



**STRATEGY
RESEARCH
PROJECT**

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**BASE REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE:
ARE ADDITIONAL ROUNDS NECESSARY?**

BY

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ABSTRACT

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The end of the Cold War signaled the beginning of dramatic changes in our national security and military strategies. These strategies along with a dismal economic environment resulted in a defense budget that dropped from a high of \$400 billion to \$250 billion in less than a decade. The Department of Defense attempted to oversee balanced cuts in the personnel, modernization, and operations accounts as fiscal resources were reduced. Military infrastructure accounts however, did not receive a proportionate reduction in resources. Despite Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) rounds in 1989, 1991, 1993 and 1995, military infrastructure far exceeds defense requirements. Against tough congressional resistance, DoD is pursuing two additional BRAC rounds. The DoD wants to use savings achieved through future BRAC closure actions for modernization and quality of life programs. This paper addresses the history of base closure, the BRAC process and arguments for and against future BRAC rounds.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT	iiii
Introduction	1
HISTORY OF BASE CLOSURE	3
Discussion	7
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK	7
THE BRAC PROCESS	8
THE CASE FOR ADDITIONAL BRAC ROUNDS	11
Infrastructure Overcapacity	12
BRAC Savings	14
Improved Business Practices	14
CONGRESSIONAL RESISTANCE TO BRAC	15
National Economy	16
Economic Impact on Local Communities	16
Political Pressure	18
Presidential Interference with the BRAC Process	20
Questionable Savings Estimates	20
The Commission Process	21
THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF BASE CLOSURE	22
REDUCING THE IMPACT OF BASE CLOSURE	24
Economic Conversion	24
Environmental Impact	24
Provisions for the Homeless	25

Conclusion	26
RECOMMENDED CHANGES	28
ENDNOTES	31
BIBLIOGRAPHY	35

INTRODUCTION

The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 signified the end of the Cold War and necessitated a review of both our National Security and Military Strategies. America's defense structure had undergone a period of unprecedented expansion in the 1980s. The defense budget increased dramatically throughout the early part of the decade and reached a high water mark in 1985 when it exceeded \$400 billion. By the end of the decade, all Services were able to modernize their key weapons systems. The overwhelming success of Operations Just Cause, Desert Shield and Desert Storm were vivid examples of our nation's ability to deploy and engage military might. Our national economy, however, was beginning to stagger from historically high budget deficits and real economic growth had come to a standstill. The Department of Defense (DoD), benefactor of over half of the federal government's discretionary spending, became a prime target for fiscal cutbacks.

Defense reductions actually began prior to the fall of the Berlin Wall and continued through 1997 with only a mild jump during the Persian Gulf War. The Defense budget has fallen 38 percent from its high mark in 1985.¹ Military personnel strength has dropped 33 percent and procurement contracts have dropped from \$120 billion to \$44 billion in the same time frame.² Careful management by DoD has allowed a "downsized" military to

maintain an adequate level of readiness; however, acquisition and modernization programs were postponed.³

The Department of Defense attempted to oversee balanced cuts in the personnel, modernization, and operations accounts as fiscal resources were reduced. Military infrastructure accounts however, did not receive a proportionate reduction in resources. Despite Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) rounds in 1989, 1991, 1993 and 1995, military infrastructure far exceeds defense requirements. Secretary of Defense, William S. Cohen, estimates that current base structure is 23 percent larger than what is needed.⁴ This excess base structure is a drain on scarce fiscal resources and does not support the National Military Strategy.⁵ The President's FY2000 budget proposal addresses this issue by requesting that Congress authorize BRAC rounds in 2001 and 2005.⁶ Future BRAC rounds will provide funding for readiness, modernization, and quality of life programs and ensure that base structure facilitates, rather than impedes, the transformation of our military as it prepares to meet the threats of the next century.⁷

HISTORY OF BASE CLOSURE

The size of our military infrastructure has expanded and contracted throughout our nation's history. As the military reorganized in preparation for the Civil War, the Indian Wars, western expansion, the war with Spain and World Wars I and II, military posts were established and later abandoned when their military value diminished.⁸ At the conclusion of the Civil War and the beginning of Reconstruction, the Army concentrated forces in the South. As reconstruction abated, the Army deployed units west to support frontier settlements and address Indian hostilities. Forts were established and reestablished as our nation explored and settled across the western half of our nation. In the 1880's, Secretary of War Alexander Ramsey, called for abandoning small posts in the West and concentrating forces along the nation's borders and at major rail junctions.⁹ Near the turn of the century, the Caribbean became the principal theater of war and forces were again concentrated in the South. The ability of the military to redistribute forces in response to the strategic environment of the time allowed it to remain relevant and responsive to our nation's needs.

Politics has always influenced the post closure process. As a case in point, early in this century, Secretary of War, Henry Stimson, and other senior military leaders recognized that Army reorganization, redistribution and consolidation was essential

to prepare for the 20th century.¹⁰ He decried the political pressure applied by citizens, boards of trade, city councils, mayors, governors and members of Congress protesting abandonment of certain military posts and even lobbying for creation of new ones.¹¹ In April 1912, Stimson published an article in *The Independent* that emphasized the need for, "sufficient public sentiment and popular interest to overcome the selfish opposition of the localities which now profit out of the dispersion of the Army."¹² Despite occasional intense political pressure, the Defense Department was able to close military posts that did not support existing military strategy.

The ability of DoD to close and realign military posts continued through World War II, the Korean and Vietnam Wars. In the 1960s, and again the 1970s, accusations were widespread that the executive branch was using base closures to punish uncooperative legislators.¹³ This sentiment prompted Congress to pass Section 2687 of Title 10 United States Code in 1977. This section requires the Secretary of Defense to evaluate the "fiscal, local economic, budgetary, environmental strategic and operational consequences" of a closure if the military installation was authorized at least 300 civilian positions. A realignment of more than 1000 civilian employees or 50 percent of the authorized work force was subject to the same criteria. If the Secretary determined that a closure or realignment met

these criteria he had to notify Congress and wait 30 legislative days or 60 total days, whichever was longer. These stipulations, combined with congressional reluctance to close military bases, effectively prevented DoD from closing any major military installations.¹⁴

In 1983, the Grace Report suggested a need for an external commission that was independent and credible to address military closure process. This recommendation was acted on in 1988 when Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci, ordered the establishment of an independent, non-partisan commission to study the issues and identify the best process for realigning or closing bases and review the current military base structure and identify which bases should be closed or realigned.¹⁵

This commission was known as the Commission on Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC). Subsequent to the formation of the BRAC Commission Congress passed Public Law (P.L.) 100-526 also known as the Base Realignment and Closure Act of 1988 which supported the BRAC Commission and provided relief from certain statutory provisions of earlier legislation.¹⁶ The Commission recommended closure of 86 stateside bases, 5 partial closures and 54 realignments. The Commission dissolved subsequent to the issuance of its report. The process was successful, but there were concerns that since the commission was appointed by and reported to the Secretary of Defense, the proposed list of

closures targeted districts represented by certain members of Congress.¹⁷

After the fall of the Berlin Wall in October 1989 and the end of the Cold War Congress passed P.L. 510, the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, which authorized three additional BRAC reviews in 1991, 1993 and 1995. The law established another BRAC Commission and outlined specific procedures, roles, and time lines for DoD, the Commission, the President and Congress to follow.¹⁸ The law required the Secretary of Defense to make closure and realignment recommendations to the Commission based on published criteria. The Commission would then review these recommendations with the authority to add or subtract bases from the Secretary's list. The BRAC Commission recommendations had to be approved by the President in their entirety. Finally, Congress also had to approve or reject the BRAC list in its entirety. This forced both the President and Congress to make an all or nothing decision. This entire process was placed within a strict timeline.¹⁹

The Defense Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 incorporated three lessons learned from the 1988 Act. First, in response to charges that the 1988 Commission was secretive, the Commission held open meetings. Second, the 1988 Commission did not visit many of the affected facilities. Congress reasoned

that visits to the facilities would help commission members verify essential data. The 1990 Act required the commission to visit each of the affected facilities. Third, Congress complained that the Commission used faulty data to reach closure recommendations. The new law required the Government Accounting Office (GAO) to monitor DoD's internal process.²⁰

Public Law 510 resulted in base closure rounds in 1991, 1993, and 1995. These closures along with the 1988 closure round, resulted in decisions to close 97 out of 495 major domestic installations and many smaller ones and to realign other facilities. When all identified bases are closed, DoD will have closed about 20 percent of its major domestic bases.²¹ DoD estimates that approximately 107,000 defense civilian jobs will have been eliminated as a result of the four BRAC rounds.²² Cumulative savings from these closure rounds will total about \$14 billion through 2001, and annual savings of \$5.6 billion are projected in 2002 and each year thereafter.²³

DISCUSSION

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

The Planning, Organizing, Motivating/Leading and Controlling (POMC) model provides a useful framework for examining how DoD manages change as it transitions from a Cold War forward presence structure to a Post-Cold War force projection

organization. The Planning process includes visioning, goal setting and the development of strategic and operational plans.²⁴ Each element of this process is interdependent on the other and all elements derive from the organization's mission statement.²⁵ The Organizing function refers to the, "basic building blocks (systems) that will be required to build the structure that is needed to implement plans at each level" of the organization.²⁶ Managing and Leading focuses on motivating members of an organization to work in the best interests of the organization.²⁷ Finally, Controlling refers to mechanisms that check and monitor the progress of a plan.²⁸

The Bottoms-Up Review, Quadrennial Defense Review and Joint Vision 2010 are examples of DoD's implementation of the planning process. Base Realignment and Closure is an element of the organizing process. It is a tool DoD has used in the past and would like to use in the future to reduce the size of the military's infrastructure and align it with mission requirements and available resources.

THE BRAC PROCESS

DoD proposes using essentially the same procedures that were used for BRAC 1995 in future rounds.²⁹ This process has proven to be the best tool for making difficult decisions that impact both national security and local communities.³⁰ It

consists of six major steps and takes approximately a year and a half to complete.³¹

Step 1.

The Military Departments and Defense Agencies develop a six year force structure plan. The purpose of the plan is to identify the people and equipment the base structure will have to support. This document assesses probable threats to national security, anticipated force structure (including active, reserve and forward based units) and anticipated implementation of the force structure plan. The plan also anticipates funding levels for national defense.³²

Step 2.

DoD issues policy guidance and identifies selection criteria. Policy guidance might include goals for base reduction and cross-service consolidation. In previous rounds a total of 8 criteria were placed in the categories of military value, return on investment, and impacts. These criteria are published in the Federal Register for public comment and submitted to Congress.³³

Step 3.

DoD military components and agencies categorize their bases by; missions, capabilities or attributes and determine if excess capacity for future requirements exists within each category. Bases are evaluated using component specific methodology against

the published criteria and closure candidates are forwarded to the Secretary of Defense. The SECDEF submits a consolidated list to the BRAC Commission.³⁴ The GAO reviews the methodology and data on the list and reports its findings to both the BRAC Commission and Congress.³⁵

Step 4.

The BRAC Commission analyzes the SECDEF's recommendations, conducts fact-finding visits to installations and holds hearings. The Commission is composed of 8 members appointed with the advice and consent of the Senate. The Commission is free to add or delete bases from the SECDEF's list.³⁶

Step 5.

The Commission reports its recommendations to the President. If the President approves all of the Commission's recommendations the list is transmitted to congress for final approval. If the President disapproves the recommendation, in whole or in part the President transmits the list to both the Commission and Congress. The Commission would then transmit the list to the president with a revised list of recommendations. If the President approves the revised list it is forwarded to Congress. If the President disapproves the revised list the BRAC process is terminated.³⁷

Step 6.

Upon receipt of the approved BRAC list from the President, Congress has 45 days to enact a joint resolution should it desire to disapprove the entire package of realignment and closure recommendations. If the time expires without action, then the decisions become law.³⁸

THE CASE FOR ADDITIONAL BRAC ROUNDS

The need for additional BRAC rounds was identified during BRAC Commission hearings in 1995. Secretary of Defense William Perry stated, "There is no doubt in my mind that the Department will need future base closure rounds."³⁹ General John Shalikashvili, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, also cited the need for future base closure authority during commission testimony. These statements acknowledged that, despite four BRAC rounds, military infrastructure still exceeded what was required. The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), published in May 1997, identified sufficient excess infrastructure to warrant two additional BRAC rounds. The National Defense Panel (NDP) echoed this conclusion in its report published in December of the same year.

In April 1998, DoD published "The Report of the Department of Defense on Base Realignment and Closure." This document spells out DoD's base closure plans and the rationale for

reducing military infrastructure. The Department of Defense requested two additional BRAC rounds beginning in 2001.

Additional BRAC rounds are necessary to: cut waste, generate savings for readiness and modernization, and adapt the base structure to the dynamic security challenges of the 21st Century.⁴⁰ BRAC rounds in 2001 and 2005 will save \$21 billion in the years 2008-2015 and \$3 billion for every year thereafter.⁴¹ The DoD requires legislative authority to conduct BRAC rounds. The framework established for the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 is the model for future realignment and closure rounds.

Infrastructure Overcapacity

DoD makes a compelling case for additional BRAC rounds. The QDR states that from 1989 to 1997, the Department of Defense reduced total active military end strength by 32 percent. This reduction will increase to 36 percent by 2003. In comparison, even after the completion of four rounds of base realignment and closure, the world-wide (overseas and domestic) base structure will have been reduced only 26 percent. The reduction in domestic-only facilities is only 21 percent.⁴² DoD compared the reductions in U.S.-based force structure with reductions in infrastructure and estimates that it has about 23 percent excess base capacity.⁴³ Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen wrote in the *Quadrennial Defense Review*, "In essence, our combat forces

are headed towards the 21st century, but our infrastructure is stuck in the past. We cannot afford this waste of resources in an environment of tough choices and fiscal constraint. We must shed more weight."⁴⁴ The Secretary also stated, "We have to ask ourselves: do we want depots in government hands or high-tech weapons in soldier's hands? Do we want to protect facilities or protect troops? Do we want to preserve local defense contracts or promote solid enlistment contracts."⁴⁵

Senator Carl Levin cites specific examples of excess infrastructure, He said,

By 2003: The Army will have reduced the personnel at its classroom training commands by 43 percent, while classroom space will have been reduced by only 7 percent.

The Air force will have reduced the number of fighters and other small aircraft by 53 percent since 1989, while the base structure for those aircraft will be only 35 percent smaller.

The Navy will have 33 percent more hangars for its aircraft than it requires.⁴⁶

The DoD is not funded to support infrastructure that does not serve a relevant military purpose. The budget has decreased 38 percent between 1985 and 1997, from \$400 to \$250 billion dollars. The QDR concluded, "The nation is unlikely to support significantly greater resources dedicated to national defense than it does now - about \$250 billion in constant 1997 dollars per year."⁴⁷ As a result, DoD must identify efficiencies within

the constrained budget in order to ensure that it can resource modernization, readiness, and quality of life programs.

BRAC Savings

Reducing military bases will also result in savings that can be applied to other DoD priorities. DoD estimates that two additional rounds of BRAC will save \$3 billion per year.⁴⁸ New BRAC rounds are critical to increasing modernization funding in the next decade.⁴⁹ Secretary of Defense, William Cohen states,

Without BRAC, we will not have the resources needed to maintain high readiness and buy the next generation of equipment needed to ensure our dominance in future conflicts. In addition, failure to recapitalize the systems in the field today would put at risk our ability to sustain our force structure.⁵⁰

DoD's report on BRAC concludes, "Savings from future BRAC rounds are a critical element of plans to provide adequate funding for the modernization and transformation of our forces and to sustain high levels of readiness well into the next century."⁵¹

Improved Business Practices

The purpose of the Defense Reform Initiative is to, "ignite a revolution in business affairs within DoD that will bring the Department management techniques and business practices that have restored American corporations to leadership in the marketplace."⁵² The DRI identifies a series of initiatives in four major areas; reengineer, consolidate, compete, and eliminate. In the area of eliminate, reduction of

infrastructure is a key category. The DRI proposes a three-pronged strategy: close excess infrastructure; consolidate or restructure the operation of support activities; and, demolish unneeded buildings.⁵³ This tactic mirrors the business practices of American corporations in the 1980s that reduced infrastructure and reformed their business practices to stay competitive in the global marketplace.⁵⁴ The future of the military will require steadily increasing investments for modern systems, new technologies and weaponry. To afford these investments, we must eliminate unneeded infrastructure.⁵⁵

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Henry H. Shelton, stressed the importance of BRAC in his February 1998 Posture Statement,

Realizing the true potential of the Revolution in Military Affairs must therefore be accompanied by a corresponding Revolution in Business Affairs within the Department of Defense. We know that significant savings can be achieved by streamlining our business practices and realigning defense activities. I urge the Congress to support the Secretary's QDR recommendations in this vital area, particularly his calls for additional base closures to eliminate unneeded facilities and installations.⁵⁶

CONGRESSIONAL RESISTANCE TO BRAC

The reluctance of Congress to enact legislation that will enable future BRAC rounds is supported by a variety of

arguments. Each argument will be discussed in subsequent paragraphs.

National Economy

At the turn of the decade, when BRAC legislation for the previous rounds was enacted, our nation's economy provided a convincing reason for congressmen to support BRAC. A sluggish economy was burdened by a staggering budget deficit. Deficit hawks made budget reduction a key political issue in the 1988 and 1992 presidential elections. A key element of budget reduction was government waste. Military bases that did not support an evolving National Military Strategy were prime examples of this waste. In other words, the political and economic environment was right for BRAC. Today our nation is experiencing an extremely robust national economy. We are enjoying historically low jobless and interest rates, and for the first time since 1969 the federal government has achieved a balanced budget. In fact, the President recently announced a budget surplus of over \$70 billion for FY 1998.⁵⁷ It is very difficult for Congress to make tough political and economic decisions while the economy is doing so well.

Economic Impact on Local Communities

Congressmen possess profound concerns about the economic impact of base closure on local communities. Military bases provide a constant, reliable source of jobs and revenue to a

local community. Bases and their employees are largely insulated from the effects of economic swings. During times of economic growth and recession, bases continue to hire local town's people, provide maintenance and construction contracts to local firms and provide life support, housing and recreation for the military members assigned to the base. In many areas the base is the economic backbone of the local community and the municipality is dependent on the base for its economic survival.

Fort McClellan, situated in Calhoun County in northern Alabama, is an example of the economic dependence a local community can have on a military base. The Fort's history dates back to the Spanish-American War. It served as a training area during World War I and as an internment camp for prisoners of war and a training camp during World War II. In the 1950s, the Fort became the home for the Women's Army Corps, the Military Police School and the Chemical Training Center.⁵⁸ In the late 1980s as pressure grew to reduce military infrastructure, Fort McClellan became a candidate for closure. It withstood the first three BRAC rounds but was selected for closure in 1995.⁵⁹ At the time of selection the Fort employed 2,300 active military personnel and more than 2,000 civilians.⁶⁰ The Fort produced an annual payroll of \$150,000,000 in a county that had a median income almost \$8,000 less than the national average.⁶¹ Unemployment rates are expected to increase by 16 percent as a

result of the closure.⁶² The economic viability of Calhoun County is now in question and the area faces an uncertain future.

Political Pressure

The politics of BRAC place enormous pressure on congressmen. A decision to support future BRAC rounds is very risky for congressmen that have a military base in their district. The constituency service model predicts that representatives act to protect investments in their districts because constituents vote on how well elected officials provide benefits flowing from those investments.⁶³ Many constituents believe that one of a Congressman's primary jobs is to, "bring home the bacon." Congressmen that support BRAC legislation risk allowing the bacon to get away. There is a fear that a congressman's ability to get reelected is compromised if a BRAC recommends closure of a military base in his district.

Congressional and public perception that BRAC is not an apolitical process has merit. In Congressional hearings on the 1991 BRAC list, Representative Patricia Schroeder noted that of the 21 major bases scheduled to be closed, 19 were in districts represented by Democrats, and she claimed that 99 percent of the civilian job losses from those closures were in Democratic districts.⁶⁴ In the 1995 round, Senator Bob Dole appointed a former post commander of Fort Riley to the BRAC Commission to

ensure that one of his state's larger bases would not be affected.⁶⁵

In the case of Fort McClellan, sited above, both the Chemical and Military Police Schools were moved to Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri which is in Representative Ike Skeleton's legislative district.⁶⁶ Representative Skeleton, a strong supporter of the military, is a senior member of the House Committee on National Security. David Sorenson, in his book, Shutting Down the Cold War, The Politics of Military Base Closure, provides multiple examples of political infighting that occurred in earlier BRAC rounds. He suggests that efforts by legislators to preserve bases in their districts are most effective prior to the release of the BRAC list.⁶⁷ Once the list is announced it is very difficult to influence the process. Sorenson also analyzed the impact of base closure on congressional elections. He concludes that, "there is no evidence that base closure was responsible for even a single congressional or senatorial defeat in the election years following each round."⁶⁸ He suggests that politicians have skillfully blamed the BRAC commission for a closure in their district, which was one of the main reasons Congress created the BRAC Commission in the first place.

Presidential Interference with the BRAC Process

The most oft-stated reason for not supporting BRAC legislation is the belief that President Clinton will politicize the process. In 1995, President Clinton ordered two bases scheduled to be closed, Kelley and McClellan Air Force Bases, kept open as private-sector concerns. He called this concept "privatization in place".⁶⁹ This action was seen by many Congressmen as a blatant political ploy to improve his political stature in the states of Texas and California. This decision very visibly introduced politics into a process that was designed to be apolitical. Senator Wayne Allard summed up his feelings with the following statement:

President Clinton resorted to political gamesmanship during the last round of military base closures which destroyed the credibility of the process. Quite frankly, I don't trust this President or his Administration to not politicize a base closure process again.⁷⁰

Other congressmen have echoed these thoughts in a variety of forums.

Questionable Savings Estimates

Both the Congressional Budget Office and General Accounting Office have raised concerns about the savings estimates the DoD has provided. The DoD does not calculate actual savings it only provides estimates. The Report of the Department of Defense on

Realignment and Closure describes savings in the following manner:

By their very nature, estimates of savings are subject to some uncertainty. The Department reallocates expected BRAC savings through numerous decisions made as part of the normal process of planning programming, and budgeting. No audit trail, single document, or budget account exists for tracking the end use of each dollar saved through BRAC.⁷¹

The GAO writes, "...[the DoD] cannot provide information on actual savings" from previous base closings, and that the information it provided was "inconsistent...unreliable and incomplete."⁷² The DoD acknowledges that early closure estimates have "changed over time" and that it will improve its estimates of costs and savings for future rounds. The Base Realignment and Closure report states, "This report's finding of substantial BRAC savings is generally consistent with those of the General Accounting Office and the Congressional Budget Office, which both confirmed that BRAC savings are substantial, but subject to some uncertainty."⁷³

The Commission Process

There are many members of Congress who have never embraced the BRAC process. Their position is that Congress, not an unelected commission, should determine the size and location of military infrastructure.⁷⁴ It is the responsibility of Congress to make these tough decisions. A commission is not accountable to the people as are elected officials. The result of this

process is a reduction of military bases across the country that has resulted in severe economic hardship with little relative savings.⁷⁵ Proponents for this position believe that Congress should not use the commission process to insulate itself from the democratic process.⁷⁶

THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF BASE CLOSURE

At the macro level, BRAC has had very little impact on the total U.S. workforce. DoD estimates that approximately 107,000 jobs will be lost as a result of BRAC over a 12-year period.⁷⁷ Approximately a quarter of these employees have found employment in other areas of DoD. For bases closed at least two years, approximately 75 percent of the civilian jobs lost as a result of BRAC have been replaced.⁷⁸

At a micro level, for every case of economic hardship caused by BRAC, DoD can site several examples of communities that have bounced back and enjoy economic prosperity. In fact, DoD claims that, "Most communities are rebounding remarkably fast, crafting more diverse and resilient economies."⁷⁹ It cites the closure of Sacramento Army Depot, which employed 3000 federal employees and closed in 1995. Packard Bell moved into the depot, rehired most of the depot's former workforce and now has over 5000 employees and expects to expand to 10,000 within 3 years.⁸⁰ Mather Air Force Base, a victim of the 1991 BRAC round,

is located less than 10 minutes from the Sacramento Army Depot. The base was converted into a light industrial airport and now has 37 tenants, including Federal Express and Emery Air Freight. The airport now employs over 1,330 personnel.⁸¹ Fleet Industrial Supply Center Oakland, Fort Ord, California and Chanute Air Force Base are other examples of bases that have closed and are now thriving in the private sector.

Separate studies by both RAND and the Congressional Research Office (CRS) have assessed the local economic impact of base closure on a community. RAND found that, "while some communities did indeed suffer, the effects were not catastrophic and not nearly as severe as forecasted."⁸² The CRS analyzed 163 communities effected by BRAC and found that 33 had unemployment rates of 5.9 percent or more in May 1995.⁸³ The national average unemployment rate was 5.7 percent. CRS concluded from its analysis that most communities affected by BRAC, "...have a relatively low degree of economic vulnerability to job losses that are estimated to result from these actions."⁸⁴ Finally, the GAO concludes that,

Though the closing of a base can be traumatic event to a community, early studies and experience provide examples of communities that are recovering from the economic impact and loss of jobs. The federal government provides several forms of assistance to affected communities and bases are being successfully reused.⁸⁵

REDUCING THE IMPACT OF BASE CLOSURE

The administration and Congress have initiated several programs that address many of the concerns communities may have about the impact of a base closure. The most onerous problems associated with the 1988 and 1991 closure rounds namely, economic conversion, environmental cleanup, and provisions for the homeless were addressed with supplemental legislation in the early 1990s.

Economic Conversion

In 1993, President Clinton announced a five-point program to revitalize base closure communities. The program placed communities in the role as master developers for closure property. This role gave communities a much greater voice in development decisions and reuse alternatives. Additionally, DoD estimates that economic assistance provided to communities affected by BRAC actions exceeded \$955 million between 1988 and 1997.⁸⁶ The GAO states, "We found that federal assistance provided to communities affected by base closures has helped to cushion the negative economic impact and supports DoD's contention that the redevelopment of base property has successfully created thousands of jobs."⁸⁷

Environmental Impact

The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) requires DoD to certify that "all

remedial action necessary to protect human health and the environment has been taken before base property can be sold or transferred.⁸⁸ This certification could potentially make it impossible to close a base and convert it to civilian use. Base closure was a three-step process in the early 1990s. First, the military moved off the base. Once the military was gone environmental cleanup began. The process of property disposal and base conversion started after base cleanup was finished."⁸⁹ Communities lost the economic benefit of the base when the military left and potentially had to wait several years before other governmental or civilian groups could reuse base facilities.

In 1993, DoD implemented a Fast-Track Cleanup program to speed up the environmental restoration process. The primary purpose of this program is to hasten cleanup at bases and accelerate their conversion to alternate use.⁹⁰ Essentially the legislation compressed the three-step process. Fast-Track also cuts bureaucratic red tape and integrates the local community into the cleanup process. During the three-year period from 1995-1997 this effort reduced 150 years of cleanup project work and avoided over \$150 million in costs.⁹¹

Provisions for the Homeless

The McKinney Act was another very unpopular element of the 1990 BRAC legislation. The Act requires surplus government

property to be evaluated for the purpose of housing homeless persons.⁹² This legislation forced the administration to face charges that homeless had priority over economic development in affected communities. In 1994 the Act was revised to give local communities more control over the redevelopment of BRAC bases. Assistance to the homeless became a consideration, not a requirement.

CONCLUSION

The Administration's request for BRAC rounds in FY2001 and 2005 will receive the same congressional resistance as earlier submissions. The current budget surplus and projected surpluses for the upcoming years may make it politically difficult for Congress to support cost cutting measures such as base closure actions. Despite the state of our national economy, the military continues to operate bases that do not support the national military strategy and consume resources that are desperately needed for modernization, readiness and quality of life programs. The DoD can be expected to continue to push for BRAC legislation until it is eventually approved. DoD is often criticized for being inefficient yet it is ironic that a major initiative that will improve efficiency such as base closure faces resistance from Congress. The DoD must address Congress's concerns about BRAC legislation, previously identified in this

paper, and implement lessons learned from previous attempts to gain BRAC approval.

The political timeline suggests that BRAC legislation has no chance of being approved during an election year. If enabling legislation is not enacted this year, then the next opportunity is in 2001. DoD estimates that approximately 3 billion dollars per year of potential savings is lost every year that BRAC is delayed. Therefore, it is extremely important that the administration conduct a full court press to gain approval in 1999. There is no evidence that either the President or Vice President have aggressively lobbied Congress for BRAC legislation. The President must be engaged and publicly support the BRAC process. A visible, bipartisan campaign is essential for successful BRAC legislation. A presidential news conference focused on BRAC attended by senior military officials, including the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Service Chiefs, would be an excellent vehicle for gaining public support and demonstrating unity of effort between the President and his military leaders. The DoD, likewise, has to be willing make BRAC a frontline issue. The Secretary of Defense and Service Chiefs must address the inefficiencies of excess infrastructure and its costs in terms the public can understand, such as readiness and quality of life programs.

RECOMMENDED CHANGES

As suggested by the POMC model discussed earlier in the paper, as long as DoD undergoes basic changes in its missions, there will be continual pressure to adjust the way it does business. Only in this way can DoD achieve the desired efficiencies that it and the Congress expect in today's financially challenged times.

The political realities suggest that modifications to the BRAC procedures used in previous rounds are necessary to assure congressional approval. The President was criticized for inserting himself into the 1995 BRAC process when he nullified the commission's Air Force maintenance depot recommendation and introduced the concept of privatization in place. Future legislation must insulate the process from presidential interference. The legislation should also include strict and unambiguous criteria for closure. These criteria should be negotiated between the Administration and Congress prior to congressional approval. The BRAC commission would be bound by the limitations imposed by the criteria. The legislation should also include a robust package of economic benefits that will be distributed to communities effected by base closure. This package would include job training and economic assistance programs. The Fast-Track environmental cleanup program implemented in the 1993 and 1995 rounds would continue as would

the shift of focus for community development from the federal government to local communities.

Our nation's political leaders must be willing to close military bases in response to a changing geopolitical environment. Failure to do so results in a waste of resources that could be better used to support pressing military needs. Legislative resistance to closure is founded in concern over local political and economic interests, not what is best for the nation. The President and the DoD must work together to craft, and then promote, legislation that results in the closure of excess facilities and provides economic support for communities affected by this legislation.

WORD COUNT = 5872.

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- ⁷ Ibid., i.
- ⁸ Lieutenant Colonel Michael F Huebner, "Base Realignment and Closure: A Historical Perspective," Military Review, November-December 1997, 68.
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- ¹² Ibid., 72.
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- ⁴⁶ Carl Levin, U.S. Senator from Michigan. Additional Views, Committee on Armed Services United States Senate, Department of Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, 105th Congr., 2d sess., 11 May 1998. 469.
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