



**STRATEGY
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TRAINED AND READY - ARE WE REALLY?

BY

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ABSTRACT

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The Army-wide problem this paper discusses is the lack of competency at the battalion and brigade level to execute combat tasks. This problem is a result of inadequate attempts to manage an ever-increasing Operations Tempo (OPTEMPO). This problem jeopardizes the Army's ability to execute our National Security Strategy without risk of initial failure or an unacceptable number of casualties. Four recommendations are included to minimize the OPTEMPO dilemma and correct the training deficiencies. These recommendations are: 1) standardize the task organizations of Corps/Divisions 2) reduce the size of the Contingency Corps 3) standardize training conditions and unit participation at the Army Combat Training Centers, and 4) stop the personnel management technique of "augmentation" to raise the strength of deploying units from those remaining behind.

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TRAINED AND READY—ARE WE REALLY?

The soldier's performance during NTC training is a reflection of national strength. He has shown continuously the ability to overcome the harsh environment and to perform as we expect him to. There is no limit to his stamina and endurance. The soldier has responded to the threat of the enemy, terrain, heat, cold, lack of sleep, and training stress unflinchingly. Where a soldier fails to perform, leadership is at fault. ¹

AN OVERVIEW

The Army wide problem this paper discusses is the deficiency found at the maneuver battalion and brigade levels to competently execute their combat tasks. This deficiency is a result of the problems and interim solutions generated by our Army's leadership in an attempt to manage an ever-increasing Operations Tempo (OPTEMPO). This lack of combat task competency places in jeopardy the Army's ability to successfully execute our National Security Strategy without significant risk of initial failure or an unacceptable number of casualties.

To describe this problem, the following areas will be discussed:

a. Historical background. The first section is the historical evolution of our current training methodology and why the Army's Combat Training Centers (CTCs) are the best objective assessment of our combat task competency. Next, a vignette, as seen through the eyes of a soldier, describes the current training problems experienced by a battalion at a CTC.

b. Discussion. This section will analyze those problems, at both the tactical and operational level, impacting directly on our battalions and brigades ability to execute their combat tasks to standard. These problems are: OPTEMPO and its impact on establishing a functioning time management system above brigade level, inadequate task organization at the division and corps level, personnel tempo (PERSTEMPO) management, reduction in the combat killing capability at the battalion level, and the changing of the training standards at our combat training centers.

c. Recommendation. This section discusses possible solutions needed to lessen the OPTEMPO dilemma and restore the training readiness posture of our battalions and brigades. These recommendations are: 1) standardize the task organizations of Corps and Divisions to facilitate an effective time management system, 2) reduce the task organization of the Contingency Corps thereby freeing up more forces for Military Operations other than War, 3) standardize training conditions and unit level of participation at all the Army Combat Training Centers, and 4) stop the personnel management technique of "augmentation" to raise the strength of deploying units from those remaining behind.

THESIS STATEMENT. The Army can not fulfill its requirements in the National Military Security Strategy by having maneuver battalions and brigades, Army wide, which are unable to execute their combat tasks

competently. General Reimer, Chief of Staff of the Army best states the need to fulfill this requirement,

I think the most important thing is to continue to focus on the most difficult mission. And for us, that's the war-fighting mission. I go back to my time at West Point, and I was there in May 1962, when General Douglas MacArthur spoke to us in a speech that I will never forget. And he said yours is a profession of arms, the will to win, the sure knowledge that in war there is no substitute for victory, that if you lose, the nation will be destroyed. So I don't think we should change our focus. We don't have the luxury. We don't have a large enough Army to be able to say, Okay, half of you concentrate on these type of missions, whatever they may be, and the other half concentrate on war fighting. We need the total force...It takes all of us well trained to fight and win.²

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Beginning in 1973, under the vision and efforts of General William E. DePuy, first commander of the U. S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), and his Deputy Chief of Staff for Training, Major General Paul F. Gorman, a training revolution took place.³ It sought to alleviate the advantages in military numbers the Warsaw Pact nations possessed and the inadequacies that existed in Army training programs to support combined arms training at the battalion and brigade level.

There were major deficiencies in the way the Army trained prior to 1975. Specifically, we were unable to quickly train and assimilate incoming soldiers into a cohesive element and maintain

training standards throughout the force whether it was deployed from its training base or not. This training system came into existence after World War II and was in effect up to and during the Vietnam War. It was known as the Army Training Program.⁴

The Army training program trained soldiers by dictating the military subjects and the amount of time soldiers were required to train. There were no specific standards or levels of performance required to be attained by units. Training standards were not uniform Army wide as local commanders had the authority to determine their own training objectives. It was this style of training and other factors: superiority in numbers of the Warsaw Pact forces, elimination of the "Draft," combat lessons learned from the Arab-Israeli Yom Kippur War, and the need to objectively assess training which drove the requirement to revolutionize the Army's training methodology.

The greatest impact on this methodology was the Yom Kippur War that revealed what superior training and tactical doctrine could do when combined with modern weaponry. An army could fight outnumbered and win. This revelation was significant to our senior military leadership who realized that in a major conflict we would not have the time, resources, or national will to win by the sheer weight of numbers.⁵ Therefore, numerous initiatives were begun under TRADOC to replicate these combat lessons learned. The most realistic and

challenging combat training activity that evolved from these initiatives was the creation of the combat training centers.

These centers were created with two key objectives in mind: they must provide a realistic battlefield-training environment and have a system of evaluation that "could objectively assess a unit's proficiency." The lessons learned from a CTC rotation were provided to the rotating unit with the intent that this information would provide the impetus for home station training that would alleviate the observed training deficiencies. These lessons learned would also be fed back into the TRADOC system to correct any doctrinal or training problems or identify new tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) for future application.⁶ It seemed that the Army now had a training system that could determine the training readiness and effectiveness of units. This system also fostered an atmosphere that required units to maintain an acceptable level of readiness at all times. The best testament to the success of this training system was the performance of our Army in Operation DESERT STORM. However, the lessons learned from our successes in that war, in terms of cohesiveness, teambuilding, and command and control, are now being forgotten.

In recent years, "Many top level Army leaders have remarked upon visiting the NTC and observing the force-on-force maneuvers, that command and control was a serious problem for almost all BLUFOR commanders."⁷ Interestingly enough, the inability of battalions and

brigades to competently execute high intensity conflict is found throughout our nation's history and revealed in John Shy's, *First Battles in Retrospect*. He discusses various reasons for the success or failure in each of the battles but the common theme that persists through all of them is:

More glaring than poorly trained troops as a first-battle problem is the weakness of command-and-control. Virtually every case study emphasizes the lack of realistic large-scale operational exercises before the first battle, exercises that might have taught commanders and staffs the hard, practical side of their wartime business as even the most basic training introduces it to the soldier at the small-unit level.⁸

It is not only the failure to conduct command and staff focused exercises but a philosophical attitude about the role of commanders and staffs at battalion and higher.

It is likely that this problem is more acute in American first battles because the size and structure of the prewar Army, and thus the prewar experience of senior commanders and staff officers, are even today dictated largely by peacetime needs, not by wartime probabilities. Headquarters in the U.S. Army habitually expend their time and energies on routine administration, seldom pushing, training, and testing themselves as they push, train, and test their troops. Perhaps it is natural for a hierarchy to act like a bureaucracy, comfortably keeping busy with the day-to-day tasks that all large organizations create for themselves. Of course, headquarters work hard, but the result too often seems to be that the troops, even when inadequately trained and armed, are readier for war than the men who lead them.⁹

Commanders and staffs must emphasize their own need to train at several command levels in order to develop the required skills that otherwise could possibly "be bought with blood and defeat."¹⁰

General William R. Richardson, a former TRADOC commander, wrote,

Excellent training means synchronizing maneuver, fire support and Air Force assets at the National Training Center (NTC). Excellent training means deploying to the maneuver rights area as combined arms teams...exploiting the joint training opportunities of TEAM SPIRIT and REFORGER so that allied armies can fight side by side executing standardized procedures with skill and competence.¹¹

Besides his emphasis on units needing to exercise the concept of combined arms training under realistic and joint conditions, General Richardson also addressed the requirement of all training to relate directly to a unit's ability to execute it's combat tasks. General Richardson stated,

Through training, our commanders-from brigade through corps-must discipline their staffs to prioritize information, to adhere closely to the mission, enemy, time, terrain, and troops available (METT-T), to develop a lucid understanding of the commander's intent, and to concentrate combat power in time. Staff training must be steeped in AirLand Battle doctrine-not with casual familiarity but with an in-depth understanding of how to execute the tenets of AirLand Battle. Clearly, disciplined, precise training of the battle staff is essential for combat success.¹²

A VIGNETTE-THROUGH THE EYES OF A SOLDIER

During a quarterly training brief (QTB) to the Division and Brigade commanders, the key issues of platoon situational training exercises (STX) and battalion/company simulation training were being discussed. The battalion commander wanted to conduct lanes that required platoons to execute battle tasks within the scenario of a company combat mission as well as exercise battalion staff functions.¹³

As the commander laid out his plan, the division commander got a perplexed look on his face, the brigade commander became distressed and we knew that the result was not going to be favorable. "I want platoons to do battle drills" was the division commander's response. "Absolutely right" retorted the brigade commander. "This concept of having platoons conduct movement to contact, attack, and defense is far too complicated. Our platoons need to execute reaction drills- they need to be competent at the basics."

The remainder of our proposed training met a similar fate although it was our prime time training period. The battalion simulation exercises, which would allow us to work our command and control, staff functions, and deliberate decision making process, were overcome by the unpredicted massive support required for the Division's Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) exercise. The battalion commander became pretty concerned about how prepared we might be at the company and battalion level to execute our "go to

war" combat tasks. As our CTC rotation loomed right around the corner, we certainly did not want to embarrass ourselves. Unfortunately, there were circumstances that had affected our preparation time for this rotation. It had been less than three months since our return from a yearlong deployment in Bosnia and the Corps Commander had already scheduled our unit for a CTC rotation.

Still, to date, there had been no training above the squad and platoon level except for the staff training that was being done weekly on Sergeants Time. Our staff desperately needed more training in mission analysis, wargaming, course of action development, and synchronization of the battlefield operating systems. We wanted to be more adept at applying and demonstrating basic staff planning and decision making during the rotation. But it did not look like we were going to get much preparation time outside of what we were squeezing in through the cracks.

In addition to our lack of training time, we were told by brigade that prior to our CTC rotation, (besides the incumbent battalion commander leaving) the battalion executive officer, intelligence officer, operations officer, and assistant operations officer would all depart. This personnel turnover was due to the summer rotation and support personnel required to fill out units deploying to Bosnia. In the end, we were going to our CTC rotation with new commanders and a non-cohesive and unprepared staff. The

only positive side to our situation was the rumors we heard about the CTC Opposition Forces (OPFOR).

Originally, the OPFOR was a tenacious, overwhelming, monster that had lethal indirect artillery, chemical weapons, and artillery delivered minefields to support a first, second, and third echelon of tanks and infantry fighting vehicles (BMPs) designed to humiliate a BLUEFOR battalion and brigade in "one on one" conflict. The force ratios in terms of combat strength were doctrinally in favor of the OPFOR before each battle. It is important to point out that a force ratio of 1 to 1 means that both forces are equal in their killing capability. In the basic tactical missions, for example, the OPFOR had an advantage in a Movement to Contact of 1.5 to our 1. In the Motorized Rifle Regiment attack against our defense they were 3.5 to our 1. In our battalion attack against their company defense, we were 2.5 to their 1. Now, if you couple these force ratios with the OPFOR's ability to employ chemical agents and artillery minefields, you can understand why we were scared to death.

Boy, were we relieved! The new OPFOR force ratios were reduced to give the BLUEFOR the advantage in every mission and we believed we could win even with our lack of preparation time. We also discovered that our division chain of command provides the leadership of the CTC an informal assessment of each battalion's combat task competencies. From the very beginning of the rotation, our senior leadership affects the training conditions in order to achieve their training

objectives. There was no emphasis placed on units meeting the training standard.

We were set! Although at battalion and brigade level we had not done any training that would facilitate the synchronization of artillery, the building of engagement areas, or the ability to mass our forces against the OPFOR, we were as ready as we could be given the circumstances.

Unfortunately, it was like being at the Little BigHorn. The results were as lopsided as these fictional football scores:

Movement to contact:	OPFOR 62 - BLUFOR 0
Deliberate attack:	OPFOR 48 - BLUFOR 0
Defense:	OPFOR 42 - BLUFOR 0

(Figure 1 - CTC SCOREBOARD)

In the post-mortem, we acknowledged that it was not for a lack of trying that the battalion and brigade did so poorly in executing combat operations. We did increasingly better after each mission but battle after battle the results were the same. Our soldiers could find the enemy, our squads could kill with hand carried anti-tank systems, our platoons could do battle drills but at the company, battalion, and brigade level, we could not competently fight even against an OPFOR whose combat capabilities had been significantly reduced.

DISCUSSION

So the question is, what is keeping our Army from training to the competence level required to be combat ready? This question leads into the first issue which is our Army's inability to effectively control our OPTEMPO.

In an excerpt from Mr. Winslow Wheeler's report to the Senate Budget Committee, after visiting the NTC in December 1997,

Units coming to both training centers frequently do not come with many of their sub-unit commanders; these have frequently been assigned to peacekeeping missions or other deployments that separate them from their units. As a result, sub-units—from basic squads on up—do not train with the commanders that they would go to war with. When this happens, it violates a key dictum of readiness and one of the basic points of having the NTC and the JRTC: the Army should 'train just as you go to war.'¹⁴

The first step to a good training regimen is the ability to manage OPTEMPO. There is no better way than having an effective time management system. In the Army, the concept of time management is reflected in FM 25-100,

Time management systems create prime time training periods for subordinate organizations to concentrate on mission essential training. A Green-Amber-Red time management system... Organizations in Green periods conduct planned training without distraction and external taskings. Units in Red periods execute details and other administrative requirements... Organizations in Amber periods are assigned support taskings beyond the capability of those units in the Red period.¹⁵

This generic definition does not address peacekeeping to peace-enforcement missions that are OPTEMPO requirements that cause a tremendous drain on personnel, resources, and time to train from units. For the purpose of this discussion, these missions will be interpreted to be a Red period requirement within the time management cycle. The rationale for this determination is that peacekeeping to peace-enforcement operations normally exceed 180 days in duration. In this amount of time, without reinforcement training, maneuver battalion and brigade's combat competencies begin to decline. In an attempt to remedy this degradation in warfighting skills, V Corps had units returning from Bosnia go through a six-month re-training period with a rotation at the CMTC to assess their combat readiness. At the brigade level, this concept of retraining can not be executed without an effective time management system.

The purpose of having a time management system is to allow corps and division commanders to

Publish their single training guidance document sufficiently in advance to provide adequate planning time for both their troop-listed wartime units and supporting peacetime organizations. Guidance at these senior levels is critical to the development and integration of a large number of subordinate...long-range training plans.¹⁶

This system provides Army units the time required to plan and train as joint and combined arms teams which, consistent with doctrine, is the way the Army plans to fight now and in the future. The doctrine

is simple and easy to understand yet, it is a doctrine that is poorly applied above the brigade level.

The reason for this failure in application is the requirement to have the correct task organization at the division and corps level to execute a doctrinally based time management system. For example, at the battalion and brigade level, all maneuver battalions have four maneuver companies (soon to be three under the new Division XXI design) and brigades have three maneuver battalions.¹⁷ In this standard task organization, there is no problem for battalions and brigades to implement an effective time management system as long as all units are integrated and participate. However, no time management system will be effective at the brigade and battalion level if there is insufficient task organization at the division and corps level. A good example of this is found in the United States Army Europe (USAREUR).

The task organization of USAREUR in its simple form is one corps (V Corps) and two divisions, 1st Infantry Division and 1st Armored Division (1 ID and 1 AD), with each division having only two ground maneuver brigades.¹⁸ From 1995 to 1998, due to having only two divisions or a total of four ground maneuver brigades, V Corps' ability to execute its go to war combat tasks became severely degraded. V Corps had one division in "Red" due to Bosnia and one division in "Amber" supporting Bosnia as well as all the other stability operations and mission requirements in the USAREUR AOR. If

V Corps had one more task organized division or two additional maneuver brigades, whom it could integrate into a time management system, it would have been able to sustain its combat readiness. The multiple of three task organization allows the corps and division to rotate its units through six-month cycles of red, green, and amber periods. A doctrinal task organization at division or corps level would allow battalions and brigades to conduct gunnery, home-station training, prepare for CTC rotations, and execute contingency deployments on a predictable schedule. Unfortunately, the advantages to implementing an effective time management system at corps and division level has been supplemented by the Army's management of units by counting the number of OPTEMPO days. General Reimer, in his interview with the Army Times, made the following comments as regards the question of OPTEMPO,

There have been a number of efforts made to address that issue. One was to measure deployments, and to say that, look, when you get past 120 days, you move into an intensive managed area, and we're going to make sure that we watch your deployments and try to keep you from going certainly above 180 days. Managing units by deployment days lends itself to the uncertainty and unpredictability that Army doctrine was supposed to alleviate and it fosters other abuses. General Reimer further stated,

Where we have not been as successful as I would like is the individual deployments and part of that is our personnel system. Many of (our soldiers, for example) have served two (back to back) tours in Bosnia, They slip through the cracks. And the commanders have to be sensitive to that issue. ...So they're not only operating inside the unit at a very fast pace, but

oftentimes they go off as individual replacements for an exercise or four months in Bosnia. They come back and they don't have any time to catch their breath.¹⁹

The Army's current OPTEMPO dilemma is further compounded by reductions in personnel and "fencing" of contingency units from peacekeeping and humanitarian aid operations. Currently, the corps and division level task organizations are not standard Army wide due to current contingency requirements. Those fragmented divisions and corps, not part of this contingency group, are unable to sustain combat readiness while executing OPTEMPO requirements.

In the continental U. S. (CONUS), a standing corps' daily task organization ranges from zero to four divisions and from zero to twelve brigades. The forward-deployed units such as V Corps and 2nd Infantry Division have only two ground maneuver brigades per division. Beside the inequity in ground maneuver task organization between forward deployed and CONUS based units is the philosophy of fencing three fully task organized divisions to execute only "go to war" contingency operations. These fenced divisions are not committed to any peacekeeping operations requiring more than a 30-day deployment or a force larger than a battalion Task Force.

Unfortunately, when the Army has only ten divisions and an OPTEMPO increasingly affected by peacekeeping operations, fencing three full strength divisions no longer seems a sound or affordable luxury. This situation is further compounded by the Army's method of

prioritization of personnel and equipment resources to the various corps.

In the case of V Corps, a forward-deployed unit, it is only a priority 3 for personnel fills. This is not terribly significant unless it is compared with other Army organizations stationed in CONUS who are a priority 1 or 2. This does not imply that V Corps is not getting personnel; it simply means they have to stand in line to have their requirements met. The Army's philosophy is

the prioritization of manning and equipping of units is based on "first to fight". It assumes that training and equipment availability is consistent throughout the total Army for both Reserve and Active component units. It assumes that all units are a potential source of fully trained personnel and fully maintained equipment. It further assumes that units other than first deployers are capable of short notice deployment for contingency missions. Tiered readiness assumes that training is the major "bill payer". It accepts the reality that not all units can conduct like levels of training. Personnel are managed by priority groups (PPG) contained within the unit's Department of the Army Master Priority List (DAMPL). This tiers personnel based upon a units likelihood of being deployed.²⁰

It is this fenced division rationale that keeps our forward-deployed units at a disproportionate task organization and resourced at a lower priority for personnel and equipment. However, this strategy does not seem in keeping with the requirements and guidance contained in our National Security Strategy.

In President Clinton's Preface, "A National Security Strategy for a New Century," he states

We have worked diligently within the parameters of the Balanced Budget Agreement to preserve and provide for the readiness of our armed forces while meeting priority military challenges identified in the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). The QDR struck a careful balance between near-term readiness, long-term modernization and quality of life improvements for our men and women in uniform. It ensured that the high readiness level of our forward-deployed and "first-to-fight" forces would be maintained. ...I am confident that our military is—and will continue to be—capable of carrying out our national strategy and meeting America's defense commitments around the world.²¹

If it was not for our forward presence, it is doubtful that the numerous world-wide nationalistic movements and decaying economies would allow our world to remain peaceful. Unfortunately, the forward presence mission has recently become even more difficult with the recent reductions in the force structure within all the Army's ground maneuver battalions. In a recent Army Times article it stated

We are reducing one-fourth of our combat maneuver battalion strength...in Germany, eliminating one combat company per maneuver battalion is exactly the equivalent of eliminating one of our four current maneuver brigades there.²²

This reduction in fighting vehicle systems, combined with the OPTEMPO dilemma, insufficient task organization, and a lower priority for personnel, are reasons why forward-deployed units cannot maintain their combat readiness. Based on reports from the NTC, CONUS based units are also exhibiting declining competency in their combat skills. This inability to demonstrate combat competency at the CTCs

has prompted some of our Army's senior commanders to change the philosophy of how they should train their units. These changes, if left unimpeded, could continue the erosion of our training readiness and our ability to execute our National Security Strategy.

The major change that commanders are making is the altering of the training conditions for each mission. Commanders are intentionally making the training standard more achievable. Some examples of these changes are: the withholding and/or reduction of OPFOR capabilities, increased mission preparation time for BLUFOR, and providing the BLUFOR non-doctrinal advantages in intelligence and weaponry.

At a recent NTC rotation, an Israeli General and Colonel had the opportunity to listen to a U. S. Army brigade commander's operations plan as well as watch the outcome of the battle. Their observations of the plan were:

- No reserve force identified to respond to unplanned events or exploit an unforeseen opportunity.
- The attacking force was evenly divided between both flanks and the center, thereby depriving the attack of a main effort
- The commander and his command post were 20 kilometers to the rear. He could not develop a feel for the attack or respond to unforeseen events as they occurred.
- There was little reconnaissance out before the attack.
- The exercise permitted 36-48 hours to prepare for a hasty attack. The Israeli commander thought 2-4 hours

to plan this type of mission would have been more appropriate.²³

The outcome was as predicted - the attack failed. However, the NTC cadre was going to let the unit run the mission again so the unit could learn from its mistakes. The intent of this action was to have the unit achieve some form of training value from the experience. However, the Israelis argued that the plan was so deficient that the brigade commander should not have been permitted to waste the money to execute it in the first place. "The NTC argued that the purpose of the training is not to 'win' but is to learn. ...It was unfortunate that the brigade commander in question did not have the opportunity to learn before he came to the NTC..."²⁴

In a letter from Major General Baxter, Commandant of the Artillery School, to Major General Ellis, Commander, 1st Armored Division, General Baxter explained why units were not doing well in planning and executing fire support missions at the NTC. He stated,

We do believe that decreasing training dollars and higher OPTEMPO has lessened the collective training opportunities for our field artillery battalions at home station. If true, this may partially explain why fires effectiveness is decreasing and not getting better at NTC. Based on analysis the United States Army Field Artillery School has completed, field artillery battalions must become more proficient at battalion level collective training tasks prior to arriving at the NTC. This is in your lane and not mine.²⁵

The decrease in unit competency at the battalion and brigade level at the CTCs is a direct result of division and corps' not having a training plan nor providing the time to execute it. This decreasing performance, however, does not justify making CTC training a customized event or as a replacement to home station training.

The lowering of the training standard at the Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC) was very evident from 1996 to 1998. Based on the OPTEMPO, USAREUR's chain of command was not able to effectively manage personnel to sustain training readiness or provide the time to train. The result was that training conditions at CMTC were changed to be much more user friendly. The value of training became more important than achieving the training standard. Brigade commanders and their staffs were allowed to determine how much they would participate in the rotation and therefore, many did not.

Additionally, the ground strength of the OPFOR was decreased and, during many of the battles, it was not allowed to implement all of its combat capabilities against the BLUFOR. For an historical comparison, a mechanized infantry task force rotating through CMTC in 1995 faced 20% more OPFOR combat killing systems than a tank heavy task force in 1998. However, the infantry task force killed 11% more of the OPFOR in 1995 than the tank heavy task force in 1998.²⁶ It is quite possible that this new philosophy of training for value and not to standard is a direct result of insufficient training time and a reduction in personnel resources.

At a recent meeting of the commanders of the CTCs, a major concern they expressed was that divisions had no brigade training plan. "Of the last four heavy brigades at NTC, none had trained as a brigade combat team prior to NTC." This situation prompted them to ask themselves, " How does a brigade combat team get comfortable with execution if there is not enough practice?"²⁷ Their discussion led to simulations training as a possible solution. The purposed concept is to have more simulation training exercises for Brigade and Battalion combat teams. It was noted that brigade commanders are very frustrated with simulations training. Their comments were that simulations are not realistic enough and do not stress their staffs equal to the challenge of a CTC rotation. Their final comment was that simulations, regardless of form, are a less than satisfactory substitute for the physical execution of unit maneuvers or the need to fight against a professional OPFOR.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the previous problems discussed concerning our combat readiness posture, I offer the following recommendations:

(a). A time management system needs to be implemented at division and corps level with the required task organization to make it work. In order to do this successfully, the task organization must be kept in multiples of three. For example, in V Corps there must be six ground maneuver brigades available for commitment to all OPTEMPO requirements. Currently, there are two brigades at Ft.

Riley, Kansas, task organized to V Corps for war deployment but they are assigned to III Corps. Therefore, they do not provide any resources or participate in any peacekeeping missions, Partnership for Peace operations, or other OPTEMPO requirements of V Corps. It would fix the OPTEMPO and time management problems in USAREUR if these two brigades were incorporated as operational and training assets although they are geographically separated.

A second recommendation to relieve the OPTEMPO dilemma would be to reduce the contingency corps force. This would increase the number of divisions available to CINCS and Corps commanders for training and mission application. If our Airborne division with accompanying Ranger, Armored Cavalry, and Special Operations Forces units were maintained as a "contingency" priority one forces, then the system would work. The remaining forces could be applied to current OPTEMPO requirements thereby allowing CINCs to more effectively plan, execute, and monitor their missions outlined in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP).

(b). Training standards, conditions, and procedures at the CTCs need to be standardized. Currently, not all brigade headquarters are integrated into the CTC training rotations. At CMTC, this is especially true. The level of participation runs the spectrum from a brigade commander only monitoring his units to the entire brigade staff actually deploying to the field and conducting operations. This situation is fostered by V Corps rotating an entire brigade

(three ground maneuver battalions) through a CMTC rotation sequentially in one block of time. Brigades conducting block gunnery in the same fashion enroute to CMTC further aggravate this OPTEMPO problem. An option is to have a training management cycle in which a battalion rotates through CMTC once every 18 months with its brigade headquarters participating in every battalion rotation. This would allow for the battalion to participate in a 6-month strategic deployment, do annual training requirements, and have time to conduct home station training on their combat tasks prior to CMTC. Additionally, multi-echelon training at the company, battalion, and brigade level must be planned and supported by the division and corps chain of commands. The endorsement of the battalion and brigade Quarterly Training Briefing and subsequent reflection on the division and Corps' training calendars would increase predictability of the planned training probably occurring. Battalions must conduct platoon and company level maneuvers prior to a CTC rotation and both battalion and brigade staffs must execute their combat tasks during every CTC opportunity.²⁸

(c). Personnel resource philosophies need to be scrutinized as regards the "augmentation" of soldiers from one "stay behind" unit to "plus up" a deploying unit. It has been the habit in USAREUR to task units remaining in theater to provide soldier augmentees to deploying units to get their strength levels up for executing peacekeeping or peace-enforcement missions. This practice continues to weaken the

fabric of cohesion and stability within these organizations remaining in theater. It affects a unit's ability to sustain "go to war" levels of proficiency in terms of multi-echelon training and staff competencies. Units remaining in theater should be maintained at authorized personnel levels and not become the "bill payers" to flesh out deploying units.

(d). Training conditions at our CTCs should not be subject to change by rotating unit commanders. Our Army needs to maintain the highest training standards and most demanding of conditions so as to be able to objectively assess their units on how well trained and ready they really are. Based on what has occurred at the CMTC, it is not possible to objectively assess, against any norm, the training competence of rotating battalions. The CTCs are not only the most realistic training available but are the best measure of combat competencies. We need to maintain an OPFOR that is the most formidable in the world and apply every "fog of war" factor against the BLUFOR that is possible. Our Army needs to maintain an ability to objectively assess our current capabilities across the force. It will never be in our nations' best interest to have a training standard at our CTCs that is not uniform or less than standard.

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ENDNOTES

¹ Anne W. Chapman, The Origins and Development of the National Training Centers (Ft. Monroe: Office of the Command Historian, TRADOC, 1992), p.109.

² Dennis Reimer, CSA speech to the National Press Club Federal News Service October 1998.

³ Anne W. Chapman, The Army's Training Revolution, 1973-1990 (Ft. Monroe: Office of the Command Historian, TRADOC, 1991), p.1.

⁴ Ibid, p.3-5.

⁵ John L. Romjue, The Army of Excellence; the Development of the 1980s Army (Ft. Monroe: Office of the Command Historian, TRADOC, 1997), p.1-9.

⁶ Anne W. Chapman, The National Training Center Matures 1985-1993 (Ft. Monroe: Military History Office, TRADOC, 1997), p.169-180.

⁷ Ibid, p.36.

⁸ John Shy, First Battles in Retrospect, Ten of America's First Battles (Lawrence Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1986), p. 329.

⁹ Ibid, p.331.

¹⁰ Ibid, p.331.

¹¹ William Richardson, Training: "Preparation for Combat" Military Review (March 1986), p.1.

¹² Ibid, p.3.

¹³ FM 25-101, Battle Focused Training HQDA, Washington D.C. 1990, p. C, 5-7

¹⁴ Winslow Wheeler, Report on Staff Trip to Army Training Facilities, 11 December 1997, p.3.

¹⁵ FM 25-101, Battle Focused Training HQDA, Washington D.C. 1990, p. 3-1 through 3-6

¹⁶ Ibid, p.3-6

¹⁷ Name Withheld, "Eliminating Combat Power: It's the Budget" Army Times 1998, p.30.

¹⁸ V Corps Task Organization, G6, Information Sources Support Office April 1996(Copy in the USAWC library)

¹⁹ Dennis Reimer, "Operating Tempo" Army Times 1998, p.13.

²⁰ U.S. Army War College, How the Army Runs, A Senior Leader Reference Handbook 1997-1998, Carlisle Barracks, p.5-8.

²¹ William J. Clinton, A National Security Strategy White House 1998, p.iii, iv.

²² Name Withheld, "Eliminating Combat Power: It's the Budget" Army Times 1998, p.30.

²³ Winslow Wheeler, Report on Staff Trip to Army Training Facilities, 11 December 1997, p.5.

²⁴ Ibid, p.6.

²⁵ Leo Baxter, Subject: Field Artillery and Fire Support Training Challenges, (Memorandum to Major General Ellis 20 January 1998).

²⁶ CMTC Statistics, TF 4-12 (July 1995) and TF 2-37 (March 1998) Combat Power Losses, 7th Army Training Center, Germany.

²⁷ Commanding Generals, "Discussion Topics for the Senior Leader Training Conference August 1998" 19 March 1998 (e-mail message).

²⁸ FM 25-101, Battle Focused Training HQDA, Washington D.C. 1990, p. D, 1-5

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