

***Training Management and Peacekeeping Operations:
Challenges to the "Band of Excellence"***

**A Monograph
by
Major Hershel L. Holiday
United States Army**

**School of Advanced Military Studies
United States Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

First Term AY 99-00

Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited

DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 3

20000321 040

SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES

MONOGRAPH APPROVAL

Major Hershel L. Holiday

**Title of Monograph: *Training Management and Peacekeeping Operations:
Challenges to the "Band of Excellence"***

Approved by:

LTC Peter Schifferle

Monograph Director

COL Robin P. Swan, MMAS

**Director, School of
Advanced Military Studies**

Philip J. Brooks, Ph. D.

**Director, Graduate Degree
Program**

Accepted this 15th Day of December 1999

ABSTRACT

Title: *Training Management and Peacekeeping Operations: Challenges to the "Band of Excellence"* by MAJ Hershel L. Holiday, USA, 62 pages.

FM 25-100 *Training the Force*, 1988, with its "how to" manual, FM 25-101 *Battle Focused Training*, 1990, have proven successful in preparing the Army for conventional warfare as demonstrated by the Army's superior performance during Operation DESERT STORM in 1991. Since then, the Army reduced size and changed structure, while the number of missions increased. Presidential Review Directive (PRD) 13 (1993) and Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 25 (1994) broadened the Army's scope of responsibilities and involved the nation in an ever-increasing range of Stability and Support Operations (SASO). Though the Army is heavily committed to SASOs, current training doctrine does not address training management for SASO missions.

National Security Strategy requires the US Army to be prepared to rapidly deploy to two near-simultaneous conventional wars along with a variety of smaller stability and support operations. Since the end of the Cold War, ethnic and religious nationalism has generated increased conflicts and human suffering worldwide. US interests abroad, with active participation in the United Nations and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, have resulted in increased deployments and participation by the US Army in SASO missions. Since the end of the Cold War, the Army has been reduced to ten Active Component divisions while the number of deployments has increased.

FM 25-100 and 101 provide a systemic formula designed to sustain unit training and readiness for conventional warfighting. Using this doctrine, units identify their most essential "go to war" tasks and design training programs that train and sustain these tasks. Known as the "band of excellence," divisions are either training or executing combat-oriented tasks in support of National Security Policy requirements. SASO missions conflict with training doctrine. Some SASOs sustain warfighting tasks; Bosnia SASOs do not. Divisions deploying to Bosnia cannot sustain Major Theater War tasks and therefore are incapable of meeting the "rapid" deployment requirement directed by the National Command Authorities. Bosnia SASOs seem the most demanding because they require significant post-deployment reorganization and render units incapable of performing their MTW mission for almost two years. These issues suggest that Army divisions involved in SASOs can no longer sustain training readiness within the "band of excellence."

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
Introduction.....	1
1. Doctrinal History of Training.....	5
2. The MTW vs. SASO Dilemma.....	13
3. How SASOs Impact Mechanized Maneuver Units.....	22
4. How SASOs Impact Mechanized Division Battle Staffs.....	34
Conclusion.....	38
Endnotes.....	40
Bibliography.....	49

INTRODUCTION

Army units must be prepared to accomplish their wartime missions by frequent sustainment training on critical tasks; they cannot rely on infrequent "peaking" to the appropriate level of wartime proficiency . . . sustainment training enables units to operate in a "band of excellence."

FM 25-100, *Training the Force*, November 1988¹

Training provides a foundation for success in military operations. Well-trained units normally succeed in battle when confronted by less-well trained forces. Training must also reflect the Army's warfighting doctrine. As an example, during the Normandy invasion, the US 90th Infantry Division (ID) suffered extreme casualties due to a mixture of leadership, tactics, and training deficiencies.² The 90th ID was prepared to fight using basic individual and collective infantry tasks. They did not focus their training efforts against the seasoned German infantryman defending the rugged hedgerows of Normandy; the 90th ID failed to adequately focus their training. There exists an inseparable bond between fighting and training doctrine. United States Army doctrine should focus on future conflicts incorporating current and projected technologies. Warfighting doctrine should be adaptive, anticipative, and reactive to new circumstances and the ideas of a changing world. When an army's warfighting doctrine changes, its training doctrine should also change.

The US Army facilitates change in warfighting and training doctrine through a series of field manuals (FM). Field Manual 100-5 *Operations* tells the Army "how to fight"; Field Manual 25-100 *Training the Force* tells the Army how

to train for these fights. The Army published its last Cold War-version of FM 100-5 in 1986. The 1993 and 2000 versions have and will continue to emphasize a full spectrum of noncontiguous missions in accordance with US Code Title 10 (Armed Forces).³ The Army published its first comprehensive training manual, FM 25-100, in 1988. With the end of the Cold War, and an increase in noncontiguous missions, there has been no corresponding change in training doctrine.

Field Manual 25-100, with its "how to" manual FM 25-101 *Battle Focused Training*, 1990, have proven successful in preparing the Army for conventional warfare as demonstrated by its superior performance during Operation DESERT STORM in 1991. Since then, the Army reduced size and changed structure, while the number of missions increased. Presidential Review Directive (PRD) 13 (1993) and Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 25 (1994) broadened the Army's scope of responsibilities and involved the nation in an ever-increasing range of Stability and Support Operations (SASO).⁴ The FM 25 series of training manuals does not address preparation for SASO, though the Army is heavily committed to these missions.

Today's Army must train for a wide range of tactical missions. The Army uses Corps to translate the National Command Authorities' (NCA) guidance into tactical operations.⁵ Army divisions execute these tactical operations. The division structure provides a self-supporting organization for both training and sustainment. Divisions establish Mission Essential Task Lists (METL) focused on conventional operations that do not include SASO.⁶ Though committed to

specific war plans, mechanized divisions continue to conduct SASO operations. Several concepts and procedures within current training doctrine remain relevant, yet these manuals do not incorporate SASO training doctrine and philosophy. Some SASOs degrade the division's warfighting capabilities. Specifically, given the increase in SASO missions, how will units achieve and maintain the band of excellence? Once a unit receives a SASO mission, can it also execute its Major Theater of Wars (MTW) mission? This research effort focuses on a mechanized division's ability to maintain MTW-training readiness when tasked to conduct SASO missions.

Field Manuals 25-100 and 101 offer nine principles of training that provide a measurable standard to determine if a unit can perform its wartime mission. Of the nine principles of training, sustainment training is the most significant because it determines the unit's level of METL proficiency. Companies and above design METL based on war plans and external directives. Sustainment training is the essential step that allows units to plan and resource training to achieve either a "Needs Practice (P)" or "Trained (T)" on each mission-essential task. If the unit has never attempted to train a certain task, that task receives an "Untrained (U)" rating. Training doctrine acknowledges the fact that units cannot maintain a continuous "P" or "T" status. Due to personnel turbulence, leadership changes, new equipment fielding, and challenges, units will experience certain highs and lows in overall readiness. Therefore, doctrine suggests that units maintain a certain level of readiness or band of excellence with training focused on "U"- and "P"- rated tasks. These tasks are normally collective tasks trained

from crew level and higher. This research paper argues that SASO missions reduce conventional MELT tasks below the "P" level because such missions, with few exceptions, do not provide sufficient sustainment-training opportunities.⁷

To establish a foundation for this study, chapter 1 examines and reviews the impact of history and theory on current training doctrine. The concepts behind FM 25-100 evolved from a series of wartime experiences; however, the greatest impact on doctrine came from the Army's World War II experiences, from mobilization through rigorous fighting in Western Europe in 1944. This chapter also shows the evolution of training doctrine from the battlefields of World War II to the present.⁸

Chapter 2 introduces a series of national directives, strategy, and doctrine that guides Army missions and commitments. Planners and doctrine writers must consider national security strategy, directives, military strategy, and other requirements that affect the division's ability to sustain training proficiency. US Code Title 10, presidential directives, the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), and other directives have a major impact on training focus. Each of these directives broadens the scope of possible Army missions. Units must achieve proficiency on a full range of training tasks in order to maintain readiness for its MTW missions under the JSCP. SASO missions stress the current training system because these operations introduce different training objectives. This chapter further defines the problem of how to sustain readiness between MTW and SASO missions.

The next portion of this research paper conducts a case study analysis of mechanized divisions that have completed SASO missions. Chapter 3 shows how SASOs impact maneuver units. Chapter 4 focuses on how SASOs affect staff sections. Mechanized units experience significant challenges when training for stability operations because most of these missions remove them from their primary weapon systems and doctrinal missions. For example, an armor unit normally spends more than fifty percent of its training funds on gunnery and gunnery related tasks; however, units rotating to Bosnia have little time or resources to support such training.⁹ A final review assesses the relevance of the band of excellence as a primary portion of the Army's training doctrine from now through the start of the next millennium.

CHAPTER 1

Doctrinal History of Training

The first battle of our next war could well be its last battle: belligerents could be quickly exhausted, and international pressures to stop fighting could bring about an early cessation of hostilities.... Today the US Army must above all else, prepare to win the first battle of the next war.

FM 100-5, *Operations*, 1976¹⁰

There are specific events and individuals in history who have contributed to changes in both warfighting and training doctrine. Such changes are usually associated with the aftermath of war, a change in theory, the introduction of new technology, or a combination of all or some of these events. Change is difficult,

especially in a normally conservative organization like the Army. When faced with a different enemy, environment, or conflict, the Army must adjust its training philosophy to achieve success. This chapter will show how the Army learned from its World War II deficiencies and developed a more efficient training philosophy from lessons learned fighting the Germans in World War II. These ideas remained dormant throughout the Korean and Vietnam Wars. However, following the Vietnam War, the US Army changed both theory and warfighting doctrine with a corresponding change in training philosophy. Under the leadership of General William DePuy and other significant military leaders, the Army developed a comprehensive training formula that would eventually bring success during DESERT STORM in 1991.

The goal of the Army's first warfighting manual since the Vietnam War was to design a doctrinal fighting concept that would lead the Army into the 21st Century.¹¹ Although the Army had developed conventional doctrine at the tactical level, there was no clear operational concept designed to defeat large Soviet armies.¹² According to historian Paul Herbert, DePuy was the primary force behind publishing FM 100-5. As commander of the newly formed Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), DePuy supervised the development of FM 100-5, *Operations*, which in 1976 introduced the concept of Airland Battle. This manual became a guide for acquisition, training, and force structure designed to direct the Army away from the low-intensity, dismounted operations used in Vietnam to the high-intensity, mechanized warfare foreseen in Europe.¹³

DePuy's theories and World War II experiences were major factors in changing both warfighting and training doctrine.

DePuy theorized that the Army should be prepared to fight sudden, unexpected localized conflicts using a smaller force. DePuy's World War II experiences made him distrustful of mass mobilizations and specifically the abbreviated training associated with mass call-ups. FM 100-5 (1976) stated:

The [US] could find itself in a short, intense war--the outcome of which may be dictated by the results of initial combat. This circumstance is unprecedented: we are an Army historically unprepared for its first battle. We are accustomed to victory wrought with the weight of materiel and population brought to bear after the onset of hostilities.¹⁴

DePuy believed future conflicts would require instant readiness. Under the older concept of full-scale mobilization, military schools, for example, trained leaders to perform at up to two grades higher.¹⁵ To develop a small volunteer force ready to deploy instantly and fight against superior numbers, training doctrine would have to produce officers and soldiers who were ready to fight at their current grade immediately. Likewise, units could no longer expect six months to a year of preparation time prior to fighting. Unit training would focus on go-to-war tasks, and units would have to be proficient before the conflict developed.¹⁶

DePuy acquired a firm belief in training from the challenges he experienced while fighting in World War II with the 90th ID. John Colby, in his book, *War From the Ground Up*, states that the 90th ID suffered more from bad leadership than from insufficient training.¹⁷ As a new second lieutenant in January 1943, Colby felt that the division "had been well trained by the standards of its day."¹⁸ Activated on March 25, 1942 at Camp Bareley, Texas, the 90th ID

also trained at Camp Roberts, California, and in the Mojave Desert. They were proficient in basic tactics such as extended order drill, village fighting, and reacting to enemy artillery.¹⁹ Although Colby targets leadership as the primary deficiency in the division, it was more a lack of training for these leaders that led to the high casualties and multiple dismissals of key leaders between 1944 and 1945.

The 90th ID early received the distinction of being a "problem division."²⁰ Its mission was to attack through the beachhead line held by the 82d Airborne Division on June 9, 1944 directly into the Cotentin Peninsula, the infamous hedgerows for which Allied planners had made little preparations. DePuy served as battalion, then regimental operations officer, before assuming command of the 1st Battalion, 357th Infantry Regiment. Facing strong German defenses, the lead battalion recoiled under its first enemy fire. By the end of that day the division had advanced only two kilometers, and the 357th Infantry Regiment suffered 99 casualties.²¹ Overall, during the first six weeks of combat, the 90th lost 100 percent of its soldiers and 150 percent of its officers. In rifle companies, such losses translated to between 200 and 400 percent of infantry soldiers.²² Because of extremely high casualties, Lieutenant General J. Lawton "Lightning Joe" Collins, the corps commander, relieved the division commander along with two regimental commanders during this period. After two additional months of chaotic battles, Collins relieved the second division commander.²³

DePuy based the division's challenges primarily on readiness, which translated to leadership, tactics, and training. DePuy agreed that leadership was

a significant problem, however lack of effective training led directly to the division's high casualty rate. Further, the leadership issues that Colby and DePuy cite show a mixture of character and training flaws. DePuy describes the actions of one of three battalion commanders:

[Lester] was a despicable punk from the Illinois National Guard--he had given ample evidence of his character continuously during the two years before Normandy. Upon issuing his order for the first attack of the war he went to the aid station, turned himself in and was evacuated. He was pursued by the authorities and reduced to enlisted rank.²⁴

On multiple occasions, commanders ordered frontal attacks that caused severe casualties. DePuy salvaged two crucial training lessons that he noted as key deficiencies in their pre-war training plan:

[W]hat we finally learned, which is what all seasoned soldiers finally learn, is not to attack them where they are. Find a hole, go through that hole and get in their rear, and then the whole bloody thing would collapse. Then you'd have them in the open. That's the kind of thing I wished we had learned during the two years we were in training in the United States and during the three months we were training in England....²⁵

The second most significant training deficiency was that soldiers of the 90th ID did not comprehend the use of small-arms suppressive fire.

[A]lmost all suppression was done by indirect-fire weapons. Very little suppression was done by small arms. Occasionally we would use our heavy machine guns. People thought first about mortars and artillery, then heavy machine guns, and finally light machine guns. Really they didn't think much about using riflemen for maneuvering and sharpshooting. The M-1 rifle was a precision weapon but there were no precision targets.²⁶

DePuy analyzed the lessons of World War II, the Korean and Vietnam Wars, and the observations of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War to publish a new warfighting

doctrine in 1976. Referring to training practices during the Korean and Vietnam Wars, Herbert stated;

While these wars did not require mobilization on the scale of World War II, the training for soldiers in both conflicts was much the same as for their World War II elders; large numbers of conscripts being hustled through a series of exercises in which minimum competence was the goal.²⁷

In 1973, DePuy directed Deputy Chief of Staff for Training Brigadier General Paul F. Gorman to rewrite the Army's training manuals.²⁸ This project began with a series of training bulletins and circulars published by the various centers and schools. Each manual described a single, specific tactical function. Individual schools published their own manuals and distributed them throughout the Army. Each manual captured DePuy's ideas about tactical operations.²⁹ This feedback generated the Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP). The ARTEP listed all of the critical tasks that a combat unit had to perform, but it did not allow units to choose their tasks; units had to train on each task based on the unit type. The manual provided specific tasks, conditions, and standards that measured readiness; however, the ARTEP did not apply a system to prioritize unit tasks.³⁰ Commanders attempted to gain proficiency on each task without regard to the unit's wartime mission. Another key contributor to the current training doctrine was General Carl E. Vuono.

Throughout his career, Vuono sought to improve training doctrine. He directed the Army away from training inspections and encouraged commanders to measure the effects of training instead of inspecting the trainer. Vuono established the "Principles of Training" which first appeared in FMs 25-1 through

25-5. Vuono continued to support the creation of training doctrine throughout several key assignments with both TRADOC and the Pentagon. He also wrote the preface and signed FM 25-100 while serving as Army Chief of Staff, which shows the level of significance he placed on Army training.³¹

TRADOC published FM 100-5, *Operations*, in 1976 after three years of development. The 1986 version was the final edition of the Cold War era. Field Manual 25-100 (1988) and FM 25-101 (1990), with a suite of mission training plans (MTPs) finally replaced the ARTEP manual as the Army's single comprehensive training doctrine. Armed with both a fighting and training doctrine, the Army was postured to fight a large-scale, conventional war employing corps and divisions.

DePuy had translated his challenging experiences with the 90th ID into a more efficient warfighting and training doctrine. The time was right for change in that the Vietnam War was in decline and the nation was ready to concentrate on its most dangerous foe, the Soviet Union. From the hedgerows of World War II, DePuy learned that training should focus on the specific enemy and environment in which units expected to fight. He challenged the Army to build units that were ready to perform immediately because future conflicts would be quick and would not allow time for mass mobilizations. He directed Army schools to graduate officers and soldiers prepared to perform at their current rank because there would be very little train-up time. Vuono provided principles to manage and focus training doctrine. After the Vietnam War and during the Cold War, the US Army changed its doctrine and corresponding training strategy. This

combination of theory, training, and doctrine proved successful during DESERT STORM in 1991.

The end of the Cold War has generated another opportunity for change. Since the fall of the Soviet Union and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the United States has no primary foe. With the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact came a surge of new and emerging nation states. Such tensions have led to human rights violations and general turbulence around the world, which the US, with the UN and NATO have attempted to resolve. The NCA focuses Army assets toward MTWs because these areas are the most dangerous and most critical to US interests. However, the NCA has also committed the Army to a series of peacekeeping operations or SASOs which will likely continue into the 21st Century. The Army's greatest challenge will be to maintain its MTW readiness while SASOs increase. To achieve success in both areas, the Army must review its training doctrine to determine if it is still relevant for today's missions. Chapter 2 will review the laws, policies, directives, and other guidelines that direct the Army to sustain capabilities in both MTW and SASO commitments.

CHAPTER 2

The MTW vs SASO Dilemma

Today, as in 1899, the fundamental business of the Army is to fight and win our nation's wars. Warfighting remains job number 1.

General Eric K. Shinseki, Chief of Staff, US Army, October 12, 1999³²

The NCA requires the Army to sustain a near-simultaneous dual-MTW capability along with a variety of SASO missions. While MTWs represent the greatest challenge to US interests, SASOs represent the largest and fastest growing category of deployments. US Code Title 10 and the National Security Strategy provide ample guidance to direct MTW sustainment training. However, increased SASO deployments compete for training time and other resources that reduce METL proficiency and, therefore, MTW readiness. Under current warfighting doctrine, divisions sustain only MTW METL tasks. As SASOs increase, MTW readiness will decrease, which presents a significant challenge to Army planners.³³ The collective body of guidance demands that units sustain a wide and expanding range of capabilities in order to accomplish current and future force commitments. This chapter will review the laws, policies, and possible solutions to this training dilemma.

US Code Title 10 forms the lawful foundation for the Army's existence and gives the Army a combat-oriented mission along with related stability and support tasks. Four primary paragraphs provide a general description of the Army's mission, composition, and peacetime organization.³⁴ Paragraph (a), bullets 2 and 3, are the only portion of the document that applies to SASOs.

- (a) It is the intent of Congress to provide an Army that is capable, in conjunction with the other armed forces, of:
 - (1) preserving the peace and security, and providing for the defense of the [US], the Territories, Commonwealths, and possessions, and any areas occupied by the [US];
 - (2) supporting the national policies;
 - (3) implementing the national objectives; and
 - (4) overcoming any nations responsible for aggressive acts that imperil the peace and security of the [US].³⁵

However, paragraph (b) states;

It shall be organized, trained, and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained combat incident to operations on land. It is responsible for the preparation of land forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war."³⁶

The words "prompt and sustained combat" imply that the Army must remain ready to deploy "promptly" to fight conventional wars. Prior to 1991, Army policy focused on conventional combat operations; however, with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, US military policy shifted toward stability and support operations.

In 1992, President George Bush declared that the US would increase its support of UN commitments by expanding its participation in SASO missions.³⁷ During the Cold War, the US limited participation in SASOs to logistical and transportation support, along with occasional observer missions. During the summer of 1992, the Bush Administration concluded that a limited role was no longer sufficient. Bush revealed his new policy in a speech to the UN General Assembly on September 21, 1992. Bush said, "In as much as the UN has done, it can do more."³⁸ He stated that peace keeping operations (PKOs) would need "better equipment and training...at the national level, [along with] enhanced interoperability, planning and training of multinational peacekeeping forces."³⁹ In 1993, President Bill Clinton continued to support an expanded role for US forces in SASO.⁴⁰ In May 1994, Clinton approved Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 25, which extended but did not radically alter Bush's original policy. PDD 25 provided guidance for carefully selecting circumstances under which the US

would commit forces to SASOs. PDD 25 emerged as the first comprehensive statement articulating US policy toward multilateral peace operations.⁴¹

Though current policy supports worldwide SASO missions, the yearly National Security Strategy demands that US forces remain prepared for high-intensity MTWs, placing SASO missions second in priority. The military portion of the National Security Strategy provides an annual policy focus for the military, which the president signs. The 1998 version concentrated more on MTWs with only casual references to SASOs. The strategy referred to human rights violations, support of NATO, and other wide-ranging circumstances that may involve the US in stability operations. However, in reference to MTWs the National Security Strategy specifically states:

[F]ighting and winning major theater wars is the ultimate test of our Total Force--a test at which we must always succeed. For the foreseeable future, the [US] must remain able to deter and defeat large-scale, cross-border aggression in two distant theaters⁴²

In terms of how to train and prepare for these contingencies, the policy identifies three primary requirements for the armed forces. Forces should remain ready, and prepared to fight in noncontiguous environments and maintain the ability to transition from noncontiguous and other limited conflicts to fight MTWs.

[O]ur military must also be able to transition to fighting major theater wars from a posture of global engagement--from substantial levels of peacetime engagement overseas as well multiple concurrent small-scale contingencies. [T]he [US] must accept a degree of risk associated with withdrawing from contingency operations and engagement activities in order to reduce the greater risk incurred [by not responding] adequately to [MTWs].⁴³

Here Clinton presents both MTW and SASO missions as competing contingencies, with priority to the MTW. The key point in both types of conflict resolution is that forces must sustain the capability for timely execution of both missions.

To meet this challenge, the forces that would be first to respond to an act of aggression are kept at full readiness, and the forces that follow them are kept at a level that supports their being ready to deploy and go into action when called for in the operations plan⁴⁴

Title 10 and the National Security Strategy imply that the Army must sustain its MTW proficiency as a higher priority over SASO. However, a series of presidential speeches and decision directives have made SASO a useful strategic capability. SASO missions directly influence and/or support global US interests. Though MTWs have a higher priority, the Army must be capable of executing both. The first post-Cold War doctrinal peacekeeping manual, FM 100-23, *Peace Operations* (December 1994) provides a solid description of how units should manage training from the beginning to the conclusion of SASO deployments.

FM 100-23 states: "[T]raining and preparation for peace operations should not detract from a unit's primary mission of training soldiers to fight and win in combat."⁴⁵ FM 100-23 considers peace operations as a logical extension of war and further states that a unit's METL should not include peace operations.⁴⁶ However, the manual acknowledges the need for SASO-oriented training; it suggests a four- to -six week training period for units to prepare for SASO

deployments. Pre-deployment training should include subjects that adjust the soldier's attitude from MTW to a SASO focus, which includes rules of engagement (ROE), mine clearing, observation, reporting, patrolling, and other peacekeeping functions. The manual also suggests that units conduct this training at combat training centers (CTC) or execute the training at the unit's home station using a mobile training team (MTT). During this period, units no longer train for their MTW METL. Instead they re-focus training efforts from MTW to SASO.⁴⁷ Time permitting, the manual suggests that units attempt to maintain combat readiness by training their METL during the SASO; however, collective maneuver training is extremely difficult to execute in most SASO environments due to mission constraints and limitations. For example, units must restrict training exercises out of concern for alarming the local population or the parties in conflict.⁴⁸ Once complete, units re-deploy and execute a lengthy reintegration period designed to regain MTW METL proficiency.

Post-operations training must re-orient the soldier to the unit's wartime METL. This process represents a significant change in orientation for the unit. Commanders must allocate sufficient resources and time for training to achieve collective and individual standards. Unit commanders must also allocate the resources for refresher training. Perhaps the most significant resource is time. Based on a study by the Arroyo Center of the Rand Corporation, combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) units may require up to three months to recover from SASO deployments. Combat arms units may require up to twelve months to reorganize and reach METL proficiency. Such training must

redevelop skills that have remained dormant throughout the SASO deployment.⁴⁹

Once complete, the commander should provide a METL assessment to determine if the unit has regained the skills necessary to return the unit to a wartime-ready status.⁵⁰

Based on current training and readiness doctrine, units are technically unable to perform an MTW mission while engaged in the preparation, execution, or recovery from a SASO mission. There is obviously a prolonged stand-down time during which the unit prepares for and executes the deployment. This fact violates the "prompt and sustained combat" directive from Title 10 and the band of excellence standard because units are essentially "untrained" or "U" in certain, if not all, METL tasks upon redeployment. During this period, how does the Army compensate for simultaneous conflicts specified by the National Security Strategy? Officers assigned to rewrite FM 100-5 in 1999, known as the "100-5 Writing Team" offer a possible solution to this problem.

Field Manual 100-5, "Training Concept Paper, 1999" presented four possible training strategies designed to prepare the Army for both MTW and SASO missions. The writing team suggested that the fourth course of action (COA) was the best. COA 4 stated that all units should achieve and maintain competency on a basic set of common core tasks until formally tasked with a specific MTW or SASO mission. The challenge to this solution is that units must receive the mission with sufficient time to prepare. Once officially ordered, the unit trains on those tasks specific to that operation.⁵¹

The concept paper presented five types of missions or "missions sets" for current and future Army missions: (1) High End, Decisive Operations; (2) Entry Operations; (3) Deter/Contain Crisis; (4) Peace Operations; (5) Humanitarian Assistance. The writing team also used four assumptions: (a) units require METL tasks to focus training and resources; (2) The METL development process remains valid; (3) Army end strength will not increase; (4) the Army will continue to use early entry light forces, strike forces, and mechanized/armored heavy forces. They presented three other COAs that failed the feasibility test because each one either violated the MTW requirement, the instant deployment requirement, or both. However COA 4, which advocates maintaining corps competencies and training up for MTW or SASO missions, also requires a certain amount of time for training, which makes it equally unfeasible.⁵²

Another significant challenge to SASO operations is that mechanized divisions, in most cases, will not use their primary weapon systems in SASO missions. Some stability operations have and will continue to require heavy forces in a mechanized role such as in Somalia and the ongoing Central Command Exercise in Kuwait. However most SASOs do not require mechanized weapon systems. This concept adds a greater training and sustainment challenge to mechanized units conducting SASOs. Field Manual 71-100, *Division Operations*, provides the doctrinal missions and capabilities of a mechanized division. According to FM 71-100, a division is a large Army organization that trains and fights as a tactical team; it is largely self-sustaining and capable of independent operations. Armored and mechanized divisions

have highly mobile and protective weapon systems. Divisions usually engage in tactical-level warfare; they fight battles and engagements within the context of operational-level campaign plans. Division-level tactics involve the movement and positioning of maneuver forces on the battlefield in relation to the enemy. They also mass combat power and provide logistic support for divisional forces before, during, and following engagements. Divisions may be involved in conflicts ranging from fighting an emerging super power, a hostile regional power, or a less sophisticated, insurgent force.⁵³ Given the doctrinal missions of mechanized divisions, there are significant sustainment challenges involved when mechanized divisions conduct SASOs.

The most recent change in the Army's method of supporting SASO missions is to allow more Reserve Component (RC) units to participate. On October 26, 1999, the Army announced its plan to rotate Active Component (AC) and RC units for service in Bosnia as part of the NATO Stabilization Force. Continental United States (CONUS)-based AC and RC units will form peacekeeping teams that will rotate to Bosnia for from 6 to 12 months using a single, integrated structure under either an AC or RC division headquarters. This plan increases the Army's readiness by ultimately decreasing the number of AC soldiers and units involved in SASOs.⁵⁴ The AC/RC peacekeeping teams will be successful only if RC units can attain METL proficiency. Based on warfighting capabilities, a prerequisite for SASOs, RC units will likely spend more time training with their AC counterpart. If not, the AC unit will provide the brunt of combat troops while the RC provides more staff, CS, and CSS personnel. The

Army must be prepared to spend more resources training the RC if this plan is to succeed. If not, SASOs will continue to degrade AC readiness.

So far, it is clear the Army must prepare to execute both MTWs and SASO missions equally well. Assuming the amount of available resources will not increase, mechanized divisions will continue to perform these operations. They will also experience difficulties sustaining combat or MTW related skills while deployed to a SASO environment. Therefore, a unit will become "untrained" throughout the duration of most SASO missions. This analysis illustrates the challenge of sustaining MTW capabilities while conducting multiple and complex SASO missions with limited resources.⁵⁵ A challenge to the Army and strategic planners is to figure out how the Army will sustain training readiness in accordance with FM 25-100 while meeting the most likely and the most dangerous Army commitments.

The next portion of this paper analyzes sustainment training challenges from the perspective of mechanized divisions that have recently performed SASO missions in Bosnia.

CHAPTER 3

How SASOs Impact Mechanized Maneuver Divisions Units

Leadership at the tank commander and tank gunner level has increased tremendously. Take a tank gunner, for example. Normally a sergeant, he has the huge responsibility to squeeze the trigger on an Abrams 120-mm gun, but he is really a technical guy. The tank commander is the leader. Here in Bosnia, we have been able to develop those tank gunners into better leaders. We are going to take back with us increased discipline, cohesion and teamwork because this environment increases those things. If you

have discipline and cohesion, you can do anything. As far as combat readiness goes, all we need to do is sharpen our technical ability on the Abrams when we get back and do just a little bit on maneuver and --boom--we would be on top of it, ready to roll.

Major General Kevin Byrnes, Commander, 1st Cavalry Division,
April 1999⁵⁶

Today's Army leaders remain confident in the current training doctrine. In a 1st Cavalry Division slide briefing titled "Post-Bosnia Return to Readiness," the first comment on the "Lessons Learned" slide was "Army training doctrine works."⁵⁷ However, the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) reported the following adjustment to training doctrine:

Nevertheless, Field Manuals 25-100 and 25-101 were the cornerstone documents for training management and developing the training strategy. Because Task Force Eagle had entered the sustainment phase of the operation, US training doctrine could be applied in a broad context. Task Force Eagle essentially took what doctrine said for peacetime and adjusted it to the operational environment. Nonetheless, the planning and execution of training required manipulation of the doctrine to correspond with [Mission, Enemy, Terrain and Weather, Troops Available, and Time] conditions.⁵⁸

According to CALL, training doctrine may not be applicable in the SASO environment; therefore, commanders must adjust training doctrine.

Commanders involved in SASO missions have declared the current training philosophy a reliable guide to training for and executing SASOs. Upon redeployment, commanders rely on current training doctrine as a guide to retrain the unit's MTW METL. However, commanders may not realize that the entire SASO training concept, from preparation to reintegration, is a "peaking" process, which FM 25-100, through sustainment doctrine, tried to eliminate. Meanwhile,

in support of national policy, the Army may not be capable of providing adequate forces to meet MTW requirements.

Assuming the Army's ten active-duty divisions along with 15 enhanced brigades of the Army National Guard, have a designated wartime focus, these divisions must train and prepare for immediate deployment and war in those areas. In a recent speech Shinseki, provided a timeline for future deployments:

[W]ith the right technological solutions, we intend to transform the Army, all components, into a standard design with internetted [Command, Control, Communication, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance], and Reconnaissance packages that allow us to put a combat capable brigade anywhere in the world in 96 hours once we have received execute liftoff, a division on the ground in 120 hours, and five divisions in 30 days.⁵⁹

Without significant changes to the current structure, the Army will struggle to meet these standards. For example, SASO missions such as those in Bosnia affect up to three divisions at once. When a unit receives notification, it spends up to six months reorganizing and training for the rotation. While one unit is preparing to go, the current peacekeeping unit is approximately midway through its twelve-month rotation in the Bosnia Area of Responsibility (AOR). Meanwhile a third division has redeployed and completed approximately two-thirds of its reintegration training after a year in Bosnia. As will be discussed in detail below, recovery plans normally require at least nine months. This chapter examines some of the challenges that units experience attempting to maintain MTW proficiency in the Bosnia AOR. This chapter also examines rotation time lines to determine if US Army divisions can respond to MTWs in accordance with current and future time standards.

The Bosnia SASO mission challenges Army strategic capabilities because it forces units to train away from their wartime METL. Though the Army participates in other SASO missions worldwide, most other missions allow units to train their METL. For example, the Army sends only light infantry units to the Sinai peacekeeping mission, while mechanized units execute CENTCOM exercises in Kuwait. Both areas allow units freedom to sustain and improve METL tasks. When preparing for SASO missions in Bosnia, commanders planned to use all available time to sustain warfighting skills, yet they had to train and improve peacekeeping skills at the risk of losing MTW proficiency. For example, leaders must constantly train and review force protection measures which have a direct bearing on casualties, property loss, and morale, all of which affect the mission. FM 25-100 references continuous training once a unit has deployed to a war zone. It says "effective training is the number one priority of senior leaders in peacetime. In wartime, training continues with a priority second only to combat or to the support of combat operations"⁶⁰ SASOs are not considered "war." However, commanders recognize, perhaps from training doctrine, that training for the current mission must continue. The challenge has been and will continue to be how to sustain combat tasks in this environment. For example, Task Force Eagle's tasks were to establish and maintain a fixed or mobile checkpoint in the AOR to facilitate freedom of movement for civilians, monitor former warring factions (FWF), confiscate contraband, and on order, block movement.⁶¹ These tasks facilitate peacekeeping and stability operations yet have little use in combat for maneuver units. This type of SASO mission

degrades warfighting proficiencies. The next portion of this chapter will compare sustainment doctrine with SASO missions from the Task Force Eagle commander's perspective.

As Major General Bill Nash, the first commander of Task Force Eagle recalled:

I am thoroughly convinced that our success is directly proportional to credibility and proficiency at warfighting. The environment has some differences, yes, but the differences are more tactics, techniques and procedures than doctrine.... The thing to remember is that we are warfighters.⁶²

Nash believed that stability and support operations skills were subordinate to warfighting skills. He indicated that a unit is only as successful as it is proficient in warfighting or MTW tasks. This commander implied that the discipline of a proficient unit will bring success in a SASO mission. Task Force Eagle commander's guidance challenged soldiers to become proficient in basic soldier skills with only a few additions.

Train on the basic warfighting skills based on CTT requirements, MOS specific and collective warfighting tasks. Units will focus on individual squad/crew and platoon-level operations using the principles established in the latest references. Again, troop leading procedures to include rehearsals and PCIs as well as battle drills, must be emphasized.⁶³

Nash suggested that the US brings a warfighting capability that gains more respect than those armies who only conduct peacekeeping. The V Corps commander listed task force objectives and included three conventional maneuver tasks: movement to contact, hasty attack, and hasty defense.⁶⁴ These tasks likely derived from a mission analysis in which the planners determined a

potential combat operation. The Commander emphasized the following training objectives:

- Protect the Force.
- Conduct Recon and Security Operations.
- React to Extremist (individuals, paramilitary, state sponsored professionals).
- React to Non-Governmental Organizations/Private Organizations.
- Synchronize Combat Operations in an Enforcement Situation.
- Sustain the Force.
- Conduct Information Operations.⁶⁵

This list became Task Force Eagle's METL while in Bosnia because the unit had to sustain these tasks to ensure their success. Because the division must also train its MTW mission, the commander must now train to sustain two METLs: SASO and MTW. The commander normally does not have the resources in terms of time and assets to train for both.

The Bosnia AOR severely restricted MTW sustainment training. This situation forced commanders to focus training efforts on individual and leadership tasks. Due to the mission, the environment, and available equipment, mechanized combat forces cannot conduct collective training above the platoon level. Combat support and CSS units face similar problems based on their assigned missions in the AOR. Due to these restrictions, commanders focus training on leadership at the individual and crew levels. As stated above, MG Kevin Byrnes, Commander, 1st Cavalry Division, considered Bosnia an excellent opportunity to improve small-unit leadership skills among soldiers in otherwise technical positions. According to his statement, Byrnes accepted the temporary

reduction in overall readiness with an increase in discipline, cohesion, and teamwork.

During the first Bosnia deployments soldiers conducted home-station training, followed by certification training at Hohenfels, Germany, as a prerequisite to enter the SASO AOR. New soldier training became necessary as a result of continued turbulence within deployed units. Army schools, Permanent Change of Station (PCS), End of Term of Service (ETS), and a variety of personal and domestic challenges contributed to the need for this program. Such turbulence affects both garrison and deployed units equally; however, units deployed to the Bosnia AOR cannot easily retrain or requalify soldiers on their weapon systems. CALL recorded the following from Task Force Eagle's experiences: "[A]s the mission continued, M1/M2 crew changeover took its toll. Many crew members separated from the service, retired, [PCS'd], attended schools, or moved to other jobs."⁶⁶ Personnel challenges have a direct impact on a mechanized unit's ability to maintain qualified crews.

Qualification gunnery is a prerequisite for both MTW and SASO readiness. M1/M2 crewmen must deploy as qualified crews. Since missions were twenty-four hours per day, maintaining qualified and proficient crews became a significant problem. Based on these limitations, commanders concentrated training efforts at platoon level and below for training and qualification. During the deployment, the most degradable skills were marksmanship and gunnery.⁶⁷

Individual weapons firing, pre-gunnery, and gunnery represent the three components of marksmanship. Small arms ranges were plentiful and assessable to units at their base camps. However, there was not enough maneuver space to construct full-scale practice ranges for tank and Bradley gunnery. Therefore, units used micro-armor and small-scale ranges to practice engagements and to rehearse gunnery skills. Pre-gunnery occurred at both base camp and during check point duty.

Task Force Eagle units had all available personnel and equipment to conduct sustainment training gunnery and platoon-level maneuver. Their challenge was time. Task Force Eagle soldiers, guided by their Master Gunner (MG), built Tank Crew Proficiency Courses (TCPC) and Bradley Crew Proficiency Courses (BCPC). They used scaled targets and training devices known as the Tank Weapon Gunnery Simulation System (TWGSS) and Precision Gunnery System (PGS). In one case, a unit discovered a two-mile stretch of road, free of mines and minimum civilian traffic. With minor engineer effort, this piece of road became a decent TCPC/BCPC course. Once declared safe or certified for live fire, units rotated, by company, to the Taborfalva Training Area (TTA) located in Hungary, sixty kilometers southwest of Budapest. Each mechanized company conducted an eight-day rotation which consisted of roughly two days of movement (to and from); two days to draw and return equipment; one day of Tactical Table IV (TTIV) (day and night dry fire, similar to TCPC/BCPC); a maintenance/prep day before one day and night of Tactical Table VIII (TTVIII)(qualification gunnery). Finally they conducted platoon

training, which consisted of Tactical Table XI (TTXI) (platoon gunnery, dry fire, day and night), followed by Tactical Table XII (TTXII) (live fire, day and night), which included platoon fire control and limited maneuver training. This was an extremely tight schedule, especially because crews fired day and night tables and had little time to retrain weak crews. One of the benefits of this gunnery training was the 7th Army Training Command (7 ATC) provided all range support to include weapon systems, M1s and M2s.⁶⁸ Though this training provides a good sustainment effort, it is deficient in two areas.

Once again, constrained by time, there was no opportunity to fire a complete gunnery exercise which includes intermediate gunner tables such as Tactical Table V (TTV) (machine gun training), Tactical Table VI (TTVI) (defensive engagements using the 120-mm cannon), and TTVII (similar to the TTVIII qualification table).⁶⁹ These exercises train proficiency with all vehicle weapon systems employed both individually or in combination with other systems. By not conducting these intermediate exercises, crews fired poorly on both the crew and platoon qualification tables.⁷⁰ Second, this brief exercise did not sufficiently train new crews or new crew members joining experienced crews. This training opportunity may have been the most convenient training opportunity for mechanized units deployed to Bosnia. It perhaps allowed crews to meet SASO standards for possible contingency operations or quick reaction force (QRF) missions. Its weakness is that it makes crews little more than "familiar" with firing their weapon systems.⁷¹ This method of gunnery does not meet MTW readiness standards.

This analysis shows that MTW sustainment is almost impossible above platoon level and extremely difficult below that level. Units could not conduct company-team-level or higher maneuver training. The next section will discuss specific time requirements devoted to train up and recovery operations. It will focus on the 1st Cavalry Division, which was the first mechanized division to deploy from CONUS and execute a SASO mission in Bosnia. Finally this analysis will show how a Bosnia rotation prevents the Army from maintaining its dual MTW capability. As stated above, a Bosnia SASO affects up to three divisions at once. Though not within the scope of this research paper, US commitment to Kosovo will further reduce the number of available divisions for MTW missions.

Because units normally have no previous record or knowledge of peacekeeping operations, training and preparation must start at the most basic level. Peacekeeping units receive their mission no sooner than six months before deployment. Once tasked, units normally end combat-oriented training up to three months before deployment and began training SASO tasks.⁷² They will spend these three months training for their SASO mission at home or at a CTC. SASO missions normally last from six months to one year, followed by a reintegration or retraining plan that will take from three to six months for CS and CSS units and from six to nine months for maneuver units.⁷³ In some cases, like the 1st Cavalry Division, the reintegration plan lasted more than nine months because each of three brigades had to rebuild even though only two brigades actually deployed to Bosnia. The 3rd Brigade became a "force provider" for the

division that made it combat ineffective throughout the rotation.⁷⁴ CALL suggests that units who do not deploy with their parent unit normally provide significant pieces of equipment and/or personnel to the deploying forces. This will normally render the stay-behind force combat ineffective-unable to sustain warfighting skills.⁷⁵ Hence the effects of SASO normally cripple a division's stay behind force; therefore, the entire division must recover.

The 1st Cavalry Division could not maintain METL proficiency while deployed to Bosnia. Based on their "Return to Readiness" plan, division readiness suffered most in the combat arms arena. As stated above, the TTA provided adequate sustainment training however, the 7th Army Training Command closed this facility before the 1st Cavalry Division's deployment, which caused an even greater reduction in unit readiness for combat arms units.

Combat support elements (Engineers, Air Defense, Military Intelligence, and Signal Corps) remained moderately proficient from individual through platoon level. Likewise CSS units remained effective throughout the exercise. Other skills severely degraded during the deployment were combined arms and crew-level tasks such as breaching, brigade and task force-level maneuver, and deep operations planning and coordination. Though the division had planned to use "all available" time to maximize training while in Bosnia, their efforts rendered the unit only partially trained with almost a year-long recovery plan.⁷⁶

The 1st Cavalry Division received the Bosnia mission in approximately January 1998. They began deploying in October 1998 and completed redeployment in October 1999. Two brigades deployed for six months each. Of

the two deploying brigades, the 1st Brigade Combat Team returned in March 1999 and began a series of recovery exercises, which will conclude with a National Training Center (NTC) rotation scheduled for January 2000. The 2d Brigade Combat Team initiated reintegration training in September 1999 and will conduct an NTC rotation in May 2000. The 3d Brigade Combat Team, though it did not deploy as a brigade, conducted a similar train-up and NTC rotation from September through October 1999.⁷⁷ As stated above, it is likely that the 3d Brigade Combat Team also required a train-up to regain METL proficiency. These train-up periods included maximum leave along with leadership and other job changes. Armor battalions conducted a second new equipment training (NET) exercise to reorient its mechanics and crewmen to the M1A2 tank. The 1st Cavalry Division had completed its first NET to receive the M1A2 before the SASO deployment. In addition, each unit completed platoon, company/team, and battalion/task force maneuver training in preparation for their NTC rotation. Combat support and CSS units experienced similar training deficiencies while deployed to Bosnia.

Combat support and CSS units usually have a shorter retraining period because they normally continue to train or conduct basic METL tasks during SASO missions. Planners must consider the massive amounts of equipment and vehicles that are unique to CSS units and how these constraints effect the movement timeline.⁷⁸ However, the general principle applies: the longer the unit spends training and executing military operations other than war (MOOTW), the longer it will take to retrain or refresh the unit with its MTW METL. For

example, a medical unit deployed to Bosnia made only one minor change to its training regime. The unit included health support for coalition forces in addition to US forces.⁷⁹ Combat and CS units experience extended retraining timelines because these soldiers normally conduct missions away from their primary Mission Occupational Specialty (MOS).

Whether a unit is involved in peacekeeping or peace enforcement, the unit must develop a viable plan to maintain its combat proficiencies. Training doctrine is effective in designing sustainment training plans, yet the training infrastructure of Bosnia did not allow rotating units to sustain warfighting capabilities. Units could not train at levels higher than platoon, which forced them to concentrate on small unit and individual training as opposed to larger scale company/team and battalion/task force training. After Bosnia SASO deployments, units return to home station untrained in warfighting tasks. Current training doctrine requires units to perform a complete range of individual through collective tasks at each level normally ending with a CTC rotation; during this "down time" the Army cannot perform its dual MTW mission. For example, if Iraq attacked Kuwait again, as in August 1990 when the Army boasted eighteen active duty divisions, it would take longer to prepare and deploy the necessary force to remove Iraqi forces from Kuwait. Today, the Army has only ten active duty divisions, three of which are either preparing for, executing, or recovering from a Bosnia rotation. It is also likely that the Army will rotate units to Kosovo similar to the current Bosnia rotation model. Such commitments will extend the

Army's response timeline. The next chapter will analyze the effects of SASO missions on battle staffs.⁸⁰

CHAPTER 4

How SASOs Impact Mechanized Division Battle Staffs

Battle staffs experience major training challenges throughout the course of a SASO mission. The majority of available information suggests that Army staffs, from battalion to division level, have performed extremely well during peacekeeping operations. Communications technology, for example, allowed commanders to plan and coordinate efficiently over long distances and rough terrain.⁸¹ Units also used the video teleconference (VTC) to provide real-time "face-to-face" and voice communications between the geographically dispersed locations, which saved travel time and associated costs.⁸² However, there is limited information on how SASOs degrade the division battle staff. Most divisions conduct full-scale Warfighter Exercises (WFX) several months after returning from their rotation to Bosnia. For example, the 1st Cavalry Division redeployed in October 1999 and will conduct their WFX in the spring of 2000. Along with leadership and personnel rotations, it is difficult to accurately measure how SASOs impact division battle staffs. In addition, most staff sections rotate between the primary and deputy staff members throughout the year long rotation. For example, the G2 might deploy for the first six months and rotate his or her deputy or assistant for the final six months.⁸³ Staffs generally perform the same planning and coordination duties in peace operations as in war. However, SASO missions degrade the staff's warfighting skills and proficiencies simply

because the environment and operating procedures prevent the primary battle staff members from planning and coordinating combat operations for at least a year.

There are a variety of factors that impact the staff's warfighting skills. First, standard division staffs typically do not deploy to Bosnia.⁸⁴ For example, 1st Cavalry Division's command structure while deployed to Bosnia consisted of a skeleton division staff, which included one BCT, with its three maneuver battalions and supporting elements. During the rotation the BCT staff executed the dual functions of the division and brigade-level staffs, while a battalion conducted all the duties associated with manning and operating two separate base camps simultaneously.⁸⁵

Another factor that impacts division staff proficiency is that the division must act as a division-level, Multi-National "Combined Forces" task force consisting of elements from 11 nations, which are a mix of NATO and non-NATO forces. Field Manual 71-100 states "US Army Divisions are designed and expected to operate with integrated forces, that is multi-national forces operating under the control of a US division headquarters or one of its brigades."⁸⁶ Because of this configuration, standard division battle staff competencies did not apply.⁸⁷ The staff simply focused its efforts on situational awareness and decision-making products for the commander and other coordination tasks. The most detailed evidence of staff degradation after a Bosnia rotation comes from the Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC).

The CMTC conducted two United States Army Europe (USAREUR)-directed WFXs in 1997 with two brigades that had recently re-deployed from Bosnia. Both brigades had the same commander and battle staff throughout the Bosnia rotation.⁸⁸ The WFX marked a transition back to an MTW focus for these units after six to nine months in Bosnia. USAREUR's goal for these exercises was to assess the impact of SASOs on critical battle staff skills.

An analysis of five of the seven battlefield operating systems (BOS) showed moderate weaknesses; however, there were no major discrepancies. The SASO environment forced these units to alter decision-making formats and coordination methods. The next portion of this chapter shows how Bosnia rotations affected the BOS of Command and Control (C2), Fire Support, Mobility/Survivability, Air Defense, and Intelligence.

Units could not adequately sustain MTW tactical operations center or TOC operations while deployed to Bosnia. One of the staff's many functions is to provide recommended COAs to the commander. The requirements of peace operations caused these staffs to lose focus on important aspects of the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) or situational awareness and allowed them to develop techniques more suitable for peacekeeping, but inadequate for warfighting. A primary example was TOC operations between day and night shifts. Planning and coordination during peacekeeping operations normally happen during daylight hours. Units, therefore, did not fully staff the TOC during hours of darkness, which allows the primary staff section representative or most experienced portion to focus on the most important missions. Night shifts

monitored radios, but they did not act as a fully functioning TOC crew.

Therefore, during the WFX, night shifts experienced difficulty executing tasks such as counter-reconnaissance, counter-mobility, and survivability operations.⁸⁹

Night crews were weak in synchronizing these and other routine nighttime operations.

Other BOS areas that showed weaknesses were Fire Support, Mobility/Survivability, and Air Defense. Due to the nature of peace operations, there was little use of these CS systems while deployed to Bosnia. During the WFX, the commander's guidance for fires lacked the necessary detail to effectively plan, synchronize, and deliver fires in support of maneuver. Hence, Brigade Combat Teams (BCT) experienced difficulties planning triggers, coordinated firing lines (CFLs), counterfires and radars, engagement criteria, and other control measures.⁹⁰

Under the Mobility/Survivability BOS, the battle staff was slow in transitioning from offense to defense. This action delayed the shaping of engagement areas, the siting M1/M2 fighting positions, and maximum use of engineer digging assets. Further, the battle staff failed to adequately plan Family of Scatterable Mines (FASCAM) and situational obstacles for both ground and air employment. They planned these munitions as "targets of opportunity" instead of linking them to named areas of interest (NAI) or target areas of interest (TAI) which demonstrates a failure in synchronization.⁹¹

Under the Air Defense BOS, the Air Defense Battery was well integrated into the planning system. However the Air Defense annex and operations order

were inadequate; these products did not assign specific air defense missions that each unit must accomplish.⁹² Under the Intelligence BOS, the most significant problems were preparing and executing the Reconnaissance and Surveillance Plan. The plan lacked synchronization and a designated person to monitor its execution. There were also gaps in the intelligence-collection plan, which generated poor enemy tracking and dissemination of dubious information down to subordinate units.⁹³ Each of these deficiencies was a clear sign that these units had not trained together on warfighting tasks for a significant period of time. This evidence suggests that SASO missions in Bosnia offer little, if any, opportunity to sustain battle staff warfighting skills.

CONCLUSION

Divisions cannot sustain readiness throughout the course of a Bosnia rotation because the environment will not allow MTW training. These missions restrict training to individual and, on occasion, crew- or squad-level training but prevent collective training because of a lack of assets and resources. In addition, the Bosnia SASO will not afford the time to conduct collective maneuver training either actual nor simulated above the platoon level. Finally, mechanized divisions conduct missions that do not require their primary weapon systems, which impacts M1 and M2 crew-level readiness.

Likewise division battle staffs do not perform or execute doctrinal warfighting skills while deployed to Bosnia. SASO staffs processes in Bosnia have proven extremely efficient for peacekeeping missions. However, this

research shows that complete division battle staffs do not deploy to Bosnia. Further, daily operations do not require warfighting functions, and there are no staff training assets in the AOR. Once redeployed, battle staffs must retrain and usually execute a WFX in order to regain battle staff competencies.

Finally, Bosnia SASOs force units to reorganize completely once redeployed. Current reintegration plans consume at least nine months which includes a complete trainup from individual to brigade collective tasks followed by a CTC rotation. Therefore a Bosnia SASO commits a division for at least two years; from alert notification, through trainup, execution, and reintegration. During this lengthy period, units are incapable of executing their MTW mission.

There is no clear solution to this dilemma. The Army has recently announced a partial solution by incorporating RC units in Bosnia rotations. The use of RC forces to augment AC forces should reduce the operational tempo (OPTEMPO) of the active force. Challenges include achieving a majority of RC participation in order to reduce the strain on AC forces. A possible structure for future Bosnia rotations would be a mixed division headquarters with one RC brigade and three AC battalions; one battalion from each of the three AC brigades from the supporting AC division. Using this combination, AC divisions could continue to focus on the "most dangerous" or MTW missions with only three battalions and assorted staff personnel committed to the SASO. Assuming that there are no changes in the Army's current strength and the current JSCP does not change, this concept might increase AC readiness. However, this plan presents an increased sacrifice by RC soldiers and the local community because

these soldiers normally represent a significant portion of the local work force. A better solution would require additional resources in terms of force structure, training doctrine, and additional personnel, which is beyond the scope of this research effort. Though there is no immediate solution, this research paper might help clarify the problem.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Government Publications

Department of the Army. *America's Army of the 21st Century; Force XXI*. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1995.

_____. FM 25-1, *Training*. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1985.

_____. FM 25-2 (Test) *How to Manage Training in Units*. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1982.

_____. FM 25-100, *Training the Force*. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1988.

_____. FM 25-101, *Battle Focused Training*. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1990.

_____. FM 100-5 (Change 1), *Operations*. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1976.

_____. FM 100-5, *Operations*. Washington, DC.: GPO, 1982.

_____. FM 100-5, *Operations*. Washington, DC.: GPO, 1986.

_____. FM 100-5, *Operations*. Washington, DC.: GPO, 1993.

_____. FM 100-5, *Operations*. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1993.

_____. FM 100-5, "Training Concepts Paper #5." *Writing Team, School of Advance Military Studies, Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS*, 1999.

_____. FM 100-7, *Decisive Force: The Army in Theater Operations*. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1995.

_____. FM 100-23, *Peace Operations*. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1994.

_____. FM 71-100, *Division Operations*. Washington, D.C.: GPO 1996.

Department of Defense. Inspector General. *Specialized Military Training For Peace Operations*. Arlington, VA: Office of Assistant Inspector General for Inspection, 1994. Available from Joint Electronic Library, Peace Operation [CD-ROM], 1995.

Joint Publication 3-0. *Doctrine for Joint Operations*. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1995.

_____. 3-07. *Military Operations Other Than War*. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1994.

_____. 3-07.3. *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peacekeeping Operations*. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1994.

Office of the Chairman Joints Chiefs of Staff. *National Military Strategy of the United State of America*. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1995.

Government Accounting Office, National Security and International Affairs Division. *Peace Operations-Effect of Training, Equipment, and Other Factors on Unit Capability*, Report to Congressional Registers, GAO'NSIAD-96-14, Washington, D.C.: GAO, 1995. [TRADOC Home Page]; available from <http://wwwtradoc.monroe.army.mil/IRAC/gao/reports/text/ns96014.txt>; Internet; accessed 28 July 99.

National Security for a New Century. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1998.

United States Code. *Title 10-Armed Forces, Subtitle B-Army, Part 1-Organization, Chapter 307, Section 3062*. Document on Line, <http://www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/10/3062.html>. Accessed 9 September 1999.

BOOKS

Bradley, Omar N. *A Soldier's Story*. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1951.

Colby, John. *War from the Ground Up: The 90th Division in World War II*. Austin, TX: Nortex Press, 1991.

Daalder, Ivo H. *Knowing When to Say No: The Development of US Policy for Peacekeeping*. William J. Durch. ed *UN Peacekeeping, American Policy, and Uncivil Wars in the 1990s*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996.

Durch, William, ed. *The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Case Studies and Comparative Analysis*. In *UN Peacekeeping, American Policy, and Uncivil Wars in the 1990s*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996.

Herbert, Paul H. *Deciding What Has to Be Done: General William E. DePuy and the 1976 Edition of FM 100-5, Operations*. Leavenworth Papers, Number

16. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, US Army Command and General Staff College, 1988.
- Kaplan, Robert D. *To the Ends of the Earth*. New York: Random House, 1996.
- Naveh, Shimon. *In Pursuit of Military Excellence: The Evolution of Operational Theory*. Portland, OR: Frank Cass Publishers, 1997.
- Quinn, Dennis J. *Peace Support Operations and the U.S. Military*. Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press., 1994.
- Snow, Donald. *Peacekeeping, Peacemaking, and Peace-Enforcement: The U.S. Role in the New International Order*. Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 1993.
- Sun Tzu. *The Art of War*. Trans. Ralph D. Sawyer. Boulder, CO; Westview Press, 1994.
- Taw, Jennifer Morrison, David Persselin, and Maren Leed. *Meeting Peace Operations' Requirements While Maintaining MTW Readiness*. Arroya Center, CA: Rand, 1998.

Periodicals

- Braden, John W. Col and MacIver, Thomas D. LtCol. "Tool to Assess Training Readiness." *Military Review* (September 1992): 87-89.
- Brewster, Casandra. "Mission in Macedonia." *Soldiers*. (October 1993): 6.
- Bucher, John W. "Training Contributes to Readiness." *Army Logistician*. (May-June 1993): 36-37.
- Ellis, James R. LtGen. (Ret). "Third (U. S. Army)...Always First!" *Army* (October 1994): 113-115.
- Maloney, Sean M. "Insights Into Canadian Peacekeeping Doctrine." *Military Review* (March-April 1996): 2.
- Naylor, Sean D. "Operations, Training Shortfalls Spur Worries About Readiness." *ArmyTimes* (April 1992): 8.
- _____. "Straight Shooters: Soldiers Sound Off on Readiness Woes." *Army Times* (March 15, 1999): 20-21.

_____. "Army IG (LtGen Larry Jordan) Confirms Combat Training Woes." *Army Times* (February 15, 1999): 20.

_____. "Size Does Matter: Task Force Training Returns to Posts." *Army Times* (November 16, 1998): 18-20.

_____. "Gauging a Unit's Potency: Real Challenge Keeping Results Under Wraps." *Army Times* (August 17, 1998): 16.

_____. "NTC Training Called into Question: Officials Deny E-mail Charges of Lowered Standards, Lying to Units." *Army Times* (February 2, 1998): 10.

Reimer, Dennis J. Gen. "Training: Our Army's Top Priority and Don't You Forget It." *Military Review* LXXVI (July-August 1996): 4.

_____. "U. S. Army Forces Command Focuses on Readiness." *Army* (October 1994): 47.

Shelton, Hugh H. LtGen. and Sifers, Steven C. Maj. "Standardizing Training Assessment." *Military Review* (October 1994): 4-13.

Research Papers

Baker, Alfred W. "Peacekeeping: A New Role For U.S. Forces." Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, 1983.

Bongi, David J. "Preparing For Peacekeeping Operations Through Battle Focused Training." School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1995.

Cabrey, Richard M. "Peacekeeping Tasks In The METL: The Dilemma of A Direct Support Artillery." School of Advanced Military Studies United States Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1997.

Flynn, Michael J. "Battle Focused Training For Peacekeeping Operations: A METL Adjustment For Infantry Battalions." School of Advanced Military Studies United States Army Command And General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1996.

Metz, John M. Maj. "Training the Way We Fight...Are Tactical Units Prepared for Post Conflict Operations?" School of Advanced Military Studies, United

States Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1995.

Martz, Joseph E. Maj. "Operational Preparation Hindered by Tactical Training." School of Advanced Military Studies United States Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1991.

Speeches, Briefs, and Interviews

Commander, 1st Cavalry Division. "Post Bosnia Return to Readiness." *1st Cavalry Division's Re-Integration Briefing*. Briefed to the Commanding General in 1999.

Commander, V (US) Corps. "Mountain Eagle IV." *Initial Briefing for Deployment to Bosnia*. Briefed to the Commanding General in 1997.

Shinseki, Eric K. "Address to the Eisenhower Luncheon." *45th Annual Meeting of the Association of the United States Army*. 12 October 1999.

Wishart, Leonard P. III, Lieutenant General (ret), Telephonic. Interview by author, 9 November 1999, Lansing, KS. This interview was not recorded.

Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL)

"Operation Joint Endeavor: Bosnia-Herzegovina, Task Force Eagle Continuing Operations; Bosnia/Herzegovina Combined Arms Assessment Team 3/4 Initial Impressions Report." Center for Army Lessons Learned, Fort Leavenworth, KS: CALL, Training and Doctrine Command, TRADOC. March 1997.

"Stability and Support Operations (SASO)," Center for Army Lessons Learned. Fort Leavenworth, KS: CALL, TRADOC. April 1994.

"Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Sustainment Training While Employing: Lessons Learned from Operation Joint Endeavor." *Newsletter No. 97-12*. Fort Leavenworth, KS: CALL, TRADOC. June 1997.

"The Effects of Peace Operations on Unit Readiness: Special Study." *Center for Army Lessons Learned*, Fort Leavenworth, KS: CALL, TRADOC. 1997.

ENDNOTES

¹ Department of the Army, FM 25-100, *Training the Force* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1988), 14.

² John Colby, *War from the Ground Up: The 90th Division in World War II* (Austin, TX: Nortex Press), 147.

³ U S Code, *Title 10-Armed Forces, Subtitle B - Army, Part I - Organization, Chapter 307 - The Army, Section 3062 Policy; Composition*; organized peace establishment (Legal Information Institute) 1-2.
www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/10/3062.html; 9 September 1999. Hereafter known as Title 10-Armed Forces.

⁴ Ivo H. Daalder, "Knowing When to Say No: The Development of US Policy for Peacekeeping," found in William J. Durch, *UN Peacekeeping, American Policy, and Uncivil Wars in the 1990s* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), 42-58. The reference provides an in-depth analysis of both PRD 13 and PDD 25.

⁵ Department of the Army, FM 100-7, *Decisive Force: The Army in Theater Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1995), 3-0 through 3-5. This is not all inclusive; some divisions might be assigned as a headquarters with interface with the NCA or act as a Joint Task Force.

⁶ Department of the Army, FM 100-23, *Peace Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1994), 86.

⁷ SASO missions such as the CENTCOMEX in Kuwait allow up to task force-level training for approximately 90 days. Units conduct gunnery and maneuver exercises as opposed to Eastern European stability operations.

⁸ Paul H. Herbert, "Deciding What Has to Be Done: General William E. DePuy and the 1976 Edition of FM 100-5, Operations," *Leavenworth Papers*, Number 16 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, U. S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1988). From his World War II experiences, DePuy argued that units must maintain a standard readiness level at all times as opposed to mass mobilizations. He felt that units should focus training toward specific combat situations. Further, he felt that future wars would involve limited manpower and would end quickly, before the mass mobilization of personnel and resources. Therefore, he promoted well-trained, division-size units prepared to execute specific combat tasks.

⁹As a tank battalion S3, the author fired at least two gunnery exercises per year. In addition, qualification gunnery is a prerequisite for deployment. This includes NTC rotations and CENTCOM Exercises (a 90-day BN/TF rotation to Kuwait). Due to multiple personnel turnovers (schools, promotions, family situations, and other challenges) units fired several make-up gunnery exercises to meet gunnery requirements.

¹⁰ Department of the Army, FM 100-5 (Change 1) *Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1976), 1-1.

¹¹ Herbert, 1-2.

¹² Shimon Naveh, *In Pursuit of Military Excellence: The Evolution of Operational Theory* (Portland, OR: Frank Cass Publishers, 1997), 250-252.

¹³ Ibid., 1. This paragraph is a summary of DePuy's vision for the 1976 version of FM 100-5.

¹⁴ Department of the Army, FM 100-5 (Change 1), *Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1976), 1-1.

¹⁵ Herbert, 27. In some ways, schools continue to train at one--sometimes two--levels over the soldier or officer's current rank. DePuy changed the army's training plan based on his belief that the Army would not conduct mass mobilizations like those of World War I and World War II. From his experience deploying for World War II, recruits received little basic training; therefore, the Army suffered significant casualties because soldiers did not have sufficient pre-deployment training. Such costs were no longer politically acceptable. Even troops deploying for Korea and later Vietnam received minimum training. Large bodies of soldiers went through a series of experiences in which minimum competence was the goal. Few acquired necessary military skills.¹⁵

¹⁶ Herbert, 26-26. DePuy was disappointed with training doctrine because it continued an outdated World War II mass mobilization training plan. DePuy felt that under such conditions, both soldiers and leaders would receive "minimum essential" training, which was inadequate for the challenges of combat.

¹⁷ John Colby, *War from the Ground Up: The 90th Division in World War II* (Nortex Press, Austin, Texas) 1-3, 150-151. Senior leaders referred to the 90th ID as ill-trained, however members of the unit blamed their problems on leadership. Perhaps the leaders needed training. As a Second Lieutenant with the 90th, Colby was a "90-Day Wonder," having spent three months in Officers Candidate School (OCS) before joining the 90th.

¹⁸ Ibid., 2.

¹⁹ Ibid., 2-3.

²⁰ Omar N. Bradley, *A Soldier's Story* (, New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1951), 297. Bradley describes the 90th ID as an ill-trained, "problem division" because to its actions under fire and its weak leadership, which he felt led to extremely high casualties and multiple dismissals of key leaders. Eventually the division developed into an extremely capable unit after multiple leadership changes.

²¹ Herbert, 13,

²² Colby, 538. These figures came from a 1979 interview with DePuy which was part of *Changing an Army: an Oral History of Gen. William E. DePuy, USA (ret.)*, by Lt. Col. Romie L. Brownlee and Lt. Col. William J. Mullen III, US Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 17013-5008). The 357th suffered severe casualties during the opening stages of the war in Europe. The record shows that 953 soldiers were killed in action; 584 were missing in action, of which 570 were taken prisoner. The 357th Infantry Regiment's authorized strength was 1,080 riflemen. Total killed and wounded equals 6,031 (p. 519-520). This is

probably why General Omar Bradley compared these losses with those of WWI instead of WWII.

²³ Herbert, 13.

²⁴ Colby, 538-539. Colby ends his book with letters and interviews received too late for publication. However he includes these pieces at the end of the book. This quotation is from a book of interviews (referenced above) with General DePuy in 1979. DePuy describes the leadership of the regiment as incompetent. While he gives names, he does not specify which battalions these men commanded.

²⁵ Colby, 540. This is a direct quotation from DePuy and references his experience with the 90th ID. This statement contradicts Colby's findings and other information received from various division veterans. Colby argues that leadership was the main problem, while DePuy, as an operations officer, adds training as a subset of leadership, which contributed the high number of casualties.

²⁶ Colby, 541.

²⁷ Herbert, 27.

²⁸ Herbert, 37-39.

²⁹ Ibid., 38-39.

³⁰ Ibid., 38-39.

³¹ LTG Leonard P. Wishart III, Telephone interview, Monday November 9, 1999 at 1800. Wishart is a retired Combined Arms Command (CAC) commander who worked with and for General Vuono for many years. During a 30-minute conversation, Wishart provided detailed accounts of how FM 25-100 developed and how it was linked to the early work of Gorman and DePuy.

³² Eric K. Shinseki, United States Army Chief of Staff, "Address to the Eisenhower Luncheon" 45th Annual Meeting of the Association of the United States Army, October 12, 1999, 1.

³³ Jennifer Morrison Taw, David Persselin, Maren Leed, *Meeting Peace Operations' Requirements While Maintaining MTW Readiness* (Arroya Center, CA: RAND, 1998) ix-xi.

³⁴ Title 10-Armed Forces, 1-2.

³⁵ Ibid., 1.

³⁶ Ibid., 1.

³⁷ Daalder, 37-39. Daalder says that President George Bush wanted to integrate UN commitments into US foreign policy, which was a new concept. In order to gain more leverage in the developing world, the US would increase both military and financial support for UN operations. The dilemma or costs for these missions is that the US would find itself spearheading these operations instead of providing support. If the US provided the most support, it wanted a bigger voice in the commitment of that support.

³⁸ Ibid., 37-39.

³⁹ Ibid., 37-39.

⁴⁰ Ibid., 37-39.

⁴¹ Ibid., 37-39.

⁴² *A National Security Strategy for a New Century* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1998) 22. Here after cited as National Security Strategy.

⁴³ Ibid., 22.

⁴⁴ Ibid., 22

⁴⁵ FM 100-23, 86. This manual suggests that success in peace operations depends on warfighting skills.

⁴⁶ Ibid., 86.

⁴⁷ Ibid., 87. FM 100-23 provides a list of key training topics for both peacekeeping and peace sustainment missions. These topics include supervision of truce and cease-fire, negotiating skills, patrolling for peacekeeping, and fighting a meeting engagement, movement to contact, air assault, raids, attacks, and defense for peace enforcement. Based on this wide assortment of possible missions, peace operations, at least during the peace enforcement phase, is much like full-scale conflict. The topic of this research paper considers SASO as peacekeeping instead of a mixture of the two.

⁴⁸ Ibid., 88.

⁴⁹ Ibid., 88-89.

⁵⁰ Ibid., 89. Units report their readiness status through one of several methods. The primary method will likely be during the Quarterly Training Briefing (QTB) at the conclusion of the re-training program.

⁵¹ FM 100-5 Writing Team, "FM 100-5, Training Concept Paper No. 5" (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, USA CGSC, 1999) 2-3. LTC Vic Robertson headed the team.

⁵² FM 100-5 Writing Team, 1-3. It is the author's opinion that these COAs are not feasible. This chart shows the comparison.

Criteria	COA 1: Current Strategy-Train for MTWs, use MREs for SASOs	COA 2: Train equally for all missions	COA 3: opposite of COA 1. Train for SASOs, use MREs for MTWs
SASO-Most likely mission-Instant Deployment (no specific time limit)	NO-Does not prepare for the most likely missions. Would require time to train and package.	NO: there are insufficient resources to achieve equal proficiency in both areas	YES: Prepares for the most likely event
Prepared to execute an MTW-Instant Deployment	YES: Prepares for the most dangerous event	NO: Same reason	NO. Does not prepare for the most dangerous event.
Comments:	All three COAs fail using these criteria		

A comparison of COAs 1 through 3

⁵³ Department of the Army, FM 71-100, *Division Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1996), v,vi, and 1-1. This entire paragraph is summarized from this manual.

⁵⁴ News Release #99-100, October 26, 1999, 1-2. The release announced a new concept which forms AC/RC peacekeeping teams.

⁵⁵ The issue of recourses is beyond the scope of this research effort. The author is aware of the many resource challenges facing the Army. They include

recruiting, re-enlistment, increased OPTEMPO with a ten-division Army, and a reduction in training dollars.

⁵⁶ Dennis Steel, "The U.S. Army in Bosnia," *Army Magazine* (The Association of the U.S. Army, Vol. 49, No. 4, April 1999) 16.

⁵⁷ "1st Cavalry Division's Post-Bosnia Return to Readiness," Briefing, 1st Cavalry Division's Reintegration Plan Upon Returning from Bosnia. Given before the Commanding General, MG Kevin Byrnes, Summer 1999, slide # 10.

⁵⁸ "Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Sustainment Training While Employing: Lessons Learned from Operation Joint Endeavor," *Newsletter No. 97-12* (Center for Army Lessons Learned, US Army Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Leavenworth, KS: June 97), I-1. Here after know as Newsletter No. 97-12, June 97.

⁵⁹ Erik K. Shinseki. Speech presented at the Annual Association of the US Army Eisenhower Luncheon. See planlst@pentagon-hqdadss.army.mil (read.asp?command=open&obj=000000002F6A9C18CB1DD311918200805FBBBAE90700, 10/15/99).

⁶⁰ FM 25-100, 1-5.

⁶¹ Newsletter No. 97-12, June 97, II-4.

⁶² Combined Arms Assessment Team (CAAT) 3/4 Initial Impressions Report "Operation Joint Endeavor: Bosnia-Herzegovina, Task Force Eagle Continuing Operations," Bosnia/Herzegovina (B/H), (Center For Army Lessons Learned, TRADOC, Fort Leavenworth, KS: March 1997), 24. MG Bill Nash, commander, Task Force Eagle, made this statement regarding training.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, 21-23. Commander's training guidance.

⁶⁴ "Mountain Eagle IV, Initial Briefing to the Commanding General," V Corps' training and execution plan for deployment to Bosnia, briefed to LTG Abrams, Winter 1997, Slide # 27.

⁶⁵ V Corps Briefing, Slide 27-29.

⁶⁶ Newsletter No. 97-12, June 97, IV-1

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, II-4.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, IV-4 through IV-5.

⁶⁹ Ibid., IV-5.

⁷⁰ Ibid., IV-5. CALL's data show that both crews and platoons did not fire very well because they did not have the opportunity to practice special gunnery techniques that the intermediate tables provide. Crews had no problems with engagements that allowed full use of the fire and control system. Nor were there problems employing only one weapon system at a time. Crews experienced difficulties in degraded gunnery techniques (for example, firing without the range finder or thermal sites). Crews also struggled with multiple-target engagements, which require the coordinated use of both the main gun and a machinegun. Intermediate firing tables train these tasks. For example, Tank Table V allows individual crews to increase proficiency with machineguns. Units who do not conduct this table normally experience problems with machinegun handling and accuracy during the qualification tables.

⁷¹ Ibid., IV-5. CALL reports that the gunnery tables are designed in a typical crawl, walk, run fashion. They incorporate all facets of the weapons system, not just "point and shoot" engagements or the portions that make a crew qualified. A gunnery training program should train crews to operate weapon systems to their fullest capacity before qualification. This training should include the intermediate tables. The concept of familiarization or Fam-Fire allowed soldiers to gain a basic understanding of a particular weapon. Its goal was to reach a level where the soldier could at least point and shoot the weapon. For example, Army regulations required Fam-Fire for the Grease-Gun, M-3 A1 Submachinegun instead of requiring a complete training and qualification exercise for M60A3 Armor Crewmen.

⁷² "The Effects of Peace Operations on Unit Readiness," *Special Study* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: CALL, TRADOC, February 1996), 8-9.

⁷³ Ibid., A-7. These numbers vary depending on the amount of equipment deployed with the unit. Units normally execute a set schedule which includes leave, NET training, changes in leadership, PCS/ETS, gunnery/marksmanship, vehicle services, section/squad/platoon/company maneuver training and a CTC rotation.

⁷⁴ "1st Cavalry Division's Post-Bosnia Return to Readiness," Slide # 6. This slide shows that 3BCT conducted the same trainup and NTC rotation as the two rotating BCTs, which indicates that 3BCT was equally depleted during the year-long Bosnia mission.

⁷⁵ "The Effects of Peace Operations on Unit Readiness," *Special Study*, A-3.

⁷⁶ "1st Cavalry Division's Post-Bosnia Return to Readiness, Slide No. 4. This particular slide shows how the unit's proficiency degraded over time and that the greatest degradation occurred in combat units, followed by CS then CSS units.

⁷⁷ Ibid., Slides 6 through 8 show training timelines for each brigade beginning with 3d (which did not deploy to Bosnia), then 1st, followed by 2d which is the order of rotation to Bosnia.

⁷⁸ Ibid., 4. Information summarized.

⁷⁹ Ibid. 16. These issues may apply more to CSS units deployed in other AORs than to Bosnia. However, planners must consider maintenance and the fact that CSS units are only "one deep," making their maintenance/redeployment even more important.

⁸⁰ The author recognizes that the term "battle staff" is not part of current doctrine. Major Cathleen Gavle, a fellow SAMS student, conducted in-dept research on this issue. For the purposes of this monograph, the term "battle staff" refers to the members of the staff planning team which include the S1 through S4 representatives from each battlefield operating system (BOS).

⁸¹ Ibid. During Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR, the signal community established a massive network that provided seamless connectivity. This network began with establishing three Tri-Service Tactical Communications (TRI-TAC) and nodal switching centers at Heidelberg, Kaiserslautern, and Mannheim Germany. These node centers were established several days before any equipment deployed to forward locations in Hungary, Croatia, or Bosnia.

⁸² Ibid., 8.

⁸³ Telephone interview at 1046, November 23, 1999 with Major John Leonard, Team Bravo, Battle Command and Training Center. Leonard is an Information Operations and C2 Observer/Controller. He conducted a Bosnia rotation with the 2d ACR (1997-1998). We discussed how divisions rotate staff personnel to Bosnia.

⁸⁴ Bosnia/Herzegovina (B/H) Combined Arms Assessment Team (CAAT) 9 Initial Impressions Report, "Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR: Bosnia-Herzegovina, Task Force Eagle Continuing Operations," CALL, TRADOC, Fort Leavenworth, KS: March 1998), 2.

⁸⁵ Ibid., 2. This is a description of 1st Cavalry Division's C2 system in Bosnia.

⁸⁶ FM 71-100, 3-17.

⁸⁷ CAAT 9, March 1998, 2; Also discussed in telephone interview. See also Leonard, who confirms the CALL report that division staffs performed nonstandard duties while in Bosnia.

⁸⁸ "Stability and Support Operations (SASO)," *Newsletter No. 98-11*, (CALL, TRADOC, Fort Leavenworth, KS, April 1998), 4.

⁸⁹ Stability and Support Operations (SASO), *Newsletter No. 98-11*, 23-24.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 5-6.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 7-8.

⁹² *Ibid.*, 8.

⁹³ *Ibid.*, 9-10.