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U.S.—CUBA POLICY FOR THE NEXT MILLENNIUM

BY

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

U.S.-Cuba Policy for the Next Millennium

by

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ABSTRACT

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In less than two years the United States will have a new president. One of the many challenges facing him/her will be the review of the U.S.-Cuba foreign policy. The new president can take U.S. policy toward Cuba in at least three distinct directions. The first is to continue with the hard-line policy. The second option would be a policy of appeasement. Starting with the removal of the embargo, this policy would formally recognize and remove all restrictions on Cuba. The third policy option is characterized by enticements. This policy would reverse the current sanctions but use the changes as "carrots" designed to entice Cuba into moving toward democracy and a free market economy. This paper argues for the second option, that the new president adopt a soft-line appeasement policy with Cuba. It is the best course of action for the U.S. because it starts shaping now for the desired future. It best supports U.S. interests and provides Castro with the best opportunity to jump into the free market system. Additionally, and most importantly, the opening of relations with Cuba will enhance human rights in that country.

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A U.S.-Cuba Policy for the New Millennium

In less than two years the United States will have a new president. One of the many challenges facing him/her will be the review of the U.S.-Cuba foreign policy. Developing and following an effective policy will be a difficult task and one that has defied U.S. presidents from Eisenhower to Clinton.

The U.S. policy and relationship with Cuba is a dark cloud that reminds us that the Cold War's affect still lingers. Cuba and the U.S. have a long and event filled history that can be characterized as cold, if not hostile, during the past 40 years. The Bay of Pigs invasion, the Cuban Missile Crisis, Cuba's support for revolution and the spread of communism in the Third World (Angola, Nicaragua, Haiti, etc), and most recently, the 1996 shooting down of two U.S. civilian aircraft by Cuban MiGs in international airspace, are some of the key events that have shaped the U.S.-Cuba relationship. To counter Castro and the previous Soviet threat, the U.S. has adopted a hard-line policy centered on the U.S. unilateral embargo of Cuba. This policy is designed to isolate and pressure Cuba to induce change and end the Castro regime.

Unfortunately for the previous presidents, the U.S. objective of toppling Castro has not been met. The reasons for this are many and complicated but can be summarized as twofold. One, support for the economic embargo has been lacking worldwide support, and two, Castro has proven to be more resilient than expected.

There are three plausible scenarios the new president will meet as the new millennium arrives: (1) Cuba under Castro (or another dictator) following its current Marxist ideology; (2) Cuba under Castro moving toward democracy and a free market economy; or (3) Cuba without Castro moving toward democracy and a free market economy. Castro is not immortal and at the age of 72 he is at the far end of his life expectancy. Based on his apparent health and ability to continue to make extended public appearances, however, it is most likely that Castro will still be at the helm of Cuba as the new millennium arrives. However, the Cuba facing the incoming president will be far different from the Cuba of the past, as the "winds of change" have begun to blow. The issue and decision for the new president will be where to take the U.S. policy with Cuba. In this paper I will analyze three plausible policy options available. I will begin by reviewing the current U.S. policy with Cuba, its

origin and its supporters. After determining the U.S. goals and interests with Cuba I will analyze each policy option for their advantages and disadvantages. I will then conclude by recommending that the incoming president adopt a long-term approach to Cuba that takes advantage of the winds of change" and best supports U.S. goals and interests.

U.S.-Cuba Policy in Review

The hard-line approach to Cuba is not a new occurrence. Starting with President Eisenhower, each subsequent U.S. president has maintained a hard-line approach to Castro and Cuba. Eisenhower began by severing diplomatic ties in 1960. President Kennedy continued the trend. After the Bay of Pigs invasion, U.S. and Cuba relations went from cold to hostile. Following Castro's proclamation of Cuba being a Marxist-state, the U.S. Congress responded with the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. This law was the first attempt to isolate the island economically and politically and prohibited assistance while it followed the communist ideology. President Kennedy followed by officially imposing a trade embargo effective February 1962. This hard-line approach to Cuba and Castro was strongly supported domestically and abroad.¹

The next three administrations, Johnson through Carter, experienced some improvement in relations until they were thwarted by Cuba's involvement in Africa. President Reagan extended his anti-Soviet hard-line approach to Castro and Cuba. Under his administration, hard-line policies and actions against Cuba were intensified. President Bush maintained a hard-line approach but lost focus on the island with his attention diverted by events in Panama, the collapse of communism in the Soviet Union and the fall of the Berlin Wall, and Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. Cuba analyst, William M. LeoGrande describes the Bush Administration's focus on Cuba as "malign neglect".² Perhaps this lack of focus prevented the Bush Administration from capitalizing on an opportunity to improve U.S.-Cuba relations. The most significant event impacting the U.S.-Cuba policy during the Bush Administration was the demise of the Soviet Union. Not only did Cuba lose its Marxist ideological beacon, it lost an estimated \$4-6 billion in annual support.³ The demise of the Soviet Union ended a key threat of the spread of communism in the Western Hemisphere, if not in the entire world. However, instead of the Bush Administration seizing an opportunity to improve relations it supported a Congressional Bill that intensified the

embargo. The act sponsored by Senator Robert Torricelli (D-NJ) removed any reference to Marxism and/or Soviet ideology and established punitive measures against countries that continue to trade with Cuba. The combination of these two events during the Bush Administration, the end of the Soviet economic support, compounded by the tightening of U.S. law, significantly altered the environment as President Clinton assumed office.

The combined effect of the U.S. embargo, along with the loss of Soviet subsidy, undoubtedly led to the near collapse of the Cuban economy and the mass exodus of thousands of Cubans in 1994. To recover and survive, Castro has adopted many changes within the Cuban economic system including several free enterprise initiatives. He trades with U.S. dollars and seeks foreign investments from Europe, Canada, and other nations. Accompanying these economic changes were also several social changes including some improvements in human rights and freedoms.

Bolstered by the change in Cuba and subjected to an ever-increasing international and domestic pressure, President Clinton began seeking ways to improve relations between Cuba and the United States. In 1995 President Clinton announced some of the same democratic promotion

efforts that the U.S. successfully used in Eastern Europe in the 1970s and 1980s.⁴ These initiatives, designed to allow Cubans a wider exposure to American ideas, drew strong fire from Congress and hard-line Cuban exile groups in Miami. The Cuban-American community of Florida and New Jersey interpreted the easing of sanctions as support for Castro.

To counter the President's initiatives, Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC) and Congressman Dan Burton (R-IN) sponsored the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act. Also called the LIBERTAD Act, or Helms-Burton Bill, this legislation significantly tightened the embargo and was designed to drive foreign investors from the island. President Clinton initially resisted the bill because of the international ramifications and his inherent loss of foreign policy flexibility. In addition to direct presidential actions, the bill allowed U.S. citizens, whose property was confiscated by Castro's government, to sue in U.S. courts any foreign company profiting from those properties. Neither the international community nor the U.S. Department of State welcomed the bill. Despite strong support from the Cuban-American community the bill's political future was in doubt until February 1996. When Cuba downed the two U.S. civilian aircraft, piloted by Cuban-Americans protesting

Castro's regime, President Clinton and Congress retaliated by quickly passing the legislation. Modified slightly from its original version to allow the President to suspend portions of the bill for national security reasons, the Helms-Burton Act is at the foundation of today's U.S.-Cuba policy and relations.

U.S.-Cuba Policy Today

Mike Ranneberger, Coordinator for Cuban Affairs, Department of State, summarizes the Clinton Administration's policy as,

"...our goal in Cuba is to promote a peaceful transition to democracy and respect for human rights. We do this with four essential elements: pressure on the Cuban Government through the embargo and the LIBERTAD Act; development of a multilateral effort to promote democracy; support for the Cuban people consistent with the 1992 Cuban Democracy Act (CDA) and through the LIBERTAD Act, to protect the legitimate interests of the U.S. citizens whose property has been expropriated in Cuba."⁵

The U.S. unilateral embargo is the cornerstone of the U.S. strategy today. However, U.S.-Cuba relations are very dynamic and are evolving daily. Spurred by changes internal to Cuba and the ever-growing pressure for change, President Clinton has taken several steps to ease restrictions on Cuba and the Cuban people. In March 1998, the President approved

the resumption of licensing direct humanitarian flights to Cuba. He approved Cubans living in the U.S. sending \$1,200 per year to their families in Cuba as well as streamlined procedures for the sale of medicines and medical supplies and equipment to Cuba. President Clinton concluded his announcements with "we must find creative ways to increase support to the Cuban people while maintaining pressure on the Cuban government for fundamental systemic change."⁶

In January 1999, the President announced additional "creative" ways to increase support for the Cuban people. He authorized increased charter passenger flights to and from Cuba and expanded quarterly payments to Cuban families from only Cuban-Americans to any U.S. citizen. He approved direct mail service with the island and approved the sale of U.S. agricultural supplies to nongovernmental agencies. Additionally, the President is seeking to expand exchange programs involving athletes, scientists, and others. Pursuant to this measure, representatives of the Baltimore Orioles' baseball team have begun talks to play exhibition games in Cuba.⁷

President Clinton's actions met with immediate opposition from both hard- and soft-liners. Softer-liners were critical because any actions short of complete removal

of the embargo are deemed inadequate. Hard-liners, like Florida's Republican Representatives Lincoln Diaz-Balant and Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, claim the President's actions are "illegal" and "an attempt to mask its true intention of normalizing relations with the Cuban dictator".⁸ The theme of the President's statement is clearly one of seeking a softer approach to Cuba while at the same time appeasing the hard-line right. President Clinton's middle-of-the-road approach clearly constitutes a political compromise and reflects a U.S.-Cuba policy that is stuck on the horns of a dilemma. Unfortunately for the President, and supporters of removing the Cuban embargo, the political environment is unlikely to change within the next two years. Based on the Impeachment trial, and the resulting political environment, the President will not have the political strength to alter the U.S.-Cuba policy, even if he desired to do so.

The next president will face a similar environment but will have an ideal opportunity to start anew. As long as the new president does not "sell" his political soul to special interest groups enroute to being elected, he will be able to follow a policy that is truly in the best interests of the United States.

U.S.-Cuba Policy for the Future

The next president can take U.S. policy toward Cuba in at least three distinct directions. The first is to maintain the hard-line policy as expressed in the Helms-Burton Act. The second option would be at the other end of the spectrum of pressure -- a policy of appeasement. Starting with the removal of the embargo, this policy would formally recognize and remove all restrictions on Cuba. The third policy option is characterized by enticements. This policy would reverse the current sanctions and use the changes as "carrots" designed to entice Cuba into moving towards democracy and a free market economy. Any other policy option would be a hybrid of the three. A summary of each policy option follows.

The Hard-line Approach to Cuba

The hard-line approach to Cuba seeks to force the Castro regime to change through economic pressure and diplomatic isolation. This approach is widely supported by the very vocal and influential Cuban-American community. Congressional supporters include Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC), Chairman of the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, and Representative Christopher Cox (R-CA), Chairman of the House Policy Committee. Senator Helms states,

"The Castro regime's persecution of dissidents and overall human rights record is deplorable. Until there is a clear sign that a transition government is in place and that democratic reform is initiated, the embargo and the strengthening legislation of the LIBERTAD Act will remain in place. We should not do business with such a man."⁹

The Cuban-American community, most of whom suffered severe property and personal losses when Castro seized power in 1959, has deep-rooted animosity for the Castro regime. Accordingly, most that count themselves in this group have taken a very vindictive and uncompromising stance toward Castro and his regime. Representing Cuban-Americans with this hard-line approach is the Cuban American National Foundation (CANF). With headquarters in both Miami and Washington, D.C., the CANF is a powerful organization and exerts a strong influence on U.S.-Cuba relations and policy. For the past four decades, the CANF has successfully lobbied the U.S. Congress to sustain a hard-line approach to the Castro regime.

The Helms-Burton Act of 1996, enacted in reprisal for Castro's downing of the civilian aircraft, tightens the restrictions of the 1962 embargo as well as the 1992 Cuban Democracy Act. The bill focuses on property claims and seeks to discourage domestic as well as international investment in Cuba. The most controversial and politically

damaging provisions of the Act are Titles III and IV. These two articles are potentially damaging to U.S.-Cuba relations as well as U.S. relations with other nations. The act hurts Cuba because it cuts the flow of capital and further cripples the Castro regime and is detrimental to U.S. international relations because it restricts other nations from freely exchanging with Cuba.

To date, President Clinton has waived the lawsuit provision. His action has reduced the detrimental impact on foreign relations but has likewise reduced the full impact of the Helms-Burton Act. In seeking a hard-line U.S.-Cuba policy for the future, the new president could implement the full provisions of the Helms-Burton Act to include the Title III and IV provisions.

The Soft-line Approach to Cuba

The soft-line, or appeasement policy, option seeks to introduce democracy through cooperation and promotion. This policy would lift the embargo and all sanctions against Cuba while "recognizing" the island nation. Theoretically, this policy would improve the living conditions of the Cuban people and allow Cuba to jump quickly into the world's open market. Supporters of this approach are many including domestic and international agencies and political

organizations. The head of the Roman Catholic Church, Pope John Paul II, is a strong supporter of removing the embargo because of the suffering it causes the Cuban people. Following his recent visit to Cuba in January 1998, he forcefully condemned the embargo as, "oppressive, unjust and ethically unacceptable."¹⁰

The international community, led by the United Nations (UN), fully supports a change to the U.S. policy with Cuba. Reflecting their overwhelming sentiments, the UN General Assembly recently voted 157 to 2 (U.S. and Israel) in favor of a resolution to end the U.S. embargo toward Cuba.¹¹ Many U.S. businesses and corporations favor lifting economic sanctions against Cuba as well. With their sights set on the Cuban market of 11 million, many are anxious to begin competing with international companies already trading with Cuba.

In addition to the international and business communities, a growing number of people and agencies are expressing support for removing the Cuban embargo. The Center for International Policy is an organization that lists one of its four primary objectives as "shaping a more pragmatic policy toward Cuba." The Center's Cuba team chief is Mr. Wayne S. Smith. He is the former head of the U.S.

interests section in Cuba and is considered one of the nation's most prominent advocates of improved relations with Cuba. Mr. Smith argues that all conditions for the embargo have been achieved and advocates promoting a relationship with Cuba as in the best interests of the U.S.¹² In addition to Mr. Smith, soft-liner supports provide the following rationale for removing the Cuban embargo:¹³

1. The U.S. embargo is responsible for the deprivation and suffering of the Cuban people.
2. The embargo is a relic of the Cold War and presently makes no sense; without Soviet support, Castro is no longer a threat to the U.S.
3. A free flow of tourism and trade will spur rising expectations and change in Cuba.
4. It is time to change a policy that has failed for nearly four decades.
5. The Cuban regime has taken important steps towards economic reform; lifting the embargo will further this process and render political reforms inevitable.
6. American businesses are losing out to investors from across the globe that are taking advantage of Castro's desire for foreign currency.
7. The embargo is polarizing Cuba, enhancing Castro's reputation as a fearless fighter against capitalism, driving anti-Castro Cubans back into his camp since they fear a takeover by Cubans returning from exile.

8. The soft-line appeasement policy is at the opposite end of the spectrum from the hard-line approach to Cuba. Bolstered by the ever-growing international and domestic support, this is a viable option for U.S.-Cuba policy as the new millennium arrives.

The Enticement Approach to Cuba

The enticement approach is the third option for U.S.-Cuba policy. The policy's ultimate objective is the removal of the Cuban embargo. This approach seeks to entice Cuba by using the easing of sanctions as a "carrot" to move Cuba toward democracy and an open market. The easing of restrictions would be done in phases; first as a gesture of good faith, then in response to positive steps taken by Castro and the Cuban government. The big "carrot," lifting the embargo, would follow significant changes and moves toward democracy such as open elections and the separation of military and civil power.

President Clinton has recently taken steps representative of this methodology. In justifying his March 1998 easing of restrictions, President Clinton stated he was, "building further on the impact of the Pope's visit."¹⁴ In essence, the President was rewarding Castro for opening Cuba to Pope John Paul II.

A U.S.-Cuba policy based on enticements and "carrots" is a viable option for the incoming president. It is flexible and adaptive and would give the president a compromising approach.

Analysis of U.S. Policy Approach to Cuba

Each of the three policy options has the same desired end-state: Cuba transitioning to democracy. What varies are the ways and means. The "ways" spectrum varies from pressure and isolation to appeasement and promotion. The hard-line policy has been the approach for the past four decades. Is it the best approach for the future, or are the other approaches more suited? To determine the optimal approach, each policy should be measured as to how well it supports U.S. goals and interests toward Cuba. The U.S.-Cuba policy best supporting U.S. goals and interests should be followed in the future.

U.S. Goals and Interests with Cuba

The National Security Strategy (NSS) describes the U.S. goals and interests in Cuba as "promoting a peaceful transition to democracy and forestalling a mass migration exodus."¹⁵ Also addressed in the NSS are the key objectives

of advancing human rights and promoting U.S. economic prosperity.¹⁶

The NSS goal of a peaceful transition also supports the soft-fall, as opposed to the hard-fall, of Castro from power. A soft-fall scenario is a more peaceful one and is usually associated with the transfer of leadership from Castro to an accepted successor. The hard-fall scenario is usually associated with the death, overthrow or attempt to overthrow Castro, and the extreme turmoil likely to follow these events. The soft-fall scenario supports the philosophy that Castro is "the glue that holds the regime together and binds the masses" and without him leads to a scenario of anarchy as power shifts to a new successor.¹⁷ The soft-fall is in the best interest of the U.S. because it provides the greatest opportunity to influence Cuba soon after Castro.¹⁸

Cuba scholar, Wayne S. Smith suggests an additional U.S. interest with Cuba is "promoting a relationship with Third World countries."¹⁹ This includes not only our relationship with Cuba, but with other Latin American countries as well as those represented in the UN and other international organizations.

Each of the three policy options has its own advantages and disadvantages when they are measured against these U.S. interests and the primary goal of Cuba transitioning to democracy. The following is an analysis of each policy compared to this goal and these interests.

Promote Democracy

Each policy option has Cuba's transition to democracy as its desired end state. What differs are the ways in which the objective is achieved. The use of pressure, promotion, and/or enticements have all been effectively used in U.S. foreign policy in the past. Each policy has its own advantages over the other and should be applied depending on the conditions. The U.S. has followed an approach to Cuba from the hard-line right for the past four decades. We do not know if a soft-line or enticement approach would be more effective -- we do know that the longtime hard-line policy has not achieved its desired goal. Castro has proven to be tough and resourceful. The conditions now, perhaps, warrant a different approach.

Peaceful Transition

The soft-fall of Castro from power is clearly supported by the soft-line and enticement approaches. Castro has

proven over the past four decades that he is tough and defiant. It is doubtful that Castro will now succumb to the U.S. pressure and quietly give up without a fight. The harder the pressure, and more isolated Cuba is kept, the greater the possibility for a hard-fall. Destroyed by forty years of Marxist ideology, Cuba lacks the economic, legal, and financial structure that facilitates democracy and a free market. Without the "glue" of Castro, a Cuba suddenly propelled into a New World would very likely find itself in anarchy leading to further despair. The soft-line approach supports a soft-fall because it makes these significant changes while Castro is still in power and able to provide the "glue". The enticement option also supports a soft-fall, albeit less than the soft-line, as it provides Cuba incentives to move toward an open society. The potential for economic gains alone should significantly ease the difficult process of transitioning Cuba to democracy.

Encouraging Free Market Economic Reforms

The soft-line approach has a vast advantage over the hard-line approach in encouraging economic reforms within Cuba. The hard-line embargo is designed to restrict commerce and trade with Cuba and force it into change. The absence of trade opportunities has created an economic

system unable to sustain a free market economy. The removal of the embargo, or enticements that ease commerce restrictions, will enable Cuba to begin developing the tools necessary for it to join the international economic community. The U.S. interest of encouraging economic reforms within Cuba is enhanced directly proportional to the amount of commerce opportunities available to Cuba. The hard-line approach provides the fewest; the enticement option more; and the soft-line approach the greatest.

Forestalling Mass Migration Exodus

The potential for mass refugee exodus is directly related to the living conditions of Cuba. The greater the despair and lack of opportunity, the greater the potential for large numbers of Cubans fleeing their island. Again, the hard-line approach appears to be counter-productive to this interest. By its nature and design, the pressure of the embargo seeks to increase the economic distress on the island. If the embargo was more effective it could lead to the complete collapse of the Cuban economy and cause Cubans to flee for their life and well being. Although there is no guarantee of economic gains under the soft-line approach, it is clear that the objective and design of the hard-line

embargo is contrary to the U.S. interest of forestalling a mass refugee exodus from Cuba.

Advancing Human Rights

The hard and soft-line approaches attempt to advance human rights from opposite ends of the ways spectrum. The advantages of the hard-line approach are its time duration and its potential to prevent human rights from deteriorating. The threat of greater U.S. reprisals has probably prevented Castro from restricting Cubans even more. This is more than a subtle difference. Improving human rights and preventing them from deteriorating are not the same. The soft-line approach is designed to take more time but has the greatest potential to improve the rights of Cubans in the end. The opening of Cuba to U.S. citizens, religious leaders, and international human rights activists will promote social growth within Cuba and has the greatest opportunity to advance human rights.

International Relations

Last year's near unanimous vote by the UN to end the U.S. embargo, and the European Union's protest of the Helms-Burton Act to the World Trade Organization, are clear indicators that the hard-line approach is detrimental to

U.S. foreign relations. As long as the U.S. retains the unilateral embargo it will remain outside the "favor" of the international community. Removing the embargo and following the soft-line approach has a clear advantage and best supports this U.S. interest.

Advancing American Economic Prosperity

The embargo prohibits U.S. corporations and businesses from trading with Cuba. Clearly not supportive of advancing U.S. prosperity, this policy adversely impacts many American companies. Although the Cuba market is not a huge market, many commodities and goods could be sold to the Cubans. U.S. farmers stand to gain the most by removing the embargo. With relatively lower transportation costs, U.S. farmers could underbid Cuba's current suppliers in Asia and Europe.²⁰ Following the soft-line approach has another advantage. With Cuban relations normalized, negotiations can begin to find suitable compensation for the nearly \$2 billion in properties seized by the Cuban government in the early 1960s.²¹ In all relative areas, the soft-line approach has many advantages over the hard-line approach in advancing American prosperity.

An Analysis of the Hard-line Approach

The U.S. has followed an approach to Cuba from the hard-line right for the past forty years. When analyzing this approach with respect to U.S. goals and interests with Cuba, it has both advantages and disadvantages over the soft-line and enticement policy approaches. The hard-line policy prevents deterioration of human rights and has the potential to quickly achieve improvements in human rights. However, the primary advantage of this approach is it has the greatest chance for preventing Castro's successor from following the current Marxist ideology. With the policy's very constrictive pressure, it is unlikely that Castro's successor will have the political strength to lead the Cuban people through another indefinite period of suffering. This leads to the approach's primary disadvantage as well. Assuming the analysts are correct and Castro will not step down on his own, this option has the greatest probability to lead Cuba into the undesirable hard-fall upon his eventual death.

Analysis of Soft-line Appeasement Approach to Cuba

The appeasement option of lifting the embargo and all sanctions against Cuba has many advantages. It clearly supports U.S. goals and interests with Cuba

when compared to the hard-line approach. This policy would be supported by the UN and would, theoretically, allow Cuba to jump quickly into the world's open market. The influx of free trade and business within Cuba would facilitate a move to a free market economy. Critics of this policy, primarily those of the Cuban-American National Foundation, would argue strongly against this option. They contend that Castro himself alone will prosper from this influx of money and will use it as propaganda to strengthen his "death grip" on the Cuban people.²² In addition to the propaganda gains by Castro, the primary disadvantage of this policy is it provides Castro fewer incentives to move toward democracy and human rights. There will be no pressure on Castro and no "big stick" over him. He could, although not likely, take the Cuban nation deeper into a repressive society.

Analysis of Enticement Approach to Cuba

The U.S. hard-liners oppose any reduction in Cuban sanctions but other nations will strongly endorse any policy that eases the plight of the Cuban people. The disadvantage of this option, besides the opposition from hard-liners, is the potential that this will strengthen Castro enough that someone else supporting the Marxist ideology can succeed him. It is doubtful

that a hard-line Marxist can follow Castro but anyone not fully committed to complete reforms will delay Cuba's movement toward the U.S. desired end-state. In addition to world support, this option has the advantage of supporting the Cuban people without supporting Castro himself. This option also has great potential to move Cuba toward democracy and a market economy within the next decade. Seeking the U.S. "carrots", Castro will be presented many viable incentives that could entice Cuba to move toward the U.S. desired goal and its interests.

Conclusion

Cuba will not be the same as it is today when the new millennium arrives. Castro is nearing his life expectancy and this, combined with other social and economic factors, produces an environment that is conducive for the "winds of change". Cuba will be different and therefore calls for a new policy approach as the U.S. changes its president. The new president will have three different policy options in regards to Cuba ranging from a hard-line punishing policy to a very open and appeasing policy. Each policy has the same goal of a Cuba transitioning to democracy and a free market economy but each option uses a different methodology.

To select the best U.S.-Cuba policy for the next millennium, the new president should measure each option against the criteria of supporting U.S. interests and having the best chance of achieving the goal of Cuba transitioning to democracy. Using this criterion, the removal of the unilateral embargo and the soft-line appeasement approach is the best choice. The changes within Cuba since the Cold War warrant a new approach to this nation; an approach that anticipates and best prepares for the post-Castro regime. This approach best supports U.S. interests and goals for the next millennium.

The hard-line approach that postpones any changes until Castro's regime is out of power must be avoided. Based on his proven ability to endure, that could be another decade or more. It has been nearly four decades since Castro's rise to power. The longer Cuba operates under the Marxist ideology the more difficult it will be to transition to democracy and a free market economy. Additionally, the hard-line policy has the greatest chance of resulting in the hard-fall of Castro. Without the "glue" holding it together, Cuba could easily implode, adding to human suffering and further delay the nation's move to democracy. The enticement option is a viable approach; however, it

retains the unilateral embargo. The easing of restrictions and economic sanctions, and the opening of commerce and trade, will ease the future transition toward a free market economy but will not provide the conditions for Cuba to immediately jump into the free market economy. Additionally, as long as the U.S. maintains its unilateral embargo it will remain outside the UN and international community's favor.

Recommendation

As the millennium arrives, the new president should adopt a soft-line appeasement policy with Cuba. It is the best course of action for the U.S. because it starts shaping now for the desired future. It best supports U.S. interests and provides Castro with the best opportunity to jump into the free market system. A Cuba with Castro as the "glue" will better facilitate this significant change. By eliminating economic restrictions, Cuba will be opened to U.S. and the World's businesses. The sooner the access, the quicker Cuba can learn and adapt to a system it has not been part of in nearly forty years. Additionally, and most importantly, the opening of relations with Cuba will enhance human rights in that country. Human rights will improve as citizens of the U.S. and the World enter Cuban cities. As Cuba's leading human rights

activist, Elizardo Sanchez, explains, "the more American citizens on the streets of Cuban cities, the better for the cause of a more open system."²³

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ENDNOTES

¹ The Organization of American States unanimously supported the resolution and declared the Marxist-Leninist ideology as incompatible with the American States according to Gary C. Hufbauer, Jerry J. Schott, and Kimberly Ann Elliott. Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, 2d ed. (Washington D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1990), 194; quoted in Bernie D. Coy, The U.S. Trade Embargo Against Cuba (Carlisle Barracks, PA: USAWC, 1996), 5.

² William M. Leogrande, "Cuba Policy Revisited." Foreign Policy, 26, (Spring 1982), 105-119; as referenced in Carl G. Roe, U.S. and Cuban Relations: Prospects for the Future (Carlisle Barracks, PA: USAWC, 1991), 6.

³ Edward Gonzalez and David Ronfeldt, Storm Warnings for Cuba (RAND National Defense Research Institute, 1994), 2-6; as referenced in J. R. Scharfen, The Helms-Burton Act: A Strategic Critique (Carlisle Barracks, PA: USAWC, 1998), 3.

⁴ Carla Ann Robbins and Jose de Cordoba state the President authorized: U.S. news organizations to open bureaus in Cuba; humanitarian and human rights organizations to send help to their counterparts in Cuba; easier academic and cultural exchanges; easier travel for Cuban-Americans to the island for family emergencies; and Western Union to open offices in Cuba for the wiring of emergency cash to relatives. He also announced grants to print and distribute pamphlets and books on democracy, human rights, and free market economics in Cuba. "Clinton to Ease Limits on Aid, Travel to Cuba," Wall Street Journal (October 6, 1995), sec. A, p. 16; as referenced in Bernie D. Coy, The U.S. Trade Embargo Against Cuba (Carlisle Barracks, PA: USAWC, 1996), 18.

⁵ Michael Ranneberger, "U.S. Economic and Trade Policy Toward Cuba," Statement before the Subcommittee on Trade, The House Ways and Means Committee, 7 May 1998; available from <http://www.state.gov/www/policy_remarks/1998/>; Internet; accessed 27 September 1998.

⁶ William J. Clinton, as quoted by Michael Ranneberger, "U.S. Economic and Trade Policy Toward Cuba," Statement before the Subcommittee on Trade, The House Ways and Means

Committee, 7 May 1998; available from <http://www.state.gov/www/policy_remarks/1998/>; Internet; accessed 27 September 1998.

⁷ Tim Weiner, "U.S. Ready to Ease Some Restrictions in Policy on Cuba," New York Times, 5 January 1999; available from <<http://www.nytimes.com/library/world/americas/010599cuba-us.html>>; Internet; accessed 12 January 1999.

⁸ "Clinton to Ease Some Restrictions on Cuba." The Associated Press January 5, 1999; available from <[http://www.NYT HEADLINE<NYT BYLINType="" version=1.0<NYT LINKS ONSITE type=main version=1.0](http://www.NYT HEADLINE<NYT BYLINType=)>; Internet; accessed 12 January 1999.

⁹ Senator Jesse Helms of North Carolina, in letter to author, 16 December 1998, Washington, D.C.

¹⁰ "Pope Raps Embargo, Calls For Freedom." National Catholic Reporter (February 6, 1998): 13.

¹¹ United Nations, General Assembly. "Assembly Urges States to Repeal or Invalidate Laws with Extraterritorial Effect on Sovereignty, Free Trade, Navigation of Other Sates." Press Release GA/9479 37th Meeting (October 14, 1998); available from <<http://www.un.org/plweb-cgi/idoc.pl/>>; Internet; accessed 12 January 1999.

¹² The views of Mr. Wayne S. Smith and The Center for International Policy; available from <<http://www.us.net./cip/index.htm>>; Internet; accessed 12 February 1999.

¹³ The rationale for the soft-line approach were presented, and argued against, by Adolfo Leyva De Varona, "Propaganda and Reality: A Look at the U.S. Embargo Against Castro's Cuba." Issue Brief, The Cuban American National Foundation, September 1996.

¹⁴ William J. Clinton, as quoted by Michael Ranneberger, "U.S. Economic and Trade Policy Toward Cuba," Statement before the Subcommittee on Trade, The House Ways and Means Committee, 7 May 1998; available from <http://www.state.gov/www/policy_remarks/1998/>; Internet; accessed 27 September 1998.

¹⁵ William J. Clinton, A National Security Strategy for a New Century (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 1998), 51.

¹⁶ William J. Clinton, A National Security Strategy for a New Century (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 1998), iii.

¹⁷ Edward Gonzales and David Ronfeldt, "Storm Warnings for Cuba," RAND Study (Santa Monica: National Defense Research Institute, 1994), 113; quoted in Michael R. Wood, Cuba After Castro: Issues and Strategic Considerations for the Deployment of United States Armed Forces, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: USAWC, 1998), 13.

¹⁸ Michael R. Wood, Cuba After Castro: Issues and Strategic Considerations for the Deployment of United States Armed Forces, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: USAWC, 1998), 4.

¹⁹ Wayne S. Smith, "Wanted: A Logical Cuba Policy." February 1998; available from <<http://www.ciponline.org/9802ipr.htm>>; Internet; accessed February 12, 1999.

²⁰ Kenneth Hobie, President of the U.S. Grains Council, as quoted in Linda Robinson, "An Opening to Cuba?" U.S. News & World Report (September 28, 1998): 45.

²¹ Wayne S. Smith, "Wanted: A Logical Cuba Policy." February 1998; available from <<http://www.ciponline.org/9802ipr.htm>>; Internet; accessed February 12, 1999.

²² Jose R. Cardenas, "U.S. Policy Towards Cuba: A Defense," Issue Brief, The Cuban-American National Foundation, 19 January 1998; available from <<http://www.canfnet.org>>; Internet; accessed 27 September 1998.

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