

PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE: NATO'S FUTURE?

A MONOGRAPH

BY

Colonel William R. Puttmann, Jr.

Infantry



School of Advanced Military Studies
United States Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

AY 98-99

Approved for Public Release Distribution is Unlimited

DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 4

19991109 029

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188), Washington, DC 20503.


1. AGENCY USE ONLY <i>(Leave blank)</i>	2. REPORT DATE 27 May 1999	3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED MONOGRAPH	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Partnership for Peace: NATO's Future?		5. FUNDING NUMBERS	
6. AUTHOR(S) COL William R. Puttmann, Jr.		8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) School of Advanced Military Studies Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027		10. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Command and General Staff College School of Advanced Military Studies Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027		11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES	
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE: DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED.		12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE	
13. ABSTRACT <i>(Maximum 200 words)</i> SEE ATTACHED			
14. SUBJECT TERMS			15. NUMBER OF PAGES 46
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT UNCLASSIFIED			16. PRICE CODE
18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE UNCLASSIFIED		19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT UNCLASSIFIED	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UNLIMITED

SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES
MONOGRAPH APPROVAL

Colonel William R. Puttmann, Jr.


Title of Monograph: *Partnership for Peace: NATO's Future?*

Approved by:



James J. Schneider, Ph.D.

Monograph Director



LTC Robin P. Swan, MMAS

Director, School of Advanced
Military Studies



Philip J. Brookes, Ph.D.

Director, Graduate Degree
Program

Accepted this 27th Day of May 1999

ABSTRACT

PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE: NATO's FUTURE? by Colonel William R Puttmann Jr, U.S. Army, 41 pages.

This monograph examines the NATO Alliance and its transition from a 1949 defense security guarantee, between 16 independent nations into a collective security arrangement. The 1991 NATO Summit formalized this shift from an adversarial relationship between east and west, to one of engagement through Partnership for Peace (PfP) a NATO alliance initiative designed to enhance stability throughout Europe.

The focus of this monograph is on the Partnership for Peace initiative that was designed to engage the allies and client states of the former Soviet Union. NATO in 1991 found its Cold War strategic objectives out of balance with the realities of a new European environment. The aim of PfP is to establish a bond between the NATO members and the nations of Eastern and Central Europe, the Balkans, and the Caucasus. It is a political and military consultative process that is based on the framework of the objectives the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council laid out. These objectives frame the PfP initiative. These are designed to: enhance democratic principles, reinforce the military subordination to civilian control, and support human rights in the former Soviet satellite nations.

The Areas of Cooperation identified in the Framework Document, signed in Madrid Spain in 1994, and are intended to establish the conditions for the Baltic States and former Warsaw Pact countries to enter into a relationship with NATO. The process of engagement through PfP provides to the partner nations the possibility of realizing full NATO membership and the economic benefits associated with the alliance. In 1999, three nations: Poland, Hungary and Czech Republic were admitted as full members.

The issue that remains unresolved is whether in the final analysis the democratic values of NATO can be transferred and incorporated into the new nation states of Eastern and Central Europe, the Balkans and Caucasus. This monograph concludes with the observation that the PfP military exercise program provides an excellent venue for NATO to influence the partner nations. However, the continued engagement of these fledgling democracies through PfP must include political and diplomatic initiatives that reinforce the values of NATO.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	Introduction.....	1
	North Atlantic Treaty Organization.....	2
	A Changing European Environment.....	3
	NATO and US National Security.....	4
	NATO's Search for Continued Relevance.....	6
II.	NATO's Dilemma: Objectives and Realities of the 1990's.....	9
	A Changed European Security Environment	10
	NATO's Engagement and Enlargement.....	11
	European Organizations: A Study in Duplication.....	13
	The Partnership Between NATO and Russia.....	15
	NATO's Future: Partnership for Peace.....	16
III.	NATO's New Direction Partnership for Peace.....	17
	NATO's Expansion and Partnership for Peace.....	17
	PfP Membership/Criteria: 1994 Brussels Summit.....	19
	PfP Organizations and Functions.....	21
	The States Partnership for Peace Program: The Beginning.....	22
IV.	The Costs of Partnership for Peace.....	26
	Partnership Exercises.....	27
	PfP and the Exercise Program with NATO	28
	Costs of Enlargement: PfP	33
	Summary.....	35
V.	Conclusion and Recommendations.....	37
	Endnotes.....	42
	Bibliography.....	47

Glossary of Terms

<u>ACRONYM</u>	<u>DEFINITION</u>
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
EU	European Union
CSCE	Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
NACC	North Atlantic Cooperation Council
PfP	Partnership for Peace
EAPC	Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council
CEE	Central and Eastern Europe
CNAD	Conference of National Armaments Directors
PARP	Planning and Review Process
PMSC/AHG	The Political-Military Steering Committee/AD HOC Group on Cooperation in Peacekeeping
ESDI	European Security and Defense Identity
WEU	Western European Union
IMS	International Military Staff
FAWEU	Forces Answerable to WEU
DPC	Defense Planning Committee
CJTF	Combined Joint Task Force
NAC	North Atlantic Council
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
EEC	European Economic Committee
NAC	North Atlantic Council
NIS	Newly Independent States

I. Introduction

“Enlargement is not an end in itself, but is part of a wider objective of building a new European security architecture.”¹

Javier Solana, NATO Secretary General and Chairman of NATO

The NATO Alliance has been the cornerstone of US National Strategy since the end of the Second World War. The 1994 Brussels Summit focused the member nations on an engagement and enlargement strategy which resulted in the creation of Partnership for Peace. This has fundamentally changed the objective of the NATO alliance. NATO provided a formal security guarantee to its members during a period when the Soviet Union posed a very real military threat to both Europe and America. The Partnership for Peace, a US initiative, was created as a security cooperation agreement to engage Central and Eastern Europe, the Baltic States, Caucasus and former Warsaw Pact Organization members. There is, however, a growing concern about whether this new relationship of engagement will lead to an enlargement of NATO that will ultimately dilute its effectiveness and resolve to act. One of history's most successful security alliances, NATO is in the process of being fundamentally altered as a result of Partnership for Peace.

Historical Perspective

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), in order to counter a growing Soviet threat, was established by the Treaty of Washington in 1949. It was created as a security organization and was based on political and military cooperation among the independent member nations in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.²

This alliance established a formal agreement between North America and her

European Allies and was “designed to bring about peace and stability throughout Europe”.³

In 1949, there were thirteen original signatories; this has been enlarged over time and currently there are nineteen members⁴:

United States	Greece (1952)
Belgium	Iceland
Canada	Italy
Denmark	Luxembourg
France	The Netherlands
Germany (1955)	Spain (1982)
Norway	Turkey (1952)
Portugal	United Kingdom
Poland (1999)	Hungary (1999)
Czech Republic (1999)	

The success of NATO is tied directly to its consultative decision making process. This process requires that all decisions be arrived at through consensus. Any actions taken in the name of NATO must be the result of the cooperation of all member countries in agreement.⁵ NATO’s essential purpose, identified in the Washington Treaty and reiterated in the London Declaration, is to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, the principles of democracy, individual liberties and the rule of law. Article 5 of the Treaty stipulates that an armed attack upon one or more in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against all.⁶

The consultative process, which is the key to NATO’s longevity, is at least in part a result of the unity that a small number of members bring to an organization. The Partnership for Peace initiative appears to be designed to enlarge the NATO alliance. The aim of this paper is to assess whether the Partnership for Peace initiative, signed at Madrid in 1996, is accomplishing its intended objectives.

A Changing European Environment

The NATO Alliance is the foundation upon which US National Security Policy in Europe was built during the Cold War (1947 – 1989), and remains so today. Its primary objective was to contain the Soviet threat and halt communist expansion. When the Soviet Union collapsed, at the end of the Cold War in 1989, profound changes occurred in Europe, which have radically altered the security environment of the NATO alliance. The client states of the former Soviet Union have regained their independence while the Warsaw Pact has been dismantled; ideologically, few former Warsaw Pact members have demonstrated hostility towards the west.⁷ The winds of change could be in the air, as NATO, in May 1999 pursues its Air War against the former Yugoslavia and the Russian economy continues to spiral out of control.

With the collapse of the USSR and the disintegration of Warsaw Pact, the NATO alliance embarked on a program of enlargement designed to prevent a reemergence of communism and to ensure closer relations with former Warsaw Pact members. In November 1991, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) adopted a new strategic concept for peace, crises and war. This security policy is based on dialogue, cooperation, maintaining a collective defense capability and creating the procedures and mechanisms to manage a crisis.⁸ The absence of a viable military threat has removed the need for large standing military forces, which has been replaced by a renewed effort to become involved in out-of-area operations. These out-of-area operations have taken on a significant importance in light of the Bosnia-Herzegovina intervention and the NATO air war in Kosovo. As the threat to the stability of Europe emerges from outside its territorial control, new mechanisms must be established to halt the destabilizing influences that could erupt into

armed conflict. This realization is what has forced the NATO members to reassess their aims and objectives.

NATO and US National Security Strategy

The United States is the world's only remaining superpower and as the leading member of NATO the US remains committed to ensuring that stability is maintained in Europe.

The National Security Strategy for A New Century (NSS), published in October of 1998, identifies the importance of the NATO alliance and details the US-led Partnership for Peace initiative, which focuses on engagement but implies enlargement. It specifically states that:

“This strategy encompasses a wide range of initiatives; expanded military alliances like NATO, its Partnership for Peace, and its partnerships with Russia and Ukraine;”⁹

The US strategic approach clearly remains one of engagement, and the US has outlined its program to accomplish this through implementation of priorities that “foster regional efforts led by democratic nations to promote peace and prosperity in key regions of the world.” The examples cited include NATO enlargement, the addition of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, as well as the Partnership for Peace and the NATO-Russian Permanent Joint Council.¹⁰ As the US and NATO embrace the former Warsaw Pact nations and make overtures in the Baltic States and Caucasus pressure mounts for NATO to continue its enlargement.

The post-cold war environment has focused US strategy on three national objectives: enhancing US security, bolstering economic prosperity and promoting democracy abroad.¹¹ These objectives are key components of the framework document outlining the goals of the PFP. The NSS identifies that the consolidation of democratic principles and

economic market reforms in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) is fostering those objectives.

The current National Military Strategy makes a major assumption in its analysis of US capabilities; that is, that the US has the capability to respond to a multitude of crisis across the full spectrum of conflict and operations other than war. The current strategy supports flexible and selective engagement as the best policy to handle the uncertain and ambiguous world situation at the dawn of the twenty-first century.¹² The 1998 National Security Strategy states:

“European stability is vital to our own security. The United States has two strategic goals in Europe. The first is to build a Europe that is truly integrated, democratic, prosperous and at peace. The second is to work with our allies and partners across the Atlantic to meet the global challenges no nation can meet alone.”¹³

The recognition of the important role the NATO alliance plays in the overall security of Europe reinforces the importance of PfP; it also implies the possibility of inclusion into NATO by PfP members. The NSS addresses specifically the value of PfP by stating:

“The Partnership for Peace provides an ideal venue for such relationships. It formalizes relations, provides a mechanism for mutual beneficial interaction and establishes a sound basis for combined action should that be desired. For all these reasons, Partnership for Peace (PfP) will remain a central and permanent part of the European security architecture.”¹⁴

The United States and Europe have a direct interest in fostering closer economic ties because more than 60% of total US investment overseas is in Europe. Additionally, there are fourteen million workers on both sides of the Atlantic that earn their livelihoods from transatlantic trade.¹⁵ These economic implications have added pressure, on both the US and European policy makers, to ensure stability and economic growth continue.

NATO's Search for Continued Relevance

NATO's transformation was abrupt; there was little advance notice of the impending collapse of the Soviet Union. The NATO framework document, The Alliance's Strategic Concept, published in 1991, laid down the foundation for the future development of European security. There are a multitude of organizations and committees, which have been established over time to unite Europe in the hope that closer social, political and economic ties would diminish the chances of conflict. So long as the threat of the Soviet Union was present Europe stayed united under NATO. However, once the common threat of the USSR was gone NATO became splintered and special interest groups began to pursue separate agendas. The European community does not have an organization that has the capability to replace NATO's military structure. It recognized this when it stated:

“Other European institutions such as the EC, WEU and CSCE have roles to play, in accordance with their respective responsibilities and purposes, in these fields. The creation of a European identity in security and defense will underline the preparedness of the Europeans to take a greater share of responsibility for their security and will help to reinforce transatlantic solidarity.”¹⁶

This statement reflects the belief that Europeans must share a larger portion of the burden for ensuring stability in Europe which will enhance US commitment. The unanswered question is without US leadership: Who will lead the European coalition? The most potent passage in the 1991 document identifies the new strategic environment as one in which the entire alliance will benefit from:

“The development of a European security identity and defense role, reflected in the strengthening of the European pillar within the Alliance, will not only serve the interests of the European states but also reinforce the integrity and effectiveness of the Alliance as a whole.”¹⁷

The NATO alliance serves a number of important political roles, in addition to being the primary security force for the defense of Europe. Although other security organizations have developed, most notably the WEU, only NATO retains a potent military organization with the degree of interoperability and structure to act decisively.

The focus of European security began to shift from a focus within NATO territories to out-of-area involvement in 1991. NATO realized that a destabilizing force outside of its territorial boundaries could disturb the balance of power. This has taken center stage. There is also a belief that only NATO under US leadership has the ability to lead NATO in out-of-area operations. The potential for instability within the former Soviet satellite states has focused NATO policy. When the Balkans erupted into ethnic civil war and UN organizations struggled with controlling the chaos, only NATO under US leadership appeared capable of intervening. NATO after 45 years, is structured and organized for operations in situations such areas as Bosnia. The current members believe strongly that to remain relevant NATO, with UN political support, must take an increased military role in enforcing stability throughout Europe.

As NATO moves into the millenium with three new members and faces the realities of the current European environment, it must devise ways to engage all its neighbors in a collective security arrangement. Partnership for Peace has an important role to play in transitioning the former Soviet satellite nations into democratic institutions.

In her book The Origins of Flexible Response, Jane Stromseths, stated the obvious when she wrote:

“NATO is not a homogeneous entity in which one clear articulated strategy has self-evident value for all. In devising a strategy, leaders cannot simply assign tasks to the various component parts according to a ‘rational’ division of labor. On the contrary, any

strategy in an alliance like NATO will represent a political compromise and will entail some degree of ambiguity. It must be ambiguous enough to allow for interpretation in line with the sometimes divergent strategic priorities and domestic constraints of the various member states, but precise enough to ensure effective coordination of alliance defense policy in crisis.”¹⁸

Partnership for Peace provides the bridge between the old alliance members and those newly formed democratic nations still establishing democratic traditions. This monograph is limited in its scope and will focus on primarily NATO’s stated goals and objectives in the new European security environment. It will identify the purpose and aim of the Partnership for Peace and compare these goals against the current and planned NATO and the Partnership for Peace Exercise Program. It will answer the question: Is the Partnership for Peace initiative accomplishing NATO’s intended objectives?

II. NATO's Dilemma: Objectives and Realities of the 1990's.

“NATO is the cornerstone on which our security has rested for fifty years”¹⁹

President Clinton in an address to the nation 24 March 1999

The absence of a viable threat has forced NATO, a security organization, to rethink its purpose and objectives. NATO's enlargement has taken on new importance, as the debate over which former Soviet client states should be admitted to the European alliance has raged. Additionally, NATO has the challenge of ensuring that the new Russia does not view as a threat to her sovereignty. This has taken on greater importance as Russia observes NATO carrying out air attacks against Yugoslavia. Throughout NATO's transition it has remained a political organization with a military purpose. With its active military peacekeeping operations (IFOR and SFOR) in Bosnia and the NATO attacks into Yugoslavia, it has redefined its purpose for being.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, NATO struggled to clarify its new role and identify a strategic purpose. The sixteen member nations understood the need for change, and in 1991 announced:

“At their meeting in London in July 1990, NATO's Heads of State and Government agreed on the need to transform the Atlantic Alliance to reflect the new, more promising, era in Europe.”²⁰

NATO's 1991 change in strategic direction was not the first time a major revision of its strategy had been undertaken. In 1967 the alliance adopted a strategy of flexible response²¹ in answer to the overwhelming Soviet buildup of conventional forces. In 1990 when NATO policy makers realized conditions had changed in Europe, they acted in a deliberate

and direct manner to establish a clear purpose for the alliance. NATO adjusted to this environment, wasting little time before the publication of The Strategic Alliance in 1991.

A Changed European Security Environment

Change is not new to NATO, and over the course of its 50-year history NATO has demonstrated a great degree of adaptability both in policy and structure. The adaptability of NATO was demonstrated during the 1960s when the alliance shifted from a military strategy of nuclear deterrence to a strategy of Flexible Response. NATO's strategy originally focused on preventing Soviet expansion but in 1991 it adapted a policy of engagement, to ensure European stability, and this has become first and foremost the political objective of NATO.²²

With the publication of The Strategic Alliance, NATO redefined its role within the context of European security. NATO expanded its area of influence as it quickly filled the vacuum left by the former Soviet Union. By engaging the Newly Independent States (NIS), Baltic States and Central European nations economically and politically NATO established a relationship beneficial to all. NATO was quick to conclude a separate agreement with the Ukraine and established military ties with Russia through Partnership for Peace (PfP) initiatives.²³

NATO, over a 50-year period, has developed procedures and a high degree of interoperability, which has allowed its members to operate within a close military relationship. This interoperability was validated by the 1999 air attacks on Yugoslavia. During the Cold War the sixteen members of NATO, often for the good of the alliance, put aside specific individual differences and internal priorities. With the demise of the Soviet sphere of influence, there was a rush by the former Soviet client states to gain NATO

acceptance by establishing closer relationships in order to benefit from economic assistance. The economic benefits of members within the European Union are significant.

The challenge of preserving NATO's core mission requirement of defending the territorial sovereignty of member states no longer requires the massing of forces along the border with the Warsaw Pact nations. It became apparent that the threats to European security would come from instability outside of NATO member territory, not from within.²⁴ This new circumstance required NATO to look for a new approach to circumvent the instability that ensued in the wake of the Soviet collapse.

The major components of the new NATO Strategic Concept include a reduced reliance on nuclear weapons; creation of smaller, more mobile and flexible forces that can react to multifaceted challenges, and planning for operations outside of the NATO area. Additionally, there is a desire among members to station fewer troops outside of their homelands.²⁵

NATO's Engagement and Enlargement

The core mission of NATO remains unchanged; it is a collective defense arrangement, but its organization, capabilities, structures and command relationships have been adapted in order to allow it to address the new European security environment. The organization has been downsized, reorganized, refitted, and repositioned for a completely different type of alliance.²⁶

Since 1991 when the new Strategic Alliance NATO members identified the need for engagement and enlargement, there have formed three distinct political blocks, each with their own theories in regards to the geo-strategic direction NATO should take. These positions are a reflection of the national objectives and beliefs of these members.

The Atlanticists led by the US along with the Netherlands, Canada, Denmark, Norway, Turkey, Portugal and the United Kingdom believe that NATO must remain the preeminent European alliance. These nations have worked to prevent the emergence of a European security organization that would marginalize NATO. A primary concern of NATO has been the encroachment of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), through the Western European Union (WEU), on NATO's defense relationships. Additionally, the Atlanticists would like to see increased ties with Eastern Europe and NATO involvement in peacekeeping operations.²⁷ This group supports NATO involvement in out-of-area operations.

The US strongly supported this position when Ambassador to NATO William Taft stated:

“It is for the Europeans ... to articulate and develop institutions through which European security identity will be manifest. ... They will have our strong support – in so far as NATO remains the principal venue for consultation and the forum for decision making on policies affecting the security and defense commitments of its members under the North Atlantic Treaty.”²⁸

The second block is the Europeanist; backed strongly by France and supported by Spain and Belgium, they want to limit NATO's involvement in the military aspects of European security and strengthen other multilateral security institutions. This group wants to preserve NATO but have promoted a greater defense role for the CSCE and the EC/WEU in addition to limiting both NATO involvement in Eastern Europe as well as expanding NATO's peacekeeping role.²⁹ There is a perception that France would prefer the US role was limited in European affairs.

The third consortium is the Euro-Atlanticists; led by Germany with Italy and Greece in

supporting roles their priorities focus on the expansion of NATO. They believe that by expanding the functions of both NATO and Europe's other organizations that they can meet the challenges of Europe. This group has attempted to find compromise between the Atlanticists and Europeans. Although not strong enough to mediate, they have offered compromises by promoting NATO, WEU and CSCE in solving European security issues.³⁰

"On a broad political level, NATO military strategy is shaped not only by the political objectives of the allied states but it is also a vehicle through which the members seek to influence one another and protect their own interests."³¹

European Organizations: A Study in Duplication

There are a number of organizations in Europe whose purpose and goals overlap with NATO. These organizations have far reaching economic, political and security implications in Europe. The Western Union was established in 1948 when the UK, France and the Benelux states felt threatened by Soviet expansion and formed an alliance. The Western Union was replaced in 1949 by NATO and in 1954 it became the Western European Union (WEU). This organization, WEU, did not mature or develop but languished in the shadow of NATO until in 1987 when it was reactivated as the European Union's defense component.³²

In 1957 the EC was established, the original members included Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. In 1973 Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom joined, followed by Greece in 1981 and Spain and Portugal in 1986. The European Union was founded by the EC in 1993 with Austria, Finland and Sweden joining in 1995. The European Union (EU) which forms the core of the European Security and Defense Identity (EDSI) was an outcome of the European Community's (EC) desire to

establish a security organization. The value of membership in the EU is realized through the economic benefits it provides to members in reduced trade and tariff restrictions.

Three pillars forged the EU: the Community pillar, the Treaties of Paris and The Treaty of Rome, these were combined in 1986, into the Single European Act. With this the cooperation among nations crossed lines of inter-governmental, criminal law, and home affairs. Its broad mandate includes the opportunity for central and eastern European nations to join the EU.³³ Not all EU members are in NATO (Austria, Finland, Ireland and Sweden) and there are eight NATO members not in the EU.

In December 1991 the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) was established at the Treaty on European Union, the EC member states established a new role for the WEU. It set up the WEU as the interface between the EU and NATO for the development of a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI).³⁴ This had far-reaching implications for the NATO alliance and in particular for US involvement in European affairs.

Although this organization was not initially well received by the US, who considered it an internal European organization, the US endorsed ESDI at the 1994 NATO summit. In 1996 at the Berlin ministerial meeting, the WEU was given permission to use NATO assets when conducting military operations.³⁵

The purpose of WEU is to provide an identity to European security and defense efforts, perform military operations, shape the European security environment and defend Europe.

Article V of the WEU Treaty stipulates that:

“All military and other aid and assistance in their power will be provided to any allies that are the object of an armed attack in Europe.”³⁶

The WEU does not maintain a standing army, air force or navy. The WEU Council

has the authority to call on member nations to provide force packages as necessary. The value of the WEU is that it demonstrates Europe's willingness to become militarily involved in European security issues rather than rely on the US and NATO. There are 28 member nations in the WEU and four different types of status: Member Status, Associate Members, Observers and Associate Partners (added in 1994). The purpose of Associate Partners is to engage the Central and Eastern European countries of Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Slovakia, all of whom are signatories to the Europe Agreement with the European Union.³⁷

Europe has attempted since the end of the Cold War to form organizations that demonstrate the willingness of European nations to take a larger role in the defense of Europe. The WEU as the defense arm of the EU represents the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. Some duplication can be found in WEU and NATO security strategies but in general they operate in concert with each other. The deputy SACEUR by serving as a liaison with the EU assists in facilitating ESDI and NATO cooperation.³⁸

The Partnership Between NATO and Russia

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, NATO has realized that to ensure peace in Europe it must establish a constructive and cooperative relationship with Russia. This is in the best interest of all OSCE states; the NACC formed the declaration that NATO and Russia would pursue a broad enhanced dialogue of cooperation.³⁹ In sections of the agreement, both commit to act in accordance with norms of international behavior as reflected in the UN charter. The Permanent Joint Council (PJC) was developed to establish a formal venue for consensus building between the Alliance and Russia.⁴⁰ NATO fully realizes that Russia must be engaged in an atmosphere of equality and transparency.

NATO's Future: Partnership for Peace

The PfP initiative, in addition to providing economic benefits to the former Soviet Union client states, does provide NATO members with access to resources in the former Soviet sphere of influence. Immediately after the Soviet collapse, a scramble ensued to gain a slice of the resources in both the Caucasus and Central Asia. The US State Department identified that as many as 178 billion barrels of energy reserves are in the Caspian Sea, which is second only to the Persian Gulf.⁴¹

NATO, through its involvement in oil exploration in the Caucasus and Central Asia (except Tajikistan), has the ability to promote and influence civilian control of the military and enable operations with NATO peacekeeping and humanitarian missions.⁴²

NATO's credibility has been challenged by Serbia; the air attacks against Yugoslavia have placed the prestige and commitment of the 50-year-old alliance on the line. There can be little doubt that Partnership for Peace members are monitoring this military action and will draw conclusions as to NATO's resolve and competence.

As stated in the book, The Origins of Flexible Response, the nations comprising Europe must select an alternative to NATO because Europe must develop a comprehensive engagement plan that does not isolate or disadvantage new members. The current ambiguity within NATO allows each member state to identify its own internal objectives and pursue those with the intention of being offered NATO membership.

III. NATO's New Direction: Partnership for Peace

“NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) program opened up huge opportunities for cooperation between the Alliance and non-NATO countries in Europe, far exceeding initial hopes. By strengthening PfP significantly, the Alliance now aims to engage partners fully at the military level while giving them greater say in the direction of the partnership.”⁴³

Ambassador Sergio Balanzino, Deputy Secretary General of NATO

The organization and functions of the Partnership for Peace initiative are designed as a method to engage those nations that were aligned with the former Soviet Union. The primary purpose is to ensure that these fledgling democracies develop with the democratic values fundamental to western democracies and establish traditions that enhance stability and security in Europe.

NATO Expansion and Partnership for Peace

In December 1991, the NATO alliance underwent a strategic transformation. The Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation formalized “consultation and cooperation on political and security issues with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) with the intention of strengthening the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)”.⁴⁴ The purpose was to engage the newly democratized nations of the CEE and establish a forum for engaging in security cooperation. The Partnership for Peace (PfP) is the first major initiative by NATO, introduced by the US at the January 1994 Brussels Summit, designed specifically to enhance the stability and security of Europe through military exchanges and training conducted with the former Warsaw Pact countries.⁴⁵

The former Warsaw Pact and Soviet satellite nations of Eastern and Central Europe and the Trans-caucas region created a new dynamic in the search for political stability in

Europe. The economic turmoil, as well as the destabilizing impact of ethnic and religious conflict, created an environment that had the potential to threaten European growth. In January 1994 the members of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) and other member countries of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) were invited to join the Partnership for Peace initiative.⁴⁶

The PfP is a clearly identifiable element within the flexible framework of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), which has replaced the NACC and has its own distinct elements and procedures. PfP was based on establishing a bilateral relationship between each member nation and NATO; all members of PfP are also members of EAPC.⁴⁷

There are 44 members in the EAPC and all 16 NATO countries are included. With the successes of PfP and NACC, the allied and Cooperation Partner Foreign Ministers inaugurated the EAPC at the 1997 Sintra, Portugal meeting. The purpose was to “raise political and military cooperation among countries to a qualitatively new level. The shared principles and values set out in the Framework Document of PfP and the EAPC as the successor to NACC provides overarching framework for political and security-related consultations and for enhanced cooperation under PfP.”⁴⁸

There are three areas identified for consultation and cooperation: the first is economic issues and this covers a broad area including budgets, restructuring defense spending and security within economic areas. The second is on Information matters and focuses on cooperative information activities, cultural relations, seminars and conferences. Lastly, in the area of scientific and environmental issues, the focus is on disarmament technologies, science and technology policy, and computer networking.⁴⁹

In each of the committees and councils NATO members have the ability to establish closer relationships and indirectly influence the partner nations.

PfP Membership/Criteria: 1994 Brussels Summit

The critical role that PfP plays is in its direct relationship with the evolutionary process for gaining membership to NATO. To join PfP a nation must sign the Framework

Document on which the principles of PfP are founded. The nations commit to:

- Preservation of democratic societies and maintenance of the principles of international law
- Fulfilling in good faith the obligations of the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights
- Refraining from the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state
- Respect existing borders
- Settle disputes by peaceful means

Additionally, all invitees reaffirm their commitment to the Helsinki Final Act and all subsequent CSCE/OSCE documents and to honoring all obligations in the field of disarmament and arms control.⁵⁰

Once the Partnership nations sign the Framework Document, they identify their specific goals and objectives for joining PfP. This document identifies the specific areas of cooperation, the signatories wish to participate in, as well as the assets the Partner nation intends to make available for Partnership purposes.⁵¹ The implication is clear: the greater the participation, the better the chance of being offered membership in NATO.

In January 1994, the states participating in the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) and other members of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) opened its arms to twenty-eight nations. The member nations of the PfP are:

Albania, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldavia, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan.⁵²

The current PfP members, including the newest members of NATO (Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic) are all past Soviet client states. The exceptions are Austria, Finland, Sweden, and Switzerland. PfP membership has obvious value both in terms of economic as well as political consequence. The aims of the Partnership for Peace program and its overarching objectives have been identified as:

- Strengthening the political consultation element in PfP, taking into account EAPC and related outreach activities
- Developing a more operational role for the PfP
- Providing for greater involvement of Partners in PfP decision making and planning⁵³

The aim of strengthening the consultative process supports the basic foundations upon which the NATO alliance is based. The requirement of developing a more operational role for PfP members supports their inclusion in peacekeeping as well as humanitarian operations. With their inclusion in the decision making process, NATO has the ability to influence their core values. All three aims support the overall objectives of NATO, which are centered on maintaining a stable and secure Europe.

The goals of PfP as identified in the Framework Document, in January 1994, stipulated the PfP objectives would be to:⁵⁴

- Facilitate transparency in national defense planning and budgeting process;
- Ensuring democratic control of defense forces;
- Maintaining the capability and readiness (of PfP members) to contribute to operations under the authority of the UN and/or the responsibility OSCE;
- Develop cooperative military relations with NATO, for the purpose of joint planning, training and exercises in order to strengthen the ability of PfP participants to undertake missions in the field of peacekeeping, search and rescue, humanitarian operations, and others as may subsequently be agreed;
- Developing over the longer term, forces that are better able to operate with those of the members of the North Atlantic Alliance.

PfP Organizations and Functions

The basic working body in the field of PfP is the Political Military Steering Committee (PMSC) which meets in various configurations at the Alliance level or as the Alliance with Partners. The primary function of PMSC is to advise the Council with respect to PfP and the overall Partnership Work Program (PWP) it also develops political-military guidelines for use by NATO military authorities. The military cooperation within PfP are developed by the NATO Military Authorities on the basis of guidance proposed by the PMSC, and agreed to by the Council.⁵⁵ Military cooperation is at the heart of establishing trust and fostering an atmosphere that is conducive to the development of stable democratic institutions.

In 1995 the Planning and Review Process (PARP) was introduced into the PfP process. Its function is to advance interoperability and increase transparency among Allies and Partners. The PARP is modeled on the defense planning cycle of the NATO alliance and is based on a triennial planning cycle. PARP is voluntary and only 18 of the 28 members participate.⁵⁶

One of the primary goals of PfP is to enhance the role of Partner nations in the operational aspect of Peacekeeping operations. This assists the NATO nations in balancing the costs of out-of-area operations and increases UN commitment for NATO-led initiatives. A key statement in the Framework Document stipulates that:

“Active participation in the Partnership for Peace will play an important role in the evolutionary process of including new members in NATO.”⁵⁷

This statement clearly implies that by participating in the PfP, a member nation enhances its ability to be accepted as a permanent member in NATO and thus shares in the

economic benefits of alliance membership. This allure holds the key to many of the under-developed and economically struggling new democracies. The requirement to have established military forces capable of working with NATO places a burden on the economic back of some of the struggling nations. Within the EAPC Basic document nineteen areas are identified for cooperation.⁵⁸

Air Defense related matters (ADF)	Exercises and related training activities (EX)
Airspace Management/Control (ASM)	Medical Services (MED)
Crisis Management (CRM)	Military Infrastructure (MIF)
Democratic Control of Forces and Defense Structures (DCF)	Conceptual planning and operational aspects of peacekeeping (PKG)
Defense Planning and Budgeting (DPB)	Operational material and administrative aspects of standardization (STD)
Defense Policy and Strategy (DPS)	Language training (LNG)
Consultation, Command and Control, including Communications and Information Systems, Interoperability and terminology (C3)	Meteorological support (MET)
Planning, organization and management of national defense procurement programs and international cooperation (DPM)	Military exercises and related training (TEX)
Planning, organization and management of national defense research and technology (DRT)	Military education training and doctrine (TRD)
	Military geography (GEO)

These areas of cooperation are designed to enhance the democratic values supported by the member states of NATO and to deter the Partner nations from utilizing military force as a means for settling differences. Additionally, these areas are focused on enhancing PfP member defensive capabilities and interoperability with NATO under civilian control. In focusing on these specific areas PfP members provide NATO with a possible resource in the pursuit of Peacekeeping and Humanitarian missions. The burden sharing and cost implications of NATO out-of-area operations are not lost on NATO members and they welcome participation by PfP members.

The States Partnership for Peace Program: The Beginning

The State Partnership Program (SPP) is an integral part of the overall US strategy of engagement in Europe. Through engagement at the State level the US is exposing the Newly Independent States, Baltic States, and Central European nations to a system that

accepts democratic values, capitalistic ideals and humanitarian beliefs. Its "objective is to allow non-NATO countries participation in a shared environment of regional and international military, political, and economic activities."⁵⁹

The National Guard is the lead agent for the SPP; the program began with Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania and sought to align National Guard partners with former Warsaw Pact members. The program must have the support of the US ambassador and in-country team; the Department of Defense has established a Joint Contact Team (JCT) Program to manage it. In keeping with the PfP program the liaison teams work with host countries and US embassies to identify activities that support the member nation objectives. Each plan specifically identifies what the host nation desires to achieve and how the activity will assist in supporting democratic reforms and enhance the achievement of US strategic objectives.⁶⁰

The JCTs in each country provide a linkage into PfP activities and provide guidance to assist in moving the partner country closer to candidate status within NATO. A critical role of the SPP is to provide assistance so that each country can develop its military capabilities to the highest degree of interoperability with NATO.⁶¹

From a historical context SPP is the forerunner of the Partnership for Peace. In early 1992 Latvia asked, "for assistance in establishing a national military based on the National Guard model of the citizen soldier. With the approval of the CJCS, the National Guard Bureau Chief grabbed the opportunity. Michigan became the first state to be involved which led the US into the establishment of the Partnership for Peace initiative two years later."⁶²

The SPP relationship provides a mentor for the partner nations. They can observe and

interact with a democracy at a lower, more local level. This program provides significant value towards achieving the goals and objectives originally established for the PFP initiative. Currently the alignment of National Guard States with European Participants is on a regional basis in Europe and Central Asia.⁶³

<p><u>BALTIC STATES</u></p> <p>Estonia – Maryland Latvia – Michigan Lithuania – Pennsylvania</p> <p><u>BALKANS</u></p> <p>Albania – South Carolina New Jersey Bulgaria – Tennessee Croatia – Minnesota FYROM – Vermont Moldova – North Carolina Romania – Alabama Slovenia – Colorado Bosnia –Herzegovina – none Serbia – none Montenegro – none</p> <p><u>THE CAUCASUS</u></p> <p>Republic of Georgia - Georgia</p>

<p><u>CENTRAL EUROPE</u></p> <p>Czech Republic – Texas Nebraska Hungary – Ohio Poland – Illinois Slovakia - Indiana</p> <p><u>CENTRAL ASIA</u></p> <p>Kazakhstan – Arizona Uzbekistan – Louisiana Kyrgystan – Montana Turkmenistan – Nevada Russia – none Tajikistan – none Azerbaijan – none Armenia – none</p> <p><u>OLD RUSSIA</u></p> <p>Belarus – Utah Ukraine – California Kansas</p>

The SPP has developed objectives similar to those of the PFP to ensure US Strategic intentions are met, they are.⁶⁴

- Demonstrate military subordination to civilian authority.
- Demonstrate military support to civilian authorities.
- Assist in the development of democratic institutions.
- Foster open market economies to help bring stability.
- Project and represent US humanitarian values.

The Partnership for Peace and the State Partnership Program work in concert toward the objectives of establishing democratic institutions in Central Europe, the Baltic States,

the Caucasus, and with changing the traditions of the former Warsaw Pact nations. The National Strategy of Engagement is relying on these initiatives to establish a framework of democratic ideals and traditions. It is through the military partnerships established in PfP that these new nations will learn to embrace the fundamental beliefs concerning individual rights and democratic values.

Europe has since the end of World War II created a plethora of seemingly redundant security organizations. These have overlapping responsibilities and different membership requirements, however NATO has remained the premier security organization within Europe. The most significant achievement of NATO since the end of the cold war is providing role models for the development of democratic institutions within PfP member nations. The goals and purpose of NATO's new strategic alliance are both straightforward and designed to facilitate interoperability with PfP members. This design provides the scope for eventual full membership in the NATO alliance. With an understanding of how and why the Partnership for Peace was established this monograph will develop measurements of effectiveness and evaluate the success of the PfP initiative since 1994.

IV. The Value of Partnership for Peace

“ The United States has vital security interests in the evolution of Russia, Ukraine and other Newly Independent States into a democratic market economies, peacefully and prosperously integrated into the world community”.⁶⁵

A National Security Strategy For A New Century, October 1998

The true value of Partnership for Peace will be measured against the objectives that were established by NATO and the dollar costs associated with the PfP initiative. The assessment will analyze the cooperative series of exercises identified on the Partnership for Peace Information System PIMS.

NATO identifies the series of exercises in which PfP participation is solicited, as the Cooperative Series of exercises, these are open to all NATO and PfP member nations. These exercises are sponsored and funded by NATO and adhere to the objectives set out in the PfP framework document. Each NATO member can invite a PfP nation to participate in bilateral exercises but these are by invitation only and paid for by the hosting nation. This monograph will evaluate the PfP exercise program (Cooperative Series) and compare the exercise objectives with the purpose and goals set out in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council's basic document. Two evaluations have been undertaken, first a review has been conducted as to the command level of participation for each training exercise. This provides the basis for an assessment as to whether the overall objectives could have the desired affects. The second evaluation is designed to review the training objectives of the Cooperative Series of exercises between 1996 through 2000. This assessment will be used to determine whether the majority of exercises match those identified in the Areas of

Cooperation outlined in the framework document. Finally, a selective review of costs was conducted to determine the dollar amount spent in support of NATO and its enlargement, as well as, the cost implications for participation in PfP by the US. The Government Accounting Office (GAO) provides Congress with annual reports on the estimated costs of NATO Enlargement of which Partnership for Peace is considered a subset. The US provided in 1997 over 88 million dollars, more than all the other NATO nations combined, and has provided well over 60% of defense expenditures throughout the 1990s.⁶⁶ This has enormous implications in terms of the US directing NATO policy and efforts and the perceptions it carries with European members.

Partnership Exercises

The Partnership for Peace Information Management System (PIMS) is a Department of Defense (DOD) information system that provides connectivity between members and NATO as well as a central information source for exchanging information about Partnership for Peace activities. It catalogues annual exercises and provides detailed information about the participants, such as dates of exercises, objective, duration and location of the exercises⁶⁷. This network is designed to enhance the bilateral cooperation and is a collaborative database; PIMS is not a NATO system but supports the US and NATO goals of enhancing the PfP program.⁶⁸

Each NATO and Partner country identifies the exercises they feel best provide the greatest benefit for their costs. Each nation establishes its own series of exercise objectives designed to meet their individual national military strategy. These bilateral, Spirit Exercises are paid for by the host nation and they can invite whom they wish.⁶⁹ The objective of all PfP exercises must meet the criteria established in the PfP framework

document. Not all exercises that NATO participates in are classified as PfP exercises. Some are also considered SPIRIT exercises; these are funded, hosted and designed by a specific nation and are conducted in the spirit of PfP⁷⁰. As addressed in Chapter III the military cooperation between NATO and its partner countries has expanded since the inception of PfP in 1994. All Central Asian, Balkan, East European and Caucasus nations have participated in some type of PfP activity.

In keeping with the overarching goals of NATO these exercises were designed to promote civilian control of the military forces and focus on joint operations with NATO along Peacekeeping and Humanitarian lines. As stated in the PfP document these exercises are designed:

“...to improve practical military cooperation and common capabilities in areas on which PfP focuses and help develop interoperability between forces of NATO allies and partner countries.”⁷¹

As part of US National Military Strategy, the US Army in Europe plays a major role in PfP. In 1997, USAREUR participated in 15 exercises in 11 different countries as part of PfP. These exercises focused on humanitarian, peacekeeping and search and rescue operations. Some required Army National Guard/Reserve Component (ARNG/RC) and CONUS based organization participation.⁷² In 1998, USAREUR PfP exercises consisted of 10 exercises in 10 different countries. These also included participation by ARNG/RC units and personnel.

PfP and the Exercise Program with NATO

The participation in PfP exercises has increased at a remarkable rate. In the first year, 1994, no exercises took place. In 1995 there were only 6 exercises classified under

Partnership for Peace. In 1997, according to PIMS, 22 exercises were classified as PfP and opened to all members. In 1998 another 22 were classified as PfP. In 1997 there was involvement by the local troops of East European nations, the first since World War II. As the exercises have increased in complexity from platoon level through brigade and higher, the degree of interoperability and understanding has grown.⁷³ The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council basic document identified nineteen Areas for Cooperation:

Air Defense related matters (ADF)
 Airspace Management/Control (ASM)
 Crisis Management (CRM)
 Democratic Control of Forces and Defense Structures (DCF)
 Defense Planning and Budgeting (DPB)
 Defense Policy and Strategy (DPS)
 Consultation, Command and Control, including
 Communications and Information Systems, Interoperability
 and terminology (C3)
 Planning, organization and management of national defense
 procurement programs and international cooperation (DPM)
 Planning, organization and management of national defense
 research and technology (DRT)

Exercises and related training activities (EX)
 Medical Services (MED)
 Military Infrastructure (MIF)
 Conceptual planning and operational aspects
 of peacekeeping (PKG)
 Operational material and administrative
 aspects of standardization (STD)
 Language training (LNG)
 Meteorological support (MET)
 Military exercises and related training (TEX)
 Military education training and doctrine (TRD)
 Military geography (GEO)

An analysis of the Cooperative Series training exercises, occurring between 1996 and 1999 and those planned in the year 2000, provide the basis for evaluation into how NATO members are attempting to achieve the objectives set out in the framework document.

The first analysis will be directed to the level of command, at which the Cooperative Series of exercises was directed. This provides insight into the level of command, within a military organization, that the training was designed to influence. For purposes of this monograph the three levels of command that exercises were categorized into are: company, platoon, and individual training, directed at basic individual and collective skills. The second is conducted at brigade/battalion level, and geared toward complex and multi-echelon collective tasks. Finally, at the division and higher level the primary focus is on

staff procedures and the decision making processes which includes the strategic and operational levels. The importance in identifying the level of the exercise is that it provides a guide into how the PffP initiative is attempting to influence the core values of the partner countries. Some exercises clearly have a dual purpose and these multi-level exercises will have benefits across all echelons of command.

In 1996 there were twenty-four exercises identified on the PIMS network. An evaluation of the exercises shows that the largest proportion of these were conducted above divisional level. In 1997 there was a shift toward small unit platoon/company level exercises and in 1998 the focus moved again, this time toward battalion and brigade level. The data is captured in Chart 1 and provides valuable insights in that it points to a directed approach towards initially (1996) influencing higher level staffs. The benefit of this approach is enabling partner nations to familiarize themselves with NATO processes and procedures. This level would highlight the subordinate relationship in NATO between military and civilian authority. By focusing training at the highest levels, NATO established a foundation for future training and removed suspicion and anxiety that might accompany an initiative such as PffP. As the focus shifted in 1997 to individual basic skills and platoon/company echelons of collective training, interoperability at the lowest level was emphasized. The battalion and brigade level focus taken in 1998 probably created the most challenges. Leaders at this level would be dealing with complex issues, decision making processes and organizational structures that do not easily adapt to change.

The evaluation of 1999 exercises identifies a shift towards division and higher level. This refocuses PffP exercises at the strategic and operational level, this should provide NATO an assessment of the progress that has been made over the course of the last four

years. In 2000 the distribution of exercises appears evenly split at division and higher and brigade and battalion level which would infer a more balanced approach.

		Ind/Plt/Co	Bde/BN	Div & Higher
1996	24 Ex	4	8	12
1997	22 Ex	10	7	5
1998	22 Ex	4	10	8
1999*	22 Ex	2	5	7
2000*	11 Ex	1	5	4

CHART 1: Command levels for PFP Exercises from 1996 through 2000.

An assessment of the Areas of Cooperation most often identified for training provides insights into what NATO believed were important for the development of PFP. In 1999 and 2000 not all specified command levels could be identified for each exercise. Many of the exercises contained multiple training objectives. In each exercise there are both multi-echelon, complex collective and individual tasks. Based on information in the PIMS network, the majority of exercises can be divided into eleven areas. These are the areas where the analysis focuses on training during the period 1996 through 2000; although not all-inclusive, this analysis provides a baseline for assessment of which areas of cooperation received the most attention.

These areas roughly correspond to the Areas of Cooperation but during some exercises more than one area was trained on. These collective exercises have some combat training tasks embedded in them but PFP exercises are not permitted by the framework document to focus on combat related skills.

The analysis took into consideration the following eleven collective training tasks:

Peacekeeping/Peace support Operations (PKO/PSO)
Humanitarian Operations (HUM)
Operational Standardization (Staff training and interoperability) (Staff Training)
Search and Rescue (SAR)
Crisis management (CRM)
Exercise and related training activities (EX)
Medical Service related (MED)
Command, control, communications and intelligence (C3I)
NATO Procedures and Interoperability Training (NATO)
Maritime/Air Operations including Logistics (Maritime)

An example of an exercise that included multiple areas of cooperation was Coop Nugget 98. The description identified it as a "Practice of combined PK (peacekeeping) and Humanitarian relief tactics, techniques and communications procedures at the company and platoon levels."⁷⁴ This exercise was further identified as conducted at brigade and battalion level. As Chart 2 indicates, it would be counted towards both peacekeeping and humanitarian training objectives for FY 1998.

The objective of Chart 2 is to identify, to the extent possible, which areas of cooperation the exercises covered. From 1996 through the scheduled exercises in 2000 Peacekeeping and Peace support operations are included in more than 50% of the focused training exercises. There are clearly residual benefits from these exercises including staff training and improved interoperability, C3I and residual outcomes from PKO and PSO operations. In each PIMS prototype database record a detailed explanation is provided.

Chart 2 lists the eleven areas of training used to identify and contrast with the areas of cooperation listed in the EAPC document. These areas were classified based on the descriptions of the exercises provided on the PIMS network.

YEAR # Exercises	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
	24	22	22	22	11
PKO/PSO	8	10	8	8	7
HUM	7	6	3	2	0
STAFF TNG	5	2	3	3	1
SAR	2	3	2	3	1
CRM	0	0	0	1	0
EX	1	1	0	1	0
MED	0	1	2	0	0
C3I	3	2	2	3	0
NATO OPN	1	2	2	3	1
MARITIME	3	3	5	5	1
AIR	0	2	5	2	0

CHART 2: Focused PfP training areas of cooperation from 1996 through 2000.

The training since 1996 has clearly been focused on peacekeeping, peace support and humanitarian operations. These are aligned with the objectives set down in the PfP framework document.

Costs of Enlargement: PfP

Defense expenditures have not significantly decreased since the end of the Cold War. Using expenditures from NATO's 1998 Spring Review and looking at five year increments in Chart 3:⁷⁵

<u>\$ In Millions</u>	1980	1985	1990	1997
NATO EUROPE	111,981	92,218	186,189	184,753
NATO USA/CA	143,141	265,731	317,717	280,817
Totals	255,122	357,949	503,906	465,570
% Change		+28%	+30%	-8%

CHART 3: Defense Expenditures of NATO.

These costs reflect a growth in expenditures. As force structures have decreased, the

peace dividend that was anticipated has not been fully realized. In FY 1997 the US contributed approximately \$470 million directly to NATO to support its three commonly funded budgets, the NATO Security Investment Program (NSIP), the military budget and the civil budget. This is in addition to over \$120 million dollars programmed in 1997 for the Warsaw Initiative activities in the three candidate countries of Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic and for PfP exercises.⁷⁶ These funds were designed to assist the nations in achieving the standards required for full NATO membership.

NATO's \$26.2 million PfP program expenditure is providing PfP nations the ability to modernize their forces and begin to improve interoperability with NATO. But this is occurring along only very narrow areas. The US Government and Accounting Office has tracked the dollars that are being used for symposiums, training, and other bilateral activities. These US bilateral assistance efforts are designed to compliment NATO's PfP program. Of the \$308 million dollars identified for PfP from FY 1995 through 1997 46% (\$143) of these funds were provided to six members Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia and 60% of those funds were for non-lethal military hardware.⁷⁷ This apportionment of dollars points to those countries being seriously considered for full NATO membership. The assistance is needed to insure these nations are compatible with NATO forces.

What is important about PfP expenditures is that the majority of the money provided to partner nations is for non-lethal purchases. This supports the civil infrastructure as well as providing upgrades to PfP member issues. The GAO identified in its report the largest single US effort has been a \$32.8 million Regional Air Space Initiative, these funds support one of the areas of cooperation, air traffic control which NATO perceives as vital⁷⁸.

Summary

To evaluate the Partnership for Peace initiative three measures of effectiveness have been analyzed. First, the PfP Exercise Program, was evaluated an assessment was made as to the command level that each exercise was designed to train. This provided analysis on how the exercises were meeting the PfP objectives. focused at the correct level in order to achieve the desired affect. The actual exercises were categorized to evaluate which areas of cooperation were receiving the most emphasis. Lastly, expenditures were reviewed to identify where the dollars were being spent. The areas where the monies were being spent focused on modernizing forces and developing infrastructure.

Based on that review the Partnership for Peace initiative is training on those specific areas of cooperation identified in the Framework Document. The interoperability of PfP members with NATO is receiving the greatest attention in the areas of peacekeeping, peace support and humanitarian efforts. By focusing training on these areas the NATO members can realize benefits in crisis management operations. Tracking expenditures provides two insights. First, it validates that the expenditures and purchases made with NATO PfP funds are in line with meeting each area of cooperation. Lastly, it identifies those is receiving the largest proportion of funds. The largest portions of the 1997-1998 monies were provided to the three nominated members to NATO Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic.

An analysis of the PfP Cooperative Series of exercises provides insights into the focus of this NATO initiative that allows for comparison to the overriding goals of the program. The fact that almost all exercises support the purpose and objectives as outlined in the framework document is an important component in assessing the value of the program. The shortfalls appear to be in the distribution or monies. The value of enhancing the

interoperability of NATO in order to provide a more secure and stable NATO supports both the US national strategic objectives as well as NATO's objectives.

V. Conclusion and Recommendations.

“ As we approach the beginning of the 21st century, the United States remains the worlds most powerful force for peace, prosperity and the universal values of democracy and freedom”⁷⁹.

President William J. Clinton, October 1998

In conclusion, the NATO and US led involvement in the Partnership for Peace initiative is providing the alliance a cost effective of means of influencing the behavior of PfP member states. The value of PfP rests in the development of carefully selected areas for cooperation, the transparency of the relationship and its purpose in enforcing democratic principles and humanitarian values. The costs of participation and the impact on NATO readiness are inconsequential compared to the benefit achieved through influencing the PfP member states, almost all of whom do not have a history or tradition of supporting democratic principles and human rights.

The NATO Alliance, by embarking on the dramatic new strategic approach in 1991, has enhanced democratic values and developed an atmosphere of cooperation with former Warsaw Pact countries. The use of training exercises as a means of influencing the leadership of the former Warsaw Pact nations has great value. The Partnership for Peace initiative, although only four years old, has achieved a degree of success rarely achieved by such a large organization that only eight years earlier had been comprised of deadly adversaries. This is reflected in the nature and importance both NATO and the Partner nations have placed on the PfP engagements. PfP has expended significant resources to achieve a stable environment and provide prospects for a better

economic future through NATO membership.

At the end of the Cold War it was important for the NATO Alliance to redefine its purpose and goals. NATO, with US leadership, fully realized the importance of maintaining influence with these fledgling new democracies in central and eastern Europe by politically engaging them. The question of whether the Partnership for Peace initiative is the right vehicle to achieve this has been answered in the affirmative. The PfP initiative provides the most effective means to achieve the goal of regional stability and to help influence the maturation process of the new democracies.

The long-term implication however, remains unanswered, and at the heart of this issue is whether participation in PfP will lead to inclusion into the NATO alliance. Whether PfP alone can achieve inclusion into NATO remains to be demonstrated. PfP can drive enlargement, but that brings a multitude of new challenges both for the member states and for NATO itself.⁸⁰ Critics have supported the goals of stabilizing Europe and enhancing the new democracies but argue that NATO might then become a collective security arrangement and not a true defense alliance.

Finally, the role of the Russia in a new Europe has not been well defined particularly in light of the Air War in Yugoslavia. Whether or not NATO wants, it must ensure that Russia does not believe NATO expansion is threatening her sovereignty. Russia still retains both the ability to provide a strong conventional force and the systems to direct a nuclear threat against NATO, while retaining the capability to deliver on it. NATO must continue to develop a dialogue with Russia and reassure her of its peaceful intentions. NATO's conduct in Yugoslavia does not reinforce this belief. The NATO alliance has done much to clarify its new role in Europe and to embrace the formerly aligned Warsaw

Pact nations. However, the actions in Yugoslavia highlight Russia's current impotence but raise the stakes on NATO's outcome. While the implications of NATO involvement in internal disputes of nations clearly signifies a commitment to act, the issue is whether the multinational alliance has the fortitude to see it through to the stated objective.

Alliances and collective security arrangements have two separate endstates. The reinvention of NATO as an effective collective security arrangement will require a disintegration of some military functions and a restructuring along a more inclusive political membership.⁸¹

Whatever the direction NATO enlargement eventually takes, it will be linked to the type of security organization that develops. Clearly, if NATO is viewed as losing in Yugoslavia, its ability to conduct future out-of-area operations will be questioned. Its ability to coerce, intervene, or retaliate will be challenged and appear less credible in the future.

Recommendations

Obviously, there are some conceptual shortcomings that require resolution if the PfP initiative is to retain its momentum. First, the PfP must insure that there is not a revitalization of the nationalistic defense structures that existed in Europe before the end of the Cold War. This must be tempered with a steady expansion eastward that integrates central and east European states into the collective security system but without threatening Russia. Without this outlet valve these countries could nationalize their defense structures to a greater degree than NATO would like and may require greater transparency than NATO prefers.⁸²

Secondly, NATO must identify how it will combine the PfP efforts into practical

cooperation. This requires a balance between the collective defense requirements identified in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty with the integrated aspects of collective security outlined in the PfP missions. According to some authors "Resolution of this conceptual gap between Articles 4 and 5 will require NATO to make difficult decisions about its relationship with the east ... before it leads to crisis."⁸³

Thirdly, it will take time for the weaknesses of the Partner states to manifest themselves within the PfP. Yet, the real challenges to security in this region are not external threats but rather instability brought on due to bad economies, lack of understanding of capitalistic principles and market systems, and ethnic and religious tensions. These are the challenges facing the PfP. This has been brought home by the conflict in Yugoslavia and although NATO cohesion has remained so far, whether PfP members will hold the course is the unknown issue.

Another key issue is that "military modernization and an integrated European security system are meaningless unless economic restructuring to market economies and creation of democratic political institutions are successful."⁸⁴ Clearly the collective security aspects must be in synch with a holistic approach to the problems of the central and eastern European nations. Lastly, the requirement for the PfP nations to pay their own way may place extreme hardships on them. These burdens could have secondary consequences that will have a detrimental affect to their development into financially independent nations. A thorough review must be conducted that will look at this aspect.⁸⁵

Partnership for Peace is providing NATO a process to influence the former Warsaw pact members. The central European and Baltic States believe that joining the NATO alliance will provide significant political and economic benefits. PfP members desire

membership in the alliance for the perceived stability and economic benefits it brings. The linkage between NATO membership and the European Union are obvious, the EU brings significant economic benefits through reduced trade barriers. Most of the members in PfP are struggling to establish a solid base of democracy while creating stable economic conditions within their country.

The most momentous long-term goal of PfP is the subordination of the military to the democratically elected civilian authorities. These newly formed democracies will benefit by the close association with NATO countries both through observing a NATO role model and participating in symposiums and training exercises designed to emphasize the functions and responsibilities of the military towards elected government.

NATO for its part desires a stable Europe, this brings economic prosperity through the creation of new markets which enhances growth. NATO however, is in the midst of a struggle for its relevance, if it does not persevere in the contest over Kosovo it will have its value as a collective security organization significantly diminished. Future threats to NATO members will in all likelihood not come from threats to their sovereign territory but from out-of-sector instability. PfP is an initiative that exploits NATO's reputation as the premier security alliance in the world and presents itself as the collective security organization of choice.

ENDNOTES

¹ NATO Review, Publisher Peter Daniel – NATO Spring 1998. Statement by NATO Secretary General On Course for a NATO of 19 Nations in 1999' NATO Publishing Services, Brussels. p. 5.

² Basic Fact Sheet, Number 12, "What is NATO?" Dated June 1997, NATO Office of Information and Press.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Summit Madrid 8-9 July 1997, Press Info release "What is NATO?" The additions of Poland, Hungary and Czech republic were not reflected they officially joined March 1999.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ The Alliance's Strategic Concept, NATO's Office of Information and Press, Belgium 1991, p. 6.

⁷ Ibid., p. 3.

⁸ NATO – The Evolution, 1991, <http://centraleurope.com/ceo/nato/natopeace.html>; The European Internet Network (7Jan 199)

⁹ A National Security Strategy for a New Century, The White House, October 1998, pg. iii.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 2.

¹¹ Ibid., p. 6.

¹² Groves, John R., PfP and the State Partnership Program: Fostering Engagement and Progress, Parameters, US Army War College, Carlisle, Pa. Spring 1999, p. 43.

¹³ Ibid., p. 37.

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 38.

¹⁵ The Alliance's Strategic Concept, NATO Office of Information and Press, Brussels Belgium 1991, p. 40.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 6.

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 3.

-
- ¹⁸ Stromseth, Jane, The Origins of Flexible Response, St Martins Press, NY New York, July 1988, p. 8.
- ¹⁹ President Clinton, television address on 24 March 1999, addressing the reasons for US involvement in the air attacks on Yugoslavia.
- ²⁰ The Alliance's Strategic Concept, NATO Office of Information and Press, Brussels Belgium 1991, p.3
- ²¹ NATO Strategy in the 1990's – Reaping the Peace Dividend or the Whirlwind?, William Johnsen, US Army War College SSI; May 1995 p. 1.
- ²² Stromseth, Jane, The Origins of Flexible Response, St Martins Press, N.Y. New York, Jul 1988, p. 5.
- ²³ NATO's Expanding Presence in the Caucasus and Central Asia, Rachel Bronson; NATO After Enlargement, Ed. Stephen Blank, US Army War College, SSI. Sept 1998, p. 220.
- ²⁴ NATO Enlargement: Building a New Security System in Europe, Walter Slocomb, CSIS, Oct 1995, p. 26.
- ²⁵ Testimony, Before the Committee on Appropriations, US Senate. NATO Enlargement GAO/T-NSIAD 98-50 p. 4.
- ²⁶ Pilosio, Giuseppe, Evolution of NATO and Development of a New European Security System. The Future of Europe and US Relations. USAWC, Carlisle Pa. April 1998 p. 7.
- ²⁷ NATO After the Cold War: State behavior in a changing world order, Weitz, Richard, Harvard University, UMI Publications, MI. 1993, p. 63.
- ²⁸ Ibid., p. 64.
- ²⁹ Ibid., p. 128.
- ³⁰ Ibid., p. 110.
- ³¹ Stromseth, Jane, The Origins of Flexible Response, St Martins Press, NY New York, Jul 1988, p. 8.
- ³² Pilosio, Giuseppe, Evolution of NATO and Development of a New European Security System. The Future of Europe and US Relations. USAWC, Carlisle Pa. April 1998 p. 24.
- ³³ Basic Fact Sheet, The European Security and Defense Identity, Information Paper No. 3, March 1996.
- ³⁴ Ibid., p. 24.
- ³⁵ Ibid., p. 25.

³⁶ Ibid., p. 29.

³⁷ Ibid., p. 28.

³⁸ Ibid., p. 34.

³⁹ Basic Fact Sheet, *The Partnership Between NATO and Russia*, Information Paper No. 20, July 1997.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ NATO's Expanding Presence in the Caucasus and Central Asia, Rachel Bronson; NATO After Enlargement, Ed. Stephen Blank, US Army War College, SSI. Sept 1998, p. 230.

⁴² Ibid., p. 235.

⁴³ NATO Review, Publisher Chris Prebensen – NATO July-August 1997. Statement by NATO Heads of State as Madrid Declaration on Euro-Atlantic Security and Cooperation on 8 July 1997' NATO Publishing Services, Brussels. p. 10.

⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 10.

⁴⁵ NATO Review "On Summit Madrid 8-9 July 1997, Press Info release The PfP Program. Also used as a source: NATO – The Evolution, The European Internet Network, 7Jan 99.

⁴⁶ Basic Fact Sheet, Number 9, July 1997, The Enhanced Partnership for Peace Program; NATO Office of Information and Press, Brussels Belgium.

⁴⁷ Ibid. The EAPC was inaugurated on 30 May 1997 as the overarching framework for political and security-related consultations for enhanced cooperation under PfP. It replaces NACC.

⁴⁸ Basic Fact Sheet, The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, Information Paper No. 19, July 1997.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Basic Fact Sheet, Number 9, July 1997, The Enhanced Partnership for Peace Program; NATO Office of Information and Press, Brussels Belgium. pg. 2.

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² Ibid., note Turkey recognizes the Republic of Macedonia by its constitutional name.

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ NATO Review "On Summit Madrid 8-9 July 1997, Press Info release The Enhanced PfP Program.

⁵⁵ Basic Fact Sheet, Number 9, July 1997, The Enhanced Partnership for Peace Program; NATO Office of Information and Press, Brussels Belgium p. 3.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ Course for a NATO of 19 nations in 1999" Documentation PfP Areas of Cooperation Sect IV p. D9.

⁵⁹ Groves, John R., PfP and the State Partnership Program: Fostering Engagement and Progress, Parameters, US Army War College, Carlisle, Pa. Spring 1999, p. 45.

⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 46.

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Ibid., p. 45.

⁶³ Ibid., figure depicts that in the article however it is broken out in greater detail in the Monograph.

⁶⁴ Ibid., p. 48.

⁶⁵ A National Security Strategy for a New Century, The White House, October 1998, p. 39.

⁶⁶ NATO Review Spring 1998 Defense Expenditures of NATO Countries p. D14.

⁶⁷ A review of the FY 2000 Exercise on the PIMS prototype Database record provides greater specificity about each exercise. The author, to derive both the command level the exercise was directed towards and the Area of Cooperation that best fit that exercise analyzed these documents.

⁶⁸ Information pulled from the PIMS network; on 27 April 99.

⁶⁹ Information obtained through e-mail dialogue with SHAPE HQ's, Major Walt Lord served as the POC, he is involved with PfP activities.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ Blank, Stephen, NATO After Enlargement, SSI, US Army War College Carlisle Pa, p. 235-236.

⁷² Briefing by USAREUR HQ's on their participation in PfP for FY 1997 and FY 1998 given in March 1998; slides used in the briefing were source documents.

⁷³ Two sources used for this data; Stephen Blank NATO After Enlargement, and the Internet site <http://www.pims.org> which classified all PfP Exercises in the given year.

⁷⁴ Information pulled from the PIMS network; 27 April 99.

⁷⁵ NATO Review Spring 1998 Defense Expenditures of NATO Countries p. D14.

⁷⁶ Testimony, Before the Committee on Appropriations, US Senate. GAO/NSIAD 97-164 p. 1.

⁷⁷ Testimony, Before the Committee on Appropriations, US Senate. GAO/NSIAD 97-164, p. 4.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 11.

⁷⁹ NATO Review Spring 1998 Defense Expenditures of NATO Countries, p. iii.

⁸⁰ NATO's Role in European Stability, Ed. Stephen Cambone, Center for Strategic & International Studies, Wash. DC. An article NATO's Enlargement and US Public Opinion, Senator Richard Lugar Oct 1995, p. 65.

⁸¹ Hillen, John and Noonan, Michael, The Geopolitics of NATO Enlargement, Parameters US Army War College Vol XXVIII, Autumn 1998, p. 28.

⁸² Johnsen, William, NATO Strategy in the 1990's, SSI US Army War College, May 1995, p. 29.

⁸³ Johnsen, William and Young, Thomas-Durell, Partnership for Peace: Discerning Fact from Fiction, SSI US Army War College, August 1994, p. 9.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 10.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books

Carpenter, Ted Galen, BEYOND NATO: Staying Out of Europe's Wars, CATO Institute, Washington, D.C., Oct 1995.

Chernoff, Fred, AFTER BIPOLARITY: The Vanishing Threat, Theories of Cooperation and the Future of the Atlantic Alliance, Ann Arbor MI, The University of Michigan Press, 1995.

Coker, Christopher, editor, Shifting Into Neutral? Burdensharing in the Western Alliance in the 1990's, NY, New York USA, Brassey's 1990.

Haglund, David, editor, Will NATO Go East? Kingston, Ontario, Canada: Queen's University, 1996.

Kaplan, Lawrence NATO and the United States – The Enduring Alliance, Boston, MA. Twayne Publication, 1991.

Heller, Francis and Gillingham, John, editors; NATO: The Founding of the Atlantic Alliance and the Integration of Europe, NY, New York, St Martins Press, 1992.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization. NATO Handbook, Brussel's Belgium; The Office of Information and Press, NATO 1995.

Papacosma, Victor and Heïss, Mary, editors; NATO in the Post-Cold War Era: Does it have a Future? NY, New York, St. Martins Press, 1995.

Shea, Jamie, NATO 2000: A Political Agenda for a Political Alliance, London, great Britain, Brassey's (UK) Ltd., 1990.

Sherwood, Elizabeth Allies in Crisis: Meeting the Global Challenges to Western Security. New Haven, CT. Yale University Press, 1990.

Stuart, Douglas and Tow, William, editors; The Limits of the Alliance, Baltimore, MD. The John Hopkins University Press, 1990.

Treverton, Gregory, Making the Alliance Work: The United States and Western Europe, Ithaca, NY; Cornell university Press, 1985.

Stromseth, Jane E., The Origins of Flexible Response: NATO's Debate over Strategy in the 1960's, St Martin's Press, NY New York, July 1988.

Articles, Monographs and Presentations

Blank, Stephen, editor; NATO Enlargement and the Baltic States: What Can the Great Powers Do? Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle, PA. US Army War College, Nov. 1997.

Blank, Stephen, editor; NATO After the Enlargement: New Challenges, New Missions, New Forces. Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle, PA. US Army War College, Sep. 1998.

Cambone, Stephen, Will the US Senate Endorse NATO's Enlargement? NATO Review, Nov-Dec 1997.

Young, Thomas Durell and Johnsen, William. Partnership for Peace: Discerning Fact from Fiction. Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, Carlisle Pa. Aug 1998.

Young, Thomas Durell. Multinational Land Formations and NATO: Reforming Practices and Structures, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, Carlisle Pa. Dec. 1997.

Young, Thomas Durell. And Johnsen William Reforming NATO's Command and Operational Control Structures: Progress and Problems, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, Carlisle Pa. Apr. 1992.

Hillen, John and Noonan, Michael, NATO: Change and Continuity, The Geopolitics of NATO Enlargement, Parameters, US Army War College Quarterly, Vol. XXVIII, No. 3, Autumn 1998.

Gilmore, Mark, NATO Enlargement – An Evaluation of the Security Implications, Monograph SAMS, Ft. Leavenworth KS. AY 1997-98.

Irving, William, NATO Enlargement and the National Agendas of America, Great Britain, France and Germany. MMAS, Ft. Leavenworth, KS. 1997.

The Military Balance, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, and 1996, International Institute for Strategic Studies, Oxford Press, London.

Sens, Allen, NATO's Small Powers and Alliance Change After the Cold War, Kingston Ontario, Canada, Queen's University, 1993.

Sloan, Stanley, NATO's Future: Beyond Collective Defense, National Strategic Studies National Defense University, McNair Paper 46, Dec. 1997.

Weitz, Richard, NATO After the Cold War: State Behavior in a Changing World Order, Cambridge, MA., Harvard University, 1993.

Stuart, Douglas T., Can Europe Transcend Its European Borders? NATO Out-of-Area Disputes, Strategic Studies Institute U.S Army War College, February 1991.

Groves, John R., PfP and the State Partnership Program: Fostering Engagement and Progress, Parameters, US Army War College, Carlisle Pa. Spring 1999.

Official Publications

Strategic Assessment 1995 US Security Challenges in Transition, National Defense University, Institute for National Strategic Studies, US Government, US Government Printing Washington D.C., 1995.

Strategic Assessment 1996 Instruments of US Power, National Defense University, Institute for National Strategic Studies, US Government, US Government Printing Washington D.C., 1996.

National Military Strategy of the USA, US Department of Defense, Washington D.C., Feb 1995, Wash. DC 1995.

A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, US. Government Printing, Washington. DC Feb 1995.

National Military Strategy, Shape, Respond, Prepare Now: A Military Strategy For A New Era, US Department of Defense, Washington D.C. CJCS 1997.

A National Security Strategy For A New Century, US Department of Defense, Washington D.C. 1997.

Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review, US Department of Defense, Washington D.C. 1997.

Internet Sources

Partnership Information Management System (PIMS), <http://www.pims.org>; this site provides detail and current data on all ongoing activities. A password is required to access this site.