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STRATEGY Research Project

FUTURE PEACE OPERATIONS – THE WAY AHEAD

BY

COLONEL HARALD SUNDE Norwegian Army

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ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Colonel Harald Sunde

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As the United Nations and its members look at the uneven record of post-Cold War peacekeeping operations and at the challenges of peacekeeping in the future, their problems are compounded by the dramatic reductions in the armed forces of most of the usual troop-contributing countries. In addition, training for the wide variety of tasks now involved in peace operations conflicts with the training necessary for national military forces to maintain their warfighting capabilities, their primary mission. These factors have led to a reevaluation of the role of military forces in future peace operations. This paper examines the evolution and dimensions of peacekeeping operations, describes the nature of existing conflicts and provides guidance for the use of military force in future peace operations. It recommends that military force be robust enough to dominate the situation and deter interference; that military force used to protect other means of conflict resolution be capable of carrying out enforcement actions as well; that military force should be used establish the conditions for peace

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rather than maintaining a cease-fire, that for unity of effort in peace operations, all available means in peace operations should be coordinated by the United Nations for legitimacy and unity of effort; and that the political and diplomatic elements should be strengthened.

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FUTURE PEACE OPERATIONS - THE WAY AHEAD

INTRODUCTION

With the end of the Cold War, the number of peacekeeping operations undertaken by the United Nations increased dramatically. Prior to 1988, there had been a total of 13 peacekeeping operations worldwide under the control of the United Nations. Since the establishment of the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) in Namibia in 1988, an event usually described in international literature on peacekeeping as the "breaking point" in modern peace operations, the United Nations has launched 36 new missions around the world.¹ At the high point in 1993, more than 80,000 UN peacekeepers were deployed internationally.

With these higher levels of activity, the United Nations realized that it was not organized to handle the number of resolutions being adopted by the Security Council and all the new demands for peacekeeping missions. To address this situation, the United Nations created in 1992 the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) as part of the UN Secretariat in New York.² Starting with a staff of 38 people, the DPKO soon grew to a total of 400 people. During this period the demands for new

peacekeepers were constant and stretched the resources of the countries willing to contribute troops to peacekeeping operations to their limits.

In spite of this boom in peacekeeping, it soon became clear that the successes anticipated by UN members were not being achieved. Most of the missions were failures, as was clearly illustrated by the missions in Somalia, Rwanda, and Bosnia. These failures led in turn to a decrease in the number of UN missions and to the handing over to NATO of the mission of the new peacekeeping force in Bosnia. By 1996 the number of UN peacekeeping troops had declined to a total of 27,000 troops. At present the United Nations has a total of 16 ongoing peacekeeping operations of which five were established before 1988.³

Today the United Nations is facing one of its biggest challenges, namely the future of peace operations. The experience gained in the 1990s clearly shows that UN peacekeeping has its limitations. Both the United Nations and regional international organizations have come to the realization that threats to peace have changed and consequently the ways to keep the peace have also changed. The Special Assistant to the UN Under Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Shashi Tharoor, concluded in an article in 1998 that the heady days of peacekeeping overstretch were gone and he laid

out four arguments why.⁴ The first is related to the nature of modern conflicts, both inter-state and intra-state. Post-Cold War conflicts have been much more complex and multifaceted compared to previous conflicts in which peacekeepers have been deployed. Secondly, western economies can no longer afford to bankroll expensive peacekeeping operations. Thirdly, the United Nations lacks the rapid reaction and command and control ability to mount the more comprehensive second-generation peacekeeping operations. And lastly, given the United Nations' failures in Bosnia, Rwanda, and Somalia, post-Cold War peacekeeping has been at best disappointing, and at worst, disastrous.

As the United Nations and its members face the challenges of future peacekeeping, their problems are compounded by the fact that most of the classic troop-contributing countries are now also experiencing dramatic reductions of their own armed forces. This has in turn led to a reevaluation of the future role of military forces in peace operations. For the military forces of any state, the primary task is warfighting. The demands on them to do a wide variety of other tasks in peace operations, however, have created new training requirements and made it more difficult for them to maintain the necessary standards for warfighting. For example, Norway has now withdrawn her forces from the UN mission in South Lebanon to be able to maximize the Norwegian effort in Bosnia. At the same time there are clear

signs that the mission in Bosnia is turning more and more away from a military operation and into a humanitarian operation. For example, the fighting vehicles of combat units have been replaced with jeeps, which are more flexible for this peacekeeping mission.

This paper will first examine the evolution of peacekeeping operations and the nature of potential conflicts and then provide some guidance for the use of military force in future peace operations.

PEACE OPERATIONS

General

To be able to discuss peace operations usefully, it is of the utmost importance to establish at the outset agreed definitions and a common understanding of the terms used. This is not the case today within the international peacekeeping community or the literature on peacekeeping, and several differences can be seen between UN documents and the documents on peacekeeping from different nations. This confusion occurs not only regarding peace operations but also to the hierarchy of terms used to put "what we mean" into a military context. The United States Army Field Manual (FM) 100 - 5, Operations, describes the principles of Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW)⁵, and FM 100 - 23, Peace Operations, describes the

application of these principles in peace operations. In the United Kingdom, they tend to write about the principles of Complex Emergencies for Peace <u>Support</u> Operations, and in France they talk about control of violence as the principles in Peace Support Operations.⁶ As a contribution to this common understanding and for consistency, the term "peace operations" is used in this paper as an umbrella term that encompasses three types of activities with a predominantly diplomatic lead -preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peace building -- and two complementary activities with predominately a military lead -peacekeeping and peace enforcement. Peace operations are multinational of nature and traditionally associated with the United Nations. In this paper the following operational terms will be used:

Operational terms

Support to Diplomacy is military support in form of advisers, observers, or limited military operations.

- **Peacemaking** is diplomatic action to bring hostile parties to a negotiated agreement through such peaceful means as those foreseen under the Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter.⁷
- **Peace building** includes the identification and support of measures and structures which will promote peace and build trust and interaction among former enemies in order to avoid

a relapse into conflict. Peace building is critical in the aftermath of conflict.⁸

• **Preventive diplomacy** is action to prevent disputes from developing between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflict, and to limit the expansion of conflicts when they occur.⁹

Military-led peace operations include:

- **Peacekeeping** is military operations undertaken with the consent of the parties involved in a conflict that are designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an existing truce and to support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement. (The United Nations defines peacekeeping as "United Nations presence in the field ...")¹⁰
 - Preventive deployment is deployment of military force to prevent fighting from happening at all.¹¹
 - Implementation of comprehensive settlement for the purpose of helping parties to a conflict, implement a comprehensive settlement which they have reached. Such settlements have involved not only cease-fires and other arrangements, but also a wide range of civilian matters.¹²
 - Peace observation is as described above only using observers and not a military force.

- Protection of humanitarian operations is the use of military force to protect humanitarian operations using force in self-defense if attacked.¹³
- Peace enforcement. The application of military force to maintain or restore international peace and security in situations in which the UN Security Council has determined the existence of threat to peace, breach of peace, or act of aggression. Article 42 of the UN Charter says:"..may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security." Peace enforcement is normally linked to a limited objective like:
 - Enforcement of sanctions. If the UN Security Council approves sanctions on a state, it automatically becomes a Chapter VII operation.
 - Protection of humanitarian operations during continuing
 conflict. Protect a humanitarian operation by the use of
 force if necessary.
 - Enforcement of protected zones has been used to protect civilian population within a conflict area.
 - Guarantee or denial of movement can be an effective means to dominate a conflict situation.

Forcible separation of factions may become necessary to establish the conditions for peace against the will of the belligerent parties. Forcible separation is the ultimate means to counter a serious threat to peace and security.¹⁴

The UN Charter, Chapter VI - Pacific settlement of disputes, in Articles 33 to 38 gives a UN force the authority to use force only in self-defense. All peace operations except peace enforcement operations are Chapter VI operations. The UN Charter, Chapter VII - Action with respect to threats to peace, breaches of peace, and acts of aggression, in Articles 39 to 51 gives a UN force the legal authority to use force.

WAYS AND MEANS - THE EVOLUTION OF PEACE OPERATIONS

Peace Observation

When the conflict in Kosovo was rekindled in 1998, the United Nations and the international community had few if any effective means to keep the peace under a cease-fire agreement. This led to the formation of a new observation mission headed by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). This mission consisted of 2000 unarmed civilian observers and was a return to the roots of "peacekeeping mechanisms." In the history of peace operations, peace observation was the first means used in the effort of maintaining international peace. The origin and

strategy of peace observation evolved out of experiences with peace operations and the failure of collective security under the League of Nations and the United Nations.¹⁵ The League of Nations was active in several disputes and crises. During these disputes the League began to perform some peace observation functions that were to evolve into a peacekeeping strategy in later years. The League conducted several successful peace observation missions. During the Greek-Bulgarian crises of 1925, the Council achieved a cease-fire and the construction of a buffer zone before the observers were deployed. Even though seldom mentioned, the experience gained under the League of Nations became the basis for the first United Nations observation missions.

The first UN peace observation mission was conducted in Greece after World War II. The mission became a success and it showed that peace observation was possible in a Cold War dispute. It also showed that peace observation was possible when a mission was stationed only on one side of a border.¹⁶ Two observer missions from these early days are still functioning. The first one was established in 1948 in Palestine as the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO). The mission of the organization has changed over the years, but one of its crucial functions, apart from its observer role, is to provide experienced officers for other missions on short notice.¹⁷ The

second mission is the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIB) which was established in 1949. This last mission must be characterized as a success in a very complicated dispute. Another interesting aspect concerning this mission is that the parties to the dispute -- India and Pakistan -- are the main troop contributors to other UN peacekeeping missions.

The United Nations has at present 16 ongoing peacekeeping missions of which 10 are observation missions. In the beginning of peacekeeping operations, observation missions were not included in peacekeeping, but today observation missions are a part of peacekeeping. Several peacekeeping principles also apply for peace observation, but there is one distinct difference. The observers are not a force and therefore they can not affect the situation by deterrence. This gives an observation mission distinct limitations and consequently the need for certain preconditions before it can be effective.

Peacekeeping

Peacekeeping is not defined nor even mentioned in the Charter of the United Nations. Its legal basis has to be found in the general description of the United Nations in Article 1 of the Charter that outlines the purposes of the UN including the maintenance of international peace and security.¹⁸ Peacekeeping has developed over the years and the concept of peacekeeping has

been broadened to include activities ranging from conflict prevention to post-conflict rehabilitation. Peacekeeping operations today are normally much more complex and multifunctional, involving a number of governmental and nongovernmental organizations that have to work together in the field in order to obtain the desired results. Another characteristic of modern peacekeeping is that it is often used against parties involved in an intra-state conflict although the Charter expressly prohibits the United Nations from intervening in matters that are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of a state, except when enforcement measures are called for under Chapter VII of the Charter.¹⁹

Attempts to create clarity in the terminology and contents of peacekeeping guidelines by formulating a peacekeeping doctrine have not succeeded because of objections that this would lead to a loss of flexibility in addressing the wide range of conflicts. In addition there are also many conflicting interests between UN member states. Peacekeeping operations are normally divided into two categories or "generations." The first generation includes the 13 operations launched between 1948 and 1988. These include small, diverse, low-level observer missions as well as classic peacekeeping operations involving a considerable number of troops. The second generation includes operations undertaken since 1988, when the United Nations became increasingly engaged

in "complex" operations considered beyond traditional
peacekeeping.

Traditional peacekeeping has been conducted using light troops with little offensive capacity or military observers to monitor the implementation of arrangements related to the control of a conflict. The interposition of force between consenting parties to a dispute has been the basic technique. A basic principle of peacekeeping is not to use force except in self-defense.²⁰ Of the 13 UN missions between 1948 and 1988, six were traditional peacekeeping missions. From these first missions the United Nations gained the experiences that would be important for later operations and that are important today in finding the way into the future. Several UN member states want the United Nations to return to traditional peacekeeping after experiencing the depressing results of the boom in complex peacekeeping of the 1990s.²¹ In this early timeframe the world also saw two peace operations outside the framework of the United Nations. The first one was the Multinational Observer Force in Sinai. This force was a result of the 1979 Camp David accord that settled the dispute between Israel and Egypt. The deployment of the non-UN Multinational Force (MNF) to Beirut in 1982 came about largely as a result of the failure of UN peacekeeping in southern Lebanon (UNIFIL) and the UN Security Council's failure to authorize another UN operation. This led

to a search for multinational alternatives outside the UN context. The MNF was put together with US, French, and Italian troops who served as an interposition force between the Israelis and the PLO fighters in Beirut and supervised the withdrawal of PLO fighters out of West Beirut. The evacuation generally proceeded without serious incidents and the first phase of MNF's mission was a success.²² After this the MNF withdrew from Beirut, but shortly afterwards new confrontations occurred and the MNF was redeployed to Beirut, this time including British forces. In October 1983 the US and French compounds of the MNF were victims of terrorist truck bombings. With the Lebanese Army on the verge of collapse and the situation in West Beirut out of control, the MNF was withdrawn by March 1984.

To be able to evaluate this first period of peacekeeping it is necessary to establish criteria by which the success or failure of the different missions can be identified. Paul F. Diehl has in his book *International Peacekeeping* used two criteria -- "limitation of armed conflict" and "conflict resolution" -- to examine the major traditional peacekeeping operations.²³ Although the limitation of armed conflict is the most important function of traditional peacekeeping, conflict resolution is the goal. Thus one may anticipate that a peacekeeping operation that fails in its mission of limiting armed conflict will be doomed in its efforts of conflict

resolution. The achievement of conflict limitation, however, is no assurance that the conflict will be resolved. The parties may be content with the status quo or deterred from resuming armed hostilities and remain unwilling to make significant concessions or even to enter into negotiations. In those cases a protracted stalemate occurs, and the peacekeeping operation can be judged only partly successful. In his work Diehl evaluated the following operations:

- United Nations Emergency Force I (UNEF I), which was the first UN peacekeeping operation and designed to defuse the Suez Crises of 1956.
- United Nations Emergency Force II (UNEF II), which was established after the Yom Kippur War in 1973.
- United Nations Operation in Congo (ONUC), which was established to assist Congo after receiving its official independence from Belgium on June 30, 1960.
- United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), which since 1964 has been deployed as an interposition force between Greek and Turkish communities on the island of Cyprus.
- United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), which was deployed because southern Lebanon was a battleground between

Israeli forces, Palestinian units, and various Lebanese militias.

• Multinational Force in Beirut (MNF).

Measured against the above-mentioned criteria, only UNEF II could be characterized a success. Adding that UNEF II was terminated because of the deployment of MFO and the Camp David accords, the current peace between Israel and Egypt can not be traced back to UNEF II alone, and the reason for the success is rather vague. These results do not give much optimism for the future of traditional peacekeeping, but it is also important to analyze other factors as well.

In almost all literature about peace operations, one finds the famous statement of the former UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold: "Peacekeeping is not a job for soldiers, but only soldiers can do it."²⁴ Based upon 50 years of UN peacekeeping experience, this saying no longer describes the right means to reach the desired ends. In the contrary, one must describe the ends and the ways to be able to deploy the right means. The end is NOT a military one, but a political objective requiring the consent and the will of the parties involved.

The traditional UN procedure has been to appoint a Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) to be the political "means" for assisting the parties in reaching a mutually-accepted agreement to the problem. The SRSG is also the

senior UN representative with overall command and control in the field of any UN peacekeeping force, UN Civilian Police, and UN offices in the area. The SRSG has in addition to a diplomatic role also a responsibility to perform numerous operational tasks. Without an adequate supporting staff and apparatus, the SRSG is not capable of being a main political or diplomatic player in achieving the UN's peacekeeping objective.

Case studies have shown that military means alone can be a stabilizing factor, but not the single means to reach the desired end. By using only military force, the risk of just preserving a situation is higher than resolving it. The words of Dag Hammarskjold should therefore be revised as "Soldiers have a role to play, but are not the only peacekeepers."

Second-generation peacekeeping is a result of the change following the end of the Cold War. International conflicts have shifted from inter-state to intra-state conflicts. The writers of the UN Charter did not foresee this type of conflict and the United Nations was largely unprepared to deal with the complexity and deep-rooted character of this type of conflict.²⁵. The second generation can be characterized by multidisciplinary operations encompassing a wide range of elements to enhance peace. This includes the supervision of cease-fire agreements, regrouping and demobilization of armed forces, the destruction of weapons surrendered in disarmament exercises, the

reintegration of former combatants into civilian life, the design and implementation of demining programs, the facilitation of the return of refugees and displaced persons, the provision of humanitarian assistance, the training of new police forces, monitoring of respect for human rights, support for implementation of constitutional, judicial and electoral reforms, and support for economic rehabilitation and reconstruction.²⁶ This extensive listing shows the enormous new challenge that peacekeepers faced in the 1990s.

In Africa, where there had been one peacekeeping mission prior to 1988,²⁷ there were 15 UN peace operations in the period from 1989 to 1999, of which four still are active. Also, on the European continent eight UN missions have been established since 1992 when the conflict in Former Yugoslavia broke out. The UN peace operations conducted in Former Yugoslavia give a good picture of how complex such operations have become and what kind of problems must be considered in future operations. Some very important lessons can be drawn from the history of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR). The United Nations became actively involved in the situation in Yugoslavia on 25 September 1991 when the UN Security Council adopted the resolution 713, calling on all States to implement a general and complete embargo of Yugoslavia under the Chapter VII of the UN Charter. In February 1992, UNPROFOR was deployed as a peacekeeping force

under Chapter VI of the UN Charter.²⁸ The initial mandate was to establish three United Nations Protected Areas (UNPAs) in Croatia. The mandate was to ensure that the UNPAs were demilitarized through the withdrawal or disbanding of all armed forces and that all persons were protected from fear of armed attack.²⁹ This mandate was soon enlarged as the situation changed in the area.

The first enlargement was to monitor the so-called "pink zones" in addition to the UNPAs and then to establish security at Sarajevo Airport and to reopen it for humanitarian airlift. The next expansion of the mandate was the addition of the protection of humanitarian convoys and released detainees, still under the Chapter VI of the UN Charter.³⁰ This was followed by the establishment a "No-Fly Zone" in the airspace of Bosnia-Herzegovina and control of the border of Bosnia-Herzegovina. In addition to this, UNPROFOR deployed a force to the Former Yugoslavia Republic of Macedonia (FYROM).

Early in 1993, just prior to the end of the UNPROFOR mandate on 10 February 1993, the situation for the peacekeeping force in Former Yugoslavia was depressing. Even though the military force had been strengthened during the period, the protection of the UNPAs and the "pink zones" had failed. This clearly showed the problems and limitations a peacekeeping mandate has in such a situation. The same applies for the border control and the no-

fly zone as well. These are sanctions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter which, as reality showed, cannot be "enforced" by a peacekeeping force. The dilemma of the Secretary-General was obvious. The peacekeeping plan could not be implemented and enforcement would require additional military forces and equipment that could not be deployed immediately upon passage of an enforcement resolution. This threatened the safety and security of UN peacekeeping personnel deployed in the UNPAs causing some, perhaps most, troop contributing countries to review their participation in UNPROFOR.³¹ This ambiguous area between traditional peacekeeping and enforcement has often been referred to within the UN community as a "Chapter six and a half" operation.³² This is a dangerous step that only contributes to diluting the legitimacy of peace operations based on the UN Charter. A better description of these Chapter VI operations is "robust peacekeeping."

An agreement with the parties to the conflict is paramount in peacekeeping operations, but the numerous operations carried out over the years have also shown that it is extremely difficult to identify all parties, and on several occasions some of them did not want to agree, or they changed their opinions. In his research of traditional peacekeeping operations, Diehl found that the opposition of a third party was the main reason for the failure of UNIFIL and MNF.³³ That means that a consensus of the

parties still is essential, but there is no guarantee that this consensus will last if a third party appears. This also applies to second-generation peacekeeping. In this picture, deterrence plays a totally new role in peacekeeping. To be able to protect an UNPA, a UN force must be robust enough to deter an aggressor from attacking and be able to protect the area if deterrence should fail. The use of military means must be limited to what is doable in a peace operation, however. This was clearly shown later in the conflict when the United Nations declared the safe areas of Srebrenica, Sarajevo, Tuzla, Zepa, Gorazde, Bihac and their surroundings without being able to provide the force necessary to protect them.³⁴

The situation in Former Yugoslavia also showed that in second-generation peacekeeping operations there can be several external political actors trying to resolve the situation. Involved in this issue were the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the Presidency of the European Union, the Chairman of the OSCE-participating States, and the Chairman of the European Community's Conference on Yugoslavia. The coordination of the effort was a large challenge because both national and regional interests played a role. In this case coordination was accomplished using the UN Security Council's Resolutions as the necessary legal and political instruments. Still a clear strategy to reach the objective is necessary.

In peace operations, the aspect of humanitarian relief plays an important role and can be the main reason for the operation. Both the conflicts in Former Yugoslavia and in Somalia are perfect scenarios to illustrate the complexity of such operations. Some institution has to be established to interact with the political authorities in the area so that this relief effort can be coordinated and can contribute to the settlement of the conflict.

Peace enforcement

Peace enforcement operations are based on the Chapter VII of the UN Charter and represent the deployment by the United Nations' political organs of military units to engage in nonconsensual action that may include the use of force to restore international peace and security. Until the Gulf War, the only peace enforcement operation had been the UN action in Korea. Since 1990 the United Nations has been engaged in peace enforcement in two ways. First by authorizing member states to take forcible actions, as in the Gulf War, the US intervention in Somalia in December 1992, and the US intervention in Haiti in September 1994. The second way has been to authorize an existing UN peacekeeping mission to take action regardless of the will of the immediate parties, as the United Nations did in giving enforcement powers to the UN operations in Somalia (UNOSOM) and UNPROFOR in 1993.³⁵

Traditionally Chapter VII has been the basis for implementing embargoes, but as conflicts have developed, the need for further enforcement operations have become obvious. The problem between peace enforcement and peacekeeping is illustrated by the situation UNPROFOR faced when it was given the mandate to control the border of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The reason was a UN Chapter VII Resolution on the embargo which was initially to be "enforced" by a peacekeeping force with a mandate given by a Chapter VI Resolution. Even after it was given enforcement power, the force tried to operate as a peacekeeping force. Enforcement requires that the military force have enough strength and adequate rules of engagement to allow it to accomplish its task. That includes the possibility that the force will become a part of the conflict and leave behind some of the traditional UN values such as evenhandedness and impartiality.

UN peace enforcement has therefore several problems linked to it. First, it is difficult, if not impossible, for a UN force put together from different countries without any fixed command structure or common training to be capable of conducting combat operations. Second, it is questionable if it is possible to mix peace enforcement and peacekeeping and still keep the credibility of peacekeeping. The tragic results for UNPROFOR are well known when it could not secure the safe areas at

Srebrenica, Gorazde and Bihac. When peace enforcement is necessary, this means that the objective has to be reached mainly by the use of military force.

The United Nations has no military forces of its own and forces must be put together on a case-by-case basis. The forces also only consist of what the troop contributing countries are willing to make available. For these reasons, these forces have not been capable of conducting combat operations. Peace enforcement operations must be conducted by a coalition of states willing to use force and engage in combat, as shown during the Gulf War. Peace operations after 1988 have demonstrated that the need for enforcement power is more likely than earlier. From this experience, it appears most likely that peace enforcement operations will be missions for national and/or coalition forces.

DIMENSIONS OF PEACE OPERATIONS

The mandate for peace operations

The United Nations has proven to be an important body in the struggle towards collective security. The Security Council's resolutions are the main instrument to state international opinion, to provide legal sanction and legitimacy for enforcement actions, and to provide the platform for coalition building in resolving international conflicts. UN forces are not

the only military means for peace operations, however. A coalition of willing states can just as well be the right means, as can a regional collective defense organization such as NATO. The most important key to success is to establish an international consensus in resolving a conflict by agreeing on the Ends, Ways, and Means. The United Nations with the General Assembly and the Security Council is the only instrument capable of creating worldwide support for crisis management. In deciding on military means, the mandate is of utmost importance. Not only the mandate but how it is transformed into mission, tasks, and rules of engagement is critical. In peace operations HOW means are used is different from war because the borders between tactical, operational and strategic levels are more diffuse. In peace operations, the military commanders on the scene are the key players. Most of the time, they must make decisions without clear guidelines and without time to ask for orders from senior commanders. Actions on patrol or at the checkpoint level can have strategic consequences, and local decisions can change the entire situation in a region.

In view of previous experience, the whole process of developing the mandate and creating a strategy for resolving conflicts must be strengthened. The United Nations' reactions to international conflicts are by nature crisis driven. This means that the response is reactive and time-consuming because troop-

contributing countries must commit troops to a new mission on an ad hoc basis. It is therefore of the utmost importance to create a structure within the United Nations that will be able to handle the total situation in a mission area. That means identifying the ends and being able to decide on the ways so that the right means can be used to resolve the situation. That also includes the identification of the role and mission of each means -- military, political, diplomatic or economic.

The dimension of force

The history of peace operations provides examples of a wide variety of force levels. Some peace observation missions consisting only of a few unarmed soldiers were successes, while other peacekeeping missions consisting of several thousand soldiers turned out to be failures. The reasons for success and failure are many, and one mission cannot easily be compared with another. However, the one factor that has been of paramount importance to all peacekeeping operations is the consent of the conflicting parties. With a high degree of consent, the need for military force have been low. When consent has been uncertain or absent, the mission has turned into an enforcement operation.³⁶

The main problem in a peace operation is often the involvement of a third-party state or a subnational actor like liberation groups. Diehl concluded in his study that the two most significant reasons for failure of peacekeeping were the

opposition of third-party states or subnational groups.³⁷ A third-party state can influence the success of a peacekeeping operation in several ways. Most obviously, it can directly intervene militarily in the conflict, causing a renewal of fighting or jeopardizing the safety of the peacekeepers. A peacekeeping force is normally not tailored to handle such a situation, and this can lead to a suspension of the operation. Third-party states might also indirectly influence the peacekeeping operation by having a dispute with one of the parties in the conflict. Subnational actors usually operate in intra-state conflicts, but can also operate as a third party in inter-state conflicts. As an example on the latter, the PLO never accepted UNIFIL, claiming that the Palestinians had the right to operate in the disputed area in South Lebanon. Consequently they smuggled weapons into the area and attacked Israeli positions, defeating the purpose of UNIFIL and destroying the little confidence Israel had in that peacekeeping force.³⁸

Later during the 1990s when the nature of conflicts changed from inter-state to intra-state, the degree of consent became a major determinant of the threat level for peace operations. The continuing conflict in Former Yugoslavia is a good example of how the consent of the conflicting parties can vary or change. Even if strategic or operational consent can be reached between

the main belligerents and the United Nations, still there can be factions or groups at the tactical level that disagree and constitute a direct threat to the peacekeepers and to the mission. Consent can therefore be divided in three levels: "strategic consent," consent between major parties such as states and the United Nations; "operational consent," consent between conflicting parties or factions and the mission (SRSG and the Force Commander), and "tactical consent," consent between elements or groups and the local peacekeeping force. As an illustration of the difficulties with consent, in Former Yugoslavia, 69 separate cease-fire agreements had been negotiated and broken by the end of 1993.³⁹

The uncertainty of consent must be taken into consideration when a peacekeeping force is tailored. In the relationship between consent and force capability, two levels are of concern. (See figure 1.)


Figure 1

The first is the critical level of consent below which force will have to be used to maintain credibility and to accomplish the mission. The second is the critical force level in relation to any potential adversary which is necessary for the successful conduct of combat operations. UNISOM II in Somalia was authorized under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Its presence in Somalia did not have universal consent, and it carried out enforcement action as authorized by its mandate. Still UNISOM II became a terrible failure and the reason is to be found in the force tailoring: UNISOM was never dimensioned to deal with its potential adversaries.

Looking at peacekeeping operations, the less the parties consent, the more force capability will be necessary for the successful conduct of the operation. With a very high degree of consent of the parties, force capability can be low and the mission can be conducted successfully by peace observation. Where tactical consent is lacking, the forces need to be robust in order to dominate any local situation. This puts the old "low force level" peacekeeping concept in question.

The functions in peace operations

The traditional "observation" or "interposition" peace operations had normally one main function: to verify compliance with a cease-fire agreement. The large number of operations set up since 1988, however, has led to a qualitative and quantitative increase in the types of activities carried out by the peacekeepers. That means that the types of missions that have been mandated have been expanded. Peacekeeping is being applied more often to conflicts that can be characterized as protracted and deep-rooted and which are resistant to resolution through the application of the traditional methods of conflict management. Based on the number and complexity of functions, an operation can be characterized as unifunctional or multifunctional. Traditional peacekeeping is normally characterized as unifunctional although two of the missions prior to 1988 could be called multifunctional. UNIFIL in Lebanon

was tasked with restoring international peace and security and assisting the Government of Lebanon in restoring its authority. ONUC in the Congo was tasked with providing security and contributing technical assistance to the Congolese Government.

After 1988 one finds a majority of multifunctional operations. For example, UTAG played an important role in the transition to independence and democracy in Namibia, while UN missions in El Salvador, Haiti and Nicaraqua verified elections, but at the same time a number of other functions had to be taken care of. The mission in Western Sahara had the tasks of verifying a cease-fire, the repatriation of refugees, the disarming and repatriation of guerilla groups, and demining. To illustrate the wide spectrum of functions undertaken by UN missions, the following list shows some of the more common ones: provision of security, conflict mediation, humanitarian assistance, humanitarian protection, humanitarian rights observation, police training, electoral supervision, institution building, democratization, reconstruction, demining, disarmament, and reintegration of combatants. Some missions also were given the authority to carry out governmental functions during a transition period.⁴⁰

Some second-generation peacekeeping operations began as unifunctional operations but turned into complex multifunctional operations as the situation changed. For example, UNPROFOR's

initial mandate was to establish the United Nations Protected Areas in Croatia, a clear unifunctional operation. As the situation changed, the mandate was enlarged to also cover "Pink Zones" and later "No-fly Zones" and border control in Bosnia and the deployment of forces to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). This can most easily be compared with a person putting an increasing number of his fingers into holes in a dam. Soon he is over-stretched and the result is a disaster. As pointed out earlier, the reaction of the United Nations is crisis driven, and a change in mandate can have dramatic consequences for the force. This shows that with an uncertain situation and a flexible mandate, the force must be robust enough to cope with any change. The United Nations states in its "lessons learned" publication concerning mandate and means:

Mandates should be conceptualized flexibly and could include elements of peace-building and emergency reconstruction of war-torn economies. The means to do this must be provided, such as a trust fund, assessed fund, assessed contributions, a mixed peacekeeping force with strong security elements as well as a substantial engineering capacity, communications experts, etc.

Multifunctional peacekeeping has increased the complexity of every level of activity of the operations. This has moved the role of the soldiers further away from their primary task and their training. This widened gap between traditional warfighting professional skills and the demands of peace operations has

created an additional need for training. Apart from general training, there is a need for mission-specific training because of the great variety of functions put together for each operation. This leads to a key question: can a warfighter be a peacekeeper in these complex operations. The answer seems to be that the need for training is so great for both missions that there is simply not enough time to cover them both.

The function of actors

After the Cold War, cooperation between the superpowers has changed dramatically.⁴¹ While the use of the veto in the Security Council earlier hampered most of the effective actions taken by the United Nations, now cooperation between the permanent members of the Council has led to a boom in peacekeeping initiatives. The early lack of cooperation was the main reason that the United Nations had not become an effective collective security organization. With increasing cooperation between the nations within the organization in the future, there should be good hopes for positive developments in the future. At the same time, the world has also seen a stronger regionalization concerning security questions. This has also led to an increase in the number of peacemaking activities outside the UN organs⁴² (OSCE, WEU, EU, OAS, etc.) and to a consequent need for coordination and for unity of effort. In conflict management, political power will be the most important instrument. Through

unity of effort, a crisis can be contained and the involvement of third-party states reduced. It is therefore important to create a mechanism to ensure unity of effort between the organs of the United Nations and those of regional organizations.

Multifunctional missions have a greater degree of civilian, humanitarian, private sector, informal and non-UN actors in comparison to unifunctional military peacekeeping operations. The Canadian International Peacekeeping Center calls this "the new peacekeeping partnership." The different actors in a peace operation can be grouped in three main categories. First are the traditional actors, which usually can be found under the "umbrella" of the SRSG and are bound together by a command and control system. Here are military forces, civilian police, legal advisors, political advisors, press and information operations, and diplomats. The second category can be called cooperative actors and here are organizations like the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), national development agencies like the US Agency for International Development (USAID), the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and some non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The third group can be called ad hoc actors, which safeguard their independent and impartial position by playing an independent role, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and independent NGOs like

Peace Bridges International. The number of organizations willing to take part in crisis management and humanitarian aid is growing and a future challenge will be how to coordinate and synchronize their efforts to best deal with the conflict. In the center of all these actors, one has usually found the military component.⁴³ For the future, it will be important to keep the right focus. Military power has its natural limitations and must concentrate its efforts on military tasks. Coordination of the total effort must be a political task. In this new spectrum of means, the military role must be defined.

In its effort to improve the coordination of activities in the field, the United Nations has tried to establish "Interim Offices." These are regarded as an experiment in better organizing the numerous activities of the United Nations in a particular county. The hope is that they will provide timely and accurate information and act as a direct link between the United Nations and the local government.⁴⁴ This experiment has so far not achieved any results, and the need of a renewal of the UN system has been stated in the Secretary-General's 1997 Annual Report on the work of the organization, "Renewal amid Transition." Several nations have also demanded reforms of the UN system.

The phases in a peace process

Four conceptual phases can be identified in a peace process.

- Conflict prevention. This is the pre-conflict phase where preventive diplomacy and preventive deployment are some of the appropriate means.
- 2.Conflict reduction or alleviation. This occurs between the start of the conflict and any cease-fire and include conflict reduction operations like mediation, sanctions and military action, and short-term alleviation actions such as humanitarian aid and protection.
- 3.Conflict containment. This is the prevention of tensions from re-escalating, and would be undertaken from a ceasefire to any long-term peace agreement and could involve the classical long-term means of military observation and interposition.
- 4.Conflict settlement. This occurs after the peace agreement and involves the rehabilitation and reconstruction of society.

The importance of the phases is clear when it comes to picking the right means for the right course or to creating a doctrine for peace operations. UNPROFOR can again be used as an example of how difficult it is to distinguish between the different phases. When a stream of refugees from Former Yugoslavia flooded into the rest of Europe, the political pressure to "do something" became clear. Simultaneously reports of war crimes and humanitarian suffering were brought to the

outside world's attention. This caused the "CNN-factor" to become an additional driving force, and UNPROFOR was subsequently formed to safeguard the UNPAs. It is fair to say that the United Nations did not have a strategy for dealing with the conflict and that peacekeepers were deployed to the area without reference to any conflict phase. The enlargement of UNPROFOR's mandate to deploy a force to the Former Yugoslavia Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), later transformed into the UN Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP), became the first and so far the only preventive deployment in the history of the United Nations. In deciding means and ways, it is important to refer to the conflict phase in making deployment decisions.

FUTURE PEACE OPERATIONS

Lessons learned

United Nations peacekeeping operations are still based on the principles first established under the League of Nations and later developed in the post-World War II environment. During the period of traditional peacekeeping, most of the UN operations dealt with conflicts related to newly independent states.⁴⁵ Seven of the 13 traditional peacekeeping operations prior to 1988 dealt with conflicts related to the establishment of the State of Israel of which three still are running. During this period, the three fundamental principles of peacekeeping: consent,

impartiality, and non-use of force, were employed and became the philosophy of these operations. As a part of impartiality neutrality also played an important role. During the Cold War, neutrality meant that national interest in a conflict could not be linked to the troop-contributing countries. First of all this excluded the superpowers as potential troop contributors and included small countries like the Scandinavian countries (Denmark, Sweden, Finland, and Norway), Ireland, Nepal, and Ghana. Initially it also excluded imperial nations like Great Britain and France⁴⁶, but later they became some of the biggest troop contributors to peace operations. An interesting fact is that during the boom period of peace operations in 1993, France was the largest troop contributor to UN operations with a total of 6175 troops, and United Kingdom the second largest with 3756 troops.⁴⁷ The lessons learned during the time of traditional peacekeeping were mainly limited to the Middle East region.

The non-use of force meant the inter-positioning of lightly armed troops who more or less umpired a cease-fire agreement. To achieve this low-violence profile, the troops often removed heavy infantry weapons such as mortars from their inventory. Some useful gear, such as night-vision equipment, was left out as well, in order to put the troops on the same level as the conflicting parties. This non-use of force profile also meant an absence of deterrent power and therefore a further limitation of

the capabilities of the force. In the history of the United Nations, it is hard to find an example where a peacekeeping mission has been the main contributor to long-lasting peace and stability. That is because the peacekeeping force has been the main and often the only means for creating peace. The absence of another powerful means halted sustainable progress toward peace.

The new wave of intra-state conflicts that occurred after the Cold War changed the peacekeeper's environment dramatically. Suddenly the classic conflict scenario was obsolete and some new conflict characteristics appeared. An intra-state conflict is usually not only fought by regular armies, but also by militias and armed civilians with little discipline and with a diffuse command structure. Civil wars are often guerilla wars without clear front lines. They are usually difficult to mediate because the opposing parties generally exhibit "winner takes all" mentalities that make compromise difficult. This new conflict situation also suddenly makes it difficult to use traditional peacekeeping means. The difficulties of mediation mean that it is hard to start the peacemaking process and thereby create the necessary conditions for a peacekeeping operation. Starting the containment of the conflict is primarily a political and diplomatic process. This fact underlines the necessity of strengthening the political and diplomatic means available for peacemaking and peacekeeping. Even if a cease-fire agreement is

achieved, the consent of the parties is usually fragile. Both the operations in Somalia and in Bosnia have shown that there are huge gaps between strategic, operational and tactical consent. For the successful conduct of an operation, tactical consent cannot be taken as absolute. The force must have enough deterrent capability to limit the consequences of a lack or failure of tactical consent.

In civil wars the civilians are the victims and often the main targets of the warring factions. This is clearly shown by the dramatically increasing numbers of refugees and internally displaced persons during the 1990s. Another feature of civil war is the collapse of state institutions, especially the police and judiciary, with the resulting breakdown of law and order and a paralysis of the government. This means that international intervention and help must extend beyond military and humanitarian tasks and must include the promotion of effective government, roles that cannot be played by the military. A conclusion to be reached from the lessons learned from secondgeneration peacekeeping is that a rearrangement of the total peace effort is strongly needed. All of the elements of power -political, diplomatic, economic and military -- must be applied to the situation and must be balanced in time and space. As discussed earlier, humanitarian assistance also has become an important factor in conflict resolution. The humanitarian aspect

must be dealt with early in a conflict stage. As history has shown, world public opinion can force action for humanitarian reasons. In many cases a humanitarian effort will need protection and a military force must be mandated and tailored to cope with providing this protection. All this points towards a classic use of military force and a role for which the military is trained.

The future challenge

All of the unrest that has flourished since the end of the Cold War may have been a consequence of the fact that the world may have needed to go through a reconstruction phase like those that have occurred after other major wars. The current lack of tension between the great powers and the absence of the Soviet Union as a hegemonic power has given new opportunities for several new states. Richard Nixon characterized the Cold War as the real Third World War which took place without direct combat and which the Soviet Union lost because of its internal failures. The consequences for international order, however, are exactly the same as if a traditional war had been fought.⁴⁸

Today the United States remains as the only superpower and the Marxist conception of society has been defeated as have many of the ideologies that dominated the 19th and 20th centuries. Still the world continues to face a variety of threats. First there still is a potential for a destructive total war. The

nuclear capabilities of several states remains and as does the threat of the proliferation and use of weapons of mass destruction, clearly shown during the conflict with Iraq. For these reasons the democratic nations of the world must train and maintain armies to be prepared to fight major wars.

In addition, there are a variety of current threats including environmental disasters, trafficking and use of illegal drugs, massive migration of people, civil wars, and wars between states. This means that ideology and global competition are no longer the most important factors for conflict. For the short and medium term, the Southern Hemisphere and the former regions of Marxist world will be natural places for future confrontations between nations and peoples. In 1988 Richard Nixon predicted in his book "1999, Victory without War" that the third world would be the next battleground. Between the publication of that book and today, in the year 1999, 15 new second-generation peacekeeping missions have been undertaken in Africa alone compared to one mission prior to 1988. The future for these areas of unrest and instability seems to hold still more civil wars and more terrible human suffering. To cope with these inescapable problems, the international community must be prepared to act.

Conflict scenario

A potential conflict scenario can be illustrated as a graph between conflict intensity and time as shown in figure 2. The reasons for the conflict can be many and often multifaceted. Tension rises through the pre-conflict phase and reaches the level of war, shown by the horizontal small dotted line.

CONFLICT INTENSITY



Figure 2

Above this line, the conflict is in the status of war until a cease-fire, shown by the vertical line down to status of war

line. The conflict then moves in a positive direction through the post-conflict phase to stability and long-lasting peace. The different layers illustrate the different functions, or means, that a peace operation has to provide the conditions for to reach a lasting peace, the end or objective of the peace operation. These functions are only illustrative and will vary from conflict to conflict. The diagram is meant to show major relationships. First, the diagram shows that traditional peacekeeping oriented towards the monitoring of a cease-fire mainly contributes to preservation of the status quo because it normally does not apply the means necessary to change the situation. Second, it shows that second-generation peacekeeping forces that try to execute actions in some or all of the "function layers" by military means are taking on new roles for which they are not trained.

Military functions in peace operations belong to the top of the illustration. Above the "intensity-line" of war, the operation must have an enforcement mandate under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Below the "intensity line" of war the operation can have a Chapter VI mandate with the consent of the parties, but the force must be robust enough to dominate the situation and to deter disagreeing groups on the tactical level from interfering with the conditions for peace. In this way, military means are used to provide the proper environment that allows

civilian means to operate. There must be as well a strong political and diplomatic force devoted to resolving the conflict as its main objective. This effort must be coordinated with use of other means such as economic power and humanitarian relief. Military means can also, when necessary, be deployed to protect other operations like humanitarian relief, but the military force must be tailored to the situation so that it has the necessary capabilities to carry out enforcement actions, if deterrence should fail.

CONCLUSIONS

The experience gained from peace operations points to the need for coordination of all available means to achieve a longterm political settlement. This means creating a total strategy for peace operations that describes both the conditions for entry and for exit of the operation. Unity of effort is one appropriate term to characterize this strategy. In spite of all the failed UN missions, the United Nations with the Security Council and the General Assembly is the only organization able to gather all the nations of the world in consensus to become involved in and to settle conflicts. It is important to strengthen the political and diplomatic instruments available to the United Nations to ensure that all possible efforts are employed in developing a strategy on how conflicts can be

resolved.⁴⁹ From this perspective, military means are only one of several means available, and the determination at the outset on HOW military means are to be used is of absolute importance. Too often military peacekeepers have been deployed in a conflict but have only perpetuated the existing situation or not achieved anything at all. Also the objectives of traditional peacekeeping must be questioned. Monitoring a cease-fire cannot be a goal. A cease-fire is not a solution, only a certain type of status quo.

The use of military force must always be the last resort in resolving international conflicts. Peacekeeping in the traditional way by deploying a force to create a situation under which a coordinated peace effort can be conducted is still valid, but the military force must be tailored to the situation. This does not violate the proven classical principles of peacekeeping. First, non-use of force is established by a mandate based on Chapter VI of the UN Charter. By deploying a robust and correctly tailored force, deterrence is created that will stabilize the tactical situation and thereby reduce the probability that the peacekeeping force will need to use force in self defense. Second, the necessary impartiality of the force does not have any relation to its strength or capability. Impartiality is defined by the mandate but above all by leadership. By using robust peacekeeping forces, the likelihood that the force will have to use force in self-defense is

diminished as well as the possibility of accusations that the force is partial. Third, consent of the affected parties is required for the launching of a peacekeeping operation. If consent does not exist, the operation will have to enforce its goals or ends. This leads to a limitation on the use of military force in peace operations compared to what has been practiced during second-generation operations. The use of normally equipped and trained military forces in peacekeeping means that they are conducting normal military functions.

In peace operations, enforcement missions also will have limited objectives and proportional use of force. Enforcement operations will therefore contain several functions from peacekeeping.

By such a definition of the use of military force, the gap in training requirements resulting from lesson learned from secondgeneration peacekeeping should be reduced.

The consequences of this are that other agencies must get the resources enabling them to carry out the other functions in peace operations.

The political and diplomatic means in peace operations are often limited to single persons with minor staffs. It is necessary to develop this fundamentally important means to become the main "force" and coordinating body. It is in the nature of democracy that military force never can play the

leading role in resolving conflicts. It is necessary to develop a common doctrine for peace operations and to build a common understanding of it. The doctrine has to start with the nature of conflict itself. Dividing a potential conflict in preconflict, conflict, and post-conflict phases will help the process of determining ENDS, WAYS, and MEANS. Analyzing the potential and the reason for the use of violence by the parties involved is important in determining where to dominate in a conflict.

In most conflicts there will be a high degree of human suffering, which means that humanitarian relief has to be integrated in the total operation. Humanitarian relief and the control and coordination of this effort will be an important way of resolving complex emergencies.

Five major means or elements of power available to the international community in peace operations can be listed:

- Political means
- Diplomatic means
- Economic means
- Humanitarian means
- Military means

Each of these elements will play a different role in each separate phase of a conflict scenario. Therefore it is important

to identify the role of each element and to create the correct structure for it to be successful. For this, Dag Hammarskjold's statement "Peacekeeping is not a job for solders, but only a soldier can do it" has become obsolete.

The following recommendations can be listed for further improvement of peace operations:

- The international community/UN needs to develop a plan before launching a peace operation. That means that they need to agree on the ends before choosing the ways and means.
- 2. All of the means necessary to reach those ends then need to be brought to bear on the situation in a coherent and coordinated manner.
- 3. The plan must aim at establishing conditions for peace, not just monitoring or maintaining a cease-fire.
- 4. Political and diplomatic elements should be strengthened enabling them to act as the primary means.
- 5. When used, military force must be robust and generously tailored for the task.

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ENDNOTES

¹ United Nations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, available from http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/; Internet accessed 14 November 1998. ² UN Senior Management Seminar, Presentation of DPKO, New York 1997. ³ Ibid. 4 International Peacekeeping, Autumn 1998, Number 3, Volume 5, page 59. ⁵ Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW), " Military activities during peacetime and conflict that do not necessary involve armed clashes between two organized forces." ⁶ 3rd International Conference on Land Force Doctrine, Lisbon, 5-8 Mai 98, "Command and Control of Peace Support Operations." ⁷ United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, General guidelines for peacekeeping operations (New York: United Nations, 1995), 5. ⁸ Ibid., 6. 9 Ibid., 5. ¹⁰ Department of the Army, <u>Peace Operations</u>, Field Manual 100 - 23 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 30 December 1994), 4. ¹¹ UN General guidelines, 10. ¹² Ibid., 10 - 11. ¹³ Ibid., 11. ¹⁴ FM 100-23, 6-9. ¹⁵ Paul F. Diehl, International Peacekeeping (Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins University Press, 1993), 15. ¹⁶ Ibid., 27. ¹⁷ A.B. Fetherston, <u>Towards a Theory of United Nations</u> Peacekeeping (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), 16. "This aids greatly in the difficult task of creating each new peacekeeping mission on an ad hoc basis, because some experienced personnel are usually available to act as the first wave in new mission areas." ¹⁸ United Nations Department of Public Information, <u>Charter of</u> the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice (New York: United Nations, August 1995), 3. ¹⁹ Ibid., 5.

²⁰ UN General guidelines, 20. Chapter 3, paragraph 34. "Force is not the means, which it utilizes to achieve its mandate. However; peacekeepers at all times retain the right of selfdefense, in which case force may be used as a last resort. The right of self-defense ends with the threat that gave rise to it; retaliation is not self-defense." Paragraph 35. "Since 1973, the guidelines approved by the Security Council for each peace-keeping force have stipulated that self-defense is deemed to include resistance to attempts by forceful means to prevent the peacekeeping force from discharging its duties under the mandate of the Security Council. This is a broad conception of self-defense, which might be interpreted as entitling United Nations personnel to open fire in a wide variety of situations. In practice, commanders in the field have been reluctant to use their authority in this way, for well-founded reasons relating to the need for a peacekeeping operation to maintain the active cooperation of the parties to a conflict. Peacekeeping forces have gone to great lengths in order not to be drawn into cycles of attack and retaliations, which would turn them into enemies rather than peacekeepers who are above the fray."

²¹ Lecture given at UN Senior Management Seminar, New York 1997.

²² Anthony McDermott and Kjell Skjelsbaek, <u>The Multinational</u> <u>Force in Beirut, 1982-1984</u> (Miami: Florida International University Press, 1991), 34.

- ²³ Diehl, 33.
- ²⁴ FM 100-23, 1.
- ²⁵ Fetherston, 20.

²⁶ United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, <u>Multidisciplinary peacekeeping, lessons from recent experience</u> (New York: United Nations, 1997), 20.

²⁷ United Nations Department of Public Information, <u>Peacekeeping at a glance</u> (New York: United Nations, May 1997), 2. United Nation Operation in Congo (ONUC), July 1960 - June 1964.

²⁸ The Institute of Public Policy, Program on Peacekeeping Policy, "United Nations Resolution 749", 7 April 1992; available from http://www.gmu.edu/departments/t-

po/peace/resolutions/sc_res.html#: Internet; accessed 22 November 1998; paragraph 2. "Decides to authorize the earliest possible full deployment of UNPROFOR>"

²⁹ The Institute of Public Policy, Program on Peacekeeping Policy, "UNPROFOR"; available from http://ralp.gmu.edu/cfpa/peace/unprofor un.html; Internet;

accessed 22 November 1998.

³⁰ UN General guidelines, 20, paragraph 34: "The peacekeeper's right to self defense does not end with the defense of his/her

own life. It includes defending one's comrades and any person entrusted in one's care, as well as defending one's post, convoy, vehicle, or rifle. Each peacekeeping operation is expected to function as a single, integrated unit and an attack on any one of its members or subunits engages the right to selfdefense of the operation as a whole.

³¹ The Institute of Public Policy, Program on Peacekeeping Policy, "UNPROFOR"; available from http://ralph.gmu.edu/cfpa/peace/unprofor_un.html; Internet; accessed 22 November 1998.

³² UN Senior Management Seminar, New York, 1997.

³³ Diehl, 89.

³⁴ The Institute of Public Policy, Program on Peacekeeping Policy, "UNPROFOR". Internet accessed 22 November 1998.

³⁵ Seligs S. Harrison and Masashi Nishihara, <u>UN Peacekeeping</u>, <u>Japanese and American Perspective</u> (Washington, D.C.: A Carnegie Endowment Book, 1995), 19.

³⁶ 3rd International Conference on Land Force Doctrine, <u>Command and Control in Peace Support Operations</u>, Lisbon 5-8 Mai 1997.

³⁷ Fetherston, 41.

³⁸ Diehl, 85.

³⁹ UN mediator Thorvald Stoltenberg at UN Senior Management Seminar, Copenhagen 1997.

⁴⁰ United Nations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, "Lessons learned"; available from http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/; Internet accessed 14 November 1998.

⁴¹ Superpowers earlier were the United States and the Soviet Union. Here the meaning is the United States and Russia. Today the United States remains as the only superpower.

⁴² Fetherston, 24.

⁴³ J. Taylor Wentges, "Force, Function and Phase: Three Dimensions of UN Peacekeeping", <u>International Peacekeeping</u>, number 3 (Autumn 1998): 64.

⁴⁴ United Nations, <u>An Agenda for Peace, Report of the</u> Secretary-General. UN. Doc. A/47/277-S/24111.

⁴⁵ United Nations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, available from http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/; Internet accessed 14 November 1998.

⁴⁶ UNEF I's task was to monitor the withdrawal of French and British troops from Suez.

⁴⁷ Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 1993. UN Senior Management Seminar, Presentation of DPKO, New York 1997.

⁴⁸ Richard Nixon, The Real War (New York: Warner Books, 1980).

.1999, Victory Without War (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1988).

⁴⁹ Kofi A. Annan, <u>Renewal amid Transition</u> (New York: United Nations, 1997), 176. "As we approach the new century, the international community has some way to go to realize the hopes and commitments of the Charter of the United Nations but, when we measure our progress against the state of the world a century ago, we can only be impressed by how far we have come. Indeed, one of the most significant differences between that *fin de siecle* and this is precisely the fact that international organizations now exist to remind, and enable the world to do better. That is why it is our solemn and historic obligation to make the United Nations the most effective instrument possible for achievement of peace and progress – for our children, and for theirs."

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