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USSR REPORT

USA: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, IDEOLOGY

NO 2, FEBRUARY 1986

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PAST, FUTURE OF SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS VIEWED

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[Article by V. M. Berezhev: "The Great Science of Living Together"; passages rendered in all capital letters printed in boldface in source]

[Text] The Geneva meeting between General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee M. S. Gorbachev and President R. Reagan of the United States was a major political event in international affairs. It marked the beginning of a dialogue aimed at changes for the better in Soviet-American relations and in the world in general.

Any observer of the political scene could learn through personal experience in the last few decades how the state of relations between the Soviet Union and the United States of America can affect world affairs. Since the beginning of the 1930's, when diplomatic relations were established between the USSR and the United States, the temperature of these relations has affected the entire international climate. President Roosevelt's recognition of the Soviet Union coincided with the criminal Nazi clique's seizure of power in Germany. During that difficult period the normalization of Soviet-American relations paved the way for the future alliance of the two powers in the war against the Fascist axis and for the creation of the anti-Hitler coalition.

Meetings between the top leaders of the Soviet Union and United States have always played an important role in the interrelations of the two powers. These meetings have been few in number--only 10 in more than 40 years. Most of them, however, were marked by major decisions of importance to the USSR and United States and to the rest of the world. The meeting between M. S. Gorbachev and R. Reagan truly rocked the world, arousing the unprecedented interest of governments, public organizations and millions of average citizens on all continents. They hopefully awaited the outcome of the talks, discussed their worries about the future of the world and expressed their wishes for success. With complete justification, the leaders of six states who addressed a message to M. S. Gorbachev and R. Reagan to suggest that the USSR and United States stop all nuclear tests for a year, stated: "The world has the greatest hopes for your meeting in Geneva.... All peoples and governments hope that you will be able to stop the recent tendency toward escalating tension and begin an era of peace and security for all humanity."¹

These words reflected the common awareness of how important the relations between today's two greatest powers are to the future of humanity and the worries about the sharp exacerbation of these relations and of all international affairs in recent years.

Many people are wondering about the possible positive development of the momentum created in Soviet-American relations by the summit in Geneva. Obviously, this will not happen by itself. As speakers noted when the results of the meeting were discussed in the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, its long-range importance "will be revealed in specific actions and will depend on the willingness of both sides to act in accordance with the joint statement adopted in Geneva. The Soviet Union will take all necessary steps to attain this goal and expects the U.S. administration to do the same."²

I

If we trace the development of Soviet-American relations over the last half-century and overlook minor details, we can see two reasons for the occasional difficulties, complications and confrontations. One is the reluctance of the U.S. ruling elite to acknowledge the principle of equality in relations with the Soviet Union and the other is its desire to be superior to the USSR in order to force Moscow--even if this should require military measures--to accept American terms. This is why one of the fundamentally important results of the Geneva summit was the acknowledgement in the joint Soviet-U.S. statement that a nuclear war must not be started, that any war between the USSR and the United States--nuclear or conventional--would be impermissible and that the two sides must promise not to strive for military superiority.

People in the Soviet Union realize that a difficult road lies ahead, especially since many difficulties arose in our relations with the United States even in the past. They were largely connected with false ideas in America and in the capitalist countries in general about the socialist order and the Soviet way of life. These biases dated back to the period of the October rebellion, back to the years of the civil war and the foreign intervention. The Great October Socialist Revolution differed radically from all previous revolutions in human history. In Russia it was not simply a matter of the transfer of power from one class to another, but also of the disposition of private property. The nationalization of banks, factories, plants and trade enterprises, the liquidation of large estates and the transfer of the land to those who worked it all shocked and amazed the capitalist camp. In particular, the events in Soviet Russia infuriated the American money-bags. The initial reaction of ruling circles in capitalist countries was an attempt to "smother the new regime in the cradle," the new regime whose very existence was challenging the "unshakeable foundations" of bourgeois society. A malicious campaign of slander was also launched to discredit the idea of socialism. So many malicious lies were invented about the "nationalization of women" in Soviet Russia, about the "mass suppression" of the intelligentsia and about "contempt for human rights." In this way, the "sinister image" of the Soviet Union was created and its existence was portrayed as a "threat" to the rest of the world.

It is no secret that a blank space took the place of the Soviet Union on American school maps after the October Revolution. Since the intervention against the Soviet republic had been unsuccessful, the ruling elite in the United States and several other capitalist powers tried to find a force capable of actually erasing the only socialist state of that time from the political map as well. At first militarist Japan was seen as this force, but then people in the capitals of the Western powers heard about a hysterical opportunist who was promising to "destroy bolshevism." They began to nurture him and help him rise to power in Berlin. Hitler's Germany became the main hope of those who did not want to accept the existence of a new social order on the planet. But Hitler betrayed his patrons' trust: He launched his first attack against the Western powers. The danger of a fascist invasion forced the U.S. leaders to agree to a military alliance with the Soviet nation.

Even during the period of the anti-Hitler coalition, Soviet-American relations were far from constant. Documents of that time indicate that President F. Roosevelt and his closest advisers wanted to maintain the wartime relationship of cooperation with the USSR in the postwar period. Although Roosevelt did not sympathize at all with the socialist system, he saw that the Soviet order was capable of defending itself and that foreign intervention, an economic blockade, the surprise attacks of the Japanese militarists and the monstrous invasion of Hitler's hordes could not defeat the socialist power. From this he concluded that the Soviet Union would emerge from World War II as a great nation with influence in world affairs. For this reason, the United States would have to negotiate a mechanism of cooperation with the USSR to allow both countries to live in peace. In essence, this was an acknowledgement of the principle of the peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems.

In October 1943, during the Moscow conference of the three foreign ministers, Secretary of State C. Hull delivered the American President's proposal of the immediate negotiation of the principles of postwar regulation to the head of the Soviet Government. Roosevelt stressed that it would be important to do this before the end of the war, before the influential opponents of Soviet-American mutual understanding who were lurking in the United States could oppose a postwar security mechanism based on cooperation by the great powers. Explaining this opinion, Hull said that differences of opinion could become more pronounced after the end of the war and that this would make it very difficult to carry out this program in the United States and to rally and unite the forces needed for its support.

Roosevelt, Hull and their colleagues who shared this opinion were well aware that the plans for postwar cooperation with the USSR could encounter the frenzied resistance of extreme reactionary elements, who had learned nothing even from the lesson of Hitler's aggression and who still viewed the elimination of the socialist system as their main objective.

The plans of these elements were clearly worded by then Senator Harry Truman, who later became President of the United States, when he suggested immediately after the invasion of the Soviet Union by Hitler's Germany that the United States help the USSR if Germany should gain the upper hand and help Germany

if the USSR should start to win, "and let them kill as many of each other's people as possible." This concealed a desire to bleed the two main fighting sides dry, so that Washington could be solely responsible for dictating the terms of postwar regulation.

As we know, the matter was not confined to mere wishes. Influential groups in the State Department, the Defense Supply Agency, the War Department and the Congress made every effort to keep the Soviet Union in hand-to-hand combat with Hitler's Germany as long as possible: They delayed the opening of the second front, manipulated deliveries of military supplies to the USSR (almost stopping them in summer 1942, when Hitler's hordes were lunging toward the Caucasus and the Volga) and held confidential talks with Nazi emissaries, hinting at the possibility of dividing the USSR and turning the Ukraine over to them as a German colony. Another important part of the plans of the opponents of American-Soviet cooperation was the confidential work on the atomic bomb and the hope of using the American monopoly on the new weapon of mass destruction to exert political pressure on the Soviet Union and to establish the United States' undivided domination of the world.

In talks with Soviet leaders, President Roosevelt repeatedly said that the United States' first obligation after the victory over the common enemy would be the assistance of the Soviet Union in restoring all that had been destroyed. If the United States had acted upon this idea, postwar relations between the USSR and the United States could have been much better. Disagreements and difficulties would have arisen after the war under any conditions, but they could have been solved in a positive atmosphere and with a view to the interests of both sides.

After Roosevelt's death, his successor abruptly steered American policy in the direction of confrontation with the USSR. Not a word was said about helping the Soviet Union. Most of the help was received by the former opponents of the anti-Hitler coalition. Some hotheads in Washington insisted that a war be declared soon on their recent ally.

Acting U.S. Secretary of State Joseph Grew delivered a memorandum to President Truman in May 1945 to inform him that war with the Soviet Union was inevitable. Grew proposed that as soon as the conference being held in San Francisco at that time for the establishment of the United Nations was over, "American policy toward Soviet Russia should quickly become tougher in all areas. It would be much better and more reliable," Grew asserted, "to have a confrontation before Russia is able to recover and develop its tremendous potential military, economic and territorial strength."³ This was followed by the attempt to perpetuate the U.S. atomic monopoly with the aid of the "Baruch Plan" and deprive the Soviet Union of any chance to develop its own atomic industry. The failure of this attempt was followed by the development of many plans for atomic attacks on the USSR and the doctrines of "rolling back" and "containment." The attempts to exhaust the Soviet Union in an arms race did not stop either.

This was followed by the long and dangerous period of "cold war," which put a freeze on international relations and put mankind on the verge of catastrophe

several times. The prevailing tendency in U.S. policy returned to the old anti-Soviet rut, now directed not only against the USSR but also against the entire socialist community and against the national liberation movements marking the postwar period.

Predictably, the delusive plans for American world hegemony failed, and by the 1950's and 1960's elements of a more realistic approach to world affairs were already apparent across the ocean. Some Soviet-American accords were reached and important agreements were concluded at the beginning of the 1970's during a series of summit meetings between the leaders of the USSR and the United States, especially agreements on strategic arms limitation, which led to the relaxation of international tension.

II

Analysts are still debating the reasons for the situation in the early 1970's. Is it true that people in Washington then realized the inevitability of the peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems and the need to build relations with the Soviet Union on a realistic foundation, on the basis of equality and equivalent security? Or were the prevailing considerations of the administration of that time only tactical, considerations connected with the desire of Washington ruling circles to climb out of the quagmire of the hopeless Vietnam venture and somehow cope with the escalating domestic problems of the United States? In either case, the possibility of putting Soviet-American relations on a new and positive basis had a real chance of success at that time. The Basic Principles of Mutual Relations Between the Soviet Union and United States of America, signed in 1972 by the top leaders of the two powers, described the specific ways of reaching this goal. The document acknowledged that there is no alternative to the peaceful coexistence of the USSR and United States in the nuclear age and reaffirmed the principle of equality and non-aggression. The sides pledged not to strive for superiority to one another and to settle all disputes in the spirit of mutuality.

Everyone knows that the policy of the United States is highly unpredictable. The machinery of state of this great power, which now has a tremendous effect on the entire international situation, was designed by its founding fathers more than 200 years ago in such a way that it is impossible to predict whether or not each new president will feel bound by the signature of his predecessor. As a rule, there is no continuity here. Each new master of the White House usually does not recognize previous agreements. As a result, after Nixon's departure, a document as important as the Basic Principles of Mutual Relations was consigned to oblivion in the United States. The same fate almost befell the SALT II treaty J. Carter signed, a treaty Ronald Reagan, the next president, was already calling groundless even during his first campaign. It is true that he later realized the need for the mutual observance of this treaty, although it was never ratified by the Congress. Many other earlier agreements, however, were broken.

The world soon learned that the American side did not like the idea of parity with the USSR and heard of Washington's intention to negotiate with the USSR only from a position of strength. Sweeping aside the statement acknowledged

by the United States on the highest level in 1972, the statement that there is no alternative to peaceful coexistence in the nuclear age, the new Republican administration shocked the public, including its closest allies, with the astounding discovery that nuclear war was possible and that it could be fought in various ways--local wars, limited wars, pinpoint strikes, etc. Furthermore, this kind of war would go on for a long time, until the other side--that is, the Soviet Union--would be ready to accept American terms. People began to discuss the possibility that the United States could survive a nuclear conflict with acceptable losses (up to 40 million American lives) and thereby "win" the war. The sum of 4 billion dollars was allocated for the construction of atomic bomb shelters, and some American citizens who believed the fairy tales about the "survival" of a nuclear conflict began to build "super-safe" shelters in their basements and store large quantities of drinking water, canned goods and special protective clothing. Obviously, this flurry of activity made it easier for the administration to push all new requests for military appropriations through the Congress, but it certainly did not solve the problem of the real security of the United States.

It must be said that security problems are an extremely painful issue in the United States. In the past, when the Americans were surrounded by boundless seas and had relatively weak neighbors, they did not fear the invasion or destruction of their territory. The appearance of nuclear weapons and the strategic means of their delivery made the United States just as vulnerable as any other country in the world. This is very difficult for Americans to accept. They still have the hope that some kind of miraculous weapon will make their country as secure and invulnerable as it was in the past. This is precisely why the so-called "Strategic Defense Initiative" (SDI) won such widespread support in the United States, despite the tremendous threat it poses to the world. People were taken in by the grand deception. Instead of seeing that the reliable security of the United States depends solely on the reduction of nuclear weapons and their subsequent elimination, many Americans allowed themselves to be convinced that an impermeable antinuclear umbrella could be installed over their country. People fell for this because they are consumed by fear born of insecurity and by the desire to regain what they lost with the advent of strategic weapons.

There is also another side to the problem. Since the Soviet Union is the only country which could deal a crushing retaliatory blow to the United States in the event of a nuclear conflict, the realization of this fact is transformed in the American mind--of course, not without the aid of the mass media and official propaganda--into a feeling of fear. This gives rise to the belief that the Soviet Union is supposedly "threatening" America and that the USSR is supposedly the enemy, although the Soviet Union is not threatening anyone and although the Soviet side has repeatedly announced on the very highest level of government that the USSR will never use nuclear weapons first.

In this connection, it is particularly significant that the Soviet leadership made an important statement during the November meeting in Geneva about the fact that profound changes on our planet had created a situation in which the security of any state cannot be safeguarded by diminishing the security of other states. "We told the President," M. S. Gorbachev said at a press

conference in Geneva, "that we are not striving and will not strive for military superiority to the United States. Furthermore, I tried several times when we were alone and during plenary sessions to express our deep conviction that a United States less secure than the Soviet Union would not be to our advantage because it would lead to mistrust and give rise to instability. We hope that the United States will take a similar approach to our security. We also told the President, however, that under no circumstances would we allow the United States to become militarily superior to us."⁴ This means that both sides must become accustomed to strategic parity as the only status of Soviet-American relations.

III

Many ridiculous lies were spread in the United States about the impossibility of establishing normal American-Soviet relations due to the "secrecy" of the political decisionmaking process in the Soviet Union and due to the fact that "Moscow cannot be trusted." Anyone willing to display an unbiased approach, however, can see that Soviet policy is exceptionally clear and consistent. V. I. Lenin was already discussing the USSR's desire for normal and mutually beneficial relations with the United States. The Soviet State is still adhering to this line even in our day. This position rests on the knowledge of the importance of normal Soviet-American relations to the entire international situation and on the vast store of goodwill the Soviet people feel for the American people.

Although U.S. ruling circles have been extremely hostile toward the socialist order since the time of the October Revolution, no one in the Soviet Union has forgotten about the American aid to the hungry in the cis-Volga region, about the American workers and farmers who came to the Soviet Union to assist in building a new life and about the economic cooperation in the construction of Dneproges, the Chelyabinsk Tractor Plant, the Gorkiy Motor Vehicle Plant and other projects of the first five-year plans. We also remember the joint struggle against our common enemy in World War II and our cooperation with the United States in the anti-Hitler coalition. This position is expressed in major documents of the Communist Party and Soviet Government.

Even in the 15 years since the 24th CPSU Congress, at which time a detailed Program of Peace was adopted, the consistency of Soviet foreign policy, its peaceful aims and the willingness to cooperate on an equal basis with all countries, including the United States, can be traced precisely. The accountability report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 24th party congress said: "We believe that the improvement of relations between the USSR and the United States is possible. Our fundamental line in relations with capitalist countries, including the United States, consists in the complete and consistent implementation of the principles of peaceful coexistence, the development of mutually beneficial contacts and cooperation in keeping the peace with states prepared to do this, establishing the most stable relationship possible with them."⁵

The Soviet side was guided by precisely this belief during the Soviet-American summit meeting in Moscow in May 1972. Since the U.S. administration

was prepared for equitable negotiations, mutually acceptable agreements were concluded and such important documents as the SALT I and ABM treaties and several agreements in the sphere of bilateral relations were signed.

By February 1976, when the 25th CPSU Congress was held, definite progress had been made in carrying out the Program of Peace adopted at the previous congress. There were some complications, however, in Soviet-American relations. The so-called Vanik-Jackson amendment, representing an obvious attempt at interference in Soviet internal affairs, prevented the implementation of the Soviet-U.S. trade agreement signed in October 1972. Furthermore, the Watergate scandal forced R. Nixon to resign and the Republican candidate in the next election campaign, G. Ford, ostentatiously avoided the use of the term "detente"; anticommunist elements obviously prevailed in the entire atmosphere of the presidential campaign.

It is noteworthy that in this complex situation the 25th CPSU Congress reaffirmed the Soviet Union's adherence to the Program of Peace, noting that the main thing in Soviet foreign policy toward capitalist states "was and is the struggle to establish the principles of peaceful coexistence, the struggle for lasting peace and for the alleviation and future elimination of the danger of a new world war."⁶ Speakers at the congress stressed that "the Soviet Union firmly intends to work toward the further improvement of Soviet-American relations in strict accordance with the spirit and letter of negotiated agreements and assumed commitments--in the interests of both peoples and the cause of peace on earth."⁷

Continuing to pursue this policy line, the Soviet Union attempted to reach further agreements with the United States in the sphere of nuclear arms limitation and reduction and to develop and strengthen bilateral relations. Success, however, required effort on both sides. At the end of the 1970's the atmosphere in Soviet-American relations was cooled down by the American side's attempts to renounce the principle of equality and again deal with the USSR from a position of strength. Even in President Carter's time, Washington tried to start a new round of the arms race and began producing new weapons systems.

The arrival of the new Republican administration in January 1981 was marked by a much stronger policy of confrontation and the denial of the possibility of the positive development of Soviet-American relations. Anti-Soviet rhetoric acquired unprecedented intensity. The behavior of American ruling circles was openly "forceful." All of this was naturally reflected in the documents of the 26th CPSU Congress. The Central Committee's accountability report said that "the existing military-strategic balance between the USSR and United States and between the Warsaw Pact and NATO is objectively serving to keep the peace on our planet. We have not wanted and do not want to be militarily superior to the other side. This is not our policy. But we also will not allow them to become superior to us. Attempts of this kind and discussions with us from a position of strength are absolutely futile!"⁸ The report went on to say that "it is common knowledge that the international situation depends largely on the policies of the USSR and United States. The state of their present relations and the severity of international problems demanding

resolution dictate, in our opinion, the need for dialogue on all levels, and active dialogue at that. We are ready for this kind of dialogue."⁹

In the first half of the 1980's the world had to live through a difficult period described by some American analysts as the "second cold war." The Republican administration, striving for military superiority to the Soviet Union, stepped up the work on the program for the nuclear and other rearming of the United States. American first-strike missiles began to be deployed in Western Europe. The "Star Wars" program made its appearance and attested to the intention of U.S. ruling circles to put weapons in space, which will pose an unprecedented threat to all people in the world.

People in the Soviet Union realized that this U.S. policy will inevitably come into conflict with reality. For this reason, the USSR has made constant attempts to effect changes for the better in political and economic relations. Obviously, this is not being done because the USSR and United States could not survive without one another. The Soviet Union is a strong power with extensive ties on all continents. It could get along quite well without the United States. This also applies, of course, to the United States, but economic and other exchanges could serve as a material basis for political relations and promote the improvement of the situation and the creation of an atmosphere of trust.

At the beginning of 1985 the Soviet side initiated an agreement on new talks between the USSR and the United States with a view to the interconnection of the entire group of space and nuclear weapons with the aim of keeping the arms race out of space and stopping it on earth. Later the Soviet Union submitted radical proposals regarding a 50-percent reduction in all existing USSR and U.S. nuclear weapons capable of reaching the other side's territory with a complete ban on space attack weapons. This gave the negotiation of agreements new momentum. The atmosphere of Soviet-American relations simultaneously began to undergo changes, and this led to the consideration of a possible summit meeting in a positive light.

The decisions of the April (1985) CPSU Central Committee Plenum were of great importance. The foreign policy instructions of the plenum stressed the need for the maximum activation of the peaceful policy of the USSR in all international relations. The plenum called for every effort to keep the forces of militarism and aggression from prevailing, stressed the urgency of the need to stop the arms race and step up the disarmament process and advocated the development of equal and civilized relations between states and the development of broader and deeper mutually beneficial economic relations.

"Our willingness to improve relations with the United States of America is also common knowledge," a speaker said at the plenum, "and this should be done for our mutual benefit and without any attempts to restrict one another's legitimate rights and interests. Confrontation between the two countries is not any kind of fatal inevitability. If we look at the positive and negative experience accumulated in Soviet-American relations, in the distant and the recent past, we must say that the most reasonable option is a search for ways of organizing smoother relations and building a bridge of cooperation, but it must be built from both sides."¹⁰

The Soviet Union has invariably conducted its foreign policy on a multifaceted basis, on the basis of strong and stable relations with all countries. Nevertheless, as M. S. Gorbachev stressed in his report at a USSR Supreme Soviet session at the end of November 1985, "the reality of today's world is such that some states must--by virtue of their military, economic, scientific and technical potential and international influence--assume a special responsibility for the nature of world development, for the course and consequences of this development. Above all, this responsibility--I repeat, a responsibility and not a privilege--is borne by the Soviet Union and the United States of America."¹¹ This provides more proof of the Soviet Union's profound awareness of the importance of normalizing Soviet-American relations.

The significance attached in the Soviet Union to these relations is also attested to by statements in the draft new edition of the CPSU Program, submitted to the 27th party congress for discussion. The foreign policy section of this major document says that "the CPSU WANTS NORMAL, STABLE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES, presupposing non-intervention in internal affairs, respect for one another's legitimate interests, the recognition and implementation of the principle of equivalent security and the establishment of maximum mutual trust on this basis. Differences between social systems and ideologies are not a reason for tense relations. There are objective prerequisites for the organization of productive and mutually beneficial Soviet-American cooperation in various fields. In the belief of the CPSU, the policies of both powers should be aimed at mutual understanding, and not at hostility, which carries the threat of catastrophic consequences for the Soviet and American people and all other people."¹²

The inclusion of this statement in the CPSU Program signifies that this USSR policy toward the United States is planned for many years in advance. This is a reply to all of those who try to call Soviet policy "unpredictable." The policy of the Soviet nation is clear: It is a policy of peace and cooperation.

Unfortunately, Washington's policy line is not at all distinguished by clarity. Immediately after the Geneva summit, the attacks on the idea of normalizing Soviet-American relations were resumed in the United States. "Hawks" are doing everything within their power to prevent Soviet-U.S. agreements on the major issues of the present day. Under these conditions, can anyone predict the prevailing policy line in Washington with any degree of certainty?

IV

When the Soviet side was preparing for the Geneva summit meeting, it did not nurture the slightest illusions about American policy and saw how far the militarization of the economy and even of political thinking had gone in the United States. The Soviet leadership was also well aware, however, that the situation in the world was too dangerous to overlook even the slightest chance of correcting it and advancing toward a stronger and more stable peace.

In a TIME magazine interview published on 2 September 1985, M. S. Gorbachev warned against Washington's attempts to speak to the USSR in the language of

diktat. He recalled that "we have not lost a war or even a battle to America,"¹³ and called for negotiations on an equal basis. Up to the last minute, however, the opponents of agreements with the USSR exerted the strongest pressure on President Reagan, demanding that he take an extremely "rigid" approach to his partner and not weaken under any circumstances. Nevertheless, the President decided to use the meeting in Geneva, and especially the personal conversations, to learn as much as possible about the Soviet position and to seek points in common. This produced definite results. As the President said at a joint session of the two houses of Congress on 22 November 1985, "we now understand one another better. This is the key to peace. I now have a broader and more accurate outlook and so does my partner, I think." This better understanding was promoted largely by the two leaders' personal conversations, which lasted around 5 hours in all. "This allowed us," M. S. Gorbachev stressed at a press conference in Geneva, "to discuss a broad range of issues face to face. Our conversation was in political language, open and direct, and I think it was of great and perhaps even decisive significance."¹⁴

Fundamental disagreements between the USSR and the United States on a number of major issues of the present day, especially nuclear arms limitation and the so-called "Strategic Defense Initiative"--that is, the American plans for the militarization of space--still existed after the summit meeting. It was hardly likely that agreements could be reached on this matter of cardinal importance in just 2 days of negotiations, but its discussion and the thorough disclosure of the two sides' positions could lead eventually to important further development. The joint Soviet-American statement published after the summit stressed the willingness of the sides to step up the work of their delegations in Geneva, "with a view to the objectives set in the joint Soviet-American statement of 8 January 1985, namely the prevention of an arms race in space and its cessation on earth, the limitation and reduction of nuclear weapons and the reinforcement of strategic stability."¹⁵

Obviously, much will depend on the conclusions the American side draws from the discussion of matters connected with the SDI and from the arguments cited in this connection by the Soviet side. In his report at a session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, M. S. Gorbachev expressed the hope that the American statement about the SDI in Geneva was not the American side's last word on the matter. After all, both sides confirmed on the highest level that the arms race in space must be prevented and that this must be done in combination with the reduction of nuclear weapons. "This is precisely the goal of the Soviet Union," M. S. Gorbachev stressed. "This is precisely what we want the United States to do. By carrying out our mutual obligation, we will justify the hopes of people throughout the world."¹⁶

The Geneva agreement on the continuation of political contacts between the USSR and United States, including new summit meetings, is of great importance. There is no question that the bilateral Soviet-American agreements made possible by the Geneva meeting could also help to improve the overall climate.

The decree adopted by the USSR Supreme Soviet in connection with M. S. Gorbachev's report on the results of the Soviet-American summit meeting in

Geneva and the international situation reaffirms the Soviet nation's intention to strengthen trust between all states and develop equitable, mutually beneficial and constructive cooperation between them, regardless of differences in sociopolitical orders. The decree stresses that the USSR has consistently advocated the elimination and prevention of seats of tension and that it believes that even the most acute and difficult problems can and should be solved by political means. The Supreme Soviet also underscored the special responsibility of the USSR and United States to keep the peace, announced that the Soviet Union would do everything within its power to put the Geneva agreements in action and expressed the hope that the United States of America would display an equally responsible approach.

Present conditions demand a fundamentally new policy, consistent with the realities of today's world. Many complications and a great deal of difficult work still lie ahead, but the Soviet people are looking to the future with optimism. Just before the 27th CPSU Congress, a sober assessment of the world situation and the role of the two great powers in today's world was issued by the Kremlin: "There is no question that our differences are colossal. But our interconnection and interdependence are just as great in today's world. The crucial nature of the present situation leaves the leaders and people of the USSR and United States no other alternative than to study the great science of living together."¹⁷

After learning to live together, the Soviet Union and United States of America could play an important role in carrying out the extensive long-range program of mutually beneficial cooperation the USSR has proposed to all states with a view to the new opportunities the age of technological revolution offers mankind.

FOOTNOTES

1. PRAVDA, 30 October 1985.
2. Ibid., 26 November 1985.
3. "Memorandum by Joseph Grew, May 19, 1945," Arthur Bliss Lane Papers, Box 16, Manuscript Department, Yale University, New Haven (Conn.).
4. PRAVDA, 22 November 1985.
5. "Materialy XXIV syezda KPSS" [Materials of the 24th CPSU Congress], Moscow, 1973, p 28.
6. "Materialy XXV syezda KPSS," Moscow, 1976, p 16.
7. Ibid., p 21.
8. "Materialy XXVI syezda KPSS," Moscow, 1981, p 22.
9. Ibid., p 23.

10. "Materialy Plenuma Tsentralnogo Komiteta KPSS. 23 aprelya 1985 g."
[Materials of the CPSU Central Committee Plenum of 23 April 1985],
Moscow, 1985, p 26.
11. PRAVDA, 28 November 1985.
12. KOMMUNIST, 1985, No 16, p 48.
13. PRAVDA, 2 September 1985.
14. Ibid., 22 November 1985.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid., 28 November 1985.
17. Ibid.

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TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS, U.S. MILITARISM ASSAILED

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[Article by I. D. Ivanov: "American Corporations and Militarism"]

[Text] The question of keeping the peace is the fundamental question of the present day, the question on which the fate of all humanity depends. It has economic aspects as well as politico-military ones. In particular, in light of statements in the draft new edition of the CPSU Program, it seems important to determine the specific relationship between the activities of private capitalist corporations and militarism in our day, especially through the example of the United States, a country with a special responsibility for the nature, course and consequences of world development in this area. Furthermore, this example provides particularly abundant information for this kind of analysis.

Role and Functions of Corporations in the Military-Industrial Complex: The National Level

Any policy, especially military policy, requires the appropriate material and technical base. It determines the possibilities and limits of any particular politico-military line and secures the succession of generations of weapons and the related military doctrines. In the United States this base consists of military-industrial corporations. For example, the deployment of American intermediate-range missiles in Western Europe on the dates scheduled by NATO was secured by Martin Marietta (the Pershing II's) and Boeing (the cruise missiles). The "rapid deployment force" became a reality after the Lockheed company produced long-range military transport planes. Furthermore, the corporation puts priority on the qualitative improvement of weapons, so that their combat effectiveness usually rises more quickly than their cost.

Experience has shown that the military-industrial business can find technical ways of satisfying even the Pentagon's most fantastic plans. But it is quite significant that it is not at all a passive executor of government military contracts. On the contrary, corporations have a strong reciprocal effect on American military policy. Many of their managers selfishly preach the fundamental possibility of U.S. military-technical superiority to the USSR and NATO superiority to the Warsaw Pact and of the disruption of the present

approximate balance of strategic weapons in imperialism's favor. They are actively striving to establish "better strategic conditions" and "methods of attack" for capitalism¹ and constantly offer the military establishment new types of military equipment. It is for this reason that the United States initiated the development of almost all new weapons systems in the last 15 years. They include many which were deliberately developed to evade existing arms limitation or control agreements or to undermine these agreements.

For example, the SALT I agreement, based on the principle of a balance of strategic nuclear weapon carriers, was technically bypassed by the development of cassette warheads and long-range cruise missiles. Corporations also establish "advance stocks" of new weapons. For example, the work on the Pershing II missile and cruise missile which violated the strategic balance in Europe began in 1969 and 1972 respectively.

V. I. Lenin was already pointing out the fact that weapons are part of the "calculations" in diplomatic negotiations and are used to exert pressure on other states even in times of peace.² For this purpose, corporations develop a broad range of weapons, allowing the administration to engage in Soviet-American talks with halfway and largely unfair proposals disguised as peace initiatives. This was true, for example, of the U.S. proposal made just before the Geneva meeting, which would have compensated for nuclear attack weapons slated for reduction with other types of weapons, would have allowed for the manipulation of various types of weapons and would even have increased first-strike potential in Western Europe through the reorganization of missile launchers.

It is this interaction of the egotistical interests of the Pentagon and the military-industrial elite that gives the arms race the character of a vicious circle. Corporations deliberately provoke Soviet reactions to their new advances in this race so that they can use the "Soviet threat" as an excuse to make more money on the development of "new generations of weapons, countermeasures against these weapons, and counter-countermeasures, as long as the money holds out."³ As a result, the military arsenals of states are transcending all relatively sufficient bounds from the standpoint of reliable defense, and the military-political situation is becoming increasingly dangerous and unpredictable.

This course of events found eloquent expression in the SDI program. On the one hand, the Pentagon had been persistently seeking ways of disrupting the existing strategic balance in the late 1970's and early 1980's. On the other, "convinced that the Defense Department's voracious appetite for military planes, tanks and frigates would be sated by the end of this decade," the WASHINGTON POST remarked, "companies equipped their engineers for a race for new weapons"⁴--space weapons this time. It is no secret that it was the technical forecasts of corporations (for example, the forecast of the SAIC firm and the investigative research begun by the Aerojet and Rockwell International corporations in 1980-1981) that "infected" Washington with SDI fever and motivated it to allocate advance funds for this program.

The military contractors do not care that the SDI will undermine the open-ended ABM treaty, cause the disappearance of the very concept of strategic

stability and put the fate of mankind in the hands of imperfect automatic devices. They are guided by the expectation that SDI-related contracts could be worth 26 billion dollars in the next 5 years and 1.5 trillion in the future. For this reason, the Lockheed Corporation, for example, views the "Star Wars" program as "a promising prospect for the financial prosperity of the concern." "An entire industry has been built around the 'Star Wars' program," the NEW YORK TIMES reported,⁵ and its managers are doing everything within their power to make military-space preparations irreversible.

As the production basis of militarism, corporations are merging more and more actively with the Pentagon and already represent an immediate element of the military machine. They establish the military infrastructure (roads, ports, airfields and communications) and operate some military facilities and networks. In Saudi Arabia alone, for example, the cost of military infrastructure facilities is estimated at 24 billion dollars, and whereas they were once usually built by the Army Corps of Engineers, the building contracts are now frequently awarded to corporations, the largest of which in this field is the notorious California-based Bechtel Corporation.⁶ As for direct management, the Radio Corporation secures the operation of radar stations for the U.S. Army, the early missile warning system in the Arctic, the Navy's navigation system in the Caribbean, the strategic communication network in Alaska and so forth,⁷ and EG & G manages the nuclear testing ground in Nevada and the Kennedy Space Center.

This merger is reinforced by personnel transfers between military agencies and corporations, stock transactions between them and so forth. In the last 3 years, 2,240 Defense Department employees took jobs in military-industrial corporations. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering R. DeLauer, the Pentagon official in charge of new weapon systems, became the vice president of the TRW firm.⁸ Besides this, the Pentagon's 20 top military contractors doubled their contributions to the Republican Party, a joint advisory committee coordinates the interests of the Pentagon and sectorial associations of military industrialists, and contacts between them are also maintained by ultra-rightwing organizations.

It is not surprising that this lobby is trying to poison the political atmosphere in the country and block projected changes in Soviet-American relations, especially after the Geneva meeting. In particular, many military contractors are, as the NEW YORK TIMES reported, extremely worried about the possibility of USSR-U.S. agreements that might make the further development of space weapons "difficult if not impossible."⁹ And although lasting peace presupposes precisely the refusal to militarize space, "in the same way that the Star Wars program is supposed to defend the United States against enemy warheads," the WASHINGTON POST remarked, "the Star Wars complex hopes to defend this new business against any threat, including political attacks, skeptical remarks by technical specialists and arms control agreements."¹⁰

Therefore, U.S. military-industrial corporations bear the indisputable responsibility for the spread of the arms race to more and more new spheres, for the creation of new types of weapons extremely difficult to include in general control and limitation formulas and, consequently, for the absence of progress in arms limitation and reduction in general.

It is indicative that the corporations are not only placing modern capitalist technology and intraorganizational production operations at the service of militarism. International division of labor is also being used for this purpose by American TNC's belonging to the military-industrial complex.

Role and Functions of TNC's in the Military-Industrial Complex: The International Level

Ronald Reagan has specifically included the protection of American assets abroad and access to foreign resources among the goals of U.S. "national defense,"¹¹ and the TNC's have repaid the administration by supplying the United States with strategic raw materials or securing the flow of additional funds into the federal budget.

For example, branches of TNC's account for 26 percent of all U.S. imports, and enterprises representing all forms of TNC participation account for 42 percent.¹² As for finances, V. I. Lenin specifically said that imperialism relies on its own economic base and on the exploitation of foreign countries in its military preparations.¹³ American transnational companies and banks have been particularly successful in this field. Transfers of TNC profits to the United States amount to around 23 billion dollars a year, and payments to banks on foreign loans total around 30 billion.¹⁴ Besides this, the United States is receiving another 100 billion or so as a result of the high interest rates of these banks and of investments in the securities of American TNC's. Part of this sum enters the federal budget through the tax and loan mechanism and is consequently used directly for the arms race. According to the estimates of IMEMO [Institute of World Economics and International Relations, USSR Academy of Sciences] specialists, these additional budget revenues amounted to an average of around 30 billion dollars a year in 1980-1984, covering 5.2 percent of budget income, 23 percent of the deficit and 16.6 percent of all military spending.¹⁵

In the sphere of production and trade the internationalization of the American military business is accomplished through the export of military products, which is now increasingly likely to be accompanied by the transfer of technology and is evolving into joint weapons production. The proportion of exported U.S. military products rose from 5 percent in the 1960's to 40 percent by the beginning of the 1980's. The TNC's are resorting to these exports to expand operations, increase mass production, lower overhead costs and avoid the underloading of capacities. They frequently use export sales to compensate for failures in the competition for Pentagon orders. For example, the Chrysler Corporation's sales of M-80 tanks in the Middle East put it in 10th place among U.S. arms suppliers in 1980, although it had never even ranked among the top 25 since 1976.¹⁶

Furthermore, the "commercial" considerations of arms exporters usually have far-reaching political implications. In view of the fact that 90 percent of the military exports of corporations are either accomplished through Pentagon channels or under its supervision, these deliveries provide the administration with a strong political weapon. "There is a common tendency to approve military sales for the sake of the following goals," a special report of the

U.S. President to the Congress said, "namely: a) to influence the political orientation of countries controlling strategic resources; b) to expand our general access and influence on governments and military elites whose political orientation is of great importance to us in connection with global or regional problems; c) to secure means of affecting and influencing certain governments in matters of direct interest to us."¹⁷

It is particularly significant that exports of weapons and military technology have established a material foundation for NATO military strategy and are making the confrontation between imperialism and socialism multiregional by extending it to the vast zones of the economic and political periphery of imperialist centers as well as to these centers themselves. In this way, the military activities of TNC's "are turning into the main element of the American administration's approach to competition with the Soviet Union on the global scale," American political scientist A. Pierre ascertained, "and perhaps into the most important instrument of our overseas operations when they are conducted without the direct use of military force."¹⁸

The consequences of these processes are also disturbing. The military-industrial complexes of the NATO countries are becoming interwoven. Military goods and technology are being transferred to foreign states along with the entire system of social relations inherent in the arms race in the United States, and forces with an interest in this race are taking shape. Largely through the efforts of American TNC's, neutral countries (Sweden, Switzerland and Austria) and nonaligned states are gradually being drawn into the circle of arms producers and consumers, the militarization of some branches of industry has begun in Norway, Denmark and Greece, and a military-industrial complex has been established in Canada, Holland, Belgium and Italy. Switzerland is a licensed producer of American planes, and Israel has a bloc of 10 military-industrial companies, with American TNC's holding stock in 4 of the 10.

In all, the capitalist world outside the NATO bloc spends around 160 billion dollars for military purposes, has more soldiers than NATO and has more conventional weapons than the United States.

It is no coincidence that the Pentagon is actively encouraging the overseas operations of U.S. military-industrial TNC's. In addition to various contracts and subsidies, it is promoting their arms for export; for example, the "deal of the century" involving the sale of F-16 fighter planes to Belgium, Holland, Denmark and Norway (by General Dynamics) was secured by the American administration. It also extended credit at 3 percent per annum (when the market rate was 17-18 percent) to Egypt, Sudan, Turkey, Thailand, Portugal and other countries for purchases of American weapons.

As a result, the American military-industrial TNC's are also largely responsible for the expanding scales of the arms race, for its spread to more and more new parts of the world.

Present-Day Militarism and the Economy

The militarization of the U.S. economy has acquired unprecedented dimensions. The Pentagon's military budget exceeds 300 billion dollars, 41 out of 145 branches of industry are military-oriented, and deliveries to the military establishment account for more than 10 percent of all sales in 35 branches. In one way or another, the arms race accounts for 10 percent of all those employed in the processing industry, 30 percent of the increase in the commodity portion of the GNP at the beginning of the 1980's and 5-10 percent of all consumed raw materials. Pentagon property has been estimated at 340 billion dollars, and the land it owns in the United States comprises an area larger than Ireland.¹⁹

It is not surprising that wherever the arms race is viewed as a goal in itself, militarism "devours," as F. Engels put it, the country.²⁰ It has already given rise to a huge federal budget deficit and excessive interest rates. The cost of weapons systems rises each year. Military expenditures absorb up to half of all tax revenues and create, according to the admission of former Chairman M. Weidenbaum of the President's Council of Economic Advisers, tremendous pressure on resources and bottlenecks in the economy.²¹ "The War Department," President D. Eisenhower once said, "does not produce anything...and uses the energy, production capacities and intellectual resources of the nation. But if it takes too much, our overall strength is diminished." This is what is happening now, and the United States, the most highly militarized of all the NATO countries, ranked 11th among the 13 main ones in terms of production growth rates and labor productivity in the processing industry, 13th in terms of proportional accumulations in the GNP and 1st in terms of the rate of unemployment in the 1960's and 1970's.²²

In combination with the dulled reaction of U.S. public opinion to repetitions of the hackneyed warnings about the "Soviet threat," all of this has already begun to color the atmosphere in the country, including the atmosphere on Capitol Hill. American legislators have become less compaisant to the Pentagon's military budget requests and more critical of the present practice of military purchases. The prevailing opinion in the budget debates of last spring and summer was the view that the reduction of the U.S. federal budget deficit should also affect military spending--and not just secondary items but weapons systems as well. This opinion has supporters in both parties, and prominent U.S. political figures (R. McNamara, P. Warnke, W. Kaufmann, C. Vance, M. Bundy, six previous secretaries of the treasury, Admiral E. Zumwalt and others)²³ are proposing ways of reducing military spending without any detriment to the country's real defense needs, including spending engendered by "psychological warfare." "Sometimes," leading congressional budget expert R. Penner acknowledged, "we continue the work on a system known to be ineffective simply because it will cost the Russians even more to develop a similar system."

Of course, these developments should not be overestimated. This is not a renunciation of the arms race, but a way of making it more effective and economical.²⁴ American public opinion, however, has been inclined, especially after the Geneva summit, to believe in the possibility of constructive

dialogue with the Soviet Union on arms limitation and to argue this point of view to the legislative and executive branches. As a result, the American "hawks" had to accept the summit meeting, although they are still doing everything within their power to divest it of its positive meaning. In general, however, this has added certain elements of realism, as General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee M. S. Gorbachev pointed out, to the current position of the American side.²⁵ What position has American business taken?

Obviously, American corporations, just as any other private enterprises, have an interest in a coercive system, including military force, to protect their class interests and in profits from treasury-financed projects. Their opinions on matters of war and peace in general and on the arms race, however, are ambiguous and are filled with the contradictions that have always existed in the capitalist class and separated its aggressive segments from the segments with a realistic outlook.²⁶

The link between the corporations and militarism stems largely from the specific practice of capitalist economic management, including its military aspect. Obviously, although the American military-industrial complex is growing, it cannot encompass all of the firms in the country. Inclusion in it entails fierce and costly competition, taking extraeconomic, lobbyist forms as well as commercial ones. This is the reason for the changing boundaries of the industrial nucleus of the complex, the two-way traffic of corporations across these boundaries and the resulting differing degrees of their individual participation in the military business. According to what criteria should corporations be categorized as military-industrial?

The percentage of military contracts in the firm's total operations is usually employed as a criterion in our literature. However, although this criterion is valid in some cases, it is not always applicable. Furthermore, in the United States it leaves out the huge Pentagon contractors whose enormous contribution to the arms race is "dissolved" in the colossal scales of the firms' total operations. As a result, this "proportional" approach includes no more than 10 of the largest corporations in the military-industrial complex, and this is certainly an inaccurate reduction of its scales. For this reason, this percentage and the absolute size of the contribution of large firms to the arms race should be the criteria for the inclusion of these firms in the military-industrial complex.

It is also hardly accurate to confine these calculations, as is sometimes done, to the purely technical category of "military shipments." Military demand today is not confined to weapons. It is more diversified than ever before, and purchases of military equipment account for only 28 percent of the Pentagon's budget. There is a larger variety of dual-purpose products, and the army is absorbing the goods and services of the civilian market on a massive scale. For example, the maintenance of military personnel and veterans also takes 28 percent of all military spending, and the 100 top military contractors include 15 oil companies whose sales to the Pentagon sometimes exceed those of the producers of military equipment. For this reason, when the involvement of various U.S. corporations in the military-industrial

complex is analyzed, military operations in general must be taken into account along with the production of purely military items.

In view of all these factors, our calculations would include around 50 or 60 of the 500 top U.S. corporations on FORTUNE magazine's list in the military-industrial complex in the middle of the 1980's.

Of course, this does not mean that the managers of the other corporations do not share the class goals of their colleagues from the military-industrial complex or that they are striving less than the latter for profits. The difference is that their involvement in the military business is generally sporadic and that their specific interests might even cause them to oppose it.

American civilian business has its own score to settle with the military corporations with priority access to budget and other resources. It is far from overjoyed that the Pentagon's main contractors pay almost no taxes, that civilian budget expenditures and employment are declining and that the sales market is being reduced.²⁷ By the end of the 1970's military expenditures were already equivalent to approximately half of all accumulated fixed capital, which results in its obsolescence and the loss of the international competitive potential of the United States. "The absorption of technology and capital by aerospace branches and other military projects," American economist S. Melman pointed out, "is impoverishing the civilian sector and paralyzing the growth of productivity." In his book "Profits Without Production," he cites calculations to prove that the cost of building just one F-16 plane is equivalent to the cost of modernizing all U.S. machine tools to the level of the "Japanese average," that the cost of building two nuclear aircraft carriers could convert 77 power plants from oil to gas and reduce oil consumption by 390,000 barrels a day, etc.²⁸ Excessive military expenditures have dramatically raised the cost of credit. In all, according to the business community's own estimates, if all of the funds spent on military R & D in the past 30 years had been used for scientific progress in civilian sectors, U.S. industry would already have achieved the technical level the corporations now hope to reach by 2000.²⁹

International conflicts can and do hurt the U.S. TNC's whose overseas operations in general have increased more quickly than their military activities.

It is also important to consider the overall global-political circumstances of American business. Many managers (even with their identical class-related feelings about socialism) long ago ceased to believe that this order could be wiped off the face of the earth by force. Their familiarity with science and technology gives them a realization of the catastrophic implications of a nuclear conflict. For this reason, many of them take a more realistic position than the American administration on matters of war and peace. Of course, this specific form of pacifism is sometimes quite conditional,³⁰ but it provides more evidence of the accuracy of V. I. Lenin's statement that it is wrong to view the bourgeois camp as a single reactionary swamp of militarism and that it is necessary to distinguish between the interests of various bourgeois groups in matters of war and peace, which are "extremely, extremely important," regardless of their reasons, and this is completely applicable to the U.S. bourgeoisie.³¹ The matter in question also has a general political,

general historical aspect. Under present conditions it is fundamentally important to discern the degree to which militarism is unavoidable in the development of capitalism as a method of production (and corporations as its personification) and the possibility of a future, even if only theoretical, non-militarized model.

The scales of the metastasis of militarism throughout capitalist production are evident. But this fact alone does not seem to be a valid foundation for unequivocal apocalyptic conclusions. In our opinion, despite the grand scales and the inclination of capitalism and imperialism to resort to force as a means of gaining economic advantages, militarism is not, and will not necessarily become, an objectively necessary link of capitalist economic functioning in general, but will remain only a derivative, secondary or even--from the standpoint of pure reproduction--alien phenomenon. Of course, military expenditures are often used to correct cyclical fluctuations and curb the tendency toward a decline in profit margins. But the military economy and the general economy are certainly not equally dependent on one another, and whereas the first, as we have already pointed out, could not exist without intersectorial reliance on the second, the entire national economy certainly has no need to, as K. Marx put it, throw part of its capital into the water.³²

It is no coincidence that all of our attempts in the 1960's to insert a "military subdivision" or "military cycle" into the general classic outlines of capitalist reproduction were futile. It is also useful to recall that F. Engels believed that disarmament under capitalism was a possibility³³ and that V. I. Lenin, who analyzed every aspect of militarism, did not include it among the main features of imperialism. For this reason, it would be wrong to regard militarism, as is sometimes done, as some kind of compulsory and inevitable phase in the genesis of capital. As a phenomenon, it is economically reversible and eradicable in principle, with all of the ensuing political conclusions and consequences.

The same can be said of state-monopolist capitalism (SMC). Its capacity as a nutritive medium for military preparations should not obscure other facets of this complex phenomenon. We should recall that V. I. Lenin also described it as a higher stage of production collectivization, the establishment of societal economic management and, finally, the rejection of the capitalist method of production within the framework of this method of production itself, as a material prerequisite for socialism. Under these conditions, the confinement of the main functions of SMC to militarist ones would signify the confusion of peculiarities with essential features. The fact is that even under SMC, capitalist production does not need a militarist machine to drain it of its juices. Even as a defensive reaction to socialism, state-monopolist policy can take various forms, not necessarily military, and is the result of all of its functions. In connection with this, it is no coincidence that V. I. Lenin stressed that "we are relying completely on the peaceful feelings of not only workers and peasants...but also of many sensible members of the bourgeoisie and governments."³⁴ For this reason, even in the face of an unprecedented arms race financed by a state budget, it would be wrong to assign, as is also sometimes done, militarism within the framework of SMC the status of some kind of objective law or inevitability.

In short, it seems wise to remember that even in arguments exposing militarism, the tendency to extend it beyond its actual framework--and this is the framework of the phenomenon of parasitism--and to assign it a "natural" origin and existence would raise questions about the possibility of curbing the arms race, the possibility of disarmament and, in the final analysis, the possibility of preventing a nuclear conflict. It is no coincidence that V. I. Lenin warned that particular care and discerning judgments are needed in this area, because the opposite practice could unwittingly "help extreme elements of military parties"³⁵ abroad, rob the peace movement of its future and give bourgeois governments an excuse to "evade" peaceful negotiations.³⁶

In other words, the non-militarized model of the capitalist economy is fully possible (and, incidentally, has existed and does exist in several countries), and militarism itself can be economically dismantled, and this is one of the tenets of the Soviet Union's peaceful foreign policy. All of this also applies to the American economy and to American corporations, although the parasitism of capitalism during the period of its general crisis is quite pronounced in this environment and the militarist wing is a counterbalance to the pacifist one.³⁷

Finally, it would be wrong to assume that military preparations in the United States are free of conflicts between corporations and the government and that the American military-industrial complex represents some kind of single monolithic structure. On the contrary, it is the scene of persistent internal battles in many areas, stemming from the distinctive features of the military industry itself and from the monopolistic competition in this sphere.

Some Current Features of Treasury-Financed Projects

The distinctive features of the operations of military corporations were described by V. I. Lenin, who regarded this sphere as "a special type of national economy," and not "pure capitalism." "Pure capitalism," V. I. Lenin clarified this statement, "is commercial production. Commercial production is work for an unknown and free market. But the capitalist who 'works' for defense is not 'working' for the market, but on the orders of the treasury, and usually finances the work with loans from it."³⁸ Lenin's remarks can also help in the assessment of new processes in the U.S. military economy, and there are many such processes.

The variety of weapons produced and the number of branches working for the military machine have increased. The "company-treasury" relationship, previously confined to national boundaries, is being expanded. The Pentagon is beginning to deal with foreign suppliers. The TNC's themselves are operating in the world arms market, where regulation is much weaker than in the American market. The procedure for the placement of military orders has been improved considerably. Furthermore, treasury-financed operations under the conditions of state-monopolist capitalism have ceased to be the exclusive privilege of military corporations. Just as advance orders, they are now characteristic of companies in virtually all sectors. Corporate contacts with the Pentagon are under the constant observation of public opinion. Finally, the world situation is now affected more by the peaceful foreign policy of socialism,

which has a strategic parity with imperialism and is restraining its aggressive impulses. Arms limitation treaties exist.

In other words, this sphere of the economy remains "special" but considerably changes its internal structure and its intersectorial and external politico-organizational ties. The combination of all this requires special investigation. In this article, only three of all these topics will be discussed: the characteristics of contemporary military production, the distinctive features of competition in the military business and the attitude of corporations toward hypothetical plans for the civilian conversion of the U.S. military economy.

It is a characteristic of the American military industry that cost and natural proportions of production and exchange depend largely on foreign economic factors. In the final analysis, they are determined by the administration's foreign and military policies. In this field, the government deliberately restricts spontaneous market activity and exerts considerable modifying influence on the effects of economic laws, including the law of value. In view of the fact that the tactical features of weapons and delivery dates are the main considerations in Pentagon weapon purchases, use value and the time factor play the main role in determining socially necessary value and the price of the commodity. For this reason, even the law governing the conservation of embodied labor in the American military economy usually does not appear in its absolute form (lowering the cost per unit of product), but in a relative form, heightening the combat effectiveness of equipment per expenditure unit, and the assortment and features of military products are diverging more and more from the standards of civilian consumption.

Furthermore, U.S. military production has extremely high requirements for capital and scientific input, the development of weapons systems usually takes years, and the material and labor requirements of this production are constantly declining. The cost of creating a job here is four times as high as in civilian sectors, 10.3 percent of the military budget is spent on R & D, expenditures of raw material per unit of military product are constantly declining and a gradual transition from standard to specialized types is taking place.³⁹ The structure of the military economy is distinguished by a higher level of concentration. The dynamics and nature of demand here depend on only one or two customers--the Pentagon and NASA, accounting for most deliveries. The level of concentration is also quite high on the supply side: Two-thirds of the Pentagon's priority contracts are awarded to only around 100 corporations, with half of them awarded to around 50, and 90 to 100 percent of all orders for satellites, nuclear submarines, missiles, surveillance and navigation systems and military transport planes--that is, weapons representing the height of technical progress--are filled by no more than four firms each.⁴⁰ Furthermore, the survival of small and medium-sized businesses has taken specific forms in this field.

This fairly short summary does, however, point up some significant factors influencing the behavioral stereotypes of corporations.

First of all, participation in the arms race requires large capital investments. Military production itself, however, remains extremely unstable and

cyclical in terms of the demand for military equipment and is distinguished by the frequent underloading of production capacities. Even the inflated federal military budget cannot finance all of the purchases the Pentagon would like to make, and this leads to the cancellation of contracts, the refusal of some corporate deliveries and the postponement of projects. For example, the program for the development of the "Orion" plane for naval aviation (Lockheed) was cancelled and only part of the funds for the MX missiles have been allocated.

Secondly, during the long cycle of weapons system development, the cost of these systems constantly rises as a result of the revision of client requirements, the obsolescence of equipment and inflation, which negates initial contract calculations. This was the case, in particular, with the B-1 bomber (Rockwell), the F-16 fighter plane (McDonnell Douglas and Northrop), the AX-64 helicopter (Hughes Aircraft) and the Black Hawk (United Technologies). Thirdly, the strict contract deadlines sometimes motivate corporations to combine the planning and production stages of weapons systems or shorten the period of their testing and final adjustment (this was the case with the Pershing II missile and the C-5A plane), which can lead to heightened operational risks under the conditions of the exceptional complexity of the technical problems to be solved.

As a result, almost all of the Pentagon's contractors fail to stay within initial estimates, and one-third of all programs in 1982 failed to meet initial schedules. The degree of the underloading of production capacities in some branches of the military industry was 30-50 percent at the beginning of the 1980's, the instability of production and employment was higher than the average, and there was a relative (and even absolute) reduction in employment due to the rising capital-labor ratio. Whereas the Pentagon's leading 25 contractors, who work on several programs at once, felt more or less secure even under these conditions, this cannot be said of the many other military-industrial firms. Chrysler, for example, even preferred to sell its contract for the M-1 tank to General Dynamics.⁴¹ As for the number of workers, it was lower at the beginning of the 1980's at Lockheed, McDonnell Douglas, General Dynamics and Grumman than it had been in 1965, and the transfer of resources from the more labor-intensive civilian sector to the less labor-intensive military branches eliminated 900,000 jobs a year on the average in the 1970's.⁴² Therefore, the military-industrial corporations are partly to blame for the massive unemployment in the country.

It appears that another fact is not always taken into consideration in our literature, the fact that in addition to the baseless profiting at the expense of the treasury, the existence of which is a common acknowledged and indisputable fact,⁴³ there is also a special form of competition, and it can be quite fierce, in this sphere of the national economy. New factors have recently promoted its intensification.

Of course, it is true that military agencies and contractors are closely united and that the administration obviously assigns priority to domestic military equipment in its purchasing policy. For example, Grumman and Litton Industries work mainly with the U.S. Navy, while General Dynamics and Boeing

work with the Air Force. From all of the major innovations in military equipment, the Pentagon chose only the English Harrier plane and the Franco-West German Roland-2 missile for its own army. Bids, however, are taken for 43 percent of all contracts (by 1992 the figure is expected to rise to 70 percent), and bids are sometimes even submitted for the right to begin working on a project.⁴⁴ For example, Lockheed, Northrop and Rockwell competed for the right to work on the Stealth bomber program. McDonnell Douglas won the competition for the C-5B military transport plane contract when the project was still in the drafting stage, but the final contract was awarded to Lockheed. Seven corporations are competing for the contract to build the American "fighter of the 21st century." The competition is even more fierce in the world market, where General Dynamics, Northrop, the French Marcel Dassault firm and the Swedish Saab firm competed for the "deal of the century" to rearm the air forces of Belgium, Holland, Norway and Denmark. The modern arms market is therefore still a buyers', and not a sellers', market.⁴⁵

As a result of all this, even the Pentagon's leading contractors can rise and fall in the competitive struggle. Only 20 of the 25 firms making up this group in 1977 were still on the list in 1982. Textron, Chrysler, Todd Shipyards, General Motors and Fairchild lost this status. The position of General Dynamics, United Technologies, General Electric, Lockheed, Boeing and Rockwell was weaker. On the other hand, the status of Grumman (the E-2C early warning system) and Martin-Marietta (the Pershing II) rose. It is also indicative that although the United States is the leader in scales of military production and R & D, its dominant position in the world arms market is not as indisputable. Whereas its share of the arms exports of Western countries was 65 percent in 1973, it was 57 percent in 1977 and 38 percent in 1980. In 1981 there were already 28 foreign firms among the Pentagon's 100 largest contractors.

Finally, relations between the corporations and the Pentagon are not always idyllic. In recent years stricter measures have been taken--both for reasons of effectiveness and in response to public demands--to monitor the activities of military contractors. They include the repeated verification of accounts and thorough expert appraisals of the correspondence of designs and products to assigned technical standards. For example, the Pentagon's demand for the simultaneous submission of bids for the design and production of weapons systems instead of separate bids for each stage frustrated the embezzlement plans of Lockheed for the C-5A plane and plans of General Dynamics (FB-111) and Grumman (F-14A).⁴⁶

In other words, technical and commercial risks and the instability of military production are now greater than before.⁴⁸ It is not surprising that even Lockheed, Grumman and Chrysler were once on the verge of bankruptcy. In light of this, it would be wrong to categorically assume that the military business under any conditions represents the "Promised Land" for any corporation breaking into it. This oversimplification could more aptly be used to "vindicate" corporations seeking entry to the military-industrial complex--that is, it could have an effect contrary to the aims of the peace movement.

For this reason, in any exposure of the parasitism of the U.S. military economy, including examples of the embezzlement, conspiracy and corruption in this sphere, it is important to also reveal the dark side of military production

for capital itself and the risk involved in participation in it. It is equally significant that the alternative to the military economy is no longer only the civilian market, but also the possible civilian conversion of military production or at least part of this production.

This kind of conversion is not at all a utopia, and various aspects of it, both positive and questionable, have already been discussed (and in a practical context) in many works, including foreign ones. In relation to the corporations, it has its general economic and intraorganizational aspects.

In relation to the overall conditions of reproduction, conversion would signify an increase in employment and the need for the partial reconstruction of the production system of military industries, which would increase total market demand. Cuts in military spending would help to normalize government finances by, among other things, lowering the cost of credit and curbing inflation, which would create better financing opportunities for the modernization of enterprises. The attainment of the same goals would also be promoted by the mass transfer of defense technology to the civilian sector. This conversion, however, would not mean the disappearance of the government market, but only a change in demand patterns.

Finally, it is significant that although the arms race has already engendered a gigantic military economy in peacetime, its conversion would not require the structural dismantling of the entire economy. In essence, the U.S. military industry is distributed in a "cluster" pattern, and all related undertakings and problems would therefore be mainly of a local nature.⁴⁸

As for intracorporate aspects, with rare exceptions the military contractors continue to operate in the civilian market (or even mainly in the civilian market). Even the aircraft industry delivers up to half of its products to this market, and it could easily absorb the "dual-purpose" products representing, according to the estimates of UN experts, 28-32 percent of all the budget-financed purchases of military agencies. For this reason, there is no rigid separation of military from non-military production divisions in the majority of corporations. The boundaries between them are mobile and sometimes even indistinct, because, in addition to the "dual-purpose" products, some items are manufactured in military and civilian models (for example, the Boeing-707 passenger plane and the KC-135 tanker plane). Furthermore, while specialists argue about the problems of conversion, managers have to practice it regularly. After large military orders have been filled, they find new uses for personnel and production capacities. The ratio of military to civilian shipments fluctuates widely from year to year even for the Pentagon's top contractors, but the firms cope with this. It is quite indicative that the feverish and irregular pulse of the military business is beginning to arouse doubts and dissatisfaction even in some of its citadels, such as military-contract-inundated California. "What worries many Californians," U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT remarked, "is the alternation of economic peaks and valleys in military-oriented production."⁴⁹

Finally, another alternative to the military business, both production and research, is the extensive, long-term and comprehensive program proposed in

M. S. Gorbachev's speech at a session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, a program of mutually beneficial cooperation by countries with different economic and social systems, with consideration for the opportunities the age of technological revolution offers mankind.⁵⁰ Western corporations and socialist enterprises could unite their forces and intellect within the framework of this program to solve many national and global problems and thereby strengthen the material basis of agreement and trust.

FOOTNOTES

1. V. I. Lenin, "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], vol 40, p 284.
2. Ibid., vol 28, p 533.
3. THE WASHINGTON POST, 20 October 1985.
4. Ibid.
5. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 20 November 1985.
6. THE DEFENSE MONITOR, 1981, No 4, pp 5-6.
7. C. Hamelink, "The Corporate Village," Rome, 1977, p 27.
8. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 30 November 1984.
9. Ibid., 20 November 1985.
10. THE WASHINGTON POST, 20 October 1985.
11. Ye. V. Bugrov, "Voyenno-promyshlennyy kompleks SShA--ugroza miru" [The U.S. Military-Industrial Complex--A Threat to Peace], Moscow, 1983, p 38.
12. "Transnational Corporations in World Development. Third Survey," N.Y., 1983, p 382.
13. V. I. Lenin, Op. cit., vol 30, p 174.
14. "International Direct Investment. Global Trends and the U.S. Role," Wash., 1984, p 55.
15. Calculated by IMEMO researchers Ye. V. Belyanova, L. V. Maksimova and S. V. Pyatenko.
16. COUNCIL ON ECONOMIC PRIORITIES NEWSLETTER, December 1981-January 1982, p 1.
17. "Militarizm. Tsify i fakty" [Militarism. Figures and Facts], Moscow, 1983, p 167.
18. A. Pierre, "The Global Politics of Arms Sales," Princeton, 1981, p 68. In recent years American TNC's have sold licenses for 80 weapons systems

abroad and are working on 58 bilateral programs of industrial cooperation in arms production with developed countries and 20 programs with developing countries, including participation in 12 programs by General Electric, in 10 by Bell Telephone, in 5 by Northrop and in 5 by Sikorsky. Military-industrial capital is also being exported. The American Boeing firm holds stock in Holland's VVV and Fokker, and Pratt & Whitney holds 10 percent of the stock in SNECMA (France). Military items are being produced by Italian affiliates of IBM, IT&T, Rockwell International, Litton Industries and General Electric, but all records have been beaten by Rockwell International, which is operating in various forms in 120 countries and derives more than one-fifth of its military profits from this (H. Tuomi and B. Vayrynen, "Transnational Corporations, Armaments and Development," Tampere, 1982, pp 42, 136).

19. For more detail, see R. A. Faramazyan, "Voyennaya ekonomika amerikanskogo imperializma" [The Military Economy of American Imperialism], Moscow, 1983, pp 46-52.
20. K. Marx and F. Engels, "Works," vol 20, p 175.
21. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 14 November 1982.
22. R. Grasse, P. Murphy and W. Ragen, "The Costs and Consequences of Reagan's Military Buildup," N.Y., 1982, pp 50-53.
23. INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, 11 June 1985; THE WASHINGTON POST, 1 March 1983.
24. This is also the reason for such new congressional amendments to the Pentagon budget as the restriction of personnel transfers between military agencies and their corporate contractors and the increase in the percentage of contracts awarded on the basis of competitive bids. From 1981 to 1984 U.S. monitoring agencies disallowed 5.9 billion dollars in bills from military contractors, taking 1,300 cases to court and suspending the operations of 1,100 firms, and in June 1985 the criminal investigation of the operations of 9 of the 10 top Pentagon contractors was instituted (THE NEW YORK TIMES, 27 September 1984; THE WASHINGTON POST, 20 June 1985; INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, 25-26 May 1985).
25. PRAVDA, 28 November 1985.
26. V. I. Lenin, Op. cit., vol 45, p 70; vol 44, p 408.
27. Just the cuts in budget social expenditures deprived 875,000 Americans of their right to food stamps and 700,000 of social security benefits. The priority development of the less labor-intensive military production has cost the country a substantial loss of jobs, and 60 percent of the U.S. population lives in the states where jobs are lost in this way. As a result, the consumer demand with which the country began to emerge from the crisis of 1981-1983 was crippled, and this stopped the general revitalization of the economy in 1985.

28. S. Melman, "Profits Without Production," N.Y., 1983, pp 152-153.
29. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 14 November 1982.
30. One of its features, for example, is the contradictory combination of a genuine fear of the use of nuclear weapons (including the use of these weapons against their assets) with the illusion of the permissibility of their accumulation--both as a means of "deterring" socialism and as a profitable business.
31. V. I. Lenin, Op. cit., vol 41, p 80.
32. K. Marx and F. Engels, Op. cit., vol 46, pt I, p 67.
33. Ibid., vol 22, p 387.
34. V. I. Lenin, Op. cit., vol 44, p 287.
35. Ibid., vol 36, p 324.
36. Ibid., vol 35, p 20.
37. Many authoritative economists, including J. Galbraith, S. Melman, A. Greenspan, W. Leontief and UN and SIPRI experts, have no doubt that the American economy is completely capable of developing without an arms race. According to the calculations of W. Leontief and F. Duchin, cuts in military spending would increase per capita income and consumption in the United States in the future. According to the estimates of UN experts, they would raise growth rates in the country by 1 or 2 percentage points. The percentage of military expenditures in the U.S. GNP is now so high that it is as if the country destroys its annual output of goods and service every 12 to 14 years (see R. A. Faramazyan, Op. cit., p 51; J. Fontanel, "L'economie des armes," Paris, 1984, pp 41, 98).
38. V. I. Lenin, Op. cit., vol 32, pp 318-319.
39. THE ECONOMIST, 18 December 1982, p 73; THE NEW YORK TIMES, 22 September 1982.
40. J. Gansler, "The Defense Industry," Cambridge (Mass.), 1981, p 36.
41. Ibid., pp 56-57; "Militarization and Arms Production," edited by H. Tuomi and R. Vayrynen, London, 1982, pp 81-82.
42. The number of jobs created by Pentagon orders is relatively low, although, of course, military corporations actively use the increase in employment for political purposes. For example, when Rockwell International was filling the order for the B-1B bomber, it contracted work on it from enterprises in 48 states with 95,000 workers, who were coerced to lobby Congress actively for the resumption of the once postponed bomber project.

43. See, for example, the series of critical articles about Pentagon purchasing practices in the INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE (23-26 May 1985).
44. INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, 23 May 1985; 27 June 1985.
45. It has become a general practice for many countries acquiring large shipments of American weapons to demand the acceptance of their own military products or guaranteed purchases from local firms in part payment for these shipments. For example, when Canada bought 18 Aurora antisubmarine planes from Lockheed for 707 million dollars, it demanded reciprocal purchases for 415 million dollars (THE GLOBE AND MAIL, 14 February 1985). Northrop sold its F-5 fighter at 7 million dollars a plane to Saudi Arabia and 3 million dollars to South Korea. This attests to the reserve profits the TNC's include in weapon prices. But it also attests to fierce competition, in prices as well as quality. The customer often insists on the acquisition of not the military equipment itself, but the licenses for its production and for its assembly with the maximum number of local parts. This is encountered much less frequently in the trade in civilian equipment, just as the bribes which have become the rule in arms sales are seen less frequently and in smaller amounts in civilian trade. Northrop alone was convicted of these illegal payments 6 times, McDonnell Douglas 7 times, Textron 11 times, Boeing 13 times, Lockheed 15 times and so forth.
46. G. Adams, P. Murphy and W. Rosenau, "Controlling Weapons Costs," N.Y., 1983, p 18.
47. Besides this, projects financed by the military budget are sometimes connected with a business philosophy diametrically opposed to work for the regular market. Success means the maximization of outlays, the prolongation of schedules and the renegotiation of specifications, which would be suicidal in ordinary competition. There are also radical differences in the skills of work for one large client (the Treasury) and for millions of different customers in the civilian market. As a result, at least some of the executives of U.S. military corporations lose the skill of participating in ordinary competition, and this causes their firms to suffer serious failures.
48. For example, it was quite possible to find civilian uses for 77 military bases once closed down in the United States, 121 of the 127 military professions have civilian functions, equivalent expenditures create twice as many jobs in civilian industry than in defense, and the additional expenditures on conversion, according to the estimates of UN experts, will not exceed 1 percent of all budget allocations a year in the United States (J. Fontanel, Op. cit., pp 102, 103; R. A. Faramazyan, Op. cit., p 210).
49. U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, 25 February 1985, p 62.
50. PRAVDA, 28 November 1985.

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ISSUE OF VERIFICATION AND ARMS LIMITATION IN SOVIET-U.S. AGREEMENTS

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[Article by V. P. Abarenkov, V. A. Kalamanov and A. A. Kokoshin; passages rendered in all capital letters printed in boldface in source]

[Text] The successful drafting of international agreements in the sphere of arms limitation and disarmament and their actual observance are connected largely with the resolution of problems in the verification of their observance. They deal with matters pertaining to the vital security interests of states and it is therefore exceptionally important to secure the belief that the provisions of these agreements will be strictly observed by all signatories.

All of this also applies to the earlier Soviet-American agreements on arms limitation, especially those pertaining to nuclear arms. In these agreements, questions of verification are given the necessary consideration. Obviously, the specific procedures were negotiated on a mutually acceptable basis and, what is most important, they seem to have stood the test of time.

Since the end of the 1970's, however, the United States has exaggerated the importance of verification problems, and much has been said about the "intractability" of the USSR in these matters as almost the main reason for the standstill in the talks themselves and in the entire process of arms limitation and reduction. In reality, in the last few years the U.S. administration first displayed a reluctance to engage in any kind of serious talks and then tried to use them as a smokescreen for intense military preparations. The former head of the American START delegation in 1982 and 1983, E. Rowny, frankly said that negotiations must be conducted only from a position of strength.

It must be said that verification is not a simple matter and that its technical difficulties are self-evident, particularly in view of the fact that new types of weapons are constantly being developed and are proving increasingly difficult to control. Nevertheless, past experience testifies that whenever the political will to conclude agreements has been present, the technical aspects of verification measures have never seemed insurmountable. An indicative example can be seen in the results of the Soviet-American talks on arms

race limitation in the 1960's and 1970's, at which time difficult technical problems of control were solved and useful experience was accumulated for the future. The USSR has never avoided the discussion and resolution of verification problems because it is just as interested as other countries in their resolution. In comparison to the United States, as Soviet leaders have stressed, the USSR is just as interested, if not more so, in a reliable control system meeting the needs of concrete arms limitation and disarmament measures.¹

The verification of disarmament is part of the sphere of intergovernmental relations and therefore depends largely on the state of these relations. Increased trust and a realization of the common interest in curbing the arms race facilitate the negotiation of specific verification procedures. At the same time, the verification of the observance of agreements is also to some extent a specific field of international relations and is influenced by several political, technical, international legal and other factors, and the planning of concrete verification procedures must therefore be based on scientifically sound principles suggested and confirmed by past experience. These principles, in turn, should be based on the fundamental provisions of international law recorded in the UN Charter, such as the sovereign equality of states and non-intervention in the internal affairs of states. No system of verification, as renowned Soviet expert on arms control R. M. Timerbayev accurately pointed out, can be valid if it is not based on these principles.²

Many American authors also interpret the concept of control (or "verification") in approximately the same way.³

The fundamental question of the purpose and aims of control is of the greatest importance in the planning of specific verification procedures. The success of all gradual steps toward disarmament will depend on the theoretical postulation of verification in relation to each specific arms limitation measure. International experience provides many examples of diverging approaches to the purpose and aims of verification on the theoretical level, and this stems from the diverging international policy lines of the USSR and United States. This is precisely what precluded the conclusion of arms limitation agreements during the first two decades after the war.

The Soviet Union has never separated political intergovernmental relations from the prospects for the successful resolution of the problems of the arms race and the issue of disarmament.⁴ The proposals the USSR has made in the postwar period provide sufficient proof of the clear connection between the overall political climate in the world and the possibilities for advancement toward disarmament. The Soviet side's approach is being reaffirmed today, now that the world situation has been seriously exacerbated and there is an urgent need to restore trust in intergovernmental relations, particularly in the main area--the area of large-scale political undertakings to avert the threat of nuclear war and develop peaceful relations.⁵

The states signing bilateral or multilateral arms limitation agreements must have an interest in them and therefore observe them, particularly in view of the serious political, moral and other implications of the violation of these agreements.

A different approach has won widespread support in the United States: People there are not concealing their suspicious feelings about their partners in agreements. When the opponents of constructive and mutually acceptable agreements in U.S. ruling circles try to accuse others of violating accords, they are essentially doing this, on the one hand, to justify their own reluctance to negotiate any new far-reaching arms limitation and reduction agreements, particularly in the qualitative sense, and, on the other, to pave the way for a possible decision not to feel bound by the limitations stipulated in agreements already signed by the United States.

Therefore, the Soviet approach strengthens trust between the signatories of agreements. The U.S. approach, on the other hand, contributes to heightened suspicion. This is the reason for another important matter connected with the international practice of verification in the sphere of arms limitation: The USSR believes that this necessitates cooperation between signatories in the elimination of all possible uncertainty and doubts about the observance of accords in an atmosphere of goodwill, so that matters do not reach the point of unnecessary (and possibly unjustified) disputes, claims and counterclaims. Many U.S. politicians and diplomats, on the other hand, believe in the need for interference in internal affairs (through compulsory on-site inspections from the very beginning), regardless of the need for such inspections. This approach frequently prevails, as it has in the middle of the 1980's. Renowned American researcher R. Barnet has said that "the simple assumption that any possibility of evasion (of an agreement) will automatically lead to (its) violation is extremely dubious in my opinion, but this is precisely what lies at the basis of American ideas about inspections."⁶

This approach is not even consistent with the basic premise of U.S. law--the presumption of innocence--not to mention the fact that it creates political difficulties in intergovernmental relations.

The USSR has never separated verification from disarmament or disarmament from verification, regarding them as a single entity. For this reason, the Soviet Union has categorically rejected U.S. attempts to impose control on other states while it has continued to build up its own atomic arsenal, from the notorious "Baruch Plan" of 1946 to the "Open Skies" plan of 1955, the aim of which was to legalize espionage. The USSR justifiably saw these attempts as a U.S. effort to substitute arms control without disarmament for disarmament. The same desire was later reflected in the American concept of "arms control," which essentially consisted not in stopping the arms race but in merely regulating it in the interest of the United States. The American military leadership pursued the same goals of continuing the arms buildup and developing new types of weapons in the 1960's, when it impeded the nuclear test ban on the pretext of the "need for compulsory on-site inspections," and in the 1970's, when it made every effort to impede the drafting of concrete strategic arms limitation agreements. It is interesting that former Secretary of State H. Kissinger stressed in his memoirs that the United States has always viewed arms control as a means of attaining specific political goals.⁷

The USSR has consistently defended and is defending the principle that verification must secure the observance of agreements. Discussing the urgent need

to prevent an arms race in space, M. S. Gorbachev expressed the belief in his TIME magazine interview that "agreement on this matter is possible and verifiable." He went on to say that "we do not trust the Americans any more than they trust us, and we are therefore just as interested as they are in the reliable verification of each agreement."⁸

At the press conference following the Geneva summit meeting, M. S. Gorbachev also noted that "the Soviet Union is open to verification. If a ban on weapons in space can be negotiated, we are willing to open our laboratories for the verification of this agreement on a mutual basis." In reference to the verification of a nuclear test ban, M. S. Gorbachev explained: "If the American side also suspends all nuclear tests and we conclude an agreement of this kind, there will be no problems with verification, including international verification, on our side in this area either."⁹

It took a great deal of effort on the part of the Soviet Union before the principle of verification was recorded in specific multilateral and bilateral agreements on the limitation of the arms race. For example, it is recorded in Article III of the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons on the Seabed and Ocean Floor (1971). The principle is also clearly stated in the 1972 Soviet-American Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and the 1976 Treaty on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes. It is clearly implied in other agreements.

The second important theoretical premise pertaining to control is the connection between verification and the specific disarmament measure. In other words, control must be commensurate with the degree of disarmament. It must be said that Soviet diplomacy set forth this extremely important theoretical premise back in the 1930's. For example, at the world conference on disarmament which began on 2 February 1932, the Soviet delegation announced that it had always insisted "that it is necessary first to agree on WHAT (emphasis in text) to control (the degree of arms limitation), and then to agree on HOW (emphasis in text) to control."¹⁰

This tenet also stems from the general theoretical assumption of the indivisibility of control and disarmament and it is nothing other than a move from the general to the particular. The problems engendered by the arms race are many and varied. Their resolution is connected in one way or another with the delicate matter of national security. For this reason, any specific verification procedure must be completely consistent with the specific disarmament measure. Otherwise, excessive verification could signify the actual evasion of agreements for the purpose of collecting information not envisaged in the agreements. Conversely, inadequate (or diminished) verification could lead to the danger of circumvention of the agreement for the violation of specific provisions.

The USSR's conceptual premise was also set forth in detail in actual proposals, such as the proposal of 10 May 1955 on arms limitation and the ban on nuclear weapons or the draft treaty on universal and total disarmament the USSR submitted to the Disarmament Committee in March 1962. It was acknowledged, although with reservations, by the United States in the negotiated Soviet-U.S. principles of disarmament talks, approved by the UN General Assembly in 1961.

This tenet has now been reaffirmed in several multilateral and bilateral Soviet-American agreements and in international documents, particularly the final document of the first special session of the UN General Assembly on disarmament in May-June 1978.

The consistency of verification procedures with disarmament measures certainly does not mean that only tried and tested methods of control will be employed in all future arms limitation and reduction agreements. The Soviet-American joint statement of 18 June 1979 on the principles and basic guidelines of subsequent strategic arms limitation talks is indicative in this context. It specifically says that "the further limitation and reduction of strategic nuclear arms must be subject to corresponding verification by national technical means, with the use of additional methods when necessary on the basis of cooperation, methods contributing to effective verification by national technical means."¹¹ Furthermore, several later foreign policy documents of the USSR stated the expediency of planning additional means and methods of verification, including specific forms of international control, with a view to actual developments in the sphere of armaments.

It is understandable that the increasing complexity of weapons systems is complicating the drafting of verifiable agreements. For example, the United States initiated the development and deployment of so-called battlefield nuclear weapons, which could be withdrawn from the zone of verification and then be easily returned to that zone after inspections had been conducted. No inspection, even an on-site one, can provide accurate answers to questions about the kind of warhead--nuclear or conventional--a cruise missile is carrying, or about the number of warheads--one or several--an ICBM is carrying.

Another extremely important consideration is the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of states during the verification procedure, stemming from the common provisions of international law, with a view to the realities of the political world and the possibility of using verification for purposes incompatible with its function. The USSR has adhered to this point of view from the very beginning. The position of the United States, on the other hand, has undergone substantial changes. In the 1920's, for example, it was categorically against any kind of on-site inspections by foreign establishments or individuals during discussions of naval arms limitation and the ban on chemical weapons. American spokesmen did not conceal their apprehension that these inspections might be used to infringe upon national sovereignty. At a Washington nine-country conference on the limitation of naval weapons and on Pacific and Far Eastern affairs (1921-1922), U.S. representative F. Kellogg (later secretary of state) frankly said that the United States would "not tolerate" control exercised by "foreign organizations" or "foreigners."¹²

After World War II, the United States took the opposite position. By the terms of its "Baruch Plan," penalties for the violation of the agreement establishing international control over atomic energy would have required only a simple majority vote in the UN Security Council--in circumvention of the principle of the unanimity of the council's permanent members.

Last but not least, there is the principle of the SPECIFIC NATURE OF VERIFICATION. This stems from the fact that the very nature of the problems engendered by the arms race demands specific forms and methods of verification for their resolution. It is true that a ban on chemical weapons is one thing, a nuclear test ban is another and the suspension of nuclear arms production is still another. Of course, there are common verification procedures with universal applicability, but the specific nature of the weapons referred to in various agreements gives rise to the need for a specific approach to the planning of forms and methods of control in each specific case.

The evolution of verification methods, means and procedures has accompanied the growth and expansion of the multilateral and bilateral, or Soviet-American, negotiation process in the sphere of disarmament.

Within the context of Soviet-American agreements, American specialists believed in the late 1960's that national technical means of verification, primarily satellite-aided, constituted reliable equipment for the surveillance of strategic forces without any need for on-site inspections.¹³ The American side acknowledged the possibility of verifying the observance of agreements with the aid of national technical means, which was one of the main considerations in the U.S. decision to start the SALT negotiations. Former Secretary of Defense H. Brown, for example, stated that "the American system of verification provides a complete picture of ICBM systems from the stage of development to the stage of deployment."¹⁴ Former Director W. Colby of the CIA also said that national technical means were highly effective in carrying out verification.

The USSR also felt that the verification of the observance of strategic arms limitation agreements could be accomplished primarily with the aid of national technical means of inspection.

As a result, these means comprised the basis of the verification procedure for the 1972 ABM treaty (Article XII) and the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Weapons (Article V). Both sides agreed that the functions of satellite-aided verification would be performed and that they would not interfere with one another, particularly in the verification of the observance of agreements.¹⁵

Contrary to the propaganda statements of rightwing politicians, many American experts have repeatedly noted that the satellite-aided verification of the observance of the ABM treaty does not present any difficulties.¹⁶ This is also attested to specifically by the McDonnell-Douglas Corporation's data on the resolution needed for the interpretation of observed objects. According to available Western data, the detailed observation cameras of, for example, the "Big Bird" and KN-11 satellites have a resolution of better than 30 centimeters at an altitude of more than 185 kilometers. These possibilities, utilized by national technical means of verification, secure the precise identification of a broad range of military objects.¹⁷

The two sides also agreed to create a verification mechanism in 1972 in the form of a permanent consultative commission with the aim of promoting the

implementation of Soviet-American agreements in this sphere. This attested to the serious intention of both sides to solve problems of verification in the event of uncertainty or doubts about the observance of agreements, and to the U.S. acknowledgement of the need for, and importance of, cooperation in the calm atmosphere of diplomatic contacts for the purpose of solving delicate matters of national security. This mechanism has operated without a hitch whenever it has been used by eliminating the problems arising on both sides--and precisely on both sides--in the observance of agreements.

Provisions pertaining to control were worded even more precisely in another important Soviet-American document--the SALT II treaty. Here the functions of the permanent commission were clarified and considerably augmented; in particular, the two sides pledged to update data on the quantity of strategic offensive arms at meetings of the commission (Paragraph 3, Article XVII).¹⁸

Unconvincing arguments have been cited by the opponents of the SALT II treaty who question the reliability of the verification procedure it envisages and the adequacy of American means of verification, spreading the rumor that the dismantling of the two electronic stations the CIA had used in Iran supposedly deprived the United States of the necessary means for guaranteed verification. An analysis of the debates in the U.S. Congress on the SALT II treaty and the potential of verification means proved that the treaty is still adequately verifiable.¹⁹

Provisions recorded in the joint statement on the principles and basic guidelines of subsequent strategic arms limitation talks, regarding the willingness to develop broader and more thorough additional verification procedures as a supplement to national technical means, were of great significance in the improvement of forms and methods of control.²⁰

The Soviet-U.S. treaties on the limitation of underground nuclear tests in 1974 and on underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes in 1976, which were, unfortunately, never enacted due to the U.S. refusal to ratify them, were of considerable importance in the improvement of verification methods in the 1970's. For example, the protocol to the first treaty stipulated the data the two sides agreed to exchange to secure reliable verification with the aid of national technical means.²¹ In the second document the sides agreed to supplement national technical means with the exchange of information about projected underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes and also agreed to give "designated personnel" access to explosion sites. The protocol stipulated the actual functions of these personnel, the opportunities they would be offered, the nature of their activity and so forth in detail (articles III-V).²²

During the trilateral talks by the USSR, United States and England on a total nuclear test ban in Geneva from 1977 to 1980, delegations essentially agreed on the draft of this kind of treaty. They agreed that national technical means of controlling the observance of the treaty would be supplemented by the international exchange of seismic data on the basis of recommendations prepared by a special working group of scientific experts from the Committee on Disarmament. The group prepared a report in 1978 with the active participation of Soviet specialists, containing recommendations on the creation of

a global network of around 50 seismic stations transmitting information to international seismic data processing centers. It proposed the formation of a committee of experts to discuss matters pertaining to the international exchange of these data.²³ An agreement was also reached on the on-site inspection of indistinct phenomena on a voluntary basis at the request of the future treaty's signatories. In spite of this important agreement, the American administration decided not to sign the negotiated draft after taking a noticeably tougher stance at the talks.

In summation, therefore, we can say that issues of verification did not present an insoluble problem during the drafting of Soviet-American arms limitation agreements concluded or prepared in the 1970's, when the political will to conclude these agreements was present on both sides. The situation was complicated when Washington abruptly changed its policy line and began the intense buildup of U.S. military potential, especially nuclear, with the aim of strategic superiority to the USSR. The American administration is once again attempting, as it has in the past, to conceal its reluctance to make further progress in arms limitation by starting counterproductive debates on the technical aspects of control.

Moreover, these attempts have been accompanied by unsubstantiated allegations that the Soviet Union has supposedly violated earlier bilateral agreements. They have been stated in two reports the Reagan Administration has submitted to the U.S. Congress. The main purpose of the reports is to cast aspersions on Soviet policy and simultaneously justify the negative U.S. approach to arms limitation, the attacks on Soviet-American agreements and the occasional demands for their denunciation.

Within the context of just the verification problems raised in these reports, it is obvious that the administration has not made use of the mechanism of the permanent consultative commission to clarify matters connected with the observance of Soviet-American agreements. Incidentally, this has been pointed out by such prominent American officials in previous administrations as G. Smith, P. Warnke, H. Scoville and others.²⁴ Prior to the start of the Reagan Administration, however, all questions arising on both sides with regard to the observance of agreements were successfully dealt with by this very commission.

Other U.S. allegations about the USSR, such as those made in the United Nations, have also been groundless, but they have inflicted considerable damage on trust in Soviet-American relations, and this was the aim of the forces opposing Soviet-U.S. arms limitation agreements. A memorandum from the Soviet embassy in the United States to the State Department explained the Soviet side's views in detail and cited facts to prove who is actually striving to violate both Soviet-American and international agreements in the sphere of arms limitation.²⁵

A TASS statement regarding information in the American press about the preparations for the publication of a second "report" stressed that "while the USSR has strictly and unconditionally observed negotiated treaties and agreements, the United States has tried and is still trying to evade and violate its international commitments."²⁶

It is noteworthy that the opponents of agreements with the USSR in the present administration have seized on these reports, arguing that since the verification of the ban on chemical and antisatellite weapons is impossible, no reliance should be placed in the prohibition of these weapons.²⁷

It is impossible to ignore the potential verification problems connected with the Reagan Administration's plans to extend the arms race to outer space. As certain circles in the United States embarked on the creation of military space systems for aggressive purposes, they began to quickly erect various types of barriers to preclude the limitation, not to mention the prohibition, of these weapons. Many rightwing conservatives have declared that verification problems connected with the prohibition of the use of outer space for military purposes would be absolutely insurmountable without even trying to discuss the matter within the framework of official negotiations. At the same time, some American public spokesmen and scientists are pointedly criticizing the Pentagon's plans for the emplacement of weapons systems in outer space and the "arguments" about the impossibility of verifying the observance of agreements in this sphere.

Many scientists in the United States favor the conclusion of an agreement prohibiting antisatellite weapons without delay, pointing out the possibility of its adequate verification. In his report "ASAT Treaty Verification" of 1 February 1984, authoritative expert R. Garwin warned that "whereas both sides will have the potential to eliminate satellites, which would represent an important element of military operations, the potential for control will be much weaker."²⁸

When the Soviet Union asked the American administration to join it in its unilateral moratorium on all nuclear tests of 6 August 1985, the administration responded with references to the "impossibility of verification." The USSR proved that these references were completely groundless when it determined the precise nature and force of a small U.S. nuclear explosion in Nevada on 9 August 1985.

According to renowned American professors L. Sikes and D. Avernden and Soviet scientists (particularly Academician M. Sadovskiy),²⁹ existing national systems for the detection of underground nuclear explosions are completely adequate. Nevertheless, the USSR expressed its willingness to agree to some measures connected with on-site inspections for the sake of progress in the resolution of this problem.

The Soviet-initiated moratorium on tests of antisatellite weapons, agreed to by the USSR on the condition that the United States refrain from such tests, has been in effect since fall 1983.

The observance of the moratorium on orbital antisatellite weapons by the two sides has been verified by their satellite tracking equipment, and no questions have been raised about adequate verifiability. When the United States tested its ASAT antisatellite strike weapon on 13 September 1985, it violated this moratorium.

Other forms of control could be found if necessary.³⁰ This also applies to suborbital antisatellite systems. In addition to the methods already mentioned, the radioelectronic equipment of the United States and USSR on land, in the world ocean and in outer space could be used for this purpose. The exchange of information and consultations could clarify obscure situations.

The behavior of rightwing conservative U.S. officials is seriously undermining confidence in Washington's policy in the sphere of disarmament. If the intense propaganda about "verification difficulties" and the lies about Soviet violations of agreements are viewed in conjunction with the reluctance to take a constructive approach to the discussion of a great variety of nuclear and space issues and with the intense U.S. arms buildup, it is clear that questions of control are being used as a cover for the aggressive plans of American ruling circles and as a means of impeding the talks in Geneva on these matters. At the present time, however, sweeping agreements are particularly necessary.

Given the present level of R & D on space strike weapons in the United States, a ban can still be verified. As M. S. Gorbachev said in his conversation with TIME magazine reporters, at this stage "control with the aid of national technical means is possible.... But when weapons are already in outer space, the process will be completely uncontrollable, and we will find ourselves, as I already said, at a stage whose consequences cannot even be predicted."³¹

It is clear that verification should not be a stumbling-block in the efforts to curb the arms race. The Soviet leadership has repeatedly noted that if there is a real desire to reach an agreement on arms limitation and reduction measures and disarmament measures, verification, as past experience has shown, cannot and will not be an obstacle.

FOOTNOTES

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4. For a more detailed discussion, see V. K. Sobakin, "Sovetskaya kontseptsiya razoruzheniya" [The Soviet Theory of Disarmament], Moscow, 1978; V. F. Petrovskiy, "Razoruzheniye: kontseptsiya, problemy, mekhanizm" [Disarmament: Theory, Problems, Mechanism], Moscow, 1982.
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10. IZVESTIYA, 25 September 1932.
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12. P. Towle, "Arms Control and East-West Relations," London, 1983, p 134.
13. See, for example, J. Richelson, "United States Strategic Reconnaissance: Photographic/Imaging Satellites," Center for International and Strategic Affairs, ACIS Working Papers No 38, Los Angeles, 1983; C. Vance, "Hard Choices. Critical Years in American Foreign Policy," N.Y., 1983, p 354.
14. "The SALT II Treaty, Part 2. Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations," Wash., 1979, pp 241-242; H. Brown, "Thinking About National Security. Defense and Foreign Policy in a Dangerous World," Boulder, 1983, p 186.
15. "Sovetskiy Soyuz v borbe za razorozheniye. Sbornik dokumentov" [The Soviet Union in the Struggle for Disarmament. Collected Documents], Moscow, 1977, pp 115, 119.
16. SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN, February 1979, p 36.
17. "The Nuclear Freeze Issue. Report of the Committee of Soviet Scientists in Defense of Peace and Against the Nuclear Threat," Moscow, 1984, pp 28, 29.
18. "Vneshnyaya politika Sovetskogo Soyuz a i mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya. 1979 god. Sbornik dokumentov" [The Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union and International Relations. 1979. Collected Documents], Moscow, 1980, pp 87-104.
19. "The SALT II Treaty," pt 1, pp 193, 197, 228; pt 2, pp 231, 241, 226.
20. "Vneshnyaya politika Sovetskogo Soyuz a," p 104.
21. "Militarizm i razorozheniye. Spravochnik" [Militarism and Disarmament. Handbook], Moscow, 1984, pp 290-291.
22. Ibid., p 296.
23. Ibid., pp 115-116.
24. See, for example, INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, 20 January 1984.

25. PRAVDA, 30 January 1984; also see SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, 1984, No 6, pp 59-63.
26. PRAVDA, 21 October 1984.
27. INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, 20 January 1984.
28. R. Garwin and A. White, "ASAT Treaty Verification," N.Y., 1984, p 12.
29. IZVESTIYA, 22 August 1985 (interview with M. A. Sadovskiy).
30. The Soviet point of view is thoroughly explained in the following works: Yu. M. Kolosov and S. G. Stashevskiy, "Borba za mirnyy kosmos" [The Struggle for Peaceful Outer Space], Moscow, 1984; I. I. Kotlyarov, "Mezhdunarodnyy kontrol s ispolzovaniyem kosmicheskikh sredstv" [International Control with the Use of Space Equipment], Moscow, 1981.
31. PRAVDA, 2 September 1985.

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WESTERN EUROPE AFTER GENEVA SUMMIT

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 2, Feb 86 (signed to press 20 Jan 86) pp 87-91

[Article by Yu. P. Davydov]

[Text] The Soviet-American dialogue on the summit level in Geneva from 19 to 21 November 1985 and its results had tremendous international repercussions, and they were also significant in Western Europe. This is understandable because the majority of the West European leaders and the public have not concealed their worries about the mounting tension in relations between the USSR and the United States and, as allies of the latter, have tried to exert some pressure on Washington on some occasions to alleviate the tension if not to remove it entirely.

Western Europe contributed to the revival of political dialogue between the USSR and the United States "by building bridges to the East when fierce arguments were going on and when disagreements grew increasingly acute," stressed Prime Minister B. Craxi of Italy in an IL MESSAGGERO interview. "It continued close consultations, advocating moderation and proving its loyalty.... At the conference in New York before the summit meeting, we asked the American President to put forth balanced proposals in Geneva and display flexibility during the meeting with the new Soviet leader."

To some extent, it can be said that the West European influence was one of the factors balancing (or neutralizing) the pressure exerted on the White House by extreme rightwing forces in the United States, especially the Pentagon bosses.

Now the myth of the "Soviet military threat," zealously instilled in the Western public mind by conservative American centers such as the Heritage Foundation and the Hoover Institute, is being discredited more and more in Western Europe. If the leaders of the two states express the common opinion in a joint statement that "a nuclear war must never be started, there can be no winners in this war" and pledge "not to strive for military superiority," it is obvious that there is something wrong with the myth because it does not fit into the situation of a Soviet-American political dialogue with positive results. And it was on this myth that the entire foundation of Atlantic solidarity rested, the coercive NATO discipline for the sake of which

Washington asked the allies to sacrifice their own specific interests in the East and take on a heavier burden in the arms race. By deliberately creating the artificial situation of the West's "common enemy," Washington hoped to use anti-Sovietism for the dissipation of Western Europe's desire for some say in international affairs.

The interest of West European politicians and the general public was aroused by the conclusion the CPSU Central Committee Politburo drew from the results of the Geneva meeting, the conclusion that "conflicts fatalistically dooming the USSR and United States to confrontation, not to mention war, do not exist." The differences between the two countries are colossal, M. S. Gorbachev stressed at a session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, but their inter-connection and interdependence is just as great in today's world. This means that the idea of cooperation should triumph over the idea of confrontation between East and West. The meeting in Geneva and its results reflect these objective realities and needs of today's world.

In a sense, the meeting legalized an idea supported by many of the United States' allies in Western Europe, namely the idea that political dialogue and cooperation in the sphere of security should be constant and should be conducted under all circumstances, including, and even particularly, during periods of strain in East-West relations. In the event of the escalation of international tension, it will be necessary to earnestly seek compromises, and not to make illusory attempts to act from a position of strength.

The statement made in Geneva by the Soviet and U.S. leaders, that there "can be no winners" in a nuclear war, was amplified a few days later by M. S. Gorbachev in his report at the USSR Supreme Soviet session: "We do not base our policy on the desire to infringe upon U.S. national interests. I could go even further and say, for example, that we would not want to change the strategic balance in our own favor. We would not want to because this would heighten the suspicions of the other side and the instability of the overall situation."

This approach to matters of international security and its explanation by the Soviet side strengthened the feelings of the West European public and political circles in favor of the idea of joint or mutual security, recorded in the Final Act of the 1975 conference in Helsinki and then described in detail in the famous report of the Palme Commission (1982).*

And it is true that if it is impossible for one side to beat the other side in a nuclear war without dying itself, and if superiority is unattainable, the illusory attempts to base the security of states (or a bloc of states) on the buildup of strength and on efforts to undermine or diminish the security of the other side are also unattainable. This means that there can be no security of the United States (or NATO) against the Soviet Union (or the Warsaw Pact); it can either be mutual or not exist at all. This concept,

* "'Common Security.' A Program for Disarmament," Report of the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues under the Chairmanship of Olof Palme--SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, 1982, Nos 9, 10-- Editor's note.

consistently adhered to by the USSR, has had many supporters in Western Europe in recent years, especially among the Social Democrats, the members of the peace movement and sensible politicians. After Geneva this idea acquired considerable momentum and is winning the universal recognition of the West European public, and this must eventually have a substantial effect on the nature of actual East-West relations in the sphere of security. Chairman W. Brandt of the SPD and Socialist International stressed in his statement that the main result of the Geneva summit was "the recognition of the need to move from the state of mutual assured destruction to the state of mutual assured security."

After a long interval, the Soviet-American summit meeting revived these hopes in many West European politicians and the general public. Both applauded the willingness, expressed in the joint Soviet-American statement, to step up the Geneva talks on space and nuclear weapons, including the projected 50-percent reduction in the nuclear weapons of the two sides, and the idea of an interim agreement on intermediate-range missiles in Europe. Furthermore, more and more political officials and journalists in Western Europe are realizing that Washington's adherence to the so-called "Strategic Defense Initiative" (SDI) is still the main obstacle in the resolution of problems connected with the arms race, especially the nuclear arms race.

It is significant that the logic of the Soviet approach to the prohibition of space strike systems, demonstrated with such conviction during M. S. Gorbachev's press conference in Geneva, made a great impression on Europe. For example, Chairman F. Ollaun of "Labor for Peace," a member of the English Parliament, remarked in the weekly TRIBUNE that "the Geneva summit proved that Reagan's 'Star Wars' plan has become a stumbling-block on the road to disarmament."

After the Soviet-American dialogue in Geneva, which graphically revealed the negative effect of the SDI on the prospect of curbing the arms race, the debates in Western Europe on the "Star Wars" issue became more heated and the doubts and worries about it became much more intense. The main concern of West European politicians and experts is the question of whether or not Western Europe will feel more secure as a result of the development of the American space strike system (and the corresponding USSR countermeasures). Many experts are already admitting that the SDI will not secure the United States against a retaliatory nuclear strike: Even if 98 percent of the launched missiles are intercepted (and this figure is an obvious overstatement), enough will remain to inflict unacceptable damages on the country. But if the United States cannot protect its own territory with weapons deployed in space, how could it defend Western Europe in this way? Besides this, West European researchers point out, American space strike systems will be aimed at strategic nuclear missiles, and not at the operational-tactical missiles that are more likely to be used in the European theater in the event of a conflict.

Another fact is also being taken into consideration in Western Europe. Its political leaders have already had a bad experience with the so-called American "nuclear guarantees," in which they are gradually losing all trust. But in what way will the "space guarantees" be more reliable than the

nuclear ones? The main result of the West European ruling elite's reliance on American "nuclear guarantees" was the excessive saturation of Western Europe with nuclear weapons, which only undermined its security. Is it not true that Western Europe will be in an even more dangerous position when strike systems are deployed in space?

Of course, even in Western Europe there are influential forces with an interest in the maintenance of international tension: It has its own military-industrial complex, extensive network serving NATO, rightwing conservative parties and so forth.

Elements of disagreement stand out in their view of the Geneva meeting. What is more, they would like to take action to expand the existing sphere of disagreements. When the English Government was the first of the U.S. allies to officially include its country in the work on the "Star Wars" program, it was acting precisely toward this end, just as Bonn and a few other followers did.

More and more West Europeans are realizing--and this feeling became stronger after Geneva--that a new round of the arms race--space, nuclear and conventional--with unpredictable consequences is a more likely result of the U.S. plan to implement the SDI than "reliable defense" and the "disappearance of nuclear weapons." Of course, this will also affect Western Europe. The SDI is based on modern technological ideas, but people are already acknowledging that weapons deployed in space will be highly vulnerable and that the United States will have to develop not only space strike systems but also the means of their defense within the near future. History has demonstrated, however, that each anti-weapon is followed by the appearance of a new "anti." In short, space weapons will follow the same pattern as weapons on earth--that is, they will be built up and improved, and so will the nuclear weapons on earth. At the present time, despite the talk about the SDI, five new strategic offensive weapons systems are being developed in the United States and the conventional arms race is being escalated. It is unlikely that Western Europe will be able to remain on the sidelines in this military competition: Washington will demand that it "share the burden."

To promote the SDI, some politicians are asserting that Western Europe will take the risk of increasing its scientific and technical lag behind the United States and Japan if it does not take part in the "space program of the century." At this time, however, Washington is using the most advanced scientific and technical developments in Western Europe and Japan for its own projected space strike systems, encouraging a "brain drain" to the United States. It is also carefully controlling and restricting the transfer of advanced technology and high-technology products in the opposite direction. Participation in the SDI could actually lead to the further expansion of the military-technological gap between Western Europe and the United States and to Western Europe's greater dependence on its senior partner in the military sphere and, as a result of this, in the foreign policy sphere.

The Soviet-American meeting in Geneva, its results, and its decisions if these should be acted upon, and the Soviet Union is prepared to do this, could give

rise to a tendency toward the gradual transfer of military confrontation between the two powers and between the East and West in general into the channel of political dialogue. This would be of great importance in reinforcing the international status of Western Europe.

The fact is that its international influence is now based primarily on its economic strength, its political experience and its cultural heritage, and not at all on its military strength, however great it might be. But the military factor still plays an important role in the system of inter-Atlantic relations and secures the attachment (through NATO, the U.S. military presence and the "nuclear guarantees") of Western Europe to Washington, giving it the ability to pressure its allies and sometimes force them to adhere to the American line even when this is not in their interest. Western Europe can feel more or less equal to the United States on the economic level, but equality is replaced by dependence on the military level.

The mounting tension in Europe and the rest of the world is increasing the importance of the military factor in the system of international relations--that is, states with considerable military strength (this now means considerable nuclear potential) have more influence. This almost automatically diminishes the ability of West European ruling circles to defend their own interests in international affairs. The relaxation of tension in East-West relations engenders the development of the opposite tendencies--the reduction of the significance of military strength and the military factor in the system of intergovernmental relations and the assumption of prominent positions by other sources of influence. These are precisely the sources of strength and influence in the world that Western Europe has, and that allow it to influence the course of international events and give it a say in world affairs under the conditions of detente.

Assessing the results of the Geneva dialogue between M. S. Gorbachev and R. Reagan, Chancellor H. Kohl of the FRG, an official with conservative leanings (in their pro-American variety), made the noteworthy admission that the meeting had "opened closed doors." Furthermore, in the interpretation of H. Kohl and other leaders, it opened them for Western Europe as well as for the United States.

The Soviet-American summit meeting legalized the desire of the leaders of some West European countries (primarily NATO members) to develop mutually beneficial cooperation with the Soviet Union and other states of the socialist community. It is not surprising that Great Britain's Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs G. Howe informed the Soviet leadership through his ambassador in Moscow of London's desire to develop political dialogue and mutually beneficial relations with the USSR just a week after the Geneva meeting, although an exchange of messages on this matter had taken place much earlier.

Cooperation with the USSR and other socialist states was practiced by West European countries even during the years of mounting tension between the USSR and the United States, but its scales were somewhat smaller and it was frequently conducted on the sly and under difficult conditions because it evoked

vehement objections from Washington, which regarded it as something just short of the "betrayal of common Western interests." Now, however, since the American administration itself has decided to resume the political dialogue with the Soviet Union and to expand commercial and other relations, these objections are groundless. And this applies not only to political problems but also questions of trade, industrial cooperation and scientific, technical and cultural exchanges. It was no coincidence that FRG Minister of Foreign Affairs H. D. Genscher stressed immediately after the meeting that the improvement of East-West relations should not be confined to the sphere of disarmament but should extend to other areas of interaction ("the improvement of East-West relations across the board").

In this way, the Soviet-American meeting in Geneva became something like a "moment of truth" for Western Europe, clearly illuminating the broad opportunities it offers Western Europe and the real dangers inherent in the policy of confrontation.

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ASPECTS OF NINTH ASTEC MEETING IN DECEMBER 1985 DISCUSSED

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 2, Feb 86 (signed to press 20 Jan 86) pp 91-96

[Article by A. A. Soskin: "For Equal Trade and Stronger Mutual Understanding"]

[Text] The ninth annual meeting of the members of the American-Soviet Trade and Economic Council (ASTEC), an organization uniting members of the USSR and U.S. business communities, was held in Moscow from 9 to 11 December 1985.

We should recall that ASTEC was established in 1973 in accordance with a protocol signed during the Soviet-American summit meeting in Washington to promote the normalization of bilateral trade and economic relations and their development on an equitable and mutually beneficial basis and to determine promising fields of economic, scientific and technical cooperation. The Soviet members of the council are 119 ministries, departments, enterprises and organizations, and the American members are around 250 industrial corporations and banks (many medium-sized and small firms in addition to the giants of the private sector), the Chamber of Commerce and the National Association of Manufacturers of the United States and some individual states.

It is indicative that the number of American members of the council has remained constant despite the considerable deterioration of the conditions of trade with the USSR in recent years and the attacks ASTEC members have sometimes suffered in the United States. This attests to the constant interest of U.S. business groups in contacts with the USSR, to the viability of the organizational structure of Soviet-American trade and economic relations created through joint efforts during the years of detente, and to the high prestige of ASTEC. The council was and is an important channel of communications between the business communities and government agencies of the two countries. The role of this channel is all the more significant in view of the fact that contacts on economic issues on the governmental level were broken off at the beginning of the 1980's through the fault of the American administration and virtually ceased to exist until recently.

Council activity played a part in the slight revival of bilateral contacts in the last year or year and a half and several important politico-trade undertakings. In May 1985, for example, the eighth session of the Soviet-American intergovernmental commission on trade was held in Moscow after an

interval of almost 7 years. Earlier, in June 1984, the USSR-U.S. agreement on the promotion of economic, industrial and technical cooperation of 29 June 1974 was renewed for another 10 years on the initiative of the American side. The talks on shipping were resumed and an agreement was reached on the resumption of regular air traffic between the two countries on 1 April 1986. The council initiated and organized visits to the Soviet Union by trade and industrial delegations from several American states and by representatives of large corporations. The "Agribusiness-USA" exhibit, in which more than 100 American companies participated, was held in Moscow in fall 1983 under ASTEC auspices.

The working program of the ninth annual ASTEC meeting included plenary meetings, meetings of the executive committee and board of directors and conferences of special committees: on science and technology, financial, on new forms of economic cooperation, on small business, on tourism, legal, on council membership. Discussion groups on the following topics were also organized: the storage, processing, packaging and shipment of agricultural products; consumer goods production; petrochemicals; compensatory agreements, full-stage agreements and production cooperation. American participants had a chance to meet and speak with people in various Soviet ministries, departments and organizations on matters of interest to them.

It is symbolic that the plane on which most of the members of the American delegation arrived in Moscow was called the "Business Summit." The meeting was attended by such prominent representatives of the U.S. business community as Archer-Daniels-Midland Chairman of the Board D. Andreas, Dresser Industries Chairman of the Board J. Murphy, Ralston Purina Chairman of the Board W. Stritz, Dow Chemical Chairman of the Board R. Landin, Litton Industries Chairman of the Board F. O'Green, Monsanto President R. Mahoney, Occidental Petroleum Chairman of the Board A. Hammer, Pepsico Chairman of the Board D. Kendall, Armco Steel Executive Chairman W. Veriti, Coca-Cola President D. Keough and several others.

In all, the meeting was attended by around 400 executives of 150 industrial companies and banks--the largest U.S. business delegation at a Soviet-American meeting of this kind.

Official U.S. circles were represented by Secretary of Commerce M. Baldrige, his deputy B. Smart, U.S. Ambassador to the USSR A. Hartman and Mayor D. Feinstein of San Francisco.

The Soviet side was represented at the meeting by USSR Minister of Foreign Trade and Honorary Director of ASTEC B. I. Aristov, Deputy Chairman of USSR Gosplan V. S. Lakhtin, Deputy Chairman of the USSR State Committee for Science and Technology A. K. Romanov, First Deputy Chairman of the USSR State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations A. I. Kachanov, First Deputy Chairman of the Georgian SSR Council of Ministers O. Ye. Cherkeziya, USSR deputy ministers of foreign trade A. N. Manzhulo, N. G. Osipov and V. M. Ivanov and managers and officials from several sectorial ministries and foreign trade and other organizations.

On 10 December 1985 General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee M. S. Gorbachev received U.S. Secretary of Commerce M. Baldrige in the Kremlin and spoke with him. D. Andreas and council President J. Giffen were received by member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers N. I. Ryzhkov.

The ninth annual ASTEC meeting was held soon after the Soviet-American summit meeting in Geneva, the results of which, as the decree of the USSR Supreme Soviet points out, "create an opportunity to move from the present state of dangerous confrontation to a constructive search for ways of normalizing Soviet-American relations and improving the international situation in general." Trade and economic relations can and should play an extremely important role in the development of this process.

This is precisely our country's approach to economic relations with the United States. "In this dangerous world, we simply cannot, and do not have the right to, ignore such a stabilizer of relations as trade, economic, scientific and technical contacts," General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee M. S. Gorbachev stressed when he addressed participants in the ASTEC meeting at a luncheon in the Kremlin. "If we want truly strong and stable relations, capable of securing a reliable peace, their foundation must include developed commercial relations."

To date, unfortunately, commercial contacts between the USSR and United States have remained below the level corresponding to the economic influence and status of the two countries in international trade. The positive political potential of these contacts has also remained essentially unrealized. The reason for this abnormal situation, which is contrary to the long-range interests of both states, is the discriminatory policy of the U.S. administration and Congress and their constant attempts to use trade as an instrument of political pressure on the USSR.

Specific examples of this policy are well known: They include the refusal to grant the Soviet Union the most-favored-nation status so common in international trade, obstacles in the crediting of American exports, the institution of various sanctions and embargos and the cancellation of trade contracts for political reasons, which caused Soviet foreign trade organizations to lose faith in American firms. Finally, there are the export controls, in accordance with which the sale of many modern high-technology products and their production technology to the USSR is prohibited on the specious pretext that this would allegedly contribute to the growth of Soviet military potential.

The last aspect of U.S. foreign trade policy warrants special consideration because it erects artificial barriers in the way of the further development of Soviet-American economic contacts and prevents the use of their more promising forms and the organization of the mutually beneficial exchange of scientific and technical knowledge and production experience.

For example, not long before the ninth annual meeting, the American branch of ASTEC prepared lists of possible cooperative projects in several fields and submitted them to the Soviet side. The fields included power engineering,

agriculture, the service sphere, the pulp and paper and textile industries, environmental protection, petrochemicals, consumer goods production, medicine, biotechnology, fishing and other indisputably purely "peaceful" fields. Each point, however, contained a special proviso with regard to restrictions stipulated in U.S. export control legislation. For example, the transfer of technology connected with oil drilling and production is prohibited in the field of petrochemicals, the transfer of technology for the production of fibers used in certain composition materials is prohibited in the textile industry, and the export of modern electronic equipment is prohibited in the medical industry. This list could go on.

American restrictions almost precluded the development of such forms of economic cooperation with American firms as the exchange of licenses and scientific production cooperation, although around 50 such agreements with firms in other industrially developed capitalist countries, mainly the FRG, France and Japan, had been signed by 1985.

Although the Soviet Union assigns priority to broader contacts with fraternal socialist countries and more thorough socialist economic integration in its foreign economic strategy, it certainly does not deny the additional advantages afforded by participation in international division of labor with developed capitalist countries, but only with the unconditional observance of the principles of equality and mutual benefit and without any kind of discrimination. Considerable potential also exists for broader commercial contacts with interested U.S. firms.

These possibilities seem particularly extensive in light of the large-scale plans for the development and improvement of the Soviet economy, science and technology in the next decade and a half. The draft Basic Directions of the Economic and Social Development of the USSR from 1986 to 1990 and During the Period up to 2000 states that the existing industrial potential of the country should almost double and labor productivity should be augmented 2.3-2.5 times by the end of the current century, thereby taking a decisive step toward the highest world indicator in this area. To this end, plans call for the rapid broad-scale remodeling and retooling of the entire national economy, with the main role assigned to the machine-building complex. Machine tool building, instrument building, computer production, the electrical equipment and electronics industries and branches connected with metallurgy, chemistry and biotechnology are slated for priority development in the 12th Five-Year Plan.

The current profound changes, Soviet speakers pointed out at the meeting, will also have a direct effect on foreign economic relations, which have been assigned an important role in the resolution of problems facing the country. Progressive changes will be made in the structure of foreign trade by increasing the proportion of finished goods in exports and imports, especially modern machines and equipment. Along with branches of the machine-building complex, imported equipment and technology will be used extensively to step up the retooling of ferrous and nonferrous metallurgy, the chemical industry and the oil and gas industry, the reinforcement of the material and technical base of agriculture and the expansion of consumer goods production.

The further improvement of forms of mutually beneficial commercial and technological cooperation with firms in capitalist countries is planned, including agreements on a compensatory basis and the continuation of the practice of enlisting their services for full-stage construction projects. Contracts of this kind have already been signed and are being fulfilled by firms in Austria, Italy and Finland, and contracts are being negotiated with Japanese firms. This form of economic cooperation accounts for 20-25 percent of our imports of machines and equipment from capitalist countries. This form could also be used in trade with the United States.

It must be said, however, that the American leadership, judging by all indications, is still not ready to begin normalizing the conditions of trade with the USSR and resolutely renouncing previous stereotypes of political thinking in this field. When M. Baldrige addressed the ASTEC members, he discussed the expediency of expanding Soviet-American trade in only the most general terms, stressing that it must be "peaceful" (although this, as the earlier example shows, certainly does not make it free of restrictions). The secretary tried to justify the legislative barriers in the export of so-called "strategic" goods and technology and linked the prospects of even "non-strategic" trade with "progress in other areas of bilateral relations." Reagan Administration spokesmen have repeatedly declared that they have no intention to repeal or amend the discriminatory Jackson-Vanik amendment.

It is also significant that the new law on export controls enacted in the United States in 1985 did not relax restrictions on sales of advanced equipment and technology to the USSR; it also does not contain any real guarantee that contracts signed with American firms will not be cancelled by the government for political reasons.* The Garn-Proxmire bill, which would further restrict the crediting of the commercial transactions of U.S. firms with socialist countries, is now being discussed in the U.S. Congress.

This is doing nothing to improve the competitive position of U.S. firms in the Soviet market. Addressing the ASTEC members, M. S. Gorbachev stressed that until political obstacles "have been eliminated, the normal and broad-scale development of Soviet-American trade and other economic relations will not take place. We regret this, but we will not ask the United States for anything...and we will not be a market for obsolete goods but will buy only goods meeting the highest world standards." As Soviet speakers repeatedly stressed at the ASTEC meeting, a great deal depends on the activity of American business circles and on their ability to use their considerable political influence to bring about changes in the discriminatory provisions of U.S. foreign trade legislation.

Participants in the ninth annual ASTEC meeting exchanged opinions on the most important issues in bilateral trade, economic, scientific and technical relations, planned specific ways of developing them and discussed the council's current activities and the plans for its work in the future. The applications of 19 new members were accepted.

During the meeting the USSR State Committee for Science and Technology signed agreements on scientific and technical cooperation with American companies:

* The Reagan Administration's approach to trade with the USSR will be analyzed in depth in an article in the next issue of the journal--Editor's note.

on gas and oil refining and repressuring equipment with Allied Signal, on the exploitation of the continental shelf with McDermott International, on off-shore oil and gas drilling with NL Industries, on glass ceramic production with Owens Illinois and on medicine with Warner Lambert; two earlier agreements were renewed.

A decision was made to hold joint seminars in the Soviet Union on the agro-industrial complex and scientific and technical progress, on medical equipment and on labor productivity enhancement and in the United States on modern welding.

A decision was made to hold an exhibit of "Machines, Equipment and Technology for Industrial and Civil Construction" under council auspices in Moscow in 1986 and to intensify the work on the organization of exhibits in general.

Participants in the ninth annual ASTEC meeting passed a resolution in which the prospects for the development of Soviet-American trade, economic, scientific and technical relations are assessed optimistically in light of the Geneva meeting of the Soviet and U.S. leaders, reaffirmed their interest in the large-scale development of equitable commercial cooperation between Soviet organizations and U.S. firms and unanimously supported the granting of most-favored-nation status to the Soviet Union in the sphere of trade and export credit and the plans for the council's more active efforts to surmount obstacles in bilateral trade.

"It is our conviction," the resolution says, "that Soviet-American trade and economic relations should be developed to the scales corresponding to the potential of the two great industrial world powers and that they will have a positive effect on bilateral political relations and create an atmosphere of trust between the populations of our countries."

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BOOK ATTACKING U.S. MILITARISM REVIEWED

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 2, Feb 86 (signed to press 20 Jan.86) pp 115-118

[Review by G. A. Trofimenko of book "Militarizm SShA: voyennaya mashina, bloki, bazy i akty agressii" [U.S. Militarism: Military Machine, Blocs, Bases and Acts of Aggression], a handbook by R. F. Alekseyev, A. V. Krutskikh and A. A. Svetlov, edited by V. F. Petrovskiy and N. F. Chernov, Moscow, Politizdat, 1985, 367 pages: "From a Position of Strength"]

[Text] Each day the reader who turns to the international section of the newspaper encounters information connected with various aspects of the military activities of the largest capitalist state in today's world, the United States of America. It might be the beginning of the latest set of maneuvers involving American armed forces, an uninvited American aircraft carrier cruising the shores of a sovereign country, a new group of American bombers arriving at the newest overseas base or additional allocations for military programs. In themselves, these reports provide some idea of U.S. military preparations and military policy, but a complete understanding of the American military line, military positions and military activity on the global scale necessitates the summarization of existing information, the separation of the main facts from the secondary items and the precise categorization of selected data.

This is what the authors of this handbook set out to do, and it is immediately apparent that they succeeded. The handbook, compiled on the basis of reports in the Soviet and foreign press and the data of official American sources and foreign research centers, provides a detailed and precise picture of the global activity of the U.S. military machine and cites specific examples of Washington's expansionist aims and actions, which are posing a threat to the people of the overwhelming majority of countries in the world.

The handbook covers virtually all aspects of the military policy, military economy and military activity of the United States and their ideological substantiation by designated propaganda agencies. The authors inform the reader of the colossal growth of U.S. military spending, show how the bigwigs of the military-industrial complex are warming their hands on huge military contracts, cite interesting data on U.S. military aid to allies and clients abroad and describe the social consequences of the growth of militarism, which is constantly devouring more and more of the federal budget.

The authors present a detailed description of arms and armed forces, the doctrines of their use, American bloc policy, the American military presence in various parts of the world and the construction of American military bases and other bridgeheads on the "advance frontiers" of confrontation with the socialist countries. Here the authors are not striving to inundate the reader with facts and figures but present them in an orderly way, citing only the most characteristic or typical data and commenting on them briefly in the narrative. When necessary, they make brief excursions into past history to help the reader reconstruct the logical chain of events connected with American overseas expansion and the interdependence of U.S. military programs and military strategies.

One of the good points of the publication is the presentation of information about the latest tendencies in U.S. military policy, military organization and overseas expansion in each section of the handbook. For example, in the discussion of the Reagan Administration's military policy, the authors underscore its purposeful activity in the buildup of strategic weapons. The authors cite data on the size of U.S. strategic forces at the end of 1984. . The group of land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM's) includes 550 Minuteman 3, 450 Minuteman 2 and 32 Titan 2 launchers, capable of simultaneously launching 2,132 nuclear warheads with a force of from 300 kilotons to 10 megatons each (p 36).

American naval strategic missile forces include 39 nuclear submarines equipped with Trident I, Poseidon C3 and Polaris A-3T ballistic missiles and a total of 666 launchers with around 6,000 nuclear charges, or more than half of all U.S. strategic projectiles (p 38).

The country's strategic forces include 617 bombers; furthermore, by the beginning of 1989, 195 of them will carry long-range cruise missiles with nuclear warheads--up to missiles each (p 40).

American programs for the modernization of each component of the American strategic triad are also described in detail. For example, in the case of ICBM's, the new MX missile will be capable of carrying 10 independently targetable warheads of 600 kilotons each and will be highly accurate, with a probable error of 90 meters (p 37). The program for the reinforcement of this element of the U.S. strategic arsenal envisages the production of 223 MX missiles in all (p 36). Work is simultaneously being conducted on the highly accurate and highly invulnerable mobile Midgetman ICBM of the new generation. According to Pentagon projections, these missiles should number 1,000 in all (p 38).

The handbook reports that the first gigantic missile-carrying submarine of the new "Ohio" class (water displacement of 18,700 tons, the same as a surface cruiser) with 24 launchers, equipped with Trident I SLEBM's, began to be built in November 1981. "It is assumed," the handbook says, "that 15 ships of the 'Ohio' class will be built or in the process of being built by 1987, and others will be built in subsequent years. The formation of a squadron of 10 submarines of this class in the Pacific Ocean will be completed in the 1980's and the deployment of a second squadron in the Atlantic will begin.

In terms of combat capability, one submarine of the 'Ohio' class surpasses ten missile submarines carrying 160 Polaris A3 missiles" (p 39).

A larger and more accurate Trident II SLBM is being developed for the further renewal of this component of the strategic triad and should be ready for use in 1989. "This missile is the closest to the MX ICBM in terms of tactical technical features and, in combination with the MX, will represent a 'pre-emptive' weapon--in other words, a first-strike weapon" (p 40).

With a view to these new characteristics of American naval strategic systems, the new Soviet proposals on the limitation of nuclear and space weapons proceed from the belief that the strategic arms of the two sides should be discussed and evaluated as a single entity. Exposing the demagoguery of American military leaders' statements that Soviet ICBM's are "more dangerous" than any U.S. weapon, Marshal of the Soviet Union S. Akhromeyev, chief of general staff of the USSR Armed Forces, stressed in one of his speeches that "our strategic offensive weapons are now approximately equal in terms of destructive potential. There is no difference between Soviet ICBM's and American Trident SLBM's in terms of combat effectiveness."*

Finally, in reference to the modernization of the bomber component of U.S. strategic forces, the authors of the handbook report that a program is now being carried out with maximum intensity for the construction of the new B-1B strategic intercontinental bomber (with a range of 9,800 kilometers and a maximum payload of 34 tons). A hundred strategic bombers of this type are to be deployed within 2 years after the beginning of 1986, and each will be capable of carrying 32 cruise missiles with nuclear warheads (p 41). But even the development of this new bomber has not satisfied the appetite of American militarists. The so-called invisible (in other words, difficult for modern air defense systems to detect) Stealth bomber is in the development stage (ibid.).

"As a result of the completion of all these programs for the improvement of the U.S. strategic nuclear arsenal," the authors conclude, "the capabilities of American strategic forces for the delivery of nuclear projectiles in a single launching or flight will increase at least 1.5-fold in the 1980's" (p 41). The Pentagon plans to augment the offensive potential of nuclear weapons even more by intensifying the work on a new strategic means of delivery--the air-, land- and sea-based long-range cruise missiles. "Around 4,000 Tomahawk cruise missiles with a force of up to 200 kilotons each will be carried on just the 154 surface ships and submarines of the U.S. Navy. These missiles, along with 4,300 air-based cruise missiles and 560 land-based cruise missiles (costing 1.2 million dollars each), can deliver highly accurate surprise strikes almost anywhere on the territory of the USSR" (ibid.).

The American program for the militarization of space, the "Star Wars" program, is also discussed in the handbook. It, as the authors stress, is being closely coordinated with the deployment of American offensive nuclear weapons.

* PRAVDA, 19 October 1985.

The authors then move on to a detailed description of American programs for the development and deployment of forward-based nuclear weapons, neutron and chemical weapons, and bacteriological weapons and various projects for the newest, so-called exotic types of weapons. The race for conventional arms in the United States and the NATO countries is also described in detail in the handbook. The authors stress the purely interventionist nature of U.S. armed forces, which have never been used for the defense of American territory since the War of Independence but have been used many times abroad. Unsatisfied with the general interventionist nature of the armed forces, the American leadership recently established interventionist shock troops--the so-called "rapid deployment force" (RDF)--for the efficient conduct of punitive or aggressive operations abroad. At the same time, the authors of the handbook point out, "the United States began the large-scale stockpiling of American weapons in potential zones of military operations. For example, in Western Europe it concentrated equipment, ammunition and materiel for four mechanized and armored divisions; supplies for another two divisions will also be stored there to be used by up to 200,000 servicemen transported to the European theater of potential military operations' from the United States 'without luggage'" (p 61). And this is in addition to the U.S. troops already stationed in Western Europe, the equivalent of six infantry and three air force divisions.*

The activities of the United States in the politico-military blocs it put together, such as NATO, ANZUS, AZPAC, OAS and others, are discussed in detail in the handbook. The authors describe not only the political and military structure of the blocs, but also the main decisions they have made, and they present a detailed description of U.S. regional military activity.

The authors also examine the American policy of building military bases abroad. "At the beginning of 1985," the handbook says, "almost one-fifth of all U.S. armed forces--more than 500,000 servicemen--were overseas. Furthermore, the combat strength of this contingent began to be built up dramatically under the Reagan Administration. Now U.S. military potential in a variety of forms is present in the most important strategic regions of the world in over 100 countries. Today the United States has more than 1,500 military bases and installations on the territory of 32 states" (p 206). The U.S. military presence in various countries is specifically analyzed in the handbook, with an assessment of the role of specific military bases and overseas U.S. armed forces in American global military strategy.

The handbook ends with an analysis of the American administration's use of the armed forces directly in military actions and subversive operations and in the exertion of political pressure on independent states.

In their discussion of the activities of the U.S. military machine, the authors regularly insert information into the narrative about the international policy of the Soviet Union and about Soviet peace initiatives to contrast the

* "Spravochnik sukhoputnykh voysk kapitalisticheskikh stran" [Handbook on the Land Forces of Capitalist Countries], Moscow, 1980, pp 60-65.

two fundamentally different approaches of the leading socialist and leading capitalist states to the problems of international security. "The detailed program of the Soviet Union's initiatory proposals on vital issues of war and peace," the authors stress, "attest conclusively to the highly humanitarian and dynamic nature of Soviet foreign policy: The Soviet peaceful campaign is still going on in all areas of the struggle for peace. The Soviet Union resolutely favors the prohibition and destruction of all types of nuclear weapons and has proposed immediate action on the major undertaking of freeing Europe of all nuclear weapons--both intermediate-range and tactical. It is pointing out the correct path to agreements on the limitation and reduction of intermediate-range nuclear weapons and strategic arms and to the prevention of an arms race in outer space.... The program of constructive initiatives is vivid proof that the great socialist power has a firm grasp on the banner of peace and international security" (pp 4-5).

Some inaccurate and awkward statements can be found in the handbook, and these could easily be omitted from a revised edition.

In general, however, the handbook, which has been edited by highly competent experts on the matters in question, will be of indisputable value and help to a broad range of readers with an interest in U.S. military policy, lecturers and propagandists and to those with a professional interest in U.S. military policy and military strategy, because it summarizes most of the latest reports on these matters in the Soviet and foreign press.

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NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER JOHN POINDEXTER PROFILED

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 2, Feb 86 (signed to press 20 Jan 86) pp 125-127

[Article by S. M. Samuylov: "John Poindexter--the President's New Assistant for National Security Affairs"]

[Text] At the beginning of last December President Reagan announced that National Security Adviser R. McFarlane was resigning and that his deputy, Vice-Admiral John Poindexter, had been appointed to this office. The American mass media gave this event broad coverage: The national security adviser, who also heads the staff of the National Security Council (NSC), usually plays a key role in foreign policy.

The NSC, which was established in 1947, is the U.S. President's main advisory and coordinating body on matters of foreign and military policy. The office of national security adviser was established in 1953. The influence of the head of the NSC staff depends largely on the degree of the President's trust in him, or, more precisely, on the role the President assigns him in the foreign policymaking process.

In the 1970's, especially under President R. Nixon, the political role of this office, then occupied by H. Kissinger, was augmented dramatically. Under Kissinger's leadership, the NSC staff of 132 specialists participated in the planning of foreign policy initiatives and in their implementation. In the 1980's, during President Reagan's term in office, the status of the NSC staff and its head declined perceptibly in the foreign policy establishment, and this is primarily a reflection of the President's general style of administration.

The milestones in J. Poindexter's career are fairly typical for a man of his military rank.

Vice-Admiral John Poindexter, 49, graduated from the Naval Academy in Annapolis in 1958 at the top of his class. In 1964 he was awarded a doctorate in nuclear physics by the California Technology Institute in Pasadena. During his service in the Navy, he commanded a guided-missile destroyer and then a destroyer squadron. He served in the West Pacific, the Indian Ocean and the South Pacific. He worked on the staff of the secretary of the Navy from 1971 to 1974. He was the assistant of Admiral J. Holloway, chief of naval operations,

from 1976 to 1978. Before he came to the NSC in 1981, he was deputy chief and chief of staff of the naval troop and combat training command in Pensacola, Florida.

As an NSC staffer, J. Poindexter was the military adviser of the President's assistant for national security affairs, and when R. McFarlane took this office in October 1983 Poindexter became his deputy and headed the advance crisis planning group. In this capacity, he planned and coordinated last year's operation to hijack the Egyptian airliner carrying the individuals who had seized the Italian ship "Achille Lauro," which aggravated U.S. relations with Italy and Egypt.

The American press portrays Poindexter as a farsighted, cautious and extremely qualified worker who gets to the heart of the matter and a strong "team player." Newsmen write that he "likes to keep a low profile": During meetings in the White House, his behavior has been "inconspicuous and discreet." They have called him hardworking. Most of these appraisals suggest the image of a qualified executor, and not an initiator of major political undertakings. According to assessments in the press, Poindexter is "more conservative than McFarlane."

Poindexter's appointment was made quickly by the White House--so quickly that McFarlane was not given the traditional few weeks to turn matters over to his successor. Observers felt that this was done because the White House wanted to prevent contacts with various powerful political lobbies hoping to influence the choice of the new candidate. Several candidates more "ideological" than Poindexter were suggested. Correspondents R. Evans and R. Novak reported that G. Shultz "almost convinced" the President to appoint former Under Secretary of State L. Eagleburger to the vacant office. This would have perceptibly strengthened the moderate-conservative group in the foreign policy establishment, a group headed by G. Shultz. Ultra-conservatives responded by insisting on the appointment of J. Kirkpatrick, former permanent U.S. representative to the United Nations; her appointment would have strengthened the group of "hawks."

If all of this is true, then it would seem that Poindexter's appointment made no cardinal changes in the alignment of forces in the foreign policy establishment and is most probably the result of a compromise between rival groups within the administration. It is indicative that H. Kissinger publicly expressed his disapproval of McFarlane's resignation. The famous leader of the "New Right," publisher and publicist R. Viguary, declared that the appointment of the "technocrat" Poindexter was the result of the "disturbing indifference" of the White House toward the conservatives.

Observers are wondering about the implications of this change in advisers. The petty squabbles in the White House under R. Reagan can answer this question. For example, as soon as former Secretary of the Treasury D. Regan became chief of White House staff after the President's re-election in 1984, he immediately reorganized the staff and took complete charge of functions previously performed by the "big three" closest assistants to the President--E. Meese, J. Baker and M. Deaver. "With the assertiveness of a former Marine"

(and not without the President's encouragement), Regan became actively involved in foreign policy affairs, and this is what led, as the American press reported, to his acute conflicts with R. McFarlane.

In particular, Regan was bothered by McFarlane's closeness to the President, who spoke with his national security adviser, according to White House estimates, four times a day. McFarlane's position in the foreign policy establishment became much stronger last year, when he made frequent official foreign policy statements. His good relations with members of Congress and representatives of the press aided considerably in strengthening his position. Nevertheless, he apparently was unable to win the degree of presidential trust he desired. Newsmen reported, for example, that in spite of his desire to play the leading role in the preparations for the Geneva summit, he had to share the leadership of the special preparatory group with D. Regan. This gives credence to the almost unanimous opinion of American observers that McFarlane resigned primarily because D. Regan was able to gain the upper hand in this conflict; administration spokesmen publicly denied this fact.

McFarlane's resignation seems to signify the elimination of the last obstacle standing in the way of D. Regan's intention to play a much more significant role in foreign policy affairs in the future. Although Regan has made several public assurances that Poindexter will also report directly to the President, we can agree with the opinion of some observers that the new adviser will be under the strong control of the White House chief of staff. The opinion of some observers who believe that Regan actively supported Poindexter's candidacy because the latter is "inconspicuous" and has no political influence also warrants consideration. In contrast to his predecessor, the new adviser has no long-standing ties with members of Congress and the Washington press corps; he has avoided contact with the latter. And without these ties, the reinforcement of his political position seems quite doubtful.

American observers have repeatedly stressed that the rightwing Regan, who has no solid foreign policy experience, respects the opinions of only the President and the "moderate" G. Shultz and therefore might seek a political alliance with the latter. The prerequisites for this already exist: Regan, McFarlane and Shultz were able to push the "hawk" group, headed by Weinberger, into the background during the preparations for the Soviet-American summit meeting. Just as Regan, Shultz would not want one of his rivals to be a strong and independent assistant to the President for national security affairs. According to many in Washington, this was obviously one of the reasons that he also supported Poindexter's appointment.

Therefore, if the influential White House chief of staff should form an alliance with the secretary of state, with the President's support this could lead to the reinforcement of moderate-conservative forces in the administration's foreign policy establishment.

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