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CONTENTS

PAGE

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

- Activity of Warsaw Pact's Western Flank Reported
 (Claus-Einar Langen; FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE, 23 Apr 77) 1

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

- Opposition Reveals Regime's Weaknesses, Poses No Political
 Threat
 (Hans-Peter Riese; FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE, 12 May 77). 4

- Waiting Period of CPCZ Candidate Members Described
 (Pavel Kertesz; ZIVOT STRANY, 25 Apr 77) 10

- 'TRIBUNA' Describes Tactics of Anticommunism
 (Bohumir Bartos; TRIBUNA, 27 Apr 77) 18

- 'TVORBA' Describes Prague May 1945 Uprising
 (Miloslav Novak; TVORBA, 4 May 77) 24

EAST GERMANY

- Lt Gen Reinhold Cites Need for Continued Vigilance
 (Wolfgang Reinhold; PRESSE-INFORMATIONEN, 6 May 77)... 28

- Experiences Reported With New Type Tank Track
 (H. Kyjovsky; MILITAERTECHNIK, May 77) 31

- Loss of Confidence Noted Among Population
 (Peter Pragal; SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG, 4 May 77) 34

- Bishop Analyzes Status of Church in Rural Areas
 (Albrecht Schoenherr; FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE, 13 May 77) 36

CONTENTS (Continued)	Page
HUNGARY	
U.S. Buildup of Diego Garcia Scored (Peter Sereny; NEPSZABADSAG, 18 May 77)	43
POLAND	
Army-Air Force Cooperation Stressed (Ireneusz Tulowiecki; ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI, 28 Apr 77)..	46
Civil Defense Structure and Goals Described (TRYBUNA LUDU, 26 Apr 77)	48
Renewed Pressure on Dissidents Reported (NRC HANDELSBLAD, 6 May 77)	50
Commentary on Church, Economic Problems Facing Regime (Robert Fischer-Ledenice; DIE PRESSE, 4 May 77)	53
'SZTANDAR MLODYCH' Cites Outside Provocateurs in Krakow Events (Ryszard Lukasiewicz; SZTANDAR MLODYCH, 20 May 77)...	56
Briefs PZPR Art, Literary Criticism Study	59
YUGOSLAVIA	
Changes in the LCY Statute Discussed (Jelica Radojcevic Interview; VUS, 9 Apr 77)	60
Law on Coat of Arms, Flag, National Anthem (SLUZBENI LIST SFRJ, 22 Apr 77)	65
Youth Federation Begins Conference (TANJUG Domestic Service, 27 May 77).....	77
Exercise by Mountaineer Unit Described (Nenad Ognjanovic; FRONT, 8 Apr 77).....	79

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

ACTIVITY OF WARSAW PACT'S WESTERN FLANK REPORTED

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 23 Apr 77 p 3

[Article by Claus-Einar Langen]

[Text] What the Federal Government understands by the catchphrase "conditions on the border with the GDR and the CSSR" and what findings it is prepared to make public can be taken from the annual report of activities from the Ministry of the Interior. Thus, there is extensive information about escape movements from the territory on the other side of the two borders, about the extent of the blockades and security installations, about the number of earth bunkers, observation towers and dog run installations, and about the kind of incidents. But no mention is made of those installations which serve the security of the Western flank of the Warsaw Pact in Central Europe and which lend the character of a military zone to the border areas of the GDR and CSSR vis-a-vis the FRG. It is no secret to the observer that wherever the conditions of the terrain require it the military alliance of socialist states has moved forward to the borders with the east of the FRG its installations for enemy reconnaissance, whose technologies in the event of armed conflict will also assume offensive functions.

The zone of military safeguards extending into the Mecklenburg Bay opposite the FRG has a total length of 1,734.3 km along the line of demarcation extending to near Hof and in its further course along the German-Czech border on to Austrian national territory. To the extent it can be determined from the FRG there are in all 32 installations which are part of the complex for air space surveillance and early warning, radio reconnaissance and radar reconnaissance and in part also for the installations for electronic disruption and deception measures. In the GDR they are for the most part under the control of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany (GSSD); in Czech territory the Soviet Army is at least involved. The distances of the stations from the borders range from 1 km to about 15 km.

The Russians have selected the general term "measures for radio counteraction" as a designation for their system of electronic activities. An essential element of these measures is radio reconnaissance. In this it

is a matter of recording and analyzing the enemy's electromagnetic transmissions which mainly have intelligence content. In this regard encodings in radio communications cannot always impede information. Even encoded contents provide hints, as for example the number of stations, their location and frequencies, the type of devices, the training level of the troops, errors and deficiencies. Radar recording is ultimately aimed at the electronic locating and guidance service. The radar device as a means for guiding airplanes, fire control, air space surveillance and early warning represents a special center of attraction of reconnaissance. In case of war the information gotten would be converted into electronic disruption and deception measures. Transmitting equipment of the enemy is then the goal of electronic disabling and neutralization.

Large installations on the heights of the Bohemian Forest clearly constitute central points of radio reconnaissance which in the case of a conflict can also disrupt FRG transmitting equipment. In the view of experts the now completed project on the Plattenberg, 859 m high, on the Czech side is such an installation of radio counteraction. The structure on the Plattenberg is the 12th and largest in the chain of telecommunication reconnaissance systems along the 356.2 km German-Czech border.

Of the 5 stations along the 421.9 km Bavarian zone border the equipment of the radar installation near Stelzen, to the northeast of Hirschberg and which is very observable and extensive, is a model for similar installations along the line of demarcation. Several radar screens, numerous antennas, a steel tower over the installation, a wooden tower which presumably is a trigonometric point, and lodgings dominate the picture. In a few years, however, a nearby forest will hide the installation. The shapes of the radar screens suggest that it is an installation for air space surveillance and early warning which covers the short, medium and long ranges. Friend-foe recording, the determination of one's own and enemy aircraft are integrated into the equipment. With certainty, in regard to a part of the positions of this category, the devices are transportable so that in the case of a conflict a change of location is possible.

Along the Hessian zone border, which is 269.7 km, long there are 3 large radar installations and 3 well-camouflaged radio stations for whose operation the Russians are responsible. One of the three large Russian installations is about 15 km from the zone border. Because of this in the series of all stations it is the farthest from the FRG. A special feature along the Hessian zone border are the two telecommunication stations of the East Berlin Ministry for State Security, which are not tied into the system of air space surveillance and early warning of radio and radar reconnaissance.

In the Upper Harz Mountains Mount Brocken represents both for the Soviets and the GDR National People's Army a decisive gain in height. The electronic sensors of the installations set up there extend far into the area of the North German lowlands. Opposite Lower Saxony, with a 549.9 km long

line of demarcation, there are 5 stations, including the one on the 1,142 m high Brocken. (Much evidence speaks for the idea that in this sector, moreover, there are two underground Soviet installations.)

Between Boizenburg and the Bay of Luebeck there are three radar installations--two large Russian ones and a small GDR one which screen the terrain reaching to the Baltic coast along the 136.6 km line of demarcation here. However, viewed from the Czech border these installations still do not constitute the last members in the military security chain. The most forward permanent position of radio reconnaissance is taken care of by the GDR with a mine-sweeper of the "Kondor" type some 3 1/2 nautical miles east of Fehmarn. The ship rides at anchor there in international waters.

Whoever describes the conditions along the line of demarcation must also mention the Russian bases located in the immediate prohibited area, and which are for combat reconnaissance and in part are permanently manned. Only recently have we more detailed information about the largest position which was built 2 years ago and is located on the zone border opposite Lauenburg. This Russian position, protected from observation by camouflage nets, is about 800 m from the line of demarcation. A Russian earth bunker in the Helmstedt sector at a distance of only about 300 m is the closest to the FRG. Three additional Russian positions are located--each about 800-1,000 m from the line of demarcation--in the Eschwege, Melpers (Rhoen) and Hof sectors. In the southern sector of the Hessian zone border the Russians have manned two bunkers.

Many installations aimed at escapees also have military importance. Thus, numerous observation towers of the GDR border troops are also trigonometric points which serve the artillery at the onset of fighting as ideal measuring points.

12124

CSO: 2300

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

OPPOSITION REVEALS REGIME'S WEAKNESSES, POSES NO POLITICAL THREAT

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 12 May 77 p 10

[Excerpt from Foreword by Hans-Peter Riese to a forthcoming book on the CSSR civil rights movement: "A Second 'Prague Spring' Is Not in the Offing: The Opposition in the CSSR Is Moving in New Directions"]

[Text] When at the beginning of the year a civil rights movement in Czechoslovakia called attention to itself with the manifesto "Charter 77," this initiative produced a great deal of attention. But the first attempts of such a protest and actions of criticism and displeasure go further back. This is shown by a documentation of the "Civil Initiatives for Human Rights" which will be published at the end of May by the Europaeische Verlagsanstalt. In it, with more than 30 original documents, the structures of the opposition to the policy of Party Chief Husak are to be shown. The published petitions, open letters, and declarations by persons of the opposition extend from a proclamation on the first anniversary of the occupation in 1969 to the "Charter 77" and its additional documents. The book, which also contains contributions by Heinrich Boell and Arthur Miller, intends to make a contribution to the discussion of the question of human rights before the conference in Belgrade. The editor Hans-Peter Riese wrote the foreword, from which we publish an excerpt.

The fact that the regime in Czechoslovakia is bringing state and social organizations under its control without delay, that is again dedemocratizing and deforming the structures of society, pushes to the edge of political happenings and to the edge of society particularly those critics who are still referring to the process of democratization of 1968. In this situation a process of change can be observed in the utterances of those critics--at least a shift in accent. They are retreating from the political discussion with those in power, which is limited anyway to the point of view legitimized by legality. From this moment on their basis becomes broader, even if this is not expressed on a mass basis in the sense of Western democracy, according to a Marxist definition. The critics are beginning to

occupy themselves with the disproportion between political and social practice and the codified law of the CSSR. One might represent the opinion that with this step a certain depoliticization of the Czechoslovak opposition has taken place. Just as much, this process meant an isolation of critics because for a while they were occupied primarily with their own fate and because state agencies pointed to violations of laws with respect to the individual person. This has been particularly pronounced in the area of literature.

It lies in the nature of such actions that they will remain without political echo, because the regime has no cause to make such happenings public, but it has drawn the consequences for its own tactics. The regime has tried to intensify the isolation of its critics even more through official measures. Part of it was not only the defamation of those authors who did not give in to pressure, but also offers to those who were either facing existential difficulties because they did not find work, or those of whom one could assume that they were unable to withstand the continued pressure over a period of time. The astonishing thing about that is that the regime did not succeed in achieving a substantial intrusion into the suppressed literature. The purged Writers' Association is to this day an association of third- and fourth-rate writers.

The regime had to recognize that the literature suppressed by it was more alive than ever before. The "Edice Petlice" (this series is published by those authors banned from publication under their own management) has reached 80 titles by now, the interest of foreign countries in Czechoslovak books and plays is unabated. This mixture of persecution at home and resonance abroad has finally led to the fact that the personal solidarity which has never been interrupted has again taken on political qualities.

From the necessity to rebuff the repressions of government agencies the critics suppressed by the party have developed a pronounced legalistic argumentation, which one could even call formalistic. Every attempt of state agencies to restrict their rights is countered with a distinct pointing to the legality of their own actions. Considering the large number of violations of rights by the state toward its citizens and the prompt, partially public reaction, these documents read together are like an exact presentation of all violations of rights by the regime: a written indictment. This procedure is unpolitical because in the foreground it dispenses with the discussion of the political connections of these individual cases. But it regains its political dimension by presenting a catalog of facts about violations of rights by the regime, which uncovers the illegal character of the procedure as a characteristic of the regime. By concentrating on the documentation of these violations of rights, the opponents engage at the same time in a political discussion of which the regime cannot take notice publicly and which, therefore, is also forbidden. The CPCZ cannot afford, either ideologically or politically, to engage in discussions with former members after party propaganda has insisted in its teachings that all of the political content of the year of 1968 is once and for all to be condemned as "rightist opportunistic" and "counterrevolutionary."

The concentration on the proof of legality of their own actions received an additional political legitimization with the final act of the "Conference on Security and Cooperation" in Helsinki, in which the rights and duties to which the critics of the regime refer were established as generally applicable principles for the coexistence of the countries in Europe. During the preparations for this all-European conference, which came to be primarily at the instigation of the Soviet Union and the socialist countries, critical intellectuals in Eastern Europe thought about how the possible results might affect their situation.

In the forefront of this conference, the climate in Eastern Europe has changed. It became noticeable that the Soviet Union was willing to make certain concessions to the West in ideological areas. However, for a long time one could not be certain what this meant politically. At any rate, the documents from the CSSR quickly show that a connection was sought between the daily violations of civil rights by authorities and the principles discussed in Helsinki. So the ground was prepared when all the participating Eastern European countries published in 1975 the full text of the final act of Helsinki in their party newspapers. This text became quickly a true "bestseller" and today the final act might well be the best-known international document in Eastern Europe. In the West it is frequently forgotten that the publication of such a document in party organs is a procedure which can hardly be underestimated in its political significance. With this publication the respective party puts itself and all of its prestige behind the text. It becomes not only governmentally official, but what is even more important, official for the party. With the final act of Helsinki the opposition also won its decisive political dimension and legitimization. Legitimization insofar as they no longer refer to the position of 1968, officially condemned by the party, but to positions which the party--through the signature of the general secretary in his function as president--recognizes as its own. Since the ratification, none of the documents of the critics fails to refer to the final act.

For the individual critics in Czechoslovakia the final act means practically a common political basis for their criticism. With regard to the reference to Helsinki in their criticism one can speak in the CSSR of an opposition which has found a common denominator. Beginning with 1975, the differences in political attitude within this opposition are no longer so prominent. "Basket Three" of the final act, particularly the declaration of civil and human rights contained therein, have more or less become something like a common program for the opposition.

But something else can be noted since Helsinki: now the individual representatives of the Prague reform communism are increasingly making political statements. They seize the development of Eurocommunism and, above all, point to the inherent agreements of its program as well as the "action program of the CPCZ" of 1968 with the principles of the final act. Anyway, between the CPCZ and most of the Western European parties (naturally with the exception of West German communists) there is considerable tension

since the latter condemned the occupation of 21 August 1968, some more and some less strongly. However, since the Communist Party summit, Prague in particular must fear that Western European communists will revive the ideas of its own reform communism. The socialists, outlawed and persecuted in their own country, no longer stand alone and are supported, publicly and politically, not only by those who according to the language jargon of the ruling communist parties are classified as "reactionary and warmongering forces." The reform communists can now refer to positions that are also represented by Eurocommunists in Berlin without having led to their exclusion from the communist world movement and to persecution. Added to this must be the fact that Husak himself, because of his policy of redogmatizing, has hit upon difficulties with the allies.

However, until now reform communists in Czechoslovakia have more or less avoided making their political views a basis for what since the beginning of 1977 has been considered a citizens' initiative or civil rights movement, even if they use the discussions concerning this movement to clearly express their own political views in personal declarations. The authors of "Charter 77" even go so far as to declare explicitly that this movement should not be a basis for an opposing political activity. The idea of legality continues to be important for the movement and offers the possibility for a broader basis and integration. Formally--in the sense of the legality of the goals pursued--this statement cannot be disputed anyway, in content the political dimension of this movement is apparent as is the "Charter" in view of the position of the Czechoslovak regime and consequently takes on the character of an opposition. In contrast to Pelikan's definition one could call it a "legal opposition." This is true in a two-fold sense.

Formally: the movement as it represents itself in the "Charter" observes with painful exactitude the frame which is drawn by the laws of the country and the international obligations of the government. The fact that the state attorney's office, as far as its activities are concerned, has not looked upon the documents themselves as evidence--otherwise all the signers would immediately have been arrested and indicted--proves that an accusation can only be construed in a roundabout way. And this opposition is legal also in content, that is from the political viewpoint. As far as the documents and the declarations of their prominent representatives are concerned, it never proclaimed the goal of overthrowing or damaging the interest of the republic. Former party members who belong to them represent now as they did before the contents of reform communism which recognizes explicitly an opposition as the legal form of the shaping of ideas. But one cannot overlook that the interpretation of the final statement in the area of human rights deals with a section of ideological disagreement between East and West. The thesis represented particularly by Moscow, again and again, in connection with Helsinki that the disagreement between the antagonistic social systems in Europe will remain, is not a Soviet trick but corresponds to the social and political reality in Europe. However, this ideological debate, part of which is the realization of human

rights, is not taking place only between East and West--in capsule represented by the differences between democracies and socialist countries--but also between democratic socialists and dogmatic communists, between these and reform communists of the "Prague Spring" and Eurocommunism.

The representatives of the "Charter" in Czechoslovakia have seen this correctly. The discussion before the CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe] are proof that the possibilities of policies of detente have not been estimated unrealistically. The policy of detente, which is the policy of treaties between nations, cannot be more than the frame guaranteed by governments for their execution and realization of human rights. But here lies also the danger for the opposition in Eastern Europe. The separation of the question of human rights from the content of the political question of the social system into which they are bound leads to the path of depoliticization of the whole problem.

The opposition in Czechoslovakia--and in the other Eastern European countries--must make plain the connection between the human and civil rights demanded by them and its political goals. For the time being, the discussion about human rights and about the realization of the final act of Helsinki superimposed itself upon the fundamental discussion. And Prague still believes that it can react to its civil rights movement with sheer terror. Still, the reaction of the CPCZ to the "Charter 77" proved how far-reachingly insecure it is.

In no other country of the Warsaw Pact is the reproach against its own opposition, supposedly maneuvered from abroad, as senseless as in Czechoslovakia. Husak's opposition is "homemade," he has created it himself. The political consciousness of the population has preserved "democratic socialism" and, to be sure, mostly because the party has turned away from it so rigorously. An opposition, if it seeks a "mass basis," has no other choice than to attach itself to this consciousness and to keep it alive.

This statement may be disputed according to the political viewpoint, because also in 1968 there were no free elections in Czechoslovakia which would have produced in a democratic way an approval by the majority of the population for the course of Alexander Dubcek. Still, the broad wave of sympathy for this course cannot be overlooked. From a historical perspective the proof is still outstanding whether under changed--that is democratic--circumstances a communist party could stay in power in any of the socialist countries of Eastern Europe. The violent interruption of the process of democratization in Czechoslovakia remains, however, the best argument for reform communists.

The civil rights movement in Czechoslovakia which was formed on the basis of the "Charter 77" is, politically seen, an amalgam of very different motives and objectives. In view of the way in which it defined itself, one would be asking too much if one expected that it might represent more or less a political alternative to the current regime. It contradicts

explicitly the interpretation that it has a political objective. Its strength is somewhere else. By showing in an essentially ideological area the contradiction between the claim and the reality of that "socialism" which is proclaimed today from Moscow ex cathedra, it forces the regime to face a discussion which today is brought to the leadership not only by its own population but which must be confronted also on an international scale. However, neither in Czechoslovakia nor in any other country of Eastern Europe is a new "Prague Spring" in the making. The most important prerequisite is missing, which is the willingness for discussion and change by a group which carries weight within the parties themselves.

8991

CSO: 2300

WAITING PERIOD OF CPCZ CANDIDATE MEMBERS DESCRIBED

Prague ZIVOT STRANY in Czech No 9, 25 Apr 77 pp 39-42

[Article by Pavel Kertesz: "The Waiting Period, an Activist's Training School"]

[Text] The waiting period is one of the important means used to raise the quality of the membership base of the party. It is indispensable, the statute stipulates, "...in order to acquaint the candidate member with the program, policy and bylaws of the CPCZ so he can prove by his activity that he will be a worthy member of the party. The party organization is obligated to help candidates prepare themselves for admission to party membership and test their ideological, political, professional and moral qualities."

Since the 14th CPCZ Congress almost 400,000 candidates have been admitted to membership. This represents a great political success obligating us to even more effective utilization of the waiting period. The 15th Congress has stressed: "The education of candidates and young members must be approached with great responsibility... It is our duty to do everything in our power so they may grow into dedicated builders of the socialist homeland, builders devoted to the ideas of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism."

The importance of the omnilateral testing of the political qualities and working habits of a candidate for party membership and his Marxist-Leninist education was also stressed by the 15th CPSU Congress: "The greater the progress we are making and the greater the tasks the party has to fulfill, the greater is the care with which we must replenish its ranks with fresh reinforcements from among those who have gained the approval of the basic party organization and the entire collective and who participate actively in production and in public life. For this reason the importance of the waiting period must be raised," says the Central Committee report to the 25th CPSU Congress.

Development of the Waiting Period in the CPSU

The history of worker and communist parties mentions the term "candidating period" for the first time to designate the waiting period for admission to the party in the Communist Party of Russia (Bolshevik) at its Eighth All-Russian Conference held in December 1919. This conference adopted the generally

valid statutory norm calling for the admission of members by local party committees from the ranks of candidates and their approval by the next plenary session of the organization. "All those wishing to join the party must pass a candidating period intended to acquaint the candidate thoroughly with the program and tactics of the party and test his personal qualities," reads the second paragraph of the statute adopted by the Communist Party of Russia at its eighth conference. The conference set a 2-month candidating period for workers and an at least 6-month period for all others.¹

What induced the adoption of this measure? By the end of 1919 membership in the Communist Party of Russia (Bolshevik) had increased to 350,000 with about 200,000 new members.² Together with revolutionary workers, farmers and members of the intelligentsia, various careerists and opportunists who wanted to take advantage of party membership also managed to join the ruling party, which they would not have joined had conditions been different.

V.I. Lenin wrote in this connection in his work "On Conditions for Admission to Party Membership": Considering the majority of its members it is obvious that our party is not proletarian enough. I think that nobody can dispute it, mere inspection of the statistics will confirm the validity of this statement." Since the war the composition of factory workers in Russia has become much less proletarian than before because during the war all those who wanted to avoid being drafted went to work in factories.... We must further take into consideration that it is very tempting to join the ruling party today.... Should the Geneva conference turn out to be a new political success, then the influx of petit-bourgeois elements and elements directly inimical to everything proletarian will increase tremendously."³

Also the 12th All-Russian Communist Party (b) Conference paid special attention to candidates, their selection and their guarantors. Unlike the wording which in exceptional cases permitted shortening or the complete waiver of the waiting period, the statutes adopted at the 12th All-Russian Conference (1922) already excluded this possibility. "All persons intending to become members of the party must pass a candidating period which is designed to acquaint the candidate with the program and the tactics of the party and test his personal qualities" says the statute adopted at the 12th All-Russian Communist Party (b) Conference.⁴ The above change was necessary and legal. The conference introduced three categories of candidating periods. The first to last 6 months, the second a year and the third 2 years.

Great importance was attributed to the guarantor. The comment on one point in the statute stressed that guarantors were responsible for the candidates they recommended and that their liability extended to party penalties, not excluding expulsion, in cases of unjustified recommendations.

The objective of these measures was to strengthen the party and its unity and increase the proportion of workers in the composition of the membership which in 1921 in the CPR (b) dropped to 29.7 percent.

Following the building of socialism in the USSR, the 18th All-Russian Communist Party Congress (Bolshevik) (1939) set uniform conditions for the admission of candidates without regard to their social status. Why were these changes in the party statute necessary? The 18th Party Congress took place at a time of fundamental changes in the economy and the class structure of the USSR population. In the USSR economy socialist production relationships won out. Accordingly, the class structure of the population also changed. All exploitative classes were liquidated and ideological, political and moral unity of the people was achieved. But uniform conditions for the admission of candidates did not imply a lowering of standards for those who were admitted into the party. Lenin's principle of selecting new party members on an individual basis remained in full force.

The All-Russian Communist Party (b) statute adopted by the 18th congress committed party members and candidates to strive constantly for greater class consciousness, adhere more strictly to party discipline, participate actively in political and public life, implement party policy and resolutions in practice, stand out as an example in maintaining work and state discipline and strengthen constantly the connection with the masses.

The last changes concerning candidates for membership in the CPSU were decreed at its 23d congress and were in accord with the development of the social structure of Soviet society. At present there is a universal 1-year waiting period for admission to membership in the CPSU. The age limit for admission is 18 years. Three guarantors with at least 5-year membership are required. Young people up to the age of 23 are being admitted to party membership through the All-Union Leninist Komsomol.

The Candidating Period in the History of the CPCZ

In the history of the CPCZ the waiting period--the preparatory school for future party members--was first introduced in 1948 by the resolution of the CPCZ Central Committee Presidium of 3 November 1948.

The necessity of introducing a waiting period arose also in our country from concrete historical conditions in the party and society. "It is natural that the Communist Party must now pursue a much stricter selection of its members in order to prevent the infiltration of careerists striving only for personal advantage or even of subversives sent by the enemy into our ranks," reads the resolution of the CPCZ Central Committee Presidium called "Introduction of Candidate Membership in the Party and Explanations and Guidelines of the Central Secretariat of the CPCZ Central Committee."

The objective of the resolution was to apply stricter criteria to the selection of new members in order to raise member quality and prevent the infiltration of various careerist elements into the party. In the course of the post-February recruiting campaign, 856,657 members were admitted into the party in the Czech lands and 196,828 in Slovakia over a 5-month period. When the campaign ended the CPCZ had about 2,500,000 members, including individuals who never should have been admitted. Various elements joined the ruling party

party only because they wanted to seize the opportunity of acquiring a good job even though the policy of the CPCZ went against their grain.

The social structure of the party deteriorated markedly because the Leninist principles of admitting new members on a strictly individual basis were disregarded. In the course of 2 months, from February 1948 to 24 April 1948, the proportion of workers dropped by 8.2 percent and of farmers by 0.8 percent. For this reason the CPCZ Central Committee resolution stipulated "...that an applicant for admission into the party must first pass through a set waiting period to enable the party organization to get to know his personal qualities and also test his practical work."

In the case of industrial and agricultural workers the candidating period lasted a year and in the case of other workers 2 years. Industrial and agricultural workers were considered those who worked uninterruptedly for at least 2 years in production or on state farms, in machine and tractor stations, etc.

The CPCZ Central Committee resolution about the introduction of the candidating period differed from later adopted statutes by two peculiarities known in party circles till the nationwide CPCZ conference in December 1952 when a new statute was adopted.

The first peculiarity was the introduction of so-called candidating groups. In factories, enterprises and villages without party organizations and party members at the time of the introduction of the candidating period those who wished to join submitted their applications to the okres party committee which decided about their admission as candidates and founded an organization. Constituted in this way and consisting of candidates only these organizations were called "candidate groups" which had no right to elect a committee. They were headed by group trustees designated by the okres committees from the ranks of party members of other organizations who were charged with the temporary leadership of the candidate groups. Members of the candidate groups held meetings where they discussed their tasks but did not have the right to decide about the admission or expulsion of candidates and about disciplinary penalties. These matters were decided directly by the okres party committee. Another peculiarity was the possibility of relegating a member back into the category of candidates regardless of his social status.

In order to prevent a mass expulsion of members who were not adequately screened by their basic organizations before admission and could not prove that they met the criteria for party membership the party transferred them into the candidate category. While transferring members into the candidate category party organizations followed CPCZ Central Committee guidelines which without exception called for individual treatment of each member. "Party organizations will screen with particular care members who joined the party after 25 February 1948 and will decide independently in the case of each such member whether he may remain a member or be transferred into the candidate category," read the guidelines of the CPCZ Central Committee.

Further development in the party and society was reflected also in the statute adopted at the nationwide CPCZ conference on 18 December 1952. Following the thorough analysis of the development of party membership, the conference deleted from the statute the article about the transfer of members into the ranks of candidates and at the same time abolished candidate groups. But it left basic organizations the possibility of extending the candidating period for candidates unable to prove in its regular course that they were worthy of party membership.

A new class, cooperative farmers, came into being in our country as a result of the reorganization of agriculture into cooperatives and the founding and consolidation of JZD's [unified agricultural cooperatives]. For this reason the CPCZ introduced changes in the statute concerning the candidating period of JZD members active in the cooperative for at least 2 years. With the same stipulation for workers with at least 2 years of work in production, a resolution passed by the 11th Congress gave cooperative farmers a waiting period of 1 year only. A further change in the length of the candidating period was decreed by the nationwide CPCZ congress in July 1960 by approving a 1-year candidating period for party membership for all classes of workers.

In 1962, after the 12th CPCZ Congress, the number of guarantors required was increased from two to three and these had to be members of the party for at least 3 years (before that for 2 years); in the case of candidates who were previously members of other political parties the required length of the guarantors' membership was extended from 4 to 5 years. The 12th CPCZ Congress also adopted the statutory stipulation that "young people till the age of 21 will normally be admitted for candidate membership in the party through the Czechoslovak Union of Youth."

A milestone in the development of candidateship to CPCZ membership was the 13th party congress in 1966 which abolished the candidating period--the training school of new party members--with the justification that "the candidating period is fulfilling its mission only formally and has outlived its usefulness."

The past period, especially the years right after the 13th congress, has demonstrated that the decision to abolish the candidating period for CPCZ membership was a mistake. On the basis of lessons we have learned and experiences we have gained we can say today that abolishing the waiting period was detrimental to the development of the party after the 13th Congress and to its ideological, action and moral unity. Especially detrimental and for further party work untenable was the justification given for abolishing the candidating period referred to later by various revisionist, antiparty elements inimical to socialism.

The ill-considered justification for abolishing the candidating period which was contrary to the principles of Marx-Leninism also encouraged right-winners and revisionists to propose various statute variations.

The opportunist intention behind the proposed "new statutes" also discussed by the CPCZ Central Committee Presidium in 1968, especially the chapter dealing with membership, was especially evident in Article 16, which says: "Citizens join the party voluntarily and can leave it by their own free will. "Article 21, which spoke about the lapse of party membership, continued in the spirit of this "formulation": "Membership in the party expires by leaving it, by being stricken from the membership roster, by expulsion or by death." The above chapters and articles had only one objective: to diminish, limit and gradually deny the Communist Party the leading role in our society.

The Candidating Period After the 14th CPCZ Congress

One of the basic measures adopted by the 14th CPCZ Congress in the matter of membership is the reintroduction of the candidating period which came into force on 1 July 1971. "Life has shown," says the 14th congress report, "that the decision to abolish the candidating period adopted by the 13th congress was premature. "The reintroduced candidating period must be used for a more thorough political and ideological preparation of new party members, for a more reliable detection of their suitability for party membership and to acquaint them in practice with the rights and duties of Communists," stipulates the resolution of the 14th CPCZ Congress. The only changes in the reintroduced candidating period in the current statute are that the responsibility for preparing candidates for party membership also falls to the party organization and that the candidate is able to prove by all his activity that he will be a worthy member of the party.

The timeliness of these ideas was again confirmed last year at the June session of the CPCZ Central Committee which stressed the necessity "of improving the system and raising the level of education and preparation of candidates and young party members who today constitute one-quarter of the party ranks in accord with the resolutions of the 15th congress. It is the duty of all party organs and organizations to do all they can so they may grow up to become proud builders of the socialist homeland dedicated to Marx-Leninist ideas and proletarian internationalism," says the resolution of the CPCZ Central Committee with regard to improving the membership base of the party.

Precisely the latter must be stressed in the current as well as the future work of the party, especially of its basic organizations: the candidate must prove by his activity that he will be a worthy member of the party. This is necessary also because today still we hear primarily among young people the question why the candidating period was not introduced right after the founding of the CPCZ or whether a 2-year waiting period was not too long. They contend that even today some communist and worker parties have no candidating period.

But it is obvious that at the time of the founding of the CPCZ and during the first republic or at the time of the fascist occupation the conditions for admission into the party were different from what they were after the Victorious February or from what they are today. During the first republic and the fascist

occupation the revolutionary struggle and the danger inherent in party membership was the best test of communists. Success in the implementation of party policy depends primarily on the quality of its ranks of members, on the dedicated work of its every member. Therefore, the introduction of the waiting period was highly necessary. The candidating period is an important means of selection into the party, an important factor in improving the ranks of members.

The experience gained from the admission of candidates to membership in the party over the last 5 years demonstrated that the schooling, education and testing during the candidating period is absolutely indispensable because it allows the organization and even the candidate to determine more accurately and convincingly whether he has the necessary prerequisites for and deserves to be a member of the Communist Party.

The current system of the candidating period fully permits the future party member to gain experience in fulfilling party assignments and in active political work and to prepare himself for tasks which he will fulfill as a party member. The candidating period is one of the means for preserving the integrity of the party ranks and for strengthening the ideological and organizational unity of the party.

As to the length of the candidating period, 2 years are needed to enable the party organization to work with the candidates for an adequate period of time and to test them by means of party assignments to get to know their qualities, to have enough time to educate and prepare them so they may become useful members of the party. The CPCZ based the setting of a 2-year candidating period on an analysis of the crisis years in the party and in society, further on the fact that young people who constitute a high percentage of the candidates being admitted lack practical political and life experience which older generations acquired in sharp class struggles under capitalism. Therefore, candidates in party collectives must be systematically prepared for the fulfillment of party assignments and older comrades must pass on to them their political experience and assist them in all respects. We must implant in them strong political convictions based on a scientific world view.

The candidating period as such and its length are determined by the existing political situation by existing facts and conditions in the life of the party and society. Desirable results accruing from the candidating period depend not only on its duration but primarily on the work of the party, its organs and organizations with candidates, on well organized, planned and systematic work with the candidates. V.I. Lenin repeatedly stressed this aspect of the matter. In the article "About Conditions for Admitting New Members Into the Party" he stressed the necessity of extending the candidating period because short waiting periods would "in reality be quite insufficient to determine seriously whether the candidates are at least somewhat tested communists.... Therefore, I insist emphatically and urgently on extending the candidating period and on instructing the organizational bureau to work out and strictly abide by rules which would turn the candidating period into a really very serious testing period and not an empty formality."⁵

FOOTNOTES

1. CPSU in resolutions..., Vol I, SNPL 1954, p 400.
2. S.M. Abalin, "On the CPSU Statutes," Rude Pravo publishing house, Prague 1954, p 24.
3. V.I. Lenin, "Works," Vol 33, Prague 1962, p 253.
4. The CPSU in Resolutions... Vol II, p 566-567.
5. V.I. Lenin, "Works," Vol 33, Prague 1962, pp 251-252.

8664

CSO: 2400

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

'TRIBUNA' DESCRIBES TACTICS OF ANTICOMMUNISM

Prague TRIBUNA in Czech No 17, 27 Apr 77 pp 8-9

[Article by Bohumir Bartos: "Religion of the Bourgeoisie"]

[Text] The whole world is longing for a permanent peace. The working people of every continent consider peace the basic precondition for their creative life. They show a lack of interest as well as active opposition to those forces that are covertly or overtly proclaiming war. They welcome, agree with, and support the international policy of the Soviet Union and the socialist countries, the policy which so magnificently and at the same time with humane simplicity offers and promotes peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems.

Lenin's idea of peace, as simple and ingenious as his entire life's work, is "taking hold of the masses," infusing the minds, feelings, desires and aspirations of people of every color of the skin, of every political conviction and of every religion, and is gradually changing "into a material force" aimed against international aggression and against those who carry that aggression on the escutcheon of their personality.

The Basis--Anticommunism

The policy of peaceful coexistence is a fact which every statesman must now consider. And indeed, all of them are considering it, but not all of them recognize it and welcome it, not all of them support it with their actions. Sometimes they "recognize" that policy only in their words, some times they "acknowledge it" silently and sometimes they "do everything to unseat it." We could find many ways of such "coping with the reality of peaceful coexistence." They are derived from one and the same value--from anticommunism. Such an antihumane policy stemming from the most divergent bourgeois ideologies touches upon everything by which man lives; upon everything that even resembles his dream of freedom, work and happiness; upon everything that fosters his desire for education, his desire for equality without any masters, his desire for social justice or national independence. Anticommunism is "religion of the bourgeoisie" as well as "the sword of the bourgeoisie." Yes, until recently it was but a religion and a sword. However, as soon as the policy of peaceful coexistence became a reality

"embracing all the world," serious anxiety stirred up in the anticommunists' minds. Previous tactics of violence, barriers, blocs and overt hatred proved to be relics and no longer operative. Anticommunism after all presented itself as "man's friend," as a protector of his freedom and happiness. Therefore, it could not fiercely oppose something with which all simple people in the world agree and for which they clamor. It was necessary to determine other, more elastic, more successful tactics, but only tactics, because the objective remains the same: hostility against socialist and communism, hostility against the national liberation movement, hostility against the world peace movement.

Development of Anticommunism

Anticommunist hatred has its history and its stages of development. One of its branches developed and grew after the Great October Revolution, with the development of the capitalist system and with its deeper spread after World War II. That branch of hostility sprouted various "shoots"--from military intervention through espionage and World War II up to the cold war in the 1950s. Today that "upshot of frenzy" has left only a burned stump sticking up above a series of failures of the most varied conglomeration of bourgeois adventurers, fuhrers, kings and presidents as a "memorial of their anti-humanism."

Another branch of anticommunist hostility developed and grew along with the first one during the development and spread of the national liberation movement. This was logical. The splendid example of the Great October Socialist Revolution encouraged the forces of oppressed nations subjugated by world colonialism in almost unremovable shackles. Whoever would stand up against colonialism became enemy No 1 and was sentenced in advance to double death, first because he had demanded freedom for his nation, and second because he saw his example in the Soviet Union. Even though the initial armed expeditions against the rebels were later replaced by economic control of colonial territories silently and behind the scene (by means of investments, banks, export of the capital and import of domestic products), nevertheless it was just another face of the same hatred. Every state which got rid of colonial rule experienced that. And where it was not possible to control the "free governments" with a gloved hand, arms were used (see Vietnam, Chile, the attempts in Angola, Cambodia and elsewhere). This involved and still involves the most brutal form of anticommunism.

Still another branch of anticommunist hatred was born at a time when various presidents, magnates and military leaders "stood over the burned stump of the first branch" with their heads downcast. At that time the Soviet Union together with other countries of socialism stepped up the Leninist policy, appealed to the conscience of nations and offered hand-in-hand cooperation on the basis of equality to all the people of good will. To all anti-communists this came as a shock; they began thinking feverishly of how to react to such a reality. They consulted their theoreticians and professors; they began mobilizing their propaganda. After a series of hastily summoned consultations they adopted a plan behind which were "the brains

of the foremost theoreticians and foremost practitioners." The plan of the ramified tactics contained--in brief--the following characteristics:

- a) to silence temporarily the anticommunist extremists ("hawks");
- b) to accept officially the policy of peaceful coexistence;
- c) to torpedo unofficially the policy of peaceful coexistence but always from the position of "friendship" (unfortunately, this cannot be done in any other way, perhaps later?);
- d) to conduct bourgeois propaganda in a strictly differentiated manner (more rights to be assigned to emigres and nonofficial broadcasts "to foreign countries");
- e) to address the people in the socialist countries as their friends (to apply the most divergent theories, such as "theory of convergence," "theory of evolution," "theory of postindustrial society," "theory of deideologization"--and so on, to use and exploit nationalism, pluralization and polycentrism, and to dress up all that in the most acceptable clothes of "psychological presentation");
- f) for discrediting, to use forces which are living and acting in socialist countries (revisionists, proponents of "socialism with a human face," proponents of ideological deviations in socialism, "religious groups"--and of course, to exploit the vestiges of the past in the people, in other words, to revive the petty-bourgeois inclinations, desire for independent enterprise, opposition to national committees and any kind of expressions of the state power);
- g) to proceed from the merits of peaceful coexistence, however, to "bring" such coexistence to extreme conclusions (tactfully but consistently to promote ideological exchange, cultural exchange and scientific exchange so as to build in this manner "a new bridge into the heart of socialism");
- h) to accept any kind of negotiations proposed by the socialist countries, but to postpone their conclusion, to set conditions for fundamental concessions on the part of the socialist countries (this concerns economic, political, power and other concessions);
- i) to pretend that the policy of peaceful coexistence is "our" policy and that it is being violated by the communists.

Evidently, the full range of anticommunists' tactics is permeated by their effort to make this policy "refined and acceptable" to the people.

Murders, violence, terror--all that must "officially disappear" from the international relations--as stressed in the secret instructions from the anticommunist centers and staffs. Of course, espionage and assassinations

will go on--however, they will not appear as our overt anticommunist weapons--the secret addenda to those instructions stated. In other words; we shall put on a mask of friendship under which the life-and-death hatred will remain intact.

New Tactics

The former psychological war of anticommunism had another form. With the aid of scientific knowledge it tried to manipulate its own citizens as well as the citizens of the socialist countries. At the same time, it did not conceal anything; everything followed an obvious purpose: deviation from the Soviet Union (polycentrism), adherence to the capitalist countries, primarily the United States. The new tactics of which we are speaking here are entirely different. Instead of unilateral hatred they stipulate multilateral "friendship," instead of the "bourgeois activity" which was supposed to "affect the socialist man" they installed "activity of the socialist man," his inner activity which "will break down the shackles of socialism and opt for the free world"--i.e., the world of capitalist exploitation, unemployment, poverty and wars.

The authors of such tactics (just as anticommunism in general) have underestimated one very relevant factor--namely, the level of social consciousness under socialism and the level of consciousness of individual socialist citizens. At the same time they could not prevent the activity of the anticommunist extremists who are writing off their potential allies by disclosing quite overtly their aggressive plans for the conquest of the world (they call it "liberation of the world"). Let us mention former U.S. Secretary of Defense Schlesinger who threatened the world with atomic weapons, or the appearance of the revanchists in the FRG, Franz Josef Strauss' anticommunism, etc. Israel and its ruling circles are playing an analogous role. (Paradoxically, they are joined by the anti-Soviet attitude of Egypt which has broken its treaty of friendship with the USSR; reprehensible is the anticommunist crusade in Chile with the "blessing" of the U.S. policy.) And so on and so forth. There are many voices openly denigrating the policy of peaceful coexistence, describing it as communist trickery, more than the authors of the new tactics of anticommunism have presumed. Among them are the attitude of NATO, the enormous funds for armament determined annually by the U.S. Congress, the hateful attitudes of the socialist Internationale, the fascist storm troops in Italy. The policy of ultraleftist groups also belongs among them. Thus, anticommunism is expressed as loudly and shamelessly as before, often even considerably more loudly and shamelessly.

Outwardly it joined the policy of peaceful coexistence, however, it fails to fulfill its obligations. It says "yes" readily but immediately changes it into procrastination, excuses and unwillingness. The testimony thereof is its unwillingness to give the Helsinki documents the publicity they deserve. While the socialist countries devoted millions of copies to the conclusions of the conference, they were published only sporadically in the capitalist countries.

Back to Capitalism

Main objectives of contemporary anticommunism are evident from all its acts: antihumanism and anti-Sovietism. The dominant aim of all the anticommunist efforts in this respect is to penetrate the ramparts of Marxist-Leninist ideology, to enter the consciousness of socialist citizens, to force upon them (one way or another) the bourgeois ideology, to control that man "by his own will, by his own thinking, by his own actions"--and to bring him back into the fold of beneficial capitalism "on his own accord, by his own decision."

In other words--the ideological area is the main battlefield for anticommunism which is accompanied and aided by the struggle in all other areas of man's life (politics, economy, culture, science, youth, sports); however, ideology is really concerned with the "life and death" of anticommunism. Yes, this concerns a struggle for its own existence, not the struggle of the socialist countries and of communism for their own survival. The forces in the world have changed so much since the Great October Socialist Revolution. Anticommunism has felt that the policy of peaceful coexistence and with it, the growing popularity of socialism dealt it a crushing blow; it is aware of the fact that it is stumbling under that blow, and therefore, it is trying in every possible way to preserve what in its opinion may still be saved.

In this struggle it relies on various opportunities, contacts with the socialist countries, on revisionists and traitors living in socialist countries (an insignificant minority); it relies on its appealing mask which it has assumed; it counts on exploiting demagoguery, etc. At the same time, however, it is extensively exploiting also its "heritage from the past"--i.e., fascism, intimidation, assassinations and the gradually declining though still existing power of the dollar. Moreover, it relies considerably on bourgeois propaganda, on the fact that the communications media are able to penetrate the borders to socialist countries without passports and visas and that they can reach the people's minds at any time, that they can present the people anything in any form. It is no coincidence that the U.S. president submitted to the Congress a proposal for an expansion of the system of transmitters for the slanderous radio stations Liberty and Free Europe.

Socialism the Most Humane

It may be noted that the project of ramified tactics of anticommunism is not being fulfilled as its authors had visualized. The reasons are numerous. One of them is the high level of socialist consciousness of the citizens in the countries of the socialist community and their confidence in the policy of the communist parties. Another is the economic, cultural, social and ideological strength of those countries. The experience has shown that only socialism can guarantee a working man the right to happiness, life-time security, and a creative development of his personality.

However, we must constantly remember what was also stressed by the 25th Congress of the CPSU: "In the struggle of two world views there cannot be any place left for neutral attitudes and compromises. It is necessary to demonstrate here considerable political vigilance, to develop an active, operative and convincing propaganda work and in due time, to stand up against hostile ideological subversion."

9004

CSO: 2400

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

TVORBA DESCRIBES PRAGUE MAY 1945 UPRISING

Prague TVORBA in Czech No 18, 4 May 77 p 11

Article by Miloslav Novak: "People's Uprising in May 1945"

Text Historical knowledge is an important part of the consciousness of the socialist human being, and the antifascist struggle of our people during World War II plays in it an especially significant role.

The May uprising of the Czech people belongs without any doubt to the most important topics. There are several reasons for that. One of them is the strong emotional impact stemming from the 1945 May events affecting not only the relatively large number of the uprising's participants and survivors of the victims, but also the young people who have been given this justified legacy.

The uprising of the Czech people in May of 1945 was a culmination of the Czech antifascist struggle and, at the same time, a manifestation of the differences and contradictions within the antifascist movement abroad and at home. A united front in the struggle against fascism (for which the CPCZ strove, although until 1941 basically without success under the conditions of sharp anti-Soviet attacks of the Western powers which were disappointed by the failures of their Munich-like anti-Soviet strategy) was even after 1941 a complicated process of a political struggle which was waged not only in respect to the principles and goals which were to govern postwar Czechoslovakia, but in respect to the strategy and tactics.

The CPCZ always opposed the passive expectation that Czechoslovakia would be liberated from abroad on the pattern of 28 October 1918, when political power would be handed over to a somewhat improved pre-Munich government. The CPCZ demanded and prepared an actively organized struggle, based on the broad masses of the people, which would culminate in a national uprising. Only such a path could make it certain that the people would not again become an object in the manipulation of those bourgeois politicians who were not compromised by direct collaboration with the Nazis but would themselves take power and realize their revolutionary needs and goals.

The Czech uprising flared up in many places in Moravia and Bohemia between 1 and 5 May into a clear-cut revolutionary situation at the time of a fast advance of Soviet troops. As a result of the activities of partisan units organized around Soviet parachutists, the Czech people in the cities and villages rose up to help destroy the organized resistance of the occupiers and actively prevent their plans to destroy the country during their retreat to the West. The actions of individual centers of uprising culminated on 5 May 1945 in the Prague uprising which gave it a nationwide character.

Prague was a natural political center of the nation and thus of its resistance movement. On the other hand, Prague was at the same time the main administrative and power center of the occupiers and also constituted an irreplaceable transportation junction. Consequently, the occupiers were determined to defend Prague with all the means they had at their disposal. From the viewpoint of material and armed forces, these were still formidable means.

The task to organize the Prague uprising was a very complicated problem and, in the final analysis, this task was not fully solved by the time the uprising broke out. The uprising broke up spontaneously, but from the first moments (or, to put it differently, especially during the first moments) it was characterized by an extraordinary tenaciousness of purpose, which was a witness to the fact that the idea of the uprising had been self-evident for some time (among other things, under the influence of Radio Moscow). The same applies to the ideas of first military steps to be taken--namely, the occupation of most militarily important targets. The first isolated attempts started on the outskirts of Prague on 4 May (for example, in Bechovice) and during the morning hours of Saturday 5 May they gradually extended to the territory of Prague. The noon appeal for the struggle, broadcast over Radio Prague, was the beginning of a spontaneous attack--although still mainly with bare hands--against most of the Nazi-controlled objects in the city, whose main purpose was to get access at least to basic light weapons and ammunition.

The provisional fourth home leadership of the CPCZ naturally expected that the uprising would take place. In early January its military commission issued relatively detailed preparatory instructions. The leadership could do so because of the preparations made by individual communist organizations. For example, the directives of the "Vanguard" of 1944 correctly adopted a principle whose idea was to force on the enemy a form of struggle in which he was the least trained. Heavy blows by the Gestapo in March 1945, however, greatly disrupted the organizational and cadre preparations of the provisional leadership of the party for an armed struggle.

An important element in the preparations was the illegal Central Trade Union Council which, especially since the end of 1944, collaborated closely with the CPCZ and which organized resistance and military groups in the factories in Prague and other large cities. The beginning of the armed uprising of the workers was to be a general strike. The Central Trade

Union Council was at the same time connected with the resistance organization R-3 from which it partially accepted an unrealistic and false expectation of deliveries of arms from London in the period immediately prior to the uprising. This as well as the fact that the employees of certain Prague plants were given "vacation," ordered by the Nazis at the beginning of May, caused difficulties at the time of the uprising's beginning which developed spontaneously only after the start of the work stoppage. (In several parts of the city this strengthened the locally defensive character of the organization of the uprising, accentuated by a joint effort to build local barricades.)

The spontaneous outbreak of the uprising at noon on Sunday was thus understandably a disadvantage for the development of an organized people's offensive character of the uprising. In spite of that, the Prague plants and their revolutionary guards played an important role not only in defending the plants and on their own barricades but in the active offensive operations. The officers' circles, however, tried from the very beginning to use as combat forces only the uniformed groups--the police, the gendarmerie, the "protectorate's armed forces," as well as transportation workers and mail men. In the case of the last two, nobody expected the major influence of Communists within their ranks. However, the development of subsequent events put a spoke in the officers' wheels. The nonsensical plans to conduct a "regular war" with the Nazis came to naught. This became obvious especially during the second day of the uprising when the Nazis, strengthened by the SS divisions from the training areas in the vicinity of Prague, started a counterattack and attempted, through mass massacres of prisoners and civilians including children, to scare the insurgents.

However, in those places where the insurgents were able to reject the army tactics which would give the Nazis predominance, their struggle was successful.

The people's uprising spontaneously changed from a passive defense to the destruction of the enemy and the prevention of his unpunished escape before the Red Army, whose arrival everybody confidently expected without knowing anything about the decision concerning the Prague operation. This is confirmed by the decision by many not to respect the fateful and shameful agreement on peaceful departure of the Nazis into American captivity. Fortunately, the Soviet Army had its own intelligence means. Its assistance came in time and the entire nation welcomed it with an indescribable enthusiasm.

This was not an uncontrolled uprising. It had clear goals, corresponding to the directives of the Moscow leadership of the CPCZ and was linked directly to the combat activity of the Soviet Army. Politically, the uprising greatly accelerated the development and the differentiation in society and became a real school for the masses. It prevented the hopes of the bourgeois to have a repetition of the 28 October 1918 and an officers' coup. Militarily, the uprising became a part of the famous Prague operation

during which the Soviet troops captured 858,000 German soldiers, 1,822 tanks, 9,464 guns, 1,104 planes, etc. This operation marked the end of World War II.

The uprising of the Czech people also clearly showed the entire world once again our attitude towards the Nazi occupiers and a warm attitude of all strata of our people toward the USSR, a country which liberated us. This has also become an important element from the international viewpoint.

During the uprising the real heroes were ordinary people and to a great extent young people. For them the uprising was a revolutionary school. In this lies the unforgettable significance of the uprising. Thanks to the CPCZ the uprising became a beginning of a new stage in the development in the Czech lands, a development toward the building of a new, people's democratic Czechoslovakia.

1277

CSO: 2400

LT GEN REINHOLD CITES NEED FOR CONTINUED VIGILANCE

East Berlin PRESSE-INFORMATIONEN in German 6 May 77 pp 2-3

[Article by Lt Gen Wolfgang Reinhold, deputy minister for national defense and chief of the Air Force/Air Defense Command of the NVA: "The Proven Military Alliance Is Being Further Strengthened"]

[Text] Guided by the principles of proletarian internationalism, the allied socialist countries are developing and consolidating their cooperation in all areas. Proceeding from the necessity of organized protection of the socialist community of nations against all forms of imperialist lusts for power and aggression, the military coalition of socialist nations fraternally united in the Warsaw Pact forms a firm bulwark whose nucleus is the Soviet Army. The basis of the fraternal cooperation is the common Marxist-Leninist world view, the common communist goals. On 14 May we are celebrating the 22d anniversary of the signing of this historic pact by the participating nations, including our German Democratic Republic.

In the declaration approved by the conference of the Political Advisory Committee in Bucharest in November 1976 it is emphasized that "so long as the NATO bloc continues to exist and to increase its military potential, the nations participating in the Warsaw Pact will take all required measures in the context of the Warsaw Pact to guarantee constantly reliable security for their peoples."

Great Achievements in Honor of the 60th Anniversary of Red October

The members of the NVA are currently accomplishing outstanding achievements in political and military training as well as in the active duty system of the united armed forces of the Warsaw Pact in honor of the upcoming 60th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution. Shoulder to shoulder in firm military brotherhood with the famous Soviet Army and the other socialist armies, they responsibly fulfill the class task set them by the Ninth SED Congress. They see in that their most important international contribution to the collective defense of the socialist order and the free life of the citizens of all nations of the socialist community.

In this connection it is the duty of the members of the air force/air defense to guarantee at all times the inviolability of the air space of the GDR and its fellow socialist countries along with our allies in the unified air defense system of the Warsaw Pact. Here in immediate proximity to the imperialist pact system the deepening of the brotherhood-in-arms above all between the members of the Soviet, Polish, Czech air defense forces and those of the NVA proves daily to be of decisive importance. Particularly great demands are made on their fighting power and combat readiness in view of the situation of military geography and military policy at the western bastion of socialism in Europe.

Only a few flight minutes from our borders are located the strongest air attack organizations of the NATO pact, whose readiness and capacity for aggression against all efforts toward peace and detente is being increased at an accelerating rate. Solely for the acquisition of 322 so-called multi-purpose combat planes of the "Tornado" type for the air force of the Bundeswehr DM 15.5 billion in taxes are to be expended. In all, DM 49.1 billion have been projected this year for defense in the FRG and legally authorized by the Bundestag on 2 March of this year. That represents an increase of 80 percent since 1971. In the other NATO countries as well, above all in the United States, the defense budgets are being continually increased. A glaring contradiction to the interests of their peoples, a blow by the aggressive powers of the FRG and the other NATO countries against their own obligations incurred in Helsinki.

This unbridled aggressive tendency is accompanied by a hate-filled defamation campaign against socialism by the opponents of peace and detente. Herein the members of the air force and air defense are renewed proof of the unaltered aggressive nature of imperialism. They know: Showing the NATO commanders again and again that their plans are doomed to failure, regardless of whether their weapons systems are pompously called Phantom or Tornado, depends in part on their capacity to master modern combat technology, to man their weapons and equipment reliably under great physical stress, and to meet the high demands of the active duty system. The strength and confidence necessary to perform these military tasks accrue to our army personnel through the knowledge and conviction of the victory of socialism and communism and the firm comradeship in arms with the Soviet Army and the other allied armies.

Socialism Is Securely Protected Jointly

This class and military alliance is forged ever more firmly and lastingly primarily by direct cooperation in the performance of joint combat tasks. In this connection the coordinated combat work in the active-duty system of the air defense of the Warsaw Pact plays an outstanding role. It is this above all which makes the steel screen over our allied nations uninterrupted and impenetrable. Vigilantly and quickly, at once calmly and collectedly, the numerous attempts at air provocation by the NATO air forces are overseen and energetically repulsed by the reliable cooperation and high military ability of the comrades in arms.

But it is not only the close military cooperation, the unified, modern and highly effective Soviet combat technology, the stable, resolute, and unified command, the joint and thorough combat training in daily duty and exercises which make our military alliance so strong and unbeatable. It is primarily and in unison with these military factors, in harmony with the basic policy questions of our workers parties and nations, the unshakeable conviction of firmly espousing the joint concern of socialism and communism which unites the members of the allied armies and strengthens their force.

The close combat alliance between the members of the air force and air defense of the Soviet Army, whose troops are stationed in the GDR, and the members of the air force and air defense of the NVA has a sobering effect on the commanders and personnel of the NATO air force. At the same time, this combat alliance, this class and military brotherhood, experienced daily by our soldiers, allows greater and better recognition of all the slanders and lies which the class enemy constantly throws around in numerous ways in the course of his anti-Soviet agitation, thereby demolishing the enemy's ideological diversion. When our flight commanders meet with Soviet fighter pilots and exchange experiences, they contend for the best results in combat training, consolidate their personal friendships, and thus in a soldierly way prepare for the great celebration of progressive humanity, the 60th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution. Our anti-aircraft missile soldiers, who regularly contend with their Soviet comrades for highest military achievements, experience daily that the best experiences are transmitted back and forth without reservation. The personnel of communications troops, rear services, special troops and command posts have learned to value highly the great value of the political and military knowledge and experience of the comrades in arms of the "next regiment" through the repeated practice of mutual brotherly assistance and support.

These bonds of comradeship-in-arms with our Soviet military comrades are being further and further consolidated. Today they have already arrived at such a qualitatively new level that they directly affect the increase in fighting power and combat readiness of the NVA. The relations of comradeship in arms increasingly encompass all of everyday military and political life.

For this reason the members of the air force and air defense are also at one with their class and military brothers in the thought that the armed defense of socialism is a task which extends beyond the borders of the homeland to the whole socialist community of nations. This growing responsibility for the collective military defense of socialism therefore strengthens all army personnel in their decisive desire to consolidate the military union with the Soviet comrades in arms and the comrades in arms of the other fellow armies with further concrete acts to increase the fighting power and combat readiness of the NVA.

8992
CSO: 2300

EXPERIENCES REPORTED WITH NEW TYPE TANK TRACK

East Berlin MILITAERTECHNIK in German No 5, May 77 pp 214-215

[Article by Lt Col H. Kyjovsky: "Experiences in the Use of the Rubber-Metal-Link Tank Track"]

[Text] The tanks of our unit have been equipped for some time with the new GMG [rubber-metal-link] track. A large portion of the tanks of the combat training section have logged several thousand km, so that certain experimental data are available which can be generalized.

Fundamentally, it can be established from the viewpoint of the unit that the introduction of the GMG track has proved advantageous. The most important advantages are as follows:

1. There are no longer any differences between the kilometer reserve of the tank and the kilometer reserve of the track. All measures which were formerly taken, in establishing combat readiness, to increase the km reserve of the tracks of the combat training section's tanks, including the time-consuming change of tracks, have been done away with.
2. Servicing the GMG tracks requires less time, and it is less frequently necessary to correct the tension of the track. On only a few vehicles must a link be taken out in order to shorten the total length of the track.
3. The unit is spared all loading, unloading, and transport work which was formerly necessary to deliver links and bolts and to carry off scrap metal. The re-equipment of the tanks with GMG tracks thus means primarily a gain in combat readiness for the unit, for also a gain in valuable time.

In using the new track, however, there are certain peculiarities which absolutely must be observed. In the first place let me point out the necessity of following the operating manual regarding the tension of the track. It is well known that the operating manual for the new track directs that for the first 1,000 km the track must be so stretched that only one middle drive roller is touched. When the 1,000-km threshold is passed the tension is supposed to be such that two middle drive rollers are touched. Our

experience has been, however, that it is better to continue driving with a track tension such that only one middle drive roller is touched even after 1,000 km. In any case driving the tank with tracks which are too loose results in damage to the drive mechanism.

Since the swinging behavior of the track with rubber-metal links differs substantially from the previously customary track and the GMG track swings more strongly with the movement of the tank depending on terrain conditions, overly loose tracks lead to breakage or serious damage of the track guards welded to the hull of the tank. In addition there is a danger that the track will "jump" the drive wheel. We have had the experience that with even slightly less than the required tension the track jumps relatively easily, especially in very sandy terrain. The same applies to steering errors by the tank driver, especially over sandy ground (e.g. driving in a declivity). The track jumps more easily than was formerly the case with the metal-link track. It can even happen that the track not only jumps over the teeth of the drive wheel, but gets between the track guard and guides. In these cases large sections of the track must be taken off. Because of the peculiarities in the construction of the GMG track, "jumping" the drive wheel is more problematic than was previously the case.

Practice teaches that the procedure for achieving the required track tension should be as follows:

- drive the tank onto as level an area as possible,
- stretch the track as instructed,
- drive the tank one length forward or backward,
- adjust the track tension.

In connection with the greater mass of the GMG track and the altered swing behavior, all parts of the drive mechanism are subject to greater stress.

During inspections and technical maintenance it is absolutely necessary to ensure that the nuts on the track bolts are inspected for firm emplacement on both sides and tightened with the help of the torque wrench in the spare parts and tool set. At these times the crews often forget the nuts on the inside of the tracks. At the same time the attachment screws on the side transmission shafts, shock absorbers, and spur gears of the drive wheels must also be checked for firm emplacement.

When starting the preheater it is absolutely necessary to check that the flame is properly adjusted. If the flame is too high there is a danger that the rubber sheaths of the track links will be damaged at the point of direct proximity to the flame.

For safety reasons we have as a rule protected the place on the track which is endangered by heat with the round wire-asbestos plates from the tank's spare parts and tool kit, as flame protectors which are used in preheating the tank on railroad cars.

Furthermore it is absolutely necessary to take care that the GMG track does not come into contact with fuels and oils, since these very quickly affect the rubber sheaths. Nor under any circumstances may the track be blackened with the customary preolit; the new blacking (polyacrylat dispersing cover paint) must be used instead. We have had good experiences with this new paint. It may be sprayed, covers relatively well, and is thinned with distilled water. Moreover the amount used is small. A special thinner, such as was necessary in using "preolit," is not longer required. However, in our experience this new track blacking may be stored only for a limited time (storage period 6 months) and is sensitive to frost (storage temperature +5°C to +20°C). If it is stored improperly or for too long a time, large lumps form in the cans which can never be dissolved.

In cleaning the tracks in preparation for the new period of tank use we have proceeded in the traditional manner by "pounding the tracks." In doing so we have not been able to detect any damage to the links.

The GMG track represents a genuine advantage for the tank units. It is important to use it properly.

8992

CSO: 2300

LOSS OF CONFIDENCE NOTED AMONG POPULATION

Munich SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German 4 May 77 p 4

[Report from "Berlin/DDR" dated 3 May 77, by Peter Pragal, SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG editorial board: "Honecker's Worries About Loss of Confidence Among Population"]

[Text] The acquittal by an Essen court of the GDR refugee Werner Weinhold was once again being discussed perforce in a Fuerstenwalde schoolroom. When the teacher expressed the official party view that the "double murderer" must be delivered over to the GDR by the Federal Republic immediately, he encountered unexpected contradiction. They "should have simply let Weinhold go over there," said a pupil; then he wouldn't have had to shoot his way clear. But the teacher refused to discuss it and punished the boy for this allegedly provocative comment with a mark in the class book.

A fellow pupil, Simona, didn't like this authoritarian style. She went to the Pioneer newspaper TROMMEL and asked whether her classmate Juergen didn't have the right freely and openly to express his opinion without immediately being disciplined. Of course she went to the wrong place and quickly got a clear rebuff. Anyone who, like the pupil Juergen, "thoughtlessly bawls out" his views, said the chief editor, cannot claim freedom of speech. In order to avoid any misunderstanding, he added: "We do not have a general freedom of opinion for fascists, criminals, idiots, or anticommunists as well."

It may be that many youths and even adults in the GDR can be put off with such demagogic arguments. At the same time the number of critical citizens who say they are not satisfied with such answers and cite the text of the constitution and international conventions and treaties is growing. Throughout the country, in plants and schools, in house association meetings and even in party gatherings officials of the SED are being confronted with uncomfortable questions, for which they seldom have ready convincing answers. Often communists are getting into "hot water," particularly when the discrepancy between the recommendations of the final act of Helsinki and political practice in the GDR is pointed out to them.

The party leadership is aware of this difficulty. "We know that our comrades face questions which are not always easy under conditions open to the outside world," stressed SED chief Erich Honecker recently to officials. He was thereby not referring only to the stream of millions of visitors from the West, but also to the fact "that imperialism in the FRG, with its electronic mass media...is technically in a position to exert influence deep into the GDR." Actually in the Eastern bloc there is no country--viewed ideologically at least--which is so little protected against the influence of the West as the German "Workers and Peasants State."

In this situation the GDR leadership promises itself improvement through intensified political persuasion work. The more than 2 million members and candidates of the SED "Struggle Union" is to be equipped ideologically and--according to Honecker--"made capable of offensive polemics." When in the company of the class enemy the party chief advised flexible tactics. On the one hand he recommended a "combative attitude," in order to clarify the "historic superiority" of socialism. On the other hand one should not give the adversary the pleasure of "jumping through every hoop he holds out for us."

To check the erosion of confidence among his own population Honecker offers a method which must appear practically adventurous to many timid and weak-spined officials. Comrades are not to shy away from addressing all problems "openly and honestly," declared Honecker. In political mass work one must "take into account the increased mental demands of the population just as much as the variability of their personal interests."

To relieve the irritated agitators the SED, after coordinating with other East bloc parties, has meanwhile started a counter-offensive. Certainly, it is stressed, there are violations of human rights. Not in socialist states, but in the "world of capital." While, for example, the right to work and education has everywhere been realized in the GDR, there is mass unemployment in the Federal Republic, lessened rights for guest workers, bans on practicing one's professions, and other discriminations.

Obviously the political bureaucrats of the SED themselves do not believe that they can achieve the yearned-for stability with ideological campaigns alone. Since the fall of last year, when the SED leadership became fully aware of the detente risks deriving from Helsinki, internal policy has been characterized by an increasing hardness. It is displayed as much in the sharpening of the political penal code as in the efforts to break the wave of exit requests with all available means.

The secret instruction of the regime leadership to the GDR authorities cited by the news magazine DER SPIEGEL, whereby all applications for resettlement in the Federal Republic not covered by family reunion are to be declared "basically illegal," reflects this line throughout. This restriction in no way excludes--as practice has shown--a differentiated application of the means of state power. Whether the denial of the right to leave the unloved state is of course the right way to narrow the chasm between rulers and ruled, can be justifiably doubted.

BISHOP ANALYZES STATUS OF CHURCH IN RURAL AREAS

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 13 May 77 pp 9-10

[FAZ excerpts from a report by Bishop Albrecht Schoenherr, chairman of the GDR League of Protestant Churches]

[Text] At the spring congress of the Synod of the Eastern Region of the Protestant Church in Berlin-Brandenburg, East Berlin Bishop Albrecht Schoenherr, who at the same time is chairman of the League of Protestant Churches in the GDR, dealt with the situation of the church in the countryside. The result of his analysis: The village in the GDR, as also the small town, still has considerable characteristics of a people's church which have already disappeared in the big city. They are also on the wane in the countryside, however. There too, owing to the dissolution or change of the village and family association, the "people's church" is now having the ground cut from under its feet for good. How is the church to react to this? In the bishop's opinion, new forms of church community life must be found. Below we are publishing excerpts from the version, gone over by Schoenherr, of the "Bishop's Word to the Synod."

The church is still in the village. This is true, first of all, of the church building. Also as regards those who do not normally visit it, it belongs to the village; nay, one has the feeling that it is the church which gives the village its face. For many, the church building is associated with the memory of family celebrations which have taken place there. Generally there are violent protests against tearing down a dilapidated church. Considerable sums are raised for renovating one's church, for getting an organ and bells. Occasionally, however, one also encounters indifference.

For a few people the church is the place of Sunday service. It is a rare exception for 10 percent or more to attend church service. Unlike former times, church attendance no longer means to confirm, but rather to

jeopardize, one's reputation among the other inhabitants. Yet, however discouraging and painful it is for the pastor and the parishioner, failure to attend church service cannot simply be assessed as indifference or rejection. There exists an attitude of being content with the very fact that the church is there, that service is held and that, if need be, one can go to see a pastor--just as it is reassuring to know that a doctor is nearby if he should be needed. The opinion still prevails to a far-reaching extent that the church, the pastor and his wife, church gatherings and events belong to the life of the community.

The full-time church worker, particularly the pastor and the catechist, is struck above all by the numerical change. The fact that the rural population is decreasing is one, though not the only, cause of the decrease in church attendance, church functions and religious instruction.

Nevertheless the majority of village communities put great store by the fact that church service takes place as regularly as possible--certainly on holidays. Religious instruction and youth work apparently are viewed with less attention. Above all, the communities want to have their pastor perform his work with imagination and optimism and are pleased when he celebrates holidays with them.

It is, however, becoming increasingly difficult to have a pastor of one's own. The growing number of vacancies (there are 116 in our Berlin-Brandenburg Church at present) makes it necessary for the work to be spread over increasingly large areas.

The net of the pastorates is being pulled at increasingly, the holes are getting larger, and already some villages have no religious instruction.

The precarious vacancy situation actually is preserving the status quo of the parish structure, for the pastor finds it more difficult to instruct in self-aid than to do everything himself in the end.

The decrease in filling parsonate vacancies affects both the Berlin-Brandenburg Church and the other Land churches. Severances due to retirement have been particularly great in the past few years. In the past 11 years severances have exceeded accessions by 120 although, apart from the most recent figures, the number of accessions has not changed appreciably. It continues to be much more difficult to fill vacancies on the fringes of the province than in the proximity of Berlin. In addition to the worry about being isolated, the concern about being overtaxed as a person in the countryside and just the desire for general comfort, considerations for the professional desires of the spouse have become a factor in the past few years, with the consistory trying to take this into account to a far-reaching extent when giving out posts of assistant ministers. It is therefore a bitter fact, and not cheap cavalier talk, that the emigration of pastors to the Federal Republic is causing a substantial additional burden for the pastor, and a considerable weakening of the community.

The feeling on the part of pastors that they are no longer equal to the demands, and on the part of the community that it has been deserted, promotes a state of general resignation.

The transition to a minority situation is not only a numerical but a psychological problem. It is not easy for the catechist to ask himself as he goes from place to place whether instruction will have to be canceled owing to a lack of children. It is depressing for all those attending church service, and hardly an incentive for others, if in a large church, which can accommodate 100 people, and actually does at Christmas, 3 or 4 people sit carefully spread out and the liturgist must chant not only "The Lord be with ye" but "And with thy spirit." From a certain point of minimal attendance, church service in the customary form becomes unfestive and unedifying. Too little quantity can lead to too little quality.

There are, however, also momentous theological problems which have to be confronted increasingly by the preacher of the Gospel in the village. In a people's church the Christian pronouncements are shared by the overwhelming majority, or at least taken for granted and routinely accepted. If Christians become a minority, their faith becomes one "opinion" among others; in fact it competes with other opinions. This is true not only of the ideology of Marxism-Leninism, not only of other religious movements quite active in our villages; it is true also of the gross religion of "mammonism," where happiness, money and success are the highest goods, to which all other goods are sacrificed. What the church has to give also increasingly becomes one offer among many on the market of possibilities. Of course, if the pastor is endowed with imagination and is imbued with a community spirit, his offer will still be attractive.

The Christian faith is increasingly becoming one religious-ideological proposition among others. The trend has not been completed. There are still quite a few points of contact in the church sphere. It is not yet necessary to make all decisions ex post facto. But it is necessary for us to confront the pending questions quickly, thoroughly and comprehensively. To cure by symptoms is not going to be of much use.

The reaction to the waning of the people's church cannot be paralysis and resignation; nor can it be hectic activity through which we constantly try to increase the church offer and make it more attractive--however desirable this might be on occasion. The church cannot simply, like an advertising firm, make an offer, extend an invitation and invite inspection "without obligation. It must--Biblically speaking--offer the precious pearl. And in doing so, it cannot economize.

It was possible to get into the people's church without making any effort of one's own. Membership in the people's church, one was able to demonstrate merely through financial contributions. Therefore, unfortunately, to this day the church tax receipt is the only fairly reliable sign of church membership for the church administration. This lack of commitment

and anonymity, particularly in our times, accords with the mentality of a great many people. But such a church without decision today can no longer accomplish what the Lord expects of it--to be, on the basis of the strength it derives from the Gospel, a missionary--i.e., an inviting, sheltering and obligating--community.

We must therefore ask ourselves: Do we want to allow the church in the countryside to go its own precipitous way? After all, it would be nothing but hypocrisy to cover our lack of action with all too cheap, seemingly pious phrases. The statement "The future of the church lies in God's hand" is true as gold, but it may be made only by a faith which has made an honest effort about the old and the new. Do we want a people's church which is becoming thinner all the time, one which one day will remain only in the form of scattered rags?

Do we want to overtax the capacity for work of our rural pastors, catechists and elders because we lack the courage to use the chance for a radical change in a conscious and careful, energetic and loving manner? It consists in our flock--having become smaller and literally "placed in question"--trying anew to take seriously what has been pronounced by the Barmer theological declaration (Theses II and III).

The church lives off the fact that in Jesus Christ God opted for us. We can therefore implement our faith in this Lord not in a sort of pale lack of commitment but only in a free but clear decision for him. It is because we hope that Jesus Christ one day will acknowledge us that we take seriously his admonition to "profess him among men." The wind is blowing into our faces. But the air has become clearer.

"Decided" does not mean "narrow." We are the community of Jesus Christ, who visualized the big harvest and not a vegetable garden with tall trees, who was not out for an elite group but for all mankind. A church which would like to accord with him must be and remain an open church. Perhaps it is a miracle which only the spirit of Jesus Christ achieves, which equally frees one of self-assertion and self-mission, that his community at the same time can be decisive in professing him and open for everyone (open but not emptied, inviting but not pocketing, sheltering but not hiding, free but not unconditional).

We will have to ask ourselves whether we can afford the further continual presence of church workers in the village or whether they have to work with greater emphasis on individual events. They will not be able to help giving priority to some things and giving up or perhaps pushing into the background other, perhaps old-established, things. A prerequisite for taking even a single step forward in the church is conscious and humble cooperation of all. This goes for both full-time workers and for elders and helpers of any kind. This also goes for all members of the community who consciously allow themselves to be equipped to be witness of their Lord.

Don't we really have to revise the principle, advocated like a dogma in the fifties, that there must be church service in every place on every Sunday, regardless of how many attend? I think it is better to arrange festive events at intervals where a sizable community gathers. On the Sundays in between, the small flock should then independently attend to devotions at the table or in the choir of the church. Of course, this would not be a step without hazards; it would be a step from the customary to the special. Of course, a special, festive church service requires more preparation and effort. The invitation to it has to be intensive. But the benefit might be stronger encouragement. Besides, the community will have gotten to know the greater community of a whole region. It would be best, of course, for the church service to be incorporated in a community day where the many small groups of a region would meet for eating, playing and talking together.

Cultivation of community spirit cannot be a purpose in itself in a Christian community. It is and remains a means of interpreting the Gospel and jointly drawing the conclusions from it. I was struck to learn that also in house circles [Hauskreise] in the village care is taken that each time half of the participants are new while half drop out.

It must be a special concern of Christian communities to help families to stay together and to come together. In all our events, we should see to it that we do not destroy the family but rather bring it together. Family counseling will also have to find its way to the countryside, just as family retreats [Familienueste] are becoming necessary. Considering the difficult situation of Christian instruction, more and more responsibility devolves on the parents. They will need to be better prepared for it. Parent's evenings are only one possibility. I have been impressed with the extent of the demand for a house book [Hausbuch] for use in the family.

The Christian faith lives off the fact that God has turned to us and leads us toward turning to one another. In the people's church we were able to wait for the people to come. After all, they had to because of official duties. When a clearer acknowledgement and a clearer decision are at stake, we must go to them and make them share the responsibility.

In conditions of the people's church, it was perhaps possible and necessary from the pulpit and the podium to instruct and, if need be, admonish the community about the generally acknowledged truth. Now, increasingly the person pronouncing it must make the effort as "fellow student"--i.e., as a united comrade-in-arms--to seek with the members of his community the truth that has concrete meaning for them and is helpful to them. He therefore must visit it. If we can make up our minds to hold church services in the individual communities at greater intervals, visitations should benefit from that above all.

Adolescents need our special love. Youth is growing into an environment of seething upheavals. It has little time and gets little opportunity to think about itself and its future. It is tempted to have a life concept

put over on it which it has not acquired itself or to flee responsibility. It needs loving instruction and selfless accompaniment. Christians have learned from their Lord to tend to children and minors, to take them to him and thus to help them to achieve the freedom of a life for which they themselves are responsible. If we want a church which is to be equal to its tasks, we must enable people to reach free decisions.

We owe youth accompaniment all the more because the parental home, whose duty it would be primarily, often fails. Instead of parents having children attend Christian instruction and accompanying them, catechists often have no end of trouble with them. The children and those tending to them should be anchored quite firmly in community life and be heard frequently. They need a particular lot of love.

What prerequisites must be created in order that we meet the mentioned demands?

The communities need to have employees who are ready and able to cooperate. This is not only a demand of work style, which heretofore has aimed too much at the individual performance. It is primarily a demand of their inner prerequisites, their mutual openness, their humility in letting others look at their hand, their courage to help others through brotherly criticism. The precarious vacancy situation can be solved only by strict cooperation. A joint result is best achieved if there are joint preparations.

Cooperation also presupposes openness toward workers in other fields of endeavor, toward elders and toward all members of the community who are ready for it. Unless something has not at least been thoroughly considered together with the elders, it does not really come off in the communities. The cooperation of those members of the community who do not have a church profession must, however, be outlined as to content and, as far as possible, limited in time.

Looking at the future, it is unavoidable to teach regional consciousness. Regional work must, however, not be an alternative to work in the local community. Visible personal relations, such as can only be provided by the concrete residential community, must not be abandoned.

In original and advanced training, every pastor must acquire basic knowledge in modern cure, particularly family cure. In every church district, one pastor should be trained comprehensively in this.

Small numbers must not be an inducement to theological sloppiness. The community today expects expert theological orientation and responsible pronouncement.

Whoever is ready for cure and is used for its needs a curate himself. The superintendent, the general superintendent and the bishop are ready for this but because of their other responsibilities are not necessarily the

best partners. The wives of parsons have a particular burden to carry and need particular assistance. We are asking for such assistance from brotherhoods and sisterhoods and hope that many more will be ready for it.

The members of the community, particularly the elders, should keep in mind that the church worker today needs a lot of encouragement. They should together probe for limited and feasible tasks and cope with them together in the time provided for.

Elders and lay meetings are an important prerequisite for matters in the church proceeding not patriarchally but in partnership. Every elder, every conscious member of the community must be in a position to give information, at least tentatively, about church matters and questions of faith. The question of how we become capable of dispersion will remain on the agenda for a long time. The Goerlitz Church is conducting a "correspondence course for elders." It is something we should benefit from.

8790
CSO: 2300

U.S. BUILDUP OF DIEGO GARCIA SCORED

Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 18 May 77 p 4

[Article by Peter Sereny: "Indian Ocean: The Attractions of Washington"]

[Text] The mosaic tiles are fitting together. The Pentagon organizes a "press excursion" to the American base on Diego Garcia. Secretary of State Vance discusses military questions as well at Teheran; and as a result of American arms shipments worth 15 million in the 1970's the Iranian armed forces are among the most powerful in the area already. On the island of Masira on the Oman coast of the Arab peninsula the United States is getting ready to purchase another base. Saudi Arabia, on whose Persian Gulf and Red Sea coasts military bases are being built with American cooperation, is working on putting together a new regional bloc. In Northeast Africa, lying opposite in the geopolitical sense, in the subversive work against Ethiopia, for example, Washington's divisive tactics are appearing directly or indirectly.

Against Whom?

The apparently independent developments have a common denominator--an increasing United States interest in the western basin of the Indian Ocean. The attraction is certainly not without interest--Washington is concerned with the oil of the Persian Gulf region, the raw material treasures of Africa and the strategically important shipping routes leading from the Cape of Good Hope (Republic of South Africa!) to the Far East. And Diego Garcia is virtually the symbol of this concentration of interest and power.

The correspondent of the NEW YORK TIMES, who a few weeks ago was among the first American journalists to be able to visit the coral island lying 1,800 kilometers from the Indian coast, reported that the expansion of the base system being built at a total cost of 173 million dollars is "proceeding at a rush pace." In addition to the artificial satellite and radio communication net there is an air and naval port (in the neighborhood of which they are building tanks for 640,000 barrels of fuel). The report confirms the predictions of military experts that the runway which can be extended to 3,600 meters (they are now working on the last section of this) will be suitable to receive modern strategic bombers and the port, which is in

the process of being deepened, will be open to mother ships and rocket carrying submarines. So Diego Garcia is growing into a base for strategic weapons systems.

But against whom? They make no secret in Washington that this coral island is a link in the global strategy against the Soviet Union. Of course, Diego Garcia, and the other similar bases, not only endanger general security but also the states along the coast and the freedom of navigation. It is well known that the sea routes linking the European and far eastern parts of the Soviet Union lead across the Indian Ocean and the Soviet fleet has at least as much right to sail here as the naval units flying the American or British or French flags.

The coastal states, most of them developing countries are afraid that sooner or later the American preparations will evoke answering steps (the Soviet Union, as its leaders have emphasized many times, has no bases nor plans for building bases on the Indian Ocean) and that the area could become the scene of military confrontation and an arms race. For this reason they protested at last year's summit conference of uncommitted nations in Colombo and at this year's foreign ministers' conference in Delhi "against the presence of such foreign military bases as Diego Garcia" and took the initiative in the United Nations to proclaim the Indian Ocean a peace zone.

Dismantle the Bases

This proposal was received differently in Moscow and in Washington. Keeping to only the most recent developments, for the Soviet part, head of state Podgorny, recently visiting the East African coast of the Indian Ocean, announced that his country, together with other interested states and naturally on a basis of mutual equality, is ready to seek a solution whereby the ocean would really become a peace zone. He also confirmed the Soviet position, which was very logically formulated by the disarmament document submitted to the most recent UN General Assembly, that the first step must be the liquidation of foreign military bases and only then could one put on the agenda "a reduction in the military activity of non-coastal countries in the Indian Ocean and in the immediately adjacent area."

The criticism coming from the developing countries and the repeated positive expression of the Soviet position forced the United States to make a diplomatic move. President Carter noted first at a press conference: "The complete demilitarization of the Indian Ocean has been proposed to the Soviet Union." And he then said in his UN speech: "We will request the concurrence of the Soviet Union to the signing of an agreement according to which we will mutually evidence military moderation in the area of the Indian Ocean."

Carter's Detour

At first glance the American formulation is not far from the Soviet proposal but in reality it makes no mention of the essential thing, the fate of the bases. If it was by chance it was characteristically so that after these

two statements by Carter the Pentagon carried the press to Diego Garcia and what the correspondents brought back with them from this base visit certainly does not speak of the planned demilitarization or the proposed mutual military moderation.

"In general the simple ideas are the best, but complex schemes disguised in simple words are perhaps the most dangerous," wrote THE ECONOMIST of London about the Carter initiative. However good "complete demilitarization" may sound completeness presupposes that every interested party be included, thus not only the Soviet Union and the United States from among the external powers but also Great Britain and France and also the coastal states from the Republic of South Africa through Australia to India and Iran. This far from complete list serves only to indicate how many would have to agree, which is hardly probable, to the "complete demilitarization" proposed by Carter.

But even if the agreement of London and Paris could be obtained the "withdrawal" of the great powers would bring to the fore the differences in the groupings of the local military forces--and those military forces which are strongest in the area are those which are tied to the West thanks to their equipment, their sources of supply and the training of their personnel. This in itself indicates already what a "complex scheme" is disguised by simple words but THE ECONOMIST openly states as well: "If external forces are withdrawn the West would be better prepared to reintroduce its forces from one moment to the next."

It would appear that in this respect also the American "mosaic tiles" being cast into the Indian Ocean fit together.

8984
CSO: 2500

ARMY-AIR FORCE COOPERATION STRESSED

Warsaw ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI in Polish 28 Apr 77 pp 1, 5

[Article by Maj Ireneusz Tulowiecki: "The Role of Air-Ground Cooperation Is Growing"]

[Text] The stormy evolution of combat methods necessitates continuous changes in the methods of organizing cooperation and in the patterns of conducting air and ground force combat operations. Nowadays, the continued expansion of the sphere of tasks performed by the Air Force in support of ground troops is becoming increasingly evident. Despite the existence of differences in opinion as to their importance, the ultimate effectiveness of operations depends directly on the solution of cooperation issues. The complexity of potential situations which could occur on the battlefield thus make it increasingly necessary to search for newer forms and methods of organizing cooperation and also for the expansion of the range of issues and sphere of tasks requiring decisions with regard to its organization and fulfillment.

Specialists from Air Force Command and the General Staff Academy of the Polish Army have already been working on just these problems of command for a long time. Continuous and comprehensive cooperation between these institutions already has a long tradition. Also, this cooperation has always been crowned by successes bringing progress in the development of military thought. One of the examples of this cooperation was the scientific symposium devoted to the unification of views on the chosen issues concerning cooperation between the air force and the ground forces. This symposium took place at the General of Arms K. Swierczewski General Staff Academy of the Polish Army.

The discussions were led by Brig Gen Zdzislaw Zarski.

The deputy commandant of the General Staff Academy of the Polish Army for line affairs, Maj Gen Waclaw Jagas, representatives of the Central Institutions of the Ministry of National Defense, the offices of the chiefs of the military branches and military districts, the Military Council of the Air Force Command as well as the cadre of the General Staff Academy (ASG), participated in the symposium.

General of the Army A. A. Shcheglov, the representative from the Headquarters of the Warsaw Pact Joint Armed Forces, was present.

Selected problems of air force-ground force cooperation were introduced in the reports of, among others, Col Aleksander Wisniewski and Col Dr Jerzy Fijalkowski.

During the discussion, Brig Gen Zbigniew Jurewicz, Brig Gen Marian Wasilewski, Col Edward Lassota and others presented views on the competence of air force command organs in the realm of organization and implementation of cooperation between branches of the air and ground forces, and in assuring protection for ground and air forces against retaliatory attack.

The Chief of Staff of Air Force Command, Brig Gen Jozef Sobieraj summed up the discussion, addressing himself to the issues touched upon during the course of the symposium discussions.

CSO: 2600

CIVIL DEFENSE STRUCTURE AND GOALS DESCRIBED

Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 26 Apr 77 p 6

[Article by (S): "Civil Defense - Teaches and Educates"]

[Text] Along with the armed forces, the fundamental role for the preparation of the country for defense is being fulfilled by civil defense. By this, we understand it to mean a group having as its goal the undertaking of a proper defense of the population of the cities and villages, work forces of the industrial plants, public utility buildings and equipment, cultural treasures, and so forth, against weapons of mass destruction and also bringing aid to the victims. In peacetime, the civil defense forces participate in preventing and combatting the effects of natural calamities as well as rushing aid in the event of more serious accidents and catastrophes.

Precisely for the implementation of these goals, all elements of the State administration, socialized economic enterprises, social organizations as well as individual citizens working on their own farms, etc., have been organized defensively. Social organizations, and particularly the National Defense League, the Polish Red Cross, the Union of Volunteer Firemen, the Polish Aero Club, and the Polish Short-Wave Radio Operators' Union--are working for civil defense, above all in the area of training the population and also in the preparation of forces and means for the conducting of rescue action.

Civilian defense activity already has more than a 25-year history. It began in 1951, during the height of the Cold War, when a Sejm law brought into existence an establishment by the name of the Local Anti-Aircraft Defense (TOPL).

In 1966, the TOPL was transformed into the General Civil Defense, which in its action program placed the greatest emphasis on the organization of rescue forces trained for operations in disaster areas.

In May 1973, the Council of Ministers of the Polish People's Republic took up a resolution concerning the establishment of the civil defense system,

while at the same time it defined its structure and basic tasks. The Chief of National Civil Defense (OCK) became the head of this part of our defense system; he is one of the vice ministers of National Defense and at the same time is the Chief Inspector of Territorial Defense. His actions are governed by the decisions of the Council of Ministers as well as by the Committee for the Defense of the Country (KOK). His executive arm is the Inspectorate of Civil Defense--one of the central institutions of the Ministry of National Defense which coordinates, among other things, the cooperation of military and civilian organs in the civil defense sphere.

Local heads of civil defense are voivodship governors, mayors, heads of gminas and city districts, directors and managers of plants. In ministries and institutions of equal status, civil defense units have been created.

Civil defense has its own forces comprised of self-defense formations, that is, plant and local units, self-defense groups and commands, and also rescue units planned for militarization. In addition, units of the Polish People's Army, particularly those specially trained along the lines of a territorial defense unit, are ready to support the civil defense forces.

In our country, each citizen has the legal obligation to participate in defense preparations. Among others, all residents of Poland (with the exception of small groups exempted on health grounds), in the 16-65 year age bracket were included in general defense training (30 hours of basic training every 5 years as well as 12 hours of practical exercises once every 2 years). Students of the higher classes of the primary schools, basic vocational schools and the secondary schools and also at the higher school level are acquainting themselves with the problem of civil defense within the framework of their required curriculum.

The most important tasks of civil defense are directed toward the protection of life and health of the individual. For example, the civil defense elements are organizing a general warning and alarm system to alert the populace to the danger of air attacks and radioactive, chemical, and biological contamination; they are preparing special buildings which assure protection against the effects of weapons of mass destruction; they are creating centers for the needs of rescue actions: medical first aid, decontamination of clothing, decontamination of transportation means and so forth; they are supplying the inhabitants of cities and villages with the means for individual protection against contamination (gas masks and protective clothing) as well as teaching them how to make substitute protection; they are planning to conduct the evacuation of the population from places particularly vulnerable to enemy attacks; they are assuring the protection of livestock and farm products as well as food and water against contamination; and they are conducting practical training in the application of first aid to victims and so forth.

CSO: 2600

POLAND

RENEWED PRESSURE ON DISSIDENTS REPORTED

Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD in Dutch 6 May 77 p 5

Text Warsaw, 5 May--While Party leader Edward Gierek managed for five hours at a stretch last Sunday to wave and toss flowers to the "Parade of Labor" filing by, 30 members of the KOR Committee for Workers' Defense and sympathizers, as well as a dozen security agents in plain clothes, who tried to be inconspicuous, waited for the Polish historian, Adam Michnik, at Warsaw Airport.

Meanwhile a charge was brought against Michnik for providing false information. The previous week two leading KOR officials, Jacek Kuron and Jan Jozef Lipski, together with Michnik, were officially accused of having acted against the Polish People's Republic by making contacts with hostile foreign organizations.

With Michnik's arrival the KOR now consists of 24 members. Moreover, assisted by a steadily growing number of co-workers, since September 1976, the KOR has come to the defense of the workers given stiff sentences, who were accused of plundering, arson and sabotage after the food riots of June 1976 in Radom and Ursus.

Of the 10 who were sentenced in the first instance to long prison terms, thanks to KOR efforts, only five are still in prison at this time. According to official spokesmen, such as Grzelak, the press chief of the Central Committee of the PZPR United Polish Worker Party, they are all recidivists.

An Affair Which Is Winding Down

It is expected that the last five will also be released shortly. In KOR circles they are developing a common policy based

on what has become apparent in the last month. Thus the prisoners in the last group which was released got to hear that the further execution of their sentence is suspended for a year: consequently conditional release.

In this group there were also several who were sentenced to nine years and who previously were branded by the authorities as hardened criminals. Consequently there is actually no further reason to hold on to the five recidivists given stiff sentences much longer.

Therefore the KOR expects that Zabrowski, Chomicki (who has suspended his hunger strike for a month, at his wife's insistence) Majewski, Zukowski; and Skrzypczak will obtain the same sort of clemency and with that the first goal of the KOR is achieved.

It is true, as appears from KOR communique No 9 of 29 April between 10 and 20 of those released since the previous summer have no work and most have again gone to work for half of their previous salary. Moreover, it also appears from the communique that the KOR is working in other industrial cities, such as Lodz and Gdansk to help heal the wounds of the June events. Finally, the parliamentary investigation committee, about which the KOR and student groups inquired by letter in March, has still not been set up and according to the communique, repression continues, especially in Radom.

Support

Michnik told foreign correspondents that he made many contacts during his 9 months in the West with leaders of Communist and Socialist Parties and trade unions. In Italy he visited the Polish philosopher, Kolakowski, who has been teaching for years outside Poland and he was an official guest with the Socialist Party and the trade unions.

According to him, the latter have especially exercised direct pressure on the Polish authorities to release the convicted workers, but also indirect via public opinion. KOR spokesmen generally consider the influence of public opinion in the West as favorable for human rights in Poland. By the same token, the KOR's existence has also influenced this opinion, so they think.

However, that favorable opinion does not hold good for all media in the West. Thus Michnik again denied the accuracy of a report in the DEUTSCHE NATIONAL UND SOLDATENZEITUNG. This concerned a letter which he and Kolakowski reportedly sent to this fascist-minded publication, with a yearning for the East, in which they are supposed to have thanked the publication for supporting their cause.

In a commentary, the Warsaw daily, ZYCIE WARSZAWY placed the supposed letter writers in the fascist corner, where according to the newspaper, the Munich Free Europe radio station also belongs. The telex which was sent by Michnik and Kolakowski to Zycie Warszawy and in which the letter was called a falsification and legal measures were announced, called forth new scorn and the remark that the gentlemen should have well realized that revisionist circles in West Germany would use their press conference in Cologne on 16 March.

"Not Anti-Polish"

Michnik reported that meanwhile the suit against the NATIONAL UND SOLDATENZEITUNG was won and that the publication must publish a rectification soon on the front page. He is also of the opinion that he has not had dealings with anti-Polish organizations.

Free Europe, so he said, has not organized a single press conference for him or Kolakowski. He denied any contact with this station. He does not regard the publications which are issued by Polish emigree organizations, such as KULTURA in Paris, as anti-Polish. As appears from the charge made against Kuron and Lipski, in which Michnik is also named, these are regarded as enemy organizations by the Polish authorities, most probably because of the fact that such publications print literature which is banned by Polish censorship.

8490
CSO: 3105

COMMENTARY ON CHURCH, ECONOMIC PROBLEMS FACING REGIME

Vienna DIE PRESSE in German 4 May 77 p 3

[Article by Editorial Staff Member Robert Fischer-Ledenice entitled: "Jeans, Horses and the Power of the Church; Poland's Regime Cannot Afford Notoriety After the Riots"]

[Text] Vienna. In the spectrum of Western political concepts, Communist Poland is a mostly incomprehensible phenomenon: a communist system is in power, the Catholic Church has a following second to none in the West. Intellectual life is relatively liberal, the influence of Western civilization unignorable. All that came about in a geopolitical situation making it sound all but paradoxical. In imitation of the Hungarian "goulash" communism, [should it perhaps be called] "rosary" communism?

Squeezed in between Germans and Russians and, finally, Austrians, all three of them historical expansionists, the Polish people has been forced to defend its national existence and identity for centuries. After having disappeared from the map several times, Poland has had stable frontiers only since the end of World War II and they are only 30 years old. Almost every generation, so goes the joke today, has had its rebellion. Moreover, Poland was the bulwark of European Christianity against the Oriental Orthodoxy of Tsarist Russia.

The balance of power of the postwar years imposed a communist system on Poland. Nevertheless, although economically backward and without Marshall Plan aid, this country can point to tremendous achievements over the past 30 years.

Reconstruction of the nearly completely destroyed capital city of Warsaw appears to be impressive. The old city was reconstructed to the very last stone according to old plans and drawings. All around it, a new Warsaw came into being although the building style clearly indicates that as many apartments as possible had to be built as fast as possible. Last year, 1 million apartments were built all over Poland.

Warsaw's street life is vibrant. One hardly notices that the exterior and interior of the stores are very modestly appointed. People are a trifle

more simply dressed, except the youth dedicated to the global uniform, the jeans. Whenever one can no longer stand the noise of pop music in the popular discotheque, the "Barn"--the establishment is as large as the congress center at the Imperial Castle in Vienna--one can retire to the cozy basement wineshop, the "Crocodile," which derives its name from the Warsaw version of the basilisk legend. In short, one feels at home.

Probably unique for a member country of the Eastern Bloc are the "international press clubs." There the most important West-European newspapers can be bought at about 15 zlotys. And if the price is considered too high, a reading room is available where the particular paper can be borrowed. It is obvious that people flock to these clubs of which there are about 20 in Warsaw alone.

Economic Miscalculations

In its effort to catch up economically, to earn foreign currency to import goods, Polish planning with its extremely extensive economic policy made miscalculations: i.e. credits in the billions were pumped into industrial expansion with the objective of being able to export industrial goods. However, purchase of licenses and western know-how has not resulted in reaching the quality standard required for exportation to the West. The Western economic crisis of recent years has added another high point to Polish economical frustrations.

In order to improve its negative balance of payments, Poland, aside from her abundantly available raw materials, such as coal and sulphur, is also obliged to export agricultural products, of which the country produces just enough for its own consumption. There is no infrastructure for "painless" export.

Polish highways, as in the past, are characterized by the horse-drawn cart. The number of horses used in agriculture drops annually by 30,000. Nevertheless, even today 2 million of them eat up precious fodder although enough tractors are available.

Another factor is inadequate utilization of the soil. In order to intensify production, the government created an opportunity for nonproductive farmers to receive a pension if they turn over the major portion of their land to the state. The latter is to be sold to cooperatives or private farmers for which purpose credits are again made available. However, only about 30 per cent of the credits have been utilized.

As a result, the latest 5-year plan has been changed from extensive to intensive economic policy: investments only wherever absolutely necessary, which means better utilization of available capacities and freezing of wages.

The average income lies at about 4,000 zlotys (100 zlotys are approximately 1 schilling). A nonskilled worker has a net income of about 3,500 zlotys

per month, a skilled worker of up to and above 10,000 zlotys, a teacher of around 6,000. A farmer's income runs between that of an unskilled worker and 20,000 zlotys. It must be considered that a kilogram of meat costs in the neighborhood of 50 zlotys; sugar, 10.50; bread, 4; and a liter of milk, 3 zlotys. The price of a shirt ranges from 240 to 400 and that of a suit from 1,500 to 4,000 zlotys. A new Polski-Fiat compact car of the smallest size costs 85,000 zlotys. Higher quality foods can be bought at higher prices in special stores. However, some consumer goods are only available on the black market.

Communism Forced To Coexist With the Rosary

The motivation for the centuries-old fight for survival came from the Catholic Church to which, according to fairly reliable estimates, about 90 percent of all Poles belong even today. It is not only a community with a common faith but also a real political force, reservoir of the opposition with increasing significance day by day, in the view of Western observers.

In its geographical position and after the experiences gained from the riots in Gdansk, Szczecin and Lodz resulting in the downfall of Gomulka in 1971 and after protest actions of workers at Radom and Ursus who prevented tremendous price increases for food, the government can no more afford an internal blowup. Add to that the influence of the church--Poland's communism just has no other alternative but to live with the rosary.

9073

CSO: 3103

'SZTANDAR MŁODYCH' CITES OUTSIDE PROVACATEURS IN KRAKOW EVENTS

Warsaw SZTANDAR MŁODYCH in Polish 20 May 77 p 3

[Commentary by SZTANDAR MŁODYCH editor-in-chief Ryszard Lukasiewicz: "On Maturity and Discretion"]

[Text] Public opinion in Poland is already known regarding the latest attempt to disturb the political atmosphere in the academic environment, undertaken by people from the so-called committee for defense of the workers during the traditional Juvenalia festivities being held in Krakow. PAP has reported on this, and a detailed analysis of the Krakow events was published in the 18 May ZYCIE WARSZAWY. If we are turning to this matter again, it is primarily because the Krakow Juvenalia became an occasion for political confrontation of the student environment with, let us state it frankly, known troublemakers recently arrived from outside Krakow--people for years in the service of foreign centers of antisocialist diversion, people who would like to settle our country's affairs from beyond the borders of Poland.

The Krakow students did not let themselves be deluded by the provocateurs. The latter--let us recall--were intent on boycotting the Juvenalia, on transforming it into an antisocialist, anti-Polish demonstration, exploiting to this end the still not finally explained circumstances of the death of one of the Jagiellonian University students.

The unfortunate death of Stanislaw Pyjas is a tragedy for those close to him and must fill his fellow students with grief. This is understandable and human. But one should recognize as highly immoral and unethical all attempts to exploit the majesty of death for well-defined politically motivated actions. And this was precisely the sole interest of the organizers of the attempts at provocation in Krakow.

No one's death can be retracted--on the other hand, life has its rights. The Juvenalia thus went according to the agenda in Krakow. It took place as it does every year with a large number in attendance at all the planned functions.

For 3 days the Krakow students were in authority in Krakow, inviting the Krakow citizens to join in the festivities. Everyone had a good time in dozens of functions in clubs and hostels and at the gala concert in the Wisly hall, and as every year the most attractive woman student of Krakow was chosen. She was Barbara Witecka from the WSP (Higher Pedagogical School). The traditional grand student march also took place. Everyone enjoyed the fun until the late hours of the evening on Juvenalia Sunday at the Main Market.

A group of several dozen persons, the majority from outside Krakow, tried in various ways to disturb the general merrymaking: threats to beat up the Juvenalia organizers, the performers taking part in the entertainment, and even the candidates for the title of most attractive woman student. Club directors were urged to cancel the parties and discotheques, microphones were snatched from the hands of those conducting the entertainment. An attempt was made to set fire to an SZSP (Socialist Union of Polish Students) minibus.

If these attempts were not successful--and in fact they ended in a fiasco--it is thanks to the discretion, common sense, and attitude adopted by the majority in the Krakow academic environment and the prudent action by the Krakow SZSP aktiv.

The organizers of the provocation were counting on being able to cause a turmoil easily during the period of the Juvenalia because traditionally the city's authority is turned over to a student group. The Krakow students proved to be good city managers, demonstrated organizational competence, and to a rather great extent exhibited ideological and political maturity. The student Juvenalia guard intervened effectively and in many cases averted attempts to disturb the peace at the functions and in the city.

This was not the first time that people from the so-called committee for the defense of the workers have attempted to create confusion in the student environment. Their emissaries have turned up in other academic environments in Poland with similar intentions. They wanted to exploit the occasion, namely the mass functions being held among the students in the framework of the annual Student Cultural Spring.

The political provocateurs tried to discredit the student organization, the SZSP. But the SZSP has strong support within the academic circles. The deep-rooted ties of student youth to their organization have been formed in the daily joint work on behalf of the student environment, in activities aimed at improving social living conditions for students, in the struggle to modernize the higher schools and to achieve greater participation of student society in the administration of the higher schools. These ties are strengthened in the work planned and executed jointly on behalf of their schools, cities, and country. Youth know well that it was on the initiative of their organization that the state decided to increase the

amount paid for scholarships and to increase the number of them, that on the initiative of the SZSP housing for student married couples and day-care centers for student's children started to come into existence, and that students achieved real participation in the school and faculty authority. They have in their organization a real and effective patron for activities in the field of culture, sports, and tourism.

These facts cannot be shaken. And this is why the hostile agitation directed at the student environment is aspiring to demagogy and rumor. The director of this year's Juvenalia, Krakow SZSP representative Waldemar Janda, stated to a [Krakow] GAZETA POLUDNIOWA journalist: "We are accused of trying to violate the dignity of someone's death with a willful organization of the Juvenalia as an activity. The Juvenalia, as far back as the Krakovians can remember, has taken place on the second Sunday of May, and the dignity of death is violated by those who a week later, long after the funeral, propose another 3 days of mourning. This is a sordid affair. Two days before the Juvenalia another student died in an automobile accident, and no one is holding him in memory. The political objectives of these provocations are manifest; the death of a young person should not be exploited for this purpose. This is base, immoral, and unethical."

We are convinced that students in all academic environments in Poland would react similarly to the way the Krakow students did to provocation, demagogy, and rumor. The provocateurs are counting on the inexperience and the political immaturity of this environment. They have counted on it a number of times. The most obvious was during the events in March 1968. They miscalculated then and they are also miscalculating now.

The decided majority of the Polish student environment have not been and will not be an object of political machinations, of shabby political games. Student youth are consciously and emotionally tied to the program of socialist construction in Poland laid out by the party of the Polish workers class, because this program most fully responds to their hopes and aspirations.

CSO: 2600

POLAND

BRIEFS

PZPR ART, LITERARY CRITICISM STUDY--Postgraduate Study of Art and Literary Criticism was inaugurated on 13 April in Warsaw at the Higher School of Social Sciences of the PZPR Central Committee. The curriculum of the course of study, which lasts three semesters, combines problems of developing and popularizing socialist culture and art with tasks involved in Poland's socio-economic development. The objective of the course, whose students are active literary and art critics, is to create conditions for deepening theoretical knowledge and improving the creative methodology. The curriculum encompasses, among other things, problems of Marxist philosophy, sociology, theory of culture, Marxist esthetics, and current problems of PZPR policy in the field of ideoeducational work and cultural policy. [Text]
[Warsaw SZTANDAR MŁODYCH in Polish 14 Apr 77 p 2]

CSO: 2600

CHANGES IN THE LCY STATUTE DISCUSSED

Zagreb VUS in Serbo-Croatian 9 Apr 77 pp 10-11

[Interview of Jelica Radojcevic, president of the Statute Commission of the League of Communist of Croatia, by Vesna Blum]

[Text] The statute of the LCY and the statutes of the republic leagues of communists will be changed somewhat at the coming party congresses, even though they were changed just 3 years ago. Discussions and preparations have already begun, but they will reach a high pitch together with the other preparations for the congresses of the League of Communists.

[Question] The first discussions about changes and additions to the statute began in Croatia. Why are the statutes being changed, when, as we know, the program of the LCY is not being altered? That was the first question asked in the discussion with the president of the Statute Commission of the League of Communists of Croatia, Jelica Radojcevic.

[Answer] The present statutes are the most carefully prepared in the history of the party, and their provisions have been put into the work and operations of the League of Communists. Yet it should be borne in mind that in the period between congresses we have become richer, both as a League of Communists and as a revolution, through many realizations and experiences. That must be reflected in the party statutes. On the other hand, an active relationship toward the statutory standards in party life makes possible changing of the statutes. In any case, it is a good idea to follow the lesson of the LCY program that nothing is so good and untouchable that it should not and cannot be changed.

[Question] What should be the essential changes in the statute of the LCY and the statutes of the League of Communists of Croatia?

[Answer] I think that the statutes should be used more to develop the method of LCY activities as an internal force in the self-management system. The functioning of the League of Communists should be more firmly based in the working class, among the citizenry, in a delegate system; it is especially important to base the functioning of the League of Communists on the Socialist Alliance, the League of Socialist Youth, and the Trade Union Association. These factors must be stressed throughout the entire statute.

Richer Organizational Forms

Special attention must be paid to the organizing of the LCY. Here the central emphasis must continue to be on the strengthening of the basic organization of the LCY, but it must not be the only form of organization. We must work out the organization of communists outside the fundamental organization in a better way.

The statute should also contain a better explanation of the relationship of members, organizations and leadership toward the ideological and theoretical preparation of members of the party. It appears, to be specific, that we still are creating illusions, particularly among younger people who enter the party, that the revolution only advances and expands, and never undergoes crises, and that as a party we are free from weaknesses, struggles for power, fractionalism and the like. Ideological and theoretical preparation must contribute to overcoming these illusions. Therein lies its importance, to enable us on the basis of already existing experiences to stress in the statutes the need for such ongoing preparation and qualification of personnel.

I also think that more attention should be paid to working out matters of the democratization of relationships in the LCY, preparation for membership in the LCY, the significance of moral values which develop our self-management system, the role of LCY members in the execution of party policy. In any case, the LCY statute should leave room for specific republic and provincial requirements, and the Croatia LC statute should similarly leave room for the specific needs of cities, communities and regions. Everything should not be spelled out in the statutes, for that hinders initiative and creativity.

Reciprocal Action

[Question] How should the LCY be organized into large collectives and systems without harming the role of the basic LC organizations? To be specific, opinions are heard that more power should be given to the conferences and their executive agencies, while on the other hand there are warnings that that might decrease the role of the basic LCY organizations, which in any case are often underestimated.

[Answer] The problem lies in the undeveloped organizational sense and lack of responsibility of communists outside the basic organizations, and that weakens their role. We must strengthen the role of the basic organization, but not in such a way that everything would be concentrated in it, for it is becoming too narrow for the present level of social organization. Rather, the basic organization should be made responsible for the entirety of LCY activities. All forms of organization outside the basic organization must have a reciprocal action back to it, and it must have a perspective on the activity of its every member, discussing and evaluating those activities. Its members must be responsible to the other agencies in which they operate, but they must also be responsible to their basic organization.

Thus the statute should work out the role of the basic organization, doing so from the standpoint of the work of communists both within its framework and outside of it.

[Question] In practice, there is a noticeable tendency for the presidia of LCY conferences, conference secretariats, and at times basic organization secretariats to usurp the rights of the basic organizations and to make ties with the highest administrative levels, thereby creating so-called political aktivs in which decisionmaking and power are concentrated.

How many such tendencies are present and how can they be countered, perhaps in statutory measures?

A Pyramid of Functions and Influences

[Answer] Yes, such tendencies are present; they tend to use the political aktivs to reach decisions on crucial questions both in organizations of associated labor and in communities. That is a weakening of the basic LCY organizations and of self-management agencies and removes responsibility from the legal forums, since these aktivs are formed according to the criterion of the "strongest" people, according to functions and influence.

We must counter that type of work energetically, even though at times it is justified on the basis of effectiveness, the insufficient coordination of agencies and organizations and the like. We must see to what extent the statute can be used to eliminate that phenomenon, and how, with that purpose, the method of operation of the LCY and its agencies can be regulated, but that is less a matter of statutory standards and more a question of continuing party action.

[Question] It seems that in practice, the most often used provisions of the statute of the LCY and of the League of Communists of Croatia are those relating to the activities of communist workers. Can there be changes or additions to the statutes that will enhance the execution of those provisions, and if so, of what kind?

[Answer] The community conferences and committees must be given the obligation to utilize the aktivs of communist workers in order to determine the most authentic opinions and interests of the workers in direct production.

Other than very successful practical applications, where the community committees develop comprehensive activities by those aktivs, there are also community committees that have not even established them, and in larger cities there are cases where after being established the aktivs of communist workers have never held a meeting. This relates not only to the relationship with work aktivs, for the problems are much deeper. It is a matter of suppressing initiative and thereby hindering responsibility outside of the agencies and forums of the LCY. I do not believe that

those committees work against the interests of the workers, but it is an essential question for the LCY to decide whether the working class itself should perform actions which insure the interests of the league, or whether they should be performed by its intermediaries. If they are to be done by intermediaries, then such actions can always be transformed into power over the class rather than the power of the working class.

More effort will have to be made to build into the statutes the position and role, and especially the method of operation, of the communist workers' aktivs, and the obligations of the basic organizations, conferences and committees of the LCY.

[Question] Neither the organization nor the activization of communists according to their place of residence has been particularly successful.

[Answer] Something more should also be said in the statutes about the organization of communist workers' aktivs on the basis of place of residence. Now those aktivs are established, but largely only in the formal sense, without real effects in their operation. Usually they are so amorphous that they cannot function at all. So far, the practice has been such that it shows the ineffectiveness of that organization on the basis of residence, so that these experiences will serve to provide a better statutory regulation of the activization of communist workers.

Probably a decision should be sought in organization according to type of activity in the places of residence, not in the sense of some generalized demand for operation, but as an obligatory involvement of communists in actual and necessary activities of the local communities and the socio-political organizations within them.

[Question] Three years ago, some innovations were entered into the LCY statute in ideological and political measures concerning LCY members, such as reprimands and the consequences of reprimands, formation of comradely councils and the like. Should changes be expected in disciplinary measures?

[Answer] Some of those provisions should be worked out more precisely, such as the obligation of the basic organization to review at least once annually the execution of ideological and political measures that it has called for and to cancel them if the performance has been favorable and brought improvement. If we only take disciplinary action and fail to see that it is carried out and what effects it has had, then such measures have no purpose. Such a statement could be included in the LCY statute.

The LCY statute should contain a uniform presentation of the responsibility of the community, regional and intercommunity organizations of the LCY, when they conflict with the policies of the LCY itself. Preparation of such provisions should not be left to the republics and provinces. Specifically, the responsibility of the basic organizations in that

sense has been prepared in a uniform manner for the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, and it should also be prepared for the community organizations.

All such questions and many other concrete matters, however, still require extensive discussions, and numerous suggestions are expected.

12131
CSO: 2800

YUGOSLAVIA

LAW ON COAT OF ARMS, FLAG, NATIONAL ANTHEM

Belgrade SLUZBENI LIST SFRJ in Serbo-Croatian No 21, 22 Apr 77

[Law on the Use of the Yugoslav Coat of Arms, Flag, and National Anthem, and on the Use of the Picture and Name of the President of the Republic, Josip Broz Tito]

[Text] I. Basic Provisions

Article 1.

This law shall regulate the use of the coat of arms, flag and national anthem of Yugoslavia and the use of the picture and name of the president of the Republic Josip Broz Tito (hereafter "the president of the republic").

Article 2.

The coat of arms, flag and national anthem of Yugoslavia represent the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and express allegiance to Yugoslavia.

Article 3.

The coat of arms, flag and national anthem of Yugoslavia and the picture and name of the president of the republic are used in keeping with the provisions of the law, public order and moral standards of the socialist self-management society, in a manner that shall not violate the reputation and dignity of Yugoslavia.

The name and picture of the president of the republic shall not be used in a manner that might violate the reputation and dignity of the person of the president of the republic.

Article 4.

The coat of arms and flag of Yugoslavia may be used only in the form and content established by the Yugoslav Constitution.

Nothing on the coat of arms and the flag of Yugoslavia can be added, deleted, or changed in any manner.

Exceptionally, if provided for by federal law, the coat of arms or flag of Yugoslavia may be used as a component part of other emblems or insignias (military, maritime, command and rank flags, etc), or certain dates or titles may be inscribed on the flag of Yugoslavia (as on battle or other ceremonial flags).

The national anthem of Yugoslavia shall be only the melody and text established by the Yugoslav Assembly.

Article 5.

The coat of arms and flag of Yugoslavia, and the picture and name of the president of the republic, may not be used as a brand name or service stamp, a sample or a model, nor as any other insignia for marking merchandise or services.

Article 6.

The use of the coat of arms, flag and national anthem of Yugoslavia, and the use of the picture and name of the president of the republic in artistic creations (graphic, musical, etc) and for educational and pedagogical purposes is free with the condition that such use shall not be counter to public order and the moral standards of the socialist self-management society, and shall not violate the reputation and dignity of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia or the person of the president of the republic.

Article 7.

The coat of arms and flag of Yugoslavia, and any object with the picture of the president of the republic, shall not be used if they have been damaged or if by their appearance they are unsuitable for use.

A damaged or otherwise unsuitable coat of arms of Yugoslavia or object with the picture of the president of the republic shall be removed from use.

Article 8.

If the coat of arms or flag of Yugoslavia is presented in Yugoslavia together with other domestic or foreign coats of arms, flags, emblems or insignias, the coat of arms or flag of Yugoslavia shall have the place of honor, unless otherwise indicated in this law.

If in Yugoslavia the Yugoslav national anthem is performed along with other domestic or foreign anthems or ceremonial songs, the Yugoslav national anthem shall be performed first in the program, if not otherwise indicated in this law.

If in Yugoslavia an object with the picture of the president of the republic is publicly displayed or shown together with objects containing pictures of other persons, the object with the picture of the president of the republic shall be in the place of honor, unless otherwise indicated in this law.

Article 9.

By their regulations or self-management general acts, the republics, autonomous provinces and other public and political units, basic and other organizations of associated labor, their associations and other self-management bodies and associations, sociopolitical and other public organizations and citizens associations can, in keeping with the provisions of this law, determine the manner of use of the coat of arms, flag and national anthem of Yugoslavia and the use of the picture and name of the president of the republic.

II. Use of the Coat of Arms of Yugoslavia

Article 10.

The coat of arms of Yugoslavia shall be used:

1. in the composition of the seal of Yugoslavia according to federal regulations concerning that seal;
2. in the composition of the seals of federal agencies, according to the federal regulations concerning those seals;
3. in official inscriptions of federal agencies exhibited on the buildings in which they are housed within Yugoslavia;
4. on objects which mark the border of Yugoslavia and on other objects in Yugoslavia in the vicinity of the border, according to special federal regulations;
5. in other cases, according to conditions and in a manner that shall be established by federal regulations.

Article 11.

The coat of arms of Yugoslavia may be used:

1. on buildings housing federal agencies within Yugoslavia and in formal and ceremonial premises of those buildings;
2. on a building containing the premises of a diplomatic or consular office of Yugoslavia abroad, on the residence of the chief of such a mission, and on the transportation vehicles which he personally uses in performing his official functions, in keeping with the appropriate

international agreements, regulations and customs of the country in which the mission is located, or regulations and practices of the international organization to which the mission is attached;

3. during international meetings, competitions and other conferences (political, scientific, cultural and artistic, or sportive in nature) in which Yugoslavia participates or is represented, in accordance with the regulations and practices customary at such meetings;

4. on army and navy flags of Yugoslavia and on command and rank flags, according to the regulations on composing such flags;

5. on airplanes, ships or other carriers and on other public means of transportation, following conditions and in a manner established by the appropriate regulations;

6. on official invitations, congratulations and similar documents used by: the president of the republic, the vice president and members of the Presidium of Yugoslavia, the president of the Yugoslav Assembly, the president of the Federal Executive Council, other authorized representatives of the presidium of Yugoslavia, the Yugoslav Assembly or the Federal Executive Council, following conditions and in a manner determined by their regulations, and also by the heads of diplomatic and consular missions of Yugoslavia abroad;

7. in other circumstances if such use is not in conflict with the provisions of this law.

Article 12.

The original of the coat of arms of Yugoslavia is kept in the presidium of Yugoslavia and coats of arms are prepared using it as a model.

The use of the original coat of arms of Yugoslavia is the responsibility of the general secretary of the presidium of Yugoslavia.

Article 13.

If the coat of arms of Yugoslavia is displayed in Yugoslavia together with one or more additional domestic or foreign coats of arms or other similar emblems, the coat of arms of Yugoslavia shall be given the following position in relation to other coats of arms or emblems:

1. in the middle of a circle so that it is plainly visible, if the other coats of arms and emblems are arranged in a circle;

2. in the middle of a semicircle, if the other coats of arms and emblems are arranged in a semicircle;

3. at the head of a column, if the other coats of arms and emblems are arranged in a column;
4. in the first place in a row, from the left side as seen from in front, if the other coats of arms and emblems are arranged in a row;
5. at the head of a group, if the other coats of arms and emblems are arranged in a group;
6. at the right side as seen from in front, of the coat of arms of state or an international organization, if that coat of arms is being emphasized in Yugoslavia during an official visit of an official representative of a state or organization.

III. Use of the Flag of Yugoslavia

Article 14.

The flag of Yugoslavia flies at the following times and places:

1. at the residence of the president of the republic;
2. on designated objects at the border of Yugoslavia and on other objects in Yugoslavia near the border, according to special federal regulations;
3. in other circumstances according to conditions and in a manner established by federal law.

The flag of Yugoslavia is used as an insignia on an airplane, ship or other carrier and on other means of public transportation to indicate their belonging to Yugoslavia according to conditions and in a manner established by the appropriate regulations.

Article 15.

The flag of Yugoslavia may be displayed:

1. on Yugoslav holidays, on buildings housing federal agencies in Yugoslavia, where it may fly throughout the duration of such holidays;
2. during accompaniment of the president of the republic on trips away from Yugoslavia and when awaiting his return to Yugoslavia from abroad;
3. on means of transportation used by the president of the republic;
4. on days of mourning as determined by the Federal Executive Council, at which times the flag shall fly at half mast for the period of mourning;
5. on other occasions, following conditions and in a manner established by federal law.

Article 16.

The flag of Yugoslavia may be displayed:

1. on a building which houses the diplomatic or consular mission of Yugoslavia abroad, on the residence of the head of that mission, and on means of transportation that he personally uses in carrying out official functions, according to appropriate international agreements, regulations and customs of the country in which the mission is located, or the regulations and practices of the international organization to which the mission is attached;
2. at international gatherings, competitions and other meetings (of political, scientific, cultural, artistic or sportive nature), at which Yugoslavia participates or is represented, in accordance with the regulations and practices for holding such meetings;
3. at celebrations, ceremonies and other mass political, cultural, sportive and similar functions that are of significance for Yugoslavia.
4. on other occasions, if such use is not contrary to provisions of this law.

Article 17.

If the flag of Yugoslavia is displayed in Yugoslavia together with additional domestic or foreign flags, the flag of Yugoslavia shall be located in accordance with the following manner for displaying such flags:

1. in the middle of a circle so that it may be seen clearly, if the other flags are arranged in a circle;
2. in the middle of a semicircle, if the other flags are arranged in a semicircle;
3. at the head of a column, if the other flags are arranged in a column;
4. in the first position in a row, or on the left as seen from the front, if the other flags are arranged in a row;
5. at the head of a group, if the other flags are arranged in a group.

If the flag of Yugoslavia is displayed together with other flags with crossed staffs, the staff of the Yugoslav flag must be placed in front of the other flags, as seen from in front.

If the flag of Yugoslavia is displayed together with two other flags, the Yugoslav flag shall be located in the middle.

If the flag of Yugoslavia is displayed next to some other flag, it shall always be located on the left as seen from in front. Exceptionally, it shall be on the right as seen from in front if the flag of another state or an international organization is being emphasized in Yugoslavia during an official visit of an official representative of such state or organization.

Article 18.

If the flag of Yugoslavia is displayed over a street or square in a vertical position, the position of the flag shall be such that the blue field on the flag will be:

1. on the north side, if the direction of the street is east-west or west-east;
2. on the east, if the direction of the street is north-south or south-north;
3. on the east side of a square.

If the flag of Yugoslavia is displayed in a vertical position on a table, podium or other place of honor, the blue field shall be the first on the left, as seen from in front.

If the flag of Yugoslavia is placed on a catafalque, a bed or other object where it is horizontal in position, as a rule the blue field shall be on the left as seen from in front.

Article 19.

The flag of Yugoslavia shall be raised and lowered, displayed and removed, or conveyed, with suitable honors (rising, saluting, etc).

IV. Performance of the Yugoslav National Anthem

Article 20.

The Yugoslav national anthem shall be performed:

1. upon paying respects to the Unknown Hero at Avala (on Victory Day, when laying wreaths at the tomb by foreign representatives, etc);
2. when wreaths at military graves, the graves of fallen soldiers, and other similar places, are placed by official representatives of Yugoslavia;
3. when accompanying the departure of the president of the republic to official visits to foreign countries, and upon his return to Yugoslavia;

4. upon the official arrival in Yugoslavia, or when accompanying the departure from Yugoslavia, of the chief of a foreign country or the official representative of an international organization;

5. in other circumstances determined by the law.

Article 21.

The Yugoslav national anthem may be performed:

1. at celebrations, political meetings, parades and other ceremonial functions that officially mark events of significance to units of the armed forces of Yugoslavia, the working people, and the citizens of Yugoslavia;

2. at international meetings, competitions and other gatherings (of political, scientific, cultural, artistic or sportive nature) at which Yugoslavia participates or is represented, in accordance with the regulations and practices for holding such gatherings;

3. at the funerals of distinguished persons who are citizens of Yugoslavia, when Yugoslavia is paying them special honor;

4. in other circumstances, if such use is not contrary to the provisions of this law.

Article 22.

The national anthem of Yugoslavia may be performed by instruments alone, singing alone, or by combined instruments and singing.

Article 23.

If the national anthem of Yugoslavia is to be performed in Yugoslavia together with the national anthem of a foreign state or another ceremonial song of an international or other foreign organization, the foreign anthem or ceremonial song of the international or other foreign organization shall be played first, followed by the Yugoslav national anthem.

If the Yugoslav national anthem is to be performed together with an anthem of a republic or the ceremonial song of an agency, organization of association in Yugoslavia, the Yugoslav national anthem shall be performed first.

Article 24.

The Yugoslav national anthem shall be performed along with the customary respectful actions by all present (such as rising and saluting).

V. Use of the Picture and Name of the President of the Republic

Article 25.

Preparation and circulation of an object with the picture of the president of the republic (in photographs, busts, sculptures, insignias, etc) can be performed only with the approval of the responsible agency involved, unless otherwise specified in this law.

Objects with the picture of the president of the republic may be displayed publicly or shown according to conditions and in a manner that will not harm the reputation and dignity of Yugoslavia, which the president of the republic represents, nor harm the reputation and dignity of the person of the president of the republic.

Article 26.

The provision of article 25, paragraph 1, of this law does not concern the originals of artistic works that present the picture of the president of the republic, nor the preparation, circulation, public display or showing of photographs of the president of the republic at meetings, processions and similar gatherings that are of interest to the public.

Article 27.

Approval indicated in article 25 paragraph 1 of this law shall be given by the Federal Executive Council or an agency that that council authorizes.

An agency indicated in paragraph 1 of this article, in granting approval under article 25, paragraph 1, of this law, shall pay particular attention to the accuracy of the picture of the president of the republic, the artistic and other value of an object with such a picture, and whether the object so prepared can be used for the purpose for which approval is requested.

No legal appeal may be initiated against the decision of any agency indicated in paragraph 1 of this article if the decision denies a request for approval.

Article 28.

The name of the president of the republic may be used as an official title for a place, settlement, street, square, or an organization, with prior approval of the Federal Executive Council.

Article 29.

The places housing federal agencies may display only such photographs of the president of the republic as the federal agency for administration responsible for matters of learning and culture shall approve.

Article 30.

If an object with the picture of the president of the republic is displayed in Yugoslavia together with an object showing one or more additional persons of domestic public life, the object with the picture of the president of the republic shall be displayed on the left side.

If an object with the picture of the president of the republic is displayed in Yugoslavia together with an object containing a picture of an official representative of a foreign country or an international organization during such a person's official visit to Yugoslavia, the object with the picture of the president of the republic shall be placed on the right.

If an object with the picture of the president of the republic is displayed in Yugoslavia together with two or more objects containing pictures of persons in public life at home or abroad, the object with the picture of the president of the republic shall be placed in the place of honor, and that as a rule will be in the middle of the objects that are being exhibited.

VI. Penalty Provisions

Article 31.

A monetary penalty of 5,000 to 50,000 dinars shall be levied for violations by organizations of associated labor, other organizations or associations or other legal entities if:

1. they use the coat of arms or the flag of Yugoslavia, or use the picture of the name of the president of the republic, as a trademark for goods or services (article 5);
2. they prepare or place into circulation an object with the picture of the president of the republic without the approval of the appropriate agency (article 25, paragraph 1);
3. they use the name of the president of the republic without the approval of the Federal Executive Council (article 26);

Violation of paragraph 1 of this article shall carry a monetary fine of 2,000 to 20,000 dinars as well for the responsible person in an organization of associated labor, another organization or association, or another legal entity.

A violation under paragraph 1 of this article shall also carry a monetary fine of 2,000 to 20,000 dinars for the responsible person in an agency of a sociopolitical association, another state agency, or a local association.

Article 32.

Violation of article 31, paragraph 1, of this law shall carry a monetary fine of 5,000 to 50,000 dinars for an individual who independently operates with the working capital and equipment of the people, and a fine of 2,000 to 20,000 for any other individual.

Article 33.

For violation, an individual shall be fined from 1,000 to 10,000 dinars if:

1. he publicly uses the coat of arms or the flag of Yugoslavia in a form or with content that has not been approved by the Yugoslav Constitution (article 4);
2. he publicly displays the coat of arms or flag of Yugoslavia, or displays an object with the picture of the president of the republic, in a damaged or otherwise unsuitable form (article 7).

Article 34.

The violator of articles 31, 32 and 33 of this law shall expressly be required to remove the object by which the violation was committed.

An authorized official agent of an agency of internal affairs may, before a criminal action has been initiated, confiscate the objects mentioned in paragraph 1 of this article. Such confiscated objects must be transmitted immediately to the agency responsible for conducting the criminal action.

VII. Authorization for Carrying Out These Regulations

Article 35.

The supreme commander of the Yugoslav armed forces, in accordance with the provisions of this law, shall carry out the regulations on the use of the coat of arms, flag and national anthem of Yugoslavia, in the armed forces of Yugoslavia.

Article 36.

The Federal Executive Council shall determine the criteria and conditions for performing the national anthem of Yugoslavia at the funerals of distinguished persons (article 21, paragraph 3).

The Federal Executive Council shall determine the criteria and conditions for granting approval for the use of the name of the president of the republic in determining the official names of places, settlements, streets, squares or organizations (article 28).

Article 37.

More specific regulations on the manner of use of the coat of arms and flag of Yugoslavia, as needed, shall be passed by:

1. the federal secretary for internal affairs, in agreement with the federal secretary for national defense, for certain objects at the border of Yugoslavia, and on other objects in Yugoslavia near the border (article 10, paragraph 4, and article 14, paragraph 1, point 1);
2. the federal secretary for foreign affairs, for diplomatic and consular missions of Yugoslavia abroad (article 11, point 2, and article 16, point 1);
3. the federal committee for commerce and communications, for aircraft, ships or other carriers, for indicating their belonging to Yugoslavia (article 11, point 5, and article 14, paragraph 2).

VIII. Transmittal and Concluding Provisions

Article 38.

The provisions of this law also relate to objects with the picture of the president of the republic that are currently in circulation but that were prepared prior to the promulgation of this law.

Article 39.

Within a period of 6 months from the promulgation of this law, its provisions must be met by all provisions of regulations, general acts and self-management general acts concerning use of the coat of arms, flag and national anthem of Yugoslavia, and the use of the picture of the president of the republic, if said regulations are in conflict with the provisions of this law.

At the conclusion of the period indicated in paragraph 1 of this article, the validity shall end of provisions of regulations, general acts and self-management general acts relating to the use of the coat of arms, flag and national anthem of Yugoslavia, and the use of the picture of the president of the republic, that are contrary to the provisions of this law.

Article 40.

The Yugoslav national anthem, "Hej Slaveni," shall be performed until the Yugoslav Assembly establishes a different national anthem, in accordance with article 4, paragraph 4, of this law.

Article 41.

This law becomes effective 8 days after publication in the SLUZBENI LIST SFRJ.

YUGOSLAVIA

YOUTH FEDERATION BEGINS CONFERENCE

Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1010 GMT 27 May 77 LD

[Excerpts] Belgrade--The Programmatic-Electoral Conference of the Socialist Youth Federation of Yugoslavia began at the SFRY assembly hall in Belgrade this morning. At the beginning of the conference, which was opened by Azem Vlasi, president of Yugoslavia's Youth Organization, the message which the President of the Republic Josip Broz Tito sent the conference was read.

The conference is attended by Stane Dolanc, Dusan Petrovic, Kosta Nadj, Ali Sukrija, Dusan Bogdanov, Mahmut Bakali, Dzemil Sarac and others. Among the guests is Marica Lojen, the girl who handed this year's youth relay race baton to Tito.

The conference decided that Comrade Tito be given the first Golden Shock Badge for his exceptional contribution to the development of youth labor drives.

The conference, in which old and new delegates are taking part, adopted the report on the work since the Ninth Congress of the Socialist Youth Federation of Yugoslavia and the proposal concerning the solution of topical issues and tasks which stem from the decisions of the Ninth Congress. The report on future tasks was submitted by Azem Vlasi, president of the conference of the Socialist Youth Federation of Yugoslavia.

In this period, he said as always the young generation and the Socialist Youth Federation in their activities will be strongly inspired by Comrade Tito's revolutionary work and messages. In Tito's personality and work the young people see their perspective, aspirations and orientation. Therefore, in this jubilee year the young people have been and will be committed to the further consolidation and development of self-managing relations, of national equality and of unity of our community, that is, of aspects to which Comrade Tito continually provides powerful encouragement and guidance.

In the past period, Vlasi said, the Socialist Youth Federation fairly successfully overcame numerous difficulties and weaknesses which were present

in the pregress period. Therefore, it is not enough to say today that we have a stronger and more united organization as regards its organizational standards, its activities and its ideopolitical aspects. The fact should be stressed, above all, that among a large number of young people a new awareness and knowledge has prevailed about concrete action being the basic precondition for a speedier change in the situation and for the solution of existing problems and weaknesses. The knowledge has prevailed, he stressed, that the function of the youth organization does not lie in submitting to society a whole list of problems but in launching and mobilizing for day-by-day struggle for new relations.

In the coming period the youth organization must become even more involved in the implementation of all social and political measures for economic stabilization. What one has in mind in this context is, above all, the elimination of a series of subjective weaknesses which influence the unfavorable economic trends. Vlasi listed as the basic tasks the struggle for greater productivity, for greater work discipline, for efficiency in implementing adopted measures and such like.

Speaking about future tasks, Azem Vlasi particularly stressed the need for the involvement of the young people in the sphere of all-people's defense and social self-protection, in the work for our young people temporarily working abroad, the development of voluntary youth labor drives, the contribution to the further affirmation of the policy of nonalinement, and so forth. All this, he said, will contribute to more successful preparations for the 11th Congress of the LCY and the 10th Congress of the Socialist Youth Federation of Yugoslavia.

When the debate ended, Azem Vlasi was reelected president of the Conference of the Socialist Youth Federation of Yugoslavia, Zivko Novevski was elected secretary. A new presidium of the conference was also elected.

CSO: 2800

YUGOSLAVIA

EXERCISE BY MOUNTAINEER UNIT DESCRIBED

Belgrade FRONT in Serbo-Croatian 8 Apr 77 pp 16-17

[Article by Nenad Ognjanovic: "Mountaineers Who Rarely Pick Violets"]

[Text] Continuing the revolutionary traditions of the 5th Sandzak People's Liberation Strike Brigade, the troops of Srboljub Petrovic's unit are preparing themselves in everyday training for combat action in hilly/mountainous terrain and in high mountains.

They are real masters of climbing and summer and winter Alpine exercises. Many tons of steel and explosive can be ejected in a single minute from the weapons and artillery pieces of this unit.

To reach the peak of a mountain means to facilitate the penetration of one's own forces for combat against a parachute landing on hilly terrain. These "highlanders" are capable of moving as far as 6 kilometers an hour over rocky terrain carrying full wartime gear.

In 1976, 17 servicemen went to their homes wearing the "Exemplary Soldier" badge, while more than 60 percent won awards or commendations. If you had seen them last summer on the Mioska-Savnik road, not as travellers but as builders, you would think that this was an engineer unit instead of a mountaineer unit.

How many times have you rushed up a hill, carried away by children's games, to pick a violet or a primrose? You probably ran out of wind halfway up. If you are or have been a scout, you have probably registered reaching some peak in your notebook. Yet you remember how you climbed: carrying a sack with a sandwich, an apple or two, a warm beverage. You moved slowly, you would take breaks, you would rest, you would enjoy the view.

So far as the mountaineer troops of Lt Vasko Soskic are concerned, everything is more complicated, is different.

Under full wartime gear, carrying weapons (e.g., a 120-millimeter mortar or a gun carriage) on their backs, they catch hold of rock skillfully and almost

go on all fours, mastering the terrain meter by meter as high as 2,000 meters above sea level. The load on their backs may exceed 30 kilograms, and they may have to move as far as 120 kilometers, in sunshine, in rain, and in snow. Breaks are scheduled, to be sure, but never to the detriment of the execution of an assignment. Breaks are therefore infrequent and brief; but the troops and command personnel in this unit do not seem to think about this. This is an everyday thing with them. The majority of them have traversed more than 600 kilometers on their feet, although they have been in the armed forces for just 8 months.

Rocky Ground Blocked the Way...

On this day, they were again in the mountains.

The "Blues" had carried out a parachute landing but had not surprised the defenders, who quickly left their barracks. They reached the nearby mountain peak with sweat on their faces, out of breath. This had been a march of some 10 kilometers on an ascent of several hundred meters. After 10 minutes, they were high in the hills. During this race for time, there were also stumbles and falls. At the 7th kilometer, rocky ground blocked the way. The horses could not go any further. You know what happens then: the human being continues. Mortars and automatic rifles were unloaded from the packsaddles, everything went onto the backs of the soldiers, the strong, persevering, agile soldiers. Their shirts were soaked in sweat, but the mountain peak was seized. Before a minute had passed, the automatic rifles and hand launchers were in operation. The "Blues" were surprised and destroyed. That was the outcome on this occasion, and it would be the same way even if this were not an exercise.

Satisfaction showed on Lieutenant Soskic's face. He was tired, but he had not given up. Even as a child, he was climbing on the slopes of Mount Prokletije. He walked the 7 kilometers to school every day and back. He came to know the whims of the sharp rocks and the dangers that lurk on every bluff. He tells the story of spending 2 nights in the vicinity of Mount Triglav, tied with a rope and "riveted" to the rock, because the fog and darkness prevented him from going further. He was taking training in climbing at the time. He now passes on his knowledge and experience to younger people, his troops. He has trained two generations without a single soldier being injured. There have been scratches from sharp rocks and underbrush, of course, but young soldiers scarcely feel that.

Bursts of Fire in the Canyon

To Branko Subasic, an instructor of physical education from Subotica, climbing a mountain with an automatic rifle on his back does not seem to mean a great effort. He has been carrying his "buddy" on his shoulders for 8 months over more than 600 kilometers and has fired more than 10,000 bullets from it. He did not part from it during the exercise. One night,

his unit stumbled upon an ambush in the canyon near Jabuka. The horses frightened by the bright lights of the rockets and machinegun fire ran away in all directions. The packsaddle with the automatic rifle fell to the ground. The automatic rifle was soon found, even in the darkness of night. Within 2 minutes, with the assistance of helper Cvetko Strecko and ammunition carrier Milan Milosevic, the rifle had "started singing." Their task resembled a wartime assignment, they remember it well.

A mortar carriage weighing 22 kilograms is "glued" to the back of Vukadin Jokic, a metallurgical technician from Niksic. In 3 hours and 30 minutes on the march, he has covered 24 kilometers. At a distance of 1,200 meters, every one of the 50 shells inserted into the tube of the 82-millimeter mortar has hit its target. He has become an outstanding mortar firer.

Rajko Todorovic, an academic painter from Niksic, also has reason to remember November of 1976. From his hospital bed, he "illegally" donned the mountaineer uniform and loaded onto his back the tube of a mortar weighing 23 kilograms. With other gear, his load totalled 40 kilograms. He climbed up Debelo hill on the double with his squad. They joke about him as the "flying mortar man."

A Wreath of Shells

Brane Grudnik, an auto mechanic from Ljubljana, also mastered the secrets of the mortar in less than a month. His buddy Blagota Kovac, who supplies the mortar with shells, was so fast during one firing practice that more than 10 shells were in the air at one time.

Slavisa Savcic, who is in the restaurant business at Sokolac, does not seem to have changed occupations. In the cafe, he fills glasses; now, he feeds shells into a mortar. Ahmet Salibasic, a miner from Olovo, complains about a comrade who took his automatic rifle to help him during one march but then did not want to return it. Ahmet is the height champion in this unit. As a miner, he has been 400 meters under the surface of the earth; as a mountaineer, he has climbed as high as 2,000 meters. To him, collective effort is a guarantee of success. He learned this from his fellow workers at the mine, where he would dig as much as 18 tons of coal in 8 hours of work. He has carried over the miners' cooperation and comradeship into his squad, his collective.

The sun seemed to be hanging on the peak of a rocky mountain on the slopes of Mount Durmitor when the column returned to barracks. Fatigue did not bother them. A military marching song resounded through the canyon alongside the swift, cold Breznica creek. Dragan Matejic, a real "artist" when it comes to dropping down a cliff, was at the head of the column moving slowly out of the canyon.

Such was one working day in Vasko Soskic's unit. The other days are similar--regular training, conditioning, climbing, marching. Only in this way can they be combat-ready if need be.

Accordingly, these troops, even though they are constantly in the mountains, rarely pick violets.

PHOTO CAPTIONS

1. p 17,
upper
left. Srboljub Petrovic: "In such terrain, we make the most use of the experiences of partisan warfare."
2. p 17,
upper
right. High up in the mountains, they were "engaged in combat" a few hours ago.
3. p 17,
center
left. Horses loaded with machine guns and mortars must be led carefully over rocks and rocky terrain.
4. p 17,
center
right. The troops must first seize the peak without being noticed and then move to carry out a specific assignment.
5. p 17,
lower
left. Aimer Rajko Todorovic is "eagle-eyed." Measurements have already been taken. Vukadin Jokic is waiting impatiently to put the first shell in the tube.
6. pp 16-17,
bottom. Even after 3 hours of marching, these "hillsmen" are fresh and ready for still greater efforts.

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