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ON PARTY LEADERSHIP, TRAINING,
AND POLICY IMPLEMENTATION IN
NORTH KOREA

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CORRECTNESS OF PARTY ECONOMIC
POLICY FOR LOCAL INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT

[The following is a full translation of an article of the above title written by Kim Hong-il, appearing in Inmin Kyoyuk (National Education), November 1959, pages 16-19.]

A national convention was recently held by activists of local-industrial and production cooperatives. This convention was held to study the remarkable results achieved by these cooperatives in line with the policy formulated by the June 1958 general meeting of our Party's Central Committee. The convention was the successful outcome of the process of the socialization private enterprises, and it dealt with the unprecedented progress made in local industries since the new program was put in operation.

Premier Kim Il-song stated: "This convention will play a significant role in the history of our socialist revolution and socialist construction."

As shown by the materials presented at the convention, our local industries have made tremendous progress, and the socialization of private enterprises has developed at a great rate under the correct leadership of the Party.

The convention constitutes an indication of the correctness of various revolutionary policies of our Party. The guiding principle for peaceful construction after the liberation was formulated in the following policy statement adopted by the March 1948 Congress: "The basic economic principle of our Party is that principle by which the state assumes leadership in the economic development of the country by coordinating all industries owned by the state, by cooperatives, or by individuals; it is also that principle by which the industries owned by the state are given priority over all other industries."

To implement this basic statement on the nature our economic system, the Party made distinctions in ownership and socialist production processes between state-owned and individually owned industries. At the same time, the Party organized consumer cooperatives, production cooperatives, and other cooperatives, and set out to make a limited

use of private capitalistic enterprises.

This unified economic system of our Party constitutes an application of the general principles of Marx and Lenin to the economic reality of Korea. The truth of this observation is borne out by analysis of the economic status and class relationships of our country, by our production methods, and by our production and consumption relationships.

The Japanese authorities in Korea inflicted severe damages on our people's economy and failed to provide for the large-scale development of consumer-goods light industries; this was especially true in the northern part of the country.

The Japanese controlled 90 percent of the total corporate stock in the country. Furthermore, the Korean handicraft industries suffered a severe blow as a result of the overflow of Japanese manufactured goods to our country.

The few light industries we were able to develop in Korea during the Japanese rule were located in the south. Thus, the North Korean share of the output of cloth fabrics and food products was 15 and 30 percent, respectively, of the total volume produced in the country.

The economic situation of the country was further reflected in the class relationships that existed in Korea at that time. Soon after the liberation, the situation of the people's capital investors and handicraft workers was extremely bad. These investors and workers were in such poor condition that they would not have survived without aid from the state.

After carefully investigating the general condition of the country in 1947, the Party and the State set out to organize various cooperatives for local industries and production cooperatives.

As a result, local industries engaged in the production of consumer goods have been growing in conjunction with medium-scale industries. Moreover, their development has helped to promote the growth of heavy industries.

The organization and development of local industries are closely related to the socialist reform of private enterprises.

Inasmuch as the socialist relations of production constitute the basis of our society, the Party has modified private enterprises. Throughout this reform of private enterprises, measures have been taken for the active promotion of cooperative movements.

It is our Party's policy with respect to private enterprises to modify their character in order to bring them into direct relationship with the construction of socialism. Furthermore, this policy consists of the modification and utilization of private enterprises not through force but through education and understanding.

This transformation, unlike that in the Chinese People's Republic where the State directly owns all private enterprises, has taken the alternative form of the agricultural cooperative.

This constitutes an exemplary case in which our Party has utilized its creative ingenuity in applying the principles of Lenin to the existing conditions of the country.

In order to scrutinize the policy of the Party, the Preliminary Committee of the People of North Korea in October 1946, adopted "A policy to protect the right to private property and to encourage individual creative initiative in production and productive activity."

This policy made it clear that the Party intended to protect the rights of the people and to give financial aid and active encouragement to those private enterprises operating in areas which contributed to the growth of the people's livelihood and to the development of the people's economy.

On the other hand, the State made it a point to organize labor laws, to systematize the tax system, to put an end to usury, to issue permits for enterprises, and to set up a pricing system for the goods produced by both the State and cooperatives.

As a result of these policies, private enterprises increased their production 148 percent and 150 percent, respectively, in 1948 and 1949, as compared with that in 1947.

At the same time, State-owned industries increased their production 140 percent and 200 percent, respectively, in 1948 and 1949, as compared with that in 1947. Thus, the share of private enterprises in the total national product decreased from 16.8 percent in 1947 to 9.03 percent in 1949.

These figures justify the Party's policy with regard to private enterprises during the peaceful construction period.

During the liberation war, the economic policy of our Party was to follow the Party motto, "All for Victory." Thus, the State was assigned the task of providing leadership in supplying needs at the front and in guaranteeing the people's livelihood.

In accordance with this policy, it was decided to fully restore and develop the production of central industries, local enterprises, and various cooperatives.

Local enterprises and cooperatives were made responsible for much of the production of consumer goods. Accordingly, they have greatly contributed to the recovery of living standards which had been lowered by the war.

Since the [liberation] war, we have been moving at full speed along the lines laid down by the 6th general meeting of the Party Central Committee.

To implement the general economic policy of the Party aimed at the development of heavy industries without, at the same time, neglecting the development of light industries and agricultural production, the State was required to balance increases in the means of production and increases in consumer goods. The State was also required to guarantee capital expansion and the further accumulation of capital reserves for production, on the one hand, and the optimum distribution of consumer goods on the other.

Accordingly, the State was required to guarantee the rapid development of light industries without reducing capital investment in heavy industries.

In order to enjoy optimum production with limited investment funds in the field of light industry, the State

has been faced with the problem of developing local productive activities.

This problem has arisen as a result of the fact that local productive activities are different in nature from those of large-scale heavy industries. In other words, local productive activities utilize the raw materials produced in the area, and both the area of production and of consumption can be closely related. Since local industries can produce goods with limited funds and facilities, they are able to reduce the cost of production.

Moreover, by devoting all our handicraft skills, as well as other technical skills, to production, we can further promote the productive ingenuity of the people.

All these factors in regard to local industries have been seriously considered by the Party in its execution of socialist industrialization.

The Party has actively promoted the socialization of private enterprises by embracing them in various production cooperatives.

Among the various socialist reforms of private enterprises presented at the Third Congress of the Korean Labor Party, one that proved to be significant was the policy adopted by the standing committee of the Central Committee of the Party on 30 September 1957. The purpose of this policy was "to organize various production cooperatives and to strengthen the inculcation of the Party ideology among cooperative members." This policy systematically laid out the framework of the structure and leadership of the cooperatives.

As a result of the sound leadership of the Party, the formation of agricultural cooperatives was completed in August 1958, and the socialization of private enterprises was carried out successfully.

These achievements have greatly contributed to our efforts to eliminate all elements of exploitation in the villages and to install socialist production relationships in the people's economy. Needless to say, these victorious results could not have been achieved without ordeals and trials.

In our country's transition period, as is the case with socialization in all countries, we eliminated all the elements of exploitation that are the consequence of harsh class struggles. However, without the sound leadership of the Party, we could not have carried out the task of eliminating the class struggle as smoothly as we have.

The June 1958 meeting of the Central Committee of the Party constituted a turning point in the development of local industries.

As proposed by Premier Kim Il-song the Central Committee adopted the policy of the large-scale expansion of local industries in order to increase the consumer-goods and foods industries.

This step was extremely sound.

At this time, the foundation for heavy industries was laid, and socialist reforms in agriculture were brought to the last stage of completion. Moreover, raw material sources proved sufficient. In addition, a large number of technicians, skilled workers, managers, and workers were trained for operation and management of factories.

Having taken all these factors into consideration, the policy adopted by the Party with regard to the development of local industries included further increases in the productivity of the country, the creation of the material foundation of socialism, and the enhancement of the living standard of the people.

These measures of the Party are of political as well as economic significance.

Large-scale local industries of both medium and small sizes were developed to meet the growing needs of the people for foods and consumer goods with the means available to the Party and without large capital investments.

This self-supporting policy in the development of local industries would make more capital available for the development of heavy industries and accelerate the process of the socialist industrialization of the country. Thus, of the established goals in 1959 for the total State production of processed foods and consumer goods, 33.1 percent,

76.7 percent, 71.4 percent, and 50 percent of vegetables, soy sauce, bean paste, and potteries respectively, were produced by local industries.

In addition, the development of local industries has narrowed the geographical distance between the area of production and the area of consumption. Moreover, local industries have more fully mobilized local financial resources and technical skills and eliminated unnecessary freight charges. As a result of all these advantages, the original cost of goods has been reduced.

By maintaining local industries, the local areas have increased their importance in terms of their function and capability. At the same time, their industrial know-how has improved.

In addition, the leaders in the field of local industry have gained knowledge of industrial management.

With the development of local industries, the families of workers and office employees have participated in local industrial production and have thus strengthened the labor force. Cities and villages have established a closer relationship, and agricultural associations have enhanced their strength. Local industries have enhanced the importance of their political and economic roles almost daily since the June 1958 Full membership Meeting of the Party Central Committee.

In one year, the number of local industries established reached 1,743, and with the inclusion of industries operated by agricultural cooperatives this figure reached 2,038.

Of the total amount of goods produced this year, the share of local industries was 27.5 percent and 45.1 percent respectively, for industrial goods and consumer-goods production.

Indeed, a large percentage of the school materials used by students are produced by local industries.

As local industries have increasingly come to play a greater role in our country, they have been faced with the necessity for reorganization.

The Party has rightly acknowledged the need to reorganize local industries on a logical and scientific basis. Thus, in August, at a meeting of the Standing Committee of the Central Committee, our industrial management was reorganized, as proposed by Premier Kim Il-song.

A new relationship appropriate to the new level of productivity has been instituted to provide a further possibility for development.

To realize these potentialities, we must enlist the workers' creative efforts and energies.

Under these circumstances, the Party called a national convention of activists from local industrial and production cooperatives. This convention is very significant in the development of our people's economy.

The above survey constitutes a bried analysis of the policies that have been adopted by the Party for the development of local industries.

The following is a list of tasks proposed at the convention by Premier Kim Il-song to further promote local industries: First, to establish firm foundations for raw-material sources; Second, to strengthen mechanical facilities and to carry out technical reforms; Third, to increase the number of the types of goods produced and to improve their quality; Fourth, to encourage the rational management of industry; Fifth, to continuously carry out work with regard to the cultural revolution; Sixth, to continuously work for the elimination of the remnants of capitalism.

These tasks will be carried out under the Party's wise leadership and through our workers' noble devotion and creative efforts.

By firmly grasping the policies of the Party with regard to local industries, our educational workers will try to incorporate these policies into their educational tasks and to stress the Party's line to students. Furthermore, the educational workers themselves will participate in self-education programs through technical and managerial experiences in the factories.

The educational workers will profit from the development of local industries, since these industries are engaged in supplying school materials. At the same time, they will help to promote the cultural revolution among the workers.

A close relationship among local factories, teachers and students is very significant in accomplishing the Party's educational policy aimed at coordinating education and production.

We hope that educational managerial workers in various schools of cities and kuns will actively help organize this work and lead students and workers toward great achievements in the execution of Party policies.

STRUGGLE OF PROVINCIAL PARTY
ORGANS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF
LOCAL INDUSTRY

[The following is a full translation of an article of the above title written by Ho Hak-song, appearing in Tang Kanbudulege Chunun Ch'ango Charyo (Reference Materials for Party Cadres), No. 10, P'yongyang, October 1960, pages 18-23.]

The June 1953 full membership meeting of the Party Central Committee decided to develop the processing, manufacturing, and consumer good industries as a general movement of the Party and the people. This policy is significant in meeting the material and cultural needs of the people that have arisen as a result of the completion of the socialization of the country.

The Party and its ever-faithful members and workers in the province [Hwanghae Namdo], have nobly complied with this revolutionary measure of the Central Committee. They have shown unprecedented patriotic devotion and intelligence in the promotion of local industries in the province.

In the past [before 1958], there were only 11 province-operated factories. At present, however, there are 198 factories, including 154 factories operated by the province or by kuns; the remainder are operated by various production cooperatives.

These factories have contributed to the establishment of a firm foundation for the material and technological development of the province. At the same time, they have achieved remarkable results in production.

As compared with the quantity of goods produced in the year prior to the June full membership meeting of the Party Central Committee, the output of goods produced in the first half of this year increased by 2.8 times.

The local factories in the province have completed their organizational tasks; they are now developing into large factories with adequate technical equipment.

The development of local industries has helped to promote a closer relationship between cities and villages. Moreover, the growth of local industries has provided an opportunity for carrying out a managerial leadership training program among Party members in cities and kuns and among central Party officials. At the same time, by incorporating the families of workers and office employees into the productive labor force, local industries have greatly contributed to the further enhancement of socialist patriotism and to raising the standard of living.

These achievements prove the correctness of our Party's policies with regard to the establishment of light industries in the country without help from wealthy capitalists. At the same time, they constitute proof of the correctness of the Party's policy of rapidly raising the standard of living.

The June full membership meeting of the Party Central Committee took measures to increase the output of foods and consumer goods at the local level by making the greatest possible local resources.

Our province has an unknown quantity of natural resources. In the sea that surrounds our province, there are various types of fish, shell-fish, and sea-weeds. Our province also produces large quantities of various wild and cultivated fruits, including Chinese dates, chestnuts, apples, persimmons, and pears.

In addition, we have large quantities of such natural resources as "myongyongp'i," "sangmokp'i," "takch'ae," "takp'ul," "nobak," etc. that can be used as paper and fabric materials.

These natural resources should enable us to produce a larger quantity of foods and consumer goods. Nevertheless, various anti-Party faction members, including Ko Pong-ki and Paek Sun-she, deliberately attempted to thwart the development of local industries by stating: "Our local natural resources consist of only water and stones."

These disruptive groups stopped production in many local industries. Moreover, many local food industries, consumer-goods industries, and industries, were sold to individual merchants in Anak, Shinch'on, and Songhwa kuns.

These industries had been engaged in the production of goods and had been equipped with relatively adequate technical facilities. They have destroyed local industries in various areas, and thus hampered to over-all development of these industries.

Having been faced with this critical situation at the outset, the struggle of our province to observe the decision of the June 1958 full membership meeting of the Party Central Committee began with an effort to eliminate the influence of the anti-Party groups and to make Party members adhere to the instructions of the Party Central Committee headed by our comrade brother, Kim Il-song.

In particular, we began our struggle with an effort to firmly establish the Party's ideology among the workers, so that they would give unconditional obedience to the Party's policies.

To Strengthen Efforts to Eliminate the
Influence of Anti-Party Sects and to Firmly
Establish the Party's Ideology Among the Workers

The provincial committee of the Party with the guidance and assistance of the Central Committee of the Party has further strengthened efforts to raise the organizational ability of the various organizations of the Party and to eliminate the harmful influence of anti-Party groups within the province.

In the course of these efforts, we eliminated from our group of cadres various anti-Party elements and their ideological sympathizers who advocated the family system and grumbled about the Party's policies. We also took positive measures to combat those who lied to their superiors and those who were irresponsible in the execution of Party decisions.

By strengthening our ideological war against the anti-Party groups and their sympathizers and by selecting our cadres only from among the ideologically sound workers, we have established a firm ideological foundation among the cadres and strengthened the ranks of our leaders.

At the same time, we tightened order and discipline within various occupations. To further enhance the morale of the masses, the provincial committee of the Party has decided to train the leading officials of various Party organizations in cities and kuns. In the future, these officials will adhere to Party policies more closely.

Moreover, they will incorporate these policies into the work of their respective organizations. At the same time, the provincial committee of the Party has increased its efforts to organize various propaganda groups and to dispatch them to various local factories and production co-operatives in the Haeju, Chaelyong, and Shinuon kuns.

These propaganda groups give assistance to each constituent unit in the factory and carry out political work appropriate to the conditions of each unit. They have actively carried out the mobilization of the workers for the realization of the policies adopted by the June 1958 full membership meeting of the Party Central Committee.

In addition, these propaganda groups have effectively implemented the tasks of educating workers to follow the instructions given by Comrade Kim Il-song and to adhere to the revolutionary tradition of the Party. They have also encouraged discussion on the contents of the Red Letter (Pulkun pyonji).

Through these leadership programs, the provincial committee of the Party discovered that some local Party organizations were still employing antiquated, impersonal, and authoritarian methods in the execution of Party policies. It further discovered that unsound individuals were in charge of certain local factories and production co-operatives and that these officials were managing production under feudalistic master-servant relationships.

Some local factories in the province existed in name only and failed to engage in production. Some factories ignored the appropriate organization of production and devoted themselves solely to monetary gains.

A substantial number of local factories failed to utilize local natural resources and had recourse to assistance from the state. Worse still, some fabric manufacturers who had received a supply of cotton and silkworm cocoons

from the state distributed these raw materials to agricultural cooperatives for weaving.

These practices should be rectified.

Accordingly, the provincial committee of the Party first closely investigated the conditions prevailing in factories in cities and kuns and made appropriate proposals for workers organized by basic production units and workers' associations. The committee also stressed systematic efforts to conduct ideological campaigns against the harmful influence of anti-Party groups and their sympathizers.

For this purpose, provincial Party organs, and various factories and production cooperatives have expelled anti-Party groups, as well as various elements who refused to cooperate with the Party's policies and who harmed our production efforts in various ways. The cadres who supervise our production efforts have been assisted by a select group of workers, veterans, military personnel, military families, and families of deceased national heroes and soldiers -- all of whom had already been engaged in various fields of production.

At the same time, the provincial committee of the Party has held lectures for the benefit of chairmen, supervisors, and managers of various local production organizations. It has provided them with a systematic education in the problems of the inculcation of the Party ideology, the problems of greater productivity in each basic productive unit and workers' organization, and the problems of the management and operation of various enterprises.

Prior to each lecture, the provincial committee of the Party asked the municipal or kun committee of the Party and the kun people's committee to dispatch a cadre group to underproductive factories to carry out the reorganization of the Party in that area and to make the necessary efforts to avoid bottlenecks in production. These policies have indeed produced positive results.

As a result of the organization and execution of the various projects thus far presented, the Party has enhanced its functional and organizational ability in local factories and production cooperatives.

At the same time, it has strengthened and unified its own ranks and carried out definite reforms in the Party's leadership in production. The basic organization of the Party has concentrated its efforts on the efficient execution of its political tasks; it has strengthened the Party life of cadres and granted autonomy to various occupational and women's associations. Moreover, it has organized various campaigns appropriate to the existing reality.

The cadres engaged in administrative tasks have placed emphasis on the systematization of the functions of production management, on the elevation of the level of operational planning, and on the realistic implementation of policies concerning factories and production.

Emphasis on Party Leadership to
Strengthen the Material and Technical
Foundations for Increased Productivity in Factories

The Central Committee of the Party and Premier Kim Il-sung have emphasized that local industries should not only engage in food and consumer-goods production, but should also cultivate the production of various items of farm machinery and building materials.

Furthermore, these factories are to gradually increase their self-sufficient character in regard to raw materials and machinery installation materials.

Since local industry must implement the above tasks on a self-supporting basis without the help of medium industry, and especially without the help of the machine industry, the provincial committee of the Party above all felt the need of establishing a local industrial center that could provide iron, concrete, coal, etc.

The provincial committee of the Party convened several policy meetings for the solution of this problem and attempted to discover methods for implementing the designated tasks.

There were, however, many cadres who questioned the feasibility of the attempt, stating: "How could we manufacture an iron furnace and build a concrete manufacturing

factory in our province where there is no iron and no machinery to speak of," and "We do not have the necessary machinery and technicians." These cadres failed to channel their best efforts into the implementation of these tasks.

To carry out the proposed tasks, we must rid our minds of conservative and negative thoughts.

The provincial committee of the Party strongly encouraged various Party organizations in the province to promote this struggle by carrying out organizational measures to closely ally themselves with our revolutionary tradition.

This policy of the provincial committee of the Party has achieved certain results.

We have also made provisions for the training of technicians. We have selected and promising workers and have sent them for training purposes to the Hwanghae Iron Manufacturing Plant and to other good metal and cement manufacturing plants. We have also conducted a search for technicians whose existence had not been previously known of in the province.

In addition, we have improvised means to actively support local and military plant constructions. The Haeju Cement Plant and other plants and enterprises are already engaged in plant construction.

As a result of our efforts, we now have an iron furnace that can produce eight to ten tons of iron per day, a cement factory that can produce 20-30 tons of cement per day, and various mines that can produce 20,000 tons of smokeless coal per year.

We are also working on the completion of a farm machinery manufacturing plant. This project is being carried out under the auspices of the Haeju Farm Machinery Cooperative and has received special material assistance from the Premier and his colleagues.

In our success in creating the material and technical foundations for the development of local industries in the province, we have reorganized our factories and production cooperatives for the more effective utilization of technical skills. We are advancing from the stage of handicraft industries to the stage of mechanized local

industries.

We are introducing a division of labor by types of goods produced and realigning the scale and size of industries. At present the food, consumer-goods, fabric, and paper factories in the province are almost all mechanized.

In the course of developing the mechanization of local industries, the provincial committee of the Party has encouraged the machine-tool reproduction movement in local factories. It has encouraged these factories to meet their own needs and has advised the already existing factories to help them meet these needs. By making full use of their equipment and by instituting various reforms through popular efforts, the workers at the Chaelyong Mine utilized their spare time to produce two lathes, which they sent to the Ch'ongnyon Farm Machinery Factory. They also helped with the installation of paper manufacturing machines in the Chaelyon Consumer Goods Factory.

The Haeju Chemical Factory enhanced its operations by applying 80 new inventions to production processes; this has resulted in the creation of a reserve productive capacity at the factory. This reserve capacity has been used in the composition of a brigade for the production of local industrial equipment. This brigade has produced hundreds of pieces of machinery, including Sasongsoda, kilns, transformers, Yod'omil, etc.; these items have been sent to local factories in need such machinery.

The local production cooperatives have also put their limited reserves together. By the 4 May 1959 Plenary Session of the Standing Committee of the Central Committee of the Party, they had produced 316 different kinds of factory machines and 1,400 machine parts.

These efforts have contributed to the great results achieved by the local industries in the province. Nevertheless, some Party organizations and local Party administrative organs have failed to take advantage of the high revolutionary morale of the masses. The provincial Party central planning committee drew up many of its production plans in a formalistic manner.

Consequently, the application of local natural resources to production was not carried out on a rational

basis. In its purchasing and selling plans, the committee has also failed to make full use of local natural resources as supplies for local industries. Consequently, there have been many complications; the materials that could have been obtained within the province were purchased outside of the province, and the materials that were needed in the province were sold to other provinces.

Yonan, Paech'on, Ch'ongdan, and Chanyong in our province are known throughout the nation as vegetable-producing areas. Thirteen cities and kuns that face the sea produce various kinds of fish, shell-fish and seaweeds throughout the year; these cities and kuns also produce persimmons, chestnuts, Chinese dates, and various other fruits.

There are also 150 water reservoirs and many waste lands, and rivers that could provide and produce raw materials for local industries. But we have failed to systematically use these resources as sources for the important raw materials required by the local industries. At the same time, these areas have failed to produce sufficient materials for their own use.

We failed to provide the spring bean paste and soy sauce that are urgently needed by the people of the province. Moreover, last fall, we were unable to process or handle a large quantity of persimmons and Chinese dates. Consequently, these foods spoiled.

After reflecting on these weaknesses, the provincial committee of the Party and the Party's administrative organs decided to raise the level of planning. Moreover, to improve the dissemination of Party policies among the lower echelons, the Party took measures to assign promising leadership cadres in the province, cities, kuns, and up to various local factories throughout the year.

This measure was successful in strengthening the basic Party unit, in increasing the knowledge of its members concerning the management of their enterprises, and in enhancing their level of leadership. It also resulted in the elimination of the mistaken tendency in some local factories to depend on the State. Consequently, the search for natural resources and the full mobilization of production was carried out as a general movement of the masses.

In order to mobilize natural resources more fully, the provincial committee of the Party organized a commission in each city and kun; this commission is comprised of persons from various fields, including specialists in forestry protection and fabric production, agricultural cooperative members, school teachers, and students.

In the cities and kuns, these commissions are responsible for undertaking a search for natural resources. It is their task to register these resources and to mobilize them for production. At the same time, the commissions are responsible for the systematic promotion of projects for the artificial production of material resources.

These commissions have actively organized and carried out their work under the supervision of the Party committee in their areas.

As a result, 350 new discoveries have already been made in the field of natural and wild-life resources alone.

An active search for local natural resources is going on throughout the province, and efforts are being made to mobilize these resources for production. For example, the Paech'on Veterans Food Factory has initiated a search for local natural resources. It has searched for various vegetables, wild vegetables (Sanch'ae), and sea products and use of them as a significant source of natural resources.

Moreover, it has cultivated more than 11,500 p'yong of vacant and waste land for the planting of vegetables and wild vegetables. At the same time, it has raised numerous domesticated animals and birds, including more than 70 heads of pig, 350 heads of rabbit, 200 ducks, 127 cans of bees, and 250 chickens.

On the other hand, such areas as the Shinuon, P'yongch'on, and Songhwa kuns have been unable to properly organize and mobilize their local natural resources. The Party and its organs in these areas have neglected the exercise leadership over the kun commissions. At the same time, they have favored certain factories at the expense of other factories. In addition, they have neglected to give leadership to local factories.

To eliminate such shortcomings wherever found and to achieve further progress in the mobilization of natural resources, the provincial committee of the Party has undertaken the central coordination of all leadership in this area of economic development.

These efforts have produced certain results. When the 4 May Plenary Session of the Standing Committee of the Central Committee of the Korean Labor Party was held, the production rate of local industries using only natural resources produced in local areas was 32 percent. At present, however, it is 58 percent. (For Unch'on kun, it is 80 percent.)

Remarkable achievements can also be observed in the establishment of stations for the production of natural resources. Waste and vacant plots in the province have been utilized, and 141,000 p'yong and 75,000 p'yong of takp'ul and takch'ae, respectively, as well as great quantities of rush, peppermint, scrubbing-brush, etc., have been produced.

Furthermore, in compliance with the instructions of the Premier and his colleagues to increase the production of persimmons, 1,300,000 persimmon stocks have been reared. Work is in progress for the raising of grey-mulletts, perches, eels, carps, and lacquer-colored (Ch'ilsaek) trouts in swamps and reservoirs. At the same time, p'eruoakim (weeds), miyok (undaria pinnatifida) and other seaweeds are being grown along the seashore.

The goods produced by local factories and production cooperatives have been relatively poor in quality and high in price. One of the obvious reasons for this failure is the lack of skilled workers. But more important is the fact that we have not been able to conquer the selfish attitude and hired-hand mentality of some workers. This, in turn, is due to the underdeveloped status of our local industries.

In systematizing education, the provincial committee of the Party has thoroughly reconsidered and strengthened the educational system in local industrial enterprises to emphasize ideological training among the workers. In particular, well-trained political workers have been dis-

patched to local production cooperatives to serve as culture protection society chairman.

We have instructed our local factories and production cooperatives to provide better leadership in order to strengthen propaganda efforts in regard to our Party's glorious revolutionary tradition and our Party's policies. We have also instructed the cooperatives to emphasize the promotion of training in communism.

In order to solve the problem of technical skills that constitutes a sore spot in our local industrial development, the provincial committee of the Party has encouraged local factories and agricultural cooperatives to establish training programs in accordance with their respective needs and to carry out their programs within the framework of the Party's policies.

In addition, each year leaders and cadres in 250 enterprises in the province, cities, and towns, are sent in three groups to Kaesong to carry out inspections in various factories. At the same time, 146 trainees are learning trade in various light-industry factories in the province.

Furthermore, 320 managerial cadres are being trained at a provincial cadre school, at a special school for cadres under the direction of the Bureau of Local Industries, and at other cadre-training facilities. Twenty skilled workers, whose skills had not been utilized, were discovered and assigned to local factories and production cooperatives.

Moreover, 583 graduates of junior and senior middle schools have been dispatched to machine factories for long-term training as machine operators.

As a result of these measures, the local factories and production cooperatives of the province are gradually being staffed with technically trained personnel. To expand their factories, these enterprises have further increased their machine reproduction operations. As a result, they were able to produce a total of 1,790 items of tools and machinery.

The necessary conditions for the full mechanization of factories have now been met, the quality of goods has been improved, and prices have been reduced.

A paper factory has been established in each city and kun in the province. The number of weaving machines now stands at 1,169, as compared with 200 at the beginning of the year. (This figure includes both power and hand-weaving machines.)

Furthermore, every local enterprise or agricultural cooperative has been equipped with machines.

Various factories, including the Shinch'on Farm Machinery Factory, have greatly increased the number of machine installations. Moreover, these factories have even produced blast furnaces. They are now engaged in the production of a variety of modern machines, including "Ch'uknyok," power threshing machines, tobacco-cutting machines, "Kokjikki," and "Ch'abanggi." These machines are being distributed to farming enterprises and to other fields of production.

To sum up, the rate of production in local factories and production cooperatives has rapidly increased through these programs. The estimated production goal for the first half of this year was surpassed by 102 percent, and factory installation capacity increased nine times over that of the previous year.

We have described the results achieved by the provincial committee of the Party in compliance with the policies adopted by the June full membership meeting of the Central Committee of the Party. But these achievements are still not adequate to match the progressive development of the country and to meet the needs of the even-increasing population within the province.

The new measure adopted by the standing committee of the Central Committee of the Korean Labor Party with regard to the firm establishment of local industries calls for the further development of local industries.

The provincial committee of the Party will encourage the further development of local industries. To adequately meet local industrial needs for iron, cement, and power sources in the near future, the provincial committee of the

Party will provide better leadership and will endeavor to make use of all resources available in the local areas.

In addition, it will also be the policy of the Party to actively promote the mechanization and automatization of local industries and to firmly place these industries on a systematic basis by exploiting all the necessary resources for their development.

By these means, in the near future the committee will make it possible to provide local areas with an adequate amount of foods, consumer goods, and the materials necessary for local construction and the mechanization of agricultural operations.

PROBLEMS IN CONNECTION WITH PARTY WORK IN VILLAGES

[The following is a full translation of an article of the above title written by Kim Sok-cho, appearing in Tang Kanbudulege Chunun Ch'ango Charyo, No 10, October 1960, P'yongyang, pages 29-36.]

The problems of the rational organization of Party organs and the determination of their proper functions play an important role in the organization of the execution of revolutionary tasks. These two problems are inseparably related.

The Party organs must be rationally organized by taking into consideration their universally recognized conditions as well as their respective characteristics related to various assignments in the execution of revolutionary tasks. Otherwise, there will be no improvement in their function and role, and it will be impossible to properly organize and mobilize Party members or the non-Party masses for the successful execution of revolutionary tasks.

(I)

Agricultural cooperativization in our country was completed last year. As a result, the Party committee in the village (ri) organized by Party Decision No 58 has lost its functions. The agricultural cooperatives constituting the village Party committees in the past have become independent integral entities. This also means that stores, schools, and exhibit halls in the villages are now under the direct control of the agricultural cooperatives.

Taking these organizational changes into consideration, the Planning Committee of the Party Central Committee adopted Party Decision No 55; according to this decision, the Party is to organize a committee in each village, regardless of the size of its membership. This committee was to exercise authority over the Party's organization of agricultural cooperatives; it was to be guided by the principles of capability, distribution, and priority.

Each agricultural cooperative would include such facilities as a work team, store, exhibit hall, school, distribution center, post office, crop storage station, etc.

Even when factories, enterprise agencies, and production cooperatives are situated within the jurisdiction of the village Party committee, they are excluded from its supervisory functions. But some workers have failed to accurately comprehend the differences between the old and new Party committees in the village since their reorganization. They have been confused by the fact that these committees have identical names.

The village Party committees organized according to Party Decision No 58 performed unifying and supervisory functions for two or more basic Party organizations. In particular, the village Party committees performed the above functions whenever there were two or more agricultural cooperatives or two or more basic party organizations in agricultural villages.

At the same time, the basic organization constituted a part of their respective city (department) or kun Party organizations, and the village Party committee closely coordinated its work with the work of the city (department) and kun Party committee by executing its assignments within the framework of the jurisdiction of its respective [parent] committee.

This does not mean that the former village Party committee failed to perform its functions independently. It promoted the important tasks of organizing and mobilizing the basic Party organization for the successful solution of problems with regard to political, economic, and cultural developments in the village.

Nevertheless, the village Party committee newly organized by Party Decision No 55 in many ways differs from the former committee. Moreover, its capabilities are also different. The newly organized village Party committee is a unified organ of leadership, comprising all sectors in the village.

Accordingly, various Party organs, including agricultural cooperatives, stores, exhibit halls, schools, distribution centers, post offices, crop storage stations, etc., are now incorporated in the village Party committee.

As in the past, these organs function as the committee's basic organizational components, but the village Party committee is no longer directly responsible to the city (department) and Kun Party committee.

In a typical village where the scale of operation and the size of Party membership are too small, basic Party organizations can be organized according to the need. Moreover, these Party organizations can maintain their subordinate units. But these subordinate units are not entitled to perform their own organizational tasks.

For example, problems concerning the Party membership enrollment of teachers of a people's school in the village or problems concerning Party organizational rules in stores will not be solved at the unit level. These problems will have to be brought up before a general meeting of the Party's basic organization in the village for solution.

The agricultural cooperative is organized merely as an administrative organ in the village, but its function differs from village to village. The basic party organizations that constitute an agricultural cooperative cannot be organized in a mechanical manner.

The Party rules and regulations must be strictly followed in their organization. But at the same time, these Party units must be sufficiently flexible to take the existing reality into consideration and to offer an optimum opportunity for their operation.

The Party Central Committee has frequently emphasized the necessity of carefully organizing various Party units by taking into consideration the problem of their capability and distribution. Nevertheless, some village Party committees have mechanically organized their units by either type of work or simple organization scheme.

Although the Party's conditions of capability and distribution should be taken into consideration, this does not mean that, a Party unit should be organized whenever there are three or more Party members in the area.

Inasmuch as the Party has emphasized these conditions to provide a guide for organizers in their execution of our revolutionary tasks, the Party unit must, of course,

have a certain membership size, so that it will be able to properly execute its assignments. At the same time, we must fully consider the level of political ideology among Party members, the degree of preparedness among cadres and Party core members (haekshim), as well as the family clan system still existing in the agricultural village.

In the absence of substantial research on the above problems, a good number of Party organs in the country have been too fragmented and some party organs have been composed of only three or four or five or six Party members.

FROM THE STANDPOINT OF THE CONDITIONS IN AGRICULTURAL VILLAGES AND THE DEGREE OF POLITICAL PREPAREDNESS OF OUR PARTY MEMBERS, THE EXCESSIVE FRAGMENTATION OF PARTY ORGANS CAN NOT BE RATIONALLY JUSTIFIED.

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If Party organs are fragmented, errors will first of all arise in our efforts to select and assign experienced and able cadres for the proper organization and execution of tasks, as required by the Party Central Committee.

Our investigations revealed, in some instances, a cadre was assigned to a small Party organ of five to six members and that, in other instances, an inexperienced, young Party member placed in charge of a Party organ of 20-30 members. Furthermore, some Party committee chairmen, with adequate experience in only limited areas of Party work, have been put in charge of related Party organs engaged in work that was outside the scope of their knowledge.

As a result of the fact that the chairman of the No 4 Party organ in the agricultural production department of Kwangsong ri, Kawksan kun, P'yongbuk Province, did not have any experience in Party work, he has not been able to organize and proceed with a general meeting of the Party. The chairman substituted a related Party organs' general meeting for a general meeting of regular Party members by incorporating the latter into the former.

The above example shows that the organization of a Party organ must be carefully worked out to ensure that the core will be constituted only of those who are able to exercise leadership.

The excessive fragmentation of agricultural party organs would also incur the danger of weakening the Party's ideological struggle. This situation is the result of the still prevalent notion of our family clan relationships.

The No 3 Party organ in the agricultural production department in Kup'o ri, Ch'onnae kun, Kwnagwon Province, is made up of nine members, including eight members with the same family name, Pak. Some of these members are brothers and some are close relatives. Similar examples can be easily found in many other Party organs.

Under these circumstances, how can the Party's ideological struggle against all antithetical, untruthful phenomena be worked out without compromise.

If not the decisive factor, our experience has shown that this phenomenon has definitely harmed the struggle to preserve our Party life. It is therefore necessary to take this point into consideration.

It should be pointed out that excessive fragmentation is apt to invite diffusion and dispersion. If too many small Party organs are created under a village Party committee, it might be too overwhelming a task for the village Party committee to supervise these organs. At the same time, supervision by the village Party committee, even if available, would be too superficial and would produce a situation in which none of its organs could enjoy close scrutiny.

Taking these points into consideration, we should investigate the organization of village Party organs and make rational adjustments in accordance with their nature.

THE DIAGNOSIS OF PRODUCTION AND GEOGRAPHICAL RELATIONSHIPS ARE PROBLEMS TO BE SERIOUSLY CONCERNED WITH IN CONNECTION WITH THE ORGANIZATION OF PARTY ORGANS.

Without considering production characteristics and geographical relationships, several Party organs cannot be put together into one unified system simply because they have a small membership.

Needless to say, if a Party organ is large enough to organize an executive committee (chiphaeng uiuon) in the production department and if it has a strong core, it is feasible to organize a single Party organ in the area.

If this not possible, a Party organ can be organized on the natural basis of the village. However, should a Party organ tend to be too big if organized on the natural basis of the village and should it tend to be too small if organized on the basis of production, it is also possible to organize a Party organ by combining two or three related production departments.

If this should be the case, the geographical distance between production divisions must be carefully calculated. Moreover, even if some divisions are related on the basis of production, care should be taken not to unify them mechanically into one system should they be separated by a great distance.

On the other hand, problems arise as to how to unify units under one organ when Party units differ widely by nature of production but are adjacent geographically. Even if this is the case, we must be certain to organize these units on the basis of the concrete situation.

A Party organ cannot, of course, be mechanically organized on the basis of agricultural production departments, livestock departments, handicraft work departments, sea produce departments, stores, or schools. These divisions cannot be unified simply because they are located in the same village.

It is more rational to organize separate Party organs for such village production departments as livestock production, handicraft work, sea produce, and construction work. Whenever possible, this policy should be carried out.

If work departments that are different in nature were mechanically unified into one Party organ, the organ would be unable to properly lead and supervise the lives of its members. At the same time, it would be unable to conduct thorough discussions at Party meetings. This does not mean that these Party work divisions can be mechanically unified by disregarding their geographical division.

The Party livestock production department in Taeha ri, Ch'onma kun, P'yongbuk Province was organized mechanically. As a result, its members are spread over more than 10 ri across a reservoir. Thus, when a meeting is held, the members must get together by crossing the reservoir by boat.

We do not mean to suggest that units must be organized separately simply because each has three or more members. Our meaning is simply that each Party organ must be rationally organized for the benefit of the life of its members.

If there is difficulty in organizing these Party work teams on an independent basis, they can be combined with other geographically adjacent teams, after serious consideration of the nature of their work.

We must always be aware of the fact that there can be non-rational aspects in combining these work teams with a small Party membership into one Party organ. For example, the chairman of this type of Party organ may accurately measure the Party life of workers once under his direct supervision. But since he would not be able to accurately measure the Party life of workers and their production activities in other areas, he would not smoothly execute the Party's struggle for production.

These irrationalities, however, can be easily overcome if the correct production method is implemented by the chairman of the Party organ. The chairman need not do everything under his direct command. He can organize his Party organ in such a way as to share responsibility with other committee members, or he can stress teamwork with the core members of the Party organ and make wide use of them in Party work.

In this way, even if some work teams cannot be directly under the supervision of the chairman he will be able to accurately judge his members, and execute and further promote his Party leadership and supervision.

(2)

Comrade Kim Il-song stressed the following obligations of Party organs. First, [he stated], the Party organs should

help each member to accurately understand the Party's policies and to promote his daily education so that each member will firmly adhere to the Party line.

The Party organs should also be unified, so that each of their members will execute the main principles of the Party Central Committee as one body and soul. Moreover, the Party organs should help each member to participate actively and faithfully in Party life, and should help each member to become stronger."

Second, "The Party organs should propagate our Party's main principles and the principles of Marx and Lenin to the non-Party general masses in order to gain their adherence to our Party's main principles." (Statement made by [Kim Il-song] on 21 and 26 February 1959 at a lecture for Party activists at production work sites, Party chairmen, and chairmen of provincial, municipal, and kun Party committees.)

Inasmuch as these primary obligations must be pursued universally by all Party organs without exception, village Party committees must pursue these obligations as well.

At the same time, each Party organ is faced with its own special obligations; that is, it is faced with concrete obligations with regard to socialist construction, its immediate revolutionary task. The revolutionary task differs by type of enterprise, occupation, and agricultural village.

What, then, is the revolutionary task that is to be pursued by the village Party committee?

The following section is primarily concerned with describing the obligations that are characteristic of the village Party committee.

The managements of our agricultural villages are today confronted with various important tasks, including the improvement of livestock production, handicraft work, sericulture, fruit cultivation, and fresh-water fish cultivation (without neglecting the further development of crop production.)

To execute these tasks, agricultural villages should pursue the large-scale promotion of irrigation, electri-

fication, and mechanization. At the same time, they should systematically engage in agricultural production by developing collective (chibyakchokin) agricultural production methods and diversified management systems, according to their geographical characteristics.

Recently, the Standing Committee meeting of the Central Committee of the Party issued an instruction, "To agricultural village Party organs, agricultural village managerial cadres, and all agricultural cooperative members."

In this instruction, the Central Committee urged the workers to continue their promotional and reform efforts in order to successfully execute their assigned tasks and, thus, in the near future to realize the transformation of their agricultural villages into villages possessing modern technology, wealth, and culture.

Moreover, it was emphasized that at the earliest possible moment, all Party members and farmers should overcome the shortcomings that still exist in the villages. At the same time, they should continuously struggle to strengthen the socialist management of the agricultural cooperatives and to more closely adhere to the Party's policies in all fields of production.

This instruction of the Standing Committee of the Party Central Committee constitutes one of the Party's platforms on the work of the village Party committee.

To accomplish the tasks outlined in the instruction and to achieve a high level of productivity in the management of agricultural villages, the village Party committee should properly organize and mobilize various Party organs and their members as well as the general non-Party masses.

These instructions will enable the village Party organs to work toward the execution of the difficult tasks of the management of agricultural villages.

The village Party organ is advised to stress the Party's leadership and control role with regard to the management and operation of the agricultural cooperative. This will strengthen it politically as well as economically and enable to fulfill the Party's policies concerning the agricultural village.

It should be pointed out, however, that there are some differences between Party control measures with regard to the management and operation of the agricultural cooperative and party control measures with regard to the management, operation, and production activities of the Party organ within the state-operated enterprise.

The managers of state-operated enterprises are fully entrusted by the Party and the state with the management and operation of their enterprises. Moreover, these managers provide leadership in economic activities under a centralized system of management.

The agricultural cooperative is managed through democratic management practices. There is no manager directly appointed by the state at the head of the agricultural cooperative. A collective leadership organ fulfills this function.

As clearly stated in the rules for agricultural cooperatives, "The highest organ of the agricultural cooperative is the general meeting of all members or all representatives," and "the management committee (koanliuiwonhoe) is the cooperative's management organ and it is responsible to the general meeting of all members or all representatives."

This means that the Party's control measures for the management and activities of the state-operated enterprise consist of direct control by the State through its appointed manager. On the other hand, the Party's control measures for the management and activities of the agricultural cooperative consist of control only over the chairman, who is solely responsible for the management of the cooperative, and other management committee members elected by all cooperative members.

Now, let us discuss more concretely how a village Party organ exercises its control over the management and operation of the agricultural cooperative.

The Party's leadership and control functions above all lie in helping the cooperative management committee to accurately grasp the intention of the Party Central Committee and to fulfill the Party's agricultural policies. It should therefore be the primary task of the Party organ to provide an accurate guidepost for the cooperative

managerial workers to clearly comprehend the Party's policies and the Party's methods of executing these policies.

The leadership concerned with providing a guidepost for economic enterprises should proceed very carefully. The chairman of the village Party committee and the committee members should endeavor to exert their collective power, rather than their personal judgment or subjective feelings in the formulation of work directives.

From a practical standpoint, the Party's regulation cannot be individually enforced. It is by nature a collective or popular regulation. Accordingly, when the agricultural cooperative is faced with various important and new problems, the chairman of the village Party committee should not try to solve these problems single-handedly, but should try to bring them to the village Party committee for solution.

In the formulation of work directives, the village Party committee should seriously consider the concrete conditions that it is faced with. In particular, the village Party committee should seriously consider various concrete conditions, including the economic foundation of the agricultural cooperative, its future prospects, its geographical characteristics, its main produce, the possibility of expanding its area of production, mechanization, the degree of irrigation and electrification, the political preparedness of cooperative members and cadres, and the extent of the Party's power and capabilities.

In this connection, what is significant is the problem of correctly determining the degree of importance and the order of priority among these conditions. Moreover, it is important to correctly deal with the central questions first.

Comrade Kim Il-song's statement at the 4 September plenary meeting of the Party committee of the Hwanghae Steel Plant, stressed that it is most important in any enterprise to make a clear distinction in the order of priority and to allocate concentrated efforts for the execution of the task. Dispersion of power and capacities will only bring failure in our tasks.

This advice of Comrade Kim Il-song is also applicable in the managerial field of the agricultural cooperative.

The June 1959 general meeting of the Party's Central Committee proposed the further acceleration of livestock production in agricultural cooperatives.

In order to fulfill the Party's policy and to firmly establish a foundation for the development of livestock production, the village Party organ at its committee meeting should discuss what means to employ for the realization of this policy in its agricultural cooperative.

Since efforts by the Party's core members and activist cooperative members are essential in this connection, it may be useful for the village Party organ, in its discussion of the problem, to try to embrace their opinions and guide them to play a role in the direct management and operation of the cooperative.

After systematically analyzing the real status of its agricultural cooperative, the village Party committee should decide on the order of priority in the development of livestock production.

The most important problem in the order of priority for the development of livestock production is that of the promotion of a feed station. The village Party committee should be able to determine the possibility of establishing a feed station. At the same time, it should be able to scientifically calculate the possibility of introducing the two crop farming system. As our experiences have shown, planning that is lacking in scientific calculation does not serve any purpose and is nothing but a scrap of paper.

The village Party committee should discuss methods of processing with two-crop farming, as proposed by the Party. At the same time, it should try to educate each worker to realize that the achievement of greater results with the present work load requires the decisive mechanization of his agricultural village.

Indeed, the mechanization of agricultural villages should be the central consideration in the installation of two-crop farming and, thus, in the development of livestock production.

As a matter of fact, the establishment of a firm economic foundation cannot be considered apart from the mechanization of management and the application of the division of labor.

The village Party committee should, therefore, put all other considerations aside in order to mobilize all available sources for the mechanization of various agricultural tasks.

If the implementation of proposed tasks, including that of mechanization, were widely discussed, we would be able to overcome both the possibility of accidents and one-sidedness. At the same time, we would be able to develop measures arrive at a better solution of problems by making use of the collective wisdom of the masses.

Decision-making by the village Party committee is the aim to be pursued by the cooperative managerial committee. The cooperative managerial committee should therefore exert itself to the utmost to implement the decisions of the village Party committee in practical production activities.

Collective discussion of a problem among the workers concerned is only the first step in realizing the objective of a project. To successfully accomplish a proposed task, THE NECESSARY DIVISION OF LABOR AND THE PROPER DISTRIBUTION OF POWER AND CAPABILITY MUST BE ACCURATELY CARRIED OUT.

Some village Party committees have failed to devote their energy to the further promotion of the administrative skill of their cooperative committees and to the proper implementation of the Party's political work. Instead, they have often performed administrative functions themselves, in place of the cooperative managerial committees. This practice deviates from the regulation techniques of the Party.

The managerial role exercised by the village Party committee in place of the cooperative management committee is primarily the result of lack of research on Party enterprises. In particular, it is the result of neglect of the clear role played by the division of labor and the proper distribution of power and capability in all

fields of work. If the division of labor is not clearly established, workers' and cadres assignments cannot be efficiently executed and the sense of responsibility and creativity cannot be developed to its maximum. As a result, progress in work will be slow and goals will not be reached. At the same time, the chairman of the village Party committee will be forced to take over the role of the cooperative management committee and function as a managerial worker.

This practice will only invite the weakening of the role of the Party and the committee. The chairman of the village Party committee should strive to avoid this type of practice and should make the proper distinction between party and management committee work.

The village Party committee should properly differentiate between assignments for Party committee members and cooperative management cadres. To assign a proper role to cooperative management cadres, the goals and contents of their work in each department (pumun) and each work-team (chakopban) should be clearly indicated.

In carrying out the division of labor in this manner, the cooperative managerial workers should devote their creative enthusiasm to systematically planning practical methods for the implementation of production goals.

Our Party has stressed the importance of crop-purchase work and expects its members to fully apply themselves to this work.

In connection with this task, the village Party committee should provide the basic framework for systematic political work. At the same time, it should provide a clear division of labor for the active application of cooperative members to crop purchase work.

The village Party committee should first of all, disseminate the Party's policies on purchasing among cooperative members. At the same time, it should carry out political work to guarantee the organization, mobilization, and conscious devotion of their highly qualified abilities to purchasing work. Village Party committee members and management cadres can be assigned to this work. They should

be assigned by work team or geographical area, on the principle of the division of labor.

The committee member or the management cadre assigned to a task should help the workers to arrive at a better understanding of our Party's purchasing policies. In this way, they will freely sell their excess crops to the State.

The village Party committee may assign cooperative management committee members to the preparation of machinery, equipment, supplies, and transportation facilities for the execution of crop-purchasing tasks. It may also appoint management committee members as agricultural cooperative store managers to prepare the goods that are in greater demand among the cooperative members.

Last season, the State's purchasing policy was carried out rather inadequately. No measures were taken to insure the division of labor among management cadres on an organized basis, and it was left entirely up to the cooperative members to cooperate with the State's policy. Thus, in the end, the village Party committee chairman and the management cadres had to run all around the place to attain the State's purchasing goal by themselves.

It is clear that one of the important prerequisites for the achievement of efficiency is that the work must be precisely charted. This will enable each worker to have a clear understanding of his assignment and to take responsibility for the achievement of his goals.

ANOTHER IMPORTANT PARTY CONTROL MISSION ENTRUSTED TO THE VILLAGE PARTY COMMITTEE IS CONNECTED WITH THE SCRUTINY AND GENERALIZATION OF WORK RELATED TO THE EXECUTION OF PARTY POLICIES.

The village Party committee should always be mindful of the management committee. The village Party committee should always be observant of the work of the management committee. It should see to it that the management committee follow the cooperative's regulations and uses methods based on democratic management principles; that it help establish system and order within the cooperative; that it organize the labor force effectively; that it follow the

principles of socialist labor distribution by taking into consideration the quality and quantity of labor; that it accurately manage the cooperative's finances; and that it pay constant attention to further improvement of the living standard of cooperative members.

The village Party committee can request a report from the management committee whenever it wishes. For example, the village Party committee can request a report on the distribution of goods among the cooperative members. The management committee should carry out the distribution of goods in accordance with socialist distribution principles, based on the quality and quantity of the labor of each cooperative member.

If this principle is disregarded and the distribution is carried out on an egalitarian basis, or if it is delayed, the great and creative enthusiasm for work shown by cooperative members will diminish and the establishment of firm system and order will be hindered. In other words, this defect would diminish the advantages of cooperativization.

The village Party committee should be mindful of all these and other facts and possibilities, and it should endeavor to rectify all shortcomings. It should guide and supervise [its subordinate organizations] to willingly adhere to the socialist principle of distribution.

At the same time, the village Party committee should pay special attention to its efforts to accurately evaluate the nature of a work day. In practice, the principle of socialist distribution can be effectively carried out only by accurately defining the point system of labor achievement.

The village Party committee should try to discover means by which the responsibility and functions of the chief of a work team can be further promoted. It should also endeavor to thoroughly oppose all misdemeanors, such as inaccurate work and mediocrity.

The village Party committee should accurately assess and evaluate work achievements on the basis of a report submitted by management cadres; at the same time, it should to popularize the achievements. The committee should also

guide and regulate the work of the management cadres to rectify any abuses through a close scrutiny of their causes.

The most effective method of analyzing the general condition of work is for the chairman of the village Party committee and its members to personally go out into the field and to infiltrate among Party and non-Party cooperative members.

The chairman of the village Party committee should not indulge himself in demanding documents and in working out statistics in his office. Once the chairman has completed the formulation of work directives and the organization of the proper division of labor, he should be in constant touch with the workers by personally participating in the life of the cooperative members. Through conversation he should try to educate the workers by convincing them of the rationality of the Party's policies. At the same time, he should try to analyze work progress.

If, in this process of scrutiny, the chairman of the village Party committee should find any shortcomings, he should try to rectify them there and then. If any shortcomings prove to be grave or prove to have far-reaching consequences, he should bring these matters up before the committee for collective discussion to devise means of rectification.

The village Party committee should adhere to the Party's primary principle in the fulfillment of assigned tasks, especially in the fulfillment of the Party's agricultural policies.

The managerial cadres of some agricultural cooperatives have neglected to constantly enhance the livelihood of cooperative members and to struggle for the solidification of the economic foundations of agricultural cooperatives. Instead, to boost their personal reputations, they have done great harm by exaggerating their achievements, by fabricating results, or by pretending that they would do things that could not be done.

The village Party committee should know how to carry on its struggle to combat these phenomena; it should endeavor to overcome false aspirations, individualism, and profiteering among workers.

The village Party committee must wage a struggle against any damage inflicted on the common property of the cooperative. The Party Central Committee has emphasized that "any action that infringes on the common property regardless of the degree of its gravity, should be regarded as an anti-revolutionary and opposition act."

The village Party committee is different from other Party organs in that it is both the Party's committee of agricultural cooperatives and the leadership organ of all village Party organs. Therefore, the primary task of the village Party committee is to strengthen agricultural cooperatives politically and economically.

At the same time, the committee must accurately execute its leadership function for schools, stores, exhibit halls, post offices, crop storage facilities, etc.

The village Party committee should make explicit the guiding principles to be applied to the work of its subordinate organs. It should organize the division of labor and the distribution of power and capacities for work in the village. It should also conduct a continuous investigation of work progress. In particular, the village Party committee should arrange for the management workers of its organs to engage in political work among the workers. At the same time, it should pay close attention to strengthening the Party life of these management workers.

The village Party committee should try to emphasize its leadership role in the work of the village people's committee and people work team. It should also give weight to the function of the representatives of the people's assembly.

To rear future generations of builders of communism, the village Party committee should accurately promote the scientific and ideological aspects of its educational tasks. Furthermore, it should be its policy to obligate commercial and public health organs to work for cooperatives and their members.

Inasmuch as all these organs, without exception, have close relationships with agricultural cooperatives, we should be aware of the fact that, in practice, the management of agricultural villages cannot be regarded as being on the right track on the basis of the development of

agricultural production alone. Simultaneous progress is necessary in the fields of commerce, finance, education, public health, etc.

Lastly, it should be emphasized that, in order to raise the level of operational skills of the village Party committee, we need to strengthen educational measures for its chairman as well as for other cooperative cadres.

As pointed out by Comrade Kim Il-song, education for these Party members is an essential task of the Party. Without learning, there is no way of raising one's political and occupational level and, thus, successfully executing one's revolutionary tasks.

The chairman of the village Party committee should try to further cultivate his understanding of the principles of Marx and Lenin and our Party's policies through constant research; this is especially true of our Party's agricultural policies. At the same time, he should try to understand advanced agricultural methods. Without possessing some economic knowledge, the chairman of the village Party committee will be unable to correctly evaluate the level of achievement in the field of agricultural work. At the same time, he will be unable to adhere to our Party's agricultural policies and to maintain his leadership in fulfilling Party goals.

For these reasons, the chairman of the village Party committee should continuously strive to raise his political and occupational standards. He should train himself as a builder of communism who possesses the necessary qualifications for a revolutionary worker.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGRICULTURAL POLICY OF THE PARTY

[The following is a full translation of an article of the above title written by Chong Yong-t'aek, Chairman, Party Committee, Yongch'on'gun, P'yongan-pukto, Tang Kanbudulege Chunun Ch'amgo Charyo, No 11, November 1959, pages 6-9.]

Speaking before the National Conference of Agricultural Cooperatives (Chon'guk Nongop Hyoptong Chohap Taehoe), Comrade Kim Il-song declared that irrigation, deep plowing, close planting and the use of greater supplies of fertilizers and manures constitute the basic methods for the implementation of intensified farming. At the same time, he stated that these methods constitute decisive assets leading to a higher yield in agricultural production.

In accordance with these instructions, immediately after the Conference, the Kun Party Committee investigated farming preparations currently in progress in the kun.

This examination has revealed that farming preparations were not carried out as satisfactorily as expected. For example, the statistics compiled by the Kun People's Council indicating that irrigation works in the kun were basically completed were not exactly in accord with reality. Of a total of 104 [irrigation] construction projects, there were a considerable number of projects in which the earth-work had not yet been completed.

Moreover, although the statistics indicated that as much as 2,080,000 tons of homemade manure were produced through "the movement of 200 tons per chongbo," the facts were entirely different.

Notwithstanding this ignominious situation, the leading officials (ilkkun) of the Kun People's Council increased their figures for the output of food-grain crops in the ledger by 100,000 to 150,000 tons after each meeting. By the time several meetings had been held, this figure had been raised to 310,000 tons of food-grain crops, which is

eight times as large as the actual output last year. This is nothing but a manifestation of a glory-seeking working attitude on the part of the leading officials of the Kun People's Council.

With such an attitude toward work, it was simply impossible to implement the instructions that Comrade Kim Il-song had delivered at the National Conference of Agricultural Cooperatives. The Kun Party Committee, therefore, thoroughly criticized this glory-seeking attitude toward work; it has initiated the organization of tasks aimed at the prompt implementation of the agricultural policy of the Party.

When the plowing period arrived, there were many tasks to be done besides plowing. Irrigation work had to be completed before the arrival of the sowing period. Moreover, spring plowing, preparation of cold-bed rice paddies, production of homemade manures, etc., also had to be carried out.

All these tasks can not and should not be assigned simultaneously. Accordingly, the Kun Party Committee began by examining the concrete situation. After this examination, the Committee set up an order of priority for each task and, thereafter, took measures to concentrate efforts on the implementation of key tasks.

The acceleration of the production of homemade manures was an important task. But even more important was the completion of the numerous wide spread irrigation projects currently underway, so that water could be drawn before advent of the [rice?] transplanting period.

The Kun Party Committee therefore organized and mobilized the Party organs in such a way as to devote priority effort to irrigation projects; the remaining resources were to be devoted to the production of homemade manures.

But some of the leading officials of the Kun People's Council did not properly execute the measures adopted by the Kun Party Committee. They did not provide concrete guidance for the implementation of these measures. Their pretext was that the implementation of "such decisions adopted by the Kun Party Committee is not obligatory," or that "the decision-making powers are reserved to us

[People's Council]." This was a clear sign that the consolidation of the Party ideological system among these leading administrative officials was urgently needed.

The situation as a whole was indeed critical. But to implement this task successfully, the Kun Party Committee, under the direct guidance of the Central Committee, under the direct guidance of the Central Committee of the Party, carried out guidance work for the Kun People's Council.

Through this guidance, the Chairman of the Council, Chong Se-dang, as well as several other unfaithful individuals who had been influenced by factionalism, were ousted, and the Party ideological system within the People's Council was firmly consolidated. The Party members and political officers (chongmuwon) of the Kun People's Council became fully aware of the Party policy aimed at understanding the central key task and concentrating efforts upon it. In this way, the Kun Party Committee enabled them to render more substantive guidance to their subordinates.

As a result, work on irrigation projects improved with the passage of time.

But these irrigation projects could not be carried out as easily as expected. When difficulties in irrigation construction projects were encountered in Tonghari and other areas, some [agricultural] cooperative members, who did not understand the significance of irrigation in intensified farming, failed to make positive efforts.

They stated that "since these projects cannot be completed this year, let us slow down." Consequently, it was necessary to further enhance the enthusiasm of the masses.

Immediately grasping this essential point, the Kun Party Committee rendered positive guidance to enable the Party organs in the areas concerned to wage an uncompromising struggle against these passive attitudes and to enable Party members to take the lead in this struggle.

At the same time, the Party Committee strengthened its mass political work in an effort to convince a broad segment of agricultural cooperative members that the establishment of a comprehensive irrigation system--which

one of the basic methods of intensified farming--was necessary in order to attain a higher yield in agricultural production.

By waging this uncompromising struggle in a flexible manner, we have completed earth-works (t'oryang kongsa) with a total volume of 708,000 cubic meters, including the completion of the Amnokkang (Yalu River) Youth Pumping Station with a pumping capacity of 12 tons per second.

Thus, we have brought 81 percent of the total cultivated land area under the irrigation system. Irrigation, one of the basic requirements for high agricultural output, was, thus, given priority and brought into reality.

When the construction of irrigation projects had entered the final stage, the Kun Party Committee initiated an investigation of homemade manure production, together with some other aspects of farming preparations. Since priority efforts had theretofore been exclusively mobilized for the construction of irrigation projects, the production of homemade manures had been inadequate and other requirements for farming preparations had not been satisfactorily met. This was especially true with regard to the production of homemade manures, which fell far behind the production plan. The situation was such that some paddies and fields would have to be planted without any manure.

Since many preparatory projects for farming, including the sowing of cold-bed rice seedlings in nurseries, the planting of spring crops, and fertilization control over fruit farms and mulberry fields, were carried out at the same time, the question now arose as to whether it would be correct to give priority to the production of homemade manures.

But it was clear that higher crop yields could not be achieved without an adequate supply of manures and that it would be almost impossible to carry out close planting without such a supply.

After several meetings in which the relevant problems were discussed in painstaking detail, the Kun Party Committee reached a decision to solve these problems through a more rational organization of labor force.

Accordingly, a one-month period, beginning 20 March, was set aside for the shock production of homemade manures. Most of the labor force was to be concentrated on this task, while the remaining labor force was to engage in the implementation of other preparatory work for farming.

The Kun Party Committee arranged the implementation of these tasks, as well as the spring-term hygiene and disease prevention work, so that the greater part of the masses could be mobilized. As a result, agricultural cooperative members, workers, office employees, and young students were all mobilized for these tasks.

The final result of this intensive drive was the production of approximately 130,000 tons of homemade manures within less than one month, or 30 tons per chongbo of cultivated land area. At the same time, the sowing of cold-bed rice seedlings in nurseries, the planting of spring crops, as well as other urgent preparatory tasks for farming, were also relatively successful.

By then, the transplanting period was soon to arrive.

In our kun, the cultivated area of paddies is greater than that of dry fields. Consequently, timely transplanting for the close planting of rice, of necessity, constituted the most important key controlling the output of food-grain crops.

But even with the mobilization of the entire labor force in the kun, the transplanting of rice for close planting would take more than one month. This would inevitably entail missing the best transplanting period and, consequently, a lower yield of rice. The most important and the most urgent task facing the Kun Party Committee was, therefore, the problem of how to complete transplanting for close planting within the transplanting period.

How could we solve this problem? The mechanization of transplanting operations had not yet been carried out extensively and no miraculous ideas came to mind. The only path open for the solution of this problem was to more rationally organize the labor force, to mobilize the creative originality of cooperative members, and to increase operational efficiency.

At first, we were completely at a loss. But, while instructing the Kun People's Council to carry out the necessary administrative and organizational tasks, the Kun Party Committee took steps to strengthen organizational and political work aimed at the full mobilization of the masses for the implementation of this difficult task.

Comrade Kim Il-song has declared that the more difficult the task, the deeper should we penetrate into the masses and the more thoroughly should we explain matters to enable the masses to fully understand the Party platform and policy. To this end, he stated, we should strengthen political work aimed at further arousing the enthusiasm of the masses.

Fully convinced that the solution could be found only in the strong support of the masses, the Kun Party Committee, began by selecting competent officials from among the kun organs, as well as lecturers from other organs. The Committee trained these workers and sent them out to agricultural cooperatives to intensify political work. At the same time, through Party organs, the Kun Party Committee took measures to ensure timely transplanting for close planting.

To further arouse the enthusiasm of the masses for the transplanting operations which were then moving into high gear, the Kun Party Committee organized a kun news editorial committee. This committee published a news bulletin called Ch'ollima ["Winged Horse"], which widely disseminated the creative experiences and exemplary activities of cooperative members. Furthermore, speech amplifiers were installed in areas which had been assigned the largest acreage for transplanting including Yangso, Yongamp'o, and Sinsori, to further arouse the cooperative members.

As a result, the whole kun displayed great enthusiasm in its transplanting operations and the creative zeal of cooperative members increased day by day. Active cooperative members in Chinamni and Sanduri introduced highly efficient rich-shoot grouping machines (chakchogi) and the method of transplanting along checkered lines (chulkan-ch'igi iang pangbop). Numerous other cooperatives also introduced creative methods of transplanting. The Kun Party Committee universalized these advanced working methods.

The Party organ of Chinhungni introduced various advanced working methods and mobilized Democratic Youth League organs for the "surpass the work norm" movement. As a result, in that ri, transplanting was made possible over 230 to 250 p'yong, compared with only 130 p'yong (at the average of 200 units of rice shoots per p'yong) in the past. Many other agricultural cooperatives also enhanced their transplanting efficiency.

But some cooperatives, who had failed to meet the technical specifications for close planting, excused their failure on the grounds of the acceleration of the transplanting speed. A concrete investigation revealed that the failure to meet these close planting specifications was not simply due to the random transplanting made necessary by the urgent need to accelerate transplanting speeds. There were also other causes.

Thus, some managerial officials and cooperative members followed "the safety first" policy, expressing doubt as to the prospective result of the close planting; this was the expression of an unfaithful attitude toward the Party policy. ["the safety first" policy, because they were not sure whether close planting would yield what they expected to attain]

At the same time that it concretely explained the advantages of close planting to cooperative members, the Kun Party Committee instructed Party organs to wage an uncompromising struggle against disorderly phenomena, such as the unsatisfactory implementation of the Party policy.

Comrade Kim Il-song ordered that close planting be ensured through a closely coordinated study of the concrete data produced in the process of transplanting. Pursuant to this order, the Party organ of Sinamni, as well as many other Party organs, launched a forceful ideological drive to combat all unsound phenomena contrary to this order. As a result, various shortcomings manifested in the process of transplanting were overcome.

In addition to this ideological and political work, the Kun Party Committee strengthened the ties between rural Party organs and Democratic Youth League members, and aroused them to take the lead in transplanting operations.

At the same time, the Kun Party Committee organized inspection groups staffed by Party nuclei and took measure to strengthen the computation of workdays according to progress in transplanting work. These measures made it possible to ensure the close planting of more than 200 units of shoots per p'yong in the kun.

Until last year, in some areas the agricultural cooperatives of our kun had not been able to complete transplanting within the transplanting period even with an additional labor supply of 75,000 man-days a year; these cooperatives had to extend the transplanting period until the end of June or even to the first part of July. But with the institution of these measures, this year transplanting was basically completed successfully by 1 June, even with the close planting of an average of 200 units of shoots in three rows (samnyolsik).

With the completion of transplanting, the strain which always accompanies farming preparations was more or less alleviated. Now some kun administrative officials and managerial officials of agricultural cooperatives began to relax their agricultural guidance work or even to retreat from this work. They said, "Well, it's all over," or "Now we can rest."

This constituted an extremely dangerous tendency. Notwithstanding the close planting of crops, manures were supplied only in small quantities. This, of course, could not bring about a higher yield. The Kun Party Committee thereofre persuaded the masses that manures should be produced in quantities adequate for the close planting of crops. At the same time, the Committee mobilized the entire efforts of the masses for mid-season weeding and the production of autumn manures (ch'ubi).

To ensure the successful implementation of these tasks, the Kun Party Committee directed the further strengthening of the ideological struggle aimed at overcoming the complacent attitudes taken by some officials.

As a result, erroneous working attitudes of leading officials were corrected in time, and the enthusiasm of the masses was further aroused for the production of autumn manures and for mid-season weeding operations.

Agricultural cooperatives in Yongch'on'up and in all the other ri ordered each of their work teams to assign certain personnel exclusively to the production of autumn manures. At the same time, all cooperative members were enlisted in a drive to leave in the morning with a bundle of manures on their back and to return in the evening, after the day's weeding operations, with a bundle of grass on their back. As a result of this drive, the production of manures was carried out simultaneously with mid-season weeding operations. As a result, manures were produced and distributed at an average of five tons per chongbo for the kun as a whole.

As mentioned earlier, we initiated our preparations for farming rather belatedly; accordingly, we were forced to carry out a more strenuous struggle. But at each stage of this struggle, the Kun Party Committee firmly grasped the central key to the solution of problems and concentrated all efforts on that key problem.

Thus, the Party policy was fully implemented and an unprecedented harvest was realized. The output of rice this year was more than five tons per chongbo, as compared with 3.6 tons per chongbo last year.

In the course of the struggle for the implementation of the Party agricultural policy, the Kun Party Committee realized that in each task, the order of priority should be clearly set, the central key of the problems should be firmly grasped, and the entire Party's organizational and political efforts should be concentrated on that key task.

On the basis of this experience, the Kun Party Committee will use foresight to guide and organize preparatory work for farming next year; thus, it will ensure the correct implementation of the Party agricultural policy.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PARTY'S
EDUCATION POLICY FOR COORDINATING
EDUCATION AND PRODUCTIVE LABOR

[The following is a full translation of an article of the above title written by Han Nam-son, Vice Chariman, Primary Party Organization, College of Fine Arts (Misul Taehak, Ch'ogup Tang Tanch'e), Tang Kanbudulege Chunun Ch'amgo Chaeryo, No 11, November 1959, pages 14-18.]

During the last three-month period, from the first part of June through the first part of September, the teachers, staff members, and students of the College of Fine Arts participated in productive labor at the Sinch'ang Youth Coal Mine. This program constituted an important factor in the ideological development of these teachers, staff members, and students.

At the same time, it contributed to the further enhancement of their creative power, and provided a good opportunity for the development of the College of Fine Arts, which was established for training young Party artists.

At present, the goal of education in our country is to train well-rounded builders of socialism and communism, and the basic method of attaining this objective is to combine education and productive labor. This method of combining education and productive labor is the only correct scientific method. It enables students to concretize their knowledge through practice, to serve the ends of practice, and to test and consolidate their knowledge practice.

By inducting the students into productive labor, this method enables them to learn productive techniques, to gain practical knowledge concerning the organization of production, and to build up their muscles. At the same time, it enable the students to orient themselves toward the ideology of the working class, which is to love labor.

If artists are to create fine art works for the people to serve the cause of building socialism and communism, they should themselves believe in the noble communist

ideology. At the same time, they should personally experience a vital sense of life by immersing themselves in the concrete realities of life.

But in the past, some teachers, staff members, and students did not fully understand the educational policy of the Party and often spoke of "the peculiar nature of art education."

Under the direct guidance of the Party Central Committee, the Primary Party Organization (Ch'ogup Tang Tanch'e) of the College in time overcame the mystical tendencies of some teachers and students, enhanced the scientific and partisan level of teaching, and correctly mobilized the teachers and students for practical experiments and productive labor. Thus, substantial results were achieved.

The Primary Party Organization and the leadership of the College decided upon at three months' period of productive labor for the specific purpose of enabling teachers and students to more fully understand the correctness of the Party education policy for combining education and productive labor. The objective of this program was to enhance art education. The purpose of art education lies in the training of people's artists to serve the cause of socialist and communist construction.

The Primary Party Organization strengthened its daily guidance work, so that the teachers and students would not neglect their study of the revolutionary tradition of the Party and Party policies even when they were engaged in the strenuous struggle for increased production.

By conducting these studies in relation to defects in work and their causes, the defects manifested in work were corrected in time and the vestiges of bourgeois ideology still present in individual teachers and students were, to a great extent uprooted.

In the course of productive labor, the Primary Party Organization devoted its greatest efforts to making the people accustomed to productive labor within the shortest possible period and to arousing them through political work, to collective heroism in labor.

Since ideological preparatory had been carried out prior to participation in productive labor, enthusiasm for heroism in labor was at a high pitch from the very first day of work. Since these teachers, staff members, and students had not been steeled through actual labor, it was necessary to carry out continuous ideological orientation and organized guidance work in order to maintain and to further raise the level of their enthusiasm for work.

Comrade Kim Il-song has stated that the young people should set an example by taking the lead in undertaking heavy and difficult work. The Primary Party Organization organized and carried out the task of explaining this instruction to the teachers and students, so that they would succeed to the fearless fighting spirit of their revolutionary forerunners and undertake the study of the agile [sic] revolutionary traditions of our Party.

Political-agitation and guidance work was carried out to arouse everyone to take the lead in undertaking heavy labor and to ensure that no one fall behind.

This organized political work further increased the enthusiasm of the teachers and students and aroused their zeal and collective heroism.

For example, on their own initiative, the member of the Pak Il-chong Platoon undertook the most difficult and urgent task of removing the Taeam Mountain (Taeamsan) and laying railway tracks within the shortest possible of time. As for the fulfillment of their assignments, the members of the platoon did not leave their site even when it rained. They worked in the evening with the aid of lanterns, chanting revolutionary songs in commemoration of the indefatigable fighting spirit of their revolutionary forerunners, and fulfilled their daily assignment by 400 percent.

The shock-unit members of the Hero Yi Su-bok Company carried red handbooks recording the instructions of Comrade Kim Il-song and the diaries (sugi) of Hero Yi Su-bok. These members always practiced what was given in the instructions and what was written in the diaries. Inspired by these exemplary deeds, in the course of their intense production struggle the teachers and students aroused at a fuller realization of the correctness of the

Party education policy; they discovered the grave obstacles which had hampered their ideological development in the past and struggled to overcome those obstacles through physical labor.

Consequently, everyone was now fighting to take the lead in undertaking more difficult and heavier work.

Through the process of productive labor, the Primary Party Organization struggled to cultivate organizational (chojiksong) and disciplinary strength (kyuyulsong) among the teachers and students, to overcome liberalism, and to strengthen the ideological rectification work.

The teachers and staff members were very keen about their administrative rank and seniority, not to mention the fact that they were not accustomed to a group life. As a result, in the early stage of productive labor, the members of the Company of Teachers and Staff Members felt very uncomfortable about the highly disciplined living conditions and tended to hope for a so-called "self-conscious" ["voluntary"] and "free" atmosphere.

In order to eliminate these phenomena, the Primary Party Organization drew their attention to the fact that, in the past, several shortcomings in the college, including the unsatisfactory implementation of the Party education policy, had been due to the lack of revolutionary order and system. Thus, they were persuaded to observe regulations, not as a duty but as a result of their sense of responsibility.

As a result, each teacher analyzed and criticized his own ideological shortcomings and agreed to an uncompromising struggle against disorderly phenomena.

Subsequently, the Company of Teachers and Staff Members became a model for the students as a result of their orderly work and life throughout the entire working period. The Company even took first place in the drive for increased production.

As a result of this strong, self-conscious discipline among all the teachers, staff members, and students, there was not a single accident during the entire working period, and everyone fulfilled his share of Party assignments with honor.

The Primary Party Group also gave a great deal attention to the further strengthening of the socialist competitive production movement. The purpose of this movement was to cultivate among the teachers, staff members, and students the communist attitude toward labor and to impress them with the ideology of constant innovation.

The spirit of competition for increased production was further intensified, and numerous innovations were instituted through the design and rationalization movement aimed at making work less difficult and more rapid. The morning record in production had already become "obsolete" by noon, and the noon record was again surpassed by new work norms in the afternoon. In the course of this productive labor, teachers, staff members, and students became convinced that no task was beyond their capacities when they were equipped with the steadfast spirit and production techniques of the workers and when they thought and acted according to the will of the Party.

Accordingly, conscious of the infinite creative power of the masses, they put themselves as a single body to the task of continuous innovation.

But in addition to these marvellous achievements, there were also some manifestations of prejudices.

At one time, some of the leading members among the students were obsessed with the idea of fame. Thus, there was an erroneous tendency to believe that an "actual high record is the only yardstick measuring the degree of ideological orientation." This notion completely disregarded the importance of the quality of work.

This tendency was not serious enough to result in large-scale spoilage of work; nor did it constitute a conscious attempt to sabotage the work. Nevertheless, the Primary Party Organization gave a great deal of attention to the correction of this tendency; for it was potentially dangerous and might jeopardize the basic objective of productive labor.

The Primary Party Organization conducted mass meetings on the basis of the documents of the decision of the February 1959 Plenum of the Party Central Committee concerning improvement of the quality of products. Through

an agitation network and by means of direct observation, the Primary Party Organization urged the teachers and students to realize the motto that "the Quality of Work is the Manifestation of the Ideological Viewpoint." The students and teachers were urged to make every moment of work into an occasion for the consolidation of their ideology [by doing a quality job].

As a result of this political work, the students came to realize in their hearts that the scooping up of a shovelful "porok" and the building of even a single block are the concerns of the Party and the people, and they, too, constitute a cornerstone in the building of socialism and communism.

In other words, a communist attitude of self-consciousness toward labor was further cultivated among the students. This was concretely demonstrated in the following example:

One evening, two students, Ch'oe Ch'ang-sop and Ch'oe Pyong-ch'ol, were awakened from a sound sleep by the noise of falling rain. They immediately remembered a pile of cement bags they had stacked. Inspired by a single thought, these two students ran out of the tent dressed only in their underwear. Subsequently, these two students saved more than 30 bags of cement from being flooded by the rising river.

In addition, there were numerous other praiseworthy episodes. But the students considered such achievements to be no more than the fulfillment of their duties, and did not want to talk about these episodes.

Working side by side with the workers, the teachers and students personally experienced a "real taste" of labor; they came to embrace labor with an infinite love and equipped themselves with the ideology of the heroic working class.

During those three months of strenuous labor struggle, a spirit of noble revolutionary comradeship, strong collectivism, and revolutionary optimism was gradually forming among the teachers and students.

During these three months of productive labor, as many as 19 new designs and rationalization proposals were adopted, including a "gravel dresser," a "large-wall working knife," a "mining car brake," an "automatic signalling apparatus," and a "thin earth support (pakt'odae).

Moreover, 376 teachers, staff members, and students, constituting almost all the participants, received certification in grades four to six for their skill as coal extractors, drillers, detonators, transporters, block layers, concrete makers, track maintainers, turnwrights, and earth thinners (pakt'ogong).

During this period, the teachers, staff members, and students of the College of Fine Arts carried out 61 kinds of difficult and urgent work projects, including the perpetuation of large electric car pits, the development of large open pits, the construction of central "tchippura" in the underground coal-extraction site, the construction of track beds over the surface, etc. These projects were of great significance for the implementation of Party policies on the establishment of fuel bases, the concentration of coal production, and mechanization and automation.

As a result, they fulfilled State assignments by 236 percent. Thus, they created a great quantity of material wealth for the Party, Fatherland, and people, not to mention the fact that they demonstrated their patriotic zeal and creative wisdom.

During the entire three-month period, a sharp ideological struggle was continuously carried out. During this period, various vestiges of bourgeois ideology, including liberalism, egotism, and clanism were completely overcome in the minds of the teachers, staff members and students of the College of Fine Arts. Armed with the Party ideology they became red-banner carrying Party artists, thinking and acting according to the will of the Party.

The art of socialist realism calls for a faithful, realistic description of reality. It must orient the workers by inculcating them with the communist ideology. It must describe in a clear and trustworthy manner, the richness and diversity of reality, the great innovation activities of the people, the noble direction and purpose of their activities, and their high moral calibre. This task demands of artists that they deeply penetrate into the realities to be described and explore their ideological content. In this way, their description will be truthful and concrete.

To meet this requirement, the Primary Party Organization has led the students into a profound involvement with the strenuous, real life of socialist construction. It has cultivated their capacity to consciously select the essential, the characteristic and the lawful, as well as to discover and emphasize the beautiful within life.

At the outset of productive labor, the Primary Party Organization demanded that the teachers, staff members and students utilize each difficult and worthy labor process as significant occasion for the development of their own creativity. Thus, it proposed the motto, "Let labor be accompanied by creative meditation and artistic cultivation."

Working side by side with the workers during this period, under the leadership of Party groups, the teachers and students personally struggled to experience the ideological feelings of the workers and to understand more fully their inner world through a frank exchange of views and by intimately sharing their life. At the same time, they also struggled to develop their artistic talent by observing this life from diversified points of view and by carrying out their artistic work during their free time.

Exhibits of simple art works were often held by platoons or squads at their working sites. Although these were simple works, drawn during rest periods and posted on rocks or tents, their significance was indeed great.

Through these creative works, the students established a habit of perfecting their artistic talents, on the one hand, and aroused the pride of workers in their work, on

the other. At the same time, a free exchange of views with the workers helped the students to further enhance their artistic talent.

In commemoration of the 14th anniversary of the national liberation, on 15 August 1945 the Club of the Mine held an "Exhibit of Field Sketches by the Students of the College of Fine Arts." More than 300 small works were displayed were enthusiastically welcomed by the workers.

For example, "Report-in of the Coal Miners," a Korean drawing by a student, Pak T'ae-su, skillfully presented the beautiful scene of Chaedong village and the life of the young miners in that village. "Detonator," a sculpture by a student, Yi Yong-t'aek, vividly represented the workers' fidelity to labor, as well as their endurance, forthrightness, and indefatigable fighting will. A three-time innovator and a grade-6 detonator, Yi brought his sculptural work to maturity through his own innivatory labor.

"Our Life," an oil painting by a student, Pak Kyong-hui, presented the life of the college students who were training their bodies and minds through productive labor. Despite the the handicap of working within the pits, student Yu Ch'ung-sang drew a good Korean drawing, "Drilling," and student Yi Chong-hwan drew "Detonating Operation."

Portraits by Pak Chin-su and Pak Yong-suk, both students, skillfully portrayed the firm inner world of the builders of socialism who do not fear fire or water in their devotion to the Party and the Fatherland.

Since the works displayed at the Exhibit were completed by taking advantage of short rest periods over many days, they were characterized by many rought points. But these works were completely free from the traditional tendency toward superficial observation and portraiture. Instead, they manifested a new tendency: to represent concrete aspects of life and the vivid inner work of human beings.

Ch'oe Ch'an-su, a senior in the Department of Painting who took the life of the miners as the theme for his graduation work, produced more than 20 excellent sketches during the productive labor period, including "In the

Dressing Room," and "Coal Miners." He was not completely unfamiliar with the life of coal miners, since he had visited the coal mine several times in the past. But this did not enable him to gain a profound understanding of the real life, personality, and inner world of the coal miner. Thus, his work in the past was not characterized by the kind of realism which could move the human heart.

Describing the change that occurred, he stated: "During this productive labor period, I solved many problems and gained a great deal in regard to creative method and attitude. I discovered the truth that only when I work along side the workers and draw my works with sweating on the canvas, can I draw an excellent picture." This was the feeling uniformly held by all the teachers and students who participated in productive labor.

All the teachers, staff members, and students thus once again personally experienced, through practice, the correctness of the Party education policy aimed at combining education with productive labor.

By participating in physical labor, the teachers accelerated the development of their own conscious discriminatory and creative capacity. Moreover, they observed the students' attitudes toward labor and arrived at a systematic understanding of their attitudes. They studied the links between labor and study--especially the connection between productive labor and the training of practical artistic talent. As a result of this study they boldly revised various aspects of the curriculum.

All the teachers without exception, renounced the passive attitudes taken by them in the past toward the implementation of the Party education policy aimed at combining education and productive labor. They are now determined to further develop college education in accordance with this policy.

The Primary Party Organization led the teachers and students to a concrete understanding of the basic purpose of productive labor, and urged them not to lose sight of the central core of work at each stage. When the productive labor period was drawing to an end, the Party Organization instructed the teachers and students to review all the work carried out during the three months and to

immediately eliminate any shortcomings thus discovered.

Through this productive labor, the College of Fine Arts achieved the substantial results originally expected at the beginning of the period. These results reflect the struggle of the Primary Party Organization to further develop the achievements of the Party Central Committee in its collective guidance work.

At the same time, the results achieved reflect the Organization's efforts to ideologically mobilize all the teachers, staff members, and students in the struggle for the correct implementation of the Party education policy aimed at combining education and productive labor.

The Primary Party Organization of the College of Fine Arts, as well as the teachers, staff members, and students of the College, are now striving to realize the Party's education policy on the basis of the experience gained through the three months of productive labor. They are implementing this task in a manner suitable to the new environs and to the characteristics [talents?] of individual persons.

MUNICIPAL PARTY ORGANIZATIONS'
GUIDANCE OF CADRES IN THEIR PARTY LIFE

[The following is a full translation of an article of the above title written by Yi Sang-p'il, Vice Chairman, Party Committee, P'yongyang City, Tang Kanbudulege Chunun Ch'amgo Charyo, No 12, December 1959, pages 7-13.]

To further accelerate socialist construction, at the present stage it is highly important to enhance the political-ideological level of cadres. The enhancement of the political-ideological level of cadres, in turn, calls for further strengthening of the Party guidance and control exercised over Party life by each Party organization.

We must carry out the great historical task of the unification of the Fatherland by further accelerating socialist construction through the correct mobilization of the already aroused revolutionary energies of the workers. In order to hasten the advent of this great revolutionary event and to face it with greater preparedness, the Party Central Committee issued a very important directive on [Party] work. The Party has demanded that the leading officials decisively improve their working attitudes and methods and give priority to political work in all fields of work.

This directive, which was presented by the Party Central Committee at the personal initiative of Comrade Kim Il-song, constitutes another manifestation of the wise leadership of our Party Central Committee and Comrade Kim Il-song in the course of further accelerating the revolutionary development of our country.

Comrade Kim Il-song has repeatedly stressed that all the heads of ministries and the leading officials of State economic organs should give priority to political work and that Party organizations should further strengthen their control over the Party life of cadres. Thus, Comrade Kim Il-song stated that "hereafter, every cadre must live and work under the control of the Party."

After this directive was issued, the political awareness of the leading officials of ministries, central government organs, and other administrative and economic organs, was further enhanced, and the habit of loyally participating in Party life was established.

As a result, the leading officials of the State economic organs have taken the lead in the struggle to arm themselves firmly with the Party ideology and to fully execute Party policies. Furthermore, these officials are achieving new economic successes.

The leading administrative officials of the Ministry of Light Industry and a considerable number of other State economic organs have personally visited production shops and lived with the workers.

They have solved bottlenecks and difficulties for the workers, and corrected various defects of the workers. At the same time, they have participated in various kinds of political work, including appearances before the masses to explain the intentions and demands of the Party. Thus, there has been an appreciable improvement in their working attitudes and guiding methods.

At the same time, Party organizations within administrative and economic organs, including ministries and other organs at the Central Government level, have become more closely involved in the work of leading administrative officials. As a result, they have further improved and strengthened their control over these officials' Party life.

But some former responsible cadres in the Ministry of Chemical Industry and the Ministry of Agriculture, by neglecting their Party life, became unfaithful to Party policies and did not carry them out properly. Moreover, some responsible cadres in educational organs even acquiesced in the activities of anti-Party individuals, rather than waging a principled struggle against them.

All of these phenomena, which are entirely alien to the Party ideology, were due to the failure [of P'yongyang Party organizations] to consolidate the Party ideological system among these cadres. These phenomena are the result

of unsatisfactory guidance and control over their Party life and the failure to completely liquidate harmful ideological effects caused by the anti-Party factionalists.

In view of this situation, one of the most essential and urgent tasks confronting the Municipal Party Committee [of P'yongyang] was to strengthen the Party life of the leading officials of the State economic organs. To accomplish this task, it was necessary for the Committee to consolidate the Party ideological system among the cadres and to liquidate the harmful ideological influence of the factionalists still manifested among some officials.

Thus, the Municipal Party Committee thoroughly explained both the decision of the Standing Committee of the Central Committee of the Party, adopted on 27 May 1959, and the directive of Comrade Kim Il-song to every Party organization and leading administrative official. At the same time, the Committee continuously intensified the intra-Party ideological struggle to further consolidate the unity of the Party and to liquidate the harmful influence of the factionalists.

The Municipal Party Committee has evaluated the overall results and experiences gained through the continuous mass struggle against factionalism conducted during the three-year period following the August 1956 Plenum. After Comrade Kim Il-song's directive was issued, the Municipal Party Committee dispatched various leading responsible cadres to the primary Party organization in each class one and class two ministry, central government organ, and enterprises.

Moreover, cadres were also sent to other principal economic organs. The cadres dispatched by the Municipal Party Organization lectured the primary Party organizations on the fact that "Strengthening of Party Unity is the Basic Asset for the Victory of the Revolution".

In the course of this lecture, the harmful ideological influence as well as the vicious criminal activities of the factionalists were exposed in detail, and guidance was given to each primary Party organization to stage a plenary meeting to attack this problem on the basis of the lecture.

The Party members were inspired by this measure of the Municipal Party Committee, and each Party organization in ministerial organs and in other State economic organs staged a Party meeting to expose and eliminate from their ranks those who were still taking refuge in certain organs and sabotaging the execution of Party policies.

This struggle was accompanied by severe criticisms of certain phenomena indicative of the lack of political awareness, and the intra-Party ideological struggle was thus further intensified.

This struggle inspired the Party members to accept Party decisions and instructions unconditionally and to execute them with determination. The working systems of numerous administrative and economic organs, including the Ministry of Light Industry and the P'yongyang Cigarette Factory, were streamlined and the work methods and attitudes of leading administrative officials improved. At the same time, mass rallies were held for the execution of Party policies, and the masses were further oriented toward Party policies.

But the Municipal Party Committee was not content with these preliminary results. Some leading officials of the municipal Party organizations mistakenly thought that the struggle for the liquidation of the harmful ideological influence of factionalism was over. They said that the "factionalists have already been eliminated," or that "we received intensive guidance from the Party Central Committee not long ago."

The Municipal Party Committee therefore helped each Party member and leading official to understand that the struggle for the liquidation of the harmful influence of the factionalists should continue even though anti-Party factionalists had been eliminated from our ranks. Each Party member and leading official was instructed to re-examine the work of the State economic organs.

As a result of this measure of the Municipal Party Committee, the awareness of leading administrative and economic officials and political officers (chongmuwon) was further enhanced. The Ministry of Finance discovered 96 regulations and rules previously formulated by anti-Party factionalists and began work on revising them.

But Party organizations in the P'yongyang Municipal People's Council and in some other organs in the city attempted to complete the struggle for the liquidation of the injurious ideological effects of factionalism by holding only one or two Party meetings. Thus, these organizations almost completely dissociated themselves from this struggle. At the same time, some officials continued to execute Party policies as a mere formality or carried them out improperly.

As a result, the Municipal Party Committee took measures to organize another intensive guidance (chipchung chido) course for some Party organizations in order to give priority to the ideological mobilization of Party members. The purpose of these measures was to further intensify the struggle for the liquidation of the harmful ideological effects of factionalism.

These measures achieved certain positive results. As a result of intensive guidance work, the harmful effects of factionalism were exposed. It was shown that the Party ideological system was not yet consolidated among some leading officials of the P'yongyang Municipal People's Council, and that Kwak Ki-won, the former Vice Chairman, Chi Yong-nyong, and other anti-Party factionalists organizationally and ideologically linked with the anti-Party and counterrevolutionary factions, had sabotaged the execution of Party policies.

It was further revealed that these factionalists rejected the leading role of the Party and sought after glory and material rewards.

The Municipal Party Committee continuously exposed and indicted these phenomena. It showed that these practices were the result of the fact that the ideological preparedness of the leading cadres within the State economic organs was insufficient to enable them to accept and execute unconditionally Party decisions and instructions.

Thus, the Municipal Party Committee took organizational measures to conduct a powerful ideological orientation work for the consolidation of the Party ideological system among the leading officials.

When the struggle of the municipal Party organizations for the liquidation of the harmful effects of factionalism

had gone into high gear, the Municipal Party Committee convened an expanded plenary meeting which primarily discussed the question of consolidating the Party ideological system in accordance with the present basic direction of Party ideological work.

Moreover, this expanded plenary meeting of the Municipal Party Committee set each Party organization in the city the task of further strengthening ideological orientation work aimed at arming each Party member and cadre with the spirit of the on-the-spot instructions given by Comrade Kim Il-song and with the glorious revolutionary tradition of our Party.

After the expanded plenary meeting of the Municipal Party Committee, former anti-Japanese partisan fighters and trained speakers were sent to each district (chiyok) of the city, where they spent seven to eight days in giving intensive orientation lecture courses to all the Party members in the district. These orientation lecture courses are still being carried on.

The Party ideological system was consolidated among the leading officials of ministries, central government organs, and other administrative and economic organs where this [political and ideological] work had been successfully carried out.

At the same time, Party policies were thoroughly executed in these organs. In addition, the struggle for the further consolidation of Party unity was forcefully conducted, and the work system of the State economic organs began to be further consolidated.

Certain positive results were thus achieved in the organizational and political work of municipal Party organizations. But in regard to the Party life of some leading officials of State economic organs, there still remained many defects which urgently called for correction.

It is true that some improvements were made following the presentation (chesi) of a Guide to the Work of Party Committees in Ministries (Song Tang Wiwonhoe Saope Taehan Chidoso) by the Party Central Committee. But the Party life of some leading administrative cadres is still char-

acterized by an insufficient determination on their part to work with Party organizations and to live within the framework of Party control.

For this reason, one of the most urgent problems of the municipal Party organizations was to convince the responsible leading officials of the State economic organs to work entirely with the Party organizations and to play an exemplary and leading role in Party life by observing the norms of Party life in an exemplary manner.

To solve this problem, after Comrade Kim Il-song delivered his instructions before the Standing Committee of the Party Central Committee, on 27 May, the Municipal Party Committee, under the direct guidance of the Party Central Committee, convened a consultative conference of leading administrative cadres with the rank of bureau chief or higher in the ministries and other central government organs. Various concrete measures to improve this situation were taken by this conference.

As a matter of principle, the delegates to the conference directed their criticism against those leading officials who considered Party control a nuisance and permitted themselves to follow a "double standard" by making themselves an exception to the rule of strict observance of intra-Party discipline and the laws of the State.

Criticism were also directed against those who either did not attend Party meetings regularly or attended the meetings infrequently without any prior preparations. These officials attended meeting as if they were "visitors." When they did come to meetings, they criticized subordinates for even minor shortcomings and replaced Party life with such formalistic attitudes as rendering a "guiding conclusion" to their subordinates.

The conference dealt a heavy blow to those who violated even the elementary norms of Party life by failing to attend Party meetings even once and by failing to pay Party [membership?] dues for several months consecutively, thus continuously sabotaging the principles of Party life. Certain former responsible leading officials of the Chemical Industry had been guilty of just such violations.

Furthermore, it was emphasized at the conference that measures should be taken to strengthen the daily contact between cadres of individual Party organizations, to organize a regular Party mandate (wilm) and division of labor among them, and to strengthen guidance and control over their Party life.

The conference also re-emphasized the need to increase the interest taken by leading officials in Party political work and to give priority to political work in all fields of work.

The measures taken by the conference also embraced the leading administrative officials of medium and small enterprises in every economic sector.

After this consultative conference, the executive committees of the Party organizations within ministries, central government organs, as well as other administrative and economic organs, held intensive discussions on various problems related to the implementation of the instructions delivered by Comrade Kim Il-song before the Standing Committee of the Party Central Committee on 27 May 1959. Subsequently, Party meetings were called at which the past Party life and work of some cadres were evaluated.

At these general Party meetings, a forceful ideological struggle was waged against those leading officials who failed to implement the Party mandate in a loyal manner or who were indifferent to Party political work. These meetings dealt with measures whereby Party organizations were to further strengthen their guidance and control over the work and Party life of leading officials by strengthening their links and daily contacts with these officials.

Measures were also proposed for the regular distribution of the Party division of labor and the Party mandate among these officials and for the timely evaluation of the results of the implementation of these tasks.

As a result, the leading administrative officials made progress in their political work, and the level of the organized guidance that Party organizations exercise over the Party life of cadres also began to improve.

In organizing and implementing this task, the Municipal Party Committee encouraged the Party organizations, first, to strengthen their daily contacts with cadres. The primary Party organizations were instructed to discuss Party political with these cadres from time to time. They were also instructed to inform the leading officials of the various problems arising within the organs and of the defects of Party members as manifested in their Party life.

At the same time, these officials were to assist the primary Party organizations consulting with them about the future direction of Party political work geared to the successful implementation of the given revolutionary tasks.

When the work of the Party organizations was carried out according to these methods, the indifferent attitude formerly taken by leading administrative officials towards Party political work was completely eliminated. At this point, the Municipal Party Committee directed its attention to the demand that the leading cadres work through their own Party organizations.

The decisive turning point in the solution of this problem was reached when the Guide to the Work of Party Committees in Ministries issued by the Party Central Committee was intensively explained and disseminated. While explaining the guide in detail, the Municipal Party Committee sharply criticized some leading cadres who refused to accept the guidance offered by the primary Party organizations and thought it fit to accept only the guidance offered by higher Party organizations.

The Municipal Party Committee also made it clear to these cadres that the maintenance of close links with higher Party organizations and the acceptance of their direct guidance offered by the primary Party organizations and the strengthening of their daily contacts with these primary Party organizations.

In the course of conducting this work, the Municipal Party Committee came to realize that it was very important to further enhance the work level and functions of the primary Party organizations, as well as to decisively improve their methods of working with cadres.

The lack of interest of some leading administrative officials in political work and their shortcomings in

Party life were the direct outcome of the passive methods of work followed by some Party organs and Party officials. The Municipal Party Committee has therefore instructed Party organizations to boldly and extensively organize the Party mandate and division of labor for these leading cadres.

As a result, the primary Party organization of the Ministry of Education and Culture and numerous other Party organizations boldly discarded their handicraft-industry-type working methods.

In the past, these organizations had refused to induct leading administrative officials into Party work on a wide scale, or they had inducted only a few of these officials into Party work. Their excuse had been that "administrative work would prevent these officials from implementing any tasks that might be assigned," or that they would tackle problems only from an administrative point of view."

But they now began to induct cadres into various aspects of Party political work, including training cadres, rendering guidance to subordinate Party organizations, arranging for individual discussions and lectures, and organizing pamphleteering.

As a result, various complaints often heard in numerous Party organizations., e.g., "we have no competent people," and "we lack adequate capacity," gradually disappeared.

At the same time, various harmful working attitudes, including "individual dogmatism" and "one man show" are being gradually corrected. The leading administrative officials have gradually strengthened their regular contacts with the masses, and their sense of responsibility for political work has been gradually enhanced. In this connection, the work methods of the Party committee of the Ministry of Finance constitutes an exemplary case.

The Party committee of the Ministry of Finance is strengthening the system of holding consultative conferences with leading administrative officials.

At the same time, it is planning a concrete division of labor and systematized normal mandate to be regularly implemented by these officials. In connection with the work

of becoming acquainted with the political officers (chongmuwon) of the Ministry, the Party committee of the Ministry presented the leading administrative officials with a selected list of the names of political officers.

In this way, a certain number of these officers can be interviewed by each of the leading officials as listed. In addition the Comrade Minister of Finance was directed to appear regularly before the political officers and address them on important decisions of the Party and the State, as well on as the instructions of Comrade Kim Il-song.

Under the system thus established the leading officials are duty bound to explain Party decisions and instructions to their subordinates in time. At the same time, the Party executive committee of the Ministry is strengthening its regular general evaluation system.

Similar experiences have been encountered in the work of Party organizations in numerous other State economic organs.

In addition, on the city level, the Municipal Party Committee has achieved certain results by assigning a share of the division of labor to all the responsible leading officials of ministries, central government organs, and State economic organs. These officials are to provide continuous guidance for the local industrial plants and producer cooperatives established in the city.

The Municipal Party Committee has thus made a substantial contribution to the establishment of the local industrial system and to the consolidation of the organizational and economic bases of local industry. Moreover, it has positively influenced the cadres to strengthen their Party life and to enhance their sense of responsibility in political work.

But some leading officials of the ministries and central government organs accepted the Party mandate and division of labor as a mere formality; they were unwilling to execute these assignments, and gave various excuses. They were not in earnest in their participation in Party life. At the same time, they failed to fulfill requirements emanating from the Statute of the Party.

To correct these defects in time and to force cadres to fully observe the norms of Party life, the Municipal Party Committee urged Party organizations not to permit any double standard within the Party or to tolerate even a minor violation of the elementary requirements of the Party Statute.

As a result, the Party organizations demanded, as a matter of principle, that the cadres meet the elementary requirements of the Party Statute in an exemplary manner. At the same time, the Party organizations adopted the policy of waging a sharp and continuous struggle against even the smallest defect manifested among the cadres.

The Party organizations now began to strengthen their regular guidance work and the controls exercised over the Party life of the cadres. In the past, guidance and control work by means of intensive investigations had not been carried out until after a problem had arisen.

In exercising the regular guidance and control system over the Party life of cadres, each Party organization adheres to the principle that the controls exercised by the masses of Party member should be strengthened by encouraging criticism from below and by strongly relying upon the Party nuclei and the broad segment of activists.

As a result, the active role and the initiative of the masses of Party members were enhanced, and the struggle against incorrect attitudes became more intense than ever before. Some leading administrative officials, including those of the Commerce Control Bureau, P'yongyang People's Council, were severely indicated by the masses of Party members for the non-Party (pidangjok) attitude they displayed in their attempt to apply pressure to the sound criticisms of their subordinates. These officials met their subordinate's criticism by saying: "You should tighten screws through administrative work," "Criticisms should be confined within bounds," or "Well, why don't we talk this over in private?"

The primary Party organizations renewed the enthusiasm of the masses of Party members by creating an atmosphere in which criticisms could be actively raised from below. Moreover, the leading Party officials have completely discarded their former practice of attempting to save the

"self respect" of cadres by protecting them from criticism or by acquiescing in their mistakes.

Furthermore, the Municipal Party Committee instructed the guidance workers of the Party organs to offer guidance to subordinate Party organs whenever they go out on assignments. These workers have been instructed to investigate the Party life of the cadres and to take measures to correct whatever shortcomings they may find in their investigations before undertaking any basic tasks.

This method has certainly yielded positive results. For example, before undertaking actual guidance work the guidance workers of the Organization Division (Chojikpu) responsible for the Party committee of Songyo Borough (Kuyok) first examined the work of the Borough Party organ and corrected to shortcomings discovered in the Party life of the leading cadres of the Borough Party committee.

Some guidance workers of the Borough Party Committee later observed that "the leading cadres carried out self-criticism for the first time in several years." Moreover, the leading cadres were very frank in their discussion of the deficiencies in Party work and Party life and the measures needed to correct this situation. A positive influence was thus exerted upon the work of the Borough Party Committee.

The regular control exercised over the study of Marxism-Leninism and Party policies occupies a very important place in the guidance and control of the Party life of cadres.

For this reason, the Municipal Party Committee also strengthened its guidance and control of the study of political theory by the cadres. Each cadre was assigned a theme for study suitable to his work and life, and measures were taken for him to regularly present the results of his studies on the assigned theme either before a colloquium or before a meeting of the masses.

As a result, the habit of studying began to be formed among the leading cadres, and study meetings (haksuphoe) of Party members engaged in self-education began to take place regularly.

Various Party organizations, including the Party organization in the State Planning Commission, have strengthened Party guidance over the cadres' studies in the theory of Marxism-Leninism and Party policies; four hours are now regularly allotted to these studies everyday. This has overcome the previous lack of interest in studies, and the pretext of "no respite even to open my eyes or nostrils" [colloquial expression meaning "too busy with one thing to do anything else"] is no longer heard. Party guidance has also given a sound character to the social and ethical life of the leading cadres.

These results were achieved through the further strengthening of the systematic inspection and evaluation system. At the same time, the organization of the Party mandate under which the leading cadres were either asked to appear before the masses or instructed to report to the Party executive committees concerned with studying the attitudes of Party members in turn helped to create self-awareness among the cadres as to their own studies.

The above constitute the results achieved by the municipal Party organizations in the course of their struggle to implement Premier Kim Il-song's instructions to strengthen the Party life of the cadres. But these are no more than preliminary achievements. There still remain numerous urgent problems in the Party life of the cadres of municipal Party organizations.

The most fundamental problem is to liquidate the formalism and bureaucracy manifested in the work of the cadres. The leading officials of some administrative organs in the city are fettered by anachronistic and formalistic methods; they are still trying to perform their work through empty words, documents, and meetings.

Such an attitude toward work places a heavy burdens on the masses. The leading officials are confined to their own offices, and the subordinate officials are discouraged from playing an independent role and exercising their creative originality.

It is precisely for this reason that the Municipal Party Committee is directing greater attention to the task of eliminating anachronistic working attitudes and consolidating a mass viewpoint among these officials.

In this way, the enormous tasks proposed by the historic December 1959 Plenum of the Party Central Committee can be successfully implemented. We shall mobilize the originality of the masses for the implementation of the tasks proposed by the Party for the adjustment period. We shall further cultivate the revolutionary personality of the cadres and enhance their role as organizers and mobilizers.

ON THE ORIENTATION AND TRAINING
OF PARTY MEMBERS FOR UNCONDITIONAL
IMPLEMENTATION OF PARTY DECISIONS
AND DIRECTIVES

[The following is a full translation of an article of the above title written by Yim Chong-ju, Chairman, Wanhwa Party Organization, Wanhwa Agricultural Cooperative, Sunan'gun, P'yongan-namdo, Tang Kanbudulege Chunun Ch'amgo Charyo, No 12, December 1959, pages 13-17.]

It is the standing demand of our Party that every Party member possess the Party spirit necessary to implement Party decisions and directives unconditionally. But in the past, our Wanhwa Party Organization did little to implement the task of developing this spirit in each Party member.

In many cases, the Party Organization merely exhorted Party members to "implement Party decisions and directives unconditionally" and to "be infinitely faithful to the implementation of the tasks proposed by the Party and Comrade Kim Il-song." As a result, the Party Organization never succeeded in orienting Party members toward putting these words into practice.

A considerable number of Party members, therefore, dealt with the decisions and directives of higher Party organizations, as well as the mandate of the plenary meeting (ch'onghoe) [of what level?], in a merely formal manner.

Some of them even attempted to avoid the unconditional implementation of the assigned tasks on the ground that various objective conditions were unfavorable. This formalistic and liberalistic attitude towards Party decisions and directives was also manifested concretely in the course of the implementation of the on-the-spot instructions of Comrade Kim Il-song.

Since 1952, Comrade Kim Il-song has made several visits to our village. He has solved numerous problems

arising from the difficult living conditions of the cooperative members and from the activities of our cooperative management. At the same time, he has assigned various concrete tasks aimed at the further development of our cooperative and at raising the living standards of cooperative members.

In a spirit of infinite loyalty to the Party and the Premier, all of our Party members and cooperative members were energetically engaged in the implementation of the on-the-spot instructions issued by Comrade Kim Il-song. At that junction, it was highly important to sustain the revolutionary enthusiasm of the masses through effective, organized guidance work.

But some of our officials did not fully study the contents of the on-the-spot instructions given by Comrade Kim Il-song; worse still, no appreciable results were achieved as a result of the fact that guidance work was carried out in a formalistic and irresponsible manner.

For example, according to the on-the-spot instructions given by Comrade Kim Il-song, green peas were to be planted in paddies and dry fields to enrich the soil, and fodder for livestock was to be secured. But some officials (ilkkun) failed to study these instructions with care and planted green peas in wet soil at random. When this planting resulted in a fiasco, they completely stopped the planting of green peas for the following year.

Another instance of irresponsible work occurred when a fish-breeding pond was built at a river's edge, only to be washed away together with the soil when the flood season arrived. The officials had neglected to take flood-control measures for this pond. These are only two of a long series of similar incidents.

As a result of the formalistic and irresponsible attitude taken toward Party decisions and Premier Kim's on-the-spot instructions, a series of projects in livestock, sericulture, and pisciculture, which were undertaken to increase the subsidiary incomes of cooperatives, were not satisfactorily carried out.

These situations indicated that the most urgent current task facing the Party Organization was to tailor the

attitude of individual officials to Party decisions and directives and to consolidate the Party ideological system among them. Thus, since the beginning of last year [1958], we have been constantly struggling to achieve this end.

One of the important lessons we learned through this struggle was that it was necessary to give each official a full explanation of the contents of Party decisions and directives, so that he could organize and guide various work projects strictly in accordance with those decisions and directives. Moreover, we learned that when violations occurred, they had to be dealt with, even where the infraction was a minor one.

In this connection, it was very important to explain the essence of Party decisions and directives to cooperative members in close relation to their interests; in this way, Party measures can be more readily understood.

An important task of the Party Organization during the autumn of 1959 was to raise the level of Korean cows to that of milk cows and to secure the necessary fodder for in time. But Chong In-hyok, a work-team leader, and other officials thought that only corn was of value; they failed to realize that if the entire corn field were used as a fodder ground for raising milk cows, they could produce a large quantity of milk and thus increase their profits. As a result, they prevented others from cutting corn ears for silage.

Witnessing these practices, the Party Organization explained that if one chongbo of corn field were utilized as fodder ground, each year three to four head of milk cows could be raised and eight tons of milk could be produced. The Party Organization explained that this was more than twice as profitable as producing four tons of corn per chongbo.

Moreover, the cooperative members would thus be able to meet their own milk requirements. As a result, even those officials who had earlier blocked the use of green corn-ears for silage adopted the spirit of the on-the-spot instructions of Comrade Kim Il-song; subsequently, the officials were mobilized for the production of quality silage.

The most effective method of ensuring that every official work strictly in conformity with Party decisions and directives is to educate him by criticising those officials who arbitrarily organize and guide the work in contravention of Party decisions and directives. These officials greatly damaged the interests of the Party and the revolution. Analyses and criticisms of the following two contrasting cases were of great educational significance.

Through the unconditional implementation of Party decisions and directives on the over-all introduction of the nutrition jar (yongyang tanji) method in cotton planting, last year our cooperative attained the striking result of producing 1.8 tons of cotton per chongbo (a 200 percent increase over the 1957 level). But this year, some officials planted cotton together with plain earth jars, with the excuse that "any kinds of soil would serve" and "any jar would yield a high output." Consequently, the output of cotton was declined to the insignificant figure of 800 kilograms per chongbo.

We emphasized to each official that these comparative results reaffirmed the correctness of Party decisions and directives, and we thoroughly explained the great damage done to the Party and the people by the failure to implement these decisions and directives unconditionally.

As a result, Kim Ye-il, a work team leader, as well as other officials who took a liberalistic and incorrect attitude toward these Party decisions, atoned for their mistakes. Subsequently, these officials began to organize and conduct their work in strict conformity with Party decisions and directives.

Similar results were achieved in regard to the implementation of the on-the-spot instructions on the production of silage given by Premier Kim Il-song on 16 August.

To ensure the thorough implementation of these instructions, the Party Organization called a plenary meeting on 17 August; and concrete assignments were given to each Party member at this meeting. Comrade Kim Ye-il, a work-team leader, was entrusted with the task of securing the total required silage by 15 September.

To ensure the successful implementation of this task, Comrade Kim Ye-il organized Democratic Youth League members into silage production teams. Since transport media were not available because of the autumn harvest, he used his ingenuity and had ditches dug at the corners of corn fields. Silage was then stored in these ditches and rollers went over the ditches to harden them. By 15 September, his team had fulfilled the silage production task assigned by the plenary meeting by 105 percent.

But some officials lacked the noble revolutionary determination to implement, Party decisions and directives under any circumstances; when good results were not obtained in their first attempt, they tended to abandon the work, notwithstanding its importance.

During the rice planting period, this summer, the difficulties caused by the long drought were augmented when the pumps formerly installed at the curb of Sanmak were moved to the Amjok field.

These pumps could not supply water to 15,000 p'yong of rice paddies in the Yimch'un field at the tip of Wonhwa village. The Party Organization called a consultative meeting of Party members and discussed the problem of how water could be drawn into these paddies. The final decision agreed upon was to divert water into these paddies from the brook flowing through the Songsok field.

The Party Organization instructed work squads (punjo) to call a provisional squad meeting and to assign the task of opening waterways to Comrade Kim Yang-ch'ong, who used to draw water from this brook when he was a private farmer, as well as to Comrades Son Myong-hyon and Cho Wallyong, active Party members. In accordance with these instructions, the squad meeting was held and the tasks assigned to these people.

One must carefully study and imaginatively organize the given tasks if one is to be loyal to Party decisions and directives. But these people did not fulfill this requirement. Without having carefully studied the problem of how to dig waterways to draw water to the Yimch'un plain, they dug at random, saying, "Well, this is a Party directive. What else can you do?" The end result was failure. They could not draw the water to their objective.

In spite of this experience, they did not attempt to learn from their mistakes for the purposes of future projects. Instead, they continued in their failure to implement the given task, saying, "This is a reckless plan, and it will just waste labor force." At the same time, they said, "This thing will even cause a delay in our rice planting," and "Better remember the proverb, 'Don't even look up a tree if you can't climb.'"

The Party Organization learned an important lesson from this situation. It came to realize once again that when the demands made on Party members for the implementation of certain tasks were not accompanied by the necessary orientation as to the importance of Party decisions, the Party Organization could not succeed in arousing Party members to self-awareness. Consequently, the expected results could not be realized.

The Party Organization thus persuaded the workers that if they could not succeed in drawing water to 15,000 p'yong of paddies in the Yimch'un field, they could not implement the on-the-spot instructions given by Comrade Kim Il-song. The Party Organization then explained that, if they failed to implement those on-the-spot instructions, their living standards would fall below the level of that of other agricultural cooperatives. They were also told that without overcoming difficulties no happy results could be expected.

As the Chairman of the Party Organization, I personally, undertook a concrete field survey and encouraged the workers to resume the digging of waterways. But, once again, we failed to draw the water up to our destination. Witnessing this failure, some work-team members mobilized for the task now began to murmur in private, "Now, you see, you just can't get the water to that Yimch'un field." But I was not discouraged or affected by this murmuring.

Having learned my lesson, I again encouraged them and we resumed the opening of the waterways, this time from another direction. Even then, we did not succeed.

But we did not despair and tried again; and finally we succeeded.

As a result of our efforts, the paddies yielded an average of five tons of rice per chongbo (1.5 tons more than other paddies.) This final result taught an important lesson to officials, Party members, and nonmembers alike. Through their work, they learned that Party decisions and directives should be thoroughly implemented, in the face of the most difficult circumstances. At the same time, they learned that unfailing struggle, patience, and perseverance is necessary to accomplish this end.

On the basis of this concrete experience, the Party organization continuously strengthened its orientation work among Party members and officials in other work teams. As a result, numerous officials and Party members were gradually imbued with the revolutionary determination to implement every Party decision and directive, no matter how difficult the circumstances or conditions.

Our experience has shown that, in guiding the Party members to fully implement the decisions of the Party, the difficulties or conditions raised by these members should also be solved from the viewpoint of the Party.

This summer, we encountered a serious problem in our attempts to build a fish-breeding pond and to catch fish for breeding in that pond. Under the mandate given by both the public meeting of the Party Organization and the meeting of the Democratic Youth League, this task was mainly undertaken by Democratic Youth League members; and their direction was undertaken by Comrade Yi Ki-hwa, a league member.

The most difficult task was to catch the tens of thousands of fish needed for the pond. Numerous League members were shaken in their original determination, and said, "We can do other things, but this is beyond our ability. We just can't catch any fish, even if we toil until our arms and legs become blistered."

When the Executive Committee of the Party Organization learned of this situation, it assigned Comrade Wi Ch'i-gap, a Party member and a war veteran, to this task and instructed him to persuade and orient these people through his exemplary work. Infinitely loyal to Party decisions and directives, he encouraged and aroused the League members by telling them true stories of the anti-Japanese

guerrilla warfare.

At the same time, he spoke of Comrade Kim Il-song's directive on constructing and managing fish-breeding ponds. But they did not have sufficient nets and labor force; nor was their experience in fishing adequate. Accordingly, their fishing efficiency was very low, and the morale of the League members declined day by day.

Subsequently, the Party Organization instructed the managing committee (kwalli wiwonhoe) to supply more nets and to augment the labor force with workers who were experienced in fishing. The workers now succeeded in catching tens of thousands of carps within a short period of time. Thereafter, the Party Organization conducted an extensive propaganda campaign on these results, both through illustrations with concrete objects and orally.

The Youth league members, guided by Comrade Wi Ch'i-gap in this sector, further demonstrated their positive attitude and originality in their management of the fish-breeding pond. The on-the-spot instructions given by Comrade Kim Il-song on the establishment and management of a fish-breeding pond were thus successfully implemented.

Our experience has shown that appeals alone are inadequate; more practical measures and concrete guidance work are required to orient each Party member toward the unconditional implementation of Party decisions and directives.

There are still some shortcomings in our Wonhwa Party Organization in carrying out these practical measures and in rendering concrete guidance. Consequently, some Party members are still unwilling to implement Party decisions and directives unconditionally; and even if they implement Party measures, they do so in only a formal manner.

There are even some leading officials and cooperative members who still continue to hope for additional concessions from the Party and Comrade Kim Il-song. Instead, they should be aroused by the concessions already given them and should be more faithful to Party decisions and directives.

As a result of these shortcomings, we could not attain a greater output in agricultural production, which would otherwise have been possible.

In view of these shortcomings, in the future the Party Organization shall wage a forceful ideological struggle against even the smallest departure from Party decisions and directives, so that our defects can be overcome in time through criticism and orientation work.

We shall thus continuously orient and train every Party member to become a revolutionary fighter, infinitely loyal to Party decisions and directives. Thus, every Party member will become a red warrior of Comrade Kim Il-song.

GUIDANCE FOR ENHANCING THE INDEPENDENT
ROLE OF THE PRIMARY
PARTY ORGANIZATIONS

[The following is a full translation of an article of the above title written by Chang Kil-chun, Chairman, Party Committee, Ch'ongjin City, Tang Kanbudulege Chunun Ch'amgo Charyo, No 12, December 1959, pages 17-21.]

The party organization is the basic organization of the Party, as well as a fighting organization that links the Party with the masses and directly implements Party policies.

The basic mission of the primary Party organizations as defined by Comrade Kim Il-song consists of (1) consolidating the Party rank and file; (2) uniting the masses of the people around the Party; and (3) ensuring the successful implementation of revolutionary tasks. (Cf. Premier Kim Il-song's concluding address before the February 1959 Plenum of the Party Central Committee and his address before a group of Party organizers.

This challenging mission calls for the over-all strengthening of the primary Party organizations and the further enhancement of their fighting force and independent role. In other words, all the [primary] Party [organizations] and all Party members should unite more solidly around the Party Central Committee headed by Comrade Kim Il-song. They should enhance their fighting force and independent role; this will enable them to firmly adhere to Party principles and to struggle for the unconditional implementation of Party policies. To this end, the primary Party organizations should be strengthened internally.

To enhance the independent role of the primary Party organizations, it is very important that they be staffed strongly.

To create a sound staff for the primary Party organizations is the most fundamental task of the Party Committee.

In the past the Ch'ongjin Party Committee did not pay much attention to this task and did not render regular guidance to the primary Party organizations. It allowed these primary Party organizations to conduct general evaluations and elect their leadership once a year merely to meet the statutory requirement.

Consequently, it could not prevent some undesirable individuals from penetrating into the Party Organization of the Ch'ongjin Locomotive Engine Depot and several other Party organizations.

As a result of such inadequate staffing of the leadership of these primary Party organizations, the principle of collective was not firmly established among them, and the mistakes of a few leading officials of these organizations led them to adopt erroneous decisions. There were even some cases in which the defects of some unsound individuals manifested in ideology and in action were not seriously examined and severely criticised; this allowed them to extend their influence to others.

Therefore, at the last evaluation and election meeting of the leadership of the primary Party organizations, some chairmen of the organizations were eliminated from the leadership.

Among the expelled were those who were corrupted by localism and clanism and paid only lip service to Party policies. Some of these leaders grossly violated the Party's principles of democratic centralism; others, who failed to serve the interests of the Party and the revolution, served their own interests by plundering State property and leading a wanton life in society.

After analyzing these situations, the Municipal Party Committee began to pay earnest attention to staffing the nuclei of the primary party organizations with competent officials who were loyal to the Party and Party principles and in whom the masses placed their confidence.

But as a result of our failure to maintain close contact with Party nuclei in the past, we were at a loss when we attempted to reshuffle the leadership. We did not know who the nuclei were, especially among the newly emerging Party members. Under such circumstances, the

most important task was to instruct the officials in how to enlighten and orient the people.

The Municipal Party Committee therefore instructed. The officials of the Party organizations in the city to strengthen their work with the nuclei of the primary Party organizations and to focus their attention on strengthening the primary Party organizations. To this end, the Municipal Party Committee repeatedly explained the concluding address of Comrade Kim Il-song delivered to the February Plenum of the Party Central Committee and the instructions of Comrade Kim Il-song given before the Expanded Plenary Session of the Hamgyong-pukto Party Committee. The contents of these pronouncements were repeated to the officials until they were able to carry out organizational and guidance work for the implementation of the address and instructions.

After the officials were armed with Party policies and after they became able to guide the primary Party organizations, the Municipal Party Committee began to organize a practical struggle aimed at the implementation of the instructions given by Comrade Kim Il-song at the Expanded Plenary Session of the Hamgyong-pukto Party Committee.

In the course of this guidance work, Party members were inspected and competent officials steeled through actual work were selected. Special emphasis was placed on the selection of ideologically sound officials from among war veterans, survivors of patriots, soldiers' families, and families of the war dead.

At the initial stage of the work, there were numerous defects in selecting the nuclei of the primary Party organizations. Since this work was not satisfactorily carried out according to concrete plans, competent officials could not be selected. Moreover, there was even a tendency to drop officials for minor shortcomings. No attempts were made to reorient them to correct such shortcomings, so that they could be further utilized.

This was constituted a concrete manifestation of the dogmatic attitudes of some officials who erroneously hoped to understand other people according to their own vague image of the past rather than through earnest study.

The Municipal Party Committee strengthened its struggle to eliminate the subjective and illusory attitudes taken by officials in judging other people. It guided these officials to understand other people, not according to a vague image formed in the past, but according to the concrete working attitudes and Party life of these people.

These officials were further guided to eliminate those who, fettered by localism and clanism, only paid lip service to Party policies and shamelessly violated the regulations of the Party. At the same time, the officials were taught to patiently reorient those comrades who had minor shortcomings in their work.

But this work could not all be organized at one and the same time in every primary Party organization in the city. Accordingly, the Municipal Party Committee took measures to give priority to examinations of the chairmen of all the primary Party organizations in the city; then it examined the nuclei in each sector of the people's economy.

Through this practical measure, it was possible to examine and to locate the nuclei of the primary Party organizations and to discover new officials. These new officials included war veterans, survivors of patriots, families of the war dead, as well as a considerable number of innovators, who, through their labor, had performed meritorious work in socialist construction.

The leadership of the primary Party organizations was now staffed by these nuclei. Through this process of reshuffling, the membership of the leadership of the primary Party organizations was considerably changed, and new officials were appointed. The overwhelming majority of these people were, of course, sound both politically and ideologically. But they lacked an adequate background in political theory, which, to a certain extent, was necessary for the implementation of their work.

For this reason, the Municipal Party Committee was faced with the new and important task of orienting and training these newly appointed nuclei. To this end, the Municipal Party Committee took systematic measures to send to the Municipal Party School (Si Tang Hakkyo) first those nuclei who had never attended a political school. Those

who had some political knowledge were gradually sent to the Municipal Party School, while being trained through actual struggle.

As a result, the primary Party organizations were now staffed with politically and ideologically sound officials, and their organizational and political work designed to implement Party policies and Comrade Kim Il-song's instructions was strengthened.

Consequently, the harmful effects of localism and clanism among many primary Party organizations were liquidated. At the same time, the Party ideological system was consolidated among the officials to such an extent that they could now independently wage an uncompromising struggle against all incorrect phenomena.

For example, the Primary Party Organization of the Provincial Communications Control Office (To Ch'esin Kwallich'o) repeatedly explained the dangers of localism and clanism to Party members and nonmembers alike. By means of orientation and persuasion, it patiently carried out an ideological struggle to liquidate their remaining influence. This struggle made it possible to pick out rebellious and heterogenous individuals, who, under the influence of the anti-Party and counterrevolutionary factionalists, criticised Party policies, denied the leading role of the Party, and created disorderly phenomena within the Party.

The primary Party organizations of the Meat Procurement Firm (Yungnyu Sumae Saopso), the Provincial Tool Wholesale Store, and others, had similar experiences.

Through the staffing of primary Party organizations with sound officials and through the enhancement of their fighting force and independent role, the harmful effects of localism and clanism were liquidated, the Party ideological system was consolidated, Party policies began to be implemented with speed and accuracy, and the regulations of the democratically centralized system of the Party were strengthened.

However, some problems still remained. What were they? First of all, as a result of a low political and administrative level, the nuclei of primary Party organizations did not have concrete knowledge of how to transform the

activities of Party organizations into practical Party work. To solve these problems, it was necessary to enhance the over-all political and administrative level of the nuclei of primary Party organizations.

Indeed, many officials who were firmly determined to think and to act according to the intentions of the Party were in fact striving to do so. But they lacked the political knowledge necessary to enable them to correctly grasp the laws of social development and to make a scientific judgment of over-all social phenomena; at the same time, they lacked sufficient knowledge about concrete working methods, e.g., methods of guiding Party members in their Party life. As a result, these officials achieved results different from what they hoped for in their work.

For this reason, some Party organizations could not organize the political work necessary for the implementation of Party decisions with sufficient skill, originality, and independent judgement.

For example, the Primary Party Organization of the Ch'ongjin Oil Refinery, as well as several other Party organizations, did not study Party policies with a view to implementing them independently, with originality and in the light of their own circumstances.

Instead, they waited for the arrival of directives or lecturers from the Municipal Party. As a result, their explanations of Party policies to Party members and non-members were deficient in speed and accuracy.

Worse still, when the Primary Party Organization of the Ch'ongjin Rubber Plant discovered that the rubber shoes produced there were of poor quality, it did not take any concrete measures to improve the quality of these shoes, although such a task was obviously within its capacity. Instead, it waited until the Municipal Party Committee presented an agenda of discussion concerning this problem. As a result, the quality of the rubber shoes was not improved for a long time.

The Municipal Party Committee came to realize that the failure of some primary Party organizations to play an independent role was not only due to the incompetence of the chairmen of these organizations but also, to a considerable extent, to its own anachronistic working methods.

In organizing political work for the implementation of Party policies, the Municipal Party Committee failed to give proper guidance to the primary Party organizations. These organizations were, thus, unable to independently mobilize and manage all their organizational and propaganda media directed at the thorough explanation of Party policies to the masses.

Greatly underestimating the working level of primary Party organizations, the Municipal Party Committee did not have confidence in them and always sent out officials to each primary Party organization under the pretext of "explanation work" or "discussion work."

But the officials sent out to primary Party organizations were, in many cases, no more competent than the chairmen of these organizations, and considerable number of these officials were sent to plants, enterprises, or agricultural cooperatives without concrete knowledge of the conditions obtaining therein.

This anachronistic working method had a certain retrogressive effect on the task of enhancing the fighting force and independent role of the primary Party organizations.

Subsequently, the Municipal Party Committee boldly corrected this obsolete and mechanical working method; in particular, it corrected its ideological tendency to greatly underestimated the primary Party organizations. Thus, it directed the Party's attention to enhancing the political and administrative level of the nuclei of the primary Party organizations.

Improvement in the Political and
Administrative Qualifications of the Nuclei is
an Important Factor in Enhancing the Independent
Role of Primary Party Organizations.

Of all the working methods devised to enhance the political and administrative level of the nuclei, the Municipal Party Committee placed the greatest emphasis upon the "orientation class."

It became an established practice for the responsible officials of the Municipal Party Committee to give orientation classes on practical matters once a month (for two to three days) for the chairmen of the primary Party organizations in the city.

On the other hand, division directors and assistant directors of the Municipal Party Committee took charge of orientation classes for vice chairmen and squad (punjo) leaders of the primary Party organizations. The latter classes were organized by sectors of the people's economy and were conducted in each district (chigu) of the city.

During the earlier stage of this orientation program, the Municipal Party Committee organized classes in which many questions were discussed. These classes uniformly lasted 10 days for all the chairmen of the primary Party organizations in the city, irrespective of their actual working level.

This method revealed that the junior chairmen of the primary Party organizations could not sufficiently digest the problems raised in the classes and that some other comrades were unable to grasp the central issue under discussion.

As a result, classes were modeled after the orientation classes organized by the Party Central Committee, and the method of conducting orientation classes was changed to the present one; i. e., the orientation period lasts only two to three days and only one problem is handled during this period. The presentation of a problem in class is later followed by a discussion among the participants.

This method proved to be very effective.

For example, an orientation course held for two days for the chairmen of primary Party organizations dealt with the subject of "Missions of the Primary Party Organizations." This subject used by the Party Central Committee when it was engaged in the on-the-spot organization of an orientation course for the ri Party chairmen.

An orientation lecture was given on the first day, and a debate on the subject was held on the second day between

districts, with the participation of the leading officials. As a result of this systematic orientation course, many chairmen of the primary Party organizations were able to clearly realize clearly the tasks and roles of the primary Party organizations and to organize their work independently on the basis of this realization.

The work of the Party organization of the Ch'ongjin Spinning Mill presents a good example in this area. This mill was once faced with a housing problem for its workers which urgently required solution. At first, the Party committee of the Mill looked to the State, hoping that it would extend a helping hand for the solution of this problem. But after the orientation course, the Party organization of the Mill came to believe that it could solve this problem if the creative wisdom of the masses were correctly mobilized. Hence, it was on the way to enhancing its own independent role.

Mobilizing all available propaganda and agitation media in the Mill, the Party committee of the Mill explained the practical problem of housing construction to Party members and nonmembers alike. After consulting with Party activists on measures to solve this problem, the Party meeting took concrete measures to that end.

To implement its own decision, the Party committee of the Mill organized a temporary construction firm (yimsi konsol saopso). Leading officials were then assigned to this firm by the Party. At the same time, administrative and workers' organizations, and a temporary Party and Democratic Youth organization were created to control the work carried out by those mobilized for the firm.

To solve the problem of building materials, workers and their families were mobilized for the production of earth tiles (t'op'i), and other workers were sent to the Yonsa area to fell old, decaying trees to meet lumber requirements. The women workers of the Mill, too, exerted their utmost originality and initiative for the construction of housing. Finally, multistory houses with 500 dwelling units were completed within a short period, and the workers' housing problem was thus solved for some time to come.

A similar case is also found in the Party organization of the Kimch'aek Iron Works. A "Housing Construction Shock Unit" has been organized there by young workers, and they are building 500 arch-type (kungnyong-sik) dwelling units by utilizing slag, as well as all other available potentials.

The Municipal Party Committee has strengthened its struggle to enhance the political and administrative level of the officials of Party organizations in the city. Our experience has shown that the working level and working attitude of officials of Party organizations are largely dependent upon the extent to which the fighting force and the independent role of primary Party organizations have been enhanced. It is well known, that only when the Party officials know how to give concrete guidance to the primary Party organizations and to concentrate their attention upon work of decisive importance is it possible to further enhance the level of Party work.

For this reason, in addition to instructing the officials of Party organs (kigwan) in the city to cultivate their own capacities, the Municipal Party Committee is also organizing orientation courses on practical administrative matters for these officials.

It has instituted a system in which all Party officials must study Party policies for two hours daily after they have reported for work in the morning. Furthermore, the responsible leading officials have been instructed, in principle, not to disturb their subordinate officials and not to call meetings during this two-hour period.

In addition, the Municipal Party Committee is giving appropriate attention to educating the officials of Party organs in the city, so that these officials will possess adequate knowledge about the development of the socialist economy. Orientation courses are offered for two hours a week for these officials. For this purpose, the Municipal Party Committee has invited competent officials as lecturers. Courses on "Industrial Economy" were already completed between June and September, and at present, these officials are studying "Electrical Engineering" and "Metallurgical Engineering."

With the enhancement of the political and practical administrative level of the officials of the city Party organs, there has also been a great improvement in their capacity to give independent guidance to the primary Party organizations.

But these measures alone were not sufficient to raise the political and practical administrative level of these officials. It was more important for these officials to be educated and trained through practical engagement in the struggle for the implementation of Party policies.

To render concrete and living guidance to officials, the Municipal Party Committee has frequently organized and conducted practical on-the-spot instruction for these officials. The responsible officials have taken guidance workers along with them to primary Party organizations in the course of rendering concrete guidance to the officials of these organizations on organizational and political matters.

For example, some time ago, the Municipal Party Committee sent a team headed by Ch'oe T'ae-jin, Vice Chairman of the Committee, to the Party organization of the Ch'ongjin Shipbuilding Yard. The officials of the team carried out a concrete investigation of the work of the Party committee of the Shipbuilding Yard. At the same time, they explained to the committee the instructions given by Comrade Kim Il-song before the Expanded Session of the Party Committee of the Hwanghae Iron Works. In the past, the Party organization of this shipbuilding yard merely gave one or two lectures at the clubhouse to explain Party policies.

As a result of this mechanical working method, numerous Party members could not clearly understand Comrade Kim Il-song's instructions, and some Party members were not even informed of what the contents of these instructions were all about.

In view of this situation, Comrade Ch'oe T'ae-jin concentrated his efforts on establishing a comprehensive lecture and propaganda system for the inculcation of Party policies. Under his concrete guidance, the Party committee chairman of the shipbuilding yard formulated an explanatory statement on the tasks to be accomplished. The members of

the Party committee, the chairmen of Party organizations [inference being that there are more than one Party organization (tang tanch'e) in the Ch'ongjin Shipbuilding Yard], and the administrative cadres were informed of this statement. It was then sent directly to the Party organization where it was explained to Party members and nonmembers.

Furthermore, his own deeds set an example for those officials in the correct method of explanation. After an explanation has been given the results of the explanation in regard to the implementation of Party policies should be closely followed up, and appropriate measures should be taken whenever they are called for.

Through individual conversations with Party members or with individual squads (punjo), he also determined to what extent his explanation had been understood by them; and whenever their understanding was imperfect, he reiterated his explanations until they have very clearly understood. On the basis of this practical ideological mobilization, he also instructed the officials to take various measures necessary for the implementation of Party decisions.

All of these concrete guidance measures made it possible to greatly enhance the guidance level of the officials. The Party organization of the shipbuilding yard correctly carried out organizational and political work to implement Comrade Kim Il-song's instructions.

According to these instructions, in solving problems, the key problem should be pinpointed and efforts should be concentrated upon it. As a result, the production assignments of the shipbuilding yard are being successfully fulfilled.

As described above, through its practical work the Municipal Party Committee realized the correctness of a point which had been constantly emphasized by the Party Central Committee. It realized that the strengthening of primary Party organizations and the enhancement of their fighting force call for a decisive improvement in the methods and attitudes shown in Party work.

Therefore, in conformity with the instructions given by Comrade Kim Il-song before the Expanded Plenary Session of the Provincial Party Committee of Hamgyong-pukto, the Municipal Party Committee shall continue its steadfast struggle to transform the activities of Party organizations into real Party work.

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