STRIKE FORCE IN THE NEXT WAR

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A MONOGRAPH BY Major Eric B. Scheidemantel Air Defense Artillery



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Strike Force in <u>The Next War</u> By MAJ Eric B. Scheidemantel USA

This monograph examines current Strike Force initiatives and their potential impact. The purpose of this examination is to determine whether, "Are the proposed Strike Force (SF) mission sets applicable to future war scenarios?"

The next ten to fifteen years will find the United States Army involved in conflicts that run the full spectrum of conflict. These conflicts will require a force that can quickly respond but has the lethality normally associated with traditional heavy forces. In 1996, TRADOC began the development of a medium weight force, Strike Force that would be able to respond to the challenges of these conflicts.

This monograph uses the 1996 book entitled <u>The Next War</u> written by Casper Weinberger and Peter Schweizer as a vehicle to examine the potential applicability of Strike Force. The Next War contains five well-conceived and plausible future war scenarios. The organizational and operational concepts for Strike Force were inserted into these five scenarios where appropriate and implications drawn from them.

TRADOC has identified potentially five mission sets that Strike Force will be capable of conducting:

Mission Set

- 1. High end decisive operations
- 2. Entry operations

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- 3. Peace enforcement
- 4. Deter/contain crisis
- 5. Humanitarian assistance

The monograph used these five missions as a framework for analysis of the Strike Force applications in <u>The Next War</u>. There were fourteen occurrences of Strike Force being utilized in <u>The Next War</u>. These Strike Force applications were limited to the High-end decisive operations, Entry operations, and Deter/contain crisis mission sets.

The study concluded that based on the frequency and diverse applications of Strike Force employment during <u>The Next War</u> scenarios, the Strike Force offers the NCA or regional CINC an additional option. The Strike Force unit would be able to preempt, contain, arrest escalation, or quickly transition to combat operations in lieu of a traditional heavy or light force.

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Introduction

Within the next ten to fifteen years the United States will be involved in numerous military operations that run the full spectrum from stability and support operations to major regional conflict. These operations will undoubtedly take place in challenging environments to include urban terrain. Additionally, the threat to the United States is less likely to be a near competitor but more likely an asymmetrical threat coming from a external or internal terrorist organization. These factors of full spectrum dominance, challenging environments, and undefined threat are the factors that the Force XXI force developers must take into account.

Current U.S. force structure and the Force XXI forces have what would traditionally be considered as both "heavy" and "light" forces tailored to defeat conventional threats operating in certain environments. As recently as the 1980s, the U.S. Army consisted of nearly 18 divisions of predominately heavy and light divisions who were forward deployed and tailored to a specific threat. The current U.S. military strategy is one of force projection, where military forces are no longer predominately deployed in foreign countries, but are based in the United States and projected into the conflict area when needed. The U.S. Army has also been significantly downsized to its present strength of 10 divisions. A force projection Army is very dependent on strategic movement assets, and its forces have to be developed and organized with this in mind.

Light forces typically can be projected faster and in greater quantities than the correspondingly heavier force. The heavy force offers greater lethality and force protection. The traditional tradeoff between heavy and light forces is one of increased lethality versus the time to deploy. According to General Dennis Reimer, Army Chief

of Staff,

"Today when we are faced with unique contingency requirements that fall in the gap between what can be provided by the rapid response of our light forces and the tremendous combat power of our heavy forces, we must deploy multiple divisions (a heavy/light mix) or create an ad hoc task force. This enormously complicates the challenge of deploying, controlling, and sustaining forces."¹

The current strategic environment calls for a force that is both quickly deployable and is

lethal enough to be operationally significant (Figure 1).



Figure 1. Current Situation²

A medium weight force called, Strike Force, is being developed by TRADOC.

The Strike Force is to be a highly lethal and deployable force. It is also suppose to be able to offer full spectrum dominance immediately upon arrival into a theater of operation. The Strike Force would be able to operate in a permissive, semi-permissive, or non-permissive environment. It would also be able to provide highly accurate direct and indirect fire by its ability to gain situational awareness to achieve information superiority. The Strike Force offers the National Command Authority the option of deploying a highly lethal force able to preempt, contain, and arrest escalation or quickly transition to combat operations for a fraction of the cost of traditional heavy or light forces. There are numerous roles the Strike Force will be optimized to accomplish among these are early entry, reinforcement of forward presence and stability operations. Initially, TRADOC has identified five mission sets the Strike Force will be capable of handling:

Mission Set

- 1. High end decisive operations
- 2. Entry operations
- 3. Peace enforcement
- 4. Deter/contain crisis
- 5. Humanitarian assistance

Mission sets two through four Strike Force will be optimized for. They will be capable of executing one and five.³

The current version of Strike Force was a product of the Army After Next project. Army After Next exercises were begun in 1996 with the purpose of identifying force requirements for the 2025 time frame and beyond. The need for a medium weight force with many of the above-mentioned capabilities was quickly identified during the AAN exercises.

TRADOC Analysis Center (TRAC) located at Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas has the analytical lead in developing the Strike Force concept. TRAC hosted a Strike Force Map Exercise (MAPEX) from 8-12 June 1998. The purpose of this exercise was threefold. First, to develop qualitative insight regarding how the force fights. Second, to identify candidate changes to the organizational designs and Operational and Organizational

Concept (O&O). Third, to identify areas for future analysis and experimentation. The MAPEX wargamed three proposed Strike Force designs against three different suitable Strike Force operational missions. Insights from the June MAPEX were followed-up during a 1-12 November simulation exercise (SIMEX) conducted at Ft. Knox, Kentucky. The SIMEX purpose was to gain quantitative and qualitative insights about force effectiveness in terms of lethality, survivability, and sustainability of different Strike Force organizational options. It was during this exercise that the option of developing a Strike Force headquarters only option was developed.

The purpose of this monograph is to answer the question, "Are the proposed Strike Force mission sets applicable to future war scenarios?" The use of scenarios in developing force structure and its performance characteristics is standard analytical procedure. Unfortunately, the scenarios are not always developed independently of the force structure being developed or studied. One of the most interesting looks at future war scenarios was a 1996 book co-authored by Casper Weinberger and Peter Schweizer entitled <u>The Next War</u>. <u>The Next War</u> contains five plausible and well-conceived scenarios all set between the years 2000 to 2010, which correspond to the same years as the Strike Force fielding. A brief synopsis of wars likely to occur within the next dozen years include:⁴

> 1.A simultaneous invasion of South Korea by North Korea, and of Taiwan by the People's Republic of China
> 2.U.S. military retaliation for nuclear terrorism by Iran
> 3.Renewed aggression by a dictator-led Russia
> 4.Violent unrest in Mexico spilling over the U.S. border
> 5.A new Japanese government attacks other Pacific nations after a trade-war

The Next War represents scenarios that were developed independently of the Strike Force O & O concept and therefor not designed for optimal performance. The Weinberger and Schweizer book does not specifically mention the use of Strike Force units or anything that resembles the concept of these forces. The scenarios do represent the entire spectrum of conflict from major regional conflict to stability and support operations. All five of the scenarios contain instances where the National Command Authorities (NCA) or possibly the Unified commander would have opportunities to deploy Strike Force. For analysis purposes emphasis will be focused on the applicability of the five TRADOC specific mission sets.

Initially, within the context of <u>The Next War</u> scenarios and where applicable, comparisons of the TRAC MAPEX and SIMEX Strike Force modeling results will be applied to <u>The Next War</u> scenarios. Secondly, potential Strike Force applications or missions will be identified even if no TRAC analytical data can be found to apply to these proposed mission sets. Thirdly, an assessment will be made on whether the Strike Force offered the National Command Authority the option of deploying a highly lethal force able to preempt, contain, arrest escalation, or quickly transition to combat operations in lieu of a traditional heavy or light force.

Strike Force

The monograph introduction explained the need for the development of a medium weight force and the Army's response – developing such a Strike Force. In order to better understand the Strike Force concept let's first lay out its operational concept and then its general capabilities. Finally, there will be a brief look at some of the proposed organizational concepts of the Strike Force.

The overall operational concept for Strike Force is:

1. The Strike Force will be able to rapidly deploy anywhere in the world with a tailored force.

2. The Strike Force will be able to conduct a range of military operations regardless of the combat environment.

3. The Strike Force will gain operationally significant objectives by conducting simultaneously distributed operations and employing the full range of Army, as well as, joint forces.⁵

The general capabilities of Strike Force headquarters and subordinate units support

the operational concepts detailed above. Some of the capabilities include⁶

1. Deployable via strategic airlift/sealift anywhere in the world.

2. Conducts high tempo operations employing maneuver and precision fires to defeat critical enemy systems

3. Employs the entire range of force packaging - heavy/light, digital/nondigital, combat/combat support/combat service support, U.S./Coalition, Active/Reserve, Army/Joint

4. Ability to export digital liaison teams to higher and subordinate elements

5. Communications systems capable of spanning extended AO with direct links to JTF/Corps

6. Possesses reachback linkages to leverage external supporting capabilities

7. Establishes relationships and conducts training with potential attachments during peacetime to compress the teaming process during crises

Based on these capabilities, there are a number of options for the actual

composition of the Strike Force unit. Three of the options that have been developed and

analyzed so far include a modernized ACR, an interim Strike Force, and an AAN

prototype Strike Force. To understand the composition of these proposed Strike forces a brief description follows.

Modernized ACR⁷

This option is the most conservative option. It keeps the cavalry regiment design but upgrades it with more lethal and survivable gear. Some of the possible systems the regiment would contain include the Light Armored Vehicle (LAV) used by the Marine Corps, the High-Mobility Multipurpose Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS), which is a truck mounted Multiple Rocket Launch System (MLRS), and also unmanned aerial vehicles.

This option includes about 4,000 soldiers, 111 LAVs, 12 towed 155mm howitzers, 12 HIMARS, and 40 helicopters. The Strike Force would fight as a regiment, one fight at time. This option would have limited built-up fighting capability, and would have limited access to joint fires.

Interim Strike Force⁸

This option is slightly less conservative than the Enhanced ACR option. This force would use systems that would enable it to be fielded within the 2004 time frame.⁹ The operational centerpiece is a 5,125 man brigade that is capable of fighting multiple simultaneous engagements, and defeat forces twice its size. According to its developers, the force would fight asymmetrically, employing the element of surprise as a matter of routine.

This option would rely heavily on aviation assets. It includes the use of up to 45 Apache helicopters, and the RAH-66 Commanche armed scout helicopter would be

integrated as it became available. It also includes an aviation lift capability, utilizing special operations helicopters, the MH-60 and MH-47D.

This option provides some built-up fighting capability due to its fifty-eight armored personnel carriers. Other equipment in this option includes 9 HIMARS launchers, 120mm mortar, and light 155 howitzer.

AAN Prototype Strike Force¹⁰

This radical design would force the Army to wait until new technologies mature enough to make this option feasible. The Prototype Strike Force would be based on an air-mechanized force giving it the capability to move equipment and personnel similar to an air-assault unit. The operational centerpiece would be combined arms company size unit, "battle element", which would use robotic direct and indirect fire systems. The entire force would consist of 4,400 soldiers of which 1,060 would be dismounts, twice the number of the Interim Strike Force option.

The multi-functionality of this design provides an organization capable of sustaining high tempo operations. Its mounted units provide combat power for decisive maneuver while the dismounted units are well suited for stability and support operations in urban terrain.¹¹

In October of 1998, the development of Strike Force was divided into two separate developmental paths. The Army leadership made the decision to begin development of a separate Strike Force headquarters. The 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR) located in Ft. Polk would serve as the interim/developmental Strike Force headquarters. Currently, the Army is focusing its force development and analytical analysis on the Strike Force headquarters axis. The Strike Force unit itself will be

developed on a separate axis or timetable independent of the headquarters. Currently, it is projected that around 2006 a technologically mature Strike Force unit will be viable and then both axis will be reunited (Figure 2).



•Allow industry, science, and technology time to work •Leverage current units (No bending metal)

Figure 2. Strike Force Timeline¹²

It is not possible at this time to determine the final organizational design of the Strike Force unit, therefor, for analysis purposes all three MAPEX organizational designs will be considered when applying results to <u>The Next War</u> scenarios. A planning assumption for Strike Force that must also be identified is that multiple Strike Forces could be available and would be forwardly deployed to facilitate employment by the regional CINC.

Scenarios

<u>Korea</u>

The first future conflict Weinberger and Schweizer choose to develop in The Next

<u>War</u> is a surprise attack by North Korea against South Korea. In conjunction with North Korea's attack, China attacks Taiwan in order to establish itself as the regional power in the Pacific. The reasons for these attacks date back to the Korean War and World War II respectively, both are seen as attempts to reunify divided nations. The defense of South Korea, has always been one of the foundations of the U.S. national military strategy. Therefore, military forces and plans have always been allocated toward the defense of South Korea.

The strategic aims of Kim Jong II, the North Korean dictator is to overthrow the South Korean government and negotiate a settlement with the U.S. with terms acceptable to North Korea. The operational goals are to strike quickly, capture Seoul, defeat U.S. forces in South Korea, and prevent U.S. forces from reinforcing South Korea.

General Hu Shih had risen to be Chief of China's Military Commission, which after the downfall of the communist "Old-Guard" made him a controller of Chinese foreign and military policy. General Hu was also the commander of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and was chiefly responsible for its modernization. General Hu's strategic goal was to increase China's political, military, and economic position in Asia. In order to achieve this strategic aim, China would reclaim Chinese territories currently held by foreign countries. China specifically laid claim in 1992 to the rich natural resource areas of the Sprately Islands, Senkakus, and Penghu. Additionally, China would reassert its claim to Taiwan whom it considered a wayward province. For China to be successful, General Hu was counting on the U.S. and any allies to be fully militarily committed to combating North Korean forces and avoid direct military conflict with U.S. forces.

The Korean People's Army (KPA) launched a massive attack across the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) by conventional forces and quickly overwhelms South Korean and U.S. forces. The success of the conventional forces was due to in large part the extensive use of North Korean Special Purpose Forces (SPF).

The KPA Special Forces were also able to incite political unrest in South Korea. Peaceful student protests of the current South Korean government had been occurring in Seoul prior to KPA attacking. The KPA SPF took advantage of this opportunity and infiltrated numerous teams into the student protests. The teams acting in concert began to escalate the attack on the South Korean police forces monitoring the protest. In front of national and international news media, the KPA SPF was able to incite the protestors enough so that the South Korean police were forced to use deadly force. This act created international condemnation, which served to undermine the political legitimacy of the South Korean government.

Through the use of tunnels dug under the DMZ, t he North Koreans were able to infiltrate thousands of SPF prior to the attack. These forces assisted the KPA maneuver units in breaching the DMZ defenses. Some of the SPF forces had missions to strike other operationally significant targets. Prior to the KPA forces attacking south, SPF teams released anthrax agents outside the perimeter fences of the U.S. 2d Infantry Division in South Korea. This attack knocked out over half of the U.S. 2d Infantry Division.

American Air Force units were also targeted by KPA SPF units. At Osan airbase, SPF units disguised as Republic of Korea (ROK) helicopter units were able to attack with fifty Hughes 500-Ds causing a half a day's delay in U.S. fixed wing response.

Within two days of the initial North Korean attack, their forces were positioned on the outskirts of Seoul. The U.S. military was placed on full alert and units began to deploy to the Korean peninsula. The traditional U.S. Army rapid deployment forces (82d Airborne Division and 24th Infantry Division (Mech)) along with the 3rd Marine Division were notified to deploy at once. It would take ten days before elements of the 24th Infantry Division and the 3rd Marine Division were in country forming a defensive line North of Taegu. **[K1]** A Strike Force unit positioned in the Pacific theater (possibly in Hawaii or Okinawa) would be able to respond quickly to the Korean peninsula. A Strike Force package deployed to the initial defensive line north of Taegu offers many different employment options. The Strike Force could help in the reception of the 82d Airborne and 24th Infantry Division into country. It could also act as a security force until a deliberate defense would be viable from follow-on units.

The 2d Infantry Division had collapsed in and around Seoul. The 2d Infantry Division was in jeopardy of being cut-off within the next six hours. KPA armored formations were attempting to encircle Seoul thereby severing the 2d Infantry Division's only avenue of retreat to the south. The Commander-in-Chief of Pacific Forces (CINCPAC) was faced with the challenge of delaying the encirclement long enough to allow the 2d Infantry Division time to withdraw South toward Taegu. The CINCPAC was able to get Air Force fixed wing assets from Okinawa there in time to delay the KPA armored formations in order to allow the withdrawal of the 2d Infantry Division.

[K2] Based on the TRAC MAPEX results, had Strike Force units been available in country, then the short notice response of attack aviation assets and fire support assets within the Strike Force could have successfully executed this mission. The Strike Force

could have used its reconnaissance and surveillance squadron to gain contacts with lead enemy armor brigades and then destroy them. Employing ATACMS and the use of FASCAM/Volcano minefields to canalize the enemy would then disrupt the main KPA effort. Decisive operations could then be conducted by the attack aviation battalion which could destroy two brigades, close air support could destroy another brigade, and the combined arms maneuver brigade could destroy yet another¹³The destruction of the KPA armored brigades would have provided the 2d Infantry Division the freedom of maneuver to withdraw.

The next potential use of Strike Force units occurs approximately two weeks later in the scenario. KPA forces have continued to attack south on the Korean peninsula and are approaching the U.S. defensive perimeter situated north of Taegu. The U.S. 25th Infantry Division and 3d Marine Division formed the main defensive line with 82d Airborne Division supporting their left flank. The 10th KPA Corps attacks and is halted by U.S. fire support assets. To regain the initiative Kim Jong II, launched a twenty kiloton nuclear strike (M-11 single stage rocket) centered on the 25th Infantry Division and the 82d Airborne Division. The 25th Infantry Division suffered fifty- percent casualties while the 82d Airborne Division lost twenty-five percent. The KPA followed the nuclear strike with an immediate armored attack against the 82d Airborne Division.

[K3] This KPA attack on the 82d Airborne Division offers the operational commander another opportunity to employ the Strike Force unit. In this situation the Strike Force would have been positioned in reserve of the main defensive units available to reinforce the defense. Modeling results from the TRAC MAPEX again detail a potential Strike Force employment method and results. In this reinforcing situation the

reconnaissance and surveillance squadron conducts counterrecon and defeats the advanced guard and lead elements of the main KPA attack. UAVs are utilized to locate the KPA corps and division command and control. The KPA momentum is disrupted through the synchronized use of HIMARS, attack aviation assets, and air interdiction. Three SADARM firebases are established along with Q36 radar and a fire effects control team. The decisive operations are conducted by elements of the attack aviation battalion, which destroy two KPA brigades, close air support destroys one brigade, and artillery destroys one brigade. The results of this Strike Force counterattack would allow the operational commander time to reposition forces in order to reestablish a deliberate defense.

The KPA attack against the U.S. forces centered in and around Taegu had stalled and this marked the culmination of the KPA ground offensive. Additional U.S. and allied forces were continuing to arrive in theater and be committed to the fight. Approximately, eight days after the KPA attack on Taegu the U.S. was prepared to counterattack. The 1st Infantry Division (Mech) and the 2d Armored Division had launched deliberate attacks against the remnants of the 9th and 10th KPA Corps. Within a brief period of time it was quite evident that the T-62 was no match for the M1A1. Additionally, the Apache helicopters from the 101st Airborne Assault Division supporting the attack were having devastating results. By the end of the first day the KPA forces were in full retreat. Once again the flexibility and responsiveness of a Strike Force unit would allow the operational commander to use a Strike Force to exploit the success of the conventional forces.

[K4] MAPEX results indicate that Strike Force units have the capability of rapidly positioning themselves behind the enemy possibly to seize key terrain or form blocking positions. In this situation the key river crossing sites were seized by the Strike Force in

advance of the retreating KPA forces. The combined arms maneuver brigades of the Strike Force would be responsible for the actual seizing of the crossing sites. GATOR/FASCAM would be utilized to delay and disrupt the retreating formations. The

reconnaissance and surveillance squadron used its UAVs to locate command and control facilities and logistics sites. The placement of a Strike Force along the route of withdrawal of the KPA forces would significantly contribute to the overall destruction of the enemy forces.

With the North Korean ground forces in retreat, the Chinese PLA were committed to North Korea in order to prevent the collapse North Korea. During the KPA's attack south along the peninsula, the defense of Seoul was being prepared by the 820th Corps along with ten other KPA infantry divisions and Chinese units. The U.S. forces did not directly attack Seoul but chose to cut-off the KPA forces in Seoul from North Korea. The U.S. 2d Armored Division and 1st Infantry Division (Mech) completed the encirclement of Seoul. **[K5]** Although it is Army doctrine to avoid fighting in built-up areas when possible, the capabilities of Strike Force are well suited for combat in such an environment. The strike force contains both the attack and lift aviation assets that would be crucial to movement and force protection of light infantry soldiers. The Strike Force would also contain the light armor or mechanized assets that are essential in urban warfare. Finally, the reconnaissance assets especially the UAVs have proven to be excellent surveillance assets in an urban environment.

The use of a Strike Force to assist in the urban warfare in and around Seoul represented the last potential use of Strike Force assets in this scenario. The scenario concludes with a tactical nuclear exchange on the peninsula between the Chinese and the

U.S. A negotiated settlement is reached between China/DPRK, and the Republic of Korea/U.S. The terms of the settlement basically return the Korean states to their pre-conflict borders with the Chinese and U.S. still aligned behind their respective supported state.¹⁴

Iran

The second scenario, presented in <u>The Next War</u> involves a Southwest Asia country with the intent of creating an Islamic Empire. The impetus behind this Islamic movement is not Iraq, led by Saddam Hussein, but the country of Iran. Tehran's strategy was twofold. One was to develop the Islamic Empire by letting Islamic fundamentalism spread throughout the Middle East. The second was to secure the region's oil resources and utilize this as a source of power against the West.¹⁵

The president of Iran was Muhammad Montazeri. Montazeri believed that all Muslims should be reunited into one Islamic Empire, and he had been chosen by Allah to bring this about. The moderate Arab states did not share Montazeri's hard-line Islamic views. Nowhere else was this more apparent than in the Organization of Petroleum Producing Countries (OPEC). The more radical Middle Eastern countries of Iraq and Iran had, for over twenty years, espoused using oil as a weapon against the West. The more moderate states of Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates (UAE) favored the status quo of stable markets and cooperation with the West.¹⁶

Unbeknownst to the West, Montazeri had secretly been developing a nuclear weapons program for Iran since mid 1990. Montazeri now had the ability to threaten the West with nuclear weapons while quickly securing the oil from his moderate OPEC

neighbors. The first target for Montazeri was the small island nation of Bahrain, located just off the coast of Saudi Arabia approximately 250 miles from Iran.¹⁷

The Iranian intelligence forces had inserted Shiite revolutionaries on Bahrain whose purpose was to create an uprising against the pro-Western Bahrain government. What began as a youth led uprising turned into an open revolt against the Bahrain government with the Iranians able to seize the parliament. The 2d Division of the Iranian Revolutionary Corps (IRGC), with air support, was already enroute to Bahrain to seize control of the remainder of the island. The Bahrainian security forces were not equal to the numerically superior Iranian forces. The U.S. 5th fleet was based on the southern tip of Bahrain, and the Royal Saudi Air Force also maintained patrol between Bahrain and Saudi Arabia. Because Iran did not directly attack them, the U.S. or Saudi Arabia chose not to intervene.¹⁸

The CENTCOM commander, therefore, is placed in the uncomfortable position of having to quickly react to an unexpected threat to U.S. naval assets on the island of Bahrain and demonstrate United States' resolve to our traditional Arab allies. [I1] A Strike Force unit pre-positioned in the CENTCOM area of responsibility (AOR) would provide the CINC the flexibility to alleviate the threat to U.S. assets and show military resolve to our Middle Eastern allies.

One of the unique aspects of Strike Force is its ability to operate from the concept of split-based operations in terms of communications, intelligence, and logistics. In this situation, the close proximity of Saudi Arabia or the UAE to Bahrain affords the CENTCOM commander the opportunity to utilize split-based operations. The preponderance of communication, intelligence, and logistics assets of the Strike Force

would be based out of a secure area in Saudi Arabia or UAE. Within the Strike Force, only those combat assets and essential command and control elements would be required to operate in close proximity to Bahrain.¹⁹

Within days of the Iranian attack a pro-Iran government was installed in Bahrain. It was now time for Montazeri to demonstrate his resolve to the West. The National Security Agency eavesdropping sensors in Turkey were the first to detect the explosion of a 100-kiloton bomb in the desolate Northwest Iranian desert. With this planned demonstration of nuclear weapon capability, Montazeri demanded, "the withdrawal of U.S. military personnel from the Persian Gulf within twenty-one days." Failure to comply will, in his words, " lead to the detonation of a nuclear device over a major city in Europe."

Once the Middle Eastern country was under Iranian control, the Iranian government turned its attention to the oil rich country of Saudi Arabia. Similar to the beginnings of the Bahrain attack, the Iranians chose to attack several Saudi Arabian political and economic targets. Over a period of two weeks terrorist-planted explosives and car bombs were detonated throughout Saudi Arabia. This terrorist campaign culminated in the attack of the Ras Tannurah oil facility. Ras Tannurah was the main oil production facility for Saudi Arabia. A lone terrorist, piloting a PC-7 loaded with explosives flying low to evade Saudi air defenses smashed his plane into the oil refining facility. The explosion and resulting fire crippled the Saudi Arabian oil production and greatly effected the world oil market.

Amir ibn Abd Abdul Rahman, the Saudi Arabian king, chose to accept the Iranian demands, those being; the removal of Saudi air and navy forces from the Persian gulf and

allowing Iran to establish Saudi oil production and pricing policy. Following the fall of Saudi Arabia, Iran quickly invaded the countries of Oman and UAE, and despite taking considerable casualties, was able to overrun the small oil rich countries. With the control of these countries President Montazeri was prepared to announce that the Strait of Hormuz was no longer international waters but now considered the territorial waters of Iran.

The combination of Iran's earlier threat to detonate nuclear weapons and now the closing of the Straits of Hormuz was enough to prompt the U.S. national security authorities to take action. President St. John authorized a simultaneous attack on suspected Iranian nuclear weapons facilities and defense sites located in Iran. The attack by Tomahawk cruise missiles and U.S. fighter-bomber aircraft was successful but did not prevent the Iranians from launching a Zulfiquar nuclear missile targeted at Rome. The missile fell short of Rome and struck the Italian town of Monza, destroying the city and causing an estimated 10,000 initial casualties in the Italian town.

This attack on the Italian town of Monza, led only to the strengthening of the West's resolve in bringing Iran's aggression to a halt. At this point, the United States realized that reopening the Straits of Hormuz and the destruction of Iran's weapons of mass destruction capability was paramount. The initial U.S. led ground attack would be focused on the Iranian islands of Qesum and Larak, which controlled access to the Straits of Hormuz.

In <u>The Next War</u>, this operation against the islands of Qesum and Larak are portrayed as a joint operation but each service fights within its own traditional service boundaries. The operation began with Special Operation forces attacking at night with

special operation helicopters to destroy the Iranian speedboat threat. Approximately two hours later, the Air Force fighter-bombers arrive on station to begin an operation on air defense sites, command bunkers, and known enemy troop locations. This air attack is followed up with an amphibious assault by Marine forces.²⁰ [12] The Strike Force concept has applicability in this type of limited operation. The Strike Force headquarters is designed to facilitate joint operations and therefor would be equipped to handle the command and control issues of operating with other services. The Strike Force could also be utilized as an independent supporting effort to this operation. An example of this would be to have the Strike Force deploy further inland to interdict any Iranian reinforcements to the islands of Qesum or Larak.²¹ This operation represents the last opportunity for Strike Force use in this scenario.

This scenario is brought to a military conclusion by the U.S. intelligence agencies being able to determine the location of the remaining Iranian nuclear missile launch locations and associated equipment. The U.S. successfully conducts a preemptive tactical nuclear strike against the Iranian nuclear missile site.²²

<u>Mexico</u>

The third scenario begins with the riot in Houston Texas that the U.S. Army is called upon to put down. The cause of this civil unrest has its roots across the border in Mexico. Mexico had a stable democratic government that was following sound fiscal policies and was making inroads into abolishing the corruption that had been plaguing the Mexican government. The leader of this Mexican government, Lorenza Zapata, was assassinated and was replaced by the radical populist Eduardo Francisco Ruiz. Ruiz was backed by the Mexican drug cartels and immediately set out to increase his nationalist

popular support. He chose to nationalize the banking and insurance agencies as well as redistribute the farmlands. This nationalization of industry proved to be an economic failure resulting in a mass exodus by Mexicans across the U.S. border seeking economic relief. Ruiz maintained his support by allowing the military to quell any opposing political party. In just a two-month period over 650,000 Mexicans had illegally crossed into the U.S. from San Diego to Brownsville.²³

The U.S. military was given the mission, by augmenting the Border Patrol, to stem the tide of illegal immigration into the U.S. To this mission over 60,000 U.S. Army soldiers, equivalent to a corps, were applied. The Mexican drug cartels quickly took advantage of the increased chaos inside the U.S. to foster increase demand for drugs, and Hispanic gangs located along the U.S. border attempted to increase their positions through gang warfare.

The Hispanic gangs were able to gain control of the Houston neighborhood of Brookhaven, and the Texas governor asked for U.S. military assistance to restore order to the Brookhaven area.²⁴

For the reasons mentioned earlier, the eviction of an enemy force from an urban area is one of the most challenging missions a military unit can be given. [M1] In this situation, conventional forces can isolate the urban area while Strike Force assets are moved to Houston. The Strike Force would then be utilized as the eviction force if the situation still required it. The Strike Force capabilities would enable access to an urban database during the fight, and equip all soldiers with both lethal and non-lethal weapons. The Strike Force capabilities would undoubtedly reduce the collateral damage and risk to noncombatants in the Brookhaven area.

It was not difficult for the U.S. State Department to establish that the real power behind the Ruiz led government was coming from the drug cartels. The Mexican people continued to flow across the U.S. border causing more and more strain on the economies of the U.S. border states. The U.S. President, in an attempt to relieve this strain, decides to militarily intervene in Mexico and to bring about the forceful removal of President Ruiz.

The military campaign for Mexico involved the invasion of six division size elements supported by Air Force strike assets located in Texas, California, and Louisiana from the west, the 1st Marine Division and Army's 7th Infantry Division would depart from Tucson and attack through Nogales Mexico. Centrally, the 2d Armored Division and 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment would leave from Ft Hood, Texas and attack through Monterrey and eventually to Guadalajara. In the east, the 24th Infantry Division point of departure was located in Brownsville Texas while the 7th Infantry Division attacked into Reynosa Mexico. Both units attacked successfully and advanced nearly 400 miles to the town of Tampico. Tampico served as the amphibious landing area for the 2d Marine Infantry Division. The 2d Marine Division met with little resistance and was welcomed by the Mexican people as they began to distribute food with which they had landed. From Tampico, U.S. forces would then turn Southwest and orient the next stage of the offensive on Mexico City. Within this limited offensive campaign plan into Mexico, possible employment aspects for a strike force unit can be found.²⁵

[M2] The Strike Force through its strategic deployability could have easily been used in a number of different roles in this operation. The Strike Force could have been utilized to seize key terrain in and around the Tampico area to assist the Army ground

based divisions or the Marine division conducting the amphibious assault. The Strike Force could have also seized an airport for debarkation, or forward landing site, that would have enabled both inter and intratheater airlift to begin operating. The Strike Force is ideally suited for missions that support another service due to its joint and organic communications suites. It is also designed to bring to bear all joint effects through the joint fire effects center.

The U.S. operation proved to be overwhelmingly successful and culminated in three days when the Mexican military capitulated. President Ruiz, as well as some loyal advisors, quickly fled to the Central Mexican Highlands in an attempt to escape the U.S. military advance. President Ruiz had established a base camp named Camp Colada in the Zacatecas mountain region in which he planned to continue the fight utilizing guerrilla warfare. U.S. intelligence sources determined that the Mexican Central Mountain region was the area of operation for Ruiz and his military leaders. The U.S. 7th Infantry Division as well as the 10th Mountain Division was redeployed from the Tampico area to begin the search for Ruiz.

In the end it took nearly six months of patrolling by both divisions before elements of the 7th Infantry Division stumbled across the base camp of President Ruiz and his followers. Apache helicopters from the 7th Infantry Division were utilized to destroy Camp Colada and nearly 200 Mexican guerrilla fighters. Unfortunately, there were nearly eighteen U.S. infantry casualties from the initial discovery of the camp. Again, the capabilities of the Strike Force are suited for this type of mission²⁶

[M3] The essential capability that Strike Force would provide in this situation is the ability to develop a greater situational awareness with fewer assets than the

conventional U.S. Army division. The Strike Force intelligence cell has the ability to receive national and joint surveillance systems and then augment this with its own organic surveillance assets. This ability to take national assets and then utilize an organic UAV or Commanche surveillance system allows the Strike Force commander to quickly develop situational awareness without unnecessarily jeopardizing soldiers to gather intelligence. Within the proposed Strike Force Reconnaissance and Surveillance Squadron, UAVs, Commanches, and Apaches are all contained. Additionally, the Strike Force contains the immediate strike assets that can immediately respond to a time-sensitive target.

The scenario is concluded with the destruction of Camp Colada. Camp Colada marked the end of any organized resistance by the Ruiz led governmental forces. However, President Ruiz, as well as his closest military advisors, was not found among the dead of Camp Colada.

<u>Russia</u>

The fourth scenario, in <u>The Next War</u> involves the rise of a nationalistic regime in Russia. During the mid-1990s the post-Soviet reforms continued to falter creating social chaos in Russia. The Mafia, corruption, and violent crime became common place in the country. Government mismanagement and organized crime were two evils that seemed to bring the Russian economy to the brink of collapse.²⁷ The country was ready for a leader who offered the hope of righting this sinking ship that had become Russia.

The man who put himself forward as the leader was Aledsandr Dankovich Karashchuk. Karashchuk was half-Ukrainian by birth and had, before resigning, risen to the rank of Lieutenant General in the Soviet Army. As most good politicians, he had a charismatic quality that endeared him to the average Russian. Karashchuk's message was

one of firmness in dealing with corruption and the economy. Additionally, Karashchuk promised to restore the Russian prestige, which had deteriorated over the last decade. His espoused aim was, "...to bring all Slavs together under one imperial roof."²⁸ Over the period of five years Karashchuk was able to stabilize the Russian economy and bring the Russian Mafia under control. He was then able to turn his attention to creating his pan-Slavic empire.

Karashchuk had been secretly supporting, with the Glavnoye Razvedyvatelnoye Upravlenie (GRU) assistance, advanced weapon technologies to include lasers, particle beam weapons, and kinetic energy weapons. The most significant weapon development of these was the "Magic Chain" Ballistic Missile Defense system. The "Magic Chain" system was a violation of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. Its deployment gave Russia the strategic advantage of being able to nullify the effects of a nuclear missile attack.²⁹ With this strategic capability, Karashchuk was prepared to begin a military offensive aimed at re-establishing the pan-Slavic empire.

The first object of Karashchuk's aggression was the eastern European country of Poland. Russia launched a well coordinated and surprise attack into Poland from Russia. Just prior to the conventional military attack Spetsnatz forces assassinated the Polish president, as well as, all the cabinet. Poland was a member of NATO and therefore immediately sought assistance from its NATO allies. The British, French, and Germans were unanimous in their support of Poland and began immediate measures to deploy forces to support Poland and deter further Russian aggression. The Germans responded with two armored divisions deployed to the Polish border, and the French deployed paratroopers to Poland.³⁰

The U.S. immediate response in <u>The Next War</u> consisted of the 82d Airborne Division and the 2d Marine Division and two air wings deploying to Germany within 48 hours. Additional assets in the form of two armored divisions would be available within two weeks. [R1] In this scenario the forward deployment of a Strike Force in this AOR would, once again, provide the CINC operational flexibility to deploy a highly flexible and lethal force.

The nature of this possible employment of the Strike Force offers many unique insights. The command and control of the defense of Poland is inherently a NATO defense prerogative. The Strike Force has the command, control, and communications architecture that allows it to be integrated easily into the multinational forces of NATO. Strike Force also has the capability of being employed autonomously for up to 72 hours.

Returning to the original scenario, the Russian forces continued to advance across Russia while NATO forces deployed to Germany in advance of the Russian forces. The Magic Chain ABM weapon system was fully deployed in and around Moscow. With the Magic Chain deployment, Karashchuk was now able to threaten NATO with nuclear missiles if they did not comply with his demands. Karashchuk immediately demanded that NATO forces not enter Polish territory or they would face immediate nuclear attack. The French president Jacques Lebou considered this a Russian bluff and continued to deploy French parachute regiments into Poland. Unfortunately for the French paratroopers, Karashchuk was not bluffing and the French parachute units were immediately struck by a nuclear missle.³¹

The French position was immediately to respond in kind to the Russian use of nuclear weapons. The French government launched a M45 missile from a submarine

targeted at a Russian military base. The Russian BMD system quickly detected the launch and intercepted the French missile above the atmosphere. The Russian Magic Chain system had proven its capability to defeat a missile attack and thus changed the world's strategic balance. The U.S. and NATO countries continued to mass forces in Germany but did not risk nuclear attack by positioning troops in Poland. Without NATO support the Polish forces could not hold back the Russian forces and Poland was forced to capitulate.

Within two weeks of capturing Poland, Karashchuk decided to continue the westward attack by striking Czechoslovakia. NATO had positioned the preponderance of its forces to defend in the North German Plain and was out of position to defend the Czech Republic. The Russian leader did not waste time in fighting the Czech army with conventional means, but once again relied on nuclear missiles. This time one lone missile targeted on the Czech town of Hradec Kralove was enough to demoralize the Czech defenders into surrendering to the Russian aggressors.³²

[R2] Once again, even though the preponderance of NATO's conventional forces may have been positioned in Northern Germany, the Strike Force's mobility would offer the operational commander some flexibility in responding to the attack into Czechoslovakia. The Strike Force's attack aviation assets could be quickly repositioned to reinforce Czech defenses. Strike Force also has the communication and intelligence assets to reach back from the Czech area of operation to either NATO forces in Northern Germany or back to the United States. This possible use of Strike Force units represents the last time U.S conventional military forces were possible for this scenario

The Russian attack had been successful so far based on the overwhelming superiority of conventional forces, the element of surprise, and, of course, the use of nuclear missiles. However, NATO forces continued to mobilize and position themselves in Central Europe to defend Germany. The buildup of conventional forces by NATO was so successful that Russia no longer contained a numerical advantage. This did not prevent the Russians from again utilizing tactical nuclear missiles to attack into Germany. Initially, Germany and then France both succumb to the Russian nuclear and conventional attacks. The United States withdrew all its military forces from the European continent and agreed to begin paying monetary restitution for historic injustices. Since the beginning of Russian disclosure of "Magic Chain" the United States had begun development of a ballistic missile defense called "Brilliant Pebbles" and had successfully deployed and tested the ABM system. The scenario concludes with a small scale Russian attempt to penetrate the U.S. ABM system.³³

<u>Japan</u>

The fifth scenario in <u>The Next War</u> involves an economically threatened Japan, who once again intends to reassert itself as a regional economic power. Prime Minister Ishiwara Kawara was elected on the promise that he would lead Japan back to a position of economic strength. He believed that Japan's lack of success and economic prosperity was attributed to its over reliance on international trade and on critical natural resources.³⁴ Throughout the 1990s, Kawara set out to develop a military large enough and capable enough to support his plans for Japan's economic destiny.

Similar to 1940, Kawara developed a strategy that would protect Japan's national interest and garnish access to raw materials and markets. Borrowing a page from history,

his strategy called for an attack into the resource rich area of the South China Sea. To protect the resource area and lines of communications, a defensive perimeter would be established along the Russian islands of Kurile, Wake Island, Marshall Islands, and finally to Malaysia.³⁵ Kawara attempted to avoid direct conflict with the United States and believed that, if successful, Japan would be able to negotiate a settlement with the United States which would enable Japan to retain its new position as a regional economic power.

In addition to Japan's conventional military forces, Kawara had invested greatly in developing a cyberattack force. These computer specialists were trained in creating logic bombs and viruses that would disable and destroy an enemy's telecommunication and computer infrastructure. With a highly technological conventional force and the ability to conduct cyberattacks, Kawara believed that Japan was now capable of carrying out its military strategy.

The opening move of Japan's strategy was an attack on the island of Taiwan, Mainland China, and the Philippines. Kawara's cyberattack forces targeted Taiwan fiber optic and telecommunication networks with highly lethal viruses that completely destroyed telephone communication and rendered computers useless. Japanese fighter jets quickly attacked the Taiwanese airfields and planes before they could get airborne.

Japanese cyberattack forces were also attacking the Chinese Naval Command Center in Shanghai. This attack destroyed the Chinese ability to command and control their Western Pacific naval forces. Japanese naval assets positioned off the coast of Mainland China launched Tomahawk cruise missiles that destroyed targets in Nanjing, Beijing, and Shanghai. These coordinated attacks on Taiwan and China left both countries
paralyzed and militarily defenseless.³⁶ Japan now was able to turn its attention to attacking the Philippines.

A combined Japanese Navy and Air Force attacked the Philippines. These forces quickly overcame what little resistance the Philippine air force could mount. An amphibious Japanese ground assault went ashore near Manila. The Philippine government immediately asked the United States to honor its defense treaties with the Philippines and come to their assistance.³⁷ The Philippines, like Taiwan and China, was unable to stop the Japanese military attacks, and the Philippine government was quickly overturned by the Japanese military forces.

Based on Japan's initial success in the Philippines, Taiwan, and China. Kawara continued to consolidate his hold on South China Sea resource areas. The small nation of Brunei was attacked, and the Australian ships *Perth* and *Brisbane* were sunk by a Stealth Japanese submarine.³⁸ The United States had, up until now, avoided going to war with Japan, but the attack on Australian Navy assets was enough to prompt the President of the United States to send the U.S. Sixth Fleet to Australia.

Within three weeks of Japan's initial attack on the Philippines, Taiwan, and China Japan had secured the small nation of Brunei, severely damaged Australian and U.S. naval capability, and seized the U.S. Island of Guam. Guam's military significance was that it was the only western operating base for naval assets in the Pacific. On the island itself the Japanese had 2,200 marines and fifty-artillery pieces.³⁹

In <u>The Next War</u> the United States launches a ground offensive at retaking the island of Guam. This offensive is a joint operation with the Marines and the Army providing the bulk of ground forces. The Army force was led by an airborne assault by

the 82d Airborne Division while the Marines landed a Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF). These units were able to bring ashore their artillery and light armor assets, which would prove decisive against the dug-in Japanese defenders. The securing of Anderson airfield, located on the north end of the island, was the objective of the U.S. operation. The Japanese defenders were forced to surrender the island but not without a cost to the U.S of 261 U.S. soldiers killed in action.⁴⁰

[J1] In this scenario the retaking of Guam for analysis purposes could be considered analogous to the early entry scenario of the TRAC MAPEX. Strike Force assets would be supporting the MEF who would be the main effort. The R&S squadron of the Strike Force would focus its UAV assets to locate Japanese command and control as well as the reserve forces in and around Anderson airfield. The main Strike Force element would once again be the attack aviation assets operating from afloat or from secure Marine operating bases. These Strike Force attack assets could be expected to destroy up to two brigades worth of Japanese light infantry or armor assets.⁴¹ Similar to the successful operation on Guam, in the scenario the nation of Brunei was also successfully attacked by combined forces from Australia, Britain, and United States.

The U.S. Marines were the first ashore and positioned in the center of the combined landing forces on the beach at Tutong. Once again the Japanese defenders put up a determined defense and only surrendered after extracting a considerable toll on allied forces. [J2] As opposed to this conventional attack, the Strike Force has capabilities that may have been able to be leveraged with greater effects in this situation. The Strike Force UAVs could have provided accurate and timely targeting information to either the U.S. long range shooters or conceivably the Australians or British long range shooters. Similar

to the Marines' developmental doctrine, of "Ship to Objective" the Strike Force has the lift capability to move soldiers and assets deep to bypass a beachhead situation.

The Japanese also targeted the U.S. Federal Reserve banking system with a cyberattack that initially crippled the U.S. economy and eventually caused the world's economy to stagnate for nearly four months. Finally, the U.S. struck the Japanese mainland with a non-lethal chemical attack launched from cruise missiles. The cruise missiles contained "calmative agents" which allowed U.S. warplanes to destroy military targets while the Japanese were under the effects of the calmative agents. Karawara's military power is degraded by this attack and he enters into negotiations for a peaceful settlement to the conflict.⁴²

<u>Analysis</u>

The addition of, and/or application of proposed Strike Force units in the five scenarios from The Next War have been conducted. It is now possible to conduct an assessment on the applicability of the proposed Strike Force uses in the context of The Next War versus the proposed mission sets for which Strike Force is being designed. To review the proposed mission sets that Strike Force is capable of conducting would include but is not limited to:

Mission Set:

- 1. High end decisive operations
- 2. Entry operations
- 3. Peace enforcement
- 4. Deter/contain crisis
- 5. Humanitarian assistance

There were fourteen different instances of potential Strike Force operations in The Next War. These fourteen Strike Force operations were then, based on the doctrinal definition of the mission set descriptions, categorized by mission set.

Misssion Set	Total Occurrences in The Next War
1. High end decisive operations	K4, K5, M2, M3, J2
2. Entry operations	K1, I1, R1, J1
3. Peace enforcement	
4. Deter/contain crisis	K2, K3, M1, I2, R2
5. Humanitarian assistance	

The use of Strike Force assets in The Next War was limited to three (High-end decisive operations, Entry operations, and Deter/contain crisis) from the five missions that Strike Force is being designed for. This does not mean that Strike Force will not be capable of performing the remaining two missions (Peace enforcement or Humanitarian assistance). The construct of The Next War scenarios did not contain instances where Peace enforcement or Humanitarian assistance missions were undertaken. Often The Next War scenarios would end upon conventional military resolution or political resolution. It is at this point that Peace enforcement and Humanitarian assistance often become viable missions. In addition to the number of occurrences by mission set for Strike Force in the Next War, it is also interesting to focus on the occurrence of other Strike Forces specific capabilities.

It has been stated that Strike Force will always operate in a joint environment.⁴³ All five of the scenario's military operations were conducted in a joint environment. Of the fourteen potential instances of Strike Force use, only two of the operations were of the nature that a Strike Force headquarters operating with joint control of all services involved in that operation would have enhanced the command and control of the specific operation.

Misssion Set	Joint
2. Entry operations	I1
4. Deter/contain crisis	I2

Multinational operations were utilized in a number of operations in The Next War scenarios. The headquarters of Strike Force with some augmentation is supposed to be able to operate as the combined forces land component commander.⁴⁴ There were only two specific instances in The Next War where Strike Force units were operating as part of a combined force operation.

Misssion Set	<u>Combined</u>
1. High end decisive operations	J2
2. Entry operations	R1

A future threat to the United States is less likely to openly engage the United States in open terrain warfare. The threat is far more likely to engage in a restricted terrain to negate the technological advantage of the United State's advanced weapon systems. The Strike Force headquarters utilizes its enhanced situational awareness capabilities and its ability to be tailored with MOUT trained infantry to gain an advantage over the adversary.⁴⁵ Again there were two proposed instances of Strike Force units operating in an urban environment. These two occurrences represent two vastly different MOUT operations for a Strike Force. One MOUT operation (K5) involves a combat against conventional military forces in a large built-up area, Seoul. The other operation (M1) involves a small paramilitary threat located in a small built-up area, a Houston neighborhood.

Misssion Set MOUT

1. High end decisive operations K5

4. Deter/contain crisis M1

One of the operational concepts of Strike Force is the ability to conduct "high tempo operations employing maneuver and precision fires to defeat critical enemy systems." Supporting this concept is the Strike Force ability to seize or control key terrain in order to maneuver and employ fires. There were two instances in which potential Strike Force operations were conducted with the mission to secure operationally significant key terrain.

Misssion Set	<u>Key Terrain</u>
1. High end decisive operations	K4, M2

One of the five missions that Strike Force is being optimized for is that of entry operations. Entry operations has been traditionally a mission of the XVIIIth Airborne Corps and within the corps the 82d Airborne Division. The 82d Airborne Division was utilized in four out of five of <u>The Next War</u> scenarios. The 82d Airborne Division is mentioned more than any other division size element in the book. This fact is important for analysis purposes because some military analysts believe that Strike Force units will be able to perform many of the 82d Airborne Division's functions. The 82d Airborne Division maintains a "ready brigade" able to deploy worldwide within thirty-seven hours. The Strike Force operational response time is projected to 96 hours. When Strike Force units become operational, what is the impact on the 82d Airborne's early entry role? There will still be instances where deployment timelines will require a unit to be able to respond within 37 hours, the 82d Airborne Division will be the only unit available to respond to such a requirement.

The 82d Airborne Division has a limited anti-armor capability and must rely on follow-on forces to defend against a heavy armor threat. The potential of the Strike Force to combine its anti-armor assets with elements of the 82d Airborne Division to form a unit that will be better suited for "forced entry" operations.

Conclusion

The next ten to fifteen years will find the United States involved in numerous conflicts across a spectrum of military conflicts from stability and support to major regional conflict. These conflicts will undoubtedly involve the need for the use of a highly lethal and deployable force. Today, operational commanders, when faced with military operations, often have to combine heavy and light forces on an ad hoc basis to meet the military needs of the crisis. The Strike Force is supposed to offer full spectrum dominance and compliment the existing light and heavy forces.

<u>The Next War</u> was a fictional look with five plausible and well-conceived political/military scenarios. The scenarios served as a vehicle in this monograph to introduce the concept of Strike Force assets into the United States military force structure. Applications of Strike Force, based on the organizational and operational concepts of Strike Force, were inserted into <u>The Next War</u> scenarios where appropriate. The contribution or impact of Strike Force toward the final resolution of the scenarios could not be determined. The complexity and duration of the five <u>The Next War</u> scenarios were of a nature that no one type of military unit was responsible for conflict resolution, but within the scenarios it was possible to examine the nature of the missions where Strike Force might be utilized. It is also possible to examine the possible performance of Strike Force units conducting specified missions. The scenarios and results of the TRADOC

Analysis Center MAPEX and SIMEX were utilized when possible to gain insights into similar occurrences in <u>The Next War</u> scenarios.

The force developers of Strike Force have initially identified five possible missions that Strike Force would be capable of performing:

Mission Set

- 1. High end decisive operations
- 2. Entry operations
- 3. Peace enforcement
- 4. Deter/contain crisis
- 5. Humanitarian assistance

With these proposed mission sets established, there were fourteen proposed instances in which Strike Force assets were applicable within <u>The Next War</u> scenarios. Due to the nature of <u>The Next War</u> scenarios, no Strike Force applications were found for the missions of Peace Enforcement and Humanitarian Assistance. Strike Force's potential versatility and utility is supported by the fourteen proposed instances of Strike Force spread equally among High End Decisive Operations, Entry Operations, and Deter/Contain Crisis. More importantly, there was also Strike Force applicability across all five scenarios. Additionally, within all the scenarios Strike Force performed multiple and different mission sets demonstrating its potential versatility to the operational commander.

There has been some Army officials who have expressed concern over the conflict between future Strike Force roles and that of the 82d Airborne Division missions. The Strike Force was utilized in the early entry mission role in lieu of the 82d Airborne Division in some scenarios but not all. There will still be instances where deployment

timelines will require a unit to be able to respond within 37 hours, the 82d Airborne Division will be the only unit available to respond to such a requirement.

Based on the frequency and diverse applications of Strike Force employment during <u>The Next War</u> scenarios, the Strike Force offers the NCA or regional CINC an additional option. The Strike Force unit would be able to preempt, contain, arrest escalation, or quickly transition to combat operations in lieu of a traditional heavy or light force.

ENDNOTES

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²⁶ Results from fighting near Camp Colada from Weinberger, 205-212.

²⁷ Government mismanagement and corruption from Weinberger, 218.

²⁸ Karashchuk biographic and political ideology from Weinberger 217-218.

²⁹ Development and description of the Magic Chain BMD system taken from Weinberger, 223-

224.

³⁰ Russian attack into Poland and NATO response summarized from Weinberger, 228-232.

³¹ Russian nuclear missile attack and French response summarized from Weinberger, 238-241.

³² Russian attack upon Czech summarized from Weinberger, 254.

³³ Russian attack on Germany, France, and U.S summarized from Weinberger, 278-312.

³⁴ Paraphrased from Weinberger, 314.

³⁵ Paraphrased from Weinberger, 316.

³⁶ Summarized from Weinberger, 322-323.

³⁷ Japanese attack and Philippine response from Weinberger, 332.

³⁸ Japanese actions against Brunei and Australia summarized from Weinberger, 352.

³⁹ Japanese military activities summarized from Weinberger, 352-360.

⁴⁰ U.S. activities on Guam from Weinberger, 371-377.

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