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**CIVIL AFFAIRS CAMPAIGN PLANNING FOR
COMPLEX CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS:
GETTING IT RIGHT**

BY

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CIVIL AFFAIRS CAMPAIGN PLANNING FOR COMPLEX CONTINGENCY

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ABSTRACT

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Recent military operations in Haiti and Bosnia have shown that civil-military tasks are crucial to the overall accomplishment of the mission. Operations of this nature require coordination of U.S. interagency participants, international relief organizations, and military participants. Current U.S. policy for interagency coordination of Complex Contingency Operations is contained in Presidential Decision Directive 56. This directive does not consider the important role of the Combatant CINC in planning or executing the civil-military objectives inherent in this type of operation and how they must be synchronized with the interagency process.

This paper will focus on integration of the interagency process and Civil Affairs Campaign Planning by the Combatant CINC. It will analyze interagency and military aspects of planning, training, force requirements, coordination, deployment, and employment of interagency and military assets in a complex contingency operation while providing recommendations on improving this relationship.

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CIVIL AFFAIRS CAMPAIGN PLANNING FOR COMPLEX CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS: GETTING IT RIGHT

...The sooner I can get rid of all these questions that are outside the military in scope, the happier I will be! Sometimes I think I live ten years each week, of which at least nine are absorbed in political and economic matters.

—GEN Eisenhower, 30 Nov 1942, Africa.

INTRODUCTION

General Eisenhower's experience in North Africa during the TORCH Campaign represents the interplay of military and political dynamics of a military operation. Political, social, economic, and military factors with the organizations and interests that they represent bring significant problems to military commanders. The civil and military planning for the North African Campaign was the United States' first attempt in World War II to plan for the occupation of foreign countries. The planning fell short of General Eisenhower's needs and the command structure was a combination of civil and military control. In reality, this structure of divided military and civilian control caused conflicts during the nine months of the campaign. These problems led to the creation of military Civil Affairs units during World War II to fill the role of military government in occupied areas over the objections of many in the

Department of State and other civilian agencies in the U.S. government.¹

Recent military operations in Haiti and Bosnia have shown that accomplishment of civil-military tasks remains crucial to the overall success of the operation. Civil affairs operators have the functional expertise to plan for and execute the integration of the political and governmental tasks necessary to accomplish this type of mission. Operations of this nature require coordination of U.S. interagency participants, international relief organizations, and military participants. Current U.S. policy for interagency coordination of Complex Contingency Operations is contained in Presidential Decision Directive 56. This directive does not consider the statutory role of the Combatant CINC in planning or executing the civil-military objectives inherent in this type of operation and how they must be coordinated with interagency actions.

This paper will focus on integration of the interagency process and Civil Affairs Campaign Planning by the Combatant CINC. It will analyze interagency and military aspects of planning, training, force requirements, coordination, deployment, and employment of interagency and supporting civil military operations in a complex contingency operation while providing recommendations for improving this relationship.

LESSONS LEARNED FROM HAITI

The U.S. invasion of Haiti in 1994, Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, was an example of an interagency coordinated complex contingency operation. Initial interagency planning for Haiti developed a coordinated political-military plan but failed to arrive at basic decisions until just prior to commencement of the operation. Notable examples of incomplete interagency planning were for a viable police force, aid shipments which were not forthcoming when the embargo was lifted, support and transportation of interagency personnel and equipment, and a sense of urgency by interagency participants to accomplish the mission. Interagency accountability for implementation was also an issue. During Haiti, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) agreed to establish a jobs program and the Department of Justice (DOJ) along with USAID were to establish the Haitian Justice Department. In these cases the agencies did not perform the functions and so they were passed to the Department of Defense where U.S. Army Special Operations Forces (SOF) performed them. In both instances, USAID's inability to provide funding was the major factor in not following through on its commitments. In essence, the interagency process never emerged as part of a comprehensive, integrated civil-military plan. This was a result of a lack of accountability of interagency partners and the absence of a designated group

director with tasking authority and the ability to hold agencies accountable for assigned tasks.² While the strategic interagency dialogue was taking place, it was not being carried through to the operational and tactical levels. The Joint Staff, which is the military representative to the interagency group, and U.S. Atlantic Command, which is the Combatant Command headquarters conducting the operational planning, did not have the same understanding of strategic and operational objectives. In essence, they conducted parallel planning that was not synchronized. This lack of strategic and operational connectivity resulted in solutions that had to be resolved on the ground after the operation had commenced.³

LESSONS LEARNED FROM BOSNIA

Clearly the need for a defined political-military plan with clear objectives was necessary for an operation with the complexity of implementing the General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP). Unfortunately, this plan was not developed. To resolve problems a "High Representative" position was created that would be responsible for the integration of civil implementation tasks.⁴ The U.S. did not integrate planning with NATO or International partners with on-going operations in Bosnia. The U.S. thought unilateral planning was best.⁵ The U.S. concentrated on military enforcement tasks. This was

caused by several reasons: an oversight or a policy decision at the senior military level, and most importantly a lack of Civil Affairs and Civil Military Cooperation (NATO term for Civil Affairs) planners at senior levels. The end result was reactive operations in the initial stages of the operation.⁶ Even after the initial military objectives had been met in Bosnia the truly hard civil tasks became apparent. In reality, a perception gap existed between military and political leaders. Military leaders did not perceive they had the mandate to perform civil implementation tasks nor the forces for these tasks. Political leaders thought that the military should perform civil implementation tasks. These tasks included elections support, civil restoration, and infrastructure rehabilitation. A breakdown of strategic policy planning at the CINC and interagency level prevented a clear understanding of what tasks would be accomplished by all participants. This conflict continues. Military support to civil implementation in Bosnia can only be provided without detracting from the "military mission".⁷

FUTURE CONFLICTS

While current military thinkers focus on major theater wars the reality is that small-scale contingency and complex contingency operations will remain the most probable operations

of the future. The "uncomfortable wars" that realize the role of the government, the military force and the people in conflict are the wars that the United States must be prepared to fight.⁸ Future conflicts will not be just "ethnic" or "religious" or "nationalism" based. They will be the result of governments failing to govern. This process of failing or failing states will lead to the conflicts that will become the norm for the 21st Century.⁹ As these governments fail, the resulting chaos requires a way to plan, organize, and implement the ways and means of achieving civil order. Chaos does not bring about the failure of government but the failure of governance begins the process that leads to the collapse of the country or region. Planning at the strategic level requires the integration of international military, multi-organizational (International organizations, private voluntary organizations, non-governmental organizations), unilateral (national agencies) civil-military planning and implementation efforts.¹⁰ Without interagency, multi-national, strategic and operational planning and implementation which recognizes the political, economic, social, and public services required, enduring solutions will not be developed.¹¹

SYNCHRONIZATION OF INTERAGENCY AND MILITARY PLANNING

Presidential Decision Directive 56 (PDD 56), May 1997 established the Clinton Administration's Policy on Managing Complex Contingency Operations.¹² This policy focused on the rising number of territorial disputes, armed conflicts, and civil wars that pose threats to U.S. interests including regional stability. These events can be the result of manmade or natural disasters. By their very nature they are comprised of political, diplomatic, humanitarian, intelligence, economic, development, and security issues. This interweaving of diverse causes and effects is why they are called complex contingency operations.

Past examples of these complex contingency operations can be found in U.S. operations in Haiti, Somalia, Northern Iraq, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. The diverse nature of these operations requires the solution of problems that are beyond the capabilities of strictly a military solution. These operations put a premium on the military's ability to work closely and effectively with other U.S. Government agencies, non-governmental organizations, regional and international security organizations and coalition partners.¹³ PDD 56, with the strong backing of the Defense Department, is intended to focus and organize all components of the U.S. Government to plan for and to implement agency solutions in complex contingency operations.

This synergy of interagency solutions, with departments providing the capabilities for which they are best suited, will result in holistic solutions and not short-term operations that fail to address the underlying problems.

PRESIDENTIAL DECISION DIRECTIVE 56 AND CINC CAMPAIGN PLANNING

The objective of PDD 56 is the creation of an Executive Committee (ExCom) with the appropriate interagency membership that will coordinate and implement a political-military plan for an operation. The guiding principle of the ExCom approach is personal accountability of presidential appointees that are responsible for implementation. The political-military plan will include a comprehensive situation assessment, mission statement, agency objectives, and the desired endstate. This political-military plan is the crux of the U.S. Government's strategy for the resolution of the complex contingency operation. This plan looks beyond the immediate problem to the social, economic, developmental, and political issues that are the root causes of these situations. The political-military plan must not only address the immediate but also the long-term solutions to problems. Prior to and during the operation the PDD requires a rehearsal of the political-military plan. This rehearsal should synchronize components of the plan, identify resource shortfalls, consider branches and sequels, and again

underscores the accountability of the responsible agency for their aspects of the plan. CINC planners should participate in this rehearsal. Training of agency officials to participate in this type of operation is also addressed. The National Security Council is directed to work with appropriate U.S. Government educational institutions to develop and conduct the interagency training program. This annual program should train mid-level managers in the development and implementation of political-military plans for complex contingency operations. To provide the means necessary to support the development and implementation of the political-military plan agencies are required to address resource shortfalls in budgetary submissions.

CINC military campaign planning doctrine is contained in several Joint publications. Fundamentals include planning for broad strategic concepts and arranging major operations that synchronize the tactical, operational, and strategic actions to accomplish the desired objectives. This campaign plan forms the basis for subsequent and subordinate unit planning.¹⁴ Campaign planning for interagency operations is much more difficult. To be a viable campaign plan it must include all elements of national power: military, diplomatic, economic, and informational. The plan must also address the ways and means necessary to accomplish the national and strategic objectives.

In most of these areas a combatant commander's authority is limited over the interagency participants. This lack of operational control and the Combatant Commander's inability to participate in the interagency process are obstacles to the development of a realistic political-military plan.¹⁵

OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

Planning

While the military and interagency planning requirements have been discussed in some detail, it is the other major partners that are often forgotten. The relief organizations that are known as International Organizations (IOs), Non-governmental organizations (NGOs), or private voluntary organizations (PVOs) are the over-looked component of strategic planning. These organizations are normally on-site when the military force arrives and more importantly will often remain when the U.S. decides to extricate the military force. Due to concerns of classification or exclusion of civilians these organizations are often the least included component of planning when they should be among the first. This inclusion of relief organizations works best when there is a common overall political framework that addresses the root causes of the humanitarian need and a path which returns the country to a sustainable level of security.¹⁶ Strategic planners must seek

the inclusion of NGOs in their planning to determine common ground on analysis of the conflict's origins and its appropriate solutions.¹⁷ NGOs are normally concerned that access and security are provided. This planning and inclusion is crucial to the long term military plan and transition to civilian organizations. NGOs must have the ability to "plug into" the interagency process and at the Combatant Commander (CINC) level.¹⁸

Coordination

The CINCs need a coordination mechanism imbedded in their staff to manage interagency coordination and humanitarian relief coordination. Several concepts have evolved in this area, which revolve around the obvious functional areas of political coordination, interagency, and civil military tasks. The first recommendation is that the Political Advisor's (POLADs) office in the Combatant Commander's headquarters should be expanded to facilitate the political coordination that must be done with the United Nations, international organizations, coalition partners, and non-governmental organizations.¹⁹ Another concept that has been advanced is a deployable Multi-Agency Support Team that would assist the CINC prior to and during the operation. This team would be a deployable group of interagency experts that would assist the Joint Force Commander (JFC) or Combatant Commander in coordinating, monitoring and implementing

interagency tasks.²⁰ A third solution is that many of these tasks are doctrinal Civil Affairs missions that could be effectively coordinated by an expanded CINC Civil Affairs staff. This approach would provide effective civil-military and humanitarian organization coordination while providing the nucleus of a deployable Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC).²¹ Lastly, another concept is a combination of the proceeding ideas to form a robust interagency coordination center at the CINC's headquarters. This coordination center would conduct deliberate planning with appropriate organizations and would be the operational interface with the interagency group in Washington, D.C. During contingencies this operations center would be a deployable unit that would assist the Joint Force Commander and the CINC in coordinating interagency operations.²² This team may not be required at all times but should be trained and rehearsed for an immediate response.

Force Requirements and Availability

One crucial aspect of responding to complex contingencies is shaping the appropriate forces for the operation and resourcing that force. The CINC and interagency planners must consider the sources and availability of military and interagency assets to meet mission requirements. At the interagency level, most civilian agencies do not have the resources to meet emerging operational requirements. They are not structured for

expeditionary missions with personnel or equipment. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) does have limited deployable assets and in some cases utilizes contractors to meet requirements. For example, in Haiti the Department of Justice did not have the ability to provide personnel or equipment for short notice contingencies. Life support can also be a problem in austere environments as civilian agencies may expect the military to provide shelter, food, and transportation.²³

The military forces necessary to conduct interagency operations and more specifically civil affairs operations are almost exclusively found in the Reserve Components (RC) of the United States Army. This situation can present policy, strategic, and operational difficulties for military planners. To employ Reserve Components forces for any useful duration requires a Presidential Selected Reserve Call-up (PSRC). This authority granted to the President allows the involuntary mobilization of 200,000 Reserve Components personnel for a period of up to 270 days service. The political decision to have a PSRC places great pressure upon the President. During Operations RESTORE HOPE and CONTINUE HOPE in Somalia the Joint Staff made the decision to not request a PSRC from the President. This decision greatly limited the Civil Affairs forces that would be available during this operation.²⁴ _During

Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY in Haiti and Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR the opposite was true. PSRC was used in both cases and in Bosnia almost 50 percent of the total Reserve Components Civil Affairs forces have deployed to this operation.

The current Active Component (AC) Civil Affairs forces is a total of 212 personnel with worldwide requirements. The Reserve Components have 5,000 personnel in the U.S. Army Reserve and 226 in the U.S. Marine Corps Reserve. The proportion of AC to RC Civil Affairs forces is a crucial factor in determining forces for contingency operations. The current AC Civil Affairs capability is not robust enough to meet more than minimal manning for any operation. This shortfall should be re-evaluated and perhaps more AC Civil Affairs forces created.²⁵ Planners must factor in the availability of forces, the component they must come from, and the timeliness in which they will be available. The arrival of mobilized Civil Affairs forces can be time consuming. The requirement for RC Civil Affairs personnel was identified early in the planning for Bosnia. To be effective, the plan required Civil Affairs personnel to be in theater 30 days prior to the operation commencing. In fact, the PSRC order was signed after the deployment had begun and the first mobilized RC soldiers did not begin arriving until 30 days after the deployment had begun.

This late arrival hampered initial operations and the theater could not leverage their capabilities effectively.²⁶

Arguably, the most important aspect of the political-military implementation is the humanitarian relief organizations. In most cases, they will already be in the operational area or will find the means to get themselves there. Without a doubt they are the most adept at tailoring their resources to meet the requirement and in getting their assets to the operation.

Preparatory Training and Doctrine

While PDD 56 requires interagency members to conduct annual training in developing and implementing a political-military implementation plan, this does not go far enough. The more important training audiences should include the CINC's headquarters staff, the military forces that could participate in the operation, and members of the humanitarian relief community. Integrated planning exercises that bring together all members in a systemic manner are required. These exercises should focus on the operation of an integrated Joint Interagency Task Force at the CINC level along with members of the humanitarian relief community.

Beyond planning exercises there needs to be integrated situational training exercises (STXs) that accurately portray the roles that all members will play on the ground. One example

could be how a Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC) will operate. Greater realism must be brought in regular training exercises and especially during pre-deployment training so participants are not "working it out on the ground" when they arrive.

Training of military participants in this type of operation is also important. The current U.S. strategic concept for peacekeeping is that "warfighting" or major theater war forces train for that mission and conduct last minute tailored mission rehearsals for peacekeeping. These mission rehearsals can be as long as six weeks, such as the initial MOUNTAIN EAGLE rehearsal for Bosnia. At the opposite end of the spectrum was the 96 hour MOUNTAIN GUARDIAN rehearsal for Kosovo. The interplay of political, diplomatic, economic, social, and military issues without clear national objectives is not a comfortable subject for most military commanders. Military unit commanders are responsible for civil military relations but they are not adequately prepared. In Bosnia, COL Gregory Fontenot, a brigade commander, provides his comments on civil military operations:

You find that your classical military activities are in support of and supplemental to civil functions. For instance, you have to convince the local police that it's a good thing to let somebody travel from Tuzla to Orasje, and it's an even better thing if they don't pull travelers off to the site of the road and club them...I haven't been trained for this. I spend a lot more time negotiating and assessing people's

willingness to be cooperative than I do on traditional military tasks.²⁷

Civil military operations training is not a subject that is taught in most military education courses. The exception is Special Operations Forces (SOF). SOF includes this in most training programs.²⁸

Current military doctrine must also become more relevant to future operations. Joint Publication 3-57, Doctrine for Joint Civil Affairs does not adequately cover the myriad of tasks that should be accomplished in civil military operations. In fact, the argument is that there is a civil military component in all military operations and joint doctrine should reflect this.²⁹ Currently, Joint Publication 3-57 is under revision and will be re-titled Doctrine for Joint Civil Military Operations. Hopefully, this change will reflect the breath of civil military operations and the role it should play in contingency operations, conflict termination, and achieving the end state of the national objectives.

Military participants should also be thoroughly familiar with the doctrine and standard operating procedures of the international humanitarian relief community. During normal training and especially in pre-deployment rehearsals military commanders and units should prepare for dealing with relief organizations. Documents such as the United Nations High

Commissioner for Refugees Handbook for the Military on Humanitarian Operations should be a part of their library and understanding.³⁰

Deployment

The integrated deployment of interagency, military, and relief organizations to the operational area must be coordinated. The political-military implementation plan must recognize that interagency and military assets deploy in a timely manner. While the military has the ability to synchronize the movement of military units this does not normally extend to interagency participants. During Haiti USAID personnel could not obtain transportation because they did not access into the United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) movement planning system.³¹ Military planners must include interagency participants in the transportation plan. Without this support interagency participants may be left to scheduling themselves on commercial or contract transportation which may not adequately support the operational requirement.

Military transportation planners and commanders need to recognize the importance of the early arrival of civil military forces. Due to the early focus of "warfighting" forces this may preclude the timely arrival of those forces not considered crucial. The early arrival of civil affairs units can set the

conditions for success that will be important to mission accomplishment.

Coordination of aircraft and the movement of humanitarian relief organizations is also necessary. The United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Military and Civil Defense Unit (MCDU) coordinates the donation and transportation of relief organizations, their supplies, and the donations that will pour in from donor countries around the world.³²

Military planners must factor military, interagency, humanitarian relief organizations, and third party contributions into their transportation planning. Without visibility of all components of the transportation networks and demands on that system they will quickly find it overloaded.

Employment

The political-military implementation plan developed for the contingency must be detailed enough to have an event phased plan for operations on the ground and the command structure that will be necessary to control interagency operations. Initially, in most complex contingency operations the first priority may be as simple as to "stop the suffering" or to prevent further conflict. Once immediate tasks are accomplished then the sequential capabilities of different interagency and military players must be considered. While an USAID Disaster Assistance

Response Team (DART) may have the initial role of refugee relief this may transition to the USAID's Office for Transition Initiatives (OTI) and infrastructure rehabilitation. Other government agencies will have roles that may include the Department of Justice for public security and safety or the Department of State for political and diplomatic activities.

Military planning must consider the initial tactical civil military tasks of host nation coordination, supporting maneuver unit commanders, and coordinating with indigenous relief organizations and those that will arrive in the operational area. As these tasks are accomplished, their focus should change to those operational tasks, which will support the formation of enduring government structures. This transition can be seen in Bosnia where the initial focus was in coordinating the movement of forces, life support to refugees, and in promoting the legitimacy of the operation. As these tasks were completed the transition was made to supporting national institutions, supporting elections, and assisting in the reconstruction of the national infrastructure.³³

The role of the Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC) and a Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center have been documented in Joint doctrine and have been used in most recent contingency operations. On the surface, these organizational concepts have proven themselves as coordination centers to

facilitate military, interagency, and humanitarian relief interaction. What has been needed is an organization that goes beyond coordination and becomes a command and control headquarters for the conduct of civil military operations. Currently, Joint doctrine has an organization that is called a Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force (JCMOTF).³⁴ This organization is normally a US joint force organization that is tailored to conduct civil military operations. This functional organization has never been successfully employed by the U.S. military. What is needed is a Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) that can command and control the U.S. military and interagency participants so they can be synchronized to accomplish the national objectives.

Force protection of U.S. participants during contingency operations must be considered as the highest priority. In Bosnia, this has led to Americans being called "ninja turtles" as they always wear their Kevlar helmets and body armor.³⁵ More importantly has been the perception, by some observers, that excessive force protection rules have made it difficult if not impossible to accomplish the civil military objectives.³⁶ Consideration of force protection will remain the principal requirement for any contingency operation. This requirement must be factored into force planning to ensure force protection and mission success.

CONCLUSIONS

The inherent strengths and capabilities of the interagency process and organizations, as a solution for complex contingency operations, are valid. However, the ends, ways, and means are not in balance. The process of planning the political-military solution and the means that will be used are not in concert with the resources that are available. Most importantly, the crucial strategic to operational link has not been completed. The regional Combatant Commander must be "in the loop" if the policy developed in Washington is to be implemented on the ground.

If anything can be certain, it is the uncertainty of the future. What is certain are the trends on the global landscape. Technology, social values, demographics, economic systems, and political structures are changing at a rapid pace. These changes will continue the trend of greater interdependence of countries; it can also continue the proliferation of intra-state and regional struggles. These struggles have brought about the rise of complex contingency operations in the past decade and will continue to do so for the foreseeable future.

While the probability of conflicts of this nature is high, unfortunately, alternative courses of action for the U.S. Government's participation are limited. There are three possible alternatives. First is selective involvement. Depending on the nature of the conflict and perceived National

interests the U.S. should respond with a fully integrated U.S. governmental approach. This could be unilateral or in conjunction with multi-national partners. Under the auspices of the United Nations (UN) many humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping operations have been successful. They could be more successful in the future with the integrated support of multi-national partners with or without U.S. government participation. The second proposal is to ignore the failed States and humanitarian disasters as candidates for U.S. military or government intervention. The third solution would be for a non-military solution that utilizes the economic, diplomatic, and informational assets of the U.S. government. This approach would be limited engagement without military support.

The first approach recognizes that the solutions required in this types of operation are not only military but require all aspects of government. The underlying reason for these operations is that the institution of government has failed. Without an integrated approach that emphasizes the political-military solution in coordination with all aspects of government, a lasting solution will not be found. This approach should formalize the current PDD 56 with effective measures to provide agencies with the resources to meet the operational requirements.

The second solution does not recognize the realities of the current world and the potential for future conflicts. We have called it "do something" or the "CNN factor" and it exists.

Secretary of State Madeleine Albright stated,

Important U.S. interests... are served every time an area of instability and conflict is transformed into one of peace and development. This contributes to our economic interests, reduces the likelihood of costly humanitarian disasters and refugee flows, and expands the network of societies working to counter global threats such as illegal narcotics, crime, terror, and disease.³⁷

The difficulty with this approach is that we respond to peripheral or humanitarian interests based on the number of starving women and children on the television. The solution is send the military and see what they can do without consideration of the long term solution and costs. Then the military is engaged without objectives or a strategy.

The third proposal would limit the U.S. government's engagement while allowing the non-military facets of power to be engaged. This would allow the U.S. to say internationally that it is involved while limiting military participation.

Unfortunately, most of these situations require military forces to force a halt in fighting or to stabilize the situation.

Security of humanitarian relief personnel is essential. If the host nation government military or police cannot provide security for the distribution of aid then the crisis will

continue. In these cases an outside military force must provide security and may be the only alternative. In these situations, the world community will expect the U.S. to take the lead. To take that lead the U.S. must commit ground troops.

RECOMMENDATIONS

On balance, the first proposal and the current policy position in PDD 56 is and will remain for the foreseeable future a valid tool for developing and implementing a political-military solution that supports the national strategy. It is the manner in which the political-military plan is developed and implemented that must be enhanced. Five specific recommendations follow.

First, the regional CINC and the interagency group need to formulate and implement the political-military plan. This could be the deployable MAST. This could coordinate interagency activities at the CINC level but at best is a transitory solution. To be truly effective, the CINC's headquarters should train, rehearse regularly and be able to perform interagency activities. This Interagency Operations Center should include the Political Advisor's office, appropriate Civil Affairs personnel, and interagency personnel.

Second, progress must be made in the professional education of military personnel to train them in the nature of complex - contingency operations and their nature. Civil military

operations should be included in professional military education and a normal part of military training and exercises.

Third, legislative and budgetary changes need to be made that allow the transfer of monies to the agency that will implement the action or a general contingency fund for the operation. Fiscal resources in the wrong agency account have been a problem in the past, but if the money could be transferred, this could be averted.

Fourth, more appropriate civil military operations doctrine is needed. Military and interagency participants must understand the complex nature of these operations and how coordinated solutions must be found for the root causes of these situations.

Fifth, and most importantly, the regional Combatant CINC has a crucial role in the integration and implementation of political-military and civil tasks. Without the Combatant CINC taking the lead in this integration of civil and military objectives then the U.S. cannot achieve conflict termination on terms that serve the long term national interests.

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⁹ Robert H. Dorff, "The Future of Peace Support Operations," Small Wars and Insurgencies 9 (Spring 1998), 166. The rise of the "failed and failing" states indicates that the continuation of these ugly wars will continue and will only increase in probability.

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