STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

THE ARMY'S INDIVIDUAL AUGMENTATION MANAGEMENT SYSTEM: A TEMPORARY EXPEDIENT OR A VIABLE ARMY-WIDE PROGRAM?

BY

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The Army's Individual Augmentation Management System: A Temporary Expedient or a Viable Army-Wide Program?

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ABSTRACT

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The Army has used individual augmentation or personnel on temporary change of station (TCS) status, to support military contingency and humanitarian assistance operations since the early 1990s. This system supplements the Individual Replacement System. The Army uses it to offset personnel shortages and personnel imbalances. The individual TCS reassignment system has proven quite successful during short-term contingency operations. However, this has not been the case for long-term contingency operations as evidenced during the ongoing Stabilization Force (SFOR) peacekeeping mission in the Balkans. Lack of proper accountability and ineffective tracking procedures of individual augmentees have caused significant problems during the SFOR mission. Until the Army can arrive at an acceptable solution to the personnel shortage crisis and provide doctrine that precludes field commanders from demanding personnel resources beyond their modified table of organization and equipment requirements, it will remain dependent on TCS personnel. Therefore, the Army must develop and implement formal standing operating procedures to account for, replace, and track individual augmentees in a timely manner to maximize personnel readiness and support deployed and deploying commanders. Presently, the Army does not have coordinated visibility of worldwide individual augmentation requirements or personnel fills, or a central point of contact for individual augmentation management—or even procedural guidance covering all aspects of individual augmentation management. This study explains how the Army's current Individual Augmentation Management System operates, assesses its impact on readiness, and recommends a proven personnel management and information system to account for, replace, and track individual augmentees for Army-wide implementation. The recommended system was developed and tested by United States Army Europe and implemented on 6 October 1998 in support of Operation Joint Forge in the Balkans.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

x

THE ARMY'S INDIVIDUAL AUGMENTATION MANAGEMENT SYSTEM: A TEMPORARY EXPEDIENT OR A VIABLE ARMY-WIDE PROGRAM?

> TCS personnel processing and accounting continues to be a problem. Telephone calls from the field and analyses of data indicate that the TCS process is not fully understood by commanders and personnel service support (PSS) personnel. All processing requirements must be accomplished to ensure that only qualified soldiers deploy and to ensure accountability for the forward deployed force.
>
> Omer F. Dalton
> Chief, Readiness and Accounting Branch
> U.S. Total Army Personnel Command
> 26 September 1997

The U.S. Army's struggle to fill its ranks remains a challenge as we enter the 21st century. On 23 June 1999, General Eric K. Shinseki, Army Chief of Staff, declared that "manning the force is an urgent priority."[1] The present personnel shortage, mainly due to today's recruitment and in specific cases to retention challenges, is clearly affecting unit readiness, individual soldier morale, and the Army's ability to support smaller-scale contingency (SSC) operations as part of our National Military Strategy. As long as the United States remains a superpower and is committed to defending existing and future democratic societies throughout the world, it will be globally engaged in SSC operations. "From 1949 to 1989, the Army participated in 10 major operations; since 1989, the Army has participated in 29 of the 33 major Department of Defense (DOD) operations, supplying over 2/3 of the forces required."[2] Furthermore, "based on recent experience and intelligence projections, the demand for smaller-scale contingency operations is expected to remain high over the next 15 to 20 years."[3] Therefore, individual augmentation by means of temporary change of station (TCS) status will continue to play an important role in future contingency operations as these expedients have done since Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm.

The Army has used individual augmentation (active component, reserve component on active duty, and civilian personnel) on TCS status to support military contingency and humanitarian assistance operations since the early 1990s. Presently, the Army has over 900 individual augmentees supporting contingency operations worldwide. This system—which supplements the Individual Replacement System due to personnel shortages, personnel imbalances, and priority of fills—has been quite successful during short-term contingency operations. However, this has not been the case during long-term contingency operations as evidenced during the ongoing Stabilization Force (SFOR) peacekeeping mission in the Balkans. Lack of proper accountability and ineffective tracking procedures of individual augmentees by Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), have been a constant problem.

HQDA uses the individual TCS reassignment to temporarily reassign soldiers as augmentees or temporary fillers to a deployed or deploying unit in support of a contingency operation. These soldiers remain assigned to their home station units and return to their permanent home stations upon redeployment, unless otherwise directed by HQDA. Soldiers may be reassigned TCS from Continental

United States (CONUS) to CONUS, CONUS to Outside Continental United States (OCONUS), OCONUS to CONUS, and OCONUS to OCONUS.[4] This way of doing business has become the norm rather than the exception for maintaining units at deployable personnel levels after internal cross-leveling. It presents challenges for commanders, personnel managers, individual soldiers, and family members.

Efficient management of our limited and over-taxed personnel resources has become critical to our overall mission success. Presently, HQDA lacks a central tasking/tracking system for global individual augmentation requirements (active component, reserve component on active duty, and civilian personnel), a coordinated visibility of global individual augmentation requirements, procedural guidance for management of individual augmentation, and total individual augmentee accountability.[5] Until the Army can arrive at an acceptable solution to the personnel shortage crisis and provide doctrine that precludes field commanders from demanding personnel resources beyond their modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE) requirements, it will remain dependent on TCS personnel. Therefore, the Army must develop and implement formal procedures to account for, replace, and track individual augmentees in a timely manner to maximize personnel readiness and support deployed and deploying commanders.

Although individual augmentation on TCS status is not a new personnel procedure, commanders today are more dependent than ever on this system during deployments. During Operation Joint Endeavor (OJE), the augmentation of the 1st Armored Division with TCS soldiers from other units became critical to mission success.[6] During Operation Joint Forge (OJF), the 1st Calvary Division was also dependent on individual augmentees and augmentation cells to support unique task organization requirements and personnel shortfalls. The augmentation supported coordination with the media, government agencies, nongovernmental organizations, private organizations, other multinational forces and civil-military elements.[7] This study explains how the Army's current Individual Augmentation Management System operates, assesses its impact on readiness, and recommends a proven personnel management and information system to account for and track individual augmentees for Army-wide implementation. The recommended system was developed and tested by United States Army Europe (USAREUR) and implemented on 6 October 1998 in support of Operation Joint Forge in the Balkans.

BACKGROUND

Although individual augmentation is based on borrowed military manpower, it has become a steady-state replacement process for long-term contingency operations.[8] Presently, individual augmentation tracked by USAREUR in support of SFOR-6 accounts for 7% of the OJF Army requirements—consisting of 433 military and civilian positions.[9] Of the 378 military requirements, HQDA sources 299 and USAREUR sources 79. During Operation Joint Endeavor, Operation Joint Guard (OJG), and now in Operation Joint Forge, USAREUR and later Forces Command (FORSCOM) could not

2

fill all personnel requirements without external support through individual augmentation. Filling all the requested requirements would have further degraded their units' level of readiness; in some cases, the necessary skills did not exist in USAREUR. As a result, these major commands (MACOMs) requested individual augmentation, in both low- and high-density military occupational specialties (MOS), from HQDA to fill their ranks. Among the most requested MOSs were military intelligence (Serbo-Croatian linguists), engineers, civil affairs, administration, and logistics. These augmentation requests then posed challenges to other MACOMs tasked by HQDA to fill personnel requirements. They predictably defended their own inventories in order to accomplish their own assigned missions and tasks. In some cases, MACOMs' rebuttals delayed filling vacant positions and caused underlaps in key positions, thereby jeopardizing certain missions. In turn, MACOMs across the Army struggled to identify and reassign timely individual augmentees to support the Balkans mission.

Until October 1998, the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (ODCSPER); the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (ODCSOPS); and the 1st Personnel Command (1st PERSCOM) in USAREUR; along with the United States Total Army Personnel Command (USTAPERSCOM) and HQDA ODCSOPS tracked the status of TCS personnel requirements and fills on individual spreadsheets and stovepipe databases. The tracking system was unreliable, offering only poor accountability, limited visibility of requirements, and untimely identification of replacements and of vacancies in key positions. These areas of concern began to negatively affect the supporting MACOMs and individual soldiers. Confusion reigned: Who was to fill what position? Short-fuse suspenses were rampant. Personnel managers at both USTAPERSCOM and 1st PERSCOM were bandaging what had become an unwieldy replacement system to keep as many positions filled as possible. This situation caused great concern throughout the chain of command and started to impact on the overall OJF mission on the ground.

Concern over the number of vacancies and their impact prompted the USAREUR Chief of Staff to establish an internal study group, known as the TCS Study Group, consisting of USAREUR action officers assigned to ODCSPER, ODCSOPS, and 1st PERSCOM. The charge of the TCS Study Group was to review the existing USAREUR Individual Augmentation Management System, define functions and responsibilities, and to develop an automated system to enable Headquarters, USAREUR and its major subordinate commands (MSCs), and USTAPERSCOM to easily access and accurately track the status of individual augmentation requirements, personnel fills, and replacements. The management system established during the early days of OJE had outgrown its purpose as the operation transitioned from a short-term to a long-term contingency operation.

The TCS Study Group, with the assistance of the 5th Signal Command and recommendations from FORSCOM, developed a flexible and evolutionary automated tracking system that enabled USAREUR, USTAPERSCOM, and other MACOMs to account for, replace, and track TCS personnel in a more timely manner. In turn, the system helped improve personnel readiness throughout USAREUR and the deployed theater in support of OJF. The automated system gave authorized users visibility to track

this information through an unclassified and password-protected home page designated the USAREUR OJF Individual Augmentee Management Home Page, located on the USAREUR Personnel Database (UPDB) Home Page.

After a few system refinements, the USAREUR OJF Individual Augmentee Management Home Page quickly became an effective personnel management and information tool. Within 120 days of the implementation date (6 October 1998), the personnel fill rate increased 20%, from 61% to 81%, and then maintained a consistent fill rate of at least 93% during its steady state period, six months later. The increased personnel fill was contributed to the consolidation, verification, and slating of all assigned individual augmentees in support of OJF against approved individual augmentee requirements, the recording of incumbents' report dates and departure dates, known replacement data, and grade and specialty requirements among other personnel management data input into the USAREUR OJF Individual Augmentee Management Home Page. This information was visible not only to the USAREUR MSCs but also to DA PERSCOM and FORSCOM for tracking and early identification of replacement purposes. For the first time, USAREUR had an automated personnel management and information system with query capabilities, capable of tracking individual augmentation requirements and fills in support of OJF. Figure 1 depicts the system progress and achievement of objectives between October 1998 and July 1999.[10]

USAREUR OJF INDIVIDUAL AUGMENTEE MANAGEMENT HOME PAGE	
OJF BASIC SYSTEM OBJECTIVES	
6 Oct 98	**27 Jul 99**
40% confirmation of names confirmed (incumbent names with all valid information)	100% accountability of incumbent names with valid information (to include pending replacements)
Only HQDA, USAREUR, and FORSCOM could access DMD(R) and DMD(S)	All MACOMs and their Directorates can access and track soldiers by regions
4 basic reports available (vacancies and 30, 60, 90 day loss report)	Basic reports, more query capability, and version updates (continue to upgrade)
Unclassified website (secure access) to track OJF Individual Augmentees: -- All positions with incumbent, no replacement -- Vacant positions, list of all positions without incumbent and replacement -- Expired loss report, soldiers that are past their loss date -- 30/45/60/90 day loss reports, soldiers that are scheduled to depart	

FIGURE 1. SYSTEM PROGRESS AND ACHIEVEMENTS (OCTOBER 1998 - JULY 1999)

The TCS Study Group also refined the individual augmentation requirement process—including validation, documentation, sourcing and management, and designated duties and responsibilities of USAREUR units and staff agencies. The refined validation and sourcing procedures (see Figure 2), which were originally established in August - September 1997, called for a USAREUR Senior Officer Working Group (SOWG) and General Officer Steering Committee (GOSC) to determine and validate all

individual augmentation requests prior to their being forwarded to HQDA ODCSOPS for action.[11] During

Operation Joint Guard, USAREUR used this process extensively.

> Based on the DA guidance issued in July 1997, USAREUR became the primary source for all OJG Army requirements, both unit and individual. If USAREUR could not fill a critical requirement, it was forwarded through HQDA, first to FORSCOM, then Army-wide, and finally to the Reserve Component. USAREUR had to justify any requirement that could not be filled from internal assets. This justification explained why cross-leveling, mobile teams, or contracting would not meet the requirement.[12]

This credible check-and-balance procedure ensured that only valid requests for individual augmentation were forwarded to HQDA for action. In effect, the procedure quickly inhibited over-reliance on this new personnel requisition tool.

FIGURE 2. USAREUR VALIDATION AND SOURCING PROCESS

THE ARMY'S CURRENT INDIVIDUAL AUGMENTATION MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

The Army's current Individual Augmentation Management System lacks the required interoperability and systems linkage across the Army to ensure accurate and timely accountability of individual augmentees in support of long-term contingency operations. As previously stated, the system lacks a central tasking/tracking system for global individual augmentation requirements (AC, RC, CIV), a coordinated visibility of global individual augmentation requirements, procedural guidance for management of individual augmentation, and total individual augmentee accountability.[13] "Lack of established individual augmentee procedural guidance has resulted in an ad hoc management of

individual augmentee requirements."[14] This ad hoc management has inevitably led to some inconsistencies in strength accountability and administrative processing by commanders and personnel services support personnel. As a result, HQDA continues to publish and forward messages such as "Contingency Operations Personnel Planning Guidance" to the MACOMs and the personnel community, advising how to account for and administratively process TCS personnel for deployment and redeployment for different types of contingency operations.[15]

TCS for individual augmentees allows reassignment of soldiers in a temporary status, similar to temporary duty (TDY). However, TCS allows a soldier to be identified as deployed on the Army's Standard Installation/Division Personnel System (SIDPERS), unlike TDY. Therefore, HQDA directs individual augmentees supporting contingency operations to proceed on TCS orders. Civilians deploy on TDY orders. The order format used for TCS is Format 401. TCS orders cite the duty location, which determines the soldiers' financial entitlements (hazardous duty pay, tax exemption, per diem, etc.) Therefore, it is imperative that the duty location is correctly cited on the TCS orders. If a soldier's TCS orders do not cite the correct duty location, an orders-issuing authority must endorse the orders.[16] Presently, HQDA policy requires that CONUS based individual augmentees deploying overseas be provided at least 30 days notification before reporting to the Fort Benning CONUS Replacement Center (CRC) for processing. All individual augmentees deploying overseas are required to process through the Fort Benning CRC, unless otherwise directed.

At HQDA, individual augmentation management responsibilities are shared by USTAPERSCOM and ODCSOPS. Figure 3 graphically displays the Individual Augmentation Management System currently used by HQDA to process and track worldwide individual augmentation requests.[17] Based on existing requirements determined by the MACOM, requests for individual augmentees are submitted through operational channels to HQDA ODCSOPS (ATTN: DAMO-ODOM). Upon receipt, ODCSOPS validates requirements and USTAPERSCOM (ATTN: TAPC-PLO) conducts MOS strength analysis by MACOMs to determine the appropriate MACOM or MACOMs to be tasked, based on existing and projected inventories. Once a MACOM has been identified as a source for required TCS personnel, ODCSOPS tasks the MACOM, by message, to provide the augmentees. In turn, the tasked MACOM identifies the selected augmentees to ODCSOPS and USTAPERSCOM or submits reclama to ODCSOPS. If a reclama is accepted, ODCSOPS then transmits a tasking message to a different MACOM for identification of augmentees or reclamas to the Joint Staff. Upon identification of individual augmentees, USTAPERSCOM monitors deployment/ redeployment. Finally, ODCSOPS/ USTAPERSCOM manages recurring validated requirements as required.

The reclama process continues to challenge HQDA and all MACOMs. During Operation Victory Hawk in Albania,

> the MACOMs frequently submitted reclamas to DA. Although DA directed the MACOMs to continue trying to fill the individual augmentee (IA) positions until officially relieved, in practice the MACOMs often put the taskings "on hold" waiting to see if the requests for relief were approved. Thus, IA positions remained open but unfilled. Unfortunately, for a

6

variety of reasons DA often did not respond to reclamas in a timely manner. This delay resulted in the IA positions remaining unfilled for extended periods of time. At one time, 23 specific MACOM requests for relief remained unfilled. Without question, the slow pace of adjudication of MACOM reclama requests increased both the number and the time that IA positions remained unfilled.[18]


HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

INDIVIDUAL AUGMENTATION MANAGEMENT SYSTEM – PRESENT CONDITION

LIMITED PERSONNEL – LIMITED RESOURCES

IDENTIFICATION ASSIGNMENT TRACKING

MACOM requests IAs	DCSOPS validates request	Analysis of assets PERSCOM conducts MACOM analysis	DCSOPS tasks MACOM	MACOM identifies IA to DCSOPS and PERSCOM or Reclamas	PERSCOM monitors IA deployment/ redeployment	DCSOPS/PERSCOM manages recurring validated requirements
Spreadsheet Stovepipe database	Indiv Spreadsheet per Theater Stovepipe database	Provides Authorization Assigned based on ODP	Official Msg	ID and Reclama via official msg	Spreadsheet Stovepipe database ROAMS telephone e-mail	Spreadsheet Stovepipe database Official msg ROAMS telephone e-mail

1. Stovepipe systems - limited visibility of requirements, assets, and status of deploying individual.

2. No connectivity. Each entity operates autonomously (redundant duplication of effort and increased risk of error)

3. "One man deep" - if absent work doesn't get done - delay

4. Lack of standardized procedures - ("ad hoc" operations within theaters)

5. Limited analysis ability

6. Static system

RESULT: DELAY IN PROVIDING AUGMENTATION TO THE CINC, ACCOUNTABILITY NOT MAINTAINED THROUGHOUT CYCLE

FIGURE 3. ARMY'S CURRENT INDIVIDUAL AUGMENTATION MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

IMPACT ON READINESS

Commanders always seek to have all required personnel and equipment in accordance with the unit's MTOE; they likewise seek to keep all soldiers trained and ready for worldwide deployment. Unfortunately, due to existing personnel shortages, personnel imbalances, and priority-of-fill, the HQDA Enlisted Distribution Policy and Officer Distribution Plan do not allow all MACOMs to be filled at 100% of their personnel authorizations. These challenges, among others, force MACOMs to request individual augmentation from HQDA to fill their ranks when deployed or deploying in support of contingency operations. In turn, this situation has reduced units' readiness to the point of not being prepared to execute wartime missions without extensive training and additional personnel. This process of temporarily reassigning soldiers to deployed and deploying units continues to impact units' readiness, individual soldier morale, and ability to support contingency operations.

Lack of predictability, insufficient time at home station, and last-minute notification of missions are among soldiers' expressed concerns on readiness surveys. Under the present individual augmentation management system, soldiers are often called to deploy at a moment's notice. Sometimes this occurs

after returning from a deployment, even though HQDA personnel stabilization policy, established in 1998, seeks to keep the soldier at home station for a specific period (one month stabilization for each month of TDY/TCS) upon redeployment.[19] Similarly, by direction of the Cdr, USTAPERSCOM, a soldier who is deployed for 179 days can be extended up to 364 days in his position when a replacement is unavailable. The present system is not alleviating these concerns. Instead, it continues to task the same soldiers for similar ongoing missions. As stated in the OJF After Action Report,

> the impact of OJE and OJG in combination with other operational taskings on USAREUR's personnel tempo (PERSTEMPO) was significant. Units were in a constant state of flux as they continually rotated in and out of the Central Region. As one senior USAREUR leader commented, since 1995 USAREUR soldiers found themselves either preparing to deploy, deployed, or recovering from a deployment. During SFOR-2 (November 1997 – June 1998), 53 percent of the 1st AD's deployed force has been deployed previously during OJE, while another one percent was on their third deployment.[20]

This increase in deployments has also affected soldiers' morale, training, and quality-of-life. Many individual soldiers are currently deployed worldwide filling temporary requirements. While the excitement of military deployments and travel is part of the attraction of military life for many soldiers, the time that soldiers spend away from home eventually detracts from morale, quality-of-life, recruiting and retention, especially if not managed properly. Deployments also disrupt units' normal training rhythms, particularly when the deployments are for missions that rely heavily on nonstandard skills."[21]

The Army and the sister services have been seeking ways to reduce the length of deployments. One method has been to use National Guard and Reserve units to supplement the active duty units. "Rudy De Leon, Defense Undersecretary for Personnel and Readiness, said DOD's goal is for service members to deploy no more than 120 days per year. Some units deploy more than others, and DoD is trying to track them down to reduce their tempos."[22]

Decreasing this unpredictability in a turbulent period is essential if we are going to maintain credibility with our commanders, soldiers, and their families. The Army must seriously consider how we manage individual augmentees, as they will be increasingly used in the future. We must establish accountability and tracking procedures to maximize readiness while reducing unpredictability for potential individual augmentees. The present system is obviously not supporting commanders and soldiers in a timely manner. "During Operation Joint Endeavor, TCS soldiers arrived close to deployment, thereby creating a training requirement and disrupting previously formed cohesive teams."[23]

Although improving individual augmentee management procedures will not reduce personnel shortages, anticipating requirements and identifying and notifying personnel as soon as possible, as well as reporting TCS soldiers correctly during readiness reporting, will reduce unpredictability across our Army, while improving readiness. This is a critical issue: The current system creates problems in credibility. Moreover, it prevents us from taking proper care of our most vital asset, our soldiers.

RECOMMENDED INDIVIDUAL AUGMENTATION MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

USAREUR implemented its current Individual Augmentation Management System on 6 October 1998. It is presently the Army's most efficient system for accounting and tracking individual augmentees in support of short-term and long-term contingency operations. This proven system provides early identification of requirements and the need for replacements by using the Deployment Manning Document for Requirements {DMD(R)} and the Deployment Manning Document for Sourcing {DMD(S)}. The DMD(R) is a requirement document listing all approved individual augmentation positions validated by the USAREUR GOSC in support of a specific operational mission. The DMD(S) is a management tool that identifies sourcing of individual augmentation requirements by aligning incumbent and replacement data against the respective position numbers.[24] Information provided by the DMD(R) and DMD(S) is shown in Figure 4.[25] This personnel management and information system, linked to the USAREUR Personnel Database, can be modified to interface with other external personnel systems (such as SIDPERS, the Total Army Personnel Database, the Replacement Operations Automated Management System, etc.) and track future joint requirements and personnel. The USAREUR Individual Augmentation

FIGURE 4. INFORMATION ON THE DMD(R) AND DMD(S)

Management System consists of three key components: (1) published individual augmentation management procedural guidance, (2) a central point of contact for the management of approved individual augmentation requirements, and (3) the USAREUR OJF Individual Augmentee Management Home Page. The following information and technical procedures on the three components were first

formulated in the draft USAREUR Policy on Individual Augmentation in Support of Operation Joint Forge developed by the TCS Study Group.

INDIVIDUAL AUGMENTATION MANAGEMENT PROCEDURAL GUIDANCE

USAREUR presently has a detailed draft policy (dated 31 August 1999) establishing written procedural guidance and responsibilities for managing individual augmentation in support of Operation Joint Forge. The draft policy has not been finalized pending final input of another study group, the TCS/Unit Movement Orders Working Group. This study group is focusing on identifying organizational responsibilities and functions and identifies the appropriate authority to publish, amend, and/or endorse individual TCS orders and unit movement orders. Following are some established individual augmentation management responsibilities outlined in the draft policy:

USAREUR ODCSPER's responsibilities include publishing and updating the USAREUR Policy on Individual Augmentation in Support of OJF; assisting ODCSOPS in accepting requests for new requirements (military and civilian); conducting and providing theater analysis for civilian sourcing; providing oversight for civilian positions; and assisting ODCSOPS in processing impact statements/ reclamas/DA pass-backs.

USAREUR ODCSOPS' responsibilities include validating, documenting, and publishing OJF augmentee requirements/positions on the DMD(R); establishing and publishing timelines and guidance for the SOWG/GOSC; conducting SOWG/GOSC meetings; accepting requests for new requirements and screening them against established new requirement criteria; determining USAREUR sourcing strategy by designating fenced units/directorates; and accepting and processing impact statements/reclamas/DA pass-backs.

1st PERSCOM TCS Management Branch responsibilities include updating the DMD(S) for USAREUR's Three Areas of Responsibility (Central Region, National Support Element, and Theater Enablers) in the USAREUR OJF Individual Augmentee Management Home Page; conducting theater analysis of military sourcing; presenting proposed military sourcing to the SOWG/GOSC; publishing weekly 30/60/90-day loss spreadsheet for USAREUR MSCs/Directorates and HQDA; communicating with USTAPERSCOM on sourced positions; alerting USAREUR ODCSPER of all unfilled 60-day losses; and resolving replacement issues for USAREUR's Three Areas of Responsibility through coordination with USTAPERSCOM, the Fort Benning CRC, and the 64th Replacement Company.[26]

The existing USAREUR draft policy should be used, as an outline and guide, by HQDA in developing and implementing their Army-wide procedural guidance. As a minimum, it should consolidate existing information and procedures on published messages, memorandums, and regulations. In addition, it must address procedures of when and how MACOMs are to submit requests for individual augmentation to HQDA, how to report individual augmentees during readiness reporting, and how to administratively process individual augmentees for deployment and redeployments.

CENTRAL POINT OF CONTACT FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF APPROVED INDIVIDUAL AUGMENTATION
REQUIREMENTS

The 1st PERSCOM TCS Management Branch, now a branch in the Replacement Operations
Directorate (ROD), rather than the Enlisted Personnel Management Directorate, is the one-stop office in
USAREUR for getting information on approved individual augmentation requirements, personnel fills, and
replacements in support of OJF. This branch has assigned account managers responsibility for
monitoring each of USAREUR's areas of responsibilities on the DMD(S) and performing the assigned
responsibilities in the USAREUR Policy on Individual Augmentation in Support of Operation Joint Forge
(Working Draft). Their management and information tool is the USAREUR OJF Individual Augmentee
Management Home Page.

Just like USAREUR, HQDA should identify a central point of contact for information relating to all
approved individual augmentation requirements (approved by HQDA ODCSOPS), personnel fills, and
replacements supporting contingency operations. Presently, HQDA ODCSOPS and USTAPERSCOM
overlap in performing this task.

ACCESSING THE UNITED STATES ARMY EUROPE OPERATION JOINT FORGE INDIVIDUAL AUGMENTEE
MANAGEMENT HOME PAGE

The following instructions enable authorized users to configure their personal computer to use the
USAREUR OJF Individual Augmentee Management Home Page.

Configuration of computers: To operate the UPDB system, a minimum of Internet Explorer 3.02
must be used; the Visual Basic requirement is version 3.1. In addition, the security mode for the
computer system must not exceed Medium. For upgrades and security changes, follow these
instructions:

Upgrade for Internet Explorer is available by logging into the 1st PERSCOM UPDB web
site http://www.updb.hqusareur.army.mil:777. Select the File Transfer Point (FTP) icon. This selection
will provide the update capability for Internet Explorer. Choose one of two upgrade options: Internet
Explorer 3.02 for Windows 95, or Internet Explorer 4.01 for Windows 98.

Upgrade for the Visual Basic (VB) is available by logging into the 1st PERSCOM UPDB
web site http://www.updb.hqusareur.army.mil:777. Select the File Transfer Point (FTP) icon. This
selection will provide the update capability for the Visual Basic. Choose the upgrade option: VB 3.1 for
Internet Explorer.

Changing your computer security mode: User should consult with unit computer security
managers before changing any security measures. Select "Start" and "Settings" in order to access the
control panel for your computer. After opening the "Control Panel," select Internet. Click on the security
tab and hit the safety level icon at the bottom of the screen. Change the security setting to Medium. This

is the highest security level that will allow the UPDB system to function. If medium security does not work properly, choose "None."[27]

USING THE UNITED STATES ARMY EUROPE OPERATION JOINT FORGE INDIVIDUAL AUGMENTEE MANAGEMENT HOME PAGE

Authorized users are issued a password and user identification (ID) upon submission of application to the Personnel Information Management Directorate, 1st PERSCOM. Once they receive their password and ID, they can log on. Users will log in through the Internet Explorer search. No other web browser can access the USAREUR OJF Individual Augmentee Management Home Page. The log on address is: http://www.tcs.hqusareur.army.mil:777. Upon log on, authorized users will view the screen, "Welcome to the USAREUR OJF Individual Augmentee Management Home Page." The screen will display a menu bar on the top of the screen with seven options: USAREUR POCS, DMD(R), DMD(S), UPDATES, PAS, REPORTS, and NEW.

USAREUR POCs: Provides names, e-mail addresses, and phone numbers of USAREUR points of contact responsible for individual augmentee requirements and sourcing actions, along with managing and tracking Central Region, National Support Element, and Theater Enablers individual augmentees in support of OJF.

DMD(R): Provides a listing of all valid Army OJF individual augmentation requirements to include Central Region (series number 100), National Support Element (series number 200), Theater Enablers (series number 300), and Task Force Eagle (series number 400). Any agency with an access code can view all OJF requirements on the DMD(R) by selecting one of the search categories on the DMD(R) option. Requirement information included on the DMD(R) includes: DMD number, TCS requirement control number, position title, required MOS, acceptable grade range, security clearance required, language skills required, and duty location.

DMD(S): Allows authorized users to view their respective DMD(S) data and their requirements by conducting a by-category search. The DMD(S) viewing is limited to those CONUS MACOMs, USAREUR MSCs, and USAREUR Directorates that provide and/or require augmentation in support of OJF. The DMD(S) provides the sourcing information for all positions on the DMD(R). For example, the 21st Theater Army Area Command (21st TAACOM) will be able to view all positions augmenting 21st TAACOM, along with all the positions that 21st TAACOM sources with augmentees. As depicted in Figure 5, the categories available for conducting a search for information include: DMD number, previous control number, command, subcommand, MOS, duty country name, and social security number (SSN).[28] The information available for each position is: DMD number, TCS requirement control number, DMD command, position title, required MOS, acceptable grade range, incumbent information, tasked MACOM, and replacement information.

PAS: Allows users to view the names and dates of soldiers and civilian personnel processed or manifested through one of the USAREUR Personnel Accounting System (PAS) sites in the USAREUR's theater of operations.

Updates: Allows USAREUR and FORSCOM authorized users to update their respective database. These users are able to enter requirement data and modify incumbent/replacement data. All other MACOMs/units only have view access.

Reports: Provides authorized users different types of established reports, such as Expired Loss Dates, DMD(S) Records with Invalid Home Unit Identification Codes, DMD(S) where SSN is not in the Army Table, Valid Position with Incumbents but not Replacements (30/60/90 day losses), Valid Position without Incumbent or Replacements (vacant positions). Figure 6 displays the type of information available under the screen of "Valid Positions with Incumbents But without Replacements."[29]

New: Each time a new system option is added or modified by 5th Signal Command, it is annotated on this screen for reference.[30]

FIGURE 5. CATEGORIES AVAILABLE FOR CONDUCTING A SEARCH ON THE DMD(S) SCREEN

The USAREUR OJF Individual Augmentee Management Home Page provides an excellent information and management tool; it can greatly assist the Army during a period of personnel shortages. Just like the Total Officer Personnel Management Information System and Enlisted Distribution and Assignment System, it accounts for and tracks its population. The USAREUR Individual Augmentation

Management System should be implemented Army-wide. The system has established individual augmentation management procedural guidance, a central point-of-contact for the management of approved individual augmentation requirements, and an automated personnel management and information system to account for and track individual augmentees.

The individual augmentation management system to be developed by HQDA must be password-protected, upgrade capable, and interface with existing personnel management system databases to facilitate the exchange of timely and accurate management information between HQDA ODCSOPS, USTAPERSCOM, and the MACOMs. In addition, HQDA should concurrently publish technical guidance on how to use the established management system with their Army-wide individual augmentation management procedural guidance to ensure standardization.

DMD CNTL NO	OWNER NO	NAME	POS TITLE	DUTY LOC	REQ MOS	GR HI	GR LO	POS STAT	EFF DATE	INC LOSS
100-003	REPL 01	VENTURA RODRIGUEZ FRANCISCO	ASST OPS OFF	SCHWETZINGEN	42B	O03	O03	A	19990912	19990910
100-006	400 23	BLANK BRIAN JASON	PAS CELL SR OP	SCHWETZINGEN	CTV	GS07	GS07	A	19981001	19990918
100-104	126 21A	MADSEN PAUL ELI LACOUR	USAREUR/7A LNO	HEIDELBERG	01A	O03	O03	A	19991205	19991209
100-106	109A 20	MURPHY WILLIE	SUBSISTANCE OFFICER	ZAGREB	92O	GS09	GS09	A	19990620	19991217
100-109		HAMILTON RAYMOND BERESFORD	TCS LNO NCOIC	KAISERSLAUTERN	CTV	GS07	GS07	A	19990404	19991003
100-110		BRYANT ERIC L	TCS NCO	KAISERSLAUTERN	CTV	GS05	GS05	A	19990404	19991207
100-201	101 01	JOHNSON PAUL HANES	CHIEF, OJG CELL	HEIDELBERG	21A	O04	O04	A	19991003	19991028
100-203	101 05	ROY SETH EDWARD	ASSISTANT PLANS OFFICER	HEIDELBERG	21A	GS09	GS09	A	19990219	19990902
100-404	104C 04	STITT ROBERT CARL	ASST LOG OFF	HEIDELBERG	90A	O04	O04	A	19991003	19991028
100-503	103B 01C	COLE CHARLES GRAHAM	CAT CHIEF	HEIDELBERG	01A	O05	O05	A	19991003	19991028
100-504	103B 01D	COLBERT PATRICK LEE	CAT CHIEF	HEIDELBERG	01A	O05	O05	A	19991003	19991021
100-505	103B 02B	BURCH RAYMOND EUGENE	OPERATIONS OFFICER	HEIDELBERG	01A	O04	O04	A	19991003	19991028
100-507	103B 02D	WALL DARYL JAY	OPERATIONS OFFICER	HEIDELBERG	54A	O04	O04	A	19991205	19991223
100-508	103B 01B(C)	HOLSCHER RUSSELL ALAN	OPS OFF	HEIDELBERG	01A	O04	O04	A	19991003	19991028
100-518	103B 08A	DEAVERS LEON	JOPES SUPERVISOR	HEIDELBERG	IMM	E08	E08	A	20000102	19990813
100-520		SANDERS, EDWIN J	JOPES OPERATORS	HEIDELBERG	CTV	GS05	GS05	A	19981001	19990912
100-527		MONTAVON STEVEN M	RCLNO DEPUTY	TUZLA	01A	O04	O04	A	19990912	19991004
100-528	400-281	WINESETTE ROBERT A III	RCLNO NCO	TUZLA	IMM	E05	E07	A	19991031	19991120
100-529		MOORE BURT	RCLNO DEPUTY	TUZLA	01A	O04	O04	A	19991031	19991120
100-706	0040 007	BIRON MARK C	PAO PLANS OFFICER	STUTTGART	46A	O04	O04	A	19990801	19991113
100-708	0131 015	MILLER JAMES KEITH	UNIT CLERK	STUTTGART	75H	E06	E06	A	19990815	19991212
100-709	0131 016	SMITH DONNERICKAL D	SUPPLY NCO	STUTTGART	92Y	E05	E05	A	19991128	19991209
100-711	0241 019	BICKFORD JEFFREY CONNORS	ADMIN NCO - BUDGET	STUTTGART	71L	E05	E05	A	19991128	19991223
100-713	0244 010	ROUSSEAU KEVIN GERALD	IMAGERY COLLECTION REQS OFFICER	STUTTGART	35C	O04	O04	A	19990801	19990819
100-722	0625 013	MORROW JASON ANDREW	TACTICAL COMMUNICATIONS PLANS OFFICER	STUTTGART	25C	O03	O03	A	19990711	19990802
100-725		YOUNG SCOTT CHRISTOPHER	ADMIN NCO	STUTTGART	71L	E05	E05	A	19990912	19991007

FIGURE 6. VALID POSITIONS WITH INCUMBENTS BUT WITHOUT REPLACEMENTS

CONCLUSION

Individual Augmentation by means of temporary change of station status will continue to play an important role in future contingency operations, similar to those in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Southwest Asia. If the Army is going to be responsive and ensure that deployed and deploying commanders have the required individual augmentation on TCS status to support future contingency operations as a force multiplier, it must establish a formal personnel management and information system to account for, replace, and track individual augmentees in a timely manner to maximize readiness and reduce unpredictability.

Implementing the USAREUR Individual Augmentation Management System Army-wide (or a similar personnel management and information system) will ensure that we begin responding now to critical personnel issues in support of our National Military Strategy. The USAREUR Individual Augmentation Management System is a proven system, which can track military personnel from any uniformed service as well as civilians with the flexibility for upgrades and expansion to include joint accounting operations in the future. The Army must immediately support the establishment of such a system to efficiently manage our critical personnel shortages and provide commanders, soldiers, and their families with some type of predictability.

The Army's current system consists of internal stovepipe systems, has no connectivity to other systems, is staffed only "one man deep," lacks standardized procedures, has limited analytical capability, and is a static system.[31] It is not a viable Army-wide program to support existing and future long-term contingency operations. If USTAPERSCOM, ODCSOPS, and the MACOMs do not synchronize their procedures and unify their efforts, this critical personnel issue will foster ongoing confusion and untimely identification and reporting of individual augmentees. The USAREUR Individual Augmentation Management System offers what the Army needs to manage efficient individual augmentation. Whatever system the Army decides to implement, it must have at least three essential components: (1) published individual augmentation management procedural guidance, (2) a central point of contact for the management of approved individual augmentation requirements, and (3) a personnel management and information tool similar to the USAREUR OJF Individual Augmentee Management Home Page.

WORD COUNT = 5246

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