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POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

SPEECHES ON PARTY HISTORY
BY DENG LIQUN

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SPEECHES ON PARTY HISTORY BY DENG LIQUN

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[Comments by Deng Liqun [6772 0500 5028] in Speeches given on 30 Jul 81 at a Conference to study 'The Resolution on Some Historical Questions in the Party Since the Founding of the PRC,' and 11-12 Aug 81 at a National Working Session for Collection of Historical Materials on Party History Symposium Commemorating the 60th Anniversary of the Establishment of the CPC]

[Text] (The questions and answers in this portion were prepared from a recorded speech by Comrade Deng Liqun on 30 July 1981 in Hebei Province as a direct organizational communication at a conference to study the "Resolution.")

In discussing the "Resolution" you have brought up a few questions, some of which, as with the question of the International Communist Movement, I cannot answer, but can only take them back with me and request relevant departments to study them. Of the questions that I can answer today, there are even those that I have not fully comprehended, and can only discuss my own views for you to consider. I ask that you not be polite in pointing out where I am wrong so that we may be critical. I will now answer the chief points that you have raised more or less in the sequence of the "Resolution."

The first question is that in Section two it says merely to oppose imperialism and to oppose feudalism. Why does it not say to oppose bureaucratic capitalism?

This was written this way because of the original features of history. In the early period of our party's existence, mostly after the Second National Congress, the proclamations of the CPC Central Committee on the current political situation put forward the task of opposing imperialism and feudalism for the first time in Chinese history. Therefore, the other bourgeois and petty bourgeoisie factions neither had nor could they find a path to the nation and the people. It was only the CPC that could point out to people that the way out lay in a thorough overthrow of imperialist and feudalist reactionary government. Sun Yat-sen worked hard at the Chinese revolution for forty years, but in the period before cooperation with the CPC, even before the May 4 Movement, he had proposed a distinct platform: "Drive out the Tartar

oppression, take back China." This so-called Tartar oppression was the Qing dynasty. With the success of the May 4 Movement the anti-Manchu task was complete, and therefore the unified line organized in opposition to the Qing dynasty: "In revolution armies arise, in revolution factions die out" fell apart. Later, he once again set up a "Chinese Revolutionary Party," with the call "this party has as its purpose the sweeping out of autocratic government and the establishment of a true republic." But this party was a secret organization, separate from the masses, and it relied upon a minority of progressives to take on military struggle and had something of the smell of military opportunism. In Guangdong he was several times put into extremely awkward positions by the likes of Chen Jiongming, afterwards running off to Shanghai. After the establishment of the CPC, he espoused opposition to imperialism and feudalism.

Opposition to imperialism is a struggle for a people's independence, and opposition to feudalism is a fight for democracy and elimination of feudal land rights. The slogan for action at that time called for opposition to big powers and opposition to warlordism. Big powers are imperialism and warlordism is the political representative of feudalism.

Bureaucratic capitalism is a scientific concept, proposed after our Party underwent a gradual process of awareness. Comrade Mao Zedong very clearly indicated in his "The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party" that China's bourgeoisie was of two groups, one being a national bourgeoisie and the other a comprador bourgeoisie, that comprador bourgeoisie belonging to any imperialism. By the time of "Discussions on the New Democracy," this comprador bourgeoisie had become known as the big bourgeoisie. That faction represented by Wang Jingwei had already surrendered to Japanese imperialism during the War of Resistance to Japan, and the English-American faction was carrying out a two faced policy. "On A Joint Government" went on further to point out that the chief ruling group in the Nationalist Party represented big landlords, big bankers, and the stratum of big compradors. By the end of 1947 in "The Current Situation and Our Task" he pointed out that what China's new democratic revolution needed to eradicate was feudalism and monopoly capitalism, the landlord class, and the bureaucratic bourgeois (the big bourgeoisie). The first clear mention of this concept of the bureaucratic bourgeois was in "Lectures at a Jinsui Cadre Forum." This time he thoroughly and accurately determined that China's new democratic revolution was not any other revolution, that it could only be and must be a revolution guided by the proletariat, the masses, opposing imperialism, feudalism, and bureaucratic capitalism. The 29th Section of the "Resolution" discusses the theories of Mao Zedong's thought regarding the new democratic revolution, where it regards imperialism, feudalism, and bureaucratic capitalism as targets of the revolution. This manner of description is very scientific.

This point explains also that things in themselves have a process of development, and our understanding also has a process of development. The Chinese people were oppressed by feudalism for several thousand years, and having undergone countless struggles, are able to recognize feudalism rather easily. Past peasant uprisings have also clearly reflected that understanding. We have provided their true scientific explanation. When our Party was established imperialism had already exploited, oppressed, and

encroached upon us for nearly 80 years. Bureaucratic capitalism itself has a process of development. According to those comrades who have studied China's modern economic history, it could be said that the military activities carried out by Li Hongzhang and Zhang Zhitong at the end of the Qing dynasty were the seeds of bureaucratic capitalism. By the time of the Beiyang warlords it had developed past that of the Qing. The ascendancy of Chiang Kai-shek depended upon the wealthy warlords of Jiangsu and Zhejiang, and after his rise they gradually merged with that bureaucratic capitalism from the time of the Beiyang warlords (naturally there were internal struggles). During the War of Resistance Against Japan, the Nationalist Party carried out policies of economic control, and what is called bureaucratic enterprise increasingly swelled. One great expansion was after Japanese investment when the Nationalist Party expropriated German, Italian, and Japanese investments in China, all of which became its bureaucratic enterprise, and bureaucratic capital reached to a very high degree in Chinese history. During the War of Liberation, American imperialism gave it another infusion. It finally became the state we all remember of the four clans, Jiang, Song, Kong, and Chen. From its inception through its development to its end, the laws and characteristics of bureaucratic capitalism gradually showed themselves, and our understanding can only gradually take them in. Only when our understanding has cleared will this revolution approach success.

The second question is, the "Resolution" just writes about the contributions of Comrade Mao Zedong after 1927; why does it not mention contributions before 1927?

Primarily this is because looking back to 1928 is a simple review, it is not part of Party history. If one is to write Party history, contributions before 1927 ought also to be considered. Based on the material of which we already are aware, there are many important points before 1927 on which the advocacy and actual practice of Comrade Mao Zedong were all correct. But at that time he did not have a position of leadership in the central committee, and after proposal to the central committee, some very good ideas of his were overruled by Chen Duxiu and the like. Therefore, even if Comrade Mao's leadership work and the area of his leadership were usually successful, from the point of view of the entire central leadership, he did not yet play a decisive role. We could take an example. After the establishment of the Party, there was a divergence of opinion on whether or not there was to be a worker's movement. Comrade Mao Zedong advocated a worker's movement, and moreover was quite successful in Changsha and Anyuan. On the first occasion of cooperation between the Communist and Nationalist parties, Zhang Guotao [1728 0948 3614] and his group were opposed, while Comrade Mao was resolutely in favor. In Guangdong, Chiang Kai-shek had stirred up the Zhongshanlian affair, using that affair to attack the Communist Party, saying that the Communist Party was going to carry out armed rebellion. How could anyone have known of this plot of Chiang Kai-shek when at the time there was division even within the party. Chen Duxiu and his faction advocated accommodation and concession, while Comrade Mao and other comrades pushed striking back. Chen Duxiu and his group did not accept this idea. Then, the Nationalist Party and Chiang Kai-shek worked up a plan to reorder the party, to drive out Party members from the Nationalist Party and from the military. In the local party organizations they wanted to give name lists of Party members to the Nationalist Party and

to restrict Communist committee members in the central committee of the Nationalist Party. This was obviously squeezing out the Communist Party, attacking them, and weakening them. At this time there were two opinions within the Party. Comrades Mao and Zhou Enlai were resolutely for resisting, and stoutly advocated striking back. Chen Duxiu still argued for concession and for accepting this proposal. From then on, Chiang Kai-shek usurped the party, political, and military authority within the Nationalist Party, even officially assuming the position of commander-in-chief of the National Revolutionary Army. As for carrying out a peasant movement, everyone can look at "An Analysis of Each Class in Chinese Society" and "An Investigative Report on the Hunan Peasant Movement." Before writing the "Report on Hunan" Chen Duxiu still regarded Comrade Mao Zedong rather highly, but when he had seen the "Investigative Report on the Hunan Peasant Movement" he split from Comrade Mao.

Here I will talk a little about a relevant question. Some comrades say that since the "Resolution" cites some important works of Comrade Mao Zedong, is that to say that those that it does not cite are flawed? That is not the intention. The "Resolution" was only able to cite the most important, those that are representative. Does the "Resolution" not say something about this? Mao Zedong Thought is an integration of correct theoretical principles and experience regarding the Chinese revolution as proven by actual experience. When the first four volumes of "Selected Works of Mao Zedong" were published, each article was revised and supplemented based upon an examination of actual practice. Comrade Mao did this work himself, revising all those places where an examination of actual practice proved it imperfect or inaccurate, or even where particular places were in error. This is called adhering to reality and correcting mistakes. Therefore, one cannot study only the important works cited in the "Resolution," but must at the same time study other works. In the future when we prepare the second edition of the "Selected Works of Mao Zedong" there will be added a few articles, telegrams, and letters that could and even should be added. As for the fifth volume, it was poorly edited and will be redone. Some things that ought to be removed will be taken out; some things that ought to be included will be added.

The third question is, what is meant by the transformation from a new democracy to socialism discussed in the "Resolution"? Was this a change within the socialist system or a revolutionary transformation?

I ought to say beforehand that the establishment of the People's Republic of China brought to an end semi-colonial, semi-feudal history, and overturned the semi-colonial, semi-feudalistic society. From this a new democratic socialist system was established. With the establishment of the People's Republic of China, Chinese society entered a new historical period, and the national political power was a political power with a new democratic character and the common program implemented was a program with a new democratic nature. Even if at this time land reform had not been completed, nevertheless, from the point of view of society at large our history of semi-colonialism and semi-feudalism had been brought to a close, and the history of a new democratic society had already begun. Therefore, the transformation spoken of in the "Resolution" ought to be said to have been a transformation from a new democratic society to a socialist society. Of course this transformation came

about through revolution. Most important in the early stage was to complete those tasks not completed by the new democratic revolution, since it was only after 1953 that we began a full scale socialist reformation and carried out the socialist revolution. We cannot set the socialist transformation against that of the revolutionary because this kind of transformation of social system has been realized through revolution. And this revolution is not the same as the revolution before the establishment of the PRC because it has been undertaken by our Party and by our national authority through mutual cooperation from top to bottom, and from bottom to top. This is to complete those tasks not completed by the democratic revolution, to complete the task of the reformation of a society with private means of production, and is undertaken with guidance, in a measured way, and smoothly.

The fourth question is that the "Resolution" only speaks of the faults of the people's commune movement. Should communization be affirmed or condemned? How ought this be understood?

When in the 17th Section of the "Resolution" it speaks of the people's commune movement as forming "five winds," and that afterwards Comrade Mao Zedong and leaders in the Party Central Committee and the Party at large corrected the errors they had already found through observance. Actually, this is talking about the sixty items of the people's communes and similar measures. The 26th Section discusses how after the 3rd Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee the Party diligently remedied the faults in rural work since the later period of the cooperative transformation of agriculture. It mentions an eight point policy, and discusses improving the prices of farm produce and sideline products, promoting all forms of responsibility systems to link planned output with remuneration, restoring village country fair trade, restoring and appropriately expanding private plots, developing village sidelines and various kinds of management, etc., all of which will gradually perfect and restructure the shortcomings and errors within our people's commune system. In a policy item in the 35th Section it also speaks of an idea of fundamental policy, which is that the transformation and perfection of production relations must suit the state of production forces and be of benefit to the development of production. It also discusses relevant questions about the state run economy and collective economy as well as the individual economy of workers. Of course, these belong to stipulations of principle. If we were to say that there are still problems in the cooperative transformation that we have not brought up, one of the most important would be the integration of government administration with commune management. There are still differing opinions within the Party on this question. Some local comrades and some comrades who do theoretical work say that the integration of government administration with commune management must be changed. If not it will be detrimental to our current economic development, production development, and the carrying out of all kinds of work, and will especially be an obstacle to rural work. As to how to restructure, some provinces are already conducting experiments. Within a few counties in Sichuan Province there is no integration of government with commune. Comrades in Heilongjiang are not of the same opinion, and say that in their region government and commune integration is extremely suitable and do not approve of its abolition. What is more, in many places that promoted the responsibility system production developed, as did division of labor, and an alliance with a

voluntary economy has already appeared. How this emergence of voluntary alliances will be managed in the future will require our pooling of experiences. Because there are still differing opinions and because there are all sorts of different situations, the "Resolution" did not give an affirmative answer, nor did it say that government and commune integration is bad or good. It has been left to everyone to investigate in actual experience, only after which can we pool our experiences and gradually resolve this kind of question.

Also, some foreign comrades, some people from friendly foreign countries, have expressed an appreciation of our people's commune system. There is certainly a reason for this, namely that in the past our propaganda about the people's commune system did not greatly accord with reality, and they were influenced by this propaganda. One of those who came to China to investigate is named (Ma-ke Si-wei-er). At the time of the border incident between China and India he wrote a book using abundant evidence to prove that Nehru was incorrect and China within its rights, and proved that the McMahon line was forced upon the local government, but was not signed. Therefore justice in the China India border incident belonged to China. After the "Gang of Four" was broken up he visited China on two occasions. He said that before coming to China he had visited the villages of India, and that this time when he went to visit Chinese villages he felt that in comparison with those of India the people's commune system of China was a heavenly palace. He really admired this system. He expressed dismay when we stressed allocation according to work done and when we maintained that a portion of the people become well off first. No matter how we explained he would shake his head, keeping this up until Comrade Deng Xiaoping broke into laughter, still continuing to argue. At the conclusion of the argument he said he wanted to see more. Other foreigners have said that our people's commune is a vigorous social organization that can contain all sorts of things and that can adapt to all sorts of conditions. I give these evaluations to you for reference. In summary, we want to gradually resolve this problem. We have solved many problems of this type, but some problems must be gradually resolved through actual practice, and, what is more, we ought to allow different areas and different conditions to use different methods.

The fifth question concerns the socialist education movement.

The "Resolution" does not have much to say about the socialist education movement, but if one reads closely one can see that the major questions about it are raised. I ask you to be aware of the sentence from Section 17 that says, "In the last half of 1964 many lower level cadre were wrongfully attacked." This is a criticism of Comrade Liu Shaoqi, albeit without mentioning his name. At the 10th Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee, Comrade Mao Zedong once again brought up class struggle, but said not to disrupt economic readjustments. However, he himself did not pay much attention to economic readjustments, and concentrated on carrying out class struggle, encouraging all areas to set up experiments. By May of 1963 he had worked up the so-called "first ten items." The calculations of these "first ten items" regarding the state of class struggle in the villages were quite severe and overdone. With the passage of the "first ten items" Comrade Shaoqi wanted comrade Wang Guangmei to go to Taoyuan in Hebei to set up an experimental station, and then went on to make up the "latter ten items." As it was, Comrade Mao Zedong had already been quite severe in his estimate of the class struggle situation in villages, but after the experiences of the Taoyuan experimental station Comrade Shaoqi was even more severe in his estimate of the situation for class struggle in the villages. He saw the villages that had undergone socialist reconstruction simply as places where you could only work in secret, conspiring one with each other, unable to be openly active; and as for the base level cadre, the work groups should remove them to one side as soon as they entered the village. Propaganda from the Taoyuan experience was certainly a major stimulus to the socialist education. Comrade Mao Zedong was later to say, I talked for two years and no one would listen, and with Comrade Shaoqi in charge the whole country was propelled forward. But because the estimate of the rural condition was not in accordance with reality, there arose the problem of the broad and serious attack on rural base level cadre. The "twenty three items" were personally sponsored and drawn up by Comrade Mao Zedong and played a positive role in this excessively broad, excessively serious problem. But although for the problem of his assessment of the rural situation he was better than the assessment of Comrade Shaoqi, and even criticized the assessment of Comrade Shaoqi, in fact there was no fundamental change. The saying at the time was "we have [only] two thirds of the country," which meant that two-thirds of the lower level units remained in our control but one-third of the leadership authority was taken away by others. Moreover, within the "23 items" it was mentioned that the thrust of the movement was to rectify the group in authority that was traveling the path of capitalism. Comrade Mao Zedong and Comrade Shaoqi had a conversation during a meeting. Comrade Mao said over and over again that the groups in rural authority that were traveling the path of capitalism had already been made apparent and that the focus of the movement was to rectify them. Comrade Shaoqi neither disagreed nor agreed, neither once, twice, nor three times did he indicate either opposition or approval. What was it he said? That the conditions in the villages were complex, that all sorts of contradictions overlapped, contradictions between ourselves and the enemy overlapped with contradictions within the people themselves, which needed specific analysis. You might say that each was talking about the other. When the "23 items" were passed Comrade Shaoqi had to express agreement. At this meeting Comrade Zhou Enlai played an important role. When

it was said that there were backers of every class traveling the capitalist road, the original draft said that there were also backers in the Central Committee. Comrade Zhou Enlai said, to say that there are backers everywhere in the Central Committee, hasn't this question gotten a little out of hand? And it was changed to read that there were backers in every department. Comrade Shaoqi said, Rao Shushi [7437 3359 4258] was a capitalist roader, and in the past I promoted him and put him in important positions. Am I then a backer of Rao Shushi? The atmosphere at the meeting became rather tense.

The sixth question is, what after all was the "February Mutiny?"

I was in isolation at that time and am not clear about actual conditions. In the spring of 1969 I was released and heard it said from top to bottom that the "February Mutiny" was a completely false case, without any basis at all, and with no indication at all. Now it is even clearer that it was solely a case fabricated and concocted to frame Comrade He Long [6320 7893].

The seventh question is why did the "Resolution" not mention the name of Chen Boda [7115 0130 6671]?

This question was also raised at the recent Central Committee discussion. The reason that the Central Committee decided to not mention his name is because we wanted to link the "Resolution" with the trial of the ten major criminals. There were more than ten people tried this time, of whom the court verdict regarding eight said that they had organized a counterrevolutionary group, and that Chen Boda and Jiang Tengjiao [3068 7506 5754] actively participated in counterrevolutionary activity, it did not say that they were members of a counterrevolutionary group. The "Resolution" mentions only the names of those officially judged to have been members who organized counterrevolutionary groups. At that time Chen Boda did many bad things; he was the group leader of a Cultural Revolution group. But many of the biggest and most serious problems certainly did not emanate from Chen Boda, but rather from Lin Biao-Jiang Qing, Kang Sheng, and Zhang Chunqiao. Besides, the Central Committee has also taken into consideration the situation that before the Cultural Revolution Chen Boda drafted some documents for the Central Committee, that after revision by discussion in the Central Committee were officially promulgated, and one section of which has been proven to be still correct. For example, in the first mutual aid and cooperation resolution, which was personally supported by Comrade Mao Zedong and prepared under the responsibility of Chen Boda, this resolution can still be seen to be a good one.

The eighth question is what was "You take care of things and I'll rest easy" all about?

In June of 1976, which was just at the time of the "prevalent attitude of criticizing Deng, striking back at Right-deviationists, and overturning the verdicts," after Comrade Mao Zedong had received foreign guests, Comrade Hua Guofeng reported to him about problems in some provinces. At that time he was still able to hear and able to write, but his speech was not too clear. After he had heard the report he then wrote for Comrade Hua Guofeng these few words: "You take care of things, I'll rest easy." This was a particular idea written

in response to a particular problem and meant, I am comfortable with the way you have handled this, or, I agree, and definitely did not touch upon, even at this time, the question whether he should be taking over in the future. Before the "Gang of Four" had been broken up, Comrade Hua Guofeng never did show these six characters to any comrade in the Central Committee. He brought it out after the break up of the "Gang of Four," and reproduced it, distributing it to all departments under the Party's Central Committee and the State Council and some local areas, and connected this thing to his succession to the position and duties of Chairman that had been Comrade Mao Zedong's. When he reproduced this thing he did not explain under what circumstances it was written.

Some comrades have said, can't it be said that "both are right" is a new version of the "Gang of Four's" "act according to already established policy"? I feel that the connection should not be forced. The "Gang of Four" was a counterrevolutionary group and they changed Comrade Mao Zedong's "Act according to policies of the past" into "act according to already established policy," and went on to say that it was the last will and testament of Comrade Mao Zedong. It fit into their plans and was for their goal of a counterrevolutionary usurpation. Comrade Hua Guofeng is still one of us and should still practice the policies discussed in the "Resolution." The question of one's own comrades are serious enough, but we want to strictly distinguish them from the questions that we want to ask counterrevolutionary elements. At last year's enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau some comrades said, Comrade Hua Guofeng, at that time when you said that the "Gang of Four" had revised and changed three characters of the six of Chairman Mao, you saying "Act according to past policies," they saying "Act according to established policy," this problem resulted in such great divisions and of such a serious nature, but at that time everyone listened and listened, articles were written again and again, but it could not be clearly seen what after all the big difference in policy was.

The ninth question regards the appraisal from those abroad of the "Resolution" that the criticism of the Sixth Plenary Session of the CPC toward the mistakes of Chairman Mao was severe, but that understanding was sincere.

This evaluation may stand. As for the understanding, it refers to when we were criticizing the serious mistakes of Comrade Mao Zedong we recognized at the same time his achievements. His achievements and contributions that we cited were all real, not forced, and that is why it was sincere. Some comrades said that, since we promoted "one divides into two," couldn't the "Cultural Revolution" be considered one dividing into two? It would appear that the current "Resolution" does not consider it so. Were we to understand it this way I would consider that unfitting and not in keeping with the intention of the "Resolution." We are very realistic about our analysis of the "Cultural Revolution" and that analysis is also "one dividing into two." There are several levels involved here.

One is to strictly distinguish the serious errors of Comrade Mao Zedong from the criminal conduct of the Lin Biao-Jiang Qing counterrevolutionary clique. These are all things that happened during the "Cultural Revolution." And, they are one dividing into two. When we distinguish strictly this is also

clearly expressed in writing. This internal turmoil was internal disorder wrongfully instigated by the leadership and made use of by the counterrevolutionary clique, which brought serious tragedy to the Party, the country, and to all sorts of people. That sentence is also an instance of one dividing into two. When some comrades have said, cannot the revision, utilization, fabrication, and misrepresentation of the works and thought of Comrade Mao by the Lin Biao-Jiang Qing counterrevolutionary clique be summed up, and this opinion is of course correct. But we have had this summation for a long time now. I ask you to look at the speech of Teacher Ye [Jianying] on the thirtieth anniversary of National Day where he spoke very clearly about how the Lin Biao-Jiang Qing clique utilized the works of Comrade Mao Zedong and how they misrepresented them, how they utilized his errors and pushed them to extremes to become an extreme leftist line. There is a section in Teacher Ye's report, "A Decisive Battle to Determine the Nation's Fate," which discusses just this question. Let me say something here to that, that Teacher Ye's lecture ought to be considered as an important preparation to the current "Resolution." Much of the wording and many of the conclusions in the "Resolution" were taken from Teacher Ye's speech or are improvements based upon his lecture, being thus even more precise.

Secondly, is to have distinguished the serious errors from the contributions of Comrade Mao Zedong during the "Cultural Revolution."

Thirdly, is that at the time we criticize the serious errors of Comrade Mao Zedong we clarify that his errors were chiefly due to errors in understanding, and are unlike the errors of those unprincipled, base people, but are the errors committed by a great proletariat revolutionary. By these so-called errors of understanding we mean, that objectively speaking there were certain problems, which at that time Comrade Mao Zedong exaggerated, exaggerating partial problems into complete ones, exaggerating apparent things into real things. Before the "Cultural Revolution," no one can deny that there existed collectively in the Party and in the state certain darker aspects. Comrade Mao Zedong saw these darker aspects, but the conclusions he drew and the analysis he made made the partial and individual into the whole and general. Of course these darker aspects need an appropriate analysis, as well as use of appropriate correct measures from the constitution, laws, and Party regulations for resolution, but we should definitely not adopt the theories and methods of the "Cultural Revolution." We here admit that Comrade Mao Zedong instigated the "Cultural Revolution," certainly because he saw certain darker aspects within our Party and within the country, and wanted to solve these problems, and this way of thinking, this kind of stimulus were good ones. But the policies that were used were completely in error. Actual practice has shown, after ten years of the "Cultural Revolution," that the darker aspects within our Party and country have not been reduced as compared with before the "Cultural Revolution," but rather have expanded. This proves that he did see certain darker aspects but that his analysis was incorrect, his policies were incorrect, and as a result, not only could he not solve the problems he saw, but it brought out problems that he had not accounted for and that we also had not imagined. The result is that the consequences will require a great deal of time before they can be eradicated. When Section 22 of the "Resolution" says that the errors of Comrade Mao Zedong were those committed by a great proletariat revolutionary it says: Comrade Mao Zedong was

normally concerned with overcoming the existing deficiencies within the Party and in the life of the nation. This affirms that he was always hoping to overcome those deficiencies within the Party and the country. But in his later years he was not only unable to correctly analyze many problems, but during the "Cultural Revolution" confused right and wrong, and who was the enemy. To say this is also making two from one. Some comrades are suspicious of the term "tragedy." Surely, when we criticized Stalin, as in "On the Historical Experience of a Proletariat Dictatorship" and "Once Again On the Historical Experience of a Proletariat Dictatorship" we used that kind of wording. In the ranks of international communism, among fair-minded people, they all said that this kind of wording in reference to Stalin was extremely to the point. What is meant is that although Stalin made serious errors, while he was doing so he felt that he was being loyal to Marxism, that he was strengthening proletarian authority, and that he was for the benefit of the Soviet people. This was the tragedy of Stalin. This and the criticism of Stalin by Khrushchev are two completely different attitudes. We adopted a forgiving, sympathetic attitude and he took an antagonistic attitude. As for this word, 'tragedy,' some comrades are possibly not comfortable with it. Actually, its applicability here is quite far reaching. We need to ask literary people to explain it. It is said that those tragedies in the history of literature that are the best, that most elicit the audience's sympathy, and that are in greatest circulation, are primarily the tragic results of a good person in error. When bad people make mistakes and in the end suffer crushing defeats, this is not called tragedy.

The tenth question concerns class struggle and principal contradictions.

In his government work report at the First Session of the Fifth National People's Conference, Comrade Hua Guofeng had these two passages on class struggle and principal contradictions: "The overall tasks of our people at the time of new development in the socialist revolution and socialist construction is to resolve to thoroughly implement the line of the 11th Party Congress of the CPC, to maintain the continuing revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat, to engage in the development of the three great revolutionary movements of class struggle, production struggle, and scientific experiment, to establish China within this century as a great modern socialist power in agriculture, industry, defense, and science and technology." "If we want to quickly realize the four socialist modernizations we must persist in the consideration of class struggle as the key link and persist in the struggle of the proletariat with the capitalists. We will keep firmly in mind the teachings of Chairman Mao and be fully conscious that throughout this period of history there will be a struggle between classes and a struggle between the two roads of socialism and capitalism, and will fully realize the longevity and complexity of these struggles. We must be good at accurately handling problems of class, of class contradictions, and of class struggle, we must correctly handle contradictions between ourselves and the enemy and internal contradictions, must continue to restructure superstructures not suited to the economic base, must continue to restructure production relations not suited to the development of production forces, must participate in undertaking socialist education, and combat and prevent revisionism. We must persist in the policies of 'grasp revolution, promote production, promote work, promote strategy,' and take hold of together the three great revolutionary movements

of class struggle, production struggle, and scientific experiment." Chief among what I ask you to be especially aware of in this are the lines saying that to put into practice the four socialist modernizations we must hold to class struggle as the key link, and hold to the struggle between the proletariat and the capitalists.

The Third Plenary Session was a great turning point in history. What do I mean by this? There is a very full description in the "Resolution." I will just say a little here, and that about the conditions of China's domestic class struggles and the conditions concerning principal contradictions. The analysis represented by Comrade Hua Guofeng before the Third Plenary Session and the analysis by the Party Central Committee after the Third Plenary Session differ sharply. One could even say, if we are going to talk about turning points, the recognition, observation, and even transformation of policy because of this was an important subject of the Third Plenary Session. The Third Plenary Session determined the Marxist ideological front, it broke up ideological ossification, advocated emancipation of thinking, opened minds, sought the truth, and united as one to look forward. The Central Committee requested investigation of new conditions under the guidance of this ideological front to solve new problems. The Third Plenary Session itself resolved many new questions, and after the Third Plenary Session we continue to study new conditions and solve new problems. One important point in the great transition was apparent in the view on class contradictions, class conditions, and principal contradictions. This work must be continued after the Third Plenary Session. And our Party will work the same way. Although the Third Plenary Session communique did not clearly mention class conditions in China, nor what principal contradictions in China are, in fact, it has already resolved this question. It is that the focal point of work will change to economic construction, we will discontinue use of the slogan to regard class struggle as the key link, and will not judge Lin Biao-Jiang Qing as extreme Rightists, but as extreme Leftists. Evident in the communique wording of the above, which is to say these policies, is in fact an analysis by our party of the questions of domestic class conditions and domestic principal contradictions that is fundamentally different from that of Comrade Hua Guofeng at the 11th Party Congress and the 1st conference of the 5th National People's Congress.

After the Third Plenary Session our Party continued to study this question. Under the direction of the spirit of the Third Plenary Session, some theoreticians began going further toward seeking out this sort of question and put forward a few good opinions. On 30 March 1979 Comrade Deng Xiaoping spoke at a conference for the discussion of principles in theoretical work, and at the same time that he discussed the four principles he also discussed the problems of class struggle and of the principal contradictions, which was a great advance over the communique of the Third Plenary Session. In his speech he spoke this way: "We oppose the enlargement of class struggle and we deny that there is a capitalist class within the Party. Nor do we admit that after the socialist system has completely eradicated the exploiting class and conditions for exploitation that it will produce a capitalist class and other oppressing classes." He clearly points out that we have already eradicated the exploiting class and already eradicated the conditions of exploitation. Further on he says, "However, we must be aware that in a socialist society there are still counterrevolutionary elements, there are still elements of enemy agents, there are various criminal elements and other bad elements that disrupt public order, there are the new exploitative elements of grafters and embezzlers and profiteers, that cannot be completely eradicated even over a long period. To struggle with them is not the same as the class against class struggles of past history (they cannot constitute an open integral class), but this is still a special form of class struggle, or we could say that it is a special type of remnant of historical class struggle under socialist conditions. To these and all kinds of anti-socialist elements we must still be dictatorial." In this a new concept has been put forward. He affirmatively says that there is still class struggle, but that the exploitative class has already been extinguished, and that the exploitative system has been eradicated. As for basic contradictions and principal contradictions, Comrade Xiaoping has said: at present the wording in Comrade Mao Zedong's "On the Question of Correctly Handling Internal Contradictions among the People" is still best. Comrade Mao Zedong said that in socialist society basic contradictions are still contradictions between production relations and production forces, and contradictions between superstructure and the economic basis. Comrade Xiaoping went on to say: "Having pointed out these basic contradictions is not to have completely solved the problems, we must still do a penetrating, concrete analysis. However, from the point of view of more than 20 years of actual practice, this wording is a better one than other ways. Even current principal contradictions, which are the principal questions or central task that the entire Party and the entire nation must solve, have actually been solved because the Third Plenary Session determined to shift the focus of work to the task of socialist modernization." This is to say that, in reality, the principal problems or central tasks that must be resolved have been resolved because of the decision about the transferral of the focus of work. He goes on to explain: "The level of development of our production forces is very low and certainly cannot satisfy the demands of the people and the nation, and this is our current principal contradiction. Our central task is the resolution of this principal contradiction." Therefore, we want to see what the basic contradictions are, but we should look even further, to what the principal contradictions of every time are, because only in this way can we determine what is the central task of this time period.

By the time of the 18 June 1979 report of the Second Conference of the Fifth National People's Congress, research into problems of class conditions and principal contradictions had continued to advance. This report was also issued under the name of Comrade Hua Guofeng, and was also read aloud by him, but in actuality, this report was guided by the Central Committee from beginning to end. Hu Qiaomu wrote the first draft and revision, which then was finalized by the Central Committee. The content of this report was completely different from that of the first conference of the Fifth National People's Congress.

What I would first like you to notice is that when analyzing class conditions and principal contradictions, Taiwan is excluded, as are Hong Kong and Macao. What is intended is the mainland, the area in which the socialist transformation took place. On the mainland we have already eliminated the feudal system and the capitalist system, as well as the class-creating landlord class and rich peasant class, and the capitalist class, which no longer exist. This is even more specific than Comrade Xiaoping's speech. Then, where did all these people go? The report confirms that the vast majority among the landlords, rich peasants, and capitalists who were able bodied have already become self-sustaining workers in socialist society. With exploiting classes eliminated, their members, their positions, and their nature has changed.

When talking about this problem some comrades have said, isn't it too early to bring up this question? Their reasoning is that to say that the capitalist class as a class is extinct, then is there still its counterpart, the proletariat? If we say that the capitalist class has been eliminated, then is it appropriate to continue the dictatorship of the proletariat? They say that it is all right if the landlord class has been eliminated, or the rich peasant class, but they do not approve of saying that the capitalist class has been eliminated. In fact, this problem was solved long ago by Stalin. After the Russian capitalist class was eliminated it was all right to continue using the word 'proletariat,' but more accurately one ought to say the working class. As for the historical task of the proletarian dictatorship, not only do we want to extinguish all exploiting classes, but we want to eliminate all class distinctions. We cannot say that with the elimination of the exploiting classes and the exploitative systems that the dictatorship of the proletariat is no longer needed. This is only one portion of the historical task of the dictatorship of the proletariat, though we could say that it is taking a long step. The dictatorship of the proletariat will continue to exist for it still has the task of eliminating class distinctions. In a certain sense, this task will be even more formidable than eliminating exploiting classes and exploitative systems and will require a long time. The Central Committee has not adopted the opinions of these comrades. Then, what kind of peasants are the peasants now who are the counterpart to the original landlords? They are already neither individual peasants nor peasants who were cultivators now with their own lands, but are socialist peasants. Peasants who were the counterparts to landlords and rich peasants have now already become socialist peasants; laborers who were the counterparts to capitalists, workers exploited by wage labor are now workers who do not sell off their capacity for physical labor, but are socialist workers, the socialist leading class. For those intellectuals who for the most part attached themselves to the exploiting

classes in the old society, now the socialist system has been established and the overwhelming majority are serving socialism and they are socialist intellectuals and are also masters of our socialist society. The "Resolution" not only analyzes the transformation of the exploiting classes under conditions of class struggle, but analyzes the transformation of the exploited classes after the elimination of the exploiting system and the changes of their positions. In his "On the Question of Correctly Handling Internal Contradictions among the People" Comrade Mao Zedong said, that at any one time this concept of "the people" will have nothing to do with other times. True, because if we talk about the time before the transformation of the Third Party Congress, and that the concept of "the people" included workers, peasants, petty bourgeoisie, and the national bourgeoisie, then now there no longer is any petty bourgeoisie, and workers and peasants are not the original workers and peasants, nor is there any longer a national bourgeoisie. At the present time, the meaning of this category "the people" is, as the "Resolution" discusses, all socialist workers, patriots who support socialism, and those patriots who support the unity of their native land. These patriots who support patriotism also include overseas Chinese and brethren in Hong Kong and Macao. At present some among them are capitalists, or members of the ruling class, but they support socialism. All kinds of people who are patriots are included within the scope of our "people." Those patriots who support the unity of their native land are the counterparts of our united front, and are included within the concept of our people. Therefore, the current meaning of "people" has changed fundamentally from the time before the transformation of socialism. The old exploiting class is no more and the position of laboring people has changed, so are there any more class enemies in our society? Generally speaking this kind of person refers to one of seven kinds: counterrevolutionary elements, enemy agents, various criminals and degenerates who seriously disrupt order in socialist society, and grafters, embezzlers, and profiteers, the new exploitative elements. That we say here "new exploitative elements" rather than "new capitalist elements," has been well considered. According to the intention of Marx, the capitalist classes want to exploit surplus value, and their premise is that labor is a commodity, which is wage exploitation. Although we cannot now say that in the lower aspects of our socialist system there is no one person or no few persons who are secretly practicing wage exploitation, when speaking from the point of view of the major areas of the country, be they open or secret, to run an underground factory or enterprise on a rather large scale by hiring a large group of workers and practicing wage exploitation would be very difficult. We are not saying that new capitalists have not come into being but that it is very difficult to do so. But the exploitation of people by all means, changing the public to private, smuggling and tax evasion, these are all exploitation. As we can see from the newspapers today there are more than the great tigers of 1952, but we don't know how much fatter they are than then. Recently, there was a piece in the paper about an ordinary shop employee who embezzled more than 200,000 yuan. So here we are talking about the new exploiters who are grafters, embezzlers, and profiteers, certain vestiges of the "Gang of Four," certain vestiges of small minorities of landlords and rich peasants and other exploitative classes who have not transformed, smugglers, and this sort of person, all of whom are enemies of socialism. Moreover, when conditions are just right, these people can band together and form a group, to

become a force to be reckoned with, to attack the socialist system, the state which is a people's democratic dictatorship, and our Party.

All of the above refers to conditions on the mainland. When we look at the whole picture of the country at large we must also consider that Taiwan's capitalist class is intact as a class and is still exploiting and oppressing people there. It is said that with the support of the Americans the Taiwan authorities bought up land from the landlords and distributed it among the peasants, which was the way their land reform was implemented. After the original landlords received this money they turned around and ran capitalist enterprises, so it is said that Taiwan's landlords have been basically eliminated. But capitalists include comprador capitalists and the national bourgeoisie, which still exist there. Capitalists in Hong Kong and Macao are an exploiting class that still exists, and the reactionary elements among them have thought of all sorts of ways to collude with our enemies on the mainland, and there are certainly those among us who on their own initiative seek refuge on Taiwan, who contact them on their own initiative, and who voluntarily act as secret agents for them; after secret agents have been sent from Taiwan to the mainland they develop their espionage. So when we talk of the conditions of class struggle throughout the country we cannot look at the mainland alone, but must look as well to Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macao.

Also, we live in an environment of international class struggle. There is a socialist imperialist country to our north, and India, Vietnam, and others to the south. Although we have developed friendly relations with them, reactionary elements within their ruling classes, and their intelligence organizations and espionage organizations gather intelligence here just as before, and just as before foster their own people here among us.

Just because of the effect of these domestic and international influences Comrade Xiaoping has said that we cannot ignore class struggle, nor can we take it lightly. Some comrades have said, can we say that our current class struggle is a classless class struggle. It is my feeling that this wording is not quite accurate. If we include Taiwan there are, after all, still exploiting classes. How then could we talk about a classless class struggle? Aside from Taiwan, exploiting classes have been eliminated but the working class and the peasant class are still two distinct classes. Contradictions between these two classes do not, however, constitute a struggle of class against class. We also want to realize that the several types of people mentioned above can form into groups to become a force in themselves. If we do not maintain our vigilance these people could cause trouble in some areas. There was an incident in Xinjiang. Some among them had been stirred up by Soviet socialist imperialism as there were those who were in collusion with the Soviets.

As for the problem of principal contradictions, it also says in the report to the Second Session of the Fifth National People's Congress that the level of productive force development is very low, and is far from being able to satisfy the requirements of the people and the nation. To implement the four modernizations within this century we must quickly raise the current low level of productive forces to a modernized level, to which purpose we must change our current production relations and the portion of the superstructure that is

inhibiting the four modernizations, and sweep out old habits that are not beneficial to the four modernizations. These are the contradictions that we first want to resolve, and is the first stage of the central task for the whole nation. Where this is different from what Comrade Xiaoping talked about is in the way of supplementing a topic, which is to say that to center on the implementation of the four modernizations we will restructure the superstructure and those things within the production relations that hinder productive forces.

In the process of discussing this report, there were differing opinions regarding principal contradictions. Some said, should we just bring up the contradictions of backward production and requirements, or should we say that class contradictions are the principal contradictions. What was the attitude of Comrade Hua Guofeng during these several discussions? When speaking he would always adopt this attitude, that although the draft of the report is put in this way some comrades do not approve of this way of writing it. For example, when it says that the exploiting class has been eliminated, some comrades do not agree, or when talking about principal contradictions there are also some comrades who do not agree. As for how it should best be written, he requested the comrades to consider more fully, think about it more. He not only did not clearly agree with the draft but did not clearly agree with the opposing opinions. And he took this stand each time. Even after the discussion he did not reveal his feelings. All the way to the finalization of the draft and when the Political Bureau had called an expanded session, he still had this attitude, saying that within this report there were analyses of differing opinions chiefly on class struggle and the conditions for class struggle, the analysis and wording of the principal contradictions. So there were still differences of opinion on these two questions: what then should be done? Should we leave this part or not leave this part? He also said, some comrades advocate complete deletion from a certain place to another place, after which discussion of this problem could be avoided, but as to whether we should delete or not delete, I leave it to you to discuss. At the meeting of the Political Bureau Comrade Xiaoping, Comrade Chen Yun, Comrade Xiannian, Teacher Ye and many other comrades all approved the conclusions and opinions in the draft. Comrade Ji Deng [character illegible] said that we should find some way to link up this report on the Second Conference to that of the First Conference. We want there to be a mutual consideration of what is said by the very same premier at the First Conference and at the Second. Consideration of what? Just that first part that I read to you, where it wants class struggle to be the key link and wants to persist in the struggle of the proletariat against the capitalists. For [Hua] to go on talking like this made Comrade [Hu] Qiaomu impatient, and he said, Chairman Hua, this question was already discussed at the Third Plenary Session, Vice Premier Deng already discussed it at the theory and ideology meeting, it had been accepted by the Central Committee, and this speech has already been passed both within and outside of the Party. You are the Premier now, you are the Chairman, but at the recent People's National Congress you would not express an opinion on this problem. Everyone naturally thinks that Comrade Hua Guofeng does not share Comrade Deng Xiaoping's opinion on the questions of the conditions of class struggle and the principal contradictions. That kind of general would have to say it's okay to not delete it, to not change it.

Comrade Deng Xiaoping, at a working session of the Central Committee on 25 December 1980, made new developments on this question based on new conditions. One very important point was his raising the problem of those who would see the country plunged into chaos. This opinion was brought out earlier by Comrade Chen Yun. Comrade Xiaoping agreed with Comrade Chen Yun's choice of words, feeling that that kind of people were currently using methods of the "Cultural Revolution" to create disturbances and cause trouble. Some people were even calling for the second "Cultural Revolution." Here I want to explain a little. After the Xi Dan wall was stopped so called secret publications appeared in many places. Last summer the bad heads of the publications banded together to form the National Federation of People's Publications, and branches were set up in many areas. A small minority of the bad heads of these illegal publications had already been shown to be in direct collusion with Hong Kong Trotskyists, were supported by Hong Kong Trotskyists, listened to their ideas, and even received a little financial aid from them. The majority of Trotskyists in this country who had been released from prison were not active, but there were individuals who were mixed up with them. In Tianjin city there was a through and through opposition party and anti-Socialist who said that he did not currently show himself but that he gave them advice. Last year we had base level direct elections. Some colleges in Beijing were running elections and the bad heads of these illegal publications were extremely active stirring up trouble, recklessly attacking the Party, and recklessly attacking socialism. This should not be underrated. Because youth have no experience in government they do not know the advantages and disadvantages, nor do they know their true colors. Some youth were taken in by them and gathered together with them to create disturbances. This also exposed loopholes in our laws and legal system itself. For example, the election laws has no provisions for this: candidates must abide by the national constitution and laws, and express one's political views, distribute literature, and carry out activities within the scope of the constitution and laws. Under foreign election laws conditions for candidates are strictly stipulated. We have no strict provisions for this in our election laws, so anyone can go to a school or other platform and make campaign speeches. Originally it was that one school elected those from its own school, but a few schools can get together. During that more than a month some schools were enveloped in a rather foul atmosphere. There were not many people involved, but youth are unknowing and love to listen to that kind of impassioned, trouble-making talk.

In addressing these conditions the Central Committee issued the documents of the ninth [which said] that for this kind of problem, if we are clear-headed, keep up our guard, and work very carefully, then it will not be difficult to solve; but if we are lax, if our thinking is numb, and we do nothing more about it, then it is quite likely that there will be trouble with this unit or in that area, even to the extent that it will not be easy to restore. In this speech Comrade Xiaoping laid out various unstable phenomena in society at that time, after which he summarized, saying "We definitely cannot lower our guard. Of these various kinds of conditions, some are owing to the activity of counterrevolutionaries, some are counteroffensives by vestiges of Lin Biao, and the 'Gang of Four,' some are the damage done by those who would see the country in chaos, some are owing to a slip into old ways by remnants of the exploiting classes, and some are because of serious corruption by the

influence of feudalist and capitalist thought. To describe their nature, one is the contradictions between us and the enemy, and one is a reflection to different degrees of class struggle among the people. This explains that although class struggle is not a principal contradiction in Chinese society, it nevertheless still exists, and must not be treated lightly. If we do not provide different resolute dispositions in a timely manner and according to the merits of each, allowing the problems of differing natures as described above to extend and converge together, that would constitute a great danger to the situation of stability and unity. As for the seriousness of these kinds of activities, some of the comrades among us do not yet have sufficient understanding, therefore they strike without force, at times are even indulgent and uncaring." These words of Comrade Xiaoping certainly answered this question, that is when comrades asked whether or not there is still the influence of class struggle or the reflection of class struggle among the people. As far as we understand, these words of Comrade Xiaoping affirm this point. Among the people, owing to the corruption of feudalism and capitalists, the contradictions of class struggle are reflected to varying degrees. That which is different from the past is that we cannot see all the contradictions among the people as being class contradictions nor see them all as the influence of class struggle. This kind of influence exists only within a certain context.

The basic spirit of the wording of principal contradictions in the "Resolution" is identical with that of Comrade Xiaoping and the Second Session of the Fifth National People's Congress, as well as that of the First Session of the Eighth Party Congress. Comrades have asked, why have we adopted the current language and not directly used the language of the Eighth Party Congress? It is because that language is quite obviously not sufficiently concise, while the language used in the "Resolution" is rather more succinct and the intention is completely the same. They say that after the socialist transformation is substantially complete, the principal contradictions that China will resolve are the contradictions between the people's daily increasing material and cultural requirements and backward social productive forces. Also, the focal point of work for the Party and for the state must transfer to socialist modernization and construction where economic construction is central.

This question of class struggle has already been explained clearly in the 35th Section of the "Resolution," namely the fourth paragraph where it says: "After the class that was the exploiting class has been eliminated, class struggle will no longer be a principal contradiction. Owing to domestic factors and international influences, class struggle will still exist for a long time within certain contexts and under certain conditions there will still be a possibility of intensification." Why does it say "certain contexts?" It goes on to explain: "We must correctly understand the various social contradictions within our society that exist in large numbers but are not within the context of class struggle." This is to say that there are all sorts of contradictions within our society and the majority are not from class struggle, and that is what is meant here by "certain contexts." Without that sentence it might not be possible to change that idea of the past that class struggle is everywhere, at every time, in every activity, in all places, times, and things. If this concept is not changed, even if we say that the principal contradiction is not

class struggle, it would be hard to avoid expansion of the attribution to class struggle during our work. Some comrades say that it would be best to outline for us the scope within which there is class struggle and that within which there is no class struggle. But this would be difficult for anyone because individual circumstances are not the same. It is just like those places that are near Hong Kong and Macao where the capitalist influence is much greater than further inland. If you outlined a scope that included that, interior areas would not have that influence or the influence would not be so great, and if you tried to put that kind of box around it, it just would not work. More important is to analyze specific conditions, times, and places, to bring up problems that need to be solved, that could intensify under certain conditions. Comrades have said, what is meant by certain conditions? In my opinion it would at present be difficult to inflexibly state that there could be intensification under a few particular conditions, and that under other conditions there could not be an intensification. Because, be it domestic economic conditions or political conditions or international conditions, normally in the course of change the things that can be seen today tomorrow could have experienced great change. To speak of this election problem of last year, had our policies been incorrect, had we allowed illegal publications, the Federation of People's Publications, and their journal to be legalized, they would have stood for election everywhere, would have put up small and big character posters everywhere, just like in the "Cultural Revolution," and might have stirred up a certain storm. But because our understanding was clear, our measures forceful, and our attitude resolute, now for the most part illegal publications have ceased their activities. This wording "under certain conditions" is very principled and very vigorous, but it is also a very necessary wording. We want to be good at comprehension and analysis. "There is a possibility of intensification under certain conditions," then under what conditions might there be intensification, under what conditions is that not likely, if you demand that the Central Committee make inflexible stipulations, then we are just too lazy to do that. Speaking from an international context, what if by chance the Soviet Union were to go crazy and start a world war, would you say that under those conditions there would be no intensification? Then look at Xinjiang, when you have bad characters like that they can cause this trouble, then that trouble. If we lower our guard, and not care, whatever he gets into I won't mind, then the incidents in one province can join up with several others.

Comrade Xiaoping has said, that because we have these conditions of class struggle, and because of domestic and international influences there are still two roads of struggle in our country and we want to maintain the road of socialism, while others want to oppose that socialist path. There are concrete manifestations in all places. Some members of the original exploiting classes have vindictive counterattack in the back of their minds; some remnants of the exploiting classes have brought the old lines out again, and want to bribe the lower levels; smuggling activity in the two provinces of Fujian and Guangdong has been particularly bad in recent days. Some articles have said that we drafted incorrectly the reform of the Third Party Congress. We should have all along continued the principles of the new democracy and the five economic components of the new democracy; still others advocate that we ought to make it up to capitalism, even to the extent of saying that where we went wrong was in capitalism not developing far enough,

and that we ought to now look to the past and make it up to capitalism. You can read this in all the public publications. In addition, there is still Vietnam and the Soviet socialist imperialists on our borders. When we think about these conditions we cannot say that there is no one traveling the capitalist path, nor that there is no influence to do so. So, what is there that is different from the past? Please look at a passage in the 17th Section of the "Resolution." It says there that at the Tenth Plenary Session of the Eighth Party Congress in September of 1962, Comrade Mao Zedong expanded and made absolute class struggle existing within a certain scope of socialist society. He developed the view brought out after the 1957 struggle against the Right wing that contradictions between the proletariat and capitalists was still the principal contradiction in Chinese society. He further concluded that capitalists would exist throughout the historical stages of socialist society and would attempt to restore the old order, and would as well constitute the basis of revisionism within the Party. A few of the most central problems that exist is that during the whole period of socialism, the capitalist class will exist as a class from beginning to end of the socialist stage, and moreover it will be a class attempting to restore the old order. The current analysis by the Central Committee of conditions of domestic class struggle is that as classes, the landlords and rich peasants have been eliminated and that as a class capitalists no longer exist. However, people of those sorts still exist. This difference is extremely important. If we do not soberly recognize this point we could go back to the old path. Therefore, the "Resolution" has said that we want to oppose the thesis of the expansion of class struggle and also want to oppose the viewpoint that considers class struggle to have been extinguished.

The 11th question concerns the people's democratic dictatorship and the proletariat dictatorship.

On this question I ask that you take another look at the two articles in the GUANGMING RIBAO published under the name of that newspaper's commentator. One article is "The People's Democratic Dictatorship is in Reality the Proletarian Dictatorship" from 21 April, and the other is "Maintenance of the People's Democratic Dictatorship is an Unshakeable Political Principle" from 23 April. These two articles were examined and approved by the Central Committee with much input from Comrade [Hu] Qiaomu, later revised and then issued. In the past when we discussed the proletariat dictatorship it leaned toward comprehension through the theories of Marx and Engels regarding the proletariat dictatorship, which only recorded the likes of England, where peasants of all sorts had already become agricultural workers, and very few individual peasants remained, and where workers, considering the conditions under which agricultural workers were the majority of the population, would practice a proletariat dictatorship, which meant that the great majority of workers, including agricultural workers, take over the leadership authority of the state. When we speak of the proletariat dictatorship it is just this sort of dictatorship. In fact, when Marx and Engels were speaking of the theory of the proletariat dictatorship they were talking about another sort of situation, as in France and Germany, the sort of country that had a working class, but in which there were still a considerable number of peasants and were still a large number of the petty bourgeoisie. The proletariat dictatorship in countries of these sorts ought to be distinguished from the

proletariat dictatorship in countries like England. There ought to be differences in the levels that participate in political authority, as well as the composition and form of this political authority. Engels said, "After a proletariat revolution a democratic system will be established, from which political domination for the proletariat will be established both directly and indirectly. In England this kind of control could be directly established because the proletariat there is already the majority of the population. In France and Germany this control could be set up indirectly because not only are the majorities of those countries proletarian, but there are also small farmers and urban petty bourgeoisie. Small farmers and petty bourgeoisie are just at the transition stage before division into the proletariat. Consequently, they will very quickly agree with the demands of the proletariat." This passage speaks very clearly. England could directly establish proletariat political domination, whereas France and Germany could indirectly establish proletariat political domination by setting up an alliance between peasants and small producers to implement political domination. Because we did not understand this problem in the past and considered as a matter of course that the Paris commune was direct rule by the proletariat-- one class. In actuality, as Marx and Engels say, the Paris commune was not direct political domination by the proletariat, but was indirect political domination. In their words, the Paris commune was a worker's government but was also a national government. On this question Lenin found a "Soviet" form based on the domestic Russian situation.

Based on a scientific analysis of the Chinese situation, Comrade Mao Zedong shaped the theory of the people's democratic dictatorship. As the "Resolution" says, this was a development of Marx' theory of the proletariat dictatorship. Comrade Mao Zedong's formula, as discussed in "On a People's Democratic Dictatorship," was: "Sum up our experiences, collect them at one point, and this is the people's democratic dictatorship based on an alliance between workers and peasants and under the leadership of (through the Communist Party) the working class. This dictatorship must be joined together with international revolutionary forces. That is our formula, that is our chief experience, that is our chief program." This people's democratic dictatorship of ours is based upon our own conditions and is a development of the theory of Marx and Engels concerning indirect establishment by the proletariat of its own political rule. A very important point of this development is as discussed by Comrade Mao Zedong in his "On the People's Democratic Dictatorship," on democratic aspects within the people joining up with dictatorial aspects of the reactionaries, which is the people's democratic dictatorship. There is within both dictatorship and democracy, which is easier for people to see clearly than the proletariat dictatorship, as it speaks of a people's democratic dictatorship and a joining together of democracy and dictatorship. Today, as a class the exploiting classes have been eliminated and the scope of the targets of dictatorship have been reduced, while the range under the people's democratic authority has been correspondingly expanded. In this sense, the wording of the people's democratic dictatorship completely accords with the real conditions of China's new period, and is also in complete accord with the process of historical development from now on. Acting as a transition, of the two phrases proletariat dictatorship and people's democratic dictatorship, the people's democratic dictatorship is actually just this phrase proletariat dictatorship,

since both will be taking up one period. We can gradually stop using proletarian dictatorship and acknowledge that the political authority in our country is a people's democratic dictatorship, all the way until it withers away.

Internationally, there are differing opinions as to whether both these terms, either people's democratic dictatorship or proletarian dictatorship, are acceptable. The Japanese have changed proletarian dictatorship to proletarian ruling power, which they explain by saying that this is a problem of translation. In the past it was not translated correctly and they believe that a translation to "ruling power" is better. Actually, this is a kind of concession to the capitalists in fear of clearly raising the flag of the proletarian dictatorship. As to what transition we will go through in the meantime, this is another question. Some of the comrades in our party also feel this way, and advocate that we explain 'dictatorship' as "to be in control of political authority." This is not in keeping with Marx' original sense and our practical experience has proven that it is in error. We cannot dare not to speak up about the function of our political authority to suppress forces and enemies in opposition to the socialist system. Capitalists certainly practice a capitalist dictatorship but they have not explained this clearly to the people but talk about all people being equal, freedom, equality, and brotherhood. In accordance with the sayings of Marx, we of the proletariat have never concealed our own viewpoint, but speak bluntly: we will establish a proletarian dictatorship. This is not the same as a capitalist dictatorship, as they are a dictatorship of the minority over the majority, while we are a dictatorship of the majority over the minority. Because they are a dictatorship of the minority over the majority they must resort to deceit to keep people from easily seeing the reality behind this dictatorship; we are a dictatorship of the majority over the minority and ought not, nor need we conceal our own positions. As long as we work well we can obtain the support of the majority, and should mobilize the majority to unite together, and united undertake a dictatorship over the minority. The newborn socialist system is fundamentally different from all exploiting systems. From slave society to feudal society to capitalist society, the forms of exploitation have changed but are all exploiting. We want to eliminate all exploitation, all exploiting systems and establish this newborn socialist system, a system without exploitation, which will certainly meet with opposition from all the old forces in history. If the dictatorship is not strong and forceful it will not be able to protect the longevity of the socialist system. However, if we are to effect this powerful a dictatorship we must practice a high degree of democracy among the people. On this question we have certainly had many deficiencies, and there have even been improper areas of theoretical explanation, including that of Comrade Mao Zedong where he said that democracy is only a means. The "Resolution" says that a high level of democracy and a high degree of culture is a goal of our establishment of a socialist power. Without democracy there will be no socialism. The political goal we have established for socialism is that we want to put into practice a socialistic high degree of democracy, and only if we have this high degree of democracy can we practice the most powerful dictatorship over the minority. This will so guarantee the longevity and development of our socialist system that it will be a transition to communism.

Question 12, what is the distinction between the theory of uninterrupted revolution and the continuing revolution under the proletariat dictatorship?

What Marx and Lenin meant by their theories of uninterrupted revolution was that when the proletariat is undertaking a democratic revolution it should remember that there is yet a socialist revolution, and after the democratic revolution has been victorious, then it ought not to allow this democratic revolution to come to a standstill, but should pass into a socialist revolution when conditions are right. There is no Great Wall between these two revolutions. Lenin himself acted this way. The February revolution was to topple the tsars and effect a democratic revolution. After the February revolution, Lenin and the Soviet party slowly gathered its strength, established policies, and shifted this revolution toward socialism. In the beginning they wanted to use peaceful means but later adopted the means of armed struggle, effecting a socialist revolution. In Lenin's "Two Tactics" he very clearly explains this kind of thinking. The continuing revolution under the proletariat dictatorship during the "Cultural Revolution" is quite obviously different from the sense of "uninterrupted revolution" in the thought of Marx and Lenin. In the "Resolution" it says that when we ourselves have taken hold of political authority, and the socialist system has also been set up, the leadership position of the Communist Party is very strong, and as a class the exploiting classes have been eliminated, we then want to take on a revolution where one class overturns another. As a result, those who will have been overturned will be the Party leadership at all levels, advanced elements, and exemplary personnel. So, the significance and consequences of the continuing revolution under the proletariat dictatorship are fundamentally different from the uninterrupted revolution mentioned by Marx and Lenin. We want to thoroughly refute the theory of continuing revolution under a proletariat dictatorship.

The 13th question concerns revisionism and hegemonism.

When the "Resolution" speaks of the occurrence of the "Cultural Revolution" it refers to the influence of struggles outside China. Originally it wrote that in the sixties there was a struggle in opposition to revisionism and hegemonism. At the full session discussion it was understood that this simple narrative expression did not say whether anti-revisionism is correct or in error, whether it would invite unnecessary and erroneous explanation abroad, so the word "revisionism" was dropped. In the sixties we were not yet calling the Soviets hegemonists, so that was not easy to write, either. Should we write socialist imperialism? It was only after the Soviets invaded Czechoslovakia in 1968 that we began using that label, so neither Soviet hegemonism nor socialist imperialism would work. Now, it has been changed to read Soviet great-nation chauvinism. In 1956 there was the Bo-xiong [3134 5172] incident, when Comrade Zhou Enlai went to visit the Soviet Union, Poland, and Hungary, after which he spoke with a Soviet assembly and there was an article that said we should criticize great nation chauvinism. Comrade Zhou Enlai bluntly criticized the Soviet Union saying, your methods in regard to Poland, your methods in regard to Yugoslavia, your methods in regard to China, even in Stalin's time were cases of great-nation chauvinism, and presently you are still practicing it. At that time, Khrushchev wanted our support, so even if he did not take it to heart, they could not but write in

their articles that people should criticize great-nation chauvinism. Therefore, to now use that phrase fits the historical circumstances.

So, what is it we call revisionism? In the past we used to say that revisionism is the revision of the fundamental principles of Marxism-Leninism. This was in accordance with the wording of Lenin to the second international revisionism struggle. Lenin opposed Bernstein, he opposed Kautsky, again and again pointing out that their theories and their positions were all revisions of Marxism. "The State and Revolution" recovered the state theories of Marxism and criticized Kautsky and Bernstein and their revision of Marxist state theories. In the past we always understood it this way. In 1979 in the process of a National Day 30th Anniversary speech Teacher Ye [Jianying] pointed out that when Lenin was criticizing Kautsky for revisionism it was in the circumstances wherein the proletariat had not yet obtained political power. With the victory of the proletariat revolution, and after the gain of state political authority, as far as the phrasing and significance of revisionism had developed at all, we said that the Soviet Union was a socialist imperialist and did that or did it not fit with the theories of Marxism-Leninism. Kautsky supported the Socialist Democratic Party's invasive and oppressing colonies, at which Lenin said that this sort of policy of Kautsky and his like was the policy of socialist imperialism. The Soviet Union has long been a socialist state and has committed aggression across its borders and has practiced hegemony, for all of which calling it a socialist imperialist is certainly not in error. These kinds of socialist imperialist policies are revisionist policies, and are as well extremist and pernicious developments of revisionism. Revisionism's revision of Marxism's basic tenets means also the discarding of the fundamental stand of the proletariat class. In this way Teacher Ye pointed out in his speech that the proletarian political party in control of the government must always be on its guard and protect against mounting the revisionist path of domestically oppressing the people and the pursuit of hegemony abroad. Even if revising this or that principle of Marxism is not on your tongue or in your writings, if the policies you actually practice are domestically oppressive of the people and are in pursuit of hegemony abroad, you have in fact mounted the path of revisionism. In the realm of theory some people agree with this wording, other do not. However, there is one point that we should notice, that there are great differences between the times and conditions under which Lenin opposed revisionism and current times and conditions. Then, how ought we now regard the nine articles that were written during the sixties? We need to analyze this. It is very obvious that looked at now, some of the writings are incorrect. Certainly the article criticizing Yugoslavia is in error! Some draw forced analogies. Are then all these nine articles mistaken? We cannot look at it that way. As to which articles are correct, which mistaken, or which points in which are correct and which points in which are incorrect, that will take new scientific research. But, that we oppose a paternalistic party, oppose great-nation chauvinism, oppose aggression across one's borders, oppose carrying out activities to topple fraternal parties, and oppose meddling in the internal affairs of other parties and other countries, cannot be said to be in error. When the "Resolution" speaks of maintaining independence and keeping the initiative in one's own hands, as it summarizes experiences in this respect it maintains our stand on principles. Our Central Committee principles are that each party has its own internal affairs, and

they all have problems of relations with other countries and parties. Every socialist country has its own internal affairs and it also has problems of relations with other countries. The policies of these two questions must be strictly distinguished. Whatever policies are implemented by people within a party or within a country, whatever policies are carried out, be they correct or mistaken, revisionist or Marxist, other parties ought not to say anything, but ought to make appraisals and reach conclusions within their own parties, their own countries, and based on their actual experience. However, if in foreign relations a party or a country carries out policies of paternalism toward another party or another country, implements policies of force against others, oppresses people, aggresses against others, disrupts others, then any other party can say something and ought to be critical. When we criticize the Soviet Union as a socialist imperialist it is done so in accordance with this policy. Comrade Xiaoping has said, to put this kind of label on the Soviet Union is neither too big nor too small, it is just good and fitting.

The 14th Question concerns questions relevant to personnel changes in the Central Committee.

Let me give you the opinion of Comrade Chen Yun. With the issue of document No 4 the Central Committee received a few reports. Some said that Comrade Hua Guofeng was honest, tolerant, and frank, modest and careful, and stable; other comrades did not feel this way about him. Comrade Chen Yun said, this problem really needs to be cleared up by discussion. The question here is really how do we regard people, how do we regard the cadres, and includes as well, how do we oversee our leadership at all levels. He said that there was one comrade who was frank and outspoken. When he had seen a problem and thought it out he would then speak out what was on his mind. When tested under actual experience, if there were something not quite proper then he would immediately correct himself. This kind of comrade is a good comrade and is a good comrade who can be trusted. In contrast, when what is on one's mind is not spoken, such that when there is a debate over principle one is equivocal and does not express one's own feelings, it is difficult for others to have confidence in that person. These words of Comrade Chen Yun are very important. This is actually what is talked about in "The Manifesto of the Communist Party," that Communist Party members are ashamed to conceal their political views. To speak out about one's own views is to not keep two accounts, but rather just one, so that when something comes up it is just put out on the table, placed before a conference, or put out among other comrades. This way everyone appraises it, everyone discusses it, and it is examined under actual experience. That which is correct is then maintained, and that which is mistaken is corrected. This is the frank and openhearted, unequivocal stand every Communist Party member should take and outlook he should have, and is especially the political character that a proletariat revolutionary should have. When it comes to making a mistake, or when sometimes one speaks inappropriately, no one can avoid this. When as great a figure as Comrade Mao Zedong makes mistakes as serious as these, who could ever guarantee that everything they ever say is going to be correct, that nothing will be overstated? No one can make that guarantee. What really disturbs people is when they really have something on their mind, but when a debate arises they never express their feelings. Working under the leadership of these kinds of comrades is truly difficult. At the Sixth Plenary Session, Comrade [Hu]

Yaobang said that two things do not change, on which everyone felt that he spoke well. He went on to say that in the future we will depend upon our own self-knowledge, and the supervision of the entire Party, especially the supervision of the Central Committee. These were truly earnest words and sincere wishes, and moreover were a complete change from some of the work styles in our party in the past. When there is something to say one should certainly to be up front. When one has truly seen deficiencies in leading comrades of the Central Committee, where this is practical and realistic, one ought to bluntly point it out, be it at a Party session, within an organization, according to standard procedure, and either to the Central Committee or even to the leading comrade himself. Supervision can only be responsible in this way. Based on my contacts, all of the current leading comrades in the Central Committee are very democratic and are very willing to listen to and adopt the various opinions of those comrades below them. We certainly want to change the practice of the past where after hearing this and that, and hearsay, none said officially, there were complaints here, grumblings there. As a result, not only are you yourself badly affected but it affects others as well. This is irresponsible behavior to the Party cause. It is behavior lacking in Party character, and is immoral activity. We ought to appraise comrades and supervise them in the way that Comrade Chen Yun has said. Only in this way can we make our party truly have even more fighting capacity.

I have taken up much of your time. Where I have not answered properly, I welcome your criticism.

(The following group of questions and answers were prepared from recordings of speeches made by Comrade Deng Lichun on 11 and 12 August 1981 at a National Working Session for Collection of Historical Materials on Party History and at a symposium commemorating the 60th anniversary of the establishment of the Chinese Communist Party)

We are studying the history of the party. I would like today to bring up a few questions and say something of my own views as we discuss and study "On the Resolution of Some Historical Questions Concerning the Party Since the Establishment of the PRC," which I will do for your reference. For that of which I have already spoken during past communications or during answer sessions, and to which I have nothing to add, I will not respond today. What I wish to speak about today are questions that have been seldom dealt with in the past or have even never been touched upon. Where I am incorrect please criticize me. For some questions you will have to study more deeply before they can be better resolved.

1. General Questions

The first question concerns the wording about cancelling the struggle between two lines and errors in the line.

Comrade [Hu] Qiaomu has already provided an excellent explanation of this question in his "A Few Explanations." Some comrades have wondered, why bring up mistaken lines if we have a correct line? Actually, what does "line" mean;

should we even say it? I think that we won't proceed from this kind of thinking and that it would be better to consider and resolve this question from the handling of this sort of question by the "Resolution."

The most difficult question to handle at the initial drafting of the "Resolution" was how to analyze and criticize the errors of Comrade Mao Zedong. The drafting took 20 months, and that we went back and forth so many times was because it was very difficult to successfully implement the proposals of Comrade Deng Xiaoping and achieve the three basic requirements and basic principles agreed upon by the Central Committee. Of the three items, the most important, most basic, and most pivotal was in the establishment of the historical position of Comrade Mao Zedong, and to maintain and develop the thought of Mao Zedong. Everyone knows that during the ten years of the "Cultural Revolution" Comrade Mao Zedong made serious mistakes. He also made great mistakes before the "Cultural Revolution," at the time of the "Great Leap Forward" and the people's commune movement. After 1957, some of his understanding and some of the wording of the problem of class struggle escalated step by step until it finally led to the "Cultural Revolution." This then produced a very sharp contradiction. Dealt with this way and that, the hardest thing to take care of was how to resolve this contradiction. In simple words, this contradiction was a fight between Comrade Mao Zedong and Comrade Mao Zedong. To both determine his historical position, maintaining Mao Zedong Thought, and to criticize his errors, it was very difficult to handle this problem well.

The "Resolution" reads this way: "The leftist, erroneous theses with which Comrade Mao Zedong instigated the "Cultural Revolution" clearly departed from the general principles of Marxism-Leninism and the path of the thought of Mao Zedong, which is an integration of concrete actual experiences of the Chinese revolution, and those theses must be completely distinguished from the thought of Mao Zedong." With this we found a way out. Comrade Chen Yun once said, the line and policies of the 7th Congress and the line and policies of the 8th Congress are all correct. After the 8th Congress, Comrade Mao Zedong gradually left the line and principles of the 7th and 8th Congresses. Our task is simply to correct these errors of his and go back to the line and policies of the 7th and 8th Congresses. During the process of the initial drafting, Comrade [Hu] Qiaomu was the first to point out that during the period of the "Cultural Revolution" the errors of Comrade Mao Zedong were the errors of the leftist line. Comrades Deng Xiaoping, Chen Yun, and Hu Yaobang and the other comrades of the Central Committee agreed on this point. Afterwards the wording of this was changed. The current "Resolution" calls it an overall long period of serious leftist errors. Comrade Deng Xiaoping has said, to speak this way of the nature of the errors is even more weighty than talking about errors in the line, and is even more realistic, more practical. After this kind of wording, the criticism of Comrade Mao Zedong's errors in the section on the "Cultural Revolution" is not at all vague, but it does not harm the image of Comrade Mao Zedong, nor does it damage Mao Zedong Thought. As we were undertaking this kind of serious criticism we kept a sense of propriety. This sense of propriety was of many facets. Foremost was that when we pointed out that he had committed serious errors we also admitted that during the "Cultural Revolution" he still made contributions to both the Party and the people. The "Resolution" also points out that although overall he

continued to stick to the errors of the "Cultural Revolution" he did correct some particular errors. He put Lin Biao in an important position, but finally saw through him and with Comrade Zhou Enlai and others resourcefully broke up the coup d'etat of Lin Biao's counterrevolutionary clique. He put the Jiang Qing counterrevolutionary clique into important positions but also exposed their schemes and did not allow to succeed their ambition to usurp the highest leadership authority. We even made a concrete analysis of the reasons why he made those mistakes. Therefore, after Zhou Gucheng [6650 4474 1004] had seen the "Resolution" he said, the criticism we have made of Comrade Mao Zedong has been sympathetic and reasonable, as well as practical and realistic. Some people always like to find fault with us, but it may be said this time about the "Resolution" and speeches of comrades of the Central Committee that they did not hypercritically find anything that they considered improper. This goes to prove that our criticism of Comrade Mao Zedong in this way is able to gain the support of a majority of people. The point with which the broad masses of workers, peasants, and cadres are most satisfied is that although the "Resolution" sternly criticizes Comrade Mao Zedong, at the same time it fully realizes his accomplishments. Therefore, they feel that a great load has been taken off their minds, and they can rest easy.

Besides the "Cultural Revolution," the "Great Leap Forward" was the occasion of another error, looked at as a whole. What was the difference between that and the "Cultural Revolution"? There are primarily two points. One is that the durations were different. The "Cultural Revolution" went on for ten years, whereas the period of the "Great Leap Forward" was shorter. The Beidaihe conference was in August and September 1958, and the first Zhengzhou conference was in November 1958, separated by only 3 or 4 months. After the first Zhengzhou conference up until the time of the Lushan Meeting of July 1959 it was just as described in the "Resolution," where Comrade Mao Zedong and the Central Committee had diligently led the whole Party in rectifying the errors they had become aware of. However, rightist opportunism appeared in the period after the Lushan conference, bringing that process to a close. In 1960, and also at the Beidaihe conference, Comrade Mao Zedong brought up leftist errors during the work to rectify rural work and put Comrade Zhou Enlai in charge of drawing up an urgent directive on rural work, which was the 12 proposals for rural areas. Later, the CPC Central Committee proposed the eight character policy and went on to draw up the 60 proposals for the people's communes, the 70 proposals for industrial management, etc. Here, too, there was only an intervening period of something more than a year. The "Cultural Revolution" went on for ten years. Second, the errors of the "Great Leap Forward" were committed by Comrade Mao Zedong, and everyone else went along. As Comrade Deng Xiaoping has often said, everyone got hot-headed and should all bear the blame. Although Comrade Mao Zedong had the primary responsibility, it was, however, Comrade Mao Zedong who first discovered the mistake, and was he who first corrected himself. Also, when Comrade Mao Zedong had first begun to rectify these errors it was still a minority position in the party. With the "Cultural Revolution" it was not this way. It was instigated by Comrade Mao Zedong, and at the time of that call to action the leading comrades of the Central Committee and the majority of cadres within the party were just as he was criticizing: uncomprehending, incapable, and not diligent. Comrade Zhou Enlai wanted to correct this and Comrade Deng Xiaoping wanted to correct this, but Comrade Mao Zedong would not permit it. Before this, there was also the "February Mutiny." When Comrade Deng Xiaoping was in charge of work the "Gang of Four" was talking, there were the nine consolidations, which were everywhere, and no one escaped. As it says in the "Resolution," Comrade Mao Zedong could not tolerate Comrade Deng Xiaoping's systematic rectification of the errors of the "Cultural Revolution." Later, and with those old revolutionaries who he educated himself using the thought of Mao Zedong, all levels of cadres, and all nationalities of people throughout the country, rectified the errors [of Mao Zedong] after his death. The "Great Leap Forward" dealt a serious blow to our economy and caused a great drop in our industrial and agricultural production, the loss created by which went through 3 or 4 years of adjustment before recovery. The "Cultural Revolution" has retarded the pace of our construction and has caused very great damage in economic work, and there have been several undulations, but actually our economy grew somewhat during those ten years. In this regard, cadres of all levels and the people as a whole have made an enormous effort. And it cannot be forgotten that Comrade Mao Zedong learned a lesson from the "Great Leap Forward." During the ten years of the "Cultural Revolution" he talked about changing the system of ownership, changing the collective system of ownership to the system of ownership by all people, and instituting this and that change in production relations. At any rate, I have

never seen Comrade Mao Zedong's written or oral instructions to that effect. Obviously, after going through the "Great Leap Forward" he was very careful in that respect. The breakup of Lin Biao and the "Gang of Four" was a different matter. Within these two general errors, the views and methods of Comrade Mao Zedong on the question of class struggle gradually escalated until he proposed that the focus of a movement be ridding the Party of the faction in power that was traveling the capitalist road. Toward the errors of Comrade Mao Zedong, toward serious policy and politics problems, the "Resolution" explicitly, realistically, and separately criticized and drew conclusions. After all, does this kind of analysis and conclusions better fit the reality, and are they more effective for us, or would saying generally that he committed errors of the leftist line better fit reality, be more effective for us? We feel that the current way of putting it will allow the lesson we learn to be sharper and more helpful in avoiding a repetition of this kind of error.

Let me talk a little more about the errors of Comrade Hua Guofeng. The first time this question was raised was in a bulletin of the Central Committee Political Bureau. The bulletin started off by affirming his achievements, later pointing out his errors. It also said in this bulletin that these would not be called doctrinal errors, so we won't call them that. Is this current way the best then? Or should we label Comrade Hua Guofeng as having committed errors of the leftist line? I think that it is best as we are now doing it.

When discussing this question, the Central Committee said that in the past we said that historically there have been ten doctrinal errors, six before liberation, four after, and add another for the "Gang of Four" for a total of eleven. Is it all right to say that Lin Biao and Jiang Qing committed doctrinal errors or should we say as was decided in court that they were a counterrevolutionary clique? Which fits the reality? The solution is rather easy to explain. The wrongful case of Comrade Liu Shaoqi has already been redressed. As for the Gao Gang who is left, his central problem is that of usurping the highest leadership authority. The wording of the five so called doctrinal struggles after liberation does not fit reality. The six occasions preceding liberation: the rash leftist mistakes of [character unreadable] Qiubai [???? 4428 4101], duration of which was 3 months. The leftist errors of Li Lisan [2621 4539 0005] lasted for 6 months. The errors of Luo Zhanglong [5012 4545 7893] cannot be called doctrinal. Comrade Deng Xiaoping really understands Luo Zhanglong, who was always causing trouble, for example wanting to set up another Central Committee and split the party. During the civil war, the errors of Wang Ming [3769 2494] were left wing adventurism and during the war against Japan they were errors of the new capitulationism, and his thinking was subjective and dogmatic. Chen Duxiu's were errors of right wing opportunism, actually capitulationism. All of these can be separately explained clearly by their individual content, so should we analyze specifically, obtaining specific conclusions or should we give them the general name of doctrinal errors? The spirit of the Marxist dialectic is specific questions and specific analysis. That, then, fits the facts.

To say that during the "Cultural Revolution" the history of the party is a history of the struggle between two lines is just too simple. If we say that there has been a doctrinal struggle then that is just one part of the party's history. But if we equate party history with the history of doctrinal

struggles, then we cannot complete our task of research into party history. If we draw particular conclusions about internal struggles, that can advance party historical research and will suit the requirements of historical materialism, allow greater advances in party historical research, and will have greater significance to our own education and that of later generations.

During the past several years of "doctrinal struggles," any trouble would be attributed to a line and reasons sought from a world perspective. Where to deliver a bucket of manure--should it be handed over to the production brigade or taken to one's private plot--would also become a question of doctrine. Even small things were investigated from the view of doctrine. If it were said that there was a doctrinal problem, even at the top, be it an individual or several within the central authorities, doctrine would be brought up, others would take up the cry, and that would be it. In the past we said that doctrine permeates everything, that when doctrine is correct everything is correct, when doctrine is in error everything is in error, all of which created a tense situation in Party lives. Doctrinal struggle has hurt so many people! Because of doctrinal struggle Liu Shaoqi died, and some founders of our state also died. Should we or should we not learn from this and change some of our methods? Which methods best suit Marxism and best suit reality? When work first began on drafting the "Resolution," Comrade [Hu] Qiaomu proposed that the "Cultural Revolution" was a doctrinal error; afterwards, when criticizing the errors of Comrade Hua Guofeng, that was connected to Comrade Mao Zedong, when it was decided to no longer use this wording of mistaken lines and doctrinal struggles. Concerned at the same time with the wording of history, the "Resolution" justly uses "line" in one or two places, as when it says that the Third Party Congress formed the ideological line, political line, and organizational line of Marxism. We have been saying "line" for so many years and are not used to dropping it all of a sudden.

Some comrades have said that there is a front and back to everything, so if there is a correct line, why is there not a mistaken line? The back side of a correct line is not necessarily a mistaken line. As for example when the Central Committee recently called a conference on problems with ideological lines, it was brought out that among a certain portion of comrades, especially those in cultural circles, there is a kind of feeling that it is not right to criticize, that when criticized they are offended and then say that they have been manhandled. At the Sixth Congress there was serious criticism of Comrade Mao Zedong, this great figure, but it was not all right to criticize the mistaken articles nor the comrades who had written the mistaken articles. Isn't this the reverse side of the correct line? Do we want to take a mistaken line? Both sides are all right, we just don't want to always think in past concepts; all we want to do is not follow a correct line or a mistaken line. Where there is a front and back we want to concretely analyze what kind of front it is and what kind of back it is. If we say that when there is a correct line then there is sure to be a mistaken line, then if there is a correct Party Central Committee is there necessarily a mistaken Party Central Committee? Isn't this going back to a wording of two headquarters? In specific areas and departments there are certainly people who resist the Party Central Committee correct line. This of course is the reverse of the correct Party Central Committee. But are we really comfortable with the label of

anti-Central Committee, does it really fit the facts? We really can't operate this way.

Many of us, including myself, have been educated by Comrade Mao Zedong. Those things about which he was mistaken have left traces in our minds because we are used to continuing with certain old ways of speaking. In research into Party history is there a problem with continuing to eliminate the leftist influence? As with doctrinal struggles, one thing leads to another, as we are very familiar with the old way of saying things and always feel that the new ways are not expressing this or that. Is this feeling that we should not tinker a leftist vestige influence? I am not putting labels on anyone, including myself, as we all have this situation.

The second question regards the wording of opportunism.

Opportunism is linked with rightists and is called rightist opportunism. I agree with Comrade [Hu] Qiaomu's opinion that this wording may be used. But it is quite imprecise to place it with leftists, as in leftist opportunism. At the same time that is not to say that opportunism will never be used later. Take Chen Duxiu, for example. It is not as good to link him with rightist opportunism as it is to say rightist capitulationism, which is more accurate. During the early period of the War of Resistance, it would be more accurate to speak of Wang Ming and the new capitulationism.

The third question is what is the difference between the current "Resolution" and "On the Resolution of Some Historical Questions" from 1945?

Comrade Deng Xiaoping took another look at the 1945 "Resolution," and has said that the current "Resolution" is written better than that one. The initial drafter of both "Resolutions" was Comrade [Hu] Qiaomu, who also says that this is better than that of 1954 [as published].

During the discussion process, some comrades said that the 1945 "Resolution" is much better and the current one not as good. Comrade Qiaomu said that seeing and hearing that kind of comment makes him feel ashamed. He said that to speak so well of the 1945 "Resolution" makes him uncomfortable because actually there are several deficiencies in that "Resolution." Yesterday, I reread the 1945 "Resolution," and my impression is similar. I agree with the opinion of Comrade Qiaomu. Speaking generally, the deficiencies in that "Resolution" are that historical proofs are too few and there are too many theoretical proofs. With one too many and one too few it clearly does not satisfactorily implement the principle of Marxism that in the analysis of history and the analysis of problems historical logic and the logic of theory should go well together. In general, this is what Comrade Qiaomu is saying. When we first began considering the draft of the current "Resolution" we made an outline that we gave to Comrades Deng Xiaoping and Hu Yaobang. Comrade Deng Xiaoping said that that outline was a theoretical demonstration and proof for writing articles. You should remember that the writing of a "Resolution" is not the writing of an article and does not require opening arguments from all aspects, but is to produce accurate assessments of important historical events and of important historical figures, and should not be too wordy.

Don't be afraid to say, what is the assessment based on? Why is it correct? You then need to prove it. But that way is no good. And not only did the outline have those faults but he said about the next few drafts that it seemed as if the faults were still in that it was an article, not a resolution, and even less was it a resolution concerning historical questions. The "Resolution" of 1945 also talked about several stages from the time of the establishment of the party until the conclusion of the War of Resistance: the stage of the Great Revolution, the ten year civil war, as well as including a concise review of history. But the majority of the sections are political, military, organizational, or ideological contrasting proofs of doctrine: where Comrade Mao Zedong was right about something, where the leftist line was wrong about something. The assessment of the leftist line is very convincing. But as for necessary comments about the stage of the first domestic revolutionary struggle, the important events of the stage of the ten year civil war, and about important figures, there is nothing.

As Comrade [Hu] Qiaomu has said, take the rightist capitulationism for an example. In the opinion of Comrade Mao Zedong the errors of Chen Duxiu were very serious in the first half of 1927. When the Northern Expedition reached Wuhan he reached an agreement with Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Jingwei, and his errors developed in seriousness in his treatment of the workers' movement and of the peasant movement, which brought on the defeat of the Great Revolution. Actually, the capitulationism of Chen Duxiu made an important appearance even earlier, which by reason ought to have been pointed out in the "Resolution" of 1945. Not a word was said about the Zhongshanjian incident. There was not a word about the proposal of the Guomindang to arrange party affairs. There were divided opinions within the party about these two matters. Comrades Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, and others advocated a decisive striking back. Chen Duxiu pressed for concessions. This was the major fact behind his capitulationism. Chen Duxiu denied the correct opinion of comrades within the party and completely accepted the proposal of Chiang Kai-shek to rearrange party affairs. As a result, the political and military authority of the party was completely taken into the hands of Chiang Kai-shek. He was not only commander-in-chief but wanted to manage the national government of the time. At Wuhan, it wasn't that Chiang Kai-shek wanted to come to Wuhan, he wanted to move the so-called national government to Jiangxi. On this point Wang Jingwei and his group, in the leftist faction and with the desires of the Communist Party, once put through a censure, and although I don't clearly remember the wording, it was critical of that proposal of Chiang Kai-shek and refused to move the national government to Jiangxi. There were in the party at that time some comrades who proposed getting rid of Chiang Kai-shek's post as commander-in-chief, but Wang Jingwei and his group, including Chen Duxiu, would not approve it. Was it after all a Northern Expedition or an Eastern Campaign. There are differing opinions on this. As a result we still consider it the Northern Expedition and not the Eastern Campaign. Historical facts like these show the important historical facts of Chen Duxiu's capitulationism, not discussed in the 1945 "Resolution."

The 1945 "Resolution" emphasizes the summation of the experiences of ten years of civil war, and is affirmative of the achievements of Comrade Mao Zedong, but for the particular base areas and contributions of other leading comrades, they are only parenthetically mentioned in one place. It is far briefer than

the current "Resolution," "A Historical Review of the 28 Years Before the Founding of the PRC." Although the current one writes about 28 years it does so in only 5,000-odd characters, but with a very rich content. It says that after the failure of the Great Revolution we went into the countryside and established base areas, created the Red Army, and encircled the cities from the rural areas. Twelve base areas are mentioned, and in addition to the 1st, 2nd, and 4th Front Armies, the Shanbei Red Army, the Red 25th Army, and the southern guerilla forces are all mentioned. This is much more comprehensive than the previous "Resolution."

Comrade Qiaomu has also said that the four occasions of repulsing "encirclements and suppression" were victories obtained under the leadership of Comrades Zhou Enlai and Zhu De. The 1945 "Resolution" did not mention their important functions.

It was also Comrade Qiaomu who said that if we talk about praise for individuals, the comments about Comrade Mao Zedong had already begun by the 1945 "Resolution." This is not to say that we want to smear the outstanding accomplishments of Comrade Mao Zedong for saving the party from crisis after the failure of the Great Revolution, but rather that that is only to write of the contributions of one person, whereas the contributions of other leaders are seldom mentioned. This was owing to the limitations of the historical conditions of the time. As those comrades know who participated in the rectification at Yan'an, Comrade Zhou Enlai was criticized during the period of the rectification, and he undertook self-criticism at several meetings, but couldn't pass the test, and at the elections of the Seventh Congress his name brought up the rear. I remember that the sequence was Mao, Zhu, Liu, Ren, Lin, and Comrade Zhou Enlai was somewhere down in the teens. At that time Kang Sheng presided over a forum on party history. Comrade Zhou Enlai talked first about the events of running Huangpu during the early days of the Great Revolution, the Zhongshanjian affair, and the proposal to rearrange party affairs. He was very modest himself saying that it was Comrade Mao Zedong who persistently advocated striking back during the Zhongshanjian affair and the rearrangement of party affairs, and he did not mention that he himself also had that idea and supported it. After the speech, Kang Sheng sternly criticized Comrade Zhou Enlai, by which he meant that at that time you followed rightist capitulationism. As to [accusations that] five times repelling "encirclement and suppression" was adventurism, or that the Long March was flightism, the 1945 "Resolution" made correct assessments. But the assessments of that "Resolution" about important events like how in the process of the Long March the war situation was turned around, how the Red Army was saved, and that more and more comrades realized that the truth was with Comrade Mao Zedong, is just too simple. As for being limited by the prevailing historical conditions, that means that in the ten year period from 1935 through 1945 the correct views of Comrade Mao Zedong were indeed increasingly acknowledged by even more comrades, whether in military, political, cultural, or other aspects. At that time, the greatest obstacle keeping us from correctly recognizing Comrade Mao Zedong was the dogmatism of Wang Ming. The threat of dogmatism needs a thorough exposure and needs to be understood systematically. By criticizing this kind of error in order to better establish the position of Comrade Mao Zedong and to establish the position of the thought of Mao Zedong allowed the whole party to better rally around the Party Central Committee with Comrade Mao Zedong as its head, and to allow the thinking of the party to better unify in Mao Zedong thought, which is the integration of the general truth of Marxism-Leninism and concrete actual experience from the Chinese Revolution. History and prevailing conditions demanded that it be this way. Speaking from the level of greatest significance the 1945 "Resolution" completed its historical task. But dealing with it as the "Resolution" of Party historical questions I'll return to what I just said, that there are too few historical demonstrations, where by comparison there are too many theoretical demonstrations. Comparing along these lines, in the current "Resolution," and excluding the portion on Mao Zedong thought that is a theoretical summary and demonstration, in every other part we may say that all important historical events and historical questions have been assessed. Some in one sentence. I'll give a simple example. In the part on the "four clean-ups" there is one sentence: In the latter part of 1964 many base level cadre were allowed to be wrongfully attacked. This

sentence is an assessment of the "four clean-ups" work led by Comrade Liu Shaoqi, and is thus a criticism of Comrade Liu Shaoqi.

You have brought up a question related to this, namely, how does one comprehend erroneous historical roots, social roots, and ideological roots. Both Comrades Deng Xiaoping and [Hu] Qiaomu have said, that the current "Resolution" does not discuss making mistakes is chiefly due to the influence of the petty bourgeoisie. This is a very important problem and is an area quite different from the previous "Resolution." The earlier "Resolution" said, there are a great many petty bourgeoisie elements within our party, and their vacillation, their frenzy is a class source of leftist mistaken doctrine. At that time, people like Wang Ming were judged to be petty bourgeoisie revolutionaries, which played a good role in criticizing the leftist dogmatism and factionalism of Wang Ming. At large and small meetings Wang Ming was criticized, dogmatism was criticized, as were Zhang Wentian [1728 5113 1131], and Wang Jiaxiang [3769 4471 4382], as was erudition, and also the other "28 and 1/2" comrades who had participated in those meetings were attacked, especially because errors of the Wang Ming line caused the base area of one's own work to thoroughly lose comrades, and when the criticism started it got pretty rough. Summing up, they felt that it was simply incomprehensible that these people were not counterrevolutionaries. Principles having been raised this high, if it had not been for special agents, traitors, and planted spies, it was unimaginable that their perfectly good base areas had been damaged to such a degree. Many old comrades were designated by you as of the AB group to be killed. The atmosphere then was truly tense. Comrade Mao Zedong personally attended a large conference at the Yangjialing Central Auditorium. Later, in his speech "Study and the Current Political Situation," he said: at the meeting I attended the entire conference hall was about to explode. We are in trouble if we continue on in this way. The Central Committee Political Bureau immediately began meeting to provide a resolution of this problem. Orally, it was said that based on an investigation of the history of those comrades criticized by the Politbureau they had reached a unanimous view that there was no basis to the charge that these comrades had political problems. Comrades working in Yan'an at the time probably remember this event. The document that was issued officially deleted this passage.

Speaking along these lines, it is reasonable to say that Wang Ming and his like were petty bourgeoisie, that the errors they committed were errors of petty bourgeoisie vacillation and were double-dealing, and that they played a stabilizing role within the party. However, there were certainly unexplainable aspects. Like Chen Duxiu, as discussed in Comrade Mao Zedong's "Seven Bigs' Working Policies," who made contributions, and who will still be written about in future histories of the party. He was our commander-in-chief and we are his students, but Chen Duxiu was the (MENG-JI-WEI-KE) of China, and in ideology was not as good as (PU-LIE-HAN-NUO-FU). It is all right to say that a person like Chen Duxiu had petty bourgeoisie influences, but were they only petty bourgeoisie influences? Therefore, the analysis of so-called class roots were dealt with rather simply in the previous "Resolution." This is not to say that mention of petty bourgeoisie influences don't serve a good function, but rather that it is too simple.

Then why doesn't the current "Resolution" write about the problem of bourgeoisie influences? The reason is quite simple: at the outbreak of the "Cultural Revolution" our individual peasants had become collective peasants; those in woolen industries had become laborers in collectives and many woolen industrial cooperatives had become nationalized, and small commodity and small vendor cooperatives had become state run; intellectuals had become masters of socialist society, i.e., socialist intellectuals. This is to say that as a class the petty bourgeoisie had ceased to exist in our society. In the current way of speaking, workers, peasants, and intellectuals are the strength upon which socialism relies. To sum up, the class structure in society had already undergone great changes. Of course the influence of petty bourgeoisie thinking will still exist.

The "Cultural Revolution" was started and led by Comrade Mao Zedong. Would you say that the set of theories and policies of Comrade Mao Zedong were representative of the petty bourgeoisie? Did they represent individual peasants, individual woolen workers? Would this make any sense? He said that the peasants after the cooperative movement would at all times give rise to capitalism and the bourgeoisie, with which conclusion can we then say that this represents the bourgeoisie? During the period of the "Cultural Revolution" many people took up anarchism and ultra-democracy, which one may say is an expansion of petty bourgeoisie thinking. Under those given conditions the tail of the petty bourgeoisie once again raised up. But during the "Cultural Revolution" Comrade Mao Zedong still said that we want to get the petty bourgeoisie on the track of the proletariat. It would certainly be nonsense to say that the "Cultural Revolution" represented the benefit of the petty bourgeoisie.

Comrade [Hu] Qiaomu has said, to say that Lin Biao and the "Gang of Four" represented the capitalists is also ridiculous. This statement might be a little difficult to understand. If you think back for a moment about the history of that time it will be clearer. Break up the old, set up the new, old cadres were rectified and struggled, the land rich reverted to the bad right, and the old industries and enterprises went backwards a step. The fixed interest payments that had not stopped for a long time were stopped during this period. Did that kind of activity represent capitalist benefits? If the "Cultural Revolution" represented capitalist benefits, shouldn't past capitalists and rich peasants have united together for firm support. I at least have never heard of such a thing, where it is said that the original capitalists and rich peasants of a certain area took advantage the "Cultural Revolution," or wanted to go back to their factories, or to go back to their land. Even in Shanghai, which was under the control of the "Gang of Four," I never heard of any policies enacted for the benefit of capitalists, or that this or that scheme had been proposed to benefit the capitalists. As for saying that they would work to collapse our socialism, this would be of benefit to capitalists and is another question. We do not want to go fight on the basis of concepts. If we look into actual life and reflect on the facts of the time, we could then understand what Comrade Qiaomu has said. Then, what social forces did Lin Biao and Jiang Qing actually stand for, what social clique did they represent? The "Resolution" has clearly stated that they were opportunists, careerists, schemers, that they were the dregs of society in collusion together to constitute their factionalist power. Some of these

people came from workers and peasants, some from students and organization cadres, with old cadres, what might be called those who had sold their souls. The goal of these people was to usurp leadership authority. In order to usurp this leadership authority they used whatever methods were of advantage. They adopted feudalistic dictatorship, and they adopted the anarchism of the petty bourgeoisie. Of course, in the analysis of anarchism there is still the question: was it only the petty bourgeoisie who had anarchism and the capitalists then not have anarchism? Marxism states that there is government within individual enterprises of capitalism, but the entire society has an anarchist attitude. With the goal of usurping leadership authority this band of Lin Biao and Jiang Qing were a completely unprincipled clique. Comrade Qiaomu once said that because this group were ultra-independent social dregs, if you look closely at a factory or a production brigade or an organization there will be a finite number, but when these people overstep their own units, their own areas and link together, and then they organize larger groups, getting into this, getting into that, taking authority here, taking authority there, that leads to the break up of social order. Therefore we say that it wasn't without a social base, but this social base cannot be explained simply by the petty bourgeoisie and the capitalists.

The fourth question is whether or not party history should be more detailed.

I don't feel that this is a problem. The Central Committee has stipulated the policy that it ought to be rough rather than detailed. By this they do not mean that correct assessments are not to be made concerning important historical events and important historical figures, but rather that details need not be overstated. At the beginning Comrade Deng Xiaoping proposed that the "Historical Resolution" not exceed 20,000 characters, that it was enough just to make assessments of important historical questions. Right now there are actually 35,000 characters, which greatly exceeds the original limit. This "Resolution" may of course not be used in place of party historical research. We cannot say that having a 1945 "Resolution" and adding to it one from 1981 thus completes the task of research into party history. We must carry out further research. Recently, the Research Office for party history has produced a preliminary draft of a record of major events in sixty years of party history, in 120,000 characters. This was arranged by Comrade [Hu] Qiaomu. The draft has already been preliminarily worked out. Whether there is this record of major events, will research into party history be considered finished? We cannot say it like that. We ought to continue research on the basis of the record of major events in party history, and some years hence should above all write the party history of the Chinese Communist Party. In my opinion, from the point of view of length, we will need at least more than 300,000 characters, and of course will still be a rather concise work. On the basis of character count, more than 300,000 characters would exceed the current "Resolution" by nine or ten times. When the length is greater this cannot be just by adding some empty words, but should be a systematic study of our entire 60 year history. We should write a true and tenable masterpiece that can be passed on to later generations. To have this kind of work many problems still need continued study. Be it the 1945 "Resolution" or the current one, as long as we resolve a few major problems, these major problems will not develop further. The section on the "Cultural Revolution" has been written well and was written from beginning to end by Comrade Qiaomu last July

and went through a few revisions to become its present form. Aside from Lin Biao and "Gang of Four" elements, they are all people of integrity, and it includes both comrades who were attacked and comrades who made mistakes during the "Cultural Revolution," as long as they were people who could think of the party and the people. All feel that this portion has been well written and that it resolves many major questions. When the party history is written in the future, those ten years will take that portion of the "Resolution" as their basis. But we must not stop at the current wording. There are still many questions that must be studied in detail and thoroughly discussed. I was talking recently with Comrade Qiaomu and we offered a few topics. One was "The Biography of Mao Zedong." This was proposed in 1977. At the same time, "The Biography of Zhou Enlai" and "The Biography of Zhu De" were also proposed. In addition would be a work especially written on the history of the "Cultural Revolution," where many questions would be truly and clearly written, which would also require 2 or 300,000 characters. Also, the ten years before the "Cultural Revolution," the seven years after the establishment of the PRC, and the not quite five years from the breakup of the "Gang of Four" until now. I think that with these two "Resolutions" we have a direction and guides for the writing of party history. But even studying party history under the leadership of that guide, researching the various periods and questions of all aspects will still be a very difficult task.

Comrade Qiaomu asked me to look at the record of major events in party history. I have looked it over several times. Among my impressions are the questions, how do we distinguish party history from revolutionary history?, how should we distinguish party history from modern history? The two cannot be separated but ought to be distinguished as each has its particular emphasis. This is just my impression. You have already put a great deal of effort into this record of major events. But to make a record of the major events in party history, and to write a party history based upon it, we must diligently consider how to distinguish it from modern history, as well as how to join with it. Because the object of research is after all the history of the party. The wording of the current record of major events is insufficiently party oriented, nor is it sufficiently oriented toward party history. How should this problem be best solved? I can only make a preliminary suggestion. Comrade Qiaomu has also said that haven't we now written a "Resolution"? It has been long proposed that we will write a history of the PRC. How shall a history of the PRC be linked to the 32 year history of our party, and how shall it be distinguished? Where do the individual objects differ, and where are they similar? This requires diligent study and diligent handling, and we cannot write the two types as if they were one.

2. A Few Particular Questions

The questions above were of a general nature. You have also brought up some particular questions.

The first question: the current "Resolution" states that the Zunyi Meeting established the leadership position of Comrade Mao Zedong in the Red Army and

the Party Central Committee, whereas the 1945 "Resolution" says that it began a new leadership with Comrade Mao Zedong at the head. Is there any difference?

I looked into the 1945 "Resolution," and actually there are two places and two phrasings. One phrasing goes: in the final period of the revolutionary struggle that was finally succeeding, our party established the leadership of Comrade Mao Zedong in the Central Committee and for the whole party. It doesn't mention the Zunyi Meeting here, but rather the final period of the ten year Civil War. Another phrasing speaks of the Zunyi Meeting, which says, this meeting began the new leadership of the Central Committee with Comrade Mao Zedong. We read through certain historical materials in the process of drafting the current "Resolution," and based upon these materials once wrote that the Zunyi Meeting truly established the leadership position of Comrade Mao Zedong in the Red Army and the Central Committee. When we had sent it to Comrade Deng Xiaoping to look at he said that he understood this thing. Because he was secretary-general of the CPC Central Committee at the time of the Zunyi Meeting, he attended the meeting. He said that it would be better to drop the word "truly." He said that after the Zunyi Meeting Comrade Mao Zedong played a leading role in the whole party. Marching the troops at that time, Comrade Mao Zedong was together with Comrades Zhou Enlai and Zhang Wentian. Each day when they stopped they would await telegrams from each unit, even waiting until deep in the night before they would determine the movements of the Red Army based on the telegrams. For major questions it was usually Comrade Mao Zedong who came up with ideas and the other comrades who agreed. Even if in name he was not a general secretary or chairman of the Military Commission, his direction of the troops and even policies on important questions were acknowledged by the other leaders. Comrades Zhu De, Zhou Enlai, Zhang Wentian, and Wang Jiaxiang took the whole situation into mind, and in the case of policies truly in the Party spirit, as long as the ideas of Comrade Mao Zedong were correct they would unanimously support him and resolutely carry them out. Therefore, if we want to talk about the basis of this question it is just that. And that is as Comrade Deng Xiaoping saw it with his own eyes.

The second question: How does one characterize the revolution during which we confiscated bureaucrat capital as told in "Seven Years for the Fundamental Completion of the Socialist Transformation"?

When Comrade Mao Zedong was reading the Soviet book "Textbook of Political Economics" there was an explanation that said that it is the nature of a democratic revolution to confiscate bureaucrat, comprador capital, and that it is the nature of a socialist revolution to expropriate the big bourgeoisie. In the current explanation by Comrade Qiaomu, although we did not directly address this question we still consider that the target of the new democratic revolution was the three great enemies, one among which was bureaucratic capitalism. Beginning with "On the New Democracy," we said in regard to operation of capitalist enterprises in the national economy and people's livelihood that we wanted to take back state enterprise, that it could not be monopolized by a minority. This was a task of the new democratic revolution. The bureaucratic capitalists who represented this system were the target of that revolution. By "Lecture at a Meeting of Jinsui Cadre" a formula had been created: the new democratic revolution is a revolution led by the proletariat, is of the great masses, and opposes imperialism, feudalism, and bureaucratic capitalism. For the uniformity of our theoretical explanation, Comrade Qiaomu felt that it would still be better if the confiscation of bureaucrat capital came under the character of the new democratic revolution. I agree with the opinion of Comrade Qiaomu.

The third question is what was the basis of the general line for the transition period?

The "Resolution" writes about the historical necessity that it reflects, and that is the basis. On this question our theoretical framework has been that a small number of comrades have recently been writing this and that kind of article in which they claim that our socialist transformation was begun too early, that it was not done well, and that the period of new democracy ought to have been extended or that we should now go back and give it another chance. This kind of article can be seen in public publications. And it was precisely because there were these opinions that we urged that the "Resolution" add more content concerning the historical necessity of the general line. Comrade Qiaomu has said recently that we ought to write a dedicated volume, perhaps several, demonstrating the complete necessity of the three great transformations, their absolute inevitability, and their total correctness. The outline for the dissemination of the general line said that it was a transition from a new democratic society to a socialist society. The current "Resolution" reads that it implemented a change from new democracy to socialism, so how are we to understand this? I would ask that you take notice of four characters that were added to the first part of Comrade Hu Yaobang's 1 July speech, where it says that we have brought about a change in our society from new democracy to socialism. This has altered the wording of a comment in Comrade Mao Zedong's "The High Tide of China's Rural Socialism," where it said that we have brought about a change from capitalism to socialism. It is my feeling that the wording in the "Resolution" quite fits the facts. After the establishment of the PRC we set up a new democratic political authority and put a new democratic program into practice, which was the common program. Continuing to complete the tasks that the new democratic revolution did not

finish, that is a transformation that confiscated bureaucrat capital and carried out large scale land reform in the newly liberated areas. Of course at this time we had already partially begun the preliminary socialist transformation, but the complete undertaking of the socialist transformation was an event after the proposal of the general line.

Some of you have said, that in the section on "A Basic Appraisal of the 32 Year History Since the Establishment of the PRC" it says that, generally speaking, the history since the establishment of the PRC has been a history of carrying out the socialist revolution and socialist construction. Are there contradictions between this wording and that of a change from new democracy to socialism? I say that there are no real contradictions because here it says "generally speaking," which includes that sense. The first three years were still a period of completing the new democratic revolution, but at the same time it partially began a socialist transformation. In 1951 we promulgated the first resolution on rural mutual aid and cooperation, and also began to put into effect the initial form of the national capitalist policy toward capitalist industries, the practice of placing state orders with private enterprises.

The fourth question: Why is it said that the ten years preceding the "Cultural Revolution" saw the beginning of overall construction of socialism. Since it was the beginning of overall construction, why were there so many setbacks, like the "Great Leap Forward" and "Anti-Rightism." Are there places in this wording that do not fit actual circumstances?

In my understanding there are no places that do not accord with reality. You probably all remember that before and after the Spring Festival in 1958 there was the Nanning Meeting, which criticized the premature advancement of Comrades Zhou Enlai and Chen Yun. At present this criticism appears to have been incorrect. This meeting proposed a general line, and also proposed that the core of our work ought to shift to the technological revolution. The Nanning Meeting was the first to stress the development of regional industry. Not only would the Central Committee plan for the development of industry, but each province, city, and autonomous area would run its own regional industry, striving so that after several years the proportion of area industry would exceed that of agriculture. An extension of that was the Beidaihe Meeting, with its doubling of steel and everybody making steel. There followed the everybody take up transportation, open up mines, everybody sing, everybody write poetry, everybody get into education, everybody take up this, everybody take up that. That was already after the Anti-Rightist Struggle. Comrade Mao Zedong felt that the Anti-Rightist Struggle was victorious and that we ought to be constructing. Although the Third Plenary Session of the Eighth Party Congress restated that contradictions between the proletariat and the capitalists were the chief contradictions, the wording was changed from that of the 8th Party Congress, but in actual practice it may be said that the effect of this wording on actual work was not great. The Anti-Rightist Struggle was necessary, but the problem was that it expanded. As the "Resolution" says, it was in fact partly in error. It was not correct to change the wording of the Eighth Party Congress, but from 1958 to the first half of 1959, as everyone can recall, who at that time was still carrying on the struggle of the proletariat and the capitalists? Wasn't everyone using

all their energy in the "Great Leap Forward," while the whole party had shifted to construction. As to practicing subjectivism, impatient advancement, and moving ahead without evaluating abilities, that is due to the lack of experience and leftist errors during construction. As Comrade Chen Yun has said, these were errors of the main body. But one cannot because of all this say that at that time we did not begin overall construction. The "Great Leap Forward" was rebuffed and ran into trouble, and Comrade Mao Zedong's concerns shifted to class struggle, but the main forces of the party at large were engaged in economic work. The eight character policy was proposed in 1960, and a large-scale readjustment was begun in 1962. By 1965 and 1966, the economy had not only recovered but had begun new development. The period of readjustment rectified errors in actual work, but leftist errors that had been pointed out in ideology were not thoroughly corrected. As the "Resolution" states, on the question of class struggle, the errors of Comrade Mao Zedong gradually increased. There were two upheavals, one of which was "focus on class struggle," which disrupted economic construction. Another was great fluctuation in economic indexes. In my individual opinion, the great upheaval before the "Cultural Revolution" was chiefly that the economic indexes did not fit actual conditions and were not done according to the overall balance as said by Comrade Chen Yun. On the problem of class struggle, the 1959 Anti-Rightist Struggle interrupted the course of the economic rectification of leftist errors, which caused the errors to go on in time, which we ought to say was overall in nature. In addition, and just as it says in the "Resolution," although the mistaken views of Comrade Mao Zedong at the 10th Plenary Session of the 8th Party Congress developed, and had an effect on actual work, the effect on that part was of a partial nature. Industrial production dropped three times during the "Cultural Revolution: after 1967 to 1971, in 1974, and in 1976. These fluctuations were caused by "focusing on class struggle." It was publicly announced at the Third Plenary Session that after the basic completion of the socialist transformation the Party and Comrade Mao Zedong repeatedly asked the whole party to shift the focus of work to economic aspects and to the aspect of the technological revolution. Comrades Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai did a great deal in leading us in socialist modernization, in which they made great accomplishments, but after which they were cut short and destroyed by Lin Biao and the "Gang of Four. It also says, "In addition, because we lacked experience in socialist construction, there were some deficiencies and errors in the area of work direction that obstructed completion of the party's change in work focus. As was said as well in the "Report on Government Work" by Comrade Hua Guofeng at the Second Session of the Fifth People's Congress, that primarily because of the damage done by Lin Biao and the "Gang of Four" and also errors that were committed at various times in work leadership, the advantages of socialism were not able to develop thoroughly and fully effectively. The errors in work leadership mentioned here include the errors in class struggle of Comrade Mao Zedong. In fact, he basically did not pay attention to economic work after 1958. This is related to his estimates of domestic classes and the conditions of class struggle.

Question five is how do we evaluate the Three Red Banners and the Organization Into People's Communes movements?

Actually, who first brought up the Three Red Banners? We have looked and looked and haven't been able to discover clearly. The Lushan Meeting proposed the three "long lives!": long live the general line, long live the Great Leap Forward, and long live the people's communes. It was gradually after that that the Three Red Banners was proposed. Before the mass rally of 7,000 people Comrade Mao Zedong had said several times that we should drop the phrase Three Red Banners. The reasoning at the time was, how can those three be put together? The "Great Leap Forward" and the people's communes were products of the general line. The "Great Leap Forward" and the people's communes could only have been launched once there was a general line. The "Resolution" has already assessed the errors of the "Great Leap Forward." Several areas in the "Resolution" have also evaluated the movement to organize into people's communes. As in the discussions of rectifying the five unhealthy tendencies, reorganization of the countryside, and formulation of the sixty provisions. Because troubles occurred in the movement to organize into people's communes, which was why the sixty provisions for the people's communes were formulated. When discussing the historical significance of the 3rd Plenary Session of the 11th Party Congress it says that after the 3rd Plenary Session, the Party diligently remedied faults in rural work since the latter period of agricultural cooperativization. This also makes clear that there were deficiencies in the cooperative movement.

This serves as well to answer these kinds of questions: at the same time that the "Resolution" confirms the three great transformations it brings out the problems in that latter period of those three transformations, that it was too rushed, too rough, too quick, and too simplified, and that it was inappropriate for the utilization and handling of some of the original industries, all of which actually existed. Writing about these things is still in keeping with the series of policies adopted after the 3rd Plenary Session. A problem arises here: in evaluating the three great transformations we say that the achievements were brilliant, the policies were correct, but that it also had these deficiencies. We are now again implementing many changes, so in order to bring them closer to perfection, are there after all any deficiencies, and after all how are we understand these things? Comrade Hu Yaobang presented an idea in a talk before the military and political working conference. The three transformations, and especially the socialist transformation of agriculture, transformed the private ownership of production materials into public ownership, which for this problem is entirely correct. After the establishment of public ownership, we made a series of leftist errors in the area of management and administration, which were not corrected for a long time. After the 3rd Plenary Session we went to work on correcting the troubles in that respect and were quite successful. What we have called the confirmation of the three transformations is simply a confirmation that we transformed private ownership of production materials to public ownership of production materials, one kind being national, another being collective, and in this respect we cannot waver. This analysis by Comrade Hu Yaobang is completely in accordance with the facts. The shortcomings of some comrades in theoretical circles lie in their belief that because we implemented this and that policy after the 3rd Plenary Session, they look skeptically at the past, even repudiating the transformation of private ownership of production materials to that of public ownership. They consider this wrong and that wrong. The significance of the socialist transformation of agriculture is

extremely great. China has little land and many people. Before the socialist transformation, and even these days after the socialist transformation, land has always made up a very important part of the materials of production. Had we not begun a transformation at that time, land would still be privately owned and there would have unavoidably appeared what in fact had already appeared at that time, the phenomena of renting out land, mortgaging land, selling land, and buying land. Had we allowed those kinds of conditions to persist until today, it is hard to imagine that the breakup of the rural classes would have reached the extent it has at present. Most peasants have lost their lands and a small portion have pooled it, but now they cannot practice the household responsibility system even if they want to. So on this question, we need to distinguish clearly what should be approved and what should be corrected. We have put into practice the production responsibility system, broadened the autonomy of the production brigades, and instituted a linking of planned output with remuneration, household production, and even assumption of total responsibility, all of which belongs under the transformation of the management system on the basis of publicly owned production materials. If we draw conclusions from this and say that land ought also to be private or that the past practice of public ownership is wrong, then that is incorrect. The Central Committee has never approved of dividing up the land for individual farming. They have stated that each area must be aware and must not allow household responsibility and total responsibility to slip into division of land for individual farming. Some areas actually have had this happen. Some comrades have said that in those places they divided the land and farmed individually but with poor results, and went back to the responsibility system.

I recently took a trip to Shijiazhuang and saw in the outskirts there a production team from a collective that has been economically stable. Income for each person last year averaged 270 yuan and had reached 300 this year. Each family and each household had running water. For meals they had plenty of hot food. A large number of new houses were going up. Although the old houses weren't bad they were torn down for new. Certain key portions of old houses were made of brick, the rest being mud brick, but now the mud bricks have been taken down and everything is brick. Someone in each house wears a watch, and there are usually two or more bicycles. They said that labor wages in the city were 40 to 50 yuan a month and that people from the city had come looking for youth to work there, but to no avail. They took on specialized contracts as well, and the system of linking output to remuneration. One way is with wheat, another is with corn. They feel that using that kind of system the cadre is well served and that relations between the cadre and the group are better than before. Most enlightening for me was when a man who was an instructor at an agricultural machinery station there told me of a situation. He said that the current rural labor force is largely 20 to 40 year olds, people who have never had experience in individual farming, people who have grown up within the collective experience. If we were now to divide up land and give it to them, ask them to individually establish households and manage farming individually, they just would not know how. There, they have collectively cultivated individual plots for years. On this occasion when they talked it over, whether or not they should hand out the private plots to individual households, they were unanimous in their refusal. Why? They gave a reason: an individual farmer must be able to keep accounts, must understand

planting technology, and most laborers today don't have that kind of ability. What's more, when they figured out individual financial accounts and the daily income they could manage on a private plot, it wasn't as good as sharing one's day's income from collective labor. And the income from their production brigade's industrial sidelines exceeded that of any production team they had heard of, being more than 50 percent. With one man-day there are those who can command 1 yuan 2 mao a day, although few reach this level. But it serves as a model. I am not saying that based on this experience we should not allow private plots. If peasants still demand this we ought to allow it. As for the household responsibility, none of the brigade wanted to do it. Looking back, after private ownership of production materials had changed to public ownership that allowed a stable base for our rural collective economy. Now even this aspect is wavering, which obviously does not suit the desires of the peasants.

The sixth question concerns the reasons for the "Cultural Revolution."

The "Resolution" has made a brief analysis of how we should view the reasons that produced the "Cultural Revolution" and that kept it going for ten years. From its inception the theory and policies of the "Cultural Revolution" had already formed a system. There were two additional reasons in addition to the direct cause being errors under the leadership of Comrade Mao Zedong. I am generalizing somewhat as in fact these two reasons include eight levels of significance, each having four. In order to allow the reader to read more smoothly the "Resolution" discusses one level at a time, but life and society are definitely not that way. The meaning of several levels and the reasons for various aspects crisscross and effect each other, connect with each other, and having combined together then created these conditions, enabling the "Cultural Revolution" to occur and to go on for as long as ten years. Because we were limited in length this question could only be mentioned briefly, and many questions that need to be opened up and discussed have all been pressed within some 1000 characters. Therefore, Comrade Qiaomu said that this section really needs to be unfolded further and fully expounded, in the end respectively writing several articles that open up demonstrations and are persuasive, and which include continued further investigation of certain questions.

To better carry out our inquiry into the reasons for the "Cultural Revolution," we must, in addition to undertaking deeper research into the actual conditions of the "Cultural Revolution," restudy the scientific methods with which Marxism analyzes historical phenomena. I suggest that you conscientiously read Engels' 1890 letter to Joseph Bloch [London, Sept 21-22].

Engels first points out that "the ultimately determining element in the historical process is the production and reproduction of real life. But we cannot say that economic factors are the only determining factors. The economic situation is the basis, but the various elements of the superstructure--political forms of the class struggle and its results, to wit: constitutions established by the victorious class after a successful battle, etc., juridical forms, and even the reflexes of all these actual struggles in the brains of the participants, political, juristic, philosophical theories, religious views, and their further development into systems of dogmas--also exercise their influence upon the course of the historical struggles and in many cases preponderate in determining their form." Then he says, "We make our history ourselves, but, in the first place, under very definite assumptions and conditions." This demands that before we analyze the birth of the "Cultural Revolution," [we know] what were the existing premises and conditions in our party, in our country, and even in the world at large. The eight reasons in the "Resolution" briefly state under what conditions the "Cultural Revolution" occurred and after its occurrence, continued for as long as ten years. To understand the eight levels of significance within the two reasons and develop and demonstrate these significances we must respect the method Engels has spoken of. The above is the first point.

Engels also said, "history is made in such a way that the final result always arises from conflicts between many individual wills, . ." Each person has his own will, and each group has a will of its own, and each unit has its own

will. Individual wills conflict, "of which each in turn has been made what it is by a host of particular conditions of life. Thus there are innumerable intersecting forces, an infinite series of parallelograms of forces which give rise to one resultant--the historical event. This may again itself be viewed as the product of a power which works as a whole unconsciously and without volition. For what each individual wills is obstructed by everyone else, and what emerges is something that no one willed. Thus history has proceeded hitherto in the manner of a natural process and is essentially subject to the same laws of motion. But from the fact that the wills of individuals--each of whom desires what he is impelled to by his physical constitution and external, in the last resort economic, circumstances (either his own personal circumstances or those of society in general)--do not attain what they want, but are merged into an aggregate mean, a common resultant, it must not be concluded that they are equal to zero. On the contrary, each contributes to the resultant and is to this extent included in it."

It is very enlightening to refer to this passage in studying the occurrence of the "Cultural Revolution" and the process and results of the "Cultural Revolution," and it allows us to understand many questions. Comrade Qiaomu has said, if Comrade Mao Zedong were alive I would very much like to ask him: what goal after all did you intend to reach by instigating the "Cultural Revolution." He said that in his estimation it would be difficult for Comrade Mao Zedong to answer clearly. Because of the development of the "Cultural Revolution" it was very much different from the original idea of Comrade Mao Zedong. To talk of the time involved, he originally expected half a year, and later said that in a year it could be entirely concluded. He would never have expected that it would go on and on until even with his death it wouldn't end. Looking at facts from the past and at conditions during the "Cultural Revolution," he wanted to resolve the problem of Comrade Liu Shaoqi. As to how he would resolve it, his original idea was completely different from later consequences. The 11th Plenary Session of the 8th Party Congress had readjusted the position of Comrade Liu Shaoqi. Comrade Liu Shaoqi made a self-criticism at this meeting. When Comrade Mao Zedong saw this self-criticism he had one comment, that the self-criticism was all right. He wanted to bring Comrade Liu Shaoqi down a little and make him admit to his mistakes, and so later in the Party Central Committee would not be of much use. The goal of Comrade Mao Zedong was very clear. But to accuse him of being a traitor, a spy, and a scab was not his original idea. Later facts showed that this was certainly created by the false witnesses of Jiang Qing and her cronies. Comrade Mao Zedong's thinking was influenced by the wills of Lin Biao, Jiang Qing, and her group, and the results of that influence was not the criticism of Comrade Liu Shaoqi that Comrade Mao Zedong had originally intended. In order to punish Comrade Liu Shaoqi he needed to rely on a force, and after selecting here and selecting there, he picked Lin Biao. Throughout their history Lin Biao and Comrade Mao Zedong had had many arguments. Especially during the War of Liberation, and whether or not to attack Jinzhou on the Northeast battleground, should they fight to the exterior lines, and on the Pingjin campaign, on the advance how they should split the troops and what measures they should take. Lin Biao's attitude toward this was that of course Comrade Mao Zedong should know. Later he said, We really had our arguments but we still carried on! Lin Biao was really behind the affair concerning Gao Gang, which Comrade Mao Zedong was aware of. Then why after all did he choose

Lin Biao? Comrade Mao Zedong has also said, the given period of adulation of an individual will be momentary. At the 7,000 person mass rally in 1962, everyone criticized this and that error and only Lin Biao gave a speech, in which he said that in summing up experience in going forward since the Party was founded and until today, when the line of Chairman Mao has not been disturbed we have then been victorious in everything, but when the line of Chairman Mao has been interfered with, then we have suffered setbacks or even defeat. Lin Biao was being a political opportunist, later greatly advocating and especially advocating the study of Comrade Mao Zedong's works and the compilation of his quotations as "the highest instructions." Comrade Mao Zedong wanted to demote Comrade Liu Shaoqi and start the "Cultural Revolution," and wanted his set of values to be practiced, and therefore needed a man like Lin Biao. On 18 May 1966 gave the aforementioned speech. Comrade Mao Zedong said, the trouble with that kind of talk is that it doesn't touch upon the Party, nor the masses, and the whole thing is about a coup. He was quite surprised and dissatisfied with Lin Biao. But since he realized that Liu Shaoqi had to be brought down it was a question of choosing between the two. His choice was the choice of Comrade Mao Zedong himself, but it cannot be said that there was no basis within the party. Take me, for example. I did not know of the arguments between Lin Biao and Comrade Mao Zedong and felt that Lin Biao was not only politically acceptable but knew how to fight as well. To govern well this country of China, this Chinese party, it is not enough to understand only politics and not military affairs. Based on my contacts, many people of the time felt this way. One cannot say that this choice by Comrade Mao Zedong did not reflect the views of a good number of people about Lin Biao. Especially when in 1963 the "First among four" came out, which Mao Zedong appreciated even more. But in the end Lin Biao wanted a coup d'etat and even sought to secretly harm Comrade Mao Zedong, and I do not think that Comrade Mao Zedong had any idea. Lin Biao was crushed. On this question the results of the conflict of many individual and independent opinions are quite different from the original intention of Comrade Mao Zedong. Each person has his own view, but the final results of the conflicts are completely opposed to the original intention and some are very greatly different. The Red Guards of the "Cultural Revolution" rushed around left and right, the majority stimulated by love of the Party, by trust in Comrade Mao Zedong. But developments in the movement, his original intentions, and the thinking of a great number of people were all different from one another, and so some became an unrestrained faction. Even at the event at Tiananmen, among those rising to mourn for Vice Premier Zhou and denounce the "Gang of Four," were a great many who had been Red Guards in the early period of the "Cultural Revolution." Were their actions in keeping with their thinking when they first joined the "Cultural Revolution"? And if not the same, did they come up with the idea themselves, thinking that they would first join up and then oppose it? Not likely. This is where the complicated process of struggle leads to conflicts and changes in thinking, and that changes only after instruction from reality. Later Comrade Mao Zedong himself was faced with the resultant of forces from this period and that, formed by the crisscrossing of forces and mutual influences, wherein one meets with a problem and solves a problem thinking that after that resolution everything will be fine. One doesn't expect that after solving this problem new ones will arise until there is a state wherein one is oneself effected. He said before he died: I have only done two things in my life. For this last one few will approve and many

will not. This is the opposite of his thinking at the beginning of the "Cultural Revolution." This is the result created by resultant of forces and reflects what was going on in his mind, finally realizing that many would oppose him. So how has it turned out? It would seem as if as in the carnage of war one turns it over to the next group, what happens after one's death can only be known by God. So it is that the developments of history are truly subtle and are seldom within the expectations of many people. This is an irresistible rule of history reflected by the resultant of forces. Although the results that finally appear are those that no one hoped for, rules of history are still playing their role. Even as grand a figure as Comrade Mao Zedong cannot violate the rules of history. Comrade Mao Zedong committed serious mistakes during the "Cultural Revolution," bringing much misfortune to the Party, the state, and the people. This has been for violating the rules of history. Therefore, it received different forms of resistance from both the Party and the people. When the "Resolution" writes of the struggle of difficulties and setbacks in this aspect, it points out that this kind of struggle gave a certain degree of limitation to the damage of the "Cultural Revolution." At the same time, it also affirmed the positive role played by Comrade Mao Zedong during the "Cultural Revolution." Our party continued to maintain unity, the government and military were still able to carry out necessary work, the nature of our society did not change, etc., none of which can be separated from the great role of Comrade Mao Zedong. This is because the role that he played in this respect was in keeping with the rules of history. Comrade Mao Zedong wanted to topple a large group of cadres that had been educated by him, and which included a large group of old revolutionaries. But the masses saw from their own actual experience that there was nothing wrong with those who had been deposed, that Lin Biao was evil, Jiang Qing was too, and they turned around to sympathize with those who had been deposed. During the period they were deposed they had truly thought things over carefully, and had truly and honestly criticized themselves. Comrade Zhou Yang said it best when he said that when during the deposed period Jiang Qing said that he was a traitor, that he was of the two-faced faction, that he was a counterrevolutionary revisionist, he did not care in the least, for each time that he was criticized and thought over his errors, they could be summed up in one sentence, that he felt deeply that he had not lived up to the training and education of Comrade Mao Zedong. It was just this sort of person who, after the death of Comrade Mao Zedong, rectified those errors. This was something that Comrade Mao Zedong had not expected, but it was precisely in keeping with the rules of history.

The seventh question, how do we understand the domestic effect from international anti-revisionism?

When researching the reasons for the "Cultural Revolution," Comrade [Hu] Qiaomu said, had there not been an international anti-revisionism, it would have been very difficult to propose the domestic task of anti-revisionism and revisionism prevention. This was one of the very important reasons for the initiation of the "Cultural Revolution." Why did the "Resolution" not write about international anti-revisionism, but wrote only of opposition to the Soviet great-nation chauvinism? We need to consider something here. Had we so written under the conditions of the time, that would have led to an unnecessary international misunderstanding. In order to avoid this kind of

misunderstanding we sidestepped this question. The draft that was submitted to the plenary session discussed this, saying that during the sixties we began an international struggle against revisionism and hegemonism. We used narrative methods, not adding evaluations, never confirming that it was correct or in error, never analyzing. When the plenary session had discussed it, it said, this kind of language is of course factual, but in reality international anti-revisionism creates tension in lives both within the country and within the party. But if you only say it this way, you have not said which part of that sixties international struggle against revisionism was correct and which part was not correct. For example, our Yugoslav comrades might think that that we still consider as correct our criticism of Yugoslavia at that time as revisionist. Comrade Deng Xiaoping talked with Planinc when he visited China and said that what has past is past and that we do not consider that we have always been correct in international anti-revisionism. It would seem that you, too, cannot say you have always been correct! Planinc appreciated those words. Comrade Deng Xiaoping then said, all right, since we feel this way about it, let's let the things of the past pass. With this in mind, the "Resolution" then deleted those words about anti-revisionism in the original. The remainder opposes hegemonism. Comrades have said, at that time, when we were in opposition to the Soviet Union we did not call it hegemonism. It would not be in keeping with the original appearance of history if we use the current way of speaking to express the significance of our debate with the Soviet Union at that time. This is in fact a problem. But then, should we phrase it as socialist imperialism? That wouldn't be appropriate. Because this label of socialist imperialism was not put on the Soviets until the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, it would not be fitting with the original appearance of history to speak of opposing socialist imperialism. Therefore, we wrote about opposing great-nation chauvinism. This phrase, great-nation chauvinism, was used after [character illegible] and the Bo-xiong incident, and is correct even today. This was a method adopted in consideration of the current international effect. And we must think in this way.

So, then, how ought we view the anti-revisionist struggle of the sixties? On the point of principle, we cannot say that it was completely in error, nor may we say that it was entirely correct, for there were aspects of it that were both correct and incorrect. Where was it correct? In its opposition to their great-nation chauvinism, their party of paternalism, and to interference in the internal affairs of other countries, these were all correct, and we want to maintain these things in the future. Then what policies, after all, should we adopt toward this question of revisionism? Simply speaking, it is that the policies, principles, and line implemented within each party and within each country, be they right or wrong, be they Marxist or revisionist, they should be evaluated by their party comrades and the people within the country according to their actual practice and experience. Other parties should not meddle and say that the line you have taken up is Marxist or is revisionist, or that the domestic policies that a country employs are correct or mistaken. We may even say that we are without the authority to make those evaluations. If we were to evaluate in that way it would be very difficult to be accurate. But in the case of one party to another, of one socialist country to another socialist or other country, if there is interference in other people's internal affairs, if one has paternalistic party policies, if one wants people

to do things this way, to do things that way, even to get involved in subversive activities when others do not do it your way, even to the point of sending troops, applying political and diplomatic pressures to change the parties of others, and to change the policies of other people's countries, as with the Soviet Union to Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union to Afghanistan, the Soviet Union to this and that party, a set of policies that had been adopted in the past and continues to be so today, then other parties have the authority to criticize, then all have the authority to make judgments based on their own views, and have the authority to say that here you have erred, these are socialist imperialist policies, these are expansionist policies, that these are policies of hegemony, you here have invaded others, you here have oppressed others, you here have departed from Marxism. It is exactly in accordance with these points that we continue today to criticize the hegemonistic policies of the Soviet Union, and continue to maintain that they are socialist imperialists. There are no errors in this. We will continue to criticize and to struggle in this way. In giving them the label of socialist imperialists Comrade Deng Xiaoping was right on the mark. We want to respect the following principle in regard to other parties and other countries: we cannot interfere with the affairs of other people's parties and cannot interfere with domestic affairs in other countries. When fraternal parties exchange opinions on an equal basis and provide suggestions for mutual consideration, that is proper and is not forced upon others. We even want to strengthen and expand work in exchange of experiences and reciprocal intelligence. We are now developing relations with the parties of Italy, Spain, and Greece, but are prepared to do so with other parties that can accept these principles, and will even develop this kind of relationship with socialist parties.

The eighth question asks whether there is any contradiction between two statements in the "Resolution" where it says on the one hand that regarding the Tiananmen affair, the Political Bureau made a mistaken evaluation, and when it goes on to say that the Political Bureau of the Central Committee broke up the "Gang of Four" as representative of the people's will?

In 1976 the Central Committee issued an official document, which said that the Tiananmen affair was a counterrevolutionary affair. This was issued with the approval of Comrade Mao Zedong. As for Comrade Mao Zedong, this was one of the greatest mistakes of his life. But as we now understand, one of the chief reasons that Comrade Mao Zedong agreed to this judgment was because he was not well at that time. That was the time when Jiang Qing and her group, after having brought down Comrade Deng Xiaoping, took over the power in the Political Bureau. They sent some trumped up materials to Comrade Mao Zedong. Comrade Mao Zedong could only understand conditions through these channels. So, based on prejudiced materials, he made erroneous judgments. Comrade Mao Zedong was responsible, but chief responsibility lay with the Political Bureau of the time. Policy making by this group was largely in keeping with activities of the "Gang of Four." Other comrades and Comrade Deng Xiaoping stood on the sidelines, deposed, and with the health of Comrades Ye Jianying and Li Xiannian not good, they went off to recuperate.

As for the breakup of the "Gang of Four," the old expression was that in one fell swoop "Wise Leader" Comrade Hua Guofeng broke up the "Gang of Four." That has now been changed to read, "The Political Bureau of the Central Committee, carrying out the will of the Party and the people, resolutely broke up the Jiang Qing counterrevolutionary clique." We ought to note, that after the death of Comrade Mao Zedong there were great changes in the Political Bureau. The "Gang of Four" were in the minority, and the majority of the comrades in the Political Bureau opposed the "Gang of Four." So, to say that the Political Bureau implemented the will of the people and the party in breaking up the "Gang of Four" is more in conformance with reality. Regarding this question Comrade Hu Yaobang's speech speaks very clearly. After this has been affirmed, we can then talk about the important roles played by Comrades Hua Guofeng, Ye Jianying, and Li Xiannian. We first emphasized collectivity, and then affirmed the important roles of individuals. At the meeting of the Political Bureau in November of last year, conditions before the breakup of the "Gang of Four" were discussed: in fact, many comrades were discussing and preparing. Even before the death of Comrade Mao Zedong they were already discussing and preparing. During the period of Comrade Mao Zedong's greatest illness Comrade Wang Zhen often went to where Comrade Ye Jianying was for discussions, saying why don't we round up the "Gang of Four," for wouldn't that solve our problems! Comrade Ye Jianying said, the old folks are still around! We can act by majority and solve their problems. But there is still an old one around, does he approve or not? By which he meant, when Comrade Mao Zedong is gone, then we'll talk about it. When Comrade Mao Zedong had passed away, Comrades Chen Yun, Deng Yingchao, and several masters regularly exchanged ideas and discussed methods. Comrade Chen Yun went to speak to Comrade Ye Jianying saying, how are we going to deal with this situation? We must think of something. There have been many discussions among the many cadres and the broad masses. We could even say it will be hard to hold them back.

The "Resolution" speaks of some of the factors involved in the breakup of the "Gang of Four," which although not all together in one place, are still discussed separately. The first, there was a solid mass base; second, Comrade Mao Zedong was not willing to give the highest leadership authority to the "Gang of Four," and criticized and exposed them, and indicated their ambitions; third, there was the collective Central Committee Political Bureau; Fourth, Comrades Hua Guofeng, Ye Jianying, and Li Xiannian played important roles. Only in this way is the analysis complete, and does it accord with historical fact.

The ninth question concerns great turns in the course of events.

There is only one question here. The "Resolution" says, the Third Plenary Session "decisively terminated use of the slogan 'with focus on class struggle' as inappropriate to socialist society, proposing the strategic policy of shifting work emphasis to socialist modernization construction." This question is of extreme importance. If we say of the turning point that was the Third Plenary Session, that the reaffirmation or establishment of an ideological line is a very important problem, then after this ideological line was established, and for now and later generations, we wanted to make an assessment of our social conditions, the conditions of our social classes, and the condition of social contradictions that accords with reality. Those two sentences appear in the "Resolution." But they are actually criticisms by Comrade Mao Zedong before the Third Plenary Session of an analysis of social conditions and class contradictions in our socialist society, which once again affirmatively proposed an assessment that accorded with reality. On the basis of this assessment it determined termination of the use of the slogan "focus on class struggle" and fixed the shift in work focus to socialist modernization construction. We are Marxists, and in determining the policies and principles of each period must analyze the social conditions of the time, and must analyze class conditions at the time and the various social contradictions. Only when these questions have been clearly analyzed and made correct can we make determinations based upon them: what our task is, what our principles are, and what our policies are. Only this kind of policy making can be correct. If we talk about a great turning point of history it is because it has this significance: having corrected the errors of Comrade Mao Zedong on this problem, we return to correct assessments and return to the correct assessments of the 8th Party Congress.

The tenth question concerns Mao Zedong Thought.

The "Resolution" writes clearly of the process of formation of Mao Zedong Thought. Mao Zedong Thought was formed under given conditions. One very important condition included the struggle with dogmatism, and included the kind of struggle that inclines toward sanctification of the Communist International Resolution and the Soviet Economy. When in the sixties our party was debating with the Soviet Union, didn't we run up against the problem of dogma with them? We said that we of the CPC are most effective in opposing dogmatism, so how could you talk about opposing dogmatism in front of us? We really ridiculed them. And this was warranted by the facts. We were earliest and most effective in opposing dogmatism. This was an important contribution

to the Communist movement. Opposition to bookishness is an important component of Mao Zedong Thought. The "Resolution" talks about the gradual formation and development of Mao Zedong Thought during the latter twenties and early thirties, i.e., the ten year period of civil war. Then it says that during the latter part of the Agrarian Revolutionary War and during the War of Resistance Against Japan it reached a systematic summation and many-sided development until reaching maturity. This kind of description is in keeping with the explanation of Comrade Mao Zedong himself. In "Introducing 'The Communist'" he divides into three stages the development of our party and the process of maturation. At the stage of the Great Revolution we were a youthful party, a party that had not completely unified its understanding of the actual practice of the Chinese Revolution and the theories of Marxism-Leninism. The second stage was the ten year Civil War. At this stage we had better learned how to integrate the theories of Marxism-Leninism with the actual practice of the Chinese Revolution. By the third stage, i.e., the stage of the national united front in the War of Resistance Against Japan, when Comrade Mao Zedong wrote this article, this stage was over by three years, and in his words the party had a closer and more unified understanding of the theories of Marxism-Leninism and the actual practice of the Chinese Revolution.

What are the symbols and characteristics of Mao Zedong Thought? I think that this question was answered long ago. What do we mean by Mao Zedong Thought? It is thought that is the integration of the general principles of Marxism-Leninism with the particular actual practice of the Chinese Revolution. Or, as Comrade Liu Shaoqi said, it is thought that is the unification of the two things mentioned. The "Resolution" says, in the primary arguments concerning the "Cultural Revolution," Comrade Mao Zedong left the track of Mao Zedong Thought. What is the track of Mao Zedong Thought? It is the integration of the general principles of Marxism-Leninism with the particular actual experience of the Chinese Revolution. What we call Mao Zedong Thought must be the integration of those two things. In order to well integrate these two things, there must be two basic conditions. One is a very complete understanding of the characteristics of Chinese society and the rules of the Chinese Revolution. In his speech to the mass rally of 7,000, Comrade Mao Zedong said that he had written a few small pamphlets, and these few pamphlets could only have been written after many repetitions of contrasting victory, defeat, more victory, more defeat. Without these many repetitions, without these many comparisons, these books could not have been written. Before the Great Revolution our youthful party had just some ten-odd members. We successfully developed a workers' movement larger than any in China's history, demonstrating the advanced role of our party and our working class on China's political stage. So it was that Sun Yat-sen wanted to cooperate with us. The party's struggle during the Great Revolution failed because of Chen Duxiu's later capitulationism. Then, we walked out on the road of Jinggangshan and the Red Army grew to 300,000, and party members of more than 300,000, more than ten base areas, and broke up the "encirclement" by the KMT. Wasn't this mounting to victory from defeat? With the leftist adventurism of Wang Ming and the defeat of the fifth repulse of "encirclement," there were some 30,000 left of the Red Army 300,000 and 40,000 of the CPC 300,000, and wasn't this another defeat? After the Zunyi Meeting we again became victorious. In victory we saw China, we saw the Chinese Revolution. Only with contrasts this

often and experience this full could the theories of the Chinese Revolution reach maturity. Of course defeat is not good, but defeat cannot be seen completely as a negative thing. As long as we are good at summing up the experiences of defeat they will become valuable wealth for us. Comrade Mao Zedong expanded on the reasoning behind the Western saying that defeat is the mother of success, pointing out that error is always the vanguard of what is right. Of course, Marx and others also emphasized the summation of experiences of defeat. Lenin as well. If one is discouraged over setbacks in a revolution, that kind of revolutionary is not worth anything. True revolutionaries are when, after defeat they sum up experiences, try it again, working even more carefully and more conscientiously. Many times Comrade Mao Zedong said, revolution needs to succeed, we need to recognize the true principles of revolution, and our people and our party will be educated on two levels. To just have education from positive teachers is not enough. We also need education from negative teachers, including education from the commission of mistakes. If we accept education from those two teachers we will mature. I have seldom seen in the books that I have read a discussion this thorough, one that so treasures the lessons of defeat. And on another point, which concerns the problem of the study of Marxism-Leninism, whether it should be more or less. Comrade Mao Zedong was very familiar with Chinese history, Chinese culture, and China's political experiences, and he read conscientiously the books of Marxism-Leninism. But during the period of the Great Revolution, and the ten year Civil War, there was fighting every day and very little time to sit down and read what few books there were. In Yan'an, during the period of the War of Resistance, he read more than before, especially in Marxism-Leninism. He read these books better than most other people. He had himself the comparison of two kinds of experience to which he added better and more convenient conditions under which to study the theories of Marxism-Leninism, and thus was able to have a more unified, deeper understanding of the general principles of Marxism-Leninism and the actual practice of the Chinese Revolution. Only in this way was Mao Zedong thought able to develop comprehensively to reach maturity. It would not have been good to have lacked any of those conditions. The way Comrade Mao Zedong was different from the dogmatists is that he fought dogmatism; and the way in which he differed from the empiricists was that he criticized empiricism. That is why Mao Zedong Thought is a thought that integrates and unifies the general principles of Marxism-Leninism with the actual practice of the Chinese Revolution. He furthered Marxism-Leninism; without integration there would have been no development. During the initial drafting process of the "Resolution," Comrade Deng Xiaoping said, it may be said the Mao Zedong Thought is the theory of the Chinese Revolution, which revolution includes not only the new democratic revolution, but also the socialist revolution and is the theory of the Chinese new democratic revolution and the socialist revolution. This theory has been proven by actual experience to be absolutely correct, and is the application in China of Marxism-Leninism, as well as being at the same time the development in China of that Marxism-Leninism, adding many new things to Marxism-Leninism, and making new contributions. The accomplishments of the Chinese Revolution and the formation of Mao Zedong Thought are events of great significance in the history of the international Communist movement.

In the discussion process concerning the "Resolution," some comrades underestimated the historical position of Mao Zedong Thought in the international Communist movement and among Marxist-Leninist theories. As we talked back and forth about it, it seemed that although Marx said this and said that, Comrade Mao Zedong, however, said it in this way and in that way. Some advanced persons abroad have sometimes seen things more clearly than the aforementioned comrades. A leader from an African country was talking with Comrade Deng Xiaoping on a visit to this country, and said that the works of Marx and Lenin are so many that we cannot read them all, and cannot understand them, and so they are difficult to use. He said that where they were able to be successful was with the first four volumes of "Selected Works of Mao Zedong." So we say that the theories of the Chinese Revolution have world significance. Of course, as Comrade Mao Zedong said again and again, we do not want to boast, nor to force ourselves upon others. During the "Cultural Revolution," Kang Sheng and his group took the acceptance or not of the "Cultural Revolution" and Mao Zedong Thought as an indicator of judgment on parties abroad, which was completely in error, and which was several times criticized by Comrade Mao Zedong. It is impossible to imagine that the theories of Marxism-Leninism would have been successful or have been confirmed in a large country like China, having one-fourth of the world's population, had it not been for the outstanding contributions of Comrade Mao Zedong, and had he not integrated the problems of China with the principles of Marxism-Leninism. Nor would they have been so elaborated, so expounded, or so developed. Did Wang Ming and his like do it this way? Wang Ming caused the defeat of the revolution! Comrade Mao Zedong turned things around and made them work, and was successful. In the history of the international Communist movement, and in the entire history of mankind, the accomplishments of the Chinese Revolution, the birth and development of Mao Zedong Thought, and the contributions of Comrade Mao Zedong must all be acknowledged.

The "Resolution" makes a rather systematic outline of Mao Zedong Thought and discusses the developments of Marxism-Leninism by Comrade Mao Zedong's theories on the construction of socialism. But we ought to say that Comrade Mao Zedong himself and the Party Central Committee all considered that the task of developing complete theories of the construction of socialism was not finished. Comrade Mao Zedong had many important thoughts on this aspect, which actual experience has shown to be correct. But, as with the new democratic revolution and the socialist revolution, our current and future task is a more unified and sharper understanding of the general principles of Marxism-Leninism and the particular experiences of Chinese socialist construction. In regard to theories of socialist construction the current "Resolution" can only reach the present level of understanding, we cannot presume that it is perfect. Because actual socialist practice is itself still developing, so we can only gradually advance in the understanding of the objective rules within. That is why Central Committee leading comrades have repeatedly said that we want to maintain Mao Zedong Thought at the same time that we develop it.

Do you want me to respond to what are the basic principles and viewpoints of Marxism-Leninism? And where it was that Comrade Mao Zedong developed them? I think it best to ask you all to jointly research these questions further.

The 11th question is that, practically and truly, the soul of Mao Zedong Thought is the mass line and independent action with one's own initiative. Those are the basic aspect of its stands, viewpoints, and methods, and are said to be the Chinese characteristics. Then what is the lifeblood of Marxism-Leninism, and the basic aspects of the stand, viewpoints, and methods of Marxism-Leninism?

I would ask again that you research this yourselves. I can briefly give my opinions. This was also discussed by Comrade Mao Zedong and other Central Committee leading comrades. The theoretical basis of Marxism-Leninism, that is its worldview and methodology, is dialectical materialism, or historical materialism. In the past, when you entered a Party school you had to read, among other Marxist-Leninist works, "Essays Against Duehring" and "Materialism and Empirio-Criticism." You had to understand those. It is imperative that we disseminate these books among party members, cadres, and the people. But can we resolve questions of worldview and methodology in this way? I feel that it is not enough. If we do not at the same time study and apply in an integrated way the practical, mass line, and independently initiated series of scientific methods of thinking, scientific methods of working, and scientific leadership methods as described by Comrade Mao Zedong, then I feel that they will be very difficult questions to answer. We go among the peasants, we go among the workers, we discuss the mass line, we speak from crowd to crowd, so that even those peasants who do not read understand when they hear and feel that it is all right. Practically and realistically speaking, it is now well known to all. Comrade Mao Zedong freed philosophy from the classroom and the study to become an effective method for the proletariat political party to carry on its entire work, for the broad masses of workers, farmers, students, and military to look at and handle problems. This set of things are easily accepted and mastered by the masses. As Marx said, if a theory can grab hold of the masses in a short time it may become a strong material force. This has been fully proven in real life. This can be seen everywhere. This was a great contribution of Comrade Mao Zedong to the philosophy of Marxism-Leninism. Therefore, we should study what the principles of Marxism are, and what new things Comrade Mao Zedong added, but we should proceed from reality, we should comprehend by means of our own lives and our own actual working experiences, because this is the only way to suit actual circumstances.

For more than a year some comrades have belittled Mao Zedong Thought, which really ought to be brought to our attention. Originally, this problem was long ago resolved by actual experience. But there are now some comrades who belittle Mao Zedong Thought and, to one degree or another, have returned to the path of the dogmatism of the past. Their study of China's problems and the answers to China's questions does not stress setting out from the experiences we have already had, and respecting the scientific achievements obtained through expenditure of great sacrifice. To not respect these things, and to go back to what Marx said, or what Lenin said, and to demonstrate on this basis, is to say that we have not engaged in scientific socialism, and is to depart from scientific socialism. Although the "Resolution" did not criticize this tendency by name, in fact it answers this question. We have recently and finally begun again to realize this difficulty. Representative of this is an article in a college journal, entitled "Some Theoretical Problems Concerning the Final Period of the Socialist Transformation." I

recommend that you take a look at this article. With the sharpest language in the piece it says that our party, including Comrade Mao Zedong, opposed narrow empiricism, but at the same time secretly promoted narrow empiricism. We opposed historical idealism, but at the same time committed errors of historical idealism. The article directly criticized "On Actual Practice," saying that we have not gone beyond the epistemological [character unreadable] based on the narrow experience of one person. It also says that the "Selected Works of Mao Zedong", which contains all these errors, already does not reflect the views of an individual, but rather reflects the joint understanding of the party. It then says, "there has [come (character unreadable)] from within our party a faction that is anti-science, anti-democracy, anti-progress, with Marxism as its rallying point, agricultural socialism at its core, and can be summed up with feudalism," and "caused our country to slide along the path of Liu Bang, Zhu Yuanzhang, and Hong Xiuquan towards feudalism." It says also that the current development of large industry will be certain to forge revolutionary warriors to wage a hard-fought battle with this faction and to vanquish beforehand this faction. This problem is well worth our attention. It makes clear that to depart from Mao Zedong Thought that the test of actual experience has proven correct to return to the old road of bookishism would be to take these very dangerous steps. To have violated the principle affirmed by the Third Plenary Session that actual experience is the only standard in the test of truth, and not to use actual experience as a test of the correctness of this or that, and to use what Marx or Lenin said as a test for the correctness of this or that, this direction is completely mistaken.

The current "Resolution" continues to use the wording from the speech of Comrade Ye Jianying at the National Day 30th Anniversary the year before last, which said that Mao Zedong Thought is a crystallization of collective wisdom. Everyone has been happy and satisfied with this. Actually, though, Comrade Mao Zedong spoke in this sense. The document "Working Principles of the 7th Party Congress" has this idea. He later said this sort of thing many times. He said, you say that my articles have been written so well, and we all approve. Actually, these are not books and articles written by me. These are books written in the blood of martyrs. Truly, this includes the idea of a crystallization of collective wisdom. When we have discussed Marxism and Leninism, they have all used this kind of language. Lenin once said, Marxism is the summation of all the cultural and scientific accomplishments of mankind. When Stalin was talking about Marxism-Leninism he often said that it is the summation of experiences from the workers' movement. Originally, and in the past, we had no different opinions on these questions. It was after the appearance of Lin Biao that we gradually dropped these very important ideas. He did not see Mao Zedong Thought as the crystallization of collective wisdom, or as the summation of the Chinese people's revolutionary experiences, or as the summation of the experiences of the two aspects, right and wrong, as discussed by Comrade Mao Zedong, but rather saw it as the product of a genius. This so-called genius theory, that in several hundred years of world history there could not have been such a genius, that only several thousand years in China could have produced this genius, and that only with this genius could there have been Mao Zedong Thought. Our past propaganda was heavily influenced in this aspect. Although the "Resolution" does not directly criticize these errors, but returns to our Marxist consistently scientific

correct stand (which includes both natural science and social science). In scientific development individuals have an important role, just as the roles of individuals throughout history must not be neglected. However, we have always said, these individual accomplishments can only have been achieved on a base of collective wisdom. There are two sentences in the "Resolution": many outstanding leaders in our party made important contributions to the formation and development of Mao Zedong Thought, and, the scientific writings of Comrade Mao Zedong are a concentrated summary. These two sentences are very important.

The 12th question: how do we view and explain the departure of Comrade Mao Zedong's theory from actual practice and the self-contradictions between his theories and his actual practice?

The "Resolution" has made a response to this question. Which is that, by the time of the "Cultural Revolution" not only his theories but also his practice had departed from the track of the Mao Zedong Thought that had been demonstrated to be correct by the test of actual practice. There were probably two situations: with the "Cultural Revolution" he violated the principles that had been demonstrated to be scientific by the test of his theories in actual practice; also, in the process during which actual practice was still developing, and in the process during which rules were still in development, recognition of these rules was also in a gradually deepening, gradually enriching process. Comrade Mao Zedong sometimes proposed views on the theory of socialist construction and the theory of socialism as a transition to communism, and then when new things happened he proposed other views based on the new things. These two viewpoints could sometimes be linked, but were sometimes in contradiction. But these front and back contradictions ought to be distinguished from the situation mentioned earlier. In hindsight we can analyze just where in the latter situation of contradictions they aren't correct, just where there are errors, and we can make an assessment. But think, too, about how there were certain reasonable aspects to both, and how we can link up the reasonable aspects of both. Those respects in both that are unreasonable will be revised in future actual practice to be perfected and reasonable. We want to distinguish between these two situations. When Comrade Mao Zedong talked about internal party strife, that we should make our thinking clear, unite our comrades, learn from past mistakes to avoid future ones, and cure the sickness to save the patient, both past and current experience has shown this to be completely correct. But in the "Cultural Revolution" he engaged in a ruthless struggle and unfeeling attacks more fierce than those of Wang Ming. We ought to clearly and resolutely criticize this kind of conflict between theory and actual practice, this kind of inconsistency in what is said, , just as has been done in the "Resolution." As for the theoretical questions we are now continuing to investigate, without speaking rashly, the viewpoints are surely mistaken, completely and absolutely so, but we ought to consider whether there are not also reasonable factors among them.

The 13th question: in the original manuscript of the "Resolution" that Comrade Qiaomu submitted to the Sixth Plenary Session, he used the phrase Mao Zedong's Later Thought, and later after discussion this wording was not used. Why?

The Central Committee once agreed with Comrade Qiaomu's opinion here, which was to call the chief theories of the "Cultural Revolution," the theories later generalized in "the continuing revolution under the proletariat dictatorship," and those theories with a particular significance as Mao Zedong's Later Thought. The central idea in the theories of a particular significance was that under the proletariat dictatorship there would still need to be a great revolution where one class topples another. This is completely in error. In order to more clearly distinguish this kind of theoretical error from the Mao Zedong Thought that had been proven to be correct through the test of actual practice, we proposed this idea of Mao

Zedong's Later Thought. During discussions, the majority of comrades at the plenary session did not approve of this wording. Some of them said, if we do it like that, when do consider "late," because there was still some correct thought in Comrade Mao Zedong's later years, so would that be included within Late Thought; since there is Late Thought, there is then Middle Thought and Early Thought, which is how divided? It was very difficult to find an accurate explanation and very difficult to unify everyone's perceptions. Some comrades added this and that supplement, this and that revision. Other comrades had a suggestion: should we add the word "mistaken" between Late and Thought, thus changing it to the Later Mistaken Thought of Mao Zedong. But then, having a later mistaken thought from Comrade Mao Zedong, we would then have to say where the mistaken thought in the middle period was, and the same for the earlier period. We talked back and forth, and since the majority of the plenary session could not agree, having this and that understanding of it, Comrade Qiaomu finally said, then let's just not say this at all. Comrades Deng Xiaoping, Hu Yaobang, and other comrades in the Central Committee agreed. In the current draft, after it brings up the important arguments about Comrade Mao Zedong's initiation of the "Cultural Revolution," it says that they were leftist mistaken arguments that clearly departed from the track of Mao Zedong Thought which is the integration of the general principles of Marxism-Leninism with the particular actual practice of the Chinese Revolution, and that they must be completely distinguished from Mao Zedong Thought. This wording was approved by the plenary session comrades.

In the last two and one-half days I have talked about the questions you have brought up, have fulfilled my task, which might be called an introduction to those attending this meeting. There have certainly been many inadequate areas. I ask you to analyze with a scientific attitude those that may serve as reference and those that should be discarded. I also genuinely hope that you will not stand on ceremony in making your criticisms.

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