


THE ROLE OF ABRI IN THE POST-SUHARTO ERA



A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

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Strategy

by

TAN CHONG LEE, MAJ, FA
SINGAPORE ARMED FORCES
M.A. (Hons), University of Cambridge (UK), 1994

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
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
Approved by:

 _____, Thesis committee Chairman
John A. Reichley, M.B.A., M.S.J., M. Ed.

 _____, Member
Stuart D. Lyon, M.A.

 _____, Member, Consulting Faculty
LTC Benjamin H. Schleider, Ph.D.

Accepted this 4th day of June 1999 by:

 _____, Director, Graduate Degree Programs
Philip J. Brookes, Ph.D.

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ABSTRACT

THE ROLE OF ABRI IN THE POST-SUHARTO ERA by MAJ Tan Chong Lee,
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This thesis investigates the future role of the ABRI (Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia or Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia) in the post-Suharto era. It examines the factors which influence the sociopolitical role of the ABRI and postulates possible models for this role within the time frame of five to ten years from the end of Suharto's rule in Indonesia. Based on the change in the sociopolitical role, this thesis identifies the effects on other component roles of the ABRI including external defense, internal security, law enforcement, business involvement, and peacekeeping. It also highlights a roadmap linking observed events in Indonesia to the likely model which will be adopted by the ABRI in the future.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Indonesia is experiencing tumultuous changes socially, economically, and politically since the onslaught of the currency crisis in Asia in 1997. The most significant has been the change of political leadership with the resignation of President Suharto who had ruled the nation unchallenged for thirty-two years. As a result, the nation is entering a new era, which will likely see increased democratization and significant social reform. The ABRI (Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia or Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia), whose role has been intricately tied to the sociopolitical developments of Indonesia, since its independence in 1945, is under increasing pressure from the wave of democratization sweeping through the nation to redefine its *dwi fungsi*¹ (dual function) role.

Background of the Problem

Before his resignation, Suharto had governed Indonesia with a near authoritarian rule for thirty-two years. A former army general, he emerged to take charge after an alleged abortive coup against the country's first president, Sukarno, in 1965. Under his rule he took over an economic disaster and turned it into a miracle. Between 1970 and 1997, the economy of the nation grew, on average, by more than 6 percent² a year. Some seventy-six million people of a present population of two hundred million were lifted above the poverty line. Despite the economic success, his leadership was characterized by widespread nepotism and cronyism. His family members and close associates were often

awarded lush government contracts. As a result, his family members accumulated great wealth, which was a source of envy and dissatisfaction with those who were outside Suharto's exclusive circle of associates. His close associates included Chinese businessmen whose businesses thrived under his leadership. These Chinese entered a mutually beneficial partnership with members of his family, providing financial incentives often through corruption in exchange for protection and security. In addition, the hard-working nature and good business sense of the Chinese minority in general placed them at the upper rungs of the socioeconomic ladder. Ethnic Chinese made up only 4 percent of the population but were assessed to control more than 70 percent of the total wealth of the nation. This, together with the failure of Suharto's government to assimilate the small Chinese capitalist class into the indigenous society, led to simmering social tensions.

Suharto had skillfully balanced the powers of the major political groups against each other. He formulated laws which limited the number of opposing political parties by forced amalgamation of ideologically dissimilar groups. The PDI (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia or Indonesia Democratic Party), for instance, comprises nine Christian, nationalist, and socialist parties, while the PPP (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan or United Development Party) is a broad Islamic coalition party. By keeping these opposing political parties in check, Suharto perpetuated his own political power and the power of Golkar, the ruling political organization. Throughout this time, prodemocracy sentiments were brewing among the younger generation of Indonesians, particularly the students. Suharto had, however, instituted a strong authoritarian structure with the help of the military, his key instrument of power.

Through *dwi fungsi*, the armed forces were integrated into every facet of the society. They have been the key apparatus of nation building. The ABRI, which consists of the three services of Army, Air Force, and Navy, also encompasses the police. It has been the single institution with enough clout to quash any social unrest and insurgencies in a country which is the seventh largest in terms of size and fourth largest in terms of population in the world. It was also used to invade East Timor and seize it from Portugal's rule in 1975. Since then, military forces have been deployed to East Timor and in Aceh and Irian Jaya to suppress the insurgent elements there. Being an ex-military person and having used the military in his political ascension, Suharto was acutely aware of the potential threat posed by a powerful armed force, and had consciously kept its power in check.

The currency crises which struck Indonesia in June 1997 has created widespread economic hardship and fuelled the escalation of underlying social tension and power struggle. It diminished the absolute power of Suharto in the eyes of the nation when he had to concede to implementing tough economic reforms in order to receive aid from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). It also forced his resignation and was a catalyst that speeded up political changes in the country after massive demonstrations, riots, and violence which resulted in many shops and houses being looted and burned, and in many thousands being killed. In the aftermath of these riots in May 1998, it was uncovered that many ethnic Chinese were "systematically" raped.³ The ABRI is on one hand praised for its firm handling of the demonstration and in ending the riots, but on the other blamed for its failure to stop the atrocities against the ethnic Chinese.

Dr B. J. Habibie, previous vice-president under Suharto, took over as president. He has been widely perceived as a protégé to Suharto. In his bid to break away from the old mold and to convince the world of his commitment to political and economic reforms with the ultimate aim of securing further IMF aid, he has promised greater democracy and has since implemented some populist measures, such as the release of political prisoners, allowing the formation of new political parties and the withdrawal of troops from Aceh, Irian Jaya, and East Timor.

Against the backdrop of events described in the preceding paragraphs, it becomes evident that the ABRI will inevitably have to redefine its role amid the social, political, and economic reforms sweeping through the country. With the demise of Suharto's rule and the release of his firm grip, there is a possibility of the power of the ABRI being unleashed to be even stronger. There is also, on the other hand, wider expectation by the masses of a reduction in the sociopolitical influence of the ABRI.

ABRI in the New Order Era

In addition to its sociopolitical involvement, the ABRI's role in the New Order era⁴ had been influenced by Indonesia's perception of external threat and the demands from internal security. Indonesia, being the largest country in Southeast Asia in terms of both area and population and the seventh largest country in the world including its exclusive economic zone (EEZ), poses a significant challenge for its armed forces to defend effectively. It straddles the strategically important sea lanes between the Indian and Pacific Oceans, which link East Asia to the Indian subcontinent, Africa, Europe, and the oil-rich Middle East. The vast archipelago on one of the world's busiest maritime

crossroads serves to add to this challenge. Externally, although the threat of an invasion has been assessed to be low and remote, Indonesia does have some minor border disputes with neighboring countries.⁵ Although it does not lay claim to the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea, it nevertheless is wary of the spillover effects of any outbreak of instability in the region particularly involving China. When China seized the Mischief Reef in 1995, it also appeared to lay claim to the Natuna Islands situated within Indonesia's exclusive economic zone.⁶ Although the issue has not surfaced again in recent years, Indonesia nevertheless remains watchful of China's actions in the South China Sea and wary of an increasingly assertive China. Internally, the lingering threat of separatist insurgencies poses another security challenge to the country. The communist elements had largely been purged following the 1965 coup attempt, while major Islamic fundamentalist insurgencies were also overcome in the 1960s. However, the possibility of an Islamic fundamentalist insurgency, although remote, continues to haunt the ABRI. These factors together have been woven into the strategic context upon which Indonesia devises its defense policy and strategy.

Indonesia's defense strategy has been based on Sishankamrata (total people's defense and security system), while its military strategy, shaped by its threat assessments, has been based on a mix of conventional and guerrilla warfare. To be effective, both concepts of Sishankamrata and guerrilla warfare necessitate a close civil-military relationship. Although ABRI has been involved in domestic politics in varying degrees since the Revolution in 1945, its unique sociopolitical role was legally instituted in the 1982 Defense Act. This has since been a source of controversy, but the current structure⁷

of the ABRI reflects the effectiveness with which it has undertaken these military and sociopolitical responsibilities.

Effects of the Currency Crisis on the ABRI

Prior to the economic crisis, the ABRI was steadily implementing various force modernization programs. However, with the collapse of the country's purchasing power by more than 70 percent following the currency crisis, many of these programs have since been shelved or delayed. Within the ABRI, its leadership also senses the public resentment for its alleged misdeeds⁸ committed during the May 1998 riots and under the Suharto regime, and the growing impatience with its perceived inefficiency in handling investigations into these incidents. The mounting pressure on the ABRI from the public as well as political factions to reduce its sociopolitical role prompted its Armed Forces Chief, General Wiranto, to announce at the commemoration ceremony of the 53rd ABRI Anniversary plans to separate the Indonesian Police Force (Polri) from ABRI and to redefine its sociopolitical function.⁹ However, it remains to be seen how the ABRI will balance its own interest¹⁰ with the redefinition of its role.

Factors Influencing the Change

Various factors have been identified that will either precipitate a change in the role of ABRI or influence the form of this change. These factors include regional security outlook; internal security situation; social, political and economic forces; leadership; and the ABRI's own interest. A good understanding of these factors will evidently be necessary in foretelling the future role of the ABRI.

The Research Question

The primary research question the thesis will seek to answer is: What is the role of the ABRI in the post-Suharto era? The thesis will also address the following secondary questions:

1. What are the probable forms of government in the post-Suharto era?
2. What are the other factors (such as social forces, internal security situation and regional security outlook) which will drive the change in role of the ABRI?
3. What are the indicators of future change in the ABRI's role?
4. What are the implications of the new ABRI on the nation and the Southeast Asian region?

The political direction that will be followed by Indonesia is singled out from the rest of the factors affecting the future development of the ABRI, since it is the dominant factor that will shape and will be shaped by the other forces of change. The resignation of Suharto signals the start of impending political reforms, which had previously been subjects of much academic interest and speculation rapidly sweeping the nation. The first secondary question will be the most difficult one to answer simply because of the tremendous uncertainty surrounding the country at the moment. The economic, political, and social reforms implemented by Dr. Habibie, who only took over as the new president of Indonesia in May 1998, have yet to take deeper effects; and the wider implications of these measures have also yet to be fully realized. The third secondary question looks for significant events which will point toward changes in the ABRI's future role. The last secondary question does not serve as a lead to answer the primary question but is pertinent to the examination of important ramifications of the resulting role of the ABRI.

Assumptions

In conducting the research, the thesis will recognize that there are many uncertainties surrounding the situation in Indonesia which is undergoing rapid changes, many of which even dedicated political observers find hard to fathom or grapple with. It is necessary to assume for the period under study, as defined below, that there will be no other sharp discontinuities in the form of political leadership,¹¹ such as a reversal to a totalitarian leadership, and that a general trend of democratization is taking place in the country. The thesis will assume that there will not be a drastic change in the regional security situation for the period under study. Nevertheless, the thesis will also discuss the effects on the ABRI's future role if each of the two assumptions is found to be invalid.

Definitions

In order to ensure that the research will be meaningful and fruitful, the post-Suharto era is defined as the period of up to ten years from the end of Suharto's rule. The era can, of course, last beyond the defined period of ten years. The study, however, will also need to look beyond the current fluctuations to a period when the various reforms have had time to take root. The post-Suharto era is therefore defined as the period of between five to ten years from the end of Suharto's rule.

Limitations

A limitation that will be faced in conducting the research will be the lack of primary sources of information due to the lack of proximity and accessibility to these primary sources. The research will rely solely on secondary open sources instead. A

second limitation, which will be discussed in the subsequent sections on literature review, will be the lack of published work on the topic simply because the related issues are new and fast evolving.

Delimitation

Given the inherent limitation mentioned above, it will be necessary to state that the thesis will not attempt to take a deterministic approach to predicting the likely form of government that will emerge during the period under study. Rather, the research will hope to discern from the works of contemporary political scientists various possible forms of government, which can be used as bases for further discussion of the role of the ABRI. Furthermore, based on the literature survey, it is necessary to limit the scope of the research to the sociopolitical role of the ABRI. Although the thesis will discuss the broad directions of change in the role of the ABRI, the final analyses will focus on the impact of the various factors of influence on the ABRI's sociopolitical role. Nevertheless, the thesis will also discuss the effects of the future forms of government and changes to the sociopolitical role on the other component roles of the ABRI.

Significance of the Study

There is as yet no authoritative or established published work on a topic concerning the future role of the Armed Forces of Indonesia. Most of the on-going work will be expected to focus on the political or economic future of the country. This thesis will complement the efforts to fill this gap and attempt to bring about a better understanding of the future ABRI.

¹Meaning dual function. This is instituted in the constitution providing for a sociopolitical function for the armed forces in addition to its traditional military function.

²Simon Long, "Suharto's End-Game: A Survey of Indonesia," *The Economist*, 26 July 1997, 46-64.

³From initial reports, an estimated one hundred and fifty Chinese women were raped. There is evidence to suggest that these atrocities were organized crimes and investigation into these crimes is on-going.

⁴This now generally refers to Suharto's rule from 1965 to 1998.

⁵Indonesia has territorial disputes with Malaysia over the Sipadan and Ligitan Islands and the Kalimantan border. It also has disputes with the Philippines and Vietnam over maritime boundaries in the Celebes Sea and Natunas Islands respectively.

⁶See for example, Prasun Sengupta's article "Profile of the Armed Forces of Indonesia," in *Asian Defence Journal* (September 1997): 6-16.

⁷Ibid.

⁸These allegations include the shooting of four student demonstrators from Trisakti University and the abduction of student leaders during the May 98 riots, as well as violence and atrocities committed against the people of Aceh and East Timor under the Suharto regime.

⁹See article by Bambang Sujatmoko and Khoiri Akhmadi, "Harvesting Storm, of Wind Sowed in the Past," in *GATRA* (Jakarta), 10 October 1998; available from http://gatra.com/_english/IV/47/lpt1-47.html; Internet; accessed 13 October 1998.

¹⁰See for example, Lowry's discussion on "ABRI Business" in *The Armed Forces of Indonesia* (St. Leonards, New South Wales: Allen & Unwin, 1996), 135-146.

¹¹However, a general election and a presidential election have been scheduled in June and November 1999 respectively given that the legitimacy of Dr Habibie's takeover is questioned by some sectors.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

It's very difficult to make predictions, especially about the future.

Anonymous

A survey of the literary work reveals two major challenges in undertaking the research and attempting to draw conclusions about the future role of the ABRI. First, any thesis which attempts to make predictions of the future may either quickly become irrelevant with the passing of time or run the risk of being proven grossly wrong as events unfold. This is especially so given the rapid flux of social, economic, and political changes currently facing Indonesia.¹ Second, there is actually very little literary work completed to date which solely examines the future role of the ABRI. Most of the work covering the role of the armed forces focuses on explaining the prevalent role of the ABRI and takes a historical rather than a predictive approach. Even in analyzing historical events, many scholars on Indonesia concede that it is at times hard to distinguish among facts, myths perpetuated by special interest groups, and government propaganda.² This is largely a result of the unique cultural and sociopolitical norms in Indonesia with regard to the flow, control, and interpretation of information.³

The challenges described above are not to prove the futility of undertaking the research on a topic concerning the future. Rather, they provide meaningful insights on the approach and methodology to be taken for the conduct of such research. They also forewarn the fallacy of taking a deterministic approach in predicting the future. Instead, they suggest that it will be more meaningful and useful to lay out in the thesis the broad

parameters of what the future role of the ABRI will look like.⁴ To increase the relevance of the subsequent findings and deductions for the thesis, the literature review places a strong emphasis on analyzing and interpreting current events and issues as these are reported in newspapers and journals as well as a great reliance on obtaining separate independent sources of information. At the same time, it also surveys past works to derive the historical basis for the thesis and related works to help determine the realms of possibilities for such a study. A survey of past works serves two purposes. It helps to trace the evolution of the ABRI's role, and highlights the forces at play which have a bearing on the analysis of the future role.

Survey of Past Works

On the evolving role of the military in Indonesian society,⁵ Harold Crouch is credited with writing the first book-length treatment of the army as a political force in Indonesia, placing special emphasis on the Sukarno years, the gradual takeover of power by the military, and the nature of Suharto's New Order government. He adopted an entirely historical approach in detailing the evolution of ABRI's role in the sociopolitical development of modern Indonesia. He asserted that the Indonesian army differed from other armies that had seized political power in that it had never regarded itself as an apolitical organization.⁶ It justified its involvement on the grounds of its ability to provide stability and leadership, and also on its historical contribution to the fight for freedom for the country and the defense of Pancasila,⁷ the state ideology. Carolina Hernandez similarly argued that the fight by the Indonesian military against the colonial regime

during the independence movement had conferred upon it a great deal of popular legitimacy and induced the general population to accept military intervention in politics.⁸ According to Crouch, the army as an institution had carefully plotted and brought about its own ascension to political power, legitimizing its actions with the Constitution and state doctrine. By the 1970s, the ABRI's social political role had become entrenched in its modus operandi. Crouch hinted that the ABRI's involvement in politics would be increasingly challenged in the future based on a rising sense of military professionalism among the new generation of "academy-trained" officers, and public dissatisfaction with the ABRI's unrestricted pursuit of commercial interests and repressive actions. Although Crouch did not dispute that significant changes would take place in the military, he maintained that military domination of the government is likely to continue for a long time in the future.⁹ The question was whether the time had come for the withdrawal of the military from political involvement.

Robert Lowry adopted a contemporary approach and examined the interaction of the ABRI with the society at large through the lenses of external defense, internal security, and regime maintenance.¹⁰ Lowry argued that while the ABRI had been a significant actor in domestic politics since Indonesia's independence in 1945, it had actually slipped from its former position at the apex of politics as Suharto increasingly asserted himself and entrenched himself at the pinnacle of power. Under Suharto, the ABRI had been relegated to a secondary, albeit still significant, role as the political prop of his regime. Lowry pointed out that while a better educated society would demand an adjustment in the political structure to include subordinating the ABRI to political

authority, the ABRI would be reluctant to step back from its political role if the reform meant only greater political power for the bureaucracy, which it generally held in disdain. He further pointed out the paradox that devolution away from military dominated authoritarian rule would win the ABRI's support if only it meant greater political power for society at large. This view was shared by Amir Santoso,¹¹ who asserted that the ABRI was not really antidemocracy as long as the idea did not conflict with Pancasila. Lowry also identified the need to improve the pay rates and working condition of members of the ABRI as a necessary condition before it would willingly withdraw to the barracks. Interestingly, he argued that the continued involvement of the ABRI in internal security and regime maintenance would only lead to a decline in its domestic legitimacy and rifts within it, which might be exploited by political groups. He correctly pointed out that drawing a clear line between the responsibilities of the executive government and those of the ABRI would remain to be of overriding importance in the post-Suharto era.

Michael Vatikiotis analyzed the intricate relationship of the ABRI with Suharto.¹² At various times in the past, there had been efforts by the ABRI to reexamine its dual function. Such efforts were typically stifled by Suharto. For instance, the "Seskoad Paper," written in 1977-78, took the view that politics was corrupting ABRI's spirit and therefore hampering its social function and defense of the Constitution. It recommended that the ABRI should be above the political groups. Suharto, however, disagreed with this political philosophy and urged the ABRI to align itself with groups that defended the Pancasila, and in particular demanded the ABRI's unwavering support for Golkar. The

"Seskoad Paper" and some of the people who backed it were quietly shelved following the election in 1982 during a reshuffle of the ABRI's leadership.

In the past, interpretation of the role was dependent on the personalities at the ABRI leadership. For instance, General L. B. Murdani, the ABRI commander in 1983 and a firm believer of ABRI's sociopolitical role, instituted a massive restructuring of the ABRI and strengthened the central control of territorial (provincial level) commanders (Kodams), making them directly answerable to Jakarta. More sociopolitical (sospol) officers were also assigned to the Kodam and Korem (sub-provincial) levels. General Feisal Tanjung, a subsequent ABRI Commander, however sensed the public sentiments and realized the growing challenge posed by the growing Indonesian middle class to the ABRI's sociopolitical role.¹³ He stated in 1994 that the ABRI needed to keep abreast of the pace and progress of development of the people's aspirations. As an illustration, foreign military officers at the Indonesian General Staff and Command College in 1994 were asked to evaluate *dwi fungsi* (dual function), and provide their opinion of its future. As in the past, there exist today among various factions contentious interpretations of the Constitution regarding the ABRI's involvement in domestic politics.

Any discussion on the military in Indonesia in literary works tended to focus on the *dwi-fungsi* nature of the ABRI. Indeed, the subject on the sociopolitical role of the ABRI usually invoked the most interest among authors on Indonesia. This is largely a result of the uniqueness and the existence of contentious interpretations of the Constitution with regard to such a role. A survey of past literary works also reveals the presence of the forces which had been pushing for a change in the ABRI's role. These

forces included rising professionalism in the officer corps which found the sociopolitical role of the ABRI increasingly incompatible with the professional function of the military; and pressure from the public as well as political groups. A force in the third dimension, which could play a part in pushing for the change, was the attempt by major donor countries to link foreign aid to the recipient country's pursuit of "good governance" and reduction of political influence of the military.¹⁴ On the other hand, there were also forces in the past which had resisted changes to the sociopolitical role. These included reluctance of the ABRI to surrender its political and economic powers that came with such a role; desire by political leadership to maintain the ABRI as its instrument of power; and altruistic views held by the ABRI of its role as a stabilizing force in the sociopolitical developments of the country. In addition, the military leadership itself also played a significant part in defining or redefining its role.

Survey of Contemporary Works

The economic crisis, the May 1997 riots, and the demise of Suharto's rule caught the world's attention and interest in Indonesia. There have been increased reports in the mass media, particularly in the regional media, on the situation in Indonesia.¹⁵ Analysis of the future social, political, and economic developments in the country is at times carried with these reports. A caveat to increased reporting is the reduced accuracy of these reports.¹⁶ In the past, the government had the authority to ban any local mass medium if its news or analysis had, according to the government, undermined the credibility of the government or threatened the stability of the country. In addition, most local sources of

information often prefer to be non-attributable to their views or the information they provide for fear of reprisals. Although the present Habibie administration appears to have relaxed some of these controls¹⁷ and to bend to the will of the population which demands greater press freedom,¹⁸ the old fear lingers. It is also plausible that some special interest groups will want to capitalize on the situation to spread speculations on certain issues for their own political gains. As a result, much of the accompanying analysis in reports is usually at best speculative in nature. While there appears to be no concerted effort by analysts to study the future role of the ABRI, many do mention inevitable changes to the ABRI as the side effects of these social, political, and economic developments.

A recurring theme in recent reports on the ABRI has been its involvement in domestic politics. Following the May 1997 riots, a fresh wave of student protests mounted in November 1998 with demands for Habibie to step down and for Suharto to be brought to trial for power abuses during his rule. Among these demands was also the call for the ABRI to return to the barracks. During the special session of the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) in November 1998, the ABRI's crackdown on the student protests resulted in a number of deaths¹⁹ and further incited public dissatisfaction with the ABRI. The event also prompted students, lecturers, some Islamic leaders, and the local media to launch a mounting campaign against the ABRI. In an unprecedented move, the ABRI took out advertisements in three major newspapers to express condolences for the fourteen people who died during the crackdown.²⁰ To date, the ABRI has announced plans to separate the police force from the ABRI and the abolishment of its key sociopolitical post and its replacement by the newly created post of Chief of Territorial

Affairs.²¹ These moves are intended to signal the ABRI's resolve to reexamine its role in society and in domestic politics although critics remain skeptical that such changes are more form than substance. Another debate is on the number of seats held by the ABRI in parliament. There have been mounting calls by students and political groups for the current number of seventy-five²² to be further reduced. Although it remains uncertain what the final forms of these changes will be, one point is clear: Maintaining status quo for the ABRI's role in society seems increasingly untenable.

Survey of Related Works

In contrast to the lack of published works on the role of the Indonesian military, there exists a wealth of written analysis on the transitions in the role of many other armed forces in the world, particularly of the countries in Latin America, Africa, and the former Soviet Bloc.²³ In addition, the subject concerning the effects of democratization on civil-military relations in a country is also well expounded. Most authors analyzed the transitions of civil-military relations that had taken place in a country and attempted to identify the causal factors and possible trends in these transitions. However, the importance of contextual considerations cannot be over emphasized when one attempts to apply these factors and trends to the study of another country, such as Indonesia, which entails an unique set of social, economic, and political considerations. For instance, the governments of most of these countries under study underwent transitions from military or communist rule to democratic rule, whereas in the case of Indonesia, one sees a possible transition from an authoritarian to a more democratic rule. Nevertheless, one can

still draw some parallels between Indonesia and these countries in analyzing military involvement in civilian affairs.

In his study on new democracies, Samuel Huntington asserted that future developments in civil-military relations would depend in large part on the actions of the emerging civilian leadership.²⁴ He foresaw the greatest problems in countries where democratic institutions and leaders proved incapable of promoting economic development and maintaining law and order. Civilian leadership would need to establish its legitimacy quickly through its performance in these areas.²⁵ Civilian politicians might also be tempted to use the military in their quest to further their own political ambitions. Michael Desch focused on the core question of military missions and how these affected civil-military relations.²⁶ Military missions could be distinguished according to whether the key tasks undertaken by the armed forces were external or internal, and whether they were primarily oriented to fighting interstate wars or extended to such domestic tasks as nation building, internal security, economic development, humanitarian relief, and social-welfare provision. Military missions in turn were determined in large part by the threat environment that a nation faced. In the absence of either a significant internal or external threat or in the absence of both, the prevailing ideas about national security embodied in a country's military doctrine also played a significant role in determining this mission. Carolina Hernandez pointed out that many Asian militaries (notably in Bangladesh, Pakistan, Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines) had penetrated domestic economies and gained access to lucrative positions in the public and private sectors.²⁷ They engaged in a variety of rent-seeking activities like natural resource extraction and cross-border

trade, and were heavily involved in corruption. Efforts to cut off this access would thus face stiff resistance from the military.

Although one should be careful about generalizing the influence on the devolution of the military away from civilian affairs, some common factors do emerge from the brief survey of studies on the role of the military in society. These include competency of civilian governments in promoting economic development and stability; use of the military by civilian leaders to further political goals; type of mission assigned to the military; role in national security as perceived by the military and access to lucrative public and private positions.

Conclusion

On the whole, it could be seen from the literature survey that there have been limited discussions on the future role of the ABRI. Although recent interest in the economic and political developments in Indonesia generates some discussions on the subject, any attempt at gaining conclusive insights is often wrought by questions on the reliability of the sources of information. This predicament has a bearing on the methodology to be adopted in the present research, which will seek to bridge the gap uncovered in the literature survey.

¹Guy Pauker commented in *The Role of the Military in Indonesia* (Ann Arbor, Michigan: University Microfilms International, 1979), 59-65, on the impossibility of drawing conclusion about the political role of the military given the uncertainty surrounding the political situation then.

²For instance, there exist today differing accounts of the events leading to and following the 1965 coup attempt, the overthrow of Sukarno, and Suharto's ascension to

power. The main contention concerns the roles played by the various parties or personalities. See for example, Harold Crouch's discussion of the 1965 coup attempt in *The Army and Politics in Indonesia* (London: Cornell University, 1978) or Peter Scott's article on "The United States and the Overthrow of Sukarno, 1965-1967" in *Pacific Affairs* 58 (summer 1985): 239-264.

³Under Suharto's rule, newspapers and journals had to obtain permits from the government for their operations. In the past, some newspapers and magazines were banned for not toeing the government line or for carrying articles which criticized the Suharto administration. Although the Habibie administration appears to relax these controls, many publishers remain cautious in their reports. Many publishing companies were also owned by influential political figures and this also raises doubts about the impartiality of their reports.

⁴Chapter three will further explain the methodology adopted in the research.

⁵The past works surveyed are defined, in the current context, as works published prior to the end of the Suharto era.

⁶Crouch, 24.

⁷See glossary for an explanation of Pancasila, Indonesia's state ideology.

⁸See Carolina Hernandez, "Controlling Asia's Armed Forces," in *Civil-Military Relations and Democracy*, ed. Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins University Press, 1996), 66-80.

⁹See Harold Crouch, "Indonesia," in *Military-Civilian Relations in South-East Asia*, ed. Zakaria Haji Ahmad and Harold Crouch (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1985), 50-76.

¹⁰Robert Lowry, *The Armed Forces of Indonesia* (St. Leonards, New South Wales: Allen & Unwin, 1996), xviii-xxiv.

¹¹See Amir Santoso, "Democratization: The Case of Indonesia's New Order," in *Democratization in Southeast and East Asia*, ed. Anek Laothamatas (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997), 21-43.

¹²Michael R. J. Vatikiotis, *Indonesia Politics under Suharto: Order, Development and Pressure for Change* (Routledge, 1993), 60-91.

¹³ Thomas E. Sidwell, *The Indonesia Military: Dwi fungsi and Territorial* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Foreign Military Office, 1995), 12.

¹⁴See Carolina Hernandez, "Controlling Asia's Armed Forces," in *Civil-Military Relations and Democracy*, ed. Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins University Press, 1996), 66-80.

¹⁵The contemporary works surveyed refer, in the current context, to the works published in the post-Suharto era.

¹⁶J. Soedjati Djiwandono, a political observer, lamented that the Indonesian press used to be so unreliable because it was too tightly controlled. But it may be equally unreliable now because it is free to publish almost anything that sells, and everybody can say anything and get away with it. See his article, "Indonesia' Facing a Leadership Crisis," in *The Straits Times* (Singapore), 27 October 1998.

¹⁷The DPR passed a new law on 22 October 1998 guaranteeing the freedom of speech and the right to demonstrate in public places, formally overturning the restrictions under the former Suharto regime. See Louise Williams' report, "Indonesia - Laws to Protect Freedom of Speech, Right to Protest," in *Sydney Morning Herald*, 22 October 1998.

¹⁸*Tempo*, Indonesia's current affairs magazine, was revived in early October 1998 after a four-year government ban. The magazine published an article in 1994 on the alleged row between the then Finance Minister Mar'ie Muhammad and Research and Technology Minister B. J. Habibie regarding the latter's decision to buy thirty-nine ships from the former East German Navy. See Derwin Pereira's report, "Keeping up the Tempo" in *The Straits Times* (Singapore), 20 October 1998.

¹⁹At least eleven people were reported to have died and more than two hundred injured from the clashes between student protesters and troops on 13 November 1998. See "Black Friday," *The Straits Times* (Singapore), 15 November 1998.

²⁰See Derwin Pereira's article, "ABRI Says 'Sorry' in Ads," in *The Straits Times* (Singapore), 19 November 98.

²¹See "Key Position in ABRI Scrapped in Line with Reform," *The Straits Times* (Singapore), 11 November 1998.

²²The ABRI used to hold one hundred uncontested seats out of the total of five hundred seats in DPR. This was reduced to seventy-five during the MPR session in 1997.

²³The related works surveyed refer to the published works on the role of the military in general.

²⁴See article by Samuel Huntington, "Reforming Civil-Military Relations," in *Civil-Military Relations and Democracy*, ed. Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins University Press, 1996), 3-11.

²⁵Samual P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman and London: University of Oklahoma Press, 1993), 258.

²⁶See Michael Desch, "Threat Environments and Military Missions," in *Civil-Military Relations and Democracy*, ed. Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins University Press, 1996), 12-29.

²⁷See Carolina Hernandez, "Controlling Asia's Armed Forces," in *Civil-Military Relations and Democracy*, ed. Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins University Press, 1996), 69-79.

CHAPTER THREE
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

If we knew what it was we were doing, it would not be called research,
would it?

Albert Einstein

The purpose of this chapter is threefold: It establishes the methodology to be adopted in the research, lays out the plan for carrying out the research, and highlights possible options¹ for change in the military's role in domestic politics for subsequent consideration.

Research Methodology

In essence, the research begins with problem identification and involves qualitative analyses of collected information to derive conclusions on the solution to the problem. Rigor in the analysis and interpretation of evidence is a key concern in the process. This is particularly so when faced with conflicting claims on what actually happened in relation to a certain event. Discretion has to be exercised when evidence is provided by groups with differing interests. It is crucial to discern the ulterior motives and associated attempts by the different groups to advance a certain cause. This concern is pertinent in the case of Indonesia, where the unique circumstances with regard to the flow and control of information described in the preceding chapter warrant such caution. The feasibility, acceptability, and suitability (FAS) test will generally be applied in

drawing conclusions from the collected information. Figure 1 illustrates the general approach adopted in the research.²




Figure 1. Research Methodology

Research Design

The key consideration in devising the research design is to be able to lay out in logical sequence the various steps of writing the thesis that supports the overall research effort. In the endeavor to answer the question on the future role of the ABRI, the research will focus on three main areas of data collection and analyses. The first area is on the evolving role of the ABRI in modern Indonesia.³ The research will trace the changes to the role of the ABRI from Sukarno's "Guided Democracy" era, Suharto's "New Order" era, and the post-Suharto era (up to the time of writing the thesis), and identify internal

factors, such as an increasing education level, rising military professionalism, and factionalism, that could have been instrumental in bringing about these changes.

Related to the first area is the second area of focus on the analyses of external causal factors, such as economic and sociopolitical factors, the internal security situation, and the regional security outlook. For Indonesia, each of these factors is undergoing changes with impetus from democratization, internal pressure (for instance, from students and political groups), and external pressure (for instance, from IMF), while being inhibited by desires of the ABRI to maintain social, economic, and political influence.

From analyses in these two areas, conclusions will be drawn on the impact of these factors on the future role of the ABRI. The main source of data collection will be published works in books and journals and reports in newspapers and periodicals. To limit the scope of the research, the thesis will refer to published works on the social, economic, and political future of Indonesia as well as the regional security outlook, and concentrate on the impact of these changes on the future role of the ABRI.

The final area of research will be on existing models on the roles of the armed forces of other countries. Because of the vast amount of literature related to the studies of the role of other armed forces, an early assessment is needed to limit the research to plausible models that may eventually be applied considering the context of the problem.

Finally, through synthesis of the above three areas of analysis, possible models on the role of the ABRI will be postulated. Each of these models will encompass qualitative assessments of the various changes to and ramifications on the internal and external missions of the ABRI in the future. The eventual objective is to be able to lay out a

spectrum of models in which the actual future form of the ABRI's role will be captured.

The research design is summarized in figure 2.




Figure 2. The Research Design. Note: The models depicted in the figure represent theoretically the full range of possibilities for the ABRI's future sociopolitical role.

Possible Models for Consideration

On a purely theoretical basis, there are four policy options⁴ for military regime leaders: retain power and restrict participation; retain power and expand participation; return power to civilians and restrict participation; or return power and expand

participation. The characteristics of the military regime that took over the government of Indonesia from Sukarno in 1965 had undergone significant transformation during Suharto's New Order era. Although the military had initially maintained its firm grip on the government, Suharto had moved quickly, after assuming power, to associate civilians of various types with the government so as to draw on the skills and experience of the civilians, and create an atmosphere of domestic legitimacy and a favorable image among Western aid donors. There was arguably a rapid transformation, at least in form, from the first option to the second option when the participation of civilians in government was expanded. However, true expansion of civilian participation was only observed in the later part of the New Order era when Suharto actively sought to co-opt the support of the Islamic groups in the country at the expense of eroding the influence of the military. As Suharto himself became a civilian after assuming power, it could also be argued whether there was actually a return of power to civilian control. While the government under Suharto could not be clearly classified under any of the four types of regime mentioned above, it nevertheless retained the trappings of a military regime for the most part of the New Order era. Finally, when Dr. Habibie, a civilian with no military background, took over the presidency from Suharto and allowed the formation of many more new political groups, it appeared that the government was heading toward the fourth option of a return to and expansion of civilian control. However, the above four options are generally too broad to be useful as models for examining the changes to the military's participation in politics.

A more refined set of options⁵--one that is more pertinent to the case of Indonesia and representative of the full range of possibilities for military versus civilian participation in politics--is next considered. These options are as follows:

Continued Veto Regime. A veto regime essentially represents a military dictatorship that is determined to retain power and restrict participation. Some analysts view Suharto's rule as a veto regime. This seems to be an appropriate description at least for the initial years of the New Order era.

Authoritarian Clientelism. This option seeks to retain power while at the same time expand participation by co-opting the newly emergent or strengthened middle classes into an increasingly corporate system of government. This option enables the present office holders to stay in power by granting political concessions to those forces which share a basic interest in maintaining the existing political and economic order.

Limited Handback. This option basically allows civilian politicians to take over the government. However, participation in competing for power will be restricted to political forces which have the explicit approval of the military.

Full Handback / Civilian Renewal. This option is a complete return to civilian rule and normally leads to the introduction of a fully democratic system. The military, in this case, completely devolves itself from domestic politics.

Impasse. This final option may be realized when none of the above four options are adopted, and the regime may end in impasse. Such a regime may be toppled in a coup or otherwise be forced into a "disorderly" retreat to the barracks.

Conclusion

In researching a subject on the future when there is currently much uncertainty surrounding the subject, the methodology adopted must ensure coherence, logic, and rigor in the argument and deduction presented in this thesis. However, in a chaotic situation where there is a complex interaction of many factors, the final outcome may defy each of these qualities which the methodology attempts to ensure. Therefore, instead of being fixated on a particular outcome, this thesis will postulate a range of possible outcome for the future role of the ABRI. At the same time, this thesis will strive to narrow the range of possibilities so meaningful conclusions can be drawn about the ramifications of any future outcome. The research design, on the other hand, will help to focus the research efforts and ensure complete coverage of each of the sub-topics highlighted. Finally, the policy options described in this chapter provide a basis for analyzing and proposing possible models for the future role of the ABRI.

¹The policy options considered are based on existing studies, which focus exclusively on the military's political involvement.

²Paul Westmeyer, *A Guide for Use in Planning and Conducting Research Projects* (Illinois: Charles C. Thomas Publisher, 1981), ix.

³This is generally taken to be the period after independence in 1947.

⁴See Samuel Huntington's *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1974), 233-237.

⁵These policy options or models will subsequently serve as the basis for postulating possible models for the ABRI's future role. They are adapted from those suggested by Ulf Sundhaussen and Barry Green in the chapter, "Indonesia: Slow March into an Uncertain Future," in *The Political Dilemmas of Military*, ed. Christopher Clapham and George Philip (New Jersey: Barnes & Nobles Books, 1985), 95-123.

CHAPTER FOUR

FACTORS INFLUENCING THE ROLE OF THE ABRI

This chapter examines each of the factors identified in the previous chapter to qualitatively assess its impact on the development of the ABRI's sociopolitical role. The chapter begins with a review of historical development of the sociopolitical role and determines its impact on the ABRI's future role. It then reviews the political, economic and social situation in the post-Suharto era, lists three possible scenarios for Indonesia's future political landscape and analyzes their influence on the ABRI. It also highlights the divisive forces within the ABRI itself and external influence that will shape its perspective on the reform process. Finally, the chapter looks at the competing requirements of law enforcement, internal security and external security, and assesses how these will affect the ABRI's sociopolitical role.

Historical Influence on the ABRI's Sociopolitical Role

Since independence, the ABRI has been intimately involved in the political developments in Indonesia. This has been a two-way process: the ABRI exerts a significant influence in the political processes, while the political processes in the country have also influenced its development. The ABRI's sociopolitical role in the past can be seen in the three historical periods: the struggle for independence, guided democracy, and the new order. The transitions among the various periods were characterized by violence

in which the ABRI played a dominant role. A brief outline of the historical developments will illustrate this relationship well.

Since its inception, the ABRI has never restricted itself to an exclusively military role. During the struggle for independence from 1945 to 1949, politics and military action were inseparably intertwined. The youths who took up arms against the Dutch were more motivated by patriotism and support for independence advocated by the nationalist politicians than the desire for a military career. Due to the lack of professional training¹ and sophisticated armaments, the Indonesian resistance took the form of guerrilla warfare in which there was no distinct boundary between the civilian and military factions. Owing to the need to rally popular support for their cause, the military leaders often performed political functions² as well. Thus from the start, the army was little influenced by the Western ideal of an apolitical orientation for the military, while the nature of the armed struggle for independence further colored its perception of the legitimacy of its involvement in politics. A third factor, which influenced the perspective of the military on political involvement, was the generation and cultural gap between the government leaders who joined the nationalist movement and the military leaders. The former were mainly from the urban Dutch-educated elite, whereas the latter received little schooling, knew little Dutch, were steeped in traditional Javanese culture, and were mostly less than thirty years old. This lack of rapport was further exacerbated by the perception that the civilian politicians with their broader strategic view of the state of affairs concerning Indonesia were too ready to concede in their political negotiations with the Dutch. The military felt strongly that it had a stake in deciding on the affairs of the state. A general

distrust of civilian politicians developed within the military and persists to the present day.³

Despite the political orientation and distrust of the politicians, the ABRI allowed itself to be subordinated to the civilian leaders after independence in 1949 under the new parliamentary Constitution of 1950. The ABRI leadership was held by a small group of officers who received formal training at pre-independence Dutch academies. Their technical proficiency influenced their preference to concentrate on building and molding an effective military force and to withdraw from direct political involvement. At this time, the alliance of the military was still largely with the local fighting units rather than the central leadership at Jakarta. This lack of unity restricted the ABRI leadership from taking a more active political role and led to the acceptance of civilian supremacy over the military. However, the feeling of legitimate claim to political involvement remained with the regional commanders.

The apolitical stance of the ABRI was short-lived. Factions existed in the regional commands which sought alliance with different political groups and further weakened the ability of the ABRI leadership to assert its authority and prevent the military from being drawn into the political rivalries between the government and opposition groups. Since independence, a series of coalition governments had failed to hold power long enough (ranging from six months to two years)⁴ to implement their programs. Dissatisfaction with the parliamentary system was becoming widespread within the military. The conception of the military as an apolitical tool soon gave way to the older idea of the military as the guardian of national interest with the responsibility to intervene in political

affairs whenever the weakness of the government made it necessary. The political parties came to be seen as more concerned with furthering the interests of their own supporters rather than the interests of the nation as a whole. The military officers also felt their interests were being marginalized. They became more conscious of their common interests as members of a potentially powerful political force. Reconciliation among the various factions took place and the new-found unity yielded considerable political strength to the military.⁵ Increasingly the officers held the view that the parliamentary system should be replaced by a system which permitted the military to play a more active political role. However, factionalism revived when the ABRI leadership attempted to weaken the relatively autonomous regional commands by transferring the well entrenched regional commanders to new positions. Paradoxically, it was this factionalism which precipitated the collapse of the parliamentary system and the introduction of martial law in 1957 when regional military commanders challenged the authority of both the government and the military leadership. Central government forces moved in to defeat the rebel forces, of which regional commanders had taken control.

The introduction of martial law expanded the ABRI's role in politics and in the broader fields of general administration and economic management. The ABRI proved its indispensability in crisis and strengthened its claim to a more permanent role in the government. The defeat of the rebel leaders also strengthened the unity, and hence the power of the ABRI. In 1949, President Sukarno, together with the ABRI, reintroduced the presidential 1945 Constitution, which provided the framework for Guided Democracy.

Under Guided Democracy,⁶ the president and the ABRI were the two main pillars of the system. The ABRI's political role came initially from its martial powers but officers were soon given substantial representation in the government, such as in cabinet and parliament, and were appointed as provincial governors and other regional officials. During this time the only rival to the ABRI was the PKI (Indonesian Communist Party), which received strong support from President Sukarno. Sukarno, well aware of the potential danger of over-reliance on the military, exploited the rivalries within the military and encouraged the activities of civilian groups as a counterweight to the military.⁷ During Guided Democracy, Sukarno launched a militant foreign policy to liberate Irian Jaya and subsequently a campaign against the formation of Malaysia⁸ in 1963. These campaigns drained the nation's resources and contributed to the near collapse of the economy, which in turn led to Sukarno's downfall.

The PKI leaders, concerned that the military would capitalize on the weakened position of Sukarno to seize control, staged a coup on 30 September 1965 to preempt the military from taking over. A number of top generals were assassinated by PKI elements but the coup lasted only seventy-two hours before it was put down by the anti-communist generals led by General Suharto, who was then the head of Army Strategic Reserve Command (Kostrad). General Suharto became the de facto military leader and banned the PKI. By 11 March 1966, Sukarno officially surrendered his power to General Suharto. Many theories⁹ abound on the events surrounding the coup attempt in 1965 and it is not the intent of this thesis to delve into these. However, the outcome of these events is clear:

They resulted in the fall of Sukarno from power, the liquidation of the PKI, and the triumph of the ABRI.

The next political phase in the history of Indonesia, commonly known as the New Order era, saw the consolidation of the ABRI both as a military and a sociopolitical force. Suharto's forte as a master tactician in politics was evident in his skilful moves to consolidate his power base. He realized his immediate concern of the presence in important military positions of officers who resented his rapid rise to power. Although these officers had accepted his leadership rather than resort to civil war, they were ready to take advantage of any signs of vulnerability. He met the challenge to his position in two ways. He maintained the repressive apparatus established after the coup and directed it against the remnants of the PKI, supporters of Sukarno, and other groups challenging his leadership, whether these were in the non-communist parties or in the armed forces. On the other hand, Suharto preferred the Javanese principle of *alon alon asal kelakon* (slow but sure) way in dealing with his military rivals who had the capacity to mobilize troops. Moving against one group at a time, he always endeavored to isolate them from their potential allies and, after convincing them of the hopelessness of their position, offered face-saving ways out in the form of prestigious and often lucrative diplomatic and administrative appointments. Many of his former rivals were given opportunities to succeed in business. A few of the more recalcitrant, however, were arrested. Through the use of a "carrot and stick", Suharto was thus able to consolidate power in his hands, and maintain his firm grip on the government of Indonesia.

It was during the New Order era that *dwi fungsi* (dual function) for the ABRI became law. The genesis of the dual function was a speech delivered by then Army Chief of Staff, General A. H. Nasution, on 11 November 1958 at the army officer training college. Faced with the threat of left-leaning civilian politicians close to Sukarno on one side and the threat of potential regional revolts on the other, he insisted that the military could neither act as political activists nor assume the role of a mere spectator. He called for the military to be given a role in the cabinet and in every state institution, from ministries to the diplomatic service. He advocated the middle way (or *jalan tengah tentara*) for the military. It was thus the political instability and tensions among political parties that forced the ABRI to examine seriously into how it could play a stabilizing role in the political power play. The New Order era saw the extension of military control of the instruments of state, which involved the transfer of active military officers across the bureaucracy in large numbers.¹⁰ Eventually with the passage of a bill titled "Basic Provisions for the Defense and Security of the Republic of Indonesia" in 1982, *dwi fungsi* became law.

Having expanded the political role of the ABRI and used it to support his ascension to power, Suharto moved to keep its power in check. His "divide and rule" tactics helped to ensure that at no time would the ABRI become so powerful as to threaten his own position. Suharto rationalized the ABRI's involvement in politics as a means of ensuring that it was directly engaged in and responsible for national development. As such, it could not be a critical bystander who might one day be tempted to seize power. Under Suharto, the ABRI was truly his instrument of power. A graphical

depiction of the historical development of the ABRI's sociopolitical role is illustrated in figure 3.




Figure 3. Historical Development of ABRI's Sociopolitical Role. Note: The graphical depiction is only illustrative of the historical changes to the ABRI's sociopolitical role. It does not seek to quantify the changes to this role.

From the brief historical outline of the development of the ABRI's sociopolitical role, useful insights could be drawn. First, the sociopolitical involvement of the ABRI did not start from a zero base. The ABRI did not have an apolitical orientation to begin with, and an apolitical stance had not had chance to take root in the ABRI's culture. Indeed, sociopolitical involvement has become arguably second nature to the ABRI. This deep-

rooted historical role poses significant inertia to any attempt to eradicate it totally from the ABRI's mind-set. Any change to this role would most likely have to be evolutionary rather than revolutionary unless the ABRI was faced with an external force for change greater than its present internal inertia.

Throughout its history it could be argued whether the ABRI had consciously played the role of an initiator in deepening its sociopolitical involvement. However, there is widespread consensus among analysts that the ABRI has certainly been quick to exploit weaknesses in the political systems to consolidate and expand its political power. The ABRI initially justified this expansion on an altruistic and ideological basis. It viewed its noble role as the protector of the nation's well-being as supreme to that of any political party or system in the management of the nation's affairs. It thus deserved the right to interfere when the stability and hence the well-being of the nation was at stake. This mentality persists in the present leaders of ABRI. General Wiranto, the present ABRI Chief and Minister for Defense and Security, has repeatedly stressed that the ABRI's overriding concern is in maintaining the stability and interests of the state. He has consistently cautioned against sweeping changes that might cause instability and upset the social fabric of the nation of which the ABRI is an integral part. The ABRI later realized that a purely ideological justification to its sociopolitical role would be untenable in the long run as its birthright to intervene in the nation's affairs, engendered from its role as co-founder of the state, was slowly being eroded and forgotten. It therefore sought subsequently to institute a legal basis to its sociopolitical role with the passing of the bill in 1982. This move was also calculated in part to soothe the unease among its ranks with

its involvement in politics and in part to quell any dissent among political groups with its encroachment upon their political turf. However, while the basic principle of *dwi fungsi* has become more widely accepted, the acceptable parameters of military intervention in society and politics have always been controversial. The present debate on the ABRI role at the DPR (House of Representatives) has generally been centred on refining and reducing the involvement of ABRI in politics rather than on abolishing the principle of *dwi fungsi*. This, however, is in contrast to the demand by students, and to a certain extent by the public, of the eradication of *dwi fungsi*.

A brief review of history reveals a third significant factor: The ABRI has never successfully launched a coup d'etat. Instead, it has often credited itself with successfully putting down the coup by the PKI in 1965. This is unlike, for instance, the case in Thailand, where military intervention is a regular determining factor in the change of government. There is perhaps little doubt that the ABRI possesses the capabilities (it has the leadership, organization, discipline and influence) if it chooses to do so. There are perhaps three considerations why this did not happen in the past. The first was the ABRI's own sense of righteousness. It had consistently regarded itself as the upholder of the Constitution and hence purportedly abhorred any violation of the Constitution. To conduct a coup d'etat against a constitutionally elected government would go against this belief. Second, the ABRI probably saw no need to do so. Its interests had been served by the *dwi fungsi* law, conferring on it a strong sense of power and influence, which it had no reason to disrupt. Third, the divisive factions¹¹ in the ABRI cast doubts within itself of the chances of success if it were to stage a coup, and had certainly precipitated in failure

in any past attempt. These three considerations still apply in today's ABRI and would perhaps preclude a coup d'etat in the near future. A fourth consideration is the increasingly negative view of the ABRI held by the public in the wake of the recent riots and the release of the details of the atrocities committed by its troops stationed in the insurgent regions such as Aceh and East Timor. It may be, however, foolhardy to exclude entirely the possibility of a military intervention to take over the government. Indeed, it is perhaps this lingering fear that compels the civilian government and the key political groups to tread carefully in dealing with the ABRI to reduce its political involvement. On the other hand, they are, of course, also attracted to the benefit of co-opting the strong political influence of the ABRI.

The Political Power Play and Indonesia's Political Future

Predictions concerning Indonesia's political future in the wake of Suharto's departure have proven no less inaccurate than economic predictions about the impact of the crisis. The economists from the World Bank and elsewhere who predicted that the Asian financial crisis would not devastate the Indonesian economy as much as it did to the Thai and Malaysian economies could not have been more wrong when the events unfolded in Indonesia in early 1998. They cited the strength of Indonesia's economic fundamentals and export performance as reasons why the Indonesian economy would weather the crisis better than the Thai and Malaysian economies. Instead, the Indonesian currency continued to spiral downward and brought about a crisis of private sector debt, widespread corporate insolvency, capital flight, inflation, dramatic rise in unemployment,

and widespread social and political unrest. Indonesia was not able to export itself out of trouble. When riots, anti-Chinese attacks, and student demonstrations rocked the country in early 1998, many Indonesia analysts rushed to announce the rise of "people power" and the beginning of Indonesian democracy. Such expectations were to be disappointed when Suharto handed over the rein to his vice-president and long-time protégé, Habibie, while his political apparatus of the New Order era continued to dominate the institutions of power. Although there was the removal of key Suharto loyalists from the cabinet, the maneuvering and jostling for power and debates over reform of parliament and the political system continued to be dominated by familiar figures from within the old regime. The key opposition figures were more concerned with negotiating alliances with the military and achieving maximum advantages for their parties by influencing the writing of new election laws than pressing for sweeping reforms in the political system. The new political parties that were formed would also not be expected to have enough clout to exert a great influence on the reform process. Skeptics have been questioning whether the departure of Suharto signifies the end of a regime with its apparatus of authoritarian rule or simply the downfall of one leader. However, faced with the social pressures and economic turmoil, a change in the political system is a certainty. The question is really about the form and extent of these changes.

While it is extremely difficult to pinpoint the exact political system that will emerge in the post-Suharto era, it might be more plausible to predict what this system will not be.¹² Four of the major features of the New Order regime will probably no longer apply in any new political order likely to emerge from the existing political gestation.

First, the extraordinarily personalized power structure created by the immense concentration of both financial resources and ultimate decision-making authority in the hands of the president himself is most unlikely to be replicated by any of Suharto's immediate successors. However, while the patronage relationships pervasive throughout the government structure might become less tightly integrated, these might prove to be impervious to significant reforms so long as public servants continue to be poorly paid and compelled to raise "unconventional finances" at every level of the government.

Second, there was a reversal in trend of the depoliticization of Indonesia's political system as evident from the "sprouting" of numerous new political parties¹³ after the "spring shower" of reform ushered in by Suharto's step-down. This reversal in trend was accompanied by a shift toward more democratic and participatory political life in Indonesia. This new trend will likely continue in the future. Third, the government's relations with politically organized Muslim groups, the Indonesian Chinese businessmen, and the Christian and Catholic communities will likely to be very different in the post-Suharto era.¹⁴ It would be extremely difficult to repeat the skilful balancing act Suharto used to create the brittle form of stability seen in the New Order era. Finally, the state-society balance shifted dramatically in favor of the much stronger social forces from the strong state control experienced under Suharto's rule. With these impending changes in mind, it would then be possible to examine what the political system in the post-Suharto era will be like.

Three Possible Scenarios of Indonesia's Future Political Landscape

As mentioned in chapter one, this thesis does not intend to take a deterministic approach to predicting the future political landscape of Indonesia that will emerge from the current political gestation. This would not be possible even for the most astute political observers. While it is outside the scope of the thesis to predict the future political outcome, it is nevertheless necessary to list broadly what the possibilities are in order that further deliberations of the future role of the ABRI could be made. Essentially three scenarios¹⁵ are put forth based on observation of the maneuvering and jostling for power as well as the debates over reform of parliament and the political system.

Scenario One: Liberal Transformation

The first scenario represents an optimistic view of the outcome of the reform process. In this scenario the recession progresses and the economic hardships generated continue to be the driving forces behind the political reform. Alliances are formed between the progressive and reformist elements as well as between the conservative elements of the main political groups. Golkar collapses to form a Republican Party of conservative ideas, privilege, and wealth. It is opposed by a socially progressive Democratic Party of reform. Centralized state control is diminished, allowing new social institutions to emerge. Many of these institutions begin to demand accountability of the bureaucracy and legal system, and the rule of law.

Scenario Two: Modified Survival of the Regime

In this scenario, the slow recovery of the Indonesian economy is seen because of stabilization of the external economic influences and the implementation of internal economic reforms. Although the surviving regime is never able to regain the concentration of central power that prevailed in the New Order era, a political coalition is established between the military and an alliance of civilian politicians. New laws relating to elections and political activity ensure that parliament becomes a more important focus in the contest for power. Interests of the powerful and wealthy are protected by all the major political parties. Overall, Golkar's influence has declined. Parliament becomes a clearing-house for political and economic deals, which engross much of the new president's time in putting together alliances.

Scenario Three: Chaotic Democracy

The third scenario represents a pessimistic view of the outcome in the political reform, and is characterized by chaos and uncertainty. Indonesia's economy continues to spiral downward because of the combination of destabilizing external influences and ineffectual internal economic reforms. Parliament is made up of numerous political parties and power and influence are increasingly decentralized. The new president is forced increasingly to bargain policy and patronage for support and becomes captive of an unruly and undisciplined parliament.

The Scenarios and the Role of ABRI

Each of the scenarios described above will entail a corresponding significant change to the sociopolitical role of the ABRI. In the first scenario, the political power of the ABRI is considerably diminished with the collapse of Golkar. The two resultant parties are more independent of the influence of the military. At the same time, the new social institutions progressively push the military back to the barracks. In the second scenario, the ABRI remains a key political group in the coalition although its influence is never as great as before. Demonstrations and sporadic protest erupt but the opposition is never able to translate its numbers and grievances into a coherent political movement. The military moves to re-impose some forms of control on the press and to dismantle the student movement in the "national interest". As unemployment remains at high levels and crime increases, the middle class and small businesses are frightened away from reform. In return for protection, they are prepared to tolerate the continued heavy-handed tactics of the military and corruption in business and government. *Dwi fungsi* continues to be advocated and accepted although dissent against the concept continues to cause tension within and outside the military. Finally, in the third scenario, the military loses its cohesion in the reform process and fails to halt the slide to chaos. Power and influence are increasingly decentralized and fall in the hands of powerful officials, party leaders, and military commanders. The ABRI does not face a unified opposition to its political involvement as in the first scenario. However, it is not able to command as much clout as in the second scenario because of its own lack of unity.

Relationship between ABRI and the President

The ABRI was not enthusiastic about Habibie's appointment as the nation's third president but the military leadership has accepted him as the constitutional successor. Harold Crouch¹⁶ of the Australian National University, an Indonesia analyst, holds the view that Wiranto accepted Habibie as the president as he was unwilling to risk the political upheaval that would have accompanied any attempt by the ABRI to regain its dominant position. Habibie has appeared to distance himself from the Muslim modernist groups which he cultivated in the 1990s as part of his strategy to build up his power base. He has realized that to count on the ABRI's continued support he needs to be more centrist and moderate in his views. Habibie will require the support of both Golkar and the ABRI at the very minimum to stand any chance of being elected in the presidential election at the end of 1999.¹⁷ Habibie will need Wiranto's blessing in order to receive the required support, and will seek to strengthen his relationship with his military commander. This could mean acceding more to Wiranto's request for further changes¹⁸ in the military command that will see the rise of more Pancasilaist¹⁹ officers. On the other hand, the ABRI needs to be cautious about responding to Habibie's wooing as it has claimed to be above politics and not to seek to influence the outcome of the general and presidential elections. Given the ABRI's significant influence on the elections, Wiranto may play the role of a kingmaker even though he may not seek to be the king himself.

The Lure of Economics

Another institution of the ABRI that is deep-rooted in its historical development is its involvement in economic activities. The business associations of ABRI date back to the Revolution when many Army and militia units had to fend for themselves. The failure of the government to provide what officers considered adequate funds for the military lay behind much of the disaffection in the military during the mid-1950s. Not only did the military feel deprived of new equipment, weapons, and other facilities, but both soldiers and officers found themselves unable to live in a style to which they felt entitled. Some military commanders in the outer islands felt compelled to resort to other sources of supply in order to maintain the functioning of their units and the loyalty of their troops. In export-producing regions, such as North Sumatra and North Sulawesi, the military could raise funds quite easily by sponsoring semiofficial smuggling, while in other areas regional commanders made irregular arrangements with local businesses which were usually owned by Indonesian Chinese. These economic activities of the military arose originally out of necessity but also created opportunities for individuals to benefit personally.

The military involvement in economic affairs was still limited until the introduction of martial law in 1957, which saw its sudden expansion. The military exercised its emergency powers, particularly in the administration of economic matters such as tax collection, issue of licenses, and granting of facilities. It used its martial law powers to place all Dutch enterprises under military supervision. During the 1960s the

military's role in the economy further expanded when British enterprises²⁰ were placed under military supervision in 1964 and American enterprises in 1965. These businesses went into decline toward the end of the Guided Democracy together with the decline of the rest of the national economy, but were revived with the military's political domination in the New Order era.

The military began running large-scale commercial enterprises, often with the help of Chinese businessmen known as *cukongs*. The alliance between officers and Chinese businessmen benefited both sides, providing the Chinese with access to business opportunities and protection from a resentful society and the military with funds to supplement their meager official budgets and to satisfy individual desires. The *cukongs* were normally linked to individual officers rather than to particular positions in the military structure, and often moved and ascended together with the associated officers as they moved and rose in the military structure. When Suharto took over the presidency, he also drew his *cukongs*²¹ along with him. With the downfall of Suharto, these *cukongs* lost their protective umbrella offered by his presidency.

The military's participation in the economy was part of Nasution's "middle way" concept mentioned earlier, whereby the military played a role in civilian areas but did not seek a position of exclusive domination. These business ventures can be grouped into four main categories:²² cooperatives, which focus mainly on troop welfare; unit business; business run by non-profit foundations to support charitable, educational or welfare objectives; and "influence and facilitation", which may take place outside a formal business structure. These four categories allow participation from the Ministry of Defense

and Security and the ABRI Headquarters down to the regional commands and to the individual soldiers. Suharto used a rationale similar to that used for the ABRI's involvement in politics, mentioned earlier in the chapter, to justify the ABRI's continued involvement in businesses. By allowing it a shared responsibility for the economy, he made it difficult for the ABRI to criticize his economic policies from the sidelines.

The ABRI's business involvements contributed to its capital formation and to the development of business skills in its officers. These in turn opened career opportunities for retired officers. They also added another aspect to personnel management in the ABRI by allowing it to move less competent middle-ranking officers out of active military service to make way for competent ones. While it seems logical for the military to operate businesses to fund troop welfare or cover capital or operating costs, problems arose owing to the lack of transparency²³ and accountability. Although these businesses provided jobs for military retirees, low official income and lack of oversight encouraged active members to devote considerable energy and time to income-supplementing schemes, often to the detriment of their professional duties. Indeed, these business associations became so entrenched in the soldiers' way of life as to further contaminate the already impure military role for the ABRI.²⁴ They are intricately linked to its sociopolitical role and contribute to the inertia to any reduction of this role. The ABRI was often able to use its political dominance to restrict competition with its businesses, especially in the provinces. Consideration for its economic interests predisposes the ABRI to cling to political power to protect these interests. The ABRI's business involvement was thus a brake on economic and social reform.

The post-Suharto era brought to the fore social pressures to end nepotism, cronyism, and collusion in government dealings, particularly in economic affairs.²⁵ The pressure for reforms to lead the country out of the present economic meltdown demanded more transparency and accountability in banking, financial transactions and business dealings in general.²⁶ While there is as yet no pressure directed to push for changes to redress the unfair advantages the ABRI has in businesses,²⁷ the greatest threat to its economic interests comes indirectly for the call for reform of its sociopolitical role. On its own, the ABRI is unlikely to introduce significant reduction to these involvements unless changes in social norms make these corrupt practices appear increasingly unacceptable, or great improvement in national economy in turn allows more funds to be channeled to the defense budget. These two scenarios appear improbable now or in the near future.

The Pressure from Social Forces

The influence of Indonesia's social forces on the political reform process cannot be underestimated. Although the root cause of the present reform process can be traced to the economic crisis, it was social unrest brought about by the economic hardships that finally precipitated the downfall of Suharto. One of the key elements of the social forces has been the student movement.

Student movements are not a new phenomenon in Indonesian political history. During the Dutch colonial era, some of Indonesia's founding fathers, such as Sukarno and Hatta,²⁸ as students led intellectual and student movements both in Indonesia and in the Netherlands seeking Indonesian freedom from the Dutch. During President Sukarno's era,

particularly in 1966, Indonesian university and high school students organized demonstrations against the so called "Old Order" government, demanding the reduction of the prices of basic commodities, the dismantling of the Indonesian Communist Party, and governmental reforms. Criticism of the Suharto regime came from university students in the early 1970s. The focus of their criticism was on the implementation of *dwi fungsi*, Suharto's tactic of mass and student depolitization, and the spread of crony capitalism. Since 1973, Suharto moved step by step to weaken political parties, university student bodies, and all elements in society which were critical of him, under the slogan of "political stability". As a result, student movements in 1974 and 1978 never achieved their goal of forcing Suharto to step down from the presidency. Policies were later enacted which prohibited students from taking part in politics inside university campuses and required students to seek approval from their faculty and university before organizing any social, economic, or political activities, including public discussions, seminars, and demonstrations. These policies rendered university students inactive in Indonesian political life for almost twenty years until the economic crisis of July 1997.

The student demonstrations that helped bring about the end of the Suharto's era can be broadly classified into three phases. In the early stage, students demanded lower prices for basic commodities, which had skyrocketed since July 1997. In the second phase, the students also demanded that the MPR (People's Consultative Assembly) not nominate Suharto for his seventh consecutive term. In the third phase, after the MPR had elected Suharto and Habibie as the president and vice-president respectively, students, supported by other critics of the government, demanded sweeping political and economic

reforms. Among these was also the demand of a review of the ABRI's dual function.

Students were not alone in their struggle for political change and for sweeping political, economic, and legal reforms. They were supported by many elements of society, such as laborers, lecturers and professors, medical doctors, nurses, and cab drivers.

The ABRI was not united in dealing with student movements. There appeared to be struggles for power between those who silently supported the student movement and those who were loyal to Suharto. Wiranto, while loyal to Suharto, tried to use the soft approach of organizing a dialogue²⁹ with student representatives. It was only when many student groups boycotted the dialogue that he ordered the use of the hard approach of shooting rioters with rubber bullets. Immediately after the May 1998 riots, Wiranto was widely praised for his restraint and control in handling the riots and demonstrations. However, when it was later discovered that certain elements of the ABRI were involved in kidnapping and killing some student and political activists, the ABRI was criticized for these inhumane acts and its image as a repressive regime in society was reinforced.

Throughout Indonesia's history, students have always regarded themselves as the "moral force" to speak up for the people and voice their opinions through demonstrations when they perceive the people's and the nation's interests are in danger. However, to be successful, these demonstrations still require the explicit or tacit support of the people and the military. The ABRI is aware of the potential of students as a social force, which can mobilize public support. This explains its cautious approach toward the handling of the student demonstrations. With the resignation of Suharto as president, the key demand of their protests has been acceded to. The students then turned their attention to press for

wider political and economic reforms. From the reduced scale of subsequent demonstrations, it appears that the students adopted a "wait-and-see" attitude³⁰ as the government debated on political reforms and changes to be implemented for the next general and presidential elections. With the threat of a repeat of the May 1997 massive demonstrations and bloodletting in mind, the government would have to tread the path of reform cautiously while balancing individuals' and groups' interests. The call for the ABRI to return to the barracks was not new but became one of the key signals of political reform which some segments of the society would like to see. Indeed, discussions of the ABRI's role in politics have not been on the principle of whether this role should be reduced, but the amount of reduction.³¹

Intra-ABRI Rivalries

As investigations into the May 1998 riots uncovered the involvement of several senior military officers³² in the abduction and torture of political activists,³³ Indonesians were once again reminded of the factions which still existed in the ABRI. Indeed, since its formation, the ABRI has been far from a monolithic organization. Two rival camps were encouraged by Suharto in his power plays to forestall the development of any countervailing power center. One key tactic used during the New Order era was the periodic reshuffle of officers holding key positions in the ABRI to prevent any permanent consolidation of power by any individuals or groups belonging to a particular camp. The two key groupings in the ABRI are the *merah-putih* (red-white) officers and the *hijau* (green) officers. The former grouping comprises officers whose loyalty is symbolized by

the red and white colors of the Indonesian flag. They are the secular nationalists or Pancasilaists, who oppose the formation of an Islamic state. The latter grouping comprises Muslim modernists who favor giving the Muslims a higher standing in Indonesian society. General Wiranto, the ABRI Chief, is perceived as ideologically the standard bearer of the secular-nationalist, while his rival, the discharged former Kostrad Commander, Lieutenant-General Prabowo, is one of the Muslim-oriented generals. The influence of the *merah-putih* officers had been on a slow decline since Suharto's cultivation of the Muslim ground in the 1980s. However, this trend was reversed with the demise of Suharto's rule when Wiranto moved to consolidate his power and revamp his senior commands³⁴ six months after the downfall of Suharto. This reshuffle is assessed to increase the likelihood that the ABRI will be managed in a less partisan and more professional way as it faces political uncertainty in the times ahead.

The intra-military cleavage is not just along the traditional religious-secular fault line. Attitudes toward reform in the post-Suharto era cut across the Islamic and non-Islamic divide in the ABRI, producing three separate camps. The first camp consists of the conservatives who are officers who served under Suharto at some point in their military career as his adjutant or in the elite presidential security guard unit and are bound by loyalty and a desire to maintain the status quo. The second camp consists of the reformers who straddle the two ideological camps and are in favor of gradual democratization but under their respective ideological banners. Both the secular and Muslim factions essentially want the Pancasila state doctrine to remain intact but the Muslim faction wants, in addition, greater representation of Islamic interests in political

and economic areas. Both the conservative and reformist camps comprise mostly the high-ranking generals in the ABRI, with perhaps a larger number of reformists than conservatives. The third camp comprises the "fence-sitters" and represents the silent majority. Many of them are colonels in the provinces and have poorer prospects of further promotion. They are ambivalent about reform and are concerned about the potential loss of moneymaking opportunities, *dwi fungsi* appointments, and the military standing in society. Wiranto is regarded by some analysts as a unifier of the different groups, who tries to balance factional interests. He appears to be supportive of political reforms but at the same time tries to defend *dwi fungsi* and the ABRI's privileges. By following the Javanese principle of *alon alon asal kelakon* (slow but sure), which was used by Suharto in the 1960s in dealing with his military rivals, he attempts to avoid being seen as carrying out a purge.³⁵ Wiranto had served under Suharto as his adjutant for five years, and loyalty to his former mentor might have prompted him to guarantee publicly that no harm would befall Suharto and his family right after Suharto announced his resignation in May 1998. This guarantee continues to prompt critics to doubt Wiranto's sincerity toward reform. Publicly, Wiranto has consistently advocated stability, hierarchy, and harmony in society and stressed that all reforms should be constitutional. He has also outwardly portrayed his lack of ambition to seize power in the national political power play. Overall, his beliefs will continue to shape the ABRI's perspective toward political reforms.

External Influence

The interest of regional countries and external powers, such as the United States, Japan, and China, in Indonesia may be summed up in one word: stability. While most countries appear to welcome the political and economic reforms, and democratization taking place in Indonesia, they also express concern over the continuation of lawlessness and instability in the country. The overriding concern with stability is understandable. Japan, for instance, depends on the vital sea lanes through the sprawling archipelago for its import of oil, while Singapore, a neighboring country, depends on the important sea lines of communication for trade, its economic lifeline.³⁶ The instability and lawlessness in Indonesia would lead to, for example, a greater outflow of illegal immigrants as well as threaten the safe passage of ships in the Straits of Malacca and the South China Sea. As a result, these two countries have also been most forthcoming in terms of rendering financial, food, and other aid to Indonesia. China, in addition, expressed concern³⁷ last year over the plight of Indonesian Chinese, who were the victims in racial riots, but stressed its interest in Indonesia's political and social stability. To most countries, the ABRI is still regarded as crucial to hold the country together and prevent its descent into anarchy. In the interest of stability and with the track record of the ABRI's ability to hold the country together, they have been cautious about urging reforms in the military.

Outside influence also comes from non-governmental organizations like the IMF and international human rights groups. The former is interested in economic reforms and has tied its financial aid to the revamping of the banking system, financial, and business policies in Indonesia. The stress for greater accountability and transparency will, as

mentioned earlier, hurt the ABRI's business interests. The latter groups are pressuring for greater respect for human rights and democratization of the country. During the New Order era, the ABRI had been the key instrument of Suharto's repressive regime. For these groups, the ABRI has come to epitomize the abuser of human rights as atrocities committed in various parts of Aceh, East Timor, and Irian Jaya are being uncovered. These groups would certainly hope to see a restructuring of the ABRI and a reduction of its sociopolitical role.

The Distracting and Thankless Role of Maintaining Law and Order

Table 1. Figures on the Civil Unrest in Indonesia in 1998

Unrest	Toll	Destruction	Damage	Monetary Loss
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ 1,995 student demonstrations ◆ 1,287 demonstrations by non-government groups ◆ 496 strikes or cases of industrial actions ◆ 48 riots 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ 263 deaths ◆ 112 serious injuries 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ 15 churches ◆ 64 offices ◆ 28 mosques ◆ 4,890 shops ◆ 16 other places of worship 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ 1,402 cars ◆ 32 motorcycles 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ 13.6 billion rupiah (US\$1.5 million)

Source: *Asian Wall Street Journal*, 11 January 1999. Given the extreme difficulty or impossibility of verifying these figures, they might probably be underestimated.

1998 had been a difficult year for the ABRI in the handling of the civil strife in the country. An appreciation of the extent of civil unrest is shown in the table 1 which reflects some official police figures on the demonstrations and riots. While these figures are not definitive, they are nevertheless indicative of the extent of the problem that faces the ABRI in policing Indonesia.

Constant exposure to civil strife is damaging to both military morale and the public respect for the ultimate guardian of Indonesia's integrity. The ABRI finds itself in a dilemma: It is criticized both for its action and inaction in maintaining public order and security. Worse, some have also accused the ABRI of collusion with rioters. While the actual role of the ABRI in civil strife may not be known, the dilemma facing the ABRI is clearly driving home the need to strengthen and reorganize a civil law enforcement authority, preferably under civilian control. The constant involvement in quelling civil unrest³⁸ is both sapping the energy of the ABRI and distracting it from its other roles. These considerations probably prompted the leadership to announce last year its decision to detach the police from the ABRI. While this decision has yet to take effect, the ABRI at the moment is preoccupied with dealing with the sporadic riots and violence that continue to erupt in various parts of the country.³⁹ The overriding concern to uphold law and ensure the smooth conduct of the general election⁴⁰ in June 1999 prompted the ABRI chief, Wiranto, to announce in December 1998 its plan to recruit a 40,000-strong civilian militia to bolster the over-stretched police force. While the plan is under stiff opposition from critics that it would worsen social tensions instead, it has received government's approval and the ABRI has proceeded with the recruitment.⁴¹

The strong opposition from certain segments of society is understandable: The plan to arm the civilians could in the worst case lead to civil war if not managed properly. The ABRI holds a different view on this: The plan is also used to co-opt the support of the public who would otherwise have less interest in the smooth conduct of the general election and may even be exploited by political activists intent on creating havoc to wreck the process. The plan to detach the policing function from the ABRI's role is thus on hold at the moment. However, ironically, with the passing of time and with any stabilization of the social situation, the impetus for detaching the policing function from the ABRI's role may be weakened instead.

Internal Security: Another Preoccupation

The ABRI has been engaged in internal security operations since its inception in 1945 and has defeated or contained all armed challenges to the nation and armed separatist movements. Indeed, this constant focus on internal security in its formative years was a major contributing factor in the ABRI's increasing involvement in domestic politics and eventual seizure of power in 1965. In fact, its internal security and political roles have become so intertwined that political activism has often been classified as an internal security problem and dealt with by the use or threat of use of force rather than by political means. Countersubversive operations were conducted in the past against Islamic extremism and communism, regarded by the ABRI as the greatest threats to internal security. While the latter threat had largely been purged by the ABRI in the 1960s and further discredited with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the ABRI still harbors the fear

of insurgency of Islamic extremism. At the same time the on-going separatist movements in Aceh, Irian Jaya, and East Timor continue to demand the ABRI's attention and require it to be internally focused.

Among the insurgent regions, East Timor has long tarnished Indonesia's international image since Indonesian troops marched into the former Portuguese colony in 1975 and annexed it a year later. The annexation was never recognized by the UN, which still considers Portugal the administering power. Indonesian occupation of East Timor has been marred by violence with an estimated 200,000 East Timorese killed in fighting and famines during the independence war over the past two decades. Habibie's government has taken a different stand on the issue of East Timor. It has agreed to discuss the issue with the Portuguese government with the possibility of granting East Timor an autonomous status or even independence. It has also begun the withdrawal of combat troops from the occupied territory. While Habibie appears willing to discuss the issue, Indonesia is nevertheless wary that independence for East Timor may spark separatist fires in Aceh and Irian Jaya.

In the short term uncertainty surrounding the status of the three regions would continue to require the ABRI to assert Indonesian authority by force.⁴² In the longer term, if peaceful solutions⁴³ could be reached, perhaps in the form of greater or full autonomy for these regions, the ABRI's preoccupation with internal security might be considerably reduced. Overall, however, the diminution of the ABRI's role in internal security may weaken its legitimacy for sociopolitical involvement.

External Threats: Sanguine Outlook

Some analysts would argue that the ABRI's preoccupation with internal security and sociopolitical function is perhaps reflective of its sanguine outlook with regard to its threat perception. Indonesia is unique among Southeast Asian countries in not having to fear invasion or attack by its immediate neighbors because of its size, military capability, and strategic location. Its non-aligned stance in foreign policy is indicative of its confidence with regard to national security. It views China as the greatest threat to its sovereignty.⁴⁴ Even then, a serious threat to Indonesia's sovereignty is considered unlikely for at least the next ten to twenty years.⁴⁵

Recent decisions with regard to the cancellation of arms acquisitions partly reflect Indonesia's prevalent threat perception. Since the onslaught of the economic crisis, the ABRI has readily suspended the planned purchase from Russia of twelve Su-30 fighters and eight Mi-17 multipurpose helicopters. Plans for additional submarines from Germany have also been abandoned. Additionally, the armed forces have cut back training and operations expenses. Cooperative exercises with neighboring countries are scheduled to continue but at a reduced tempo. Although one would argue that the reality of the economic situation necessitates such decisions, the benign threat perception⁴⁶ allows such readiness to permit drastic cuts in defense expenditure.

The impact of the economic crisis on Asian countries has been uneven. China and Taiwan, for instance, have been less affected by the crisis. Outstanding economic performance in the past decade had allowed Southeast Asian countries to embark on a steady program of arms acquisition and defense modernization. The economic crisis has

put a brake on these programs and compelled most Southeast Asian countries to drastically cut back on their defense expenditures, while the defense modernization program of China has remained unabated.⁴⁷ In the long run,⁴⁸ if the economic gloom continues to loom over the region, the net effect might be an accentuation of the differences in defense capabilities, especially between China and Southeast Asian countries. In the short term, unless there is a change in Indonesia's threat perception, such as a perceived malignant China, external security is likely to continue to take second place to the ABRI's other roles.

Conclusion

Having examined the various factors that may impact a change in the ABRI's role in the post-Suharto era, it is imperative to note three general characteristics of these factors. First, many of these factors are inter-connected and cannot be simply analyzed in isolation. When examining their impact on the ABRI's sociopolitical role, one has to consider the reality of a dynamic interaction of these factors. Furthermore, some factors may be mutually inclusive while others are mutually exclusive. For example, for the latter case, an increase in sociopolitical and internal security involvement would necessitate a corresponding decrease in its external security role, given the ABRI's finite resources. Second, the impact of the factors on the outcome of the future role of the ABRI is uneven. In the present context, some would have a more direct and stronger impact than others. Consideration of the political and economic factors, for instance, would have greater impact on the ABRI's future sociopolitical role than, say, the consideration of

Indonesia's external security. Third, a great amount of uncertainty surrounds many of these factors, rendering a difficult assessment of their full impact. Political and economic developments in Indonesia are baffling even to the most astute political and economic observers.

Notwithstanding the three characteristics considered above, it is still useful to summarize the impact of these factors in order that meaningful conclusions can be drawn about the future role of the ABRI. Figure 4 is a simplified depiction of the complex interaction of these factors. In general, the factors including external influence (e.g. from IMF and human rights group); social forces (e.g. students); reformists within the ABRI; law enforcement involvement and malignant threat perception will push for a reduction in the ABRI's involvement in sociopolitical affairs. On the other hand, other factors including historical influence; ABRI's business involvement; pro-ABRI social forces; conservatives within the ABRI and internal security requirements will act to resist this push for reduction in the ABRI's sociopolitical role. Yet other factors such as the present ABRI's leadership and "fence-sitters" within the ABRI will attempt to balance the two opposing forces and seek to maintain the status quo for as long as possible. In addition, some factors, such as leadership, political reforms, social forces and business involvement, are assessed to have a greater influence than the others. These can decisively affect the eventual outcome of the ABRI's future sociopolitical role.




Figure 4. Factors Influencing ABRI's Role

¹Although there were some "professional" army officers from the Dutch colonial army, the majority of the fighting force were mobilized from the population and had little prior military training. This prior training was largely received from the Japanese during the Japanese Occupation.

²The relationship between political and military affairs is explained in U.S. Marine Corps Fleet Marine Force Reference Publication (FMFRP) 12-18, *Mao Tse-tung on Guerrilla Warfare*, (Washington, DC: U. S. Department of the Navy, 1989), 88-93.

³For a more detailed discussion, see Harold Crouch's *The Army and Politics in Indonesia* (London: Cornell University Press, 1978), 24-42.

⁴*Ibid.*, 29-30.

⁵According to Harold Crouch's account of the expansion of ABRI's sociopolitical in *The Army and Politics in Indonesia*, the ABRI even brought about the downfall of the

coalition government led by the Indonesian National Party when it rejected the government's appointment of the army's chief of staff in 1955. See Crouch, 31.

⁶The nation was under martial law until 1965.

⁷Sukarno cultivated the air force and the PKI to counterbalance the army.

⁸Sukarno saw the formation of the Federation of Malaysia, consisting of Malaya, Singapore, Sarawak and North Borneo (now the state of Sabah), as "neo-colonialist" and a threat to his dream of a Greater Indonesia. He also saw the need to consolidate domestic political support behind a popular issue.

⁹There exist contentious interpretations of the roles played by the various parties and personalities including the ABRI, PKI, Suharto and even external influences such as the US and IMF in the downfall of Sukarno.

¹⁰By the late 1970s, one-half the cabinet and over two-thirds of the regional governorships were military appointees.

¹¹These factions are discussed in a later section.

¹²See Jamie Mackie, "What will the Post-Soeharto Regime be like?" in *The Fall of Soeharto*, ed. Geoff Forrester and R. J. May (Singapore: Select Books, 1998), 200-207.

¹³The national election is scheduled to be held on 7 June 1999, and registration for new political parties began on February 5, 1999. A total of thirty-three political parties signed up on the first day. A total of one hundred and forty-one parties registered before the deadline on 22 February 1999. See "New Parties Start Registering for June Election," *The Straits Times* (Singapore), 7 February 1999.

¹⁴It is generally believed that Suharto began cultivating the support of the Muslim groups in the 1990s as a countervailing force to the influence of the ABRI. See later sections on Suharto's relationship with the *cukongs*.

¹⁵These three scenarios are adapted from Richard Robison's article, "Indonesia After Soeharto: More of the Same, Descent into Chaos, or a Shift to Reform," in *The Fall of Suharto*, ed. Geoff Forrester and R. J. May (Singapore: Select Books, 1998), 226-230.

¹⁶See "Not a King but a Kingmaker," *The Straits Times* (Singapore), 17 January 1999.

¹⁷This is tentatively scheduled to be held in November 1999.

¹⁸See later section on intra-ABRI rivalries.

¹⁹Nationalist officers who support Pancasila as the state ideology. See later section on intra-ABRI rivalries.

²⁰Robert Lowry, *The Armed Forces of Indonesia* (St. Leonards, New South Wales: Allen & Unwin, 1996), 137.

²¹These included Liem Sioe Liong, the owner of one of the world's largest conglomerates and Bob Hasan, the owner of various national corporations in timber, cars and airline.

²²See for example, Robert Lowry's *The Armed Forces of Indonesia*, 134-146, for a detailed discussion of these categories of business.

²³This lack of transparency also makes it difficult for one to appreciate the full extent of the ABRI's business involvement. Some analysts believe that the actual involvement is probable not as large as popularly believed.

²⁴Critics have dubbed business association ABRI's third function (*tri fungsi*).

²⁵Under popular pressure, several contracts for national development projects, which were awarded to Suharto's family members and business associates were rescinded or nullified by Indonesia's Attorney-General since Suharto's fall from grace. One example was the project to develop a "national car", which was run by Suharto's youngest son. A presidential decree issued in February 1996 ruled that producers of the so-called national car would be granted exemptions on import duties and luxury taxes, which added about sixty per cent to the price of other cars in Indonesia. See "A-G Kills All Prospects of National Car Project," *The Straits Times* (Singapore), 8 December 1998.

²⁶According to the report, "Seven Suharto Decrees abolished," *The Straits Times* (Singapore), 1 January 1999, the government announced the abolition of seven presidential decrees issued by former President Suharto considered as favoring and benefiting his family and cronies. Seventy-nine of the one hundred and sixty-seven government projects were cancelled because of relation to corruption, collusion and nepotism.

²⁷Indonesian government announced on 28 December 1998 that the state oil firm, Pertamina, had cancelled the contracts of one hundred and fifty-two projects, linked mostly to the family and associates of former President Suharto, because of alleged corruption in the way they were awarded. Pertamina is traditionally run by former military officers and has connections with the ABRI's businesses. The effects of these

cancellations on the ABRI are unclear. See "Indonesia's Pertamina Scraps 152 Suspect Deals," *The Straits Times* (Singapore), 29 December 1998.

²⁸Mohammad Hatta was the late first vice president. He was among the students who formed *Perhimpunan Indonesia* (Indonesian Association) when studying in the Netherlands.

²⁹The dialogue was held in Kemayoran, Central Jakarta, in April 1998. See Ikar Nusa Bhakti's article, "Trends in Indonesian Student Movements in 1998," in *The Fall of Soeharto*, ed. Geoff Forrester and R. J. May (Singapore: Select Books, 1998), 177.

³⁰Students from Java, Lampung and Bali issued a defiant New Year statement vowing to continue with demonstrations this year as a means to maintain pressure on the government. See "More Protests on the Way, Say Student," *The Straits Times* (Singapore), 7 January 1999.

³¹The ABRI has been allotted thirty-eight seats in the new five-hundred-seat House of Representatives, a reduction from the present seventy-five seats. The ABRI Chief General Wiranto described the reduction as "radical" but said he would accept it since the decision had been taken by consensus. He also said that if the armed forces were to have representatives in Parliament, they should be present in sufficient numbers to enable them to function effectively. See "MPs Agree to 38 ABRI Seats in New House," *The Straits Times* (Singapore), 28 January 1999.

³²Among these was the Lieutenant-General Prabowo, a son-in-law of the former President Suharto, who was discharged from the army. He previously held the positions of Kostrad and Kopassus (Special Forces) Commander. It was believed that Prabowo had intended to discredit General Wiranto by demonstrating to Suharto that Wiranto was not capable of handling the student movements.

³³At least twenty-four activists had gone missing during the student demonstrations in 1998. Nine resurfaced after months of absence and spoke of being abducted, kept in solitary detention and tortured. One was found dead and the rest were still unaccounted for. See "Prabowo's No-show at Ceremony," *The Straits Times* (Singapore), 12 December 1998.

³⁴See "Military Reshuffles 100 Senior Officers," *The Straits Times* (Singapore), 6 January 1999.

³⁵Wiranto had to retract his decision eighteen hours after the announcement to appoint Lieutenant-General Johnny Lumintang, a Christian and a Pacasilaist, to take over as Kostrad Commander in May 1998 because of objection from the Islamic generals and members of the Association of Muslim Intellectuals (ICMI). The incident showed that he

was not free from the influence of the Islamic camp. He also needed to guard against retaliatory moves (possibly through inciting more riots to destabilize Wiranto's leadership) by the *hijau* officers after the reshuffle in January 1999.

³⁶During an official visit to Japan in December 1998, the Deputy Prime Minister of Singapore, Dr Tony Tan, expressed shared concern with Japanese ministers over the situation in Indonesia. See "Instability in Indonesia 'May Affect Region's Vital Sea Lanes'," *The Straits Times* (Singapore), 13 December 1998.

³⁷Chinese President, Jiang Zemin, said in a meeting with Habibie during APEC in November 1998 that ethnic Chinese Indonesians should enjoy equal treatment with and the same rights as other Indonesians. However, he also highlighted China's position that it had no "private interests" in the matters of overseas Chinese or people of Chinese origin. He expressed sincere hope for political and social stability in Indonesia. See "Chinese Indonesians should be Treated Equally," *The Straits Times* (Singapore), 18 November 1998.

³⁸For instance, the recent outbreak of violence between Christians and Muslims in the city of Ambon in the eastern province of Maluku required the ABRI to send in seven hundred and fifty police and army troops to augment the one thousand local police, army and navy personnel in the province. See "Troops Flown in to Quell Ambon Riots," *The Straits Times* (Singapore), 22 January 1999.

³⁹The social breakdown into lawlessness prompted *The Jakarta Post* to dub Jakarta as the "city of fear." See *Jakarta Post*, 3 February 1999.

⁴⁰Many Indonesian expressed pessimism that the coming election would be even more bloody than previous elections as competing parties put tens of thousands of supporters on the streets. See "Indonesia's Elections 'Likely to be bloody'," *The Straits Times* (Singapore), 16 December 1998.

⁴¹See "Thousands Sign Up for Civilian Militia Forces," *The Straits Times* (Singapore), 30 January 1999.

⁴²For instance, the ABRI lifted Aceh's "military operations status" in August 1998, after nine years, with the withdrawal of combat troops. However, the fresh outbreak of separatist attacks prompted the State Secretary, Akbar Tandjung, to warn in January 1999 that Indonesia might reinstate the "military operations status" in Aceh. See "Jakarta May Send Troops Back to Aceh," *The Straits Times* (Singapore), 6 January 1999.

⁴³Kiroku Hanai opined in his article, "What lies ahead for Indonesia?" in *Japan Times*, 1 January 1999, that the Indonesian government had not come up with a clear-cut

policy on the issue of how to handle the separatist movements in the country. He felt that Indonesia's democratization would depend on a resolution of the issue.

⁴⁴Lowry, 4.

⁴⁵Ibid., 5.

⁴⁶In contrast, South Korea, which was also severely affected by the economic crisis, but has made less drastic cuts in its defense expenditures because of a continual genuine threat it faces from North Korea.

⁴⁷The official 1998-99 defense budget for China increases by 12.9 percent over the previous year. See "Asian Crisis Hits Defense Spending," *The Straits Times* (Singapore), 14 July 1998.

⁴⁸China's acquisition of new weapons, while potentially challenging Southeast Asia's armed forces in the long run (ten to twenty years), is much less alarming in the near term. See Sheldon Simon, "The Economic Crisis and ASEAN States' Security" (Study Project Report, Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 1998), 9-12.

CHAPTER FIVE
POSSIBLE MODELS

Having analyzed the various factors influencing the sociopolitical role of the ABRI in the previous chapter, this chapter outlines some of the possible models of the future role that may emerge from the resulting interaction of these factors. This chapter first presents three distinct models for the ABRI's future sociopolitical role and then discusses the future forms of the other component roles. It also identifies the key events which will indicate the direction of the future role of the ABRI. Finally, while the models are postulated based on current observed trends, the thesis also recognizes some unexpected events which can challenge these trends.

Possible Models for ABRI's Future Sociopolitical Role




Figure 5. Possible Models for ABRI's Future Sociopolitical Role

On the future sociopolitical role of the ABRI, this thesis identifies three possible models, representing the varying degrees of change to the role. Figure 5 depicts the full range of models, including the three possible models, and how these are compared with the options discussed in chapter three. In deriving these three models, this thesis makes two key assumptions. First, it assumes that the forces of democratization, which have brought about the post-Suharto Era, will continue to significantly affect the process of political reform in Indonesia in the future. Second, it assumes that the regional geopolitical situation will not change substantially in the period under consideration, i.e. five to ten years from now.

Based on the first assumption, a return to the role played by the ABRI during the New Order era is improbable. The New Order rule by Suharto began as a veto regime and evolved into an authoritarian clientelism toward the end of the rule when Suharto sought to co-opt the support of other political groups at the expense of diminishing the political influence of the ABRI. Nevertheless, the ABRI remained a strong instrument of power for Suharto throughout the New Order era. The social and political forces, which brought about the downfall of Suharto, would continue to object to a reversal of the ABRI's role to that under Suharto's rule. A change to a totally apolitical role for the ABRI is also considered improbable within the time frame of five to ten years. The lack of a powerful external impetus, such as a drastic change in threat perception, further renders such a model improbable.

As mentioned earlier, the ABRI's sociopolitical role is intricately tied to the political developments in Indonesia. Each of the three models therefore has to be consistent with one of the scenarios for Indonesia's future political landscape described in

the preceding chapter. On the other hand, the ability of the ABRI's leadership to contain the internal strife and maintain itself as a cohesive political force will increase its propensity to shape future political developments in the country. Given a choice, the ABRI will desire a political outcome that maximizes its interests. However, the external forces of change may prove to be beyond the ABRI's calculation and control, and may force the ABRI to accept a less desirable compromise. The key features of the three models are summarized in table 2.

Table 2. Characteristics of the Three Models

Sociopolitical Role	Model A: Kingmaker	Model B: Gridlock	Model C: Partial Handback
Political Role	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Maintenance of new status quo. • ABRI still has considerable political influence and acts as guardian of political processes in the country. • Political groups continue to seek ABRI's support. • Very slow decline in influence over time. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Weakened because of lack of cohesion. • ABRI engaged in constant internal power struggle. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Considerable reduction as a result of stabilization and maturation of the political system. • ABRI pushed off the center stage of politics.
Social Role	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Maintenance of strong social influence. • Very gradual decline in influence over time. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Social influence remains strong but is divided along political lines. • Less effective overall. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Corresponding reduction. • Replaced by other institutions.

Model A: ABRI as the Kingmaker--Unified ABRI

The events surrounding the downfall of President Suharto brought to the fore a new role for the ABRI. This model essentially assumes the maintenance of the new status quo in the post-Suharto era. In the aftermath of the May 1998 riots, which brought about the downfall of President Suharto, the ABRI Chief, General Wiranto, gained considerable respect domestically and internationally for his conduct and handling of events in the two weeks surrounding the resignation of the former president. In the public eye, he was steady and unflinching even when there was tremendous pressure on him to take advantage of the instability in the country. Many analysts believe that Wiranto could have used the chaotic political situation to launch a bid for the presidency¹ of the world's fourth most populous nation, but he chose instead to stand by his boss, even when that meant going against the tide of resentment, which was building to a boiling point. His public guarantee of the safety of Suharto and his family immediately after Suharto announced his resignation, his proclaimed adherence to the constitutional process, and his open rejection of the notion of violent overthrow together defined a new role for the ABRI.

The ABRI has been hailed as the kingmaker in the nation's latest leadership changeover. On the surface, the concept of a kingmaker appears to be a novel idea. However, closer examination reveals that elements of this role already existed in the ABRI's culture long before the recent chain of events. The ABRI has always regarded itself as the protector of the nation's interest, upholder of the constitution, and firm supporter of the state ideology, Pancasila. This belief has facilitated its transition to the new role. Since Dr. Habibie assumed the presidency, the ABRI has dutifully undertaken

its new role, dealing with unrest and protests, some of which call for Habibie to step down as president. In the ensuing months, the ABRI's support will continue to be crucial for a peaceful election process.

This model assumes that the ABRI will be able to maintain its cohesion and unify its support for the dominant party and the newly elected president. In this model, the ABRI holds a certain number of uncontested seats² in the Indonesian parliament and maintains its social and political influence such that its support can still decisively tilt the balance of power in the jostling among political parties. The ABRI acts as the guardian of the political process and stability of the country while the newly elected president will not be able to wield as much power over the ABRI as Suharto did. Overall, the ABRI maintains its sociopolitical role although over time the forces of democratization will compel a slow and gradual decline in its influence in sociopolitical matters. This model will be consistent with the scenario of a modified survival of the regime discussed in the previous chapter. It will appeal to the sense of altruism and righteousness of the ABRI, and will be most favored by the current ABRI leadership.

Model B: ABRI Embroiled in Political Gridlock--Confused ABRI

In this model, the ABRI itself becomes embroiled in the constant power struggle. The intra-ABRI rivalries, as discussed in the earlier chapter, then divide the ABRI and prevent it from taking a unified stance. The *hijau* (Muslim oriented) officers and the *merah-putih* (nationalist) officers are divided in their support of the dominant non-secular and secular political groups respectively. An internal power struggle consumes the ABRI's attention and energies. Because of the lack of cohesion, the ABRI will be much

less effective as a political force. Its social influence will remain strong although this is divided along political lines. In addition, the pro-reform officers increasingly call for the ABRI to shed its sociopolitical role with more fence-sitters splitting to join the pro-reform and anti-reform groups.

This model will be consistent with the scenario of a chaotic democracy described in the previous chapter. It is similar to the impasse option discussed in chapter three except that the observed gridlock is a result of both external political developments and internal political struggle. Such a model, although abhorred by the present ABRI leadership, may not be too remote from reality in the future if the current political process slides to further chaos. Conviction of the officers involved in the abduction of political activists during the May 1998 student demonstrations, evidence of organized violence revealing the hidden hand of the ABRI, and Wiranto's cautious moves in reshuffling his senior officers are indications of such a possibility.

Model C: Partial Handback of ABRI's Sociopolitical Role--Sidelined ABRI

In this model, the assumption of power by influential political parties, the stabilization of the political processes in the country, and rising call both internally and externally for the ABRI to return to the barracks together push the ABRI off the center stage of politics. However, internal resistance to such a development prevents a full handback of the ABRI's political role in the timeframe under consideration. The ABRI's social role will be diminished correspondingly and will be filled by other institutions put in place by the new government. This model will pave the way for the full relinquishment of the ABRI's sociopolitical role in the more distant future.

This model is consistent with the scenario of a liberal political transformation described in the previous chapter. It is differentiated from the limited handback option discussed in chapter three in that the political developments are somewhat beyond the ABRI's control. This model will see the greatest reduction in the ABRI's sociopolitical role. While the maturation of the nation's political process weakens the legitimacy of the ABRI's sociopolitical involvement, the concern for the loss of its economic interests must somehow be assuaged by the government in order for the military to submit to civilian authority without fear of a military revolt.

The Role of the ABRI in the Post-Suharto Era

The next section outlines and compares the component roles of the ABRI in accordance with the three models of sociopolitical role (see table 3).³ For the period under consideration, it is assumed that the total resources, in terms of time, finances, and manpower available to the ABRI will not change significantly. In most instances, the availability of resources will therefore be a limiting factor, which constrains the expansion of a component role without a corresponding reduction in another component role. For instance, the ABRI cannot remain internally focused while expanding its external mission without an overall increase in resources committed.

The ABRI's business involvement is likely to remain substantial in the future for two of the models. This is one aspect of the ABRI's role that will be most resistant to change. Even with instituted control in the third model for the ABRI's businesses at the corporate and unit levels, business involvement at the personal level, such as facilitation, will remain substantial until corruption in society could be completely eradicated.

Table 3. Component Roles of the ABRI

Component Role	Model A: Kingmaker	Model B: Gridlock	Model C: Partial Handback
Business Involvement	Substantial. Still a main source of income and financial support.	Substantial but less effective because of weakened sociopolitical influence.	Limited at the corporate and unit levels. Still substantial at the personal level. Government budget for the military has to increase correspondingly.
Internal Security	Likely to continue to demand much of the ABRI's attention and efforts unless resolution of the status of the secessionist states of East Timor, Irian Jaya and Aceh could be reached.	Similar to Model A. However, divided views of the government reduce the effectiveness in the control of secessionist elements.	Similar to Model A. In addition, a less centralized government may be more willing to grant an autonomous status acceptable to the secessionist elements.
Law Enforcement	Likely to engross much of the ABRI's attention and efforts in the near term. Separation of the police force from the ABRI may be deferred until normalcy in society could be restored. The military may still be used as a tool for suppressing political dissidents.	Likely to continue to be a focus for the ABRI's efforts. Because of factionalism, breakaway of the police force could occur earlier than the return to normalcy in society.	Law enforcement will be a separate function. The military will cease to be a tool for suppressing political dissidents.
External Defense	Likely to take second place so long as the military remains internally focused. Emphasis for defense build-up will increase gradually over time.	Unfocused because of disunity. The military will be muddling through in developing its defense capability.	Increased focus on defense. Rise of professionalism in the ABRI observed, which will in turn push for less involvement in sociopolitical affairs and law enforcement.
Peacekeeping Missions	Maintained at current level of involvement.	No emphasis in these because of preoccupation with in-fighting.	Likely to increase commitment in these, especially to lend legitimacy to the existence of the military and to demonstrate its role as a key player in the region and the world.

Nevertheless, any reduction in the ABRI's sociopolitical influence is likely to decrease its level of business involvement.

Until such time as the status of the secessionist regions of East Timor, Irian Jaya, and Aceh are resolved, the ABRI will continue to be heavily engrossed in the tasks of enforcing internal security. The recent strife in these areas has compelled the ABRI to send troops back to these regions despite President Habibie's pledge to withdraw all combat troops when he first took over presidency. However, the prospect for increased autonomy of these regions is brighter now than before. With the resolution of these issues, the ABRI will retain its internal security role although its actual involvement in this will be much reduced.

Although the ABRI has announced the decision to separate the police force, this has yet to take effect. The many incidents of lawlessness have consumed the ABRI's energies for the moment.⁴ As mentioned in the previous chapter, the ABRI's concern with law enforcement, especially during the period surrounding the general election, has prompted it to reinforce its law enforcement teams with the formation of a civilian militia.⁵ The ABRI will remain engaged in law enforcement activities until the stabilization in the social condition, which will then offer a reprieve for it to objectively appraise and redefine its future role in this area. For all three models, the use of the military as a tool for suppressing political dissidents on the pretext of maintaining social order will become decreasingly viable in the future.

The ABRI will want to improve its defense capability as soon as the economic condition allows based on three considerations. First, it recognizes the need to be able to counter any potential threat to its sovereignty regardless of whether such a threat actually

exists now. In its second white paper⁶ in 1997, it identified China as the main potential threat to the region and Indonesia's sovereignty. It assessed that continued successful economic growth would increase China's power, while failure could lead to a flood of refugees into Southeast Asia. Either way, the ABRI needs to be strong enough to stand up to such potential threats in the future. As soon as Indonesia emerges from the current economic gloom, it will have to catch up militarily with its potential adversaries. Second, the ABRI also recognizes the considerable challenge to effective protection posed by its vast expanse of land and maritime territories. Fish poaching, piracy, and freedom of navigation are security issues which will have to be dealt with. Third, it is logical for Indonesia to desire a role in regional and international affairs that is more commensurate with its size and population. To do so, it would have to improve its military as the nation's instrument of power. The three models represent varying degrees in which the ABRI is able to fulfill its desire for defense build-up. Short of a drastic change in threat perception, the ABRI may only significantly increase its focus and efforts on defense with a substantial reduction in its sociopolitical involvement.

Finally, there may also be an increase in participation by the ABRI in peacekeeping missions corresponding to a reduction in its involvement in sociopolitical affairs and internal security. While participation in peacekeeping missions will unlikely be a key focus for the military, the ABRI will seek to expand its participation in these missions. This is partly to demonstrate its role as a key player in regional and global affairs; and partly to lend legitimacy to the existence of the military especially if the ABRI's involvement in internal missions is substantially reduced.

Indicators

Having postulated models for the ABRI's future role, it is next useful to consider the key events which can indicate the realization of these models in the future. Each of these events on its own will not conclusively indicate the future direction for the ABRI's role. However, considered as a whole, they may give fair indications of what the future will be like. These indicators include the following:

Outcome of the general and presidential election in June 1999 and November 1999 respectively. The importance of a peaceful election process cannot be overemphasized. A fair election is very much needed to restore public confidence in the political processes of the country. None of the scenarios for the future political landscape identified in the previous chapter may be fully realized with this election. Nevertheless, the outcome of the coming election will set the stage for future political developments.

Open discord within the ABRI. This may be deduced from the public statements of key ABRI figures. Because it is unusual in Indonesian or Javanese culture, particularly in the hierarchical military, to adopt an openly confrontational stance, one would most probably have to discern any significant discord within the ABRI from inconsistencies among the public statements.

Formation of an alliance of the ABRI with certain political groups. This may occur before and after the general election although the ABRI currently proclaims a non-aligned stance.⁷

Leadership change in the ABRI. This may result in a shift in the ABRI's position with regard to its proclaimed political neutrality and the reform of its sociopolitical role.

Public announcements by the ABRI on its role or organizational changes. The ABRI may be forced to announce further restructuring of its roles and functions in exchange for support from students who have been most critical of its sociopolitical involvement.

Table 4. Roadmap Relating Indicators to Possible Models

Indicator	Development / Outcome*	Possible Model
General election and presidential election	Victorious ABRI-supported or pro-ABRI political groups.	Kingmaker
	Chaotic outcome; divided control by political groups.	Gridlock
	Emergence of strong coalition of anti-ABRI political groups.	Partial Handback
Open discord within ABRI	Publicized minor clashes between key ABRI personalities.	Gridlock
	Severe opposition between ABRI factions.	Wild Cards
Formation of alliance with political groups	Formation of single alliance with dominant political group or coalition.	Kingmaker
	Formation of several alliances with various political groups.	Gridlock
Leadership change in ABRI (This refers to significant change in outlook on ABRI's role.)	Inability of new leader to hold ABRI together.	Gridlock
	Strong advocacy by new leader for an apolitical stance for the military.	Partial handback
	Strong political ambition displayed by new leader	Wild Cards
Public announcements on role and organizational changes.	Restriction of ABRI's role in sociopolitical affairs.	Partial Handback
	Assertion of greater political control.	Wild Cards

* This is only indicative but not definitive of the future form of the ABRI's role. Many events may interact and together shape the development of the future role.

Nearly all the indicators listed above relate to developments within the ABRI or specific actions taken by the ABRI. However, it is important to note that this list of indicators is not exhaustive. It is impossible to foretell all events that may affect changes in the ABRI's role. There may well be other unexpected events that can challenge the

assumptions upon which the viability of the three possible models is based.⁸ A simplified roadmap relating the indicators to the possible models is illustrated in table 4. Figure 6 further depicts how the events are linked to a particular model.




Figure 6. Linkage between Indicators and Models

Wild Cards

The three models described are based in large measure on analyses of the trends of democratization prevalent in Indonesia. There are, however, a number of potential "wild cards"--unforeseen events that could cause a major discontinuity in the process of democratization or fundamental change in threat perception, both internal and external,

by the ABRI. Three wild cards are identified; the first two are based on changes in the internal situation while the third is based on changes in the external situation.

Wild Card One: Imposition of Nation-Wide Emergency Rule or Martial Law

If the Indonesian society slides further into chaos and lawlessness, the ABRI may be forced to impose nation-wide emergency rule or martial law to prevent the nation from descending into anarchy.⁹ This scenario may not seem too far-fetched if the general election in June 1999 fails to yield a fair outcome as perceived by the public in general or if dissatisfied political parties reject the election results and incite more social unrest and violence. The ABRI's sociopolitical influence will have to increase as long as emergency rule, or martial law, is in effect. The overall effect will be to set back the process of democratization in Indonesia and delay the realization of any of the models described in the preceding paragraphs.

Wild Card Two: Military Coup

This is largely an extension of the preceding scenario. The need to stem the slide into further social unrest together with the perceived incompetence of the newly elected government provides the justification for the ABRI to seize control. The ABRI Chief, General Wiranto, has repeatedly stressed the ABRI's support for the constitutional process. He also revealed having passed up the chance to seize control when he was conferred the authority by President Suharto to take actions necessary to quell the unrest. It appeared that Wiranto's sense of loyalty to Suharto had made him unwilling to overthrow his former mentor. Wiranto has also openly expressed support for Habibie's

presidency despite the ABRI's initial uneasiness with the latter's appointment. Realizing the need to stabilize the situation in Indonesia economically, socially, and politically, Wiranto has consistently conveyed a sense of predictability for the ABRI. He has also displayed his lack of ambition to be the king and contentment to be the kingmaker for the time being. However, the elected government and president in the future may not command the same loyalty from the ABRI without the president or influential members of the parliament being former senior ABRI officers. Furthermore, the new ABRI Chief or senior officers of key factions in the future may harbor a greater desire for the nation's top post. The ABRI or a faction of the ABRI may then launch a coup to seize control. The new government may be a veto regime or an authoritarian clientelism similar to that observed during the New Order era. Like the earlier scenario, this will only further set back the process of democratization in the country.

Wild Card Three: Significant Change in the Regional Geopolitical Situation

The first two wild cards concern unexpected changes within Indonesia. A third wild card is derived from unforeseen upheaval in the regional geopolitical situation, which results in a corresponding change in the ABRI's threat perception. This will compel the ABRI to focus its efforts more on defense and countering external threats at the expense of its internal mission, particularly its sociopolitical role. Examples of such a change to the geopolitical situation in the future could include the escalation of regional disputes to the threat of use of force; and action by a regional power, such as China or Japan, which confirms its malignant intention on other regional countries. Indonesia may be able to use such a situation to imbue nationalism and unify the country behind a

common cause. As long as the malignant threat perception persists, the ABRI may be compelled to shift its focus from internal to external missions. In addition, the chances for partial or full handback of the ABRI's sociopolitical control to civilians will be enhanced.

Conclusion

There are still great uncertainties surrounding the economic, social, and political developments in Indonesia. This chapter has highlighted a range of some possible future forms of the ABRI's role that may emerge from the current uncertainties. Barring any wild cards which may set back the process of democratization in the post-Suharto era, this thesis has identified varying degrees of reduction in the ABRI's sociopolitical role consistent with the different scenarios for Indonesia's future political landscape. This thesis has also identified the indicators and a roadmap linking the indicators to the possible models.

¹Even Wiranto himself admitted much later in March 1999 that the military could have taken power if it wanted to in May 1998 as former President Suharto had granted him special powers to quell unrest and restore stability in the country. He made the disclosure to refute allegations that the military intended to take advantage of the on-going political turbulence and wanted greater power for itself. See "I Could Have Seized Power, Says Wiranto," *The Straits Times* (Singapore), 6 March 1999.

²This number has been reduced from seventy-five to thirty-eight. See "MPs agree to 38 ABRI seats in New House," *The Straits Times* (Singapore), 28 January 1999.

³A consistent set of component roles is listed in the table for each of the models. There can, of course, be other permutations of these component roles.

⁴For instance, the ABRI Chief announced in March 1999 the dispatch of a special team, comprising officers from the Army Strategic Command (Kostrad), Air Force Special Command (Paskhas) and marines. The team is expected to restore peace and order to the strife-torn Ambon. Ambon, the capital of Maluku province, has witnessed the continuous outbreak of conflicts between Christian and Muslim groups since January 19, 1999. The ABRI is reported to have sent four thousand troops, mostly from Java, to

Ambon since the outbreak. See "ABRI Sends Special Team to Ambon," *Tempo* (Jakarta), 11 March 1999; available from <http://www.tempo.co.id/harian/include/index.asp?file=08031999-jp-1>; Internet; accessed 12 March 1999.

⁵As of 4 March 1999, a total of six thousands civilians have been recruited to form the civilian militia, People's Security (Kamra), to help enforce law and order during the June 1999 general election. See "3,000 More Recruited for Civilian Militia," *Tempo* (Jakarta), 4 March 1999; available from <http://www.tempo.co.id>; Internet; accessed 5 March 1999.

⁶Charles E. Morton, *Asia Pacific Security Outlook 1998* (Tokyo: Japan Center for International Exchange, 1998), 58-64.

⁷The ABRI Chief, General Wiranto said in March 1999 that the ABRI was committed to being neutral and not supporting any party in the June 7 election. See "I Could Have Seized Power, Says Wiranto," *The Straits Times* (Singapore), 6 March 1999.

⁸These are the "wild cards" discussed in subsequent sections of this chapter.

⁹The ABRI Chief, General Wiranto has rejected calls to impose emergency laws in some regions to quell unrest, citing the negative psychological and economic impact of such an action. See "Top Brass Born in Maluku to Quell Riots," *The Straits Times* (Singapore), 8 March 1999.

CHAPTER SIX

CONCLUSIONS

The military's involvement in Indonesia's sociopolitical affairs has long been a contentious issue both internal and external to the ABRI. During the New Order era, the ABRI had substantial political power but was controlled and effectively used by Suharto as an instrument to deal with security concerns and political dissidence in the country. Suharto's repressive rule was resented but tolerated by the masses as long as the country enjoyed unprecedented economic growth. Hence, opposition to the ABRI's *dwi fungsi* in the past had never been strong enough to bring about significant change to this role. The Asian financial crisis which struck Indonesia in 1997 caused widespread economic hardship and great dissatisfaction with Suharto's leadership. It brought to the fore the undercurrent of resentment with Suharto's rule which was characterized by nepotism, cronyism, and corruption. The demise of authoritarian rule ushered in the post-Suharto era along with a groundswell of expectation for more democratization, political reform, and devolution of the military from sociopolitical affairs. This thesis has analyzed the various factors affecting the ABRI's sociopolitical role to postulate its future role.

Literature Survey and Research Methodology

The literature survey revealed the considerable challenge faced in researching a topic on a future role and uncovered a gap in literary work on the subject. It helped formulate the research methodology used and identify the different factors affecting the ABRI's sociopolitical role examined subsequently in the thesis. Most importantly, it

helped focus the thesis in deriving possible models of the ABRI's future role in the post-Suharto era. Simply put, the research methodology is a broad qualitative analysis of the past, present, and possibly future events and trends in order to draw conclusions about the likely development of the ABRI's role in the future. Furthermore, the research design established a roadmap to ensure complete coverage of each of the identified sub-topics in the thesis.

Factors Influencing ABRI's Sociopolitical Role

The next section recapitulates the main conclusions drawn from the analysis of the factors affecting the sociopolitical role. First, historical considerations are assessed to have a significant impact on the future evolution of the ABRI's sociopolitical role. The ABRI has a long history of participation in the sociopolitical affairs of Indonesia. It did not begin with an apolitical orientation and its sociopolitical involvement has been rather deeply entrenched in the culture of the ABRI and the nation as a whole. History has provided justification for the ABRI's continued involvement. Second, the ABRI as a whole has been concerned about the legitimacy of its involvement in sociopolitical affairs. It saw its involvement as serving a need of the nation. Publicly, it has consistently expressed strong support of the Constitution and rejected any violent overthrow of the government. This concern about legitimacy will likely restrain the ABRI from enlarging its sociopolitical role.

The current processes of political reform and particularly the outcome of the general and presidential elections will set the stage for Indonesia's political developments for the next five to ten years. Different political groups will either attempt to co-opt the

support of the ABRI to shore up their political power bases or denounce the ABRI's meddling in sociopolitical affairs. The political development in Indonesia will significantly affect the ABRI's sociopolitical role. Although the exact involvement of the ABRI in the changeover of the presidency in May 1998 is yet unknown, the ABRI's support was observed to be crucial and has been a key source of strength to the president.

The ABRI had extensive business involvement in the past. This involvement provided an important supplement to the soldiers' meager income and a significant source of the defense budget. Democratization and economic reform will push for greater transparency and accountability in businesses which could hurt the ABRI's interests. The ABRI will naturally resist this process unless the economy improves and greater funds are allocated by the government for remuneration and defense development. On the other hand, the continuation of its sociopolitical role will facilitate the ABRI's business involvement.

Externally, the pressure from social forces played a key role in the toppling of Suharto's presidency. It is presently the key factor pushing for political reform and devolution of the ABRI's sociopolitical role. Continued economic hardship will increase this pressure. In addition, external state and non-state actors influenced the political and economic reforms in Indonesia. Many influential state actors have civilian control over the military. Through greater interaction with these state actors, Indonesia's perception of its military involvement in politics will be affected. A probable effect will be the adjustment of the military role to one that is more in line with the international norm. Of the non-state actors, organizations such as the IMF are assessed to have a greater influence on Indonesia than others such as human rights groups. Internally, the ABRI is

divided along ideological lines and in its differing support for political and military reform. A more pronounced division will weaken the ABRI as a whole while the dominant position taken by the ABRI will shape its perspective toward the reform of its sociopolitical role. The position taken by the ABRI's leadership may be a decisive factor in determining the direction of this reform.

The increased social unrest has absorbed much of the ABRI's attention and energy. This will distract the ABRI from a serious reform of its sociopolitical role when its social influence may be needed to quell the unrest. However, a dilemma for the ABRI is evident when certain segments of society resent its meddling in social affairs. The separation of the police force from the ABRI is apparently deferred until stabilization in the presently observed social strife. The maintenance of internal security is another preoccupation for the ABRI. The ABRI's involvement is rejected by secessionist groups because of its past repressive methods. The demands of law enforcement and internal security will compel the ABRI to be internally focused.

Finally, external threat perception will probably remain benign for the next five to ten years. The resulting sanguine outlook will allow the ABRI to continue to focus on internal missions. Conversely a malign threat perception will force the ABRI to divert more attention to external missions given the finite resources available to it. Its sociopolitical involvement may then be correspondingly reduced.

It can be seen from the above discussion that many factors exist which will influence the ABRI's sociopolitical role in the future. These factors interact with one another and have an uneven impact on the change to the role. Some will act to maintain a significant sociopolitical role while others will push for a reduction in this role. Historical

influence, political reform, business involvement, ABRI's leadership, and social forces are assessed to have greater impact on the redefinition of the sociopolitical role than the other factors discussed. Together these factors form the bases for postulating the possible models of the ABRI's future role.

Possible Forms of the ABRI's Future Role

Based on the assumptions of a continuation in the process of democratization and a benign threat perception, this thesis has identified three distinct possible models. The models encompass varying degrees of change to the ABRI's sociopolitical role. Within each model, the associated broad changes to the other component roles, including business, internal security, law enforcement, external defense, and peacekeeping are also highlighted. The three models are:

Model A: The ABRI assumes the role of a kingmaker.

Model B: The ABRI is embroiled in a political gridlock.

Model C: The ABRI partially hands back control of sociopolitical matters to civilian politicians.

Considering the ability of the ABRI to protect its own interests, model A will be most desirable to the ABRI. Model B is potentially unstable and may, in the worst case, lead to further social and political chaos. Short of a complete devolution from sociopolitical affairs, model C will be most acceptable to most social groups unless, in model A, sufficient stabilization and economic recovery take place to redress the social dissatisfaction.

Some "wild cards" are also identified when the assumptions for the postulation of the models are challenged. These include:

Wild Card One: Imposition of nation-wide emergency rule or martial law.

Wild Card Two: Military coup.

Wild Card Three: Drastic change in regional geopolitical situation.

The first two wild cards represent the possible outcome of the worst-case scenario of Indonesia's further descent into social and political chaos. The overall effect of these would be to set back the process of democratization and delay the realization of any of the possible models for the ABRI's future role. The third wild card may be observed with a significant change in external threat perception. In this scenario, Indonesia deems itself to be severely threatened by an external power such that the armed forces would need to shift the focus from internal missions to defense build-up.

Regional Perspective on the New ABRI

By virtue of its size and population, Indonesia has been a dominant player in regional affairs. The Asian economic crisis has shown the inter-dependence of the regional and even of global economies. As the Indonesian archipelago straddles the vital sea lines of communication and trade routes, regional countries are also wary of other fallout from Indonesia's unstable conditions, such as an increase in illegal immigrants and piracies. Based on these considerations, most regional countries will desire a stabilization of the economic, social, and political conditions in Indonesia. Therefore, models A and C, which could bring about these conditions, will be more desirable to most nations. Both models will also ensure greater predictability in government-to-government and military-

to-military relations. In addition, a more professionally oriented Indonesian military with reduced involvement in sociopolitical affairs (model C) may pave the way for greater regional security cooperation, particularly within the ASEAN. Given the interest in stability, regional countries will continue to closely watch and, if possible, influence the economic, social, and political developments in Indonesia. The role of the military, which has so far been intimately tied to these developments, will continue to generate interest both within Indonesia and the region.

Further Research Questions

This thesis has examined the possible broad directions of change of the ABRI's role. The conclusions arrived at in this thesis may form the bases for further research. The related research questions that could be further studied include:

What are the associated changes in force structure of the ABRI as a result of the change in its sociopolitical and other component roles?

How will the overall change in the ABRI's role in the future influence the regional geopolitical situation?

GLOSSARY

- ABRI. *Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia*. Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia. It currently comprises the army, air force, navy, and the police force.
- ASEAN. Association of Southeast Asian Nations. It includes Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Brunei, Vietnam, Laos and Myanmar.
- DPR. *Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat*. People's Representative Council. The House of Representatives in Indonesian government. This 500-member body meets annually. In the New Order era, seventy-five seats were allocated to military representatives who were appointed at the recommendation of the ABRI. The justification was that since members of the armed forces could not take part in elections, their political rights as a sociopolitical and defense force were served through guaranteed DPR seats. In the post-Suharto era, the MPR has decided to reduce this number from seventy-five to thirty-eight.
- Dwi fungsi*. The "dual function doctrine" by which the armed forces claim a right to participate in social and political affairs as well as in defense and security.
- Golkar. *Golongan Karya*. Functional Groups. The de facto ruling party organized around functional groups in society in the New Order era.
- Hijau*. Green. The color of Islam. The term is used to describe Islam-oriented officers within the ABRI.
- Kodam. *Komando Daerah Militer*. Military Area Command. The ABRI currently has ten Military Area Commands, each covering a region of Indonesia.
- Kodim. *Komando Distrik Militer*. Military District Command. Most Kodims are subordinate to a Korem.
- Kopassus. *Komando Pasukan Khusus*. Special Forces Command. One of the major operational commands. The command of special forces is normally retained at the highest level because its primary role is strategic intelligence gathering and special, often covert, operations at home and overseas.
- Korem. *Komando Resort Militer*. Military Resort Command. There are a total of thirty-nine Military Resort Commands. These are the subordinate headquarters to the Kodam. Each Korem commands about seven Kodims.
- Kostrad. *Komando Strategis Angkatan Darat*. Army Strategic Command. It comprises two infantry divisions and an independent airborne brigade and functions as a central reserve force.

Merah-putih. Red-white. The colors of the Indonesian flag. This term is used to describe the nationalist officers within the ABRI.

MPR. Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat. People's Consultative Assembly. The highest constitutional body which meets every five years. In the New Order era, the MPR had one thousand seats, five hundreds of which were assigned to the members of the DPR. Of the other five hundred seats, about one hundred were reserved for representatives of professional groups, and about one hundred and fifty seats were held by delegates elected by provincial-level legislative assemblies. The balance of seats were assigned after the DPR elections on a proportional basis to the representatives of the political parties, depending on their respective membership in the DPR. In the post-Suharto era, the MPR will be reduced to seven hundred and fifty seats.

Pancasila. Panca (five) and *sila* (principle). The state ideology based on five interrelated principles: belief in one supreme God; just and civilized humanity; nationalism as expressed in the unity of Indonesia; popular sovereignty arrived at through deliberation and representation or consultative democracy; and social justice for all Indonesian people. The Pancasila was announced by Sukarno on 1 June 1945.

Pangab. Panglima ABRI. Commander-in-Chief ABRI. The Pangab answers directly to the president, who is the Supreme Commander, and is in charge of the preparedness and employment of the ABRI.

PDI. Partai Demokrasi Indonesia. Indonesia Democratic Party. The PDI was created from a fusion of the two Christian parties: the Indonesia Christian Party and the Catholic Party; and three secular parties: the Indonesia Nationalist Party, the League of the Supporters of Indonesian Independence, and the Party of the Masses. These parties had no common ideological link other than the commitment to the Pancasila.

PKI. Partai Komunis Indonesia. Indonesian Communist Party. The PKI was outlawed when Suharto assumed power.

PPP. Partai Persatuan Pembangunan. United Development Party. After the forced amalgamation, the PPP comprised Nahdatul Ulama, the Muslim Party of Indonesia, the Islamic Association Party of Indonesia, and the Islamic Educational Movement.

Sishankamrata. Sistem Pertahanan Keamanan Rakyat Semesta. Total people's defense and security system. This seeks to mobilize the whole nation together with global and regional support for defense. Sishankamrata also provides for internal security and regime maintenance.

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

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
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