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STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

ACTIVE AND RESERVE COMPONENT DIVISIONAL TEAMING

BY

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

Active and Reserve Component Divisional Teaming

by

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ABSTRACT

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Since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. Army has been faced with numerous reductions in both force structure and funding. To meet this challenge, the Army National Guard has been seeking new ways to work together with Army senior leaders on how to ensure all remaining ARNG units have relevant roles in the National Military Strategy. In particular, Guard divisions have been targeted by the Army for elimination or realignment. A new initiative that will add relevance to Guard divisions is "Teaming," whereby an active division aligns with a similar Guard division to perform mutually supporting roles along the entire spectrum of missions. This study examines how senior leaders envision the application of this teaming initiative and how to overcome many of the significant challenges associated with this concept. Army decision-makers recognize that with the Army's constantly increasing operational tempo, they must rely more on the reserve components. Such initiatives as teaming enable the Army to meet this challenge.

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THE TOTAL FORCE POLICY

The foundation for building a seamless force is developing and sustaining trust and confidence among the Active and Reserve Components. Developing the kinds of multi-component units discussed in the "One Team, One Fight, One Future" White Paper will go a way towards meeting these objectives. Specifically, I talked about our Divisional Teaming concept, where we will partner Active and Guard divisions to provide mutual support to one another. I see this program as a "win-win" idea for Active and Reserve forces, enhancing our ability to respond across the spectrum of military operations, maintaining the integrity and warfighting capability of Army National Guard combat divisions. In the end, these kinds of initiatives will demonstrate that through the prudent use of multi-component units we can evolve all the Army's force structure, shaping it to best meet the demands and requirements we will see in the next century.

GEN Dennis J. Reimer

Since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. Army has been faced with numerous reductions in both force structure and funding. The Active and Reserve Components (AC/RC) each have paid the price during these tumultuous times. Because of these reductions and a strained relationship between the AC and the Army National Guard (ARNG), senior leaders of both components have seriously deliberated their respective roles and future working relationships. At the center of this deliberation has been the issue of what units in the Army National Guard should be eliminated and what units should remain to support the National Military Strategy (NMS). A point of considerable

contention is ARNG divisions. Designated as the "strategic reserve," ARNG divisions do not have an assigned mission. And their lack of an assigned mission causes concern among Army leadership, some of whom question their relevance to the NMS. Nonetheless, if the United States must remain prepared to fight and win two nearly simultaneous Major Theaters of War (MTW), then reliance on the RC is paramount. Senior Army leaders must seek new initiatives to meet this challenge. Divisional teaming offers a method for the Army to accomplish the mission.

The ARNG is working closely with the Active Component to reorganize Guard divisions to better support the NMS. As indicated in GEN Reimer's "One Team, One Future, One Fight" White Paper, the Army's senior leadership is working to ensure that every unit (to include ARNG divisions) has appropriate, relevant assigned missions to guide its training, modernization requirements, and operational preparation. This cooperation will maintain the traditional combat role for the ARNG and provide the divisions with a relevant role in support of the NMS.

The operational tempo/personnel tempo (OPTEMPO/PERSTEMPO) for the Active Component has increased significantly during the 1990s. Many current deployments are Small Scale Contingencies (SSC) or Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) that evolve into long-term operations. In order to sustain this on-going demand for forces worldwide, the Army is relying more on the RC,

which now makes up 54% of the Army force structure. The total force policy envisioned by Secretaries of Defense Melvin Laird and James Schlesinger in the early 1970s is becoming more of a reality than ever.²

As stated above, achieving a seamless force between the AC and the RC has caused strained relations between the two components. Some of the most difficult periods include the majority of the 1990s until 1997. Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen renewed the effort to minimize the problems and truly unite the components into a seamless Total Force Army. The ensuing cooperation between the AC and the RC has been breaking down the barriers, thus enabling the Total Army to get down to business.

Divisional teaming is a step in the right direction to stay on track with full AC/RC integration. This concept will enhance the capabilities of AC divisions and provide relevant missions to ARNG divisions. However, teaming will require the Army to rethink the way it conducts business. If successful, teaming will provide AC and RC divisions greater depth for sustained operations across a wide spectrum of missions.

TEAMING CONCEPT

Historical Perspective

Before examining the present concept of Divisional Teaming it is useful to review some of the historical imperatives leading to this initiative.

The traditional role of the Army National Guard is to serve as the combat reserve of the active forces. Because of this historic role, divisions still remain within the ARNG force structure. There has been pressure from a variety of sources to eliminate ARNG divisions; however, it must be noted that the Guard, working closely with Army senior leadership, is restructuring its divisions to meet the future needs of the service. As noted by Dr. Samuel Newland, "a study of defense legislation shows that ARNG divisions were initially organized under the National Defense legislation, 1903-1916, which addressed the need for the ARNG to have the same structure and organization as the active duty Army. Since the Army is supposed to fight with divisions, so would the ARNG, which serves as the major combat reserve of the Army."

Historically, the Army has tried several methods to integrate the AC and the RC at the division level. One of the methods was a Roundout unit concept (e.g. RC brigade as part of an AC division) developed as part of the Total Force Policy.

Roundout, while well conceived, failed to meet objectives in the

Total Force Policy (especially in the matter of the disputed readiness of the 48th Bde, GA ARNG, during Desert Shield/Desert Storm). However, there is little dispute that Roundout works well for Combat Support/Combat Service Support (CS/CSS) units.⁴

Also, RC units have deployed as individual replacements for active units. This system was a dismal failure in WWII. Individuals were sent to units in staggering numbers to replace the numerous casualties. As a result, unit cohesiveness suffered because replacements were inadequately trained. There were virtually no veterans to train these new replacements which only exacerbated an already bad situation. In Stephen E. Ambrose's book "Citizen Soldier" he talks extensively about the replacement system and states "One suggestion was on the mark. It was to put the replacements in squads that would stay together from basic training to the foxhole. That would have To put them into companies would have been even more effective in creating the bond that is critical to combat infantry. Best would have been as battalions, ready to relieve combat-weary units at the front."5 In the end these suggestions were not acted on and the individual replacement system remained until the end of the war. Even after the war, during reviews of the lessons learned on this issue, the individual replacement system was not abandoned. Indeed it continued into Korea and Vietnam. Since the question of how to best integrate the Army

components has not been fully answered, the Army continues looking for a better way.

Current Perspective

The concept of divisional teaming was first introduced when GEN Dennis Reimer, Chief of Staff of the Army, visited the 40th Infantry Division (M), California Army National Guard at Camp Roberts, CA in March 1998. 7 He recalled his tenure as the $4^{\rm th}$ Infantry Division (M) commander and the positive relationship he had with the 40th ID.⁸ During his visit to California he reminisced about that time, especially about the good relationship between the AC and RC partners. GEN Reimer gave credit where credit is due: he noted that the concept of divisional teaming came mostly from MG Robert J. Brandt, Commander of the California ARNG. Then he observed that with a reduction of over 36% of the Total Army, along with the increase in diverse missions, we had to find a way to broaden the base of a smaller force to mix and match force structure in order to meet these diverse missions. Thus the teaming concept began with this exchange between two general officers - one AC one RC. 10

Divisional teaming is a mission, not a training relationship. The concept enables an AC division and a similar RC division to establish a mutual supporting relationship or

partnership, hence a "team." The first teamed divisions are the 4th Infantry Division and the 40th Infantry Division (CA ARNG) and the 1st Cavalry Division and the 49th Infantry Division (TX ARNG). The Army envisions that the ARNG divisions will retain their structure and role as a MTW deployable entity. But they will also adapt, as necessary, to assist their AC partners in accomplishing their assigned missions. Such missions could range from providing a fully trained combat armor or infantry battalion to replacing a combat ineffective AC battalion in combat, down to individual replacements.

The ARNG is supportive of the concept of replacing units from platoon to battalion. However, they are concerned about organizational cohesiveness when supporting with individuals. But the issue of individual replacements versus unit replacements is negotiable. In a protracted conflict, use of individual ARNG replacements should be closely monitored to preclude the problems we had in WWII, Korea, and Vietnam. 13

Initially, the focus of divisional teaming will most likely be at the platoon or company level. But the ultimate decision will rest with the two division commanders. No matter at what level teaming is implemented, this process will add significant depth to each division's capability by allowing a fully trained unit entity (platoon, company, etc.) to be replaced. It will enhance 24-hour operations when necessary. The overriding

intent is to provide fresh and well-trained units or troops to the AC or RC division commander when necessary.

THE PLAN

ADDING CAPABILITY AND DEPTH

Three mechanisms are being examined to develop an effective method to replace units or troops: "Push out", "Plus up" and "Plug in." 15

1. Push out. The ARNG division will support the partner AC division upon receipt of a deployment mission (MOOTW, SSC or MTW). This support will be available during both preand post-mobilization of the AC division. During the premobilization phase (prior to apportionment to a Commanderin-Chief [CINC] within the National Command Authority), the ARNG division will mobilize appropriate units to assist the AC division in preparation for their deployment. ARNG unit support activities may include maintenance, equipment loading, movement, range operations, staging, and providing opposing forces (OPFOR) for Combat Training Center (CTC) rotations. During the post-mobilization phase, the RC teamed division would backfill the deploying AC division's peacetime mission and augment installation requirements. 16 The RC division would engage in such activities as providing family support and

- training the ARNG Enhanced Brigade (eSB) that is tasked to support the AC division. Additionally, the RC division will provide requested individuals to backfill critical vacancies to the deployed force such as intelligence specialists, master gunners, or first-line supervisors.
- 2. Plus up. The ARNG division will provide unit augmentation at the platoon, company, or battalion level for the teamed AC division during exercises or deployments. Deploying divisions will benefit from cohesive ARNG units that have a habitual working relationship with the AC division. These deployment "Plus ups" will provide units from the ARNG division to fill organizational shortfalls in the AC division. While this method would reduce the ARNG division's readiness posture during the AC division's exercise or deployment, it will significantly enhance the readiness of the deployed or exercising division. Like units that continually work together will develop relationships that will facilitate the "Plus up" method: Leaders will share close working relationships over time and develop a sense of each other's capabilities. Using the RC division will also add depth to the mission by providing sufficient units to enable the AC division to conduct sustained operations (for example, two crews for each aircraft to provide 24-hour operations). It will

- also provide seamless integration of battalions during deployment. 17
- 3. Plug in. The ARNG divisions will provide battalion level units (plugs) to replace AC division shortfalls. These unit plugs will be available for both training (such as a CTC rotation) and deployment when required, or when requested by the division commander. The "Plug in" units from the ARNG will be employed across the entire spectrum of AC requirements. These plugs will consist of organizations of battalion size or higher, which will be used in a "Roundup" role. These battalion or higher roundups will redress some of the active structure shortfalls, such as an attack helicopter or an artillery battalion, thereby enhancing the lethality of AC division deployments in the future. Teaming differs from what the previous "Roundup" concept in that ARNG battalions do not become an assigned unit of the AC division until assigned for deployment. 18 Plug in provides for greater depth as described in Plus up: it also provides immediate battalion augmentation in aviation, engineer, CS/CSS, transportation, and artillery. Other combat battalion formations could be ready within 90 days of mobilization.

Teaming works both ways: AC divisions will be available to support partnered RC divisions engaged in Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA) or the Homeland Defense mission with the same type of unit support packages required by the RC division commander. The divisional teaming concept recognizes that either division could be in the lead and either division in support. What is important is that this initiative has the potential to broaden the capabilities of partnered divisions across a wide spectrum of missions and training opportunities.

APPLICATION AND RELEVANCE CHANGING THE WAY THE ARMY CONDUCTS BUSINESS

Training

To implement teaming, we need new training strategy for ARNG divisions. Developing this strategy is critical for divisional teaming and must include pre- and post-mobilization requirements. The Army has published a training strategy for ARNG Enhanced brigades because they are included, or "missioned", in the NMS. But strategic reserve (ARNG) divisions have nothing comparable. So the Army should quickly promulgate training strategy for all teamed divisions.

Teamed divisions must work closely throughout the entire training cycle. They must coordinate nearly identical Mission

Essential Task Lists (METL), standardized SOP's, training briefings and mobilization plans. Teamed divisions will liaison throughout the training year to conduct joint planning and coordination visits in order to enhance unit interoperability and build trust. Key unit members will participate or observe in Command Post (CPX) and Field Training Exercises (FTX) to include extensive support during CTC rotations. Initially, teamed divisions will integrate training and operations emphasizing small unit tactical training while building battalion and brigade partnerships.

Personnel shortfalls common to Warfighter Exercises (WFX) train-ups could also be offset by teamed divisions filling key vacancies in one partner with individuals or units from the other partner, thus offering valuable training opportunities to both components and optimizing the training experience for all participants.²⁰

Modernization

Much of the above training can be accomplished easily.

However, the ARNG's lack of modernized equipment will require some significant changes in the way the Army conducts business.

Today we have in reality two armies: the have's and have not's, the AC and the RC.

ARNG divisions are resourced at Tier 4 for much of their equipment, which means they "enjoy" the lowest priority for modernization. This mismatch of equipment will pose significant problems in "Plus up" and "Plug in" operations. For example, the 40th Infantry Division does not have sufficient Single Channel Ground Airborne Radio System (SINGARS) radios or integrated tactical automation with III Corps and the 4th Infantry Division. Further, the 40th would have to modernize key systems to include the M-1A1 Tank, the M-2 Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV), the M-3 Cavalry Fighting Vehicle (CFV), M-109A6, and Multiple Launch Rockets System (MLRS) to achieve complete Modified Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE) interoperability. These systems are simply not available in sufficient quantities to fully modernize all the divisions in need. However, in order for divisional teaming to succeed, we must modernize division slices to achieve full integration. A quick fix for the problem of interoperability is to pre-position equipment sets at the CTC's or ARNG teamed training facilities. This would enable ARNG units to train on modernized systems during annual training periods and thus prepare RC units to conduct "Plus up" and "Plug in" operations.

In order to accomplish this, senior Army leadership would have to accept some risk and consider modernizing teamed divisions at the expense of AC units. The AC would view this as

a paradigm shift, but such radical change is necessary to make teaming work.

Resourcing

If divisional teaming is fully developed to meet future Army requirements and to be included as an integral part of the NMS, it needs visibility in the Program Objective Memorandum (POM). Once it is included in this process, the initiative can ultimately find its way into the budget. Since the Department of Defense (DOD) budget is severely affected by efforts to balance the federal budget, additional dollars to fund divisional teaming will have to come from money management within the Army. The Army is ripe for a revolution in resource management because the United States does not face a monolithic threat at this time and most likely will not for at least another 10-15 years.²¹

First and foremost, we need sufficient training dollars.

ARNG divisions received a significant increase in their Training Year 1999 OPTEMPO funding (13% to approximately 28%) because the majority of them had reported lower than normal training readiness. While this increase will enhance training, we have no additional funding for the divisional teaming initiative during Fiscal Year 1999. So all funding must come from current resources. ARNG divisions are barely funded to achieve Training

Level (T) 4, while AC divisions are funded at least to T2. This disparity will have an impact on the success of teaming because ARNG divisions must be resourced to T3 in order to be a complete partner. Training beyond T3 in combat units will be accomplished at post-mobilization.

The ARNG is committed to make divisional teaming a success. The 40th ID has indicated that they will do whatever it takes to make this initiative work, even if Inactive Duty Training (IDT) and Annual Training (AT) are the only available funded activities (39 days total) for migration to the initiative. Sadly enough, these 39 days are not adequate to support AC divisions when deployed. Other cost saving measures are being examined. They include ARNG focused simulations programs and distributive training technology, as well as using distance learning facilities as a communications link between partnered divisions. This interactive training and Command and Control resource could significantly offset some of the costs of traveling between divisions.²³

The leadership understands the resourcing challenges. At a recent divisional teaming meeting (Video Teleconference) in California (11 December 1998) between the 40th ID, 4th ID, and GEN Reimer, all parties agreed that training with unlike equipment is a challenge that must be overcome. GEN Reimer stated that resource and equipment issues will be addressed at the next

Senior Leaders Training Conference (SLTC) at the end of January 1999.²⁴

Mobilization

The Army's OPTEMPO/PERSTEMPO has increased dramatically. While the ARNG has numerous volunteers able and willing to support current missions, it cannot fully support teaming by replacing a platoon, company or battalion. The Army currently mitigates this problem by means of the Presidential Selective Reserve Call-up (PSRC). PSRC allows the president to order to active duty up to 200,000 members (cumulative for all DOD reserves) of the selected reserve for a period of up to 270 days. Once the 200,000 ceiling has been reached, the President may (in the absence of a Congressional Declaration of War) issue an executive order declaring a state of national emergency and order partial mobilization for 1,000,000 personnel for up to two years (all services). Other elements of the National Guard may also be activated under Title 32, United States Code, for specified Homeland Defense missions. Examples of these missions include protections of key assets, responding to weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and information operations (cyber terrorism). Guardsmen or units with comparable specialties can be activated under this authority and do not count against cumulative

ceilings in PSRC, but they may not be used for other than the missions listed above.

PSRC will provide the means to activate the ARNG to support AC/RC divisional teaming. However, current extensive use of the RC is causing some concern for families and employers. It may be necessary to reexamine the statutory considerations in support of divisional teaming in order to give commanders greater flexibility. While there is no empirical evidence to validate this claim, its appears that the 270 day obligation overly commits the RC. Evidence suggests that 120 days is more practicable because families, employers, community, and church relationships are better able to withstand the shorter period. 25 The Army is not obligated to activate RC members for the entire 270 days; however, it is not likely that they will release units sooner because of the cost associated with mobilizations. Additionally, PSRC can only be used once per mission, such as in Bosnia. Regardless, a change in the current law may be required not only to support divisional teaming as envisioned but also to alleviate the current demand on the RC if we continue at this pace.

Real World Missions

The Bosnia rotation for the 49th Infantry Division (Mech) will be the first real-world application of divisional teaming.

The $49^{\rm th}$ ID will follow the $10^{\rm th}$ Mountain Division and be a "Plug in" unit. This mission for the 49th ID, if successful, will validate the concept of teaming. It could easily set the stage for future applications of this initiative and establish a trust factor among the components. Currently the 1st Cavalry Division is in the Balkans; they are teamed with the 49th ID. The intent is to take the lessons learned from the 1st Cavalry Division rotation and transfer them to the 49th ID. When Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 49th ID is deployed, they will work with their teamed AC division (1st Cavalry) to identify any shortfalls in critical personnel for their Command and Control mission. Divisional teaming did not start soon enough for the 49^{th} ID to assist the 1st Cavalry on their current rotation. 26 Even so, this will be the first time an ARNG division has been tasked to Command and Control a MOOTW outside the Continental United States (OCONUS). This will be a true test of divisional teaming as well as for the ARNG as a whole.

Other missions for divisional teaming include Partnership for Peace (PfP). Teamed units could provide relief to the CINC and add depth (more units to choose from) to our response to these types of missions. Further, ARNG teamed units should be considered as the primary units in some missions. Rather than task the Guard for personnel or units, simply assign them the entire mission, to include resources. Then the partner AC

division can "Push out", "Plus up", or "Plug in" to support the Guard mission. The concept is designed to work in both directions.

There are simply not enough AC units to meet the current demand. The RC can expect to receive more missions in the future simply out of necessity. Teaming will enhance the ARNG's credibility and practically increase its ability to accomplish the mission.

The Road Ahead

Divisional teaming has moved from concept to emergent reality. In addition to teaming the 4th and 40th Infantry Divisions and the 1st Cavalry Division and the 49th Infantry Division, Army senior leadership is considering two additional AC/RC divisional relationships: The 28th Infantry Division (PA ARNG) with the 3rd Infantry Division and the 29th Infantry Division (VA ARNG) with the 10th Mountain Division. Given the OPTEMPO and increasing reliance on the RC, this is a necessary step.

Other considerations are to bring the $40^{\rm th}$ ID into the Force XXI design to retain its compatibility with the $4^{\rm th}$ ID and ultimately III Corps as these units prepare to modernize for digitization. Additionally, the $49^{\rm th}$ ID is preparing to stand up an MLRS battalion, an important step toward the goal of full

interoperability. In order to make this transition, the National Guard Bureau (NGB) is developing a concept plan for modernization. 27

Geographical proximity facilitates teaming, as in California and Texas. But it does not have to be the long pole in the tent. All teaming participants must capitalize on available technology. Teaming units must employ modern methods of training, including distributed simulation and distance learning technologies, to overcome the geographical limitations that might be perceived as obstacles to executing teaming. The ARNG has been very successful in this decade in instituting distance learning technologies. The state of Iowa, for example, has a robust system of distance learning technology. The baseline is there. No teamed unit or FORSCOM has to "reinvent this wheel."

We do not have all the answers. For example, it is not uncommon for RC members returning from deployments to terminate their military service. The United States Army Reserve (USAR) is experiencing a 33% turnover rate annually. Frequent deployments are probably responsible for mush of this turbulence. For the most part, the Army has deployed a larger number of USAR units because the majority of the CS/CSS is in that component. The divisional teaming concept could cause the same turbulence in the ARNG community. This, of course, remains to be seen.

NGB will work closely with Forces Command (FORSCOM) which has the lead for the divisional teaming initiative. FORSCOM will also seek to codify this concept in the very near term. This process will begin at the SLTC in January 1999. Overall, divisional teaming is well on its way, both out of necessity and from senior leaders a determination to fully integrate the AC and RC.

BENEFITING THE TOTAL ARMY

Divisional teaming strengthens the Total Army. The AC/RC will receive low-cost unit augmentation for training and mission support. Savings will be realized since pre-mobilized ARNG divisions can be trained at T3 for significantly less than the cost of training an AC division. Realized divisions will mutually support one another during mobilizations and deployments by using the "Push out" and "Plug in" methods. Additionally, the AC will gain extensive knowledge in MSCA and establish habitual relationships, adding to mission depth such as 24-hour operations. The RC will have the opportunity to work with AC personnel with extensive experience and with fully modernized systems. Further, they will gain additional and vital access to the CTC's.

As stated earlier, extensive use of the RC by means of such initiatives as divisional teaming is the only way the Army can

fulfill its obligation in the overall strategy of fighting two nearly simultaneous MTW's. Teaming broadens the Army's base and offers great potential.²⁹

Teaming offers other specific benefits: 30

- 1. Teamed divisions could provide exercise support to one another and open doors for simulation activities.
- 2. ARNG divisions could provide Prepositioning of Material Configured to Unit Set (POMCUS) or Prepositioned Equipment maintenance support anywhere in Continental United States (CONUS) or outside the Continental United States (OCONUS).
- 3. The mission continuum (MSCA to MTW) can be better served through a teaming concept that provides for ARNG division participation with the combat elements of AC divisions and Enhanced brigades. Fifty-two percent of the Total Army combat structure is in the ARNG. The teaming process will create opportunities to exercise ARNG combat structure through a habitual working relationship with the partnered AC division. The capabilities inherent in ARNG division force structure dramatically increase the combat relevance of the Guard.
- 4. ARNG divisions could help prepare AC divisions and eSB's called upon to participate in an MTW by assisting them to complete pre-deployment training, by preparing equipment for shipping, by providing OPFOR lanes and range support

- equipment preparation. A second order effect for ARNG divisions would be a significant head start in their own mobilization, reconstitution, and rotation process.
- 5. Teamed divisions could coordinate to provide mutually supporting Mobile Training Teams that may profoundly enhance the Army's ability to conduct training on multiple generations of equipment. The teamed divisions could assume greater responsibility for worldwide partnership programs as they are doing now in programs such as Partnership for Peace (PfP) or Commander-in-Chief, Southern Command's (CINCSOUTH) traditional activities programs.
- 6. The teaming relationship can also enhance CONUS contingency preparation to conduct missions in humanitarian relief, disaster assistance, community support, and security.
- 7. The enhanced trust built in the pre-mobilization and deployment environment will increase the number of volunteers available to deploy with an AC division.
- 8. Teaming will lead to development of standardized personnel systems and of a standard readiness assessment tool to validate ARNG personnel and units for deployment.³¹

While the above list is certainly not all-inclusive, it specifies numerous potential benefits for the Total Army.

Further, we must always acknowledge that the RC is the military

organization most familiar to the majority of the country. In many small towns, the Armory is the only tangible link to the government (ARNG has 3,222 armories in 2700 communities across America). Through teaming, the Total Army can share this connection to the community. ARNG teamed units are part of these communities and will foster a better understanding of the role of the military around the world. This nexus is crucial for sustaining the support of the American people for any military operation, especially for protracted ones.

CONCLUSION

In an interview in Killeen, TX, GEN Reimer reiterated that "to be combat ready, a Total Army is needed. That includes using the Guard and Reserve units more frequently."³³ In the same interview he was asked what impact this might have on employers. He responded that the Army does not know the answer to that question. He admitted that the issue concerns him greatly.³⁴ This and other issues are important and will require resolution. The Army is already relying more on the RC, and frequent deployments are impacting employers and families.

Armor and infantry battalions will still possibly require as many as 90 days after mobilization before unit "Push out" or "Plug in" can occur. As always, divisional teaming gives ready access to critical personnel to fill shortfalls. The RC has

always trained at a lower level due to time constraints, but it plans to increase the training to standard during post-mobilization. This catch-up will continue to be a reality for the RC, primarily for staff and commander synchronization development in certain types of units.

The ARNG must have sufficient resources to train to T3 at the platoon and company levels with a goal of T3 for battalion level in combat units. If additional funds are realized through money management, adequate resources will be available for divisional teaming and modernization that includes Comanche and Crusader.

AC divisions must embrace the concept of teaming. They are already operating with reduced manning because they simply don't have the faces to fill the spaces. In some instances they are operating on the "rule of threes," which states that it takes three units to support a single mission - pre-mission preparation, mission support, and post-mission recovery.

Downsizing is also taking its toll on the AC. Even with an endstrength of 485,000, the AC has committed numerous personnel to other assignments, so it does not have 100% fill in its divisions. Such shortfalls and robbing Peter to pay Paul could signal the beginning of a hollow Army. The Army has numerous commitments that reduce available personnel for divisional assignments, such as providing ARNG advisors, recruiters, and

numerous TDA positions that keep soldiers from serving in divisions. The senior leadership recognizes this fact and therefore supports initiatives such as teaming.

Beyond personnel problems, senior Army leadership must find a solution for the resourcing and interoperability of equipment. ARNG senior leadership will work with the Army to possibly realign modernized equipment already in the Guard (eSB's and ARNG divisions with embedded eSB's) to begin the process. For other equipment problems, Army leadership must find ways to field these systems - including SINGARS and secure communications at division headquarters.

The Army has already begun a process that will enhance teaming by placing an AC commander in an ARNG battalion or brigade level assignment. The senior leadership of the Army is also looking at ways for RC officers to command AC units. This will foster a better understanding of problems between the components. Some changes need to be made in the law to allow AC and RC personnel to move easily between the components. There are other examples of good faith initiatives being taken by senior leaders. The good news is that people are recognizing current needs and trying to solve problems.

As the process improves and matures, teamed divisions will ultimately be in the same Timed Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD) and supporting the same CINC for planning and training.

This initiative will remove interoperability barriers and ultimately eliminate disparity between the components. It will increase the relevance of AC structure and dramatically enhance political leverage for the AC. There will be a meld of AC/ARNG/USAR cultures that will benefit the Total Army. The potential exists for the Total Army force structure to be considered in the NMS, which in essence means that all forces are strategic. It will improve modernization techniques such as determining more creative ways to optimize the modernized equipment on hand. The initiative could reduce redundancies in personnel systems and finally reduce acceptable risk in the NMS. Teaming is a new and winnable initiative for the AC/RC. It will provide greater ARNG relevance and be a forward leap toward a total force.

The concept of teaming is viable. There are some significant challenges ahead in order to make it work well. However, none of them are insurmountable. One senior CA ARNG officer says it well: This initiative will bring about a seamless transition for pre- and post-mobilization for partnered divisions. The Chief of Staff has stated that this [divisional teaming] has got to work, because that is the only way we are going to be able to make it. "39

ENDNOTES

- GEN Dennis J. Reimer, One Team, One Fight, One Future, White Paper, Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 1998.
- ² Charles L. Cragin, "Total Force Integration: The Way Ahead," The Officer, September 1998, 27.
- ³ Samuel J. Newland, interview by author, 12 January 1999, Carlisle Barracks, PA.
- ⁴ LTG (Ret) Trefry, interviewed by author, 22 December 1998, Ft. Belvoir, VA.
- ⁵ Stephen E. Ambrose, <u>Citizen Soldiers</u> (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 1997) 277.
 - 6 Ibid.
- ⁷ Dennis Reimer <Dennis.Reimer@U.S.ARMY.MIL>, "RE: AC/RC Teaming," electronic mail message to LTC Daniel J. Nelan <nelanfam@aol.com>, 4 January 1999.
- 8 Ibid.
- ⁹ Specifically, the idea of divisional teaming was the brainchild of MG Robert J. Brandt. He had been working on the concept for nearly two years and had on several occasions attempted to persuade the senior leadership of both the AC and RC components on his idea. It was not until GEN Reimer visited the California Army National Guard that he finally had an opportunity to present his ideas to GEN Reimer. As a result of the meeting with MG Brandt, GEN Reimer rewrote part of his White Paper, "One Team, One Fight, One Future" adding the concept of divisional teaming. MG Brandt's concept was expanded by GEN Reimer to include the AC supporting the RC in MSCA.
 - 10 Ibid.
- 11 COL James Combs, California Army National Guard, telephone interview by author, 3 December 1998.
 - 12 Ibid.
 - 13 Ibid.
 - 14 Ibid.
 - 15 Ibid.
 - 16 Ibid.
 - 17 Ibid.
 - 18 Ibid.
 - ¹⁹ Reimer electronic mail.
 - 20 Ibid.
 - ²¹ Ibid.
 - ²² Combs interview, 3 December 1998
 - 23 Ibid.
- 24 P.J. Szczepanski, CPT, <u>Trip Report Summarizing a Video</u> Teleconference Between the Commanders of the $4^{\rm th}$ and $40^{\rm th}$ Infantry

<u>Divisions and GEN Dennis J. Reimer, 11 December 1998</u>. (Los Alamitos, CA, 11 December 1998).

25 Ibid.

- 26 Reimer electronic mail.
- ²⁷ LTC Douglas Earhart, interviewed by author, 22 December 1998, Arlington, VA.

²⁸ Trefry interview, 22 December 1998

- ²⁹ Reimer electronic mail.
- 30 Combs interview, 3 December 1998
- 31 Ibid.
- ³² U.S. National Guard Bureau, Army National Guard Vision 2010, Arlington VA: U.S. National Guard Bureau, 1997.
- 33 Elke Hutto, "Chief Of Staff: Army To Use Its Citizen Soldiers' More Frequently," Killeen Daily Herald, 27 October 1998, Sec A, p. 1.
 - 34 Ibid.
 - 35 Combs interview, 3 December 1998.
 - ³⁶ Earhart interview, 22 December 1998
 - ³⁷ Thid.
 - 38 Combs interview, 3 December 1998.
 - 39 Ibid.

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 <u>1998</u>. Los Alamitos, CA, 11 December 1998.</u>
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