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POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

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1 October 1984

EAST EUROPE REPORT
POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

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POLISH-GDR RELATIONS CHARACTERIZED BY DISTRUST

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 28 Aug 84 p 10

[Article by J. Bremer: "Questions Warsaw Asks East Berlin"]

[Text] Warsaw, in August. The attack of the Soviet party paper PRAVDA on 27 July made clear the Soviet displeasure with the special path taken by the two Germanies with respect to "damage limitation" after the NATO decision on counterarmament (and the assent of the German Bundestag to this path last November). Warsaw criticism of this path is older. It developed from the reaction to a speech given by FRG Minister of the Interior Zimmermann on 29 January 1983 in Munich. At that time this politician recalled the fact that the German question is by no means finally settled by the treaty with Warsaw of 7 December 1970. On the contrary, he indicated, it remains open. At that time, the Warsaw criticism was directed solely at the FRG. But a short time later, shortly before the counterarmament decision of the Bundestag, it became evident in the GDR press that the SED was only reluctantly prepared to agree in its turn to the stationing of new tactical weapons on its territory as reply to a Western counterarmament. Warsaw, by contrast, although not affected at all, gave assurances of its willingness to support any step against NATO perceived as necessary by the Soviet Union. That was in the fall of 1983.

In the relationship between Warsaw and East Berlin most things take place quietly. But the mutual distrust is old. Nevertheless a political tourist traffic developed conspicuously between the two countries, which, to be sure, was interpreted differently at that time than today. Last fall it was felt that it suited the GDR, on behalf of the Soviet Union, too, to make Poland, after the escapades of the "Solidarity" period, once again a firm part of the Eastern Alliance. From the perspective of today, one could also draw the opposite conclusion. After all, the Polish party, marked by the stabilization after the years of unrest 1980 and 1981, came forward as an especially loyal adherent of socialist internationalism. That must prove difficult particularly in Poland, for in the case of the Polish population not much can be gained with an appeal to internationalism, but almost everything--with an appeal to nationalism. The Polish government increased the contact with the GDR. Previously, for example, it was always the GDR which wanted to influence Polish young people in a Marxist-Leninist vein. Now all of a sudden it was also in the interest of the Polish side to prepare a youth exchange. Poland issued an invitation, and many thousands of FDJ-members came to a Polish-German summer

camp at an old air field near Stettin.

Of course, to criticize the fraternal East German government is not one of the habits in Warsaw. But questions are being raised. Thus, the chairman of the foreign policy committee in the Polish parliament, the communist deputy Wojna, in March 1984 pursued the question of whether the partition of Germany is forever. As a result the subject was out in the open, 4 months before the attacks of PRAVDA. Then Wojna recalled the fact that the GDR leadership had given its consent to the reconstruction of a monument for Frederick the Great in its regular place "Unter den Linden". In so doing, he made the connection to a discussion which had already been held in Poland in 1979, when the GDR historian Ingrid Mittenzwei devoted a much-noticed biography to this Prussian king, whose policies led to the partition of Poland.

The Polish discord between "internationalism" as understood by Moscow and Polish national interest cannot be solved. Polish nationalism is limited by the status quo, for the present European order has supranational perspectives as its criterion: Above all, the security interests of the Soviet Union--or what Moscow passes out as its security interests. Within this framework, the Soviet Union did not return Lemberg and Wilno [Vilnius] to Poland, and instead Poland received Silesia, Pomerania, West and East Prussia. In his article, Wojna arrives at the conclusion that "regardless of all sentiments, no one in West Germany at present perceives the possibility of a reunification of Germany". To be sure, Wojna does not answer the question: "Forever Divided?"

Closer contact of any kind between Bonn and East Berlin calls forth uneasiness in Poland. Uneasiness was also called forth by a reference to these contacts in the speech of the CDU-deputy Ruehe in May in Warsaw. The Poles, Ruehe said, should take an example by the GDR and its policy vis-a-vis Bonn.

On 11 July of this year, that is to say still before the first article in PRAVDA, the Polish foreign minister, Olszowski, gave a speech at a session of the foreign policy committee of the parliament. For the first time, this panel met not in Warsaw, but--for easily discernible reasons--in Breslau, which, so it was said, "after centuries of foreign rule reverted to Poland". Olszowski accused politicians of the union parties in Bonn of revanchism. He lauded the GDR, which already in its border treaty of 6 July 1950, as he put it, took reality into account and as a partner in the Warsaw Pact since 14 May 1955 as the first "socialist state on German soil since its establishment" has been faithful to the Potsdam Agreement. Olszowski expressed this forcefully, as if his words were also intended to be heard in the GDR. He recalled the Yalta Conference, where it was decided that "Germany must never again be able to disturb world peace".

Up to this point, it would still have been possible to argue that all of this has nothing to do with the GDR. But on the eve of the 40th anniversary of the communist seizure of power on 21 July, Party and Government Chief General Jaruzelski himself gave open expression to Polish fears. The GDR Politburo member Krenz was sitting on the platform for honored guests in the Sejm when the general warned against any "return of a greater German expansionism", which now is being "revived under the pretense of a reunification". The GDR guest

appeared to have understood. Before workers of a machine shop in Breslau, he gave assurances a few hours later to the effect that the GDR alone is an insurmountable obstacle to all imperialist dreams of a greater German empire within the boundaries of 1937. But the subject was not settled with this speech. Six days after the speech of the general in the Sejm, the Soviet party newspaper PRAVDA took up the issue.

8970

CSO: 2300/635

PARTY IS ALWAYS RIGHT; MEDIA ROLE OF SED

Bonn RHEINISCHER MERKUR/Christ und Welt in German 17 Aug 84 p 14

[Article by R. Roebbing: "The Party as Trend Setter - SED Leadership Still Uses Media for Political Manipulation"]

[Text] Media reporting in the GDR is a resolute transmission of party directives, hence ultimately a political instrument of the SED government party. "Just carry a lot of it over TV, so that we can see something too," GDR citizens said to journalists on 8 July, the day of the "Berlin Sound Cloud" of Andre Heller's "fireworks of the century." As the Brandenburg Gate, at Unter den Linden, was widely blocked on its eastern side for reasons of "fire protection measures," East Berliners in the street could make out only fragments of the fireworks.

That the SED leadership did not deem a poll taken among GDR citizens on Heller's "peace fireworks" a matter "report worthy" was obvious. After all--on this the party executive agrees there--for all intents and purposes it is the "class enemy" who controls evening TV. Even in the sleepest province of the first German workers and farmers state, roof antennas are turned west. The Western "show window" offers enough material for discussions in enterprises and collectives; and thus a harmless firework may possibly be upgraded into something political when the people begin to ask questions. Generally, the GDR press and radio get 98 percent of their news from the official ADN news service. The great political guideline thus is set down from the outset. But occasionally there are exceptions.

Recently SCHWERINER VOLKSZEITUNG reported a fire in the Soviet barracks there--most unusual for the GDR. The safety in those ramshackle quarters is said to be not too good, nor can it be immaterial to the GDR that light switches and other electrical gadgets are filched from the GDR as "souvenirs" because such things are rare in the Soviet Union. Because journalism, and thus the trade classification of "journalist," in contrast to the West, is a legal classification, and one can become a journalist only after having been so certified through completing pertinent studies, and by being regarded as loyal to the party line, the Schwerin report is hardly a coincidence.

The GDR, as one may contend for every good reason today, had to reduce its restrictive media policy because of the program transmissions from ARD and ZDF, RIAS, SFB, Deutschlandfunk and Deutsche Welle. It signed the Final Act of Helsinki, which includes the free movement of correspondents--that of the GDR in Bonn and West Berlin as well. Specialists in communication today doubt that the East Berlin "elite" paper NEUES DEUTSCHLAND depends on the Soviet Union, as one media scholar once said. It was possible to show convincingly that only 5.5 percent of the news deals with the Soviet Union--and only 17 percent of it comes from Soviet sources.

They are complaining NEUES DEUTSCHLAND is "dry and dull." As it offers little analysis and often prints whole pages of communiques on official visits, it rather is a government information bulletin. The long columns with their boring text are said to make even functionaries yawn, yet they need the content for their discussions. Many people rather listen to RIAS.

A television viewer in the GDR, comparing his program with those from ARD and ZDF, will at least surmise or sense the selection process for political news. GDR news, on domestic matters, sometimes picked up critically by their own media, yet kept on a low flame, at once causes greater attention among spectators, listeners and readers because they suspect some larger dimension behind it. While the FRG citizen is spoilt, as it were, by self-critical reporting on the GDR, a GDR citizen constantly confronts the dilemma to put the exulted reports of his own media into perspective. GDR TV has a dual task: strengthening and consolidating the socialist principles and taking issue with the ideological adversary.

This is the reason why, e.g., the GDR foreign ministry paper HORIZONT devotes two pages to the Western "media monopolies." They are talking there of an abuse of the new technologies--but not in our sense, relative to possibly jeopardizing jobs through an all too brisk rationalization. The GDR is afraid of the "propaganda apparatus of imperialism."

The chief GDR television commentator, Karl-Eduard von Schnitzler, thus finds himself induced to "comment" on long passages of original sounds from ARD and ZDF. On 10 July, e.g., the "Black Channel" of East Berlin dealt with Israel, accusing it, along with South Africa, of "racism." Says Schnitzler: "Tel Aviv never has been honest; Pretoria and Chile are imitating it." He is hard to take when he talks about police, juridical and ideological terrorism. In his view, "the allies have to represent U.S. interests" yet--so says Schnitzler in ideological exhortation--one would have to be "deluded" to want to go through thick and thin for such an ally.

Who can then be surprised that Hans-Juergen Roeder, the EPD (Evangelical Press Service) correspondent accredited in East Berlin, was forbidden to report on a "Peace Sunday" in Magdeburg. Nor was another EPD roving correspondent-- in violation of the Helsinki accords--allowed to report on a rural youth Sunday in Potsdam. True enough, they do like it when Western media report in detail on visits by Trudeau, Palme, Papandreou and Craxi--yet the sovereignty still stops--at least for the time being--when it comes to ecclesiastically reformed "swords into plowshares."

5885

CSO: 2300/636

STATE GUARANTEES FULL EMPLOYMENT DESPITE AUTOMATION

East Berlin STAAT UND RECHT in German No 8, Aug 84 pp 617-623

[Article by W. Buechner-Uhder and E. Poppe: "Protecting Basic Socioeconomic Rights"]

[Text] It is not under the aspect of systematizing them in terms of legal theory that the basic socioeconomic rights¹ are to be examined here, though a signal is given to that within the basic rights system they command a greater weight of their own, if not a key position.² (Such considerations surely should be pursued.) Yet this contribution is concerned with emphasizing that the basic socioeconomic rights are indispensable to the working people both under bourgeois and socialist social conditions. Their being indispensable has several reasons: --In states which, by and large, determine the citizen's social position, freedom, equality, dignity and development through basic rights, freedoms and duties, basic socioeconomic rights give judicial expression to the measure of socially assuring the individual of the indispensable foundations for material life. They are the constitutional reflex to F. Engels' observation "that men must above all eat, drink, live somewhere and clothe themselves, must work, in other words, before they can dispute about government and engage in politics, religion, philosophy and so forth."³

--Socioeconomic rights also are imposed by the constitutional pledge to the people's sovereignty, which is to assure each citizen of having a share in the democratic shaping of society. Such participatory political action is only feasible when the citizen is legally assured of the satisfaction of his basic existential needs through his own work (and his education and so forth). Unless socioeconomic rights are regulated and guaranteed, the pledge to the people's sovereignty is hypocritical.

--The United Nations also in principle and repeatedly took account of the inviolability (objectivity) of socioeconomic rights under national law. That is attested to by the international economic, social and cultural rights convention ratified in 1966⁴ and by the General Assembly observation of 1977 that "the full implementation of political and civil rights is impossible without the implementation of the economic, social and cultural rights."⁵

For those reasons, the socialist states guarantee and regulate the basic socioeconomic rights.⁶ They were written into the constitution right after the triumph of the proletarian revolution, and it can be demonstrated by the development of the Soviet Union and the socialist states allied with it that the socioeconomic and other civil rights were ever more fully and extensively implemented and guaranteed while socialism grew stronger.

What happens in bourgeois states shows an entirely different trend. Verbal commitments to socioeconomic rights present a heterogeneous picture.⁷ The widely unknown West European Social Charter of 1961 is devoted to these issues, to be sure, yet the imperialist signatory states are systematically torpedoing the implementation of their own legal assurances. The FRG's Basic Law contains no socioeconomic rights. Article 12 regulates the free choice of occupation, job and place of training. But there are right now 2.5 million unemployed discovering how worthless that freedom right is, which offers a free choice only to the "entrepreneur" among the workers' surplus. The Japanese Constitution, on the other hand, stipulates the right and duty to work for all (Article 27) though the "legal guidelines" announced to be issued on it make one surmise that the Marxist analysis of bourgeois constitutional rights continues to apply, to the effect that every constitutional article contains its own antithesis, "in the general text it is freedom, the marginal comment cancels that freedom... all in the legal fashion, of course."⁸ The French Constitution also sets down "the duty to work and the right to be employed" for everyone. The nation "guarantees to all, mainly to children, mothers and old workers, health protection, material security, rest and leisure. Every human being finding himself unable to work for reasons of age, physical or mental condition, or because of the economic situation, has the right to obtain from the community the means to lead a decent existence," according to the preamble to the French Constitution of 1946.

Simply studying the texts of bourgeois constitutions reveals the monopoly bourgeois forces' ambivalence toward socioeconomic rights. They seem to accept the elemental demands of the working people, even elevate them into constitutional claims, assuming thereby the semblance of democracy and social statehood, and then they paralyze the rules set down by guidelines, adequacy reservations and other limitations. To expect much of these rights is as little to be recommended as placing trust in bourgeois election campaign promises. Even so it would be wrong to ignore these rights, possibly with reference to Marx who defined the right to work under capitalist conditions as a pious wish⁹ or by saying that under imperialist conditions socio-economic rights could never be implemented. Whatever motives may induce the ruling bourgeoisie to set down social rights, they can yet become instruments in the working people's legal struggle for better living conditions.¹⁰ In this sense H. Mies remarked at the Seventh DKP Congress: "The struggle for the right to work is the main battleground for the social conflict between capital and labor in the FRG today."¹¹ Even though they realized that the antagonism between capital and labor objectively ruled out an extensive implementation of the working people's socioeconomic rights, Marx and Engels did not hesitate a moment to identify with and articulate the workers movement's pertinent legal demands.¹² The criterion for rights and legal demands relative to the imperialist system must not be that system's limits and inadequacies but, exclusively, the working people's class interests in their struggle for a decent existence.

The imperialist state shows different ways of reacting to socioeconomic rights and legal demands, depending on the crisis or business cycle situation. Right now two basic tendencies prevail:

--In all imperialist states, even those that have written the socioeconomic rights into their constitutions or recognized them by joining the UN convention referred to, these rights are being massively violated. That is attested to by officially reported 12.5 million unemployed at this time in the region of the

European Community alone¹³ and 9 million in the United States.¹⁴ None of those states, whose apologists normally extol the so-called judicial authority of bourgeois rights and freedoms, grants the working people the legal right to engage in the implementation of socioeconomic rights through court or administrative approaches; lockout caprice by the entrepreneurs, sanctioned by the courts, is unconstitutional.

--The political and the theorists among the protagonists in the imperialist states are defaming the socioeconomic rights as, allegedly, threats to freedom, in order to justify either their absence or the paralyzing of their effects. In the dispute on the "pro and con over introducing basic social rights in the constitution" even the SPD's law policy conforms to the system. The Fifth Law Policy Congress arrived at the following conclusion: "Introducing basic social rights would not conform with the traditional doctrine on basic rights as actually these basic social rights are no subjective basic rights but the point is to introduce under their banner competencies for state intervention."¹⁵

Socialist constitutions, on the other hand, have always espoused the working people's elemental socioeconomic rights. And not that alone. They also guarantee the reality of these basic rights.

For the basic right to work, the citizens' crucial socioeconomic right, the GDR's socialist Constitution (Article 24) contains a specific catalogue of guarantees. It ensures that right by general and legal guarantees. A starting point for ensuring the right to work is the socialist ownership in the means of production, which includes the full utilization of the public labor capacity through the socialist management and planning of the social reproduction process. Together with other general guarantee mechanisms in the Constitution, these conditions are at once the prerequisite and general guarantees for securing the right to work.

This extensive guarantee mechanism turns the basic right to work into a real right for each citizen. It is expected of each citizen who is able to work that he will resort to this right which is equally important for the development of socialist society and of his own personality. So the Constitution also refers to the right to work and the duty to work in unity (Article 24 Paragraph 2). Through target-directed promotional measures the socialist state sees to it that all population groups can resort to that right at equal measure.¹⁶

As the socialist state generally ensures the right to work for its citizens, it also guarantees that the citizen will maintain the right to work and to a job that conforms to social requirements and personal qualifications. That task does not proceed automatically. Rationalization measures, the broad application of microelectronics and industrial robots, and other measures in scientific-technical progress cause jobs to be cut back or changed and manpower to be reassigned. The 1981-1985 Five-Year Plan alone has scheduled a total saving of 2,854 billion working hours, equivalent to a year's labor of 300,000 workers.¹⁷ That task still can and will be solved even under the more complicated requirements of the 1980's. Also for the future each GDR citizen can and will be guaranteed full employment and, thus, the right to work. That is possible because the scientific-technical progress is embedded in the economic strategy of the working class party that was issued by the 10th SED Congress and is being implemented as an overall social task. Part of that is that long-range conceptions are being developed for the most effective use of the public

labor capacity and rationalization is carried out jointly with the working people. Needed assignment changes in an enterprise have to be conferred on with the working people and to be clarified in accordance with public and individual needs. All these measures are carried out through cooperation with the trade unions which thus exercise a function in securing basic rights. Likewise, the extensive development of the continuing education system serves to secure the right to work. Above all, the rigorous application of socialist labor law and the trade union codetermination right vested in it in detail make possible that when changes are made in the labor process the working people can carry on their work without any threat to their existence. That also is guaranteed by precluding, in principle, any unilateral cancellation of the labor law contract by an enterprise (Labor Code Articles 54-59).

So the basic right to work is vested politically, economically and legally. The same applies to the other socioeconomic rights of the citizens.¹⁸ Equally guaranteed is the extensive protection of basic rights. If a citizen is prevented from the exercise of a basic right or a basic right of a citizen, or a legal claim resulting from it, is violated, he can resort to effective legal mechanisms to ensure his socioeconomic rights:¹⁹

--A formal complaint, presented through regular legal proceedings, in principle, to that organ of the state apparatus that has made the particular decision. This possibility concerns, e.g., decisions within the scope of the governmental housing management, touching on the right to dwelling space;²⁰

--an objection, to be brought, through regular legal proceedings, to the FDGB grievance commission, when it concerns benefits of the FDGB-managed social insurance for workers and employees.²¹ These possibilities relate, e.g., to pension payments or benefits from the kreis social security office and, thus, to the kind of civil rights that are spelled out, mainly, in Articles 35 and 36 of the Constitution;

--an application or objection likewise brought, through regular procedural provisions, before a social court when the legally guaranteed rights and interests of the citizens under the jurisdiction of the given social court are infringed.²² While the social courts, in the form of conflict commissions, primarily deal with labor litigation and thereby mainly protect the uninhibited implementation of the basic right to work, the legal protection by arbitration commissions mainly relates to the right to dwelling space and to personal civil rights as well as to the protection of the right to work in the socialist cooperatives;

--litigation, to be brought before a government court, based on the Code of Civil Procedure. That is also possible for administrative litigations when a law or some other law regulations provide for the competency of a court.²³ This relates to the right to the protection of the citizens' health and work capacity, as e.g. in harm done by inoculations when disputes arise over the amount of compensation set down by GDR State Insurance.²⁴ As legally equivalent to litigation is held, according to Article 8 Paragraph 1 in the Code of Civil Procedure, an objection to the ruling of a social court in civil and labor law cases. A citizen has the possibility, e.g., to appeal against a ruling by a conflict commission in labor law cases to the kreis court, labor law chamber;

--a petition, brought before the organs of the state apparatus, enterprises, the people's representations and so forth, which then leads to a thorough-going review of the citizens' total concern.²⁵ In the field of socioeconomic rights, it is mainly used in the business of making applications. It is also possible, and enjoys the same real protection, when a case relates to the

realization of the basic right to work and no specific legal regulations are at hand. For instance, labor offices in the kreis councils can impose on the enterprises quotas for employing citizens when public or economic reasons require it.²⁶ The enterprises have the obligation, in accordance with such orders, to offer the citizen a labor contract in line with his qualifications and abilities.

Regardless of which type of legal mechanism a citizen uses to ensure his right, the competent organs, through legal procedures, have to examine the claim and see to it that legality is observed. Specific control and supervisory organs furthermore are responsible for seeing the laws and other legal regulations strictly observed.²⁷ That applies, e.g., also to petitions from the citizens over the realization of which the council and people's representation exercise regular supervision. Anyone despising or infringing civil rights is called to account.

All legal mechanisms for protecting civil rights thus have the same legal validity. Their attribution to the different basic socioeconomic rights respects the socialist state's experiences with expert consultation and decision-making on citizen affairs. Typical of that is that often representatives of social organizations or work collectives are drawn into drafting decisions or, as in the case of social courts, the working people themselves get engaged in jurisdiction.

Attributing various legal mechanisms to the protection of specific basic socioeconomic rights, as of the civil rights as such, forbids any dogmatic rigidity but is subject to the same dynamic development as the basic rights themselves are. Further to explore the guarantee mechanisms for all basic rights and to examine them in terms of their most efficient application should be one of the most urgent tasks in basic rights research.

FOOTNOTES

1. According to the GDR Constitution, these mainly are the right to work, the right to employment and its free selection, the right to pay according to the quality and quantity of the work, the right to equal pay for equal work output for men and women, adults and adolescents, the right to a creative participation in the elaboration and fulfilment of plans and the management of enterprises and of the economy, the right to leisure and recreation, the right to the protection of health and of the labor capacity, the right to social old-age welfare and disability care, and the right to dwelling space.
2. In his "Marxismus und Menschenrechte" [Marxism and Human Rights], Berlin, 1982, p 135, H. Klenner writes: "Although it is generally recognized among Marxists that the key for understanding human (and naturally also personality) development is found in work, it has thus far not been attempted yet, in the debate on classifying the basic rights, to proceed from the Marxist distinction between working for external purposes and the human capacity development that conceives of itself as an end in itself." Cf. also labor law textbook "Arbeitsrecht," Berlin, 1983, p 69.
3. K. Marx/F. Engels, "Werke" [Works], Vol 19, Berlin, 1973, p 103.

4. Cf. GBL [legal gazette] Part II 1974 p 106.
5. "Resolution 32/130. Alternative Possibilities, Ways and Means within the UN System for Better Ensuring an Effective Exercise of Human Rights and Basic Freedoms, as of 16 December 1977," reprinted in SCHRIFTEN UND INFORMATIONEN DES DDR-KOMITEES FUER MENSCHENRECHTE, 1978, No 1, pp 52 f. This resolution was adopted without veto but with 16 abstentions. Among those who abstained were Belgium, the FRG, France, the UK, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United States.
6. Cf. "Grundrechte des Buergers in der sozialistischen Gesellschaft" [Basic Civil Rights of Citizens in Socialist Society], Berlin, 1980, pp 76 f, 173 f.
7. Cf. also constitutional law textbook "Staatsrecht buergerlicher Staaten," Berlin, 1980, pp 182 ff.
8. K. Marx/F. Engels, "Werke," Vol 8, Berlin, 1960, p 127.
9. Ibid., Vol 7, Berlin, 1973, pp 41 f.
10. In this context the remark made by R. Jarosch/W. Menzel, "Crisis in the State Monopoly Government System and Basic Rights," STAAT UND RECHT, 1977, p 481, appears rather too much of an absolute. It reads: "And even where one or the other, under the pressure from the working class, had to be vested in the constitutions (as in Italy or France), these rights are fictitious."
11. H. Mies, "Peace Must Triumph! Now All the More: Jobs Instead of Atomic Rockets!" NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, 7/8 January 1984, p 3.
12. Cf. E. Poppe, "Marx and Bourgeois Human Rights," STAAT UND RECHT, 1983, pp 272 f.
13. Cf. NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, 28/29 January 1984, p 5.
14. Ibid., 6 February 1984, p 2.
15. "The Fifth SPD Law Policy Congress Proceedings by G. Wehling," RECHT UND POLITIK, West Berlin, 1980, No 1, p 31; also cf. H. Kluge, "Right-Wing Social Strategy Against Social and Democratic Rights," EINHEIT, 1984, p 161.
16. One may for example refer to the special rights for working women and mothers in the Labor Code (Articles 240-251) or the measures to ensure the right to work for convalescents (GBL Part I 1973 p 500).
17. Cf. Comrade Erich Honecker, "Bericht des Zentralkomitees der Sozialistischen Einheitspartei Deutschlands an den X. Parteitag der SED" [SED Central Committee Report to the 10th SED Congress], Berlin, 1981, p 57.
18. Cf. "Grundrechte des Buergers . . .," op. cit., pp 173 ff.

19. The breadth of legal protection available under socialist conditions was cogently summarized in H. Klenner, op. cit., p 137, as follows: "As little as here the court counts as the only organ that guarantees civil rights, it is of course also not the only organ that is not competent to do so."
20. Cf. Article 22 of the ordinance on dwelling space management of 14 September 1967, GBL Part II p. 733 with reference to the ordinance on adapting the disciplinary and misdemeanor penalty provisions and of penalty instructions in force--adaptation ordinance--of 13 June 1968, GBL Part II p 363, Rep. p 827, and to the ordinance on the new rules on legal mechanisms to oppose rulings from state organs, of 24 June 1971, GBL Part II p 463, Rep. p 544.
21. Cf. Article 88 of the decree on mandatory social insurance for workers and employees--SVO--of 17 November 1979, GBL Part I p 373.
22. Cf. Articles 18 ff of the GDR State Council resolution on the activity of the conflict commissions, of 12 March 1982, GBL Part I p 274.
23. Cf. Article 4 of the law on the constitution of GDR courts--court constitution law--of 27 September 1974, GBL Part I p 457.
24. Cf. Article 16 in the second implementing regulation for the law on preventing and fighting infectious diseases in man--protective vaccinations and other protective practices--of 20 January 1983, GBL Part I p 33.
25. Cf. law on processing petitions from citizens--petition law--of 19 June 1975, GBL Part I p 461.
26. Cf. Article 2 of the order on improving the effectiveness of the public labor capacity, of 25 May 1979, GBL Part I p 115.
27. Cf. "Grundrechte des Buergers . . . ," op. cit., pp 222 f.

5885

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HONECKER GREETS, AWARDS RETURNING ATHLETES

East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND in German 1/2 Sept 84 p 3

[Speech by E. Honecker: "Securing Peace Also Means Assuring Future for Sports"]

[Text] Dear Athletes!

Dear Friends and Comrades!

On behalf of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany, the State Council and the Council of Ministers of the German Democratic Republic, I cordially welcome the women and men athletes, the coaches and officials, the sports scientists and sports physicians to this festive awards program. For the party and state leadership it is a great joy to meet with the most successful women and men athletes of our country in the summer sports. Your achievements, dear friends, have found high recognition throughout the world. Our republic is rightfully proud of you.

In the spring we were able to welcome here in the State Council the most successful members of the GDR team that participated in the 14th Olympic Winter Games. With magnificent results they represented in Sarajevo our socialist homeland, the German Democratic Republic. At that time, we expressed our firm conviction that the athletes in the summer sports, too, [will] oblige with equally outstanding performances.

However, the U.S. Administration and the organization committee for the Olympic Games in Los Angeles sacrificed the Olympic ideals to their egoistic interests and to profit. Thus the GDR National Olympic Committee was forced, in the interest of the honor, the dignity and the life of our athletes, to forego participation in the Olympic Games. But nothing can shake the faithfulness of the athletes of the GDR to the Olympic Charter. They have been, are, and always will be defenders of the Olympic idea.

Olympic Ideals and Socialism Belong Together

Whenever and wherever athletes of the GDR set out to compete, they feel obliged to the peace-promoting mission of sports. "To contribute to the establishment of a better and more peaceful world"--it is by this idea of the first rule of the Charter of the International Olympic Committee that they let them-

selves be guided. Our women and men athletes grow up in the spirit of friendship among nations and humanism. This spirit determines their thinking and conduct while they learn and work, during their training and in competition, in the happy hours of victory as well as in defeat.

Faithful to the Olympic Charter, you have during this summer again achieved top performances with admirable athletic ability and exemplary fighting spirit. They testify anew to the fact that the athletes of the GDR determine the world peak in many types of sports. The high-class and interesting contests which during the past few weeks were held in the GDR and in other socialist countries were honest and comradely. One more time it became evident that the Olympic ideals and socialism belong firmly together.

Dear Athletes!

The successful development of the socialist sports movement of the GDR is inseparably connected with the development and growth of our workers' and farmers' state. With its establishment on 7 October 1949, it was possible to begin a new chapter in sports, too, on German soil. For the first time, a state had come into being in which the promotion of youth and sports was among the principles of politics. Our workers' and farmers' power opened up stadiums and sports facilities for all and promoted talents for the benefit of the individual and for the benefit of the people. Since their first participation in the Olympic Games, the women and men athletes of the GDR won a total of 157 gold medals, 147 silver medals, and 141 bronze medals. They won 544 titles in world championships and 433 titles in European championships. These achievements speak for themselves.

The Baton Passed On

Especially in the 35th year of the existence of our republic, we remember magnificent athletes who, with their ability, in the truest sense of the word have written socialist sports history. I am thinking of Harry Glass and Wolfgang Behrendt, who gained the first Olympic medals for the GDR. Dramatic contests and victories are associated with names like "Taeve" Schur, Helga Haase, Wolfgang Nordwig, Gerhard Grimmer, Gabi Seyfert, Roland Matthes, Karin Janz, Siegfried Brietzke, and many others, who are held in high esteem by our people.

You, dear sports-enthusiasts, you are today successfully carrying on the baton taken over from this sports generation. Representative of the many successful women and men athletes of this summer, I would like to call special attention to:

--Uwe Hohn, who with his phantastic world record in the javelin throw has opened up the gate to new sports dimensions;

--Marlies Goehr and Marita Koch, who for years have been among the fastest sprinters in the world.

--Birgit Fischer and Ruediger Helm, who internationally are an example of consistence and high performance capacity for an entire canoe generation;

--Lutz Hesslich, who in the Friendship Games once more demonstrated the highest sports mastery in the track bicycle sprint and set a new outstanding world record;

--Maxi Gnauck, who in these days once more in an impressive manner confirmed her place among the world's best gymnasts;

--the women and men swimmers, who in the high-level international competition won 16 victories and in so doing were able to register again 4 world records;

--the women and men rowers, who during the high points of this year's competition again proved their international top position;

--the players of the national team in handball, who in exciting contests again proved to be the best of this type of sport in the world.

High Incentive for Hundreds of Thousands

For hundreds of thousands of girls and boys, the sports achievements of our best are an incentive for their own training, for endurance, tenacity and courage, for high goals in sport and in school, in professional and social life. All of us are witnesses in regard to the high input with which our top athletes are helping to realize the decisions of the 7th Gymnastics and Sports Meeting of the German Gymnastics and Sports Federation. Your results in the "Sports Relay GDR 35" are an expression of the firm association of the women and men athletes with the policy of the SED, with our socialist homeland, the German Democratic Republic.

For me it is a special joy to express to you, the best, to your coaches and officials, the sports scientists and physicians, indeed, our entire socialist sports organization, the GDR German Gymnastics and Sports Federation, the thanks and recognition of the GDR party and state leadership for the magnificent achievements.

From the Triad of Love to Peace

Dear Sports-Enthusiasts!

Socialism, youth and sports--that is a triad of joy in living, the willingness to perform, and the love of peace. If tomorrow we celebrate the World Day of Peace everywhere in our republic with demonstrations, we can note in good conscience that every day since the founding of our republic has been filled with our tireless endeavor not to permit the outbreak of a war from German soil ever again.

For the German Democratic Republic we can say this in the present acute international situation with full responsibility. For the Federal Republic of Germany, which is being transformed into a launching pad for U.S. nuclear weapons and cruise missiles against the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, this unfortunately does not apply. It is all the more necessary, in accordance with the proposals of the Soviet Union and the participating states of the Warsaw Treaty, to see to it that the military-strategic balance is pre-

served at a constantly lower level and a situation is created in which Europe is free of nuclear weapons.

In alliance with the Soviet Union and the other fraternal countries we are strengthening our state of peace, socialism, freedom and human dignity. The great echo to the appeal of the Berlin Youth Brigade Harder, to achieve record performances on the occasion of the World Day of Peace, shows how very much our people associates its desire for peace with deeds for peace.

With your impressive sports results, you have placed yourself in the ranks of the many outstanding citizens of our country, who attain great achievements in all areas in order to make the 35th year of the republic the most successful one in our history. That is the correct response to the policy of confrontation and increased armament of the most aggressive circles of imperialism, which conjures up great dangers for world peace. In view of this fact, peaceful men appreciate all the more the fact that the socialist community, with its strongest bastion, the Soviet Union, is doing everything possible to keep mankind from nuclear destruction.

Confession During the FDJ Torchlight Procession

Sports and peace cannot be separated from one another. And the GDR became a land of sports precisely because it has always been and will always be a land of peace. To secure the peace also means to give a future to sports. Without the peaceful living together of the nations, there are no sports contests. This is also being increasingly recognized by women and men athletes throughout the world. For this reason they are becoming involved in the preservation of peace, together with millions of people. We are firmly convinced that you, too, during the FDJ torchlight procession on the eve of the 35th Anniversary of the GDR, will again express: The love, the faithfulness and the deed of the women and men athletes belong to our socialist homeland, the German Democratic Republic.

Dear Friends and Comrades!

At the suggestion of the Politburo of the SED Central Committee and the GDR Council of Ministers, I award you, in recognition and appreciation of outstanding achievements, the honorary title "Hero of Labor", the "Order of Merit of the Fatherland", and the "Banner of Labor" Order. I congratulate you most sincerely on the high decorations and wish you the best of everything and new successes in honor of our socialist homeland and for the glory of socialism.

8970
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MORE SOCIALIST RESPONSIBILITY URGED FROM DOMESTIC MEDIA

Budapest PARTELET in Hungarian No 3, Mar 84 pp 11-17

[Article by Erno Lakatos, Head of the CC Agitation and Propaganda Department:
"Current Questions on Information Policies"]

[Text] Recently the Politburo discussed the work of Hungarian Radio and Hungarian Television, the experiences since the separation of the two institutions a decade ago, and the lines of further progress. The comprehensive political evaluation of these two influential means of the mass-communication systems may provide lessons not only for information policy but also for viewers, listeners, the broader mass of newspaper readers and public opinion, and among other things it may provide orientation to the debates and exchanges of ideas that are constantly being renewed.

The Politburo acknowledged the successful and useful activity of both radio and television, and valued that work which promotes the understanding, approval and realization of policy as a whole and in part. Of course, the programs play a useful role not only in political information and in the raising of awareness but also carry out an important cultural, educational and entertainment mission--at a higher level according to the evaluation of the Politburo. It stresses the importance of the fact that in our times we are witnesses, both world-wide and in Hungary, to a mass communication "explosion." The volume of news and information that is put out--thanks to the great achievements of technology based on microelectronics--is doubled within a 5 to 7-year period.

The main factor in the accelerated development and quality change is the electronic press. The abundance of news services, live transmissions showing world events, simultaneity, the experience of pictured scenes have affected the openness and angle of our point of view at the same time challenging the press, information and the entire raising of awareness. The response that must be given to the challenge does not assume merely a new kind of work distribution and cooperation among press, radio and television that is appropriate to the new situation, but a correction of biases, fuller information, and an exacting raising of awareness and taste. There is still much to do in developing the image we have of the world and ourselves, in shedding light on the interrelationships, the historical and political background.

Since we want to expand, not limit informational possibilities, the responsibilities of the editorial offices are increasing in regard to the selection of information and orientation. We regard as particularly important the basic raising of consciousness and taste, which will help the viewer and listener to weigh real values and high-level selectivity. In all this we cannot emphasize enough the role and responsibility of television and radio.

The mass effect of the two institutions, television in particular, can be gauged, among other things, by the fact that a given interesting report which evokes a great deal of attention frequently becomes an event, a national subject of conversation. The program directors and reporters understand this very well, and that is why in their work they search and often find sensational material. In itself this is a praiseworthy ambition which strives for maximum reaction to noteworthy achievements. But the trouble is that in this exertion sight is lost of the goal, and the cause for a reaction at any cost overcomes substance. Or the person of the reporter intrudes unjustifiably, making up with aggressiveness and arrogance for the lack of evidence or a real story. The possibilities for cheap success and the desire for the limelight frequently lure the reporter down this path. For this reason, in the end the viewer and listener receive a distorted mirror of reality deformed by the exaggeration of negative phenomena, the search for extremes and bad style.

Such weaknesses in editorial and reporting work prompted the Central Committee to emphasize again in April of last year: "It must be recognized that the press, radio and television are not the property of those who work there but of the socialist society. All those who work there must realize the determinations of the people who are building socialism, and must serve its goals." As compared to the situation that existed several years ago reality as portrayed by television and radio is undoubtedly more complex, realistic and balanced. First of all, there has been a drop among presentations in political programs which do not meet the real demands of the viewers or actual political needs. But there are still too few newspaper and artistic creations which show the everyday affairs of construction, the struggles and life of the working man.

High-level cultural programs on radio and television are essential for the development and consolidation of the socialist value system. It is desirable that increasingly more works be created which deal with the problems of socialist reality and help in the advancement of socialist ideas. We must increase the number of those programs which for most of the viewers and listeners offer a high-level, lasting experience and promote the moral realization of socialist behavioral forms and cultural entertainment. At the same time, we must not tolerate, either on radio or television, obscenity, filthy talk, open eroticism that offends public taste, brutality, and the propagation of baser instincts. The saying "teher alatt no a palma" [the palm tree is growing under great burden] can also be applied with a little change to all the work of mass information. Information is only one of these "burdens" and perhaps not even the most important one. Much more important is the fact that it is a huge job nowadays to make global political events and domestic political problems understandable and the requirement level is being raised higher and higher. Understandably under such conditions the question rises how it is

possible to meet the requirements on information at a continuously and evenly high level. What are the new means and methods which have become indispensable? Do the changing external and internal conditions make it necessary to examine and adapt information policy to the new situation?

Before trying to answer the questions and analyzing the tasks and common problems, it is worthwhile to tarry a bit by a basic concept, the clarification of which is essential if we are to look ahead from a common platform. In doing things on a large scale, it is common practice to limit the means of information to the press, radio and television. But these make up only a part--although clearly the most important elements in their effect--of information, the system of means for persuasion. And yet, information has other channels also, which in some cases fill the "gaps" of mass communication. I am primarily thinking of the agitational propaganda forums: party days, activist meetings, mass organization conferences, membership meetings and personal talks, plus various types and levels of educational courses.

Mass communication--the written and electronic press--is more complex and manifold than many assume on the basis of the daily and weekly press. Therefore when I speak of information problems we must study this greater and lesser complex as a unified whole. Otherwise we will receive a distorted picture; only a segment of reality, as it is torn from its interrelationships, can be the object of the study.

We must bear all this in mind when we emphasize that in its whole history the press was an important political means for the prevailing power, and it still is. The press reflects the political goals and substance of power. Wherever the press openly undertakes its political obligations--and this is the case with socialist journalism--mass communications serve its policy.

The broadening of socialist democracy and its enhancement is a basic interest and pressing need of Hungarian society in its present condition. Essential to this is the expansion of information in strengthening the role of social openness. The list of tasks related to this can be reviewed only when knowing the changes in the internal and external conditions. There are also principles, however, which remain valid for the press--and above all the socialist press--and in fact they are truly being realized in our times. Among these is the Leninist principle that the press is a collective organizer, agitator and propagandist; moreover, the well-known three requirements are that information must be fast, accurate and creditable.

The information explosion in a natural way developed the technical conditions for the realization of these requirements. Our political interests are tied to our identification with the acceleration of news circulation. In this regard, we attended in the past decade to developing and applying the technology that is adjusting to the requirements of the age. Although the development process is by no means finished, we have by now created the most necessary conditions. Our news agency, the Hungarian Telegraph Office, has become a key station in international traffic in news. Thus it is possible for our population to be aware in minutes of any event at any point in the world. Building on this, our information institutions can hold their own in international

competition in publishing news and commenting on it. The favorable technical endowments clearly and increasingly demand that we implement in a unified way the requirements that have been put on information.

On whom or on what does the implementation of these requirements depend? Proceeding from the foregoing the answer is clear: on one hand it depends on policy and on the other hand on the entire system of informational means. We must know and clarify what kinds of requirements we want to meet, where they come from and where they point to.

The greatest contradiction--and therefore misunderstanding--is how the press can meet at one time the apparently dual requirements of policy and public opinion. I am convinced that there is not, and cannot be, a lasting contradiction between policy and public opinion. It is a basic human demand that everyone wants to see clearly the matters in the world around him in order that he may make decisions of greater or lesser importance in full possession of information. Given present technical development, we cannot suffer any kind of lag in this respect. Therefore, the requirements for speed has increased. Or can there be some justifiable interests which bespeak a "delay" of certain news? Yes, there can be and this in fact can promote the realization of the equally important requirements of accuracy and creditability.

Sometimes in these areas a contradiction may develop between the needs of information and policy, chiefly when the publication of so-called sensational news is being considered. In certain shops of the Hungarian press the intent is evident to publish "sensational news" above all, even sacrificing clear, correct content for this purpose. Because a true sensation is a national subject of conversation, it is at such times that care must be taken that the content shows the essence and importance of the information, in its actual interrelationships and in accordance with the importance of the given event. (Of course there are cases where the delay is for a certain partial or assumed interest. These cases must be clarified, and the conditions must be created to eliminate such delays in the future.)

All this does not alter the fact that speed is a basic requirement for the socialist press. In fact, we must increase speed by relying on our technical means. In the future, press management will have higher requirements in this area. If we can help it, no one should acquire a political or psychological advantage over us by a more rapid publication of news.

Credibility and accuracy are not primarily a professional but above all a political requirements. The constantly expanding democracy of our society requires this daily. In order to see to it that the real interest of society as a whole is embodied in socialist construction we must solve a number of problems in information. The press should not simply give an account of what is interesting but what is important. If an event is important--and we can convince people of its importance--then the communication is interesting for the viewer, listener and reader. It is true that frequent publication can magnify insignificant matters, but they do not become important in this way.

What is important, of course, must not be decided by one person alone who considers himself infallible. Democracy carries not only the right to information but closely linked to it the responsibility stemming from the obligation to provide information. The question of what is important can be judged only with adequate preparation, political and professional commitment and skill. What interests determine what the selection will be? It is a basic principle of our informational policy that we must speak of everything which interests and engages people and develops their orientation, political sophistication and knowledge of the country and the world. The responsibility, therefore, lies in what we say and how we say it. We know that there is an unavoidable need for selection if for nothing else because of the tremendous volume of information. The favorite method of the middle-class press is to "overinform," it puts out a flood of news without differentiating between important and unimportant, making it in this way impossible for one to find his way among the events and to recognize the actual interrelationships. Since selection is in itself a means and method of influencing, it must be done with a great sense of responsibility. The informant must be guided by the goal that the information needs to be spoken or rendered readable in a circle where it fulfills actual political and social requirements.

The main goal of socialist information is to see that essential political interrelations are recognized, understood and accepted. To do this, the informant must be adequately informed. The informant must have up-to-date information on the development of policy, the process of its implementation, the situations, the small and big interrelationships, and he must be well informed in the subject with which he deals. But this is not enough. He must undertake this political service both as the representation of his press agency and as a private person.

The MSZMP recognizes the existence of varying interests in socialist society, it has built up a system for the discovery, representation and conflict of interests, establishing thereby the conditions for the social solution of interest conflicts. It is the basic task of the press to mirror all these things faithfully and promote by its own means a fast and successful solution to the conflicting interests.

A condition of this is that the participation of the means of information in the preparation of decisions and resolutions and in introducing alternatives must be more successful in the future. The political leadership and press management must find the ways by which through mass information more and more people can participate in the preparation and passing of decisions and control over their execution. We can be encouraged in this by the successful work distribution which is developing between the daily press and the specialized press.

The interpretation of the various demands must also be clarified. It is the continuous task of TV, radio and the press to awaken a demand in regard to behavior, morality and taste. There are rightful demands which require publicity and support. But there are also individual and group interests that should not be handled as proper social interests. This refers to custom, consumption and style. No one has the right with microphone or pen to present public opinion

with individual demands as though they were social demands. We cannot refuse to accept the task--it would be a serious error--of satisfying the public's desire to know. To do this we must know what effect each of our steps and measures have on public opinion, and to what kind of question the population expects answers. But it would be advisable for us to entrust these surveys to experts who by their training perform their work in institutions and at a good, high level. By relying on the results of this work--and with proper political insight--we can decide what questions the press may undertake to represent. It should be clearly seen that the press cannot represent unfounded demands (because they are unappeasable), and the efforts of small groups and regions that are in conflict with the public interest.

For expressly professional-type debates the mass information means with the greatest effect are not the most suitable, but rather the specialized press and other forums. The structure of our press--the modernization of which is in process--is differentiated enough to meet the needs of the different subclasses.

A demand is sometimes voiced for creating a partnership relation between mass information and politics as a requirement of the times. The press itself is a political institution among other political institutions. By this fact, it appears valid to maintain that harmony is necessary in the institutional system and cooperation is essential. The combined system of political means serves the policy that carries out the guidance of society. For the political leadership the press is an indispensable ally. In appreciation of this it regards the press as a comrade, it pays attention to its signals, it needs its experiences and makes use of its decisions. The press itself is a forum, the terrain for political development. And this is how it is also in practice, although with less than smooth sailing at times.

Party guidance of the press takes place above all by virtue of the work of communists running the press. Of course, we are not speaking here of a partnership because among other things the party also consists of communist journalists, who--if they take their obligations seriously and take advantage of their rights--participate in the discussions of policies and help shape them. This also refers to the members of the other mass organizations and movements, who also participate in working out the tasks of building society and carrying out the work. In this way the whole society increasingly becomes a partnership, and the strengthening of the partner relationships is quite a task, giving a greater and broader scope of duties to all of us who have obligated ourselves to the service of the people in common politics and in the field of information, agitation and propaganda.

The leading bodies of the party always devote a great deal of attention to developing the means of mass information and to deepening cooperation. The 9 November 1983 resolution of the Politburo established among other things that "radio and television should participate increasingly in preparing for important decisions and in making measures understood and accepted. The regular appearance of party and state leaders on the picture tube, their role on radio is indivisible for an increased effectiveness of political work and the development of democracy."

The Politburo supported the development lines in the activities of the two institutions. Thus Petofi Radio will convert this year to a daily 24-hour, continuous program of broadcasting, and it shall create the conditions for district radio-programming dealing with the life of the capital city, Szeged and the Debrecen agglomeration.

A political position has been taken for the development of a new TV-program policy concept. A step forward will be made necessary both by the expected expansion of social and economic development and artificial satellite programming. The program which starts earlier but is still a second, supplementary program shall gradually become in 4 to 5 years an all-day program of educational character offering actual possibilities of choice. At the same time there will be an increased role for district transmissions and local cable television.

Of course as a living process, our information policy is criticized from time to time. This is true particularly when the implementation of the principles of information policy are obstructed by outside subjective and objective factors and political situations. The points of view expressing political requirements we wish to have accepted and implemented first of all by political means and not by setting up prohibiting signs, for this would be a practice not in harmony with our principles. At the same time, these particular situations do not justify reexamination of our political principles. On any day complicated affairs may, and do, come up, but these are not a consequence of our principles. What is needed is the consistent implementation of these principles and their continuous further development as required by practice. The credibility of information can be strengthened in this way, as well as the confidence in which is at the same time confidence in policy.

Given the present difficult domestic and foreign conditions the solution of tasks which test the individual man and the community require devoted work and special effort from everyone. Identification with tasks, initiative, the surfacing of existing material and intellectual reserves require a better initiation of the population into public affairs. Therefore the development of information is not only a task for radio and television, or the task of the press as it derives from work distribution, but in the most comprehensive sense of the word it is a public and social matter.

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REVIVAL OF POLITICAL DISCUSSION CLUBS DESCRIBED

Budapest IFJUKOMMUNISTA in Hungarian Apr 84 pp 44-47

[Article by Peter S. Fold: "'Touchy' Subjects--Always a Full House"]

[Text] There might be more than 500 of us in the Karl Marx University of Economics auditorium, designed for 300 people. The audience, mostly students, is listening attentively to the lecture by Elemer Hankiss, department head of the MTA [Hungarian Academy of Sciences] Institute of Sociology. The title of the subject already indicates that we are not in one of the "ideological clubs," also exhorted by Tamas Cseh, where activists with faces lined with problems try to turn Hegel from upside down to upright again. The author of the book "Diagnosis" entitled his current lecture: "Functional Disturbances in Society."

Of course, functional disturbances are present not only in society; the club which had seen better days--and mainly better conditions--before, is nowadays functioning under rather difficult circumstances. Because of renovation of the university, they had to move from the small but cozy club site at the half-story level to the auditorium. In addition to the somewhat classroom-like character of the hall, the diligent hammering, drilling and chiselling--which recently has extended into the evening--is disturbing the speaker and the audience.

The POLTAR Club of the "Kozgazosok" [nickname for economists] was formed in 1976--originally under the name: POLVAX--and it rapidly became known and famous through the persons of the invited lecturers and the topics discussed here.

One of the founders of POLVAX-POLTAR is Laszlo Szentirmay, who has been a co-worker at the Hungarian Radio since finishing his university studies. Since 1976, he has been tirelessly organizing and leading--in social work--the undoubtedly most popular political club in Budapest. His coworker, Zoltan Pap, is working in the Institute of Social Sciences of the Central Committee of the MSZMP; he joined the activities shortly after the start.

"We started POLVAX in the autumn of 1976," says Laszlo Szentirmay. "A new club manager arrived at the university in the person of Gyula Jobbagy, who has brought rapidly perceivable changes into the cultural life of the university.

He succeeded in enlisting a group of enthusiastic people and subsequently these students participated in organizing the programs and preparing the posters. It is not accidental that during this period the then best and most famous orchestras appeared at "Kozgaz" but of course it was also felt in other areas that the university lifestyle--which, for years earlier, only existed in traces--appeared to be resurrected from its dying ashes. POLVAX--the name of which is a not so subtle reference to PILVAX--was organized through the recognition that, because of the limits and deficiencies of the official information distribution, there was an enormous hunger of the students for information. We considered it extremely important that frank debates should not be relegated to the hallways, messhalls, or even to some nearby saloons, but that an organized forum should supply the framework.

"Of course, we have not 'rediscovered the wheel' with POLVAX," says Laszlo Pap. "The club had its predecessors but this was the first form organized regularly and serially. After the experiences of the first semester, the club was started in full swing. The preliminary program closely belonged to its mood; the most popular "polbeates" and folk singers gave a brief, usually 30 minute program, but the political debates were often preceded by a recital by some young artist. These were primarily intended to entice the audience but the preliminary program--just as the free tea served in a Samovar--rapidly started serving other functions as well: it has lent a unique atmosphere, a certain style to the club."

Since the start of the club, there have been several hundred programs and, in a short time, POLVAX became not only famous but also infamous in the eyes of some. It was unusual that the programs included topics considered touchy elsewhere; for instance, the situation of socialist countries, the debates of the international communist movement, human rights, the problems of pluralism and, not last, the generally popular domestic policy and economic policy questions. And the invited guests were the guarantee that these debates were not the threshing of empty words but have provided an opportunity for true political discussions. In the course of the years, the audience had a chance to meet several members of the Political Committee--Gyorgy Aczel, Valeria Benke, Miklos Ovari--ministers, or even other party functionaries: Janos Berecz, Sandor Jakab, Gyula Horn, Tamas Palos.

Interesting and important were the meetings at which a scientific or economic expert stood in the crossfire of the questions--Rezso Nyers made an appearance and debated within the walls of the university--in 1978, on the 10th anniversary of the economic reform; it was his first appearance in front of a larger public after a 4 year pause. But the debate, providing information about the future of the reform, was also educational, with Tamas Sarkozy and Tamas Bauer as the speakers (or rather partners in debate).

The programs were not strictly limited to economic or political problems. The organizers did not want to establish a strictly professional platform; accordingly, they have also invited famous artists and public life figures. Those who attended include Tamas Major, Gabor Szekely, Gabor Zsambeki, Peter Bacso, Miklos Jancso, Gyula Hernadi and Ivan Boldizsar--the list and the sequence are incidental.

"We would have wanted the university students to get 'first hand' information from the best and most qualified authorities on the subjects involving 'sensitive' topics, declared taboo by many," tells Szentirmay, "so that they would not obtain the information from unreliable rumors, gossips or other, even hostile news sources. So it came to a discussion with Barna Sarkadi Nagy, on the peace movements in Hungary, both official and what is being referred to as 'independent,' or to the invitation of Andras Knopp, who debated the audience on people who think differently and on different thinking. These topics, which may perhaps count as sacrilegious at other places, are a deliberate part of the POLVAX character, and the mostly successful, open and honest debates were certainly useful. Perhaps it is not irrelevant to note that, in the course of the programs, we presented a series of still unreleased films--several of them shown in the movies since--such as, for instance, the 'Witness,' 'Bastyá Alley '74,' 'Private Sins and Public Morals' by Miklos Jancso and the films 'There Is Fire, Baby' and the 'China Syndrome' produced by Forman."

The merely randomly picked topics make it felt, already through their titles that clever, circumspect organization and coordination is indeed needed here. The preliminary orientation and acquisition of knowledge are largely promoted by the thorough and interesting informative articles appearing weekly in the KLUB KOZLONY, the paper of the club, through which the students can form a picture on the "past life" of the invited guest, the main stations of his career and his activities. Of course, this is not done on their own but in close cooperation with the leaders of the university.

Dr Miklos Szuhay, general vice rector of MKKE [Karl Marx University of Economics], is guiding and aiding the work of POLTAR "ex officio"; the club managers discuss and coordinate their plans with him.

"At our university, the general vice rector has also been, traditionally, the president of the Committee on General Education," explains Miklos Szuhay.

"This committee is actually responsible for the general education of the university as a whole, and students delegated by the various departments, representatives of KISZ and the manager of the club participate in its work. In addition to many other tasks, we are paying high priority attention to POLTAR because timely political problems are debated there. With respect to the activities of the club, our committee accepts a semiannual program--naturally, this is merely a framework; the concrete implementation depends on the free time of the lecturers and also on the daily actualities.

POLTAR is followed with great interest, it is popular mainly among the students but recently our own lecturers have also participated in the programs.

Unfortunately, the latter did not evolve spontaneously: it was through our request to our lecturers that, whenever a particularly sharp debate can be expected on the basis of the personality of the invited speaker or of the topic, they should also participate. We have already succeeded as far as having our lecturers appear in the club--but to also have them join in the debate: not yet."

How does the program of the club fit into the educational system of the university?

"I still remember the times when the history of the Hungarian workers' movement was not taught at our university. At that time, lectures and debates were organized by KISZ. Therefore, the current club is not without precedents in this respect although it is undoubtedly more significant because it moves greater masses than do other platforms--for instance, those active in the college hostels.

"Teaching at the university, if only because of its character, is unable to react in a methodical and up-to-date manner to political actualities--at the most, in the framework of specialized seminars is there a chance to discuss those questions; however, this involves only 20-25 students at a time. I see the importance of POLTAR in that it provides fresh, convincing information in the field of both foreign and domestic policies--including sports and arts. And its true content is derived from providing an opportunity for debates and an exchange of opinions. Of course, several hundred people cannot participate in a debate simultaneously, but the opinions formed at the club meetings lend themselves to learning about and practicing public life on the part of the students, to helping them see that, in a given case, the various opinions are at times very divergent, and the decisions are preceded by debate. And let me mention another thing: our students can meet the type of people here--party and government leaders, noted scientists, public life personalities--that the majority of them will hardly have a chance to directly exchange opinions with after graduation."

Particularly heated debates took place at a few evening meetings; certain meetings were judged positively scandalous by some people.

"We have never wanted to make this club into a closed platform, but we have always wanted POLTAR to provide an opportunity for debates primarily for the students of our university. We know that interested students from other universities are also attending and, at our get-togethers, we can meet with a fair number of people, belonging to an age group which have already outgrown the benches of the university, who have explicitly prepared themselves for certain debates and thus--contrary to our intentions--they will take the initiative and become the tone setters. If our students have problems because, in the course of the lectures, their doubts do not meet with adequate response, we do have to face that. No one has ever met with any kind of retaliation for formulating a thought in his question which differs from our opinion. However, we do not want the debate club of the university to become a platform for outsiders representing other views.

"In this context I can say that we can be basically satisfied with the atmosphere of the debates. A bigger problem is that the students do not participate in high enough proportions: of the 2,000 students, about 200 represent the active nucleus who are regularly present, the others are rather passive. Of course, this is, unfortunately, also true in the public life of the university, in KISZ or in the parliament for youths."

The attentive reader certainly noticed that at times POLTAR and at times POLVAX was used to refer to the club. This is not accidental. Formed in 1976,

POLVAX suspended its activities for a year starting with the autumn of 1981 and was subsequently restarted under the name POLTAR.

"By the spring of 1981 the situation changed around POLVAX," explains Laszlo Szentirmay. "Although the majority of our guests has left us with a 'good taste in his mouth'--many of them also helped our work later--the problems associated with the club were multiplying.

"The problems were exacerbated by the fact that the meeting of students of the universities and academies, known as BEFOT, was also organized in the spring of 1981 by our university. Surrounded by many misunderstandings and suspicions, this getting together further upset the tempers. We have done everything possible to have POLVAX continue its work at the usual level, even under these circumstances. Unfortunately, it did not work. For instance, one international platform--already accepted in the preliminary plan and organized with several months of preparation--nevertheless, was denied permission one week before its date. Although the plane tickets and simultaneous translators had all been secured....

"These experiences indicated that the club must continue its activities under new conditions. While earlier we had outstanding cooperation with the leaders of the university, the disputes were now increasing. The sad thing is that these disputes were not carried on at but rather over POLVAX.

"We were still planning a POLVAX where we could have discussed Marxist training with the leaders and teachers of the university," remarks Zoltan Pap, "but the invited guests did not consider it timely. And in the course of the autumn program adjustments, already so many names and topics were rejected by the leaders of the university that it would have led to the fading of POLVAX, in our opinion. (For instance, we wanted to invite Andras Hegedus at the time--he has already lectured to POLTAR since, with great success.) We decided that instead of letting the club fade, we would rather let it 'rest.'"

After a year, a new manager came to head the club and the cultural life of the university started to awaken from its Sleeping Beauty slumber. POLVAX was also restarted, by now under the name, POLTAR.

How it was done? Let us ask for the opinion of current students. Katalin Puskas, second year student, would like to work for an enterprise after finishing the university. She came to "Koxgaz" from the high school of a small town and she regularly attends the POLTAR programs.

"It is surprising to me how openly the lecturers talk here," she says. "It is very good that this club provides the opportunity for us to direct questions even to ministers. We listen to a whole array of topics which, I feel, indicate that they consider us adults, thinking, responsible people."

"We still have to learn how to debate," says Attila Koltay. He is a fourth year student but, already as a high school student, he had occasionally visited the club still named POLVAX at the time. "In my opinion, it is very important that we learn to respect each other's opinion, that we listen to and

try to understand each other. This is also one of the lessons of this club, I think."

Today's students--mainly the first and second year ones--only know the former POLVAX from hearsay. Legends and mysticism are woven around it; the oral tradition inherited from the alumni either praised it sky high or mentioned it with disparagement.

One thing is certain; both POLVAX and POLTAR belong among the political clubs where much more is happening because--again quoting Tamas Cseh--"numerous activists are filling the rooms with cigarette smoke in earnest."

2473

CSO: 2500/361

ST. STEPHEN HERITAGE INCOMPATIBLE WITH 'PROGRESSIVE HISTORY'

Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 19 Aug 84 p 9

[Interview with Jenő Szűcs, historian, by Eva V. Balint: "Portrait of Our First King in History"]

[Text] [Question] It is one year since the rock opera "Stephen the King" was introduced on August 20. A certain degree of confusion in the reception arises presumably from the selection of the subject. Thus, our conversation with historian Jenő Szűcs--a researcher on the period--about what sort of picture or pictures, distortions, have existed in the national consciousness around our first ruler. And what is the reason for these?

[Answer] I feel the background to the confusion in the reception is to be sought in the recent past, but the trend is traceable back several centuries, because during the course of centuries the figure of Stephen always became a little abstract and afforded the possibility of distorted interpretations.

[Question] Let us then look at the question of what sort of image of Saint Stephen the early Middle Ages formed.

[Answer] The first distortion is observable at the end of the 11th century. It is common knowledge that Saint Stephen did not have a successor by blood. After the confusion around Peter and Aba, a succession of Hungarian kings originated from the Vazul line whose ancestor Vazul Stephen had blinded. This fact in a certain sense cast a shadow over the figure of our first great king. In the chronicles being produced at that time Stephen's work seemed somehow insignificant, or rather, too abstract. The second factor that caused the abstraction was the canonization that occurred in 1803. Although this had a dynastic background, and it was relied on to document the sacral character of the dynasty in all of Europe, the Stephen-legend written after the canonization set before the 11th century, a figure serving as a Christian example abstracted from the concrete historical reality. But there is something else, a third factor, that stiffened the figure of Saint Stephen. During the course of the 13th century a claim developed in legal thinking that a mythical legislator was the source of every law--and this was Saint Stephen. Not only the rights of his dynasty, but the privileges of the various social strata as well were all tied to him, which is naturally an anachronism historically. Simplifying to some extent,

these three factors caused the figure of Stephen to remain really abstract, and in the 14th century, when a "national" consciousness with medieval trappings started to develop, he no longer enjoyed much of a role.

[Question] What shape did this image take in the 16th and 17th centuries?

[Answer] Around that time the anti-Habsburg struggles came to the fore, and Stephen, as a source of law, did not appear as an especially preeminent factor. The single institution that kept his memory fresh was the Catholic Church. In the 18th century the image of Saint Stephen suffered additional damage. When Hungarian feudalism made the first substantive compromise with the Habsburgs, his figure seemed suitable for tying the legitimacy of the entire state system to his person, with a Catholic coloration naturally--and Saint Stephen was put in command of Hungarian statehood in such a way that he should be ideologically linkable to the Habsburg state system that had already been consolidated by the 18th century. This was the ideology of the Regnum Marianum, the country of the Blessed Virgin.

[Question] Now this is also curious only because people connect the word sovereignty with the figure of Stephen.

[Answer] That is so, but as a rule ideology--by its nature--always selects that thread from a tradition for which there is the most need in the present. In this instance Catholic legitimacy proved suitable.

[Question] During the course of the conversation you have referred several times to the concept of "legitimacy." I know that this expression appeared in the "Intelmek," the work of political science written in a personal tone by Saint Stephen to his son. Public opinion preserves a contradictory image of Stephen, which takes note on the one hand of the good Christian, and on the other hand of the iron-handed ruler. How can this discrepancy be resolved, how can it be explained by the concept of legitimacy?

[Answer] Before I answer the question, let me only note briefly that it also happened with the "Intelmek" that it became insignificant in tradition and lost its meaning. Its aim was not properly recognized and it was treated as a "law." We are dealing with a work of political science, whose source is traceable to the system of ideas of the late Carolingian period. The work strongly emphasizes that a Christian ruler cannot be a tyrant but must rule on the basis of Saint Augustine's righteousness and benevolence. It finds the legitimacy of authority not in the dynastic principle, not in the principle of blood, but in the practice of the Christian virtues. At the same time this Christian fitness of the ruler, the practice of the virtues, also means that he must settle accounts with paganism in the most definite way and by the most resolute means. Thus, justice and benevolence and--on the other hand--the merciless struggle against nomadism did not denote a discrepancy, but constituted an organic unity.

[Question] Now let us take a big jump in time and look at what sort of picture of Stephen the historiography of the 50's has evoked.

[Answer] We cannot understand the historical image of the 50's without briefly illuminating the weighty inheritance of earlier periods. Already from the 18th century through the 19th century, in the period of the agreement, then after the suppression of the 1918-19 revolutions, the figure of Stephen in some way fell into a hopeless symbiosis with Hungarian conservatism. His figure served to legitimize historical Hungary, then when that collapsed it became an ideological element of the partial or complete restoration. This was the Saint Stephen idea that was the watchword of conservative political opinion, political theory, and historiography especially in the period between the two world wars. It followed from this that the progressive trends did not know what to do with the figure of Saint Stephen. They rather dissociated themselves from it.

After 1945 there continued to exist in connection with our first king the misgivings about whether he was unambiguously classifiable among the progressive traditions. As is known, the historiography at that time was seeking progressive traditions and found them in a range that began with Dozsa and continued with the anti-Habsburg freedom struggles and battles for independence. Stephen did not find a place in this portrait gallery. This is also odd for the reason that national independence stands at the center of the progressive traditions, and Stephen would have had to stand at the head of such a trend. Now when we look at why there was this circumspection, beyond the conservative appropriation of Stephen, we have to say that there were a goodly number of ticklish points in Saint Stephen's life work. The most embarrassing perhaps was that our first king made the Hungarian people and state part of the West. This was the kind of point that the historiography of that time, working with somewhat reductionist schema, could not take cognizance of. The second slippery issue was the problem of the Hungarian ethnic group, whether the Hungarian people consist of those who live within the country's frontiers or whether those living outside the frontiers also belong to the Hungarian nation. All this also came up in connection with Saint Stephen already on the level of elementary association. Thus, the peculiar situation developed where on the one hand it was not possible to deny his progressive character, and on the other hand the reductionist historical view that was working with good and bad points did not know what to do with his figure. It was not possible to deny that as a state-builder he was progressive, for if he had not founded the Christian Hungarian state the Hungarian nation too would have suffered the fate of the Avars. On the other hand, on account of the previously-mentioned ticklish points, the historiography of the 50's put him away in a half-closed drawer, from where it was indeed possible to pull him out, but it was also possible to shut him back in from time to time.

Now the issue was entirely different in the 60's and 70's. The ideological supervision of historiography ceased at that time, and this quite naturally had an impact on public opinion. The viewpoints of historiography became multifarious. In 1977, there appeared the monograph about King Stephen and his work, which helped quite a lot in making the image we had formed of him more nuanced--and the crown of Saint Stephen was returned on January 6, 1978.

[Question] I think that the historiography of today is endeavoring to analyze Saint Stephen's activity and role in his own time.

[Answer] That is so. We have arrived at the point where we have peeled off false ideological symbols from the analysis of Saint Stephen. A millenium had to pass for us to bring truly scientific viewpoints to bear in the judgment on him. Now we may attempt to analyze Saint Stephen with the categories of that period in which he lived, and in which period his entire life and activity were decisive for Hungarian history.

8971

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ROLE, RESPONSIBILITIES OF HORTHY REGIME

Budapest PARTELET in Hungarian Jun 84 pp 46-58

[Round-table discussion: "Judging the Horthy Regime"]

[Text] Interest has been growing lately in the recent historical past, including the events of the period immediately preceding the liberation. On this occasion, our editorial office held a round-table discussion in which the following participated: Ivan T. Berend, university professor and department chairman of Karl Marx University of Economic Sciences; Peter Bokor, motion picture director; Gyula Juhasz, scientific consultant to the Hungarian Academy of Sciences Institute of Historical Sciences; Ferenc Revesz, retired director general of the Ervin Szabo Library; Peter Sipos, senior staff member of the Institute of Party History; and Gyorgy Szaraz, author and editor in chief of KORTARS. The moderator was Sandor Lakos, the responsible editor of PARTELET. In the following we present the most important ideas that emerged at the round-table discussion.

Sandor Lakos: In recent years, Hungarian historians and public-affairs commentators have been turning their attention more frequently to the Horthy era. Scientific studies, reminiscences, articles, and radio and television interviews attest to this. But while public opinion has broadened its knowledge of the details, the overall picture seems to have become fainter and more confused. There are questions that provide food for thought or require clearer answers. Our historical science is investigating the disorders in our national development between the two world wars, and the causes of its contradictions; and--abandoning the earlier simplifications--it is also striving to present a more differentiated picture of society at that time. Its results in all this are by no means insignificant. Which is necessary and commendable. In the course of this, however, the antinational character of the Horthy regime seems to be relegated to the background and fade. In scientific circles and--perhaps even more strongly--publicly in the mass media, furthermore, views are being expressed that suggest identification with the Horthy regime, and they are not being answered adequately.

I think we should stop to ponder the sources of these phenomena. Is all this perhaps related to the question of where we stand in answering the problems

pertaining to that period? Are these phenomena ideological rather than scientific ones, or is this merely a question of delay in providing the answers? What is the explanation of the mass media's fairly frequent uncertainty in depicting and judging the Horthy era? Are the scientific answers failing to enter the mainstream of the mass media, are they being disregarded for some reason, or are the answers themselves inadequate? What is hampering and influencing clarification, and what can and should be done in this respect? The purpose of our discussion, I believe, is to attempt to jointly describe what that period was like, in the light of objective facts.

Ivan T. Berend: I concur with the introductory chains of thought and regard the raised questions as warranted. The tendencies to embellish, reassess and, in a certain sense, to rehabilitate do exist in our scientific and public life. But they can be understood and repudiated only if we also take into consideration how long there have existed a simplistic approach to, and a simplified depiction of, the Horthy era. For example, the summary and simplified statement that the Horthy regime was the first fascist regime in Europe, and Hungary was Hitler's last satellite. There was also the view that historiography had to adopt an optimistic approach; in other words, the main emphasis in assessment had to be placed on the forces that were not definitive in the given period but would be decisive in the future. Sometimes it might have appeared on this basis that the progressive democratic forces had played the decisive role in this period. Simplification in the opposite direction is practically a natural consequence of such approaches.

Gyula Juhasz: This view ties in also with the natural phenomenon that every period seeks its historical prototype. Since it was entirely out of question after the liberation that the Horthy regime might become a tradition to be continued, we attempted to resolve this contradiction by regarding for a time as our prototype the history of the working-class movement. This method, of course, was not tenable. If for no other reason, because the fact could not be permanently avoided that there had been difficult problems and serious contradictions also within the working-class movement. Presentation of the working-class movement's history as our prototype necessarily left public opinion with the feeling that something was missing, and it produced reactions as well.

Peter Sipos: The simplistic conceptions' effect can be felt even today, and it is hampering particularly the formation of the younger generation's historical awareness. Young people lack the personal experience and emotional background that could confirm the elder generation's judgment of this truly difficult past period, a judgment that is necessarily passionate and interwoven with emotional elements. To the young this period is truly history. It is essential also for this reason to have a shaded and documented picture, for which mere condemnation is no substitute.

Peter Bokor: The passions and emotions, of course, must not be omitted from the Horthy era's depiction, because there would be no convincing standpoint without them. The trouble is when passions are the dominant and overshadow the detailed exploration of facts and the reasoning. The one-sided picture mentioned here can be corrected properly by depicting the Horthy era's left objectively and responsibly, together with its fights, difficulties, struggles and internal disputes. This way our standpoint will truly gain credence that we

agree with the program of the leftist forces at that time and regard their program as the most significant asset, even though the leftist forces of the Horthy era did not wield decisive influence.

Ferenc Revesz: A young man who teaches Marxism in college asked me: When was there more freedom, in the Horthy era or now? The question leads one fairly unambiguously to conclude not that the young man in question views the conditions of that era too darkly, but that he cannot even imagine what the situation of the working-class movement was like at that time. And he obviously is not familiar with the Horthy regime itself. Specifically on the basis of the memoirs, broadcasts and films that have appeared since then, he has formed of that period a picture that departs entirely from reality.

Gyorgy Szaraz: We are experiencing problems to this day not only because we painted the Horthy regime all black, without any shades of color, but also because we painted the working-class movement all red. Furthermore, from historiography it would seem that we have two histories: a general or so-called Hungarian history, and a history of the working-class movement. Occasionally the two overlap or tie in, but actually they do not constitute an integral whole. This too makes the gathering of information more difficult. If I want to write a political article on the history of the working-class movement under the Horthy regime, I will not find a book that contains all the information. For the details I have to peruse 50 different sources and then must anxiously check them to avoid mistakes.

Ivan T. Berend: Indeed there still are many problems with historical literature, but let us be objective. Historical research in recent years has scored significant results in uncovering the history of the Horthy era. Far more questionable than the historical works I find the picture of history emerging from various statements by political writers, debates and reminiscences, and also their influence on the public's awareness of history. There are very few professional political writers who would challenge the simplifications and embellishments that now have been turned around and are acting in the opposite direction. Admittedly, the work of the mass media in this respect is fairly poor. Yet, the distortions in the opposite direction go so far that some present the Horthy regime as a halfway democratic regime, speak of Hungary as a resisting nation, and so on. We must challenge by all means this distorted, superficial and unsubstantiated picture.

Gyula Juhasz: Undeniably, in recent years we have been encountering efforts that broaden almost without limits the scope of positive traditions and also exaggerate the influence of such traditions. Hence follows also the view that Hungary was a resisting nation in World War II. One of course cannot agree with this view, but behind all this there is a real problem. In my opinion, any force, movement or trend that opposed fascist domination and Hitlerism in some respect deserves a positive rating on the resistance scale.

Peter Bokor: I think that the establishment of authentic historical facts is equal in importance to assessing our national values. Reminiscences play a very significant role in this. The thoughts of those who have an important message for the present and the more distant future must be preserved. Memoirs are important tools also of the mass media. Fortunately, memoirs covering the

period of World War II are now appearing in large numbers. But there are still too few memoirs going back to the 1920's and 1930's.

Sandor Lakos: Reminiscences are indeed very important and valuable. But they are strongly subjective by their very nature. This is why it seems very important that memoirs always be accompanied by objective evaluation, suitable comments and criticism. Regrettably, there has been little evidence of this so far. For example, we discussed for months memoirs in which truly qualified persons informed us about the activities of high-ranking officers close to Horthy and dwelt, among other things, also on the role of the counterintelligence department. Many important and historically interesting facts emerged from these memoirs. But it is thought-provoking that in the meantime nobody told us what this department had been whose chief also published his memoirs, and the lives and torture of how many thousands had stained its activity. On radio and television and in the press, the authors of these reminiscences occasionally appear as unambiguously positive individuals, which does not agree with historical reality. Thus we must bear in mind that the appearing reminiscences always have an ideological impact and are able to influence awareness.

Gyula Juhasz: The other morning I was astonished to hear on radio a review of this book's second edition. The lack of criticism in the comments truly almost bordered on unprincipled praise.

Gyorgy Szaraz: All this is quite true. At the same time, however, we must bear in mind that the characters of that period must be judged not only on the basis of the institutions in which they were active, but on the basis of their personal deeds as well. In other words, we must have a definite opinion of the regime, but let us not collectively condemn its characters on the basis of this definite opinion. For collective condemnation could easily switch over into collective exoneration. To give you an example: in Endre Bajomi Lazar's book I vividly remember the noncommissioned officer of the gendarmerie who treated the French prisoners of war decently even under the arrow-cross regime. We condemn the gendarmerie as a body, and justifiably so. But should we condemn also the noncommissioned officer in this book? I think not. Specifically a finer individual judgment will prevent the blurring of personal responsibility. For at the other pole of generalized condemnation there is the danger of collective exoneration.

Ivan T. Berend: I agree with the principle, but the example requires further refining. The point is that under the Horthy regime, and even when the Hungarian fascists were in power, the treatment that citizens of the western Allies received stemmed from political calculation. The special treatment that the French prisoners of war received, for example, was intended to help preserve the regime or certain institutions. In other words, this was a political ploy. Aside from this, however, the book's noncommissioned officer of the gendarmerie could still have been a very humane person.

Sandor Lakos: What has emerged from the discussion so far is that we all agree on the need of shaded and differentiated historical assessment. Furthermore, that simplifications of the past are effective even today; but more recently there have been appearing, particularly before the forums of the mass media,

distortions that are attempting to "correct" these simplifications. Unless we succeed in overcoming this, the uncertainty will only grow. From the viewpoint of forming a scientific picture it is very important, in my opinion, to investigate the period in its historicity, beginning with how the Horthy regime came into being.

Gyula Juhasz: Generally speaking, few of the authors dwell on the question of the Horthy regime's formation and, within it, on the fact that the Horthy regime came to power not on its own but under the influence of specific international factors, which had a far-reaching influence on the internal structure of power and on the system of institutions as well. In their note of 25 November 1919, the Allies specified that they would recognize the government that the Horthy regime would form only if it would guarantee so-called civil rights and convene a parliament based on universal suffrage and secret balloting. That the Horthy regime met these conditions, at least perfunctorily, did not follow from the nature and program of the Siofok general headquarters. All this can be attributed to the influence of international factors.

Peter Sipos: Particularly British politics played a role in the Horthy regime's rise. Britain was pursuing a global policy and did not want this area to become a source of constant upheaval. Horthy, too, recognized the necessity of meeting the conditions that the British had set. Although he himself sympathized with the racist ideas of the kind advocated by Gombos, he nevertheless heeded Bethlen and the British in order to ensure power for himself and the ruling cliques he represented.

Ivan T. Berend: The international conditions were interesting also in the sense that in Europe this was the period of counterrevolutions that defeated the proletarian revolutions, except of course in the Soviet Union. Delayed national revolutions also were taking place in central and east Europe at that time, and thus the elements of counterrevolution and late national revolution were strongly intermixed. In Hungary this enabled the classic example of a counterrevolutionary regime to present itself as a national revolution, by claiming to be the depository of national independence, national demands and Hungarian cause. All this meant that many different political and ideological currents and trends existed side by side.

Gyorgy Szaraz: The real impact of the ideological and political currents was strongly influenced by the fact that, under the Hungarian Soviet Republic, the desire to solve the national problems was combined with the hope of a world revolution. And even later it was felt that the world revolution, expected in the near future, would rectify everything the nation had lost in the Treaty of Trianon. When this failed to occur, the expectations of the masses switched over into disappointment. But in many people the lost illusions generated new expectations and new illusions. There were quite a few who felt that they had found a way out in Hitler's national socialism, which seemingly offered a direct national solution and claimed to solve the social problems as well.

Peter Sipos: In this situation it was very difficult for the left, for the democratic forces. They had to cope not only with the consequences of prewar Hungary's disintegration and of the Hungarian Soviet Republic's defeat, but also with the fact that the western Allies and the neighboring countries of the

Little Entente had recognized the Horthy regime and had stabilized it by their political behavior. For example, the Social Democratic Party sent in vain its delegation to Britain asking that the Allies exert pressure in the interest of establishing democratic conditions in Hungary; its requests fell on deaf ears.

Ferenc Revesz: I believe it is extremely important to emphasize that the Horthy regime was a strongly counterrevolutionary regime. Actually it was the continuation and embodiment of Hungary's thousand-year history, and of all the traditions that the reactionary and antinational trends and cliques of the ruling classes represented. A certain political playing field had to be set up, certain seemingly liberal forms had to be placed in operation, and some concessions had to be made. But all this did not alter the regime's very essence. And this essence was that it instituted severe and ruthless class rule. It followed from the circumstances of the regime's birth and from its basic nature that it was antidemocratic and irredentist. Its characteristics included opposition to the Soviet Union and to communism, persecution of all progressive forces, and deprivation of the working man's rights.

Gyula Juhasz: I concur with the formulation that the Horthy regime was a classic example of a counterrevolutionary regime. This characteristic of the Horthy regime follows also from the fact that it came to power after the power of the working class had been defeated.

Ivan T. Berend: In my opinion, the formulation that Ferenc Revesz mentioned has to be treated with care. Of course, many different traditions were intermixed here that dated back to earlier periods. But the essential thing is that the Horthy era and the Horthy regime were the products of specific historical conditions characteristic of only that period.

Gyorgy Szaraz: I too concur with this but wish to emphasize that we must not vest the Horthy regime with the legal continuity of our thousand-year history. Despite all the class oppression and historical tragedies, the Hungarian people and the country advanced and developed during those 1000 years, and we are the ones who are continuing this basic process. We must be able to differentiate very carefully. Regarding what is essential, one can agree with what also Ferenc Revesz has mentioned: that the Horthy regime was a continuation of the most reactionary traditions.

Ferenc Revesz: That is true. The Horthy regime had nothing in common with Rakoczi, Kossuth or Petofi, although it cherished attempts to expropriate them.

Sandor Lakos: I too believe that the Horthy regime's counterrevolutionary nature must be formulated unambiguously. It is indeed true that we cannot undertake authentic assessments without historical facts. But if all the details do not fit into a whole picture and the essence does not become evident, then objectivity alone is not enough. For this very reason it would be desirable to investigate more closely what this regime was really like, how it functioned, was it able to create some kind of consensus, and in what direction did it change and develop.

Peter Sipos: The Horthy regime's apparatus was essentially able to ensure the assertion of the most important class interests of those in power. The forum

for reaching consensus was the regime's parliament and the governing party within it.

Gyula Juhasz: When assessing this parliament's role, it is very important to take into consideration that also international treaties required Hungary to maintain a parliamentary system. It was a multiparty system, but the Horthy regime saw to it already at the beginning of this period, between 1920 and 1923, that the governing party would always have an absolute majority in parliament, and that under no circumstances would the opposition be able to assert its will against the government.

Peter Sipos: The Bethlen government was able to pursue also a fairly differentiated social policy. In the final outcome, it succeeded in winning the support of the social strata it regarded as important. For example, it was able to ensure the support of the landed peasantry, the tone-setter within rural society. But it was able to keep also the working class within limits that prevented this class from becoming capable of overthrowing the regime. This statement does not wish to belittle in any way the legal Social Democratic Party. The point is that the regime's leaders discovered how it was possible to restrict and suppress the Social Democratic Party and trade unions by "legal" means. Of course, the Communists forced underground were treated the most firmly and ruthlessly.

Gyula Juhasz: Another guaranty of the regime's stability was the governor's wide-ranging authority. For example, he kept the armed forces under his control. The Upper House was restored in 1926 to give members of the ruling class a direct voice in legislation. Any insult against the regime evoked ruthless retaliation. And if the insult came from a legal forum against which it was not possible to retaliate directly, there was the law prohibiting incitement against social classes. It enabled the public prosecutor to institute proceedings against newspaper editors and the authors of articles.

Sandor Lakos: In the process of research and clarification, can we expect the role of the Horthy regime's opposition, of the left and of the Communists, to emerge more clearly and to be assigned to its proper place in history?

Ferenc Revesz: A few words about the situation of the working-class movement. The Social Democratic Party functioned under extremely tight control. Police observers or informers were everywhere. When anything was said that violated the regime's norms, the meetings were dispelled or banned. Even so, the party did much to improve the workers' lot. But it was too cautious and restrained. In most cases it did not take full advantage of the opportunities that its legal status provided, to the extent they could have been utilized without jeopardizing the party's further legal existence. The party's right-wing leadership, and Peyer in particular, played a very great role in this. And the Communist Party was forced to operate underground, under extremely difficult conditions. Regrettably, no agreement developed between the two working-class parties. In addition to the manipulative and terroristic means that the regime employed, this too contributed to the absence of stronger resistance within the working class.

Peter Sipos: When assessing the left's political influence at that time, one must not overlook the fact that the regime was able to exploit the concurrence of the nation's grievances with the 1918-1919 revolution. Furthermore, the fact remains that the forces of the left, with the exception of the Communist Party, distanced themselves from 1919 and the Hungarian Soviet Republic. In the mid-1930's, in accordance with its Popular Front policy, the Communist Party likewise did not refer any longer to the heritage of the 1919 dictatorship of the proletariat. All these factors jointly contributed to the ability of the regime's counterrevolutionary propaganda to exploit to its advantage any mention of revolutions, and to succeed in scaring the middle class and smallholders that 1919 could recur.

Gyorgy Szaraz: Another propaganda weapon was the propagation of the need to revise the Treaty of Trianon. The Horthy regime intentionally and purposefully linked the grievances of the Hungarian minorities in the neighboring states, with the so-called historical claims, i.e., with the out-dated and reactionary objective of restoring prewar Hungary. The decision of Mihaly Karolyi and Oszkar Jaszi, the prominent leaders of the democratic progressives living abroad, to request the Little Entente's governments for assistance in their struggle against the counterrevolutionary regime can be termed rather unfortunate. The Horthy regime exploited this request for assistance to accuse all Hungarian progressives of being antinational. At the same time, the regime used also the cases of individual grievances to support its irredentist demand for the restoration of the so-called historical borders.

Ferenc Revesz: I know also from personal experience how strong this chauvinistic propaganda was. In classrooms, on the pages of newspapers and, let us add, even from the pulpits of the various denominations, one constantly heard or read the irredentist slogan: "Truncated Hungary Is Not a Country; Entire Hungary Is Heaven." This propaganda campaign confused many people. At the same time it served to divert the accumulated dissatisfaction, and to keep the people away from leftist movements and parties.

Sandor Lakos: When assessing the conditions existing at that time, we cannot limit ourselves to the ideological and political factors; we unquestionably must consider the economic situation as well. If for no other reason, because our public opinion measures a regime's success or failure, by no means lastly, on the basis of its results in economic development. In recent years, the view was expressed in several works and broadcasts that economic development under the Horthy regime was actually a continuation of the post-1867 golden age, and that Hungary made very significant economic progress during that era. What can be said about this view in the light of the facts?

Ivan T. Berend: In the same way as many other countries of Europe did, the Horthy regime switched to a protectionistic, autarchic, import-restricting and import-substituting policy of industrialization. This was a rather conservative response to the changes that took place in the world economy and in Hungary's economic situation. The regime was able to score successes essentially only in industries (primarily in the sectors of the textile industry and light industry) that in the world economy already counted for declining industries. But in modern industries--particularly in one or two sectors of engineering, in food processing, and in a few areas within the chemical industry--the

results achieved were only sporadic, nice, and in their aggregate not decisive. As a result, the country's technological lag became ever wider, and so did its lag in developing the infrastructural sectors, except in one or two areas. But there were other consequences as well. Maintenance of the economy's traditional structure, including its agricultural character, was possible on the basis of the German and Italian markets; from the second half of the 1930's on, however, this contributed to Hungary's economic subordination to Germany, and to political and economic defenselessness. On the basis of all this, in my opinion, this was a negative period in the modern Hungarian economy's history, in spite of the progress in certain partial areas and of the results in adjusting to the very difficult conditions of the world economy.

Ferenc Revesz: This economic policy of the Horthy regime had serious consequences for the working classes. During the years of the world economy's depression, unemployment was extremely high, and the regime was unable to provide even bare necessities for tens and thousands of workers. Typically, only the economic boom during the war was able to remedy this situation.

Peter Sipos: As much as it is warranted to emphasize the Hungarian economy's stagnation on the one hand, on the other we must take into consideration that a certain modernization took place in Hungary, especially from the 1930's on. In 1944, in spite of the destruction wrought by the war, Hungary's industrial capacity was 50 percent greater than in 1938. Within the infrastructure, health care and education developed, the latter mostly through the construction of universities in the provinces.

Ivan T. Berend: I agree that there was a certain amount of modernization within the infrastructural sectors. The foreign loans obtained in the 1920's were used primarily for that purpose. But the rate of this development was by no means significant, and especially it did not represent a real breakthrough toward a modern infrastructure, especially not in transportation. In spite of the development of education under Klebelsberg's ministership, university enrollment in Hungary was only about 10,000, merely 1.0 to 1.5 percent of the age group in question, which was extremely low by European standards. All that happened in secondary education was that the proportion of students increased from 5 to 10 percent of their age group, which again was very low by European standards. What real progress was made in this area was in wiping out illiteracy, which actually was the solution of a task from the 19th century. Electrification likewise proceeded successfully. I might add that a major recovery occurred in the late 1930's but still before our entry into the war, mainly from 1938 to 1940, thanks to the war boom. The Horthy regime combined this with the then starting territorial gains, using both to justify its policies.

Sandor Lakos: This brings us to another and very important range of questions: to the Horthy regime's international alignment and to the interrelations of its international policies. This deserves special attention, I believe, for a better understanding of the subsequent developments.

Gyula Juhasz: Beginning with the second half of the 1930's, the international factors again came into prominence. But now the point was the growing influence of the fascist powers. From this period on, the regime was subjected to

twofold pressure. On the one hand, there was external pressure from Germany, which simultaneously opened the prospects of territorial revision. On the other hand, there was domestic pressure from the increasing gains of the extreme right; which of course was not independent of the German Reich's growing role, nor of the fact that Horthy allied himself with Hitler in order to have the Treaty of Trianon revised, which in the end swept the country into the camp of the most aggressive forces in international life.

Peter Sipos: An important factor in the extreme right's gains was that the coalition of the traditional ruling classes and genteel middle strata broke up during the depression years. The depression took a heavy toll of the genteel middle strata because, among other things, there was a very sharp rise in the number of university graduates who were unemployed. The demand for a so-called change of guards--i.e., that representatives of the extreme right should take over the top and administrative positions within the state apparatus, because they could be expected to represent more forcefully the interests of the genteel middle strata--was formulated primarily among the unemployed of these strata.

Gyula Juhasz: In 1937 and 1938, under the pretext of taking the wind out of the extreme right's sails, the Horthy regime made a series of concessions to the demands from that direction. At the same time, it took care not to exceed a certain limit in relations with Germany. This led to the zigzagging policy that especially Teleki pursued in 1939. The Horthy regime attempted to form its relations with Germany so that they would not jeopardize the regime's structural framework and would not lead to confrontation with the antifascist great powers. This worked until the war reached our area. Then this policy essentially failed. For example, this explains why Hungary strived to participate in World War II with relatively small forces so as to have military strength even after a possible defeat. The final collapse of this policy occurred on 19 March 1944, when the Germans occupied Hungary.

Sandor Lakos: The illusions of that time seem to be recurring in some of the historical assessments. We encounter the view that, in the political formula of the late 1930's and the first half of the 1940's, the pro-Anglo-Saxon orientation was just as strong as the pro-German orientation. This view suggests that only random factors, or a series of such factors, prevented the pro-Anglo-Saxon orientation from prevailing. I think that the exploration of the domestic conditions can provide the answer to this view.

Ivan T. Berend: It is indeed very edifying to examine more closely also the domestic political interrelations of the fluctuations noticeable in international political orientation. The demonstrations in the early 1930's, particularly the memorable mass demonstration on 1 September 1930, showed the strength of the working class. Although a revolutionary situation did not arise, the ruling elite intensely feared a revolution. Its gut reaction to the shock effects of the Hungarian Soviet Republic was exaggerated. It is no accident that the ruling classes helped Gombos to power who, with his racist ambitions, had essentially been forced out of politics in 1923. Gombos wanted to dissolve parliament, "solve" the Jewish question, and establish institutions modeled on Hitler's. He failed then because the pro-Bethlen groups of the ruling classes still saw another solution. From the second half of the 1930's,

however, the extreme right could no longer be relegated to the background in politics. The series of governments that followed employed the tactic of incorporating into their own programs the demands of the extreme right, in the belief that this way they would remain in control of the situation. Meanwhile the regime shifted increasingly to the right: official policy went farther and farther in its alliance with Hitler and in meeting the demands of the extreme right.

Peter Sipos: We must mention also the Jewish question, for in none of the neighboring countries was the role of Jews so significant in industry and the professions as in Hungary. In our country, therefore, it was very easy to divert dissatisfaction in this direction, and to blame the social contradictions and tensions on the bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie of Jewish extraction. The anti-Jewish laws succeeded in corrupting society's politically active strata, or at least their significant proportion. Thereby more and more people had an interest in supporting the axis powers, and in instituting changes in the regime that pointed toward total fascism.

Ferenc Revesz: The problem of the Popular Front is closely linked to this period and our topic. The view was fairly widespread within both the Communist and the Social Democratic Party--from opposite outlooks of course--that the Communists regarded the policy of a United or Popular Front merely as a tactic. For a long time, therefore, the idea of a Popular Front was unable to gain acceptance strong enough to dispel the traditional mistrust between the two working-class parties. The country's domestic conditions and international situation at that time were such that most of the political forces were thinking mainly of the future. The forces on the right, of a coming total fascism; the traditional ruling classes, of salvaging their power in the future; within the leftist forces, the Communists and the left-wing Social Democrats, of socialism; and many Social Democrats, especially in the party's right wing, of a bourgeois democracy that would replace the Horthy regime. I believe that the fascists' gains, the war, but mostly the German occupation in 1944, compelled the leftists and other democratic forces to realize that some realistic mode of joint action had to be found, but there was not much time left to do so.

Gyula Juhasz: The illusion that the counterrevolutionary regime, although in a weaker position, could be salvaged for a democratic Europe after Hitler was the strongest in 1943. This is why the German occupation on 19 March 1944 came as a surprise to the government and to public opinion as well. But Horthy continued to live in his previous illusions. He made no small concessions to retain his post as governor. The most serious of these concessions was that he agreed to the deportation of hundreds and thousands to the death camps. Merely to preserve the regime and the state apparatus, so as to abandon the alliance with Germany when the time was right. However, Horthy and his circle not only disregarded the country's real interests, but were also mistaken in their assessment of the political forces. By 15 October 1944, the regime and its machinery--in other words, the state apparatus, the army command and the civil servants--were no longer capable of abandoning the Germans and joining the Allies. They were only capable of being swept with the tide, which led to the final catastrophe, to arrow-cross rule.

Peter Bokor: In the trials before the people's court after the war, Geza Lakatos and his codendants contended that on 15 October, when proclaiming an armistice, Horthy had decided on a course of action that was entirely impossible because he could rely on no military force to implement it. But now it turns out at every step that this was not so. In researching historical documents, I have already counted 15 or 16 armed battalions whose presence in Budapest at the time of the proclamation can be proven. But even more battalions might have been present. The generals testified the way they did before the court in order to escape blame.

Peter Sipos: The responsibility of the ruling classes is the greater because they fostered hopes of an Anglo-Saxon occupation even though the Americans had repeatedly told them unambiguously that no British and American troops would be committed in Hungary, and therefore the Hungarians would have to negotiate with the Soviet Union.

Ivan T. Berend: When looking back to the war years and already to the 1930's, it will do no harm to mention also the responsibility of Western policy, although this does not detract at all from the responsibility of the Hungarian ruling classes. Recently an American historian pointed out that in this area the Western powers lost the first battle of World War II in the 1930's when they abandoned central Europe to Germany's sphere of interest. With their ill-conceived economic policy they plunged the hard-pressed countries of central Europe into financial bankruptcy; at the depth of the agricultural depression--in contrast with the purposeful measures of Nazi policy--they did not really open their markets to these countries, thus driving them into the arms of Germany.

Gyula Juhasz: Those who are evaluating the World War II period today, regardless from which side they are viewing the events, can find arguments to explain the actions of various politicians. But explanation is one thing, and exoneration quite another. Horthy was responsible for what happened because he was the country's head of state. Also responsible, along with Horthy, were the senior officials and generals who wielded power. The Horthy regime is responsible especially for spreading and advocating hatred of other peoples over a quarter century, and for doing everything in its power to pave thereby the way to participation in a future war of aggression. A large proportion of the people no longer approved of what was happening in this period, and the democratic forces attempted to organize the resistance. For something to happen, however, also the possessors of power--or at least those among them who were capable of making decisions--would have had to join the resistance. But this did not occur. Therefore the regime and its leaders are clearly responsible.

Peter Sipos: By attempting to abandon the Germans, Horthy at any rate saved himself from being called to account.

Gyula Juhasz: We often engage in polemics over the label that our country was Hitler's last satellite. Objection is entirely warranted when the label applies to Hungary and not to the Horthy regime. At the same time we must face the fact that many in the state apparatus left during the tragic months, but most of the officials nevertheless followed Szalasi. In most cases, not

because they supported the Arrow Cross Party, but because they felt that to follow Szalasi was the last refuge for Hungarian statehood. This attachment was so close that a significant part of the civil servants, and a very substantial proportion of the military officers, army and police force preserved their organizations even after leaving Hungary and settling in another country. The Horthy regime's history ended in this wretched manner.

Sandor Lakos: From our discussion, in which we attempted to review the more important factors that determined the Horthy regime, there emerges the counter-revolutionary nature of this regime. International factors essentially determined the regime's aspect at the time of its formation; among other things, the acceptance of certain democratic forms can be attributed to the influence of such factors. Under the then existing conditions, this was in the interest of also the Hungarian ruling class because it made the international acceptance and pursuit of counterrevolutionary policy easier, problem-free and more "respectable." While the ruling classes, fearing for their own power interests, attempted to check the gains of the right in the 1930's and partially also in the 1940's, later this increasingly meant accepting the right's demands. Development led to undisguised fascist rule, which proves that total fascism as an openly terroristic form of rule was never foreign to counterrevolutionary policy.

Horthy's decisions in critical situations were not random decisions, nor was it accidental that in the end he did not oppose undisguised fascism. Reliance on the democratic forces was foreign to the regime and its masters. This illustrates the antinational and antipopular nature of the ruling classes under the Horthy regime. Hence follows also its responsibility for the fact that the country participated to the very end in an unjust war of aggression that served unambiguously reactionary objectives. History has returned its verdict on the Horthy era, and this verdict is also the basis of public opinion's value judgment.

A superficial, mistaken and distorted judgment of the Horthy era and regime could cause confusion in ideological questions. And conversely, a proper and scientific historical assessment can contribute significantly toward ideological clarification, and thereby toward the solution of our current problems and tasks. Anyone investigating this period has an especially great responsibility for forming the historical awareness of young people and, in the final outcome, their picture of society and their present set of values. And we must accept this responsibility willy-nilly, whether we are aware of it or not.

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SOCIAL, POLITICAL, LEGAL ASPECTS OF SCOUT UNION EVOLUTION

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[Interview with Ryszard Wosinski, Chief of the ZHP [Polish Scout Union], by Kazimierz Kozniewski: "How Many Kinds of Scouting Are There?"]

[Text] [Question] A most important matter! Was the 1980-1982 period a period of a great crisis in scouting, or of a great crisis of scouting? What was the more telling blow: the political attack or the revealed methodological deficiencies? And is it by now behind us?

[Answer] The political blow was strong. Attempts were made to form substitute structures within the ZHP, that is, to divide authority. What was the underlying purpose of the concept of the Andrzej Malkowski circles? Attempts also were made to establish an "independent" scout association as an alternative, but it was small and properly speaking it existed only in Lublin and collapsed. Activities undertaken within the ZHP were more effective: in 1981 they had the full support of Solidarity. This became particularly evident at the Congress in the spring of 1981, when Teachers Solidarity attempted to practice a kind of blackmail on the ZHP--blackmail that was besides rejected by the delegates. Following the collapse of Solidarity, a new attempt was made to subordinate the scouts to another ideological, and hence also educational, tutelage.

[Question] To the Church? To the "Oases" Movement?

[Answer] Part of our youth, chiefly the senior scouts [explorer scouts in American parlance] joined the "Oases." The "Oases" employ many elements of scouting methods. With respect to the ZHP they represent rather a form of external pressure, an attempt to win youth over. But I was referring to something else. In every diocese a "scout chaplain" has been appointed and already is operating and scout pastorates intended to influence scout youth outside the ZHP structure as it were are being established. The pastorate in Gdansk recently even sponsored a banner on which everything is embroidered: the scout's cross, the fleur-de-lis, the Occupation anchor, the Holy Virgin....

[Question] But the terms "scout" and "scouting," being associated with an organization of higher usefulness, are legally protected and can be employed only by the ZHP, cannot they?

[Answer] I do not believe that legal redress alone should be resorted to in this matter. We must win authority on our own, by our own work and worth, in order to be a popular organization.

[Question] According to 1980 figures, every third scout has withdrawn from the ZHP....

[Answer] Fellow Scout, do you think it bad?

[Question] In my opinion, this is very good! I have the impression that the members first to withdraw from the ZHP were precisely those who in general should not have belonged to it in the first place and who became scouts only because they had no other choice. They were more suitable for other organizations, and they did transfer to them....

[Answer] That one million members left us in the course of 3 years. This was not a sudden blow. This was a complex phenomenon, difficult to assess unambiguously. The departures began in the second half of 1980 and continued until 1983. Now a slow return movement has commenced. It is characteristic that rural membership of the ZHP has hardly declined: its decrease in the countryside was insignificant and, moreover, it was offset by an improvement in the quality of performance of rural Scouting. Last year, for the first time in the entire history of Polish Scouting, one-half of the scout youth in summer camps--which altogether totaled 370,000!--was represented by boy and girl scouts from rural-school scout troops. This was in accordance with the structure of the ZHP. Currently one-half of the scouts attend urban schools and the other half, rural schools.

[Question] This means one million plus one million.

[Answer] Relatively the greatest decline in membership affected the senior scouts. Of the 600,000 members of senior scout troops implementing the program of Scout Service to the Socialist Poland, 200,000 have remained. Entire troops disintegrated, excepting troop leaders. Sometimes the converse was true: the troop leader left and the troop members remained. Sometimes the leader's departure destroyed the troop. The program of Scout Service to Poland was criticized.

[Question] But there also was a reaction to the fact that, owing to the reform in the 1970s, when the scout movement was officially reestablished in secondary schools, at the same time other organizations were eliminated from these schools in a pedagogically injurious and ill-conceived manner. As a result, youth in these schools was deprived of the right of choice. This exacted its toll in 1981. At present this mistake has been repaired....

[Answer] I wish to emphasize that scouting has existed in secondary schools since 1957--to be sure, its quantitative scope and forms of work were then

different. The current situation is causing new problems and vexations. In some secondary schools the various organizations engage in a veritable competition for membership among students....

[Question] This is healthy competition.

[Answer] But this healthy competition is advanced to the point of negation, to mutual harmful squabbles. There also exist schools in which scouting is not welcomed.

[Question] I would not be very apprehensive about this. No one will any longer eliminate scouting from secondary schools. It will exist, as it did years ago, as one of a couple of youth organizations, as an organization with its own special ensemble of methods and therefore attractive to a particular group of young people, not in the least to all. The problem of own specific methods is linked to what is personally of the greatest interest to me in scouting: the question of how far have been methodological conclusions inferred from the recent crisis. Has it already been surmounted in this respect?

[Answer] Rather not. This is a... continuing process. These negative and positive processes engendered or made evident by the crisis will still last for a long time.

[Question] The most important thing is to overcome a crisis that is deeper than the one in 1970, a deeper and much older crisis. This concerns the elimination of the patrol system from the life of scout troops--a system which, for many reasons, seems to be to be the most important educational factor in scouting. The disregard of patrols has led to a crisis among the troops, with attempts being made to replace the troops with cohorts and banner detachments, with great centralized activities, to the considerable detriment of educational work. Of course, the sequence of harmful mass measures was converse. First it had been thought that mass drives would promote a more rapid nurturing of the citizen of the socialist state than would paltry patrols. Subsequently, the excessive number of these centrally undertaken drives and initiatives neutralized the effectiveness of troops, which in its turn practically eliminated the work of patrols. The mentality of the individual began to be built from the top instead of from the bottom [i.e., centrally rather than at the grassroots level].

[Answer] I'm familiar with your critical view of this kind of measures. But this view is not always just and complete. These great drives also had a purpose of their own and were needed.

[Question] But not as a substitute for patrol work.

[Answer] All right... and not as a substitute for troop work. For there are no good patrols without good troops.

[Question] There is no good troop unless it consists of authentically functioning patrols.

[Answer] The resolution of this issue, as of all methodological issues besides, hinges on the cadre, on training the scoutmaster cadre to direct the work of the troops through the work of the patrols. For many years the cadre has been trained in a totally different manner. Nowadays we have to answer to ourselves the question of whether we have made some progress in our work with the cadre and to what extent the cadre itself is changing. The progress, though unquestioned, still is far from satisfactory. There can be only one justification for us: work with the cadre is longlasting work.

[Question] Particularly when no one is eager to begin it. Even in the Malkowski circles, in which scouting has been so much criticized, few people demanded the restoration of the patrol system. Their proclamations made only slight mention of this, being largely preoccupied with politics.

[Answer] The program for upbringing the new cadre can be accomplished through consistent work. In the last 3 years, difficult and nervewracking as they were, we have not been able to restructure the methodological knowledge and awareness of the scoutmasters, even of the extremely committed ones who however are socially confused. They are active socially and occupationally and affected by the tensions occurring at their workplaces.

[Question] Thus this should be constantly and publicly discussed.

[Answer] We are doing this. Intensive attempts to educate scoutmasters in precisely this direction are being undertaken by senior scouts.

[Question] Perhaps now finally the next attempt to develop a program of work for that senior scout youth will succeed. So many attempts already have failed, beginning with the 1930s.

[Answer] This is a continuing problem. At the last session of the Supreme Council we again heard about program difficulties regarding the senior scouts.

[Question] I am hoping against hope, being aware that to this day no one yet anywhere on the terrestrial globe has succeeded in developing an attractive, normal and peaceful program of exercises for youth during the most difficult years of adolescence: from the 16th till the 19th.

[Answer] But we should not give up trying.

[Question] One has to believe that this time success will be achieved!

[Answer] Do you remember your visit to the CAS [Central Training Course] in 1981? That was yet another stage in explorations which still continue. Yesterday I attended the All-Polish Assembly of Senior Scouts, and it could be seen that a new ZHP cadre is emerging from that youth, a cadre that is aware of its duties, functions and place. We need keenly a new cadre. The shifts and quantitative losses of membership in recent years have resulted in a change in the quality of the scoutmaster cadre. In 1980 that cadre consisted only 40 percent of teachers, with the other 60 percent being school and university students as well as individuals in other occupations and professions. As a

result of the losses experienced, at present teachers account for 60 percent of scoutmasters, although the total number of teachers acting in this capacity has remained the same.... This is the same situation as had existed in the 1960s.

[Question] A fatal change....

[Answer] This is not as definite as that. Nevertheless, we attempted to restructure the entire system for training scoutmasters. But this will still take time. A single directive, even in such a directive-based organization as scouting, will not accomplish anything. Part of the cadre is reluctant to cooperate with the new attempts.

[Question] A movement that is already more than 70 years old is not a movement without impunity. Ossification is inevitable.

[Answer] We cannot submit to it. We are introducing annual reviews of the performance of the troops. Seventy percent of the troops have already been thus reviewed, and the resulting conclusions are so extensive that we must employ computers to assess them. We are introducing annual reviews and evaluations of the performance of every individual scoutmaster. We maintain three central schools for cub scouts, boy and girl scouts and senior scouts, respectively. We have started again to publish three methodological periodicals: ZUCHOWE WIESCI [Cub-Scout News], PROPOZYCJE [Propositions] and NA TROPIE [On the Spoor], for cub scouts, troop leaders and senior scouts.

[Question] We thus already are aware that we must fundamentally restructure and improve scout education methods. After all, we cannot go back to the methods used by Polish scouts before World War II, which even then differed from those original Baden-Powell methods whose existence in Poland came to an end in 1914, that is, if they had existed at all in this country in their "pure" form even then. The possibility and worthwhileness of a return, after nearly 50 years, to precisely the same educational method are simply inconceivable. One does not enter the same river twice. On the other hand, the methods employed in the 1960s and 1970s caused major losses and defeats to the ZHP and proved to be fallacious. After all, the troop system based on patrol units should be reinstated in a qualitatively new form. To accomplish this, scouts themselves must answer a fundamental question which, I think, should continually preoccupy you. This is besides a problem of not only the scouting movement but of any social pedagogics in general. Namely, it has turned out that, in Poland and everywhere else, methods employed in all kinds of mass organizational-upbringing work with youth enable neither us nor anybody else to attain high moral parameters: we lose from sight both personal ethics and work ethics. We cannot bring up people with a conscientious attitude toward their work, their families or even the society. No one has succeeded in developing methods causing mass upbringing to be effective in shaping the character of the individual. In view of this--and of course on retaining the hope that some day such an educational-methodological invention will be made--should not the focus rather be placed on upbringing young people associated within much smaller groups? In this case, the upbringing would entail particularly high requirements of moral character and personal, occupational

and social conscientiousness. In this way, the smaller groups associating at first young and then adult persons would provide an example to the rest of the society. So that these groups would operate like yeast, by contrast with the upbringing work of the schools and other mass organizations whose work is more of a recreational than of an upbringing kind, relating to youth as a whole, which is of a fairly routine and stereotyped nature. Thus, should a scout become not so much one of many students, similar in manner of life and dress to the others, or should not he rather be someone special who takes pride--even if he may annoy his friends thereby--in his being special? But if he is to become someone special, proud of his distinctiveness, he must be provided with strong support by his youth organization and even by the state. The wearing of the scout badge and shorts as well as abstention from smoking would be only the outward manifestations and symbols of one's special nature. But then perhaps the two-million membership of the ZHP would be much too large? This is a problem faced by the scouting movement.

[Answer] The problem is broader. It also is a problem of both educational and social concepts. It almost contains an element of utopian socialism. Should the society be accepted as is [or should] attempts be made to alter it as a whole? Or, too, should qualitatively new groups be established within the society on the premise that in the future they will begin to influence the entire remaining society? In theory this could also be applied to students and youth as well, but only in theory, because in practice no one yet has attempted this. Should an elite group be brought up or should the largest possible numbers of youth be brought up? In practice this is not at all so simple, it being the 20th rather than the 18th century. It is only in theory that such logic constructs can be formulated. Life itself, on the other hand, will suggest different possible practices and solutions. There is no way in which the future of the scouting movement /as a whole/ [emphasized] can be predicted. There is not and never will be a standard scouting movement. Scouting varies, not only because urban scouting differs from rural scouting, or cub-scouting differs from senior scouting, or because it varies from region to region, with even scouting in the "old" provinces being different from scouting in the "new" ones. It also varies because each community is different. In some communities that "[knightly] order" you, Fellow Scout, mention on many occasions is possible, but there also are others in which we will have to operate on a mass scale and broadly, and in such cases I consider such operation useful. Scouting should reject neither the concept of the "order" nor organized mass drives.

[Question] So long as it does not dissolve in the mass.

[Answer] Yes, I agree. But this concerns explicit attributes of belonging to the ZHP. What is more, abandoning the idea of influencing the masses would isolate the scouting movement and in general deprive it of the possibility of exerting any such influence. That should not be our aim. Scouting should be flexible.

[Question] Scouting is flexible! That was said by Aleksander Kaminski, the most outstanding--he and not Andrzej Malkowski!--scoutmaster in the entire 70-year history of our movement.

[Answer] Kaminski! I agree with you. Scouting must be flexible, but we must be aware of the aim of our movement. After all, scouting is not an end in itself, being also a superb method of upbringing. We both agree on this: it is superb! It is even an inspired method. But if tomorrow we develop more effective educational techniques, any soberminded educator would have to reflect and make a choice....

[Question] Then scouting would disappear.

[Answer] Then some programwise and methodologically different kind of scouting would arise. At present we lack such an alternative. But our evident goal remains the same: educating a creative citizen, an active citizen of the socialist state. But unfortunately we still face various obstacles on the road toward this goal, including obstacles harbored within the scoutmaster cadre itself, to which the means often obscure the end. Sometimes it is even worse: it is not the means in themselves but the organization in itself, for its own sake, rather than for the sake of the paramount goal. Thus, is this to be a "[knightly] order"? This must be a group which attempts to translate into reality that goal, that ideal, revivify it, accomplish it through its attitude and actions. But such an "order" must operate widely; it cannot be self-immured and exist for its own sake aslone.

[Question] But it will operate only when it itself becomes immeasurably distinct. In the 1970s, or perhaps earlier, the scouting movement quite explicitly desired to represent the interests of the entire school youth. Entire? Thus, it desired to be the force resulting in the unfortunate, as I consider it, Student's Code. Unfortunate, because the matter was hardly a success. If scouting desires to represent the interests of the entire youth, it will cease to be sufficiently concerned with the interests of its own members; it will cease to be an effective factor in upbringing.

[Answer] But are the interests of the scouting youth itself so divergent from the interests of the entire youth?

In terms of approach, yes. That encompassing the entire society by the scouting movement which had once, in the 1930s, been the dream of some scoutmasters would be dangerous to scouting itself. Dangerous, in the sense that all those character traits which cause a scout to be a most valuable citizen would of a certainty become diluted, because I don't believe it is feasible for scouting to actually shape the entire society, or even only the youth segment of the society. Because then the example to be followed would become blurred, as it were. This is an example that can be derided--fools deride it--but which has proved itself, if only during the most difficult years, and also afterward, when scouts proved their worth as workers in their occupations and offices.

[Answer] But let's not fall into the trap of a purely verbal disputation, not even in this interview. After all, organizations of adult people which sometimes are internally quite varied and far from being completely identical, have not only the right but also the aim of representing particular interests

of entire communities, societies, classes. This is not a new problem. Is not an organization with two million members, that is, one accounting for one-third of the entire youth population in our country, large enough for the assessment of its internal condition to apply to the entire society as well?

[Question] That is true. But is it educationally practical?

[Answer] In practice this varies depending on the cadre.

[Question] The cadre will always vary. One part of it is excellent, another, and the largest, average, and the third part is always weak. This has always been and will ever be so. I suspect that the same proportions in the worth of the cadre have always existed, whether the scouting movement had nearly 200,000 members as in 1929 or about 2 million as at present. Except that then the movement was at its qualitative best in Warsaw, Krakow and other large cities, whereas now....

[Answer] In large cities many troops are qualitatively deficient at present. Sometimes I wish that the leaders of these troops would be dispatched from Warsaw, Krakow and other large cities on trips to the small towns and the countryside so as to show them how good scouting can be even at present.

[Question] It is precisely these regional divisions in the scouting movement that complicate so much the operation of the ZHP as a whole, as a large organization and a movement....

[Answer] The obstacles in general are many. Several years ago we had organized in Lodz a conference of a sociological nature at which problems of scouting in large cities were discussed along with the reasons for the difficulties it is experiencing there. Another obstacle to educational work is the absence of scouting appurtenances.

[Question] Appurtenances?

[Answer] Those material appurtenances that are an organic part of educational scouting activities. You want an example? There arrives a moment when the cub scout is to become a boy scout. He is now mature enough for it, but he cannot make his oath because the most important factor at that moment, which is so educationally important to the kid, may be absent--namely, the pinning of the badge on his chest. The Central Scouting Warehouse right then may have run out of the badges: perhaps delivery will occur in 3 months.... But 3 months is a terribly long period in the educational process of an 11-year-old.

[Question] A shortage of badges...? Yes, this does happen.

[Answer] There was a time when the scouting movement brought up older youth without the aid of tents, rucksacks, mess kits, canteens, kayaks, but at that time....

[Question] It was revolvers instead.

[Answer] At that time the appurtenances were different: revolvers. And that had been a time of conspiratorial activity when Hitlerite banners were torn off flagpoles and flung on the floor of rooms serving as scout dens. This time is fortunately over now! But it is now that we lack tents, skis, messkits, canteens, precisely these material appurtenances of our educational method, of our field-trip and camping method, and it is now that we have problems. Not every scoutmaster is a [Janusz] Korczak.

[Question] The simplicity of the educational method of scouting has the great virtue of compensating for this shortage of competent scoutmasters.

[Answer] Just as industry will never again become cottage industry so scouting will never again reduce to a couple of patrols coached by talented scoutmasters. Nowadays scouting is a large organization, a powerful movement, and its operations are impeded not only by a shortage of badges or tents but also by the absence of a definite niche for it in our entire system, in the educational system of the socialist state.

[Question] Lack of a niche in the system of national education and upbringing?

[Answer] The Parliament has issued a decree on universal education but it does not make any mention of scouting.

[Question] Perhaps it is better so. In Poland the most permanent things are those not regulated [by legislation].

[Answer] This is the kind of paradox that is uttered by a journalist, but in the practice of such a large movement this kind of formal non-existence is very troublesome. The educational system, for which we felt an unrequited love, unrequited to the extent that the freedom of scout troops was curtailed by school directors, now quite often refuses to recognize the presence of scouting. Perhaps it thus is compensating for its own substantial deficiencies in the teaching cadre and educational methods.... Or perhaps.... Consider this authentic anecdote from barely yesterday. At the muster of the senior scouts, after we had already been exhausted by our furious, passionate, fervent discussions, suddenly I asked them: "What is the origin of the quotation [from Marx]: 'A specter is haunting Europe'?".... Utter silence. They did not know! They, students of Polish secondary schools! But to the point: at first we and the educational system were in love with each other, but now we are having problems....

[Question] Like in a longlasting marriage, except that divorce is impossible.

[Answer] And unnecessary. But the aim should be to define more precisely mutual relations based on mutual respect and awareness of shared educational goals.

[Question] I am not so sure of it myself. Sometimes the absence of legal clarity is useful to both partners.

[Answer] Sometimes it indeed may be so. But in this case it is rather counter-productive. I repeat: scouting still lacks a definite niche for itself in the system of education and state-directed upbringing. Difficulties also exist in relations with party echelons.

[Question] Early in 1982 these relations were extremely candid and marked by numerous initiatives showing a grasp of the need to undertake fundamental changes in the educational system and terminology....

[Answer] We had been fortunate to meet precisely only with such [party] comrades. But there are others, who also have a say on the matter, and who would like to turn scouting into a routine association accepting and implementing instructions for organizing mass drives and mass demonstrations. These individuals still dream of the scouting movement of the 1960s, which in official ministry reports had looked good but in the educational reality had sustained major defeats. So long as the place of scouting within the whole panorama of the system of national upbringing and education is not clearly defined, we will remain susceptible to the moods of state administrators at various levels. And these moods produce repercussions locally, so to speak, above all. It is the cohorts and banner detachments that are the partners of the local state administration. Some of these cohorts and banner detachments are fully aware of their traditional strength existing for 70 years, while others do not feel as strong because they have been in existence for barely 28 years, and there also are some banner detachments that are less than 10 years old....

[Question] There is more than one name for scouting....

[Answer] And yet, despite this internal heterogeneity of the ZHP, after all these crises, which have been quite numerous, already this year we succeeded in sending to [scout] camps 400,000 young people, of whom one-half were rural youth, whereas in our seemingly best years when our organization had a youth membership of 3 million, only one-half million could be sent to the camps. Then one-sixth of the ZHP's membership went to the camps, whereas now it is one-fifth.

[Question] The dieting cure was successful. The ZHP will be the better the more it will educate those who want to be educated by scout methods, rather than those who found themselves in the scouting movement by accident, owing to lack of choice. Consisting of better, more conscientious scouts, the ZHP will operate more effectively as a movement not only internally but also externally.

[Answer] So long as our activities in all these fields do not become routine. Scouting will survive and remain viable only so long as it will be internally pluralist and flexible and continually explore new solutions, suggest to young people the most varied activities that are never internally codified.

[Question] Except that such a living organization which continually poses to itself new problems, and hence also poses them to others, is immeasurably difficult to confine once and all within some framework of regulations, even

when the national education decree is concerned. Fellow Scout and Chief Scoutmaster! Two souls live in your breast: one is that of a scoutmaster who wants this educational movement to proliferate and grow richly, and the other is that of the head of an organization who desires that it have its own niche in the legal landscape of the state, as then it would be provided with all the privileges of sovereign and autonomous operation. It is extremely difficult to mesh these two desires.

[Answer] It is indeed extremely difficult, but it also is greatly needed. Scouting must preserve the features of a movement while at the same time being a flexible organization.

[Question] For all my skepticism, I wish you that the ZHP may succeed in this. Except that on the day when everything is "buttoned up"....

[Answer] Then Scouting may forfeit its impetus?!

[Question] There are some who claim that it has already lost it. But I'm not one of them.

[Answer] I'm not either, all the more so.

[Question] "Bo w Mazurze taka dusza..." [Song line, "Cause the Masurian has such a soul"]. Friend Chief Scoutmaster! I thank you for the interview. Be prepared!

[Answer] Be prepared!

Postscript by "K.K." [Kazimierz Kozniewski]: What About the Patrols?

Since the last, Seventh, Congress of the ZHP in 1981, already 3 years have elapsed. The ZHP Supreme Council has published "Theses for Discussion During the Campaign for Reports and Elections to the Officers of ZHP Cohorts and Banner Detachments," intended to inaugurate, as it were, a great debate among scouts prior to next year's Eighth ZHP Congress.

Now these "theses" evoke one serious and quite fundamental reservation. They discuss correctly the ideological attitudes of the ZHP. They consider the movement's social activities. They are--of course!--concerned with the conditions of organizational work. Their principal chapter deals--this already being very commendable!--with work in the troop as the basic unit of the ZHP: "One of the organization's strategic goals is a situation in which every cub scout and boy scout can find a place for himself in a troop that performs interestingly and well. For it is within the troop that their personalities are shaped above all."

The stress in this sentence should be shifted in a fundamental manner. The paramount strategic objective of the organization should be a situation in which every scout can find a place for himself in a troop that performs interestingly and well. But there is not, and never will be, a troop that interestingly and well unless it consists of good patrols!

The patrol above all, the patrol! It is the patrol that constitutes the basic cell of the ZHP. Well-performing patrols represent precisely that most important educational method of Scouting. This can happen only if the troop shapes the personalities of scouts while interesting, solid work and play are under way within the patrols. This happens when the patrols are good, when it is pleasant to belong to them, when they are interesting, and when they perform well.

It is impossible to imagine a well-performing troop that consists of, for example, poor patrols, or in which the work would be done only by the troop on bypassing the patrols. The principal cause of the deficiencies observed in the performance of the troops of our ZHP is the faulty performance of the patrols.

This represents at the same time a basic educational deficiency, considering that the most essential self-educating scout work begins and is accomplished once the young girl or boy becomes a patrol leader and thus begins to bear the responsibility for the group of somewhat younger scouts entrusted to her or him. It is then that begins that fundamental process of scouting self-education which, through the exercise of subsequent instructor functions--chiefly of the functions and duties of the troop leader--causes a sizable number of young people to become more valuable persons from the standpoint of interests of the society, as mature citizens and workers in their jobs. This process begins at the moment when a scout assumes the leadership of a patrol. When patrols are left outside the field of view of the organization, positive results of upbringing are lacking.

Yet, in a situation in which it is known that is precisely the patrols that are so weak and sometimes non-existent, the published "Theses," whose Preamble and six chapters altogether total 1,400 lines of print, make only one mention of the patrol and in just one brief sentence at that: "In some communities, troop or patrol musters should be combined more often with a short 2-hour excursion."

This is the only mention of patrols and of their inadequate performance in the "Theses"!

Does this mean that the situation at the ZHP is so special that the patrols already are performing so splendidly that there is no need to mention them, and that only the troops are performing badly?

But this can hardly be the case. So then?....

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ASSAULT LANDING DIVISION, NAVAL VESSELS DISCUSSED

Seventh Assault Landing Division

Frankfurt am Main SOLDAT UND TECHNIK in German No 2, Feb 84 pp 88-89

[Text] In addition to five tank and eight motorized rifle divisions, the Polish People's Army (PVA) has two major formations at its disposition for special tasks: the 6th Airborne Division deployed in the Krakow region and the 7th Assault Landing Division deployed in the Danzig/Gdynia region.


Judging by their training, their equipment and the operations in which they are used, the Assault Division is the equivalent of the Soviet marines. Unlike the latter, they are assigned to the ground forces, but cooperates closely with the naval forces. Although the division is modestly described in open Polish publications as a "coastal defense unit" (jednostka obrony wybrezesa), it has--as its training and exercises demonstrate--a totally offensive mission: together with Soviet marine forces and specially trained motorized rifle divisions of the GDR's National People's Army, it is intended to carry out amphibious operations to open exits from the Baltic or to threaten the coastal flanks of the FRG or Denmark. The division's emblem is a silver anchor on a blue ground. The division's vehicles are similarly identified. The soldiers wear it on their left upper arm and can also be recognized by their light blue barettes.

Three assault regiments, each of which includes six combat companies, comprise the core of the division. The TOPAS-2AP transport tank, a Polish version of the Czechoslovakian OT-62, built under license, serves as the combat and transport vehicle for the five infantry assault companies. Compared to the very similar Soviet BRT-50, it differs because of its anti-aircraft defensive turret (elevation up to + 78°). Eighty-eight mm mortars, mounted on the side, are carried by at least two vehicles in the company. The tank company of the assault regiments and the tank battalion of the division are equipped with the PT-76 light amphibian battle tank. For amphibian operations air intake trunks are fitted to the TOPAS and the PT-76.

The remaining combat and combat support battalions are equipped with the familiar Soviet standard weapons systems. According to Polish pictorial reports this includes the BRDM-2 reconnaissance tank, the BM-21 multiple rocket launcher and the ZU-23-2 twin anti-aircraft gun. The engineer battalion

has a large number of PTS-M type tracked amphibious vehicles at its disposal, which can be used in winds up to force 4.

The amphibious transport capacity of the "Polish Naval Fleet" suitable for combat landings, which comprises 23 "Polnocny" class landing ships, 4 "Marabut" class landing craft and 15 "Eichstaden" class landing craft, is adequate for landing the combat sections of a reinforced assault regiment as the first detachment of a seaborne operation. For bringing up additional forces, ro-ro ships and other suitable tonnage from the WP mercantile fleets have to be brought into service.



Key:

- | | |
|---------------------------------------|---|
| 1. ≈ 5,500 men | 6. 4 FROG's |
| 2. 7th Assault Landing Division | 7. ? ZU-23-2 twin antiaircraft guns |
| 3. 40 PT-76 amphibious tanks | 8. ? PTS-M tracked amphibious vehicles |
| 4. ? PT-76 amphibious tanks | 9. 12 TOPAS-2AP personnel carriers each |
| ? BRDM-2 reconnaissance tanks | 2 82-mm mortars each |
| 5. 18 BM 21 multiple rocket launchers | 10. 13 PT-76 amphibious tanks |

The 11 "Polnocny A" class landing ships and the 11 "Polnocny B" class landing ships of the Polish maritime forces can each take 6 tanks, the single "Polnocny C" ship can take 8 tanks. The "Marabut" class boats can each carry 1 tank, the "Eichstaden" boats can carry 20 assault troops.

Modernization of Navy

Frankfurt am Main SOLDAT UND TECHNIK in German No 5, May 84, pp 258-259

[Text] The Polish navy, whose ship strength has been stagnating for more than a decade, may now possibly be entering into a modernization phase. The indications are the delivery of a new class of guided-missile corvettes, whose first unit was put into service on 28 December 1983 in Gdingen in the presence of Admiral Ludwik Jamczyszyn, the head of the Polish naval fleet. The ship was named "Gornik" ("Miner") by the widow of a "deserving miner" from the Wiecorek pit. The new ship is a unit of the Soviet "Tarantul" class, which was first identified at sea in January 1979. The "Tarantul" class has two variations, which differ in their main armament and are also externally different from each other. The version which appears without the Band Stand radome is identified as the "Tarantul" class, while the version with the Band Stand radome is called "Tarantul II."

According to estimates so far, the "Tarantul I" version appears to consist of only one unit, number 1 in the class. The units counted as "Tarantul II," starting with number 2, differ by having a less steeply raked mast and electronic equipment, which is partly divergent and partly differently disposed, as well as by the presence of the Band Stand radome. The Bass Tilt anti-aircraft weapons guidance system had to be positioned higher because of the Band Stand cupola, which is directly in front of it. While "Tarantul I" and the first ship of the "Tarantul II" variation carry the SS-N-2C ship-to-ship guided missile system, there are indications that one unit (or several?) is equipped with the improved ship-to-ship SS-N-22 missile system. There is no specific NATO class designation for the latter, although one would seem to be called for--"Tarantul III" perhaps.

Externally, the "Gornik" has the same configuration as the "Tarantul I" and shows a great similarity to the number 1 of the class, which had been observed under the Soviet flag for the first time on the open sea at the beginning of 1979. There are shades of difference between the "Gornik" and this ship; the "Gornik" lacks the radomes on both sides of the mast, and the construction of the ventilator behind the funnel has a different shape. This could be explained by subsequent changes, but by and large this seems unlikely. It is more probable that the "Gornik" was built as the number 1 of a series intended for export, and the comparable Soviet unit is serving as a training ship to train the crews intended for the export ships. Perhaps an export series of this kind is to replace the extremely old "Osa I" class light guided-missile ships--and if this is the case, the continuing supply of additional units must be expected. It is possible that names will then reappear that have a tradition in the Polish navy, such as "Blycawica," "Grom," "Wicher," "Burza," "Orzel" and others. The Polish naval periodical MORZE gave an indication of this in a commentary on the decommissioning of the "Whiskey" class submarine "Orzel," in which it was stated that the name would be revived in a new ship.

Bild 3: FK-Korvette TARANTUL-I/GORNIK.




Bild 4: FK-Korvette TARANTUL-II.




Fig. 3 Guided missile corvette "Tarantul I/Gornik"

Fig. 4 Guided missile corvette "Tarantul II"

The delivery of these new guided missile corvettes and their possible successors represents an important milestone for the Polish navy. For the navy it means an entry into innovations in engine technology, electronics and weapons technology that had been withheld from it before. They are:

- the technology of combined propulsion with gas turbine and diesel engines,
- the improved SS-N-2C ship-to-ship guided missile system,
- the close-range SA-N-5 ship-to-air guided missile system,

- the ADMG 630 Gatling antiaircraft weapons system,
- the new L/60 76-mm tower gun and
- decoy rocket launchers as a means of electronic warfare at sea.

Technical Data of the "Tarantul-I Class

Standard displacement	480 tons
Full load displacement	540 tons
Length overall	56.5 ms
Width	10.5 ms
Draft	2.5 ms
Power plant	2 gas turbines + 1 diesel engine presumably in CODAG [Combined Diesel on Gas] arrangement (3 shafts)
Speed	35 knots
Armament	2 X 2 SS-N-2C ship-to-ship missiles 1 X 1 76-mm cannon 1 launcher for SA-N-5 ship-to-air short-range missile
Electronics	1 X Plank Shave radar (surveillance at sea) 1 X Krivach-3 radar (navigation) 1 X Square Head (IFF) [Identify Friend or Foe] 1 X High Pole (IFF) 1 X Bass Tilt (artillery weapons guid- ance equipment) 2 X decoy rocket launcher (EW)

Naval Vessels

Stuttgart MARINE-RUNDSCHAU in German No 6, Jun 84 pp 281-284

[Article by Siegfried Breyer: "Poland" Navy In An Updraft Again?"]

[Text] In the past 10 years the development of the Polish naval fleet seems to have stagnated. This decade is characterized by the absence of almost any new acquisitions of combat ships and by only sparse deliveries of units of subsidiary categories. The navy, which is integrated into the Warsaw Pact, had to fulfil its tasks with:

- 1 Soviet "Kotlin-SAM" class guided missile destroyer ("Warszawa"),
- 4 Soviet "Whiskey"-class submarines ("Orzel," "Sokol," "Kondor" and "Bielek")
- 13 Soviet "Osa-I"-class guided missile fast patrol boats,
- 15 "Wisla"-class high-speed torpedo boats (of Polish construction),
- 5 "Obluze-II"-class patrol boats (also of Polish construction),
- 24 deep-sea minesweepers (12 each of the Soviet T-43 class and the
"Krogulec" class, which was developed and built in Poland),
- 23 coastal minesweepers of the K-8 class (built in Poland),

--23 "Polnocny"-class landing ships (developed jointly with the Soviet navy),
--19 "Marabut"- and "Eichstaden"-class landing craft and
--43 guard boats of various classes in coastal border defense.


Most of them date from the 1960's, only a few units were built in the first half of the 1970's. In the case of most of them, then, the assumption is that they are more or less extremely run down and worn out, quite apart from the fact that from a technological standpoint they have been out of date for a long time. This becomes particularly clear if the core units--destroyers, submarines and high-speed guided missile boats--are examined more closely; in the Soviet navy these classes have long since been assigned to the second and third rank and have been replaced by more modern material. This inadequate level of arms is all the more surprising, because Poland belongs to the Warsaw Pact alliance and its navy has been assigned a clearly defined area of assignments in cooperation with the Soviet Baltic Red Flag fleet; seen from this perspective, the Soviet Union would be expected to take a special interest in seeing that Poland's navy has at least adequately modern ships at its disposal. But this does not appear to be the case. This picture emerges even more clearly if one recalls that the Soviet Union is building considerably more modern warships for several of its client states or is supplying them from its own stocks; by doing so, it is granting them a favorable position compared with Poland. It can be said with some certainty that the reasons are political in nature and extremely varied in nature. It is not just the prevailing difficult domestic political relationships in Poland (as a result of which the People's Republic is regarded at least secretly from a Soviet point of view as an "unreliable fellow" who should not be given any modern weapons as far as possible) that can be held responsible, there could also be other reasons. One of them may be commercial-political in nature, because weapons deliveries in the West and the East convert into providers of hard currency, and in addition --the more modern an exported weapons system is, the more such side effects it has--the states receiving the shipments are putting themselves in a dependent position, since they are bound to the country making the shipments with respect to personnel training, logistics, maintenance and supplies of spare parts.

Developments of their own by partner states in the Warsaw Pact is permitted by the Soviet Union, but clearly only in a highly restrictive framework, and with the probable exclusion of major warships, occasional exceptions apart (such as the "Parchim" class in the GDR's People's Navy). At the same time, Poland's shipbuilding industry has attained a level of productivity that would allow it to meet the needs of its own naval forces completely. This is, however, true only for the shipbuilding and power plant technology areas; in weapons systems and for most of the electronics Poland, like the rest of the Warsaw Pact nations, remains dependent on Soviet deliveries, since it does not have a manufacturing industry of its own worth mentioning. The Soviet Union is exploiting the productivity level of Polish shipbuilding to a considerable extent for the expansion of its own fleet.

In the past decades the following ships have been built for them in Polish shipyards:

- 55 "Polnocny"-class landing ships (plus another 21 for 7 client nations),
- 17 "Ropucha"-class landing ships (plus 1 more for the People's Republic of Yemen),
- 130 "K-8"-class minesweepers,
- 5 "TR-40"-class minesweepers,
- 23 "Amur"-class workshop ships,
- 12 "Oskol"-class workshop ships,
- 4 "Tomba"-class base ships,
- 2 "Ob"-class hospital ships,
- 3 "Smolny"-class school ships,
- 2 "Vodnik"-class school ships,
- 25 "Bryzak"-class training ship tenders,
- 10 "Yug"-class research ships,
- 11 "Nikoly Zubov"-class research ships,
- 6 "Akademik Krylov"-class research ships,
- 13 "Finik"-class survey ships,
- 12 "Biya"-class survey ships,
- 10 "Kamenka"-class survey ships,
- 28 "Moma"-class survey ships,
- 15 "Samara"-class survey ships,

a total of more than 400 units, with an overall tonnage of close to 50,000 tons.




"Tarantul-I," yard number 2

In view of these factors it must come as a surprise that on 28 December 1983 a guided missile corvette was commissioned, which was named "Gornik" ("Miner"). This is a unit of the "Tarantul" class, which was first observed at sea in January 1979 and now exists in three variations:

-- The first version is represented only by yard number 1 of this class, which was not given any externally visible electronic weapons guidance system and consequently does not carry the characteristic Band Stand radome.¹ This version is listed with NATO as the "Tarantul-I" class.


--The second version, starting with class yard number 2, differs from the "Tarantul-I" through the presence of the aforementioned Band Stand cupola, but it also exhibits some changes in its electronics equipment (for example, Light Bulb radome on the mast instead of Plank Shave radar) and it has a less steeply raked mast. Both "Tarantul-I" and these versions carry the SS-N-2C" ship-to-ship missile system, consisting of two launching containers arranged in piggyback formation. This version is classified in NATO as "Tarantul-II."

--The third version differs from the "Tarantul-II" as a result of the transition to the more powerful SS-N-22 missile system, which is also mounted in two twin launchers arranged in the same way as the two previous versions. So far this version has not been accorded any special designation by NATO, although one would appear to be appropriate--perhaps "Tarantul-III" class. Clearly no decision has yet been reached in NATO as to whether this version has any prospect for an increase in its production numbers or whether it is only an armed services experiments limited to a single or a few units.



"Tarantul-I/Gornik"


The recently commissioned "Gornik" bears a great resemblance to the Soviet yard number 1 of this class, but the two do not appear to be identical with one another. The explanation for the "Gornik" seems to be that it represents the first ship of a special export series for which the Soviet yard number 1 may serve as the training ship for future foreign crews, as is the case with the Soviet "Koni" class.



"T 43"-class "Tur"


From some differences in equipment and structural elements it can be seen that in the case of the "Gornik" we are dealing with a different ship than the Soviet yard number 1, in spite of all the other external similarities in protection. The "Gornik" lacks the two radomes on both sides of the mast, and the ventilator superstructure behind the funnel is different, i.e. situated higher.

Construction of the "Tarantul"-class corvettes was started in 1979, initially at the Petrovsky shipyard in Leningrad, but in the mean time other yards are said to have been shifted over to the program as well. The Izora yard in Kolpino on the Neva and the Volodarsky yard in Rybinsk are mentioned. This new development in corvettes, using the configuration of an enlarged guided missile high-speed patrol boat, shows the striving to achieve better sea-going behavior, greater range at sea and more platform stability. The use of a standardized ship's hull seems to be advantageous in this respect; it is identical with that of the "Pauk"-type submarine chaser, construction of which started and is being carried out parallel to the "Tarantul" class.



The "Navigator"

The triple-shaft propulsion of the "Tarantul" class probably consists of two gas turbines, estimated at 11,000 kW each (15,000 hp), and one diesel engine of about 1,470 kW (2,000 hp), most likely in CODAG [Combined Diesel and Gas] configuration. The only possibility here is that the gas turbines drive the side shafts while the diesel engine is connected to the center shaft. It is most probable that adjustable propellers are used. Exhaust gases from the diesel are clearly removed through the funnel, while the gas turbine exhausts escape from circular openings in the stern, which are covered by flaps.



The "Hydrograf"

Two guided missile containers per side are arranged one on top of the other --"piggyback" style--to form one group inside a common casing, solidly mounted to the upper deck and raised 8° with the direction of fire straight ahead; apparently a reserve missile load is not carried. The upper works are constructed behind the missile containers in such a way that they deflect the burst of flame during the missile launch out and away. The 76-mm tower cannon is located forward, in fact in such an extreme forward position that an optimum firing zone is created; even targets off the stern beam can be taken under fire. Two ADGM-630 automatic Gatling guns are mounted on the stern part of the superstructure, on the afterdeck immediately behind them there is a quadruple launcher for short-range SA-N-5 ship-to-air missiles; the two decoy rocket launchers as part of the EW [electronic warfare] equipment are located on each side of it. A Plank Shave radar is mounted on the upper platform of the tubular mast. The Bass Tilt weapons control system is located on a pedestal immediately in front of the mast on a pedestal set up on the bridge deck. The IFF [Identify Friend or Foe] equipment is at the tip of each of the two lattice top masts, which are arranged side by side, a Square Head frame antenna on the port top mast and a High Pole B cage antenna on the starboard top mast.

The remaining movements in the material stock that have taken place and will take place can be enumerated quickly:


1. On 20 December 1983, the submarine "Orzel" which belonged to the Soviet "Whisky" class was decommissioned after more than 20 years of service, presumably to be broken up. However, there are hints in Polish professional journals that the name "Orzel" would be revived in new ship.² The elimination of this submarine again makes clear that the "Whiskey" class has reached the end of its life, regardless of whether these boats sail under the Polish, Soviet or other flag.

2. In 1978 the deep sea minesweeper "Tur" of the Soviet "T-43" class, which was built under license in Gdynia in the 1950's, was converted into a radar early warning ship on the Soviet model. The 37-mm twin anti-aircraft gun posted on the stern disappeared, and in its place a tall four-legged lattice mast was erected, carrying an air surveillance radar similar to the Soviet Big Net. Strings of cables lead from the radar to the likewise new container lashed down on the former working deck, in which the electronic equipment is probably housed.

3. On 16 April 1983, a new approaches mine defense vessel, the "Notec" was launched and has now been commissioned.³ It has a displacement of 150 tons; supposedly its hull is made of fiberglass reinforced plastic. This is apparently a prototype vessel. To date there is no information about the start of construction of additional units.

4. It is well known that the "Moma-mod"-class reconnaissance ship "Navigator" had a sister ship--the "Hydrograf"--but it is less well known that the two differ from one another in minor areas. Even less well known: both ships are designed for the installation of armament in the event of mobilization, each one to carry four 25-mm L/70 twin anti-aircraft guns of familiar

Soviet construction. The bases required for them--two each on the foredeck and at the stern end of the superstructure deck--can easily be verified in photographs.




"Finik-mod"

5. In 1981 and 1982, two "Finik"-class survey ships were built at the Nordwerft in Danzig, the "Zodiak" and the "Planeta." They are the exact counterparts of the units of this class built for the Soviet Union. Unlike them, they are not under the command of the navy, but of civilian authorities.

6. Also in 1981 and 1982, two survey ships, the "Heweliusz" and the "Arctowski," were built for service with the navy. Both are identical in size and other respects to the "Finik" class, but they have different superstructures, so they are designated "Finik-mod" class in NATO. Apparently no provision has been made for installing antiaircraft weapons in the event of mobilization; at least no installation for weapons can be identified.


7. On 11 August 1972, a new sailing schoolship, the "Iskra" was commissioned. It was built as a replacement for the antiquated schoolship which was decommissioned in 1977 and for years had borne the name "Iskra" and was finally named "Iokta." The new "Iskra" can accommodate 45 men for training and has a sail area of 307 m².

8. A new class of tugboat should also be mentioned, the units of the "Pluskwa" class. They were observed on their first sea trials in 1982-1983. Besides their capability as tugs, they also have to fulfil a role as fire boats.




"Iskra" (II)

9. In conclusion, a run of two torpedo recovery boats must be mentioned, which have been in service since the beginning of the 1970's but which have only just been documented in pictures. These are the vessels of the "Pajak" class. The characteristic of this type is the stern ramp and the derrick located behind the superstructure, which is used to land the recovered torpedoes.



"Pluskwa"



"Pajak"

The commissioning of the guided missile corvette "Gornik" appears, in spite of any skepticism--the possibility is not (yet) excluded that it will remain a single ship, like the "Kotlin-SAM"-class guided missile destroyer "Warszawa" which was delivered 13 years ago--to introduce a phase of modernization. Its objective may be to replace the extremely aged "Osa-I"-class small missile boats, which have been in use since 1966. Whatever, the delivery of the "Gornik" represents an important milestone for Poland's navy, because it provides access to newer developments in ship propulsion, electronics and weapons technology which had been barred to it before. But, at the same time, this imposes strains of such enormous extent--one can mention personnel training and numerous logistic arrangements--that a single ship would not justify an expenditure of this magnitude.

FOOTNOTES

1. The Band Stand radome is a significant characteristic of all Soviet surface warships which are equipped with SS-N-2C (with exceptions), SS-N-9 and SS-N-22, that is, all three versions of the "Nanuchka" class, the "Sovremenniy"-class guided missile destroyers and the hydrofoil missile of the "Sarancha" class.
2. MORZE, No 1, 1984, p 1.
3. "Notec" is the Polish name for the Netze, a river in former German West Prussia.

9581
CSO: 2300/627

POLAND

BRIEFS

NOWY SACZ DEFENSE COMMITTEE--A meeting of the Nowy Sacz Voivodship Defense Committee devoted a great deal of attention to the problems of speculation and wasteful and inefficient practices in industry. The participants in the meeting urged stepped up inspection and audit programs and recommended a series of preventive measures. The Nowy Sacz Voivodship Defense Committee assessed the performance records of the voivodship and local commissions for combating speculation as well as the performance records of revenue offices. The Nowy Sacz Voivodship Defense Committee called for the continuation of a wide-ranging campaign dedicated to the elimination of negative phenomena in the region's social and economic life. [Text] [Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 3 Sep 84 p 5]

CSO: 2600/1260

ROMANIA

BRIEFS

GOVERNMENTAL PERSONNEL CHANGES--The President of the Socialist Republic of Romania decrees that Comrade Mihail Tenea is relieved of his position as counselor to the president of the Socialist Republic of Romania and appointed deputy chairman of the State Planning Committee. Comrade Alexandru Dimitriu is appointed deputy minister of industrial construction. [Excerpts]
[Bucharest BULETINUL OFICIAL in Romanian Part I No 66, 18 Aug 84 p 2]

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