

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE  
Newport, R.I.

Command and Control of Peace Operations

by

Robert C. Rush, Jr.  
LTC, U.S. Army

A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature: 

17 May 1999

**DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A**  
Approved for Public Release  
Distribution Unlimited

Gerald F. Dillon  
COL, U.S. Army (Retired)  
Faculty Advisor

DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 4

19991122 161

## REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

1. Report Security Classification: UNCLASSIFIED			
2. Security Classification Authority:			
3. Declassification/Downgrading Schedule:			
4. Distribution/Availability of Report: DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION IS UNLIMITED.			
5. Name of Performing Organization: JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT			
6. Office Symbol: C		7. Address: NAVAL WAR COLLEGE 686 CUSHING ROAD NEWPORT, RI 02841-1207	
8. Title (Include Security Classification): Command and Control of Peace Operations (U)			
9. Personal Authors: Robert C. Rush, Jr., LTC, USA			
10. Type of Report: FINAL		11. Date of Report: 17 May 1999	
12. Page Count: <span style="background-color: black; color: black;">██████</span> 21			
13. Supplementary Notation: A paper submitted to the Faculty of the NWC in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the JMO Department. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the NWC or the Department of the Navy.			
14. Ten key words that relate to your paper: Command, Control, Peace Operations, Interagency, Headquarters, Civil-Military Operations, National Command Authority, Country Team, Civil Military Operations Cell			
15. Abstract: In this paper, the author argues that in order to alleviate civil-military friction and agency desynchronization at the operational level, a separate headquarters with a coordinated command and control structure is required. This headquarters would serve as the bridge between strategic guidance and policy at the Principles/Deputies level of the National Security Council and implementation at the operational level. It would have the authority to direct and synchronize the efforts of military forces and civilian agencies toward a common objective.			
16. Distribution/Availability of Abstract:	Unclassified X	Same As Rpt	DTIC Users
17. Abstract Security Classification:	UNCLASSIFIED		
18. Name of Responsible Individual:	CHAIRMAN, JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT		
19. Telephone: 841-6461	20. Office Symbol: C		

Abstract of

**Command and Control of Peace Operations**

The future appears to hold many opportunities for United States forces to become involved in some sort of peace operation. In the past, these forces have acquitted themselves admirably in fulfilling the national goals established for them. They have also worked extensively with U.S. government agencies, International Organizations (IOs), Non - government Organizations (NGOs) and Private Volunteer Organizations (PVOs) in fulfilling the goals of the United Nations, NATO, the United States, and other organizations. However, this working relationship has been less than friction free and, at the operational level, it has been organizationally and conceptually ad hoc at best.

In this paper, the author argues that in order to alleviate civil-military friction and agency desynchronization at the operational level, a separate headquarters with a coordinated command and control structure is required. This headquarters would serve as the bridge between strategic guidance and policy at the Principals/Deputies level of the National Security Council and implementation at the operational level. It would have the authority to direct and synchronize the efforts of military forces and civilian agencies toward a common objective.

Such an organization robust enough to synchronize the efforts of International Organizations, Private Volunteer Organizations, and Non-Government Organizations is unfortunately beyond the scope of this paper. A synchronous organization to focus the efforts of military forces and United States agencies would, however, make inroads toward a focused international effort as well.

## Command and Control of Peace Operations

*"An integrated approach to timely planning and conduct of operations is essential, across the military and civilian components and agencies of the United Nations and the nongovernment organizations, all the way from the United Nations secretariat, to the forward area for the duration of the mission." <sup>1</sup>*

### Introduction

The future appears to hold many opportunities for United States forces to become involved in some sort of peace operation. In the past, these forces have acquitted themselves admirably in fulfilling the national goals established for them. They have also worked extensively with U.S. government agencies, International Organizations (IOs), Non - government Organizations (NGOs) and Private Volunteer Organizations (PVOs) in fulfilling the goals of the United Nations, NATO, the United States, and other organizations. However, this working relationship has been less than friction free and, at the operational level, it has been organizationally and conceptually ad hoc at best.

### Hypothesis

In this paper, the author will argue that in order to alleviate civil-military friction and agency desynchronization at the operational level, a separate headquarters with a coordinated command and control structure is required. This headquarters would serve as the bridge between strategic guidance and policy at the Principles/Deputies level of the National Security Council and implementation at the operational level. It would have the authority to direct and synchronize the efforts of military forces and

---

<sup>1</sup> Lieutenant General John M. Sanderson, Companion of the Order of Australia, as quoted in Peace Operations, (Field Manual 100-23)(Department of the Army, Washington, D.C., 1994), 31.

civilian agencies toward a common objective.

Such an organization robust enough to synchronize the efforts of International Organizations, Private Volunteer Organizations, and Non - Government Organizations is, unfortunately, beyond the scope of this paper. A synchronous organization to focus the efforts of military forces and United States agencies would, however, make inroads toward a focused international effort as well.

### **Perspective**

One observer has pointed to the interagency process at the operational and tactical levels as "one of the most neglected aspects of the national security process, yet it is one whose importance can hardly be overestimated."<sup>2</sup> In fact, while there is very little material published with suggestions and recommendations on how to overcome this problem, there are a number of documents which do at least recognize that there is a problem, including our joint doctrine.

The military might consider itself the resident expert on all things organizational, but this is certainly disputable, especially in regard to peace operations. As one author notes: "Those who have taken part in UN peacekeeping operations are well aware of the limitations of the military in many of the capacities in which they are required to act; and; recognize that there are other civilian organizations better equipped mentally and by training to fulfill them instead."<sup>3</sup>

In considering the problem, this author will first examine some historical examples of command and control organizations used in the past, explore some

---

<sup>2</sup> C. Lord, quoted in Barry K. Simmons, Executing U.S. Foreign Policy Through the Country Team Concept, reprinted, USNWC, Newport, RI, 1994, 136.

<sup>3</sup> John A. Warden, quoted in Thomas F. Greco, Unity of Effort in Peace Operations, (US Army Command and General Staff College, Leavenworth, KS) 63.

alternatives, examine the organizational structure of an alternative organization, discuss unity of command under a single authority, and conclude with a recommendation for future planning.

## **Background**

An important consideration for planners and military commanders, particularly in peace operations, is the number of civil agencies required to achieve the goals of the nation. There is much more to a peace operation than the employment of military force. According to Joint Doctrine, "The intrinsic nature of interagency coordination demands that commanders and joint planners consider all elements of national power and recognize which agencies are best qualified to employ these elements toward the objective."<sup>4</sup>

At the strategic level, the United States National Security Council has developed a fairly mature process to formally synchronize the planning process of the United States among military forces and the agencies at the Principals and Deputies levels.<sup>5</sup> However, planning at the Unified Command or Joint Task Force level and below tends to be a bit more parochial, and is thus less synchronized.

Additionally, execution and supervision of a strategic plan at the operational level has also been ad hoc. There have been many attempts at an interagency organization and structure, but none were truly synchronized across the departments and agencies and most lacked a genuine command and control arrangement to

---

<sup>4</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations, Volume 1 (Joint Pub 3-08)(Washington, D.C.: October 9, 1996), I-2.

<sup>5</sup> Presidential Decision Directive 56 designates that the Principals Committee is the senior interagency forum for national security issues. The Deputies Committee is responsible for oversight of the process and is the action agency for crisis management. The Deputies Committee is further authorized to organize subordinate working groups.

increase efficiency and effectiveness.

In fact, the complication seems to increase proportionally as time goes on and with the involvement of new agencies. According to one observer, based on the world's increasing interdependence over the past two decades, United States agencies such as the Departments of the Treasury, Commerce, and Agriculture have become much more involved in the country's foreign policy.<sup>6</sup> Such agencies would rarely have become involved in foreign policy issues in the past, however in two current peace operations, Bosnia and Haiti, they are very much involved.

### **Examples - Haiti and Bosnia**

During peace operations, most recently in Haiti and in Bosnia - Herzegovina, some efforts between the deployed military forces and civilian agencies could have been more efficient by capitalizing on their respective talents and capabilities.

Haiti was conducted almost unilaterally by the United States and was, in many ways, simpler in nature than the United States intervention in Bosnia - Herzegovina. Haiti did, however, yield many lessons that should have been incorporated into the deployment and subsequent operations in Central Europe.

### **Haiti**

Planning for Haiti began months before the operation. However, on the eve of American intervention, as the operation switched from permissive entry to forced entry and back again, a large part of the plan was scrapped, or at least unraveled. The transition from planning to execution met with predictable results. Much of the confusion was due to the lack of an in country central forum in which to coordinate.

---

<sup>6</sup> Barry K. Simmons, Executing U.S. Foreign Policy Through the Country Team Concept, reprinted from The Air Force Law Review, USNWC, Newport, RI, 1994, 125.

Additionally, no one person had the authority to coordinate the operation. "The force commander was not in charge of the civilians, other than to insure the safety of those he knew about. The Ambassador, on the other hand, was swept up in a myriad of events not directly related to the military mission. Neither the force commander nor the Ambassador had total command of the situation."<sup>7</sup>

The authors of the previous quotation submit that the existence of a "war room" used for coordination between civilian agencies and military forces in theater could have ameliorated many problems in implementing the operation. The existence of such a "Coordination Center" would have obviously necessitated appropriate staffing, for which neither the State Department nor USAID were prepared.<sup>8</sup>

### **Bosnia - Herzegovina**

Though more complicated by many factors, including more agencies, PVOs and NGOs than in Haiti, and a larger multinational focus, the implementation of the Dayton Accords in Bosnia - Herzegovina required both United States military and civil action. The civil functions have been adjudged by many either to have never started or to have been comparatively slow when compared to the military provisions. The shortfall in civil implementation has been recognized, even by the architect of the Dayton Accords, Richard Holbrook.<sup>9</sup>

For the military, once the diplomatic and political conditions were set and Rules of Engagement (ROE) were established, the mission was very clear, with an objective and time - phased goals. The force structure was appropriate and had a suitable

---

<sup>7</sup> Margaret D. Hayes, Gary F. Wheatley, eds., Interagency and Political Military Dimensions of Peace Operations: Haiti - A Case Study, (National Defense University, Washington, D.C., 1996), 55.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid, 43.

<sup>9</sup> Richard Holbrook, To End a War, (New York: Random House 1998) , 324. Holbrook states: "While the military,...., met every deadline, the civilian side,...., fell steadily behind schedule."



command and control architecture. Conversely, the civil aspects of the accords were almost entirely entrusted to the United Nations High Representative, who initially had very little power, no clearly established realistic vision, and no implementation guidance. Further, he had no professional staff, and only an ad hoc organization *nominally* under his control to fulfill international expectations.<sup>10</sup> The same lack of organizational structure was replicated at the United States level, where the Ambassador was placed in charge of some, but not all of the effort. The commander of U.S. forces, like the Ambassador, was not in charge of the entire effort, and exercised only partial control.

The United States appears to have paid no attention to "lessons learned" in Haiti or Bosnia, or to have been reliant on an ad hoc arrangement to synchronize the efforts of military forces and civilian agency effort.

Some might argue that there is not a problem and no need to examine interagency arrangements at the operational level. Their assessment might be that the organizations currently in place are "good enough" and, with appropriate authority and when supplemented by a staff, more than adequate to meet mission requirements.

### **Would an additional headquarters be duplicative?**

There are a number of existing organizations which could be charged with exercising command and control of military and agency operations during peace operations. This paper will now examine three of them: the Ambassador's Country Team, the Civil - Military Operations Center, which is generally assigned to a unified command, and was used in both Haiti and Bosnia - Herzegovina, and, for the sake of comparison, an example of a successful interagency coordination effort, the MACV

---

<sup>10</sup> The Dayton Accords, Annex 1A, Article 1, specify that SFOR comes under the command of NATO, instead of the control of the High Representative.

"CORDS" organization, as employed in Vietnam.

### **The Country Team**

Depending on the size of the peace operation, some might submit that there is already a command and control organization in place to synchronize small scale peace operations: the Ambassador's Country Team. Although optional, Country Teams are employed by most Ambassadors as a forum for macro coordination between representatives of the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the Ambassador's staff, and other agencies (Appendix A, attached). The purpose of the Country Team is, in fairness, not command and control, but rather to keep the Ambassador, as the personal representative of the President, apprised of all issues, both military and civilian. <sup>11</sup> While a useful forum to review priorities and responsibilities, the Country Team is staffed to plan or supervise only the most simple operations. The Country Team, even if supplemented by additional people, is probably not sufficient to coordinate an operation on the scale of Bosnia.

### **Civil - Military Operations Center (CMOC)**

The Civil - Military Operations Center, employed by most Joint Force Commanders in recent peace operations, represents an effort to focus the efforts of not only the military and civilian agencies and organizations, but PVOs and NGOs as well. Besides the problems inherent in focusing the efforts of PVOs and NGOs, the CMOCs serve only as adjunct staff agencies, with no real directive authority. The CMOC, while capable of some agency coordination, has been more focused on PVO/NGO activities.

Even when a CMOC is operational, authority is still split between the military

---

<sup>11</sup> Steven E. Cady, The Country Team, the Critical Interface between the Department of State and the Department of Defense, (Air War College, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, 1991), 2.

commander for military operations, and the United States Ambassador for agency operations. The CMOC is useful as a clearinghouse for NGOs, PVOs and the voluntary cooperation of some U.S. agencies, but it lacks a Commander or Director with the authority to coordinate in - theater military - agency efforts.

Sometimes, the United States has stumbled onto more formal command and control arrangements which seemed to work very well, and did in fact serve as a bridge between policy at the strategic level and execution at the operational level.

## **Vietnam**

The United States has, in fact, synchronized the interagency effort in past operations. Concurrent with military combat operations in Vietnam, President Johnson appointed a single point of contact for all interagency operations in Vietnam, who spoke with the authority of the President. He also appointed a civilian as the Deputy Commander of the Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV), who synchronized interagency operations at the province level - with remarkable success.

The program, the Civilian Operations Revolutionary (later "Rural") Development Support, or "CORDS" enjoyed the appropriate focus of the President and the MACV Commander, and ended the previous desynchronous operations performed by the military and the agencies.<sup>12</sup> CORDS delegated synchronized plans to military or civilian Province Senior Advisors for execution, and this eliminated, or at least minimized, the separate agency "agenda phenomena" (author's term) which had previously existed.

It is important to note that the Commander, MACV, in charge of CORDS, was concurrently Commander, U.S. Army, Vietnam. This focused the efforts of both

---

<sup>12</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations, Volume 1 (Joint Pub 3-08)(Washington, D.C.: October 9, 1996), III8 - III9.

military forces and civilian agencies toward a common goal. While CORDS did not have a flawless record, it was at least organized to carry out United States policy with a common direction and it had an appropriate chain of command with the authority to synchronize operations and activities.

This concept of unity of effort, a principle of war for military forces, has an obvious application to peace operations, but it may not be seen at the same level of importance by civilian agencies.

### **Command and Control - "Who's in Charge? - Pick Somebody."**

Although interagency coordination has improved at the National Security Council level, the question remains, "Who's in charge at the operational level?" The author does not question the position of the Ambassador as the personal representative of the President, however, someone needs to decide during planning what the respective responsibilities of the Ambassador and the Joint Force Commander are. This author also argues that one of the two needs to have overall responsibility. Another author gives this viewpoint: "The government which assigned two senior American representatives to a country and directed coordination between them, does not specify how that coordination should take place."<sup>13</sup>

Military participants at an interagency workshop on Haiti perceived the need for an operational level commander who "would coordinate and direct all agencies and forces involved." Some participants believed that the senior military commander should be in charge, and others believed it should be the Ambassador. One participant, however, pointed out that the Ambassador was not staffed for such a

---

<sup>13</sup> Cady. p. 7.

function, and in some cases, there might not be an Ambassador in country.<sup>14</sup> Another consideration might be that the peace operation extends over national borders, with more than one ambassador involved.

Others might submit that establishing a single interagency organization is not really important, and that the military is overly concerned about one single person being in charge. One author puts it this way: "The challenge is to blend or synchronize many agencies' activities at the strategic, operational and tactical levels.

Synchronization of national instruments of power for national purposes is difficult; synchronization of national, supra-national and non-governmental agencies with sometimes diverse goals, different organizational cultures and diverging assessments of the situation may be impossible. But perhaps if synchronization is beyond our reach, we can work toward cooperation, coordination, and consensus."<sup>15</sup>

This author argues that cooperation, coordination, and consensus are required for day to day civil-military operations. Consensus, however should be a course of last resort during operations because it lends itself to inefficiency and it risks compartmentalization by the agencies and the military.

Maybe there is another answer. Perhaps the United States should draw on its experience with MACV and CORDS and assign a senior civilian with appropriate authority as the Deputy to the Joint Force Commander in charge of peace operations. Such an arrangement would ensure that agency coordination and military operations were synchronized at the highest level and that all were moving toward a common goal.

Would this structure usurp the power of the Ambassador? This author argues

---

<sup>14</sup> Margaret D. Hayes, Gary F. Wheatley, eds., 55.

<sup>15</sup> D.M. Last, Interagency Cooperation in Peace Operations - A Conference Report, (Ft. Leavenworth, KS, Concepts and Doctrine Directorate, 24 November 1994), 2.

that it would not. In fact, it would allow the Ambassador to concentrate on general affairs of state and allow his military and civilian counterparts to coordinate the details of the peace operation.

Why a civilian head rather than a military officer? There are three principle reasons. First, the precedent for a civilian deputy was established with the CORDS program and it may be an outwardly visible sign of civil-military cooperation. The second reason relates to a previous paragraph. A civilian deputy might be more favorably viewed by the United States Ambassador and the civilian hierarchy in the region. It has been stated that members of the Country Team have tended in times past to view military forces as interlopers in their affairs of state. A civilian appointee might be less likely to give the appearance of a military takeover.<sup>16</sup> Finally, the appointment of a civilian might improve the perception of such an organization by other institutions. PVOs and NGOs, many of whom are invaluable to the agencies and to peace operations, might be more inclined to coordinate with an interagency headquarters headed by a civilian instead of a military officer.<sup>17</sup>

## **Organization and Function of a Command and Control Headquarters**

### **Function**

Joint doctrine admits to a civil - military organizational shortfall and, after skirting the issue with no objective solution other than the ad hoc invention of such an organization as required by circumstance, implores the military to pull such an

---

<sup>16</sup> Thomas F. Greco, Unity of Effort in Peace Operations, (US Army Command and General Staff College, Leavenworth, KS) 63.

<sup>17</sup> Captain (N) Leif Ahlquist, ed., Co-operation, Command and Control in UN Peace - Keeping Operations (Swedish War College, Department of Operations) 99.

organization together.<sup>18</sup>

The function of a Command and Control Headquarters for Peace Operations would be to synchronize military and civilian efforts in a peace operations environment. Specifically, the tasks performed by the headquarters would include instituting national agency decisions regarding civil - military operations, performing liaison and coordination between military units and other agencies, departments, and organizations, providing a forum for coordination of activities, receiving, validating, and coordinating requests for support from NGOs, PVOs and International Organizations, and soliciting focused support by those organizations under an agreed upon support plan.<sup>19</sup> In short, the organization would execute policy at the operational level.

### **Organization**

The United States has a number of interagency coordination headquarters in use today. An organization for peace operations might resemble the one used for domestic support operations and outlined in Joint Publications, modified according to specific needs.<sup>20</sup>

Another approach to organization might resemble the Federal Emergency Management Agency's Incident Command System, which uses an operations section, a plans section, a logistics section, and an administrative section.<sup>21</sup>

Led by the senior civilian previously mentioned, the staff for the organization would mirror, as required by the nature of the peace operation, the staff found on the Principles Committee, to ensure connectivity with decisions made by the NSC

---

<sup>18</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations. Volume 1 (Joint Pub 3-08)(Washington, D.C.: October 9, 1996), III-16.

<sup>19</sup> Extracted from sources as the tasks associate with the CMOC, both from JP 3-08 and FM 100-23, Peace Operations.

<sup>20</sup> JP 3-08, III-3III-5.

<sup>21</sup> JP 3-08, II-10.

Principals (Appendix B, attached).

Additional representatives in such a headquarters would obviously depend on the nature of the peace operation, the degree to which multinational forces are employed, and the number of nongovernment and private volunteer organizations willing to contribute to the effort.

The nature of the peace operation would affect which agencies might be employed. Department of Justice agents might be employed in Haiti for infrastructure redevelopment, but maybe not in another peace operation, where national objectives are different.

Some multinational forces, agencies and organizations are employed exclusively in specific forms of infrastructure repair, which might offset the requirement for United States agency representatives with similar capabilities.

The number of NGOs and PVOs in country willing to contribute might dictate the requirement for the number of interagency representatives required to coordinate support with organizations who choose not to directly coordinate with the military.

Military participation in such a headquarters would probably be limited to those Civil Affairs soldiers currently found in the Civil - Military Operations Center and supplemented with Combat Service and Service Support Staff Officers to coordinate military assistance to civilian support operations. A senior military officer would probably be required to interface with the civilian Deputy Commander and with those military units associated with the peace operation. One suggestion has been made that the regionally aligned Civil Affairs Brigade Commander be placed in charge of all military support operations.<sup>22</sup> That commander might be the right choice to work with the civilian deputy. It would simplify the chain of command, and place one military

---

<sup>22</sup> John T. Haynes, A Comparative Study of Civil - Military Operations Perspectives As They Apply to Peace Support Operations, (Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 1996) 159.



person in charge.

### **Why a New Organization is Better than the Status Quo**

While each of the organizations discussed, the Country Team, the Civil - Military Operations Center, and the CORDS organization, has made valuable contributions, none of those organizations was specifically designed to be in charge of overall operations.

Despite the arguable success of CORDS, its organization was probably more appropriate for Vietnam than for future peace operations. There are several reasons for this but the main reason is that modern peace operations are inherently more complex than Vietnam and there are many more agencies and organizations demanding participation. Each of these agencies and organizations comes to the operation with its own set of principles and values, which they are not willing to compromise. This further complicates planning and execution.<sup>23</sup>

The Country Team is appropriate for day to day operations to further and synchronize the efforts of the United States, but this structure is questionable as a command and control organization in major peace operations on the scale of Haiti or Bosnia - Herzegovina. As previously stated, its design has the Ambassador's information requirements in mind and it may not be able to function as a directing headquarters. Even as augmented in a crisis situation, it is probably not as good as several of the other examples.

The CMOC is a valuable clearinghouse which attempts to link needs with aid, but mostly on a voluntary basis, and with little or no continuing agency participation. The possible exception is the United States Agency for International Development,

---

<sup>23</sup> JP 3-08, I-5.

(USAID), the State Department's clearinghouse for aid distribution. As viewed by one observer, the CMOC "is not a panacea, only part of a multi disciplined effort to achieve cooperation."<sup>24</sup>

It is equally important to recognize that a Joint Task Force headquarters, as generally staffed, is not by itself an appropriate headquarters for interagency planning, coordinating, executing, and supervising. Its focus is toward military operations - creating the conditions where infrastructure redevelopment can occur. It is a key player in peace operations, but only a part of the overall effort.

A new organization, appropriately staffed to synchronize the efforts of United States departments and agencies, headed by a civilian deputy commander, is the best way to achieve efficiency and effectiveness at the operational level.

### **Implementation**

It is unlikely that the various agencies of the United States Government will voluntarily form one, and like the interagency planning process, a Presidential Decision Directive will almost certainly be required to implement it. Some hope, however, is in order. Probably no one expected the formalization of the planning process at the Principles/Deputies level, which created a forum to consider all agency and departmental input. Perhaps the same can be done at the operational level.

### **Conclusion**

The formalization of the planning process at the National Security Council level is ground breaking, but has not solved the dilemma of synchronization at the operational level. The Joint Force Commander is still confined to cooperation and

---

<sup>24</sup> Thomas F. Greco, Unity of Effort in Peace Operations, (Unpublished Research Paper, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Leavenworth, KS: 1996) 19.

consensus, where control is really the optimum solution. The situation is no better for the various agencies in peace operations, who would be more effective if focused by a formal organization and a single decision authority.

An examination of the three examples, the Country Team, the Civil - Military Coordination Center, and the comparative CORDS example, points out that all three suffer disadvantages, and are unsuitable to efficiently and effectively synchronize interagency and department operations at the operational level. All three, however, have advantages which should be considered.


This author therefore recommends a separate headquarters with a synchronized command and control structure. This headquarters would serve as the bridge between strategic guidance at the principles/deputies level and implementation at the operational level, and have the authority to direct and synchronize the efforts of military forces and civilian agencies toward a common objective.


Building a new organization is only a part of the solution. In all three examples, only the CORDS organization seemed to successfully integrate military and interagency functions under an appropriate command arrangement.

This author therefore recommends that the United States appoint a Deputy Joint Force Commander and grant him authority over national organizations and agencies. The Deputy Commander would likely be a civilian appointee who would also direct the previously mentioned headquarters.

The United States has arranged organizations in the past which, to a greater or lesser degree, have positively impacted on the United States' role in peace operations. Transition to a new headquarters with decision authority would not only be easier, more efficient, and more effective, but would successfully bridge the gap between the National Strategy and operational implementation.

# U.S. Country Team





**Appendix B**

## Bibliography

Ahlquist, Captain (N) Leif, ed., Co-operation, Command and Control in UN Peace - Keeping Operations, Swedish War College, Department of Operations: 1996.

Cady, Steven E., "The Country Team, the Critical Interface between the Department of State and the Department of Defense," Unpublished Research Paper, Air War College, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: 1991.

Department of the Army, Peace Operations (Field Manual 100-23), Washington, D.C.: December 30, 1994.

Greco, Thomas F., "Unity of Effort in Peace Operations," Unpublished Research Paper, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Leavenworth, KS: 1996.

Hayes, Margaret D. and Wheatley, Gary F., eds., Interagency and Political Military Dimensions of Peace Operations: Haiti - A Case Study, National Defense University, Washington, D.C.: 1996.

Haynes, John T., "A Comparative Study of Civil - Military Operations Perspectives As They Apply to Peace Support Operations," Unpublished Research Paper, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA: 1996.

Hoogland, Steven J. "Peace Operations - Are We Getting Warm Yet?," Unpublished Research Paper, Army War College, Carlisle, Pennsylvania: 1997.

Holbrook, Richard, To End a War, New York: Random House, 1998.

Joint Chiefs of Staff, Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations, Volume 1 (Joint Pub 3-08), Washington, D.C.: October 9, 1996.

Last, D.M., Interagency Cooperation in Peace Operations - A Conference Report, Concepts and Doctrine Directorate, Fort Leavenworth, KS: 24 November 1994.

Simmons, Barry K. "Executing U.S. Foreign Policy Through the Country Team Concept," reprinted from The Air Force Law Review, 1994.