

STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This document may not be released for open publication until it has been cleared by the appropriate military service or government agency.

SHOULD THE U.S. ARMY ESTABLISH A PEACEKEEPING TRAINING CENTER?

BY

DANIEL P. POSSUMATO

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A:

Approved for public release.

Distribution is unlimited.

USAWC CLASS OF 1999

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA 17013-5050



USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**SHOULD THE U.S. ARMY ESTABLISH
A PEACEKEEPING TRAINING CENTER?**

By

Daniel P. Possumato

Colonel Robert M. Stewart
Project Advisor

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This document may not be released for open publication until it has been cleared by the appropriate military service or government agency.

U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A:
Approved for public release.
Distribution is unlimited.

ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Daniel P. Possumato

TITLE: Should the U.S. Army Establish a Peacekeeping Training Center?

FORMAT: Strategy Research Project

DATE: 22 March 1999 PAGES: 34 CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

This paper explores the notion that as multinational peacekeeping operations have evolved since the end of the cold war, the United States Army has increasingly participated in military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW), usually under complex and politically sensitive circumstances. While there are now a host of publications related to peacekeeping operations, such as Field Manual (FM) 100-23, Peace Operations, and the Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations, peacekeeping itself is not viewed as a separate mission requiring the integration of specialized preparation into existing training programs. It is very much viewed as a mission to be prepared for utilizing *just enough* and *just in time* procedures, as stated in FM 100-23. This paper discusses the likelihood of increased U.S. involvement in peacekeeping operations, and the references to such an assumption contained in national policy and strategy documents. The lack of a serious, Army-wide process to developing a systematic, integrated approach to soldier skill development in the many and diverse areas of MOOTW is also discussed. Finally, the paper proposes the establishment of a permanent U.S. Army Peacekeeping Training Center and a Peacekeeping Training Module to enable soldiers and leaders at all levels to become better equipped with the knowledge and skills specifically related to modern peacekeeping operations.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT.iii
INTRODUCTION	1
LACK OF AN INTEGRATED TRAINING PROGRAM	2
WHAT U.S. PEACEKEEPERS THEMSELVES HAVE SAID	7
NEED FOR SOLDIERS TO UNDERSTAND THE POLITICAL AND CULTURAL COMPLEXITY OF CONTEMPORARY PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS.	12
PEACE OPERATIONS DOCTRINE AND TRAINING IS NOT VERY HELPFUL AS CURRENTLY PACKAGED	13
WHAT SHOULD BE DONE TO BETTER PREPARE OUR SOLDIERS FOR PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS?	21
CONCLUSION	23
RECOMMENDATIONS	24
ENDNOTES	29
BIBLIOGRAPHY	33

INTRODUCTION

The U.S. military has experienced many successes, and some would argue a few failures, in its post-Cold War peace operational deployments. Most U.S. military analysts would certainly agree with the statement, contained in the first Bosnia-Herzegovina After Action Review (BHAAR I) of the initial deployment of U.S. troops to Bosnia, that "peace operations are here to stay and the U.S. Army will be called upon to all corners of the globe to bring stability to chaos, order to anarchy, and peace to conflict."¹

Smaller-scale contingencies, which include peacekeeping operations (PKO), will likely pose the most frequent challenge for U.S. forces and cumulatively require significant commitments over time.² Since 1993, U.S. forces have been extensively involved in peacekeeping operations such as in Macedonia, Haiti, Somalia, and Bosnia. Yet the rank-and-file participants in these operations, enlisted and officers alike, had either scant training in peacekeeping operations or none at all, and were in many cases inadequately prepared for what they encountered in these Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW). For example, during my six months in Bosnia during 1996-97 as a member of Operation Joint Endeavor, many noncommissioned officers and several battalion commanders informed me that they were insufficiently prepared for the mission they encountered. Army

doctrine and training is focused on how to fight and win wars, not on how to keep the peace. However, the recent frequency of peacekeeping missions in which the U.S. has participated indicates a need for such training. Like it or not, peacekeeping has become a routine mission for American military forces, yet it is looked upon by many in the Army as something of a distracter to be endured, taking away time and resources from warfighting training. The very nature of true peacekeeping procedures and requirements is contrary to the current military mindset. Soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines prefer to think of themselves as warriors, not policemen.

LACK OF AN INTEGRATED TRAINING PROGRAM

The Army's Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) is the agency responsible for overseeing the preparation of the Army for war. TRADOC schools provide leadership and technical training. This Major Command (MACOM) is also responsible for Force XXI initiatives, Advanced Warfighting Experiments, Battle Laboratories, new equipment training, and digitization of training support products.³ The notion that armies primarily train for war, and little if anything else, is as old as armies themselves. It is not surprising that the realization that there is a systemic need for professional military training suited to peacekeeping operations has been slow to materialize. The monolithic threat posed for over fifty years by the Soviet


Union afforded the United States little opportunity to participate in such operations without a serious impact upon our ability to respond swiftly to Warsaw Pact aggression.

However, the concept of providing specialized training and preparation for units designated to participate in peacekeeping operations is increasingly seen as desirable by soldiers of units designated to actually perform such missions.⁴ Even so, evidence of the old thinking - that is, the belief that a peace operation should not be treated as a separate task - persists. The publication in December of 1994 of Field Manual (FM) 100-23, Peace Operations, offered field commanders and staffs charged with conducting peace operations at least a general guide regarding what to expect. The fact that this 131-page manual is the only comprehensive doctrinal document the Army possesses to address the concept of implementing peace operations indicates there is much room for improvement.

Indeed, this FM is well written and researched, and a thorough reading of it paradoxically illustrates the intricate complexity of the whole concept of using troops and equipment trained and equipped for combat for peacekeeping purposes. Despite this fact, the Army's philosophy is that the amount of training required, and when it should be given, are dependent upon the particular peace operation mission at hand.⁵ In fact, FM 100-23 doesn't even identify who should conduct such

training, or where. In other words, in spite of the National Security Strategy's assertion that peacekeeping operations will be the most frequent challenge for U.S. forces for the foreseeable future, BHAAR I asserts that the Army still believes an *ad hoc* approach to training units for such missions is adequate to the task.⁶ This is all the more reason to expect that the Army should establish a peacekeeping training program that can be delivered to any unit in the world designated to participate in a peacekeeping mission.

A diagram referred to as the "Jumping the Fence" chart illustrates the role of U.S. Army forces engaged in peacekeeping operations.⁷



This chart is in no way complete, as many other factors such as roads, power plants, police training, and infrastructure revitalization could have been included. The chart simply attempts to show that U.S. Army peacekeeping forces bring with them the attributes, familiarity, and expectations indicated to the left of the wall. However, once involved in peacekeeping missions, these forces learn they often must also engage in providing for some or all of the items listed to the right of the wall, for which they are usually ill-prepared.⁸

Additionally, during a peacekeeping mission, forces are often required to repeatedly jump back and forth over the wall, depending upon the situations in theater. For example, a peacekeeping force may need to perform armed convoy escort and be ready to use deadly force under the applicable Rules of Engagement (ROE), while still implementing all other aspects listed to the right of the wall. But even so "every soldier must be aware that the goal is to produce conditions that are conducive to peace and not to the destruction of an enemy."⁹ It is difficult for soldiers to constantly shift from thinking and acting as warriors to being peacekeepers, and psychological preparation for this dual-natured situation should be part of any PKO training program.

There is no prescribed training prior to peacekeeping missions designed to assist soldiers in adjusting their Army-

instilled tendency towards aggressiveness when actually engaged in a mission to one of restraint. In 1994, the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) published a report on Operation Able Sentry, the US peacekeeping operation in Macedonia. This report noted the contrast between the aggressiveness inculcated in US soldiers and the non-confrontational attitudes of the Nordic troops participating in the same mission. The troops from Norway, Sweden, Finland, and Denmark were trained in United Nations peacekeeping methods that emphasizes use of minimum force. The Scandinavians boasted that if due to circumstances a Nordic sergeant thought willingly surrendering the weapons of his soldiers and allowing them to be arrested was regrettably expedient to the mission, he would do so. This is contrary to US soldiers' adherence to the Military Code of Conduct, and the CALL report noted this stark difference in the two approaches as just one potential problem in multinational PKO that training could address.¹⁰

It is generally agreed that when judged against the criteria set forth in the Dayton Peace Agreement, NATO Implementation Force (IFOR) commanders in Bosnia met their military objectives within the first 120 days of the mission. However, modern complex contingencies can end "only when the total civil-military team has finished its work."¹¹ The bulk of

this work, in time and effort, constitutes the essence of peacekeeping.

WHAT U.S. PEACEKEEPERS THEMSELVES HAVE SAID

Both Bosnia-Herzegovina After Action Reviews (BHAAR I and BHAAR II) identified several themes that were judged to be of critical importance to future peacekeeping operations. The idea that the Army continues to view each operation as a stand-alone mission "promotes a narrow focus which inhibits institutional memory from being applied to, and reinforced from, a particular operation."¹²

An analysis of After Action Reviews (AAR) from Army peacekeeping missions in Rwanda (Support Hope), Bosnia-Herzegovina (Joint Endeavor), and Somalia (Restore Hope) identified the commonalties in the following areas related to the need for more formalized preparation prior to execution of peacekeeping missions.

● **Better Integration of Effort**

When the U.S. participates in a peacekeeping operation, it is usually in conjunction with a United Nations or other multinational coalition force. The complexity of these operations is such that a single nation or organization cannot meet all the requirements of an international peacekeeping intervention. The "operational methods, styles, and

responsibilities of...agencies vary considerably from U.S. military procedures."¹³ The need to better acquaint U.S. personnel with these different procedures before actual deployment is a prudent goal. Participating nations, indeed even other American military services, have doctrinal differences from our Army which must be addressed in order to facilitate mission execution in the theater of operations. There is currently no proponent within the Army that responsible to provide a basic orientation on United Nations or other multinational peacekeeping operations procedures and doctrine. U.S. Army doctrine is designed to render traditional military solutions to traditional military problems. "...there is little or no doctrinal recognition of the fact that peace and stability operations are primarily multinational, political, and psychological in nature."¹⁴

● Training with Relief and Other Civilian Agencies

U.S. military preparation for participation in PKO should include training with nongovernment organizations (NGOs) and International Organizations (IOs) to preclude "meeting on the dance floor."¹⁵ Aside from an exercise in February 1999 involving the 25th Infantry Division, there have been no other peace operations exercises conducted at the Combat Training Centers (CTC) involving civilian organizations since 1994, and

the elimination of this training was deemed a mistake by participants in BHAAR I.¹⁶ Army planners usually do not even know how to contact NGOs/IOs during the planning process.¹⁷

Military forces employed in PKO should collaborate and coordinate with NGOs also involved in the mission prior to arrival in theater, as both parties have an appropriate role to play in daily peacekeeping operations.¹⁸ Most NGOs are able to maintain much organizational autonomy when executing their mission during a PKO, "that allows them to act when and where they want, they are not used to external direction to other organizations let alone the possibility that they could be political players."¹⁹ They are also not used to being held to any kind of accountability to outside organizations, especially by the military in a field environment. Introduction to the way NGOs are organized, their varied functions, and their political importance during PKO should be part of any peacekeeping orientation and training program.

● **Need for Specific Training**

FM 100-23 states that peacekeeping operations should not be treated as a separate task added to a unit's mission-essential task list (METL).²⁰ However, the senior-level participants from twenty-six organizations who attended both BHAAR I and BHAAR II disagreed with this assertion, and recommended adding peace

operations to the METLs of at least some Army units. This does not create PKO units, but rather units with peace operations skills.²¹ University of Alabama Professor Donald M. Snow, in a study commissioned by the U.S. Army War College completed in February 1993, has cautioned the Army about thinking peacekeeping missions are just extensions of what the Army does, or as a parallel or compatible mission. They are not, and therefore he suggests that different approaches to training for such missions be instituted, although he offers no suggestions in this regard.²²

FM 100-23 also states that predeployment training should address the unique aspects of PKO with the assistance of Mobile Training Teams (MTTs), training support packages (TSPs), and if time permits, training at a Combat Training Center. Just who is supposed to provide such training, and how a unit notified to participate in a PKO is supposed to arrange for such training, is not addressed, nor is it defined. Lastly, this FM states that for planning purposes, 4 to 6 weeks of specialized training are required to train units selected for peace operations.²³ The basis for this timetable is not given, and it must be noted that the training of troops for Operation Joint Endeavor took 9 to 12 weeks,²⁴ and the allocated time to train troops for duty in Bosnia is even longer now.

Currently, training programs are created by various commands to support the particular mission at hand, and are often useful only for the particular rotation of officers that complete the training, since newly assigned personnel will most likely not have benefited from similar training elsewhere. There is generally no published, Army-wide use of these unit-generated curriculum materials as a program of instruction, the result being that valuable ideas are not passed on to other commands that might benefit from self-generated training programs.²⁵ The CALL-endorsed Stability Operations Mission Training Package (MTP) published by 7th Army Training Command/Combat Maneuver Training Center in Germany has "all the elements of an MTP and is very useful for units preparing for a peace operation."²⁶ This document may be useful, if sufficient copies are available, but would a battalion of the 172d Infantry Brigade (Separate) in Alaska, once alerted for a PKO mission, even know of its existence or be able to order sufficient copies for training purposes in a timely manner? I think not.


Of the PKO tasks referenced in FM 100-23, the 1st CAV Division received most of the training in these areas from the United States Army Europe, III Corps, and developed their own training within the division for the remainder. It is not practical or reasonable to expect that a future PKO mission to, say, an Asian nation would find the United States Army Pacific

(USARPAC) capable of organizing and conducting similar training on short notice.

NEED FOR SOLDIERS TO UNDERSTAND THE POLITICAL AND CULTURAL COMPLEXITY OF CONTEMPORARY PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS.

Peacekeeping operations tend to be multinational responses to primarily political agreements, meaning that "unilateral political and multilateral political and coalition considerations - rather than primarily military considerations - dominate."²⁷ Soldiers at all levels need to obtain at least a rudimentary knowledge of the country they are soon to enter, and also receive insights into just why U.S. forces are being sent there. Given the fact that coalition forces can come from many countries and bring with them varied cultural perspectives, it is critical to attempt to minimize the cultural misunderstandings which will arise between the peacekeepers and the indigenous population. Training in this area is essential for maintaining troop morale, increasing efficiency of operations, and will better prepare soldiers to deal with unexpected mission shifts. Again, there is no proponent within the Army tasked to provide such a tailored training and orientation program to PKO-bound units. It is a CINC responsibility, often exacerbated by the fact that troops executing a given PKO mission may be rotated in and out of theater from other unified commands. The question arises: which

CINC is responsible for the training, the sending or the receiving? I submit it should be an HQDA responsibility to at least develop through TRADOC an on-the-shelf training package which can be quickly augmented and adjusted for the mission at hand, regardless of which CINC actually conducts the training. The following chart highlights the many dynamics that may be associated with PKO, most of which are beyond the scope of normal soldier skills training.²⁸



PEACE OPERATIONS DOCTRINE AND TRAINING IS NOT VERY HELPFUL AS CURRENTLY PACKAGED.

There are literally hundreds, perhaps thousands, of peacekeeping training documents scattered throughout the Army.

There are even more in the possession of other organizations, both domestic and foreign, which contain valuable information and lessons learned applicable to PKO across the whole spectrum of peacekeeping operations. The UN alone has printed and distributed over 50,000 different books, manuals, and other training materials to member states and organizations.²⁹

However, there is no central repository within the Army for this type of information in a readily-available format, which means this information must often be painfully rediscovered by troops in the field - if such an effort is even attempted. The U.S Army Peacekeeping Institute (USAPKI) possesses a fair store of this type of information, as well as publishing some of its own, but the data is not integrated into a cohesive, doctrinally-approved package readily available for training purposes. The USAPKI does publish a bibliography of reference publications available on the Internet related to peacekeeping operations, but again, when units are notified they are to participate in PKO, they cannot benefit from this cumulative knowledge because there is no existing means to realistically link the information to the unit.

The United Nations website contains a National Training for Peacekeeping Database, and lists the training programs associated with PKO conducted by 65 member states. The US entry, submitted through our permanent mission to the UN, is

most interesting. It states that the Department of Defense and subordinate elements have incorporated "the study of crises and disorders arising from ethnic and political rivalries into established educational frameworks."³⁰ This UN website contains 22 courses offered by the United States under the "complete academic year" heading, yet 10 of them are electives, and 4 of the remaining 12 deal with jointness rather than peacekeeping. The point is that the majority of these courses are not required, and neither are they mainly focused on peacekeeping. These courses fill up the page on the web site, but they are misleading in that most US soldiers don't take these courses.

Also included in this site is a listing supplied by our UN mission of "peacekeeping training and courses conducted by the various institutions in the United States of America." A review of these courses, listed below, reveals that most of them are also not specific peacekeeping courses at all, nor are they available to large numbers of troops on a regular basis. Indeed, the 7 courses taught at the School of the Americas at Fort Benning are intended for foreign military participants from South America.

- a. At the Combat Maneuver Training Center, Germany:
Peace Operations Tasks Scenarios
- b. At Fort Leavenworth:
Battle Command Training Program

- c. At the Expeditionary Warfare Training Group,
Atlantic Fleet:
Military Operations Other Than War (Peace Operations)
- d. At the School of the Americas, Ft Benning, Georgia:
Civil Military Operations Course
Countermine Operations Course
Democratic Sustainment Course
Joint Operations Course
Peace Operations Course
Psychological Operations Course
Resource Management Course
- e. At the J.F. Kennedy Special Warfare Centre and School:
Individual Terrorism Awareness Course
UN Military Observer Course (MINURSO)
- f. At the USAF Special Operations School:
Africa Orientation Course
Asia-Pacific Orientation Course
Latin American Orientation Course
Middle East Orientation Course
Joint Senior Psychological Operations Course
Joint Special Operations Staff Officers Course
Cross Cultural Communications Course
Dynamics Of International Terrorism

Units replacing other units in PKO, such as the 10th Mountain Division relieving the 1st Cavalry Division in Bosnia, will rely heavily upon information provided by the in-theater force for use in their own predeployment training. New PKO in completely different areas of the world, operations with different political and humanitarian implications, are much more intimidating to the units that will be first employed. For them there will be no standard, no time-developed procedures, but there will assuredly be CNN cameras rolling from the outset,

reporting to the world the progress - or lack of progress - of U.S. forces sent in to accomplish the mission. The fact that the commander of the U.S. task force will have had to essentially prepare his unit himself for such a mission is a testimony to the Army's failure to adequately address the need for on the shelf, yet tailorable, PKO training programs.

There are numerous publications and agencies that offer scores of topics that should be covered to some degree when preparing units for PKO, depending upon the nature of the specific mission at hand. For example, Canada's Pearson Peacekeeping Centre, funded to a large degree by the Canadian government, currently offers the following resident courses at the centre's facility in Nova Scotia. All courses are 10 days duration, unless otherwise indicated.

--General Overview of Modern Peacekeeping

--Peacekeeping Management, Command and Staff Course (6 weeks)

--New Peacekeeping Partnership in Action

--Peacekeeping Negotiation and Mediation

--The Legal Framework of Modern Peacekeeping

--Refugees and Displaced Persons

--Technology & Engineering in Modern Peacekeeping

--Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration

--The Maritime Dimension of Peacekeeping

--Human Rights in Modern Peacekeeping (9 days)

Established in 1994, this more methodical approach to peacekeeping missions is readily available to Canadian forces personnel prior to their assignment to units employed in a PKO. The courses are continually revised and augmented, and the resident staff members are experts who may be contacted for consultation by Canadian military members at any time, from anywhere in the world.

FM 100-23 identifies the following topics that should be included in unit training for PKO:

- 1. Nature of peacekeeping**
- 2. Establishment of lodgments**
- 3. Performance of relief in place**
- 4. Regional orientation**
- 5. Establishment of a buffer zone**
- 6. Supervision of a truce or cease-fire**
- 7. Monitoring of boundaries**
- 8. Contributions to maintenance of law and order**
- 9. Negotiating skills**
- 10. Mine and booby-trap training and awareness**
- 11. Assistance in rebuilding of infrastructure**
- 12. Checkpoint operations**
- 13. Investigation and reporting**
- 14. Information collection**
- 15. Patrolling**

- 16. Media interrelationships**
- 17. Staff training**
- 18. Demilitarization of forces and geographical areas in a permissive environment**
- 19. Rules of Engagement**

Of these 19 topics, the 1st Cavalry Division, prior to its deployment to Bosnia for peacekeeping duty, trained itself in 15 areas, and received inadequate training in four areas (5,6,7 and 11).³¹

In spite of repeated references to the need for and importance of training, there is a deficiency in this area at virtually all levels of senior leader development. For example, there is only one specific PKO course -- Peace Operations Issues -- contained in the current U.S. Army War College (USAWC) curriculum, and it is an elective as opposed to being included in the core subject area. During academic year 1999, the enrollees in this course totaled 12 foreign military officers and only 8 U.S., plus 2 Army civilian employees.³² During the previous year, a total of only four students enrolled in the same elective, none of which was a combat arms officer. The fact that only 4 out of the approximately 280 US students of USAWC Class of 1998 actually enrolled in the Peace Operations Issues course is eye-opening testimony to the lack of interest among military leaders in signing up for these course offerings. It

seems to be the perception of the USAWC that, if PKO were indeed important enough for the Army's future leaders to learn more about, such instruction would be imbedded in the core curriculum. It would fit very appropriately into Block IV of Course 4 of the core curriculum, Implementing National Military Strategy.

The fact that peacekeeping operations is given only token inclusion in the USAWC academic program is an obvious disconnect from what the Army has been doing, given the magnitude of recent and current U.S. involvement in PKO. It is important to consider that "these are the kinds of operations that will engage American ground forces for at least the next quarter century...civil-military operations in modern complex contingencies need to be taught at every level of officers' military education system"³³

There are indications, however, that measures to change this state of affairs are being taken at the Army's Command and General Staff College located at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. There are 24 hours of instruction on MOOTW/Peacekeeping imbedded in the resident core curriculum, with five additional elective courses available as well, several of which are currently taught by a Canadian officer.³⁴

In May 1994, the U.S. Department of State published "The Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace

Operations," which among other things called for the establishment by the United Nations (UN) of a professional Peace Operations Training Program for commanders and other military and civilian personnel.³⁵ Almost five years later, the UN has not answered this call, yet the need for training continues unabated. The UN has established a Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), but as of 1996 the Training Unit within the DPKO has only a staff of nine, five of whom are military officers on loan from their governments.³⁶ The UN asserts that the training of peacekeeping personnel is primarily the responsibility of UN member states, and the Training Unit will assist these members by coordination with national training facilities. The UN DPKO is in fact being downsized to a total of 55 military positions against a requirement of 70, even though PKO are increasing in frequency.³⁷ Therefore, this UN agency continues to be of negligible benefit to the U.S. Army as far as the development of a PKO training package is concerned.

**WHAT SHOULD BE DONE TO BETTER PREPARE OUR SOLDIERS FOR
PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS?**

Clearly, the Army's efforts to prepare soldiers for participation in peacekeeping missions are not standardized or institutionalized. There needs to be a multi-pronged approach to improving the current situation. One is for our Army to affirm that civil-military operations in smaller-scale

contingencies needs to be taught throughout officers' professional development, not just through token courses, often at the senior service college level. The other initiative needs to be the establishment of a permanent peacekeeping training program, one that will be continually updated through the incorporation of real-world experiences and recent developments, developed and taught by experts, and will be available to all units selected to participate in a peacekeeping mission. This course could incorporate a broad menu of PKO lessons, from which a commanding officer could choose to provide his troops training suited to the specific mission requirements. Whether taught at a resident facility or exported to a unit's home station and taught there, this course needs to be mandatory for key staff prior to their deployment on a PKO. It should not be up to the deploying commander to design such training, as he will have enough on his schedule as it is, and he should not be expected to gather relevant and timely information on his own. Neither should he be expected to develop a program of instruction based upon his personal ideas and areas of emphasis alone. Rather it should be programmed for him by the appropriate Major Command, which also will make allowances for scheduling conflicts and obtain an exemption for less critical, yet conflicting, training requirements.

CONCLUSION

Multinational peacekeeping is an extremely complex undertaking, one that is primarily political in nature, and involves a whole host of participating organizations (NGOS, IOS, PVO, etc.) of which the average soldier has little or no knowledge. They take place on foreign soil, often in chaotic circumstances, usually in areas that most Americans know little or nothing about. A good soldier is not necessarily a good peacekeeper, since much of what he will encounter during a PKO mission will be different than anything he has previously experienced. The unofficial motto of the United Nations soldier is "Peacekeeping is not a soldier's job, but only a soldier can do it."³⁸

It is obvious that the most important ingredient for successful implementation of a peacekeeping mission is a well-trained and ready force possessing the full-range of military warfighting skills. It is also apparent that the main value of this capability is the knowledge by the former warring factions that a credible armed force is in the affected area, ready to respond militarily to any violation of the applicable peace agreement.

However, the fact remains that the overwhelming majority of missions conducted during PKO are designed to accomplish political, not military, ends. There is no single unified

training system for PKO existent at present within the U.S. Army that reaches all soldiers who will perform peacekeeping missions. Reluctance to establish a meaningful framework through which to prepare soldiers and their leaders for peacekeeping missions cannot alter the fact that the Army will continue to participate in such missions on a frequent basis. TRADOC should add selected peacekeeping tasks to units' Mission Essential Task List, which would serve as a clear message that PKO are to be taken seriously and trained for with more emphasis and consistency. It is therefore both prudent and necessary for the Army to establish a Peacekeeping Training Program to prepare our forces to more adequately participate in multinational peacekeeping missions.

While there is much activity within the Army regarding peacekeeping operations, such as USAPKI involvement in the Battle Command Training Program (BCTP), III Corps-developed materials and the Joint Regional Training Center (JRTC) Peace Operations Rotation Support, the fact remains that at battalion level most enlisted and officer personnel continue to have had little or no training in PKO.

RECOMMENDATIONS

I recommend that the Army establish a permanent Peacekeeping Training Center (PKTC), and an exportable Peacekeeping Training Program.

Establishment a permanent Peacekeeping Training Center would do much to begin to alter the way the U.S. Army prepares for participation in worldwide peacekeeping operations. The following are some of the reasons such a center is necessary:

- A permanent staff and resource library/network always available to train selected personnel, as well as assist deployed units already engaged in PKO.
- The center would serve as a focal point and central repository for all lessons learned related to PKO, regardless of which command, service, or nation published them, and would integrate these lessons into the current program of instruction, if applicable.
- The center would also publish and update useable PKO-related manuals and other publications, drawing upon the experiences of U.S and foreign military forces involved in PKO, as well as UN documents.
- The staff at such a center would constantly interact with the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations to keep abreast of member nations peacekeeping training efforts, and would be able to blend much of the information obtained into the center's existing program.
- Soldiers would begin to see peacekeeping as a legitimate, though adjunct, military mission, as

evidenced by the establishment of a facility dedicated to training in PKO.

The obvious question of "Where will the resources come from to support a Peacekeeping Training Center?" would certainly be a complex issue, which is beyond the scope of this paper. If deemed essential to the Army, funding and personnel would most likely need to be reapportioned from existing assets and programs. Physical facilities to house the center exist at many locations throughout the Army, and it would not be a problem of any consequence regarding the relatively simple matter of locating a facility. Staffing the facility with adequate military and civilian personnel would be a much tougher problem, though this would unquestionably be able to be accomplished.

An exportable Peacekeeping Training Module, without establishing a permanent center, is the second preferred option. This is a continuation of the *ad hoc* approach the Army has used to provide peacekeeping training thus far. While better than the *status quo*, it communicates to the ranks that peacekeeping skill development is not yet integrated into the training system.

Still, a module of peacekeeping training courses built around the desired skills stated in FM 100-23 could provide current, well-organized information to units preparing to engage in PKO. Such a program could be delivered to any unit anywhere

in the Army, and could be quickly tailored to the requirements of any given mission.

The G3 of the 1st Cavalry Division, currently deployed to Bosnia, agrees with the idea of developing an on-the-shelf peacekeeping training module, since it could be quickly augmented and tailored for a particular mission.³⁹ He also thinks there should be a permanent site established, and the two programs should compliment one another. Subject Matter Experts (SME) could fall in on a unit and assist in designing and evaluating unit-generated training.

An exportable PKO module would require full-time, dedicated personnel to develop, revise, coordinate and deliver instruction to targeted units. Also, as part of this approach, personnel connected with the module could act as a clearinghouse to advise selected PKO-bound personnel regarding the availability of relevant courses held at other institutions. For example, members of the division or task force legal staff could be enrolled in the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre's course covering legal aspects of peacekeeping. Other personnel might benefit from taking the negotiations course held at Fort Bragg in conjunction with the USAPKI. The point is that most line units don't know which courses are available, nor do they know how to enroll, and neither do they know the relative merits and value of the courses that are out there. An organization that can

understand the need for such a link-up and facilitate it would be doing a great service to the unit destined to participate in a complex PKO.

The U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute is the logical organization to take the lead on either of these two recommendations.

Although stood up in 1993, the USAPKI has quickly established the best network for gathering information about PKO, both internal and external to the Army. The USAPKI, upon direction from the Chief of Staff, Army, could undertake a feasibility study regarding the establishment of a dedicated peacekeeping training center, as well as the development of an exportable PKO module. The institute is not currently staffed, nor does it possess the needed facilities, to become the Army's Peacekeeping Training Center. However, it is the Army's expert on PKO, and this expertise should be employed to conduct a detailed assessment of how a PKTC or exportable PKO module could be established and fully utilized as a permanent method for ensuring our soldiers are better prepared to meet the challenges and unique demands of today's complex peacekeeping operations.

Word count: 5555

ENDNOTES

¹ U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute, Bosnia-Herzegovina After Action Review I (BHAAR I), Carlisle Barracks, PA, May 1996, 8.

² The White House, National Security Strategy for a New Century, October 1998.

³ Robert M. Walker and Dennis J. Reimer, A Statement on the Posture of the United States Army Fiscal Year 1999, Posture Statement presented to the 105th Cong., 2d sess. Washington, DC, U.S Department of the Army, 1992.

⁴ Lieutenant Colonel James Milano, G3, 1st CAV DIV
g3tfe@email tc3.5sigcmd.army.mil. Electronic mail message to Dan Possumato possumato@pa.net. 13 March 1999.

⁵ Department of the Army, Peace Operations, Field Manual 100-23, Washington, DC, U.S. Department of the Army, 30 December 1994, 86.

⁶ Bosnia-Herzegovina After Action Review I (BHAAR I), 29.

⁷ This chart was used by a retired general officer during a briefing to students enrolled in the Advanced Course elective SOF Operations, Academic Year 1999.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Peace Operations, 17.

¹⁰ Scalard, Douglas, "People of Whom We Know Nothing: When Doctrine Isn't Enough," Military Review, (July-August 1997): 4

¹¹ U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute, Comprehensive Engagement in Post-Cold War Complex Contingencies, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 1998, 7.

¹² Bosnia-Herzegovina After Action Review I (BHAAR I), 29.

¹³ United States European Command, After Action Review Operation Support Hope, Stuttgart, Germany, 1994, 27

¹⁴ Max G. Manwaring, "Peace and Stability Lessons from Bosnia," Parameters 28 (Winter 1998-99): 34.

¹⁵ Ibid., 33.

¹⁶ Bosnia-Herzegovina After Action Review I (BHAAR I), D-6.

¹⁷ Bosnia-Herzegovina After Action Review II (BHAAR II), Carlisle Barracks, PA, April 1997, 6.

¹⁸ Captain Chris Seiple, The U.S. Military/NGO Relationship in Humanitarian Interventions (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S Army Peacekeeping Institute, 1996), 178.

¹⁹ Ibid., 6.

²⁰ Peace Operations, 86.

²¹ Bosnia-Herzegovina After Action Review I (BHAAR I), D-6.

²² U.S. Army War College, Peacekeeping, Peacemaking and Peace-Enforcement: The U.S. Role in the New International Order, Carlisle Barracks, PA, February 1993, 31.

²³ Peace Operations, 87.

²⁴ Bosnia-Herzegovina After Action Review II (BHAAR II), 9.

²⁵ Comprehensive Engagement in Post-Cold War Complex Contingencies, 39.

²⁶ "The Effects of Peace Operations on Unit Readiness," available from http://call.army.mil/call/spc_sdy/unitrdy/peaceops.htm. Internet; accessed 30 March 1999.

²⁷ Ibid., 30.

²⁸ Joint Warfighting Center, Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations, 16 June 1997, I-23.

²⁹ John Otte, "UN Concept for Peacekeeping Training," Military Review 78 (Jul/Aug 1998), 26.

³⁰ "National Training for Peacekeeping Database," September 1998; available from <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/training>; Internet; accessed 27 February 1999.

³¹ Milano.

³² Personal observation as member of the class.

³³ Comprehensive Enggement in Post-Cold War Complex Contingencies, 40.

³⁴ U.S. Army Command and General Staff College; available from <<http://www-cgsc.army.mil>>. Internet; accessed 29 March 1999.

³⁵ U.S. Department of State, The Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations, Washington, DC, Department of State, 1994, 8.

³⁶ National Defense University Press, Complex Emergencies: Bureaucratic Arrangements in the U.N Secretariat, Washington, DC, 1996, 36.

³⁷ These figures were presented in an Advanced Course lecture given by a USAWC faculty member during the 1998-99 academic year.

³⁸ U.S. Department of the Army, Peacekeeping A Selected Bibliography. Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College Library, 1996.

³⁹ Milano.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Department of the Army. FM 100-23, Peace Operations. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 1994.
- Department of the Army. Bosnia-Herzegovina After Action Review I. Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute, 1996.
- Department of the Army. Bosnia-Herzegovina After Action Review II. Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute, 1997.
- Department of the Army. Comprehensive Engagement in Post-Cold War Complex Contingencies. Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute, 1998.
- Department of the Army. "Peacekeeping, Peacemaking and Peace-Enforcement: The U.S. Role in the New International Order." Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1993.
- Department of the Army. Peacekeeping A Selected Bibliography. Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Library, 1996.
- Department of Defense. After Action Review Operation Support Hope. Stuttgart, Germany: United States European Command, 1994.
- Department of Defense. Complex Emergencies: Bureaucratic Arrangements in the U.N. Secretariat. Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1996.
- Department of Defense. Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations. Fort Monroe, VA: Joint Warfighting Center, 1997.
- Department of State. The Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations. Washington, D.C.: Department of State, 1994.
- Langholtz, Harvey J. (Editor) The Psychology of Peacekeeping. Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Publishers, 1998.
- Manwaring, Max G. "Peace and Stability Lessons from Bosnia." Parameters, 28 (Winter 1998-99), 34.

Otte, John. "UN Concept for Peacekeeping Training." Military Review, Jul/Aug 1998.

Scalard, Douglas. "People of Whom We Know Nothing: When Doctrine Isn't Enough." Military Review, Jul/Aug 1997.

Seiple, Chris. The U.S. Military/NGO Relationship in Humanitarian Interventions. Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute, 1996.

Walker, Robert M. and Dennis J. Reimer. A Statement on the Posture of the United States Army Fiscal Year 1999. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 1998.

The White House. A National Security Strategy for a New Century. Washington, D.C.: The White House, 1998.