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FOREWORD

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Introduction

In the summer of 1918, Richard Fool Bull sent greetings in his native Lakota to the agency at Rosebud, South Dakota from Camp Funston in Kansas. "How Cola," he began, "I am getting to be quite a soldier learning right along.... I got a dandy rifle and bayonet and I am anxious to make use of them on some German. When the war is over I'll bring a German scalp with me back to Rosebud."²

Fool Bull's bellicose enthusiasm for fight fit perfectly non-Indians stereotypical expectations of Indians in warfare. Fool Bull's response, however, was not the only reaction Indian soldiers' had to training at Camp Funston and Fort Riley during the First and Second World Wars. Indian soldiers at Camp Funston/Fort Riley were often reluctant to serve for reasons both personal and in principle. This study of Indians' experiences at Camp Funston/Fort Riley, while unique in several details, supports historians' contentions that while there was no typical Indian experience during the world wars both military policy and American Indian policy operated as if there were.³ At times, Indian soldiers lived up to whites' expectations of them, sometimes they did not. The difference between stereotypical expectation and individual experience is central to understanding the relationship between Indian soldiers and Camp Funston/Fort Riley between 1918 and 1945.

Long before the outbreak of World War I and lasting well into the late twentieth century, accepted notions of "Indianness" were central to national policy in the Office of Indian Affairs (later the Bureau of Indian Affairs) and the War Department, albeit for completely different reasons. The Office of Indian Affairs, as exemplified by

Commissioner Cato Sells at the outbreak of World War I, regarded military service as a golden opportunity for Indian assimilation into mainstream American society. In response to a January 1918 query from the Superintendent of the Pine Ridge reservation about the desirability of forming an all-Indian unit, Commissioner Cato Sells replied,

I am in full accord with the idea of giving to all Indians such a clear definition of patriotism as will form a lasting mental picture of their relation and duties to our common country. . . This as you know is of prime importance in all our work with the Indian . . . but I do not think that thought can be properly upheld by encouraging a racial recognition in defense of a common cause.”⁴

Assimilation, and therefore the destruction of native culture, had long been the goal of Indian policy reformers. Integrated military service was consistent with OIA’s boarding school programs, allotment policies and restrictions on native religious practices. Each were designed, in the famous phrase of Indian educator William Henry Pratt, to “kill the Indian and save the man.”

The War Department, on the other hand, had a very different objective in mind when recruiting Indian soldiers to its ranks. Influenced by widely- accepted popular stereotypes, War Dept. officials believed the average Indian soldier was like a secret weapon, fearless on the battlefield, and possessing uncanny talent in scouting, reconnaissance, and sharpshooting. These two rather different views of Indian peoples, each based on notions of racial “types” converged into an unusual policy for Indian

soldiers at Camp Funston/Fort Riley. In a peculiar departure from accepted practice in regard to racial minorities, the Indian soldier was purposely and deliberately integrated into service alongside regular white recruits.

All-Indian companies were vigorously opposed by the Department of Defense, and although a few Indians from the same tribe trained together at Camp Funston and even served together in the same regiments in World War I, by 1940 War Department policies were clear in trying to place at least one "chief" in every company if possible, or one in each regiment at least. This did not mean that the War Department believed Indian soldiers superior to white soldiers. On the contrary, it was generally accepted that Indian soldiers should be relegated to very specific tasks within the military and that their efforts should always be monitored by white officers. In fact, according to the Secretary of War in 1917, a "conscientious test" of separate Indian units was made in 1891 with the U.S. Cavalry, but that "plan was discontinued." In his 1893 report on the Army's experiment with an all Indian unit, Lieutenant Z.B. Vance wrote that although the Indian soldier was "remarkably intelligent," honest and forthright, he lacked ambition and discipline and so should "constantly be kept under the eye of a white man."⁵ Indian soldiers, it was still believed by army commanders in 1917, were most useful under the guidance and direction of experienced white officers. What this meant for Indian recruits in WWI is that while they were expected to act and behave like regular soldiers, not much was expected from them in terms of leadership or advancement.⁶ All of these assumptions about the Indian recruit's fitness for service, both positive and negative, worked to severely limit Indians' military experience .

The decades encompassing American participation in World Wars I and II, 1917-1945, were a period of rapid change for Indian peoples. Some of these changes, such as the loss of tribal lands to whites or the revival of warrior societies, were a direct result of Indian involvement in those conflicts. Indian military service, while touted and appreciated by whites, rarely increased mainstream society's appreciation or respect for native customs. In spite of Indians' solid contributions during the world wars, overseas and at home, American Indian policy was steadfast in its goal to eradicate tribal society and culture. Compulsory and volunteer military service (and the policy of termination that closely followed World War II) were regarded by policymakers as corrective steps in the final elimination of the "Indian Problem" in the United States.⁷ The special talents of the Indian soldier so valued by the military were often the same characteristics the Bureau of Indian Affairs hoped could be erased through his participation in the armed forces.

In his most recent essay, Indian historian Alvin M. Josephy, Jr., reminds us that policy makers in the first half of the twentieth century believed "Indians and the problems generated by their presence would ultimately vanish--if not by disease and war, then by assimilation and attrition on the reservations."⁸ With the possible exception of John Collier's administrative tenure in the 1930s, federal officials charged with Indians' overall welfare believed it was their duty to stamp out a dying culture that was too primitive to survive in a modern world. Indian service in the armed forces was hailed as positive catalyst in this process. Certainly Cato Sells believed this when he wrote to the Superintendent at Pine Ridge Agency, that the "mingling of the Indian with the white soldier ought to have . . . large influence in moving him away from tribal relations and

toward civilization.”⁹ This goal went largely unchallenged until the mid-1960s.

At Camp Funston/Fort Riley, nearly every aspect of policy regulating Indians’ military service reflected the prime directive of assimilation. This, it must be noted, was in stark contrast to the treatment other minority groups received, specifically African Americans, who were indifferently recruited, segregated from regular troops and then given the menial details. Any exploration of Indians’ unique role in the military during the world wars must, therefore, take into consideration the special expectations that whites had of Indian soldiers. This study specifically attempts to place the role of Indian soldiers at Camp Funston/Fort Riley into the larger context of Federal Indian policy, military policy and Indian-white relations while alternately exploring the more personal aspects of Indians’ experiences while stationed there.

World War I & Camp Funston

In 1924, the Office of Indian Affairs estimated that over 17,000 Indian soldiers had served their country in World War I. When the United States entered the war on 6 April 1917, there were only 127,588 soldiers in the U.S. Army and 80,446 National Guardsmen. By the armistice on 11 November 1918, the U.S. Army had expanded to become home to approximately 4,000,000 men.¹⁰ This exponential increase in soldier numbers and in defense spending were the result of a massive project in the early months of the war to train volunteers and draftees for military service in base camps constructed throughout the nation. One of those bases was Camp Funston, located on the Fort Riley Military Reservation just east of Junction City, Kansas on the old Sante Fe Trail.

Camp Funston was only one of several dozen training camps nationwide, and although no effort was made to recruit Indians together, transportation routes and other organizational economies meant that most Indian soldiers trained at a base not too distant from either their reservation or from an Indian boarding school. At Camp Funston, this meant that the majority of recruits came from Pine Ridge, Rosebud and Cheyenne River reservations in South Dakota. Indian Boarding schools were also a direct source of recruits nationally and it seems that a multi-tribal group of Indians enlisted from Haskell Indian School in Lawrence, Kansas, and trained at Camp Funston, although complete records of their service are not extant.¹¹ Because the Army did not keep separate records related to place of enlistment or discharge, it is extremely difficult to estimate the total numbers and tribal affiliation of Indian recruits at Camp Funston. Indian Agency records, housed at Regional Centers of the National Archives do, however, suggest that while Funston received a smattering of Indian recruits from Oklahoma, Iowa and Kansas, the majority of Indians at Funston came from the main agencies in South Dakota, and Rosebud in particular. This geographical connection had a direct effect on Indians who trained at the camp in World War I.

As the country prepared for war, Camp Funston, named for Spanish-American war hero and Kansas native Frederick Funston, was established on 18 July 1917 as a training camp for the 89th Division (National Army) and as an Officer Training School. Volunteers and draftees began arriving in September 1917. New recruits continued to rotate through the training camp until May of 1918. Seven months later in December, Camp Funston was designated a demobilization center through which 77,800 men were processed in their

journey back to civilian life.¹² Major General Leonard Wood was camp commander at Funston. Wood, like the camp's namesake, was a hero of the Spanish-American War, known for his training of the Rough Riders and close friendship with the unit's organizer, former President Theodore Roosevelt. He was the senior Major General in the Regular Army, had combat experience, and was incredibly popular in the United States, Britain and France.

Wood spent the prewar years calling for America's entry into the conflict, or at least mobilizing in preparation for it, and did his part by organizing an officer training camp at Plattsburgh, New York. His goal was to prepare young men in the basics of military command should the nation suddenly need an officer core to train an army at war.¹³ Camp Plattsburgh was a successful project and became the basis for national camp organization in the summer of 1917. As one of the originators of the project, Leonard Wood seemed an ideal officer to have in command at Camp Funston.

Unfortunately for the men at Camp Funston, Kansas was the last place Wood wanted to be. He craved a command in Europe and visited the continent to demonstrate his popularity to the man holding his coveted position, General John J. Pershing. But Wood had made some powerful enemies. He repeatedly spoke out against President Woodrow Wilson's administration for its lack of aggression and preparedness, and even after American entry into the war Wood was openly critical of his commander-in-chief and his pacifist-leaning Secretary of War, Newton D. Baker. Pershing eventually decided that Wood was too old and ill for European command and ordered him back to the United States. When Pershing finally made it clear to Secretary Baker that if Wood returned to

Europe, Pershing would send him home, Secretary Baker informed Wood that he would serve in the United States.¹⁴ Despite his keen disappointment, Wood was effective in raising housing standards and training facilities at Camp Funston. He retained his contacts with Washington, and frequently voiced his complaints to people in a position to make changes on the base.¹⁵ As the training ground evolved into a complex of 1401 buildings with as many as 42,000 men in training, Wood's experience with military organization lifted the camp to a new level of efficiency.

Efficiency, however, did not necessarily make training at Camp Funston more comfortable. As Americans took up the Allies' cause, new recruits were met by parades and bands at every stop on the rail line, heightening the 'boys' anticipation of adventure.¹⁶ The severely regimented life at Camp Funston was, therefore, a shock for most new recruits. As they entered the training camp, the men were directed through a series of rough hewn buildings or tents. Inside, officers demanded to see their identification and directed them to an assembly-line-like examination by camp doctors. The process was so fast that some men took the mandatory oath of loyalty before the physician had completed his work, leaving the young soldier to pledge his allegiance while partially or completely unclothed. The rough nature of their initial encounter with camp life was noted by Indian recruits in their letters home. As Richard Fool Bull wrote to A.G. Wilson in July 1918, "I saw all the Rosebud boys going *thru the mill* the other day. All passed examination except Felix Eaglefeather and Little Crow." [italics added]. The men were then given a uniform, or whichever of those items of the uniform were still in supply. Camp Funston trainees, like at other training camps, often wore a mix of civilian and military garb during

their first eight weeks in camp.¹⁷

New recruits were also given a psychological exam to determine their most effective position within the military infrastructure, and to measure the mentality of the average American soldier. Unfortunately, the creators of this test, Dr. Walter D. Scott of Northwestern University and Dr. Robert M. Yerkes of Harvard, developed a two part exam that reflected soldiers' socio-economic background more than their native intelligence. The Alpha-Beta tests, as they came to be known, contained questions for literates such as "The Overland car is made in: Buffalo, Detroit, Flint, *Toledo*" or "Mauve is the name of a: drink, *color*, fabric, food." Even that portion of the test designed for illiterates asked soldiers to recognize that a net was missing from the tennis court, or a horn was missing from a phonograph. Questions like these placed soldiers from either rural or working class backgrounds at a severe disadvantage.¹⁸

As a result of these flawed instruments, scientists concluded that approximately 47.3 percent of all white recruits, including Indians, were below the mental age of thirteen. The Alpha portion of the test put black soldiers far below white recruits, but the Beta portion failed to show any statistical difference between black and white soldiers, much to the consternation of the examiners. In every instance, however, soldiers from economically underprivileged or rural homes were charted as mentally inferior to educated urban whites. Championed as heroes only days earlier, new recruits from the rural areas surrounding the camp were now classified as "morons."¹⁹ For Indian recruits, with little exposure to urban life in general, psychological testing of this kind automatically relegated them to the lowest levels of the army hierarchy. American Indians were treated the same

as whites with similar scores and assigned positions within white regiments. Indians as a racial group were removed or singled out only if their inability to speak English proved a problem. According to the policies of the U.S. Army, the experience of the American Indian soldier at Camp Funston during World War I was designed to be exactly the same as the average white doughboy.

Every morning, trainees arose at 5:45am to stand reveille and then marched to breakfast at 6:20. Breakfast consisted of cantaloupes, corn flakes with sugar and milk, fried liver and bacon, fried onion, toast and coffee. Dinner was advertised as beef a la mode, boiled potatoes, creamed cauliflower, pickles, tapioca pudding, vanilla sauce, iced tea and bread. This was followed by an evening meal of Chili con carne, hot biscuits, stewed peaches, and iced tea.²⁰

For the most part, Indian recruits relished the vast quantity and quality of food served at camp, even if it was not exactly what they were used to. In general, Plains Indians' consumed a higher proportion of meat to other foods than that issued to them in the army. While the vast quantity of food served to recruits was welcomed during their early days in camp, Indian soldiers soon began to look forward to food packages from home.

The Red Cross, Y.M.C.A., and Knights of Columbus were the main contact between Indian recruits and their families on the reservations. The Red Cross chapter in South Dakota, in particular worked with their sister organization at Camp Funston to send food and gift packages to the Indian soldiers to keep up their spirits. A grateful Robert L. Grier sat down on Christmas eve 1917 to thank the Rosebud County Chapter of the Red

Cross for his holiday package. "It is very kind of the people," he wrote, "to remember the soldiers so liberally and undoubtedly represents a great amount of work and sacrifice."²¹

Indian families across the country responded to the war through volunteer work with the Red Cross, making up packages, knitting socks and mittens and raising money. At Rosebud, the elder male members of the community showed their support for the young men at Camp Funston by forming their own "home guard" and drilling daily should they be needed to defend the reservation from German attack. At Pine Ridge reservation, the Red Cross employed the agency farmers, who worked for the Office of Indian Affairs, to collect packages from the relatives and friends of Indian recruits which the Red Cross would then mail to the training camp. As a result of these cooperative efforts, according to one historian, the war emergency likely had a palliative, if temporary, effect on Indian-white relations.²²

The training at Camp Funston was as predictable as the meals. The day's drill began at 7:30am. For the next four hours men learned to march in line and in columns, dig trenches, attack with the bayonet, care for their uniform, make and pitch a tent, care for their rifle, about personal hygiene, and to participate in and defend themselves from gas attacks. After dinner at noon, soldiers returned to the parade ground to drill some more until the call for retreat, presentation of arms, the lowering of the flag and the playing of the national anthem at 5:45pm. Following the evening meal, soldiers enjoyed a brief free period until lectures at 7pm. Ten o'clock was lights out marked by Taps.²³

Just as Indian peoples were subject to policies based on the ideals of Progressive Era reformers, soldiers in World War I were similarly regarded as an opportunity for

moral reform. This was purpose of the Commission on Training Camp Activities (CTCA) established by President Woodrow Wilson only days after America's entry into the First World War. Expanding on their original goal of educating and protecting American soldiers against venereal disease, the CTCA moved to prevent unnecessary losses in manpower in uniform and unnecessary future chaos in American society.²⁴ The CTCA made every attempt to improve morality and social stability through "education, recreation, and repression." These goals fit hand-in-glove with Indian assimilation policies initiated in the 1890s and which remained in effect until the mid 1930s. Training bases sponsored movie theaters, recreation centers, and other activities offering 'wholesome' entertainment for soldiers during their off-hours while severely limiting soldier access to alcohol and prostitutes. As Fool Bull joked, "There is no whiskey here and I'm glad of it, for I know I'll never keep out of the guard house if there was. The orders are pretty strick here and it's a man's hat when they found booze on him." Alcohol was similarly forbidden on Indian reservations at this time, although it was not as strictly enforced as it was at Camp Funston.

Across the country, the CTCA oversaw the construction and management of 34 Liberty Theaters with a capacity for anywhere from 2000 to 10,000 men. Hit movies were shown every night, in addition to performances by leading actors from Vaudeville and actors associations (donated free of charge). Westerns, featuring battles between Indians and the U.S. Cavalry were a common theme and must have been somewhat unsettling for Indian recruits. In addition, the CTCA appointed numerous athletic directors and instructors, especially for boxing, to camps across the country. The association provided

equipment for nearly every activity or sport including the less popular but no less enthusiastic song leaders charged with maintaining camp spirits.²⁵ Indian recruits at the camp would have had no trouble with tunes like *Uncle Sam, Wrap me in the Dear Old Flag* and *Canning the Kaiser*, all of which were regular fare at Cheyenne River school and others.²⁶

The CTCA was not alone in attempting to offer Camp Funston soldiers some distraction. The American Red Cross, Y.M.C.A., Knights of Columbus (National Catholic War Council), the Jewish Welfare Board, the Salvation Army, the Travelers' Aid, the American Library Association, and the Playground Association of America all organized to furnish camps with the amenities necessary for wholesome living. When Indian soldiers went abroad, many of these benevolent societies accompanied them, assisting with correspondence to families, medical care, and providing general comfort.²⁷ On occasion, the Red Cross even followed up on Indian soldiers who were rejected for training due to illness or disease to make sure they had arrived back at the reservation safely.²⁸

Despite the efforts of volunteer societies to ease Indian soldiers' transition into military life many reservation recruits had difficulty with the experience. On the other hand, Indian soldiers who were boarding school graduates seemingly had little difficulty with camp routine. In the October 1917 draft, Pine Ridge Indian recruits were drawn mainly from the the Indian schools at Rapid City and Flandreau in South Dakota, Haskell Indian School in Lawrence Kansas and Genoa Indian School in Nebraska. Boarding school recruits were among the first to be integrated into the regular Army at places like

Camp Funston where they were valued for their mechanical and husbandry skills learned at school. For those Indian men accustomed to life in small rural communities, however, the experience was much more difficult. Homesickness is a constant theme in the letters sent by Indian soldiers at Fort Riley to the Indian agents. In the fall of 1917, Grover E. Burnett, a Lakota Sioux, was clearly homesick as he thanked his family for the early Christmas packages that had arrived in camp.

I received the xmas pkg. All OK and thank you one and all, dear friends not only for the presents but for your kind wishes. It makes one feel as if he is not forgotten altogether by his home people. I find every thing in the pkg very useful. We boys are getting along alright – if it wasn't for so much wind in this country it would be so much better. It is dustier here than it is in Rose Bud on a windy day it is windy every day here . . . ²⁹

Superintendents varied in the interest they showed in recruits from their reservations, but Superintendent Claude Covey from Rosebud, South Dakota, wrote regularly to the Lakota Sioux men stationed at Camp Funston. On 22 November 1917, he asked Private James Witt to share his greetings with “all the Rosebud boys” and to let “each one know that we think of you all and wish you the very best there is which is to be in at the finish and get the kaiser and all his war lords, every one of them.”³⁰ Just as Americans were being wooed by the Committee on Public Information, Indian recruits were regularly reinforced in their role as the defenders of democracy. Some, like Witt who

was one-eighth Cherokee, paid a high price for their loyalty to the United States. Witt was wounded in Belleau Woods, France in the summer of 1918 and returned to Rosebud reservation minus his left arm.

In spite of encouragement from home, not every American Indian at Camp Funston settled down to camp life or resigned themselves to the war effort. In numerous documented cases, (and in opposition to the prevailing stereotype of the bloodthirsty Indian soldier) the Rosebud "boys" actively worked to be discharged from Camp Funston and sent home to their families. For the Lakota, Camp Funston was a grim reminder of the grisly murder of their own kinsmen at Wounded Knee only a quarter century earlier. If the average Indian recruit at Funston was between 21 and 27 years old (based on a survey of discharge papers), he was born in the immediate aftermath of a very dark moment in Lakota history. These soldiers would have grown up entirely in the shadow of the massacre; a situation that may well have dampened their enthusiasm to serve at the same camp that had housed and trained the soldiers responsible for the deaths of nearly 300 Lakota men, women and children in the bitter winter of 1891.

Unlike conscientious objectors who were pacifist or had religious reasons for resisting the draft, many Indian soldiers did not seek exemption from military service to avoid combat or from religious conviction. Rather, they saw their draft as a violation of their status as non-citizens. As wards rather than full American citizens, they feared their families and property would not be adequately protected while they were in service. Some recruits also worried that the government would deny them Veterans Benefits after the war. The majority of Indians who resisted the draft at Camp Funston were seeking

temporary exemptions or deferments until they could settle their political and legal status as American citizens. This was true for Pierre From Above, a Lakota Sioux who declared that he would not fight without the full rights of citizenship. He wrote to the Agency, "This doesn't mean that I am backing out the Army, but I rather be a citizen before I go."³¹

From Above had good reason to be concerned. In 1917, in response to reformers' and Western politicians demands, Commissioner Sells embarked on an aggressive campaign to have thousands of Indian wards declared "competent" to manage their own affairs. Under Sells new policy, any Indian of less than one-half Indian ancestry would be automatically declared competent, while full bloods could be declared competent by superintendents whether the allottee made application or not. Consequently, this policy subjected Indian lands to taxation and other legal obligations that frequently led to their ultimate dispossession.

Public support for Sells new policy was strong as a result of increased demand for agricultural products and a widespread belief that Indians were less productive farmers than whites. Competency policy virtually guaranteed that Indian lands would fall under white control in a short period of time. This was particularly hard on the Indians at Pine Ridge and other South Dakota reservations where most of the allottees were unable to speak, write or read English and were in no way competent to negotiate the intricacies of legal land title. New patentees were quickly offered mortgages on their land and without any business experience were swindled out of it as lenders foreclosed.³²

Other Indian recruits were concerned for the safety of their family members in their

absence. For Private Louis Whitehorse, being drafted into the army meant he was unable to protect and support his family. In the fall of 1917, Whitehorse filed a claim for exemption "on account of having a dependent wife." Louis's request was quickly denied by the district board. The secretary of the local exemption board explained that Louis White Horse "was ordered to report for entrainment on October 5, but he failed to do so . . . and on October 26th he was arrested as a deserter and taken to Fort Mead and from there to Camp Funston."³³ White Horse continued to ask to be allowed to return to the reservation to no avail. In the spring of 1918, while still serving time for desertion in a camp cell, his wife died.

George Big Owl and his wife Millie Peneaux, of Rosebud tried unsuccessfully to have George discharged from Funston on account of Millie's polio. They wrote to various officials both in the army and the Office of Indian Affairs asking for help. As Millie wrote to the Agency Superintendent, "I can't take care of my childrens because I can't walk and I have no relatives to help me . . . supposed you were in my place, suffer like this what would you think? Sure enough you will think of killing yourself and then you will be better off." Millie Peneaux even wrote to Vice President Charles Curtis, an one-eighth Cherokee Indian from Oklahoma, asking for help but her efforts were in vain. In July of 1918, the Superintendent wrote her that it was useless to make "any further attempts toward getting him exempted." He told her she was better off financially while George was in the Army and that "instead of looking at it as you do you should indeed be proud of your husband for having an opportunity to do his part in this great war."³⁴

Whitehorse's experience and that of George Big Owl seem doubly tragic

considering that exemption boards across the nation were still in the process of trying to clarify the rules and to whom they applied. Some boards exempted all married men, while others refused to hear cases of dependency that would have served as grounds for legal exemption. As the war dragged on, the War Department attempted to clarify the guidelines for Selective Service and Exemption Boards, but by that time, many Indians had already been forced into service and could only argue their case by correspondence with their Agency superintendents.³⁵

In the spring of 1918, nearly one year after the United States had entered the war and called the first draft, the local exemption board of Mellette County, White River, South Dakota was still unclear about exemption guidelines. Secretary C. W. Kerlin explained:

We have received no ruling from the War Department in regard to exempting Indians who were not citizens. I understood that some of the Boards had received this ruling, and last week while at Pierre [South Dakota] I had a talk with Adjutant General Morris, and I asked him in regard to this matter, and he said that he had sent out such a ruling to a few of the Boards whom he thought would have Indians among their registrants, but we failed to receive any. I understand that this ruling is to the effect that an Indian receiving his trust patent from the Government since May 1906 is not a citizen, [and] not subject to draft."³⁶

Confusion over Indians' status as citizens and their eligibility for the draft would continue

to plague Indian soldiers even after the passage of the Curtis Act in 1924 which, as a result of Indians' service in the Great War, finally made all Indians citizens of the United States.

Unfortunately, neither conscientious objectors nor Indians had much success in securing discharge from Camp Funston. Part of the reason was the command policy of General Wood, who became well known for his intolerance of objectors. This may have been a result of the fact that a very frustrated Wood had little patience for those who failed to support a war that he had been demanding the nation enter since 1914. Whatever the source, Camp Funston became notorious for its brutal treatment of conscientious objectors. When rumors of torture leaked out from the base, investigators gathered evidence of horrendous treatment of prisoners between 5 July and 21 October 1918. These included "bayoneting, forced cold showers under fire hoses for up to fifteen minutes at a time (sometimes repeatedly) in the middle of the night, vicious blows, and hanging by the thumbs." The testimony led to public demands for an investigation of conditions at Camp Funston in what became popularly known as the "Camp Funston Outrages."³⁷ Because exemption laws were particularly foggy with regard to Indian citizen status, Indian objectors may very well have experienced duress and false imprisonment at Camp Funston.

Indian soldiers were likewise disappointed by their inadequate training at Camp Funston. The general policy nationally was that the average American soldier spend six months training at camp, another two months training in France, and one month in a quiet sector at the front before entering battle. Indians writing home from Camp Funston,

however, noted that their training might last only one month before they departed for France. One private from Rosebud agency noted that "Our Captain introduced us that we shall fight the German as soon as we are trained."³⁸ In July 1918, Richard Fool Bull wrote that Camp Funston is "only a receiving camp and about a month's training is all we get here and equipments [sic]."³⁹ Whether this shortened training was unique to Camp Funston or was a common event in training camps everywhere is still in question.

Although the Army did not keep separate records of Indians' contributions in World War I, acts of gallantry and bravery were regularly noted in local newspapers and by Agency superintendents in their records. Several Indians who trained at Camp Funston served with distinction overseas and were ultimately killed or wounded in the conflict. Moses Clown, a Haskell student who was born at Cheyenne Agency, was inducted in June of 1917 and sent to Camp Funston for training. He left for Europe with Company B of the 314th Military Police which was attached to the 32nd Division of the Army. Ten days before the November armistice, Clown and four others in his unit were killed by an exploding shell. Funston trainees Thomas Blackbird, Oliver Leftheron, Edward Lessert, William Fire Thunder, Felix Fly, Thomas Garcia, Vincent Bad Wound, Benjamin Prettyboy, and Frank Two Two, all of Pine Ridge, saw service in France in the last days and months of the war and returned safely. Antoine LeDeaux and Allen Kills Warrior who trained at Funston suffered eye and lung damage after being gassed. Eddie Cottier, another Funston recruit was wounded in the Battle of Meuse Argonne on October 21, 1918. His wounds were severe enough to warrant amputation of his left leg at the thigh and part of his right foot. Other former trainees were not as fortunate. Corporal Roy

Lessert of the American Expeditionary Force fought in numerous engagements before he was killed in November of 1918. Joseph Thunder Hawk of the 350th Infantry, 88th Division saw action in three different engagements with the AEF and was gassed several times. He died at Pine Ridge reservation on January 21, 1921.

The Inter-war Years 1919-1940

Upon their return to the United States in 1919, American Indians found a society, that although grateful for their service, had not fundamentally changed their minds about Indian people. It was expected that Indians would return to their former lives on the reservation, even though many of the Indian veterans were no longer physically able to do the same work they had done before. Former ranchers and farmers, many Indian veterans now found work in the Indian Service or as common laborers in agriculture and local industry. War time spending had reduced federal money available for reservation programs like healthcare and schools and veterans often returned to a diminished level of service for their families and children. Indian lands had similarly been taken over through liberal long term land leases to white farmers who profited from high wartime prices for agricultural products.⁴⁰ On the other hand, the experience of war in some Indian communities helped to revitalize old warrior traditions, societies and rituals. Seen as an expression of patriotism, American officials were more tolerant of these ceremonies than they had been of earlier ceremonies such as the Ghost Dance. Some tribes, as at Cheyenne River Agency, formed their own American Legions to honor their veterans and oversaw the erection of memorials to their fallen comrades.

Within American popular culture, Indian heroism in World War I took on mythic proportions and only served to strengthen long held stereotypes about the "natural" ability of the Indian soldier. In the spring of 1919, the Historical Section of the American Expeditionary Forces asked a number of field officers to fill out a lengthy questionnaire on the conduct of Indian soldiers during the war. The survey assumed Indians' special abilities in several ways. For example, the first half of the questionnaire asked if the Indian soldier had been able to "stand the nervous strain; prove a natural leader in the ranks; associate readily with white men; regarded well by white soldiers or demonstrated any special fitness for duty." On the second half of the questionnaire, titled "Scouting" the questions went to the heart of the matter with queries about the soldier's "courage, endurance, good humor, keenness of senses and dexterity, judgement and initiative, ability to use maps, buzzers etc, night work as a runner, observer and verbal reporter." While most C.O.s described their Indian soldiers as simply normal or fair, without any exceptional attributes, a fair number took the bait offered and described their Indian charges as having exceptional abilities in terms of courage, humor, keen senses and running messages, but considered their leadership abilities to be "average" or "normal." This was in keeping with stereotypes forged before the war which held that Indians made good, even exceptional regular soldiers in the right place, but should not be made officers over whites. While it is uncertain what the direct consequences of this unscientific survey were for War Department policy, the fact that Indians were regarded as a separate race with particular characteristics helps to explain how Indian soldiers were regarded on the eve of World War II.

In the case of Fort Riley, the conspicuous service of Haskell Indian School students during the Great War led to some unexpected positive connections between the school and the base, albeit based on the same old stereotypes that had influenced the Army survey in 1919. As the horror of the war receded into the distance, both the School and the Fort looked for ways in which to publicize their continued importance in American society. This led to the establishment of two troops of all-Indian student-soldiers, one a mounted cavalry unit and the other an artillery unit. These two functions were not chosen randomly, but were selected for their seeming "natural" fit with Indians' affinity for horses and sharpshooting. The artillery troop was made up of 65 students and lasted until 1934 when the school ran into financial difficulties related to the proper storage of equipment. The mounted Troop "C" of the 114th Cavalry at Fort Riley was also made up entirely of Haskell students. These students were carefully selected for their good conduct and, as the following press release pointed out, represented a cross section of the different Indian tribes.

These Indians come from twenty states of the Union. The Cherokees, with thirteen men, have the largest representation on the Troop roster with eleven Siouxs running a close second. In addition to the above there are six Pimas, five Navajos; four Utes; two each Snohomish, Creek, Seneca, Chippewa, and Menominee; and one each from the tribes of Pomo, Stockbridge, Sac and Fox, Shoshone Omaha, Wichita, Pawnee, Piute, Bannock, Klamath, Cheyenne, Arickaree and Oneida.⁴¹

Troop "C" of the Mounted Cavalry in particular enjoyed the strong support of both the base and the school. As the War Department reported, "When there are distinguished visitors, the Indian Troop is always called upon to give its silent drill." For ten minutes, "without command or guiding signal, the Indians go silently through a drill involving 1192 movements in marching and the manual of arms, never stepping outside of the limited space assigned, brushing the lines of spectators, but never touching them." Troop "C" was designated the "banner" troop of Kansas because, "in athletic competitions members of the Troop clearly display the traditional Indian prowess."⁴²

According to historian Samuel Newland, "C" Troop was disbanded in 1927, but I Troop of the 114th Cavalry served in the Kansas National Guard until 1940. Indian students were glad to join the troop because it provided them with a small income in addition to a great deal of attention. The National Guard, on the other hand, was able to exploit the romantic image of American Indians to its advantage by staging public demonstrations and other public relations events that underscored the Guard's presence in the state. Newland notes that even though the 114th Cavalry was phased out in 1940 and became the 127th Field Artillery by order of President Roosevelt, E Battery continued to operate as an all-Indian unit. When the 127th Artillery was sent to California from Kansas, the Indian Battery was "checkerboarded" into other units. Newland says this was done "for reasons that are not altogether clear." While the reason for the scattering of Indian servicemen might not be clear in the records of the Kansas National Guard, it was most certainly the result of the War Department's national policy to have an Indian "issued" to as many different units as possible.⁴³

The 1930s were a difficult time in Indian people's history as their land base dwindled and the weak national economy strained their already meager resources. In some cases, reservation superintendents tried to argue for better treatment and more financial support for Indians based on their war service. As Roland Thompson of Pine Ridge Agency wrote in his 1940 report on Sioux veterans of the great war, "this data will help many Indian veterans and their relatives in regard to employment, compensations, widows, orphans, burial flags, burial claims and in other ways."⁴⁴ Certainly their war service helped Indian veterans gain a greater awareness of the resources of the nation at large and of their meager portion as wards of the federal government. At the height of the depression, James McGregor, Superintendent at Pine Ridge Agency, wrote to Commissioner John Collier on December 8, 1934 to ask about a war department warehouse that was rumored to contain a "large amount of canned Argentina beef." McGregor pleaded with Collier to investigate the possibility of having this beef sent to Pine Ridge, as "on account of some Act of Congress this beef cannot be used by the War Dept." The Sioux Indians, McGregor explained, do not have any money to purchase beef, "and they will have to live on shorter rations if we do not get this beef." McGregor's request was denied, as was a similar request for coffins, also rumored to be in storage somewhere in a federal warehouse.

John Collier, a reformer, humanitarian and sociologist, became Commissioner of Indian Affairs in 1933. He enacted sweeping changes in Federal Indian policy, including the repeal of the Dawes Act which had divided up tribal lands into individual allotments. Collier also stressed Indian self-determination through democratic home rule, tolerance of

tribal religious practice and federal support for tribally owned businesses, especially arts and crafts. On the eve of World War II, however, assimilation again became the main goal of Indian policy. This time, there was less confusion over exemptions for Indians who were not citizens, at least in the Office of Indian Affairs. The War Department, on the other hand, had not quite caught up to the changes in Indian policy since 1917.

Captain W.B. Palmer of the General War staff wrote to Commissioner John Collier in July of 1940 about Indians' eligibility for service, having heard from some of his staff that Indians were exempt as non-citizens. The Army maintained its originally mistaken notions that non-citizen Indians were exempt from the draft even though this was not the case even in World War I for any Indian allotted before 1906. Palmer wrote Collier that, "we understand informally that today all Indians are citizen of the United States." Collier replied the next day that under the Act passed in 1924, "all Indians born within the United States are full citizens," which, of course, made them fully eligible for service.

Collier also circumvented the confusion generated by the selective service in World War I (when local draft boards discriminated against Indian recruits) by setting up registration centers on the reservations to be overseen by the Agency Superintendent and his staff, rather than members of a local draft board. Some states, like Oklahoma and California, decided to handle registration themselves and opted out of Collier's plan. In South Dakota, however, registration of Indian recruits took place at the Agency. Unlike in the Great War, however, Indian registrants could not readily expect to be inducted and trained together. A review of the service records available for World War II Indian veterans reveals that there was no effort to keep Indian recruits together. On the contrary,

it was Army and Navy policy to scatter Indians as widely as possible throughout the service. This policy was a direct result of the Army's interpretation of Indians' unique service in World War I.

This persistent belief in the Indian as a 'natural' soldier was beautifully and succinctly expressed in a Department of the Interior radio interview broadcast on October 24, 1940. In that interview, Commissioner John Collier reassured his host, (Mr. Allen) that Indian people were thoroughly loyal to the American Government and (stretching the truth a little here), stated that, "In the World War in 1917, the Indians were the only native-born group not subject to the draft," yet "more than 12,000 entered the World War." In his defense of Indians' loyalty and distaste for the Axis, Collier made the argument that the "the whole spirit of totalitarianism is in irrepressible conflict with the spirit of the Indian and his way of life." As for the Indians' usefulness as soldiers, Collier took a remarkably similar stand to the arguments made for all-Indian regiments in the past. These same arguments were also used in the War Department's final decision to integrate Indian soldiers throughout the Armed Forces. Collier's careful pitch for Indian patriotism in spite of cultural differences was beautifully illustrated in an interview with the Department of the Interior in October of 1940.

Mr. Allen: Indians I know are extremely adaptable and quick to learn and adopt new ways. Do you think, therefore, that the great inherited military gifts and skills of the Indians might be adapted to modern warfare?

Mr. Collier: Modern warfare has again become warfare of movement. Modern

aerial warfare places a very high value on audacity, swiftness of decision and self-reliance of individual fighters. Audacity, tenacity and individual resourcefulness have distinguished the Indian fighters of the past above almost any other fighters of history. In case after case, a few score or a few hundred Indians have fought to a standstill and worn out armed forces of the white man ten times as numerous.

These qualities have not died out from the Indian at all. [italics added]⁴⁵

Collier's defense of Indians as soldiers, although somewhat more enlightened than his predecessors who wished to use military service as a way of eradicating Indian culture, was similarly biologically based, making it easy for the War Department to classify Indians as a separate but useful racial type.

Indian veterans and trainees from Camp Funston in World War I were used as object lessons by the Indian Office as positive proof of the desirability of Indians as soldiers. As in World War I, Indians themselves were divided on the question of the draft and of their assumed service as soldiers in another conflict. In New York, New Mexico and Florida, organized tribal resistance to the draft regularly plagued Collier's administration. Official publicity, however, tended to ignore these resisters and consistently reported on Indians' good showing at the registration offices. In reporting on a group of Sioux Veterans who were honored by the all-white Order of Indian Wars at a dinner in Washington D.C., Collier noted that many of the guests, both Indian and white, were veterans of the incident at Wounded Knee in 1890. Collier concluded that this reconciliation was "a measure of the transformation that time has brought." In other

words, past conflicts were now forgotten and the Indian was ready and able to fight on behalf of his country.

WWII at Fort Riley

As America watched the war escalate in Europe, the nation slowly began the process of physically and emotionally gearing up for another global conflict. By the time the United States entered the Second World War, the expectation that American Indians would be an integral part of America's military effort was already deeply entrenched in the minds of most Americans and again, Indians signed up in numbers far out of proportion with their population. As in World War I, the initial organization of divisions was done on the basis of geography or membership in the National Guard. As of March 4, 1944, a total of 1023 Indians were recorded as having come from South Dakota, some of which undoubtedly were placed into units at Fort Riley alongside white recruits from the same area. A few divisions took in a larger than average numbers of Indian recruits, such as the Forty-Fifth Infantry Division, who adopted an Indian style Thunderbird as a symbol to replace their original swastika design. Indians of the Great Plains served in noticeable numbers in the Nineteenth Iowa Infantry Regiment, the Fourth Infantry Regiment and in the 147th Field Artillery Regiment. With the possible exception of a portion of the 147th Field Artillery, these regiments and divisions did not serve or train at Fort Riley during World War II, meaning that Indians at Fort Riley are about as easy to find as soldiers of Scandinavian ancestry.

As historian Alison Bernstein unhappily notes, "Because the army did not keep records concerning Indians' participation in the military, it is difficult to uncover their contributions."⁴⁶ In the absence of official records of Indian service, Reservation Agency records, newspaper copy and individual service records are the three best sources of

information about Indians' service in World War II. Although the Bureau of Indian Affairs asked local Superintendents to forward any information about the activities of Indians in World War II, for inclusion in the Bureau magazine, *Indians at Work*, the information they provided did not generally include anything related to their training base or discharge base, but focused on their service overseas. Designed to highlight Indian heroism, these records do not provide anything close to a comprehensive picture of Indian war service in general, much less a picture of Indian service at Fort Riley. The most that can be said for certain is that Indians were undoubtedly among the regular soldiers that were sent to Fort Riley for training, transportation, incarceration and discharge between 1941 and 1945 and that they were subjected to the same stereotyped expectations that Indian soldiers everywhere endured.

These stereotyped expectations led the Army to scatter Indian personnel as widely as possible among the available commands for which they were suited. Among experts at the War Department, not only was the American Indian soldier useful in his own right as an outstanding fighter and scout, he had a positive effect on his white contemporaries in the field. According to an army report:

It is interesting and suggestive to note that throughout the army where Indians are enlisted they become in a sense more or less objects of company pride. They usually show up to advantage in drill, in sports and in action and universally dubbed "chief" they receive attentions which in no way disturb their normal status as soldiers. This generally prevalent company interest in enlisted Indian soldiers

operates to the advantage of the Indian who returns to the company from detached scouting service in that at mess and in the supply room his reasonable needs are more readily met than would be those of the ordinary enlisted man reporting back after a period of separated service.⁴⁷

In essence, the War Department considered American Indians to be useful both as soldiers and as mascots for regular troops and made a conscious effort to place an Indian into every company where possible.

In addition to the lonely token role many Indian soldiers filled in their companies, Indians on their way to Fort Riley underwent a more demanding training period compared to their predecessors in WWI. More practical preparations for World War II were being undertaken at Fort Riley which expanded by an additional 32,000 acres to meet the demands of a modern army. Camp Funston was rebuilt as the home of the 2nd Cavalry Division in December 1940, while a Cavalry Replacement Center was established on base at Camp Forsyth. As the war expanded and activities at Fort Riley increased, components of the 2nd Cavalry split off to form the 9th Armored Division.⁴⁸ Personnel training was similarly more sophisticated than in the previous war. With the increased use of telephones and airplanes, the instruction of Army personnel routinized through constant direction and analysis from the Army Ground Forces center. Inspectors were routinely flown to training camps to check on the progress of instructors and ensure that everything was being done in a uniform manner. The specialization of the WWII Army was everywhere apparent at Fort Riley making the assimilation of Indian soldiers into the

regular army an accomplished fact.

This did not mean, however, that the Army considered every soldier equal. Most Indian recruits traveling through Fort Riley had already been subject to the Army General Classification Test (AGCT) upon their registration. The Army had also revised its intelligence testing system since the First World War, but this new examination retained similar flaws. The AGCT was devised to divide World War II soldiers into appropriate classes and assign them to work suitable to their capabilities. There was an effort to insist that this was not a test of men's I.Q. or mental age, but the examinations still measured trainees based on their socio-economic background. For young men from rural regions and urban ghettos, the examinations were just as biased as they had been in the previous war.

As a result of the classification system and the structure of the Army prior to 1943, the bottom two classes (those scoring lowest on the examinations) became ground combat troops. Consequently many Indians and other minorities served primarily in infantry, artillery and armored units. By 1943, Army command had recognized its mistake in assuming that the least "intelligent" recruits were all ground combat service required and insisted that this branch of service was being negatively impaired by its failure to represent a true cross-section of American manpower. From that point forward, the men trained at Fort Riley, Kansas and at bases across the country, came to represent the "average American" at war.⁴⁹

Also new to Indian recruits was the Army's use of audiovisual materials in World War II. In 1942, Army Ground Forces began producing training films to "hold the interest

of trainees long accustomed to viewing the finest Hollywood productions."⁵⁰ In addition, mass publication allowed for the printing of an array of training manuals for an army at war. The War Department had been printing military manuals since the nineteenth century, but during the Second World War publications tripled in number to meet the demands of mobilization. In this war, unlike the First World War, the limited number of experienced officers would not provoke the same problems associated with a lack of uniformity. As a result of technological advances, the Army Ground Forces became the best and most uniformly trained troops the nation had ever put in the field.⁵¹

This was a fortunate advantage, because with this war soldiers had to know much more about the enemy and their allies than ever before. At Fort Riley, the accelerated training involved a review of the basic military instruction in "camouflage and concealment, mine removal and the detection of booby traps, patrolling, map reading, and combat intelligence, recognition of American, Allied, and enemy aircraft, armored vehicles, and other equipment [much of which continued to change throughout the war], the use and disposal of captured equipment; and the processing of prisoners of war."⁵²

Despite all of these advances in training, the Army Ground Forces were having difficulties even as late as 1945 in providing a sufficient number of replacements for the losses being suffered overseas. As part of the effort to meet this demand, the Army Ground Forces Replacement Depot No. 3 was activated at Fort Riley on 1 June 1945. The depot served as a processing station for soldiers assigned as replacements and on furlough in the upper Mississippi and Ohio River valleys. It was one of the last stages of training for soldiers as they came from replacements centers and were on their way to a

unit in Europe or the Pacific.

On average, replacements remained at Depot No. 3 for four days, though some had an extended stay of up to 12 days. Thus, the training of the 3,000 men usually cycling through Fort Riley was formatted to fit a more accelerated pace.⁵³ When Replacement Depot No. 3 was established in June 1945, the war in Europe had ended and as a result, Army Ground Forces training became more focused on combat in the Pacific War. This meant greater focus on the use of flame throwers, demolition, assaulting prepared fortifications like pillboxes and small unit tactics.⁵⁴ In addition, replacements received training in health risks specific to the Pacific combat areas, especially scrub typhus, and specialized instruction on assaults on "jungle positions and jungle villages, jungle patrolling, attack on Japanese command posts, and identification of Japanese uniforms and equipment. Throughout the country, replacement training centers modified courses that had simulated the topography of Germany and Western Europe to represent the Japanese-occupied jungles and villages.⁵⁵

When Indian soldiers arrived at Fort Riley, most had already received approximately five months training in Replacement Training Centers with an emphasis on warfare in the Pacific. Therefore, the instruction at the training depot concentrated on reinforcing the basics of "range work with all small arms varying from known distance firing to combat village problems and applicatory training in map reading, military courtesy, physical and mental conditioning."⁵⁶ Most of the units that passed through Fort Riley in this period stayed only briefly before being sent to a coastal base to await service in either Europe or the Pacific.

During this time, Fort Riley was host to one of the Army's most famous recruits, Johnny Nevermissashot. In a publicity shot for the base, Johnny Nevermissashot identified only as a "Sioux Indian," or the "perfect replacement" was photographed putting an apple on the head of WAC Sergeant prior to "stepping off twenty paces and effecting a simulated "William Tell" Act." The publicity surrounding this unidentified Indian, is a good example of the uniform expectations whites, and the Army, had of Indian recruits and their presumed natural skills and abilities at marksmanship. It is instructive that although this soldier's name was certainly not actually "Nevermissashot," the Army did not think it necessary or appropriate to identify their token Indian marksman by his real name.

Johnny Nevermissashot's appearance at Fort Riley was predictably exploited as an opportunity for the base to explain its most pressing function, which was to re-train highly skilled recruits before being shipped out. Part of the reason for this review of a broad range of combat assignments reflected Army Ground Forces command's recognition that replacements would have to be prepared for a much wider range of assignments due to the tremendous losses already suffered in the Pacific. Thus the training at Army Ground Forces Replacement centers and depots shifted from a system of instruction in a soldier's specialized assignment to greater emphasis on "the basic disciplines, skill with weapons and equipment, and competence in individual and squad tactics."⁵⁷

Fort Riley was also the home of the "Provisional Casual Company" for processing AWOL cases and men involved with civil authorities. Organized in June 1945, the Provisional Casual Company handled all clerical work for charge sheets and paperwork

associated with base court martial proceedings and interviewed all soldiers to determine the validity of their cases.⁵⁸ After the Japanese surrender in August 1945, AGF Replacement Depot 3 was not closed, but revised its training methods. Now the emphasis was on occupational duties, and replacements were schooled in "riot duty, more interior guard and close order drill."⁵⁹

During the war, the Army had evolved in to one of the most powerful military forces in the world, and the training at Fort Riley reflected this transition. The historic importance of horse cavalry at Fort Riley came to a close with the deactivation of the last cavalry unit at Fort Riley in March 1947. The Cavalry School was replaced by the Ground General School, which emphasized basic military instruction for both officers and enlisted men.⁶⁰ An older era of military training had effectively come to an end.

Conclusion

The relationship between Indian peoples and Camp Funston/Fort Riley between 1917 and 1945 is a reflection of two larger stories; first, of the increasing technological specialization of the Armed Forces and second, of the changing relationship between mainstream American society and American Indians. In a broad sense, the technological advances that shaped life at Fort Riley far out-stripped static romantic ideas about Indian peoples as presented in popular culture. Stereotypical notions of what Indian soldiers were best suited for persisted within the Armed Forces in spite of attempts to scientifically measure soldiers' intelligence and service. It is also clear that sweeping changes in Indian life, education, self-governance and economic status between the World Wars were not

well understood by the military.

Indians at Camp Funston and Fort Riley, for the most part, responded to military life in ways that were not very different from their white counterparts, but which reflected their deep connections to family as well as their unique status as non-citizens, (especially in World War I). Some of the pressures experienced by Indian soldiers throughout the period 1917-1945, were, however, quite different from that of the average white soldier. Indians were regarded as having special talents for horsemanship, sharpshooting, tracking and scouting, and many tried hard to live up to those expectations—sometimes at the cost of their lives.

There can be no question that military experience at Funston/Fort Riley also shaped Indians' ideas about the world and their eventual place in it. The generation of young men and women who served in WWI and II, gained critical experience which allowed them to become cultural brokers for their people after the war. World wide veterans later helped Indians negotiate more effectively with mainstream society and led to numerous changes in reservation life and policy. In the case of the Curtis Act of 1924, their service resulted in a new status for Indians nationally. As individuals, the brief time Indian soldiers spent at Camp Funston/Fort Riley probably did not directly effect operations at the base as much as the base changed them. The thousands of white soldiers who served alongside the token "chief" in their company at Camp Funston/Fort Riley were also effected by the experience, although in ways that have yet to be systematically documented. Overall, Indian soldiers' perceived positive contributions to the effectiveness of the American military helped pave the way for the integration of other

minorities after WWII, the legacy of which can be observed in all ranks of the military personnel that work and live at Fort Riley today.

ENDNOTES

1. The research and writing of this report was funded through a grant by the Department of Defense. The project was directed by Professor James E. Sherow, Department of History, Kansas State University. James E. Sherow, Bonnie Lynn-Sherow, Susannah U. Bruce, and Robert B. Bruce, all of Kansas State University, conducted the research for this project. Dr. Dick Shields, Chief of Cultural Resources Division, Fort Riley, Kansas, and Mr. John Dendy, of Dynamac Corporation - Fort Riley, Archeologist, provided superb support during all phases of this project.
2. Richard Fool Bull to Mr. A.G. Wilson, Rosebud, SD, July 1918. Record Group (hereafter RG) 75, Box 345 "Soldier Boys" Rosebud Agency Records, National Archives Records Administration (hereafter NARA), Kansas City, MO.
3. An example of this conclusion can be found in Thomas A. Britten, *American Indians in World War I: At Home and at War* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1997), 183.
4. Cato Sells to Henry M. Tidwell, 4 February, 1919. RG 75, Box 657, Records of the Pine Ridge Agency, NARA, Kansas City, Missouri.
5. Lieutenant Z.B. Vance, "The Indian Soldier," *Journal of the Military Service Institution*, 14(1893): 1203, 1205.
6. Michael L. Tate, "From Scout to Doughboy: The National Debate Over Integrating American Indians into the Military, 1891-1918" *Western Historical Quarterly* 17 (October 1986): 417-437.
7. Termination involved a series of post-WWII federal Indian policies that were designed to "relocate" from reservations to urban areas, and to "terminate" federal trusteeship of Indian reservations. The ultimate goal was for the complete integration of Indian peoples into American culture. See: Charles F. Wilkinson and Eric R. Briggs, "The Evolution of the Termination Policy," *American Indian Law Review* 5 (1977): 139-184.
8. Alvin M. Josephy, Jr., "Modern America and the Indian," in *Indians in American History*, edited by Fred Hoxie and Peter Iverson (Harlan Davidson: Wheeling, Illinois, 1998), 199-200.
9. Sells to Tidwell, 4 Feb., 1918.
10. Edward M. Coffman, *The War to End All Wars: The American Military Experience in World War I* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1986), 16. Leonard P. Ayers, *The War with Germany: A Statistical Summary*, 2nd ed.

(Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1919), 16.

11. "Haskell Indian School" RG 75, File 610, box 657, Pine Ridge Agency, NARA, Kansas City, KS.
12. *Order of Battle of the United States Land Forces in the World War, Zone of the Interior: Territorial Departments, Tactical Divisions Organized in 1918, Posts, Camps, and Stations*, Vol. 3, Part 2 (Washington: Center of Military History, 1988), 884-886. During the First World War, units of the 7th Division, 10th Division, 15th Division, 35th Division, 41st Division, 42nd Division, 89th Division, and 92nd Division traveled through Camp Funston during garrison duty, mobilization for service in Europe or demobilization. Throughout this period, nearby Fort Riley, established in 1853, served as a school for Cavalry and Light Artillery, as well as an Officer Training School. There, the 5th Division, Hq. Tr. Mobilized for service in Europe while the 20th Infantry, 10th Division served garrison duty. The majority of American Indians traveled through Camp Funston, though, so our study focuses on their experiences at the camp.
13. Frederick Palmer, *Newton D. Baker: America at War* (New York: Dodd, Mead, & Co., 1931), 46.
14. Palmer, *Newton D. Baker*, 239.
15. *Ibid.*, 236.
16. Coffman, *War to End All Wars*, 64.
17. *Ibid.*, 62.
18. *Ibid.*, 61.
19. *Ibid.*, 60-61.
20. *Ibid.*, 65.
21. Letter from Robert L. Grier to "Kind Friends" at the Rosebud County Chapter of the American Red Cross, Rosebud, S.D. 24 December 1917. RG75 Rosebud Agency Records, Rosebud Subject Correspondence, 1910-1925, Box A-435, File: "Soldier Corr., misc." NARA, Kansas City, MO.
22. Donald L. Parman, *Indians and the American West in the Twentieth Century* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), 65.
23. Mark Sullivan, *Our Times: The United States, 1900-1925*. Vol. 5, *Over Here, 1914-1918* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1933), 319-324.

24. Nancy K. Bristow, *Making Men Moral: Social Engineering during the Great War* (New York: New York University Press, 1996), xvii.
25. Sullivan, *Over Here, 1914-1918*, 330-332.
26. "Closing Entertainment of Cheyenne River School, May 30, 1918" RG75, Cheyenne River Agency, "Boarding School Corres." NARA, Kansas City, KS.
27. Sullivan, *Over Here, 1914-1918*, 334-335.
28. Henrietta Lund, Supervisor of Family Work, ARC to Claude Covey, Rosebud, S.D. 25 October 1918. The Indian recruit mentioned in the letter is Seven Dog Prairie, who was discharged from Camp Funston after being diagnosed with tuberculosis. RG75, Rosebud Agency Records, Rosebud Subject Correspondence 1910-1925, "Soldier Boys Corres." NARA, Kansas City, MO.
29. Letter from Grover E. Burnett, Camp Funston, KS to Friends, c/o Red Cross Committee at Rosebud, S.D. 22 November 1917. RG75 Rosebud Agency Records, Rosebud Subject Correspondence, 1910-1925, Box A-435, File: "Soldier Corr., misc." NARA, Kansas City, MO.
30. Letter from Superintendent Claude Covey, Rosebud, S.D. to Private James Witt, Camp Funston, KS, 22 November 1917. RG75 Rosebud Agency Records, Rosebud Subject Correspondence, 1910-1925, Box A-436, File "Soldiers Cases" NARA, Kansas City, MO.
31. Pierre From Above, Camp Funston, Kansas to Claude C. Covey, Rosebud, S.D., received 2 October 1917. RG 75, Box 345 "Soldier Boys" Rosebud Agency Records, NARA, Kansas City, MO.
32. Janet A. McDonnell, *The Dispossession of the American Indian 1887-1934* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991), 103-106.
33. C.W. Kerlin, Secretary, Local Exemption Board for Mellette Co., White River, South Dakota. To Claude C. Covey, Rosebud, S.D. 13 August 1918. RG 75, Box 345 "Soldier Boys" Rosebud Agency Records, NARA, Kansas City, MO.
34. Superintendent, Rosebud Agency, to Millie Peneaux, July 29, 1918. RG 75, Box A 435 "Soldier Boys" Rosebud Agency Records, NARA, Kansas City, MO.
35. Early, Frances H. *A World Without War: How U.S. Feminists and Pacifists Resisted World War I* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1997), 64.
36. C.W. Kerlin, Secretary Local Exemption Board for Mellette County, White River, S.D. to Claude C. Covey, Rosebud, S.D. 27 March 1918. RG75 Rosebud Subject

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37. Early, *A World Without War*, 112-113.
 38. Pierre From Above to Claude C. Covey, received 2 October 1917.
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 41. War Department Press Release 14 March, 1927. File 610, Box 657, Pine Ridge Agency Records, NARA, Kansas City, MO.
 42. Press Release, War Department 14 March, 1927. RG75, Box 657 "Pine Ridge Agency Files" File 610, NARA, KC, Mo.
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 44. Roland Thompson to W.O. Roberts, 23 Sept. 1940. RG75, File 610, "Letters from Superintendent," Pine Ridge Agency Records, NARA Kansas City, Mo.
 45. Department of the Interior Radio Address, 24 October, 1940. Record Group 75, Box 610, Records of the Kiowa Agency, NARA, Fort Worth, TX.
 46. Alison Bernstein, American Indians and World War II (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991) 44.
 47. John R. Eddy, 1st Lieut. Infantry, to Brigadier General Spaulding, 15 February, 1919. "American Indians as Battalion Scouts" Misc. File "Correspondence, Reports and Other Records Relating to American Indians Serving with AEF 1917-1919" Box 3471, R.G. 120, Records of the AEF WWI, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
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50. John Sloan Brown, *Draftee Division: The 88th Infantry Division in World War II* (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1986), 35. Originally cited as Memorandum for the chief of staff, U.S. Army (subject: report on Army Ground Forces activities), 23-24, J.E. Sloan Papers in the private collection of author noted above John Sloan Brown.
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Web Sites

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http://www.riley.army.mil/history/history%20_frame.htm

“Field Offices” at the Bureau of Indian Affairs Home Page
<http://www.doi.gov/bia/areas/>

APPENDIX A: Note on Historical Sources for This Project

Researching the relationship between Indian peoples and the military requires investigation of several governmental record groups: the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) archives, or Record Group 75 and the Department of Defense (War Department) archives, Record Groups 163 (Selective Service), 147 (Selective Service), 407 (Adjutant Secretary) and 120 (AEF). In addition to these these federal record collections housed in Washington D.C. the Bureau of Indian Affairs has collections related to Indian military service in several Federal Records Centers. The two records centers with information related to Fort Riley were Kansas City Missouri and Fort Worth Texas.

These major record groups are extremely useful in documenting Federal Indian Policy and military policy with regard to Indian service. They also contain a wealth of information related to veterans benefits with an occasional file dedicated to newspaper releases on Indian soldiers in the field. While important to this study, and to understanding how the military regarded the Indian soldier, Federal records housed in Washington D.C. and in College Park, MD did not contain information on individual service by Indians who trained or served at Camp Funston or Fort Riley. This was especially the case at the federal archives level where much of the information was in the form of final compiled reports, either by Reservation Superintendents or Post Commanders.

Far more specific information is available in the regional archives at Kansas City and Fort Worth Texas. The vast majority of sources related to Indian military service can be found in the individual reservation files. In several cases, primary documents such as correspondence, selective service reports and medical files were included in the regular files of the Agency Superintendent. This was especially true of Indians who served in World War I. In response to a request by the Office of Indian Affairs, Superintendents were asked in 1919 to furnish the federal Office with a list of veterans of WWI. This required local reservation agents to collect the names of Indian veterans and write a little information about them on a prepared form. A description of the veterans training led to our preliminary list of Indian servicemen from Camp Funston/Fort Riley. Not all agencies complied with the request, however, and in a few that did, the records and lists were subsequently lost or destroyed. The result of the OIA questionnaire on WWI veterans led to two significant results: a master list of Indian veterans of the war compiled by the OIA with over 17,000 names of individuals from across the country and the passage of the Curtis Act in 1924 which granted all Indians American citizenship.

Unfortunately, the effort expended by both the military and the Bureau of Indian Affairs after World War I was not sustained in the years after World War II. As fully integrated soldiers in the military with a solid (even exalted) record of service, Indian soldiers were considered a bonus for a company. The army's paternalism toward Indian soldiers was especially evident in their deliberate effort not to treat Indian soldiers any differently from white soldiers even though they were considered to less civilized or sophisticated. This

affected the records pertaining to Indian service in several ways. Specifically, the army did not keep separate records for soldiers of Indian ancestry as this was regarded as a form of segregation. Similarly, the Bureau of Indian Affairs kept only informal records of individual Indians' service in WWII. In 1943, the Bureau produced a 54 page booklet on Indians in the War that was designed to highlight Indian bravery in action and patriotism in general.

This lack of race-specific record keeping has become compounded with the loss of thousands of individual service records in a fire at the Federal Records Center for the Military in St. Louis Missouri in the late 1970s. Currently individual service records from WWII are being re-constructed as they are requested by family members, generally for the purpose of proving eligibility for veterans benefits. While it may be possible to compose a list of WWII veterans utilizing the records of local VFW groups, on-site reservation records and medical referrals for Indians who may have rotated through Fort Riley between 1941 and 1945, the opportunity for researchers to supplement that information with an individual service record is now regrettably compromised.

As in any research into the history of the army on a local basis, the records of the Fort Riley Archives do not currently contain up-to-date station lists of the different divisions and companies that rotated through the fort in World Wars I and II. Quite reasonably, regimental histories move with the division from place to place and so do not provide the historian of a particular post much detail. The likelihood of encountering stories related specifically to Indian soldiers in the division, regiment or company are even smaller.

Finally, there remain numerous records of individual Indians' service in the military that remain classified for reasons of personal privacy but which may become public information in the not-too-distant future. In other words, numerous veterans of World War II are still alive. This of course also means that Indian veterans of World War II may also consent to oral interviews, which was not within the scope of this project. Given the lack of federal records specific to Indian people in World War II this would be of great benefit to historians in the future.

APPENDIX B: Regarding the First Phase of Fort Riley's Interaction with Native Americans: 1853 through 1911 & 1911 through WWII

In July 1997 the first phase of this project was completed with the submission of the report titled "A Richly Textured Community: Fort Riley, Kansas and American Indian Peoples, 1853-1911," which was received by the Cultural Resources Division at Fort Riley, Kansas. In a revised form, this report was published in *Kansas History: A Journal of the Central Plains* 21 (Spring 1998): 2-17.

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