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I. KHRUSHCHEV'S DOMESTIC POLICY

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On 5 March 1961, eight years will have passed since the death of Stalin, an event which introduced new developments into the area of Soviet Communist power. Many changes have been instigated in the Soviet Union as well as in the other countries belonging to the Eastern bloc. Thus a system of political, economic, and social relations has been formed which is quite different from the Stalinist one.

This system has not yet transcended a certain developmental stage and still shows many traits of a provisional setup; this is due to the fact that the forces of society which have caused the limited deviation from Stalinism are as yet relatively weak, and have not thus far found their most effective form. This explains why the transition period in which the Soviet Union finds itself since the death of Stalin is still in effect, despite Khrushchev's success in his struggle for leadership.

This indefinite situation, and the lack of agreement between the totalitarian government inherited from Stalin and the realities of the Russia of today have caused many contradictions which are characteristic for the Soviet Union in the era of Khrushchev. These are emphasized by the internal struggles between Soviet leaders, where motivations of foreign and domestic policy are often so entangled that they can hardly be distinguished from one another.

Three different tendencies have determined the development of Soviet politics since the death of Stalin: the restorative (in the Stalinist sense), the reformist, which is condemned as being "revisionist", and the revolutionary tendency.

The restorative direction was represented by Molotov. We suspect that it still has many adherents among Soviet functionaries.

Tito was first to follow the reformist line. Among the successors of Stalin, Malenkov was the one most ready to follow him along this line.

Mao Tse-tung was to become the most important representative of the revolutionary direction.

Khrushchev takes the middle road between the two extreme positions. His ambiguous political attitude is based on the fact that as a believer (in the sense of the Communist religion) he is tied to the revolutionary line, whereas for prgamatical reasons he tends towards the reformist direction. He tries to cover up this dilemma by being particularly radical in his propaganda.

The reforms carried out by Khrushchev so far show an ambiguous character for the same reasons. They are only a partial concession to the political realities which leave the totalitarian substance of Soviet Communism unchanged. The changes undertaken so far in domestic policy (see Meissner, Russland unter Chruschtschow (Russia under Khrushchev), Munich, 1960) have therefore followed two opposite lines:

1. Adjusting the autocratic form of government to the requirements of a more mature economy and to the sociological factors present in a modern industrial society demanding a certain amount of autonomy, which includes the willingness to fulfill the demands for a higher living standard in the individual classes of Soviet society, as well as the demands for a higher degree of autonomy for the non-Russian nationalities.
2. An attempt to check the bourgeois tendencies present in the new intelligentsia by radical educational reforms (polytechnic institutes, boarding schools) and other revolutionary measures coming from the top, in order to orient Soviet society more strongly towards the utopian goals of Communism and its image of man.

The reaction to the ideal and the criticism of reform Communism have had an incisive effect on both directions. But while the one led to a certain degree of let-up in the totalitarian form of government, thereby meeting the endeavors of the reformists, the other necessarily strengthened the totalitarian concepts of the Soviet government, in certain areas even beyond the Stalinist system.

The ambiguous character of "Khrushchevism" is especially evident in the legal area. On the one hand, a relative stabilization of the legal situation for the individual Soviet citizen has been achieved by the legal reforms carried out within the last few years. On the other hand, the institution of the "law of society" which Khrushchev is supporting, has shaken the power which had been restored to the regular courts, and these and other measures have curtailed the rights of the individual.

The ambiguity of Khrushchev's "centristic" position is intensified by the fact that he has by no means completely divorced himself from Stalinist ideas. This is evident from the back-and-forth of re-Stalinization and de-Stalinization, as well as from the way in which the new party history has been written. By destroying the myth of Stalin, the bridge from Khrushchev to Lenin and to the early days of the revolution has been established. By the semi-rehabilitation of autocratic dictatorship, the continuity of the Party history was maintained, while the legitimacy of Khrushchev as a successor was especially emphasized.

These four men, three of whom are unequivocally Great Russians, whose presentation in a closed group by Pravda on 3 May was by no means accidental, have in common a certain "conservative" trait which sets them off from the "liberal" wing of the Khrushchev group, which is mainly Ukrainian in origin. For this reason they may have advocated a stronger centralization in domestic affairs, and considerable modifications in the policy of coexistence practiced by Khrushchev so far. The emphasis on the aspect of class struggle within the concept of coexistence by this group which Khrushchev also adopted, as proved by his behavior in Paris, Bucharest, and New York, is not a return to the "cold war" of Stalin's times; but this interpretation meant an approach to the revolutionary attitude of Peiping. The Bucharest formula, which had been advocated in 1956 and 1957 by the Agitprop apparatus under Susslov (see Frolov in Partiynaya zhisn' (Party Life), 1956, No 20; editorial in Pravda, 11 December 1957, p. 3/4, etc.) corresponded to this line. The interpretation which Kozlov gave of the Bucharest compromise formula during the July plenum of the Central Committee deviated by an essential shade of difference from Susslov's concept. It is surely no accident that Kozlov was entrusted with writing the report of the Bucharest conference of the Communist Bloc states although he did not even participate. On the basis of this report, the CC plenum approved "the political line and course of action of the delegation headed by Comrade Khrushchev in this conference" (Pravda 17 July 1960). Interestingly enough the Central Committee did not mention the possibility of a non-peaceable revolution in the "capitalist countries" which had been expressly stressed in the Bucharest communique. This basic tendency in the CC resolution may have corresponded to the Kozlov report on which it was based, the wording of which was not published. It is interesting to note that "revisionism", i.e. reform communism, was not in this resolution made out to be the chief ideological danger.

It is certainly noteworthy that the second report, on economic questions, in the July plenum was given by another representative of the Leningrad group, Kosygin. This report was distinguished by the fact that self-satisfaction and arrogance were not as strongly apparent as they usually are. We must guard against drawing too far-fetched conclusions from these actions of Kozlow and Kosygin, especially since Suslov has appeared in a particularly prominent position alongside Khrushchev since last summer. But these subtle shades deserve to be noticed, since they allow us to draw conclusions as to the relative independence of Kozlov. At least they show that a final formulation of the general line of domestic and foreign policy, which will have to be approved by the 22nd Party Congress of the CPSU in October 1961, has not yet been drawn up.

At the Moscow Conference of Communist parties in November 1960, Suslov and Kozlov were the main speakers for the Soviet side. In the last phase of this drawn-out ideological summit conference, the Kremlin had to make use of the negotiative abilities of Mikoyan, whose prestige rose considerably after the compromise had been reached. The same cannot be said of Khrushchev, who has again "lost face" after a temperamental explosion against the Chinese. The unusual silence which he observed during the December meeting of the Supreme Council of the USSR was certainly no accident. The failure

of this year's harvest forced him to sacrifice again one of his closest Ukrainian followers, Secretary of Agriculture Matskevich. It is noteworthy that Finance Minister Sverev, who, with the exception of an interval of one year, had administered Soviet finances since 1938 under Stalin, Malenkov, and Khrushchev with great ability, was relieved "for reasons of health" just on the eve of the currency reform.

The plenary session of the Central Committee planned for December 1960, which was to deal mainly with the difficult position of Soviet agriculture, was not held until January 1961. It was characterized by Khrushchev's endeavors to shift the blame from himself and from the central leadership in Moscow to the local functionaries. He criticized especially sharply one of his most faithful followers. Ukrainian party chief Podgornyy, while he was very reserved in his statements concerning Polyanskiy. One of the immediate consequences of the January plenum was the downfall of Aristov, vice-chairman of the Central Committee of the RSFS and cadre chief for Khrushchev for many years. Aristov, who together with Brezhnev and Ignatov, had been among the closest collaborators of Khrushchev since the 19th Party Congress (October 1952) had to be the scapegoat for the agricultural and industrial failures in the RSFSR.

Aristov was made ambassador to Warsaw and thus shared the fate of his former colleagues, Ponomarenko, Mikhaylov, and Pegov. Only two men holding the office of party secretary are left of the last CC secretariat of ten men, named in 1952 under Stalin: Khrushchev and Suslov.

The Revival of the Struggle for Power and the Question of a Successor to Khrushchev

After the death of Stalin, collective leadership instead of individual leadership became the basic organizational principle of party and state. Until the June 1957 plenum, this principle was the expression of a directorial constitution based on the key position which the CC presidium occupied within the party leadership, and on the dualism between party and state. By appealing to the Central Committee against the majority of the presidium, Khrushchev had in June 1957 violated this directorial constitution. He also upset, in favor of the Party machine the previous balance between party and state as it had been symbolically expressed in the duumvirate design (Malenkov-Khrushchev; Bulganin-Khrushchev) since 1953. This development which in its effect upon the constitution equalled a coup d'etat, was subsequently legalized by the 21st Party Congress. The congress also tolerated the first beginnings of a cult of the personality, this time directed towards Khrushchev rather than Stalin, thereby further weakening the collective leadership principle. On the other hand, the Party congress has not consented to any further weakening of the oligarchic element, which would have meant to practically abandon the collective leadership principle.

The great reorganization, in May 1960, which ended with the July plenum of the Central Committee has led to strengthening of the collective leadership principle and thereby has limited the power which Khrushchev has help up to now. This turn of events was achieved by a concentration in the

personnel of the party presidium, and by the expansion of the government presidium, and on the other hand, by diminishing the CC secretariat and by making the CC office for the RSFSR independent. By this process the balance which had existed in some respects up to Khrushchev's coup d'etat among the upper echelons of leadership was restored.

The greatest importance in these developments must be ascribed to the incisive reorganization of the CC secretariat which streamlined the administrative top of the party. By reducing the CC secretariat to five members, the state of affairs of Stalin's times was reinstated. In those days only the private secretariat headed by Poskrebyshev had more importance politically than this important switchboard of power. In the postwar years, first Zhdanov and Malenkov, and then Malenkov and Khrushchev, have decisively influenced Soviet politics under Stalin from their posts in the CC secretariat. Even in those days, Suslov was at their side, who has been a member of the CC secretariat longer than Khrushchev, that is, since 1947 without interruption.

Khrushchev has replaced the system of state absolutism, by which Stalin maintained his unlimited autocracy, by the system of party absolutism. Thereby he has become dependent on the party bureaucracy to a much higher degree than Stalin ever was. This dependence necessarily became more effective at the moment when the power of the CC secretariat, which forms the top of the heirarchy of party secretaries, was fully restored. In this situation, the hypothesis of a balance maintained without impairment of Khrushchev's power as advanced by some press commentators can hardly be maintained, not even considering the fact that Khrushchev heads three of the executive organs since 1958. First of all, the CC secretariat carried much more weight than the CC bureau for the RSFSR which is in effect subordinated to it, and also more than the Council of Ministers of the USSR. For instance, the central personnel file, which forms the basis for all personnel shifts in the Soviet Union, is in the department of party organizations (of the republics of the Union) of the Central Committee, which is subordinate to the CC secretariat (see Boris Meissner, op. cit., p. 189). The department of party organizations of the CC bureau of the RSFSR also is subordinated to the CC secretariat, just as the individual cadre departments of the Communist parties of the non-Russian republics of the Union. Secondly, Khrushchev does have a private secretary by the name of Lebedev, who acts as a "ghost writer", but he does not have a fully staffed private secretariat (as Stalin did) which could form a counterforce to the CC secretariat. Since the principle of individual leadership no longer applies, Khrushchev has no other possibility but to make an arrangement with Suslov or Kozlov, or to appeal to the Central Committee which, if done too often, certainly would not strengthen a one-man dictatorship.

These considerations, as well as the actual course of events, make it feasible to speak of a revival of the struggle for power in the Kremlin, the results of which up to now have not led to a strengthening of the dictatorial position of Khrushchev. There is not the slightest reason to assume that the plan according to which the struggle for power has been carried out in the Kremlin so far suddenly has lost its validity. Thoughts along this line had

been advanced before the death of Stalin, the fall of Beria, the Dismissal of Malenkov, and the conflict with the anti-Party group, but these thoughts have always proved to be illusions.

In a system of government where there is no clear delineation of the competencies in the highest power brackets and no legal rule for the determination of a successor, there will always be a struggle for power. This is a political and sociological fact which has been proven by historical experience. Even more this must apply under a totalitarian one-party rule when there is such a great discrepancy between the form and the reality of the constitution as we find it in the Soviet Union.

The problem of the power struggle therefore depends little on the nature of the individual dictator.

It would be primitive thinking to assume that these struggles for power have a purely personal character. Even in Stalin's fight for complete power, next to personal motives, the question of the concrete shape of politics has played a decisive role. In the dispute between Khrushchev and the anti-Party group there was hardly an area in domestic and foreign policy that was not under discussion. Why should this suddenly be different today? The revival of the struggle for power does not aim at the removal of 66-year-old Khrushchev from power, but rather is it the beginning of the fight for the successorship. The main concern is the access to the decisive source of power, the control of which is absolutely necessary for winning this struggle. A certain amount of limitation of Khrushchev's dictatorial position is merely a welcome by-product of this fight.

Thus the question whether Khrushchev's position is in danger, which is occasionally heard, bypasses the real problems of the present fight for power in the Kremlin. This does not exclude the possibility that his position could be in danger in certain concrete situations, for instance if the unity of the Communist bloc should become endangered.

The Seven-Year Plan and the Difficulties in the Development of the Soviet Economy

The main problem which concerns Khrushchev is the future development of the Soviet economy. The Seven-Year Plan is actually the central point of his politics. An enormous development program, especially in the area of raw materials and heavy industry, is contained in the plan. The economic development of Soviet Asia, and especially the creation of a third base for metal production, in Siberia, are most important.

This program began with comparative success in 1959. But by 1960 a decrease in the rate of growth of the total industrial production from eleven to ten percent occurred.

As is well known, the rates of growth given by the Soviets, as well as their "gross values", are too high because of double counting. This was admitted recently in a work by the senior of Soviet economic scientists, Professor Strumilin. According to Strumilin, the figure of a ten percent growth of industrial production given by the new Soviet planning chief Novikov for 1960 actually is only 7.6% (rate of industrial growth for the German Federal Republic 1960: 11%).

Under these conditions the Seven-Year Plan could be carried out successfully only if the Soviet Union succeeded in overcoming the difficulties in the development of the Soviet economy, which become more apparent every year. These difficulties are less the expression of a crisis of development than of a structural crisis, brought about by the fact that the Soviet economy has become more mature and complicated, while society is making greater demands on the economy.

The main causes for the difficulties are: shortage of capital, shortage in manpower (not quantitatively, but according to qualification and distribution of workers), and the disproportion between individual branches of the economy (industry and agriculture, heavy and light industry). In addition to these disproportions there are functional discrepancies in the plan (production and supply of materials, investments and creation of new production units).

Three factors are necessary for the achievement of such far-reaching goals in this situation:

1. An approximate fulfillment of the gigantic investment program of altogether 3,000 billion rubles, which is not very likely to occur considering the present financial condition of the Soviet Union.

In forth years (1918-1957), 1904.1 billion rubles (by the price standard of 1955) were invested in the Soviet economy from the fiscal budget and from the funds of industrial plants. Now, from the same sources, 2,650 billion rubles (2,000 billion from the fiscal budget, 650 billion from industrial funds) are to be provided within seven years. 350 billion rubles are added to this from Kolkhoz funds. The maintenance of an investment rate of ten percent during the first two years of the Seven-Year Plan was due chiefly to the increased income from industrial plants. Whether these increases will be maintained during the next few years seems questionable.

2. An increase in labor productivity which will be hard to achieve to the extent aimed for by the Soviets (8% to 9% per year).

The increase of 10.5% provided for 1960 (as against the original 5.8%) proved to be greatly exaggerated, especially since in 1959 only 7.4% were achieved with the greatest exertion. In 1960, the increase achieved amounted to only a little over five percent according to Novikov (Pravda, 21 December 1960). The rates of increase in previous years were thus higher than the present ones (1956: 7%; 1957: 6.5%; 1958: 5.6%). At this time 47% of all Soviet industrial workers are still not using machines and equipment but work entirely by hand. At the end of 1959, 42.5% of all workers in the Soviet Union were agricultural workers, as compared to 4-5% in Great Britain, 10-12% in the US, 15% in the(German Federal Republic). Soviet economists fear that automation, especially full mechanization in agriculture, will lead to a surplus of available labor.

3. Decrease of disproportions and removal of functional discrepancies.

Real success in this area would mean the abolishment of the taboo of the "basic economic law of socialism" with the premium it puts on heavy industry, which Khrushchev can hardly be expected to effectuate, although he recognizes the problem, as we can see from his latest pronouncements.

Because of this state of the Soviet economy, Soviet leaders are confronted with the following dilemma:

They must either change their foreign policy, consenting to controlled disarmament, which would afford savings and improve conditions for foreign trade while increasing the possibilities for economic cooperation with the West -- or else, the Soviet Union must try to reach the goals of the plan under its own power while maintaining, or even intensifying, the present course of foreign policy.

The second method presupposes the utilization of the last inner reserves and a considerable increase in the production of consumer goods, raising the general living standard, without which a further increase in labor productivity cannot be obtained. Such a policy, however, can only be realized at the expense of heavy and armaments industry.

A bitter struggle for a way out of this dilemma ensued in the disputes concerning economic policies in the spring of 1960. The fact that Mikoyan's position was temporarily endangered is indicative in this instance. During the celebration of the 40th anniversary of the Azerbaidzhan CP, his name was first shown prominently in the April issue of Kommunist (published 18 April 1960) and then, in Izvestiya of 26 April, and in the May issue of Partiynaya zhizn' (published 3 May 1960), his name was left out completely. The decision was finally in favor of the second possibility, that is, a liberal economic policy mainly supported by "conservative" forces. Khrushchev has given the reason for this decision by indicating the position of the opposition, in a speech held before the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on 5 May, in the following words:

"Some of our comrades might ask are we not hurrying too much in abolishing taxes and increasing capital investments for consumer goods? Will this not weaken the development of the industry which produces the tools for production, the main potential of our economy, for the future development of the economy and especially for our country's defense?

We have thought about all this and considered all sides when we worked out the proposals which are now being presented to the Supreme Soviet, and we are convinced that we are now in a position to abolish taxes and to increase capital investment for the production of consumer goods without weakening the development of heavy industry" (Pravda, 6 May 1960).

Additional capital investments of 25 to 30 billion rubles are earmarked for the increase of the production of consumer goods. By reforms in the commercial sector the distribution of goods to the population is expected to improve considerably. By the reforms of currency and taxes, by construction of additional living units, and by increasing the range of social security, the general living standard is to be increased further.

The difficult position in agriculture and the decreasing rate of labor productivity in industry caused Khrushchev to go one step further. In a speech which he gave at a meeting of members of Party organizations at the Party institute of higher learning, the Academy of Social Sciences and the Institute for Marxism and Leninism at the CC CPSU on January 1961 (Full text: Kommunist, 1961, No 1, pages 3-37) he advocated a decrease in the rate of development of heavy industry and a partial diversion of the funds provided for this sector

into agriculture and the consumer goods industry. Referring to the continual increase in the production of steel, Khrushchev said:

"But I do not think that we will carry out a policy of developing iron metallurgy to the limit of its possibilities now. Obviously we shall shift part of the investments into agriculture and light industry ....

This is not a revision of our general policy but only a reasonable utilization of our material possibilities."

All these measures mean a revival of the "New Course" of Malenkov, while still clinging to the ideological axiom of the priority of heavy industry. A currency reform always carried with it certain risks. The other measures require the use of additional means and thus deplete the capital substance of the Soviet Union.

Thus Khrushchev has embarked on a course which is popular with the people but economically risky in order to make an approximate fulfillment of the Seven-Year Plan possible without outside involvement. Whether this will be possible is extremely questionable. The main question is how Khrushchev will be able to solve the "chief economic task", that is, to catch up with and to overtake the United States with a decreasing rate of development for heavy industry. Steel production in the Soviet Union amounted to 65 million tons in 1960; that of the European Economic Community was 73 million tons, and for the US, 100 million tons, despite the recession.

With these contradictions it is understandable that Khrushchev has recently tried to push into the background the sizable difficulties which have to be overcome at the present time by presenting the glowing prospects of a Twenty-Year Plan. This Twenty-Year Plan, first announced by Khrushchev in the above cited speech of 5 May 1960, is to form the basis for the new Party Program which is to be adopted at the 22nd Congress of the CPSU in 1961.

The Twenty-Year Plan is meant to be Khrushchev's testament for the further development of "Communist society" as introduced by the Seven-Year Plan in 1959. The maximum production increase, without neglecting "material interests", the striving for gain in the individual, is one of the main goals of further planning. Khrushchev, as did Lenin and Stalin, sees in a surplus of consumer goods one of the main ideological premises for the eventual transition into the final stage of Communism.

Ideological Foundations of Khrushchev's Domestic Policy

Khrushchev is much less of an ideologist than were his predecessors. On the other hand, he stands with both feet on the foundation of the Marxist-Leninist revolutionary theory as developed by Lenin and Stalin. He has retained a child's faith in the promised Communist paradise which Stalin had lost very early. The teleological character of Khrushchev's thought, together with temperamental factors make him a political voluntarist who is far more dynamic than Stalin, who has always tried to maintain a certain balance between the casual and final aspects of Marxism and Leninism. The faith in a world revolutionary mission is therefore much more pronounced in the pragmatist Khrushchev, who abhors the ideological intricacies which afford pleasure to a Suslov and Pospelov, than it was in the sober pursuer of power, Stalin.

On four occasions Khrushchev has attempted to give an ideological foundation to the aims of his domestic policy:

a) By his treatise, "For a Close Connection between Literature and the Arts and the Life of the People", which appeared in the second half of August, 1957.

In this treatise, which is of particular importance for the recognition of Khrushchev's personal characteristics, the Soviet party boss tried to justify ideologically the "welfare Communism" for which he strives. He did this in a way which must shock those revolutionaries who are ascetic fighters, even though they may be complete pragmatists, as, for instance, the Chinese leaders. Khrushchev said:

"If one has a hungry stomach it is sometimes very difficult to grasp Marxist-Leninist theories. But if one has a nice apartment, good food, and cultural attainments, then everyone can say with conviction "I am for Communism".

This basic motive is also contained in his speech of 6 January 1961, where he says:

"One cannot build Communism only by offering machines, iron and non-ferrous metals. It is necessary that people eat well and dress well, that they have living space and other material and cultural benefits".

b) In his speech on the occasion of the 40th anniversary celebration of the Soviet Union on 6 November 1957, where he explains in detail the contradictions found in a socialist society.

In the development /of this society/ Khrushchev made a distinction between the following types of contradictions:

1. Contradictions in capitalist society. These are antagonistic in character and can only be solved in a bitter class struggle.

2. Contradictions in the first phases of socialistic development. These may acquire an antagonistic character as in this period an intensification of the class struggle may occur (in the sense of Stalin's thesis of "intensified class struggle").

3. Contradictions in the so-called socialist society. These are not antagnoistic in character. They are, according to Khrushchev, mainly difficulties in growth which result from the contradictions between the growing demands of the "members of the socialist society" and the still insufficient base for the fulfillment of these demands, and from the contradictions between "new and old", between progress and backwardness.

According to Khrushchev, the dynamics of social development would be maintained by the tension which underlies these non-antagonistic contradictions. The thesis of non-antagonistic contradictions between the people and the leadership whihc Mao Tse-tung upheld in his "hundred flowers" speech was characteristically passed over in silence by Khrushchev.

c) In his speech on the occasion of the 13th Comsomol Congress in April, 1958, Krushchev discussed in detail the theory of the "withering state" which he had already mentioned in the above anniversary speech and in two interviews. The discussion of this doctrine could not be avoided because of the reversion to the authority of Lenin, the dispute with revisionist Communism, and the necessity of founding ideologically the increased rapidity of the transition to the final stage of complete Communism.

On the one hand, Khrushchev kept the reservations which Stalin held against an early withering away of the controlling power of the state, only he replaced the justification of the so-called "capitalist surroundings" by the fact of being surrounded by militaristic blocs. On the other hand, he far transcended Stalin in establishing the thesis that the "social organs", whether they be Comsomol, trade unions, or anything else, would remain even after the state had withered away in the final state of Communism.

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Khrushchev's thesis far transcended the deviations from Marx and Lenin which Stalin had perpetrated. The thesis means the ideological justification of the existence of the Party even in a classless society, that is, in a state ostensibly without government. There is no doubt that the Party, even when seen from the Marxist point of view, is a governing agency. The daring thesis of Khrushchev and his interpreters, which was actually meant to accentuate the superiority of the Party as compared to the state, has been limited somewhat during the 21st Party Congress of the CPSU, but its essence has been preserved.

The well-known party ideologists Ponomarev, Konstantinov, and Andropov criticized the Yugoslav reformed Communists in an editorial in Kommunist (No 8), May 1960, because they thought that "when the state withers away, the Party will also wither away". According to the Soviet party ideologists, the tasks of the Marxist party would, on the contrary, not decrease but increase in approaching the final stage of Communism. The political functions of the party would wither "finally and eventually" only when 1., the highest phase of Communism has been reached in the entire world; 2., classes have disappeared, and 3., Communism ceases to be the object of social struggle. As an "organization of Communist autonomy" the Party will evidently remain in existence even in the state of complete Communism.

The party as a "social power" will be the main agent in the planning of economic developments. The following remark by the leading Soviet political scientist Romashkin (Sovietskoye Gosudarstvo i Pravo (Soviet State and Law) 10,1958) must be understood in this sense:

"The withering away of the state by means entails the disappearance of all social control and administration. Society may get along without state courts of law and without jails, but it cannot do without an organization which will plan and account for the public economy".

The weakness in the arguments of the Soviet party ideologists is evident. Power, even when called "social" rather than "political" is still a ruling of people over people, not the bare administration of things as Marx had envisioned in the final Communist state, where there would be only purely technical economic agencies.

Without a doubt Stalin was closer to Marx than are Khrushchev and his ideological interpreters when he said ("Works", Vol 6, p. 160): "The party is an instrument of the dictatorship of the proletariat. This means that with the disappearance of class distinctions, with the withering away of the proletariat dictatorship, the Party must die as well".

d) In his speech on the occasion of the 21st Congress of the CPSU in January, 1959, Khrushchev devoted a great deal of attention to ideological questions. His main goal was to give an ideological foundation to the phase of the "unfolding development of Communism" and the "chief economic task" connected therewith; on the side there was the hidden criticism of the Chinese concept of people's communes. He thereby continues the attempt to render more definite and concrete the social utopia contained in the prophesied Communist final state, an attempt in which a great many scientists and ideologists had cooperated. In connection with the legal aspect of government, he reiterates his former considerations of the withering away of the state and discusses whether certain functions of the state could be transferred to social organizations. In connection with economic and cultural factors, he discussed the necessary bases for the construction of a Communist society. The main purpose of these explanations was to justify his revolutionary reformed policies in the economic and cultural sector. They also served for the ideological foundation of economic, and, especially, agricultural measures planned by the Soviet leaders. It became apparent that Khrushchev had by no means abandoned his project of Agro-cities which he had been unable to realize in 1951 under Stalin.

In his predictions concerning the future, Khrushchev was cautious. Therefore, he engaged Strumilin, the Nestor of Soviet economic science, to develop avant-garde thoughts about the Communist society of the future. In an article in Novyy Mir (New World), (No 7), which he called "Rabotchiy Byt i Communism" (Way of Life of the Workers and Communism), Strumlin gives exact time calculations for the gradual transition from the principle of compensation for the amount of work invested to the principle of compensation according to need. Near the large industrial centers, communal palaces (communy-dvortsy) are to be built which have all the necessary services for the welfare and assistance of the people. In the large cities these communal palaces are to represent "Micro districts" in which the inhabitants without motorized transportation will find everything for their cultural and other living requirements. The agricultural community is imagined by Strumilin - as by Krushchev - as a great grain and meat factory within the framework of an Agro-city.

Strumlin's image of communal palaces corresponds to the modern suburbs in some respects, such as have been developed in the Western world, for example in the environs of Stockholm, without the underlying collectivist ideas, of course. His idea is essentially different from the Chinese concept of a people's commune which is the center of the ideology of Mao Tse-tung.

The Soviets still have no systematic survey of the ideologies of Khrushchev, since many questions are still unsettled and doubtful. Time is growing short, since at the coming 22nd Party Congress of the CPSU the new Party Program, which has been announced for the third time since 1939, is to be officially accepted. Since this Party Program is not only a guide for

the Bolshevist state party, but for the entire Communist world movement, the task is very difficult, especially since the leading man in Moscow does not have an ear for the dogmatic finesse of this ideology. The insecurity in this area and the indefiniteness of the outcome of the Moscow council session of November 1960 may be assumed to be the main reasons why the Soviet leaders have set the date for the 22nd Party Congress as late as October, 1961.

10,362

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