# NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
## Monterey, California

# THESIS

US TERRORISM POLICY TOWARDS SUDAN:
BLINDED BY ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM?

by

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December 1999

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Sudan is currently ruled by a government that was put in place by a 1989 military coup that overthrew a democratically elected government. The US considers Sudan an Islamic Fundamentalist regime because National Islamic Front (NIF) members hold key positions in the government. In 1993 the US imposed unilateral diplomatic and economic sanctions against Sudan for allegedly harboring terrorist organizations.

This thesis assesses US policy towards Sudan with respect to terrorism. It reviews current policies and argues that key strategic interests are being neglected. The US tends to equate Islamic Fundamentalism with its more radical element, terrorism, which significantly influences US policy towards Sudan.

Currently the terrorism policy of the US is based on countering state-sponsored terrorism while the more significant threat is from a new breed of well-funded terrorists who operate independently of states. Instead of isolating Sudan for harboring such individuals, the US should take advantage of Sudan's influence with loosely knit Islamic groups. America's inability to effectively deal with the evolving terrorism threat, as reflected in its policy toward Sudan, represents a serious vacuum in its ability to provide for its national security.

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# US TERRORISM POLICY TOWARDS SUDAN: BLINDED BY ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM?

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
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## NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

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# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This thesis examines the US policy towards Sudan with respect to terrorism. It reviews current policies and argues that key strategic interests are being neglected. In 1993 the US imposed unilateral diplomatic and economic sanctions against Sudan for allegedly harboring terrorist organizations. Of the major economic and military powers, the US is alone in its sanctioning of Sudan. The policy of isolating Sudan has lessened the influence of the US in the United Nations regarding Sudan and has countered its strategic objective of reducing Libyan and Iranian influence in Africa. The recent missile attack on a Sudanese pharmaceutical factory, without credible evidence of its link to chemical weapons production, has inspired anti-American rhetoric and increased the threat of terrorism.

In an era when international cooperation is required to crack loosely-knit terrorist rings, the time has come to reconsider the effectiveness of economic sanctions and military action against Sudan. Sudan could be a significant ally in the fight against terrorism if the US provided the proper incentives. Additionally, Sudan could provide an opportunity for the US to deal with the growing issue of Islamic Fundamentalism. Sudan has indicated on numerous occasions that it would like to establish better relations with the US. Since the US is willing to work with other terrorist countries such as North Korea, the time is right to reconsider US policy towards Sudan.

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# I.     INTRODUCTION

## A.     PURPOSE OF THESIS

The purpose of this thesis is to assess United States (US) policy towards Sudan with respect to terrorism. It reviews current policies and argues that key strategic interests are being neglected. Through an analysis of available literature and personal interviews this thesis seeks to show that domestic political considerations influence the implementation of the US terrorism policy, that the perceived threat to US national security from Sudan is overstated, that there is little possibility Sudan can spread Islamic Fundamentalism throughout the region, and that there are strategic reasons the US should build better relations with Sudan.

## B.     OVERVIEW

Sudan's current government came to power by military coup, in 1989, initiated by the Revolutionary Command Council for National Salvation (RCC-NS). The RCC-NS consisted of fifteen members who had carried out the coup, among them the current President of Sudan, Hassan Ahmad al Bashir. Several members of the RCC-NS had ties to the National Islamic Front (NIF), an Islamic Fundamentalist activist group.[1] Shortly after the coup, members of the NIF occupied key government posts.[2] From these leadership positions, the NIF transformed the government of Sudan into an Islamic Fundamentalist regime by instituting Islamic law, courts, and principles as the

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[1] Helen Chapin Metz, ed. *Sudan a Country Study* (Washington D.C.:U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991), xxviii.

[2] Interview with former Sudanese government official who asked to remain anonymous. This former government official saw how NIF members assumed key government leadership positions enabling them to carry out the political and social agendas of the NIF, July 1999.

foundations for governance.

In 1993 the US imposed unilateral diplomatic and economic sanctions against Sudan for allegedly harboring terrorist organizations. Of the major economic and military powers, the US is alone in its sanctioning of Sudan. European and Asian countries such as Germany, England, China, and Japan continue to trade with Sudan.[3] Clearly these countries do not perceive the Sudanese terrorism threat warrants economic sanctions. Indeed, France explicitly declared Sudan a non-terrorist threat after Sudan turned over terrorist Carlos the Jackal in 1994.

In the absence of US engagement, Sudan is building economic relations with other countries. Since 1992 Iran has been a significant trading partner with Sudan providing low interest loans, oil at a reduced cost, and military hardware and advisors. Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Germany, South Korea, the United Kingdom, and Italy were the major trading partners of Sudan in 1996.[4] China has invested heavily in the oil infrastructure of Sudan, which has brought these two governments closer together economically and militarily. Consequently, the US has lost leverage and US businesses have been disadvantaged in response to a threat that is not perceived as significant by its closest allies.

This thesis will show that the US terrorism policy toward Sudan is influenced by the perceived threat of Islamic Fundamentalism. The US believes the Islamic Sudanese

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[3] CIA, *Sudan,* The World Factbook 1999; Internet, available from
http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbooks/su.html, Internet; accessed 4 November 1999.

[4] Ibid.

government is a security threat comparable to that of Iran.[5] US State Department officials and diplomats from the Middle East region are concerned about the destabilizing potential of an "Islamic Axis", consisting of Iran and Sudan.[6] A "Khartoum-Tehran axis" is considered a threat because it is believed to be aimed at extending religious and political influence in Africa, and promoting Islamic governments in North Africa and the Middle East.[7] Additionally, in 1999, the American public ranked Iran as the country that posed the greatest danger to the US.[8] However, the ability of Sudan to unite with Iran and export its version of Islamic Fundamentalism is severely constrained by traditional antagonisms such as the Arab/Persia divide and Sunni/Shiia differences.[9]

Furthermore Sudan could in fact be an important ally in US anti-terrorism policy. The current terrorism threat is from loosely knit organizations rather than alleged state sponsors of terrorism such as Iraq, Libya, Iran, North Korea, Cuba, and Syria.[10] Radical Islamic groups, similar to Osama bin Laden's organization, are emerging as the primary

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[5] Jennifer Parmelee, Sudan Denies 'Khartoum-Tehran Axis' To Promote Islamic Regimes in Africa, Washington post, March 12 1992. [Service on-line], Available from Lexis-Nexis, Software version 7.1. accessed 5 November 1999.

[6] Ibid.

[7] Ibid.

[8] Samuel Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996), 224.

[9] Glenn Robinson, Professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, Interview by author, Monterey, Ca, Fall Quarter 1998.

[10] Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence U.S. House of Representatives, *Terrorism—Looking Ahead: Issues and Options for Congress,* report prepared by the Congressional Research Service Library of Congress, 104th Cong., 2d sess., 1995, Committee Print, 2-5.

terrorism threat to US security interests. Sudan's spiritual and defacto political leader,[11] Hassan al-Turabi, wields influence with many militant Islamic groups and thus could help the US combat terrorism. After the Gulf War, Turabi created the Popular Arab and Islamic Conference (PAIC) as a counter to the Saudi dominated Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC).[12] Several hundred delegates from Islamic Fundamentalist organizations and movements from eighty countries attended the PAIC's third conference, held in Khartoum during 1995.[13] Additionally, al-Turabi has submitted letters to Congress indicating that Sudan is willing to work with the US, however, the US has not responded to these opportunities to improve relations with Sudan.[14]

Finally, it is in the best interest of the US to maintain an open channel of communication with a country of increasing strategic importance. The opening of Sudan's oil pipeline in October of 1999 will increase its power in the region. Moreover, extensive oil and natural gas reserves in Sudan may be the second largest in Africa.[15]

## C. DEFINITIONS OF TERRORISM AND ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM

Since there is no one standard definition of terrorism, for the purpose of this paper

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[11] Adam M. Abdelmoula, "The Fundamentalist Agenda for Human Rights: The Sudan and Algeria", *Arab studies Quarterly*. 18, no.1 (Winter 1996), [Service on Line], Available from Proquest. ISSN 02713519, Naval Postgraduate School Library, Monterey, Ca.

[12] Samuel Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, 176.

[13] Ibid.

[14] House Judiciary Committee Crime Subcommittee Prohibition on Financial transactions with Countries supporting Terrorism Act Hearing on H.R. 748, *Federal Document Clearing House Congressional Testimony*, (Federal Document Clearing House, Inc., 1997), 10 June 1997.

[15] The predicted amount of oil and gas reserves is based on preliminary hydrocarbon testing. Bheki Ghila, a mineral and gas lawyer from South Africa, Interview by author, Monterey, Ca., 29 July 1999.

I will use the definition of terrorism contained in Title 22 of the United States Code, Section 265f(d):

- The term "terrorism" means premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.

- The term "international terrorism" means terrorism involving citizens or the territory of more than one country.

- The term "terrorist group" means any group practicing, or has significant subgroups that practice, international terrorism.[16]

- State sponsors of terrorism are those governments that support international terrorism either by engaging in terrorist activity themselves or by providing arms, training, safehaven, diplomatic facilities, financial backing, logistics and/or other support to terrorists.[17]

In practice, the term "terrorism" is more flexible, leaving considerable room for politicization. For example, recently there was heated debate in the halls of Congress over whether President Clinton should grant clemency to Puerto Ricans who were identified as either nationalists, freedom fighters, convicts, or terrorists depending on one's political views. Had the issue stayed out of the political arena and the decision left to the FBI, clemency would not have been granted, in accordance with US's tough terrorism policies.

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[16] The US government has employed this definition of terrorism for statistical and analytical purposes since 1983. Office of the Secretary of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1997, *Introduction,* Department of State Publication 10535, April 1998; available from http://www.state.gov/www/ global/terrorism/1997Report/, Internet; accessed 16 August 1999.

[17] Office of the Secretary of State Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1997, *Overview of State-Sponsored Terrorism,* Department of State Publication 10535, April 1998; available from http://www.state.gov/www/ global/terrorism/1997Report/, Internet; accessed 16 August 1999.

Islamic fundamentalism is a similarly vague, often misused term. However, the term "Islamic Fundamentalist regime" is widely used to refer to the two non-secular Islamic regimes of Iran and Sudan. For the purposes of this paper, an "Islamic Fundamentalist regime" is an Islamic political movement that comes to power and governs the state according to an Islamic ideology. "Islamic Fundamentalist groups" refers to those groups that want to replace secular rule with non-secular rule.[18]

## D. THE CHANGING THREAT OF TERRORISM

The US international terrorism policy was designed in response to state sponsored terrorism. The main purpose of the policy is to place the responsibility on a state to stop its sponsorship of terrorism, primarily through the use of economic sanctions.[19] However, the terrorism threat is now primarily of the "boutique" variety. According to Ralph Perl, Specialist in International Terrorism Policy, Congressional Research Service:

> As the World Trade Center incident illustrated, a nonstandard brand of terrorist may be emerging—Individuals who do not work for any particular established terrorist organization and who are apparently not agents of any state sponsor, what one may call the "boutique" terrorist. In the international area, where US counterterrorism policy is a sanctions-oriented policy, which has traditionally sought to pin the responsibility on state sponsors, some policy realignment may be required.[20]

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[18] House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Africa, *Recent Trends in Islamic Fundamentalism in Africa North and South of the Sahara*, written testimony submitted by Sulayman S. Nyang, Ph.D., African Studies Department, Howard University, 102nd Cong., 2d sess., 1992, ISBN 016-0401283-3, 53.

[19] Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence U.S. House of Representatives, *Terrorism—Looking Ahead: Issues and Options for Congress*, report prepared by the Congressional Research Service Library of Congress, 104th Cong., 2d sess., 1995, Committee Print, 1.

[20] Ibid.

Sudan is the first country to be put on the US "terrorism list"[21] not for sponsoring terrorism but for harboring terrorists such as bin Ladin. However, US terrorism policy tools have not been appropriately tailored to the new type of threat. Economic sanctions and military strikes implemented to change a state's behavior will have little effect against loosely-knit groups that have no formal allegiance to any nation.[22]

The slow response of the US to the evolution of international terrorism threats led to public clashes with Germany and France at the G7 summit in 1996.[23] The US insisted on a policy of isolating state sponsors of terrorism such as Iraq, Iran, Libya, and Sudan. According to Bruce Hoffman:

> Members of the French delegation chided their American counterparts for being pre-occupied with 'old forms' of terrorism - arguing that state-sponsored terrorism was no longer the menace that the Americans portrayed it to be. From France's point of view, loose associations of self funded, transnational groups, such as radical Islamic cells encapsulated the 'new forms' of terrorism against which the West must prepare ... [24]

Governments will have to unravel complex webs of bank accounts, businesses, and investments that fund these loose knit organizations.[25] Successful counterterrorism efforts will require international cooperation for intelligence gathering, monitoring, and

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[21] The other six countries on the US State Department's "terrorism list" are Iran, Iraq, Cuba, North Korea, Libya, and Syria. Office of the Secretary of State Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1998, *Overview of State Sponsored Terrorism*, Department of State Publication 10535, 1998; available from http://www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism/1998Report/ sponsor.html

[22] Bruce Hoffman, *Is Europe soft on terrorism? Who is Europe?*, 1999 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace: Foreign Policy, 22 June 1999. [Service on-line]; available from LEXIS-NEXIS, Research software 7.1, IAC-ACC-NO:55015316, accessed 16 September 1999.

[23] Ibid.

[24] Ibid.

[25] Ibid.

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infiltrating terrorist groups. Therefore, the US and its allies need to arrive at a mutually agreeable approach to "boutique" terrorism, and more specifically to a common policy response to Sudan.

## II. BACKGROUND

### A. IMPLICATIONS OF THE 1989 MILITARY COUP

In 1989 Sudan's democratically elected government was overthrown by a military coup led by General Umar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir. This was the third time since independence in 1956 that a democratically elected government in Sudan had been removed for its ineffectiveness and inability to promote economic development and resolve the civil war.[26] Immediately following the coup, political parties, their newspapers and other free associations were outlawed, and political leaders were arrested. In 1990, Peter Bechtold, a senior State Department official with extensive expertise on Sudan, stated:

> Within a relatively short period, however, it became clear that the new junta differed greatly from its predecessors in political orientation and style. Far from being a nonpartisan group of military officers simply disgusted with the mismanagement of almost everything, as erroneously reported early on, the RCC-NC had a definite agenda and soon set out to pursue its objectives. [27]

Bechtold speculated that the coup was initiated by the National Islamic Front (NIF) over the rescinding of the Sharia[28] as the basis for law.[29] Evidence of this

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[26] Peter K. Bechtold, *More Turbulence In Sudan: A New Politics This Time?* 582.

[27] Ibid., 583.

[28] Sharia is another term for Islamic law. An overwhelming majority of Sudanese Muslims practice Sufism, a progressive version of Sunni Islam. The roots of Sharia law in Sunni Islam are: (1) the Quran, (2) the prophet Mohammed's living example (Sunna), (3) the learned consensus of the Ulama, and reasoning by analogy from accepted interpretations of the first two roots to new problems not directly addressed therein. The Ulama are the learned doctors of law who belong to a class of leaders in Islamic society. They are highly respected for their learning in the religious sciences. Islam has no clergy or priesthood as such. Members of the Ulama in every village and city attain such status through social recognition of their achievement in the study of the roots of the right belief and practice. Taken from an introductory text regarding Islam by Richard C. Martin, *Islamic Studies: A History of Religions Approach,*2d ed. (Upper Saddle River: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1996), 11.

speculation includes the allocation by the new regime of key leadership positions to NIF members. A former Sudanese official maintains that Dr. Hassan al-Turabi, head of the NIF, was behind the scenes of the military regime to ensure the creation of an Islamic Fundamentalist State.[30]

## B. SHIFT IN US POLICY TOWARDS AFRICA AFTER THE COLD WAR

The end of the Cold War drastically changed the foreign policy and the national security strategy of the US towards Africa. The Cold War rivalry between the US and the Soviet Union contributed to the development and maintenance of autocratic or "strongmen"[31] regimes in Africa. "Strongmen" became skilled at earning external support by declaring allegiance to one of the two superpowers,[32] and kept receiving aid by threatening to join the rival side. According to Michael Bratton: "For its part the United States became entangled with egregiously despotic regimes – including those in Zaire, Somalia and the Sudan that were top US aid recipients."[33]

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[29] Peter K. Bechtold, *More Turbulence In Sudan: A New Politics This Time?* 592.

[30] Interview with former Sudanese government official who asked to remain anonymous. This former government official saw how NIF members assumed key government leadership positions enabling them to carry out the political and social agendas of the NIF.

[31] Strongmen is a term used to characterize authoritarian rulers before the late 1980's. Typically in sub-Saharan Africa, a President and or a small number of military and political elites exercised exclusive control over a country and its resources. Access to Cold War foreign aid, in return for loyalty to one of the two superpowers, kept strongmen regimes in power much longer than would have been possible without such aid.

[32] Michael Bratton and Nicolas van de Walle, *Democratic Experiments in Africa Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective,* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997), 115.

[33] Ibid., 135.

Strongmen such as Mariam Mengistu of Ethiopia, Siad Barre of Somalia,[34] and Mobuto Seseko of Zaire used economic and military aid from the US and Russia to stay in power, to increase their personal wealth, and reward loyal followers. They neglected to develop economic and political infrastructures needed to build an independent country. When economic conditions worsened, strongmen resorted to violent measures to suppress resistance against their regimes. However, the sustainment of autocratic rule was only effective when the coercive arms of government, the military and security police, received their salaries. When foreign aid dwindled at the end of the Cold War, political change became inevitable because there was little available money to pay salaries.

After the Cold War, emphasis in US policy shifted from stopping the spread of communism to promoting democratic regimes, sustainable economic growth, combating trans-national threats such as terrorism, nuclear and chemical proliferation, and reducing environmental degradation.[35] In practice, Africa has witnessed less involvement in the post-Cold-War era. The US is no longer willing to intervene in internal matters to prop-up autocratic regimes. Additionally, the US encouraged democratization, which subsequently became a precondition for diminished US aid. Bratton states:

> The end of the Cold War had significant implications for the foreign policies of Western powers. Once the Soviet threat faded, the United States, "lost the urge to intervene in African conflicts, standing aside during the armed overthrow of governments in Liberia and Chad and entering cautiously with relief missions in Somalia and Rwanda only after massive humanitarian crises could no longer be ignored. While cutting

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[34] Jeffrey A. Lefebvre, *Arms for the Horn: U.S. Security Policy in Ethiopia and Somalia 1953-1991*, (Pittsburgh:University of Pittsburgh Press, 1991), 175-182.

[35] A National Security Strategy for a New Century, October 1998, available from http://www2.whitehouse. gov/WH/EOP/NSC/html/documents/nssr.pdf, Internet; accessed 2 November 1999.

back on overall aid commitments to Africa, the US government began to concentrate resources in countries that not only undertook market reform but also promised to respect civil and personal liberties.[36]

The United States promotes democratic ideals in Africa to enhance both security and prosperity. Democratic governments are believed to be more likely to cooperate with each other against common threats and also encourage free and open markets.[37] Additionally, they are less likely to wage war against one another and abuse their people.[38] With foreign aid increasingly tied to political reform, autocratic rulers were forced to liberalize their political systems.

Hence, between 1990 and 1994 thirty-five African countries liberalized and instituted measures towards democratization such as implementing multi-party political systems, freedom of the press, providing increased personal freedoms, and less arbitrary judicial measures. However, twelve countries in Sub-Saharan Africa were less democratic in 1994 than in 1990.[39] Sudan was one of these twelve. Events in Sudan, mainly as a result of its civil war, prevented political reform from occurring.[40] Consequently, the US cut off foreign aid to Sudan when its ineffective elected government was overthrown by a military coup in 1989.

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[36] Michael Bratton and Nicolas van de Walle, *Democratic Experiments in Africa Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective,*135.

[37] *A National Security Strategy for a New Century,* May 1997, http//www.whitehouse.gov/WH/EOP/NSC/Strategy, p. 6 of 39, Internet; accessed 12 Sept 1998.

[38] Ibid.

[39] See table 12, Michael Bratton and Nicolas van de Walle, *Democratic Experiments in Africa Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective,* 286-87.

[40] Ibid., 119.

## III.   US TERRORISM POLICY TOWARDS SUDAN

When the US is confronted with a state sponsor of international terrorism diplomatic solutions are attempted first.  If diplomacy is unsuccessful, the US normally resorts to economic sanctions to pressure the offending state.  Finally, if all else fails and the provocation is too great to ignore, the US resorts to military action.[41]

The US has been at odds with Sudan's "Islamic Fundamentalist regime" over a variety of issues since the coup in 1989.  The US and Sudan engaged in a diplomatic war of words until 1993 when the US accused Sudan of terrorism.   Shortly thereafter, US policy escalated into coercive diplomacy (economic and diplomatic sanctions) and subsequently military action in 1998.

In 1993, at the urging of Congress, the US State Department Counterterrorism Office designated Sudan as a state that sponsored terrorism placing Sudan on a list with: Iran, Iraq, Libya, Syria, North Korea, and Cuba.  Being on the terrorism country list automatically triggered a series of mandatory diplomatic and economic sanctions for Sudan, which remain in effect today.  The US terrorism policy is the primary vehicle used to encourage change in Sudan, since countering terrorism is at the top of the US diplomatic agenda.[42]

Sudan is on the terrorism list because it allegedly serves as a meeting place, safehaven, and training hub for international terrorist groups, particularly bin Laden's al-

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[41] David Tucker, *Skirmishes at the Edge of the Empire: The United States and International Terrorism,* (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1997), 73.

[42] A National Security Strategy for a New Century, October 1998, available from http://www2.whitehouse. gov/WH/EOP/NSC/html/documents/nssr.pdf, Internet; accessed 2 November 1999.

Qaida organization.[43] Additionally, Sudan is accused of harboring militant extremist groups such as Hamas, the Iranian backed Hizbollah, the secularist Abu Nidal organization, Egypt's Al-Jamma al-Islamiya (in 1995 accused of attempting to assassinate Egyptian President Mubarek in Ethiopia) and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Additionally, Sudan has not signed any counterterrorism treaties.[44]

## A. UNILATERAL SANCTIONS

When Sudan was being considered for the "terrorism list", US policy makers considered whether or not unilateral economic and diplomatic sanctions would be effective in altering Sudan's behavior. Skeptics in the State Department questioned the applicability of sanctions, noting that Sudan is a poor country with few economic and political ties to the US. Despite the economic and military weakness of Sudan, advocates of sanctions believed that this "terrorism" designation would be a powerful bargaining tool, which would motivate Sudan to remove themselves from the list.[45]

Officials within the Regional Bureaus of the State Department disagreed with this assessment because placing Sudan on the "terrorism list" complicates their job of diplomacy through continued communications.[46] Experts at the Regional Bureaus argued

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[43] See annual US State Department on Terrorism sections pertinent to Sudan. Office of the Secretary of State Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1998, *Overview of State Sponsored Terrorism,* Department of State Publication 10535, 1998; available from http://www.state.gov/www/ global/terrorism/1998Report/sponsor.html#Sudan; Internet; accessed 16 August 1999.

[44] A National Security Strategy for a New Century, May 1997; available from http://www.whitehouse.gov/WH/EOP/NSC/Strategy/; Internet; accessed 5 August 1999.

[45] David Tucker, interview by author, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, Ca., 14 August 1999.

[46] Ibid.

by breaking communications, strategic opportunities would be missed to enhance other US concerns, including humanitarian issues, democratization, and promotion of new markets for US goods.

Economic sanctions are a deliberate curtailment or cessation of economic or financial relations in order to coerce the target government. Unilateral sanctions usually do not cause sanctioned states to change their behavior and may cause the sanctioned state or its population to become more recalcitrant.[47] Still economic sanctions may be effective because of the signal they send about the intentions of the country imposing the sanctions.[48] However this does not seem to be the case in Sudan.

Sanctions have had very little economic effect on the Sudanese regime. Sudan is on the verge of unprecedented economic growth, with China and France continuing to increase their investments in the country. These and other countries are building their economic and political influence with Sudan while US influence is waning. As a result, US businesses are bearing the brunt of the US terrorism policy, causing them to question the effectiveness of a unilateral policy of economic sanctions.

Recently a Caterpillar Inc. representative testified before the Senate that he feared the administration's actions towards Sudan were inconsistent. If Sudan is such a threat, then the US should militarily enforce multilateral rather than unilateral sanctions. William Lane explained:

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[47] David Tucker, *Skirmishes at the Edge of the Empire: The United States and International Terrorism*, 85.

[48] Ibid., 85-87.

You will recall that on November 4, 1997 President Clinton declared a "national emergency." At that time the President imposed a comprehensive trade and investment embargo against a country that he declared "constitutes an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United. States." Last month, we discussed this issue with more than 30 members of a House of Representatives and asked if any of them could name the target country. We didn't have a single correct response...... Perhaps what is most disappointing is that we learned from both USTR and State that following the imposition of the embargo, at the APEC conference in Vancouver, the US didn't even mention the Sudan "threat" nor attempt to win multilateral support for sanctions. If the U.S. government truly believes Sudan represents a "national threat" shouldn't there be a serious effort to enlist help from our allies and trading partners?[49]

Moreover, Lane explained how unilateral sanctions were hurting US businesses while helping their competitors:

While few in Congress took notice of America's new Sudan policy, regrettably our biggest worldwide competitor -- Komatsu of Japan -- did. Immediately after the announcement, Komatsu took out newspaper ads in Khartoum announcing its new Sudan sales and support locations. Three weeks ago their initiative paid off when Komatsu won an important contract to sell Sudan hydraulic excavators. Caterpillar also lost a $35 million engine contract to a Malaysian company that is doing business in Sudan. On December 19, 1997, we asked the President permission to just sell agricultural products in Sudan so there would be enough commercial activity for our Sudan dealer to weather this difficult period. To date we have not received a substantive response. Consequently, our Sudan dealer now faces a tough choice: layoff 600 employees or affiliate with a Japanese company.[50]

China, France, and other European countries including Britain are making significant inroads into Sudan's developing economy while US firms are excluded. In

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[49] William C. Lane, Washington Director of Governmental Affairs Caterpillar, Inc., Testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on International Economic Policy, Export and Trade Promotion Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 25 March 1998, [Service on-line]; available from Lexis-Nexis, software version 7.1, accessed 5 June 1999.

[50] Ibid.

1997, Arakis, a Canadian firm, attempted to get financing for its oil project through a joint venture with Occidental Petroleum of Bakersfield, California. The Clinton administration granted Occidental a special exemption from its terrorism policy and allowed it to compete for $1 billion dollars worth of potential oil contracts in Sudan. The New York Times reported:

> Washington's policy toward the Sudanese regime now seems hopelessly confused. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright did little to clarify it at her introductory news conference last Friday. Even as she called for new United Nations sanctions against Sudan, she endorsed the decision to let Occidental bid for the oil contract.[51]

However, Sudan's "Islamic Fundamentalist regime" vetoed Occidental's participation.[52]

While oil is available from other countries high quality gum arabic[53] is produced almost exclusively by Sudan.[54] Gum arabic is an essential ingredient in a wide variety of products important to the US economy. Before the imposition of the sanctions, Sudan was the principal supplier of gum arabic to the US; now US companies have been forced

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[51] Editorial Desk , "Headline: Oil Deals and Arms Sales", *New York Times*, 27 January 1997, Late Edition, Section A; Page 20; Column 1.

[52] Yahya el Hassan, "Sudan Inaugurates Oil Export Pipeline", Panafrican News Agency, 31 May 1999, available from http://www.africanews.org/east/sudan/, Internet; accessed 9 June 1999.

[53] Gum arabic is a remarkable substance. It is used in products purchased every day by United States consumers. In pharmaceuticals, gum arabic is used as a binder in tableting. In cough syrups it is used as a demulcent. In the flavor and beverage industries it is a preferred emulsifier. Gum arabic is used to stabilize foam in the manufacture of soft drinks and beer and to clarify wine. As an emulsifier, gum arabic provides excellent shelf-life stability to oil-in-water emulsions unmatched by synthetic additives. In cosmetics, it functions as a stabilizer in lotions and screens. Gum arabic increases the viscosity of cosmetics, imparts spreading properties, and gives a protective coating and smooth feel. The product is vital to the United States economy. No substitutes match gum arabic's extraordinary film-foaming and emulsifying qualities.

[54] Eighty percent of all gum arabic is produced in Sudan, but more important, to US businesses, is that the finest quality gum arabic is found in Sudan.

to pay more for lower quality gum arabic from neighboring Chad.[55]

Sudan has a ready market for gum arabic throughout Europe and particularly in France. Since the imposition of the US sanctions French gum arabic processors have doubled their imports from Sudan and have moved aggressively to gain market share in the US and its export markets.[56] Those who benefit the most from US unilateral sanctions against Sudan are foreign business competitors.

## B. THE AFFECT OF ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM ON US TERRORISM POLICY

Concerns over the threat of Islamic Fundamentalism have unduly influenced the severity of the US terrorism policy towards Sudan. Since Sudan is the only "Islamic Fundamentalist regime" in Africa, it has received a great deal attention concerning the threat it might pose to US interests in Africa and Middle East.[57] The year before the US placed Sudan on its "terrorism list", the US Congress was concerned that Sudan and Iran might be forming an "Islamic axis"[58] intent on promoting "Islamic Fundamentalist regimes" in the region.[59] Although, Sudanese Foreign Minister, Ali Ahmet Sahlool,

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[55] Testimony on 27 May 1993 by Shirley Christian, Business Manager Frutarom, Inc, Before the Subcommittee on Trade of the House Committee on Ways and Means Hearing on the Use and Effect of Unilateral Trade Sanctions, 3 June 1999, [Service on-line], available from Lexis-Nexis, software version 7.1, accessed 5 June 1999.

[56] Ibid.

[57] "The Islamic Threat" illustrates how the West has distorted the threat of both Iran and Sudan. *The Economist*, 13 March 1993, [Service on-line]; available from Lexis-Nexis, software version 7.1, accessed 14 October 1998.

[58] House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Africa, *Recent Trends in Islamic Fundamentalism in Africa North and South of the Sahara*, 102nd Cong., 2d sess., 1992, ISBN 016-0401283-3.

[59] Jennifer Parmelee, Sudan Denies 'Khartoum-Tehran Axis' To Promote Islamic Regimes in Africa,

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denied that his country and Iran are building an axis to the detriment of other countries in the region.[60]  Robert G. Houdek, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, stated: "this drive to set up Islamic states is the real long term threat."[61]

Dr. al-Turabi acknowledges that the Sudanese policy of allowing free entry to all citizens of Arab countries means occasionally members of Islamic extremist groups and political refugees[62] have been in the country.[63]  Sudan's open door policy is affected by its Islamic ideology as professed by al-Turabi, Sudan's leading Islamic ideologue and de facto political leader.  Al-Turabi argues that nation-state borders are a western invention that has no precedent or place in an Islamic world.  He believes that in Islamic states, Muslims should be able to work and live where they choose unconstrained by artificial borders.[64]  Additionally, Sudan's open door policy is practical because its long borders are hard to monitor and regulate.  Sudan borders nine countries and has a relatively small military that is preoccupied with the civil war in the South.

Fear of an "Iran-Sudan axis" and the open door policy of Sudan have influenced

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Washington post, March 12 1992. [Service on-line], Available from Lexis-Nexis, Software version 7.1. accessed 5 November 1999.

[60] Ibid.

[61] Ibid.

[62] Graham Fuller, interview by author, phone conversation, Retired CIA desk officer for the Middle East Region, Monterey, Ca., 10 September 1999.

[63] Sean Gabb, ed., Islam, Democracy, the State and the West: A Round Table with Dr Hassan al-Turabi. London, United Kingdom: The Sudan Foundation, 1997, Internet; available from http://www.sufo.demon.co.uk/reli005.htm, accessed 19 October 1998.

[64] Sean Gabb, Islam as a Pan-National Movement and Nation-States: An Islamic Doctrine of Human Association, London, United Kingdom: The Sudan Foundation, 1997. Internet; available from http://www.sufo.demon.co.uk/ reli002.htm. accessed 19 October 1998.

the US terrorism policy. Even though Sudan is not accused of state sponsored terrorism, it is treated equally harshly if not more so than other countries on the "terrorism list" such as Iran, Iraq, Syria, and North Korea. By 1997 Mr. Kenneth McKune, Acting Coordinator for Counter Terrorism at the US State Department, testified before the Africa Foreign Relations Committee that the US still did not have any evidence that Sudan has provided support for specific operations.[65] Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that the severity of the US terrorism policy is influenced by more than the actual terrorism threat, the general fear of "Islamic Fundamentalism". Chapter IV is devoted to a more complete consideration of the level of threat posed by Sudan.

## C.    US TERRORISM POLICY IS INFLUENCED BY POLITICS

Politics played a major role in the decision to put Sudan on the "terrorism list". Although the Secretary of State ultimately determines whether a country is a state sponsor of international terrorism, the executive and legislative branches wield considerable influence. The Congress is able to exert pressure in determining who gets on the list because it controls the annual operating budget of the State Department and Congressional members and committee staffers often have decided opinions.[66] Additionally, there are many lobbies in the US that influence both Congress and the Executive Branch. These lobbies and congressmen whom they seek to influence may be

[65] Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *Sudan and Terrorism:Statement before the Subcommittee on Africa*, Washington D.C.; available from http://www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism/ mckune_970515.html; Internet; accessed 23 November 1998.

[66] Rodney Kennedy-Minott, interview by author, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, Ca., 30 November 1999.

biased against a country for reasons other than terrorism.[67] Hence, there may be any

number of political reasons why a country is either put on the or left off the list.[68]

For example, Poland and East Germany were never placed on the list despite their

support of Abu Nidal, one the most notorious terrorists during the Cold War.[69] This

support included providing safe havens and front companies to Abu Nidal.[70] Iraq is

another good example of the role politics plays in which countries are put on the

"terrorism list". The Reagan administration, in 1992, successfully pressured the State

Department to remove Iraq from its "terrorism list".[71] This allowed the US to provide

military and economic aid intended to prevent Iran from winning the Iran/Iraq war (1981-

1988).[72]

The most recent example of political influence on US terrorism policy is President

Clinton's easing of trade, banking, and travel restrictions against North Korea. In return

the communist government of North Korea has pledged to forgo testing of long-range

missiles capable of hitting Japan and possibly Hawaii. Since North Korea will remain on

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[67] David Tucker, interview by author, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, Ca., 14 August 1999.

[68] Ibid.

[69] Ibid.

[70] Ibid.

[71] Elaine Sciolino, "U.S. Documents Raise Questions Over Iraq Policy", *The New York Times,* 7 June 1992, Sunday, Late Edition - Final, Section 1; Page 1; Column 5; Foreign Desk, [Service on-line], available from Lexis-Nexis, Software version 7.1, accessed 20 August 1999.

[72] During the latter part of the 1980's, Congress demanded that Iraq be put back on the list because of indications that Iraq was harboring terrorists and inflicting gross human rights violations on its Kurdish population. However, the State Department was opposed to putting Iraq back on the list and did so only after Iraq attacked Kuwait in 1990.

the State Department's "terrorism list", there will be no easing of the ban on US weapons, missile-related technology, and foreign and economic aid, except humanitarian assistance. The US is taking these steps to improve relations with North Korea.[73] This policy shift also received praise from the Japanese Foreign Minister who hoped this would lead to further strengthening of relations between North Korea and the US.[74] Joe Lockhart, the White House Press Secretary, stated:

> I think clearly they have an interest in expanding trade and economic development. This is about trade and investment, not about opening up other assistance or loosening other restrictions we have against North Korea as a terrorist state.[75]

By looking at the vastly different ways the US has dealt with terrorism in such countries as Poland, East Germany, Iraq, and North Korea it is evident the US policies on terrorism are subjective and inconsistent. More importantly, however, is the defining difference between the countries mentioned above and Sudan is Sudan's "Islamic Fundamentalist regime".

Similarly, special interest groups in the US[76] are shaping policy to the detriment of future relations with Sudan. These groups lump Sudan with extremist groups or "Islamic Fundamentalist regimes" that are unfriendly to the US and its Middle East

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[73] WASHINGTON (AP), "Clinton Eases Sanctions on North Korea," *Investor's Business Daily,* 20 September 1999, sec. A12.

[74] Ibid.

[75] Ibid.

[76] According to Fuller, Egypt and Israel have significant lobbies in Washington D.C., while Sudan has no lobbyists and minimal political presence. Graham Fuller, interview by author, phone conversation, Retired CIA desk officer for the Middle East Region, Monterey, Ca., 10 September 1999.

allies.[77] The importance of the US relationship with Egypt and Israel weighs heavily in US policy decisions regarding countries in the Middle East. The US for a long time has viewed Egypt as a critical military, political, and strategic ally in the Middle East region. For two decades, the bilateral relationship between the US and Egypt has been a centerpiece of US policy to bolster peace and security in the Middle East.[78] This is evidenced by the large amounts of foreign aid Egypt and Israel receive from the US. From the Cold War to the present, over fifty percent of the annual foreign aid distributed by the US goes to these two countries.[79]

Since the end of the Cold War, Egypt and Israel have had a significant interest in overstating the terrorist or militant threat of Islamic regimes. According to Beinen and Stork in *Political Islam*: "Palestinian Islamists alone hardly warrant the over $3 billion in military and economic security aid Israel receives from the United States each year."[80] Without a serious threat in the region, it is going to be increasingly difficult for Egypt and Israel to justify why they should continue receive over fifty percent of the annual US foreign aid. Sudan provides a convenient target because of its alleged support of "Islamic Fundamentalist groups" with grievances against Egypt and Israel.

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[77] Testimony by Mr. Jason F. Isaacson, Director of Government and International affairs, American Jewish Committee. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee On International Relations, *The Threat of Islamic Extremism in Africa: Hearing before Subcommittee On Africa,* 104th Cong., 1st sess., 6 April 1995, 9. Underline added by the author of this paper.

[78] Congress, House, Committee on International Relations, *U.S. Policy towards Egypt,* Washington D.C.; available from http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/intlrel/hfa43413.000/hfa43413_0.html; Internet; accessed 4 November 1999.

[79] Ibid.

[80] Joel Beinin and Joe Stork, ed., *Political Islam:Essays from Middle East Report,* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1997), 18.

Ironically, year after year there are more terrorist attacks perpetrated against US interests in Latin America than anywhere in the world.[81]  However, these attacks in the US are rarely noticed.  For example, in 1993 the US embassy in Peru was attacked, yet the story did not appear in the Washington Post.  According to Mr. Perl:

> We have hostages in Latin America, which comes as a surprise to a lot of people because we had hostages in the Middle East and the country was wrapped around the issue of how we're going to free these people.  We've had hostages in being held in Latin America for years, and the country is not mobilized to worry about it because most people don't know about it.[82]

Terrorist attacks in Latin America don't get the same coverage that an attack in the Middle East generates.[83]  As a result of this increased media attention, the terrorism policy of the US is numerically biased against the Middle East region.  Four out of the six countries on the State Department's "terrorism list" are from the Middle East region.

The examples of Poland, East Germany, Iraq, North Korea, Egypt, Israel, and Latin America all demonstrate the flexibility of the US terrorism policy.  This section has shown that economic sanctions have lessened US influence in the region and hurt US businesses.  It has also demonstrated that there is a myriad of ways to handle countries involved in terrorism.  The fear of Islamic Fundamentalism is the differentiating factor between Sudan and other countries.  Chapter four will assess whether this fear is justified.

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[81] Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence U.S. House of Representatives, *Terrorism—Looking Ahead: Issues and Options for Congress,* report prepared by the Congressional Research Service Library of Congress, 104th Cong., 2d sess., 1995,  Committee Print, 8.

[82] Ibid.

[83] Ibid.

## D.    CONSEQUENCES OF TERRORISM POLICY

This section will argue that placing Sudan on the terrorism list in 1993 and slapping them with additional sanctions in 1997 has eroded US influence and affected other policy objectives, without achieving a significant reduction in terrorism. Since the US closed its embassy in 1996, it has been hard to get reliable information out of Sudan. The US must depend upon foreign intelligence agencies and a host of anonymous sources for its anti-terrorism information on Sudan. According to Michael Barletta, a senior research assistant at the Monterey Institute for International Studies:

> Since the United States withdrew all diplomatic and intelligence personnel from the Sudan in January 1996, it has had to rely on informants whose allegiance and reliability are not always assured. Shortly after all US personnel were evacuated due to fear of imminent terrorist threats against Americans, the CIA retracted over 100 intelligence reports-including those spurring the fear of attacks and linking the Sudanese government to terrorist actions-because it concluded that the source of the reports was a fabricator.

> Based on this and other informants' reports of terrorist threats that were not corroborated and never materialized, an unidentified Clinton administration official told *The New York Times* that 'the decision to target Al Shifa continues a tradition of operating on inadequate intelligence about Sudan.

> Unidentified US officials who question the US attack on Shifa said that dubious intelligence has driven US policy toward Sudan for at least the last three years. Hence the reliability of the informant who collected the sample is questionable, and it is possible that the agent could have deliberately tainted the sample or collected it from another location in the Sudan.[84]

The US bombed a Sudanese factory in 1998 for allegedly producing chemical

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[84] Michael Barletta, *Chemical Weapons in the Sudan: Allegations and Evidence,* The Nonproliferation Review, vol 6 no.1, Fall 1998, available from http://cns.miis.edu/iiop/cnsdata?Action=1&Concept =0&Mime=1&collection=CNS+Web+Site&Key=pubs%2Fnpr%2Fbarlet61%2Ehtm&QueryText=%3CAN D%3E%28%3Cthesaurus%3Esudan%29, Internet; accessed 4 November 1999.

agents for bin Laden's terrorist groups. The US cited hard, but secret, evidence of nerve gas chemical production.[85] The Clinton administration says soil samples from the area contain Empta, a chemical not found in nature and with no known uses outside the manufacture of the deadly nerve gas VX.[86]

Citing security reasons, the US government will not produce the samples or detailed results of its tests on the soil.[87] Sudanese authorities insist that the plant only produced pharmaceuticals, noting that the United Nation's sanctions committee had authorized the Shifa factory to export veterinary medicine to Iraq. Sudan has invited an international mission to come and collect its own soil samples. However, the US has vetoed requests calling for an investigation by the United Nations and African regional organizations.[88]

Islamic hard-liners in Sudan and other countries went on the offensive calling for militant Islamic groups to strike back at the US for what they feel was an unjust attack against an Islamic country. According to Jane Perlez: "Turabi branded the United States a 'terrorist' nation for its attack and accused it of hating Islam."[89]

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[85] Michael Barletta, *Chemical Weapons in the Sudan: Allegations and Evidence*, The Nonproliferation Review, vol 6 no.1, Fall 1998, available from http://cns.miis.edu/iiop/cnsdata?Action=1&Concept =0&Mime=1&collection=CNS+Web+Site&Key=pubs%2Fnpr%2Fbarlet61%2Ehtm&QueryText=%3CAN D%3E%28%3Cthesaurus%3Esudan%29, Internet; accessed 4 November 1999.

[86] Ibid.

[87] Ibid.

[88] Ibid.

[89] Perlez, Jane, "For This Islamic Tactician, Battle With U.S. Has Begun", The New York Times on the Web, 24 August 1998; available from http://www.nytimes.com/library/world/africa/ 082498attack-sudan.html, Internet; accessed 8 September 1999.

Military action against Sudan has increased the threat of future terrorist actions against the US from independent groups.[90] According to Serge Schmemann: "It is most likely that the targets of the action and their supporters will lash back."[91] Groups such as bin Laden's have stepped up their rhetoric campaign against Americans at home and abroad. During an interview with a New York Times reporter, al-Turabi indicated that he thought bin Laden would try to retaliate against the US. Al-Turabi said: "When you start fortifying your embassies it becomes very attractive, the Americans have made themselves very attractive targets."[92] Turabi also predicted: "Probably bin Laden would try to mobilize friends, ex-Afghan fighters from Arab countries, and try to hit back against the Americans anywhere."[93]

The leadership of Sudan is convinced that the US terrorism policy is part of an overall strategy to topple the Islamic regime. As evidence they cite US support for Southern Sudanese rebels:

> Khartoum has long charged that Washington supports the rebellion in the mostly Christian and animist south of the country that has cost more than 1 million people their lives and has led to three famines in the last decade, the latest this year in Bar el Ghazal.

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[90] If attacked militarily, a country may respond violently against interests of the attacking nation regardless of the reasons given for the attack. Since the decision to bomb the factory was based on questionable information, it has unnecessarily increased the risk of terrorism against Americans.

[91] Serge Schmemann, "In the War Against Terrrorism, Any Attack has Pros and Cons". The New York Times on the Web, 21 August 1998, available from http://www.nytimes.com/library/world/africa/082198attack-assess.html, Internet; accessed 21 September 1999.

[92] Perlez, Jane, "For This Islamic Tactician, Battle With U.S. Has Begun", The New York Times on the Web, 24 August 1998; available from http://www.nytimes.com/library/world/africa/ 082498attack-sudan.html, Internet; accessed 8 September 1999.

[93] Ibid.

The Clinton administration denies it supports the rebels directly, but it acknowledges giving non-lethal military aid to Uganda, Eritrea and Ethiopia, who have in turn have funneled arms, radios and other equipment to the rebels.

US officials have also made it plain the US supports the rebellion's goals... Many in Khartoum see the rebellion as part of a US strategy to destabilize Sudan and eventually force the government to fall.

The endless war also serves US goals in the Middle East. It weakens Khartoum's ability to support Islamic militants opposed to the government in Egypt, the most important US ally in the Arab world and a counterbalance to Israel.[94]

Overall, US terrorism policy has lessened US influence regarding Sudan in the United Nations, has countered US strategic objective of reducing Libyan and Iranian influence in Africa, and has inspired additional anti-American rhetoric, and increased the threat of terrorism from radical Islamic groups.

The US National Security Strategy goal to "diminish the influence of Libya and Iran in Africa"[95] is being undermined by a terrorism policy that isolates and labels Sudan a pariah state. In its infancy, Sudan's "Islamic Fundamentalist regime" experienced significant economic difficulties because of debts accumulated by previous regimes, mounting civil war costs, widespread famines, and two coup attempts. At the same time, the US was building its case for multilateral sanctions to the United Nations. As a result, the future of the "Islamic Fundamentalist" regime was in doubt.[96] Therefore, Sudan

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[94] James C. McKinley, "U.S.-Sudanese Tensions Finally Erupt Into Open Warfare", New York Times on the Web, 21 August 1998, [Service on-line];available from http://www.nytimes.com/library/world/africa/082198attack-sudan.html, accessed 8 September 1999.

[95] A National Security Strategy for a New Century, May 1997; available from http://www.whitehouse.gov/WH/EOP/NSC/Strategy/; Internet; accessed 5 August 1999.

[96] James Wyllie, Sudan – going for Broke, Jane's Intelligence Review, vol 6 no. 5; 1 May 1994, [Service on-line]; available from Lexis-Nexis, software version 7.1, accessed 4 November 1999.

turned to radical Middle East regimes such as Libya and Iran for economic and military help. The Sudanese regime made concessions to Iran allowing Iranian sponsored groups into Sudan in return for low interest loans needed for basic necessities such as oil and food.[97] This economic and military relationship has increased Iranian influence in Sudan, which straddles the Arab and African world.

The US is unable to garner multilateral support against Sudan because Western and Asian countries have developed economic relations with Sudan. The "Islamic Fundamentalist regime" has encouraged other countries to invest in Sudan and many of these countries do not have the same regional interests or foreign policy philosophies as the US. China and France, for instance, have been actively pursuing economic and military interests in Sudan. Both of these countries have veto rights on the United Nations Security Council, which they have used to thwart efforts by the US to implement multilateral sanctions against Sudan.

In short, US terrorism policy has reduced its influence in the UN Security Council, strengthened Iranian ties to Africa, angered citizens of Sudan, inspired radical Islamic militant groups, and cut the US off from accurate information about what is really happening in Sudan. Therefore, economic sanctions and military action taken by the US have been counterproductive.

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[97] Dalia Baligh, *Iran Spreads Influence to Africa with Military experts, Weapons,* The Associated Press, 20 January 1992, [Service on-line]; available from Lexis-Nexis, software version 7.1, accessed 4 November 1999.

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## IV.   THREAT OF ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM FROM SUDAN

This chapter looks at whether Sudan can spread its "Islamic Fundamentalist" ideology to neighboring countries.   It examines the roots, emergence, and political strategy of the National Islamic Front (NIF), demonstrating there were a number of unique factors in Sudan that enabled the party to grow and assume power.   Additionally, it will review the regional issues that have prevented the spread of "Islamic Fundamentalism" in the past.

### A.   NATIONAL ISLAMIC FRONT'S RISE TO POWER IS UNIQUE TO SUDAN

The rise of the "Islamic Fundamentalists" in Sudan started as a small elite movement in the 1950s.   By 1986, they had grown into a populist movement that garnered twenty percent of the vote in the last democratic election held in Sudan.[98]   The NIF is an outgrowth of the Muslim Brotherhood (*Ikhwan*) which was formed in 1954. During the 1950's, the *Ikhwan* was an ineffectual movement.   However, it gained acceptance in Sudan's universities during the 1960's and Hassan al-Turabi emerged as the most influential leader of the group.[99]

The *Ikhwan*, hereafter referred to as the NIF, movement took on a political identity in 1969 after resolving philosophical differences between its two main factions.[100] The conservative faction favored a non-political approach to preserve the

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[98] Abdel Salam Sidahmed, *Politics and Islam in Contemporary Sudan* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), 191.

[99] Ibid.

[100] Ibid., 192.

purity of the movement. Conservatives believed in a strategy of indoctrination choosing to reform society from the bottom up much like the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt.[101] However, al-Turabi advocated the more radical approach of gaining political power before attempting an Islamic transformation of Sudan.[102]

Only after numerous attempts at overthrowing Jaafar Nimeiri's regime (through alliances with other political parties from 1969-1985) did the NIF realize it would be a negligible minority in any emergent power or even excluded altogether.[103] Therefore, the NIF adopted a strategy of becoming a political force in their own right. In 1977, the NIF reconciled its differences with the Nimeiri regime providing a conducive atmosphere for its growth.[104] However, political autonomy by itself does not explain the rapid growth of the NIF movement.

The NIF was able to evolve into a mass movement because of the unique social and economic factors in Sudan. During the 1970's, President Nimeiri's regime embarked upon an aggressive modernization strategy in Sudan causing a rapid increase in urbanization and educational opportunities.[105] Traditional tribal and clan support networks within the cities could not keep up with the influx of new people, and people

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[101] Ibid.

[102] Ibid.

[103] Ibid., 195.

[104] Ibid.

[105] Helen Chapin Metz, ed., *Sudan a Country Study*, (Washington D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1991), 127-171.

were forced to find other support networks. Islamist organizations became popular because they advocated similar values.[106]

However, many development programs failed creating overcrowding, shantytowns, and high unemployment among the educated and recently arrived city dwellers. Failed state modernization programs is a phenomenon that has increased Islamist organization popularity and influence throughout the Middle East.[107] Through pragmatic social, political, and economic tactics, the NIF was able to provide survival strategies for a large portion of the young educated and newly displaced urban population.

The NIF's political autonomy during the 1970's and 1980's separated it from the other Islamist movements in Sudan. During this period the NIF recruited new members, controlled student unions, selected who entered higher education institutions, set up and manned Islamic civic and relief organizations, broke into state bureaucracies and parliamentary positions all with the tacit approval of the Sudanese administration.

Additionally the NIF benefited from the oil boom of the seventies and the subsequent proliferation of Islamic-Saudi banks. Since the NIF enjoyed privileged status with the Saudis and its members were well educated, they formed the managerial and labor pool for Saudi Islamic banks in Sudan.[108] According to Abdelmoula:

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[106] Glenn Robinson, Professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, Interview by author, Monterey, Ca, Fall Quarter 1998.

[107] Alan Richards, Professor of Economics at University of California, Santa Cruz, "Toward a Political Economy of Islamism: Grievances and Collective Action", April 1995, Article Contained in Course Reader for NS4310 Islamic Fundamentalism: Theory and Practice, Fall Quarter 1998, 11.

[108] Joel Beinin and Joe Stork, ed., *Political Islam:Essays from Middle East Report*, 18.

> The significance of the Islamic financial institutions is that they opened up avenues of economic mobility for many who would otherwise have been at the most civil servants. In this the significance of the *Ikwhan* movement is that it became one of the important avenues of social, political and economic mobility on merit for young people who would have otherwise lacked the necessary connections.[109]

As a result of these socio-economic factors, the popularity of the NIF increased significantly.

During popular elections in 1986, the NIF received almost twenty percent of the vote, finishing a distant third to the two traditional Islamic parties.[110] Although its goal of establishing political power before launching an Islamist program was not possible, NIF members were well established in essential leadership positions of important institutions such as the military, labor unions, universities, and banks.[111] In 1989, Colonel Umar Hassan Ahmad al Bashir led a successful coup, against an ineffective coalition government in Sudan.[112]

It took the NIF over thirty years to attain their goal of transforming Sudan into an "Islamic Fundamentalist regime". The NIF realized its grass roots strategy would take too long and adopted new top-down political strategy. According to Abdelmoula:

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[109] Abdel Salam Sidahmed, *Politics and Islam in Contemporary Sudan,* 209.

[110] Adam M Abdelmoula, "The Fundamentalist Agenda for Human Rights: The Sudan and Algeria," *Arab studies Quarterly* 18, no.1 (Winter 1996): 5 of 26, [Service on Line: Proquest], ISSN 02713519, Naval Postgraduate School Library, Monterey.

[111] Interview with former Sudanese government official who asked to remain anonymous. This former government official saw how NIF members assumed key government leadership positions enabling them to carry out the political and social agendas of the NIF, July 1999.

[112] Helen Chapin Metz, ed., *Sudan a Country Study,* (Washington D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1991), xxv.

> The bulk of the membership was assigned the paramount duty of achieving power and creating the materiel conditions in which religion could be applied experimentally. In other words, achieving power comes first and in-depth knowledge and application of Islam come next.[113]

The NIF also took advantage of Nemieri's failed modernization programs to recruit new members. Finally they were well placed in leadership positions during and following the coup. According to al-Turabi, these unique factors came together at critical times and if any of these elements had not been in place, the NIF would have remained a theoretical movement instead of an actualized political force.[114]

## B.    REGIONAL CONTRAINTS

As demonstrated earlier in this thesis, the US is concerned that Sudan will spread its Islamic fundamentalism form of government to other countries, which if realized would affect the political stability of allies such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia. However, there are significant constraining factors in the region because of a lack of central leadership among Islamic states, Sunni/Shiia differences, and the Persia/Arab divide. Therefore, Pan-Islamism whether led by Sudan or another country will be difficult to achieve.

During the 1960's and 1970's when Nasser emerged as the dominant leader in the Middle East region, he worked with Sudan, Syria, and Libya to form a federation of Arab countries. However, Nasser never accomplished more than pulling these states together for discussion purposes.[115] Nasser could not convince leaders to give up the sovereignty

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[113] Adam M Abdelmoula, "The Fundamentalist Agenda for Human Rights:The Sudan and Algeria", 5.

[114] Ibid., 20.

[115] David E.Long and Bernard Reich, 3d ed. *The Government and Politics of the Middle East and North*

of their states to become part of a larger entity. Additionally, for the leaders of these nations, a pan-Arabic state also means sharing or relinquishing power and potentially being relegated to a tertiary role,[116] which few are willing to risk. Since its revolution in 1979, the Islamic leaders in Iran have also been trying to form and lead a coalition of Islamic states. However, they too have failed. If Iran and Egypt are unable to achieve a centralizing leadership role, then it is doubtful that other countries in the Middle East region will follow the leadership of their weak African cousin, Sudan.

Even if the problem of centralized leadership were overcome, ideological differences pose a larger obstacle towards unification.[117] For example, both historically and in modern times, Sunni/Shiia differences have prevented unification among groups that otherwise have much in common. According to Oliver Roy: "ten years of Iranian Islamic revolution have shown that, despite Tehran's effort to make headway in Sunni milieus, the opposition between Shiites and Sunnis remains a key aspect of the contemporary Islamic world."[118]

The historical enmity between Arabian and Persian civilizations is even a greater obstacle to unification than that of the Sunni/Shiia differences.[119] Olivier Roy writes:

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*Africa* (Boulder and Oxford: Westview Press, 1995), 364.

[116] Glenn Robinson, Professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, Interview by author, Monterey, Ca, Fall Quarter 1998.

[117] Ibid.

[118] Olivier Roy, *The Failure of Political Islam* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press,1996), 123.

[119] Glenn Robinson, Professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, Interview by author, Monterey, Ca, Fall Quarter 1998.

The great ethnic, religious, and national divisions of the Muslim world are turning out to be stronger than all the calls for Islamic solidarity. Although this imaginary solidarity still has the power to mobilize popular support, it cannot provide the basis for an Islamist international union.

Consequently, it is doubtful that Iran, a Persian country, will form an effective "Islamic-axis" with Sudan, a predominantly Arabic country.

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## V.     STRATEGIC INTERESTS

While there are many reasons the US should build better relations with Sudan, combating new terrorism threats and maintaining access to vast supplies of oil are two of the most important.

## A.     TERRORISM

As noted in section D of Chapter One, the new terrorism threat is from loosely knit Islamic extremist groups instead of established groups with well known political agendas. Since the incidence of state sponsored terrorism has significantly declined, the emphasis of US counterterrorism activities needs to shift from combating known groups of state sponsored terrorism to focusing on groups with no names.[120]

During a congressional seminar on terrorism, Ralph Perl, a specialist in international terrorism policy stated:

> They are individuals who come together—Islamic extremists from a variety of countries who happen to find each other in New Jersey or Manilla and get together an decide "Lets go do something." My friends and I call them the wandering "Mujahaddin" or the wandering "Muji" for short. But there is no official name because they are not groups. And it makes it much harder to find them because we don't know their structure, we don't know their organization because, indeed, there is no such thing.[121]

Attacks on a US military installation in Saudi Arabia, the World Trade Center bombing, and the subsequent bombings of two US embassies in 1998 elevated non-state actors as

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[120] Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence U.S. House of Representatives, *Terrorism—Looking Ahead: Issues and Options for Congress,* report prepared by the Congressional Research Service Library of Congress, 104th Cong., 2d sess., 1995, Committee Print, 1.

[121] Ibid., 5.

the leading terrorism threat against US security interests.[122]   Louis Freeh, Director of

Federal Bureau of Investigations, stated:

> These loosely affiliated extremists may pose the most urgent threat to the
> United States at this time because their membership is relatively unknown
> to the law enforcement, and because they can exploit the mobility that
> emerging technology and a loose organizational structure offer.[123]

Over the past decade, the US has focused its anti-terrorism efforts on state-

sponsors of terrorism, forbidding trade with countries like Sudan and Iran.  However, the

emergence of sophisticated, privately financed networks of loosely-knit terrorist groups

poses a new set of diplomatic challenges for the US government.  According to Phillip C.

Wilcox, Jr., Head of the State Department Counterterrorism Office: "Identifying and

taking action against individuals who support terrorist groups is much more complicated

than moving against rogue states."[124]

US law enforcement agencies have found it difficult to combat "boutique"

terrorist groups because of legal constraints and a lack of intelligence information due to

the adversarial terrorism policy imposed on Sudan by the US.  The Central Intelligence

Agency and Federal Bureau of Investigations are restricted in their ability to collect and

penetrate religious groups, thus making it difficult to monitor Islamic groups in the

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[122] Office of the Secretary of State Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Patterns of Global
Terrorism: 1998, *Overview of State Sponsored Terrorism,* Department of State Publication 10535, 1998;
available from http://www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism/1998Report/sponsor.html, Internet; accessed 9
November 1999.

[123] Louis J. Freeh, *Threats of U.S. National Security,* 28 January 1998, available from
http://www.fbi.gov/pressrm/congress/98archives/threats/htm, Internet; accessed 9 November 1999.

[124] Jeff Girth and Judy Miller, "Funds for Terrorists Traced to Persian Gulf Businessmen", The New York
Times on the Web, 14 August 1996; available from http://partners.nytimes.com/library/world/
africa/081496binladen.html?Partner=PBS&RefId=Eutttn-uFBqv, Internet; accessed 8 November 1999.

future.[125] Additionally, reliable and timely intelligence information is crucial because the US requires legal proof before taking action against individuals like "boutique" terrorists or their supporters. Therefore, sharing information with other countries is essential because the "boutique" terrorism threat is often trans-national. However, according to Girth and Miller: "experts inside and outside of the US government stated the biggest obstacle to legal action is the reluctance of intelligence agencies to share information with other countries or law enforcement official."[126] Consequently, the US government is ill suited to combat this new threat due to the absence of American diplomats and intelligence capabilities in Sudan.[127]

Al-Turabi could be a valuable source of information because he has established relations with many Islamic groups in the Middle East region as evidenced when he created the Popular Arab and Islamic Conference (PAIC) in 1991. In 1995, for instance, several hundred delegates from Islamist organizations and movements in eighty countries attended the third annual PAIC conference. According to Ivan Bodansky, the seniority of the participants and the location of important meetings best expressed the importance of al-Turabi. He states:

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[125] Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence U.S. House of Representatives, *Terrorism—Looking Ahead: Issues and Options for Congress,* report prepared by the Congressional Research Service Library of Congress, 104th Cong., 2d sess., 1995, Committee Print, 31.

[126] Jeff Girth and Judy Miller, "Funds fir Terrorists Traced to Persian Gulf Businessmen", The New York Times on the Web, 14 August 1996; available from http://partners.nytimes.com/library/world/africa/081496binladen.html?Partner=PBS&RefId=Eutttn-uFBqv, Internet; accessed 8 November 1999.

[127]Tim Weiner, "U.S. Case Against bin Laden in Embassy Blasts Seems to Rest on Ideas", The New York Times on the Web, 13 April 1999, Internet; available from http://www.nytimes.com/library/world/africa/bin-laden-index.html, accessed 6 October 1999.

While open sessions were taking place at the Hilton, the substantive and top level meetings were being held in office No. 7 on the fifth floor of Friendship Hall: the National Islamic Front (NIF) headquarters. In addition to the three Egyptian terrorist leaders, the participants included Imad Mughniyah and Naim Qassim (HizbAllah), Fathi Shkaki (Palestinian Islamic Jihad), Mussa Abu Marzuk and Muhammad Nezzal (Hamas), Adrian Saad-ad-Din (International Muslim Brotherhood), Abd-al-Majid al-Zandani (Yemen), as well as representatives from Ennadha's consultative council (Tunisia,) Kazi Hussein's Islamic Jihad (Pakistan), representatives from Algeria's Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) and its armed wing.[128]

Bodansky also says that bin Laden was in attendance.[129] If al-Turabi was working with the US, and he has repeatedly indicated a willingness to do so,[130] he could provide information and insights that are currently inaccessible.

Al-Turabi has been a moderating influence in the past and could be an important ally to the US in the future. He has demonstrated his effectiveness in constructively dealing with radical Islamic groups, effectiveness which has been acknowledged by the American and French governments.[131] After the 1992 Algerian election was overturned, al-Turabi persuaded Islamic radical groups to stop their bombing campaigns in Paris. Additionally, al-Turabi mediated between Hamas and Yasser Arafat at the height of the Mid-East peace process when Arafat needed the support of Hamas to move the process

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[128] Ivan Bodansky (contributing editor), *The Mubarek Assassination Attempt takes the Islamist's War to Center Stage,* Defense & Foreign Affairs' Strategic Policy, July 1995 – August 1995. [Service on-line]; available from LEXIS-NEXIS, Research software 7.1.

[129] Ibid.

[130] House Judiciary Committee Crime Subcommittee Prohibition on Financial transactions with Countries supporting Terrorism Act Hearing on H.R. 748, *Federal Document Clearing House Congressional Testimony,* (Federal Document Clearing House, Inc., 1997), 10 June 1997.

[131] Prepared Testimony of Mansoor Ijaz, Chairman Crescent Investment Management, LP, Before the House Judiciary Committee Crime Subcommittee Prohibition on Financial transactions with Countries supporting Terrorism Act Hearing on H.R. 748, *Federal Document Clearing House Congressional Testimony,* (Federal Document Clearing House, Inc., 1997), 10 June 1997.

forward.[132]

Al-Turabi was also instrumental in helping the French government capture "Carlos the Jackal". In 1994, Sudan turned over "Carlos the Jackal", one of the most sought after terrorists in the world.[133] He was handed over to the French government while he was receiving medical care in Khartoum.[134] However, the exchange of favors between Sudan and France had increased even before "Carlos the Jackal" was captured. In 1994, a report in the al-Hayat, the London Arabic Newspaper, stated that:

> Trade between France and Sudan jumped from $25 million in 1992 to $725 million in 1993. France is also giving medical aid to a hospital being built in South Sudan and is helping Sudan prospect for gold...

> France supported Sudan in its efforts to thwart compulsory withdrawal from the International Monetary Fund...[135]

The French have shown that Sudan is key to helping combat terrorism and that promoting diplomatic and economic relations with Sudan is an effective counterterrorism tool.

It may have been easier politically for the Sudanese government to apprehend "Carlos the Jackal" than it would be to turn over an Islamic leader accused of terrorism. However, there are a number of ways an "Islamic Fundamentalist regime" can control Islamic "boutique" terrorists. For example, under Islamic law, Muslims are required to

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[132] Ibid.

[133] Evan Soloman, Anchor, *Sudan Strategy*, Television Show: The National Magazine presented by CBC TV of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, 7 July, 1999, [Service on Line], Available from Lexis-Nexis, Software version 7.1.

[134] Ibid.

[135] "Sudan Mediates between Algeria, France", United Press International, 22 August 1994, [Service on Line], Available from Lexis-Nexis, Software version 7.1.

receive fellow Muslims as "guests" despite their personal feelings towards the "guest". While it is true that an "Islamic Fundamentalist regime" can not turn away a Muslim "guest", it can control him by establishing restrictive guidelines. The "guest" must abide by these guidelines or else risk losing the protection of the "Islamic Fundamentalist regime".[136]

While this concept seems foreign by Western standards, it is nonetheless potentially an extremely powerful and effective way to curtail the activities of Islamic "boutique" terrorists. A recent example of this was the handling of bin Laden by the Taliban government of Afghanistan.[137] Despite facing increased sanctions, the Taliban government has repeatedly refused to turn bin Laden over to the US or a third country for trial. The Taliban stated: "their traditions do not allow them hand over a 'guest' to his enemies."[138] Unless sought after Islamic terrorists violate the conditions placed on them by an "Islamic Fundamentalist regime", they can not be apprehended, ejected, or turned over to the US. With a change in US policy, Sudan could be an important ally in combating the "boutique" variety threat of loosely knit Islamic groups.

**B. OIL**

Oil is important to the US, and Sudan may have the second largest oil and gas

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[136] Ralph Magnus, Professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, Interview by author, Monterey, Ca, Winter Quarter 1998

[137] Ibid.

[138] Amir Shah, Associated Press, "Taliban asks delay in curbs facing U.N. sanctions for refusal to over alleged terrorist", The Monterey County Herald, 14 November 1999.

reserves in Africa.[139] In May of 1999 Sudan confirmed reserves in excess of 800 million barrels.[140] Since less than ten percent of the potential oil areas have been explored, additional drilling and more comprehensive testing is required to determine the actual quantities of oil and gas. Unfortunately, Sudan's endemic civil war has prevented complete exploration and has curtailed development of confirmed deposits near war zones.

The Sudanese government has teamed with a Canadian, Chinese, and Malaysian consortium to start developing its oil infrastructure. Since 1997, China has invested roughly a billion dollars to help Sudan develop its oil infrastructure. Additionally, China has been instrumental in helping Sudan triple its oil output starting in 1999.

Arakis, a Canadian firm, teamed their resources with the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) and Petronas Carigali Overseas of Malaysia. Together these companies have contributed 700 million dollars of capital into the 1,600-kilometer pipeline.[141] The pipeline is designed to carry 450,000 barrels of oil a day, however, it is initially carrying 150,000 barrels per day.[142] Approximately 50,000 barrels will be refined at the Khartoum oil refinery, which is being built by a Chinese firm at a cost of

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[139] Bheki Ghila, A mineral and gas lawyer from South Africa, interview by author, Monterey, Ca., 29 July 1999.

[140] "Sudan Confirms Oil Reserves of 800 Million Barrels", Africa News Service, 13 April 1999, available from http://library.northernlight.com/FB19990413880000047.html?cb=0&sc=0#doc, Internet, accessed 10 November 1999.

[141] Yahya el Hassan, "Sudan Inaugurates Oil Export Pipeline", Panafrican News Agency, 31 May 1999, available from http://www.africanews.org/east/sudan/, Internet; accessed 9 June 1999.

[142] Ibid.

620 million dollars.[143] The oil venture started exporting oil in August of 1999 and is expected to bring in annual revenues of $1 billion US dollars (one tenth of Sudan's current GNP).[144] Initially most of the revenues from the oil projects will go to pay off the development efforts. However, Sudan will eventually have vast new financial resources that could be used to influence loosely-knit Islamic terrorist groups.

Additionally, China's interest in Sudan has strategic implications. Since China's rapidly developing economy will need vast amounts of fuel to sustain its growth in the future, it has formed partnerships with the oil rich "Islamic fundamentalist regime" of Sudan. This partnership with China appears to be altering the balance of power in the Middle East, which could affect Africa. According to Prince Ermias Sahle-Selassie Haile-Selassie:

> All of this is developing at a time of growing polarization between the West and the People's Republic of China (PRC). There is little doubt but that the PRC has already been of significant strategic assistance to Iran, and this assists Iranian support of Sudan and the overall export of radicalism. The fact that the PRC has a treaty alliance with North Korea (DPRK) adds to the texture and substance of an emerging new radical, or at least anti-Western, bloc. It would be easy to sensationalize this as a coherent, planned development of a new bi-polar world. Clearly, it is not: it is a situation which is evolving organically....[145]

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[143] Ibid.

[144] "Drillbits & Tailings: Canadian Oil Company Employs Mercenaries in Sudan", PROJECT underGROUND, August 7, 1997: Page Four, Internet; available from http://www.moles.org/projectUnderground/drillbits/970807/97080704.html, accessed 9 June 1999.

[145] The global community ignores the ongoing crises in the Horn of Africa at its peril, says the President of the Ethiopian Crown Council, Prince Ermias Sahle-Selassie Haile-Selassie. The ramifications of instability affect not only the vital Red Sea-Suez sea lanes, but also the stability of the oil-producing Arabian states, Egypt, the Arab-Israeli peace process and the stability of the Eastern Mediterranean. "The Restoration of Stability along the Red Sea is a Global Priority", Defense & Foreign Affairs' Strategic Policy, February 1999. [Service on-line]; available from LEXIS-NEXIS, Research software 7.1.

Haile-Selassie has some valid concerns. He adds: "The world is by default drifting into new alignments by the coincidence of activities."[146] Oil resources in Sudan could alter the strategic balance of power in the Middle East.

Since relations between the US and Sudan are cool due to an isolationist and sanctions oriented terrorism policy, the US does not have access to the oil in Sudan and US companies are missing business opportunities. If the US had diplomatic relations with Sudan, it would be able to better influence what happens in the region. As things stand, the US is missing an strategic opportunity to increase its influence with a country of increasing strategic importance in the Middle East and sub-Saharan Africa.

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[146] Ibid.

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## VI.   CONCLUSION

This thesis examines the US terrorism policy towards Sudan.  The current US terrorism policy focuses on state sponsored terrorism and does not address the newer threat from "boutique" terrorists.  The decision of the State Department to list Sudan as a terrorist state was influenced by external factors such as politics and the fear of the "Islamic fundamentalist regime" spreading to other countries.  Thus far unilateral sanctions imposed on Sudan have been ineffective and have lessened US influence in the region.  Additionally, it is difficult for the US to obtain accurate information from Sudan that would aid in the fight against terrorism.  Sudan could be an important ally for the US, helping in the fight against "boutique" terrorists, providing oil, and increased business opportunities for US companies.

It is unlikely that further American sanctions will have anything more than psychological impact.  There are no major US firms doing business in Sudan at present.  China and Malaysia have acquired, through their respective national oil companies, large stakes in the southern oil fields, with estimated reserves of some 3.5-4.5 billion barrels, and built the 900 km pipeline to transport oil to Port Sudan on the Red Sea.  Given China's growing oil needs, it is likely any US effort at the United Nations to sanction Sudan over terrorism issues or to block oil sales will be met with a Chinese Security Council veto.  Unilateral sanctions will be even less effective in the future because second stage oil field development will include Russian and French partners, further bolstering Sudan's position in the UN and the ability to thwart unilateral sanctions.[147]

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[147] Prepared Testimony of Mansoor Ijaz, Chairman Crescent Investment Management, LP, Before the House Judiciary Committee Crime Subcommittee Prohibition on Financial transactions with Countries

The US terrorism policy is subjective and inconsistent as demonstrated by Iraq during the Iran/Iraq war, Eastern European countries during the Cold War, and most recently North Korea. The US included Sudan on the state sponsored "terrorism list", and targeted it with equal or harsher sanctions than known state sponsors of terrorism, even though Sudan has never been accused of state sponsored terrorism.

This thesis shows that the threat of Sudan spreading its "Islamic Fundamentalism" in the region is minimal. There are too many cultural, ideological, and philosophical differences between Sudan and other countries that prevent them from joining forces. For example, Iran is Persian and subscribes to Shii Islam, while Sudanese Muslims are Arab and subscribe to Sunni Islam. Each difference is monumental and by itself has historically prevented alliances between countries in the Middle East region. Additionally, it would be highly unlikely that the NIF strategy for achieving political power could be duplicated in other countries: there were a number of unique social, economic, and political opportunities that enabled the NIF to succeed in Sudan. Despite these opportunities, it took the NIF thirty years to build the necessary infrastructure to take control of Sudan and transform it into an "Islamic Fundamentalist regime".

This thesis also demonstrates that a policy of alienation towards Sudan is not in the best interest of the US. These interests include combating the bigger threat of "boutique" terrorism and also maintaining stability in the region. Sudan could be a valuable ally to the US because of its leadership role in the PAIC. Additionally, because of al-Turabi's unique connections with "Islamic Fundamentalist groups", he could help

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supporting Terrorism Act Hearing on H.R. 748, *Federal Document Clearing House Congressional Testimony*, (Federal Document Clearing House, Inc., 1997), 10 June 1997.

contain "boutique" terrorists.

Unfortunately, the current terrorism policy of the US towards Sudan is shortsighted given the evolving nature of terrorism and the strategic interests at stake. In an era when international cooperation is required to crack "boutique" terrorist rings, the time has come to reconsider the effectiveness of economic sanctions and military action against Sudan. Instead of isolating Sudan, the US should engage it.[148] The French government has discovered that diplomacy and economic incentives work well in eliciting Sudan's support in combating terrorism. Sudan has indicated on numerous occasions that it would like to establish better relations with the US.[149] Since the US is willing to work with other "terrorist" countries such as North Korea, the time is right for the US to change its terrorism policy towards Sudan.

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[148] Ibid.

[149] Ibid.

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