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POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

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30 August 1984

EAST EUROPE REPORT

POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

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BULGARIA

CHIEF OF STAFF SEMERDZHIEV DWELLS ON NATO, U.S., WARSAW PACT

Sofia POGLED in Bulgarian 9 Jul 84 p 4

[Interview with Semerdzhiev conducted by Mariya Atanasova: "June 1941 Will Not Be Repeated"]

[Text] [Question] To begin with, congratulations, Comrade General! Our public recently celebrated your 60th birthday. Therefore, on 9 September 1944 you, the partisan commander of the Chepino unit, were only 20 years old.

[Answer] Yes. Time flies.

[Question] We were romantics. We dreamed of a sensible and free world. We dreamed of it in the narrow student apartments with a broken down coal-fed stove, the picture of Botev on the wall and the monotonous sound of the slippers of the elderly landlady. Do you remember? These are lines borrowed from your book "Za da Ima Zhivot" [For the Sake of Life]. What was Atanas Semerdzhiev, the then high school student in Pazardzhik and later partisan commander, dreaming about?

[Answer] Your question awakens in me a vast number of thoughts, feelings and emotions. The atmosphere of those memorable times was charged with the most humane and noble ideas in the name of which the Soviet people were waging their Great Patriotic War, and for the triumph of which millions of people were fighting at the front in various parts of the world.

We, the Bulgarian men and women partisans, realized in varying degrees of clarity, that we were direct participants in the crucial events of mankind. That is why our dreams were focused on achieving the great objectives of the great liberation struggle waged by the peoples and the victory of the socialist revolution in our country.

These were the dreams I shared, the dreams of all Chepino partisans. We needed them as much as we needed our bread.

To this day I believe that the most terrible thing for a person is to be deprived of faith in ideals and of the dreams created by these ideas.

However, man cannot live by great dreams alone. During those harsh and fierce times, many mundane and earthly wishes and yearnings played a part in our dreams as well: to live to the day of our victory, to eat until we were sated, to sleep like human beings and to have many other things which we lacked then.

My personal plans for the future were quite modest. After the victory I wanted to hug my family, whose life had become a torture and who showed a heroism unnoticed by others, to pursue my studies and then to dedicate myself to sociopolitical work in my birthplace. This was the horizon which I did not dare to overstep even in my dreams.

[Question] Your life developed in such a way that you became a military person from an early age. Was your professional orientation deliberate or accidental?

[Answer] I became a member of the military without either foreseeing or wanting it. Furthermore, like most of my comrades, bearing in mind the anti-people's nature of the tsarist army, deep in my mind I had rejected the military profession. Only later did I realize that despite this psychological tuning, after joining the ranks of the participants in the armed struggle, I had actually subconsciously linked my life to the army forever.

[Question] Do you regret the fact that life pushed you into the military profession?

[Answer] Now, wisened by the years, and having studied more profoundly the crucial importance of the tasks related to the armed defense of the country against aggression, my only possible answer is no regrets!

This profession requires intellect and high-level education and, at the present stage, a great deal of scientific and technical knowledge and total dedication to the performance of military duty. The only thing which I personally regret is the lack of sufficient time and, sometimes, also the physical possibility of studying at least the most outstanding works of artistic culture.

[Question] We know that the characteristics of the contemporary international situation are determined by the ratio of forces between the Warsaw Pact and NATO. We also know that during the 1970's, for the first time in the history of mankind a balance was reached in the military power of the socialist and imperialist countries. The 1970's will be remembered also as the period of detente. Why is it that during the 1980's the political climate has worsened to such an extent that a real danger exists of the self-destruction of mankind? Could you explain the reasons for the present unrestrained militaristic course charted by NATO?

[Answer] The leaders of imperialism do not concede that they have abandoned the policy of detente because it failed to justify their expectations. They hoped to be able to rally and unite the forces of global reaction and, using

the active exchanges among countries with different social systems, to be able to erode the socialist community and to inflict it a decisive defeat. However, it is precisely the opposite which occurred. During the period of detente the socialist countries and the other revolutionary and liberation forces gained new positions. Socialism was firmly established over large territories in Asia, Africa and Latin America, whereas the United States and the other imperialist countries fell into a deep crisis. Their plans failed in the military area as well. That is why they considered that detente was unprofitable to them and should be replaced by new policy--the policy of global confrontation with the Soviet Union, the other socialist countries and the liberation forces. According to them, this would stop further revolutionary changes in the world and the advent of real socialism and would enable them to regain their lost positions.

Such is the class nature of the foreign policy of the United States and the militaristic circles of the other NATO countries. It is a policy of social revenge.

This policy is yet another confirmation of Lenin's idea that whenever the ruling circles in the imperialist countries confront insurmountable difficulties, they seek a solution in intensifying reaction and militarism, fanning chauvinism and military hysteria and undertaking military adventures.

Such policies include a wide set of measures of military strategic, economic, political and ideological nature. However, the imperialists realize that with the current ratio of forces in the military area they cannot achieve their final objective. The existing balance has tied their hands and deprived them of the possibility of imposing their will.

[Question] What is the nature of the multi-billion U.S. rearmament program?

[Answer] In its 16 April 1984 editorial PRAVDA points out that "the American leadership has literally become obsessed with the idea of developing ever more advanced weapon systems for a first (disarming) strike." The development of such systems plays a central part in all U.S. military programs.

Naturally, decisive significance is ascribed to the strategic offensive nuclear forces the possibilities of which of delivering to the target nuclear charges with a single missile launching or takeoff of heavy bombers will be increased by 50 percent during the present decade.

The Pentagon plans to achieve this by manufacturing and installing 100 MX intercontinental ballistic missiles by 1986; this will give it a destructive power equal to 30,000 atom bombs of the type dropped on Hiroshima. Closely related to this program is the plan which Reagan proclaimed last March of creating an efficient anti-missile defense based on the use of so-called ray weapons (chemical and x-ray lasers or other guided energy sources). The purpose is entirely obvious: to deprive the Soviet Union of the possibility of a retaliatory strike against American territory, thus allowing the United States to avoid retribution for its aggressive actions.

Subsequent plans call for increasing the possibilities of strategic nuclear forces with the help of the Midgetman intercontinental ballistic missile, equipped with a single nuclear charge and mounted on mobile launching pads.

The Trident nuclear missile submarine, which is scheduled to replace the present similar systems of the Polaris-Az class, plays an important role in the program for the development of strategic nuclear forces. The new system is 10 times more powerful than the old in terms of combat power.

The great attention which the United States and the NATO leadership pay to the long-range so-called cruise missiles is well known. They come in three varieties, based on land, air and sea. At the same time, the production of the Pershing-II ballistic missile, with a 2,500-kilometer radius of action, was undertaken.

The multi-billion dollar military program of the United States does not neglect the so-called non-nuclear armed forces--general purpose forces--as well. During the next 5 years the size of the land, air and sea forces and marines of the United States will be increased by another 250,000 and they will receive more than 5,000 new airplanes, more than 7,000 new Abrams tanks and thousands of armored personnel carriers, heavy caliber artillery, anti-tank weapons, ships and other ordnance.

Although the world has lived on mountains of weapons for a long time, the United States and the NATO leadership are planning the development and stockpiling of ever new and ever more dangerous weapons for striking at people and the living environment. They include the neutron bomb, binary chemical gasses, various preparations which can affect the human mind, and others.

The madness of the American and NATO strategists extends beyond the boundaries of our planet. It is being directed toward outer space as well, where various systems for conducting operations in outer space and from outer space against the territory of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries is contemplated.

[Question] The members of the Warsaw Pact have repeatedly and publicly stated that they will not be the first to use nuclear weapons. Assuming that the medium-range missiles deployed in Europe can reach their targets in 5 to 8 minutes, would we not find ourselves in an unenviable tactical and strategic position?

[Answer] The deployment of American missiles in Western Europe, virtually on our threshold, has indeed created exceptionally serious problems for the political, state and military leadership of the Soviet Union and the members of the Warsaw Pact, as Comrade T. Zhivkov noted in many of his statements. They were indicated in detail in the 24 November 1983 declaration of the Soviet government.

However, this time again the imperialists were forced sadly to note that their intention of checkmating our defense alliance failed.

It failed thanks to the prompt, fast and extensive answer of the Soviet Union which, in coordination with the other members of the Warsaw Pact, engaged and carried out deployment not only of the necessary reconnaissance facilities for prompt detection of any outbreak of enemy aggression but also of the necessary quantities of nuclear striking missile systems based on land and sea, the power, accuracy and, above all, speed of which are equal to the nuclear missile systems of the imperialists. Therefore, a threat adequate to the threat which they created for the territory of the Soviet Union and the other allied countries by deploying medium-range American nuclear missiles in Europe, was extended to not only British, West German and Italian but U.S. territory as well.

The following thought expressed by Comrade Konstantin Chernenko should be cited on this occasion: "...The peoples can see the results of the appearance of the new American missiles in Europe. Washington neither obtained nor will obtain any sort of military strategic advantage. Yet the level of the nuclear confrontation was in fact raised. The danger of a nuclear catastrophe increased and will continue to increase whenever a new American missile is placed there."

[Question] You know a great deal about waging modern war. What is your prevalent feeling: despair or optimism?

[Answer] I shall try to answer you on the basis of the studies made of the contemporary military and political situation and the possibility of preventing a war, found in the official documents of the Political Consultative Committee of Warsaw Pact Members and the remarkable speeches and statements by Comrade Todor Zhivkov. The conclusions are optimistic while remaining realistic.

Let us begin with the fact that a tremendous gap exists between the imperialists' intentions and the actual possibilities of implementing them. Is it not a fact that imperialism is encountering a great deal of complex and difficult problems and difficulties, such as substantial idling production capacities, inflation, unemployment, huge budget deficits in the United States, contradictions among the individual imperialist countries in the economic area, etc.?

At their recently held London meeting, the seven industrially most developed capitalist countries had to find a solution to the problem of how to deal with the huge debts incurred by the economically weak developing countries, debts which amount to many hundreds of billions of dollars and which threaten the economic foundations of the entire capitalist system.

Does imperialism not face the difficult problem of surmounting the opposition of its own working class to the policy of the monopolies and the suppression of the spontaneously developing exceptionally widespread anti-war, anti-missile and anti-nuclear movement? It would be erroneous on our part also to neglect the influence and possibilities of that part of the Western ruling circles who, displaying realism and, in many cases, guided by their own interests in developing economic relations with the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, firmly oppose the militaristic and adventuristic policy pursued by the United States and the NATO leadership.

The role which the countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America play, united within the nonaligned movement, is increasing in the struggle for peace. They are becoming increasingly resolved to oppose imperialism and their opposition to the aggressive actions of Western governments and in defense of peace and cooperation among nations is becoming increasingly more persistent.

Naturally, the main and decisive factor which dooms to failure the adventurous plans of the aggressive imperialist circles in the United States and NATO is unquestionably the socialist commonwealth with its historical accomplishments, as Comrade Zhivkov has said: first, in the field of economics; second, in resolving age-old social problems which face mankind; third, in developing powerful armed forces.

The members of the Warsaw Pact have frequently stated that they have never aspired and do not aspire to achieve military superiority but nor will they allow the imperialists to disturb the established balance.

"June 1941 will not be repeated," Comrade Chernenko said in addressing the workers at the Serp i Molot Plant. "Any aggressor will receive immediate retribution. Let this be known to all--to our friends and our enemies."

[Question] Could you describe the connection between the alarming international situation and the need to do quality work? Does it seem to you, a military person, that we, civilians have a rather tranquil life?

[Answer] The high defense capability of the country is determined by its economic, scientific and technical and moral-political potential which cannot be developed and strengthened other than through conscientious, persistent and highly efficient work by millions of working people in the material and spiritual areas.

The problem of the quality of all social activities is particularly closely linked with the increased defense capability of the country. The policy pursued in its resolution is actually a policy of increasing the material, spiritual and moral wealth of the country and, consequently, upgrading the level of its military power. In this sense it is a contribution to increasing the defense power of the Warsaw Pact and a battle for ensuring lasting peace on earth. In this battle everyone must find his place and contribute to the common thrust of the party and the people.

[Question] Thank you!

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CSO: 2200/158

BULGARIA

NEW UKASE ENCOURAGES HIGHER BIRTH RATE, RAISES PENSIONS

Sofia DURZHAVEN VESTNIK in Bulgarian 29 Jun 84 pp 617-618

[Ukase No 2004 of the State Council of the Bulgarian People's Republic, issued in Sofia on 15 June 1984, on Amendment of the Ukase on Encouragement of the Birth Rate, Ukase No 1844 on Increasing the Amounts of Pensions Under the Rescinded Law on the Pensioning of Members of Cooperative Farms, Ukase No 1094 on Moral Incentives in the Bulgarian People's Republic, Ukase No 2773 on the Forgiveness of bad Debts Owed to the State, and the Ukase on Public Assistance]

[Text] The State Council of the Bulgarian People's Republic, on the basis of article 94, section 2, paragraph 2 of the Constitution of the Bulgarian People's Republic, hereby issues the following Ukase No 2004 on the Amendment of the Ukase on Encouragement of the Birth Rate, Ukase No 1844 on Increasing the Amounts of Pensions Under the Rescinded Law on the Pensioning of Members of Cooperative Farms, Ukase No 1094 on Moral Incentives in the Bulgarian People's Republic, Ukase No 2773 on the Forgiveness of bad Debts Owed to the State, and the Ukase on Public Assistance.

Section I. AMENDMENT OF THE UKSE ON ENCOURAGEMENT OF THE BIRTH RATE (Published, DURZHAVEN VESTNIK, No 15/1968; amended, No 21/1968, No 63/1973, No 17/1974, Nos 3 and 21/1975, No 63/1976, Nos 36 and 93/1979, No 4/1981 and No 73/1982)

§1. Article 2 is amended as follows:

1. In paragraph 1 the words "for the first child 15 leva; for the second child 25 leva; for the third child 45 leva" are replaced with "for the first child 15 leva, and after the birth of the second child 30 leva; for the second child 30 leva; for the third child 55 leva. When one of twins is the third child in a family, the monthly allowance for each twin shall be in the amount of 55 leva."

2. The following new paragraph 2 is created:

"(2) For children with physical and mental defects ascertained by decision of a medical advisory board, the allowances under the preceding paragraph shall be paid in double amount."

§2. Article 3 is amended as follows:

1. Paragraph 1 is changed as follows:

"(1) To lone mothers (adoptive mothers) who are seeing to the maintenance of their children themselves, monthly child allowances shall be paid in the following amounts:

"for the first child 40 leva, and after the birth of the second child 60 leva; for the second child 60 leva; for the third child 110 leva; for each subsequent child 30 leva each. When one of twins is the third child, the monthly allowance for each twin shall be in the amount of 110 leva."

2. In paragraphs 2 and 3, after the words "the lone mothers" and "lone mothers" respectively, "(the adoptive mothers)" and "(adoptive mothers)" are to be added.

3. A new paragraph 4 is created:

"(4) The provisions of article 2, paragraph 2, shall not be applied in determining the monthly child allowance of lone mothers (adoptive mothers)."

§3. Article 3a is changed as follows:

"3a. To lone mothers (adoptive mothers) who do not work and are uninsured, for all insurance contingencies monthly assistance shall be paid in the amount of the minimum monthly payment established in the country until the child reaches the age of 2 years, and in the case of twins, if one of them is the second or third child, until the child reaches the age of 3. Assistance shall be paid by the people's councils or city councils according to place of residence from social assistance funds."

§4. Article 3b is amended as follows:

1. Paragraph 1 is changed as follows:

"3b. (1) To women studying in post- and undergraduate higher educational institutions and in secondary special schools which accept secondary school graduates, and to regular postgraduate students studying in the country and abroad, as well as to women who have borne a child in under 6 months from graduation from the educational institution or from completion of the regular postgraduate work shall be paid monetary assistance for pregnancy, childbirth and child care in the amount of the minimum monthly payment established in the country for a period from 45 days before childbirth until the attainment of the age of 2 years for the first, second and third child, the age of 3 years for twins, and the age of 10 months for each subsequent child. When a family has twins and one of them is the second or third child, assistance shall be paid until the twins attain the age of 3 years."

2. In paragraph 3 the word "paid" is deleted.

3. Paragraph 5 is changed as follows:

"(5) To women who have borne (adopted) children before admission to the educational institution or to regular postgraduate work, monetary assistance under

paragraph 1 shall be paid after registration in the educational institution with effect from the beginning of the academic year, or after enrollment in regular postgraduate work, as the case may be, until the attainment of the age of 2 years for the first, second and third child, the age of 3 years for twins if one of them is the second or third child, and the age of 10 months for any subsequent child."

§5. In article 3e, "(adoption)" is to be added after the word "birth."

§6. In article 3g, paragraph 2, "with time to be counted towards length of service" is to be added at the end of the first sentence.

§7. In article 7, paragraph 2, first sentence, the words "up to 80 leva monthly under article 4 of the Law regarding a Tax on Total Income in the amount of 5 percent for persons from 21 to 30 years old and of 10 percent for persons over this age and for families childless 5 years after the contraction of marriage" are to be replaced with "in the amount of 5 percent for persons from 21 to 30 years of age, 10 percent for persons from 30 to 35 years of age, and 15 percent for persons over this age."

§8. Article 8 is amended as follows:

1. Subparagraph "a" is amended as follows:

"a) families--up to 3 years from the contraction of marriage or from the death of the child, including cases of a stillborn child";

2. The following new subparagraph "e" is created:

"e) the husband who is not the parent, even in cases where he has not adopted the child, provided that he takes care of it and the other parent is deceased."

§9. Article 11, paragraph 2, is changed as follows:

"(2) The Committee for Labor and Social Welfare, the Ministry of Public Health and the Ministry of Finance in coordination with the Central Council of Bulgarian Trade Unions shall issue rules and regulations for the enforcement of this Ukase."

Section II. AMENDMENT OF UKASE No. 1844 ON INCREASING THE AMOUNTS OF PENSIONS UNDER THE RESCINDED LAW ON THE PENSIONING OF MEMBERS OF COOPERATIVE FARMS (DURZHAVEN VESTNIK, No 71/1981)

§10. In article 1 the first sentence is changed as follows:

"The basic amount of the personal old-age pensions under the rescinded Law on the Pensioning of Members of Cooperative Farms is set at 50 leva monthly."

§11. In article 4, paragraph 2, the number "30" is replaced with "40."

§12. Paragraphs 2 and 3 of §3 of the transitional and concluding provisions are deleted.

Section III. AMENDMENT OF UKASE No 1094 ON MORAL INCENTIVES IN THE BULGARIAN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC (Published, DURZHAVEN VESTNIK, No 48/1974; corrected No 54/1974; supplemented, No 9/1977; amended, No 37/1978, Nos 31 and 41/1979, No 60/1980, No 3/1981 and No 32/1982)

§13. The following new paragraphs 3 and 4 are created in article 87:

"(3) A pension supplement of 120 leva per month shall be paid to persons who have been awarded the honorary title of 'Hero of the Bulgarian People's Republic,' and 100 leva per month to persons who have been awarded the honorary title of 'Hero of Socialist Labor.'

"(4) The persons encompassed under the preceding paragraph, if awarded the honorary title of 'Hero of the Bulgarian People's Republic' two or more times, or the honorary title of 'Hero of Socialist Labor' or two honorary titles, as well as persons who are entitled to monthly supplements to their pension under article 88 or a percentage supplement under article 91, shall receive only one of the supplements of their choosing."

Section IV. AMENDMENT OF UKASE No 2773 ON FORGIVENESS OF BAD DEBTS OWED TO THE STATE (DURZHAVEN VESTNIK, No 100/1980)

§14. Article 9 is amended as follows:

1. In paragraph 2, first sentence, after the words "of the Ministry of Finance" is to be added (or, as the case may be, of the Committee for Labor and Social Welfare, when it is a question of a wrongly obtained pension, monthly child allowance or compensation for temporary disability."

2. In paragraph 2, second sentence, after the words "Ministry of Finance" is to be added "or, as the case may be, the Committee for Labor and Social Welfare."

3. In paragraph 3, third sentence, after the word "Ministry" is to be added "or, as the case may be, the committee."

4. In paragraph 3, section 2, the words "in the okrug council of Bulgarian Trade Unions" are to be deleted.

Section V. AMENDMENT OF UKASE ON PUBLIC ASSISTANCE (Published, IZV. [IZVESTIYA NA PREZIDIUMA NA NARODNOTO SUBRANIE; Official Gazette of the Presidium of the National Assembly], No 77/1951; amended, No 69/1956, No 55/1957)

§15. In articles 1, 4, 17 and 18 the words "and social welfare" are to be deleted.

§16. In article 2, new subparagraphs "h" and "i" are created.

"h. needy families of persons who have served their regular military duty;

"i. persons with a severe disability."

Section VI. TRANSITIONAL PROVISIONS

§17. The provisions of paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 shall apply as well to children born or adopted before 1 July 1985.

§18. Paragraphs 7 and 8 shall enter into force effective as of 1 July 1984, paragraphs 10, 11, 12 and 13 as of 1 September 1984, and paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 as of 1 July 1985.

Issued in Sofia on 15 June 1984 and authenticated with the state seal.

Signed by the chairman of the State Council of the Bulgarian People's Republic, T. Zhivkov, and by the secretary of the State Council of the Bulgarian People's Republic, N. Manolov.

6474

CSO: 2200/159

DEMOGRAPHIC STATISTICS: PERCENTAGE OF AGING POPULATION

Sofia OBSHTESTVO I PRAVO in Bulgarian No 6; 1984, pp 25-26

[Article by Prof Dr Anastas Totev: "Is This Bad?"]

[Excerpt] What is the situation in our country? Today Bulgaria is a country with an old population but still far behind the situation in which countries with a very old population find themselves.

There Are 1,459,977 Bulgarians on the Threshold of Old Age

On 31 December 1982 we had 1,459,977 people 60 years of age or older (16.4 percent of the entire population), 773,506 of whom were between the ages of 60 and 69 (8.7 percent of the entire population), 535,360 between 70 and 79 (6 percent) and 181,159 over 80 (1.7 percent). On that same date middle-aged and elderly people (from 35 to 49 and from 50 to 59) totaled 941,488 people (33 percent of the entire population).

Between 1900 and 1982 the age group structure of our population experienced radical changes: the share of the young population dropped substantially (from 58 to 36 percent); the percentage of the adult population increased smoothly (from 33 to 48 percent) while the percentage of the aged population increased greatly (it doubled from 8 to 16 percent). The percentage of children under 14 declined quite substantially (from 40 to 22 percent). In other words, we note an intensifying process of population aging, which began in 1926. Until 1934 the young Bulgarian population accounted for more than 50 percent; adults accounted for more than 30 percent and the old for some 8 percent of the entire population.

Thirty-six Is the Average Age

The course of the aging process of a population can be determined and measured also by tracing changes in its "median age" over a longer period of time. The "median age" is the total of all the ages of the population divided by its number.

Thus, the median population age in our country has been steadily rising from the turn of the century: it was 26 in 1900, 27 in 1934, 29 in 1946, 34 in 1965 and 36 in 1982.

The aging of our population is confirmed also by data on the steady increase in the number of individuals 60 or older and the fast decline in the number of children under 14 per 1,000 population. Thus, between 1900 and 1982 the number of individuals 60 years old or older per 1,000 population increased from 84 to 164. Within the same period the number of children under 14 per 1,000 population declined from 502 to 222.

A particularly characteristic feature of the aging process is the systematic increase of the average life span. In the past almost 80 years it increased from 42 to 71, i.e., by 29 years.

Studies conducted by the Demographic Section of the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Activities allow us to make the following forecast as to the average lifespan of the Bulgarian population born through the year 2000: 70 years for men and 75 for women for the period between 1980 and 1985; about 71 for men and 77 for women for the period between 1995 and 2000.

5003

CSO: 2200/158

BULGARIA

REGULATION ON ADMISSION TO UNIVERSITIES AMENDED

Sofia DURZHAVEN VESTNIK in Bulgarian 3 Jul 84 pp 628-629

[Regulation on Amending and Supplementing Regulation No 9 on the Admission of Students to Higher Educational Institutions in the Bulgarian People's Republic and Allowing the Training of Bulgarian Citizens in Foreign Higher Education Establishments (DV Nos 10 and 11 1984). Signed by Minister Al. Fol]

[Text] 1. Article 10, Paragraph 1, Point 1: add "with the exception of the professional specialization in biotechnology)" after "at Kliment Okhridski University in Sofia."

2. Article 10, Paragraph 1, Point 2: add "electric power supply and electric power installations in the mining industry" after "production automation in the mining industry."

3. The following new sentence will be added to Article 10, Paragraph 2: "Only individuals who were residents of Sofia or Sofia Okrug on the date of submission of their documents may apply for the subjects of preschool pedagogy and primary school pedagogy at the Kl. Okhridski SU [Sofia University]."

4. The following new sentences will be added to Article 11, Paragraph 1, Point 9: "An applicants whose student rights are being restored my submit his documents only to the higher educational institution which he previously attended, and only for the subject for which he had been previously admitted. If the subject in which the applicant's rights are being restored is no longer offered or has been changed with the new list of professional areas and higher education specialities and specialties distributed among the VUZs [Higher Educational Institutions], the restoration will apply to a similar subject as determined by the dean (the rector). Applicants whose student rights are being restored may not apply simultaneously for other professions or specialities at the same or other VUZs."

5. Article 11, Paragraph 1, Point 10: at the end of the text, in parentheses, add "as well as applicants for the subjects of preschool pedagogy and primary school pedagogy at the Kl. Okhridski SU)."

6. Point 3 of Paragraph 1 of Article 23 is deleted. Points 4 and 5 become respectively Points 3 and 4.

7. Article 24, Paragraph 3: delete "during the year of candidacy."
8. Article 26, Paragraph 7: delete "(excluding the subjects of art and architecture and those indicated in Paragraph 8)"; include "(excluding the subjects of art, architecture, landscaping, graphic art pedagogy and those indicated in Paragraph 8)."
9. Article 26, Paragraph 10: delete "architecture in the VIAS" in the third sentence.
10. Article 28 will be amended to read as follows:

"Article 28. Vacancies as per Article 26, Paragraphs 6-[illegible] and Paragraph 11, left vacant as a result of insufficient number of applicants or insufficient number of competition points will be filled in the course of the rating based on the points scored by the applicants within the same category and in accordance with regular procedures."
11. Article 32, Paragraph 2 will be amended to read as follows:

"(2) Young people who have been rated and admitted as students as draftees but whose military service has been postponed or who have been freed from same after submission of their application documents may be admitted by the VUZ and pursue their education if such release or postponement and admission by the VUZ have taken place no later than 15 September of the year of their application."
12. Article 32, Paragraph 3 will be amended to read as follows:

"(3) Draftees whose military service has been postponed and who have been accepted as students as per Article 25, Paragraph 7, and Article 32, Paragraph 2, as well as those accepted as per Article 24, Paragraph 2 will fulfill their military service obligations after completing their higher education (Articles 46 and 47 of the Law on Universal Military Service of the Bulgarian People's Republic)."
13. The following will be added to Article 37, Paragraph 1, Point 2: ",as well as the courses at the Kl. Okhridski SU," indicated in Article 13, Paragraph 7."
14. The following amendments and supplements will be introduced in Appendix No 1 of the "List of Professional Areas, Specialties and Forms of Training in VUZ, Competitive Examinations for Special Subjects and for Special Subjects in the Secondary Education Diploma, Which Are Included in the Rating Points:"
 1. Subject 4.10: Car Building and Automotive Transportation Equipment, at the V. I. Lenin VMEI [Higher Machine-Electrical Institute] in Sofia: delete letter "H" in column 5.
 2. Subject 4.11: Technology and Organization of Automotive Transportation at the V. I. Lenin VMEI in Sofia: substitute "PH" for letter "P" in column 5.

3. Subject 4.10: Car Building and Automotive Transportation Equipment Angel Kunchev VTU [Higher Technical School] in Ruse: delete letter "H" in column 5.

4. Subject 4.11: Technology and Organization of Automotive Transportation at the Angel Kunchev VTU in Ruse: substitute "PH" for the letter "P" in column 5.

5. Subject 4.18: Timber Machine Technology at the VLTI [Higher Institute of Forestry Engineering] in Sofia: substitute "PH" for the letter "H" in column 5.

6. Subject 14.11: Trade Economics and Management at the D. Blagoev VINS [Higher Institute of the National Economy] in Varna: delete letter "C" in column 5.

7. For the Kl. Okhridski SU: delete course No 30 "Historical-Philological Pedagogy" and related texts in the other columns.

8. For the Kl. Okhridski SU: include the new course No 32 "Biotechnology," with the following addition to the table:

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
32.	Biotechnology	For stipulated seats as planned	P	Physics	Mathematics	Physics	Mathematics	
		For remainder as planned	P	Biology	Chemistry	Biology	Chemistry	

15. In the title of Appendix No 4 add "and foreign" after "Bulgarian."

16. In the title of Appendix No 5 add "and foreign" after "Bulgarian."

17. In Appendix No 6 "Schedule for Candidate-Student Examinations for Higher Educational Institutions, in the date "3 August (Friday)" change "Chemistry - oral - for the Kl. Okhridski SU" to "Chemistry - oral - for the Kl. Okhridski SU and the P. Khilendarski PU [Normal School]."

5003
CSO: 2200/158

CURRENT REVISIONIST THOUGHT VIEWED

Prague TRIBUNA in Czech 11 Jul 84 pp 8,9

[Article by Karel Horak: "Revisionism Results in the Betrayal of the Working Class"]

[Excerpts] Decisive Influence of Leninism

In his struggle with the revisionists Lenin was not only able to defend the purity of Marxist theory but also to elaborate on all its aspects in such a way as to permit to cope with the new tasks. This theory also became a basis for the strategy and tactics of the revolutionary parties during the imperialist period. The establishment of a party of a new type and the stipulation of ideological, organizational and tactical principles, theoretical preparation and consistent resolution in practice of all questions which had to be answered in order successfully to realize a socialist revolution, the safeguarding of the achieved victory and the building of a socialist community--all this was and still is an irreplaceable contribution of V. I. Lenin to the development of the theory and practice of Marxism.

The origin and development of the activity of the Bolshevik party had historical significance not only for the Russian but also for the entire international revolutionary workers movement. At the beginning of the 20th century, countering the growth of revisionism in European social democracy and the loss of the revolutionary prospects in the parties belonging to the Second International, a party of a new type appeared in Russia, a really revolutionary proletarian party which based its activity on the creative application of Marx and Engels' ideas.

Lenin continued their great work, and his legacy--Leninism--is rightly called the Marxism of the present period. Since its origin, the theory and practice of Leninism has contributed to the revolutionary education of the healthy forces in the workers and socialist movement, which served as an example of how to fight the bourgeoisie and which, after the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution, became a basis for the establishment of the communist parties and the great international communist movement.

The 95th anniversary of the founding of the Second International offers an occasion for looking back and comparing--for reminding ourselves of the impact of revisionism on the formerly revolutionary, socialist parties.

We cannot ignore the fact that these parties have profoundly degenerated and drifted away too far from the struggle for fulfilling the historic mission of the working class, while we can see what has been achieved by the proletariat and its allies under the leadership of the Marxist-Leninist parties.

Recalling the consequences that revisionism had for the parties of the Second International and the entire workers movement at the beginning of the 20th century, we are not engaging in mere political reminiscences. Revisionism has not ceased to be a danger for the revolutionary parties of the proletariat even now. Just as it was used for stamping out revolutionary Marxism from the parties of the Second International, today it is used as the main tool for "surpassing" Leninism and persuading the communist parties and the international communist movement to discard Leninism.

Even today the bearers of revisionism try to "adapt themselves to the new conditions." In fact, however, they are attacking--just as their predecessors--primarily the revolutionary foundations of the scientific teaching of the proletariat, namely, the class struggle, the socialist revolution, the dictatorship of the proletariat, the leading role of the working class and Marxist-Leninist parties, etc.

New Slogans--Same Old Goals

Since the time when socialism evolved from scientific theory to reality, and especially since the time when it became a powerful international system, when it showed in practice that only the realization of Leninist ideas could lead to the liberation of the working class and to the building of a socially just society, the bourgeoisie has tried to activate its agents within the international communist movement, namely, the revisionists. Old and new slogans on specific national conditions or paths to socialism, on "democratic," "pluralistic," or any other socialism, on the need to search for a "third" path to socialism which will be neither social democratic nor Leninist--all these attempts have one purpose: to disguise the old goal of revisionism of transforming the communist parties from their revolutionary character into parties of social reform.

This natural consequence of the revisionists' activity--insofar as they can succeed in taking over the leadership of the communist parties--was fully confirmed in our communist party during the crisis years. The revisionists in the leadership of the CPCZ, as shown in the document entitled "Lesson from the crisis development in the party and society in the period following the 13th CPCZ Congress," directed their efforts primarily at creating doubts about Leninism, rejected Leninism and eliminated the Leninist norms and principles from the work of the party. Gradually they rejected the Leninist character of the party, which as a result started to lose the ability to function in its role as the leading force in society.

Furthermore, the development of so-called Eurocommunism and the activity and attitude of the parties whose leadership has adopted this revisionist theory show how dangerous revisionism really is. It is no accident that

the so-called Eurocommunists have adopted on many issues--as, for example, on the declaration of martial law in Poland or internationalist assistance to the Afghan people--the same attitude as the representatives of the bourgeoisie, that they have shown attitudes which lack any class consciousness on such an important question as the struggle for peace, and that in domestic politics they accept (as, for example, the Communist Party of Spain) positions similar to those of the Socialist Party. It is no accident that bourgeois propaganda presents so-called Eurocommunism as a model for a "new face, modernity and progressiveness" of communist policies.

After all, there is nothing new under the sun. Revisionism has enjoyed the support of the bourgeoisie and the propaganda which serves it since the time of Bernstein. Its representatives--in order to enjoy the necessary weight and "authority"--were or are singled out as leading scientists, thinkers and politicians. Where these "revolutionaries" end up has been shown by past and recent history on numerous occasions--in the camp of enemies of progress, as open or disguised lackeys of the bourgeoisie.

The history of the Second International, in spite of the fact that almost 100 years have passed since its beginnings, since the time it went totally bankrupt 7 decades ago, does not belong merely to history textbooks. The struggle between revisionism and reformism on the one hand and creative Marxism on the other, which took place within and outside the Second International, is a constant lesson for the international workers movement, for all those who strive for the victory of progress, peace and socialism in the world.

The past has clearly shown that only loyalty to the teaching of Marx and Engels and its creative application under new conditions as realized by V. I. Lenin and at present carried out by the CPSU and other Marxist-Leninist parties demonstrates that only a party of the proletariat can be a real revolutionary avant-garde of the working class, a force able to lead the working people to their victory in a socialist revolution and to the building of first a socialist and later a communist society. Practice has confirmed the validity of these words of Lenin: "...Anyone who has or tries to inject a 'middle' or 'third' path into the revolutionary movement of the working class or the international communist movement betrays the interest of the working class and logically ends up in the enemy camp."

1277

CSO: 2400/384

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

EXPERIENCES WITH TANK DRIVER TRAINING VEHICLE

East Berlin MILITAERTECHNIK in German No 4, 1984 (signed to press 11 May 84)
pp 178-179

[Article by Lt Col J. Valentin, engineer: "Experiences with the 500U"
Driver Training Tank]

[text] With the beginning of the 1982-1983 training year, a new driver training tank is being used at the Ernst Thaelmann ground forces officers academy. About 20,000 km have been covered using this tank in tank driver training.

1. Using the 500U

The base vehicle for the 500U driver training tank (henceforth FAP 500U) is the 57-mm antiaircraft self-propelled gun carriage (fig. 1). Most of the technical parameters of the FAP 500U are the same as those of the T 55 medium tank. Table 1 shows some of the data that differ.



Fig. 1 500U Driver training tank

Table 1. Some technical data for the FAP 500U that differ from the T 55 medium tank

<u>Type</u>		<u>FAP 500U</u>	<u>T 55</u>
Weight	t	20.0	36.0
Power-weight ratio	kW/t	12.85	11.85
Engine, power	kW	252.2	425.0
Ground pressure	N/cm ²	4.41	7.95

As a result the FAP 500U can be used for tank driver training in place of the T 55. Changes in construction, particularly in the controls for the driver, and additional equipment make conditions almost the same for the driver as in the T 55. The driving instructor has substantially better working conditions.

With this vehicle it is possible to use original equipment sparingly, to save considerable amounts of fuel and still reach the objectives of training and education.

It is primarily the 1st, 2nd and 5th training drives that are conducted with the FAP 500U. The results achieved can be evaluated as good or very good. The trainees acquire sufficient skills and expertise to shift the gears in the transmission, when crossing natural obstacles, when driving through restricted passages and driving in a convoy during the day and at night. For practical reasons the vehicle is only used only on the training grounds for the 3rd and 6th training sessions.

Because of the higher power-to-weight ratio it is possible to accelerate the FAP 500U more quickly when starting from rest and shifting into a higher gear.

One effect of the low ground pressure is that the tracks do not sink into the ground so deeply, especially on a loose or muddy substrate. Rolling resistance is also reduced and fuel consumption drops.

Another effect is that the grip between the tracks and the ground is less than with the T 55. A special point must be made of drawing the trainee's attention to this. If acceleration is too great, particularly on an upslope, the tracks can slip. At high speed the vehicle can slide or skid when negotiating a curve. For this reason, the vehicle's speed must be reduced in adequate time and a lower gear engaged when approaching narrow or blind spots or curves. The available grip is adequate for overcoming all the obstacles and grades on the improved tank course safely.

To prevent accidents while driving, the instructor has a motor shut-down switch. He can use it to stop the vehicle's progress. Tests showed that if the switch was thrown in 4th gear and at a crankshaft speed of 1,800 rev/min,

the vehicle's braking distance to a complete stop is a maximum of 10 m. Braking is carried out through the motor, although stopping distance is dependent on the conditions of the track surface.

2. Use of the FAP 500U

The FAP 500U must be used in accordance with the regulations in DV 051/0/001--safeguards for tanks--AO 051/1/110--medium tank T 55, T 55A (use)--and with instructions for the tank driver training vehicle--description and use.

Before operating the engine each time, the coolant must be prewarmed to 70°C. As part of the organization of training (inspection checks), the longer prewarm up times, compared with the T 55, must be noted. The preheater on the FAP 500U is less efficient. It will require 25 to 35 minutes to heat the coolant to 70°C at an outside temperature of 9°C. Fuel consumption during warmup is about 10 percent higher than with the T 55.

The established intervals for cleaning the preheater boiler must be observed, and the combustion flame must be adjusted to the correct height. Heavily contaminated boilers and incorrectly adjusted flames cause a substantial increase in fuel consumption.

Starting from rest is carried out with the help of the steering lever from the 2nd position. In contrast to the T 55, it is possible to bring the steering lever back from the 2nd position immediately to the initial position at medium engine rpm without the engine stalling.

Because of its greater weight, the T 55 has to be accelerated from rest longer and with more fuel being fed to the engine. Too little attention is usually paid to the need for this by the students, and the engine can stall when starting from rest. The head of training must alert the students to this peculiarity.

The resistance encountered while driving is less with the FAP 500U than with the T 55. As a result, the terrain can be utilized better for shifting gears and driving can be carried out in the middle rpm range. This makes efficient driving possible. By using ground conditions skilfully to shift gears and supply fuel to the engine, a high average speed combined with a considerably lower fuel consumption than in the T 55 can be achieved.

3. Crossing Obstacles, Steering and Turning

Crossing obstacles and driving through restricted passages are carried out in accordance with the regulations in DV 250/0/012--practice driving for armored equipment (fig. 2). At an engine crankshaft speed of between 1,600 and 1,800 rpm all obstacles can be crossed safely in 1st or 2nd gear. The engine develops maximum torque at between 1,200 and 1,300 rpm, maximum power is developed at 1,800 rpm.

Because of the change in the position of the center of gravity, the FAP 500U does not tip forward when crossing irregularities in the ground that are

shorter than the contact length of the tracks until the third road wheel. The trainee has to reduce the fuel to the engine later than when driving the T 55 in order to avoid a hard impact.




Fig. 2 Crossing a treadway bridge with the FAP 500U

When crossing obstacles and rolling ground it must be remembered that the FAP 500U has different oscillation characteristics than the T 55. On uneven terrain, at 1,800 rpm and with 4th gear engaged, it begins to pitch. At this speed the tracks start to strike the track deflectors. The noise is considerable. Speed must be reduced and a lower gear engaged.

It is particularly important to remember that for steering and turning the grip on the ground is less with the FAP 500U than with the T 55. At high speeds on a solid substrate and particularly on roads it is more difficult to keep the vehicle tracking straight ahead. If this is not considered when choosing a speed, the result can be an accident.

Turning in 4th or 5th gear by braking the tracks must be avoided absolutely. The most frequent mistake in steering is moving the steering levers too abruptly. The old established rule that the lower arm should be supported on the thigh to control the right arm better when pulling the right steering lever is paid too little attention.

4. Behavior During Use

In comparison to the T 55 the outlay for the maintenance and service of the FAP 500U is considerably less--both for inspection checks and for other technical service operations. As a result, the possible days of use per year

increase if the vehicle is utilized constantly. Fuel consumption is about 2.6 liter/km.

It has been possible so far to remain under the norms for progressive maintenance. With proper use the breakdown rate of engines, transmission and running gear has been low. Malfunctions of the transmission range indicator did occur.

At outside temperatures below +10°C the recommended engine coolant temperature of 70° to 90°C is not reached. As a rule the coolant temperature does not rise above 65°C, even when the engine is at full load. Contributing to this phenomenon is the fact that flap 6 over the engine compartment cannot be closed completely when the engine is running. If the blinds and flap 6 above the engine compartment are closed completely, a vacuum is created in the driver's cabin.

It would be worthwhile if other writers expressed their opinions on using the FAP 500U, so that experiences can be generalized quickly.

9581

CSO: 2300/608

NEW CURRENCY REGULATIONS PUBLISHED

Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET in Hungarian 19 Apr 84 p 7

[Article by Maria Lakatos: "Strict Duties, Limitations; New Currency Regulations"]

[Text] It is advantageous to the foreign students studying here, but not very favorable to those who come home permanently after extended service abroad--this is about how we could summarize the recently issued regulation by the Ministry of Finance on currency management. The modification of Decree No 1. § 1974 (I.17.) EM regulating the implementation of the earlier statute--No 1, 1974 concerning planned currency management--adjusted the rules to the developments of the last 10 years, and made some regulations today considered important more strict, while relaxing others.

One of the most important changes affecting all of us is that currency received for lodging and fuel for personal tourist travel can be spent "according to the purpose of the trip abroad, to cover living expenses (lodging, food, other expenses, minor purchases) and fuel purchases in connection with the trip." The emphasis was placed on minor purchases, since now the regulation defines specifically how much we can spend and for what during tourist travel.

Paragraph 11 of the new regulation has further narrowed the opportunities of private import--many people dislike this expression but a better one for the time being does not exist for the import of equipment purchased from private money for the enterprises. Until now those returning home permanently from extended service abroad paid import duty for one item of merchandise exceeding 60,000 forints of value and for one durable and high-value item needed to perform their job, only if they sold these within 5 years. They did not have to pay the 60 percent fee in effect since mid-October. But according to the new regulation, if they sell these for sums higher than the customs value within 5 years, 60 percent of the difference between the two amounts must be paid as a fee. (At the time many people attacked this regulation, justifiably concerned about the offer of deals made on assignment. So far, because of the exemption enjoyed by those in extended service abroad, the selection has not decreased drastically, even though many fewer personal computers have come in recent months. There will probably not be more in the future, either, but it is also true that the prices have come down.)

But the regulation concerning gifts which can be sent by mail has changed favorably. In the past purchased or domestically crafted gifts not considered commercial quantities could be sent abroad by mail for up to 400 forints without permission from the currency authorities. But this limit is so low for today's prices that it does not even cover a better-quality tablecloth or vase. The new value limit is 800 forints, but even within this can not mail gold, platinum, silver, items made from these, items of museum value, postage stamps, and also items on the list of the National Bank published earlier; for example, food and pharmaceuticals cannot be put in the packages.

But the possibilities of gift-giving within the country have been restricted. A foreign citizen can give as a gift to a Hungarian citizen only items within the country of a value not to exceed 25,000 forints without permission from the currency authority, the Hungarian National Bank, while our fellow Hungarian citizen can give souvenirs which are within the country to a foreigner totaling 10,000 forints in value without the permission mentioned. (The customs and currency regulations concerning removal from and into the country have not changed.)

Foreigners know not only the materialized form of gift-giving. If not often, it does happen that they leave here uncompleted--blank--checks, check books, credit cards for their relatives and friends in this country. These must be placed on deposit with the Hungarian National Bank, but can be used later during the trip. But if a specific sum is written on the check, for example, the "value paper" must according to the earlier currency regulations be offered for sale within 8 days.

Last year the number of foreigners studying in our country's school system increased. Until now, after 30 days in this country they were not allowed to keep foreign currency on their persons in excess of 2,000 forints of value, or they had to offer it to the Hungarian National Bank. Now they can put their money into travel accounts, known to the public as BC accounts, as long as they ask for a value import statement at the border upon entry, and when they leave they can take it with them with the proper permit. The new regulation has also relaxed the situation of those who return home only temporarily, that is, as a visit, from extended service abroad for a vacation or rest. Until now they could obtain their papers to verify their ownership of currency only after a prolonged procedure, but now they can get the value import certificate at the border. (Unfortunately, it has happened in the past that the few days spent here in the country were not enough to take care of the paperwork, and legally obtained but undocumented foreign currency was confiscated at the border on the outbound trip.) The modification also covers the verification of money for the spouse and children over 14 years of age.

The statute has put into order the possibility of levying the 60-percent fee because it states that in the future under the 25,000-forint value limit the foreign currency authority's permission will not be needed for customs proceedings. This changed only the letter of the earlier statute and not the practice, which has been working well since October.

LABOR SITUATION AT ENTERPRISES EXAMINED

Budapest TARSADALMI SZEMLE in Hungarian No 6, 1984, pp 14-26

[Article by Lajos Hethy: "The Situation and Perspectives of Labor in the Enterprises"; this study is based on research regarding this subject at the Labor Research Institute. The main results will be published in the near future in book form by the Kossuth Konyvkiado. Besides the author of this article, who also served as the editor, the following participated in writing the book--Miklos Antalovits, Marton Buda, Mrs Istvan Haglemayer, Laszlo Ivanyi, Agnes Simonyi, and Dezso Vass. The data are from KSH [Central Statistical Office] publications, or are built on them.]

[Text] For almost the past 40 years the question of the situation and perspectives of labor in our country has come up in various forms and always stood at the center of attention in the society and political life. This is how it is nowadays, too, although the attention of guidance and public opinion is tied down to a great extent by the tensions and problems which have accumulated (but not at all independently of the fate and actions of labor) in various areas of society and the economy. The question has not, and cannot be, forced into the background, and this article also seeks to contribute to keeping it on the agenda by showing several interrelationships between work, working conditions and the factory environment that basically determine the life of labor.

At the center of the analysis stands the question of what the conditions are today of work performance in the factories--following the development of the 1970's and in the well-known economic difficulties of the 1980's. In what direction are conditions developing? To what extent do they meet now and in the future the demands of labor? To what extent do they help the people working in factories to develop their physical and intellectual capabilities for the benefit of themselves and society? What possibilities do the workers have to shape the conditions of work performance according to their interests or to influence the managerial decisions and national policies which form these?

These questions and the answers are undoubtedly of social and political importance. The conditions of work and work performance are of vital importance and have an effect on the political profile of labor. And still it would be a mistake to believe that these questions could be decided on as "ideological" or "social" matters--that is, independent of the economy--which have nothing or little to do with the success of the economy. On the contrary, without the

continuous assurance of appropriate factory conditions for work performance we cannot bring about and maintain in our factories that degree of action unity and effort which is necessary to overcome our economic difficulties. The requirement that labor be satisfied with its lot today and in its own workplace and that it must see clear perspectives in that place underscores the responsibility of enterprises beyond the comprehensive responsibility of social guidance--the economic managers at the enterprises and the political-social organs--in this question. It must be seen that the enterprises--although within the limits of national endowments and the economic-political and economic regulation resolutions, but with significant independence--may themselves shape their internal conditions in such a way that these will be more favorable or less favorable from the viewpoint of their workers' present and future.

Labor, Labor Organization and Technique

It is an internationally observable trend that labor content changes with the development of industrial work organization and technique. Thus, with the advance of mechanization (including automation) and the exchange of the workshop system manufacture for different types of continuous production, or with the advance of large serial manufacture, mass production in place of one-time and small serial manufacture changes are occurring in such content characteristics of work performance as the ratio of intellectual and physical work, the autonomy of labor in work performance, its control over this process, the requirement for expertise, the independent and bound nature of work performance, its variety and monotony, the uses of new knowledge, the possibility of working out and applying new work methods, the need for learning, and so forth. These changes are not without ambiguity. There are phenomena that appear positive like the decline of manual (generally hard physical) labor, but there are also phenomena which appear negative in their effects: thus certain types of new work organization, techniques (as a scapegoat they used to mention the conveyer belt, or more exactly the auto industry's conveyer belt) result in the "breaking down of work into small parts," the content reduction of the workers' work, his social isolation, and so forth.

What is the situation in Hungary in this respect? What kind of content characteristics are displayed by industrial work with particular reference to work organization and the development of technique?

Industrial technique and work organization developed significantly in Hungary particularly in the 1970's. Automated machines have appeared (and more recently, robots in small number), conveyer belt production is being extended (although less in the machine industry and much more in wine, fur, shoe and textile clothing, etc. industries). Despite this development, manual work dominates. In industry every other job (46 percent) is of such type, and machine jobs are represented relatively modestly--these make up together with control and inspection work less than one-third of the jobs (28.2 percent). The ratio of jobs organized by conveyer belt (19.2 percent) indicates not so much technical progress as the change accompanying the quantitative increase in production. The lag in mechanization is particularly conspicuous in activities like material movement, where hand work still represents a two-thirds (65.1 percent) ratio. Since current investment constraints have an

unfavorable effect on technical progress, it can hardly be expected that there will be a significant change in adapting mechanization and "high technologies" in the near future. But even if there were rapid technical progress, it cannot be expected that semiskilled work, or the large-scale manual work that still exists, and the frequent instances of primitive labor will disappear. This is clearly evident from scientific research.

Research which studied work satisfaction or the relation of this to work content in the 1970's did not find significant tensions in this area. The indirect indexes of dissatisfaction--manpower migration, labor shortages, hiring difficulties in certain lines--developed independently from those content characteristics of work which derived from modifications in technique or work organization. Dissatisfaction derived most of all from the unfavorable development of wages and physical working conditions. We see the explanation for this characteristic situation in Hungary as follows:

1. The strong material orientation of the workers (this stems from the satisfaction level of their material needs and the imperfections of the wage system, both of which have a particularly deepening effect on the wage question) forces into the background the otherwise elemental importance of work content.
2. The relatively high rate of physical work done under difficult conditions also exerts an effect in the same direction.
3. Most of the labor force does not consist of traditional industrial workers, but are workers from agriculture who have no traditions regarding the content characteristics of factory work, or roots in the work culture of their own or their parents' past.
4. Some of the workers deal with the work as a necessary evil for sheer survival, and they are constantly "looking outside" the factory (for example, those married women who as a rule do unqualified unskilled or semiskilled work for low wages, and since they have no fantasies here--fully understandably--their thoughts are with the family and the household, and they therefore prefer monotonous work that does not require their attention).
5. Because of frequent lack of organization, the critical types of technique and work organization do not function as they are supposed to, and for this reason their effect on work content is also modified; if there are, for example, regular breakdowns in production tied to the factory conveyer belt, the work cannot become monotonous, the worker is not isolated from his fellow workers.
6. There are rather few examples in Hungary of technique or work organization types--like the conveyer belt, for one--that can be handled as examples of work content reduction, and this concerns a small fraction of the workers.
7. Entirely for economic reasons or for solving or easing problems related to manpower and not in an attempt to "humanize" the work, certain enterprises use production organization procedures which cope largely in the process of work with the possible difficulties that arise in this area. These solutions vary a great deal:

--generally all enterprises strive over and beyond fulfilling the hiring requirements to "put the right man at the right place" (for example, unambitious, semiskilled women for monotonous and routine work, and in the proto-factories experienced, handy, thinking skilled workers);

--to the extent technique and work organization permit, job areas are established according to the quality and requirements of available manpower (for example, if there is an ambitious, qualified and skilled worker cadre the machine setting and machine operating tasks are united, and if the manpower is unqualified and unambitious these tasks are separated; in the professional literature this solution is known as "work enhancement");

--we compensate in various ways (additional pay, work breaks, etc.) for unattractive content characteristics of work (for example, being tied down to the operation of automatic machinery, or similar characteristics of assembly work);

--the autonomy and the participation possibilities of work groups are increased.

In their framework, the group may shape tasks and jobs according to the requirements of the members, it may "rotate" the work among the members, in fact, it may carry out production guidance functions, for in addition to the distribution and control of tasks it also participates in the distribution of wages, and in some cases takes this task on itself. (The brigade movement can also be the framework for this task, but unfortunately this worthwhile content appears with relative rarity in the socialist brigades.) Although the development of work content still does not cause significant strains among the workers, it is a conspicuous fact that the consideration of this problem is completely absent from the activities of the central organs--not counting the resolution of the trade unions on the "humanization" of work. We do not find this wanting only because this task--perhaps as a matter of fashion--is a central problem of policy for shaping the situation of the workers in every European country. Rather we are convinced that sooner or later we must face this problem. For sheer economic considerations alone: it is already evident that in the solution of factory problems requiring well-considered social efforts the most simple means of "financial compensation" are looked for (whether it is a matter of unfavorable working conditions or monotonous work without content) which use up the money that could be used to give incentive to achievements. This is even more undesirable from a sociopolitical point of view, for in this way we would only lend a helping hand to the recreation of a "materialistic" working class.

Wage and Achievement

When in analyzing the factory situation of the workers we deal with wages immediately following work, we are acknowledging the outstanding economic and at the same time sociopolitical importance of material awards for work. The strength of material needs--which characterizes most Hungarian workers according to scientific research and everyday experience--derives necessarily from the present development level of consumption, living conditions and the economy, or from the great material pressure in particular (for a part of

society and the workers) of the cost of buying a house. But of course, the needs of the workers are considerably varied as shown coincidentally by research and everyday knowledge. There are some groups which have already surpassed meeting basic material needs and are more sensitive to the development of conditions and social environments "beyond wages." (It is already difficult to find manpower for such well-paid but physically difficult lines of work performed under unpleasant conditions as excavator, molder, smelter, etc.)

What characterized, or still characterizes today, the wage situation of workers, the wage differences and their formation in time? What are the factors on which depended, or still depend nowadays, the wage of factory workers, the earnings they attain, and what are the factors that shape their ratios?

1. There occurred in Hungary a significant increase in wages and earnings in the 1970's: In the socialist sector of the economy by the end of the decade average wages rose by 73.3 percent, and average wages for workers in state industry by 78.9 percent, which represented a lower but still substantial increase in real wages. The rising wages played an important role in the fact that the workers made progress in satisfying their material needs, their housing conditions; also their supply of durable consumer goods improved, their living standards rose.

2. The wage system functioning in our factories included guarantees that if the work performed was of such quality as society judged worthy of recognition it was honored by material awards, even if only symbolic. Thus in 1979 in state industry the difference in average wages between the skilled and the unskilled was 1.31; workers at the top degree received 1.29 times more than five general or lower; the average earnings of the workers between the ages of 46 to 60 was 1.48 times greater than those below the age of 20 years; finally the wages of those working under the most unfavorable conditions was 1.75 times more than those who performed their work under more favorable conditions. (Among other things, the latter indexes show the increased weight of physical work, working conditions in the determination of wages or earnings.)

3. In a significant ratio of the factories, on the other hand, the workers had to, and still have to, experience the fact that the relation between actual work achievement and its material reward was ended, the distribution of wages is made in an ad hoc manner (more exactly, on the basis of viewpoints completely or partly independent of work achievement), or the fact that the small wage within a factory or among factories was given for work of highly divergent quality or quantity. This is related to the fact that achievement requirements (the fixing of which belongs exclusively to the authority of the enterprises) vary from enterprise to enterprise. In some places they are technically well founded and systematically maintained; in other places they blink their eyes at their relaxation, or they are not applied where they could be. Similar divergences--influencing the expected volume of work--are experienced (not independently of all the conditions of work norms) in the organization of certain enterprises.

4. In our wage system it is not possible to achieve significant increases in earnings as compared to the average even with significantly more work investment than average: in certain areas (in workplaces with achievement wages) it is theoretically (and sometimes actually) possible to attain a certain wage increase, but in most of these cases the workers must experience that the gain in return for their additional efforts continually declines, and after a certain point even comes to an end. This stems at one and the same time from internal enterprise causes (lack of organization a priori hinders significant surplus achievement, the enterprises shy away from achievement-wage payments) or from extra-enterprise causes--above all the brake on enterprise wage increases by wage regulation. Independently, however, of the causes of the phenomenon, the workers--who are pressured by their material problems, the burdens of housing construction and family support, rising prices, etc.--are not given in this situation a real possibility of investing their additional energies in the factories.

5. Looking at it from the workers' point of view, however, it is undoubtedly an advantage of the wage system that it contributes not only to the maintenance of employment security--and in such a way that this generally means maintaining the security of the job--but for the most part it also protects them against the dangers of incidental wage reductions. It is general experience that in the present condition of the labor market--which is not independent of the described characteristics of the wage system--the low level (quantitative and qualitative) of work investment as compared to the average will not bring substantially lower wages than the average, and in fact in a significant part of the cases does not have any effect at all. Moreover, it is exceptional in industrial practice for derelictions--violation of work discipline and technological discipline, scrap production, and so forth--even to be penalized with temporary wage reductions. Such sanctions affect at most the least significant elements of earnings (profit sharing, awards) and are simple and of little magnitude.

Only very incidentally and in strict limits do the described characteristics of the wage system, the wage level and wage differences as they have developed make it possible for the factory workers to find--by way of surplus achievement for surplus work--the perspective of material welfare which they judge to be desirable, necessary and attainable for themselves and their family. The workers react in various ways to this situation:

Some of the workers succeed in achieving a harmony between wages and needs. The wage system of their factory is correct, the achievement requirements are well founded, and therefore they feel that the quality and quantity of their work, their personal qualifications, their knowledge and experience are recognized, even though symbolically. Most of these workers are vocationally and materially well established, generally older, are employed in characteristic factories of their enterprise (proto-factory, experimental factory, toolmaking, TMK [Preventive Maintenance]), are responsible for the content, conditions and social environment of their work, and are relatively free (sometimes because of restrained material demands) from material pressure.

Some of the workers cannot bring their wages in harmony with their needs and aspirations, and thus they make constant efforts to increase their income. The most characteristic channel for acquiring earnings within the factory in the past decade and a half has been overtime. A similar income-supplementing function was provided by working on second or third shifts, or variable shifts. Later on--this was a post-1980 development--it was provided by VGMK [Enterprise Work Association] work. All three ways gave a way for the worker to increase the yields of his work investment (all of the ways provided high hourly earnings).

Work carried on outside the factory (maszek [private sector] activity, and fusi [use of factory materials for private trade], and so forth) without permissions has continued to serve as the channel for income gained outside the factory.

Although this situation cannot be changed over the short term, and it would not be advisable to try to do so, the maintenance of this situation over a long period of time would not seem to be desirable either from the point of view of the workers or society, for the costs are quite high:

--a) in this way only certain groups of workers within the factory and only a part outside the factory would be capable of gaining the perspectives of material prosperity, and no doubt beyond work investments in this factory position, "the bargaining situation" play a role;

--b) these solutions cover up for factory lack of organization, insufficient incentive, and manpower waste, that is, they are damaging both in respect to the enterprise and society;

--c) these solutions are also very costly for the workers because they cause the deterioration of other working conditions (of which we shall speak more at length below).

Physical Work Conditions and Hours of Work

The physical work conditions of industry are basically determined by the machine equipment and technology that is used. Both in the positive and negative sense the present situation bears the effects of the technical development and investments of the past decades; thus the significant improvement in physical conditions--expressed in the reduced number of accidents and fatal accidents--can be ascribed in no small part to the technical progress of the 1960's and 1970's. But the new, modern technique does not automatically bring with it greater work safety, for work protection equipment can also be "spared" from modern machines--or vice versa: with appropriate measures traditional machines and technology do not unconditionally mean greater danger of accidents or less favorable working conditions. Very much depends on the extent to which the prominent production interest and the limited means of the enterprises will permit work protection and health affairs to be expressed, to what extent trade union interest protection is functioning (if it functions) in this area, and to what extent state administrative compulsion can be realized. More recently the manpower shortage and hiring difficulties in certain job areas represented the strongest stimulus to the improvement of working conditions.

How are the physical work conditions in the factories today?

It is not easy to answer this question. If we can believe the data available to us (in final analysis deriving from enterprise sources) we would have to think that in the past 20 years physical work conditions have continuously deteriorated, although in reality we are speaking of a constant, reliable improvement. The cause of this peculiar phenomenon is latent in the relationship of work conditions and wage classification. The wage scales of certain jobs--within the framework of a centrally established wage schedule system--have been established on one hand on the basis of qualification requirements and on the other hand on basis of physical requirements. In order to be able to pay certain worker groups, the enterprises "upgrade" these either on the basis of the qualifications of their work or (where this is not possible as in the case of unskilled workers) on the basis of the physical requirements or working conditions. Thus the picture of work performed in the factories, the special requirements, and the working conditions are used (frequently) to support wage level increases. Unfortunately, in this way a clear view of the actual expertise requirements for industrial jobs and working conditions falls victim to the "wage bargaining" that occurs throughout the country. Therefore, the data do not exactly reflect reality, but give a certain orientation to the main features of the situation.

Working conditions are the most unfavorable in those areas of the economy where a great expenditure of strength accompanies exposure to weather and other external natural factors: thus in the construction industry the average working condition is rated 2.11 and in agriculture 1.99; it is rated average in industry, or 1.55. But within industry the differences are great, and many areas can be found where the unfavorable working conditions are shown throughout the country: thus mining 2.33, the construction material industry 2.03, the electric energy industry 1.96, and metallurgy 1.96.

As called for by the wage schedule, working conditions are indicated in the statistics by numbers from 1 to 4. Number 4 indicates work performed with great expenditure of strength under unfavorable working conditions, and number 1 indicates work performed with normal expenditure of strength and under normal conditions.

Working conditions also vary for different groups of workers. Thus the better qualified young workers who have a wider choice in jobs and are also more demanding enjoy better working conditions than the uneducated, more subordinate older workers; working conditions for women are also better than those for men, and so on.

It should be mentioned that the lack of organization which is evident in many places in industry--and which was found again and again in the course of our analysis--has an unfavorable effect on working conditions: an uneven pace of production, last minute rushes, weaknesses in work discipline, and so forth lead to a point where the workers have to work under even more unfavorable conditions than those which already exist as a consequence of old machines, obsolete technologies, outdated buildings, and ineffective work protection equipment. Overtime (of which we have already spoken) increases the burdens

of people working in factories. At the end of the 1970's one-third of industrial workers did overtime work.

Even though it occurs outside the enterprise and the factory, the effects of the "second economy" cannot be ignored from the viewpoint of the workers: the high hourly earnings which are attainable with overtime compensate mostly for unfavorable working conditions. As is well known, labor intensity at "second economy" places of work is high (the customer wants work in return for his money), the level of means and working conditions vary greatly but for the most part are outside any kind of control, and the hours of work put significant burdens on the physique of the workers.

Occupational illnesses and accidents show approximately the situation that exists in physical work conditions and work safety. In the perspective of the past 20 years we can perceive a significant decline in both areas, which is obviously related to the general rise in work culture beyond technical development and the development of work protection and health. Today the most frequent illnesses are loss of hearing due to noise, skin diseases caused by inexpert handling of chemicals, and silicosis is still holding its own. In recent years illnesses of neurotic origin have also multiplied. In the beginning of the 1960's, 6,700 to 7,000 new occupational illnesses were registered; in 1979-1980 this number declined to 2,700 or 3,000.

The number of factory accidents is considerably greater: annually it is of the magnitude of a hundred thousand. In 1980 there were 102,000 accidents in the company as compared to about 138,000 in the first half of the 1960's. In the same year, the number of fatal accidents declined to below 400 (395) as compared to the average annual index of 654 in the first part of the 1960's, although this is still too high. (In 1981, there was again some worsening in the number of instances.)

We can include hours of work among the working conditions--number of hours by month, week or day--and also the shift schedule. The number of work hours per week declined gradually in recent years, and now the introduction of the 40-hour work week is on the agenda, while Saturdays have become generally a work-free day. Despite the intentions of the economic guidance and the significant incentives introduced in recent years, work on more than one shift has declined: in state industry the ratio of workers on variable shifts was 53 percent in 1974, and 45 percent in 1979.

The picture is rather contradictory in respect to physical work conditions. From the beginning it is not reassuring that because of the written characteristics for the operation of the wage schedule system, we do not have reliable information on this important area which affects the mass of the workers' health and physical soundness. But what we do know is very contradictory. On the one hand a substantial improvement has occurred in the past two decades in physical work conditions, although with increased organization there should still be room for further progress given industrial techniques and technologies. On the other hand, in certain conditions of work performance (workload and total working hours) significant groups of workers suffered because of enterprise lack of organization, inadequate wages and the workers' own

income-seeking efforts (we are thinking of overtime and extra work in the VGMK's and in the "second economy") brought on a retrogression which reminds one of conditions prior to the turn of the century. This situation can hardly be maintained without serious personal and social damages.

Worker Advancement and Continued Education

We regard it as advancement when a worker--by virtue of a change in the place he holds in work specialization or of his job--moves to more substantive tasks, greater income and greater social prestige. The classical example, it may be said, of such advancement is to become a leader, that is, when a worker by rising in the hierarchy achieves the assignment of a foreman or other production guidance or higher position. But it counts as a similar advancement when a manual worker becomes a white-collar worker, the unskilled worker a semiskilled worker, and the semiskilled worker a skilled worker, or in a certain sense, advancement within categories to more substantive jobs or higher earning categories (although these are the borderline cases of advancement).

This process is not free of contradictions. Advancement does not always and in every respect result in an improvement in the worker's situation. When someone becomes a leader, for example, his work becomes more substantive, he has increased responsibility, and sometimes he also receives less pay; this is particularly true when a laborer "advances" to the job of a white collar worker ("administrative" employee).

It follows from our explanation that an advancement does not always exceed the limits of a worker's life, although certain forms of its manifestation may be interpreted as social mobility. Finally, it is necessary to emphasize that worker advancement is inseparable from the continued education and training of the workers--and these regularly establish the basis of advancement. Advancement that exceeds the limits of a worker's life--which from the aspect of social mobility appears as mobility within the generation--slowed down in the years following the liberation. According to the most recent mobility data only 2.3 percent of the skilled male workers and 0.5 percent of the skilled female workers moved into leadership or intellectual categories signifying an important social change or situation (and at the same time schooling advancement). Naturally we must take into account that this subclass of workers is basically rather small.

Of course, becoming a leader or intellectual does not exhaust the describable paths of social mobility for worker advancement. Let us continue with the skilled worker category, 18 percent of the males and 21 percent of the females moved upward according to mobility ratio retirement figures during the course of their life career, assuming that we regard as such moving to another intellectual group (that is, short of a university or college degree). Unlike becoming a manager or intellectual, this does not unconditionally represent "a great leap forward," but in any event one which is accompanied by basic change in the substantive characteristics and conditions of the work performed, and which affects the income and social prestige of the advancing workers (although not always in a positive direction).

The characteristic and traditional way of advancement beyond the worker's way of life is to become a foreman, the problems of which--partly because of the nature of the job and partly because of the position of the assignment in the work organization--has again been on the agenda in recent years. It is well known that the recruits to this group do not come mainly from skilled workers (and even less from the "best skilled workers"), but from those with some kind of intellectual occupation, including among others young, recent graduates from universities or colleges. They are able, in the beginning years, to put up with the low earnings of a foreman, which for the best skilled workers would mean a clear deterioration of their material situation; moreover, to these young intellectuals the assignment affords, it appears, good "career learning" and a "springboard" to higher assignments as production directors and managers. For the skilled workers the foreman's assignment is not alluring because most of the conflicts in the factory--regarding problems of wage or lack of organization--are precipitated here. Despite all these things, the second most important source for the recruitment of foremen is from the skilled worker class.

From the viewpoint of worker advancement--whatever positive consequences we consider--progress effects important masses, and the advancement occurring at this qualification level or corresponding jobs is not to be underrated. According to 1973 mobility data, only one-third of the unskilled male workers remained at this level, one-fourth became skilled workers and one-fifth became semiskilled workers. One-fourth of the semiskilled male workers advanced as skilled workers. (Among women the situation is less favorable.) Thus, if we research the worker advancement possibilities which affected the most characteristic and largest masses in the past two decades we will find it in the mobility which does not go beyond the limits of a worker's life but leads to more substantive work, more favorable working conditions, higher wages, and qualification levels and jobs which bring greater social respect. The fact that someone has a "skill" is in itself a value among the workers.

Continued training and continued education is the basis of worker advancement--but we must not absolutize its role even in the case of the most radical changes of social situation. (For example, it is well known there are many other factors to becoming a leader even according to the formal qualifications, not to speak of the situation in a substantially more complex social reality.)

The workers' educational level has improved considerably in the past two decades: among the younger workers 8 years of general schooling is characteristic, a secondary school diploma is frequent, and there are cases of higher education. Accordingly, in adult education the lower grades have lost their significance, today high school education dominates. Thus in 1980, only 0.8 percent of the manual workers were doing continuation studies in the lower grades, 2.2 percent at secondary school level, and 0.1 percent at institutions of higher learning. (For the most part this latter provided a way to advancement for young manual workers who were not able to enter a university.)

Technical developments would make it natural for, let us say, workers with a high school education to return to production work. Today, if an educated worker does this it is mostly to avoid reduction in earning as a white collar

worker. This is also one of the sensitive points in the initiative known as the SZET ["skilled workers to attend university"] movement which is designed to make it possible for outstanding young workers to acquire a university diploma by "skipping" high school. Aside from the fact that this puts a great burden on those who are involved and has caused tensions with those colleagues who already have a high school diploma but were unable to go to a university, their return to work has caused further tensions because most of them before going to the university earned much more than their colleagues who are of the same age and graduated from a technical college and who came directly to similar assignments (for example, foreman). From the aspect of advancement within a worker's way of life, continuation training courses (organized mostly by the enterprises) are important. The scope of participating workers expanded continuously in the 1970's. Their number (with some decline) was somewhat more than 200,000 in 1980. These included about 70,000 in semiskilled courses, 15,000 in skilled worker courses, and about 120,000 in refresher--expertise expansion--specialization courses.

In summary, it may be said that the paths to worker advancement today are open primarily within the limits of a worker's way of life, and only exceptionally does it occur that the worker can rise from these limits to a path pointing beyond a worker's way of life. Where the first-named path, which was and is taken by large masses of workers, may lead and how much broader the new positions and quantitatively how much better (in respect to work content, working conditions, income, prestige, and so forth), these are questions which the foregoing answer. Looking at the matter from this point of view, therefore, a scarcity of factory channels leading to material welfare, or the reduction or impoverishment of work content is not only a problem in itself but a very important factor determining the advancement of a worker and the perspectives of a worker's way of life. We must see it clearly: if the workers have a perspective somewhere for advancement today, it is in the factory. Therefore, the conditions of factory work performance merit increased attention from society and management.

Worker Participation in Decisionmaking

In the development of workers' perspectives and the factory situation, their participation in the management is of dual importance. On one hand, the participation may give the workers a way of achieving needed changes in working conditions favorable to them--whether this means wages, work tasks, physical work conditions or continued training. On the other hand, participation in decisions, orientation to factory problems, thinking these problems through and discussing them, introduce motifs in factory activities which undoubtedly expand and enrich them, that is, satisfy certain needs. Participation is also the cornerstone of political activity, for the expression of views about common affairs is necessarily the first step to participation in shaping the conditions directly affecting the workers and their personal needs and interests.

Since many analyses have appeared in recent years about participation--or to use the political term: plant democracy--I shall limit myself here to a discussion only of several features related to the subject of this study. Participation in factory management has two well-known paths: direct or representative

participation (in the former case, the workers personally express their views, and in the latter representatives of trade union officials do this for them). After a long period of indecision, changes in an important and positive direction occurred in 1980 in the institutions of both representative and direct democracy, the main result of which was that the body of trade union stewards took the place of the enterprise trade union councils--VSZT's [Factory Trade Union Committees] which formerly embodied the topmost enterprise trade union organ and the highest enterprise forum of plant democracy. With this the organ was terminated that was avowedly chosen for the task of representing in a "general," that is, differentiated way the interests of the workers, and that similarly had "general" responsibility for the membership as a whole.

The trade union stewards were chosen to represent the interests of separately determined groups of workers, and similarly they owned these bodies specific responsibility. The grade union stewards took over this new role with a significantly expanded scope of rights: in 1976 a regulation was adopted forbidding decisions in wage, norm and award matters without their concurrence. Then the steward body received advisory rights in all enterprise decisions regarding the living and working conditions of the workers. Modification of collective contracts and the supervision over execution are among its rights; it has advisory rights in the development of the wage and award system, and in fact it now gives views also on the activities of the managers. The basis for the functioning of this construct is the relationship between the trade union stewards and the voters, the internal life of the trade union group. We can also put it in this way--the participation is realized directly within the group. The sound direction of these developments can hardly be disputed, but researchers always find that an effective advisory role by the workers in decisionmaking and supervision over management is very limited. Economic management continues to determine the pace of development in the needs and interests of the workers and in questions that concern them greatly and directly--and they do so with but often without the formal participation of the representatives of the workers. But this phenomenon has causes latent in thinking and attitudes of many working people, workers and managers, trade union officials, or in the factory socioeconomic relations themselves which the changes (otherwise very positive) that have taken place in the institutional system of participation cannot eliminate. What are we speaking of?

1. These forums are today not very suitable for discussing the wage questions that evoke the greatest interest. On one hand, because there is little possibility in the given system of wage regulation for the development through these forums of the wage ratio. On the other hand, the frequent, almost general, unfounded base of achievement requirements makes effective discussion impossible. (It is not in the interest of the managers or the workers to take up the question of the work norms--amid the given conditions of enterprise management exactly because of the central limits on wage level increases.) This does not exclude, of course, the democratic forums from dealing with the interests of the workers as they do with many other matters closely concerning them (for example, physical working conditions, work protection, and so forth which have been debated effectively up to now).

2. For some of the workers the effective channel of interest realization within the factory is the unofficial, in some cases not even legal, wage bargaining by which the economic managers award in various ways the most important worker groups as necessary at the cost of others--with the silent approval of the trade union--through overtime, awards, bonuses, unjustifiably high achievement rates, unjustified rolling up of wage categories, and in extreme cases calculation of work not performed, and so forth.

A similar solution, which does not require trade union approval, is the opening of up vgmk possibilities for these worker groups.

Perhaps it is superfluous for us today that not one type of such interest realization bears being presented to democratic forums.

3. Groups of workers in the "second economy"--that is, outside the factory--who undertake work legally or illegally or in some cases perform maszek activity have no participation interest in the rather difficult factory interest realization institution, for they cannot realize their interests in the factory, which they regard as a kind of "safety net." This kind of "looking outward" from the factory hinders the development and strengthening of the ultimate collective.

Nevertheless, there is a considerable number of workers who seek the perspectives of their work and material welfare in the factory, and therefore what happens there is of importance to them.

There are well-known obstacles to the effective functioning of democratic forums in the insufficiency of managerial interest, the dissatisfaction of the enterprise organization and management, the limits to enterprise independence, and the weaknesses of trade union interest protection.

Despite the repeated political efforts of the past two and one-half decades, there has been only moderate success in bringing about the effective participation of workers in decisionmaking. This is unfortunate in itself, but all the more so because the fundamental nature of decisions in the matter of working conditions--considering the wide variation in possible solutions and the complexity of the workers' needs--expressly requires the participation of those concerned. Nowadays the further development of enterprise organization and management--including the increased participation of workers--awakens new hopes in this area although it still continues to be the case that the establishment and operation of new institutions can only be successful if this is accompanied by a corresponding development in the basic interest and regulation relations.

To our days--in the 1970's and already in the 1960's--the situation of factory workers has been improving: wages have increased considerably (together with real wages), the safety of work has increased, the physical work conditions have in general become more favorable, hours of work have declined again and again, and the possibilities for worker participation in enterprise decision-making have expanded and developed, while employment security has been maintained. But tensions have accumulated between the development of certain working conditions and the needs of workers who are increasingly better

educated and more qualified and living in better material conditions (but also continue to include uneducated, unqualified and disadvantaged groups). Such increasing tensions have developed around physical work conditions and wages. The latter has valued upward the role of wages in the list of factory conditions--as compared also to the intensification of material needs, while devaluing the importance of work and other work conditions. Such compensatory mechanisms have been developed, the functioning of which helped in solving the most severe tensions around the most important problems (including material welfare), but it evoked lasting deterioration in other factors of the workers' situation. Contradictions which have become more severe in important features of the workers' situation are inhibiting progress also in relations where otherwise the outlook would be favorable, these include, for example, worker participation in decisions in respect to continued education.

The solution of the present problems and contradictions will not be easy and will require that in some cases the given factors in the factory situation and workers' perspectives should be given special attention. As is obvious from our reasoning thus far, substantial improvement in the tense problems of today cannot be brought about by the "special" handling of the workers (necessary as this is) but the elimination or easement of those inadequate conditions which--deriving from the global economic conditions that have become so much more difficult and the insufficient achievements of our economy--are a serious burden on our economic and political policy and the whole of our economy and society. Nowadays those changes are designed to open paths to this end which we call the economic management reform that increasingly points toward a more definite direction and offers favorable directions of movement in such primarily important areas as the wage system, participation by the workers in enterprise management, and enterprise independence. These changes, we hope, will have a favorable effect on the factory environment, which in the economy is the basic factor in the activities of the working people, that is, the workers. Here belongs that active, initiative-taking action which is an essential means for overcoming our difficulties.

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TRADE UNION TIES WITH ENTERPRISE ECONOMIC WORK ASSOCIATIONS

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[Article by Dr Andras Szabo: "Enterprise Business Work Partnerships and the Trade Unions"]

[Text] Since the possibilities for second jobs and earnings have been broadened in Hungary and the more simple economic organizational forms offer incomes more in proportion with achievements, public interest has been intensified regarding the differentiation of incomes. But the more careful observer or the analytical one will quickly pose the question: Can the problem of small businesses be reduced to income differences, or does the question require an approach that is more complex and nuanced? The appearance of simple economic organizational forms--in popular language, small businesses--and business work partnerships has started a process of unending debates. The passionate arguments of those who are opposed and those who see an innovation, a regeneration, are inexhaustible. Despite the debates, the small businesses and work partnerships keep increasing in number, and one need not be a prophet to foresee that they will continue to increase in the future.

The Question of Interest Representation

The businesses which have emerged thus far, whether they are in the sphere of public services or in enterprises, have also striven up to now, of course, to build harmoniously within our economic system and integrate themselves into it, because only in this way can they fulfill their auxiliary and supplementary role. The process of building and of conducting smooth, continuous activity assumes a new type of bilateral relation, in which the interests of the small businesses appear and are realized like those of the "traditional" workers. Thus the demand for a separate interest representation must be regarded as a necessary accompaniment of the different activity.

Certain writers espouse the cause that the changes--the existence and the increase of businesses--are necessarily accompanied by the fact that a new type of interest representational organ must be formed. Lajos Hethy wrote on this in his article "What Are the Managers Interested In?" I do not want to get into polemics over Lajos Hethy's article as to the extent to which his opinion that only a new type of interest representation can solve the problem

is well founded. But the fact is that in the recent past, on the basis of the views of various organizations, it has been proposed that the enterprise business work partnerships may also form independent interest representation based on "self-maintenance," self-organization.

By way of introduction, therefore, we may state that the more simple economic organizations--beyond the fact that their incomes differ, and may differ from other economic organizations--seek and demand the representation of their interests, for interest representation is necessary everywhere and at every level. But "who should represent whom," and what is the nature of the "true interest representation" stemming from the differences?

In reading Tamas Sarkozy's study on the revaluation of the economic role of the state, the thought arises that it is necessary to speak and write about the new task and change in interest protection, even though in the view of many the enterprise business work partnerships and their relationship with the trade unions do not merit such concentrated attention. Indeed, the members of the enterprise business work partnerships are very close to having a split personality, for in the regular daily working hours they work as trade union members and their interests are represented by the trade union, while after working hours as "entrepreneurs" in the enterprise business work partnerships their interests can be formulated only by "another" representation.

Can the duality which is developing be maintained? Are those arguments well founded according to which it is necessary to form an interest representation separate from the trade union in the case of those who are basically and primarily enterprise workers and only secondarily, after working hours, workers (members) of an enterprise business work partnership?

Independent Organizational Form

In 1980, high-level resolutions were passed on the modernization of organizational forms for consumer services, and on the further development of artisan and auxiliary activity. The conditions regarding the operation of the enterprise business work partnerships--together with the economic business work partnerships--are regulated by Council of Minister Decree No 28/1981 (IX 9). According to this, the essence of the "characteristic" relationship with the enterprise is that only a worker or retiree of the same enterprise may be a member of an enterprise business work partnership. In addition to his main occupation, an enterprise worker may establish a membership relation with an enterprise business work partnership. In certain cases (for example, incompatible work by a member that must be performed during working hours for his main occupation, etc.), it is necessary to obtain the approval of the employer on the basis of prior notification.

The enterprises may support enterprise business work partnerships formed with the support of workers and retirees by granting permission to use equipment, by providing a place to work and other means (for example, expert advice, provision of basic material, and so forth). The relationship of this

enterprise and the enterprise business work partnership, and within this framework the support and its conditions are set by separate contract. The essential substantive elements are the fee schedules, the necessary enterprise equipment that is permitted to be used, the premises, and so forth, and the return charges for these. The separate contract is a part of the determination of responsibility stemming from the activity of the enterprise business work partnership. In general, the members of the enterprise business work partnerships are liable for their property contribution and the income acquired in the partnership; in exceptional cases the enterprise may accept liability for its activity.

The internal membership relations of the enterprise business work partnerships are regulated by a membership contract, which on the basis of prior approval by the given enterprises is tied to official approval.

The separate contract of a business work partnership with the enterprise involves the undertaking of a task or the completion of a task, and has features that are identical with those of production, cooperation, and, more recently, entrepreneurial contracts signed by an enterprise with another enterprise. Nevertheless, according to certain authors, the enterprise business work partnerships are "byproducts" of the more simple economic organizational forms. They base their opinion on the fact that it was the basic goal of the new economic organizational forms to raise the level of public services, and make up for the shortage of services where these cannot be provided either by the state or the cooperative service industry, because organizationally the problem cannot be solved at a profit. At the same time, it was the basic goal that they should be suitable for such services as could meet changing or new requirements.

Therefore, their activity helps socialist economic policy to concentrate more effectively on the development of its resources, and it helps large organizations to avoid the fragmentation of their stock of equipment, and to carry out services which at first glance are visibly unprofitable for large organizations.

On the other hand, the enterprise business work partnerships--according to these authors--were "expropriated" by the enterprises, and rarely, if ever, do they perform public services. They function primarily within the enterprise, making up for shortages evident there. Thus, according to the above-mentioned authors, if they do not function in the sphere of public services, they should at least perform a similar activity among enterprises. Apparently, it helped in the development of their views that the basic rules for the operation of the enterprise business work partnerships are ambiguous: "in essence they resemble business work partnerships," but "they are not independent organizational forms," they write. I am of the opinion that in this case the word "enterprise" cannot be used only as an adverb of place or adjective because it is exactly this word that gives the characteristic sense differentiating it from other work partnerships. But this sense would require "an independent organizational form" and its appropriate regulation.

A New-Type Worker Collective

The repeated debates and the emphasized requirement on interest representation raise the question: where now? Is the present regulation appropriate to an enterprise business work partnership which is showing an increasingly marked profile? Does it help in the realization of the characteristics, does it assure that the new work organizations can be built as soon as possible within the enterprise order, the work environment?

We are basically counting on two possibilities in the future. The first is that we should leave the present regulation, which indisputably is functioning well, unchanged, and thus have all tensions and contradictions with the enterprise business work partnerships remain. The other alternative would occur if we were to take into account the "characteristic" relation of the enterprise business work partnerships with the immediate environment in which they function. For this, it would be necessary to modify the Labor Code to make it possible to build this new type of work performance into the system.

Let me refer, without being charged with improvisation, to an example: In June 1983 a law was approved in the Soviet Union on workers' collectives and their increased role in the management of enterprises and institutions. The workers' collectives received the right and authority to participate directly in the defining of material incentive. The right of work distribution passed under their competence. They determine total premiums and work wages according to how the members of the collective contribute to the results of the common work. The law authorizes the collectives to call violators of work discipline to account including recommendations for dismissal. The work partnerships are organized to carry out definite enterprise tasks, and consist generally of outstanding skilled workers. The work partnerships themselves organize their work, and arrangements are made accordingly. Their leader can only be someone who is best qualified not only in the area of management and organization but also in the given line of work. To assure quality work, they have developed a characteristic mixture of individual quality control and collective control. It is very important that everyone is responsible for the work of the collective in addition to his own work.

What is the situation to our enterprise business work partnerships?

Only in exceptional instances do the enterprise business work partnerships work outside the enterprise gates, and even on the basis of a separate contract they perform their operations in the form of an "entrepreneurship."

Is this a fortunate name based as it is rather on tradition than on function? If we clear the enterprise business work partnerships of statutory provision constructs, we stand before a new type of worker collective which we cannot ignore from the point of view of development.

What are those elements already present or suitable for further development which buttress our statement? First of all, such an element is the self-organization of the collective. But complexity directed at carrying out the

tasks is also a noteworthy element, as is the fact that those who best work together are the ones who organize into partnerships. Such elements include the selection of the immediate leaders and organizers of the work; distribution by achievement of wages deriving from the common results of work; disciplinary jurisdiction within the collective; the possibility of recommending a call to account or exclusion from the partnership; individual and collective (dual) quality control; and a collective responsibility for results. I must quickly add, however, that the criteria are sketchy and include prognostic elements, but in certain enterprise spheres the lines of development in the workers' collective are similar. I also consider it important that while the economic work partnerships carry out their activities in areas where relations are regulated by the Civil Code, this code and the related parts of decrees by the Council of Ministers are contradictory with respect to the enterprise business work partnerships. A harmonious relationship can only be achieved with a regulation which takes into account other regulated relations prevailing in the area of operation, in our case provisions of the Labor Code, if for no other reason than that neither now nor in the future will "pure" entrepreneurial relations be developed with respect to the basic relations.

"New Type" of Interest Representation?

In my opinion the work-place organs of the trade union are not dealing with the problems of the economic business partnerships adequately. This aversion--if it can be called that--is explained in many instances by the tensions deriving from high earning differences, or the measure whereby economic business partnerships are not obliged to provide data, report to the trade unions, and so forth.

Proceeding from official regulation, however, we must state that the trade unions cannot implement their powers as included in the Labor Code and related regulations with respect to the differently regulated enterprise business work partnerships. The nature of the "entrepreneurship" precludes the realization of existing interests going beyond the bilateral economic interests in the narrow sense and already functioning in the case of other recognized workers. I would here point, above all, to the fact that the well-known achievements in living and working conditions--for example, rest periods--are developing differently from the original social goal, and are becoming uncontrollable.

The maintenance of the situation results in an increasingly greater distance separating the workers' collectives within a given economic organization. Without interest coordination an undesirable rift may occur. The danger is increased by the fact that under the guise of the modernization of the enterprise, there are appearing management views according to which the interest representation of the "entrepreneurs" in the enterprise business work partnerships cannot be solved within the framework of the "old" organizational forms. A "new" interest representational organization is necessary for them. The question of how the present forms of interest representation and coordination could be used in the new type of performance forms is not even raised. Similarly, no one has raised examining the regulation in a way that would make possible the functioning of work association which are better suited and better integrated into the environment.

High-level political decisions and documents set as their goal the modernization of the management system and the further development of the enterprise organizational forms and the internal organizational structure. There is a very large group of people who even under present relations press the possibility of creating "self-management" forms. In a very well-founded way, Mrs Istvan Hagelmayer, for example, sees the new organizations in the form of "autonomous groups" that choose their own leaders, make common decisions on work and wage distribution, and the acceptance and expulsion of group members. These ideas differ basically from the situation that has now developed in that they strive for the further development and modernization of the given branch of rights (work right). They keep all that is valuable and durable, including the present functioning system of interest representation. They try to avoid solutions which would plant "foreign bodies" into the given environment. Obviously, that solution which at present impels the interest representational organs inside the enterprise toward noninterference or toward intervention by circuitous paths cannot be maintained over the long run.

When a worker entrusts his interest representation and protection to a social organ--by way of mandate--he is expressing a confidence stemming from a very high degree of inner conviction. Therefore, it appears justified that some kind of specific mark--in the present instance the work performance of the enterprise business work partnerships as compared to the undertaking--should unconditionally mean a new type of interest protection. In this way the further development of the enterprise management, the leadership and the system would not represent automatism in the interest representational area.

We must recognize that in the present situation the trade unions and other social organizations must solve extremely difficult tasks, above all the interest protection and representational task which affects every worker of the enterprise, for the procedural and substantive development of which the Central Committee of the MSZMP passed a resolution at its meeting on 12 October 1983. The activity of the trade union organs will continue to be basic and very important in the enterprises, regardless of how many enterprise business work partnerships are functioning.

The Main Occupation Is First

Regulation of the enterprise business work partnerships ties the membership relation to the main occupational work relation established at the given enterprise. Thus a member of an enterprise business work partnership is primarily an enterprise worker and trade union member. His basic problem of existence are solved in this primary sphere, and the secondary sphere has only a motivational role. Therefore, it is important that in their work the trade unions should see that the interest protection and representational activity stemming from the main-occupational work relation should be first. It would unconditionally lead to distortion if the interests stemming from the auxiliary activity and their representation were to predominate. One of the troubling distortions of the past was that because of wage regulation and our economic situation the auxiliary activity and the interest represented by it pressed to the forefront. To change this and return to the proper ratios, great

pressure rests on the enterprise organs. (For example, it is a source of tensions if the efforts of the socialist brigades to undertake more efficient work coincide with the work performed by the enterprise business work partnerships for additional earnings.)

As long as it is not characteristic of an enterprise that all its workers are members of enterprise business work partnerships, but only a relatively thin layer of the work association membership participates, we must constantly expect sources of tension. Every step taken in the direction of differentiation between "simple" workers and those who also perform auxiliary activity--here I also include separate interest representation--will create a situation that can lead to emotional and production difficulties. I cannot imagine that worker collectives in their main occupation working time should over the long run do only outworker work, serve--if necessary through overtime--the workers in the economic work partnerships. It is indisputable, on the other hand, that the activity of the enterprise business work partnerships make up for shortages, and increased exports imbue the whole of the given economic organization.

The mutual effect is in practice becoming increasingly close. It is transformed instead into a new quality, a mutual dependence. We must study the regulation now in effect and the interest representational work by taking this into consideration. It would not be advisable to create separate interest protection and representational organizations. It would not have a comprehensive view of the whole, it would lack the means necessary for the coordination of varied interests, or it could give rise to subordination and superior status. Recently the Trade Union of Chemical Industrial Workers studied and summarized in the industrial branch the experiences of 2 years of operation by the enterprise business work partnerships. Their basic study showed that it is not feelings, but reality and fact that lead to a realistic judgment. The trade union evaluated its study by stating that every possibility exists for realistic cooperation and for the mutual coordination and realization of interests.

Unlike the proposal of the Ministry of Justice and other organs, I believe that it would be a more reassuring solution if the interest protection and representation of the enterprise business work partnerships were built on the trade unions and were fitted into them.

Basically, interest representation does not depend on the special form of work performance because the workers will accept as their own only that independent organization--trade union--which has a profile, view and recommendation, one which pays due attention to the situation, demands and interests of its own members. Therefore, I do not regard it as unrealizable for enterprise business work partnerships to choose their own stewards and chief stewards--with attention to parity--and for their elective representatives to participate with identical rights and obligations in the forums of workplace democracy in the representation and interest coordination activity of the steward bodies.

Further development of the economic reform with the enterprises may create the conditions for entrepreneurial-type work performance, which would not be based on the Civil Code but on the further development of the Labor Code.

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PARTY'S LEADING ROLE HISTORICALLY EXAMINED

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[Article by Adolf Dobieszewski: "Basic Premises for the Leading Role of the PPR [Polish Worker's Party] and PZPR"]

[Text] The history of revolution and the building of socialism has been closely tied to the activity of the marxist-leninist party. The historical mission of the party, originating in the objective needs of socialist construction, has deep historical and contemporary justification.

The existence of a strong marxist-leninist party with great influence over the people is one of the basic preconditions for victory by the working class in its struggle for power, because it is only when the working class "has the leadership of an organized and tested party with strictly defined goals and a clearly defined program for immediate action in both domestic and foreign policy, the attainment of political power will not be a chance episode but the beginning of the proletariat's long-term building of a communist society".¹

The working class's attainment of power is therefore not a conclusion to the process, but, on the other hand, the beginning of a period of revolutionary changes in the existing system of social and economic relations. A party is therefore needed by the working class not only before it comes to power but once it attains that power and throughout the period in which a socialist society is being built.

1

The experiences from the first years of Soviet power brought V.I. Lenin to the conclusion that, under the dictatorship of the proletariat, the party becomes more and not less important. In terms of its substance, form and methods, the party's leadership over all spheres of social life becomes ever greater and deeper and therefore more complex than during the struggle for power. The difficulty of creating a new society, the breadth of revolutionary changes, need to mobilize all working people for their realization and provide the working classes leadership over these changes means that the necessity of the existence of a marxist-leninist party "disappears only with the abolition of classes...when communism ceases being the object of struggle and the entire working class becomes communist."²

V.I. Lenin's belief has been confirmed by the experiences of all socialist states. It has turned out that the construction of socialism is, in a certain sense, a harder task than the establishment of popular rule. The building of socialism has turned out to be harder to realize because it has been attempted in countries in which most of the economy and other attributes of social life are very backward. In such countries, it has been necessary to not only transform social relationships but to create a material and technological base for socialism as well. It has been necessary to do so in a relatively small amount of time, with the effort of the entire nation and in the face of opposition from imperialist states. As socialism continues to grow, its tasks become greater and ever more complicated.

Revolution followed by the building of socialism is an unusually deep social upheaval which changes the very foundations of society. The party alone cannot carry out such historical tasks such as the transformation of a nation into a modern industrial country, gradual socialization of rural life and the deepening of cultural revolution and socialist interpersonal relationships but it needs the support of the masses.

V.I. Lenin often ridiculed the nonsensical view that communism could only be built by communists. Communism could only be achieved thanks to the efforts of all working people. "We are only one drop in a sea of people so we can only rule if we can clearly express what the people feel. Otherwise, the communist party will not lead the proletariat, the proletariat will not lead the masses and the entire mechanism will fall apart."³ Therefore, the execution of "all serious revolutionary activity requires understanding and the ability to embody these truths in life, that revolutionists may only take the role of vanguard of a really vital and progressive class. A vanguard can fulfill its role only if it identifies itself with the masses and really leads them forward. With no alliance to noncommunists in the most diverse areas of activity, it cannot be said that the building of communism has been successful."⁴

In spite of the fact that socialist transformation of society is done in the interests of the majority, not everyone immediately knows their needs. Some are inclined to speak against socialism but are themselves unable to initiate anything, direct or realize their needs. For that reason, organization, rallying the masses and bringing them into active and creative motion is the party's key to solving the most difficult problems in socialist transformation of society. "Our constant task," Lenin emphasized, "is to strengthen at any cost our bonds with honest noncommunists. This is the only way to revive our often-withering party cells. Wherever barriers exist between communists and noncommunists, they must be eliminated at any cost. No one is a communist if he or she is unable to bring together a few honest noncommunist workers and maintain daily contact with them...help them in their everyday affairs...and bring forth worker candidates as union or worker activists."⁵

The party's ties with the working class and other working people are of a bilateral nature. The masses will support the party if its policies reflect their interests, if it considers their opinions, studies the mood and experiences of the working class and base its policies accordingly. V.I. Lenin thus wrote that "teams of responsible comrades, not necessarily party

members...should be in the very thick of the workers' lives, know them firsthand, accurately determine the present attitude of the masses to a given problem, what are their real hopes, needs and thoughts, to determine without an ounce of false idealization the level of their awareness and the influence of prejudices and relics of the past, gain the unlimited trust of their colleagues through caring for their needs."⁶

A marxist-leninist party must, however, unceasingly study the opinion of the masses and adjust its policy to these opinions and other, often temporary spontaneous moods. Were the party to fail to do so, it would find itself proverbially "lagging in the rear" of the mass movement. The solving of the working people's everyday problems would not be possible without active party work among the masses or an ability to perceive the entire diversity and discrepancies in the interests of the different social forces.

Lenin pointed out that "one of the greatest dangers facing...the communist party as the avant-guard of the working class...in a nation developing socialism is the danger of the party losing touch with the masses, of the avant-guard moving too far ahead without having evened out the front and out of constant contact with the entire army of workers, i.e., the overwhelming majority of workers and peasants."⁷

As the experience of the worker's movement has shown, there may be many sources of obstructions to the party's ties to the people. These obstructions are especially apparent when the party policy is obviously improper and the party itself is unaware of this or for various reasons will not amend the situation. The party policy may be good but the masses lack the maturity to understand and accept it and the party does not want or is unable to wait until the masses acquire the ability through their own experiences to understand what the party is doing and it tries to impose the policy on the people. Perhaps the party does not build its authority on the basis of mutual trust and conviction but relies on administrative command rather than political and ideological work among the masses. The party may be permitting bureaucratic or technocratic methods of action into the state apparatus or there is within the party a deformation of leninist standards of party life and leadership producing autocratic trends and factions.

The above phenomena disrupting mutual ties and trust between the party and the masses may occur singly or together. The obligation of the political leaders of a socialist state is to prevent these conflicts through creative policy-making meeting society's proper needs and adjusted to changing conditions. Such a policy may be conducted solely on the basis of marxist-leninist analysis of the facts and a close bond with the working class and society.

The leading role a marxist-leninist party in the building of socialism is mainly reflected in the fact that it is carrying out the most progressive program of social change in all of history. The party's program should always be based on two fundamental factors: marxist-leninist theory and ties to the masses. Marxist-leninist theory makes possible scientific analysis and assessment of social and political phenomena, motives for class actions, the shaping of human attitudes, behavior and views and forms the basis for

formulation of a party program that will correspond to the laws of social development. At the same time, the party's ties to the masses create daily confrontation of this program with public opinion and make it possible to enrich it with experience and conclusions drawn from social practice and needs.

Constant confrontation of the party's program and decisions with the opinions of the working class and constant use of the experience of the entire party, especially its working class backbone, protects the party from making the type of decisions that may create a gap between it and the working class. The fundamental party tasks are to quickly discover and assess the possibilities of the working class at a given historical period. The suitability of the party's program is determined by its ability to accurately assess possibilities created by a stage in the development of socialism, establish proper methods of using these possibilities to best meet the needs and hopes of working people. The basis of the party's leading role in society and in the state is worker approval of its program and decisions.

Thus, in the most general terms, the leninist concept of the party's leading role in society and government defines the type of social relationships and ties in which:

-- the working class and its associated groups and social sectors recognize their class interests and the national interests as identical to the program and activities of the party. This requires that the workers have a real influence on the shaping of the party's program, everyday practice of socialism and the type of activities taken by particular organs of the party and state;

-- the party has a decisive ideological, programmatic and political influence as well as initiative in determining the cadre policy of the state and its institutions and ideological and program leadership of social organizations. This requires that the party leadership possess a high degree of competence and a proper style of action and that the primary party organizations as well as members be active, in accordance with law, in state institutions and social organizations.

2

Abbreviated and necessarily simplified, the above reconstruction of the leninist concept of a marxist-leninist party's leading and guiding role in the struggle for socialism found expression in the theory and practice of the Polish Worker's Party, later the Polish United Worker's Party.

The basis of fundamental changes in social relations in Poland was the concept, developed during the nazi occupation by the PPR, the left wing of the PPS [Polish Socialist Party], radical populists and democrats, of consolidating the struggle for national liberation with the struggle for social freedom. In this concept, V.I. Lenin had already seen the key to the victory of revolution in Poland. The success of this concept is chiefly due to the fact that, at the decisive moment of the struggle for liberation, the PPR became the main political force of the working class, a decisive factor in Poland's future, the instrument in the struggle of the working class and its allies for power in the

reviving Polish state, for implementation of social and economic reforms, for the rebirth of Poland within new borders and for alliance and brotherhood with the USSR.

The PPR's theme of an alliance between the working class, peasants and intelligentsia in the struggle for progress and later the strengthening of this alliance through constitutional changes attested to the long road travelled by the Polish revolutionary worker's movement and its theoretical and political thinking. The concept of a broad alliance was correct in more than just the struggle for power. The alliance was able to continue and become even more meaningful after power was attained, during the establishment of the new order and during the attainment of ever greater levels of socialist development.

The PPR and the forces of the social left wing were able to gain the support of the majority of the people for their programs. People's power became the main engine of revolutionary changes and an instrument of the direct influence of the working class and the masses on the fate of the nation. Under the conditions of sharp struggle against reactionary elements repudiating the platform of national consolidation, the Polish people's state filled the most important functions of the power of the working class leading the popular masses: overcoming the resistance of the exploiting classes to the formation of a new power structure and new political, social and economic structures. In this very sense, the reborn Polish state was identical to the state that came into being by the October Revolution and profited from its experiences to realize under its own specific conditions a Polish program for revolutionary change.

The uniqueness of Poland's national and historical circumstances made it necessary for her to find specific political, constitutional, economic and social solutions. This uniqueness came from the possibility of realizing the main premises of socialist revolution in a gradual manner, that is, evolution from lower to higher forms of development based on the concept of a broad national front with a multiparty democratic block maintaining and strengthening the role of leadership attained by the working class and its party during the struggle for national liberation.

Considering the fact that the democratic parties in Poland were a coalition between the marxist party and the prewar parties somewhat bound to the traditions of the past and to some degree revising their former programs, the coalition necessarily contained elements of compromise. This was, however, compromise on the basis of popular democracy, compromise that in practice, despite some rough places and temporary difficulties, brought these parties together and united them in action.

As the initiator and leader of the democratic forces, the PPR faced many fundamental problems in determining the nature, scope and forms of cooperation of the coalition of parties. The main one of these problems was how to effectively give the party a leading role while strengthening coalitional cooperation and to bring about working class hegemony with maximum activation of its democratic front allies.

The decrees of the PPR from this time stressed that the coalition of democratic parties falls within a jointly established platform in which the the independence of all coalition parties is maintained but, at the same time, must be made to conform to the political substance of this platform as a necessary condition to the permanence of the coalition. The relations between the parties of the democratic national front should therefore be based on discussion and agreement on the most important moves and tolerance of criticism as long as it does not challenge the very foundations and cohesion of this front.

Without using its advantages and privileged position to dominate its allied parties, the PPR still had to maintain its hegemony. The process of solidifying and strengthening the PPR's hegemony within the coalition of democratic parties of the national front was reflected in, on the one hand, the party's initiative and activeness, its full responsibility for the fate of the nation, its courageous handling of its own mistakes and, on the other hand, in the help it gave its allies in overcoming illusory concepts, in filling their ideas of democracy with new social and political substance and in expelling the right wing of the WRN [Liberty, Equality and Independence] from the socialist movement and the agrarian mainstream from the people's movement. This principle of alliance between parties reflected the highest form of democracy in political relations and at the same time expressed the essence of a qualitatively new political phenomenon in Poland: the leading and guiding role of the marxist-leninist party.

The program formulated by the PPR and its allies for building a socialist People's Poland was equal to its historical task of rallying the principle social classes and groups of Poland around its program. Despite mistakes, the work taken up by the PZPR to build socialism produced advances in the nation's civilization and fundamental changes in the structure and position of particular classes and social groups. Over the past 40 years, former social and political barriers have been gradually overcome and the consciousness of the people has been changed.

These processes occurred on three levels:

-- on the economic level, the integration of Polish society has tightened economic ties between individual regions of the country, reduced their differences and strengthened bonds between the different classes and social groups;

-- on the social and cultural level, the integration of Polish society has weakened previously strong differences in access to the fruits of material and spiritual culture, produced more equal living conditions of the different social groups and has made similar their lifestyles;

-- on the political level, integration of Polish society has led to ever increasing acceptance of the principles of socialism, gradual weakening of older bourgeois and petit-bourgeois ideologies and political tendencies and strengthened the socialist social system.

Contemporary social relations in Poland are characterized by an advanced degree

of class integration and common sharing of fundamental interests. However, at the current stage in the development of socialism, the existing system of property relations, relations resulting from the social division of labor and the class structure, although largely transformed, reflecting these aspects are not all equal in nature. Along with the classes and social groups associated with public ownership of property (the working class, peasants and cooperative farmers and the intelligentsia), there exist certain social groups for whom the basis of existence is private property and small-scale commerce (working peasantry and part of the urban middle class for whom the ownership of a workshop or store is the basis of independent work). There still exist the remains of a bourgeois class, small urban and rural capitalists. This is the structure of the present state of socialist development in Poland and we see that socialist relations have still not taken over all areas of the economy.

Thus, at the present stage of the building of socialism in Poland, the social differentiation of people and their places and roles in the division of labor, varied participation in the creation and distribution of national income and their different social and political awarenesses have also created within socialism a whole range of particular interests and subsequent social frictions. This is due to the fact that these interests are the direct expression of the position of people, classes and social groups within the production system and the needs that it creates.

The social and economic relationships of a "given society make themselves felt first and foremost as its interests."⁸ These interests are the driving force for the activities of people, classes and social groups in all spheres of life. These interests are determined by the objective conditions of social life. It is this very distinctness of social positions of an objective nature and thus independent of the awareness of people occupying a specific position that is the source of the numerous interests arising in socialist societies as in others.

The law of unity and the struggle between opposites as a well-known law of dialectics acts on all forms of society. Therefore, like any other form of society, socialism has its own contradictions. "Antagonism and contradiction," wrote V.I. Lenin, "are not the same. Under socialism, antagonism disappears while contradiction increases."⁹ Using the same concept, Lenin stressed that the very ideas of opposition, contradiction, the uniting of opposites and the struggle of opposite sides are of a substantially different character under socialism and take different forms than in an exploitative society. While the struggle of opposite sides under capitalism usually results in the victory of one side and the destruction of the other and, finally, the liquidation of bourgeois society itself, under socialism, these contradictions can be overcome by a new quality of social integration.

In distinction to preceding forms of society, a socialist order does not have irreconcilable classes because there no longer exist any contradictions between the social nature of production and private ownership of the means of production and private capitalist usurpation. Lenin's idea that, under socialism, antagonism disappears while contradiction remains does not at all mean that there are no antagonistic conflicts within a socialist society. As experience

has shown us, these conflicts can arise as a result of mistakes in the handling of important social tasks or too-late perception of or the ignoring the requirements of the objective laws of social development. The situation may be further complicated whenever the forces of social reaction within the country unite with those of world capitalism to exploit for their own interests the difficulties of building socialism in the given country. The essentially unantagonistic contradictions of socialist society can then become antagonistic.

The distinguishing feature of socialist society is not that there are no contradictions, because no society can grow without conflict. It is unallowable as well to treat contradictions in socialism as secondary, marginal, temporary or purely outside problems. As a result of the liquidation of the structural conflict that is the source of lasting class antagonisms in capitalist society, the conflicts of interest under socialism are ones that can be solved within the framework of the socialist order.

The socialist social order, in its very essence, is both a precondition and a result of the integration of the basic classes and groups of socialist society. However, the process of forming and integrating a socialist society is not the automatic result of the objective laws of socialism. For the integration of society, not only are objective factors necessary but also appropriate action as the embodiment of the effects of a subjective factor: the marxist-leninist party and the socialist state.

3

In every historical period, at every stage of the development of socialism, new needs emerge that always require entirely new forces to rally society around its shared tasks. The leading role of the marxist-leninist party in the process of building socialism is at every stage to find at the proper instant and properly assess means of realizing the desires and aspirations of the working class and working people and to put these means to use in clearly defined actions. In some way, the prerequisite for these enterprises is constant analysis of the dialectics in the development of a new society. Objective and realistic assessment of the degree of integration in a socialist society resulting from the purposeful and active involvement of the party in consolidating and harmonizing the actions, desires and interests of classes, social groups and persons and the consistent realization of the historical interests of the working class has important theoretical, ideological and political implications.

Let us remember that, in the middle of the 1970's, it was claimed in Poland that the majority of tasks in building up the foundations of socialism had already been accomplished. This was argued in the following manner: the state is a totally socialist state and is acquiring an increasingly national character; that power belongs to the workers and the leading role of the party has become an unshakable principle; that socialism is providing a rich political life to the Polish people; socialist relationships completely dominate industry and that the position of socialism in rural areas is growing stronger; that the principles of socialist social justice are being more

consistently realized and that socialist social awareness is spreading. Poland, they claimed, is therefore entering a new and higher stage of building a developed socialist society.

We now know the truth of this assessment. The course of the crisis in 1980-81 has shown how unreal and overly optimistic this assessment was and how it left the working class and party defenseless in the face of events. It has turned out that, in many areas of our country's social life, there continue to exist the phenomena and contradictions characteristic of the transition from capitalism to socialism. The crisis revealed with full power large distortions in the development of particular areas of the national economy. Despite its significant advances, the Polish economy had not succeeded in emerging from the extensive growth stage to the intensive growth stage. The voluntarist policies of the 1970's together with the world economic recession and then destructive battle waged against the national economy by extremist forces in Solidarity brought about a serious economic regression in both consumption and investment. During the 1970's, there was a regression from the earlier socialist achievements in the realm of social relations. This was reflected by the creation of a rather large and clearly privileged neobourgeois class comprised of the top groups in private business on one hand and on the other its associated corrupt elements enjoying illegal benefits within the economic and political apparatus of the socialist state; in the sphere of political relations, the opposition began to take the form of organized antisocialist groups that used the conditions of economic crisis to strengthen themselves through the temporary support of some of the working people and working class. In 1980-81, there was a considerable weakening of the socialist state and there arose a real danger of counterrevolution. In the realm of public awareness, there were rather large strata of bourgeois and petit-bourgeois ideology and thinking. In the second half of the 1970's, an unusually strong regression in social awareness occurred. The influence of marxism-leninism began to wane and antisocialist, nationalist and antisoviet moods and attitudes began to grow stronger. Religious feeling, which has always been strong in Poland became in many segments of the population an encouragement for militant clericalism of a highly antisocialist nature.

The introduction of martial law put an end to the process of degradation that Poland was undergoing as a result of the activities of antisocialist and anarchist forces. It also ended the dismantlement of the very class essence of the state, its worker-peasant character. However, although the crisis could be to some extent overcome in a relatively small amount of time, a full transition from capitalism to socialism requires many years of work and struggle. The party's strategy must therefore be directed at solving the contradictions of such a transition stage and to unite the transformation of the country's social and economic relations with the struggle for the people's socialist awareness.

The special role of the party is to see that unantagonistic contradictions, the natural engine of development of a socialist society, not become outright conflicts. The increasing importance of party policy in solving these unantagonistic contradictions is the result of the fact that this type of contradiction has become the dominant type as the economic and political bases of socialism became stronger and that it is also found among the different social

classes of fraternal nations working toward the same socialist goals or even between groups within the same class. The timely overcoming of these contradictions through the use of our own resources will determine what sort of bond the party has with the working classes and the cohesion of social forces at the foundations of socialism.

In its realization of socialist goals and in outlining its programs and policies, the party must consider the economic, ideological and political consequences of differentiation of social groups and individuals with regard to the many different traits of their social position. The party must be aware of the fact that the society it is leading has become involved in an entire range of public interests. These include class interests such as those of the various factions of the working class, and group, professional, regional as well as current and long-term interests. These many different interests often bring about social situations that do not fully correspond to what the party plans and intends. In cases in which the party does not take quick and effective countermeasures, these conflicts of interest can especially develop a strong influence on the party itself, most of all upon its strategy and tactics, membership and leadership and other elements of its structure. The situation may become even more complicated if the party does not quickly counteract natural tendencies for a mood of alienation within social and political structures that may distort or altogether degenerate the party's principles of action.

Proper analysis of the substance and form of processes of integration in a socialist society together with the uncovering of social contradictions and antagonisms, correct selection of methods for solving these problems, accurate formulation at a given stage in the development of socialism of the working classes interests along with those of all of society and monitoring the degree of their realization, optimal coordination at various levels of growth of general, group and individual interests have all been the basic duties of the party throughout the historical period of the building of socialism. Experience has taught us that subjectivism will bring about dangerous political errors for which the party must pay a high price.

In recent years, contradictions in class and group interests, especially in the principles and methods of distribution of national income, earnings and consumption, have become painfully obvious. The collision of frequently changing concepts of social and economic development reflected in socially unjustifiable distribution of means have sometimes brought about sharp contradictions between workers within state-owned enterprises or between them and the representatives of the petty commerce and petty capitalistic sectors. There have also been contradictions in the understanding of the present and long-range goals of socialism. The process of overcoming discrepancies between earnings and consumption as well as those associated with the distribution of national income between classes and social groups must first and foremost be grounded on continuous growth in national income. This does not in any way mean that the ability to define the proper proportions between present public consumption and investment funds and the proportion of the growth rate of particular economic sectors or regions is a secondary matter but that contradictions in this sphere can be solved in the future.

The interests of particular classes, groups and individuals are above all manifested in their desire to obtain a favorable share of the national income. This most often brings about a collision between the interests of groups and individuals with those of the public as a whole and this often can develop into a sharp conflict between society's current and long-range interests. With the passage of time, it is becoming more obvious that one of the chief causes of the crises that Poland has experienced was a lack of synchronization of current goals with long-range goals. In the perception of the masses, the reality of socialism's long-range goals is chiefly verified by just and proper satisfaction of current needs. If these needs are not met, then the long-range goals of socialism become an abstraction for people and thus incomprehensible.

For these very reasons, it is necessary to "install into the system of party functioning and all of social life a lasting and dependable mechanism for early detection of political errors and policies destined to lead to disruption of the economic interests of large social groups, especially the working class. Such an early warning mechanism is one of the party's main activities in the sphere of economic."¹⁰ The party must therefore possess its own system for ongoing analysis of economic processes and sounding party and public opinion in order to study the political results of economic actions.

It is especially necessary to be able to foresee and alter the hierarchy of social needs over a long period of time. Depending on their income levels, various social groups will put their needs at the head of this hierarchy. "Practice has shown that in periods in which important decisions on economic development are made and realized, the loudest voices are those of economically stronger groups which are most often established in branches at a very advanced level. They force further development of their own areas including their own incomes and hierarchy of needs. The development of socialist democracy will limit such tendencies but there is no guarantee that they can be eliminated. Administration has given in to and will continue to give in to the wishes of stronger pressure groups because, from a point of view of technical efficiency, investment in areas already advanced gives hope of profits. For that reason, in the interests of overall development, the responsibility for strengthening the voice of economically weaker groups rests with the party alone. What is important is that this voice be heard on an equal basis with those of other social groups."¹¹

Synthesis of group interests "in the shared national interest is not an easy process since it usually involves limitations on the interests of part of society for the sake of society as a whole on the basis of acknowledgement of the bond to society, the dependency not only of the weak on the strong but of the strong on the weak as well. The party should take constant care that these very economic interests, the objective motive of human activity, not lead to a free-for-all. As Karl Marx often said, the essence of the problem is that individual or group interests may be realized only under conditions created by society and with the aid of resources previously provided by society."¹²

As our experience in recent years has shown us, the specific details of the

appearance of conflicts in Poland are reflected by the fact that these conflicts occur not only between particular classes and social groups but between them and the state as well. Although a socialist state is not the guardian of privileges and profits and is supposed to meet the needs of all of its citizens, there is the paradox that the state may appear to some people as an antagonist. This is because the state is the principal owner of the means of production, the giver of laws and the distributor of national income and other such resources.

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For these very reasons, it is of the greatest importance, especially in Poland, that the party act to overcome, as they appear, the varying types of disproportion between the socialist character of the economic base and in the socialist state and the awareness of part of the public, the public's participation in social life and their relationships at work.

In this regard it is absolutely necessary to carefully analyze and above all reveal and overcome conflicts of interest brought about by state ownership of the means of production. These conflicts occur between: work crews (employees) and the administrations of enterprises and of higher levels of economic organization; trade unions and the administration and worker self-management organs; enterprise administrations and higher levels of economic management; productive enterprises and consumers (clients in the broad sense of the word); the employees of various sectors of the economy, especially those in productive enterprises of the main industries and workers in consumer and service sectors; economic sectors and the central authorities; between regions or between regions and the central authorities.¹³

As the history of the Polish People's Republic has shown us, both underestimation and overrating the degree of integration of socialist society may hold back the development of socialism. Underestimation of ongoing processes of integration may hinder the state in meeting the mature needs of socialist society and keep it from using the existing possibilities for initiative and activity, or to limit or undervalue the effectiveness of ideological and moral motivation. The underestimation of social integration may also hinder socialism's natural process of creating new types of social ties or new types of controls (in the form of a diversity of institutions of socialist democracy) over social life. On the other hand, idealization of the unity of socialist society gives rise to the danger that the activities of conservative, revisionist elements and forces hostile to socialism. Wherever the two systems of capitalism and socialism coexist in structural antagonistic conflict, the forces will always constitute a threat to socialism.

In the practical terms of social life, these two tendencies do not necessarily have to act independently. They can also function as overlapping and mutually complementary processes. In Poland, the expression of these tendencies, especially during the 1970's, was the authorities effort to rule in a centralized and bureaucratic manner. The responsibilities and subordination between elected legislative organs and the executive powers in both the state and party was repudiated and there was a lack of actual control by

representatives of society, especially those of the working class, over the actions of the authorities, especially the government and its institutions. As a result, there was a lack of any clear, legal and permanent mechanism within the political system for expression of the interests of particular social groups and classes.

This type of practice was a clear sign of a lack of faith in the possibilities and need for democratization of political structures. At the same time, however, there was championed the fanciful idea that the nation was politically and morally cohesive, which it had never been. The acceptance of this idea as fact led the authorities to reject any idea of the existence of class, ideological or political conflicts and it is therefore no surprise that they found themselves helpless to deal with crisis and the threat of counterrevolution.

The deep social, economic and political crisis produced by unsolved objective conflicts added to by subjective errors in the party's policy, had been ripening for many years and came to full head in August 1980. In its very essence, the worker protest was a protest against the deformation of the system and the universal principles of socialism. The party's alienation from the people during the 1970's and the growing lack of faith in authority made it easy for the opponents of socialism to work their way into the new structures of the Solidarity trade union and to increasingly use this union for antisocialist and counterrevolutionary activities.

The negative effects of the actions of antisocialist and counterrevolutionary forces had a varying degree of influence on the views and behavior of different social groups. The enemies of socialism made the most headway in the intellectual community. Most of the intellectuals were inspired by the mirage of class solidarity which offered them a leadership role as the ideological inspiration and conscience of the nation, thus negating that class' proper relation to the working class. The intellectuals had a great effect on youth. Due to its position as a result of the negative effects of social policy and its own lack of experience, youth was the most frequent ideological and political target of the antisocialist forces. Youth was also supposed to become the main force in counterrevolutionary activities.

As a result of the actions of its extremist forces, Solidarity sharpened and magnified all social conflicts. The country was faced with the real danger of the destruction of the socialist state and a bloody civil war. The introduction of martial law put a stop to the open activities of opponents to socialism within the country and imperialism's efforts to use Poland to begin the nation-by-nation dismemberment of the socialist community.

The class struggle so violently intensified at the beginning of the 1980's within Poland should continue for a number of years to come. The introduction of martial law made it impossible for counterrevolution to break up the socialist state. However, the counterrevolutionary forces continue to exist and act and have a rather large amount of influence within various communities. At the same time, they are still supported by the imperialist nations. The increased political, ideological and economic pressure placed on Poland is part

of the course taken by these nations to heighten international tensions.

The new tactical concept of the political opposition is aimed at preparing various social groups and communities to take up agreed-upon and timed protest activities against the state and the authorities. The actions are supposed to be led by today's conspirators. The basic strategic goals of the antisocialist opposition in Poland remain the same. To realize these goals, however, they are using methods and techniques that change according to domestic and international conditions. From the point of view of these tactics, it is very important to be able to hide and mask the underlying counterrevolutionary strategic goals. This is because the opposition forces feel that open counterrevolution in the given situation is "still too early" and that society has still not "matured" to that point.

Following its repeated setbacks, the antisocialist opposition has regrouped and, instead of using tactics of immediate, one-time and final confrontation with the authorities, has resorted to the concept of the "long march," in other words, the starting over again of toilsome and long-term preparation to rebuild its base and a new social confrontation. On the basis of this concept, there has been formulated an auxiliary tactic, the formation of a so-called "underground society." This would in essence be a permanent separate and antagonized society, broken up and irritated by hatred: a society of terror, insecurity over tomorrow, economic decline and paralyzed authority with no way out.

Recognition of the degree of unity of Polish society and uncovering the conflicts that develop within it must become an unusually important component of the party's ideological and theoretical work. It is also a crucial condition for successful practical activity. The dialectics of social development make it necessary that the class struggle between socialism and capitalism be a struggle of the new with the old, the modern with the obsolete and the particular with the general. Moreover, in the area of the whole scope of basic interests, needs, aspirations and expectations of both groups and individuals, the increasing complexity of social phenomena and relationships and the degree of difference are not as obvious against this background, as in the case of antagonistic classes, but the understanding of the significance of these differences and the need to consider them within the party policy are not as widespread and grounded in the public awareness as is the understanding of the importance of class conflicts. To lead and direct a society requires not only a deep understanding of everyday social processes but also an ability to see the course of socialist development over long periods. Realistic consideration of the degree of social harmony as well as the concrete conflicts occurring at a given stage of socialist development are both important elements of social and economic prognosis and long-term planning. As the creators of scientific socialism stated repeatedly, this is because the building of socialism and communism is a complex dialectical process. "Life," said V.I. Lenin, "advances against opposition and the living opposition is much richer and more diverse and substantial than it first appears to be to the human intellect."¹⁴

The main goals of the PZPR today are recognition and assessment of the phenomena of social life, motives of social classes and groups, the shaping of human attitudes, views and behavior, establishment of a program for overcoming con-

conflict of interest and the integration of interests, goals and aspirations of specific groups and social forces around the ultimate, common goals of all of society.

The realization of this task requires: convincing and fact-based examination of the dialectics of interests in social life, their interrelationships and the preconditions for realization of specific interests and their consequences; the creation of social and material conditions for harmonizing interests and social needs in the realm of social relations; organization of production, market supply and social benefits; special care over realization of the interests of individuals and social groups finding themselves in the most difficult living situations; counteracting neglect and obstructions to the realization of public, group and private interests resulting from actions that violate the law of particularism and bureaucracy; the shaping of socially beneficial proportions between collective and individual consumption and socially beneficial proportions between particular areas of social welfare (health, education, culture, etc.); the treatment of social goals in production and services and the social effects of the production and distribution of goods as items of superior importance to direct goals and economic effects and, finally, consistent support of socialist principles of social justice.¹⁵

The party's program and social practices for social integration cannot, of course, be treated as a sum or a random arrangement of the different views and interests of particular social classes and groups. The party cannot seek solutions that are aimed at satisfying the claims of all of the different social groups but those of society as a whole. Such a society is an abstraction. The harmonization of diverse social interests must be dealt with on the basis of the superiority of the long-term interests of the working class, the leadership of a socialist society. At the present stage of historical development, the interests of the working class concur with those of the entire nation.

For these very same reasons the party must repeatedly, in the good interests, both momentary and long-term, of the working class oppose temporary and particular interests called for by some factions and overcome their improper and sometimes backward views. This must be done now in the present atmosphere of popular disaffection and impatience, while the situation seems to be worse despite all efforts to attain immediate results.

As V.I. Lenin pointed out, this basic premise of the party's fundamental class policy is not synonymous with the negation of the masser views and moods. The party must consider them and use them to prepare its own ideological arguments, especially in order to determine a tempo and range for the realization of certain far-reaching programs which may be, under specific circumstances, hard for certain classes and factions to work out. The party must therefore seek the most effective under the given circumstances methods of acting in order to make real progress in the gradual realization of socialism's programmatic goals.

FOOTNOTES

1. "II Kongres Miedzynarodowki Komunistycznej, 16 Lipca - 6 Sierpnia 1920 r. Rezolucja o Roli Partii Komunistycznej w Rewolucja Proletariackiej" [II Congress of the Communist Internationale, 16 July - 6 September, 1920. Resolution on the Role of the Communist Party in Proletariat Revolution], from Lenin, V.I. and Stalin, J., "O Budownictwie Partyjnym" [On Building the Party], Warsaw, 1953, pp. 891-892.
2. Ibid, p. 895.
3. Lenin, V.I., "Sprawozdanie Polityczne Komitetu Centralnego RKP(b). XI Zjazd RKP(b), 27 Marca - 2 Kwietnia 1922 r." [Political Report of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik). XI Congress of the Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik), 27 March - 2 April 1922], from "Dziela" [Works], vol. 33, Warsaw, 1957, p. 312.
4. Lenin, V.I., "O Znaczeniu Wojujacego Materializmu" [On the Meaning of Militant Materialism], "Dziela" [Works], vol. 33, Warsaw 1957, pp. 231-232.
5. Lenin, V.I., "Projekt Listu KC RKP(b). Nieznane Listy, Notatki, Przemowienie Lenina z Lat 1917-1922" [The Letter Project of the Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik) Central Committee. Lenin's Unknown Letters, Notes and Speeches From 1917-1922], Warsaw, 1962, p. 141.
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7. Ibid.
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9. "Leninski Sbornik XI" [Lenin Collection XI], Moscow-Leningrad, 1929, p. 357.
10. Glowczyk, J., "Spoleczne Problemy Reformy. I Ogolnopolska Partyjna Konferencja Ideologiczno-Teoretyczna" [Social Problems of Reform. First All-Polish Party Conference on Ideology and Theory], Warsaw, 1983, p. 117.
11. Ibid, p. 119.
12. Ibid, p. 120.
13. Widerszpil, S., "Prawidlowosci Budowy Socjalizmu a Sprzecznosci Rozwoju Spolecznego. I Ogolnopolska Partyjna Konferencja Ideologiczna-Teoretyczna" [Laws of the Building of Socialism and the Discrepancies of Social Development. First All-Polish Party Conference on Ideology and Theory], Warsaw, 1982, p. 257.

14. Lenin, V.I., "W.I. Lenin do A.M. Gorkiego (List z 16 XI 1909 r.)" [V.I. Lenin to A.M. Gorkij (Letter of 16 November 1909)], "Dzieła" [Works], vol. 34, Warsaw, 1957, p. 413.

15. Michalik, M., "Zgodność i Sprzeczność Interesów Społecznych" [Consonance and Disconsonance of Social Interests], IDEOLOGIA I POLITYKA, 1982, no. 4, p. 57.

12261

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RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN IDEOLOGY, PRACTICE EXPLORED

Warsaw ZYCIE PARTII in Polish No 14, 4 Jul 84 p 5

[Article by Stanislaw Kwiatkowski: "How Far From Theory?"]

[Text] No self-proclaimed supporter of Marxism would question the unity of theory and practice. Who does not know the appropriate quotations on this subject? But as soon as it comes to specifics, we see how some (the theoreticians) say one thing, whereas others (the practitioners) say another. Mutual grievances verge on accusations of ignorance. "Theoretically, it should be thus, but everybody knows that in practice..." "It is not a matter of actual conditions, but of model solution"; we hear these things from this or that side. The conflict between theory and practice has a long history and it is easy to renew the ancient arguments. Practice--at least for a Marxist--is the most important criterion for testing a theory. The validity of accepted assumptions can only be judged by effects, by the reality created.

Thoughts are tested in actions, theory is borne out in practice. This truth also applies to what has happened and is happening in Poland.

How did it come to this, that the beautiful ideals brought into being proved to be crippled, morbidly deformed? What happened? These questions have been asked many times, and they have received even more answers. We continue to survive all political changes, we meditate, we take stock. Assessing past years, we confront the realia with the assumptions, with recorded theory, with what we know of socialism; we compare Marxist-Leninist thought with social practice, with the situation in our country. In these examinations the greatest controversy arises when what was and still is confronts theory or ideological visions.

From the very comparisons between theory and practice it is easy to draw superficial, hence in fact not altogether valid conclusions. If things have not gone well in reality, if that reality has become so remote from the model vision that it has almost lost direct contact with it, one cannot content oneself with a description of errors only in execution or in assumptions. Let us leave the opinion of those who express their views from positions inimical to socialism. Among us there was generally the universal conviction that certain people and known conditions were responsible for everything; namely, bad practice was to blame. Are we not embracing superficiality? It is only

a question of practice? Even if what happened in Poland is a matter of errors solely in execution, then to trace the causes one must in any case refer to theory. Namely, one must pose the question: were the postulated visions, the assumptions outlined in model form, the ideas and values recognized as points of reference, the goals for which we aimed, fully understood according to Marxist principles and defined according to Marxist principles?

There have arisen quite a few distortions in that understanding of the theory. This is best seen when it comes to discussing ideology. I have already written about this in several places.

Theory is nothing more than the search for wisdom in practice, the detection of laws and regularities governing reality, a basis for political prognoses, for planning and prognosticating social activity. Marxist theory examines society's processes of development; it is a scientific analysis of social inconsistencies and it generalizes the regularities of historical development. A grasp of those regularities allows one to prognosticate the anticipated course of history.

Marxism-Leninism understood thus is a methodology of changing reality, and at the same time it is a theoretical generalization of the sum of interests and aspirations of the working class or an ideology. It is supposed to mobilize the working class to a realization of these interests and aspirations, it is supposed to stimulate intellectually, to engage emotionally, and to integrate. That theoretical formulation of interests and aspirations is possible with the aid of science, through scientific analysis, scientific diagnoses and prognoses. Science is supposed to serve in assessing the direction in which social practice is developing, to fulfill regulatory functions in relation to politics, to liberate the forces that motivate collective activity. It is supposed to be simply the theoretical consciousness of the workers' movement. Without a theory understood in this way, the Marxist-Leninist party cannot conduct its political activity effectively.

Marxism originated in practice; it was supposed to serve practice mainly as a means of action in the workers' movement and in its avant-garde--the communist party. It was a question of self-definition, an indication of the direction of struggle, of political and economic goals, a question of realizing workers' interests through a scientifically elaborated methodology. Such a union of theory and practice constitutes the crux of Marxism, is one of the chief principles that cannot be violated. That interdependence filters organically through all the constituent parts of Marxism.

Marxism does not proclaim revealed truths but it helps to discover appropriate governing principles for new events and situations. As one of the classics said, Marxism is not a dogma, not some sort of absolute, ready-made, unalterable doctrine, but a live guiding principle of action. The future cannot be "constructed" on dogmas. Those who conceive of socialism as a system created according to a fixed design adopted from above, a model established once and for all, for the realization of which one should aim, are in error. Socialism

is realized under concrete state conditions, it takes place during the course of action, and is a result of social progress, of the process of social development. That is why the union of theory and practice cannot be merely formal, artificially created.

Distortions may be various. Let us examine two extreme cases: when theory separates from practice and when practice seeks justification in erroneous theory.

The first extreme may be seen when the object of study becomes nothing but thought, e.g., of the works of the classics, and substitutes that for an examination of reality. Then there arise idyllic notions about socialism, reveries only of ideas and ideals, without any importance being attached to the motive mechanisms of social life, of social psychology, of contradictions between what is individual and what is social. Neglect of social realia, especially of natural contradictions, leads to political subjectivity, to voluntarism in making decisions and other errors. Under such circumstances, the natural order of things and the theory itself (i.e., ideology) is reduced to the role of merely an ad hoc instrument of superficial indoctrination, a means of propagandistic activity; it cannot be a source of moral motivation in people's actions, it loses sense and becomes a kind of theatrical scenery, a dummy. In such an unreal light everything can be played for make believe, as in a theater, in a sphere situated as if beyond our practical life and moving farther and farther away from its course. For the sake of practice, a kind of political liturgy is created in this sphere, a liturgy that serves mainly to beautify reality, to stifle differences of interests and conflicts treated as if they were alien to the nature of socialism. Meanwhile, socialism is supposed to differ from capitalism not by virtue of being free from contradictions, but above all by solving them in the interests of the working people.

Serviceable theory is indispensable to bad practice, it justifies it, it lends it scientific authority. In turn, erroneous, lame practice repays such a theory by creating for it conditions for unchecked development. The person was right who noted that even when theory and practice diverge, theory abandons practice as its justification, whereas practice does not abandon theory as its justification.

The other extreme derives from a lack of comprehension of the significance of the connection between theory and practice. At the same time, it adds to distortions not necessarily with any ill intent but for wholly practical reasons: on the one hand, practice cannot wait for a good theory, but has to avail itself of what it has at its disposal; on the other hand, as a result of weak, superficial acquaintance with Marxism in the name of summary needs, it confines itself to slogans, declarations, quotations. Marxism is deprived of practical significance, it destroys the authentic desire in people to know and practice it. In this way social consciousness is deformed and the comradely ranks are ideologically disarmed.

In practice it often happens that when a specifically conceived "ideology" neglects politics, the dogmatists are on top, whereas when politics do not take ideology into account, pragmatists have the say. These are by no means merely theoretical distinctions. Both these extremes, even today, could be personified. Pragmatists especially have multiplied somehow. So I maintain that the ignoring of theory, the primacy of politics over ideology, a purely pragmatic approach to human affairs, summary, shortsighted decisions, the solving of problems in accordance with today's circumstance--these usually end the same way. All this has already happened. New errors threaten, including the error of opportunism, a voluntarism unchecked by anything in practice and by stagnation in theory.

This is fresh in our memory. It was not long ago, after all, that ideology stopped exerting an influence on state politics, and indeed political practice started to depart from theoretical assumptions, theory was distorted to the point of glaring divergence and was turned into a screen for erroneous politics. Theory was honored at most verbally, when people expatiated on the subject during anniversary celebrations; or for the sake of peace it was supported by some quote that was chosen from it.

Marxism-Leninism needs strategic thinking. We do not have such habits, we do not know how to do it. We have become used to speaking and thinking about theory (ideology) and practice (politics) separately. It is clearly not a matter of propagandist texts for the use of various activities. I know that it is easy to let Marxism serve any uses one wishes, by making use of a collection of ideological platitudes, of pragmatic and propagandist instructions. It is always tempting to content oneself with knowledge about that which is convenient, omitting inquiries into that which is only just manifesting itself, which is latent, unclear, recalcitrant. Yet such an examination of reality will not be complete and authentic. Therefore, it cannot disclose that which is coming into being.

The distortion of meaning which results from the union of theory and practice as one searches for good solutions leads one, for example, to succumb to the temptation of capitalistic efficiency in administration. Managerial personnel with eyes fixed on Western managers start to operate according to their pattern without realizing that such a mode of administration cannot be transferred onto the foundation of socialism for basic reasons. That system of management, after all, can function so efficiently only under the constant threat of unemployment, whereas we have to perfect a system of management based on a completely different sort of motivation. And that demands a fundamental knowledge of Marxist theory.

Good capitalism can be built without any theory, but without theory one cannot put into practice even the worst socialism. Why? Capitalism develops on the principle of environment. One does not need to know the laws and regularities functioning in societies with a conflicting class structure; they themselves rushed toward their annihilation (from slavery through feudalism to capitalism). Meanwhile, the attainment of socialism requires revolutionary changes, a knowledge of and respect for a well-defined methodology, the assimilation of

certain laws, without the observance of which all kinds of degeneration occur which are closer to capitalism than socialism. Such a degenerate socialism, even if it aspires to overtake and surpass modern capitalism, is in fact a regression.

For the competent assessment and control of socialist modification, especially of social relations, one needs the wisdom of science. Science is the indispensable instrument of effectiveness in socialism. Only thus can Marxists demonstrate in practice, not just in words, that their theoretical weapon, their methodology, embraces better and more comprehensively the totality of changes taking place in Polish society and in the world.

Not every science in its present form, however, satisfies these demands. Would all scientific works withstand the test of the criterion of Feuerbach's 11th thesis? In general, they are in a position to change the world only symbolically, intentionally, but not materially.

And, finally, what is so important regarding the present attacks on the party is that the progress of science, as Engels said, does not move from truth to truth, but from error to error. Social practice based on science is not free from error. All one's efforts should follow the direction that will yield the fewest errors possible.

12584

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DISPARATE VIEWS ON SOCIALIST DEVELOPMENT EXCHANGED

Warsaw NOWE DROGI in Polish No 6, Jun 84 pp 143-147

[Polemical exchange between Wacław Mejbaum (first part) and Stefan Opara]

[Text] In the article "On the Issue of Disputes About Socialism in Poland" (NOWE DROGI No 2/1984), Comrade Stefan Opara expressed, among other things, a negative opinion about the theoretical concept which I had formulated a year earlier in the essay "Questions About Socialism" (MIESIECZNIK LITERACKI No 2/1983). If it only concerned that, I would not bother to do anything about it. I am not a fanatic about my own theoretical views and, even though I do feel the need to formulate them, I see no real reason to take up cudgels in their defense. I believe that an idea has fulfilled its role when it has induced a person to reflect, even if this leads to intense criticism.

I am worried about a more serious thing. Comrade Stefan Opara in the first paragraph of his article formulated a comprehensive evaluation of the current ideological situation, which I will take the liberty to quote, and then he made it the subject of his thought. He wrote the following:

"In the aftermath of the crisis, multiple views on the present and future of our country have revealed themselves. In the columns of publications, one encounters various ideological concepts not always inspired by the official documents of the PZPR. This situation requires that the party's ideological front be activated. The ideas of the Ninth Congress and the Resolutions of the Central Committee require steady popularization and defense against distortions and against cheap demagoguery and (usually) veiled criticism. The party line of fighting and agreement will not defend itself."

The statement that the resolutions of the Ninth Congress and of the plenary sessions of the Central Committee are the law which obliges all party members, is therefore beyond controversy. On the other hand, highly problematic is the conviction expressed in the quoted text that the diversity of views on Poland's future constitutes the "aftermath of the crisis," and that the surfacing of notions "not inspired by official PZPR documents" is a disquieting phenomenon.

Let me say two things about the first of the convictions in question. It was not the "crisis" which generated the crazy-quilt of political and ideological slogans. This motley collection was only a reflection of the complex class

structure in People's Poland, and the articulation of antisocialist views and programs observed from the beginning of the sixties ought to be treated rather as one of the factors causing the crisis, not its aftermath. There also is no doubt that in the whole transitory period from capitalism to socialism, the party ought to carry on a determined policy directed against antisocial demagoguery and hampering the formulation of antisocialist programs in ideology.

The battle against antisocialist ideological subversion, however, does not in the least exclude sharp theoretical controversies within the party, particularly among party scientists, responsible for accurately recognizing the real problems arising at a given stage of socialist construction. Every administrative attempt to "tone down" such disputes must--sooner or later--have a negative impact on the shaping of the party line. The experiences of the seventies emphatically confirm this truism.

Comrade Opara justly stressed the importance of the ideas of the Ninth Congress to the inspiration of Marxist thought in Poland. On the other hand, he omitted altogether "the other side of the coin," namely he forgot to add that the theoretical achievement of Polish Marxists in the years 1981-1985 ought to be treated as one of the sources of inspiration to the delegates to the Tenth Congress of the PZPR. It is a mistake which testifies, I believe, to the nondialectical, and thus erroneous recognition of the relation between theory and practice in the activity of the Communist party.

The whole of the achievement of Marxism-Leninism and the whole of the historical experience of the worker movement must always be the source of inspiration for a party theoretician in social sciences. The resolutions of particular party congresses certainly belong to this heritage; they do not, however, exhaust it.

I will allow myself to illustrate this thesis by using a certain classical example. At the Seventh Congress of the RCP(B) [Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik)], Bucharin proposed to include in the party program the description of the socialist system as a one in which there takes place an "elimination of any political superstructure." The arguments which Lenin put forward against Bucharin's amendment are interesting:

"(...) Comrade Bucharin did not convince me. The name of our party says clearly enough that we are striving for full communism, that we are putting forward such abstract theses that each of us will work according to our capacities and receive according to our needs, without applying any military control and force. It is too early to talk about it now. When is the state to start withering away? Until then, we shall have convened more than two congresses, to be able to say: 'Look how our state is withering away.' In the meantime, it is probably too early to announce the withering of the state, it would be a violation of a historical perspective." (see "The Seventh Congress of the RCP(B)", Stenograms," KiW 1964, pp 227-228).

We must clearly distinguish two things here. First of all, it is a fact that the thesis about the withering away of the state, or, as Andropov has formulated it, about replacing the state with a "social self-government," belongs to

the basics of Marxism-Leninism. Secondly, it is a fact that this thesis did not find its place in the historical program of the RCP(B) and, perhaps, will not find a place in the long-range program of our party either.

The replacement of the state by a social self-government in Poland belongs to a long historical perspective. It is a mistake, however, to demand that a theoretician ignore this perspective and not take it into consideration in making analyses. Comrade Opara in a fragment of his article devoted to my modest person does me an unjustified honor by calling me a "visionary of a semistate" (see the quoted article, p. 9). This definition, incorrectly used in an ironical way, rather ought to be applied to Lenin and all those readers of "State and Revolution" who developed the views expressed in this classical work.

In his criticism of my theoretical view, Comrade Stefan Opara attributed to me this meaningless absurdity, which I shall quote. Namely, I was to have said the following: "Thus in heading toward socialism, Poland ought to follow its own, unique way, adapting to our conditions certain concepts which have not been realized anywhere else, consisting in a creation of a thoroughly self-governing worker republic, realizing state capitalism, capitalism which is a system of civilized members of cooperatives, a system which assumes the competition of the cooperative against the state and foreign capital. The reader deserves an apology for this complex sentence, but one cannot express in a shorter way this complicated systemic vision" (quotation from p 8). It probably cannot be said in a shorter way, nevertheless it can be said more honestly, namely:

1. I never and nowhere stated that "striving toward socialism, Poland ought to choose its own, unique way." In a certain sense, the historical experience of each country is "unique," yet the task of a scientific theory is precisely to draw general, important regularities from various unique experiences.
2. I maintained, and continue to maintain that in a long historical perspective, the state apparatus will be replaced by social self-government. In that historical period there will obviously no longer be state capitalism nor "civilized members of cooperatives," nor state and foreign capital.
3. State capitalism, which assumes the competition of state enterprises with domestic and foreign capital, is not any "systemic vision," complicated or otherwise, but brutal reality. In order to avoid misunderstandings I explain that I am using the term "state capitalism" in the sense established by Lenin and not in the vulgar understanding adopted in antisocialist writings.
4. I understand the problems of state capitalism in the following way. Assuming that in an undefinable future we retain small peasant ownership in agriculture and allow the activity of capitalist enterprises (domestic and foreign) under certain defined conditions, and that we must also adapt to the conditions of competition imposed by the monopolist capital on the international market, the question is how to retain and strengthen the control of the socialist state over the whole of the national economy? I suggest that in research concerning this key problem we refer to Lenin's theoretical achievement from the first years of Soviet power.

A critic has the full right to question every one of these points, and to argue that my interpretation of Lenin's views is either literally incorrect or that it concerns those aspects of Leninism which have no application to our concrete historical situation. A critic should not, however, insinuate (as he is doing!) that the theoretical categories I applied, such as "semistate," "state capitalism," a "system of civilized members of cooperatives" are my own irresponsible ideas. In fact these are, as every specialist knows, authentic Leninistic categories. The opinion of Comrade Opara that "one sees there rather the ideas of Fourier woven through with theories of Bakunin and Abramovski and... economic laissez-faire policy" does not find any justification in his text. Although I do not wish to be impolite, I see in it a symptom of a disquieting nonchalance in debating the key problems of Leninism.

[Stefan Opara]

The concise review of Wacław Mejbaum's essay "Questions About Socialism" (MIESIECZNIK LITERACKI No 2/83), included in the introductory article in No 2/84 of NOWE DROGI, was not to the author's liking, because it was a negative review. Thus Comrade Wacław Mejbaum has written a reply, whose structure confirms his good knowledge of the debating rules used in our country. The polemicist recognizes his own views as a matter he would not bother to defend. On the other hand, he is filled with concern about a "much more serious matter," namely other views, i.e., my evaluation of the current situation in ideology, whose evaluation he found to be "nondialectic, and therefore false," not to mention lesser deficiencies. Thus the polemicist wishes to defend himself on somebody else's turf, wants to discuss first of all my views, placing his own on a second plane.

Let it be so, although here we are falling into a stereotype familiar from many polemics: the critic must prove that he is not a camel, and the subject of the polemic becomes secondary. It cannot be denied that as a critic of one of Comrade W. Mejbaum's texts, in his eyes I deserve an unattractive image. I am supposedly against theoretical controversies, I consider a plurality of views a symptom of the crisis, I probably want to turn down the volume of ideological disputes, and it is my wish that scientists and journalists be inspired only by official party documents. As one can see, Comrade Mejbaum mercilessly paints up an image for me which can give nightmares to our liberal intellectuals.

The polemicist bases his opinion on the exegesis of five sentences from the introduction to my article. From the point of view of semantics and logic, however, this exegesis fails. Here are the elements of his structure of drawing conclusions, in their full glory. 1) I assert that as an aftermath of the crisis, a plurality of views on our country's present and future has surfaced; from this Comrade Mejbaum draws the conclusion that only in the crisis I see the genesis of the diversity of views; 2) I express the opinion that with a plurality of views, the party line defined in its programmatic documents requires popularizing and defending; Comrade Mejbaum sees in this

the conviction that party documents ought to be the only source of theoretical inspiration, and he also suspects the premise of an administrative toning down of disputes.

One sees here paralogsms which are surprising, since they flow from the pen of a theoretician otherwise regarded as perceptive. It probably stems from a broader stereotype. We know that in our scientific periodicals there hardly are any polemics or criticism, and even critical reviews have disappeared. Why? This may be because some consider criticism a threat to freedom of expression. It is hard to resist the impression that some scientists are afraid of criticism and are unable to distinguish a polemic from a personal attack, and that more attention is paid to who criticizes whom than to the subject of the dispute in criticism. I know Comrade W. Mejbaum from more successful critical texts and I would like him to be my ally in the battle against stagnation in our social sciences. The freedom of criticism (a concrete criticism, not criticism "in general") ought to be an elementary condition, not a contradiction of, the freedom of expression.

As to the role of party documents, their treatment as an exhaustive source of study is as dangerous to the development of Marxist theory, as is ignoring them.

I believe that the ideological principles of the party ought to be treated with due attention by party theoreticians writing in periodicals managed by party editors. Without this condition, the differences between Hyde Park [Corner] and party periodicals would be difficult to define. We have in Poland dozens of nonparty periodicals (not to mention other channels of information); we also have legions of theoreticians who do not belong to our party. Who is to defend the party line if this is not done in a clear and decisive way by intellectually active party politicians in theoretical periodicals (which are not too numerous), in which the party enjoys some influence?

And now let us move on to the issue itself, namely, Wacław Mejbaum's essay. In this essay, referring to the authority of V.I. Lenin, Wacław Mejbaum presents to contemporary Poles "a powerful historical vision, a vision of a semistate," understanding this vision as a realization of a "political system in which workers themselves take over all the functions of the administration, and in which factory and territorial self-government completely replaces, and renders unnecessary, the alienated state apparatus." I cited this and other quotations accurately in my article. I continue to maintain that visions of this kind constitute in the present situation (which is well known to me) not a reconstruction of the Leninist method of thinking, but a symptom of personal recklessness. Comrade Mejbaum defends the thesis that Lenin was once fond of the vision of the semistate and of the concept of the withering away of the state. I agree, nevertheless Lenin's disputes concerned not whether the state will wither away and whether to introduce self-government, but when and how this process ought to take place. In the "State and Revolution" and in many later works, V.I. Lenin sharply fought against any visions of immediate withering away of the socialist state without taking into consideration objective conditions and real dangers. "Marxism differs from anarchism," said Lenin,

"in recognizing the necessity of the state and state authority in the revolutionary period and in general, and in the epoch of transition from capitalism in particular."* As we know, this epoch continues.

Thus I believe that Lenin's name is invoked in vain in spinning out visions of the liquidation of the state apparatus in Poland (even if these visions are only a futuristic game). I rather see the topicality of these of Lenin's statements which speak about the need to strengthen the socialist state in the situation of imperialist threat. It is also worth knowing that against the concepts of liquidating the socialist state Lenin used terms which I shall refrain from quoting here--since my polemicist could take them as directed against himself. I, too, would prefer not to be impolite.

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V.I. Lenin, "Works" v. 24, p. 32.

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EFFECT OF NUCLEAR BLASTS ON RADIOELECTRONIC SYSTEMS

Warsaw WOJSKOWY PRZEGLAD TECHNICZNY in Polish No 6, Jun 84 pp 48-50

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel Engineer Boguslaw Borcuch and Major Engineer Edward Lyszczyk: "Effects of Nuclear Explosions on Radioelectronic Systems"]

[Text] The operation of radioelectronic devices can be affected--due to local ionization of space--as a result of scatter and combustion of readily ionizable substances (such as cesium or sodium), as well as surface nuclear explosions. This effect is based on the damping, reflection and refraction of electromagnetic waves in plasma.

We know from electrodynamics that the reflection of electromagnetic waves occurs when the macroscopic parameters of a nonuniformity, the so-called refractory index, $n = \sqrt{\epsilon \cdot \mu}$, and the effective reflection surface

$$\sigma = \frac{\pi}{4} n^2 \lambda^2$$

(where λ is the wavelength, ϵ is the electrical permittivity and μ is the magnetic permeability) are different from those of the environment in which the radio waves propagate. To obtain intense reflection of radio waves from ionized spaces, a corresponding change of the parameters n and μ of the environment is necessary. The macroscopic parameters mentioned above can only be used to describe the electric properties of the environment when the average distance between the particles creating the environment is much smaller than the wavelength and the environment--in terms of electromagnetic waves--can be viewed as a continuum.

Errors in determining the direction where the source of radio waves is located occur when a region that constitutes a local nonuniformity compared to the environment is also heterogeneous inside, that is, when its refractory index is a coordinate function (Fig. 1). Similar errors can also occur even when the local nonuniformity has constant electrical parameters but a shape that induces such errors (for instance, when it is not orthogonal).

The refractory index of an ionized region (a local nonuniformity), disregarding the influence of the magnetic field of the earth, can be approximately defined as

$$n = \sqrt{1 - 81 \frac{N}{f^2}},$$

where f is the carrier frequency (MHz) and N is the number of electrons per cubic meter.




Figure 1. Path of electromagnetic wave in a local nonuniformity.

Key:

1. Medium with variable refractive index
2. Electromagnetic wave path

With a sufficiently high electron concentration, all the radio waves may become reflected from the ionized volume (complete external reflection). The critical frequency corresponding to the complete reflection of radio waves is determined under the condition of $n = 0$, such that $f_{cr} = 9\sqrt{N}$. To obtain complete reflection of vibrations of a carrier frequency f from an ionized region, the required electron concentration is $n = f_{cr}^2/81$. For example, for a wavelength of 3 cm, the required electron concentration is 10^{18} electrons/m³.

Producing this high electron concentration N is only possible by using very powerful ionization sources. The threshold electron concentration for visual detection of ionization is 10^{17} – 10^{18} el/m³. It can reliably be assumed that the required power of the ionization source would be

$$P_{\text{ionization}} = a \cdot N^2,$$

where a is the electron recombination factor, which at the earth's surface is approximately $a = 10^{-12}$ cm³/s.el. If, for example, $N = 10^{18}$ el/m³ and $a = 10^{-12}$ cm³/s.el, then the ionization source should have a power of $P_{\text{ionization}} = 10^{24}$ el/m³.s.

Creating an ionized volume with a concentration of 10^{18} electrons per cubic meter, we need an ionization source that within one second generates 10^{24} electrons per cubic meter. This huge concentration can be produced for a short time by nuclear explosions or by simultaneously burning a large quantity of easily ionizable materials. The blast of a nuclear warhead produces a very high concentration of electrons at the explosion epicenter. But electron recombination results in a fast reduction of this concentration in time. For that reason, the disruption of the operation of radio location stations in the centimeter wavelength band caused by a nuclear explosion is short-lived. A nuclear blast has a much stronger effect on the propagation of radio waves in the meter band. We will now consider the damping properties of a locally

ionized region. The damping mechanism of radio waves in an ionized region can be described as follows. The free electrons under the influence of the electric field of the incident wave experience forced vibrations with a frequency equal to the carrying frequency of electromagnetic vibration. Performing the vibration movements, the electrons collide with neutral molecules--atoms and ions--increasing their kinetic energy. In that way, the energy of the electromagnetic field is converted to thermal energy of the medium.

The damping properties of an ionized medium are characterized by the damping factor of radio waves (db/km):

$$\beta = \frac{1.8 \times 10^{-2} N_e}{\omega^2 + J^2},$$

where N_e is the number of electrons in the volume of one cubic meter; J is the number of electron collisions with other particles (ions, atoms, molecules) during one second; and $\omega = 2\pi f$.

The damping factor attains the maximum for a certain value of collision frequency. Denoting the extremum of this function, we obtain $\beta = \beta_{\max}$ for $\omega = J$. The collision frequency is proportional to the air density, such that there is a certain altitude limit within which the damping of radio waves is greatest.

From calculations and experiments, we know that the damping of radio waves is strongest within the band of a thickness of 16 km whose median lies at the altitude of 72 km. The collision frequency at that altitude is approximately 6×10^6 collisions per second. At lower altitudes, the wave damping is not increased because the electron half-life is much reduced. For signals with a carrying frequency of $f > 5$ MHz the value ω^2 is much greater than J^2 and the expression is simplified:

$$\beta = \frac{0.45 \times 10^{-2} N}{f^2}.$$

By using this expression, we can define the required electron concentration at which the damping attains the required value in db/km:

$$N = \frac{\beta \cdot f^2}{0.45} \times 10^3 = 2.2 \times \beta \times f^2 \times 10^3 \text{ (el/m}^3\text{)}.$$

For example, for damping of waves of the length $\lambda = 3$ cm, to attain at the altitude of 72 km the value of 10 db/km an ionized volume should be created in which the electron concentration would be 0.37×10^{18} el/m³. At the present time, such a concentration on a large area can only be created for a short period of time by means of powerful nuclear explosions. Practically, considerable damping of radio waves can occur in meter and longer wave bands. The damping factor of waves of a greater length rises already at a relatively low electron concentration (10^{11} - 10^{14} el/m³).

Nuclear explosions at altitudes below 16 km do not produce prolonged ionization and cannot significantly affect the operation of radioelectronic systems. In surface and underground (submarine) explosions, areas can be created with intense damping and reflection of radio waves. The phenomena of damping and reflection, however, are caused here by the existence of a local nonuniformity in the medium rather than ionization, which is due to a heavy concentration of particles of solids and water ejected into the atmosphere. The explosion products can affect the operation of radioelectronic devices in the centimeter band only during the initial phase of the blast.

The length of existence of ionized regions depends on the altitude, the blast power, the time of day, etc. At high altitudes (above 40 to 50 km), fairly stable ionized areas with a relatively high electron concentration can be formed. After the explosion of a nuclear warhead at a high altitude, ionized areas can survive for a time of from a few minutes to several hours.

In first approximation, the ionized regions can be subdivided into two categories: those with slow electrons and those with fast electrons. The first category includes the areas with slow electrons produced by ionization of the medium mainly caused by thermal and X-ray radiation. These areas have limited dimensions, not larger than between 10 and 20 kilometers, and the electron concentration in these areas decreases according to the following relation:

$$N = 10^{23} \frac{1}{t} \text{ el/m}^3 \cdot \text{s},$$

where t is time (s).

The ionized area over time takes a shape in accordance with the law of diffusion.

The second category includes the areas with fast (relativistic) electrons emitted by radioactive decay products. The fast electrons are broken by the geomagnetic field, so that the ionization of space acquires a global character rather than being local as in the preceding case. The average electron density is low, and these areas do not affect functioning of radio location stations. The problem is different, however, as far as the communication and radio navigation installations are concerned, especially those operating on short and medium waves. These phenomena can cause major disruptions in the operation for a relatively longer period. The detonation of a nuclear warhead at an altitude of 480 km (the Argus operation) clearly delineated layers of about 100 km in thickness which were distinctly observed. These ionized areas persisted for several days.

In addition to the basic factors of damage due to nuclear explosions, such as shockwave, light radiation, penetrating radiation and radioactive contamination, radioelectronic devices can also be affected by phenomena which result in passive disruptions. Sometimes nonsynchronic reciprocal interference of radioelectronic system equipment due to reflection of signals also arises. These disruptions interfere with combat operation of radioelectronic systems in target detection, but also signal that the enemy has used nuclear weapons. Areas of intensified ionization appear not only near the blast but also (given

the appropriate atmospheric conditions) in areas at quite long distances from the epicenter (up to hundreds of kilometers), especially for explosions at high altitudes. The ionization of the space near the blast causes reflection and partial absorption of electromagnetic energy emitted by the radioelectronic devices.

The reflection of energy results in the appearance on the radioelectronic screen of flame-shaped patterns whose size, brightness and duration depend on the explosion distance, altitude and power. Large reflecting surfaces sometimes cause intensive unsynchronized disruptions which occur particularly between devices operating in the meter bands. The radius of such reciprocal interference can be 500 to 600 km from the epicenter (for stations operating on the same frequencies). The screening effects of the explosion zone and energy damping make the targets behind that zone invisible. Figure 2 shows the dependency between the dimension of the "blackout" sector and the distance to the epicenter of the explosion of a power of one megaton.




Figure 2. Darkened sector value as a function of the distance to the epicenter of a 1-megaton explosion.

Blasts at low altitudes or on the surface produce a rising dust cloud which reflects the electromagnetic energy in the centimeter band and, to a lesser extent, in the decimeter band as well.

The duration of reflection at radio location stations depends also on the station wave bands: the longer the wave, the shorter the period during which the cloud would be observed. Aerial explosions at medium and high altitudes do not cause a dust cloud and are observed by stations operating on the decimeter, meter and centimeter bands for a relatively short time (where a high ionization takes place). For radioelectronic devices in the centimeter band, the reflections from the dust cloud cause passive interference that may continue for one to two hours. The reflections from ionized areas are limited for this group of waves to just three minutes. On the decimeter band, reflections from both dust clouds and ionized regions can be observed.

The period during which radio locator indicators register the interference caused by nuclear explosions and the value registered depend on the weight of the charge. For the centimeter band, the radio location signal for a blast at low altitude for a small charge will be registered for 10 to 40 s and for a larger charge for 2 to 3 min. The indicator of the interfering signal during

the first observation phase (ionization) for a small charge is about 2 km (as from ordinary aerial targets) and for a large charge about 3 to 5 km. In the second observation phase (development of the dust cloud) the reflection from the cloud can register up to 10 km. For a blast on the earth's surface, the dust cloud for a small charge will be observed for 1 to 3 min and for a large charge for about 2 hours. The dust cloud on the radar screen moves with the wind speed. On the altitude indicator screen, the reflection from the cloud is spread along the coordinate altitude. Its dimension is about 5 km (for a small charge) and up to 13 km (for a large charge). The detonation of a small charge is discernible at a distance of up to 60 km and of a large charge at up to 280 km.

On decimeter devices, the first phase for a ground or low-altitude blast with small charges is observed for just 10 to 20 s. The interfering signal can sometimes be received by the lateral lobes of the antenna characteristic. The interfering signal indicator, for a small charge blast, gives a reading of about 3 km and for a large charge more than 5 km. If the explosion occurred at a low altitude, then 3 to 5 minutes after the disappearance of the signal from the ionized region a second phase caused by a dust cloud can be observed. Intensity and duration of the interfering signal indicator are smaller than for the centimeter band devices. Reflections from the ionized region are slightly stronger for aerial explosions than on centimeter band devices, and their duration measures several minutes.

No reflections from the dust cloud are observed on the indicator screen in the meter band. There is no difference between ground and air blasts. Explosions of a small charge are detected at shorter distances, but larger charges produce effects at several hundred kilometers. The reflection from a small-charge explosion measures 4 km; for a large charge, it is up to 10 km. The duration of the effect as observed at a radiolocation station is virtually equal for small and large charge: 3 to 3.5 minutes. For the first 20 to 30 s, a circular light area may appear on the indicator screen due to signal pickup by lateral lobes of the radiation characteristic of the antenna. Nuclear blasts at high altitudes--above 50 km--are observed on meter band devices as reflections from intensive ionization regions (which can develop at distances of hundreds of kilometers from the epicenter). Such reflections appear 1-5 minutes after the blast and persist for 3-16 minutes. The reflecting surface can attain large dimensions, lighting a large portion of the screen. The surface of the reflecting ionized zones is very large and can be observed at distances equal to several time periods of the indicator, resulting in multi-valued distance readings.

A specific factor characterizing nuclear explosions is the electromagnetic pulse induced in longer radioelectronic circuits (cables, communication lines). The pulse can also cause short breaks in synchronization, form false distance and azimuth readings, disrupt computer operation and sometimes cause breakdown of electronic equipment, particularly telex lines (terminal and relay amplifiers and regenerators). The electromagnetic pulse (aside from blasts near the station) is short-lived and does not affect seriously the operation of radioelectronic systems. The radius of the zone where its action is felt by input circuits of receivers and indicators is slightly larger than the radius of the shockwave zone.

CATHOLIC WEEKLY ON VATICAN DIPLOMACY

Warsaw PRZEGLAD KATOLICKI in Polish No 3, 8 Jul 84 p 7

[Article by Janusz Reiter: "Dialogue--Courteous in Form, Steady on Principles"]

[Text] The question of how many divisions the pope has is merely anecdotal today. Even the Vatican's opponents admit that its powerful advantage--in a world which seemingly respects power alone--is that it does not have to mount an army. The papacy, whose mission is not focused on the affairs of this world, has been a presence in European politics for many centuries. Not always have popes relied on moral authority alone--there have been periods, mostly in the Middle Ages, when they counted on their secular power as well, if not primarily.

Saint Peter's patrimony, founded by the Carolingians in 754, continued for 11 centuries as a sovereign state conducting its own policy and entering alliances and conflicts with mixed, occasionally deplorable results for the religious mission of the church. Papal diplomacy had to defend both the interests of the ecclesiastical state and the church's possessions in individual countries, which was difficult to reconcile at times. To regulate its legal relations with state governments, the Holy See tended to conclude with them international agreements (concordates) specifying the privileges and scope of independence of the church and the prerogatives of the state. Such concordates were signed even after 1870, when the ecclesiastical state ceased to exist in its traditional form. The interwar period also abounded in concordates, including those signed with Poland (1925), Italy (1927), and Germany (1933). Beginning in the 1960's, the Vatican has given up on concordates, which on one hand stabilize the situation of the church but on the other hand hinder its adjustment to a rapidly changing world. In practice, the establishment of diplomatic relations does not require the signing of concordates. The new concordate signed this year with Italy is the outcome of a special relation between the Vatican and the state of Italy.

Debate on whether the agreements concluded by the Holy See have full legal and international validity is now a thing of the past. Although the Vatican does not possess all the internal attributes of a state government, its sovereignty is fully recognized in international relations in the West and in the East. The pope appears to the world in a dual role as the supreme representative of the Vatican state and the head of the church. This is the origin of the interchangeable use of two terms: the Vatican, a state with an area of 0.44 square kilometer and 1,000 inhabitants whose sovereignty is

recognized by international law, and the Apostolic See, the supreme authority of the ecumenical church headed by the pope and Roman Curia.

Overall, the loss of secular power over the former ecclesiastical state has produced more good than bad. Although early on it provoked a sense of defeat in the church hierarchy, it enabled the Vatican with the passage of time to bypass international conflicts jeopardizing the church and to adopt a status of neutrality universally recognized in the world.

Understandably, the principles of Vatican diplomacy have changed as well. State secularization put the church in a new situation wherein it no longer has to deal with friendly or hostile courts of rulers but with governments which, to a lesser or greater degree, must take into account the demands of their societies.

The Vatican must therefore take account of the international situation of a country with which it enters into an agreement, so that no impression is provoked among that country's society (even more importantly, among its clergy) that an accord is being made without the participation of the interested parties themselves.

While relations with the countries that preserve their neutrality on worldview issues present no special difficulties, genuine problems have cropped up in the Vatican's contacts with ideologically committed countries that regard the sphere of world outlooks as their own domain or at the least as an area of competition. In communist-ruled countries, conflict based on such claims was initially so severe that it appeared to preclude even the finding of a *modus vivendi* allowing for the fundamental interests of the church and aspirations of the ruling parties. Over time, the ideological offensive against the church has weakened to the extent that chances of an accord have emerged [----] (law of 31 July 1981 on control of publications and public performances, article 2, points 1, 2, 3, DZIENNIK USTAW No 20, item 99, amended DZIENNIK USTAW 1983 No 44, item 204).

It is impossible to present in a single chart the Vatican's relations with the communist-ruled countries. They take various forms, depending on their internal settings and the church's situation in individual countries. Accordingly, the 1964 treaty between the Holy See and Hungary could not have become a model for the entire Eastern European bloc. In fact, it was an accord very modest in scope, permitting simply a partial reconstruction of the Hungarian Church. The nomination of five bishops certainly represented some improvement stemming from the accord, but concurrent hopes for a long-range improvement failed to materialize. An agreement concluded 2 years later in 1966 with Yugoslavia could not have become a model solution, either. The status of the church in that country greatly alarmed the Holy See at the time. The accord--referred to as a protocol--provided agreement on an exchange of diplomatic representatives, which was a modest gain, though contributing to more solid regulation of church-state relations.

The contacts with the East European countries established at the time have

continued uninterruptedly with varying intensity in individual countries. They were facilitated by the Second Vatican Council recommendations, including the formulation in one of its documents that the church can develop freely under any government "provided that the government recognizes the fundamental rights of a human person and family and the needs of the common good."

The council also instructed the church not to link itself with any political, economic, or social system, which is why papal nuncios were sent such diverse countries as Australia, Bangladesh, Upper Volta, and recently the United States. For the time being, there are no papal ambassadorships in Eastern Europe, although special delegates of the Holy See have been visiting regularly for some time now. Their conversations are conducted with extraordinary secrecy. [----] (law of 31 July 1981 on control of publications and public performances, article 2, point 3, DZIENNIK USTAW, No 20, item 99, amended DZIENNIK USTAW 1983, No 44, item 204).

According to a widespread opinion, Poland could be the first country in the Eastern bloc to establish permanent diplomatic relations with the Holy See. In 1974, both sides formed "task forces for permanent working contacts," headed on the part of the Polish People's Republic by its designated embassy counselor, and on the part of the Vatican by Archbishop Poggi, a special papal nuncio who regularly visits Warsaw and, occasionally, the capitals of other Eastern European countries. The history of negotiations on elevating the rank of diplomatic relations, continued since that time, is a reflection of the government's religious policy. The Polish Episcopate, supported by the Holy See, has allowed no doubts from the start that it favors normalization of the relations between the Vatican and the Polish state, provided that "the normalization has substantive content, rather than being of a purely institutional and administrative nature" (November 1974). This fairly obvious condition has remained unchanged. As Primate Wyszynski stated on innumerable occasions, normalization means a normal situation of the church within the state, thus a restoration of its public and legal status above all.

The Vatican's policy with regard to Eastern European countries combines flexibility and realism with resoluteness and calm. It is, as Cardinal Casaroli put it, "loyal dialogue, broadly conceived, courteous in form, steady on principles, and prudently conducted."

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