack he had made provision for advanced distribution of artillery ammunition. This change of tactics proved quite advantageous for the Corps, for despite the heavy flak screen, we succeeded in destroying 59 enemy artillery pieces during the period 4 - 6 May. Following the counterattack the enemy moved his artillery back to caves and continued these tactics throughout the remainder of the campaign.

The enemy doctrine for the employment of artillery is almost identical with ours. Although he speaks the same words, his interpretation is quite different. This is particularly true in the massing of fires. It is true he achieved heavy concentrations; however it was seldom the result of coordinated action of more than a battery, and never more than a battalion. Furthermore, the Jap is not organized for concerted artillery action. He has no organization such as our fire direction centers, nor are his forward observers trained to give close support to his infantry.

Another difficulty encountered by the Japs in the control of their artillery was the lack of communications. While he did have in limited quantities all the communications agencies employed by us, he was never able to make effective use of them. His wire was soon shot out and, struggle as he might, he was never able to maintain effective wire communications. He had difficulty with his radios. Generally they lacked power and the great signal strength of our own radios had the effect of jamming the Jap radio.

g. Special Weapons.

(1) Dual purpose antiaircraft guns - The Jap had a considerable number of mobile dual purpose antiaircraft guns on OKINAWA. Their primary mission was antiaircraft defense, particularly of the areas occupied by his artillery. A secondary mission, and one that was much used, was to employ his antiaircraft against ground targets. All antiaircraft weapons up to 120mm were employed at some time in this manner. The Jap had no time shells for his regular artillery and it is believed that one

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of his purposes in employing his antiaircraft against ground targets was to achieve the effect of time fire. Although harassing to our troops, it was not particularly accurate. Much of the time the shell exploded high in the air and consequently the effect of a close burst was entirely lost.

(2) Spigot Mortars - The Jap had many 320mm or so-called "spigot" mortars. These were encountered particularly in and around KAKAZU and later along the URASOE escarpment. Although the size of the projectile resulted in a terrific blast, it was not a particularly efficient weapon. The fragmentation was very poor, the principal damage being caused by the blast or falling debris. The weapon was very immobile; it lacked flexibility, being confined to one line of fire unless the base was shifted which would require a considerable amount of time. The rate of fire was slow, being for a well-trained crew a maximum of two rounds per hour.

(3) Heavy Mortars and Rocket Weapons - The Jap employed many heavy mortars in calibers of 90mm, 150mm and 240mm. In addition, troops reported many shells falling which they were unable to identify and yet appeared to be heavier than that of 150mm. It is highly probable that these projectiles were rockets. Within the III Amphibious Corps zone of action, many rocket launchers and some rockets were captured. No launchers were captured in the XXIV Corps zone of action. The Corps did, however, capture 42 - 1,000 lb. rocket projectiles and 30 - 500 lb. rockets. Therefore, there are good grounds for the belief that rockets were employed against the troops of the XXIV Corps.

d. Antitank Weapons - Recognizing the effectiveness of our tanks, the enemy concentrated on counter-measures. Even when the manpower shortage on the front lines was becoming critical, the enemy continued to draw troops to the rear for special training in antitank tactics. Antitank guns and the direct fire of artillery were the long range measures employed by the enemy. Specially trained suicide demolition teams were used by the enemy against tanks, but their effect was negligible and not worth the expenditure of men involved. Mines, both standard and improvised, were used extensively. The technique of mine-laying varied. In some areas, mines were carefully and skillfully planted in cabbage patches, along the edges of roads and in draws which afforded natural routes of approach to fortified positions. In other areas, mines were hastily and carelessly laid. Types of mines varied widely, with the Jap using everything from standard antitank mines, through artillery shells of all types to 500 lb bombs. Normally, mines were difficult to locate inasmuch as the enemy followed no consistent pattern in planting these weapons. In general, the enemy's antitank measures were thorough and effective; how effective is amply proven by the total of 239 tank casualties suffered by the XXIV Corps.

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e. Tactics.

(1) Small Unit Tactics - The small unit tactics of the enemy were extremely sound and rendered more effective by the fanatical fighting spirit of the Japanese soldier. In a large measure, the infantry soldier was employed to protect the approaches to enemy fortifications. This was accomplished by surrounding blockhouses, artillery emplacements and other defensive works with a network of rifle pits and light machine gun emplacements. As a result of this local all-around defense, the reduction of every strongpoint was a separate and difficult problem. The theory of "Jack-in-the-Box" defense was also promulgated by the enemy. This was simply the detailing of special groups to hide themselves in tombs and carefully camouflaged caves in areas through which we were to be allowed to proceed unopposed. After our troops were past, the enemy was to debouche from his concealed positions and sabotage our rear installations. This tactic met with little success and was not emphasized by the enemy.

(2) Major Unit Tactics - Tactics of the larger units can be characterized by a strong defense at the base of hills, the exploitation of steep escarpments for defensive purposes and the well coordinated defense of reverse slopes. The enemy promptly counterattacked locally to regain critical terrain. The enemy built the framework of his infantry supporting fires around heavy mortars, light and heavy machine guns, the number of which far exceeded the normal Table of Equipment for an infantry division.

(3) Counterattack - It was expected that the enemy would fight to hold OKINAWA at all costs and that he would expend what available sea and air power he had to break our grip on this highly strategic piece of land. On 4 May, he launched what turned out to be his main counter-offensive - a coordinated land-air-amphibious assault against our forces. His plan was well conceived and involved a major shift of troops, forward displacement of reserves, and concentration of rations and ammunition in forward areas. An intense artillery preparation was called for and executed, with more than 14,000 rounds of artillery and mortar fire falling on our front lines before and during the attack. At least 109 infiltration parties of 2-3 men each were dispatched by land and water with the mission of destroying our tanks and artillery and generally harassing rear installations. The counterattack was launched at dawn with the 22d Regiment of the 24th Division driving into the center of our lines and the 89th Regiment and 32d Regiment echeloned to the right and left rear respectively. Coordinated with this assault, the enemy attempted a double amphibious envelopment with at least one battalion of shipping engineers making a counterlanding on the coast behind our west flank and another battalion attempting a counterlanding on the coast behind our east flank. The latter move was forestalled and mostly destroyed at sea, but the west flank attempt was initially successful; the enemy landed 500-600 troops

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behind our lines early in the morning of 4 May. This success was short lived and by 5 May all but a few of this force had been annihilated. On land, the main enemy attack was equally unsuccessful although he did manage to infiltrate a battalion behind our lines in the vicinity of TANABARU which had to be destroyed by reserve units. By 7 May, the enemy had sacrificed over 8,000 troops and our lines were still firm. The air assault was equally fruitless; less than 25 enemy planes pierced our fighter screen and these inflicted no major damage to our forces. This was the only large-scale effort of the enemy to take the offensive during the entire campaign. Thereafter he placed his main reliance on infiltration attacks. After the fall of the SHURI line, and when the collapse of the YUZA-YAEJU-DAKE position was all but complete, enemy killed in night infiltration attempts jumped from a normal 30 to 40 during the main course of the campaign to 500-800 a night in the days immediately preceding the end of all organized resistance. This was ordered by the Commanding General, 32d Army in lieu of a general "Banzai" attack, organization of which was not feasible.

(4) Finale - The last gesture of defiance and resistance of Lieutenant General USHIJIMA is worthy of reproduction (see Plate J on following page). Personally written and signed by the General, in all probability it is the last order he issued:

DIRECTIVE

TO: Captain MASUNAGA, Tadashi (TW: Member of Intelligence Staff, 32d Army Headquarters).

This officer will command the CHIHAYA Unit ("Blood and Iron" Youth Movement) and is assigned the mission of guerrilla warfare on OKINAWA Island after the cessation of organized combat by the Army.

18 June 1945
USHIJIMA, Mitsuru
Commanding General
32d Army

At 0340I 22 June 45, after 82 days of stubborn and clever defense, Lieutenant General USHIJIMA committed hara kiri in the traditional manner in recognition of his defeat. His Chief of Staff, Lt. Gen. CHO, Isamu, killed himself immediately after his commander died. Having declared all enemy organized resistance at end on 21 June, the Commanding General, Tenth Army announced on 22 June 45 that OKINAWA ISLAND was secure.

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陸軍大尉益永重

貴官于早隊之指揮之軍

組織的戰鬥終了後

二於之沖繩本島之遊

擊戰二任之

昭示其功

陸軍大尉益永重

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Plato J

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D. ORDER OF BATTLE.

1. L-Day Strength Estimate.

On 1 March, a month before target date, estimate of the enemy strength for OKINAWA stood as follows:

32d Army Hq	625	Arty (incl one Med Arty	
24th Division	15,000-17,000	Regt, 1 AT Bn, 3 AT Cos,	
62d Division	11,500	2 Mortar Bns and AAA)	5,875
44th IMB	6,000	Air-ground Personnel	3,500
One IMR	2,600	Service & Construction	5,000-6,000
One Tank Regt	750	Naval-ground	2,500-3,000
			<u>53,000-56,000</u>

This estimate was raised to 65,000 prior to L-Day on the basis of heavy convoy movements into NAHA spotted by long-range search planes.

Doubt was cast on this L-Day estimate by the astonishingly easy Blue landing. The lack of resistance was soon explained by disclosure of the Jap plan for massing their total strength in tightly integrated defensive positions centered on SHURI rather than attempting to contest beach landings supported by naval gunfire.

The exact L-Day Jap troop strength on OKINAWA GUNTO remains unknown. However, captured 32d Army rosters of late November and early March have provided rather comprehensive lists of unit strengths. Supplemented with other documents and prisoner of war information, these rosters form the basis of the following revised strength estimate. Since approximately 90% of the estimate is actually based on captured documents, the final total of 98,000-100,000 on OKINAWA SHIMA is believed accurate within 10%. This exceeds the 65,000 L-Day estimate by 33,000-35,000. The final 30 June revision of the L-Day strength estimate is summarized below. Only major combat units are itemized.

Combat Units 41,400

32d Army Hq, 24th Div (22, 32, 89 Regts), 62 Div (11-15, 21-23, 272, 273 IIBns), 44th IMB (2d Inf Unit of 3 Bns and 15th IMR), 1-3, 26-29 Ind Bns (converted from Sea Raiding Base Bns). The strengths of the 1st and 2d Prov Bdes with their 2-6 Spec Est Regts, the 1st Spec Est Regt and the 6th, 50th Spec Est Bns are not included in this combat troop total. They were all formed from service elements which are included in the Service Troop category.

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
Tanks - 27th Tank Regt	800
Artillery	11,200
5th Arty Comd, 1st & 23d Med Arty Regts, 7th Hvy Arty Regt, 100th Hvy Arty Bn; 3, 7, 22 Ind AT Bns; 22, 23, 32 Ind AF Cos; 1st Arty Mortar Regt; 1, 2 Light Mortar Bns (incl 3-10 Ind Mortar Cos); 21 AA Comd; 27 Ind AA Bn; 79, 80, 81 F AAA Bns; 3, 4, 14, 17, 23 Ind MG Bns; 103- 105 Machine Cannon Bns.	
Shipping and Engineer	5,000
23, 26 Shipg Engr Regts, 86 Ind Engr Bn, 11 Ship Gp, 102-104 Sea Duty Cos with 2100 Koreans	
Airforce Ground	5,600
L of C (Depot, Sig Tpt, Const, etc.)	8,700
Naval Ground (with unknown number of BOETAI)	<u>8,000</u>
Estimated Combat Troops Total	80,700
Okinawan Labor Troops (BOETAI) (Early March 45 roster)	<u>12,100</u>
Total L-Day Strength Estimate, 30 June	92,800
Estimated Okinawans conscripted subsequent to 15 March	<u>5,000-7,000</u>
Grand Total 32d Army Combat and Service Troops	98,000- 100,000

The most critical inaccuracies of the original estimate lay in its failure to assess Jap artillery strength adequately and to appreciate the extent to which Okinawans would be mobilized into the 32d Army. These topics will be discussed in subsequent paragraphs.

2. Enemy Dispositions.

The original enemy troop dispositions are indicated in Plate K. The three major combat units - the 62d Division, 24th Division and 44th IMB - provided all-around protection for the hub of the Jap defense system, the high ground surrounding SKURI. Only a few air-ground troops organized into ineffectual provisional infantry units and scattered outposts of the 12th IIBn were encountered opposite the HAGUSHI landing beaches.

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ENEMY DISPOSITIONS
 &
 PLAN OF DEFENSE
 L-DAY (1 APRIL 45)
 COMPILED FROM DOCUMENTS
 AND POW

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The 63d Brigade of the 62d Division bore the full brunt of our early attack until the rapid Blue advance was temporarily halted by the first main position of the defenses guarding the approach to SHURI from the north. This ran in an arc coast to coast just south of GINOWAN-TSUWA. Along this line elements of the 64th Brigade were first committed.


On 12 April identification of elements of the 22d and 32d Infantry Regiments (24th Division) on the east flank demonstrated this division's displacement from its southern OKINAWA deployment as well as indicated the strain already imposed by steady XXIV Corps pressure on the 62d Division defense of the outer main position. The threat of an amphibious landing caused the enemy to hold this division in the YONABARU area during an obvious pre-attack lull along the battlefield.

Although the 19 April full-scale Corps attack of three divisions abreast, made very slow progress on the immensely strong KAKAZU Ridge defenses, the cumulative total of enemy dead reached 17,500 on 28 April under unremitting Blue pressure. This heavy attrition forced a major realignment upon the Nips. Elements of the 22d and 32d Infantry Regiments which had been withdrawn for YONABARU flank defense reappeared on 21-22 April on the east flank as reinforcements. The shattered battalions of the 62d Division were gradually echeloned to the western third of the front. At the same time the Jap policy of bolstering the failing strength of front line units by using miscellaneous service troops to refill their ranks became apparent. Thus the 63d Brigade and later the whole 62d Division continued to be identified long after the organization was judged to have been effectively destroyed by reason of the large number of casualties suffered.

By 1 May the 24th Division had taken over the eastern two-thirds of the front with regiments abreast, as shown in Plate L of the 4 May enemy dispositions (see next page). At the same time the 44th IMB, the last fresh major combat unit, moved north from OZATO MURA in southern OKINAWA, prepared to exploit the planned breakthrough of the 24th Division in the attempted counteroffensive. The remnants of the 62d Division were slowly squeezed into a narrow defense sector just north and east of SHURI, although elements of the 64th Brigade continued to be identified along the III Amphibious Corps front. This regrouping laid the groundwork for the 4-5 May attack, a grandiose project whose abortive results produced more than 6,000 Jap casualties and raised the total Jap dead to 27,000 in southern OKINAWA. Upon failure of the attack the 44th IMB was shifted to defend the western flank with the last two fresh Jap infantry regiments against two strong Marine divisions.

Attachment of at least seven independent battalions, formed from service troops, to both 62d Division and 24th Division units and the use of other service elements as extensive

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replacements in organic combat units disclosed not only the extent of the drain on Jap manpower but also the Jap method of getting the most fight out of their service elements by close integration with line troops. Although service troop replacements were poured into the framework of the line commands, their stubborn resistance and counterattack efforts precluded any thought that rear echelon troops would furnish easy killing so long as a stiffening cadre of die-hard regulars survived.

The foregoing alignment of Japanese forces continued to be identified holding the SHURI bastion until its complete collapse on 30 May. All combat units and the best service troops in the 32d Army were steadily chewed up in fanatic and frequently suicidal defenses. When the 96th Division cracked COMICAL HILL, eastern pivot of the SHURI defense system, on 20 May allowing the 7th Division to plunge through the gap thus created, the withdrawal southward of the remnants of the major combat units which had been developing slowly, rapidly accelerated. The SHURI defense position became a hollow shell. Heavy rains cloaked this major withdrawal, carefully planned for 29 May, which was forced by Jap inability any longer to man adequately such a wide front. Covering units, in spite of their heterogeneous components, managed to sustain their stubborn and effective skeleton defense against the 77th Division until the sudden collapse of the hollow shell on 30 May. They had been instructed to hold till 2 June.

The provisional infantry units assigned delaying missions between the YONABARU-NAHA road and the final escarpment position were uniformly incapable of more than isolated instances of stiff resistance. By 5 June the final defense line along the YUZA-YAEJU-DAKE escarpment had been reached. Plate M shows the final defense dispositions. At 1306 on 21 June organized resistance was declared at an end.

3. Infantry Reinforcement Methods:


The 12th II Battalion provides a typical example of the reinforcement process which allowed regular line troop units to survive long after most of their L-Day personnel had been destroyed. This battalion with its attached units had a 23 March strength of 1,335. Reduced to 475 by 12 April, new replacements restored its manpower to 1,267. Such blood transfusions completely transformed units and reduced to absurdity any strength estimate based on order of battle identifications.

The diary of the 5th Company, 22d Infantry, showed a dissolution typical of all Japanese combat units in spite of frequent replacement drafts. Its original table of organization of 175 men was reduced to 110 by 17 April, and then to 17 men on 15 May.

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NOTE: THE REORGANIZATION OF THE 32 ARMY FOR ITS FINAL DEFENSE WAS BUILT ABOUT THE REMNANTS OF ITS MAJOR UNITS: 24TH DIV, 62ND DIV, AND 44TH IWB.



ENEMY DISPOSITIONS
8 JUNE 1945
FOR FINAL STAND ALONG
YUZA-YAEJU-DAKE ESCARPMENT

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4. Artillery and Automatic Weapons.

The most serious order of battle error rose through failure to anticipate the unprecedented proportion of artillery, mortar, antiaircraft and automatic weapons in relation to infantry strength. Identified Army and Navy artillery more than doubled the estimate and produced the heaviest and best-directed use of artillery fires by the Jap encountered to date in the Pacific War.

The employment of antiaircraft, antitank and automatic weapons in close support of infantry line troops helps explain their unexpected stamina. In the case of the 62d Division the following units were attached as support:

22d Ind AT Bn (12 x 47mm AT Guns)
14th Ind MG Bn (24 x 13mm HMGs)
32d Ind AT Co (8 x 37/47mm AT Guns)
223, 224 Spec Car Cos
11th, 12th, 15th Naval Btrys

A captured 32d Infantry Regiment order showed elements of the following units attached to its battalions in platoon or company strength:

3d & 17th Ind MG Bns	3d Ind Co
3d Ind AT Bn	Elements 42d FA Regt
In regimental reserve:	
27th Ind AAA Bn	104th Mach Can Bn

When the weapons of these units were added to already abnormal weapon complements, formidable concentrations of fire resulted. For instance, the 21st Independent Infantry Battalion of the 62d Division possessed 46 grenade dischargers, 45 light machine guns and 6 heavy machine guns, as compared with the 27 grenade dischargers, 27 light machine guns and 6 heavy machine guns of a normal infantry battalion.

5. Mobilization of Okinawans.

The original strength estimate wholly failed to reckon with the formidable mobilization of perhaps 30,000 Okinawans to reinforce the Jap garrison. These Okinawans included young 19-20 year old regular active service conscripts of whom two classes were called up in the past year instead of the normal one. Trained Army reservists recalled to active duty comprised a second large group. These categories are believed to have received sufficient training and indoctrination to become effective combat troops. The third and largest group of conscripted Okinawans were labor troops drafted beginning in February 45. These actually freed Jap service troops for combat duties and thereby increased Jap fighting strength. Although originally considered of doubtful combat value, most of them ultimately participated in the actual

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fighting and had to be killed along with the Jap regulars. Only 1,939 Okinawan troops had been taken prisoner by 222400 June, the vast majority taken in the last few days of the campaign. This fact largely explodes the myth that so-called unarmed Okinawan laborers provided no effective Jap troop strength. Only complete disintegration of the 32d Army loosed the bonds of discipline sufficiently to produce an appreciable number of Okinawan prisoners of war.

The actual total of conscripted Okinawans has not been established. Documents have provided incomplete rosters of conscripts drafted on several occasions. Some refer to active service, some to reservist, some to labor conscripts. The exact proportion is unknown, though simple labor conscripts probably made up one-half of the total. To break down the overall 32d Army strength into Jap and Okinawan troops is well-nigh impossible. The Okinawans are included in some strength rosters, excluded in others. An estimate, however, is possible.

The 18,000 increase in Jap troop strength between December 44 and March 45 rosters must be attributed largely to Okinawans. Drafts prior to December and subsequent to mid-March probably boosted the total of Okinawan conscripts to 80,000. This figure represents 30% of the final strength estimate.

With invasion of the homeland approaching, successful incorporation of relatively apathetic Okinawans furnishes unpleasant portent of what may be expected on KYUSHU or the TOKYO Plain.

6. Provisional Infantry Units.

Prior to L-Day 32d Army ordered all service personnel reorganized into provisional infantry units, including two provisional brigades with six Specially Established Infantry Regiments. This program had precedent elsewhere in the Pacific where isolation compelled similar death stands. The combat efficiency of these scraped-together commands varied greatly. When the provisional infantry unit was formed from one service unit, as in the case of the independent battalions from the Sea Raiding Base Battalions, their staunchness was impressive both in defense and small-scale counterattack. Where a diverse miscellany of rear echelon units was thrown together, as in the case of the Specially Established Regiments, they were not militarily efficient. Individuals composing these units, nevertheless, proved stubbornly fanatic soldiers who were nearly as difficult to dislodge as the regular troops. Since much of the strength of provisional units was employed in piecemeal reinforcements, no really fair judgment can be passed on their potential combat efficiency in other theaters.

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7. Naval Troops.

The isolated pocket defense of the OKINAWA Base Force on the OROKU Peninsula is believed to have been due partially to mistaken orders. This further instance of lack of coordination between the Army and the Navy even on isolated islands when the chips are down emphasizes impressively the sharp cleavage between these rival services.

8. Jap Counter-Intelligence.


An outstanding feature of OKINAWA campaign from the order of battle viewpoint was the dearth of enemy documents and other identification material. Captured orders now make clear the strenuous security effort which has been carried out by the Commanding General, 32d Army. Diaries were ordered burned and dogtags picked up before units entered combat. In addition, all unit records were ordered to be destroyed or deposited with 32d Army. All Army records were in turn ordered destroyed by the engineer battalion in charge of demolishing the 32d Army Headquarters at SHURI during the withdrawal.

9. Remaining Strength Estimate.

On 30 June the total of counted and estimated killed in action, prisoners of war and surviving Jap troops on all OKINAWA totaled 139,893 (See Plate N on following page for a chart showing Corps totals of Japs killed in action and captured). This figure does not include soldiers buried by the Japs themselves. Comparison with the revised L-Day strength estimate of 98,000 - 100,000 shows a discrepancy of more than 40,000. Such an apparent error requires explanation.

The following is offered as a possible solution: Okinawan males of military age are almost wholly absent from military government camps. Although the conscription of BOETAI (Home Guards) continued even during the YUZA DAKE-YAEJU DAKE escarpment stand, a maximum of only 30,000 Okinawan conscripts are carried in the final strength estimate. The official OKINAWA Gunto census figures of 435,000 for 1940 indicate a larger total was probably available. These facts support the belief that conscripted Okinawans account for a large but unknown part of the discrepancy in casualty totals. Advance propaganda about an enchained race seeking liberation has perhaps clouded appreciation of the full extent of Okinawan contribution to the defense of their native land.

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E. PROPAGANDA.

Pre-L-Day propaganda, and propaganda during the majority of the campaign was handled by Headquarters Tenth Army. Japanese language newspapers covering the world situation, instructions to civilians, and surrender appeals addressed personally to General USHIJIMA were used. Methods of distribution included plane-drop, firing by means of converted 105mm smoke shells, and some distribution by patrols. After the collapse of the YUZA-YAEJU-DAKE position, one division instituted surrender broadcasts from tank-mounted and LCI-mounted loudspeakers. Direct appeals and instruction to specific groups was found to be the most efficacious means of bringing in prisoners and an unprecedented number was taken, including a large number of officers. The tabulation below shows the percentage of enemy who preferred death to surrender and also the ratio of enemy killed to prisoners taken. It indicates almost conclusively that propaganda is only effective after the Jap soldier's will to fight has been crushed by the overwhelming power of American arms.

The table below is a mathematical indication of a fact which cannot be stressed too frequently: the average Jap soldier is imbued with the conviction that he must fight to the very end regardless of the hopelessness of his situation or his personal beliefs regarding the probable outcome of the war. Column (1) is self-explanatory. Column (2) shows the cumulative total of enemy killed. Column (3) represents an arbitrary deduction from Column (2) of the probable number of Okinawan conscriptees and BOETAI killed. Column (4) represents the number of Jap army personnel captured but does not include figures for Okinawan Labor Units. Column (5) is self-explanatory. Column (6) shows the cumulative relation of Japs killed to Jap prisoners of war. It is interesting to note that this column also indicates the "resistance-density" during any one period in the campaign.

(1) Period	(2) Killed	(3) Okinawans Killed	(4) Jap PsW	(5) % of killed to total casualties	(6) Ratio of KIA to PsW
1 Apr - 7 Apr	2,873		11	99.6	261 to 1
8 Apr - 14 Apr	7,234		17	89.7	425 to 1
15 Apr - 21 Apr	11,733		27	99.7	435 to 1
22 Apr - 28 Apr	17,478		42	99.7	416 to 1
29 Apr - 5 May	26,695		59	99.7	452 to 1
6 May - 12 May	29,815		64	99.8	450 to 1
13 May - 19 May	37,155		81	99.7	454 to 1
20 May - 26 May	44,281		86	99.8	515 to 1
27 May - 2 June	50,702		101	99.8	502 to 1
3 June - 9 June	53,045	2,500	132	99.7	383 to 1
10 June - 16 June	61,067	5,000	225	99.6	249 to 1
17 June - 22 June	75,484	10,000	1421	97.8	46 to 1
23 June - 30 June	82,278	10,000	3195	95.7	23 to 1

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F. SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE.

1. Special Reconnaissance Missions.

Early in the planning phase liaison personnel from each assault battalion, regiment, division and the Corps were selected to accompany Navy Underwater Demolition Teams for the purpose of obtaining early information of hydrographic conditions, beach defenses and profiles of prominent land marks in the beachhead area. To make certain that all commanders would get the information early, each officer or enlisted man was ordered to report back to his assigned unit on L-1 day. Personnel were trained on LEYTE using assigned APDs and operating under simulated reconnaissance conditions during the dry run. Teams embarked early, accomplished their mission and on L-1 APDs made rendezvous with the Task Force and transferred personnel to APAs and LSTs. Information obtained by this group proved to be very accurate and timely. Tide, reef and beach conditions were recorded over a period of several days providing comparative data for all units concerned. Little or no enemy reaction was encountered and no casualties were suffered by Corps personnel. It was recommended by Corps and Division representatives that Underwater Demolition Teams be supplied with cameras in order to take panoramic shots of beaches. Pictures would be of extreme value to coxswains for approaches to beaches.

No special reconnaissance missions were assigned to ground forces during the campaign, although observation aircraft were extensively and effectively used.

2. Map and Aerial Photo Distribution.

Operational maps were issued to Corps and Divisions in sufficient quantities; however, some of the important sheets of Corps beachhead arrived late. Few aerial photos were received and these were limited to the Corps beachhead area. The photos were of excellent quality and mosaics were prepared, contact prints of which were distributed to divisions. Prints were gridded and annotated showing all enemy installations and defensive positions. A total of 1,500 copies of a contact print photo mosaic, scale 1:16,000 were received and a distribution of 400 copies made to each division and 250 copies to Corps Artillery. Initially this photomap was intended as an aid in fire control of artillery units. However, due to the lack of adequate photo coverage south of the Corps beachhead area, infantry commanders soon requested copies for operational use. Over 2,000 copies of the seven sheets were printed by the command ships and distributed to divisions for issue to lower units. Up to the time when a captured Jap map was reproduced this was the only map that showed in detail the difficult terrain over which the divisions were operating. During the first weeks of the operation many photo requests were flown by the Navy. Missions were flown and processed aboard the AGC and delivery of at least five prints was made

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to divisions within 24 to 36 hours. Additional reprints of selected photos were made upon request. After the Army Photo Reconnaissance Squadron was set up ashore the southern section of the island was photographed at a scale of 1:5,000 and seven copies were delivered to divisions. Soon this squadron was flying photo missions every other day taking obliques of the area in front of the assault troops. Sufficient prints were made to enable distribution to platoon leaders of front line units. To speed up the delivery of photos to lower units, the processing laboratory broke the sorties down, packaging one copy for each division of its zone of action and five copies for each of the respective regimental zones.

A captured Jap map scale 1:25,000 was reproduced and distributed to divisions and Corps troops. Later on the map was annotated with place names and blown up to 1:10,000 for use in small units. Corps Artillery reported an accuracy of 200 yards or less in horizontal control and a fair degree of accuracy in vertical control. The original Jap map was dispatched by air to CinCPac and a revised 1:25,000 map was issued based on this map and latest photos. Corps Artillery reported its mean accuracy to within five yards in both horizontal and vertical control.

A third revision of the 1:25,000 map was issued late in May. This became the official operations map. It was later blown up to a scale of 1:10,000 and distributed to company commanders and platoon leaders. It is suggested that in future map revisions where captured maps are available, the hill numbers and correct town names be included in the revision. Jap maps of OKINAWA contained hill numbers and in many instances correct names of towns as well as names of towns not shown on our maps.

3. Counter-Intelligence.

The XXIV Corps CIC Detachment was broken down into operations teams and one administration team. The operations teams, supplemented by Corps language personnel, supported the division CIC detachments, lending assistance in handling, screening, interrogation and segregation of civilians. The administration team remained at Corps Headquarters handling administration and security surveys and investigations within Corps rear areas.

The processing of civilians posed no problems during the first two months of the operation. That part of the population in the southern half of the island was not permitted through the enemy's lines and was forced to retreat with the Japs as they were driven from their fortified positions. The Japanese did not permit the Okinawans to come through their lines for security reasons and because they wanted to utilize all available labor. Those few thousands that were initially overrun in our advance were thoroughly interrogated and pertinent target data obtained was coordinated with other intelligence collecting agencies for dissemination to G-2. When the SAURI defenses were cracked the

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rapid forward displacement of the assault elements overran so many thousands of civilians that only a selective spot screening could be accomplished. Emphasis was placed on uncovering prisoners of war who had adopted civilian clothing as a means of escape. In the last three weeks of the campaign over 30,000 civilians were screened and those considered dangerous or possessing military information were classified accordingly. A total of 1,113 prisoners of war (military prisoners of war 498, including 8 "Kempei Tai" Military and Undercover Police - Naval prisoners of war 8 - BOETAI, armed and unarmed laborers 424 - GUNZOKU, military civilian employees 121 - others unclassified, Korean laborers, merchant marine, etc. 64) were apprehended with assistance of CIC teams or were uncovered by them during the screening process. The results of this counter-intelligence screening while not necessarily complete, has limited, and nullified to a great extent, the enemy's chances of infiltrating prisoners of war with the civilian masses intent on engaging in espionage, sabotage or carrying out guerrilla warfare against our forces.

NOTE: A special study has been prepared by the 7th and 96th Divisions of two typical Japanese defensive positions as encountered on OKINAWA to be included in a final report prepared by Tenth Army. A copy of this report will be on file at Headquarters Army Ground Forces.

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CAPTURED AND DESTROYED ENEMY WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT CHART For Period 1 April - 30 June

	<u>Total To Date</u>		<u>Total To Date</u>
<u>ARTILLERY:</u>		<u>RIFLES:</u>	
70mm Gun	37	Rifle Grenade Dischargers	6
75mm Gun	49	7.7mm	10589
75mm How	23	Shotguns	8
3" Gun	3		
105mm How	9	<u>AMMUNITION (Tons):</u>	
105mm Gun	15	Small Arms	27½
150mm How	36	Mortar	81½
5" CD Gun	16	Artillery	173
150mm Gun	19	TNT	15¼
12cm Naval Gun	1	Prepared Charges (each)	63
8" Naval Gun	1	Flares (cases)	3
6" Naval Gun	2	Mines (each)	377
		Bomb (100 lb) each	110
<u>ANTI-AIRCRAFT GUNS:</u>		Bomb (500 lb) each	69
13.2mm HMG	1	Rocket Bomb (1000 lb) each	42
20mm	17	Rocket Bomb (500 lb) each	30
40mm	4	Spigot Mortar Rounds (each)	31
75mm	16		
76.2mm	1	<u>ORDNANCE:</u>	
		Tanks	49
<u>ANTI-TANK GUNS:</u>		Trucks	234
20mm	27	Prime Movers	20
37mm	14	Amphib Tank Trailers	3
47mm	84	Car, Staff	4
		Tires	233
<u>MACHINE GUNS:</u>		Artillery Caissons	5
7.7 LMG	987	Airplanes	14
7.7 HMG	275	Airplane Engines	6
13.2 HMG	1	Suicide Rocket Planes	20
		Fire Control Instruments	30
		Motorcycles	5
<u>MORTARS:</u>		<u>CHEMICAL WARFARE:</u>	
50mm Grenade Dischargers	465	Smoke Pots	58
70mm	9		
81mm	48		
90mm	6		
150mm	1		
320mm	22		

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	<u>Total To Date</u>		<u>Total To Date</u>
<u>SIGNAL:</u>		<u>ENGINEER (Cont'd):</u>	
Radio	46	Road Scraper	1
Telegraph	1	Carryalls	5
Telephones	46	Well Digger	1
Switchboards	1	Steam Roller	1
Generators	12		
Transmitters	5	<u>MISCELLANEOUS:</u>	
Receivers	1	Foodstuffs (tons)	62
Blinker Signals	4	Clothing (tons)	4
		Aviation Gas (bbls)	150
<u>ENGINEER:</u>		Other Fuel (bbls)	3787
Diesel Engines	2	Saddles	38
Bulldozers	6	Torpedo Boat	1
Water Purifier	1	Barges	38
Barbed Wire (rolls)	18	Suicide Boats	2
		Trolley Car	1

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CHAPTER IX

COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The following comments and recommendations cover briefly some of the deficiencies noted and improvements for combat efficiency that are considered worthy of mention. Some of these have already been covered by "action letters" and others will be so covered in an effort to get prompt corrective action. Others are mentioned in hope that they may be of benefit to other units scheduled for participation in similar combat.

C-1 MATTERS

1. Comment:

The outstanding deficiency in this Corps throughout the HUKUWUS Campaign was the initial and continuing shortage of replacements, particularly in junior officers and enlisted men of Infantry. Although this deficiency has existed in some degree in all United States Army operations in the Pacific, it was particularly aggravated in this instance by an initial shortage of approximately 1,000 men per division, by heavy casualties and by the slowness in arrival of replacements available in rear bases. Our tables of organization by policy are stripped of all fat and units can operate effectively only when kept at full strength. The Infantry component that bears the brunt of fighting and casualties and upon which we must depend to eliminate the enemy ground forces, is low at best and every infantryman in tables of organization is critically essential in combat. Casualties in ground combat almost all fall on the infantry, and any lowering of infantry strength is reflected immediately in the fighting effort of the entire division. This has never been more conclusively demonstrated than on OKINAWA. Particularly for amphibious operations, we must recognize and meet the necessity for early availability of replacements. We made great effort to take in initially a specified level (usually 30 days) of ammunition, supplies and equipment, and at the same time did not provide for an initial supply on the beaches of by far the most important commodity for combat effectiveness, namely, manpower. As further invasions are made into hostile territory, the need to operate at full strength will become even more critical. In practice to date, shipping for major landings has been set up based on material needs of equipment and supplies and have always had surplus space which could be used to carry replacements.

Recommendation: That a definite, clear-cut and adequate replacement supply system be established in all future amphibious operations that will provide a constant flow of replacements to fighting units

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beginning on Landing Day. That such supply system include:

a. 5% initial overstrength in all divisional units (and attached) except that infantry battalions and regimental medical detachments be given 25% overstrength of officers and men trained with the units.

b. Provide one battalion of 1,000 balanced infantry replacements attached to and loaded with each infantry division loaded in assault shipping. In addition to giving a replacement cushion in the early days after landing, these battalions will provide a pool for the always demanded beach labor during the early unloading period.

c. Bring in one full replacement depot in first echelon (within ten days of landing) following the assault and thereafter maintain the subsequent flow of replacements from the closest base based on the non-effective rate produced by both battle and non-battle casualties.

2. Comment:

Although Military Government teams did excellent work under the circumstances, they were greatly handicapped by the following factors:

a. Late arrival at staging area of unit to which attached.

b. Absence of training in living in the field ashore under combat or simulated combat conditions.

c. Being from a service other than the one with which operating.

Recommendation: That military government teams be of the same service as troops they support and that in addition to training in military government duties, they be given a full course of training in living in the field under conditions similar to those expected to be encountered by combat troops. This training should include firing of individual weapons and basic principles of area defense by small arms against infiltration.

3. Comment:

In operations of the character just completed, a tremendous overload is placed on the Corps Headquarters and Headquarters Company as organized under current tables of organization. Large numbers of observers are invariably attached for the operation (thirty were present the first night ashore). Many correspondents appear from the blue to be taken care of. Special teams from many agencies, heavy in officer personnel, drift in unannounced with orders indicating they are attached to the Corps Headquarters for

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the operation. Language teams, historical teams, CIC teams, PI teams, bomb disposal teams, special intelligence teams, enemy equipment teams, etc. are essentially attached or assigned for the operation. A substantial congregation of visitors of various categories flow through during the operation. Most of this mixed multitude are classed as officers - many of high field rank. They have no transportation, no means of messing and no means of caring for themselves. Few have any equipment for sleeping or living. They place inordinate demands upon transportation, shelter and office space, and add greatly to the orderly and mess requirements. In past combats and to an increasing extent necessary in future combats the defense of the Corps Command Post against Jap infiltrators is of high importance. For example, in the campaign just ended over 170 Japs have been killed on the Corps Command Post perimeter. None of the foregoing factors are included in making up the tables of organization for a Corps Headquarters and Headquarters Company.

Recommendation: That Corps troops as follows be allotted the Corps Headquarters to cover the deficiencies indicated in the foregoing comment as a stop gap until such time as an adequate table of organization is authorized:

- a. One Quartermaster Car Company.
- b. One Quartermaster Service Company.

4. Comment:

Many small teams - (Sound locator teams, CIC, PI, ISO, Military Government) - attached to the Corps for the operation did not arrive at the staging area in time to get oriented, get property unloaded and segregated, make up loading plans, be reattached as required and be properly indoctrinated in their place in the larger team. Some of these arrived without special equipment required for functioning.

Recommendation: That all small dependent teams to be attached to any Command for loading out on amphibious operations, arrive at the staging area not less than three weeks prior to loading out, and that they be accompanied by all special equipment they are to use.

G-2 MATTERS

1. Comment:

ISO (Language) teams assigned for use of the Corps were inadequate in strength for this operation, due to the great demands in handling documents, prisoners of war and particularly civilian internees. Operating in Japanese territory throws a greater load upon these teams than ever before. Also, a Corps needs a reserve

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ISO strength to reinforce divisions and frequently Corps troop units.

Recommendations: a. That each CIC team have five Nisei as an integral part of the team.

b. That Military Government units be provided with their own language personnel.

c. That ISO teams assigned to tactical units be kept at full strength.

2. Comment:

Signal Corps Photo Assignment Units with Corps and divisions in this operation in large degree failed in their local mission of providing timely photo coverage for public relations and historical records. The delay occasioned by sending exposed film to GUAM for processing and the reproduction of prints on an order basis after the receipt of the first print is such as to nullify the value of the photography, especially from a public relations point of view.

Recommendation: That additional processing facilities for forward area photography in no higher echelon than the Army Headquarters be provided and prints of all photography be furnished units concerned for their selection and use in historical records and public relations.

3. Comment:

Although the Corps Signal Battalion is provided with radio intelligence platoons, their work was of limited value in this operation because it was not integrated into an area radio intelligence establishment or system.

Recommendation: That all radio intelligence agencies operating in any area be integrated under a comprehensive system that will provide rapid channelling and dissemination of radio intelligence through a central agency.

4. Comment:

This headquarters made a recommendation at the end of the LEYTE Campaign that a reconnaissance battalion or squadron be assigned to the Corps. Repeated cases arose in this operation when the Corps Commander needed a fighting reconnaissance unit for missions not involving any division. The solution either of omitting the accomplishment of the mission or diverting divisional units from their own mission was never satisfactory. Each Corps of United States Marines has such a unit.

Recommendation: That a reconnaissance squadron or battalion

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be made part of Corps troops of each Corps operating in this theater.

G-3 MATTERS

1. Comment:

Based upon experience in the LEYTE landing it was strongly recommended that shipping for Corps troop units be organized into transdivs rather than scattering these troop units throughout all transdivs of all transrons. For this operation the Amphibious Group Commander upon his own initiative carried out the wishes of the Corps Commander in this respect by formation of a provisional transdiv with results that were outstanding in the elimination of problems of control in loading and unloading of Corps troop units. There is a definite need in moving a large amphibious force for recognition of the requirement for organization of shipping beyond that required to carry a stated number of infantry divisions with the expectation of sandwiching into this shipping all the mass of troop units over and above combat divisions.

Recommendation: That the matter of organization of shipping for carrying Corps and Army troop units in large amphibious operations be restudied and provisions made to handle these units to allow some degree of centralized control by the Corps or Army Commander.

2. Comment:

For the past two operations the Corps has had available a provisional engineer topographic platoon. This unit manned re-production equipment almost equivalent to that of a topographic company, did superior work and rendered outstanding service, adding greatly to the efficiency of the Corps. However, the operation of an over-equipped provisional unit is always unsatisfactory in many respects and this particular unit was greatly overworked and always behind on needed production because of shortage of personnel. The need for adequate topographic facilities in a Corps is a must.

Recommendation: That the Corps be assigned permanently one engineer topographic company.

3. Comment:

Chemical mortar units were employed extensively on this operation. The continuous requirement for infantry support by these heavy mortars necessitated employment of units without relief throughout the entire campaign. Experience has indicated that the chemical mortar battalion with its headquarters and headquarters company containing ammunition sections to support its companies and adequate administrative personnel, is far preferable to an equal number of separate chemical mortar companies.

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Recommendation: That in all future operations chemical mortar battalions be assigned or attached to the Corps for the entire operation on the basis of one battalion per frontline division, and that separate chemical mortar companies be eliminated.

4. Comment:

The ability of the artillery to use ammunition profitably in this operation always exceeded the ability to supply the ammunition desired. This will always be the case in operations of invasion where all supplies must be brought in over beaches or improvised harbor facilities after long water hauls. However, if proper flexibility in use of Corps artillery is to be maintained, certain minimum requirements in amount of medium and heavy artillery must be present. This will be particularly essential for operations in JAPAN.

Recommendation: a. That the following be considered as the minimum standard Corps Artillery for future operations, when the Corps is supported by the Army echelon:

- Hq & Hq Btry, Corps Arty
- 1 FA Obsn Bn
- 3 Hq & Hq Btrys FA Cp
- 3 Bns 155mm How
- 3 Bns 155mm Gun (M1A1)
(one of these should be M-40 SP if available)
- 2 Bns 8" How
(one of these should be T-89 SP if available)

b. That in the Army or General Headquarters supporting artillery there be available per Corps in addition to the above:

- 1 Bn 240mm How
- 1 Bn 8" How

5. Comment:

Tanks were used in the RYUKYUS Operation to an extent never before used in the Pacific Area. The medium tank converted to a flamethrower tank was used for the first time. It is believed that a complete restudy of supporting armor for future action against the Jap in his homeland is in order. Outstanding deficiencies and needs developed are:

a. Present light tank M-5A-1 is practically useless in combat.

b. There is need for a substantial increase in flamethrower tanks having no other mission.

c. There is need for heavy tank units to follow assault

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echelons ashore in time to support decisive action.

d. There are certain deficiencies in tables of organization of tank units.

Recommendations: a. That the present light tank M-5A-1 be replaced by the light tank M-24 in the standard tank battalion.

b. That flamethrower medium tanks (without gun armament) be made available at the rate of two three-company battalions per Corps of three divisions where extended operations are expected.

c. That supporting battalions of heavy tanks be landed by Army of General Headquarters echelons at rate of one per front-line division as early after the assault as conditions will permit.

d. That serious consideration be given to replacement of present medium tank equipment with the heavy M-26 tank as soon as shipping can handle this equipment in assault echelons.

e. That the following additional changes be incorporated in present standard battalion tables of organization and equipment:

(1) The mortar platoon be eliminated and the number of tanks, medium, 105mm (assault guns) be increased to eight organized into two platoons of the headquarters company.

(2) Headquarters company of each tank battalion be provided with a pioneer platoon of three sections, organized and equipped to detect and remove mines.

(3) Four tank dozers and one D-6 bulldozer be included in each battalion.

6. Comment:

It is believed that the RYUKYU'S Operation approaches and may be accepted as a preview of combat upon our invasion of the Japanese homeland. We may expect the same last-ditch defense to the death, the same type of cave warfare, somewhat similar terrain, roads, smaller towns, etc., plus an added hazard of an intensely hostile and probably fanatical civil populace. With the difficulties of an amphibious landing over in the first two or three days, the problems met by the fighting units were purely those of land warfare against our bitterest enemy. As is always true in this type of battle, the progress of the battle is the progress of the infantry. As is the usual case, the progress of the infantry is the progress of the small infantry units. However, in this particular campaign the progress of the small infantry units was in great degree the progress of close-knit Infantry-Tank assault teams, infantry demolition assault teams and infantry flamethrower assault teams. The expenditure of satchel charges, shaped charges and other

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demolitions by infantry was enormous. The reduction and capture of every Jap position meant the reduction and neutralization of numerous mutually supporting caves and pillboxes one by one in close assault combat. All weapons, air, naval gunfire, heavy, medium and light artillery as well as infantry and direct fire supporting weapons were used to the fullest, but in only a few cases could the Jap be "shot" out of his positions. Close-in assault fighting tactics in their dirtiest aspects were the rule rather than the exception. Small night operations proved to be highly successful when properly planned and executed.

Recommendations: That for all units slated for participation in invasion of the Japanese homeland training in the following be stressed particularly over and above normal routine:

a. Individual

(1) Fast accurate shooting of individual weapons at close ranges (not "hip-shooting", but rapid delivery of accurate fire comparable to "wing-shooting").

(2) Accuracy in throwing and timing of hand grenades.

(3) Night movements as an individual.

(4) Individual close combat, including use of bayonet, knife, club, fists.

(5) Handling of all types of demolition explosives. (Engineers should not be used for routine combat.)

(6) Removal of mines.

b. Small Units

(1) Close-knit Infantry-Tank assault teamwork using both standard gun and flamethrower tanks.

(2) Infantry demolition assault tactics with and without tanks.

(3) Infantry-flamethrower assault team.

(4) Night attacks.

(5) Combat patrolling.

c. Leaders of all grades

(1) Thorough knowledge of capabilities, limitations and use of all available supporting weapons.

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(2) Use of maneuver and tactics of using small unit teams to best advantage in mutual support.

(3) Develop depth in all leaders from squad up to two or three deep in each unit.

G-4 MATTERS

1. Comment:

In this operation, the Corps was again called upon to operate without engineer combat or construction units that it could call its own. In the final analysis it was reduced to begging for engineer troops to do road construction and engineering work highly essential to tactical operations in support of the divisions and of Corps troops. The need for one group of construction or combat engineers with Corps troops in forward areas is continuing, both in and out of combat. These should be assigned to support the Corps primarily and work for other echelons only when not needed by the Corps Commander.

Recommendation: That there be designated and assigned as permanent Corps troops, not available for detachment except by full concurrence of the Corps Commander, one engineer construction group.

2. Comment:

In the LEYTE operation, troops of this Corps used the time-honored method of carrying in the assault shipping one barracks bag per man to carry all those articles he is supposed to take to combat, but cannot carry on his person. In a surprisingly large number of cases, men were never joined with their bags. In most cases, contents of the bags had been ruined before their owners got at them. The result was an unnecessary and heavy loss in clothing, shoes, and many items of equipment carried in the bags. Since much of what is set up to go with the individual is in the nature of reserve supply, particularly in items of Class II, the overall result was an undue shortage of Class II reserves and the inability to keep men properly clothed and shod. In the RYUKYUS operation, all such surplus was carried in bulk supply and each man took with him only those articles he could carry. Universal rolls were carried in unit supply for beach assault troops, and any roll could be issued to any man. Supporting and service troops carried their own rolls. Each squad was allowed two barracks bags for men to pool authorized personal articles they wanted to retrieve after they were able to care for them, these being carried in the unit supply. The result was a tremendous saving and a greatly improved Class II supply situation with no greater initial outlay of supplies.

Recommendations: That troops going into combat be issued only what they will carry on their person and all other supplies be handled in bulk for use in replenishment as the situation requires.

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3. Comment:

An outstanding feature of Japanese offensive tactics in this operation was his constant and increasing efforts at night infiltration attacks. There were extremely few mass night attacks or "Eanzai" attacks, but night suicide infiltrations reached the point in the latter part of the battle where they might be called "mass infiltrations". Through liberal use of flares, our troops were able to break up all night infiltrations, even though they did not use the close "shoulder to shoulder" perimeter in this campaign. Several hundred Japs per night were killed by each division during several nights of the last twenty days of combat. In this security measure flares used included trip flares, 60mm flares and incendiary grenades, but the principal stand-by was the Naval star shell flare which was feasible throughout the campaign. A few new artillery flares were available for test and were liked by testing troops. Since the Jap doctrine, as indicated by captured documents and prisoners of war, shows strong tendency to increase night infiltration as a move to circumvent our great firepower and to raid our tanks and heavy weapons, an increase in these efforts may be expected in the future. Also in future operations on larger land masses, we will not be able to depend upon Naval illumination fires after leaving the beachhead.

Recommendation: That adequate supplies of the new illuminating projectiles for larger ground weapons be placed in this theater and units of fire include considerable numbers of each type to insure adequate availability to troops in combat.

4. Comment:

Replacement field ranges and repair parts for same have been a critical shortage throughout both the LEYTE and RYUKYUS Operations.

Recommendation: That material increase in these items be supplied for troops in combat or preparing for combat.

5. Comment:

Herringbone twill clothing furnished for this operation was badly unbalanced in tariff sizes, running far too heavy in large sizes.

Recommendation: That if the clothing supplied was the standard tariff assortment of sizing, steps be taken to reduce number of large sizes with corresponding increase in small and medium sizes.

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6. Comment:

Ammunition expenditures for this operation indicate that the use of the current CinCPAC Unit of Fire as an overall balance for estimating ammunition is faulty in balance for use in an operation of this nature. Artillery and mortar ammunition of all categories were used and needed far in excess of the proportions indicated in the unit of fire. Other indications of poor balance were evident.

Recommendation: That the Unit of Fire be restudied in light of ammunition expenditures in the RYUKYUS Operation with a view to providing a better balance between the various components for resupply.

7. Comment:

Although Ordnance maintenance units did magnificent work in proportion to their availability, the experience of this command indicated a need for more 3d and 4th echelon service, particularly for tanks and vehicles. Increased ordnance equipment and attachments of many units to divisions make an ordnance maintenance load far beyond the capacity of the division light maintenance company.

Recommendation: That Ordnance maintenance needs for major landing operations be restudied in the light of increased equipment, and additional maintenance units be allotted for early arrival.

8. Comment:

The currently assigned antitank, 57mm, is entirely unsatisfactory in mobility and has little use other than as a static antitank gun. The M-18 self propelled 76mm weapon was given a combat test by two of the divisions of the Corps and found to meet all requirements in an excellent manner.

Recommendation: (Details covered by memorandum, this Headquarters, to Commanding General, Tenth Army, 27 May 1945)

a. That twelve M-18, 76mm weapons be assigned to each infantry antitank company to replace current major armament. Also that each vehicle be equipped with a caliber .30 bow gun for close protection.

b. That six 57mm recoilless rifles be assigned to the infantry Battalion antitank platoon in lieu of three 57mm antitank guns.

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TROOP LIST
XXIV CORPS
RYUKYUS CAMPAIGN

Listed below are the units which were attached and assigned to the XXIV Corps during the RYUKYUS Campaign. Unless otherwise indicated, these units belonged to the Corps during the entire period 1 April-22 June 1945. In the case of other units, dates of attachment and detachment are indicated:

XXIV CORPS:

MaJ Gen JOHN R HODGE, USA

Hq, XXIV Corps

CORPS TROOPS:

XXIV Corps Arty:

Brig Gen JOSEF R SHEETZ, USA

Hq & Hq Btry, XXIV Corps Arty

142d PI Tm

156th PI Tm

287th FA Obsn Bn

749th FA Bn (8" How)

Henderson Prov Gpat: (Atchd 9 April, Det 7 May)

1st 155mm How Bn (USMC) (Atchd 7 April, Det 23 May)

3d 155mm How Bn (USMC) (Atchd 9 April, Det 7 May)

8th 155mm How Bn (USMC) (Atchd 7 April, Det 7 May)

8th 155mm Gun Bn (USMC) (Atchd 7 April, Det 7 May)

9th 155mm Gun Bn (USMC) (Atchd 9 April, Det 7 May)

419th FA Gp:

Hq & Hq Btry, 419th FA Gp

145th FA Bn (155mm How)

198th FA Bn (155mm How)

225th FA Bn (155mm How)

420th FA Gp:

Hq & Hq Btry, 420th FA Gp

226th FA Bn (155mm Gun) (Atchd 29 May)

531st FA Bn (155mm Gun)

532d FA Bn (155mm Gun)

97th AAA Gp: (Det 20 April)

Hq & Hq Btry, 97th AAA Gp (Det 20 April)

EWT #4 (Det MAWS #7) (Det 20 April)

502d AAA Gun Bn (Det 20 April)

EWT #1 (Det MAWS #8) (Det 20 April)

504th AAA Gun Bn (Det 20 April)

EWT #3 (Det MAWS #8) (Det 20 April)

435th AAA AW Bn (Det 20 April)

Btry C, 294th AAA SL Bn (- 1 Plat) (Det 20 April)

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861st AAA AW Bn (Det 20 April)
Btry A, 295th AAA SL Bn (- 2d Plat) (Det 20 April)

Spec Tre, XXIV Corps:

Hq Co, XXIV Corps
MP Plat, XXIV Corps
APO 285
158th PI Tm
160th PI Tm
161st PI Tm
162d PI Tm
3231st Photo Asgmt Unit
306th Int Serv Orgn
307th Int Serv Orgn
311th Int Serv Orgn (Atchd 9 April)
L Hist Unit
29th JOB Tm
Base Censor Det
224th SIG Det
Civ Corres Gp
JICPOA Tm #28
101st Sig Bn
1178th Engr Cons Gp: (Det 15 April)
Hq & Hq Co, 1176th Engr Cons Gp (Det 15 April)
Co C, 1397th Engr Cons Bn (Det 15 April)
1398th Engr Cons Bn (Det 15 April)
1901st Avn Engr Bn (Det 15 April)
Prov Engr Topo Plat
1165th Engr (C) Gp: (Atchd 9 April, Det 18 April)
Hq & Hq Co, 1165th Engr (C) Gp (Atchd 9 April, Det
34th Engr (C) Bn (Atchd 9 April, Det 18 April) 18 Apr)
152d Engr (C) Bn (Atchd 9 April, Det 18 April)
1341st Engr (C) Bn (Atchd 9 April, Det 18 April)
31st Field Hosp (Det 2 May)
Det 14th Med Lab (Det 2 May)
Det 233d Gen Hosp (Det 2 May)
68th Field Hosp (Atchd 9 April, Det 2 May)
69th Field Hosp (Det 2 May)
1st Ortho Tm, 366th Med Serv Det (Det 2 May)
376th Gen Surg Tm (Det 2 May)
590th Neurosurgical Tm (Det 2 May)
71st Med Bn:
Hq & Hq Det, 71st Med Bn
644th Coll Co (Sep)
645th Coll Co (Sep)
334th Clr Co (Sep)
558th Amb Co (Sep) (Det 2 May)
594th QM Ldry Co (- 3 Plats) (Det 11 May)
122d Mal Contl Unit (Atchd 9 April)
214th Mal Surv Unit
377th Gen Surg Tm (Det 2 May)
366th Med Serv Det (- 1st Ortho Tm) (Det 2 May)
2d Med Sup Tm, Type 4, 726th Med Det (Det 15 April)

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843d Med Sup Tm (Atchd 20 April)
Evacuation Det (USMC) (Atchd 18 April, Det 8 May)
Mil Govt Units:
Det B-6 Mil Govt
Det B-7 Mil Govt (Det 20 June)
Mil Govt Camp Det C-2 (Det 7 May)
Mil Govt Camp Det C-3 (Atchd 13 April, Det 7 May)
Mil Govt Camp Det C-6 (Atchd 13 April, Det 7 May)
1st G-10 Disp (Det 20 June)
2d G-10 Disp (Det 20 June)
3d G-10 Disp (Det 20 June)
5th G-10 Disp
8th G-10 Disp (Det 20 June)
15th G-10 Disp (Atchd 9 April, Det 11 May)
2d G-6 Hoop (Det 7 May)
86th Cml Wpns Bn (Mtz) (-Co A) (Co A Atchd 22 April,
Co B Det 7 May)
713th Tk Bn (-Co B) (Atchd 5 April) (Co B Atchd 15 Apr,
Det 7 May)
3240th QM Serv Co (- 3 Secs)
519th MP Bn (519th MP Bn less Co B Det 19 June)
Co B, 1st Prov MP Bn (Atchd 19 April, Det 7 May)
1st Sound Locator Tm
2d Sound Locator Tm
3d Sound Locator Tm
4th Sound Locator Tm (Atchd 18 April)
5th Sound Locator Tm (Atchd 18 April)
392d Ord Hv Maint Co (Tk) (Atchd 22 April)
404th Ord Med Maint Co
61st Ord Am Co (Atchd 9 April, Det 17 April)
2217th PCA TQM Tm
1st Plat, 637th QM Ldry Co (SM) (Atchd 20 May)
96th Ord Bomb Disp Sqd (Atchd 8 May)
660th QM Fumigation and Bath Co (Atchd 9 May)
4230th QM Sterilization Co (Atchd 9 May)

Corps Shore Party:

Prov Hq, Corps Shore Party
20th Armd Gp:
Hq & Hq Co, 20th Armd Gp
536th Amph Trac Bn
715th Amph Trac Bn (Atchd 22 April)
718th Amph Trac Bn
726th Amph Trac Bn
773d Amph Trac Bn (Atchd 22 April)
788th Amph Trac Bn
708th Amph Tk Bn (Atchd 22 April, Det 29 May)
776th Amph Tk Bn
780th Amph Tk Bn
472d Amph Trk Co (Det 15 April)
474th Amph Trk Co (Det 15 April)
481st Amph Trk Co (Det 15 April)
827th Amph Trk Co (Det 15 April)

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1122d Engr (C) Gp: (Det 15 April)
Hq & Hq Co, 1122d Engr (C) Gp (Det 15 April)
170th Engr (C) Bn (Det 15 April)
173d Engr (C) Bn (Det 15 April)
174th Engr (C) Bn (Det 15 April)
1140th Engr (C) Gp:
Hq & Hq Co, 1140th Engr (C) Gp
50th Engr (C) Bn
104th Engr (C) Bn
120th Engr (C) Bn
504th Port Bn: (Det 15 April)
Hq & Hq Det, 504th Port Bn (Det 15 April)
200th Port Co (Det 15 April)
204th Port Co (Det 15 April)
291st Port Co (Det 15 April)
293d Port Co (Det 15 April)
521st QM Gp: (Det 15 April)
Hq & Hq Det, 521st QM Gp (Det 15 April)
197th QM Bn: (Det 15 April)
Hq & Hq Det, 197th QM Bn (Mbl) (Det 15 April)
3754th QM Trk Co (- vehicles) (Det 15 April)
191st QM Gas Sup Co (Det 15 April)
492d QM Bn: (Det 15 April)
Hq & Hq Det, 492d QM Bn (Det 15 April)
347th QM Dep Sup Co (- 1 Plat) (Det 15 April)
244th QM Dep Sup Co (Det 15 April)
3008th QM Gr Reg Co (- 4 Plats)
3063d QM Gr Reg Co (- 1st & 2d Plats) (Det 15 April)
1st Plat, 368th Engr Maint Co (Det 15 April)
1068th Engr Dep Co (Det 15 April)
163d Ord Dep Co (Det 15 April)
Det, 196th Ord Dep Co (Det 15 April)
3260th QM Serv Co (Det 15 April)
832d Ord Am Co (Det 29 April)
644th Ord Am Co (Det 15 April)
284th Ord Hv Maint Co (Tk) (Det 15 April)
Det, 563d Ord Maint Co (AAA) (Det 15 April)
1445th Engr SL Maint Tm (Det 20 April)
1st Prov Cml Det (Det 15 April)
4342d QM Serv Co (Det 15 April)

1ST MAR DIV, REINF: (Atchd 30 April, Det 7 May)
(III Phil Corps) Maj Gen P A DEL VALLE, USMC

7TH INF DIV, REINF: Maj Gen ARCHIBALD V ARNOLD, USA

7th Inf Div:

4th Bn, 11th FA Regt (105mm How) (USMC) (Atchd 8 April,
Det 30 April)
711th Tk Bn
91st Cml Wpns Co (Sep) (Det 7 May)

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204th Ord Bomb Disp Sqd
52d Ptbl Surg Hosp
66th Ptbl Surg Hosp (Det 20 June)
5th Med Museum and Arts Det
2d Plat, 3008th QM Gr Reg Co
40th War Dog Plat
75th JASCO (75th JASCO less ALP & SFCP Det 15 April)
2211th POA TQM Tm
3233d Photo Asgmt Unit
7th CIC Det
34th JOB Tm
132th PI Tm
Base Censor Det
News Tm C, 1st Info & Hist Serv
310th Int Serv Orgn
Civ Corres Gp
Det A-4 Mil Govt
Det B-4 Mil Govt
4th G-10 Disp
1 Sec, 3240th QM Serv Co

96TH INF DIV, REINF:

Maj Gen JAMES L BRADLEY, USA

96th Inf Div:

1st Bn, 11th FA Regt (75mm Pack How) (USMC) (Atchd
8 April, Det 30 April)
763d Tk Bn
206th Ord Disp Sqd
51st Ptbl Surg Hosp
67th Ptbl Surg Hosp
2212th POA TQM Tm
1 Sec, 3240th QM Serv Co
3d Plat, 3008th QM Gr Reg Co
41st War Dog Plat
593d JASCO (593d JASCO less ALP & SFCP Det 15 April)
3236th Photo Asgmt Unit
96th CIC Det
38th JOB Tm
140th PI Tm
Base Censor Det
News Tm A, 1st Info & Hist Serv
314th Int Serv Orgn
Civ Corres Gp

77TH INF DIV, REINF: (Atchd 22 Apr) Maj Gen ANDREW D BRUCE, USA

77th Inf Div: (Atchd 22 April)

706th Tk Bn
98th Ptbl Surg Hosp
98th Ptbl Surg Hosp (Atchd 9 April, Det 24 May)

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292d JASCO (292d JASCO less ALP & SFCF Det 16 May)
2218th PCA TQM Tm
Det 27, 3117th Sig Serv Bn (Atchd 16 June)
5234th Photo Asgmt Unit (Det 16 June)
4th Plat, 3008th QM Gr Reg Co (Atchd 1 May)
1 Sec, 3240th QM Serv Co
93d Ord Bomb Disp Sqd (Atchd 2 May)
77th CIC Det
38th JOB Tm
158th FI Tm
Base Censor Det
News Tm B, 1st Info & Hist Serv (Det 18 June)
312th Int Serv Orgn
Civ Corres Cp
Det A-6 Mil Govt
Det B-5 Mil Govt (Det 20 June)
9th G-10 Disp (Det 20 June)

27TH INF DIV. REINF: (Atchd 9 April, Det 1 May)
Maj Gen GEORGE W GRINER, Jr, USA
27th Inf Div: (Atchd 9 April, Det 1 May)

2d Bn, 11th FA Regt (105mm How) (USMC) (Atchd 9 April,
Det 30 April)
3d Bn, 11th FA Regt (105mm How) (USMC) (Atchd 9 April,
Det 30 April)
193d Tk Bn
93th Ftbl Surg Hosp
219th Mal Surv Unit
95th Ord Bomb Disp Sqd
45th QM War Dog Plat
1st Plat, 3063d QM Gr Reg Co
594th JASCO
157th FI Tm
5240th Photo Asgmt Unit
311th Int Serv Orgn
Civ Corres Orgn
35th JOB Tm
Opn Tm Type #1, CIC
Hq & Adm Tm Type #1, CIC
18th G-10 Disp (Atchd 9 April, Det 11 May)
Det, B-10 Mil Govt (Atchd 9 April, Det 11 May)

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HEADQUARTERS XXIV CORPS
APO 235

OFFICERS ROSTER

1 April 1945 to 30 June 1945

NAME	RANK	ASN	A/SV	DUTY
<u>COMMANDING GENERAL</u>				
HODGE, John R.	Lt Gen	07285	USA	
<u>AIDE-DE-CAMP</u>				
McLAUGHLIN, Chas V	Maj	01291306	ADC	
<u>CHIEF OF STAFF</u>				
GARVIN, Crump	Brig Gen	012745	GSC	Chief of Staff
STROTHER, Kenneth C	Col	015758	GSC	DC/S for Operations
NEWELL, Frank W	Maj	01292387	INF	Ln Officer 16 Jun
OSMERS, Frank C Jr	Maj	01288695	INF	Ln Officer (Trfd G-3)
YOUNG, Wayne B	Maj	0345021	FA	TD G-1 (TDR&R 22 May 45)
GREEN, Robert A	Capt	01285413	INF	Ln Officer
LUCAS, Eino T	CWO	W2110873	USA	Chief Adm Asst
<u>G-1</u>				
SINCLAIR, Duncan	Col	019757	GSC	AC of S, G-1
JARRETT, Paul J	Maj	0345140	GSC	Asst
DAVIS, Robert	1st Lt	0353439	INF	Asst
<u>G-2</u>				
NEST, Cecil W	Col	015274	GSC	AC of S, G-2
BEATY, Harry L	Lt Col	0317010	GSC	Asst
TIDMARCH, Harold A	Maj	023916	CAV	Asst (Evac 23 May 45)
*SHEPARD, Maurice L	Maj	0304158	INF	PRO
*ELLIOTT, Marvin A	Capt	0451951	INF	Asst
*KELCHER, Reynolds R	Capt	023941	CAV	Asst (Dptd 28 May 45)

*Attached
**In addition to regular duties

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NAME	RANK	ASN	A/SV	DUTY
BEHN, Daniel R	Capt	0363016	FA	Asst
*GAILLARD, John P	Capt	01635227	EC	Asst (Dptd 20 May 45)
*KARTEN, Mortimer K	Capt	01263441	INF	Asst (Dptd 24 Apr 45)
*APPLEMAN, Roy E	Capt	01946747	MI	PRO (Arrived 3 Jun 45)
NEWLIN, Donald E	WOJG	W2133109	USA	Chief Adm Asst

Teams Attached to G-2

HEALY, Richard D	Capt	01039176	CWS	141 Photo Inter Team
HELIZEL, Alan S	1st Lt	0625403	CAC	141 Photo Inter Team
SEEBURGER, Robert F	1st Lt	01033533	CAC	160 Photo Inter Team
STRADA, Joseph S	2d Lt	01594209	QMC	160 Photo Inter Team
TRUMP, Vincent A	1st Lt	0576531	AC	161 Photo Inter Team
RAFKIND, Sam P	1st Lt	01180302	FA	161 Photo Inter Team
TENKSBURY, Herbert C	1st Lt	0348413	CAC	162 Photo Inter Team
KUNKEN, Norman H	2d Lt	01322267	INF	162 Photo Inter Team
CRUDEN, Donald G	Capt	0384042	OMP	142 Photo Inter Team
HADDOW, Girwood E	Capt	01635996	SC	156 Photo Inter Team
JUSTIS, Gelmuth A	1st Lt	0854836	AC	156 Photo Inter Team
HAZARD, Benj H Jr	1st Lt	0545304	MI	306 Hq Int Det
CLARK, Eugene W	1st Lt	0550460	MI	306 Intery Team
BOTHWELL, Joseph Jr	2d Lt	0550304	MI	307 Hq Int Det 45)
MAZNEK, Nicholas	2d Lt	01326104	INF	29th SOB Tm (Evac 6 Apr
CRENT, Malcolm I	2d Lt	01325821	INF	29th " (Trfd 7 Jun 45)
DAVIDSON, Frank L	Lt (jg)	232561	USNR	Civilian Inter Team
SASS, Walter E	Lt (jg)	232277	USNR	Civilian Inter Team
LaMOET, Kenneth C	Lt (jg)	232769	USNR	Civilian Inter Team
ZASLOW, Milton S	1st Lt	0545869	MI	JICPOA Team
HALL, George R	1st Lt	0571901	AC	" (Dptd 11 Apr 45)
ARNER, Donald F	Lt (jg)	233976	USNR	" (Dptd 30 Jun 45)
DOKOVAN, James J	Lt (jg)	228039	USNR	" (Dptd 30 Jun 45)
THEORLAKSSON, Niels E	Lt (jg)	246374	USNR	" (Dptd 10 Jun 45)
KRENE, Donald L	Lt (jg)	236726	USNR	" (Dptd 29 Jun 45)
GORDON, William R	Capt	01304716	INF	224 CIC Det (Aspd 1 May)
APWOOD, William H	1st Lt	01184977	FA	" " (Trfd 14 May 45)
GORMAN, Edw A Jr	2d Lt	02012424	MI	" "
BAKENELL, Alexander	2d Lt	02012423	MI	" " (Trfd 1 May 45)
MULFORD, Donald L	Capt	0365019	FA	1st Info & Hist Sv (Dptd 9 Jun 45)
TUCKER, Jack	1st Lt	01320790	INF	1st Info & Hist Sv (Dptd 4 Jun 45)
RUTH, John E	Capt	01002512	AUS	2223 Base Censor Det
JOHNSON, Willis V	1st Lt	0349037	AUS	2223 Base Censor Det
DOWNING, Archie E	1st Lt	01170235	AUS	2223 Base Censor Det
BERTEAU, Thomas F	1st Lt	01176233	AUS	2223 Base Censor Det
KRIENKE, Arthur G	1st Lt	0466649	SC	3231 Sig Serv Det

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NAME	RANK	ASN	A/SV	DUFY
<u>G-3</u>				
GUSPARD, John W	Col	0253797	GSC	AC of S, G-3
MOORE, Norvell H	Lt Col	0401686	GSC	Asst(Asgd PM 17 May 45)
JENKINS, Farish A	Lt Col	0361621	FA	Asst 14 May 45)
COOLIDGE, Joseph B	Lt Col	016570	INF	Asst(Arrived on TD
PEASE, Clarence H	Maj	0365151	INF	Asst
BELLOWS, Charles S	Maj	0104009	CAC	Asst(Trfd C/S 16 Jun 45)
BOYER, Martin E III	Capt	0416011	INF	Asst
HAMPTON, Orville H	Capt	0373801	FA	I&E Off(Trfd 11 May 45)
NEBLOCK, Herman G	Capt	01306308	INF	Asst
*WOOD, Samuel S	Capt	0339123	INF	Asst
WARD, James G Jr	1st Lt	0111532	CE	I&E Off(Asgd 11 Jun 45)

G-4

MILLER, Guy V	Col	0296978	GSC	AC of S, G-4
BARROW, Aquilla	Lt Col	0294311	INF	Plans
LEWIS, Reece H	Lt Col	0268344	FA	Asst (TDR&R 22 May 45)
NICHOLS, Herbert Jr	Maj	0453120	FA	Operations
*NURKIN, Spencer E	Maj	0330988	INF	Asst (Dptd 3 Jun 45)
WOMACK, Neal H	Capt	01036094	CWS	Operations
EASTMAN, Samuel V	Capt	0374456	INF	Asst

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S SECTION

BIGGERSTAFF, Wm E	Col	0391952	AGD	Adjutant General
BOARDMAN, Charles D	Lt Col	0224659	AGD	AG Exec(Trfd 13 Apr 45)
MORROW, Glenn C	Maj	0143214	AGD	Asst AG(Asgd 19 May 45)
DOBYNS, Frank F	Maj	01000350	AGD	Personnel
WAHL, Edwin E	Capt	0368418	AGD	Miscellaneous
BRADLEY, Charles P	Capt	01895047	AGD	Records
**JOHNSON, Velby K	1st Lt	0236204	AGD	Postal Officer
LSMA, Philip E	1st Lt	01044879	CAC	Personnel(Asgd 16 Apr 45)
*KINKAM, Floyd H	1st Lt	01054650	CAC	O Courier(Dptd 18 Jun 45)
*HARRIS, Lewis M	1st Lt	01170427	FA	O Courier(ArrTD 8 Jun 45)
ROGERS, James L	GWO	W2103379	USA	Publications

MILITARY GOVT SECTION

*BUEHLER, Martin S	Lt Comdr	99386	USNR	Chief of Mil Govt (Dptd 30 Jun 45)
*MURFIN, Thomas H	Lt (jg)	292917	USNR	Asst (Dptd 30 Jun 45)
*McDONNELL, Thomas E	Capt	01030469	CAC	Asst (Dptd 1 Jun 45)
*McENANEY, Clifford J	Capt	0906959	AC	Asst (Dptd 24 Jun 45)
*O'CONNOR, J E Jr	Lt (jg)	307189	USNR	Asst (Dptd 1 Jun 45)

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Officers Roster, Hq XXIV Corps, Cont'd

NAME	RANK	ASN	A/SV	DUTY
<u>ENGINEER SECTION</u>				
LENOX, George H	Col	0262899	CE	Corps Engineer
BOYKIN, Luke H	Lt Col	0396812	CE	Asst Engr (Exec)
*OGDEN, Paul J	Lt Col	0296069	CE	Asst (Dptd 18 May 45)
REED, Fred D	Capt	0305569	CE	Cpns (Trfd 5 Apr 45)
DUNLAP, Frederick A	Capt	0112668	CE	Supply (Trfd 11 May 45)
LIGON, Grover C Jr	Capt	0290281	CE	Operations
*DIRMEYER, Richard D	1st Lt	0444842	CE	Intelligence
*DUDLEY, William H	Capt	01287323	CE	Supply
FOOTE, Norman S	1st Lt	0407955	CE	Asst (Asgd 8 Apr 45)
<u>FINANCE SECTION</u>				
GRAHAM, Luke B	Col	017756	FD	Corps Fin Off
TOTTERDALE, David W	Capt	0573696	FD	Asst
CAMPBELL, Thomas M	1st Lt	01280834	FD	Asst
<u>CHEMICAL SECTION</u>				
DOXEY, Thomas A Jr	Col	019978	CWS	Corps Cml Officer
WEIGHT, Herbert C	Maj	0315404	CWS	Asst
<u>SPECIAL SERVICE SECTION</u>				
COMSTOCK, George S	Lt Col	0276145	SAV	Spec Sv Officer
RAMSEY, Ross B	Capt	0419777	FA	Asst (Ret 30 May 45)
ANDERSON, David S	Capt	0425943	FA	Asst (Asgd 28 May 45)
<u>QUARTERMASTER SECTION</u>				
NIHUS, Ward R	Col	0343356	QMC	Corps Quartermaster
MILLER, Athel W	Lt Col	0380090	QMC	Asst Corps QM (Trfd
*CALDWELL, Thomas B	Maj	0220652	QMC	Supply 11 May 45)
MORRIS, Henry F	Maj	01573442	QMC	Supply
ALLBRIGHT, Wm Jr	Capt	0455608	QMC	Supply
<u>ORDNANCE SECTION</u>				
POWELL, Grosvenor F	Col	018322	ORD	Corps Ord Officer
LANTHER, J Paul	Lt Col	0481590	ORD	Asst Ord Officer
MOODY, Norman F	Maj	0393575	ORD	War Plane
HENDERSON, John W	Maj	0383433	ORD	Supply
FREEMAN, William J	Capt	0455935	ORD	Maintenance
MARTINSON, Raymond	Capt	0424051	ORD	Ammunition
*FUNK, William H	1st Lt	0336389	ORD	(Dptd 3 May 45)
*PLENCE, James E	1st Lt	0337118	ORD	(Dptd 3 May 45)
*WAGNER, Paul A	1st Lt	0374702	ORD	(Dptd 3 May 45)
KEMPF, Charles W	WOJG	W3153258	USA	Chief Adm Asst (Aptd 25 May 45)

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Officers Roster, Hq XXIV Corps, Cont'd

<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>ASN</u>	<u>A/SV</u>	<u>DUTY</u>
<u>SURGEON'S SECTION</u>				
POTTER, Laurence A	Col	022294	MC	Corps Surgeon
DERRICK, Clifton J	Lt Col	0260129	MC	Plans&Tng (TDR&R 12 May 45)
AUERBACH, Joseph	Lt Col	0336005	MS	Med Inspector
BULLIS, Stanley W	Maj	01533268	MAG	Supply (Trfd 11 May 45)
WECKESSER, Paul F	Maj	0417178	MAG	Adm (Trfd 11 May 45)
MELTON, Frank	Capt	01542606	MAG	Supply (Asgd 20 May 45)
TARBETT, Ralph L	1st Lt	0531564	Sn C	W Pt Inspector
MARINO, Leslie P	WOJG	W2133105	USA	Chief Adm Asst

SIGNAL SECTION

MURRAY, Thomas J	Col	0296105	SC	Corps Sig Off (Dptd 11 May 45)
KELSEY, John E	Col	021061	SC	Corps-Sig Off (Asgd 10 May 45)
SWAN, Arthur G	Maj	0363155	SC	Asst (Trfd 11 May 45)
KELLY, Major L	Maj	0292163	SC	Asst (Asgd 20 Jun 45)
FRIED, Stanley H	Capt	01633223	SC	Asst (TDR&R 9 May 45)
HESS, George	Capt	01842967	SC	Asst
*RYATT, John	2d Lt	01649830	SC	Asst (Arrived on TD 19 May 45)

JUDGE ADVOCATE'S SECTION

POTTER, Willis A	Lt Col	0299742	JAGD	Corps Judge Advocate
RISE, George R	Maj	0917402	JAGD	Asst

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*RUTH, John E	Capt	01002512	NO	Censor
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INSPECTOR GENERAL'S SECTION

STUBBS, Louis F W	Lt Col	0170245	IGD	Corps Inspector General
McMASTERS, Cecil C	Maj	0355726	IGD	Asst
STUBBS, Archie F	Maj	0361805	IGD	Asst

CHAPLAIN'S SECTION

NEWMAN, Phillip J	Ch (Col)	0370006	USA	Corps Chaplain
CURTIS, Reuben E	Ch(Lt Col)	0262460	USA	Asst

ARTILLERY SECTION

**SHESTZ, Josef R	Brig Gen	09720	USA	
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Officers Roster, Hq XXIV Corps, Cont'd

<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>ASN</u>	<u>A/SV</u>	<u>DUTY</u>
<u>AIR SECTION</u>				
EMERSON, Arthur	Lt Col	0100813	FA	
LOGAN, George	Lt Col	0148742	AC	(Jd 24 Jun 45)
*CROSBY, John W	Capt	0589705	AC	(Reid 25 Jun 45)
*McCARTHY, Robert C	Capt	0405293	AC	(Reid 26 May 45)
*FISHER, Sheldon	Capt	0424601	AC	(Reid 25 Jun 45)
FRISSONE, Enrico D	1st Lt	0461129	AC	(Reid 25 Jun 45)
<u>NAVAL GUNFIRE SECTION</u>				
FRANSON, Paul C Jr	Lt Col	0357735	CAC	Naval Gunfire Officer
FERRELL, James C	1st Lt	01170733	FA	Asst
NASH, Richard C	1st Lt	01170883	FA	Asst (TD to NCF Sch
NORTH, Richard	1st Lt	01169674	FA	Asst 7 Jun 45)
<u>TRANSPORTATION SECTION</u>				
DALY, Donald A	Maj	0332148	CAC	(Trfd 23 May 45)
BENNETT, Edward E	Capt	025463	GE	
JONES, Donald B Jr	Capt	0399857	TC	(TD&R 22 May 45)
*PERKINS, Charles R	Capt	01103852	GE	(Arrived 5 May 45)
CARTER, Gale A	1st Lt	01060586	FA	
<u>PROVOST MARSHAL AND MP SECTION</u>				
MOORE, Norvell H	Lt Col	0401866	INF	PM (Asgd 17 May 45)
NELSON, Glen A	Lt Col	0301979	INF	PM (Trfd 12 May 45)
LEED, Leonard W	Capt	0415707	GMF	Asst
COPELAND, Sterling W	1st Lt	01797791	GMF	MP Plat (WIA 6 Apr 45)
BURROWS, James R	2d Lt	0537374	INF	MP Platoon
*KELLY, Edwin J Jr	2d Lt	0537888	INF	MP Plat (Dptd 7 May 45)
<u>HEADQUARTERS COMDT</u>				
YOUNG, Stanley A	Lt Col	0221511	INF	Hq Comdt
<u>HEADQUARTERS COMPANY</u>				
COX, Eldridge H	Capt	01577052	QMC	CO, Hq Company
ZIEG, Camell A	1st Lt	01575293	QMC	Mess Officer
CARROLL, John M	1st Lt	0488941	QMC	Trans (Trfd 7 Jun 45)
VANZANT, James E	1st Lt	0621542	INF	Platoon Leader
KIMM, John A	1st Lt	01315943	INF	Supply Officer
RINDHAGE, Fred W	1st Lt	01381440	INF	Executive
ROBERTSON, Henry W	1st Lt	01328789	INF	Platoon Leader
DILLON, Frances J	1st Lt	0439067	INF	Transportation
HOLMES, John G	2d Lt	01329366	INF	Platoon Leader

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Officers Roster, Hq XXIV Corps, Cont'd

NAME	RANK	ASN	A/SV	DUTY
<u>MEDICAL DETACHMENT</u>				
BOECK, Virgil H F	Capt	0424491	MC	Med Det (Asgd 20 Jun 45)
GRACE, James J	Capt	0439870	MC	CC Med Det (Trfd 22 Jun)
NECLERIO, Thomas A	Capt	0502950	DC	Dental Officer
<u>XXIV CORPS ARTILLERY</u>				
SHEETZ, Josef R	Brig Gen	08720	USA	Commanding General
HANCOCK, Charles R	1st Lt	0519249	ADC	Aide-de-Camp
TAYLOR, Robert L	Col	014940	FA	Asst Arty Officer
MOLSMORE, Ephraim H	Col	017184	FA	Exec Officer
WOOD, Milford W	Maj	0342580	FA	S-2
MILLER, Charles F	Lt Col	0263304	FA	S-3
WAGGONER, Edwin P Jr	Lt Col	0231328	FA	S-4
FUERBRINGER, Ralph O	1st Lt	0514707	FA	Adjutant

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NAME	RANK	A/SV
KERBY, K D	Lt Col	USMC (Rel'd 20 May 45)
KURETICH, W A	Lt Col	USMC (Arr 10 May 45;
BEST, George J	Lt Col	USMC assumed comd
BARAN, W A	Maj	USMC 20 May 45)
MOORE, J R	Maj	USMC
BERTLING, John D	Maj	USMC
NISHWITZ, F S	Capt	USMC
PAYNE, H E	Capt	USMC
ROGERS, R A Jr	Capt	USMCR
AVEY, Fred V	Capt	USMC
JONES, A M	1st Lt	USMCR
NELSON, J	1st Lt	USMCR
SHORT, J F	1st Lt	USMC
SPEAKER, J M	1st Lt	USMC
WOLFORD, Gayle W	1st Lt	AC
FAUNCE, Michael E	1st Lt	AC
KAUTH, Robert N	Lt (jg)	USNR
CROAS, W D	2d Lt	USMC
RUFFEL, J B	2d Lt	USMC
SHIPLE, E E II	2d Lt	USMC
SMITH, A J	2d Lt	USMC
NEALS, E C	2d Lt	USMC
GARKER, W T	Lt	USNR
ULLMER, Ronald G	Ensign	USNR
DAUGHERTY, William E	Ensign	USNR

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OBSERVERS

<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>ASN</u>	<u>A/SV</u>	<u>DATE RETD</u>	<u>DATE DPTD</u>
HOWE, James H	Col	09757	JRF	4 Mar 45	11 Apr 45
TODD, William N Jr	Col	09773	CAV	5 Mar 45	13 Apr 45
BABCOCK, C Stanton	Col	016104	GSC	3 Mar 45	13 Apr 45
MATEOK, William L	Col	0255411	FA	4 Mar 45	Deceased
ACKERMAN, John B	Col	018706	AC	5 Mar 45	13 Apr 45
EDWARDS, Frank W	Lt Col	0318595	INF	13 Feb 45	29 May 45
KAUFMAN, Moses R	Lt Col	0478184	MC	29 Feb 45	27 Apr 45
READS, Edward G	Lt Col		CAC (RCA)	27 Feb 45	11 Apr 45
ASHMAN, Alfred	Lt Col	019846	GSC	3 Mar 45	13 Apr 45
LANGFORD, Clarence A	Lt Col	021079	GSC	12 Mar 45	13 Apr 45
FRESTON, Walter J	Lt Col	0450095	FA	4 Mar 45	13 Apr 45
TRIMBLE, Homer	Lt Col	0216326	OE	3 Mar 45	13 Apr 45
WILLIAMS, Robert C Jr	Lt Col	022091	INF	3 Mar 45	10 Apr 45
LYNCH, James K	Comdr	138118	USNR	6 Mar 45	4 May 45
FOCKLER, Emerson F	Maj	0413352	MC	20 Feb 45	10 Apr 45
SA BOURIN, Charles A	Maj		(RCA)	27 Feb 45	11 Apr 45
CUNNINGTON, Douglas W	Maj		RCE (RCA)	27 Feb 45	2 May 45
BOGLE, Roy T	Maj		RCEME (RCA)	27 Feb 45	11 Apr 45
BREAUVE, Gilbert A	Maj		GIC (RCA)	27 Feb 45	11 Apr 45
SHIRLEY, Walter O	Maj	0407206	INF	9 May 45	10 May 45
KOWDER, Charles O	Maj	0292834	INF	28 Feb 45	10 May 45
MYERS, George H	Maj	0301722	INF	9 Mar 45	30 Apr 45
ADAMS, H J Jr	Maj	05540	USMC	18 Mar 45	Evacuated 8 Apr 45
McMATH, C B Jr	Maj	0293932	GSC	12 Apr 45	1 May 45
WILKENFELD, Allen D	Capt	01824260	FA	9 May 45	10 May 45
ULRICH, Fred R	Capt	0453148	INF	25 Feb 45	11 Apr 45
EDMONSTONS, James A	Capt		RCASC (RCA)	28 Feb 45	11 Apr 45
HART, Samuel W D	Capt		RCAMC (RCA)	28 Feb 45	11 Apr 45
LAWSON, Walter R	Capt		GIC (RCA)	28 Feb 45	11 Apr 45
PURDY, Carl E	Capt		GIC (RCA)	28 Feb 45	11 Apr 45
SMART, Alexander C	Capt		RCS (RCA)	28 Feb 45	11 Apr 45

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The Public Relations Office assisted the following correspondents during the RYUKYU Campaign; 1 April to 30 June 1945:

<u>Name</u>	<u>Service or Paper</u>
John Leonard	Reuters
Julien Hart	International News Service
Warren Kaseow	New York TIMES
Robert Coons	Associated Press
Ed Thomas	United Press
Al Mc Coy	Kansas City STAR
William Mc Giffin	Chicago DAILY NEWS
Homer Bryant	New York HERALD TRIBUNE
Tom Stowe	American Red Cross
William Lawrence	New York TIMES
John Beaufort	Christian Science Monitor
Malcolm Johnson	New York SUN
Frank Smith	Chicago TIMES
Tom Morrow	Chicago TRIBUNE
George Valens	United Press
Harb Paul	Minneapolis STAR JOURNAL
Eugene Smith	Life Magazine
Paige Abbott	International News Photos
Eugene Sherman	Los Angeles TIMES
George Burns	Yank Magazine
Bill Reed	Yank Magazine
Raymond Coll	Honolulu ADVERTISER
Roy Cummings	Honolulu STAR BULLETIN
Dillon Ferris	Yank Magazine
Justin Gray	Yank Magazine
Nixon Denton	Cincinnati STAR TIMES
Bill Land	Mid-Pacific
Gordon Cossedick	Cleveland PLAIN DEALER
Sanny Goldstein	International News Photos
Bill Harlan	Australian Press
William Warden	Saturday Evening Post
H. Knowlton	American Red Cross
Julien Garrett	American Red Cross
Robert Taylor	Newark NEWS
Chio Chu	Chung King
Jill Bundy	Kings Features
Bob Sanick	Fox Movietone
Chuck Jerry	Associated Press
Walter Davenport	Colliers
Bob Golger	Associated Press
Geo. Mc Williams	International News Service
Joe Hainline	National Broadcasting System
Norman Faige	Columbia Broadcasting System
Tim Leitner	Blue Network
Ed Jones	Atlantic Monthly
Al Dobkang	Associated Press
Cecil B. Jackson	Cannett
Jack Horley	Blue Network
Axel Olson	The Argus
Allyn Lee	Sydney MORNING HERALD
P. D. Falne Jr.	Fortune

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<u>Name</u>	<u>Service or Paper</u>
Leslie Nichols	Mutual Broadcasting System
Rudolph Erie Jr.	Boston HERALD
Bob Cusimino	Associated Press
Milton Chase	W. L. W.
H. H. Smith	Chicago TRIBUNE
Mack Johnson	New York HERALD TRIBUNE

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

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