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STRATEGY Research Project

THE STRATEGIC RELEVANCE OF THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE AND OBSERVERS PEACEKEEPING MISSION IN THE SINAI

BY

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The Strategic Relevance of the Multinational Force and Observers Peacekeeping Mission in the Sinai

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ABSTRACT

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With the end of the Cold War, the United States Army has experienced an inverse relationship with increased operational tempo and declining force structure. In a fiscal environment of flat budgets and decreasing discretionary funding it is unrealistic to anticipate an increase in forces available to satisfy requirements. A viable option, then, is to review current commitments and to end those that have successfully completed their mission or are no longer serving the national interest. However, a careful analysis of each mission's strategic relevance must be made rather than relying on a cursory review of the tactical or operational mission functions. This paper uses the Multinational Force and Observers mission in the Sinai, Egypt to illuminate the strategic importance of a current military engagement that may well have completed its tactical and operational missions. The strategic relevance of this mission is evaluated on its contribution to the ongoing diplomatic efforts in the Middle East, as well as its relevance to the National Military Strategy function of shaping the international environment.

Finally, based on the foregoing analysis, this paper offers a methodology that can be applied to an international situation to evaluate the appropriateness of military intervention in concert with established National Security Strategy guidelines. This "test" is based upon a modification of the Just War Criteria and a refinement of PDD 25 guidelines.

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THE STRATEGIC RELEVANCE OF THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE AND OBSERVERS PEACEKEEPING MISSION IN THE SINA!

With the end of the Cold War and the victory in Desert Storm, the United States Army has greatly reduced its force structure. The 1990 force structure of eighteen divisions has dwindled to the 1999 active duty strength of ten divisions. Conversely the commitment of the Army has increased substantially during the past decade. In May 1999 these remaining ten divisions were fully engaged with one permanently on station in South Korea, one engaged in force development experimentation, four committed to the Balkans in varying degrees, and one redeploying from Central America after providing humanitarian assistance to victims of Hurricane Mitch. The remaining three divisions provided force and manpower augmentation to satisfy Army mission demands in 73 countries.¹ In a narrower, theater specific view, this increased commitment with reduced assets is readily evident in an examination of the U.S. Army Europe. U.S. Army Europe's force structure decreased from 213,000 personnel in 1990 to a current level of 62,000 representing a 70% reduction in available forces. Unfortunately mission requirements have followed the opposite trend and have increased substantially. From the end of World War II to the Gulf War, U.S. Army Europe executed 29 peacekeeping, or humanitarian assistance missions, as contrasted with over 100 such missions in the period from 1991 to present.² This substantial increase in operational tempo with more constrained resources could result in a tangible impact on force readiness and personnel retention over an extended period of time.

This inverse relationship of increasing commitment for a greatly reduced force is not lost on the civilian leadership of the nation. Congressman Ike Skelton commented that it was not only money that was behind a reduction in retention of active military members, but that the increased operational tempo military members and their families are experiencing was adversely affecting recruiting and retention. Congressman Skelton further cited that "after winning the Cold War and downsizing, our military finds itself busier than ever, protecting American interests around the world. This translates to longer and more frequent periods away from home for those fewer personnel remaining. Simply put, a higher operational tempo is wearing out the troops, and in the aggregate, they are giving notice with their feet." ³

Increasing missions with a decreasing force structure is not new to the Army. General Johnson declared in 1964 that "...the Army had reached a point, with its many missions scattered throughout the world, where it could not be stretched much further." ⁴ What is different about the situation facing the Army today, as opposed to the situation in 1964, is that without a clear emerging threat to our national security, we can not anticipate a funding increase or force build up as we experienced for Vietnam to balance missions and resources.

Therefore, if funding is to remain relatively constant and the force structure at, or below current levels, the only remaining variable that can be affected to reduce operational tempo is to reduce the level of commitment of the Army. While ultimately a political decision of the NCA, it would be prudent to review all current missions and operations and assess their relevance to the current National Security Strategy and

supporting National Military Strategy in order to reduce the commitment on the military. Clearly some longstanding commitments of forces are easily assessed and will likely endure. For instance the continued presence of a substantial force in South Korea is clearly in the national interest to contain and mitigate a continuing threat from North Korea. Recent NATO actions in Kosovo underscore our continuing presence and engagement on the European continent as the former Soviet Republics transform themselves for the future. The strategic value of these longstanding commitments is relatively easy to deduce.

However, there is a potential danger in disengaging U.S. commitment from missions and commitments when the tactical but not the strategic mission has been completed. In some of these cases, the strategic interests to the nation may not be so easily deduced. The continued U.S. support of the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) mission in the Sinai, Egypt provides an excellent example of a strategically important operation who's stated tactical mission may have long sense been completed. The tactical mission of the MFO is "to observe and report any violations of the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel."⁵ Given the peace that has existed between Egypt and Israel since the termination of open hostilities in 1973, isn't it reasonable that the commitment of U.S. forces to the MFO is no longer required? The peaceful intentions of Egypt toward Israel were commented on by Secretary of State Albright as she thanked President Mubarak of Egypt and Egyptian Foreign Minister Moussa for their support in achieving the Arab-Israeli Peace Process which was signed in Sharm-El Sheikh, Egypt, September 4, 1999. Secretary Albright went on to state, "For many years Egypt has merited the world's admiration as an unwavering and courageous champion of peace."⁶ Why then would the United States need to maintain over 900 Army personnel in the Sinai on a daily basis to ensure a mutually beneficial peace that has existed for almost 27 years? Greater still is the rotational impact on these forces that on an annual basis directly affects over 3,000 personnel either in deployment preparation or recovery following their rotational mission. In an era of operational tempo concern, the MFO-Sinai appears at the tactical level to be a prime candidate to declare mission success and withdrawal of direct U.S. military support.

It is this cursory evaluation of the relevance of missions such as the MFO-Sinai that pose a danger to the nation's strategic engagement in pursuit of our national interests. This paper will analyze the relevance of the MFO mission to the National Security Strategy and the pursuit of our national interests in the vital and turbulent Middle-East Region. The two major areas of focus for this analysis are the aspects of military engagement that enables the diplomatic element of national power to be viable in pursuit of our national goals and the military as a major shaping element that furthers the spread of our democratic values and ideas. Additionally, this analysis will provide considerations for the further commitment of U.S. military forces to humanitarian or peacekeeping operations.

PROMOTING DEMOCRACY

The National Security Strategy states that its three core objectives are: to enhance our security; to bolster America's economic prosperity; and to promote democracy abroad.⁷ Clearly, it can be argued that by continuing to support regional stability in the vital and volatile Middle East we decrease the likelihood of a major regional conflict and therefore enhance the overall security of the United States. Likewise in an era of increasing global economics and the presence of major energy reserves in the Middle East, it is clear that efforts to maintain and improve regional stability clearly facilitate the opportunity to enhance America's economic prosperity. Therefore, in a cursory analysis it is apparent that the U.S. military participation in the Multinational Force and Observers mission supports the first two core objectives of the National Security Strategy. Is it possible that this commitment of U.S. forces also supports the third and final core objective of promoting democracy abroad? This section will analyze this question and outline several means by which this peacekeeping mission contributes to promoting democracy both regionally and internationally.

Why would our National Security Strategy outline a core objective of promoting democracy abroad? One manner of interpretation of this objective is that we intend to export our democratic ideas and society in the hopes that others will emulate our beliefs and values and that the spread of democracy will enhance global stability. This is echoed in the National Military Strategy, which lists "Shaping the International Environment" as one of three critical elements of the overall strategy. The National Military Strategy goes on to specify that this element of the strategy will be accomplished through the inherent deterrent qualities of a viable military force and through peacetime military engagement.⁸ It is through this peacetime military engagement that the U.S. forces supporting the Multinational Force and Observers mission support both the National Security Strategy and the subordinate National Military Strategy.

But again the basic question remains, why would we have to be engaged internationally with deployed forces to achieve the desired core objective and the shaping functions of our nested strategies? Clearly our words and laws are readily exported throughout the world and are there for all to see and read. The preamble to our Declaration of Independence describes the founding principles and rights of democracy for all to see. Clearly the following words that define the very essence of democracy are sufficient to accomplish our objective of promoting democracy abroad:

"We hold these Truths to be self-evident, that all Men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness-That to secure these Rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just Powers from the Consent of the Governed,..."⁹

Unfortunately the well proven dictum that "deeds are more powerful than words" necessitates an active engagement abroad to demonstrate that democracy is not just a concept for the United States, but is an enduring and defining characteristic that has universal applicability for all peoples.

The American soldiers serving in the Sinai, Egypt support the promotion of democracy abroad and assist in shaping the international environment in several ways. First among these is a living, functioning,

embodiment of one of our greatest national assets, which is our diversity. Diversity that does not simply co-exist, but diversity that strengthens us as a nation through a synergistic effect created by our blending of ethnic, cultural, and racial backgrounds. This counters a primary destabilizing factor in the world society - - ethnocentric thinking that can be manipulated to exclude those of different race, religion, or gender, as incompatible or unfit from the chosen society. Our Army is a reflection of our great national diversity in all aspects. Our Army is comprised of all races with 59% white, 27% black, 7% Hispanic, and 7% of all others. Gender integration continues to advance in our services as a reflection of society and virtually all-major religions are represented and respected within the force.¹⁰

The deployed American forces in the Sinai, Egypt are a microcosm of our democratic society with regards to race, gender and religious diversity. There for all to see is a living embodiment of the critical founding words of our declaration of independence and the founding ideas of our democratic constitution. As antagonists on either side of the Egyptian-Israeli friction agitate destructive action based upon ethnicity, their audience need only to look at the U.S. peacekeepers to see that diversity and tolerance are more than just democratic ideas, they are an embodied reality.

Potential antagonists may choose to pursue "nationalism" as a rallying point toward destabilizing actions in the global community. Claims of isolationism and oppression by an uncaring world community may be a powerful catalyst towards action by an uninformed population. Here again the Multinational Force and Observers stands as an indisputable counter to those who claim that nations can not cooperate effectively toward a common goal of peace and prosperity. The Multinational Force and Observers is comprised of personnel from eleven nations ranging from combat battalions from Fiji and Columbia. Additionally, support forces are provided by Uruguay, Norway, and Italy.¹¹ Personnel from these eleven nations interact on a daily basis in the execution of their collective mission of peacekeeping between two former belligerents. The success of this international organization is measured in a peace that has existed between Egypt and Israel for 26 years. The MFO is tangible proof, for all to see, of international cooperation and synergy among diversity. With continuing diplomatic efforts in the region to bring about lasting peace and agreement between Israel, Syria, and Palestine; it is conceivable that the MFO-Sinai is a viable tangible model in support of our diplomatic element of power...a solidifying model of words backed by deeds.

Not only do the American soldiers demonstrate democracy in action to those for whom they secure peace, but also to those who work side-by-side with them in their collective mission. This military to military contact provides the opportunity to demonstrate to the soldiers of ten other nations that the principles of democracy are alive and viable. In addition to exporting our national democratic values through deed and not just word, these American peacekeepers export other stabilizing beliefs that contribute to our national strategy.

Civilian control of the military is not a universally accepted proposition. Yet, just as with race and religion, here is a living example of the world's most powerful military sworn to defend the democratic Constitution of the United States, and to obey the orders of the President of the United States. Civilian

control of the military is not just a concept in our words, but is embodied and demonstrated by our military peacekeepers in the Sinai and around the world.

It can be strongly argued that the "tactical" mission of the U.S. military, in support of the Multinational Force and Observers, has been accomplished. However, it is clear from the preceding discussion that our continued engagement in the MFO is indeed viable and vital in support of the stated core goals of our National Security Strategy and in support of the shaping aspect of our National Military Strategy. Under the view of the world's population, American soldiers serving in the Sinai, Egypt, in cooperation with international partners, solidifies the words of our national values and democratic ideas into a tangible deed.

THE ROLE OF MILITARY "CONFIDENCE BUILDING" IN SUPPORT OF DIPLOMACY

Before beginning a discussion of the role of the military in confidence building, particularly in concert with diplomatic actions, it is useful to examine the definition of the terms confidence and treaty. Webster defines confidence as "the fact of being or feeling certain; assurance", with treaty defined as "a formal agreement between two or more nations."¹² From this one can argue that a common thread between confidence and a diplomatic solution in the form of treaty is the assurance of commitment to the agreement between the parties concerned. Therefore, assurance must be the critical ingredient, or "currency", that is exchanged when the diplomatic element of national power is employed in the pursuit of the nation's interests.

Is it reasonable to assume that the word of a nation, in the form of a written treaty backed solely by the nation's honor and reputation, is sufficient to provide the critical assurance value for a viable lasting agreement? If not, then what is the "currency" with which the United States is paying the assurance bill for its current diplomatic treaty endeavors? This section will present a view of our apparent policy in this regard and recommendations for consideration if we are to continue the current policy course as outlined in the National Security Strategy.

To deal with the first question posed above, one need only look at the value and enduring nature of a nation's promise and indebtedness bound only by its word as described by Charles Krauthammer in his Schwarzenberg Principle. "Asked if he felt indebted to Russia for helping crush the Hungarian uprising of 1848, the Austrian Prime Minister, Prince Felix Schwarzenberg, replied 'Austria will astound the world with the magnitude of her ingratitude." Krauthammer goes on to state that virtues such as selflessness, faith and trust "have little place in the life of nations."¹³

Surely this lack of integrity and a word given without honor does not apply to a great nation like the United States. Yet history shows that this is sadly the case. I offer the following historical evidence that the word of the United States alone is not to be trusted in accepting diplomatic solutions. In 1973 President Nixon ordered the halting of all bombing operations in Vietnam, effectively ending all direct military support to President Thieu and his country. Yet in spoken assurance Nixon pledges that the U.S. will react with force to any massive communist "truce violations". This assurance was logically a critical

element that led to the South Vietnamese accepting the Paris Peace Pact in 1973. Yet, when the final aggression came in 1975, President Ford was unable to secure even funding to assist South Vietnam, much less the "Force" which was promised in 1973.¹⁴ It is safe, if not sad, to claim that the word of a nation in its diplomatic solutions must be backed by some tangible "currency" other than mere words and national honor.

What then is the "currency" with which the United States secures agreement when exercising the diplomatic element of national power? I propose that the primary currency our nation uses for achieving diplomatic solutions between belligerents is the men and women of the United States military. It is the presence of U.S. military forces that serves as the vital confidence building catalyst which assures all parties that we as a nation will honor our commitment to the diplomatic solution. Current examples of this are our peace efforts in Bosnia and Kosovo. Either of these two examples in isolation can validate my assertion that the military has become a critical element in diplomatic assurances.

However, to further strengthen my view I offer a more tangible, and well documented example in the form of the United States' participation in the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) mission in the Sinai, Egypt. This use of the nation's military as a currency for a diplomatic resolution to the costly conflict between Egypt and Israel is a classic example of the military element of national power providing the confidence building between two belligerents that has resulted in a lasting peace. Documentation from the MFO recounts the history of the peace process and the organization as follows:

"Following the October War in 1973, Egypt and Israel, realizing that the social and economic costs associated with continued warfare were too high to bear, initiated a period of military disengagement in the Sinai. Egypt and Israel turned to the United Nations and the United States for assistance and support. The United Nations sent a peacekeeping force known as the United Nations Emergency Force II to separate the two sides physically by supervising the Egyptian-Israeli disengagement agreement known as the Sinai I agreement of January, 1974. During the period of disengagement, negotiations continued between both sides and culminated in the signing of the Sinai I Agreement in Geneva on September 4, 1975. This agreement expanded the role of UNEF II and called upon the United States to install and operate an early warning system. Known as the Sinai Field Mission (SFM), this early warning system's mission was to monitor traffic flow in and out of the entrances to the Giddi and Mitla passes, and at the Egyptian and Israeli surveillance stations located at the Opposite ends of the Giddi Valley.

The SFM officially began its mission on February 22, 1976 and together with the UNEF II assisted in building the confidence necessary to for Egypt and Israel to make the next step towards a more permanent settlement. In November 1977, President Sadat of Egypt made his dramatic visit to Jerusalem to begin talks with the Israeli Government. These talks led to an agreement that Israel would return the Sinai to Egypt, that the Sinai and a zone in Israel would be subject to limitations on militarization, and that there would be a United Nations peacekeeping force stationed in the Sinai.

On September 17, 1978, President Sadat of Egypt and Prime Minister Begin of Israel signed the Camp David Accords that established a framework for a peace treaty to be negotiated between the two states. These negotiations culminated on March 26,1979, in the Treaty of Peace, signed by the leaders of Egypt and Israel, and witnessed by the President off the United States. This act brought an end to the state of war that had

existed between the two nations since 1948, formalized a new relationship between them, and set out the terms of the Israel's phased withdrawal from the Sinai. ¹⁵

A critical element in this historical account of the diplomatic resolution of conflict between Egypt and Israel is the authors' contention that it was the presence and effectiveness of the UNEF II and SFM that provided the confidence to continue the diplomatic process to its conclusion at Camp David. President Carter's ability to broker a treaty between these two belligerents remains as a great feat of statesmanship. Yet the critical factor in the negotiations remained the commitment of the United States to ensure compliance with the negotiated settlement. President Carter pledged this in the form of the MFO, which he vowed to establish even if the United Nations failed to provide the requisite force. This proved prophetic, as indeed the U.N. failed to provide for the MFO under threat of veto in the United Nations Security Council from the USSR. Therefore, the "currency" with which the diplomatic solution was guaranteed was not the treaty document, but the commitment of the United States military to the region which provides tangible U.S. resolve and commitment.

The presence of the MFO in the Sinai also provides insight into current diplomatic efforts in the region and further reinforces my assertion about our current policy that links the military and diplomatic elements of power. The tactical mission statement of the MFO is to "Observe, report, and verify all activities and any potential violations of the 1979 Camp David Accords.¹⁶ To accomplish this mission the United States initially contributed approximately 1,175 personnel out of a total force of 2,623, and today provides approximately 917 soldiers of a total force of 1980.¹⁷ As previously discussed, given the lasting peace that has existed between Egypt and Israel for the past 26 years, to include the 17 successful years of the MFO mission, it would be conceivable that in the current period of reduced assets and high operational tempo, that the U.S. would claim victory and withdraw from the MFO. This, however, is not the case and the U.S. appears committed to the mission with consistent troop strength and funding.

At the tactical level it can be argued that the observe and report mission of the force is obsolete given the stability between the two nations. However, at the strategic level the presence and commitment of the MFO in the region provides tangible reassurance to the Israeli government and people that the U.S. remains committed in word and deed to peace in the middle east. The presence of the U.S. military in the Sinai provides "strategic depth" to both Egypt and Israel. I contend that it is this confidence building that has enabled Israel to turn from its western border and seek resolution with her Arab neighbors on her eastern border. The peace process with the Palestinians and the Syrians continues to progress. This is evidenced by the agreement between Prime Minister Ehud Barak and Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat to establish the first open land link between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The establishment of this land link is viewed as a vital step toward eventual statehood for the Palestinians.¹⁸ Additionally, on September 23, 1999, President Clinton pledged to Yasser Arafat that the United States will do "Whatever we can to help" the Palestinians and Israelis achieve their goal of reaching a final peace settlement.¹⁹ If, as we have already established, the word of a nation is not a tangible confidence builder between

belligerents then, what is the "currency" that the U.S. President and Secretary of State are using to advance peace in the Middle East? Logically, it must be the continued presence of U.S. forces in the MFO that serves as proof of commitment and a confidence builder that the same level of involvement will be forthcoming from the U.S. in any future peace negotiations.

To ensure a balanced portrayal of the effectiveness of this policy in regards to Egypt and Israel it is important to point out that in fact all elements of our national power are employed in retaining this peace treaty. As already discussed the military and diplomatic elements of our national power are well in evidence. Additionally, the economic element of national power is well engaged in retaining this success. Egypt and Israel are the two top recipients of U.S. economic aid.²⁰ Obviously the information element of national power is at work as a quick scan of national and international newspapers and periodicals reveals a well defined and publicized commitment of U.S. resolve to peace in the Middle East as an important, if not vital, national interest. Although all four elements of our national power are at work to secure peace between Egypt and Israel, only the presence of U.S. military personnel is a concrete, not easily interrupted or withdrawn, commitment to the treaty parties.

TEMPTATION AND THREAT

The success of military presence as a confidence building mechanism as tangible U.S. commitment to diplomatic treaties, such as the MFO, is a tempting "cookie cutter solution" to world instability. But, the improper application of this element of national power undermines our national security. Our national values serve as a guide to the decision to commit national power to a situation. The National Security Strategy helps sort out and prioritize among the many demands for commitment of U.S. national power and ensures that we will apply this power commensurate with the degree that affects our National Interests. The NSS further defines three levels of national interests; Vital, Important, and Humanitarian and Other Interests. The NSS prescribes that we will do what ever we must to defend vital interests to include unilateral and decisive military action and that we will apply our resources for important interests to the degree that the cost and risk are commensurate with our interests. In the final category, the NSS offers that we may act when our humanitarian or other interests so require.²¹

Clearly, it is not our strategic intent to commit the military element of national power to a peripheral humanitarian interest. Yet it is this lowest level of national interest that holds an increasing danger to the nation as we apply the military as a confidence building mechanism to provide the currency for diplomacy in peripheral humanitarian matters. U.S. forces as "currency" in support of humanitarian interests such as in Somalia, or more recently Kosovo, places the nation on the precipice of a military conflict. When belligerents are not deterred by the presence and potential military power of the United States, we may then find ourselves engaged in Armed conflict over an issue that is, in the context of the hierarchy of national interest, only a peripheral one. Potentially even more dangerous would be the decision to avoid conflict and withdraw our military forces rather than engage in conflict. This would rapidly be deduced by potential belligerents as the method to defeat U.S. peacekeepers... attack and they will depart. This

would have the effect of invalidating the military's ability to be the tangible proof of U.S. resolve and negate its confidence building role in support of diplomatic solutions.

Additionally, even the commitment of military forces to these confidence building operations that are deemed of important interest to the nation, such as the MFO, place our forces, and potential security at risk. Even the extremely successful MFO mission has come at a high price to military readiness with the commitment of over 900 American soldiers in country and the turbulence and resource requirements required for those battalions preparing to deploy and who have recently redeployed. In an era of dwindling force structure and resources this constitutes an increasingly higher percentage of expenditure of precious assets. Peace in the Sinai has exacted a high toll in terms of U.S. casualties. In addition to several U.S. casualties a year due to various accidents in the Sinai ranging from traffic accidents to drowning, our nation suffered the loss of 248 soldiers from the 101st Airborne (Air Assault) Division who were redeploying home from the MFO when their plane crashed in Gander, Newfoundland in 1985.²²

RECOMMENDED TEST

Given the demand, limited resources, and risks associated with using the military in vague national security issues concerning involvement in humanitarian or other interests, there exists the need for a process to logically analyze the costs and risks associated with committing military forces to secure diplomatic agreement. In 1994 the Clinton administration provided Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD25) in an attempt to provide this process. Although useful, PDD 25 fails to assess the risk of a humanitarian or peacekeeping operation evolving into an escalating armed conflict. This critical assessment must be made because if we employ military forces to secure diplomatic resolution we are in fact risking military conflict should deterrence and presence fail. Therefore it seems prudent to evaluate the value of the interest at stake in terms equal to the decision to wage war. This is to say, we should apply many of the same decision criteria as used in the determination of "Just War." Specifically, I believe that the following modified elements of the Just War Criteria should be considered and evaluated before committing military forces to solidify diplomatic solutions:

- 1. Just Intent: The end sought must include the restoration or maintenance of peace and advance our national interests at a level of risk and cost commensurate with the expected gain.
- 2. Last Resort: Given the risks, as discussed earlier, the employment of the military as the currency of confidence should be as a last resort, rather than an initial offering.
- 3. Reasonable hope of success: A decision to commit military forces in a confidence building role must be based on a prudent expectation that the ends sought can be achieved. It is hardly an act of justice to plunge one's people into the suffering and sacrifice of a impossible endeavor.²³

Application of these "Just War" criteria will lead to the appropriate answer to the critical question of whether the risk of committing U.S. military forces is in balance with our national interests and national security. After this critical determination, based on the "Just War criteria", we can then apply several criteria from Presidential Decision Directive 25 to determine how to best commit our limited national

resources to increasing international demands. PDD 25 declares that the U.S. will support well defined peace operations. Additionally, PDD 25 prescribes that selected peace operations should not be open ended commitments, but should instead be linked to concrete political solutions.²⁴ PDD 25 provides a listing of criteria that should be considered before committing U.S. resources. Specifically, the following modified PDD 25 criteria should be applied when deciding to engage the U.S. military in humanitarian or peacekeeping operations:

- 1. Involvement advances U.S. interests.
- 2. There is a threat to, or breach of, international peace and security that threatens U.S. interests.
- 3. There are clear objectives and an understanding of where the mission fits on the spectrum between traditional peacekeeping and peace enforcement.
- The political, economic, and humanitarian consequences of inaction by the U.S. have been weighed and are considered unacceptable.
- The operation's anticipated duration is tied to clear objectives and realistic criteria for ending the operation, and not to a specific calendar date. ²⁵

Failure to apply these criteria, or some like process, before committing the military as currency for diplomacy is at best a risky endeavor. This avoidable risk could find our Commander in Chief faced with the same three poor courses of action that President Johnson faced in 1965: escalate, accept status quo, or withdraw. This undesirable situation resulted from a military entangled in a confidence building mission gone terribly wrong.²⁶ The results will inevitably be as Clark Clifford stated, "...catastrophe for my country."²⁷

CONCLUSION

As we continue in an era of decreasing military resources, perhaps reducing current commitments may, in certain instances, be a viable option. However, before taking such measures, it is critical that we evaluate the importance of the mission and commitment not only on its tactical merits, but more importantly on its impact at the strategic level. Specifically, we should assess how does this current commitment of the military enhance the national interests and values and what role can the military play in achieving a synergistic affect with the other elements of national power.

Additionally, we can reduce the increase in operational tempo and, more importantly, avoid military conflict over peripheral national interests. This can be accomplished by applying the recommended process to logically analyze the costs and risks associated with committing military forces to humanitarian or peacekeeping operations. In this manner the United States will further its national goals while retaining viability in its national powers.

WORD COUNT 5,460

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¹¹ Office of Personnel and Publications, 17

¹² David B. Guralnik, ed, <u>Webster's New World Dictionary of the American Language</u>, (New York, Simon and Schuster, 1986).

¹³ Charles Krauthammer, "The Schwarzenberg Principle,"The Washington Post, 3 September 1999,Sec.A, p27.

¹⁴ Army War College, <u>Vol. IV, Course 2: War, National Policy & Strategy</u>, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Department of National Security and Strategy, 1999), 361.

¹⁵ The multinational Force and Observers, Servants of Peace, reprinted in 1st US Army Support Battalion Welcome Pamphlet.

¹⁶ Robert L. Bateman "U.S. Battalion Operations in the Multi-National Force and Observers." Infantry 82 (July-August 1992): 7

¹⁷ Bruce Fenton. "The Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai: A Quiet Success Story," in Culligan, Joseph P., et al., eds. The War Studies Papers. Volume I. Studies in Peacekeeping. Kingston: The Royal Military College of Canada, (1993), 110

¹⁸ Dina Kraft, "West Bank-Gaza Strip Passage OK's", available from <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/aponline/19991005/aponline102949_000.htm., accessed 7 October 1999.

¹⁹ John Lancaster, "Clinton, Optimistic for Mideast Peace, Pledges Help;" available from http://search.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/Wplate/1999-09/24/0551-092499-idx.html, accessed 7 October 1999.

²⁰ Washington Post, "For the Record", available from <http://ca.dticc.mil/cgibin/ebird?doc_url=/Oct1999/e19991007for.htm, accessed 7 October 1999.

²¹ Clinton, 5-6.

²² "Gander", (Microsoft Encarta 96 Encyclopedia, [CD-ROM]

²³ The United Methodist Council of Bishops; Inn Defense of Creation: The Nuclear Crisis and a Just Peace. P33-34, "Just War Criteria," by the United Methodist Council of Bishops, Graded Press, 1986 in Army War College, <u>Vol. I Part B, Course 2: War, National Policy & Strategy</u>, (Carlisle, PA, : Department of National Security and Strategy, 1999), 361

²⁴ William J. Clinton, <u>Presidential Decision Directive 25</u>: <u>The Clinton Administration's Policy on</u> Reforming <u>Multilateral Peace Operations</u> (Washington, D.C.: The White House, May 1994), 9.

²⁵ ibid., 4.

²⁶ Clark Clifford, <u>Counsel to the President: A Memoir by Clark Clifford with Richard Holbrooke</u>. (Random House, Inc. 1991), 315 in Army War College, <u>Vol. IV, Course 2: War, National Policy &</u> Strategy, (Carlisle, PA,: Department of National Security and Strategy, 1999), 361

²⁷ Ibid., 322.

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