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STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

FIELD ARTILLERY IN PEACE OPERATIONS

BY

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FIELD ARTILLERY IN PEACE OPERATIONS

by

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ii

ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Kenneth L. Pieper, LTC, United States Army

TITLE: Field Artillery in Peace Operations

FORMAT: Strategy Research Project

DATE: 20 May 1999 PAGES: 38 CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

This research project examines the use of field artillery in support of Peace Operations. Current Joint and Army doctrine for Peace Operations is examined with regard to the use of field artillery. The utility of field artillery in Peace Operations is examined through the use of the military decision making process of METT-TC -- enemy, troops available, terrain and weather, time, and civilian considerations. The end result is a decision matrix that recommends the level of field artillery deployment and employment required to support a Peace Operation, given the type of Peace Operation task required (Mission) and the characteristics of the parties to the dispute.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT iii
List of Tables vii
FIELD ARTILLERY IN PEACE OPERATIONS
METT-TC - AN ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK 2
Mission - Peace Operations 2
Enemy and Threat - Factions, Parties to the Dispute,
Belligerents or Entities 7
Troops — Field Artillery 8
Terrain and Weather 11
Time Available
Civilian Considerations 12
DECISION SUPPORT FOR FUTURE OPERATIONS
Mission
Enemy and Threat - Factions, Parties to the Dispute,
Belligerents or Entities
Decision Matrix
Force Caps and Political Considerations 22
Field Artillery in Peace Operations 24
BIBLIOGRAPHY

LIST OF TABLES

Table	1:	Peace Keeping Activities
Table	2:	Peace Enforcement Activities
Table	3:	Decision Matrix

FIELD ARTILLERY IN PEACE OPERATIONS

On 15 June 1998, Colonel Mark Kimmitt, Commander, 1st Armored Division Artillery, and Command Sergeant Major George Nelson, Command Sergeant Major, 1st Armored Division Artillery, cased the colors of the 1st Armored Division Artillery at Tuzla Base, Tuzla, Bosnia Herzegovina. 1 As the colors were cased, the cannon tubes of two howitzer batteries of the 2nd Armored Cavalry Division and Bravo Battery, 2nd Battalion, 3rd Field Artillery, "were lowered in silence signifying a major victory in the progress of peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina."2 So ended, after two and one half years, field artillery's participation in America's latest peace operation. Field artillery units of the United States Army and Marine Corps have participated in numerous Peace Operations in the past, Beirut, Somalia, and Bosnia's JOINT ENDEAVOR and JOINT GUARD. United States' field artillery units have not been called on, to provide fire support, in other Peace Operations, notably the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Haiti, and now Operation JOINT FORGE in Bosnia. To be sure, field artillerymen have participated and are participating in these operations, but not in the mode of providing cannon artillery fires in support of maneuver operations. When should cannon artillery units be deployed in support of forces engaged in Peace Operations? Through an examination of Joint and Army Doctrine, and available literature, this paper proposes a framework for making that decision.

METT-TC - AN ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK

One of the key elements of the military decision making process is the mission analysis. Given a mission, enemy, troops available, terrain and weather on and in which to "fight", time to execute and accomplish the mission, and civilian considerations, the well known METT-TC, commanders and their staffs decide who, what, where, why, and how they are going to conduct the military operations. METT-T has been around for a long time, while the "C" for civilian considerations has been added recently. The METT-TC method is really an operational or tactical construct, but one that will be useful in this analysis.

Mission - Peace Operations

A broad term that encompasses peacekeeping operations and peace enforcement operations conducted in support of diplomatic efforts to establish and maintain peace.

— Joint Pub 3-07.3

Peace Operations are a military mission and a subset of the broader term Military Operations Other than War.³ This new U.S. definition, effective on approval and publication of Joint Pub 3-07.3, <u>Joint Tactics Techniques</u>, and <u>Procedures for Peace</u>

Operations, modified the existing definition and limits the discussion here to two types of Peace Operations: peacekeeping and peace enforcement.⁴ The United States, the United Nations, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) all have similar, yet distinct, definitions for these two terms.

Regardless, any Peace Operation can fairly easily be described adequately by one of these two terms.

Peace Keeping

The United States now defines Peace Keeping in Joint Pub 3-07.3, <u>Joint Tactics</u>, <u>Techniques</u>, and <u>Procedures for Peace</u>
Operations as:

Military Operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement (cease-fire, truce, or other such agreement) and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement.⁵

The United Nations definition is much the same:

Peace-keeping is a United Nations presence in the field (normally involving military and civilian personnel), with the consent of the conflicting parties, to implement or to monitor the implementation of arrangements relating to the control of conflicts (cease-fires, separation of forces, etc.) and their resolution (partial or comprehensive settlements) or to ensure the safe delivery of humanitarian relief.

NATO has a definition for peacekeeping as well. It is not structured in the same manner as the U.S. and UN definitions, but should result in the same conditions determining that an operation be characterized as a peacekeeping operation.

Peacekeeping is the containment, moderation and/or termination of hostilities between or within States, through the medium of an impartial third party intervention, organized and directed internationally, using military forces, and civilians to complement the political process of conflict resolution and to restore and maintain peace. (Although the word "peacekeeping" is not specifically used in the UN Charter, it is normally authorized under Chapter VI).

Using these definitions, JP 3-07.3 lists several examples of UN and non-UN-sponsored peacekeeping operations in which U.S.

forces have participated. These include: the United Nations
Mission in Haiti (UNMIH), the United Nations Preventive
Deployment Force in the Former Yugoslavia Republic of Macedonia,
the Multinational Force Observers (MFO) Mission in the Sinai, and
the Multi National Force I (MNFI) in Beirut.8

Joint Pub 3-07.3 lists specific missions, tasks, or activities that may be undertaken by forces involved in a peacekeeping operation. They fall into two main categories,

Observation or Supervision and Assistance as shown in table 1.9

❖ Observation	-	Observing, monitoring, verifying, and reporting any alleged violation of the governing agreements.
	1	

- Investigating alleged cease-fire violations, boundary incidents, and complaints.
- Negotiating and mediating.
- Conducting regular liaison visits within their operational area.
- Maintaining up-to-date information on the disposition of disputing forces within their operational area.
- Verifying the storage or destruction of certain categories of military equipment specified in the relevant agreements.

Supervision and Assistance - Supervising disengagments and withdrawals. - Supervising prisoner of war exchanges. - Supervising demobilization and demilitarization. - Assisting civil authorities. - Assisting in the maintenance of law and order. - Assisting foreign humanitarian assistance

Table 1: Peace Keeping Activities

operations.

Peace Enforcement

Similarly Peace Enforcement is defined by the United States, the United Nations, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

The United States' definition:

Application of military force, or the threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order. 10

The United Nations definition:

Peace-enforcement may be needed when all other efforts fail. The authority for enforcement is provided by Chapter VII of the Charter, and includes the use of armed force to maintain or restore international peace and security in situations in which the Security Council has determined the existence of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression. It

The NATO definition closely follows the UN definition but explicitly adds the idea of possible intervention in an internal conflict:

Peace Enforcement are actions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter using military means to restore peace in an area of conflict. This can include dealing with an inter-state conflict or with internal conflict to meet a humanitarian need or where state institutions have largely collapsed. 12

The most obvious examples of peace enforcement, in recent U.S. experience, are Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR, GUARD, and FORGE in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Joint Pub 3-07.3 also lists specific missions, tasks, or activities that may be undertaken by forces involved in peace enforcement missions. They fall into four main categories: enforcement of sanctions, protection for humanitarian assistance, operations to restore order, and forcible separation of belligerent parties as shown in Table 2.¹³

*	Enforcement of Sanctions.	-	Restricting the flow of goods across international borders.
		_	Confiscating or destroying unauthorized imports and exports.
		-	Denial of movement of military forces or supplies.
		_	Enforcing air, land, or sea exclusion zones.
		_	Guaranteeing rights of movements or passage.
*	Protection for Humanitarian Assistance.		
*	Operations to Restore Order.		
*	Forcible Separation of Belligerents.		

Table 2: Peace Enforcement Activities

Enemy and Threat - Factions, Parties to the Dispute, Belligerents
or Entities

Traditional military operations key on the enemy or threat to be faced. In Peace Operations, the fundamental of impartiality14 argues against using the term enemy or threat as being too pejorative. Many terms have been used. For Operations JOINT GUARD, in Bosnia Herzegovina, the term chosen was Former Warring Factions 15. Further, 1st Armored Division and Task Force Eagle Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) precluded the use of the traditional enemy color of red for any of the factions, less someone construe that faction as "the enemy" and others an ally or friend. The Joint Task Force (JTF) Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations advocates the term "parties to the dispute."16 Regardless of what you call the other military forces involved in a peace operation, a key to the mission analysis is a specific understanding of an entire range of factors with a major emphasis on the enemy's military capability. Understanding a former warring faction in a peace operation may require a focus on understanding the political, cultural, and economic factors that affect the situation. Information collection and analysis in Peace Operations must often address unique and subtle problems not always encountered in war. 17 For the purpose of this discussion, the utility of field artillery units in Peace Operations, the primary factor in this METT-TC analysis really is the military capability of the forces involved.

In considering including field artillery units in a peace operation, the specific military capability that deserves the most attention is the presence of artillery; cannon, mortar, or rocket, in the force structure of the former warring factions.

This is particularly true in peace enforcement operations as opposed to peacekeeping operations since the likelihood of combat is much higher in a peace enforcement operation than in a peacekeeping operation.

Troops - Field Artillery

The United States has cannon artillery; 155mm towed and self-propelled, 105mm towed; Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (MLRS); mortars; 60mm, 81mm, and 120mm; as well as counter battery (Q-37) and counter mortar (Q-36) radars to use in war and peace operations.

According to Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) "the primary mission [in peace operations] is counter-fire operations." Joint Pub 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, defines counter-fire as "Fire intended to destroy or neutralize enemy weapons. (DOD) Includes counter-battery, counter-bombardment, and counter-mortar fire."

Joint Pub 3-09, <u>Doctrine for Joint Fire Support</u>, describes the joint targeting methodology as one of decide, detect, deliver, and assess. The field artillery systems listed above have the capability of executing two of the functions in the methodology - detect and deliver. United States Army Firefinder

Radars (Q36/Q37) are effective means of detecting belligerent indirect fire units that are firing.²¹ Cannon, rocket, and mortar systems have the capability of executing the deliver function of the methodology.

Other systems available to the joint force commander have the capability to execute the deliver function as well. Most obvious of these are close air support (fixed wing), AC-130 aircraft, and attack helicopters. 22 CALL describes the suppression of artillery used to harass population centers and airfields as a formidable task and one that cannot be accomplished by air power [close air support] alone. 23 Several facts make this statement true. One is that, despite advances, close air support is not The major truly an all-weather-capable day-night system. disadvantage of CAS in night and weather limited conditions is the difficulty that CAS aircrews and ground forces may have in "pinpointing targets and accurately locating both enemy and friendly positions."24 Recent events in Operation ALLIED FORCE bare out these concerns. Most newscasts and analysis of this operation include discussions of the weather and, since the bombing of the civilian convoy, the difficulty of discerning targets from high altitude at high speed. This limitation will be discussed subsequently in more detail. While, arguably, a more capable day-night system, attack helicopter operations are limited by weather, high wind, rain, and fog, in much the same

way as close air support. Field Artillery is an all-weather-capable day-night system.

Another factor is the tactics and techniques likely to be employed by any former warring faction electing to use its artillery while in a peace operation.

When faced with an air threat and counter-battery threat, belligerents will seek to protect their artillery by exploiting its high mobility (especially the mortars) and using concealment offered by terrain. Weapons may be deployed individually, rather than in batteries. Weapons may re-deploy from one camouflaged position to another after firing a few rounds. Weapons may be located in populated areas such as near schools, hospitals, or other restricted fire areas.²⁵

Counter-fire radars are the quickest and most accurate means of accurately locating a firing weapon. This targeting information can be transferred almost immediately to co-located or nearby firing units for engagement. Even if a close air support or attack helicopter asset is immediately available, the time required to transfer targeting information to that asset will likely allow the firing element time to execute its shoot-and-scoot tactic and technique.

In addition to the lethal delivery capability implied above, cannon artillery and mortar systems provide limited capability for non-lethal fires as well. This capability will be subsequently discussed in Civilian Considerations.

Cannon artillery, 155mm only, provides a capability for precision engagement with the cannon-launched guided projectile,

Copperhead. This capability will be subsequently discussed in Civilian Considerations.

Terrain and Weather

This factor has limited impact on the analysis. Certain affects of weather have been discussed previously. Other weather effects will be discussed subsequently.

Time Available

This factor has some limited value in this analysis. The effect of time during execution has been described previously.

Army units routinely train as part of a combined-arms team that includes maneuver and fire support. Battalions train routinely with their organic mortar sections. Brigades train routinely with their direct support field artillery battalion and their associated counter-battery (Q36) radar in addition to the organic mortars of the maneuver battalions. Brigade training activities often include operating with the multiple launch rocket systems of the Division Artillery. Tactics, techniques, procedures, and standard operating procedures are trained, refined, and used routinely.

While maneuver brigades and battalions, and direct support field artillery battalions often train with close air support and attack helicopter assets, this training is less frequent than the training conducted with organic or habitually associated units.

Close air and attack helicopter support provided during training exercises is not often conducted with the same units or

individuals that deploy to an operation. Peace operations are most often multi-national operations, further reducing the likelihood that the soldiers in the maneuver unit have trained with the particular close air or attack helicopter support assets or pilots. This lack of familiarity with the personalities and standard operating procedures on both sides, can't help but reduce the effectiveness and timeliness of the detect — deliver processes of the targeting methodology. These may become more effective over time, but in the initial phases of the operation these may have a significant impact.

Civilian Considerations

Civilian considerations is a fairly new addition to the, formerly METT-T, military decision making process. While new, this factor is extremely important in peace operations.

The planning factor Civilian Considerations includes cultural information and the political situation. The primary consideration here is the military, and political, concern of limiting civilian casualties and collateral damage. This is a desired outcome in war but essential in peace operations. A prime consideration is the need to minimize collateral damage to the fullest extent possible. In particular, peace enforcement operations may require combat, they are not wars and may have more restrictive Rules of Engagement (ROE) than wars. Rules of engagement specify the when, where, against whom and how force can be used.

The primary means available to reduce collateral damage, when employing lethal means, is the use of precision weapons.

Using precision weapons can minimize collateral damage and casualties. Planning and delivery of precision weapons can help the commander preclude unwanted collateral damage and avoid consequences with political ramifications that could jeopardize the operation.³⁰

Cannon artillery, 155mm only, close air support, and attack helicopters all have the capability of employing precision weapons either jointly or independently. "Both fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft platforms as well as ground-based observers can laser-designate targets for precision-guided munitions." Ground observers, aerial observers, attack helicopters, and certain close air support aircraft, all have the capability of lazing for the other's precision munitions.

Use of precision weapons reduces the weapon and/or sortie attack requirements.³² Fewer weapons are needed to achieve the same effect, reducing the likelihood of collateral damage.

Environmental factors, rain, clouds, smoke, and target type may reduce the effectiveness or utility of precision weapons.³³ Since these factors affect all systems relatively equally, there is no advantage accrued to any particular system.

Cannon field artillery and mortars have the capability of firing certain non-lethal munitions. These munitions include, smoke and illumination rounds. Attack helicopters and close air support aircraft do not have this same capability.

Non-lethal fires can be used to confuse, deceive, delay, disorganize, influence, or threaten.³⁴ Smoke or illumination may be fired to demonstrate the accuracy and capability of friendly forces to target individuals engaged in activity that must cease.³⁵ This is the non-lethal artillery equivalent of "firing across the bow" or a "warning shot." The use of smoke or illumination shells to make the "warning shot" is less likely to create unacceptable collateral damage than firing a high explosive shell.

DECISION SUPPORT FOR FUTURE OPERATIONS

The United States and its allies frequently find themselves involved in peace operations of one type or another. Having described those operations and the utility of field artillery in those missions, how should a military staff decide whether or not to assign field artillery assets to the mission?

Two factors of the military decision making process dominate the process in determining the type and size of forces required for deployment to military operations. Those two factors are the factors of Mission and Threat (Factions, Parties to the Dispute, Belligerents or Entities in this paper). Those two factors will be discussed further here. The other factors; Troops (Field Artillery), Terrain and Weather, Time Available, and Civilian Considerations have been discussed in sufficient detail above.

In the simplest form there are three decisions to be made regarding the deployment and employment of field artillery in

support of peace operations. Obviously, a decision may be made to deploy no field artillery units or personnel. Another decision may be to deploy individuals or small units without howitzers to accomplish certain specific tasks that require the special knowledge and expertise possessed by field artillery soldiers. The final case is the actual deployment of field artillery units with their full capability to provide indirect fire support. This analysis makes no effort to determine the exact size or composition of the field artillery unit to deploy when such deployment is recommended. That determination requires very specific details for the mission analysis, which are not available here in this theoretical discussion.

The ensuing discussion will recommend which field artillery deployment and employment case is appropriate for the various peace operations Missions and "Threats" described above. This analysis is depicted as a matrix having entry arguments of peace operations and "Threat" and an internal table value which recommends the level of field artillery deployment and employment required to support the peace operation.

Mission

Peacekeeping

The Peacekeeping Mission Activities for Observation described in Joint Pub 3-07.3, <u>Joint Tactics</u>, <u>Techniques</u>, and <u>Procedures</u> for Peace Operations, and listed previously in Table 1, do not, of themselves, call for the deployment or employment of field

artillery units. One task may, however, argue for the possible deployment of field artillery soldiers either as individuals or as small units without equipment. The task is that of "verifying the storage or destruction of certain categories of military equipment specified in the relevant agreements."³⁶ If the category of military equipment involved is field artillery equipment, the resident experts on all types of field artillery equipment are field artillery soldiers. These soldiers or their units should be used to verify the proper storage or destruction of the field artillery equipment. Standing alone, this factor does not support the deployment or employment of field artillery units with a firing capability. It may, however, support the deployment of small units or individuals to supervise this peacekeeping task.

The Peacekeeping Mission Activities for Supervision and Assistance described in Joint Pub 3-07.3, <u>Joint Tactics</u>, <u>Techniques</u>, and <u>Procedures for Peace Operations</u>, and listed previously in Table 1, do not, of themselves, call for the deployment or employment of field artillery units. One task, "supervising demobilization and demilitarization" of military units, may call for the deployment of small field artillery units or individuals for the same reasons as the case cited previously. Particularly if the category of units and equipment involved is field artillery.

Classical peacekeeping operations, as defined by <u>Joint</u>

<u>Tactics</u>, <u>Techniques</u>, and <u>Procedures for Peace Operations</u> don't

call for the use of field artillery units with firing capability.

They may, however, call for the use of field artillery units or individual soldiers in their role as the subject matter experts for field artillery units, systems, and equipment.

peace enforcement

The Peace Enforcement Mission Activities described in Joint Pub 3-07.3, <u>Joint Tactics</u>, <u>Techniques</u>, and <u>Procedures for Peace Operations</u>, and listed previously in Table 2 clearly provide greater opportunity for the deployment and employment of field artillery units.

The actions taken to enforce sanctions "have traditionally been considered an act of war" and commanders should posture their forces accordingly."³⁸ Specific tasks in enforcing sanctions that lend themselves to the deployment and employment of field artillery units are the denial of movement of military supplies and units and the enforcement of land exclusion zones. This is not to say that field artillery units will routinely fire to deny movement of military supplies or to exclude units and individuals from an exclusions zone. However, in the words of Colonel Greg Fontenot, Commander, 1st Brigade, 1st Armored Division, Task Force Eagle, Bosnia-Herzegovina, the movement and positioning of the artillery in Bosnia-Herzegovina would be

much the same as a Naval Battle Group patrolling just offshore, moving the guns within the Brigade, employing

them, and pointing the tubes at the FWFs' (Former Warring Factions') verification site or positions, sends a powerful message to the citizens and soldiers of all sides. There is also a tremendous psychological impact on the people and military when huge cannons and armored vehicles go thundering through small villages.³⁹

The guns "serve as an instrument to deal with those who would seek to disrupt"40 the peace process.

Clearly the most compelling need for the deployment and employment of field artillery units is when the task to separate belligerents is assigned to the military force. Since "forcible separation may involve reducing the combat capability of one or more of the belligerent parties"⁴¹, this task clearly calls for the use of a traditional combined arms team, sized appropriately to the "threat". Field artillery units, habitually associated with the unit or units conducting the forced separation, must deploy and be employed with their supported maneuver units.

Another key consideration in the mission analysis for peace enforcement is the characterization of the entry of forces — opposed or unopposed. An unopposed entry is obviously preferred, but may not always be possible. In fact, the mode of entry may not be certain until the time of execution. Task Force Eagle's entry into Bosnia for Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR was planned as a deliberate, opposed, river crossing. In the end, the crossing was not opposed but the commander needed to plan for both possibilities.

Classical peace enforcement operations, as defined by <u>Joint Tactics</u>, <u>Techniques</u>, and <u>Procedures for Peace Operations</u> clearly call for the use of field artillery units with firing capability when the task of separating belligerents is included or a forced entry into the area of operations is required. In other peace enforcement missions, field artillery units may be required based on the disposition and capabilities of the parties to the dispute. Maneuver commanders may also find field artillery units useful, as employed by Task Force Eagle in Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR.

Enemy and Threat - Factions, Parties to the Dispute, Belligerents or Entities

For peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions, the capabilities and disposition of forces are the most important considerations in determining what force to deploy to the operation.

Capabilities

For this discussion we'll consider two cases of force capability. As was the case in Bosnia, the Parties to the Dispute (or Former Warring Factions) may have a significant military force in terms of capability and numbers of systems and units. The force structure, in Bosnia, included tanks, infantry, artillery, and mortars. Such a force poses a significant threat if turned against the peacekeepers or peace enforcers. The other case is the case of a lightly armed force or guerilla-type force

with little or no heavy weapons beyond a few mortars. This type of force poses a much different threat to friendly forces.

The heavy-force case argues strongly for the deployment of a combined arms team including appropriate field artillery units.

The force deployed to a peace operation must be able to respond and over-match the full capability of the parties to the dispute.

The guerilla-force case may allow the deployment of less than a full combined arms force. Field artillery units may not serve a useful purpose in this environment and the maneuver commander may rightfully opt to deploy greater numbers of lighter forces to accomplish his mission. It is a risk-assessment, balancing mission risk versus force protection.

Disposition of Forces

The disposition, on the ground, of the forces of the parties to the dispute is also a major consideration, particularly for the heavy-force case.

If the forces of the parties to the dispute are deployed in battle formations, or presently engaged in combat, the deployment of a full combined arms team is the obvious solution.

If the forces of the parties to the dispute are not deployed in battle formations, not engaged in combat, or have re-deployed to garrison locations, the need for the full combined arms team capability may be reduced. This may allow the maneuver commander to substitute more peace-enforcers either infantry or military police, for field artillery units. It is again a risk-

assessment, balancing mission risk versus requirements for force protection.

Decision Matrix

For simplicity, the forgoing can be reduced to a simple decision matrix, which recommends for or against the deployment of field artillery units to peace operations. The matrix, Table 3, has the missions and tasks measured against threat. For the mission, the two types of peace operations, peace keeping and peace enforcement are listed. Under these missions are specific tasks as described above. For the threat, heavy and guerilla forces are shown along with the characteristic of deployed in battle formations or in garrison locations. Given a mission type or task and a threat characterization, the decision matrix can be read to determine whether the deployment or employment of field artillery units to the peace operation is recommended based on this first level of analysis.

	Heavy	-Force	Guerilla-Force	
	Deployed	Garrison	Deployed	Garrison
Peace Keeping Missions				
Verifying the storage or destruction of field artillery equipment.	Soldiers or small units	Soldiers or small units	Soldiers or small units	Soldiers or small units
All other tasks.	None	None	None	None
Peace Enforcement Missions				
Separating belligerents.	Units	N/A	Units Likely	N/A
Forcible entry.	Units	N/A	Units	N/A
All other tasks.	Units	Units Likely	Units Likely	Units Unlikely

Table 3: Decision Matrix

Force Caps and Political Considerations

The foregoing discussion lays out the traditional method of determining the forces required to accomplish a given military mission. More so than in war, political decisions dominate this military decision making process, affecting all aspects of the military mission. The JTF Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations cites our deployment to Somalia as a case where political considerations caused the deployment of a force that was smaller than that determined by the military decision making process. "The size of the force preparing for deployment to

Somalia was artificially capped at 10,200. This was not based on mission analysis, but on political decisions."44

Operations JOINT ENDEAVOR, GUARD, and FORGE have been limited by "force caps" as well. Force caps have driven the downsizing of the U.S. forces in Bosnia from the initial 15,000 to today's 5,000 as much as has the change in the military situation.

Today's discussion of the possible deployment of ground troops to Kosovo brings similar discussions and limitations. "One NATO staff study reportedly estimates that 150,000 to 200,000 troops would be needed to stabilize the region." Troops strengths of 300,000 have been bantered about by various sources. But at the same time, political leaders in the United States who support the use of ground troops are calling for the deployment of 100,000 ground troops. The politicians and news media generally avoid discussions of the types of troop formations that would be deployed, dealing instead with these easy to remember round numbers.

The danger is the pre-mature issuance of a troop cap "number" that later serves to bound the military decision maker in his military decision making process, thereby reducing his flexibility in meeting his mission requirements. It seems that field artillery units may be a tempting target for reduction when trying to squeeze under these caps. Field artillery units provide a capability that the commander is likely to need to accomplish his peace operation mission.

Regardless, the military planner owes the political decision-maker with his best estimate of the requirement to meet his assigned mission. In our constitutional system of government the political leaders must make the ultimate decision. That decision may or may not meet all of the perceived requirements of the military planning staff.

Field Artillery in Peace Operations

In the final analysis, field artillery has great utility in supporting peace operations. This is particularly true in peace enforcement operations where there is some likelihood of hostile activity on the part of the parties to the dispute. Field artillery provides an all-weather, day-night capability that is not always resident in close air support or attack helicopter capabilities.

Given this utility, it is possible to generalize situations in which it is appropriate to deploy and employ field artillery soldiers or units in support of peace operations. The matrix provided previously does just that at the most basic level without attempting to determine the exact size or composition of the field artillery units involved. That determination requires more careful consideration of the factors of METT-TC with very specific details not available in the general case. What the matrix does is provide policy level decision-makers with a first order recommendation that would need to be judged further based on detailed political and military considerations.

Word Count = 5002

ENDNOTES

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 - ² ibid.
- ³ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, <u>Joint Tactics</u>, <u>Techniques</u>, and <u>Procedures (JTTP) for Peace Operations</u>, Joint Pub 3-07.3.

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 - ⁵ ibid.
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