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East Europe Report

POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

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SLOVENIAN SOURCE ON ROMANIA'S CONFLICTS WITH USSR, HUNGARY

Ljubljana DELO in Slovenian 6 Jan 83 p 4

[Article by Marjan Sedmak: "Coolness Between Moscow and Bucharest"]

[Text] Although for some years Romania has been noted for not always "agreeing" with the rest of the members of the Warsaw Pact (whose political consultative committee met on Monday and Tuesday in Prague), there have been signs coming from Bucharest that during the past few months Romania has had further coolness in relations with her partners in the Warsaw Pact and with Moscow, in particular.

One of the latest signs of the coolness was the participation of Romanian President Ceausescu in the ceremonies in honor of the 60th anniversary of the establishment of the USSR, at which time there was a meeting between the Romanian leader and the new secretary general of the Soviet party, Yuriy Andropov. At the meeting, a joint report was issued, stating that the meeting took place in an "open and comradely atmosphere"--a formula which, for a long time, has signified that the co-spokesmen spoke from positions which were in conflict and that it was not possible to surmount the conflicting positions.

Romania is one of the countries which has relied, to a great extent, on foreign (convertible) currency accumulations during recent years as a means of development, and which, because of policies in petrochemistry and in the face of changes in the world market for liquid fuels, because of its policies, has experienced difficulties, (at the beginning of the week there was an announcement from the Federal Republic of Germany that Romanian banks were requesting that their debts for 1983 be rescheduled, saying that otherwise they would be obliged to suspend the payment of credits). Romania is in such an economic position that a month ago she asked for increased economic cooperation within CEMA, along with new agreements in regard to the extent and structure of trade, in which, among other things, the Romanian economy would be especially interested in long term and firm deliveries of raw materials and, of course, energy.

Although a number of other CEMA members are in favor of changes in mutual exchanges and although Romania enjoys the least advantages, as regards the category of Soviet aid to other states, the members of the camp did not get

the proper response to what they requested from Moscow. As a matter of fact, the Romanian economic difficulties are so serious that that silence probably did not contribute to the improvement of relations between Bucharest and Moscow. At the same time, in recent months, the Romanian president has made some foreign policy moves which, certainly, were not to the liking of the old Soviet leadership and they certainly will not be welcome to the new leaders. Furthermore, Romanian diplomacy supports the so-called zero option in regard to missiles in Europe, as the proper proposal for eliminating both Soviet and American strategic missiles from the continent of Europe, an idea which Moscow has resolutely rejected.

In addition, this year, President Ceausescu--in complete opposition to Soviet interests--met with Prince Sihanouk and restated his negative point of view in regard to the Vietnamese presence in Kampuchea. Three weeks ago, in Pakistan, the Romanian president reiterated his negative views in regard to the Soviet presence in Afghanistan. At the same time, Romania, the only Warsaw Pact country which has normal diplomatic relations with Israel, prudently kept silent when Israel invaded Lebanon; considering the protests made in this connection in the other Warsaw Pact countries, the special political significance of this silence could not be missed.

In recent months, something else was added to this split. The issue of the rights of the Hungarian national minority in Romania (there are about 2 million) has been a burning issue for a long time and recently it became so acute that it was necessary to have discussions between the countries (Gyorgy Aczel, one of the closest collaborators of Janos Kadar, visited Bucharest in November in regard to this issue and had a meeting with President Ceausescu).

At present, it is not clear how the problem will be solved in the framework of relations between the two states, especially since it seems that the polemics are heating up especially on the part of the Hungarian side which, in various forms, has been repeatedly charging Romania with carrying on a policy of de-nationalization. In Bucharest, semi-officially, they are responding differently: they are alluding to indirect pressure from Moscow, saying that it is a process which began in 1968 when Romania condemned the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia.

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CZECHOSLOVAKIA

FOJTIK DISCUSSES IDEOLOGICAL STRUGGLE

Prague NOVA MYSL in Czech No 11, 5 Oct 82 pp 3-15

[Article by Jan Fojtik, CPCZ Central Committee secretary: "A Most Vivid Legacy; 65 years from the Great October Socialist Revolution"]

[Text] We are marking the anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution at a time when the struggle for its ideological legacy has again sharpened and when attacks are increasing on the historical edifice created under its influence and with its inspiration.

Enough time has passed for it to be clear that in the struggle for the ideals that the Russian October placed on its banner, the final victory is on the side of these ideals, on the side of socialism, social progress and peace. Only those who suffer from terminal blindness can ignore the vivid and increasing importance of the legacy of the October Revolution, can fail to see that it pervades contemporary reality and is determining the character of the struggles which are giving birth to the tomorrow of humanity. And only those who have quite lost their reason can think that it is possible to reverse the changes which this revolution has brought about and which have become so clearly evident on the political map of the world, especially after World War II and the epochal triumph of the USSR over Hitlerite fascism. Only such people could think that it would be possible to erect an impermeable barrier to the ideas of socialism and communism, or even to drive peoples back to the yoke of colonialism or to renew the unlimited reign of imperialism.

The revolutionary renewal of humanity brought forth by the Great October Socialist Revolution 65 years ago is irreversible. It is a fundamental reality of our time. We rightly derive our historical optimism from it. However, no matter how well we are aware of this objective trend which allows us to proceed in our overall views of future development with firm conviction and the certainty that we have embarked on the correct path, we cannot allow ourselves in any way to underestimate the difficulty of the tasks which we must resolve today, or the level of responsibility with which we must approach them. The right to the future does not fall to any social order by default. The dialectic of development is a dialectic of a tenacious struggle with everything that belongs to the past, but which nevertheless holds on to life tooth and nail. Every instance of unconcern, every instance of overlooking the intensity of this struggle, the ferocity of the opposition of the forces

destined for extinction, but which are still very resourceful in adapting to new situations and ready to exploit even the smallest opportunities for the restoration of their former positions, every instance of frivolity which can so easily occur when there have been successes is unconditionally and severely punished with the most serious difficulties and shortcomings. We could have convinced ourselves of this, incidentally, on the basis of the very experiences which we have summarized in "Lessons Drawn from Crisis Development in the Party and Society After the 13th CPCZ Congress."

It was none other than V I Lenin, the leader of the Great October Socialist Revolution and founder of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, who warned innumerable times immediately after the first small steps of the new proletarian power of the danger of underestimating the complexities of socialist construction. "The road to socialism," he remarked, "will never be a straight, but rather an unbelievably crooked line." The necessity of a dictatorship of the proletariat which follows from the elementary need of uniting the working masses for the building of socialism under the leadership of the working class, which must have at its disposal the instruments of state power to fulfill this mission, was justified by Lenin not only because of the need to repress the opposition of exploiters, capitalists, landowners, and their henchmen, but above all as historical task which could be successfully resolved only by a revolutionary socialist restructuring of the entire social base and superstructure--"to make working people all members of society, to remove the basis for any kind of exploitation of man by man." "This objective," he wrote in his famous greeting to Hungarian workers in May 1919, "cannot be attained immediately, but requires quite a long transitional period from capitalism to socialism--not only because the reorganization of production is a difficult matter, but also because time is required for the fundamental changes in all aspects of life, and because the immense force of the habit of petty-bourgeois and bourgeois attitudes can be overcome only by a long, tenacious struggle. This is why Marx speaks of the entire period of the dictatorship of the proletariat as a transitional period from capitalism to socialism."

The greatest achievement of the international working class and the progressive forces of the world is real socialism, the socialist community, the natural vanguard of which is the USSR, which has the authority of a country to which history has entrusted the task of blazing the trail to socialism under unbelievably complex conditions which forced it to defend its very existence. How many attacks and various campaigns against the USSR and our community have already been undertaken! Overcoming these attacks certainly steels one, but also leaves marks. At present, anticommunism has a predominantly anti-Soviet form with a priority objective of weakening and liquidating real socialism, the socialist community. Reactionary imperialist circles, represented mainly by the spokesmen of the military-industrial complex and monopolies of the United States of America are not sparing any resources in pursuit of this goal. It is absolutely clear to them that each weakening of real socialism penalizes not only the worldwide revolutionary working class movement, but all progressive movements and thereby, which is particularly important for them, strengthens their hopes of achieving military superiority, renewing the world hegemony of imperialism and regaining the lost historical initiative which has been taken over by socialism.

Socialism has put down firm roots and is demonstrating its advantages. But it is a young social order and vulnerable primarily because every success must be achieved at great cost and paid for with sacrifices. The magnitude of its tasks, as we characterized them briefly with Lenin's words in his letter to the Hungarian workers, is constantly confronted with a reality that is far from solely the property of the conscientious builders of socialism but to a large extent, after the liquidation of enemies, both of those who merely adapt to the new conditions as a sort of necessary evil, and of those who cultivate their "elan" only insofar as the new order gives them what they require without delay. If, in the first instance, we must reckon not only with a silence that is often taken for agreement but also, and this may be more frequent in certain conditions, with systematic, albeit petty and negativistic criticism of everything that may be attributed to socialism, then, in the second instance, we should not be surprised by rapid changes in position justified by frustrated hopes once placed in revolution and socialism and accompanied by a multitude of revisionist conversions and dissatisfactions requiring a de facto return to the prerevolutionary situation, or the choice of a "third path" between capitalism and real socialism.

The young socialist order is most vulnerable, however, on those occasions when for one or another reason there is a disruption of the Marxist-Leninist character of the political vanguard of the working class, the Communist Party. Lenin considered the fragmentation of the party by a petty-bourgeois element to be the greatest threat to the working class, the revolution and socialism. In the socialist political system, where the party as the vanguard of the working class occupies the leading position (and only in this way can the working class fulfill its mission of unifying all of the previously exploited masses, the democratic and progressive forces of society for the creation of a classless society), the principled policy of the party, the creative application of Marxist-Leninist theory and the consistent implementation of this theory in the concrete historical conditions of one country or another are the most important, critical factors in successful progress along the path to socialism and communism.

Party responsibility in this area is absolute. It is no accident that in his polemics with revisionists Lenin remarked that the thesis that "politics cannot fail to take priority over economics" belongs to the fundamentals of Marxism. The strength and stability of the new order is first of all determined by respect for this thesis, by a knowledge of and comprehension of this fundamental of Marxism. The party cannot allow itself to fail. But at the same time, it is unthinkable to resolve the difficult tasks of the transition to socialism and the building of developed socialism without mistakes, nor is it possible, as the contemporary history of socialism attests, to avoid various types of deformations. This may be denied only by people who do not comprehend the character of the tasks brought by revolution, the reality that socialism must come to terms with problems that no previous social order could master, to say nothing of the fact that most of them did not even attempt to define them.

As an example, let us consider the formation of a new, conscious relationship to work. Is it in the power of economics alone, if based on social ownership (and thereby presuming the power of the working class), to resolve this task?

Is it perhaps sufficient, after the socialization of the means of production, to issue the necessary decrees, to say to people that from this time forward they are on their own, without capitalists and landowners, in order for an awareness to begin to form within them automatically of new social responsibilities and in order for them to be willing to make sacrifices for the society, to identify totally with the interests of their workplace, their homeland, and even with the interests of those who are building socialism in other countries or who are fighting against imperialist oppression? However much capitalism itself accomplished toward the hardening of the class consciousness of wage workers, however cruel the tests to which it subjected the lower and middle levels of society, it remains now for socialism to implement its own type of new resolution in this regard after the assumption of power by the working class. Its full victory, however, requires time which can scarcely be measured in terms of the life of a single generation. The elimination of deep-rooted stimuli and motivations for work and social activity, and their replacement with new guidelines functioning in accordance with the standards and principles of socialist cooperation is an exceptionally difficult task which only very naive people could consider capable of being completed with two or three "economic reforms" supported by a few propaganda campaigns. The improvement of national economic management and planning, the preparation of guidelines concerning the regulation of the law of value, where and how to support material incentives for procedures and encourage them to take initiative, where and how to slow them down, how to utilize price mechanisms and other economic and financial control rods and mechanisms is exceptionally important and responsible work which cannot be neglected. The price is too high for shortcomings in this sector. But this in itself cannot resolve the historic task of formulating a comprehensive system of incentives and motivators which will guide the man of the socialist era in decisionmaking, in the adoption of basic views on life and to the consequent attitudes toward society, to the specific collective in which he works and lives, to his responsibilities in regard to his family, his fellow citizens, his homeland, etc.

This task, just as all the other tasks which socialism takes upon itself, whether they be not nearly as significant or whether they seem inconsequential, is being successfully resolved only on the basis of the principled Marxist-Leninist policy of the Communist Party, the leading role and resultant authority of which must be applied in all spheres of social life--political, social, economic and ideological. A weakening of attention to any of these areas results in shortcomings and deformations which in turn result in dissatisfaction and, in more serious cases, in doubt concerning the correctness of party policy or in capitulation in the solution of the most difficult and serious tasks. One way or another, these are always linked with the question of whether the party is in step with the times. If it does not react adequately, the increasing dissatisfaction is sooner or later turned against it. And it is probably not necessary to mention specifically that there is usually more in the balance than the positions of one or more people.

How is one to deal with similar undesirable phenomena which may lead to a serious crisis situation? How can they be prevented? The answer to this question was given by Comrade L I Breznev at the 16th CPCZ Congress when he

spoke of the necessity for consistently paying attention everywhere to the implementation of Leninist work standards and techniques in the party, and in the activities of state and managerial economic organs. It is especially necessary to proceed on the basis of a critical analysis of one's own work, to draw conclusions from the causes of shortcomings which are uncovered, and not to wait for problems to accumulate, making it necessary to solve them under various kinds of pressure. Socialism is a society with an obligatory order, with a precisely defined division of labor and responsibilities. Where conclusions are not drawn from shortcomings, where mistakes are not corrected, where the disruption of discipline, indifference and antisocial behavior are tolerated, even among functionaries, the responsibility of the given facilities, individuals or managerial organs will understandably be forfeited, and sources of criticism will spread and flow together into a stream of antiparty sentiment. This is already, incidentally, being well taken care of by those who think that they have their own reasons for doing so, whether this be because someone stepped on their toes or that "socialism has not met their expectations", or plainly and simply because "they did not adapt" and belong body and soul elsewhere, in the camp of the opposition.

Some of our critics from the ranks of so-called Eurocommunism (I have in mind mainly those who from time to time "consider it their duty" to make known their "reservations of a fundamental character" about the Soviet Union and the countries of real socialism, and who also made themselves heard in connection with the declaration of martial law in Poland, in order to distance themselves again from Leninism, with some of them for the first time publicly renouncing the legacy of the Great October Socialist Revolution) would reduce all of our problems and shortcomings to a single common denominator, which according to them is the recognition and application of a fundamental Marxist-Leninist principle--the leading role of the political vanguard of the working class, the Communist Party, obligatory guided in its activities by the theory of scientific communism. If for us a source of many difficulties on the path to socialism and communism is the revisionist distortion and simplification of this role (it does not matter whether this comes from the right or the "left."), overlooking it or making light of it, then for them its Leninist application is the greatest point of contention. In their terminology, we are showing signs in this area of a "Stalinist period," but this means to them about as much as a cross means to a devil. And because the CPCZ had to come to terms with the crisis of the end of the sixties, and the basis of the consolidation process consisted of the renovation of Leninist work forms and techniques, the "Eurocommunists" are particularly down on us. The Leninist application of the leading role of the party is, according to them, the main reason for the "restriction and disruption of democracy and freedom." Clearly, if they are speaking about democracy and freedoms, they cannot comprehend them in any other way than as the undetachable attributes of bourgeois society with its renowned pluralism of political parties, which expend their activity primarily in parliament and in primary campaigns.

We could, it is true, silently overlook similar views, if they were not currently being hurled at us in only a slightly different form by those who make daily accusations against us from frankly inimical positions, and for whom criticism "from within" our movement is a particularly welcome argument. In its overall impact, this is supposed to serve as an important trump card, aimed at compromising real socialism at any price. It may be used in truly many ways:

--for disorientation on such critically important issue as those relating to the character of the social order and its future development, which can consist either of its strengthening, or its gradual disintegration, making possible the activation of antisocialist forces;

--for weakening the resolution of pressing issues of economic and social development which requires a strengthening of the authority of central managerial organs, the subordination of sectorial and group interests to public interests, an increase in the role of the party in the economic and ideological fields as a mechanism for the integration of society and a deepening of socialist democracy;

--for weakening of vigilance and watchfulness, for the creation of an atmosphere of indifference to socialist values and the defense and strengthening of revolutionary achievements and the results of socialist construction, especially those related to the forms of a political system anchored in socialist legality and the system of national economic planning and management, which must provide a reliable guarantee of the strengthening of socialist ownership of the means of production and likewise an orientation of the economy to the formation of use values, to the assurance of the resources necessary for the strengthening of the socialist way of life.

"Eurocommunists," who have raised the question of the validity of the legacy of the Great October Socialist Revolution and linked it with attacks on conceptions of democracy and their implementation in our countries, act as though they are in step with the times and that their criticism is motivated by a desire to meet squarely the demands of today, to find the courage to break with anachronistic views. The reality is, however, exactly the opposite. In his time, Lenin ridiculed the leaders of the bankrupt Second International, who were not capable of comprehending the historic significance of the Great October Socialist Revolution precisely because they were afraid to let go of the coattails of the bourgeoisie and make rather a complete break with it, and because they had previously seen how capitalism and bourgeois democracy had developed in Western Europe in a certain way, but were unable to comprehend that "this path can be considered, *mutatis mutandis* as a model only with certain corrections (from the viewpoint of the course of world history, quite insignificant changes)."

If the Paris Commune had clearly uncovered "the historically conditioned nature and limited value of bourgeois parliamentarianism and bourgeois democracy" (V I Lenin), then the Great October Socialist Revolution and the development which followed it and which verified in practice its basic consequences, demonstrated the actual possibility of creating a higher type of democracy, a proletarian democracy, a socialist democracy. The fact that the reformists have missed the significance of the Great October Socialist Revolution stems, as Lenin wrote, from theoretical and political errors founded in a lack of understanding that forms of democracy have inevitably alternated over thousands of years. "In the ancient Greek republics", he wrote in 1919 in "Theses and Report on Bourgeois Democracy and the Dictatorship of the Proletariat," "in medieval towns and in developed capitalist countries, democracy takes many forms and has been used in many ways. It

would be the height of nonsense to think that the most profound revolution in the history of humanity, the transition of power from the minority of exploiters to the majority of the exploited, the first such in the world, can take place within the old framework of old, bourgeois, parliamentary democracy, that it can take place without the most wrenching breaks conceivable, without the creation of new forms of democracy, new institutions which embody the new conditions of its implementation, etc."

The critics who have "discovered" that the Great October has already lost its inspirational influence and who are vehemently trying to document this view with their thoughts on democracy, in which they show their complete dependence on concepts of democracy already overtaken by history, and the limited nature of which has already been uncovered by all contemporary socialist revolutions, are not only unmodern, but are behaving themselves in quite a doctrinaire manner. Why should they take pains with new contributions in an area which they so confidently subject to crushing condemnation, from which have been formed the countries of the world socialist system. Why should they trouble themselves with an analysis which would be based, as the technique of the Marxian dialectic demands, on the concrete historical situation in one country or another? Their conception of ideal democracy, which, incidentally, has long been shared by every petty bourgeois in the West, does not and cannot yield to development, is in its principles not related to any time sphere, is an abstract structure fixed forever, and woe to reality if it does not conform to it.

It is precisely this abstract, doctrinaire and nonclass approach to the question of democracy that prevents an evaluation of the true advantages of socialist democracy in the individual countries of our community, what it gives to the working class, the workers of these countries, how it helps them to develop those forms of their social activity which step by step increase their role in decisionmaking concerning public affairs, concerning the constructive building of a new society. Their view completely misses the richness and variety of the forms of this worker activity, insofar as it has a fruitful and positive character and strengthens the power of the socialist state. They concentrate their attention exclusively on activities which are centrifugal and weaken the joint approach of the party and the people. We once again have clearly seen the limited character, incompetence and bafflement of this dogmatic-nonclass viewpoint in the evaluation of the activities of the so-called Solidarity in Poland and in the support of all movements in that country which, in the name of defending the interests of "workers" or "Polish national affairs," "Polish sovereignty," have hastened the fragmentation of the main mechanisms of working class power--a revolutionary party and a socialist state--and supported efforts by reactionary forces in Poland to tear the country from the ties of the socialist community.

This dogmatic-nonclass approach to the evaluation of the most varied events and phenomena in the countries of the socialist community suffers from a special contradiction. Those who espouse these views are asking the impossible from us. On the one hand, they demand that our reality be perfect, since socialism, after all, must represent an ideal social order and should, therefore, serve as an inspiring example in all respects. At the same time

however, our critics are calling into question the very basis of that by which socialism breaks out of the historical constraints of capitalism, that which forms the basis of its historical superiority to capitalism, that which, nevertheless, must develop and be formed in a fierce struggle and with exceptional difficulties. Our development and the situation in our country are thus being judged by standards which must at the very least disorient workers in the capitalist countries. It could appear, according to the model which has been forced upon us, that there can be no one in our country who disagrees with such an ideal order as socialism. And to the extent that such people are found here, this must clearly be as a result of shortcomings in our work, perhaps that we are not able to deal with them properly. If we do not tolerate, then, the activities of people who would wish to harm our social order, if we call them to account and apply our laws, we are then making "regrettable mistakes" according to our critics, advocates of "pure democracy," which they would so gladly like to see mainly in our country. The logic of their thought, however, marks them as mere "dissidents," as people who "think differently," for whom it is only a matter of being able to "carry on a dialog" with us, discussing other possible paths of socialist development, better and more humane socialism.

Only those with no responsibility, however, can indulge in such concerns. Naivete may be excused in nonbinding theoretical polemics, but a terrible practical price is paid for it. Reality has taught us this. In the direct interest of the further development of socialism, in the interest of the power of the people and of socialist democracy, the field may not be left open for a "pluralism", for a "democracy" that would deprive the socialist state of control over the activities of various antisocial and antisocialist elements. The so-called dissidents of the socialist countries are nothing other than groups of obstructionists organized and supported by anticommunist centrals for subversive activities, for creating a spark of destabilization of the social order. The events in Poland, incidentally, proved this with utter clarity, where "the dissident movement," incited and directed from the West, formed from the beginning the main source of counterrevolution.

Our people do not long for the restoration of those forms of social life which the revolution overcame and which restricted workers in their freedoms and rights, and whose liquidation made it possible to move on to socialist construction. There does not exist the smallest place in our political system, in the National Front system in which the Communist Party exercises its leading role, for any political opposition with an antisocialist platform, no matter how well camouflaged. For socialism, democracy is not a matter of theatrical performances, of a kind of public people's theater, but a very serious and responsible thing which vitally touches the interests of the working person and implements the real power of the people. This is generally true, and true in our country as well, but in no sense because someone has forced upon us some kind of "Soviet model" of socialism.

The crude insult that our country has been forced to adopt the "Soviet Model" of socialism has been spread for a long time by our enemies. It is their old tune. All of their propaganda has always counted on the nationalistic prejudices and political illiteracy of the bourgeoisie and the backward levels

of society. The development of socialist changes long ago disposed of this demagogery. It would hardly even be necessary to return to this issue had it not again been raised by certain prominent spokesmen of "Eurocommunism" in direct connection with attacks upon the legacy of the Great October Socialist Revolution. The heart of the matter is that their attacks are directed simultaneously at casting doubt on the generally valid teachings of Marxism-Leninism and at making absolute a sort of geographicozonal and nationalistic conception of socialism. This again calls to our attention not the existence of various paths to socialism, but of various socialisms and the right of each to "his own" and quite "specific" socialism. There can scarcely be anything more stupid or more dangerous for the unity of the communist movement.

Regarding our country, everyone who is not under the influence of artificially constructed models, who bases his observations on historical reality, on the actual development of the revolution and the revolutionary restructuring of our society must perceive that the CPCZ, by creatively applying Marxist-Leninist theory, the Leninist theory of revolution and socialist construction, has done the most for the interests of our nation, the Czechoslovak people.

This is the reason that the party was the target of sharp criticism from those who thought that postwar Czechoslovakia must remain in the "Western sphere". As well as those who not only thought this, but who also did everything to bring this about--in conflict with the will of the Czechoslovak people who had been bitterly educated by Munich and the war. According to these people, Czechoslovakia, as a country with a tradition of bourgeois democracy, could under no circumstances become a part of the world socialist system then being born. As is well known they lost this struggle across the board precisely because they set themselves against the will of the people, against the interests of our nations. And if in 1968 the "awakeners of socialism" again attempted the impossible, the return of Czechoslovakia to imperialism, if they wished to drag the country back into the imperialist sphere, then this effort only confirmed that this represented a counterrevolution that was attempting to establish continuity with prerevolutionary development. All the speeches about a "Soviet model" at that time then served as a smokescreen behind which this avowedly patriotic movement directed against the vital interests of our republic was to be implemented.

No one in this country denies that on the way to socialism we have made many errors and that we have simplified many problems. We have, however, always made decisions with an awareness of our own responsibility and no supplementary alibis which might perhaps excuse these simplified views and approaches can change anything about the fundamental matter; that the experiences of the USSR and the Soviet people, the experiences of the country that first set out on the unexplored path of socialism, have been and remain for us of immense, inestimable assistance. They have significantly enriched the practice of the revolutionary restructuring of our society and have in many areas fostered our development, which has been realized and has taken place in accordance with the developmental requirements of our society, our people, in continuity with its progressive and revolutionary tradition.

Part of the greatness of CPCZ history is that in the resolution of all problems which the revolutionary epoch placed before it, it has always succeeded in uniting the class interests of the workers with national interests and these in turn with the responsibilities of internationalism. This is the main source of the authority of our party for our people and in the international revolutionary and progressive movement. Klement Gottwald, Zdenek Nejedly, Ladislav Stoll and many other representatives and spokesmen for our party have on innumerable occasions emphasized the inseparable unity of patriotism and proletarian internationalism as a characteristic feature of Czechoslovak communists. This naturally includes a warm feeling of respect and friendship for the Soviet Union, of admiration and a sincere, comradely relationship to the Leninist, Bolshevik party, to the CPSU. It is in the simple and inspiring heroism of Julius Fucik that patriotism and internationalism, love for the land of the Soviets and the hopes that he attached to it in the conviction of our great common future in socialism are forged together as in a single piece of steel.

In December of this year, 60 years will have passed from the founding of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Once again on this occasion let us recall what the Soviet Union has meant and continues to mean for us; recall that it is only in alliance and friendship with the Soviet Union that our national welfare is assured, that only in this alliance and friendship, which is finding expression in everincreasing cooperation in all areas of public life, is the sovereignty of our state assured, and the sovereignty of our peoples, our security, our peaceful life and the further development of socialism.

Our ties to the Soviet Union have been determined by the entire contemporary history of our peoples. Those who dream up tales about some kind of forced acceptance of "Soviet models" ought, if they are going to meddle in the affairs of other countries, at least made an elementary attempt to acquaint themselves with this history and attempt to comprehend it. Speeches about a kind of new internationalism which allegedly is to replace the obsolete concept of proletarian internationalism sound similarly strange to our ears. Is it not true that all development since the Great October Socialist Revolution has confirmed the principles of proletarian and socialist internationalism as these were conceived by Marx, Engels, and Lenin? Has it not been sufficiently demonstrated what a binding force these principles are for truly revolutionary mass movements, for communist movements which in recent decades have become one of the most powerful political forces of the day? And what does not demonstrate with sufficient clarity how constructively these principles have operated in the relations which have formed among the states of the socialist community, and which are the basis of deepening cooperation and mutual convergence on the principles of honor, mutual respect and trust? It is precisely this faithfulness to the principles of proletarian and socialist internationalism that is one of the basic conditions of our strength, our successes in the struggle for socialism, social progress and peace.

Today, when imperialism is increasing its attacks on socialism, the communist movement and everything progressive, when it is even threatening nuclear war, it is especially important to realize this.

The American President, spokesman for the most reactionary forces of the contemporary world, has announced a new (how many is it now?) crusade against communism. For people of his type, it is inadmissible that the popular masses and nationalities demand improved living conditions under true freedom and democracy. The senior representative of imperialist oppression has pronounced communism as an "anomaly" of history, rattles his weapons and threatens any and all that if history does not stop he will be forced to instruct and alter it. The historical hall of the British Parliament should clearly have given his rhetoric the proper shine and greater credibility. However, the very remark "cradle of democracy", in which was at one time born such a powerful empire which came to grief just in this century because its "civilizing mission," in which blood was never spared, was mercilessly confronted with developments caused by the ideals of the Great October Socialist Revolution, turned the entire carefully prepared rhetoric upside down. It did not even have its supposed effect on the lords and members of the House of Commons who were present. Someone disrespectfully remarked that it perished in a whiff of naphthalene.

And really, what kind of democracy can those swear by who must most of all fear the power and sovereignty of the people? What kind of freedom can they speak about when all of their energy and the resources at their disposal are expended primarily on assuring that nothing be able to threaten the position of the long-standing oppressors and exploiters, the power of the minority over the majority, the hegemony and despotism of the monopolies, military-industrial and financial magnates? Indeed, they themselves, mired in the web of their own demagoguery, describe the efforts of the masses to live a life of peace and freedom, free of those who are willing, for colossal and ever-increasing profits, to hold the world on the edge of nuclear catastrophe, as a "deviation" and "an excess", which must always be nipped in the bud. They even ascribe to these efforts such dangerous attributes as those possessed by terrorism, which they themselves consciously and provocatively cultivate and spread in order to discredit and weaken revolutionary and liberation movements.

The paradoxes and absurdities that are characteristic of mature capitalism arise for the most part from the contradictions inherent in the exploitative and violent nature of imperialism. Its ideological spokesmen, therefore, try as hard as possible to hide these attributes behind phrases about democracy and freedom. They pursue this the more ardently the more the space constricts for the life of the working person in its truly human dimensions, those outside the bounds of the values of a consumer society. And they thereby help to demonstrate the more clearly and sharply what the example of real socialism can mean for the disintegration of this society.

We have no illusions about the struggle which awaits us and which will be fraught with new and dangerous risks. The world, which has already been sentenced by the judgment of history, is not ready to capitulate and as yet has a lot of strength. And the world to which the Great October opened the future will continue to have to fight through difficulties for each forward step.

But already that which socialism has proved capable of creating in the historically short period of its existence, under the conditions of attack and permanent threat in which it was born and formed, and the rapidity with which it has spanned and overcome the distance separating its beginnings from the present, from the forms of life in which the principles of socialism are being and will be increasingly applied, must truly appear as something unbelievable that has no parallel in human history. The inspirational influence of socialism on the course of world events is undoubtedly becoming stronger and increasing. Sixty-five years after the Great October Socialist Revolution, progressive people throughout the world welcome it as a historical milestone which initiated developments which began to write the chronicle of a new epoch of true freedom, democracy and social progress. We are proud that our country is among the builders of a new, socially just society, the principles of which are peace and liberated work.

9276

CSO: 2400/68

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

KLUSAK'S SPEECH TO PACEM IN TERRIS

Prague KATOLICKE NOVINY in Czech No 44, 31 Oct 82 pp 1, 4

[Address by Milan Klusak, CSR minister of culture, at the meeting of the expanded federal committee of the CSSR Pacem in Terris on 12 October 1982 in Brno: "Joint Efforts for Peace"]

[Text] Mr Chairman, reverend capitular vicars, gentlemen:

Permit me to greet, on the authorization of the CSSR Government, your working session of the leading officials and members of the Pacem in Terris Association of Catholic Clergymen in the CSSR. As it appears from its agenda thus far, your session today is one of the meetings in which you deal with meaningful issues related to your personal participation in the building and consolidation of world peace and in which you articulate your standpoint to urgent problems of relations developing between our socialist state and the Roman Catholic Church.

The city of Brno, where you are holding your meeting, probably has not been chosen at random for your session today. Not only is it located midway on the expressway between Prague and Bratislava, but what is more--it is famous for its hospitality and the common interest of your Moravian dioceses in the work of your association to which they are paying incessant attention.

Your association is indivisibly connected with the significant historical traditions of patriotic priests for whom it was characteristic that they always effectively combined their loyalty and devotion to the Roman Catholic Church with loyalty to the people from whom they came, with dedication to the welfare, social and cultural development of the oppressed classes in former systems of social exploitation. In the course of time to this day, such beneficial and naturally wholesome traditions have developed in harmony with new trends in our social and civic development. Our era has confirmed beyond any doubt and is stressing increasingly more the irreplaceable personal effort for the benefit of the church and of our joint, one and only socialist fatherland.

The most significant achievement of your Pacem in Terris Association, which the leading constitutional representatives of our socialist state have always respected in the past and still appreciate now, has been and still is your tireless involvement for world peace.

Gentlemen, it also has become a good tradition that meetings such as today's session acquaint you with our state's fundamental attitudes to important international and internal political issues. This is understandable; as citizens who are openly demonstrating your dedication to the life and work in our socialist society, it is your absolute right.

Recent events in the world have demonstrated again to every judicious person even more convincingly that world imperialism is and will be an even more dangerous and aggressive mortal enemy of world peace, social progress and good relations among nations. In his keynote address at the current session of the UN General Assembly, the minister of foreign affairs of the CSSR, Bohumil Chnoupek, stressed that we must repeat again with feelings of great anxiety that the current international situation remains distressful and complex. At the same time he expressed our conviction that the political atmosphere did not have at all to deteriorate so much. As he proved with facts, there are no real objective reasons for that. After all, the policy of detente was obviously quite successful and effective as a historical achievement of mankind. Deviations from this universally beneficial policy and attempts to return to cold war practices have become literally a program line only for the notorious circles of imperialism and reaction. Primarily under the aegis of the Reagan administration in the United States they are enforcing methods of pressure, violence, aggression, barbarity and genocide wherever circumstances permit. In recent days, Israel's open aggression in Lebanon, especially the massacres in Palestinian refugee camps in Beirut, have confirmed again that in order to achieve its autocratic goals, imperialism shirks from one of the most heinous crimes against humanity, even such as the genocide of the Palestinian people which is practiced systematically beyond any doubt. Explosions of such conflicts and similar escalations of murder are now threatening Central America where the targets at present are mainly the Nicaraguan and Salvadorian people. Irrefutable facts recognized and publicly condemned even by realistic politicians of the bourgeois states witness to the direct involvement and responsibility of the United States and its government in all those horrors, whether already committed or planned; all that illustrates realistically, albeit drastically, the real objectives and methods of the Reagan administration in the United States is thus trying to replace the policy of mutual understanding with the policy of confrontation of political powers.

It is a well-known fact that the Reagan policy of the United States is now attempting not only to produce devices of atomic military threat against the USSR and the socialist community, but that it is trying to apply various tools of economic blackmail against our countries. However, it has also resorted to acts of direct trade and economic pressures even against its own allies whenever they are unwilling to submit unconditionally to U.S. policies. All those are, of course, old and notorious practices of world imperialism, however, in a very concentrated and menacing form. They are not shirking even from attempts of direct, albeit cunningly differentiated, interference with the internal affairs of sovereign states, as confirmed by their actions against the Polish People's Republic, or, together with Chinese Maoists, against the people of Afghanistan or Cambodia. In its consequences, it is an attempt to subjugate both the internal political development and foreign policy of practically every country on this planet to the spirit, or, as the case may be, to the diktat of the so-called U.S. democracy--in other words, to U.S. capital.

Of course, practical implementation of this policy would lead to nothing else but conspicuous further increases of military budgets, to a compulsory arms race, which would profit only the U.S. military-economic complex and the capitalist configuration yoked with it indivisibly all over the world. This would bring the nations, the simple people, nothing but suffering--a further decline of social welfare, deterioration of the living standard, and above all, new wars and conflicts--with the ultimate threat of a worldwide nuclear conflagration.

It is, therefore, small wonder that during this year the opposition to the Reagan course has escalated so much all over the world among all types of social strata, as demonstrated not only by peace manifestations but also by practical policymaking and increasing class struggles. In the contemporary capitalist world, class struggles have become extremely complicated and exacerbated by the phenomena of crises, inflation and growing unemployment, which strengthens the opposition of the working people and proves the progressive forces right. On the other hand, the reactionary rightwing forces are trying to profit from fishing in troubled political waters, as for example in the FRG today.

The general public, however, appreciates more than ever before the value and the historical role of the USSR and of the socialist community, the necessity and the reality of its tireless peace initiative and disarmament proposals, advantageous economic relations with our countries as well as relations and cooperation in the whole far-reaching area of culture. The conviction that the spirit of Helsinki was good, beneficial and life-giving has not evaporated; on the contrary, it has increased.

We witnessed that recently, for example, at the world conference on cultural policies in Mexico. For a long time, we had not heard so many explicit condemnations of U.S. information imperialism even from representatives of certain countries in the West, or charges of U.S. coresponsibility for all current bloody conflicts. At the same time, a very massive front joined in support of progressive, humane, anticolonialist cultural policies to the benefit of a progressive social development of nations.

It is obvious that the peace forces in the world are, therefore, becoming increasingly more aware of the risks involved in the current world situation; they know on whom they may depend and against whom or against what they must fight. It is our good fortune and assurance that we are standing together with our Soviet friends on the right side of life and peace, on the side of a healthy future for our whole planet.

It pleases me, gentlemen, that as in our previous meetings I can see again that in these complex and grave times your Pacem in Terris Association of Catholic Clergymen has shown and is showing its political wisdom and principles, its unity with the peace forces, and its support for the peace policy of our socialist state. For many years, your association has proved a solid and valuable link in the world Christian movement and a respected collaborator of the Czechoslovak Peace Committee in our country and of the Czech and Slovak peace councils.

A notable achievement in the activities of your association was the participation of its members, with representatives of other churches and religious congregations in the CSSR, in the conference of all religious held in May in Moscow under the slogan "Church Representatives for the Saving of the Sacred Gift of Life from a Nuclear Catastrophe." Unfortunately, upon the order of the Vatican, Roman Catholic bishops from our country could not attend it. The Moscow congress addressed its urgent peace appeal not only to all churches, their associations and peace movement, but also to nonreligious peace organizations and to governments all over the world. Our country and the peace organizations in the CSSR did not stay behind with their response. For instance, the Czechoslovak Peace Committee invited the representatives and clergy of all 18 churches and religious societies from all over the country to an important and historically unique congress which met in Bratislava on 16 June 1982. In our opinion, it was more than a representative assembly which could address itself responsibly, from religious positions, to issues concerning the preservation and consolidation of world peace. We, therefore, very much appreciate the declaration adopted in Bratislava, especially the fact that it put such a high value on the peace initiative of the USSR and other socialist countries and recognized full responsibility of its involvement in "the further development of the world, face to face with escalating tensions in the world." It declares literally: "We shall rely above all on the systematic program of the Pacem in Terris Association of Catholic Clergymen and of the regional association of member churches of the Christian Peace Conference, and cooperate with all those who are involved in this field or who wish to become involved." The appeal of the Moscow Peace Congress also produced an impulse for peace activities of religious organizations in our country.

Gentlemen, from my discussion with you over a number of years I know well that you are aware that we--our CPCZ and our government--together with all our working people are engaged in creative activity, trying to prepare material, social and cultural preconditions not only for our time but also for the future generations. Our society today is solving many urgent domestic problems, primarily those of an economic nature. In his recent address, the president of the CSSR, Comrade Husak, characterized the current efforts of our socialist state and of the CPCZ as follows:

"All our activity is directed at safeguarding a happy, materially and culturally rich life of our people. That is the main purpose of our policy. Having achieved a high living standard in the current complex situation in which our economy operates, we have every right to stress the close correlation between satisfaction of our people's needs and the economic achievements and realistic opportunities. This was the point of departure for the 16th Congress when it outlined the task of maintaining the achieved living standard and improving it further in accordance with the opportunities which our work will create. The simple truth still applies: it will depend on our achievements how we will live."

That does not pertain to economic issues alone. Our society is concerned about consolidating the social welfare of our citizens, including every age and social stratum of our population. Systematic attention is also paid to our health and educational systems. Furthermore, the cultural area contributes vital values for a balanced development of socialist man.

All our citizens, irrespective of their ideological orientation, share in all of the above-mentioned achievements of our socialist society. We have emphasized before, and shall emphasize in the future, that indeed all honest citizens of our state are invited to participate in the building of a developed socialist society. Our state is also genuinely concerned about establishing good relations with our believing citizens as well as about developing relations with churches and religious congregations recognized by our state. This attitude is not motivated by any pressures of the moment. We are interested in achieving stable long-term conditions for a balanced development of our socialist society. For that reason Article 32 of our constitution guarantees freedom of religious belief: "Every citizen may profess any religious faith, or have no religious belief, and many perform religious rites so long as it does not contradict the law."

Our state's relations to the Roman Catholic Church are guided by these principles which fully respect the hierarchical system of the church, its liturgical rules and other internal customs. The state spend extensive funds for material needs of all churches, personal benefits of the clergy, study of theologians, religious literature and press, etc. However, we cannot permit our church-political relations to be determined from abroad and the church to be dragged into a political game whose objective is an effort to weaken socialism; we cannot permit this especially if that goes beyond verbal distortions of facts, slander of our church policy or general, abstract fomenting of the spirit of discord between religion and churches, on the one hand, and the socialist state, on the other, in which hostile propaganda constantly indulges.

Some specific, systematic steps are now being made in various areas in an attempt to influence the churches, clergymen and believing citizens. Such attempts have occurred recently in our country. I do not have in mind only the quite unusual interest of the representative diplomatic corps of certain Western powers and their quite systematic interrogation of the churchmen in our country. At this moment, I am referring above all to very specific steps concerning your association under the pretext of the implementation of the declaration issued by the Vatican Congregation for Clergy on 8 March 1982 "Concerning Certain Associations Prohibited to Clergy." This declaration is very intentionally applied to your association, although it does not specifically identify any clergymen's organization. Today you and we all know perfectly well the conditions and the methods used to apply it against your association and we know the arguments which were used. Whoever says that Pacem in Terris is an association against the bishops, that is splitting the church's unity and does nothing for the church, he knows nothing about you and your activity, or he slanders you maliciously. In other words, it is more than a brazen and, therefore, unjustifiable allegation to say that any specific action of Roman Catholic priests aimed at consolidation of world peace in this contemporary successful form is futile.

Gentlemen, I do not intend to repeat every argument contradicting in an authoritative manner the malicious slander of your association. Prominent officials of your association presented such arguments on various occasions and published most of them. All I want to ask is what kind of relations

between the Roman Catholic Church and our common Czechoslovak state are the goal of those who by their attitudes are trying to undo every positive accomplishment achieved in this area since the founding of your association in 1971. The activities of your association were praised on several recent occasions by the leading representatives of our state, particularly by the president of our republic, as a significant factor in generating an atmosphere of trust and mutual understanding between the CSSR and the Roman Catholic Church.

Your meeting is devoted to issues concerning the struggle for peace and against the nuclear catastrophe in the light of the decisions of the Second Vatican Council. In fact, the Second Vatican Council introduced some constructive factors in the attitudes of the Holy See which facilitated the solution of problems in the relations between the Holy See and the states of the socialist community. Twenty years have passed since the opening of that council whose documents serve as important guidelines for your church. However, the times have changed and the so to say regionally authoritarian interpretation of those documents (in other words, applicable to various areas and to various countries) has given rise to legitimate fears about the future orientation of the Roman Catholic Church in the class-divided world of the early 1980's. In the conclusion of the pastoral constitution on the church in today's world, "Gaudium et Spes" [Joy and Hope] which as far as I know is regarded in your church as the point of departure for subsequent post-council documents, Article 92 mentions mutual recognition, respect, unanimity and legitimacy of different views among the Catholics, irrespective of their hierarchical position. The paragraph in question concludes with a reference to the encyclical "Ad Petri Cathedram" [At the Throne of St Peter] by Pope John XXIII issued on 29 June 1959, which states: "What binds the believers is stronger than that what divides them: let there be unity in vital issues, freedom in doubts, and love in everything."

Precisely that attitude offers effectively satisfaction to all those who have been trying in the past and are trying now to work for peace and for a fruitful development of contacts with people of other than Catholic convictions. In this context, the efforts to silence or break up your association appear as intentions deviating quite conspicuously from the above-mentioned program of the Second Vatican Council. It is obvious that for political reasons certain powers would gladly destroy every achievement patiently created over the years. They would wish to prevent the further process of constructive development and solution of existing problems. We have never tried to conceal the fact that we regard attacks against your association as a tactical maneuver directed mainly against the peaceful atmosphere in which we are building a developed socialist society in the CSSR, as well as against the good relations between our state and the Roman Catholic Church. This we stated frankly during the negotiations of our government with the Vatican. As a sovereign state, the CSSR will never permit the civic orientation of its population to be controlled and determined from abroad. That would contradict our laws and our constitution, which guarantees and protects all rights of all our citizens.

In fact, every self-respecting state determined to defend its sovereignty would act the same. It suffices to recall the decisive step taken by our neighbors and friends in the Polish People's Republic whose lawful state

authorities are determined to protect all honest people in their country, including the believers, from being used by anyone against their socialist society and its system. In this endeavor, they have found and are still finding increasingly more support and appreciation not only of the truly patriotic citizens of their country but also of the sensible and peace-loving people abroad.

Gentlemen, on several previous occasions in the past months we unambiguously reaffirmed our full support for the further development of your Pacem in Terris Association and underscored the fact that we want, and we shall, defend by all means, consolidate and further develop peace and constructive cooperation in our domestic social relations--specifically, between the state and the Roman Catholic Church. If the attempts to infringe on those relations, however, intensive they had been, failed in the past and are failing now, that is primarily to the credit of your association which goes on with its work, and to the credit of its members who cannot be misled or intimidated, who maintain their equilibrium and are aware of their civic responsibility, for which they deserve our sincere appreciation.

Undoubtedly the attitude of both councils of bishops and ordinaries in the SSR and CSR, who recently articulated their support for the peace activity of Roman Catholic priests in our country is having a calming effect. We believe that this will foster a constructive atmosphere for the solution of the really urgent issues concerning the Roman Catholic Church and our state.

Consolidation of the church-political situation was, is, and will be a necessary precondition for the solution of our internal problems as well as for our negotiations with the Vatican. We believe that such negotiations will continue and that they will follow a constructive course, if they deal with the truly urgent problems of mutual interest and if nothing is introduced or done to revive controversies. If both parties demonstrate their goodwill and realistic approach--which we are doing--then the results will be beneficial. We shall support every peace initiative of the Vatican and of Pope John Paul II personally, when they are effectively focused against imperialist aggression, against armament and in support of peace in the world and friendship among nations.

Gentlemen, from the historical perspective of mankind's existence on our planet, there is no other realistic alternative than the victory of peace over war. To be involved in this struggle and to strive for life in peace, that is now the duty and the right of every individual. The peace-loving forces in the world have ample courage and power to defend peace. We support this conviction firmly and unshakably this year when together with our Soviet friends and all progressive people in the world we realize how in the 60 years of the existence of the USSR the historical situation on our planet has changed and how people on every continent have progressed on their way toward their liberation from the oppression of imperialism and colonialism; despite all the suffering which they must endure to this day, they are not left to the mercies of the arbitrary rule and manipulation of capitalism which once used to dominate the world.

We are happy, as we have every right to be, that we have steered the ship of our state into the haven of the socialist community where we are protected against the harshest blasts of international storms and thus, may develop and implement the stable, hopeful policy of our country's development in cooperation and mutual assistance with our allies. It is a policy which has helped us for many years to gradually upgrade the potential of our whole country and improve the life of our working people, of every citizen of our socialist Czechoslovak federation. It is a policy of sensible and prudent management and efficiency of all our social work outlined for our days as well as for the future on the basis of systematically fostered and implemented civic responsibility.

Our CPCZ, the entire National Front call all our citizens to implement and develop precisely this policy. Everybody, even you and your Pacem in Terris association should and may have the opportunity of enjoying your full rights, potentials and means to participate in achieving the goals of the program which wants nothing else but peace in the world and serene work for the welfare of all people in our country, for both our nations--the Czechs and Slovaks--as well as of all nationalities living in our country. At the same time, it challenges everyone to struggle against all shortcomings and deficiencies which are weakening our common path. It calls to the people in foreign lands to join us in friendship, disarmament and peace.

Only those who are blinded by their class interests or prejudices, those who have succumbed to ideological confusion and hostile propaganda so much that they ignore or even betray the most vital interests of their own country and its people can oppose this policy or the efforts to implement it.

All honest and, I would say, responsible people in our country, in Bohemia as well as in Slovakia, will not be seduced; in fact, they have adopted this honest and responsible policy and are trying to help implement it, which we sincerely and truly appreciate. This is, and always will be, the decisive strength of our socialist fatherland; this is, and will be, our country's future.

In this spirit, gentlemen, permit me to thank you once more for inviting me to attend this meeting, to express my appreciation for your commendable work for peace--and to wish you the best of health and personal gratification in the future.

9004

CSO: 2400/73

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

EXPATRIATE SED FUNCTIONARY ANALYZES UNOFFICIAL PEACE MOVEMENT

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German Vol 36 No 50, 13 Dec 82 pp 58-59, 62, 64-65, 67

[Article by Rudolf Bahro: "A Taut Net-Rudolf Bahro on the Peace Movement in the GDR"]

[Text] Former SED functionary Rudolf Bahro, was sentenced in 1978 to eight years in prison for his book "Die Alternative" (The Alternative), a criticism of the regime, and deprived of his citizenship in 1979. Today he is involved with the Greens and the West German peace movement.

[Text] The change in atmosphere we have experienced in the Federal Republic since the mid-seventies is significant enough, but only when we relate to it what is now happening in the GDR do we realize the historical dimension of the change being experienced by Germany. Latest developments on the other side are more of a German and European event than an Eastern bloc event.

While over here quite a number of people were intently and then disappointedly looking out for a GDR counterpart to solidarnosc, over there a completely independent movement was about to blossom out. About what direction it is taking, West Germans too now can find out in two publications.*

The texts mirror it as lived reality, whose origins go back to the sixties. And it really is a movement if one looks at its substance, at the unbound consciousness which is the source of its effort, and does not allow one's glance to be darkened by criteria of organization and countability.

*"Friedensbewegung in der DDR, Texte 1978 bis 1982" (Peace Movement in the GDR, Texts from 1978 to 1982), edited by Wolfgang Buescher, Peter Wensierski and Klaus Wolschner, Edition transit, vol 2, 230 pages. Klaus Ehring/Martin Dallwitz, "Schwerter zu Pflugscharen, Friedensbewegung in der DDR" (Swords Into Plowshares, Peace Movement in the GDR), rororo aktuell, No 5019, 280 pages.

The initiative rests with different forces and accentuates the questions differently from what I had expected at one time. They are no Marxist "dissidents" such as Robert Havemann and I were. While they adopted our ideas, their start is different.

In the Bautzen II Prison I had read a new Protestant house book [Hausbuch]-- I think it was entitled "Aufschluesse" (Elucidations). It already breathed the spirit which Bishop Hempel presumably had in mind when he said at the Dresden Peace Forum in February in light of the comparatively few opportunities for action: "If the church is at the center, is engaged in meditation and is engaged in doing good, it would be the first time for it not to be alive with new life."

And I was under the impression that more than "the church" was at stake and that there existed, though not that analytically, an access to the problems of the two competing industrial societies which was a level lower, more basic than the one in my book "Die Alternative." If I in the end arrived at pointing up problems of common concern to East and West, this other beginning, ecumenically inspired, was based on it from the start.

It is precisely from there that the key to the entire material is presented by the little book "Beton ist Beton" (Concrete Is Concrete)*, which offers criticism of civilization from the area of the Protestant Church over there. (See DER SPIEGEL 47/1981) It portrays the energy gathered in the protective area of the church as a particularly pure expression of those new forces which seek to overcome not just the political-military East-West contrast but the confrontation of the two systems altogether.

If they are to have their say, the East is no longer to "catch up with and overtake" the West, as has been the decisive slogan since 1917. For the environment and peace movement in the GDR, the country is rich enough, perhaps too rich compared with the Third World. And wherever it criticizes GDR institutions, it does not apply the standard of Western democracy but the standard of what is humanly required, before which every political order must identify itself.

This ecology book and one of the two others with a direct bearing on the peace movement come from the same "edition transit" which wants to induce people to leave the hose running through the whole country "of a width of a few meters and a length of hundred of kilometers"--the transit stretches, in other words--and to observe the tangible life on the other side.

*Peter Wensierski, Wolfgang Buescher, "Beton ist Beton, Zivilisationskritik aus der DDR" [Concrete Is Concrete, Criticism of Civilization From the GDR], Edition transit, vol 1, 220 pages.

Whereas these two concentrate on documentation and in doing so seldom exceed the bounds of the church, the third ("Schwerter zu Pflugscharen," roro aktuell) rather reports and describes and, in doing so, points more strongly beyond the Christian milieu and makes it clear more or less that the church is only the organ, however important, of a universal need.

All that the three publications contains seems to me to be absolutely authentic, and the introduction, reports and commentaries of the West German and editors too are throughout close to reality.

There is every indication that there exists for a start a numerically limited network which, however--simply by virtue of communicating on a socially accepted spiritual basis of considerable resilience and range--is organized more dependably than one imagines.

Its significance cannot be understood by making comparisons such as between the 300,000 people at the big peace demonstration in Bonn in October 1981 and the 5,000 people at the church peace forum in Dresden in February 1982, not only because it is qualitative in nature but because 5,000 in the GDR also qualitatively represent, comparatively speaking, just as much as 60 times as many people over here.

So far, primarily people engaged politically and as Christians in such a way as to sacrifice to their autonomy any kind of career normal in the GDR are in public evidence. If the threats of sanctions disappeared, we would soon also see 100,000 (for the 17 million) assemble there, probably not at one place but more effectively in almost all parts of the country.

But the nucleus of the movement at the same time represents trends for which there are antennas reaching as far as into the part of GDR youth that is loyal to the state. The hollowness of the official ideology is recognized increasingly for what it is from about the age of 12 or 13 on, when naive adapting ceases and reflection begins.

The special nature of the relations between the church, the peace movement and the state in the GDR which gives its stamp to the political process over there in a way different from the other East European countries is described and analyzed very instructively in the roro book. It is exceedingly important for the balance in the "division of labor" between the radical movement at the base and the protecting or mediating church to be maintained, with these components however being rolled into one in one and the same person.

Evidently there are church people who are not primarily pledged to institutions but to the idea, and we should not make the mistake of believing that those who would like to make direct attacks on the state over there thus automatically are also the more radical ones.

Without the impulse represented by the GDR--an impulse which is not purely negative--Christianity there would never have blossomed out into its present

stature. The state at one time started opposing Muenzer to Luther and celebrating him; by now a conservative Lutherism in the church reserves would be far more comfortable for it than the Muenzer spirit which is abroad everywhere.

An ideological competition with the GDR leadership is developing which, though its spread is far less, might be compared to the Polish church--if it were not as advanced in its attitudes as the latter (for understandable reasons) is old fashioned.

What was crucial for the result is the decision made in the course of the sixties--under the sign of the stabilization of the state following the building of the wall and under its pressure--to get involved in the GDR, to be a church "not beside, not against, but in socialism." Not before this was taken as the basis was it possible for the church to implement the claim of serving man "not only in the private sphere but also in society and politics."

Former Bishop Schoenherr identified the sensitive point when he blamed mere refusal on the "wrong conviction" that a "fundamentally atheistic and totalitarian regime cannot but produce wrong things everywhere and at all times." It is part of arch-Christian mentality and motivation to seek no antagonistic clash except at the spiritual level.

The outlines of a new policy developing from there are only at the first glance determined by adjustment to the East German conditions. It is no deformed residue which would have to apologize that "more and other things just are not feasible." With this Christianity, the peace movement of the GDR is in its element.

On the basis of its religious intensity coupled with political sagacity, this Protestant conception has a potential reach which we cannot but underestimate. It is only a question of time as to when the spiritual force of leadership radiating from there will exercise influence on large segments of youth and on all those politically interested.

Just as the peace movement in the Federal Republic cannot be properly understood without taking its "Green" soundboard into account, so this is not possible in the case of the peace movement in the GDR. If we recall the faces revealed to us by the awakenings in Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland, there is the following difference despite all similarities: Nowhere else did the opposition bear the features of the environmental and peace movement. Only recently has a parallel existed in Hungary.

Meanwhile it is being generally realized that the rationale of the armament race can be broken only if a force appears which places itself beyond the power competition of the two industrial systems and no longer sees industrialization as the royal path to freedom and social justice. But if there is a country in which such a force can appear, it is now evidently Germany--East and West. Surprisingly at first glance but only seemingly paradoxically

the bipolarity of the postwar world order first loses its ideological inescapability in our dividend country.

Contrary to a number of apparent indications and notwithstanding considerable mutual effects, the development on the other side has not been induced by the Federal Republic--at least not the short and direct way. In any case, it cannot be explained by any means without a genuine disposition in the GDR. In the final analysis, the parallelism and virtual simultaneity of the awakenings rather indicate common origins having to do with the particular fate, the particular political and geographical situation, the specific traditions and psychological characteristics as well as the historical guilt complex of the Germans. These of course have an effect on both sides of the border, and to this extent the processes over here and over there are basically connected.

This national identity which now for the first time is making itself felt again as a factor capable of making history (one among others but an important one owing to the Germans' international position) among many people, for a start, triggers wishes of repression.

Below the surface I have found the differences in behavior between East and West Germans from the start to be smaller than one would have expected. For example, I was struck by the fact that at least half of the people who got somewhere in Bavaria via the CSU or in Bremen via the SPD would have done so in Leipzig via the SED. Very much to the point, Wensierski and Buescher in their editorial article on "Beton ist Beton" speak of the oppressively broad center stratum of both societies.

But there is every indication that the political initiative in the long run--on both sides--is shifting to forces which at other times made themselves heard only very incidentally--for instance, 1517 to 1527, in our classical era, toward 1813 and 1848, in Social Democracy from Lassalle to the law against the socialists and then briefly in 1918.

And the form on both sides of the border--on the other side even more than here--appears to be determined to a large extent by the earliest "national" tradition--the Protestant one. The theologist Dietrich Bonhoeffer is the guiding figure.

At another level, which is probably even more important than that of intellectual cooperation--as regards the mass character, anyway--rock music constitutes an intensive connection. It stands for the synchronization of feelings. Just as in the case of radical theology, the oppositionist attitude toward conditions in the West facilitates the arrival of information. However, disparate the elements may appear, it is an overlapping culture ranging from rock music to theology.

In DER SPIEGEL(33/1982), Wilhelm Bittorf on the occasion of the blockading of the nuclear weapons depot at Grossengstingen quoted a military policy non-commissioned officer saying about the blockaders: "They are the same kind of guys as in the GDR."

This is precisely the phenomenon. For the first time since the split and notwithstanding the seemingly so unbridgeable difference in systems, we have opposition movements on this side and on the other side of the wall which are at one in their motivation and aims.

Nor do they by any means turn against one power structure (their "own") in the name of the other. Rather the two institutions consider themselves as reverse sides, in the last analysis, of an antagonistic system which has to be overcome as a whole.

Someone from the GDR writes to someone from the FRG: "We will manage together." They have the same concept of the nature of the problem, and its solution. This occurrence of a peace movement with an all-German trend means no less than that the second postwar generation fascinated by the "Oekopax" [ecology-peace] complex in both German states also carries with it the prospect of a national renaissance.

For all those who have not got over the postwar image of the world, the experience passed on in these books is bound to have a largely irritating effect. The cut goes even deeper than at the goodbye to Adenauer's Germany policy. What are they to do with a countermovement in other German state which neither longs for the West nor is out for a reform-communist power struggle in the system, but instead proves to be a twin of the pacifists and Greens on this side?

Not quite 3 years ago, when we both came over here, the conservatives showed in their reception of Nico Huebner what kind of an idea they had of GDR resistance and what they expected of it. In conformity with the West's Berlin policy, he had refused military service over there, and over here was immediately prepared "to defend freedom."

Of course, this pro-Western-oriented resistance continues to exist on the other side, just as there continue to be pro-Soviet "peace fighters" on this side. But these attitudes are becoming clearly anachronistic on both sides. There is no advancing that way. Without emancipation from the black-white basic pattern ("We are good, and you are bad") which the West German conservative forces constantly sought to impose as a behavioral norm toward the East German state, the GDR church would never have attained its current influential position. Dissociation from ordinary anticommunism has enabled it also to reject the absolute claim of the state ideology.

The GDR church ever since 1965, "with a view to clarifying and testing the concern of his conscience," has asked whoever refuses military service there "whether he would be ready to do military service as a citizen of the other German state"--and today less than ever expects the answer to be yes. The Protestant attitude toward this question, meanwhile, is based on a political initiative, whereas the admirers of the free West over there, any more than the admirers of the Eastern socialist achievements over here, have no effect.

Any reader from the CDU/CSU spectrum who is honest toward himself, for the very reason that it is not he that is directly kept in mind, will find a great number of sentences in the books which need to be amended only slightly to be directed just as well at him as at those in power over there. And he will find other sentences which need only a substitution of the adversary to be taken as coming from him rather than from the propaganda mill of the SED.

The self-righteous on both sides are cooperating as ever by defending their respective domestic political reserves. But the resemblance has never been brought home to them so strikingly.

At the other wing too quite a few people find it difficult to take an appropriate attitude toward the development in the GDR. During the Prague Spring and thereafter, there were a large number of reasonable people in the West who engaged in self-criticism, saying that there had been too vociferous and open interest in the events in the neighboring Eastern country, that there had been interference. Sure, there was such interference, and the intelligence services are not asleep, but over and above that what was being demanded basically was abstinence--very much in line with the interests of the functionaries on the other side.

As recently as last year I was told after a Bremen discussion during which I had said that with their hearts the Poles had left the Warsaw Pact that one must not say such things aloud. It was one of the Young Democrats who appealed to me in those terms. This reserve is now to apply to the GDR: one should not call the child by its name [call a spade a spade] because otherwise it will cease to exist, or rather "made to cease to exist."

To pretend we didn't know? The power apparatus is not wont to get the idea to invade Czechoslovakia, or to have Poland occupied by Poles, by way of its newspaper clipping service. Because of its exposed location, the GDR has the most vigilant security service in the world for its ideological buffer zone. No one should seriously believe that, though it recognized the danger, we could ex post facto throw a little sand into the eyes of the leadership; or that it might have forgotten the danger in the meantime because there are indications that after more careful calculation it thinks it is better after all to couple pacifism by linking it to the antifascist ancestors Thaelmann, Ossietzky and Bonhoeffer.

Probably it is fundamentally a question of the following: Both conservatives and leftists in case of opposition in the GDR first think of the benefit the West might be able to draw from it. There is agreement about this alternative as such. What makes a difference is whether one is for or against benefiting the West. Then it remains to be decided whether the Western peace movement, for example, is participating or should participate in the destabilization of the Eastern bloc.

The question is erroneous because it is raised on the basis of bloc logic. It is assumed as a matter of course that a destabilization of the Eastern

bloc in the last analysis can only strengthen NATO. That means one does not at all take into account the possibility of NATO and the Warsaw Pact being dependent on each other for their stability--in other words, of the collapse of one bloc entailing, or at any rate promoting, the collapse of the other.

Where will the result of the intellectual confrontation which has now begun between Christian ecological pacifism and the state? At any rate, it is one thing to reject civilian in lieu of military service as the GDR Government has done, and quite another thing to destroy the net which is spreading over the country. Of course State Security knows all its meshes and can destroy them without exception.

But that is not going to happen. To the extent that this net has been woven not only with a view to political aims but of decisions concerning life, decisions of opinion and decisions of religion, it will also prove largely immune to attack. Its hour will come, though one cannot predict at the moment how that will happen, but it is much more likely to occur on dove feet than to the accompaniment of fanfares.

It is up to the West Germans to be concerned about favorable circumstances. In the event that the West German Peace movement gets stuck in regard to its immediately material obstacle objectives, consideration for the movement on the other side will of course let up. Yet this is but the foreground. Subliminally one has to be interested in the GDR in long-term prospects of the Western environmental and peace movement, for the overall political situation has worsened badly.

Since Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968 and Poland from 1980 to 1982, the GDR, move after move, has lost the secure hinterland which connects it with the Soviet Union. Economically speaking, one will have to consider oneself fortunate not to be worn down between rising prices of raw materials and dropping opportunities for sales--in other words, decreasing possibilities of imports of technology from the West. There are no reserves left, and no kind of impulses can be expected from the Soviet Union.

In this situation an initiative from the West based on the new political forces and breaking through the structure of the cold war can have some effect all the way to Moscow.

Inner-German dynamics can be the veritable lever for changing the consensus in both German states in such a way as to cause the idea of the picture of the adversary to collapse and to make disarmament possible. Precisely in the GDR conspicuous militarization is being conducted not to make the latest weapons systems plausible to the population (there is no debate about that in the Eastern bloc, and they are introduced whenever they are ready) but because one is more than ever dependent on the picture of the adversary to keep the state together.

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SCHOLAR'S 'FAUST' INTERPRETATION IGNORES OFFICIAL VIEW OF GOETHE

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[Article by Dr. Heinz Hamm, Halle-Neustadt: "The July Revolution, Saint-Simonism and Goethe's Concluding Work on 'Faust'"]

[Text] Goethe, in a conversation with chancellor von Mueller, called the July revolution "the greatest mental exercise which could have befallen him at the end of his life."¹ This word also has validity for the concluding work on FAUST. Of course, it would be wrong to interpret those segments of Faust written after July 1830, i.e., all of Act IV, the first three scenes of Act V, and additions to the older scenes "Midnight" and "Great Forecourt of the Palace," as nothing but a reaction to the contemporary event of the July revolution; for they are in a poetic context which covers a much larger epoch of historical experience. But they do have an important premise, not to be neglected, in the revolutionary turmoils of 1830/31 in France and Germany, because they caused Goethe deep and general perplexity.

Scientific research does not deny this fact, it even underlines it. Nonetheless it has not really taken it into account up to now in the text interpretation. Only the work by Schuchardt in 1935 is an exception.² It reaches conclusions, however, which are unacceptable. I therefore consider it meaningful and appropriate to first of all, again analyze comprehensively Goethe's non-poetic attitudes towards the July revolution, and then to examine separately those Faust parts written after July 1830, to see how the confrontation with the "powerful Paris earthquake"³ was reflected in them.

The July revolution is for Goethe a societal catastrophe of momentous proportions. And that is for two reasons: Since the revolution of 1789. Goethe is certain of one thing: "Revolutionary uprisings of the lower classes" are "never the fault of the people...but of the government." They take place where the "people" are oppressed to an unbearable degree by an unjust "government." They can be averted if the "government" makes timely concessions to the justified wishes of the "people" for "modern improvements" and eliminates "public ills through wise proceedings"⁴ of their own volition. Goethe defends against all attacks the existing political system, which still grants the sovereigns almost unlimited autocratic rule, because he

cannot be shaken in his conviction that the German "princes" have learned from the revolution of 1789, and that they have the capability and willingness to exercise the "conduct of government"⁵ for the welfare of the "people." Having been disappointed many times, he has no overly great expectations, but he sees "splintered Germany" on the right road and, by and large, in a condition "which can still be called commendable and honorable."⁶ In the talk with Eckermann in which he defends himself against the accusation of being a "minion of princes," he even considers himself entitled to the opinion that "such times," in which "princes" lived "only for their own pleasures...at the expense of the "people" and did not care about the welfare of the people, are "far behind us, thank God."⁷

Then--totally unexpectedly⁸--a "lightning-fast revolution"⁹ erupts in the prominent country of France and "spreads" its "convulsions throughout Europe."¹⁰ And worst of all: there are "tumultuous agitations of the people,"¹¹ "mob scenes, wild fights, burnings"¹² also in Germany, where according to Goethe's conviction, the "demon of revolutions"¹³ appeared to have been banned forever through wise government. Goethe had considered himself secure from a "repetition of the tragedy of 1790"¹⁴ in Germany, and now he must witness how "after 40 years the old tumultuous frenzy is renewed"¹⁵ and how his patriarchal covenant of regent and "people" is coming to naught.

The new revolution is a declaration of bankruptcy of Goethe's basic political conviction that the existing "governments" are capable and willing to satisfy the just claims of the "people" and to make violent uprisings superfluous. Even if he struggles hand and foot against it: in the last analysis, he can only attribute the new revolution to a shameful failure of the "higher-ups."

In French writings about the July revolution which reach Goethe, and which he studies carefully, it is made very clear that the regime of Charles X had to be removed by violent means because it had delivered the country [into the hands of] a parasitical caste of nobility and clergy, and was in insurmountable contrast to the interests of all working people. In the brochure, *Causes et conséquences des événements du mois de Juillet 1830* by Joseph Fievé, which Goethe reads on October 18 and 19, 1830,¹⁶ the July revolution is celebrated as the historically necessary revolt of the working classes against the political rule of those who do not contribute to the wealth of society and live on the work output of others: "What mere reasoning could never have achieved, the great week in July brought about, and a new organization of society took place. All those who work and pay found themselves united in intent and deed and were therefore invincible through their numbers and their courage, while those who get payed were satisfied to be represented through the soldiers...Everyone works or must work, since the wealth of society is only the result of all combined labor. In all areas--they are as numerous and varied as the needs and inclinations of society--useful people are always, and only, the working people: M. Casimir Perier as well as his architect, the architect as well as the bricklayer; M. Ternaux as well as his workers; the writer as well as his

printer, etc., etc.,...the alliance of those who work and pay was strengthened in the streets. Here, in the streets, was the proof that those who live off the public wealth are the only enemies of working people of all classes."¹⁷

A man like Leipzig banker and wholesale merchant Feliz Ferdinand Kuestner, consul general of the Grand Duchy of Saxony-Weimar-Eisenach in Leipzig, can also appreciate the July revolution as a demand of the century and as a great civilizing achievement of the French people. From a class viewpoint comparable to Fievé's, but oriented more towards the general human condition, he writes in a letter to Goethe of 18 August 1830 with joyful excitement: "God is still alive; his great and measured education of the human race took a great step forward in recent events, the preponderance, the victory of good has greatly enhanced the maturing of nations towards improvement and good. The ugly endeavors of the enemies of light and justice, after a stubborn battle against the urgings and demands of the century, have failed shamefully. The French nation, through unity and moderation, has finally achieved an unsullied page in the annals of its history and the high respect and gratitude of its fellow nations. Only now it seems to have found the right track, and the day of good has dawned. Hail to [this nation] and the close bond between regent and people."¹⁸

In his answering letter of 31 August 1830, Goethe skips over this central passage with a trivial phrase. He refrains from denouncing the deposed French "government" as an incorrigible enemy of the public "weal," and yet he knows that men such as Fievé and Kuestner are right. But he was not always able to keep silent. Soret tells of an acidly sarcastic remark of Goethe's about Charles X which unmistakably clarifies the question of guilt in favor of Fievé and Kuestner: "I had brought back a five-franc piece of 1830 with the picture of Charles X, and Goethe made fun of his pointed head. 'The organ of religiousness is very highly developed in him,' he said, 'and without doubt, because of his religious conviction he did not feel obligated to pay his debts, but we are all the more deeply in his [debt] since his stroke of genius which turned everything topsy-turvy in Europe.'"¹⁹ There is no more devastating judgment. A king who believes that he does not have to pay his debts is not in a position to exercise the "conduct of government" for the welfare of his "people."

The "great people" are responsible. Goethe sees the July revolution as a great calamity, because those called upon to govern have again failed shamefully. He does not say that in public. For under no circumstances is to be justified what is even more damnable about the July revolution than the failure of the "great ones": the renewed, violent interference of the "revolutionary rabble"²⁰ in the "highest affairs of state."²¹ Goethe condemns the "great people" who give cause for a violent uprising. Even more forcefully, however, he condemns the "masses of people and the rabble"²² who execute it.

It applies even in peacetime: the "people," because of their limited education, are incapable of understanding the dominant needs of the state as a whole, and must therefore have a say only in family and domestic

matters which concern them directly. If they meddle in the higher tasks of "governing," then they presume to a position which they cannot fill, and they will always want to impose their own base and egotistical purposes, to the detriment of the whole. Such "egotistic-anarchial behavior...through which everyone pushes and places himself where he does not belong"²³ only demonstrates its real perniciousness in times of crisis, when they believe themselves capable of attaining their goals by means of force. It destroys public order and threatens property and life of wealthy citizens without bringing about any improvements in the state whatsoever. Goethe cannot see in the renewed "revolutionary actions"²⁴--as in the revolution of 1789--anything but the atrocities of a "revolutionary rabble out for robbery, murder and arson and, hiding behind the pretext of the common good, pursuing the basest egotistic purposes."²⁵

Goethe reacts with great consternation to the "obnoxiousness against the governments"²⁶ which his correspondents report from various German states--primarily the political reports by Weimar minister von Gersdorff.²⁷ He watches with anxiety how the disturbances of Leipzig and Dresden come ever closer to him. When, after student rioting in Jena, the wildest rumors about an impending revolution start circulating in little Weimar,²⁸ he does not hesitate to take these rumors very seriously. He reports to his son: "There have been disturbances in Jena for more than 2 weeks, the upper classes did everything possible, but finally troops had to be sent there. Here, also, the wildest threats have been spread about and the persons were named who were to be hurt in, and with, their houses. The Grand Duke was absent, but after some hesitation it was decided to call out the troops; 800 soldiers in all. With this (sic!) and with other precautions, we hope to get through [all right]."²⁹

Goethe feels himself directly threatened and openly admits that he is afraid, in a passage of a letter to Wilhelm von Humboldt which he then suppresses: "One had to take care if not of oneself then of one's neighbors, initiate actions, be active, for the best ones were usually threatened; and [all] this in the strangest complications of attitudes, circumstances, decisions; a situation that became all the more painful as one clearly remembered having been threatened in the same way 40 years ago and, after the ups and downs of circumstances, to have been driven to the very edge of the abyss, and one had hardly retreated from the gaping chasm and thought to be settling on firm ground again, when we were again threatened and--why not admit it--frightened."³⁰

It seems quite understandable that Goethe considered himself threatened when, for example, workers in Aachen, some under the influence of alcohol, destroyed the machinery of several textile plants and climaxed their storming of machines with an attack on the jail house, or when students in Jena broke window panes, destroyed furniture and set an old barn on fire.³¹ Not only a man of Goethe's social position and years must have had difficulty in perceiving the historic significance of these, often spontaneous, expressions of disapproval, and to perceive the wildly rebellious workers, apprentices and day laborers as the political force of the future.³² But Goethe can find nothing good, either, in the revolutionary battle of the Parisian

workers and students during the 3 glorious days, which contemporaries credited with a high degree of discipline. While the ladies around him confess that, were they Parisians, they also would "shred linen"³³ [for bandages] for the wounded street fighters, he himself cannot bring himself to [utter] a word of sympathy or understanding.

Goethe does not differentiate: In France, the employers gave their workers paid leave and thus, indirectly, encouraged participation in the street fighting; in Germany also, parts of the bourgeoisie seemed inclined to tolerate the people's uprisings as long as they could be used to further their own demands against the feudal bureaucracy.

Goethe, on the other hand, condemns without exception any violent people's revolt. He does not like attacks against the "governments" and the nobility, and especially not by means of force.³⁴ In addition, an evidently strongly developed class instinct tells him that a violent revolt by the "lower classes," once tolerated, will not stop at the property of the wealthy citizen, and must therefore be prevented in principle.

Goethe's contemplation of the July revolution and its consequences ends where it started. Goethe wants to attain society's progress through higher productivity. He wants to see the position of the bourgeoisie in society raised and the material lot of the "lower classes" improved. He believes as ever that this can only be initiated meaningfully through reforms "from above," and never through violent revolt. Actually, the July revolution should not have happened at all.

There is a direct correlation between the irritation occasioned in Goethe by the July revolution and the confrontation with Saint-Simonism. Goethe had some prior knowledge of Saint-Simon.³⁵ In LE GLOBE of 4 June 1825, he comes across an obituary of Henri de Saint-Simon which surveys his life and work.³⁶ Nine marginal notes prove that he had read this article with the greatest of interest. He probably also followed with interest later reports in LE GLOBE about the school of Saint-Simonists, who far transcend their teacher in their [own] views. But this is always second-hand information. Another point: While LE GLOBE is still sympathetic to Saint-Simon himself, as an organ of the liberal bourgeoisie it rightfully considers the Saint-Simonists as the enemy and does not always give an authentic picture of them.³⁷ Thus Goethe, up to the July revolution, possesses only general knowledge gleaned from the secondary literature about the school of the Saint-Simonists--Saint-Simon himself is quite overshadowed by them. There is no indication at all that he occupied himself with source material. Only after the July revolution does Goethe see himself impelled to really study Saint-Simonism. Public interest in Saint-Simonism has grown considerably. The school, which since 1828 had intensively tried to propagate its ideas through two lecture cycles³⁸ but had only reached a limited audience, gets its chance to speak to the masses³⁹ and to expand its influence abroad as a consequence of the July revolution.⁴⁰ But the real impetus to become acquainted with the source material stems from his own [feeling of] insecurity. The new revolution has cast a brutal doubt on his own model of societal progress. Now Goethe wants to know all about it; now he himself

wants to examine what Saint-Simonism has to offer. In May 1831, he reads the printed version of the above-mentioned lectures, the EXPOSITION DE LA DOCTRINE DE SAINT-SIMON, the work in which the school has expounded its viewpoint ex cathedra.⁴¹

Saint-Simon himself, to the end of his life, was impressed by the liberation of the individual from the shackles of guilds and corporations and the ensuing industrial upswing, brought about through the French revolution. For him, antagonism exists only between workers and idlers, not between workers and those who possess the means of work. For him, the ideal society of the future will exist when there are no longer any feudal idlers, and everybody works.

The young men of the school, on the other hand, have as their basic experience of society the growing crisis symptoms of free-enterprise capitalism and the increasing impoverishment of the proletariat. They see contemporary society determined by an implacable battle of competition in which the efforts of human labor are greatly wasted, and by the merciless exploitation of workers by the entrepreneurial class. To create the society of the future means to them: abolition of man's exploitation of man; implementation of the performance principle for all members of society, supplanting the competitive struggle with overall societal planning: "These industrial crises are due to the lack of a general planning of consumer needs and of production resources....If in this important branch of social action so many disruptions and disorders occur, it is because the distribution of working tools is carried out by isolated individuals who do not see the whole [picture]."⁴² "Today, the mass of workers is being exploited by those whose property they make profitable...In such a situation, the worker proves to be a direct descendant of slaves and serfs; although his person is free and he is no longer tied to the soil. Yet that is all he has achieved, and in this legal condition of freedom, he can live only under conditions which are imposed on him by a small class of people to whom a jurisdiction derived from the law of conquest has granted the monopoly of wealth. And this monopoly means the possibility of disposing arbitrarily, and even in idleness, the production means."⁴³

The decisive step which the school takes beyond its teacher consists of the insight that the demanded reorganization of society can be achieved only if "the present institution of property" makes way for "an entirely new institution."⁴⁴ What does it consist of? In a first step, the school does away with the present form of private ownership of production means, based on the law of individual inheritance, by rescinding this inheritance law whereby initially all production means fall under the control of society as a whole. In a second step, it reinstitutes private ownership by transferring production means--for administration, application and use--to individual members of society in varying degrees according to performance capability. In principle, it differs from the previous form of ownership in that "it is solely justified through capability...through personal merit and not through birth."⁴⁵ It cannot be inherited, it must be constantly legitimized through performance, and can be rescinded in case of mismanagement.

This organizational form of ownership can function only with the help of a powerful, competent central authority. Thus the "general managers" play a decisive role in the school's model of society. As the representatives of the interests of the whole, they have the responsible task to place everyone in the position most appropriate for him personally, and with regard to others."⁴⁶ They distribute the production means among individuals and supervise their effective use.

The school thus differentiates between an overall ownership which is society's due, represented by the central authorities, and a transferable, subordinate ownership. It does not yet consistently wipe out private ownership of production means, since it perceives consistently socialized ownership of production means only as "community property" ("communauté des biens"). And this must be ruled out because it would invalidate the performance principle: "We must take into consideration from the beginning that some will mistake this system for the one known as community property. But there is no connection between them. In the future order of society... everyone will be graded according to his capabilities, and rewarded according to his work. With this, the inequality of the division is sufficiently indicated. In the system of communal property, on the otherhand, all shares are equal, and there are necessarily a number of objections to such a method of division. The principle of competition is destroyed [in a system] where the idler receives as much as the diligent worker, and where the latter sees himself encumbered with all the burdens of the community."⁴⁷

What conclusion does Goethe draw from the "doctrine" of the Saint-Simonists? Unfortunately, we possess only one direct statement which, however, gives sufficient information. In his letter to Zelter of 28 June 1831, a longish passage deals with what to think of the Saint-Simonists: "At the head of this sect there are very intelligent people; they know the shortcomings of our time well, and they also know how to present that which is desirable;..."⁴⁸

Goethe sees eye to eye with the school in their analysis of the present condition of society, and in stating desirable changes.

He therefore agrees with them in substance, when they denounce the competitive struggle and the miserable lot of the workers, and when they demand an order of society in which people work together in brotherly unit, and each one makes a sufficient living according to his performance.

Goethe's agreement stops as soon as it becomes a matter of translating the "desirable" into deeds through certain means. The school wants to achieve the society of the future--and that is its decisive starting point--through a change in ownership conditions. A position needed to be taken on this. Goethe does not take up a direct position on the new form of ownership. He "only" disputes that it can be realized in practice, which in the end also amounts to a rejection.

Goethe's criticism is aimed at the distribution of production means according to capability through the "managers," which actually raises a problem difficult to solve. The "managers," in judging the capability of a person,

are making a decision of great consequence because they determine his place in society for a long time. Once the classification has been made, in the interest of economic stability it cannot be revised constantly. But can such a classification be justified if one considers that people change, and that judging the ability of a person is generally very difficult?

This is Goethe's point of attack: In general, he considers a performance judgment of such magnitude for the individual an outrageous presumption. In the promise to reward everyone according to his merit, he sees a hidden claim to power which he must reject indignantly: "The fools imagine they can play Providence and promise to reward each one according to his merit, if he follows and joins with them body and soul, hide and hair. What human being, what society should be permitted to do this, since it is not easy even from childhood on to know someone, and to judge an improvement in his activities. How else does character develop and come into play, if not through the give and take of daily action. Who would undertake to determine the value of fortuitous events, stimuli, reverberations, who would dare to evaluate the elective affinities. Whoever dares to judge what a man is would also have to consider what he had been, and how he has become that way. We have often experienced such general effronteries, they always come back and must be borne."⁴⁹

Actually, the Saint-Simonistic "capability ownership"⁵⁰ which is to implement consistently the performance principle, should not be alien to Goethe. However, he prefers to question its applicability--which really is problematical--, evidently because it is connected with intervention in the existing rights of ownership. This is probably the decisive factor for his rejection of Saint-Simonism. Goethe is unwilling, under any circumstances, to agree to an intervention in the status quo of ownership.

The further development of the Saint-Simonistic school makes Goethe feel justified in his opinion. After Bazard leaves [the school], under the influence of Enfantin it degenerates more and more into a religious-sexual sect. When, early in February 1832, he learns of Enfantin's arrest, he reacts with satisfaction: "The best of thanks for the Paris news. It is a big step, highly necessary, but hardly thinkable, a great victory over anarchy."⁵¹ The upshot is: The Saint-Simonists make an offer to solve the social question which Goethe cannot accept.

Let us now go on to the FAUST text: After the July revolution and the uprisings in the German states, Goethe can no longer conceptualize how matters will go on. The beginning of Act IV, in which the decision is made on Faust's new activity, testifies to that. But it also demonstrates that Goethe, in spite of it, is not willing to remain in perplexity. While his non-poetic statements largely despair of the future, his poetry shows a new starting point.

Mephisto wants to incorporate Faust into the existing societal reality in a high position; he offers him "to take a seat on the throne of princes and the mighty."⁵² Faust rejects this position, since in his opinion the

existing circumstances cannot but lead to a violent revolt. The sovereign, as Mephisto envisions Faust to act,--in the way of sovereigns--does not fulfill his task of being "beneficial to himself and others in a serious sense,"⁵³ he only leads a life of pleasure and must therefore expect the revolt of his subjects. But this is not the only reason for which Faust sees the existing order threatened. He could try, after all, to be a better sovereign. Such an attempt is not even considered, however.

I think it significant that Faust affirms Mephisto's depressing picture of the conduct of a princeling only in his second retort with the contemptuous exclamation, "modern and vile! A Sardanapalus!" (10176)⁵⁴. In his first reply, he directs attention to the "people," to a "people" that is not badly off, that ought to be satisfied with its government and yet opts for rebellion: "One likes to see a folk increase,/ Comfortably gain their food and fare,/ Develop, get learning, if you please,/ But rebels all they prove to be." (10156-10159)

This passage does not poke fun at "the style of wellmeaning, narrow-minded princelings of the type of Duke Karl August."⁵⁵ The reform policies of Karl August are not condemned here, but the "people" who do not appreciate them. Goethe accuses the "people" of a tendency to violent revolt. When Mephisto creates the mountains where Faust is dwelling, from a satanic upheaval which converts "the nethermost to topmost" (10090), he can name a docile pupil who has understood the "open secret" (10093) of this creation of the mountains: "Your loyal common folks alone, they know/ and their conviction is not to be shaken/ Their wisdom came to ripeness long ago:/ It is a marvel, a monument to Satan." (10116-10119)

Faust does not want to be a "Sardanapalian" "prince"; but he also wants to have nothing to do with the "people," which cannot be stopped from violent revolt, even if its material and spiritual situation is gradually being improved by reforms "from above." The existing order has thus failed completely on both sides, so that meaningful action is no longer possible in it. Incompetent "princes" have ruined it. The "people" will finish the work of destruction in a violent revolt. Goethe candidly admits here that his "ideas about the possibilities of an evolutionary way of reform"⁵⁶ have failed.

While the Goethe of non-poetic statements only stands helplessly before the shambles of his model, the Faust of poetry gains a new starting point by forsaking history, so to speak. Faust sees the only chance for meaningful action in a new beginning, which radically leaves behind all existing society. There is "room for feats undone" (10182) only in the battle against "unpurposed strength of untamed elements" (10219) which, not yet blocked by present society, starts from the very beginning. Faust wants to wrest land from the shores of the sea, to establish a new order where there has never been one before. It is, therefore, not a matter of overthrowing existing conditions but of founding entirely new ones. In the "scenario" of Act IV of 16 May 1831, it says: Mephisto "describes the condition of the wealthy. Faust always has something objectionable. [sic] Mephistopheles describes a Sardanapalian lifestyle. Faust retorts with a description of the revolt.

Enviably, to him, are the inhabitants of the seashore which they want to wrest from the ocean. He wants to join them. First [one must] form and create. The advantages of human society in its beginnings."⁵⁷

"Advantages of human society in its beginnings:" That is Goethe's longing for the July revolution. No matter how much he longs for a start from the very beginning, he knows, of course, that man cannot escape from the historic context into which he has been placed. And so Faust, as soon as he puts his plan into action, is mercilessly caught up by history.

The emperor, as the highest landowner and feudal lord, also has the power of disposal over the seashore. If Faust wants to gain it as his "possession" (10187), it cannot be done without entering into a relationship with the emperor. It is not to be inimical, since forceful possession is not contemplated. The only remaining way is to earn the land as a fief on friendly terms. Since Faust now gets involved with the emperor for the sake of his "best gains" (10237), he triggers the mechanism which he had actually wanted to avoid. He gets entangled in the "convulsive cataclysms" (10104) of violent disputes.

Thus the central theme of Act IV comes to the fore: violent overthrow, and violent overthrow in the form of a "devil's festival" (10777). Researchers have often asked why Goethe, in the scene "On the Promontory", so broadly depicts the events of war, and why, in the following scene, "Tent of the anti-emperor," the new state order is described in such detail. The question becomes superfluous if one understands Act IV as the fresh result of an experience still totally present. Still completely under the impression of the revolutionary upheavals, Goethe decides to present the "primary phenomenon" of a violent cataclysm and to settle, through example, with the phenomenon of revolution. The revolution is brought to the stage with depressing presence, so that it will reveal itself as the devil's work.

The emperor himself brought about the uprising against his regime. Whenever the causes of violent revolts are to be uncovered, they are left in no doubt. The emperor, who as a human being is quite likeable, "and loved his error like a treasure:/ that he could easily combine,/ two things desirable and fine,/ his rulership and his own pleasure." (10248-10251) But those who rise up against the emperor and threaten him with an army in order to destroy him, also do not have in mind the welfare of society. Although--according to Mephisto's report--they appear as the "efficient ones" who wish to choose "one who can resurrect this empire dead" (10281) and "in a world of fresh direction/ show us sweet peace with justice wed" (10283 f.). But these are only demagogic slogans of "priestcraft" (10285) behind which the basest egotistical intents are concealed.⁵⁸

The "clerics more than others" (10286) stir up the revolt. It is not proven whether Goethe in this instant is relying on recent experiences. In tearing Belgium from the United Kingdom of the Netherlands, and founding its own monarchy after the July revolution, he would have had, at any rate, very appropriate and instructive material on how the Catholic clergy knew how to utilize a revolutionary liberation movement, cleverly and without scruples,

for the enhancement of its own position of power.⁵⁹ The "clerics" are the real string pullers. The actual dirty work of soldiering is carried out by the "allegoric" figures of "Tramp" (10329), "Bullyboy", "Havequick" and "Holdfast." They are exemplary personifications of that "rabble" which offer their necks in order to gain from the spoils. Once used in the fight for "gold" (10802), they are not about to be excluded from the distribution [of the booty] by their noble superiors, who want to get rid of them once the job is done: "We risked our lives! It's only fair/ for us to get our booty share." (10819 f.)

In principle, violent revolts are therefore rooted in the "pains to extract from situations his best gains" (10236 f.). But there is no difference at all between those who cause them, and those who carry them out. Thus it is of no importance whatsoever, after Faust has become involved in the fight between emperor and "anti-emperor," with which side he makes a pact. The essence of the activities of both sides consists in ruining the state through robbery. The events of the war culminate in the plundering of the "imperial treasure case" (10818). The three "tramps" who fight on the imperial side under Mephisto's command, do win back the emperor's treasure from the "anti-emperor," only to plunder it on their part.

In the end, the most depressing thing is that no one has learned anything from this senseless fight, and that one revolution begets the next one. There seems to be no escape from the [vicious] circle of robbery and counter-robbery. The cause of the revolution, the emperor, establishes a state order which, because of extreme favoritism towards special interests, will bring about a new revolt against himself. The "clerics," always on top, shamelessly use the occasion to "extract something" from the weak emperor for their own advantage. After Goethe experienced the "repetition of the tragedy of 1790" in the July revolution, he leaves no doubt that the new empire will fall victim to renewed revolutionary uprisings.

In Act V, Faust now has the desired "possession" (10187) and at the same time he "rules" (10187). De jure "possession" and "rule" may still be subject to the sovereignty and ownership of the emperor, since not a single word indicates that the empire had ceased to exist. One must take into account that the feudal law in the German states was only abolished in the course of the 19th century, and that in some states, such as Mecklenburg, Lippe and Waldeck, it remained in force, intact, until 1918.⁶⁰ De facto, however, Faust's "possession" and "rule" are not subject to any restrictions. There are no indications whatsoever in the text that the emperor, after granting the fief, still asserts in any way rulership in Faust's domain, for instance through levying of the taxes promised to the archbishop. Whatever Faust makes out of his "possession" and "rule" stems from his sovereign decision, and he alone must take the responsibility.

At the beginning of the 19th century, ownership of landed property is no longer an impossibility for a non-nobleman, for a wealthy bourgeois. But when Goethe invests citizen Faust also with "rule," then he realizes a demand of the liberal bourgeoisie which he had always fought with great

determination. The Faust of poetry is permitted political power, the bourgeois class in real life is not. How to explain this? Evidently again under the pressure of the July revolution which dethroned the noble sovereign, Goethe finally accepts the risk of having a citizen rule a [political] community in order to play out, in the poetic experiment, what he does with this "rule."

One point is never in question for Goethe, and it is properly emphasized in the text by several sides: Faust clearly guarantees superior productivity in exploiting nature for human purposes. Bourgeois "rule" organizes an economic civilization which could not be attained by far under aristocratic "rule."

I do not have to touch upon Faust's economic enterprises in detail since Thomas Metscher only recently presented them in great detail and analyzed them regarding their "sociohistoric substratum."⁶¹ I only want to briefly touch upon the question of why, in these enterprises, industry is missing. When Faust begins with projects to increase the value of the soil, in order to use the gains thus achieved for large-scale trade, he practices one of the central economic policy orientations of Saint-Simon [planned] for France. In one of his letters to "Messieurs the workers" in 1821, Saint-Simon calls upon the "managers of the important enterprises in agriculture, manufacture and trade" to participate in a "general improvement project for the territory of France," because only in this way could the means for a "general stimulation of production" be made available: "In less than 10 years, the value of France's territory can be doubled. [To accomplish this,] fallow areas must be made arable, swampy terrain must be dried out, new roads must be constructed and existing ones improved, bridges--needed for shortening transport routes--and canals--which can be useful for shipping and irrigation--must be built...The entrepreneurs will willingly make capital available if the state will let them keep, as far as possible, all the gains accruing from the execution of their plans...There will also be no lack of working hands; since the measure mentioned by us, which alone would bring about a general stimulation of production, was not taken, many workers of the soil are usually without work."⁶²

Faust's "rule" thus finds its justification in economic productivity. But how does it organize human relations? In this regard, Goethe affirms his fears which had always made him face, with the greatest of scepticism, the claims to power of the liberal bourgeoisie. Goethe is of the opinion that the high aristocrat as sovereign, because of his material independence, stands above all individual material interests, and can mediate impartially between individual interests and can preserve them in their individuality. If a bourgeois comes to power, however, Goethe believes that he will destroy all individuality and variety, and will want to subject all other interests to his own individual interest.

And that is what happens. "Patron" (11170) Faust tolerates only the one relationship of total subjugation. He is the "lord" (11091/11169) and all other people are his "servers" (11091/11503). It is "impossible" for Faust

to "tolerate" independent, selfreliant people around him (11237). Whoever does not want to be "his dependency" (11134), must "move" (11239).

This is demonstrated by way of example in his relationship with the small world of Philemon and Baucis. In the marxist literature, the destruction of this world is usually understood as the direct expression of an economic necessity. "Small farm property" could not be preserved "under the given economic development conditions."⁶³ True, Philemon and Baucis are the owners of a small farm property, they trust in the "God of old" (11142), and live in a selfsufficient idyll. But in Goethe's text, the two old people are not done away with for economic reasons. Faust himself does not advance a factual necessity, such as road building or improvement works, for his wish to take possession of the "Linden hill" (11157) of the two old people. The "sound of bells" (11253) which carries from the old couple's "chapel" (11139), bothers him. He wants to relax under the linden trees alone and undisturbed; and lastly, he wants to erect a lookout point on linden hill so he can survey his realm. These facts of the case cannot be erased by speaking of a "mystification" of the true causes for the "destruction of the idyll of small property."⁶⁴

Of course, Faust does not remove Philemon and Baucis simply because of an individual presumption. And in the conflict between Faust and the two old people, different views of life collide [with each other] which, in the last analysis, stem from different methods of production. Goethe clearly stresses Faust's production method as superior. But he very much poses the question if it is a dominant historic necessity, when the superior producer cannot tolerate an old, traditional way of life next to himself. Must the world of Philemon and Baucis "pass" (11337) with Faust's victory? Goethe did not want to see inevitability in the destruction of this world, since he does not argue economic necessity in this case.

The organization of human relationships, according to the lord-server principle, must necessarily create new fertile soil for violent revolts. Philemon and Baucis as well as their protector, the wanderer, can only offer helpless resistance. The real threat to Faust's "rule" announces itself through the lemurs. But they, too, are not yet in a position of truly conscious opposition. As living-dead semibeings, they only have the strength to victimize, belatedly, a Faust whom death has already robbed of his power of resistance. Death gives them the belated satisfaction of dragging Faust down into the grave with them. A spiteful, helpless, belated act, not yet open resistance, but nonetheless a frightening promise for the future.

In the lemurs, whom I understand--with Guenther Mieth--as a "negative intensification of Faust's 'servers'"⁶⁵, Goethe's relationship to the rebelling workers, apprentices and day laborers of 1830/31 is reflected. They are, as Gerhard Scholz was the first to stress pointedly, the "short-changed ones," "'operose', work slaves bogged down in labor, nothing but hard labor for insufficient bread, in hovels unfit as human dwellings."⁶⁶ Goethe does not think this condition right. He definitely grants the "lower classes" the right to a better life, but always, and only, within the framework of a reform policy "from higher up." If the workers let themselves be

carried away into violent actions against the government, then--in his view--their justified claim is perverted into a crime against society. Since Goethe at that time is under the impression of such an experience, the negative features dominate in the picture of the lemurs. They are tools without a will of their own in the hands of "foreman" (before 11511) Mephisto, and in fact cooperate in his work of destruction. There can be no sympathy for their fate against this background.

The political rule of citizen Faust is characterized by rigorous subjection of all other people as "servers" under the one "lord," and is again threatened by violent overthrow. In Goethe's opinion it can, therefore, not be "wisdom's final say" (11574). Goethe characterizes bourgeois rule at a time when it does not even exist in the German states, and which can only be established when a form of societal conditions must be transcended in the interest of assured progress, i.e., excluding violent overthrows. The same high economic productivity which Faust has guaranteed so far, must be attainable without degrading people to be the "servers" of a "patron."

The decisive factor is the abolition of the lord-server contrast. At the very end of his final words, Faust gains this insight when he utters the wish to be part of the "active-free" (11564) people, and thus relinquishes his position as lord. It is left completely open how the abolition of the lord-server contrast is to be handled in practice. Goethe rejects the offer of the Saint-Simonists to interfere with the existing ownership situation, but he has nothing different, or better, to offer. He really does not know. The double use of the attribute "free" in the decisive verse line 11580, on which Goethe decides in the final revision, obviously serves the purpose of consciously leaving ample room for future supplements.

NOTES [to footnotes]

A discussion contribution, read at the Goethe-Kolloquium in Weimar on 25 March 1982.

For footnote references, the following abbreviations are used:

BA Goethe: Poetische Werke [Goethe: Poetic Works], Berlin and Weimar 1960-1968, 16 vol;

Goethe: Kunsthistorische Schriften und Uebersetzungen [Goethe: Writings on Art History and Translations], Berlin and Weimar 1970-78, 6 vols. (= Berlin edition)

Bergemann Johann Peter Eckermann: "Gespraechе mit Goethe in den letzten Jahren seines Lebens "[Conversations with Goethe in the last years of his life]," edited by Fritz Bergemann, Leipzig 1968.

Grumach Kanzler von Mueller: "Unterhaltungen mit Goethe. Kritische Ausgabe" [Chancellor von Mueller: Conversations with Goethe. Critical edition], edited by Ernst Grumach, Weimar 1956.

- WA Goethes Werke [Goethe's Works], published by order of Grand Duchess Sophie of Saxony, Weimar 1887-1919, 133 vols. (Weimar edition)
- WA T "Dritte Abteilung: Tagebuecher" [Third section: Diaries]
- WA B "Vierte Abteilung: Briefe" [Fourth section: Letters]

FOOTNOTES

1. Chancellor v. Mueller to Friedrich von Rochlitz, 4 Sep 1830, in: "Goethe's Briefwechsel mit Friedrich V. Rochlitz" [Goethe's correspondence with Friedrich V. Rochlitz], edited by Woldemar Freiherr v. Biedermann, Leipzig 1887, p. 468.

2. Gottlieb C. L. Schuchardt: "Julirevolution, St. Simonismus und die Faustpartien von 1831" [July revolution, Saint-Simonism and the Faust segments of 1831], in: Zeitschrift fuer die deutsche Philologie, 60 (1935), pp. 240-274 and 362-384.

Schuchardt gives a complete, tabulated compilation of Goethe's remarks on the July revolution in diaries, letters and conversations. He had no access to the articles in LE GLOBE and LE TEMPS as well as the French brochures which Goethe read, as can be proved, in connection with the July revolution. They are included by me in the evaluation for the first time. Schuchardt does not exhaust the compiled material when he can only find in it Goethe's general "cultural pessimism" (p. 240). All agreement must cease with his interpretation of the Faust segments, and particularly of Act V. Schuchardt interprets "the action and vision of freedom of old Faust as an intensification of...the current pessimistic mood" (p. 241). "Legislator Faust, who talks so much about freedom, reveals himself in his final words as a dreamer or charlatan." (p. 382).

3. Goethe to J. J. and Marianne v. Willemer, 8 Oct 1830, in: WA B, vol 47, p. 280.
4. Compare Eckermann, 4 Jan 1824 (Bergemann, p. 493 f.), and 3 Feb 1830 (ibid, p. 640).
5. Compare Eckermann, 18 Feb 1831 (see Bergemann, p. 410).
6. Goethe to J. G. v. Quandt: Draft 18 Sep 1830, in: WA B, vol 47, p. 229.
7. Compare Eckermann, 27 Apr 1825 (see Bergemann, p. 518).
8. Since the end of February 1830, Goethe sees a serious crisis developing in France but--like most of his contemporaries--to the very end he does not believe in a violent uprising. With regard to the July revolution as such, I refer to the works of Kurt Holzapfel which represent the latest findings of marxist research: On the dialectics of internal and external factors in the bourgeois revolution. A study on selected

- aspects of the July revolution of 1830 in France. Ph.D. diss. B, Leipzig 1980 (typed); Revolution and balance. On some aspects of the July revolution 1830 in France, in: Zeitschrift fuer Geschichtswissenschaft, 2/1979, pp 111-124; The July revolution 1830 in France. Opinions, controversies, research desiderata, in: Zeitschrift fuer Geschichtswissenschaft, 8/1981, pp. 710-725.
9. Chancellor v. Mueller to Friedrich von Rochlitz, 4 Sep 1830, in: Goethes correspondence..., op. cit., p. 486.
 10. Goethe to Zelster, 5 Oct 1830, in: WA B, vol 47, p.275.
 11. Goethe to A. v. Goethe, 8-10 Nov 1830, in: WA B, vol 48, p.276.
 12. Goethe to A. v. Goethe, 17 Sep 1830, in: WA B, vol 47, p. 260.
 13. Chancellor v. Mueller, 5 Jan 1831 (Grumach, p. 199).
 14. Goethe to Knebel, 12 Sep 1830, in: WA B, vol 47, p. 217.
 15. Goethe to Zelster, 5 Oct 1830, in: WA B, vol 47, p. 275.
 16. Diary, 18 and 19 Oct 1830, in WA T, vol 12, p. 319.
 17. Joseph Fiévée: "Causes et conséquences des événements du mois du Juillet 1830," Paris 1830, p. 47 f. (translation by H. H.). An account of Fiévée's writing--in part a literal translation, in part a report--can be found in: "Ueber Frankreich, Italien und Spanien, von Fiévée, Stendhal und Rotalde." Reported and introduced by F. W. Carové, Leipzig 1831, pp. 1-26. Fiévée's writing contains 107 pages.
 18. Felix Ferdinand Kuestner to Goethe, 18 Aug 1830 (Goethe- und Schiller-Archiv, Eingegangene Briefe 1830, Nr. 244). Regarding Kuestner, see: "Goethe und Leipzig," edited by Woldemar Freiherr v. Biedermann, Part II, Leipzig 1860, p. 129 f.
 19. Frédéric Soret: "Zehn Jahre bei Goethe" [Ten years with Goethe], translated and edited by H. H. Houben, Leipzig 1929, p. 502 (17 Jan 1831).
 20. See Eckermann, 27 Apr 1825 (Bergemann, p. 518).
 21. See Eckermann, 21 Mar 1831 (Bergemann, p. 437).
 22. Goethe to Zelster, 5 Oct 1830, in: WA B, vol 47, p. 275.
 23. Goethe to Zelster, 28 Jun 1831, in: WA B, vol 48, p. 257.
 24. Diary, 6 Sep 1830, in: WA T, vol 12, p. 299.
 25. See Eckermann, 27 Apr 1825 (Bergemann, p. 518).

26. Goethe, 17 Sep 1830, in: WA B, vol 47, p. 260).
27. Compare "Briefwechsel zwischen Goethe und Minister von Gersdorff. Mit politischen Berichten des letzteren." [Correspondence between Goethe and minister von Gersdorff. With political reports by the latter.] Reported by Lily v. Kretschmann, in: Goethe-Jahrbuch, 13 (1892), pp. 98-117.
28. What to think about the rumors [flying about], is shown in the opinion of Caroline v. Egloffstein in a letter to her mother of 21 Sep 1830: "It suits me well, for now I can prepare leisurely for your arrival, although I must desire that you do not come here before October 18. Everybody is afraid here, noble and lowly alike, and strangely enough, all people seem to me like the moor and Papageno! [Reference to Mozart's "Magic Flute."] Last night at 5:30, when I walked through the small streets, everybody bolted their front doors; everyone talks about revolution, and there is no one who seems to want to make one. Now they say, to teach themselves fear, the ruckus would start with the fair, and since this pretty much coincides with the 18th when there are always many drunks and rowdies, I would like to spare Gustchen the rumpus which will probably break out." (Alt-Weimars Abend. Briefe und Aufzeichnungen aus dem Nachlass der Graefinnen Egloffstein, edited by Hermann Freiherr v. Egloffstein, Muenchen 1923, p. 362 ff.).
29. Goethe to A. v. Goethe, 30 Sep 1830, in: WA B, vol 47, p. 263 ff.
30. Goethe to Wilhelm v. Humboldt, 19 Oct 1830, in: WA B, vol 47, p. 436 ff.
31. Goethe had himself carefully informed on the events in Jena. Compare diary entries of September 18, 20, 21 and 29, and of October 1, 3, and 16, 1830.
32. On the course and importance of the upheavals in the German states, see Helmut Bock: "Die Illusionen der Freiheit. Deutsche Klassenkaempfe zur Zeit der franzoesischen Julirevolution 1830 bis 1831" [The illusions of freedom. German class struggles at the time of the French July revolution 1830-1831], Berlin 1980.
33. Goethe to Soret, 11 Aug 1830, in: WA B, vol 47, p. 176.
34. Compare Goethe's best-known statements: Diary, 24 Apr 1831 (WA T, vol 13, p. 67 f.); Chancellor v. Mueller: "Unterhaltung mit Goethe vom 16.6. 1831" [Conversation with Goethe on 16 Jun 1831] (Grumach, p. 204), and letter to Zelter, 17 Sep 1831 (WA B, vol 49, p. 78 f.).
35. On Saint-Simon, reference is made to the edition with a basic introduction: Claude-Henri de Saint-Simon: "Ausgewaehlte Schriften" [Selected writings], translated and with an introduction, edited by Lola Zahn, Berlin 1977.

36. "Necrologie. M. Henri de Saint-Simon", in: LE GLOBE II 116 (4 Jun 1825), p. 595 ff. [Obituary of ...]
37. Werner Kahle, in his short essay on "Goethe's relationship to Saint-Simonism as mirrored in his late letters", makes the basic mistake of thinking that the "globists" before 1830 are Saint-Simonists. See "Goethe", 89 (1972), p. 82.
38. The first lecture cycle consisted of 17 sessions and lasted from 17 December 1828 until 12 August 1829. It was published in August, 1830 under the title "Doctrine de Saint-Simon. Exposition. Première année 1829." The second cycle consisted of 13 sessions and lasted from 18 November 1829 until June 1830. It was published as "Deuxième année in December 1830.
39. Compare Sébastien Charlëty: "Histoire du Saint-Simonisme (1825-1864)", Paris 1931, pp. 103-119.
40. Ibid., pp. 79-94.
41. Evidently Goethe had already planned in September 1830 to read the "Exposition de la Doctrine de Saint-Simon," which would fit with the publication of the first part in August 1830. Under the "agenda" for September, and again for October 1830, the "Société St. Simonienne" is listed, but the item is not crossed out, which means it is still pending (see WA T, vol 13, pp. 256 and 259). Only on 21 May 1831, Goethe notes in his diary: "Have started reading the work of John Sinclair, first volume, 'Doctrine de Saint-Simon.'" (WA T, vol 13, p. 81) As Schuchardt already pointed out (op. cit., p. 369), we are dealing here with two different titles. John Sinclair did not write a work with the title "Doctrine de Saint-Simon."--The entry of 30 May 1831 quite certainly refers to the "exposition": "[Making] effort to explore the nature of St. Simonism. Read until evening because of it." (WA T, vol 13, p. 83) The fact that Goethe read the "Exposition" in May 1831 is also confirmed in his letter to Zelter of 1 Jun 1831 (in: WA B, vol 48, p. 207). Under the "agenda" for June 1831, there is again the item "Rel. St. Simonienne" (see WA T, vol 13, p. 269). This time, the item is crossed out as taken care of. It is possible that the "agenda" entry of June 1831 refers to the title in Goethe's library: "Religion Saint-Simonienne. Enseignement central," Paris 1831 (see "Goethe's Bibliothek. Katalog" [Goethe's library. Catalogue], edited by Hans Ruppert, Weimar 1958, p. 444, Nr. 3034). The brochure is cut open, but there is no proof anywhere that it was read. It is immaterial whether Goethe actually read the brochure, since their authors, Hippolyte Carnot and Jules Lechevalier, had participated in editing the "Doctrine de Saint-Simon" and nothing new was to be learned by someone acquainted with the central work of the school.
42. "Die Lehre Saint-Simons," [The teaching of Saint-Simon], introduced and edited by Gottfried Salomon-Delatour, Neuwied 1962, p. 117.--The translation is based on the authoritative edition: "Doctrine de Saint-Simon. Exposition. Première année 1829, published by C. Bouglé and Elie Halévy, Paris 1924.

43. See "Die Lehre Saint-Simons, op. cit., p. 106.
44. Ibid., p. 130.
45. Ibid., p. 154.
46. Ibid., p. 128.
47. Ibid., p. 111.
48. 48. Goethe to Zelster, 28 Jun 1831, in: WA B, vol 48, p. 258 ff.
49. Ibid., p. 259.
50. On this concept, compare Thilo Ramm: "Die grossen Sozialisten als Rechts- und Socialphilosophen," [The great socialists as legal and social philosophers], vol 1, Stuttgart 1955, p. 295.
51. Goethe to Zelster, 4 Feb 1832, in: WA B, vol 49, p. 230.
52. Gerhard Scholz: "Faust-Gespraechе," [Conversations on Faust] Berlin 1967, p. 165.
53. Goethe: "Maximen und Reflexionen" [Maxims and reflections], Nr. 966, in: BA, vol 18, p. 621.
54. "Faust" is quoted according to BA, vol 8. The quotes are marked in the text with the verse number in parenthesis. [The verse numbers also correspond, in the English translation, to the "Faust" edition, in English, by Charles E. Passage. Published 1965 by the Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc.]
55. Gerhard Scholz: "Faust-Gespraechе," op. cit., p. 168.
56. Ibid., p. 169.
57. BA, vol 8, p. 612 f.
58. In order to make Faust into a grim reactionary and representative of feudal restoration, Hans Rudolf Vaget in his contribution to Basel 1980, "Faust, der Feudalismus und die Restauration" [Faust, feudalism and restoration]--relying on Mephisto's report--sees the party of the "anti-emperor" not as a "bourgeois, democratic oppositon" but rather as a "front of aristocrats, including princes of the Church," but at any rate as a "positive political alternative to the emperor and the existing form of the feudal system" (see "Akten des VI. International Germanisten-Kongresses." Basel 1980, Part 4, published by Heinz Rupp and Hans-Gert Roloff, Bern/ Frankfurt/ Las Vegas 1980, p. 347). Given the choice between supporting the emperor or the anti-emperor militarily, Faust clearly decided for the restoration camp. "If Goethe had wanted to give us a Faust who is politically progressive and hostile to feudalism, he would logically have had to put him in the camp of the anti-emperor." (Ibid.) Through his military aid, Faust makes a pact with

feudalism. There is no doubt about it. But it must be denied that he consciously does not make use of a "positive political alternative." Vaget takes Mephisto's ironic words about the "efficient ones" seriously. The behavior of the archbishop, who must have belonged to the party of the "anti-emperor," but who, after the restoration, haggles over his privileges in the old feudal style, does not fit into this concept and is disregarded by Vaget.

59. See Alfred Stern: "Geschichte Europas von 1830 bis 1848" [History of Europe from 1830 to 1848], vol 1, Stuttgart and Berlin 1905, p. 262 ff.
60. Compare "Enzyklopaedie der Rechtswissenschaft in systematischer Bearbeitung" [Encyclopedia of Jurisprudence in Systematic Treatment], edited by Josef Kohler, vol 1, Berlin 1915, p. 241 ff., and Richard Schroeder: "Lehrbuch der deutschen Rechtsgeschichte" [Textbook of the History of German Law], Berlin and Leipzig 1922, p. 880 f.
61. See Thomas Metscher: "Faust und die Oekonomie" [Faust and the Economy], in: "Das Argument," Special volume 3, Berlin [West] 1976, pp. 84-93.
62. Claude-Henri de Saint-Simon: "Ausgewaehlte Schriften" [Selected Writings], op. cit., p. 321 f.
63. Gerhard Scholz: "Faust-Gespraechе," op. cit., p. 186.
64. Thomas Metscher: "Faust und die Oekonomie," op. cit., p. 91.
65. Guenther Mieth: "Fausts letzter Monolog, Poetische Struktur einer geschichtlichen Vision" [Faust's last Monologue, Poetic structure of a historical Vision], in: "Goethe," 97 (1980), p. 100.
66. Gerhard Scholz: "Faust-Gespraechе," op. cit., p. 91.

9917

CSO: 2300/86

WEST GERMAN BOOK ON CLASS DIFFERENCES IN GDR REVIEWED

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 18 Dec 82 p 9

["Rapprochement Between Intellectuals and Workers Class in the GDR? Differences in Standard of Living--Alienation Continues"--Review by Horst Laatz of Guenter Erbe's book "Arbeiterklasse and Intelligenz in der DDR (Workers Class and Intellectuals in the GDR), "Papers of the Central Institute for Social Science Research, Free University, Berlin," Vol 37, published by Westdeutscher Verlag, Opladen, 1982, 224 pages, hardcover, DM 28.00]

[Text] Within the countries of "genuine socialism" there has been repeated discussion of the "process of rapprochement of the classes and strata." This has been a stated task of the revolution with a high priority, setting for itself the goal of further intensification of the "socio-economic, political and ideological commonalities of the working classes and strata of socialist society," of gradually reducing the social differences still existing between them and finally--no one can say exactly when--of achieving a classless society. Rapprochement between workers and intellectuals is seen as a first step along this road, apart from the political alliance of all classes and strata within socialist society under the leadership of the working class. In the program of the SED, adopted at its Ninth Party Congress in 1976, a separate section was devoted to the evolution of the social structure of the GDR. This is characteristic of the high socio-political importance assigned to this process.

It is the course of this process which is examined by Erbe, formerly a research associate in the Research and Archive Section for GDR Studies of the Central Institute for Social Science Research of the Free University of Berlin, using the relationship of the working classes and intellectuals, wherein he confines himself to the relationship between production workers and scientific-technical university graduates in the industrial sector. This is a thoroughly appropriate mode of approach since production workers in socialist basic industry are regarded as the cadre of the working class, having developed those characteristics which, inter alia, are seen as legitimating the leading role of the working class in the GDR: discipline, collective esprit and a sense of responsibility. It is here that the GDR's efforts to achieve its goals can be most clearly seen throughout the more than 30 years of its dominance.

Erbe divides his work into two sections: in the first part he depicts the sociological aspects of the evolution of the social status and the development of the working class and the intellectuals in the GDR; in his second part he explores the structural development of production workers and the scientific/technical intelligentsia in the context of the scientific/technological revolution in the GDR. The second half of his undertaking is substantially more difficult than the first, since empirical data in this area have generally been kept secret with relatively little quantitative evidence to be found in published sociological studies. The concrete empirical data of official surveys and the sociological analyses based upon them have usually been made available only to the senior leadership of party, state and trade union bodies--keeping in mind that the only studies permitted are those approved by the Council of Ministers and the Central State Statistical Administration. Hard data concerning developments in particular sectors are most likely to be found in dissertations and other graduate research studies. The author was thus obliged to restrict himself to a relatively few criteria for the determination of social rapprochement and unable to apply one of the most significant indicators, that of wage income. If this had been the case, one very clear aspect of the social differentiation between production workers and university graduates in the "people's-owned enterprises" would have been taken into account, since the income discrepancy is considerable.

The discrepancy would be found to be most marked if it had been possible to take account of the distribution of expensive consumer goods such as cars, color television sets and modern apartments. It would then have been evident that the standard of living, which is an essential component of social status, has in no way achieved rapprochement: production workers in state-owned enterprises still rank at the bottom--in terms of the standard of living in the GDR--among all persons employed in industry. Erbe also is able to find only scant changes in terms of reconciliation of differences between intellectual and physical labor; advanced technologies have resulted in higher degrees of job satisfaction for only relatively few workers. Nonetheless, the percentage of all employees with university education engaged in industry has been constantly rising in the GDR, as it has in all industrialized countries, though they are seldom engaged in the production process itself.

Management practice has also undergone few changes: decisions are inevitably made by highly trained managers. Any sort of co-determination is limited, at best, to the organization of work at the point of production; planning is determined somewhere else. In this setting, the only decision left to the worker and the intellectual to undertake jointly is one to do the job more efficiently and nothing more. This is the reason, as stated by J. Kuczynski, in a departure from the line taken by other GDR sociologists, that the subjective alienation of workers from their jobs will continue and that personal fulfillment will be found in leisure time activity.

In the first part of his work Erbe presents a comprehensive and well-drawn picture of the development of socio-political theory in the GDR and the various views of its different "schools." This is extremely interesting and it becomes clear that many of these theoretical explorations are much like a tightrope walk between the official "creative advancement of Marxist-Leninism" and the despised "revisionism." It is known that many have slipped and fallen in making the passage, some of them further than others. The history of sociology in the GDR has never been far from feeling the ostracism of the party. Small wonder that sociologists in the social sciences, like writers in the arts, also exercise a "sceptic's function" and not simply in the domain of "genuine socialism." "Doubt will burst the gates of hell," was the poetic assertion of Theodor Storm. But who in power would venture a gaze into hell when the visions of paradise are so much more comforting.

9878

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PUJA HIGHLIGHTS 1982 FOREIGN POLICY EVENTS, FUTURE GOALS

Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 24 Dec 82, pp 2-3

[Article by Frigyes Puja, Minister of Foreign Affairs: "A Balanced, Active Foreign Policy"]

[Text] I. The year 1982 did not bring real progress in reducing the tensions which have built up on the international scene. The impetus of detente which developed in the first half of the 1970's stagnated and, indeed, declined, although a number of factors of detente are present and have an effect in international life simultaneous with the elements of tension.

We continue to see the chief cause of the increase in tension in the fact that extreme imperialist circles have reviewed the relationship of their countries to detente and want to return to a foreign policy based on strength. This purpose is served by the new arms program announced by the American administration, more multifold in scale than ever before, and by those political steps and propagandas campaigns which they have unrolled against the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.

It continues to be our conviction that there is no rational alternative to peaceful coexistence. Detente, the broad cooperation between the two world systems which developed in earlier years, is rooted in the objective situation of historical development. It follows from this that the imperialist policy aimed at liquidating detente and striving for a cold war will necessarily clash with hard realities. The signs of this are appearing already. Western statesmen must see that they have no possibility of overthrowing the balance of forces between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. They must be experiencing also that an ever broader mass movement embracing virtually every stratum is developing in Europe and in the United States in opposition to the confrontation policy.

In the past year also, the foreign policy activities of the Soviet Union and the socialist countries were characterized by efforts made in the interest of improving the international situation. In the forum of the UN, at the disarmament talks and in high level statements they have made new proposals in the interest of encouraging the avoidance of nuclear war, limiting and mutually reducing all types of weapons of mass destruction. The

Soviet Union has submitted realistic proposals, keeping in mind the goal for equal security, at the Soviet-American talks in Geneva. It has taken a number of unilateral steps in the interest of creating an atmosphere of mutual trust also.

All these and other facts again prove that with the goal of improving the presently tense international situation the leaders of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries have indicated on a number of occasions their readiness to discuss and solve disputed international problems. They have made clear, concrete and realizable proposals which are still valid. Thus, it is now up to others to take the next step.

II. In 1982 our foreign policy was characterized by balanced, manifold work in every considerable question of international life, in the areas of our bilateral and multilateral contacts alike. But we must say openly that just because of the sharpening of international tension the realization of our aspirations and achieving new results required from us a good bit more effort than previously. This was reflected in the manysided international activity of the leaders of our party and government, in their discussions and in the everyday work of the representatives of the Hungarian People's Republic.

III. The crux of our foreign policy activity is the constant strengthening of fraternal cooperation with the socialist countries, primarily with the Soviet Union, both in the framework of bilateral contacts and in our common political and economic organizations, the Warsaw Pact and CEMA. The cooperation of the socialist countries is not only a reliable pledge of the realization of our social-political and economic goals but also a strong support in the defense of peace and security. Meetings, talks and exchanges of opinion among the leaders of the fraternal countries are very important factors in the cooperation which has developed in decades past. Outstanding in its significance was the December exchange in Moscow between Janos Kadar and comrade Yuri Andropov. This year we could greet in our homeland comrade Nikolay Tikhonov, prime minister of the Soviet Union, and other high ranking Soviet leaders with whom Hungarian party and state leaders held useful and successful discussions. Mutual visits by deputy premiers and ministers were regular events in the course of which they discussed primarily timely questions of our economic construction work. The cooperation of the foreign ministries, their consultation activity concerning timely problems of international life, strengthened further. It is a new and gratifying phenomenon in Hungarian-Soviet contacts that our cooperation has strengthened with several Soviet republics with economic conditions similar to ours.

Hungarian leaders and party and state leaders of other socialist fraternal countries held mutually useful discussions concerning a number of problems of political, economic, cultural, scientific, and last but not least, foreign policy cooperation. This year our homeland was visited by comrade Wojciech Jaruzelski, comrade Gustav Husak, a party and government delegation of the German Democratic Republic under the leadership of comrade Erich Honoecker and by Grisha Filipov, the Bulgarian, Jambyn Batmonh, the

the Mongolian, and Sali Vongkhamsoo, the Laotian prime minister. The discussions, together with other high level talks, going beyond the debate of a number of practical questions of bilateral contacts, significantly contributed to a better understanding of each others' situation and position and to the development of cooperation.

The cooperation of the socialist countries has great significance in solving the problems of individual fraternal countries also. Our people have watched with great anxiety the developments in Poland in recent years. They received with satisfaction the news about the progress of the process of political consolidation, about the forcing back of the forces opposed to socialism and that in 1982 the legal order of society was basically successfully restored, ensuring the defense of the socialist achievements of the Polish people. It is reassuring that the international conditions for consolidation are gradually improving, that a defeat has been suffered by those extreme western efforts which are trying to exploit the internal problems of Poland to sharpen the international situation and poison the atmosphere. For our part, we actively support the efforts of the Polish United Workers' Party and of the Polish workers aimed at socialist development.

We attribute special significance to the development of our traditional contacts with socialist countries neighboring our homeland. We are steadfastly striving to discover new possibilities with common effort and to remove obstacles. This goal was served by the visits to Romania of comrade Gyorgy Lazar and comrade Gyorgy Aczel and of comrade Peter Varkonyi. Our contacts with socialist Yugoslavia are developing well. The visit to our homeland of the Slovenian prime minister was a significant event in the cooperation which extends to the individual republics also. It is our conviction, justified by life, that the development of contacts with the neighboring socialist countries enriches and adds color to our socialist construction work and internationalist cooperation and contributes in practice to a liquidation of our problems deriving from the past.

Communication between the foreign ministers and representatives of foreign ministries of our homeland and of the socialist countries was very lively in 1982. Talks conducted with the Bulgarian, Czechoslovak and Polish foreign ministers and with the foreign minister of the German Democratic Republic effectively served the coordinated foreign policy of the socialist countries. In addition, talks between the Vietnamese, Laotian, Cambodian and Hungarian foreign ministers offered an occasion to express our solidarity and practical support for the Vietnamese, Cambodian and Laotian proposals serving peace and security in the Indochinese area. The talks in Budapest of the foreign minister of the Korean People's Democratic Republic were useful also.

As for Albania, our contacts continue to stagnate in an unfortunate manner. For our part we consider the development of cooperation and the restoration of normal interstate relations to be rational for the good of both peoples and countries.

Much is being said these days about China, about contacts between China and the other socialist countries. The line of the 12th congress of the Chinese Communist party permits one to conclude that the Chinese leadership will strive to ensure political stability and a better founded economic development. All this--although one can still experience no little uncertainty in Chinese policy--could contribute to improving interstate relations between China and the other socialist countries. For our part, we continue to be ready for the development of bilateral contacts with China in this spirit, keeping in mind mutual advantages and interests.

The 36th session of CEMA-- which took place in Budapest at the prime ministers' level--was an important event in the cooperation of the socialist countries. A high level meeting of the CE, A member states, in the preparation of which our homeland also is actively participating, is on the agenda. We feel that a worthy development of the work and organization of CE, A could be an additional significant resource for the efficiency of cooperation and a guarantee of the national and common interests of the individual member states. At the same time, CEMA could play an increased role in protection against capitalist economic discrimination, sanctions and embargo actions and in reducing their effects. This also will require making the cooperation of the member countries more profound.

A meeting of the foreign ministers' committee of the Warsaw Pact took place recently in Moscow, in the preparation and work of which representatives of our homeland also actively participated. In the present international situation and the significance of the upcoming meeting of the political advisory body of the Warsaw Pact has increased even more. Already the initiatives of the common defensive organization of the socialist countries have played a great role in preserving the peace of our continent and in furthering international detente. We can be certain that this will continue to be the case. In this knowledge we want to continue to strengthen the cooperation of the member states of the Warsaw Pact, working out a foreign policy serving common goals in the interest of decreasing tension, in the interest of disarmament and a strengthening of peace and security.

The developing countries are winning ever greater scope in international life. The 12th congress of the MSZMP and positions taken by our higher party and state organs have devoted great attention to the development of our cooperation with socialist oriented countries and with the Near and Middle East. This was emphasized by a June resolution of the Central Committee also. We find reassuring the growth in the share of the developing countries in our foreign trade, although we still have no little to do in this respect. The composition of our export and of our import is favorable. Several thousand Hungarian experts are working in the developing countries. Our policy in regard to the developing countries is consistent and rests on principled foundations. This is expressed in our diplomatic activity and in the positions taken by Hungarian foreign policy.

The situation which has developed in the wake of the Israeli aggression against Lebanon makes ever more urgent a comprehensive and just settlement

by peaceful means of the Near East crisis, bringing in all interested parties and with a guarantee of their security and sovereignty. It is an absolutely necessary condition for a lasting peace that Israel cease its aggression without conditions, withdraw its troops and put an end to the occupation of Arab territories seized in 1967. Ensuring the lawful national rights of the Palestinian Arab people, including the creation of their own independent state, is a basic condition for a settlement.

The Soviet initiative aimed at restoring the peace and security of the area is suitable for settling the problem. We feel that the draft accepted in September at the Arab summit meeting in Fez may be a suitable starting point also. At the same time, we consider the Reagan plan unacceptable, because it ignores elementary requirements for a just and lasting peace, the lawful rights of the Palestinian people, and involves making permanent the consequences of the Israeli aggression against Lebanon and strengthens the imperialist military presence in this area.

The outstanding events in Hungarian-Afghan contacts was the recent visit of a party and state delegation led by Babrak Karmal and the signing of a treaty of friendship and cooperation. At the talks we determinedly condemned outside intervention, among others armed intervention, in the internal affairs of Afghanistan and gave assurances of our support for the concrete proposals of the Afghanistani Democratic Republic for a political settlement of the situation which has developed around Afghanistan. It is our conviction that a normalization of the relations of the Afghanistani Democratic Republic for a political settlement of the situation which has developed around Afghanistan. It is our conviction that a normalization of the relations of the Afghanistani Democratic Republic and its neighbors would have a favorable effect on the security and stability of the area.

The visit of Pal Losonczi, President of the Presidential Council, to Burma, the Philippine Islands and Kuwait effectively served both our political and economic goals. The Argentine, Brazilian, Peruvian, Venezuelan and Mexican talks of deputy premiers Lajos Faluvegi and Jozsef Marjai opened new and promising possibilities for our contacts. The foreign ministers' talks which took place also served well our political and economic goals. The Mexican, Nicaraguan and Malaysian foreign ministers visited our homeland this year and we held talks in Algeria, Cyprus, Malaysia and Sri Lanka. These talks contributed to a mutually advantageous development of contacts, to strengthening common action against imperialist and neocolonialism and to better knowledge and better understanding of the policy of the socialist countries and of our homeland.

On the basis of a policy of peaceful coexistence the Hungarian People's Republic continues to take an active role for the purpose of developing and expanding contacts with the developed capitalist countries. The sharpened international situation, preserving and salvaging the achievements of detente and not least of all the realization of our economic interests all require that--in measure with our possibilities and conditions--we try to contribute to a reduction of tension and to strengthening mutual understanding and trust.

We can say that, despite the already mentioned domestic and international problems and difficulties, we succeeded in preserving our position in this regard also, contributing to the solution of the tasks before us. Indeed, in some areas and relationships we strengthened our position. All this is well reflected by the talks with leaders of developed capitalist countries, by the talks of comrade Janos Kadar in Bonn and comrade Gyorgy Lazar in Vienna and by the first visit to our homeland of the French head of state in the person of Francois Mitterrand.

The visit of comrade Pal Losonczi to Portugal, of Mauno Koivisto, the Finnish head of state, and Dom Mintoff, the Maltese premier, to Budapest and of Gyorgy Lazar to Turkey were important events. If we add to all this the visits to Hungary of Richard Nixon, former American president, and of a number of other famous western political and public life personalities and the western talks of Hungarian politicians we can justly say that in our way we have contributed to maintaining and continuing the dialog between the leaders of socialist and capitalist countries.

Concrete questions of the development of bilateral contacts and timely problems of the international situation stood in the center of those talks in Budapest which we held with Hans-Dietrich Genscher, foreign minister of the German Federal Republic, and most recently with Italian leaders in the course of a Hungarian-Italian foreign ministers' meeting.

In all these talks it was confirmed that mutually advantageous cooperation contributes to creating the favorable atmosphere necessary for the clarification of international problems and strengthens the responsibility of the various sides for the development of the international situation. In the course of the year this feeling of responsibility could be experienced in the talks with the Spanish, Norwegian, English, Finnish, Swedish, Icelandic and Canadian foreign ministers also. In addition the talks opened up a number of other possibilities for cooperation between our homeland and the developed capitalist countries.

IV. Work done in international organizations and at international conferences is an ever more significant area of our foreign policy activity. It has strengthened our international position that we have joined two specialized organizations of the UN, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Representatives of our homeland occupy leading offices in a number of international organizations and prestigious international conferences take place in Hungary ever more frequently. The fact that a representative of the Hungarian Peoples' Republic holds the office of chairman of the 37th session of the UN General Assembly, going beyond the general political recognition of our homeland, is contributing to strengthening bilateral contacts with some countries.

Representatives of our homeland perform worthy activity at international meetings discussing basic problems of the international situation also. The Hungarian People's Republic--in agreement with the opinion of the majority of European states--considers the Madrid meeting of the participants in the European security and cooperation conference to be an important

forum from the viewpoint of furthering the detente process. It is our conviction that adopting a substantive and balanced closing document would contribute in significant measure to a further development of the contacts of European countries on the path designated in the Helsinki Closing Document. In the interest of improving the international atmosphere and strengthening the achievements of detente it is similarly important that there be a decision at the meeting concerning the convening and mandate of a confidence building, security and disarmament conference which fits into the all-European process.

We regret that the Madrid meeting has again suspended its work without tangible results. But the dialog which took place can be evaluated positively. At the most recent session the behavior of the NATO member states was less characterized by accusations against the Soviet Union and the socialist countries. We trust that this session of the Madrid meeting aided a more realistic, more constructive approach to the problems awaiting solution and that the meeting can resume its work in the hope of coming to an agreement. It is our conviction that a successful conclusion of the conference would be aided significantly if the Soviet Union and the United States were to make progress, with mutual agreements, in settling disputed questions.

In sum, we can say of the year now ending that Hungarian foreign policy--beginning with the highest party and government level talks down to professional, branch and social and mass organization contacts at various levels--has conducted very broad, many-sided and pioneering activity in relations with both socialist and developing and developed capitalist states and in international organizations, actively representing our fundamental national goals and our common socialist interests. This foreign policy is a national policy, a class policy and a peace policy; that is, it is the policy of a country building socialism. In the words of comrade Janos Kadar: "Our capital--in the moral sense--is an open, honest, understandable and consistent policy, namely, that we want to be faithful allies of our allies, good friends of our friends, good neighbors of our neighbors and correct partners of our partners. We will stick to this."

8984

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COMMANDER DISCUSSES WARSAW MILITARY DISTRICT

Warsaw PRZEGLAD WOJSK LADOWYCH in Polish No 10, Oct 82 pp 6-9

[Article by Maj Gen Wlodzimierz Oliwa]

[Text] The dynamic development of means of warfare as well as the progress of the newest military thought, closely connected with this development, makes it the order of the day to find efficient forms and methods for improving commands and staffs and troop training. On the other hand, theoretical thinking and the processes of practical preparation and adaptation to the requirements of the battlefield as well as the actual capabilities of equipment and the troops have an influence on the structure of training.

This brings about the need for quickly and permanently attuning the training processes to the real situations and conditions occurring in regard to the equipment, tactics and art of operations.

The shortest and best way leading directly to fulfillment of these tasks is the systematic search for new organizational-training structures and further improvement of those so far tested, constant enhancement of their functionality and the methodological adaptation of cadres to action under new conditions.

A multitude of complex organizational, training and educational problems arises from the organizational structure of the Warsaw Military District [WOW] and this requires an unusually careful and constructive approach. The lack of homogeneity, different profiles of training, and especially the training of personnel reserves compels all commanders to systematic improvement of the organization and methodology of conducted exercises and activities, their increased quality and efficiency, continual improvement of the training base as well as systematically putting the experiences of training into practice.

Each exercise, starting from the lowest level of command, is planned with attention to the necessity for efficient use of time and least expense. The cost-effect principle is of essential importance, especially in the country's present situation.

Decision by Cadre

The quality of teaching depends on the knowledge and experience of commanders and staffs at given levels at which we also devote much attention to

well-planned, high-level conducted exercises and activities with the command and staff cadre. Conditions have compelled us to use more economical, and from the standpoint of results, fruitful forms of training. I will mention a few:

Collective training--making it possible to acquaint the command cadre with a problem given at a specific year of training, and to consolidate information from selected and newest tactical and operational problems with simultaneous testing of knowledge and skill at resolving various tactical-operational problems.

During this training, solutions are worked out that are the result of the needs of the battlefield, among others, connected with re-grouping (deployment and withdrawal of columns into and out of areas, crossing destruction zones, vehicle refueling), organization of fire against the enemy, coordinated action, command etc. New theoretical problems are also solved.

Advanced training--has the ongoing purpose of maintaining high efficiency in the accomplishment of functional duties through commands and staffs. The training is conducted both on base and under firing range conditions in courses specially organized for this purpose. In the opinion of participants, course training is the most effective form, because it brings about standardization of the training processes throughout the district in accordance with requirements set by the higher commanding officers. We are continuing to give a lot of attention to individual forms of improving one's abilities, such as self-education. We continually broaden such forms with new problems. Within the range of this training, the command cadre of the Staff and ZT [tactical large unit] has spent several years working out episodic exercises, reports and other papers on the most innovative subjects.

Correspondence training of staff officers is a new form of education which fully meets the test. On the basis of sent instructions and documents, the staffs carry out the tasks commanded (making decisions, support of combat action, etc.) that are then presented to the staff of WOW and there evaluated.

Forms of reserve officer training are continually being improved in the Warsaw Military District. Correspondence training has been accepted ever more widely, although with difficulty. We put many hopes on the activity of the Union of Former Professional Soldiers as well as the Reserve Officers' Clubs--LOK [National Defense League], which comprise a basic cadre. Every circle is included under the patronage of a military unit.

Methodological Preparation

In training work, we give special attention to the young command cadre which lacks appropriate experience. This especially pertains to cadre having finished their studies at military institutes. For this purpose, there have been organized instruction-demonstration exercises which give the trainees the possibility of getting more closely acquainted with standard organization of work at designated posts and in various combat situations and which at the same time standardize the forms and methods of work used in the entire district.

An immensely worthwhile form of training which has bearing on the direction of comprehensive development of the young cadre is the widespread institution of "initiators." This institution is realized by officers with long-term command or staff experience who, with discreet supervision and care, oversee the correct course of adaptation in a new, unknown environment, and also take care of the young cadre's proper social and daily life conditions.

A highly important problem is the methodical training of professional soldiers and organizers of subunit and unit training. The directions of methodical work are determined at the district training courses, and afterwards by those of the tactical formation and unit. These are additionally assisted by firing schools and specialized firing range groups, at which the problems of methodical improvement are demonstrated, and by exchange of experiences.

Many diverse solutions are being used in the Warsaw Military District in the area of training noncommissioned officers and the preparation of junior specialists.

The knowledge of future noncommissioned officers is dependent upon the methodological abilities of the cadre. Therefore, methodology conferences are also organized twice a year at which the cadre has the opportunity to share its accomplishments and experiences in the area of training and educational work. We are aiming for the troop leaders and trainers to go outside of the classrooms. This will be achieved through monthly firing range groups during which cadets improve themselves in firing exercises, battlefield practice and methodology work.

Cost-Effect-New Solutions

Cost-effect analysis has confirmed the appropriateness of army exercises. Staffs and commanders previously taken to exercises conduct staff and group exercises, improve their combat organization, command abilities, organization of coordinated action, etc., and then take part in troop exercises. This method makes it possible to prepare all officers, chiefly reserve officers, for proper direction of subunits in battle. This gives a double savings through cadre preparation, better command and troop activity as well as the implementation of tasks on equipment brought out for the mission.

The method of retraining reserve troops is subject to constant reevaluation and modification. Statutory limitations concerning the time and number of summons to duty are the stimulus demanding constant modernization of principles and cycles of training. Instructions that every soldier should take part in planned training once every two years have brought about a cycle of coordinated firing range lessons enabling the restoration of tactical and fire efficiency. These tasks are done in two stages: the first stage is coordination of troops and crews by the integrated training method, and the second stage is coordination of subunits where the leading element is tactical training for integrating fire and movement.

In the Warsaw Military District, specialized training of soldiers plays a large role. This training is done in divisional and district groups.

Some specialists of the rocket, artillery, OPL [antiaircraft defense] chemical and engineering troops are trained in this manner as are the soldiers of reconnaissance subunits. For this purpose, there has been developed a specialized integrated training base in garrisons where the largest units are stationed.

Under conditions of the Warsaw Military District, an appropriately equipped training base determines fulfillment of tasks. For that reason also, its development is concentrated on the further integration and especially the expansion of firing range infrastructure. The chief purpose of such activity is to assure NCO schools cadets and reserve soldiers of conditions for direct entry into training after their arrival at the firing range. This is accomplished through the build-up of camps.

There are many modernization projects that have been accomplished in garrisons. In the Warsaw Military District, the organization of exhibition and lecture halls has been given up in favor of concentrating the main effort on the field training base integrated with the garrison base.

In implementing training and teaching tasks, we still perceive many untried areas and possibilities. We have a good, efficiently-operating command cadre, upon whose activity the result of our work depends. It is not, therefore, a coincidence that its very training and advancement lies at the center of interest of the district command.

The specific character of the Warsaw Military District brings about definite resolution of the main points of training. The limited training time of NCO-school cadets, junior specialists and reserve troops demands a high organizational and training predisposition from the command cadre.

Conscious of the tasks that face us during martial law, we are doing everything so that training may be realized rhythmically, so that every kilometer will be saturated with the proper tactical content and that the contents of training will include educational elements.

12261

CSO: 2600/136

THEORETICAL-POLITICAL TEACHERS' CONFERENCE HELD

Warsaw GLOS NAUCZYCIELSKI in Polish No 44, 12 Dec 82 pp 1,4

[Article by Z.M. entitled "Helping to Understand"]

[Text] The second National Theoretical-Political Conference of Teachers, which was held on 26 and 27 November 1982, brought together 130 participants; teachers of the humanities and social sciences, methodologists, school principals, workers from scientific institutes of the Ministry of Education and Upbringing, representatives of pedagogical journals and educational workers. The minister has announced the organization of similar conferences at least twice a year on a national level and in the individual superintendents' offices. Their goal, as he emphasized, is to give teachers information about current ideological-political issues, which will help them in carrying out the upbringing tasks of the school.

Jozef Czyrek, Politburo member and secretary of the CC PUWP, informed those gathered at the conference about international conditioning of the social-political situation in Poland. Dr Wlodzimierz Szewczuk gave a report on general psychological conditioning of optimal upbringing effectiveness. The strategy and tactics of the political underground in Poland were the subject of a speech by Professor Dr Leslaw Wojtasik, and Minister Professor Dr Boleslaw Faron spoke on the social-political situation in the school community.

Peace at Home and Partnership in the International Arena

Characterizing the external conditions of the situation in Poland and the influence of that situation on the increase or decrease of tensions, Secretary of the CC PUWP Jozef Czyrek stated, among other things, that Poland is counted as a partner in the international arena when calm reigns within the country. A mood of confrontation increases tensions, and then our country becomes a bargaining card in the politics of the western states. The realization of the idea of national understanding will knock the propaganda weapon out of the hands of the enemies of socialism, and therefore helps the cause of international detente. For this reason consciousness of those ties

is so important, especially for teachers of social-political subjects, who to an important extent form the views, and hence the mood, of young people.

The speaker recalled the actions undertaken by the government aimed at normalizing the situation in Poland, at national understanding and a gradual exit from the economic crisis. In foreign policy, as the Secretary stated, Poland is striving toward even closer cooperation with the Soviet Union and the countries of people's democracy. A thorough review of our unused production potential is taking place in order to mobilize that potential through cooperative agreements. We are also trying to establish closer ties with Third World countries, whose economic situation is similar to ours. For here the basis of partnership has more realistic prospects of realization than with respect to the highly industrialized, rich and economically stable countries.

The most important problem, however, remains Poland's indebtedness to the West and the economic sanctions of U.S. President Reagan, including the suspension of most-favored nation status, which significantly limits our receipts of hard currency for buying goods necessary for our industrial production.

The Secretary of the CC also pointed out certain symptoms of detente. The attendance of numerous delegates from all over the world at the funeral of Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev was a manifestation of esteem for the USSR, a manifestation of a sober evaluation of world political reality. This shake-up of U.S. policy, as he estimated, is undoubtedly tactical in character. Nevertheless, it contains a note of optimism, for this shake-up, (e.g. lifting the embargo on delivering equipment for the Siberian gas pipeline) creates a chance for calm discussions at various levels, and as long as there exists a dialogue, the road to understanding remains open. The mass antiwar movement in the West also gives hope for a reduction of tensions.

Bases of Upbringing Instruction

In a wide-ranging report Professor Dr Wlodzimierz Szewczuk presented the essential bases of upbringing instruction. Because of the modest size of this newspaper, we shall indicate only a few important problems, familiar from theory, but overlooked in practice. For example, does every teacher, even the most highly qualified, try to make his students aware of what role he plays, what part of the picture of reality his subject represents in elementary and high-school instruction as a whole? What is instruction: an exercise in the act of knowledge for its own sake or for the sake of a system of life goals of the individual as a single person and as a member of society? Goals included in a system of values which is reflected in the form of the world.

Unfortunately, Professor Szewczuk lamented, we do not have any critical scholarly monographs on children's and young people's value systems functioning in life. Awareness of the changes taking place in the form of those values is of essential importance in revising curricula and upbringing activity, for the effectiveness of upbringing activity depends on the image of the world which young people receive.

That effectiveness increases in proportion to the development of self-guiding dispositions. Scholarly research indicates that people's accomplishments are much less than their capabilities. This is because in our education too little importance is attached to forming independent effectiveness and the responsibility of each student for his own development.

The term "upbringing for creating" is also familiar from theoretical monographs. But who carries out that upbringing? Certainly individuals. And the matter is not all that complicated. It is enough once to set creative activity in motion, or to cross a certain threshold for the child to believe in himself, that he can do something more than mindless rote learning of textbook formulae, and the "I can do that myself!" bacillus injected begins to cause chain reactions.

The Professor referred to his own memories from the postwar years of the struggle against illiteracy in Poland. A certain miner, who used to do the same as other miners after work hours, i.e. drink a lot of beer and vodka, later a little "scuffle" or mindless hanging around with a few drinking buddies on a street corner, when he learned to read and write, when he became "infected" with books, disappeared from his empty little world. He began to improve himself, and after a year of such "disappearance", announced his own invention at his workplace. Meeting his teacher-savior, he said to him with gratitude, "I done been reborn!"

In every developmentally normal child there is a need even greater than in adults for self-realization and creation. One need only awaken it and help to satisfy it, or to help the child believe in himself.

Are teachers prepared for this? Some of the older cadres are. But the majority are not. Thus, searching for the paths to renewal, we must first of all turn our attention to the system of training teachers and the proper selection of candidates for the profession. A young person receives in his study only a basic preparation. But where is the preparation for the role of an upbringer who will treat instruction as a means to achieving the subjective form of the student's personality?

The Professor recalled the foundation of the wise partnership between the teachers and young people, a partnership which excludes treating the student as a mindless object subjected to a moralizing monologue. Where essential argumentation based on facts and a dialogue are replaced by a monologue, upbringing ends and training begins.

How Do They Fight, and For What?

Professor Dr Leslaw Wojtasik presented the picture of the struggle being waged in the country by the political underground against the socialist system in Poland. He indicated two concepts of the strategy of this underground. The first, which prevailed in the beginning period after the introduction of martial law, is the concept of the "great leap forward"; the second, which seems to be prevailing at present, is the concept of the "long march." The great leap forward meant a one-time fight with authority by means of a general

strike, which was supposed to develop into a national uprising unless the authorities agreed to a compromise.

Opponents of the great leap forward accused its proponents of political naivete, and of underestimating the power of the authorities. August 31 was a turning point. At that time the concept of the long march, which was born at the end of April and the beginning of May, was publicized. What are its assumptions? The basic assumption is the organization of an underground society, not a state, since the underground structures of the authorities cannot justify their existence.

What is an underground society? This society is based on organic activity aimed at spreading the ideology of "Solidarity", demonstrating in various forms its existence in spite of the dissolution of the union. In order to influence the consciousness of young people, the creators of the concept of the "long march" strive to create an underground system of national education and circulation of culture, referring back, among other things, to the working method of such societies as the Philomaths and Philorhets [early nineteenth-century Polish nationalist student activists].

Professor L. Wojtasik also directed the audience's attention to the boycott of the media by various sections of the creative intelligentsia, as well as the expanding circle of social apathy when people cease to be interested in any kind of ideology.

Due to the length of Professor L. Wojtasik's speech, we were not able to transmit many particular pieces of information and considerations contained in it. To those interested we recommend the monographs "The Strategy and Tactics of the 'Solidarity' Underground" and "Who Are the So-Called True Representatives of Society and What Are They Fighting For?" put out by the Information Department of the CC PUWP for party activists. In reference to his speech, the editors conducted an interview with Professor L. Wojtasik which will appear in a forthcoming issue.

Youth Needs Help

Minister Professor Boleslaw Faron called the audience's attention to the exceptionally difficult situation of young people, who are subjected to the pressure of the most varied sources of information. This leads to the mental exhaustion and neuroses of students. The role of the school, the role of the conscientious teacher is to help these young people stabilize their views and attitudes. Unfortunately, it often happens that teachers avoid discussions of sensitive topics. Young people themselves are also reluctant to raise those topics in class.

The true pedagogue, the Minister emphasized, does not give in to such difficulties, he works, using every type of means at his disposal, so that young people should see in him support for their uncertainties. It is obvious that rebuilding consciousness is a long-term process, and cannot be accomplished overnight.

The fact that high school, and also elementary school, students participated in street demonstrations at the end of August and beginning of September must fill us with profound concern. The organs of public order detained 560 high school students for directly participating in incidents, distributing leaflets, shouting anti-state slogans, not possessing identity papers, disobeying appeals to disperse, not observing the curfew, and watching street incidents. Sixty-five percent were trade school students, 11.5 percent came from general education high schools, 4 percent from post-high school studies, and 11 percent from elementary schools. These figures are not high if we consider that there are six million students in day schools and another two million in schools for working people. Nevertheless, each case should concern upbringers, since it is linked with the sanctions resulting from martial law. All this can lead to a dislocation of young people's personalities so early in their lives. Therefore each teacher must think hard about what to do in order to protect young people from similar complications of life.

At the same time, recently we have been observing among teachers a weakening of motivation, a lack of commitment, a reluctance to take upbringing initiatives. Actually the majority, in spite of fatigue and the tremendous difficulties arising from the crisis situation, are trying to carry out their duties well, and simply understand their obligation. And precisely thanks to that great feeling of responsibility, work in the schools is proceeding, aside from a few isolated cases, smoothly.

The Ministry, as the Minister emphasized in his address, is making efforts to integrate teachers with the realization of common tasks. A proof of this is the implementation of the terms of the Charter. The speaker recalled the rights and duties of teachers contained in the Sejm law, of which compliance with the Constitution of the Polish People's Republic is one of the basic duties. He devoted particular attention to the consequences for the whole school system of the reduction in teaching loads, which, among other things, causes great personnel problems. According to Ministry calculations, next year 56,000 teachers will have to be added in the elementary schools.

How to get out of this impasse? The Ministry of Education and Upbringing resorts to various measures and half-measures, of which the most important is expanding education in post-high school studies, especially before elementary teaching, since in that period the shortcomings are the greatest. Referring to criticism to the effect that preparation at the post-high school level is a step backward with respect to the concept of full higher education, the Minister declared that universities and Higher Pedagogical Schools are incapable of assuring a sufficient number of qualified people. I consider, he declared, that this step backward is still better than accepting into the profession completely unqualified people.

The second method for improving the personnel situation is to do away with all formal barriers to employing retired teachers. According to a rule in the Charter, in 1985 pedagogues having served 30 years in the profession will be able to retire.

The third course of action is to lure back those who have left the profession. On the basis of preliminary calculations, we can approximately determine that about five thousand teachers have already returned to teaching work.

And finally, the fourth method is to increase the activity of superintendents' offices toward colleges. The important thing is for superintendents, and also inspectors and gmina school principals, establish permanent contact with colleges, and invite college students to their schools in order to show them their future workplaces. In short, to attract future workers.

As the Minister put it, the salary payments for overloading classes above the normal number have grown to gigantic proportions. The Ministry starts from the assumption that resources earmarked for that purpose should be used to raise the basic salaries for all teachers. To calculate all the additional pay would require a special bookkeeping service. Thus, it has been established that additional pay will be given for students present at classes. How? The teacher will take attendance at each lecture. Then on the basis of the records in his journal he will total up the attendance and report it to the principal.

The Minister also pointed out the phenomenon of teachers more and more frequently calling in sick, seeing this as taking advantage of a rule in the Charter about teachers also getting paid for justified absence from class. Parents inform us about this in their letters. Awareness of the social control of parents should help those internally undisciplined teachers to overcome the slackening of their feeling of responsibility for their didactic-upbringing obligations toward their students.

The goal of the conference was to help teachers understand current social-political problems in Poland. Time will tell whether all the speeches exchanged and the discussion, which concentrated on practical realization of upbringing tasks and raised matters which have been also widely present in recent months in the columns of GLOS NAUCZYCIELSKI, will have really helped them to understand the internal and external entanglements in present-day Poland. Of course, if there is a result from the undertakings of the conference in rational proportion to other activities. And such activities remain those which liquidate the essential causes of all kinds of tensions.

9970

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GDANSK PROVINCE PARTY ACTIVITIES NOTED

Gdansk Party Board Meeting

Gdansk DZIENNIK BALTYCKI in Polish 26-27-28 Nov 82 pp 1,2

[Text] For several weeks in the whole party the reporting campaign has been in progress. All organizations and party authorities have analysed at meetings their activity during the past year since the beginning of their current term of office. As far as the timetable within which these reporting meetings were to take place is concerned, despite certain delays in some organizations, the first stage of this campaign is approaching its end, as was stated at yesterday's meeting of the Voivodship Committee Executive. In the coming week, meetings in the remaining party organizations should be completed, with the exception of some organizations on board ships because of the planned later return to Poland of a part of the Polish Ocean Lines and Dalmor Deep Sea Fishing Enterprise fleets.

In connexion with the beginning of the second stage of this campaign -- the conferences of plant, commune, district, and town party authorities, the Voivodship Executive drew attention to the need for ideological-educational problems to be taken up in a broader way than at the meetings of primary party organizations. The purpose should be, as a result of discussions summing up the gains so far and the weaknesses which appear, to define the tasks for particular organizations and authorities in order to develop and strengthen their activity.

As the second point on the agenda, the Voivodship Executive evaluated the current sociopolitical situation in the Gdansk voivodship. It stated that the mood is becoming more calm and that simultaneously there is increased understanding of the need for undisturbed work. This is contributing to the progressive stabilization of life in our region and the isolation of the underground calling for destructive attitudes and activities against the authorities. The Voivodship Executive then adopted a plan of action whose implementation will serve to consolidate sociopolitical stabilization in workplaces and in the whole Gdansk voivodship.

Comments on Gdansk Party Board Meeting

Gdansk DZIENNIK BALTYCKI in Polish 10-11-12 Dec 82 p 2

[Text] During yesterday's meeting, the Voivodship Executive of the PZPR assessed the current sociopolitical situation in the Gdansk voivodship. A considerable improvement in law and order was reported, as was an undisturbed rhythm of work during the whole of last month and the first ten days of December.

Referring to the assessment of this situation made by the Voivodship Commission for Cooperation between the PZPR, ZSL, and SD, the Voivodship Group of Deputies, and the Voivodship Defense Committee -- all of which were meeting during this period, the Voivodship Executive declared that the emerging atmosphere in the coastal region is contributing to the stabilization and normalization of the situation. At the same time, the need for further efforts in order to eliminate everything which hinders calm and productive work on the part of the workforce and which arouses social dissatisfaction was firmly stressed. Here, it is a question of continuing energetic actions against all abuses, speculation, and unjustified self-enrichment and also of making efforts to improve market supplies and to ensure the best possible conditions for undisturbed, productive work.

In connexion with the imminent prospect of the suspension of martial law, the Voivodship Executive appeals to all party members to take an active part in the measures being taken in order to ensure conditions for the effective continuation of the introduction of the economic reform and for the further stabilization of our life. [The Executive appealed] also that the coming week, in which the Sejm will debate the proposal concerning martial law legislation, might be another week -- together with the following weeks -- of peaceful and normal work, and that such a climate might prevail also during the days of remembrance of the tragic anniversary of December 1970. Neither the Gdansk Voivodship nor the national authorities, it was emphasized, are eradicating this anniversary from memory. In order to commemorate it, numerous delegations, including delegations from the leading plants in Gdansk and Gdynia, will lay flowers at the memorial monuments.

A kind of supplement to this point on the agenda was a detailed analysis of the sociopolitical situation in the institutions of higher education in the coastal region. It was reported that this milieu, too, shows an improvement in social climate but that, nevertheless, there continue to be many weaknesses in the administrative work of individual colleges as well as party and youth organizations. The successful resolution of many matters and problems is hindered by the lack of regulations and executive orders relating to the new law on higher education.

Despite these difficulties, it is necessary to strengthen the role of party organizations and college committees in order for them to be able to undertake effective action to assist the creation of the desired sociopolitical and educational-teaching situation in colleges and to draw up appropriately the statutes of individual colleges. A further

contribution to this should be made by the assistance which college committees are rendering to youth organizations active in the academic milieu and in particular, the newly formed Union of Polish Students.

The next point on the Voivodship Executive's agenda was the presentation of information on the functioning of the incentive system in plants and the introduction of wage reforms. During the discussion on this information it was stated -- on the basis of numerous data -- that wage increases during the first ten months of the year are considerably above increases in output and that they are continuing to increase rapidly. This is bound to arouse justifiable concern, since, so far, wage settlements have been simple wage increases without any elements of incentive to more, better work or increased productivity. For this reason, the Voivodship Executive recommended that party organizations and plant managements take up this problem in detail in order to work out solutions and changes so that wage increases might contain incentives to more productive work.

Familiarizing itself next with all the matters relating to the dissemination of internal party information and propaganda materials to shop-floor and primary party organizations, the Voivodship Executive noted a considerable improvement in their content and distribution and emphasized the need for their further improvement as well as better utilization of the materials by party lecturers.

In addition, the Voivodship Executive heard information on the social activity of the consultative commissions established in many enterprises and on the schedule for the implementation of resolutions of the tenth Central Committee Plenum and the plenum of the Voivodship Committee held in September this year. There was also some discussion of the preparations for the next plenary session of the Voivodship Committee (around the 20th of this month) and for the PZPR Voivodship Reporting Conference (at the beginning of February 1983).

9993

CSO: 2600/186

ACADEMIC DISCUSSES STATE ENTERPRISE SELF-GOVERNMENT

Warsaw SZTANDAR MLODYCH in Polish 9 Dec 82 p 3

[Interview with Dr Tadeusz Jaworski of the WSNS [Higher School of Social Sciences], by Pawel Lewandowshi: "Chances of Self-Management"; date and place not specified]

[Text] [Question] What is your opinion of the resumption of self-management activity in state enterprises?

[Answer] This activity is proceeding more slowly than one might expect, considering the need for economic reform. In the discussion on self-management, not enough attention is given to the fact that self-management is an organ of the enterprise. When it is absent, only one of the three organs named in law is functioning--the manager. The absence of a workers council and a general assembly of the workers or their delegates makes it impossible to create conditions for the normal operation of an enterprise. The opportunity for the rank and file to avail themselves of the constitutional right to participate in running the plant is not being taken advantage of. Yet, only someone who participates in the decision-making process can feel responsible for a decision.

[Question] Let's suppose that I as a metal fitter belong to a self-management body. What opportunities might this provide for me?

[Answer] I believe that enterprises have no clear conception of the functioning of self-management. Organizing the work force to participate in running the enterprise on the administrative level is only half the objective. What I consider important, perhaps most important, is organizing participation on the lowest level, on the shop floor, where the decisions on production are made. As a metal fitter you know best what makes your life difficult, what hampers your work. You know what the management doesn't know, and you're the one who can plan beneficial changes.

[Question] Not all workers are convinced that management really takes their opinions into account.

[Answer] And that gives rise to misgivings about the possibility of self-management. The chain-of-command system that was once mandatory in the economy

fostered such perceptions. Self-management is an opportunity, but we must take advantage of it. We ought to create conditions in which workers will want to participate in the decisionmaking process. Administrators must fully respect the legal authority of self-management bodies.

[Question] What factors are hindering the resumption of self-management activity?

[Answer] First, the lack of a general conviction among the rank and file that the new system gives them a chance really to participate in running the enterprise. Second, the skeptical and sometimes hostile attitude of management in some enterprises toward self-management as a concept of democratizing operations and as a form of organizing the enterprise. Old traditions and habits are a negative influence here, but the main problem is the inability of some administrative personnel to operate within the self-management system.

Evidence for this can be found in the bylaws of many enterprises. While these bylaws lay out in detail the functions of the manager as an organ of the enterprise, they fail to describe and specify what functions are to be performed by the other two organs--the general assembly of the workers and the workers council--and what their sphere of authority is in the operation of the enterprise. The act of 25 September 1981 explicitly says that self-management organs play a vital role in the enterprise. Article 4, paragraph 1 of the Act states: "The organs of the enterprise independently make decisions and organize activity in all the business of the enterprise, in accordance with the provisions of the law and in order to accomplish the tasks of the enterprise."

Although the manager is in sole charge of the enterprise, the act makes it clear that the other two organs have an extremely important role. However, managers often regard the self-management system as something that will tie their hands. It seems to me that managers should treat their subordinates as they would like to be treated by their superiors. Utopia? But it doesn't cost anything. No investments are needed to improve the work climate.

Some administrative personnel are overly skeptical about self-management. I find this disturbing. Can workers have confidence in a manager who has no confidence in them? The workers' council, after all, is supposed to appoint the managers of most enterprises.

[Question] What, then, are the manager's obligations toward the other two organs of the enterprise?

[Answer] If the self-management bodies are not operating, the manager is obliged to convene a meeting that will present candidates for the election committee. This committee, in turn, will organize elections for the self-management bodies. This rule will apply in the majority of enterprises--wherever the self-management bodies are not yet operating or where they are operating on the basis of a temporary regulation or enactment that was not brought into line with the provisions of the act by the end of 1981. In other words, wherever legal irregularities occur in the appointment of self-management bodies.

[Question] What sort of irregularities are they?

[Answer] Mainly they have to do with voting procedures. Elections have not always been universal, direct and proportional. Also, the right to vote has often been restricted to a greater extent than the act stipulates. Conducting elections at the general assembly of the workers violates the principle of universality: some workers do not participate in the assembly for reasons of illness, because they are on vacation, or because they do not wish to attend. In a number of enterprises the workers council has been appointed in the elections by delegates. This is a violation of the act, since elections are supposed to be direct.

Members of the workers council and the delegates to the general assembly are elected in organizational units in the enterprise that are recognized as electoral districts. The principle here is that the number of members of the self-management body is proportional to the manpower in a given unit. Departure from this principle or voting for one combined list is a violation of the act. There has also been a tendency to restrict the right to vote to the self-management bodies, particularly with regard to individuals in administrative positions or in political organizations. According to the act, the right to vote is not restricted to the general assembly of delegates.

Those ineligible for membership on the workers council are workers employed for less than two years, the manager of the enterprise, the assistant manager, the chief accountant, the legal adviser, factory managers and their assistants, and workers delegated to work outside the enterprise for a period longer than half a year. It is against the law to prevent other individuals--those performing administrative duties in social, political, or trade union organizations, for example--from being candidates for the general assembly and the workers council.

If a self-management body was elected illegally and if a reelection was not held before the end of last year, a legal election must be held in order to authorize the resumption of self-management activity.

[Question] Yet there are self-management bodies unaware of the requirements of the law. Are their decisions valid?

[Answer] Any violations must be corrected as quickly as possible so that the body's decisions will not be invalidated or annulled. An illegally appointed body cannot make decisions that have legal force. Therefore, the rank-and-file workers, their representative bodies and the managers should all be involved in bringing the organization and principles of self-management into line with the law.

[Question] Have self-management bodies been appointed illegally in a large number of enterprises?

[Answer] In some enterprises, wherever irregularities have occurred, new elections must be held.

[Question] What can self-management bodies really accomplish?

[Answer] The workers council has the right to express its opinion and take a position on all matters relating to the enterprise. The self-management act gives the council a wide range of crucial powers. The manager cannot make a number of important decisions without its consent. For example, the appointment of assistant managers, the split-up and merger of enterprises, participation in an association, and the distribution of economically managed income all require the council's express consent. Only the workers' council has the right to establish work regulations and to hold a referendum in the enterprise. The council has the new, important right to appoint the manager in all those enterprises where this right is not vested in the founding organs.

[Question] From the viewpoint of the law, what is the relation between trade unions and self-management bodies?

[Answer] Trade unions, as the representative bodies of the rank and file, will have protective, participatory and educational functions to perform. They will not only defend workers' interests, but will see to it that the means are provided to satisfy these interests. Generally speaking, unions have the right to take positions on matters affecting the material and working conditions of the labor force.

Self-management bodies, however, by virtue of their functions in the operation of the enterprise, will concentrate on problems affecting the activity of the enterprise and its results--on organization, administration, and the creation of conditions that help to meet the needs of the work force.

1608

CSO: 2600/148

LAW ON ENSURING QUALITY OF NUCLEAR INSTALLATIONS

Bucharest BULETINUL OFICIAL in Romanian Part I No 106, 20 Nov 82 pp 1-10

[Law No 6 Regarding the Quality Assurance of Nuclear Objectives and Installations]

[Text] Statement of Purpose

The RCP program for building a multilaterally developed socialist society and advancing Romania toward communism stipulates the implementation of large investment programs for using nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

The fulfillment of these programs requires the construction and exploitation of nuclear objectives in keeping with the latest advances of the modern technical-scientific revolution, while assuring a high level of quality specific to the nuclear field, so as to ensure the safety of installations, protect the population, the environment, and material goods, and obtain high economic efficiency in the exploitation of these installations. For this reason, particular attention must be devoted to the quality assurance of products and services used in creating nuclear objectives.

The present law includes regulations intended to assure in the areas of design, manufacturing, construction-assembly, and exploitation, the level of quality required by nuclear safety criteria, exploitation reliability, and economic efficiency for nuclear objectives and installations.

The law regulates the authorization of units which participate in the construction and exploitation of nuclear objectives and installations; establishes measures regarding the conduct of quality assurance activities in design, product fabrication, construction-assembly, exploitation, and in the handling, transportation, and storage of products intended for these objectives and installations; defines the obligations and responsibilities of ministries and other central organs; specifies the functions of supervisory organs; and provides sanctions against violations of the provisions of the law.

At the same time, the law establishes the tasks of scientific research and technical engineering in assuring the quality of nuclear objectives and installations.

The Socialist Republic Romania

In accordance with article 57 of the Constitution of the Socialist Republic Romania, we sign and order the publication in BULETINUL OFICIAL OF THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC ROMANIA, of Law No 6 of 12 November 1982, regarding the quality assurance of nuclear objectives and installations.

Nicolae Ceausescu
President of the Socialist Republic Romania
Bucharest, 20 November 1982

Law Regarding the Quality Assurance of Nuclear Objectives and Installations

The RCP program for building a multilaterally developed socialist society and advancing Romania toward communism, strongly encouraging technical progress representative of modern technical-scientific advances, stipulates the implementation of large investment programs in the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

The fulfillment of these programs requires the creation and exploitation of nuclear objectives and installations while ensuring the safety of installations, protecting the population and the environment, and obtaining high economic efficiency.

For this purpose, it is necessary to institute procedures of authorization and inspection which will ensure strict compliance with specific quality requirements in the construction and exploitation of nuclear objectives and installations, and in the execution of products and services used in their creation.

In order to increase the contribution and increase the responsibility of ministries, other central and local organs, industrial centrals, enterprises, research and design institutes, other economic units, and workers, in the quality assurance of products and services intended for nuclear objectives and installations,

The Grand National Assembly of the Socialist Republic Romania
adopts the present law.

Chapter I. General Provisions

Article 1. The quality assurance of nuclear objectives and installations, and of products and services used in their construction and exploitation, constitute a permanent obligation for ministries, other local and central organs, industrial centrals, enterprises, and all socialist units participating in their construction.

Article 2. Products and services intended for nuclear objectives and installations, as well as the exploitation of these objectives and installations, are subject to the procedures of authorization and inspection stipulated by the present law.

Article 3. All construction-assembly and exploitation activities for nuclear objectives and installations, as well the execution of products and performance of services intended for these objectives and installations, are conducted according to quality assurance programs.

Quality assurance programs establish the comprehensive technical and organizational measures needed by each unit to assure the quality of products and services, to prevent and detect any violation of specifications in technical execution documents, and to correct all non-compliances, so as to fulfill the requirements for nuclear safety, operation reliability, and economic efficiency of nuclear objectives and installations.

Quality assurance programs include quality assurance manuals, as well as procedures and plans for quality control, verifications, and tests.

Quality assurance programs will be updated periodically in order to improve their effectiveness.

Article 4. The inspection of quality assurance activities is organized and conducted throughout the design, construction, and exploitation of nuclear objectives and installations, as well as during the execution of products and performance of services intended for these objectives and installations, in order to fully comply with quality requirements and prevent any violations of regulations, standards, specifications, or technical documents.

Inspection is conducted according to plans for technical examinations and inspections, which are compulsory for each authorized unit, and consists of actions performed systematically or randomly, or at predetermined stages of construction, according to legal provisions.

Article 5. The State Committee for Nuclear Energy (CSEN) supervises and is responsible for the implementation of quality assurance requirements in the design, construction-assembly, and exploitation of nuclear objectives and installations, and in the execution of products and performance of services for these objectives and installations.

Article 6. Ministries and other central organs, together with CSEN, fulfill and are responsible for the implementation of their tasks in the nuclear energy program, and for strict compliance with quality assurance requirements in nuclear objectives and installations.

Article 7. The National Council for Science and Technology (CNST) coordinates and is responsible for the conduct of scientific research and technical engineering activities in the construction of nuclear objectives and installations, and in the execution of products and services intended for them, under conditions of complete quality assurance.

Chapter II. Authorization of Units Which Participate in the Creation and Exploitation of Nuclear Objectives and Installations

Article 8. The design, product fabrication, performance of services, and construction-assembly projects for nuclear objectives and installations, as well as the exploitation of these objectives and installations, can be conducted only on the basis of quality assurance authorizations issued by CSEN.

Authorizations are issued only for specific periods of time, and only to units with legal standing.

Authorizations are issued at the request of units, on the basis of quality assurance manuals and of plans for technical examinations and inspections of quality assurance, after the requestors have met the provisions of the present law.

Article 9. Authorizations issued according to article 8 do not exclude the obligation to also obtain the other authorizations stipulated by law.

Portions of nuclear installations whose specific conditions are subject to special regulations and which function in accordance with these regulations, such as hoisting installations, pressure installations, gas installations, or other similar installations, continue to be subject to the inspection and authorization procedures stipulated in legal provisions for such installations, as well as to the provisions of the present law.

Article 10. Quality assurance authorizations can be suspended or withdrawn by CSEN when:

- a) The provisions of the present law have not been respected;
- b) The conditions under which they were issued have not fully respected;
- c) Measures issued by inspection organs for quality assurance have not been fulfilled.

Article 11. Contracting units must purchase products and engage services intended for nuclear objectives and installations, only through contracts with units authorized for this purpose, and must specify in contract documents that the contracted products or services are subject to the provisions of the present law.

Article 12. Units authorized to execute products or perform services intended for nuclear objectives and installations, must meet all the requirements included in the technical documents appended to orders, and must close their contracts only after meeting these requirements.

Article 13. Authorized units will analyze orders received from contracting units, draw contractual documents, and begin fabrication only on the basis of written procedures.

Article 14. In order to fulfill their contractual obligations, units which execute products or perform services can subcontract, with the agreement of contracting units, the execution of part of these products or services; subcontracts can be issued only to authorized units.

Units which through subcontracting have entrusted another unit with the execution of parts of products or services, must perform quality controls and tests upon their receipt. In this case, responsibility for quality assurance is incumbent on each unit for its direct obligations.

Article 15. Units which execute products or perform services can use in the production process, products or services made available to them by contracting units for the purpose of fulfilling contractual obligations. In this case, responsibility for quality assurance falls jointly on both units.

Article 16. Contracting units which use imported products or services intended for nuclear objectives and installations, and foreign trade enterprises, will include in foreign contracts stipulations which will take into account the provisions of the present law.

The Ministry of Foreign Trade and International Economic Cooperation, and CSEN, will see to it that contracts with foreign units will, in a compulsory manner, also include appropriate clauses regarding the fulfillment of the provisions of the present law.

Article 17. Contracts with foreign units to import products or services intended for nuclear objectives and installations will be closed or modified, and imported products or services will be used in nuclear objectives and installations in Romania, with the approval of CSEN regarding compliance with the quality assurance requirements stipulated in the present law.

Chapter III. Conduct of Quality Assurance Activities for Nuclear Objectives and Installations and for Products and Services Intended for Them

Article 18. Nuclear objectives and installations which fall under the provisions of this law are established by decree of the Council of State.

Products and services intended for nuclear objectives and installations, which are subject to authorization and control according to the present law, are included in appendix 1.

The contents of quality assurance programs, and of plans for technical examinations and tests, are included in appendix 2.

Article 19. Documents included in quality assurance programs and in plans for technical examinations and tests, for scientific research and technical engineering, design, execution of products and services, construction-assembly, and exploitation of nuclear objectives and installations, are formulated by executing units, with the agreement of contracting units, and are approved by CSEN.

Documents included in quality assurance programs and in plans for technical examinations and tests, for each nuclear objective or nuclear installation, are formulated by the contracting unit of the nuclear objective or nuclear installation, and submitted for approval by CSEN.

The documents stipulated in the present article can be modified under the same conditions as the ones under which they were issued.

Article 20. The conduct of all quality assurance activities must respect the provisions of the present law regarding:

- a) Design of nuclear objectives and installations, as well as of products intended for them;
- b) Fabrication, acceptance, and receipt of products;
- c) Performance of services;
- d) Construction-assembly projects;
- e) Exploitation of nuclear objectives and installations;
- f) Other phases and operations.

A. Regarding the Design of Nuclear Objectives and Installations, and of Products Intended for Them

Article 21. Design units authorized to formulate technical documents for nuclear objectives and installations, and for products intended for them, have the following obligations and responsibilities:

- a) Formulate projects whose construction designs and technical quality requirements specified in documentations, will assure the operation of nuclear objectives and installations under conditions of safety and economic efficiency;
- b) Include in projects the quality controls, verifications, and tests that must be performed in plants and at work sites in order to ensure the operation of nuclear objectives and installations under safe conditions;
- c) Establish quality requirements for the assembly, start-up, exploitation, maintenance, repair, and shut-down of nuclear objectives and installations.

Article 22. Units authorized to formulate design projects for nuclear objectives and installations, and for products intended for their construction, will perform the following activities only on the basis of written procedures:

- a) Check the data necessary for design;
- b) Formulate designs;

- c) Supervise design activities;
- d) Check design projects formulated by subcontracting units;
- e) Formulate, verify, approve, distribute, use, store, and circulate documents on which designs were based;
- f) Document and approve modifications to approved designs;
- g) Withdraw portions of designs that are no longer used as a result of approved modifications;
- h) Apply to its own activities, corrective actions resulting from technical examinations of quality assurance.

B. Regarding the Fabrication, Acceptance, and Receipt of Products

Article 23. Units which execute products intended for nuclear objectives and installations, are responsible for the application of quality assurance programs for contracted products.

Article 24. Units authorized to execute products intended for nuclear objectives and installations, will perform the following activities only on the basis of written procedures:

- a) Formulate, verify, approve, distribute, use, store, and circulate all documents regarding quality assurance;
- b) Calibrate or verify metrologically, mark and utilize means of measurement used in execution, control quality and test products, in accordance with metrologic requirements provided by law, indicating the expiration date of metrologic calibrations or standardizations;
- c) Execute products;
- d) Heat treat, weld, braze, execute non-destructive tests, clean, cover surfaces, and perform other special processes which must be implemented under controlled conditions;
- e) Identify and mark products;
- f) Handle and store subcontracted products, products made available by contracting units, products in various stages of fabrication, and final products;
- g) Protect, pack, ship, and transport products;
- h) Distinctly mark products that do not comply with quality assurance requirements, preserve them in the state in which they were found not to comply, store them separately, and repair or reject them, as the case may be.

Article 25. Authorized units will start the fabrication of products intended for nuclear objectives and installations only after the procedures necessary for their fabrication, as well as plans for quality control, verifications, and tests for contracted products have been formulated, examined, and approved according to the provisions of the present law.

Article 26. Special processes such as heat treatments, welding, and others, will be executed for products intended for nuclear objectives and installations, only after they have been accepted exclusively by personnel qualified or approved for this function, and periodically checked according with the specifications of standards, regulations, or technical execution documents.

Article 27. Deviations from stipulated tolerances, the use of unsuitable materials, defective executions, and any other similar shortcomings likely to prejudice quality, will be identified and reported directly to the management of the executing unit, so that it may take corrective steps and prevent their recurrence.

Article 28. Units which execute products will formulate documents to accompany the products throughout their execution, indicating at all times the operations, quality controls, verifications, and tests undergone by the products at all stages of execution.

Article 29. All documents which record or attest the fulfillment of quality assurance requirements throughout the execution of products, such as authorization documents for subcontractors, results of quality controls, verifications, and tests, reports written after the performance of technical examinations and inspections of quality assurance at executing units and subcontractors, as well as other similar documents, will be formulated, written, and kept under appropriate conditions, and copies of them will be turned over to contracting units upon product delivery.

Units which administer nuclear objectives and installations, will keep in their archives throughout the existence of these objectives and installations, records of quality for all acquired products.

Article 30. Ministries and central organs that have jurisdiction over units which execute products intended for nuclear objectives and installations, will formulate and apply acceptance procedures for these products, with the approval of CSEN.

When a single product is built by units belonging to several central organs, the applied acceptance procedure is the one formulated by the central organ which has jurisdiction over the producer of the final product.

Acceptance procedures will specify the content of acceptance documents, conditions for compulsory periodical re-examination of accepted products, and the composition of acceptance commissions, as a function of the category of installation, equipment, and instruments.

Article 31. Acceptance tests and tests of products intended for nuclear objectives and installations, are performed in laboratories equipped with appropriate test stands, belonging to the producing units or to specialized units.

Products of high technical complexity, important for the safety of installations, the protection of the population or the environment, or for the economic efficiency of nuclear objectives and installations, established through national regulations for quality assurance, will be tested both for acceptance and at delivery, in laboratories or test stands belonging to CSEN.

Article 32. Products intended for nuclear objectives and installations are received by commissions constituted for the purpose, which will also include representatives of quality assurance departments of contracting or executing units. The composition of the commissions is approved by the managements of contracting units.

Article 33. Commissions that receive products intended for nuclear objectives and installations, conduct their activities according to law, and monitor the existence and content of quality records stipulated by the present law for products being received.

C. Regarding Performance of Services

Article 34. Units which perform services intended for nuclear objectives and installations are responsible for the application of quality assurance programs to contracted services.

Article 35. Units authorized to perform services intended for nuclear objectives and installations will carry out the following activities only on the basis of written procedures:

- a) Formulate, verify, approve, distribute, use, store, and circulate all documents regarding quality assurance;
- b) Perform services;
- c) Calibrate or verify metrologically, mark and utilize means of measurement used in the performance of services, in accordance with metrologic requirements stipulated by law, indicating the expiration date of metrologic calibrations or standardizations.

Article 36. Units authorized to perform services will begin their contracted activities only after the necessary procedures, and plans for quality control, verifications, and tests have been formulated, examined, and approved according to the provisions of the present law.

Article 37. Units which perform services will formulate documents to accompany the operations performed, documents which they will record and keep in appropriate conditions, and copies of which will be turned over to the contracting units.

Units which administer nuclear objectives and installations, will keep in their archives throughout the existence of these objectives and installations, records of quality for all services performed.

Article 38. Services intended for nuclear objectives and installations are received by commissions constituted for the purpose, which will also include representatives of quality assurance departments of contracting or executing units. The composition of the commissions is approved by the managements of contracting units.

Article 39. Commissions that receive services intended for nuclear objectives and installations, conduct their activities according to law, and monitor the existence and content of quality records stipulated by the present law for services being received.

D. Regarding Construction-Assembly Projects

Article 40. Units which perform construction-assembly projects intended for nuclear objectives and installations are responsible for the application of quality assurance programs for the projects that they execute at these objectives and installations.

Article 41. Authorized units will begin the execution of any construction-assembly project only after the necessary procedures, and plans for quality control, verifications, and tests for these projects have been formulated, examined, and approved according to the provisions of the present law.

Article 42. Units which execute projects for nuclear objectives and installations will carry out the following activities only on the basis of written procedures:

- a) Formulate, verify, approve, distribute, use, store, and circulate all documents regarding quality assurance;
- b) Calibrate or verify metrologically, mark and utilize means of measurement used in the execution of projects, quality control, and product or service testing, in accordance with metrologic requirements provided by law, indicating the expiration date of metrologic calibrations or standardizations;
- c) Execute construction-assembly projects;
- d) Heat treat, weld, braze, execute non-destructive tests, clean, cover surfaces, and perform other special processes which must be implemented under controlled conditions;
- e) Identify and mark products;
- f) Handle and store purchased products and products made available by contracting units;

g) Distinctly mark products that do not comply with quality assurance requirements, preserve them in the state in which they were found not to comply, store them separately, and repair or reject them, as the case may be.

Article 43. Welding, heat treatments, and other special processes for nuclear objectives and installations, will be performed by qualified or authorized and periodically checked personnel, as the case may be, and only after acceptance of these special processes according to the specifications of standards, regulations, or technical execution documents.

Article 44. Causes of any nature that prejudice quality, such as deviations from specified tolerances, use of unsuitable materials, defective executions, and any other similar shortcomings, will be identified and reported directly to managements of executing units, so that they may take corrective steps and prevent their recurrence.

Article 45. Units which execute construction-assembly projects for nuclear objectives and installations, will accompany the projects throughout their execution, with up-to-date documents indicating at all times the phases of execution, operations, quality controls, verifications, and tests undergone by the projects.

Article 46. Documents authorizing subcontractors, results of quality controls, verifications, and tests, reports written after the performance of technical examinations and inspections of quality assurance performed at executing units and subcontractors, as well as any other similar documents which attest the fulfillment of quality assurance requirements throughout the execution of projects, will be recorded and kept under appropriate conditions, and copies of them will be turned over to contracting units upon approval of payment.

Contracting units for nuclear objectives and installations, must keep in their archives throughout the existence of these objectives and installations, records of quality for all construction-assembly projects contracted with executing units.

Article 47. Receiving commissions for nuclear objectives and installations are designated according to law.

The commissions will include representatives from the State Inspectorate for Control of Nuclear Activities and for Assuring Nuclear Quality (ISCANACN), as well as from the quality assurance departments of contracting units.

Article 48. Receiving commissions for nuclear objectives and installations, conduct their activities according to the functions stipulated by law, and monitor the existence and content of quality records stipulated by the present law for the respective nuclear objectives and installations.

E. Regarding the Start-up, Exploitation, Maintenance, Repair, and Shut-down of Nuclear Objectives and Installations

Article 49. Units which administer nuclear objectives and installations will perform the following activities only on the basis of written procedures:

- a) Work associated with start-up, exploitation, maintenance, repair, and shut-down;
- b) Metrologic calibration or verification, marking and utilization of means of measurement used in the start-up, exploitation, maintenance, repair, and shut-down of nuclear objectives and installations, according with metrologic requirements stipulated by law, indicating the expiration date of the validity of metrologic calibrations or verifications;
- c) Periodic tests and monitoring of equipment in nuclear objectives and installations;
- d) Cleaning and decontamination of systems and constructions;
- e) Identification and marking of equipment in nuclear objectives and installations;
- f) Handling, storage, and transportation of products used in the start-up, exploitation, maintenance, repair, and shut-down of nuclear objectives and installations;
- g) Supervision of activities involved in the start-up, exploitation, maintenance, repair, and shut-down of nuclear objectives and installations;
- h) Application to their own activities, of corrective actions resulting from technical examinations of quality assurance.

Article 50. Units which administer nuclear objectives and installations will maintain in their archives all quality-related documents accumulated during the construction and operation of the objectives and installations, until these objectives and installations are shut-down.

F. Regarding Other Phases and Operations

Article 51. Products intended for nuclear objectives and installations are handled, transported, and stored on the basis of written procedures, and are performed only by personnel that is qualified, specially instructed, and supplied with adequate means and equipment. The dropping, overturning, tumbling, and other unexpected events that may occur to these products during their handling, transportation, and storage, must be recorded, and necessary additional quality controls, tests, and verifications, as the case may be, must be performed in accordance with written procedures. These will immediately be brought to the attention of supplying or contracting units for the adoption of appropriate measures.

Article 52. When units which execute products or perform services receive from contracting units products intended for the completion of their contractual obligations, they will ensure the handling, transportation, and storage of these products under appropriate conditions, on the basis of written procedures.

Article 53. Depending on the requirements for quality assurance of nuclear objectives and installations during construction and exploitation, or of products and services intended for these objectives and installations at various stages of completion, organs with appropriate jurisdictions can limit or temporarily suspend over an appropriate area, the access of other categories of persons than those involved either in the activities mentioned above, or in actions of inspection of quality assurance as provided by law. Depending on circumstances, the limitation or suspension of access is assured by the personnel of supplier or contracting units, or by specially instructed personnel from public organs.

Chapter IV. Quality Control of Nuclear Objectives and Installations

Article 54. Personnel in separate departments and collectives for technical quality control in units which execute products and services, as well as in construction-assembly projects for nuclear objectives and installations, have the following obligations and responsibilities:

- a) Verify the quality of raw and other materials, parts, and subassemblies being supplied or introduced in fabrication, the adjustment and precision of means of measurement and control, as well as strict compliance with quality regulations in the packing and shipping of products;
- b) Perform technical quality control operations at all phases of fabrication, and on finished products;
- c) Reject products with quality defects;
- d) Request cessation of fabrication and stop the delivery of products of inadequate quality.

Article 55. ISCANACN fulfills its functions of inspection of quality assurance activities through its own personnel or through highly qualified specialists delegated from other units, and empowered for the purpose by ISCANACN.

Following the performance of technical examinations or inspections, inspectors or those empowered by ISCANACN, as well as the personnel of quality assurance departments or collectives will write inspection reports which include their findings, measurements, and the conditions under which they were made.

Article 56. Units subject to inspection must:

- a) Present to inspectors or those empowered by ISCANACN, papers, documents, and all information associated with the application of quality assurance programs;

- b) Designate a representative of the unit's management who will be present during the performance of the inspection;
- c) Assure appropriate working conditions to fulfill the objective of inspections;
- d) Conform exactly to the indications of inspection organs resulting from the inspection actions undertaken.

Chapter V. Tasks of Scientific Research and Technical Engineering in Ensuring the Quality of Nuclear Objectives and Installations

Article 57. The National Council for Science and Technology (CNST) will take measures so that institutes for scientific research and technical engineering will assign priority, both in areas of activity and in setting completion deadlines, to research associated with nuclear objectives and installations or their component parts, or to products and services intended for nuclear objectives and installations, and will also supervise quality assurance for these activities.

Article 58. Units for scientific research and technical engineering have the following obligations and responsibilities:

- a) Adopt modern solutions at the level of the most recent progress of science and technology in Romania and abroad, to solve product and technology research problems arising in design, execution of products and services, construction-assembly projects, and exploitation of nuclear objectives and installations, for conditions of safety and economic efficiency;
- b) Formulate methods of technical quality control, verification, and testing, appropriate for demonstrating the fulfillment of project requirements throughout the execution of products and services, construction-assembly projects, and the exploitation of nuclear objectives and installations.

Article 59. Units authorized to conduct scientific research and technical engineering activities for nuclear objectives and installations, will perform the following activities only on the basis of written procedures:

- a) Calibrate or verify metrologically, mark and utilize means of measurement used in research, according with metrologic requirements stipulated by law, indicating the expiration date of metrologic calibrations or verifications;
- b) Carry out standard procedures in taking and preparing samples for measurement, and in performing these measurements;
- c) Identify and mark samples;
- d) Record and maintain research results.

Article 60. Research projects are begun only after institutes, with the approval of contracting units, have formulated quality assurance programs for the lifetime of the research, in accordance with the data known at the beginning of the research.

Article 61. Research projects are considered complete only after their results are complemented with proposals generated by the results of the research, regarding the quality assurance programs that remain to be formulated by the units which apply the results of the research.

Article 62. Throughout the research projects or at their completion, institutes for scientific research and technical engineering will make concrete proposals for formulating or modifying standards, regulations, and instructions regarding quality assurance in the nuclear field.

Chapter VI. Obligations and Responsibilities

Article 63. CSEN has the following obligations and responsibilities in assuring the quality of nuclear objectives and installations:

- a) Together with ministries and other central organs which participate in the nuclear energy program, formulate regulations, standards, and instructions regarding quality assurance in the nuclear field, which are submitted for approval according to legal provisions;
- b) Authorize units which execute products or services in the nuclear field;
- c) Supervise the application of plans for quality control, verification, and testing in authorized units;
- d) Inspect the fabrication, design, construction, and assembly at compulsory control points established in plans for quality control, verification, and testing.

Article 64. Ministries and other central organs have the following obligations and responsibilities in ensuring the quality of nuclear objectives and installations:

- a) Take measures for the formulation of quality assurance programs on the part of units under their jurisdiction;
- b) In units under their jurisdiction, supervise the strict application of quality assurance programs in scientific research and technical engineering, design, execution of products and services, construction-assembly projects, and exploitation;
- c) Monitor the strict compliance with regulations, standards, and instructions regarding quality assurance in the nuclear field, as well as the fulfillment, on scheduled deadlines, and on the part of units under their jurisdiction, of measures established by inspection organs stipulated by law.

Ministries and other central organs with tasks resulting from the nuclear energy program, must report quarterly to the Council of Ministers, the fulfillment of quality assurance requirements in the activity of units under their jurisdiction.

Article 65. For the application of quality assurance programs by units under their jurisdiction, ministries, other central organs, and industrial centrals must:

- a) Organize within each unit, quality assurance departments or collectives, as well as separate technical quality control departments or collectives for products and services intended for nuclear objectives and installations;
- b) Provide all the necessary endowment for applying quality assurance programs;
- c) Train the personnel necessary for applying quality assurance programs, and organize periodic instruction and verification of the personnel's knowledge;
- d) Order the cessation of product and service execution if quality assurance programs are not respected.

Article 66. Quality assurance departments or collectives in contracting or executing units, with the guidance and supervision of the ISCANACN of CSEN, perform inspection functions and are responsible for quality assurance activities in their own units and at suppliers, for which purpose they:

- a) Verify the manner in which documents required for quality assurance programs are formulated;
- b) In accordance with provisions in quality assurance manuals, verify the degree of organization and training in the execution of products and services;
- c) Perform technical examinations for quality assurance or inspections of quality assurance in accordance with the provisions of plans for technical examinations and inspections;
- d) Inspect fabrication at compulsory control points;
- e) Confirm quality in the delivery of products and performance of services;
- f) Monitor the activity of persons, collectives, or departments which execute activities that determine quality assurance, and order the cessation of activities when they observe violations of provisions in quality assurance manuals;
- g) Propose the suspension or withdrawal of authorizations, under conditions provided by law, to organs that have issued the authorizations.

Article 67. Quality assurance departments or collectives, as well as separate quality control departments or collectives for products and services intended for nuclear objectives and installations, are under the jurisdiction of CSEN. Personnel for these departments or collectives is hired by units managers with approval from CSEN.

Changes in the functions of the personnel stipulated in the present article, and sanctioning of this personnel, is performed with the approval of CSEN.

Article 68. Executing units are responsible for the application of quality assurance programs in scientific research and technical engineering activities, design, execution of products and services, and construction-assembly projects.

Contracting units are responsible for the application of quality assurance programs for nuclear objectives and installations.

Contracting units can entrust to other authorized units projects for fulfilling any part of quality assurance programs for nuclear objectives and installations, without reducing in any way their own responsibilities.

Chapter VII. Sanctions

Article 69. Violations of the provisions of the present law result in material, civil, disciplinary, contraventional, or penal responsibility, depending on circumstances.

Article 70. Material damages resulting from the destruction or damage of nuclear objectives and installations, traceable to designers, producers, builders, assemblers, or any other units, as well as to persons who have participated in the construction or exploitation of nuclear objectives and installations, become their responsibility as a function of their guilt.

Article 71. Confirmation of quality by quality assurance departments or collectives of executing units, or by receiving commissions, does not remove the direct responsibility of those who have executed products or performed services.

Persons in quality assurance departments or collectives are responsible for the quality of products or services, together with those who have organized, managed, and performed the respective activities, each of them according to their functions and degrees of guilt.

Article 72. The following deeds constitute violations of the provisions of the present law, if they have not been committed under such conditions that they are considered as infractions according to penal law:

- a) Attempts to mislead personnel of ISCANACN, or erroneous reporting of data or documents regarding quality assurance in the nuclear field;
- b) Failure to fulfill within established deadlines, the stipulations contained in reports of inspections of quality assurance;

- c) Failure to perform formalities for obtaining approvals stipulated by law for contracts for imported products or services;
- d) Failure to specify in contracts, the fact that contracted products or services are subject to the provisions of the present law, or to close contracts without first verifying the existence and validity of authorizations of executing units;
- e) The formulation of documents included in quality assurance programs without complying with the approvals of contracting units and the observations of ISCANACN;
- f) Any violations of the provisions of quality assurance manuals, of procedures for execution, quality control and quality assurance, as well as of plans for quality control, verification, and testing;
- g) Failure to perform formalities for notification and approval for all necessary procedures, and for plans for quality control, verification, and testing;
- h) The utilization of personnel which is not properly trained for the activities it performs, or of personnel which has not been checked or has been rejected in periodic examinations;
- i) Failure to fulfill the measures necessary for providing facilities for quality control, verifications, and testing;
- j) Failure to provide conditions for proper maintenance of quality assurance documents and counter-tests.

Violations stipulated in letters (a) through (d) are sanctioned with fines of 3000 to 10,000 lei, and those in letters (e) through (j) with fines of 1000 to 3000 lei.

Article 73. Determination of violations and application of sanctions is performed by personnel with supervision functions stipulated in article 55.

Appeals against violation determination reports can be made within 15 days from the date of their communication.

Appeals are submitted to CSEN and are accompanied by a copy of violation determination reports.

Article 74. The provisions of Law No 32/1968, regarding the determination and sanctioning of violations, apply to the violations stipulated in article 72.

Chapter VIII. Final Provisions

Article 75. Specific quality requirements for products and services intended for nuclear objectives and installations, are established by national quality assurance regulations, formulated or approved by CSEN, and are compulsory for all ministries and other central organs, as well as for all units which execute or contract for such products or services.

National regulations for quality assurance in the nuclear field will also establish criteria for levels of classification in construction, and in systems and components for nuclear objectives and installations, as a function of their importance to the safety of installations, the protection of the population and environment, as well as for the economic efficiency of nuclear objectives.

Article 76. Ministries and other central organs, as well as industrial centrals, which have tasks or responsibilities in the implementation of nuclear objectives and installations, will formulate specific technical standards of time necessary for the execution of products and services intended for nuclear objectives and installations, as well as for the performance of activities regarding quality assurance in these projects.

Article 77. The organizational structure of quality assurance departments in the nuclear field, specific functions and pay scales for personnel in these departments, are established by decree of the Council of State.

Article 78. Appendices 1 and 2 form an integral part of the present law.

Article 79. The present law becomes effective 60 days from the date of its publication in BULETINUL OFICIAL OF THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC ROMANIA.

This law was adopted by the Grand National Assembly session of 12 November 1982.

Chairman of the Grand National Assembly,
Nicolae Giosan
Bucharest, 12 November 1982
No 6

Appendix 1. Products and Services Intended for Nuclear Objectives and Installations

1. Products executed on the basis of technical documentation made available by contracting units, ordered for utilization or inclusion in nuclear objectives and installations:

- a) Materials;
- b) Semifinished products;
- c) Stock items;
- d) Subassemblies;
- e) Components;
- f) Equipment;
- g) Subsystems;
- h) Systems;
- i) Constructions.

Products executed on the basis of catalogs and used as such in building nuclear objectives and installations are not considered as products intended for these objectives and installations.

2. Services performed on orders from contracting units for executing products described in item 1 paragraph 1.

- a) Design;
- b) Supply;
- c) Distribution;
- d) Import-export;
- e) Transportation;
- f) Storage.

3. Services performed on orders from contracting units in the building and exploitation of nuclear objectives and installations:

- a) Services stipulated in item 2;
- b) Consultation;
- c) Technical assistance;
- d) Personnel training;
- e) Construction;
- f) Assembly;
- g) Start-up;
- h) Exploitation;
- i) Maintenance;
- j) Current and capital repair;
- k) Shut-down.

Appendix 2. Contents of Quality Assurance Programs, and of Plans for Technical Examination and Inspection

I. Quality Assurance Programs

Quality assurance programs include the following documents:

1. Quality assurance manual: document which presents the concept of quality assurance in the units which executes products or performs services intended for nuclear objectives and installations, and which contains:

- a) Organizational measures specific to the unit, for the purpose of fulfilling the quality assurance requirements stipulated in the present law, for categories of products or services in its activity profile;
- b) Procedure for periodic updating of the quality assurance manual;
- c) Procedure for formulating a plan for quality control, verifications, and tests stipulated in item 3;
- d) Procedure for technical examinations of quality assurance stipulated in item II, 1;
- e) List of other quality assurance procedures stipulated in item 2, with a definition of the role these play in the quality assurance program, as well as of the manner in which they are applied.

2. Written quality assurance procedures: documents according to which are executed all production, functional, quality control, verification, testing, and acceptance activities, as well as quality assurance activities stipulated in the present law.

3. Plan for quality control, verifications, and tests: document which enumerates and describes all necessary quality controls, verifications, and tests, by phases of execution and at final points, for a product or service.

II. Plans for Technical Examinations and Inspections

Plans for technical examinations and inspections represent documents used to plan the supervision of quality assurance activities in one's own activity as well as in the activities of suppliers of products and services.

The supervision consists of:

1. Technical examination of quality assurance: a monitoring action performed periodically, analyzing the efficiency of quality assurance activities; technical examination is performed by the executing unit as part of its production process, by contracting units on executing units, or by ISCANACN on all authorized units.

2. Inspection of quality assurance: a monitoring action performed unexpectedly or at predetermined physical stages; the inspection is performed by executing units as part of their production process, by contracting units on executing units, or by ISCANACN on all authorized units.

11,023

CSO: 2700/61

ROMANIA

EFFORTS TO STOP DEPORTATION OF JEWS RECALLED

Bucharest FLACARA in Romanian 12 Nov 82 p 17

[Article by Emanuel Kinsbruner]

[Text] In mid-August 1942, SS Hauptsturmfuhrer Gustav Richter, head of the Jewish section of the Hitlerist German Legation in Bucharest, instructed Radu Lecca, representative of the government and general commissar for Jewish problems in Romania, to deport around 40,000 Jews. Entering into this category were Jews which lived in immediate proximity to the Romanian-Hungarian border of that time, which was unjust and temporary: Arad, Brasov, Beius, Sibiu, Medias, Timisoara and Turda.

This diabolical plan was initiated by Dr A. A. Tester, an important member of the Gestapo, who had great influence on the Antonescu government and the legation of the German Reich.

This deportation plan caused general panic among the Jewish population, particularly the rumors that these transports of deported persons from Transylvania and Banat would be sent through Hungary into the extermination and gas camps at Auschwitz, Buchenwald, Birkenau and Bergen Belsen.

Despite the steps taken by the Jewish leaders in Bucharest intervening with Gen C. Z. Vasiliu (Picky), minister of the interior, a conscientious performer for the German Reich, they could not be convinced to change this hateful decision to deport the Jews. In order to thwart the evil action, in full course of being carried out, on the Hill of the Metropolitan Seat I waited for Metropolitan Balan of Transylvania, who had come from Paltinis to a meeting in Bucharest. I presented Metropolitan Balan with the dramatic situation of these innocent people; the metropolitan promised that he would support this action, that is, prevent the deportation of the Jews.

I also told him that the next political argument could convince Marshal Antonescu to renounce these deportations: the fact that the Romanians did not need agitation at the Hungarian border. The Metropolitan agreed, went to Marshal Ion Antonescu and presented this argument which, it seems, was decisive: the deportation of Jews from Transylvania and Banat should be definitely halted on 11 October 1942.

So the Hitlerist plans to deport innocent people from Transylvania to the camps of Hitlerist Germany met "unforeseen" difficulties: on 13 August 1942, a conference was held in Berlin at the security police headquarters (S.D.), Sicherheitsdienst, in which Radu Lecca and Gustav Richter, hauptsturmfuhrer and head of the Gestapo in Romania, participated. At this conference it was decided to concentrate the Jews from Romania in the zone of the city of Adjud, from where they were to be sent in

lots of 2,000 along the Plöiesti-Cernauti line every two days to the extermination camps in Belzec, Poland.

On the order of Gustav Richter, Radu Lecca, representative for Jewish problems, among other evil instructions, also receives the one of making contact with the leadership organs of the Romanian Railroads to obtain the necessary railroad cars by a fixed date to deport the Jews from Romania, as written in the newspaper BUKARESTER TAGEBLATT, semi-official organ of the German Legation, in No 4700/8 August 1942.

On the basis of order of the chairman of the Council of Ministers No 9283/1942 of 24 and 31 July 1942, the minister of internal affairs orders the evacuation of all those suspected of being hostile to the regime from all over the country and their internment in the Vapniarca camp. For this purpose, the order was given to place at their disposal (starting on 20 August) the freight cars needed for this transport, with the boarding station being Bucharest freight station.

On 19 August 1942, the railroad general directorate, through Eng Constantin Paunescu, along with whom we intervened, answered the ministry of the interior that no cars were available yet for this transport on that date. But in October it was communicated that besides normal transports, the transporting of the potato and grain harvest was in full swing as well as supply of wood for the population, a fact which meant that this order could not be executed for the time being.

" Tuesday, 13 October 1942, the Council of Ministers under the chairmanship of Mihai Antonescu, the vice chairman of the council, with the participation of all government members, together with Al. Ottulescu, governor of the National Bank, Gen C. Voiculescu, government of Bucovina, Gh. Alexianu, governor of Transnistria and Gen C. Z. Vasiliu, subsecretary of state in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, was forced to meet again to examine the situation created and to discuss the new evacuation system.

" Council was concerned with the matter of the deportations.

"Mihai Antonescu showed need for matters in this area to proceed with perfect order, with organs and functionaries specifically instructed, who would bear responsibility for executing the orders, after which he showed the need for creating a special organ which would be concerned with these problems. Until the creation of it no measure of this order is to be taken" (TIMPUL, No 1954/16 October 1942).

As a result of these facts, in light of the development of events, the chairman of the Council of Ministers on 27 October 1942 is forced to give up the deportations (TIMPUL, No 1967/ 30 October 1942).

Those interned in the Vapniarca camp were interned in December 1942 in Grosolovo on the banks of the Nistru, where many of them became sick and paralyzed due to the misery and being fed fodder peas.

At the start of 1943, the pressures and interventions of the forces of illegality succeeded in having a portion of them brought back into the country.

So that the deportees would be treated more humanely, the General Directorate of the Romanian Railroads placed the following resolution upon our request: "They are to disembark in Tirgu Jiu." So the prisoners successfully did not have to go once again through the barbarous channel of the general security and the police.

What is more, upon our intervention with Eng C. Paunescu, a good friend of my father's even in Cernauti, the General Directorate of the Romanian Railroads requested a number of Jews for the circle of recruiting in Bucharest in order to provide obligatory work for the railroads. Through the "financial service," which operated in the Carpati Building, they were sent to obligatory work as office workers. But here they received a pay which was equal to and in no way different from the other railroad workers. Although the government dispositions were strict: all Jews must do obligatory work absolutely for free. At the same time, in many cities of Romania scenes could be seen where Jews taken to obligatory work to clean the snow were greeted with tea and bread and even food.

That is how an extraordinary act could take place in Romania: while throughout Europe Jews and other innocent people were being exterminated, in Romania a compact mass of Jews could remain alive.

A solution to this historical enigma was sought for a long time. There is just one answer: failure in the actions to oppress the Jews is due to the fact that the Antonescu regime unexpectedly met up with the resistance of the masses and a large majority of intellectuals who were not associated with the Iron Guard but who were opposed to the abuses and outrages, at the price of great risk and sometimes at the risk of their lives. The working masses, led by the Romanian Communist Party, did not allow themselves to be intimidated by the fascist barbarities. In this way the broad humanitarian sentiments of the Romanian people could effectively be demonstrated.

8071

CSO: 2700/46

SOVIET BEHAVIOR AT 1946-47 PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE CRITICIZED

Bucharest ANALE DE ISTORIE in Romanian No 6, Nov-Dec 82 pp 124-131

[Article by Eliza Campus]

[Text] The Paris peace conference--as fully proven by its documents¹--did not have the mission of working out peace treaties with Italy, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland but merely of making recommendations to the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the big powers, a council which already had published the draft treaties.²

On 29 July 1946, when the conference work opened in Paris, the participants--delegates from China, France, Great Britain, the United States, the USSR as well as other delegates³--knew that the discussions would have to have a strictly limited nature, a fact which also was seen in the regulation for operation, or organization and procedure for the conference. An investigation of these documents, no matter how cursory it is, for example, shows that the five commissions which were to be concerned with Italy, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland merely had the task of examining the political and territorial clauses of the treaties and, if needed, requesting advice from the representatives of the country with which these treaties were to be concluded and which, in conformity with Part III of the regulations, were participating just as invited guests. The two commissions concerned with the treaties' economic clauses as well as the military and legal commissions also had a similar statute. So all these commissions had to present their observations as recommendations, which the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs could or could not take into consideration.

It is worth bringing out the climate in which the conference took place, one in which visible contradictions appeared from the start between the United States and the Soviet Union. So the then U.S. president, Harry S. Truman, as seen in his memoirs,⁴

1. Stefan Lache, Gheorghe Tutui, "Romania and the 1946 Paris Peace Conference," Dacia Publishers, Cluj-Napoca, 1978; Eliza Campus, "La Roumanie et le Conference de la Paix de Paris (1946-1947)," in REVUE ROUMAINE D'HISTOIRE, No 1/1978.
2. Draft peace treaties were worked out by Gladwyn Jebb (Great Britain), James Dunn (United States), A. I. Vishinskiy and Gusev (USSR), Roger Couve de Murville (France).
3. Australia, Belgium, Byelorussia, Brazil, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, Greece, India, Yugoslavia, Norway, New Zealand, Netherlands, Poland, Ukraine, Union of South Africa.
4. Harry S. Truman, "Years of Decisions," New York, 1955.

even by 5 January 1946 demanded that James F. Byrnes, secretary of state, be absolutely intransigent toward V. M. Molotov, USSR foreign minister. This is also emphasized in a certain way by the Soviet dignitary who, in one of his works,* points out that in previous meetings the decisions had been made in an atmosphere of friendly agreement and mutual understanding, while now a tendency of breaking up this state of affairs was found. Also referring to the amendment proposed by Great Britain and supported by the United States and adopted by the conference, the amendment according to which the vote could be exercised by a simple majority while the conference work was going on, V. M. Molotov stated that the USSR considered the British amendment unacceptable, since it actually cancelled out the decisions of the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs. These significant facts and still others of a similar nature, in our opinion, also represented the first steps toward the cold war, toward establishing zones of influence.

Together with these serious contradictions among the big powers, the contradictions also were forcefully demonstrated between them and the small and medium-sized allied states, states which had fought within the anti-Hitlerist coalition. So, when James F. Byrnes stated at the second plenary session of the conference that it would be impossible to apply the peace treaties which established borders and basically decided the fate of the colonies if they were not accepted by the main big powers, the retort of the small and medium-sized states was particularly sharp. Australia's representative showed that even in December 1945 the big powers signed in Moscow an agreement referring to the right of the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs to make a final review of the peace conference recommendations, thus giving this council the rights which the Potsdam Conference of August 1945 had not given it. The Netherlands' representative went even further, stressing that the small countries were opposed both to the procedure through which the big powers imposed their will on other states as well as the thesis according to which they could attribute the monopoly of wisdom in the area of international relations. P. H. Spaak, Belgium's delegate, examining the situation created by the big powers realistically, also stated with all determination that if the commissions' recommendations were not going to be taken into consideration then the entire fabric of the procedure would be destroyed and then it would be totally useless to continue a conference which everyone could look at in such a case as a comedy without grandeur and without need.

In such a spirit, the speech by Edvard Kardelj, Yugoslavia's delegate, was particularly significant; in pointing out certain incipient elements resulting from the trends of the big powers to create spheres of influence and exercise economic and political pressures, he demanded that the conference actually learn lessons from the immediate past, that is, from the tragic events of the temporary domination exercised by the Nazis. As a result, the Yugoslav statesman stressed, the peace conference would have to take action taking into account that only the nations upon whom economic or political pressures are not exerted as well as unwarranted interference in their internal affairs were the nations which were truly free. In light of these ideas, E. Kardelj stated, the conference had to know that it would not be able to take any decision on Yugoslavia without having its complete agreement.

Against the background of this climate, the speech delivered by V. M. Molotov at the plenary session of 31 July 1946, a speech also approved by the other big powers,

* See V. M. Molotov, "Problems of Foreign Policy. Speeches and Statements, April 1945-June 1948," State Publishers, Bucharest, 1951.

undeniably aggravated the situation. The USSR foreign minister pointed out that the states which were allies with Germany during the war of aggression had to answer for all the crimes committed by their leading circles. Although to some extent he softened his thesis, adding that the states which later had joined the United Nations coalition would not fully pay for the losses they caused, still the idea with all its consequences fell heavy. Just as heavy was the resolution of 9 August 1946 which contained A. I. Vishinsky's thesis on inviting to the conference the states with whom peace treaties had been concluded. This thesis, also agreed upon by the other big powers, extremely limited these states' right to a reply, with its specifying that the representatives of Italy, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Finland would not participate permanently in the peace conference's work. As provided in the resolution, they would come when invited in order to express their hopes and viewpoints, but they would not take part in the discussions.

Under such circumstances, the Romanian delegation on 13 August 1946 presented its points of view, after which the important memoriums and documents had been presented at the conference table.*

Romania was convinced that, following the heroics and unanimously recognized acts during the anti-Hitlerist war, after northern Transylvania had been liberated, then actually collaborating in the liberation of Hungary and Czechoslovakia, the legal rights to northern Transylvania as well as status as a cobelligerent country would be recognized.

The statement of the Romanian delegation, presented by Gh. Tatarescu, expressed satisfaction with the content of Articles I and II of the draft peace treaty, articles which declared as null and void the arbitrary sentence of Vienna of 30 August 1940 and which established the Romanian-Hungarian border along the line existing on 30 January 1938.

Later referring to the other portions of the draft peace treaty, Gh. Tatarescu brought out not only the regret but also the astonishment of the Romanian government, which found that there was no mention in this document of the status of Romania as a cobelligerent state. The Romanian people, he pointed out in his statement, felt that the military and economic effort they made in the last phase of the war gave them in full the right to claim such a status. Especially since Romania entered the war on 24 August 1944 (actually, on 23 August 1944), a fact also stipulated in Article I of the Armistice Convention and not on 12 September 1944, as was written in the preamble to the peace treaty.

For that reason, the statement stressed, Romania's status as a belligerent with Germany and Hungary was not a consequence of the armistice convention signed on 12 September 1944, but rather the effect of the royal proclamation and government declaration of 23 August 1944, with both documents representing the sentiments and will of

* "Memoire sur l'effort Militaire et Economique de la Roumanie dans la Guerre Contre l'Allemagne et la Hongrie," Imprimerie d'Etat, Bucharest, 1946; "Memoire sur la Transylvanie," Imprimerie d'Etat, Bucharest, 1946; "Memoire sur les Reparations que la Roumanie demande a la Hongrie," Imprimerie d'Etat, Bucharest, 1946; "Memoire Concernant Differentes Dispositions a Insérer dans le Traite avec la Hongrie," Imprimerie d'Etat, Bucharest, 1946; "La Roumanie devant la Conference de Paix," Imprimerie Federative S. A. Berne, Paris, July 1946.

all the Romanian people. It also pointed out that Romania entered the war in August 1944 not only against Nazi Germany but also against Horthyist Hungary and that it also fought against the Hungarian fascist forces following the armistice concluded with the United Nations by the Hungarian provisional government on 20 January 1945.

At the same time, observing that the principle of full equality between the large and small states did not operate in the draft treaty, Gh. Tatarescu pointed out that, differing from Italy whose right as a cobelligerent state was recognized, Romania did not capitulate unconditionally but rather, on the contrary, entered the war even in August 1944 against the Third Reich.

Discussions surrounding Romania's right as a cobelligerent, in conformity with the regulations for operation of the conference, were carried on within the territorial and political commission,* presided over on 27 August 1946 by Dimitri Manuilski (Ukraine). So Romania's requests were brought into discussion and they were as follows: consideration of the date of 24 August 1944 as the precise point of its entry into the war, not 12 September 1944, the day the armistice was signed; establishing the fact that Romania entered the war not only against Nazi Germany but also against Horthyist Hungary.

The documents on the territorial commission's activity prove that two member states, the Ukraine and Czechoslovakia, supported Romania's legitimate requests, formulating them as amendments to the draft peace treaty. Only the Ukrainian delegate N. Petrovski, although he brought out the sacrifices and important contribution made by Romania in the war, requesting that it, like Italy, be given the right as a cobelligerent state, did not want to recognize the date of 24 August 1944 as the moment our country entered the anti-Hitlerist war. In exchange, Gen Heliodor Pika, Czechoslovakia's delegate, supported both of Romania's requests very warmly, in particular stressing the important contribution of the Romanian army to carrying out the last phase of the war successfully. At the same time, he expressed his people's recognition of the Romanian army's sacrifices to free Czechoslovakia, on whose land more than 20,000 Romanian soldiers heroically sacrificed their lives.

Despite the clear facts brought out in particular by the Czechoslovak delegate, the vote on the amendments resulted in four votes for--Byelorussia, France, Czechoslovakia and the Ukraine--and eight against (Australia, Canada, Great Britain, India, New Zealand, United States, USSR, Union of South Africa). With a two-thirds majority, the commission, as a result, decided not to recognize Romania's right as a cobelligerent state. From the start it is clear that the big powers had decided in advance not to recognize this right of Romania's. The minutes of the meeting fully show this situation only if we take the dissatisfaction expressed openly by France's representative, who was disturbed that he was not in the same position as the three other big powers and this was for the simple reason that he had not known their viewpoint. The injustice done to Romania undeniably bore the stigma of the dictatorial decision of the big powers. This was even visibly reflected in the speeches of some of the states which voted for. France's vote, as we have shown, was full of reservations. Byelorussia and the Ukraine, republics comprising part of the USSR, could not help but take into account the negative position of the Soviet government. The Ukraine's representative, although he recognized Romania's right to cobelligerency,

* Twelve states were represented: Australia, Byelorussia, Canada, Czechoslovakia, France, India, Great Britain, New Zealand, United States, Ukraine, Soviet Union, Union of South Africa.

diminished it actually when he was not in agreement with the real date of our country's entry into the anti-Hitlerist war. Yet, the vote for cobelligerency expressed by the two Soviet republics, we are convinced, had a moral value, since it expressed the value recognized officially by the Soviet High Command placed on the acts of the Romanians. Voting in favor, the two delegates, of Byelorussia and the Ukraine, basically were expressing a real state of spirit of the masses of soldiers who had fought shoulder to shoulder with the Romanian soldiers. However, if we examine these votes in favor in a strictly diplomatic view, then, of course, the dimensions of them are reduced to well-known red-tape procedures continually used by the big powers at international meetings for the purpose of publically showing that they are not exercising pressure and are not seeking to influence the opinions of their partners.

The only vote in favor which was expressed with sincerity, warmth and conviction remains the vote of Czechoslovakia which also continued to support Romania's right to cobelligerency in the conference's military commission, also.

So Romania suffered serious damage following this decision, damage also seen in the document entitled "Observations presentees par le Gouvernement Roumain sur le Projet de Traite de Paix avec la Roumanie," presented to the conference on 26 August 1946. For example it shows that a grave consequence of the failure to recognize the right to cobelligerent status was caused by the content of Article 8 of the draft peace treaty, which stipulated that a peace treaty would not exist between Romania and Hungary despite the common struggle of the Romanian army alongside the allied armies against Horthyist Hungary. Romania, as was natural, protested, showing the totally unprecedented nature of such a procedure, unprecedented in the practice of international relations, since it was not possible to conceive that peace between two states would be established by a procedure to which neither of the sides was to agree formally. As a result, the Romanian government proposed that a special protocol be concluded between Romania and Hungary, a protocol which would be signed on the same day as the peace treaty, a procedure also used often in international practice. Such a protocol, however, implicitly would have represented a recognition of Romania's cobelligerency, that is, an actual historical situation, a situation which the big powers did not wish to accept. So Article 8 of the draft treaty remained unamended.

Of course, the Paris peace treaty, by regulating the country's northern border, gave Romania first-rate satisfaction by recognizing its legitimate rights to northern Transylvania, which basically meant recognition of the treaty of Trianon, also, concluded in 1920 by the allied powers with Hungary.

With regard to regulating the eastern border, the documents which have been at our disposal have shown that at the Paris peace conference Article 4 of the armistice convention of 12 September 1944 was taken into consideration--the one on the border between Romania and the USSR, an article which provided that it would be the one which had been established on 28 June 1940.

From what has been presented until now we see that both the draft as well as the peace treaty* accepted and signed by Romania had some positive parts but also many

* "Traite de Paix entre la Roumanie et les Puissances Alliees et Associees," Paris, 10 February 1947, Bud-harest, 1947.

negative parts, which the Romanian delegation stressed continually. We see an abundance of Romania's opinions, reservations and protests in the documents submitted to the conference table from minutes and some Romanian documents.*

As other small and medium-sized states, Romania wished that the peace treaty through its stipulations would bring real peace. However, such a peace could only be achieved if the United Nations would have been able to end the system of unilateral actions, spheres of influence and so forth--methods and means which had been used all through the ages and constantly failed. Referring in particular to the danger represented by zones of influence, one of the documents mentioned stressed that these zones deny the small states their free judge, that they maintain a climate of rivalry between the big powers, that this climate is favorable to hegemonistic purposes which were achieved by violating the right and always favored war. For that reason, Romania, as the other small and medium-sized states, as the document points out, wished to insure the security of each state, maintaining that if the fate of peace in certain zones were abandoned to a single power or a group of powers, then neither international security nor national security would be able to be insured. Undoubtedly, this viewpoint, generally valid and appreciated in particular by the small and medium-sized states, referred in particular to the climate of the conference, polluted by the continual contradictions between the two big powers, the USSR and the United States.

With regard to our country's actual interests, the statement of the Romanian delegation brought out a serious number of inequities, for example, connected with the economic clauses of the draft treaty, clauses which opened the gates for certain poisonous demands with incalculable and grave consequences for Romania. So the question is raised of why 30,000 of Romania's railroad cars, which had been used after 23 August 1944 in the interest of the allied nations, had been confiscated. Also, the question was posed of why Article 31 of the draft treaty directly hurt the national sovereignty of the Romanian state, demanding that it automatically give the clause of most favored nation to all the states making part of the anti-Hitlerist coalition. In such a situation, as shown in the memorandum entitled "The Military and Economic Effort of Romania in the War Against Germany and Hungary," any effort to reconstruct the country became illusory, since resources were getting smaller from one day to the next. At the same time, as observed by Dr Petru Groza in his statements on 12 August 1946, the introduction of the most favored nation clause in the peace treaty had no connection with the war which had barely ended. So inequity was abundantly clear. Part VI of the peace treaty--the economic clauses--included in Articles 24-35 many paragraphs which caused grave damage to Romania, who had to pay excessive damages. This state of facts also is seen in the government's statement of 8 February 1947, which pointed out that carrying out such duties would increase the overwhelming tasks pressing on the people's lives and would aggravate the country's economic situation, so powerfully shaken by the acts and effects of the war.

Inexplicable injustices also were found in the draft treaty's military clauses; as pointed out in the statement of the Romanian delegation, they involved even the idea of a penalization. For how could the clauses on disarming of the Romanian soldiers who had successfully fought in the anti-Hitlerist coalition be evaluated otherwise?

* "Statements Made by Dr Petru Groza" on 12 August 1946; "The Statement of the Romanian Government On the Occasion of the Signing of the Peace Treaty with the Allied and Associated Power," 8 February 1947.

The military commission also amended Article 15 in a similar manner; it prohibited Romania from holding, from manufacturing or from obtaining war materiel or military installations besides what was needed to maintain the military forces authorized by Article 11. At the same time, Romania was forbidden from possessing, manufacturing or experimenting with the atom bomb. The military commission, presided over by Brig General Mossor, also decided that the Romanian state should make available to the United States, USSR and Great Britain all surplus war materiel. Then later, in conformity with this commission's recommendations, the three big powers would give the materiel sent by Romania to that state from which it had captured war materiel during the big conflagration. Despite the justified protests of the Romanian delegation, part III of the peace treaty--the military, naval and air clauses--comprising Articles 11-20, contains provisions of inexplicable harshness, given the important contribution of the Romanian army to the success of the fighting in the years 1944-1945.

The statement of the Romanian delegation also protested Article 7 of the draft treaty, which could cause grave damage to Romania's right to reparations. In this regard, presented among other documents to the conference also was the one entitled "Memoire sur les Reparations que la Roumanie Demande a la Hongrie" (Bucharest, 1946), showing in detail the losses suffered by the country and its citizens both in 1940-1944, the years of the Hungarian occupation of northern Transylvania, as well as the military reparations owed by Hungary in the war of 1944-1945. We see from the statement of the Romanian government presented to the peace conference on 8 February 1947 that account was not taken of Romania's just demands, since Articles 22 and 23 in Part V of the peace treaty--reparations and repayments--contained clauses seriously damaging our country. For example, the statement mentioned shows the unjust situation created for Romania, forced to give up utilizing even the debts due from Germany as well as the fact that it would not be paid back by this state for the damages suffered during the anti-Hitlerist war. What is more, through the treaty provisions Romania even lost some rights from the period in which it still was neutral.

Another matter, long a controversial one and one which brought clear damages to Romania's sovereignty, was that of the Danube. On 10 October 1946, the conference in plenary session devoted to the peace treaty with Romania brought up for discussion Article 34 of the draft, on freedom of navigation on the Danube. Paragraph 3 of this article demanded from Romania that the four big powers, along with the river states, should participate in the work of the future conference on the Danube. Imposing such a situation on Romania, which wronged its rights as a sovereign river state, at the same time a similar situation was being created for all the other river states. This fact brought a vehement protest from Edvard Kardelj, Yugoslavia's delegate. He decisively opposed this kind of pressure being placed on small and medium-sized states, in the name of the principle of free navigation on the big rivers. Then, referring to this principle, he delivered a truth which once again showed the state of spirit which dominated the conference. He emphasized that the principle of free navigation had been transformed into an imperialist political tool to the detriment of the small states, since the concept of an international river system immediately involved the matter referring to who holds the keys to this system. The truth is that basically a struggle for the Danube was being waged, declared the Yugoslav statesman. And he concluded that this conference has brought to light that the words about the equality of nations, about international collaboration, about democracy and freedom were hiding an antidemocratic procedure. Defending Romania's rights with all his force and, implicitly, those of Yugoslavia, Edvard Kardelj gave a cutting retort to the big powers.

The discussions about paragraph 3 resulted in positive results, since Part VII of the peace treaty with Romania--the clause relative to the Danube--did not contain in its single article (36) - one reference to the obligatory participation of the four big powers in the future conference on the Danube.

Whereas Romania accepted and signed the Paris peace treaty, despite all the damage and injustices brought to it, this is explained by the fact that the treaty recognized its legitimate rights to Transylvania. Also, as specified in their statement of the Romanian government of 8 February 1947, it wished to contribute without delay as a free and sovereign state to the postwar organization of the world in the spirit of the United Nations charter, for effective construction of peace and international collaboration.

8071

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'PRAXIS' PROFESSOR DISCUSSES CRISIS OF YUGOSLAV SOCIETY

Belgrade SOCIOLOGIJA in Serbo-Croatian Nos 2-3, Apr-Sep 82 pp 323-331

[Article by Zagorka Golubovic, of the Institute of Social Sciences, Belgrade: "Crisis of Yugoslav Society: The Nature of the Crisis and Its Roots"]

[Excerpts] One proceeds from two basic assumptions:

1) It is necessary to establish what the crisis is. In other words whether the crisis was produced by special [economic] conditions or by long-term unresolved contradictions of the system; is this a crisis related to the growth of self-management society or a crisis of the existing system of self-management?

2) It is necessary to establish the roots of the crisis. I believe it can be done by using the Marxist historical and critical approach....

In connection with this one must ask: Why do Yugoslav sociology, economics, and other social sciences not offer an insight into the examination of conditions under which present Yugoslav society is developing, although a number of partial analyses do exist which point to the basic problems? Linked to this is also the question of the manner in which postwar Yugoslav history (especially the history of self-management) has been treated.

An historical analysis would have to be directed toward re-examining, of course, the most decisive period in postwar Yugoslav history, 1948, and asking: Has Yugoslavia, in settling accounts with Stalinism, critically examined its own past?

First thesis: In its nature the crisis of Yugoslav society is a crisis of an incoherent system produced by long-standing unresolved basic contradictions:

a) One can proceed from the contradiction arising from the discord between ideological concept and the policy as it operates in practice.

Self-management, as a radically different model of socialism than authoritarian state socialism, requires the satisfaction of certain basic assumptions to bring the project to fulfillment. It is a question of the self-organization of society which assumes that social movement arises from below....

When self-management is reduced to an institutional form which appears in the form of an elementary mechanism (the workers' council) with elementary rights of self-management which can be practiced within an OUR (organization of associated labor), the development of the bases of a self-management society is not stimulated but, on the contrary, is prevented by eliminating the need to develop a mass social movement as the authentic base of self-management (direct democracy is reduced to an elementary level; by creating such quasi-self-management forms as the SIVs [self-management interest communities], self-organized forms are eliminated and institutionalization proliferates at the expense of democratization, and bureaucratic elements are strengthened; statistics on the growth of the administrative apparatus in the 1970's adequately show this),

b) The roots of the above contradictions should be sought in the nature of the political structure which belongs to the systems of East European states, although modified, and can be defined as a political system based on the a-priori authority of the LC which does not have to prove in practice that its policy takes precedence over others because its legitimacy does not arise from the results of practice but from defined goals (thus the disparity between goals and practice is not simply a question of practice lagging behind the system but is a basic question: about the justification of such a legitimizing of policy).

Second thesis: The roots of the crisis of self-management lie in the manner in which it arose; according to its concept it originated from below, [but in fact]...the state specifies the forms, scope, and limits of self-management and defines the rights and duties of self-management units, i.e., self-management is a matter of state decision, which is a contradiction in terms.

As a result, one insists on a decentralization of the centers of power instead of a democratization of administration. (Research indicates that the basic power is in the hands of state and para-state organs, including also enterprises, and hence decentralization does not represent automatically the democratization of administration [management]. At a meeting of the LCY Central Committee it was said that workers' influence on social reproduction and the distribution of income declined after the Law on Associated Labor was enacted....)

Because of the absence of an integral social movement and trade unions as the real representative of producers and other employed citizens, social control is carried out from above, (social control means here that control which is carried out by official representatives of the governing apparatus, instead of an organized society controlling the apparatus). [There is either this control] or there is no control in general because of the atomization of OURs. Self-management has thus found itself in a crevice between command and anarchy.

In such a way an organized working class (which is atomized) cannot achieve influence even in an enterprise because others decide the basic goals of society. One should ask: Is the problem of integrated self-management solved by the delegate system?

A much more open criticism of the Stalinist heritage is necessary in order to find a way out of the crisis of society. In this connection the task of sociologists is to critically re-examine the use of historical documents (on the nature of the system up to 1948, on the situation which casts light on how the break with Stalin came about; as well as the documents immediately after 1948 which show what solutions were originally sought; then documents which pertain to the introduction of self-management and which show when structural changes occurred and what was the nature of these changes, etc.).

It is necessary to study the ideological program documents and theoretical literature from the end of the 1940's and the beginning of the 1950's to establish how the concept of the specific Yugoslav road in socialism was formed.

An examination of this literature will necessarily raise the question: Was it possible to radically overcome Stalinism, without at the same time critically re-examining the inter-war and post-war history of Yugoslav society, because it has common roots. (However, the opposite tendency is noted, [it is said] that official criticism of Stalinism began before 1948 in order to prove that there is no need to re-examine one's own Stalinist past.) Such a re-examination, however, would contribute toward finding a way out of the existing crisis because the way out is to be found in uncovering and facing the contradictions of the system, and not in hushing them up.

What problems must be re-examined to find a way out of the present crisis? This relates, above all, to the question of the role of the party and the state in society....:

- 1) The prevailing concept offers a metaphysical understanding of the party, as the infallible possessor of "historical truth," as the only legitimate subject of history which represents the correct moral principles regardless of the actions and conduct of its members and leaders.

One speaks today about the party as about a mythological creature and thus essential questions are not raised.... Why can the question not be raised: What in fact does the existing LC organization represent? (statistics offer...an answer but the question is not asked); or Whose interest does it largely represent and in the name of what part of society does it exist? It would be entirely normal to study such questions as: the structure of the LC, the reasons for the steady decline in [the number of] workers since the 1960's, the question of the strata of society from which the leaders are recruited and in what way. One should critically examine the kind of compromise which it [the party] legalized with the introduction of self-management: one can speak about the division of the spheres of influence, [i.e., the influence given] to the actual governing which is done outside the sphere of the working class (one only needs to analyze the number of workers in basic governing organs and in the high levels of representative organs) and [the influence given] to limited self-management which is reduced to the OUR level to satisfy certain workers' aspirations. The question is whether the development of self-management is deepening this division or should it eliminate it?

One should openly ask whether the policy carried on by the LC is leading toward fulfilling workers' interests, especially solution of questions which are the highest in Europe), the steady decline in the living standard....

2) In program documents the withering away of the state is supported, but in practical policy the state is treated as the most important subject which establishes and limits self-management. Thus, one should ask: Is self-management an annex of the state, or is it a way toward withering away of the state? ...State intervention is ever more frequent, leading to restricting and suspending the already limited self-management rights (not only in the economy but also politically, for instance, intervention in the election of delegates by setting up "cadre lists," and in culture, where the introduction of Marxism as an obligatory subject in secondary and higher education, is the best example of state intervention).

All the forms of frequent intervention are explained as "guarding society," "preventing particularist egoism," and "defending self-management." One asks: If the state is in fact the only representative of the community of Yugoslav peoples and the defender of the idea of socialism, can such a society be maintained and does this society have a socialist future? (The future for the development of socialism supported by statism is well-known to us from the practice of the East European countries.)

An analysis of public opinion would have to offer an explanation of what the Yugoslav citizen experiences as socialism in our country and whether the values of socialism, or the values of a consumer society, are the dominant form of conduct. One would have to establish what is the main danger and obstacle to the development of socialism in Yugoslav society and whether the "enemy" is being sought in the right place: Does a developed critical view exist toward the aggressiveness of the value system of the consumer society, or is such a value orientation being stimulated by the institutionalization of a way of life...which favors egotism and competition, primary interest in personal income, the closing off of jobs, material values and prestige as measures of success, the disunity of the OURs, the fictional unity of society as a whole, etc.

It is also necessary to study the disparity between proclaimed and propagated values (between program declarations and the propaganda of daily policy), and the disparity between the scientific socialist values and the conduct of everyday life.

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NATIONALIST OUTBURSTS IN CROATIA DISCUSSED

Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian 21 Dec 82 pp 4-11

[Introduction, editorial, accounts by staff writers Vlatka Volaric and Jadranko Sinkovic, and statements by Damir Grubisa, director of the Center for Ideological and Theoretical Work of the Croatian LC Central Committee, and Vladimir Jovicic, distinguished sociopolitical figure and literary historian of Belgrade: "New Nationalistic Masks"]

[Text] [Introduction]

Many lines have been written in past days about nationalism, about its ever greater presence, about its diverse manifestations, but also about the destructive changes which it carries with it for the equal and harmonious development of self-managing socialist Yugoslavia. And as is usually the case in such and similar situations, we have been deluged with numerous and increasingly frequent questions, some sincere and some less sincere, some sober, but some also exaggerated, which do not all get the same answers.

Many people have used a few drastic nationalistic excesses and outbursts to render a judgment that nationalism is again on the rise, that its shadow is hovering disturbingly over the peace and mutual understanding of our nationalities and ethnic minorities. Some on the other hand feel that one should not generalize from individual outbreaks and speak about troubled interethnic relations with the exception of the counterrevolutionary events in Kosovo. Given this broad span, one logically must ask one's self where the truth actually lies, is it really a question of unnecessary dramatization and exaggeration, or are we dealing after all with a new escalation of nationalistic consciousness and its spokesmen?

Instead of an explicit answer it seems to us more important on this occasion to recall Tito's admonitions, still vigorous and relevant, to the effect that we must preserve brotherhood and unity like the apple of our eye, since it is the pledge and foundation of our community consensus, equality and full understanding. Precisely for that reason, however marginal the effect of some excess, it is always a painful warning that the specter of nationalism has been finding fertile soil in certain heads.

Which is why eliminating the causes and conditions which give rise to nationalism and the nationalistic consciousness is an extremely important and significant task of all the socialist forces. Frank, sound and well-argued debates are another part of that struggle against nationalism, so that the editors of DANAS, in addition to pieces by its own staff writers, also is publishing in this issue two pieces by outside authors: Damir Grubisa, director of the Center for Ideological and Theoretical Work of the Croatian LC Central Committee, and Vladimir Jovicic, distinguished sociopolitical figure and literary historian of Belgrade.

[Editorial] The Bitter Taste of Lascina: A Precise Assessment of Nationalistic Manifestations Is Needed

Is the year 1971 recurring in Croatia, at least in certain important elements? Is a nationalist movement again being born, especially among young people at the university and in secondary school? These are questions which are not being put explicitly and publicly these days, since there is a desire not to dramatize the individual excesses in a harmful way, but they are also questions which must undoubtedly stand in the rear, at the foundations of any serious political analysis of political-ideological tendencies and nationalistic manifestations in a portion of university students.

In any case, as was stated at last week's meeting of the Presidium of the Zagreb City Committee of the LC [League of Communists], at which these problems were debated, especially in connection with the brutal clerofascist outbreak in the Ivo Lola Ribar dormitory on Lascina, there are no grounds for any sort of dramatization. Excessive dramatization of that excess committed by ruffians, it was emphasized at the meeting, in which the student Dusan Celar was harshly mistreated with nationalistic motives, and this a dramatization which some have superficially succumbed to--places the League of Communists in a defensive position. Yet it is on the contrary resolute in its commitment to suppress with effective action all adverse manifestations among university students. This is evidenced not only by that meeting, at which the public was finally given more complete information about the events in the dormitory on Lascina, but also the task of precisely establishing in a meeting of the city committee in early January the causes, significance and intensity of all adverse political-ideological tendencies, as well as the specific tasks of all entities in society which will arise out of that kind of serious and comprehensive analysis. Accountability for failure to take prompt effective measures to prevent activity from positions of nationalism will certainly be established as well.

The Silence of Party Members

So DANAS is now also in a position to offer the public a fuller scrutiny of the nationalistic events involving some university students, from which it will be evident that the fascist attack on the student Celar which we have mentioned, which occurred on the night between 23 and 24 October, is not the only escalation of nationalism in Zagreb and Croatia, nor in a political sense the most serious one. It is precisely that realization that indicates that the League of Communists is waging a serious, sober and uncompromising fight against nationalism and chauvinism, be it Croatian or any other kind.

That is, one thing that was established during the debate in the city committee is that that group of nationalistically oriented students have been living for years in the same dormitory on Lascina, in the same wings, on the same floor and in the same rooms! What might appear to be an incidental fact indicates to anyone who has a good familiarity with the way accommodation of students in dormitories is organized the possibility and indeed necessity that one would have to be in good with the dormitory authorities to retain that privilege for years. Since only today has it been learned that for years that same group of nationalists gradually "legalized" its presence in the everyday life and work of the students, and that in such a way that it often and openly sang nationalistic songs and probably expressed nationalism and chauvinism in other ways as well, the silence of party members (122 students among the 400 residents of the dormitory are members of the LC) in the dormitory on Lascina concerning all such previous excesses become rather eloquent and indicative.

In addition to this fact, there are also a whole series of "prior" facts which sketch out the political-security situation not only in Zagreb, but also in Croatia at large. It has been established that oppositionist forces covering a wide range of differing ideological outlooks, among which the fascistic form of clerical nationalism is today only the most pronounced, have been operating on a permanent basis. There have been numerous examples of assaults on the brotherhood and unity of our nationalities and ethnic minorities, on socialist self-management, and on the SFRY's policy of nonalignment and territorial integrity. Let us mention only some of them: nationalistic escalation also occurred in a dormitory in Split, and the pattern was similar to that in Zagreb. For quite a long time nationalistic songs have been sung, "quiet" clerical nationalist indoctrination has been carried out, and, finally, an attempt was made to "take power" in the dormitory, which was stopped by an action of the League of Communists.

It is also indicative of the political situation that only now have we become sensitive to the fact that back in 1976 the words "socialist self-managing" were omitted in reference to Yugoslavia in the text of the Pioneer oath in the educational film "Obecanje" [Promise].

Nationalistic outbursts at athletic events have also been numerous: we are aware of the beating in Vinkovci of a wrestler belonging to "Spartak" of Subotica, the throwing of stones at the "Hajduk" bus in Belgrade, and the display of unacceptable slogans at games and matches.

There was open expression of Albanian nationalism among students from Kosovo in Zagreb; there were gatherings of people from the same region whose content was ethnic or indeed nationalistic, there were even attempts by nationalistically oriented groups to penetrate the bodies of self-management in certain other dormitories in Zagreb, a group of clerical nationalists attempted to take over leadership of the youth organization at the School of Philosophy and to devise a corresponding political form for rallying students at the university, the events in Poland were in certain places interpreted from anticommunist and nationalistic positions, regional rallying lay behind certain of the outbreaks by ruffians in the dormitories, and they were carried out by nationalists, and there were attempts to attribute political significance and a nationalistic interpretation to certain celebrations in the church.

An Imposed List

All of these attempts to assault our sociopolitical system were successfully thwarted by action of the League of Communists. But the fact that they occurred at all, though by and large they were on a small scale, restricted in character and had no kind of serious support among the university students, makes it imperative to conduct a serious political analysis of all the circumstances under which such excesses occur, and in particular a critical analysis of a certain local lack of vigilance and opportunism on the part of party members themselves. After all, although it is a fact that antisocialist and anti-self-management manifestations become rampant precisely when various objective difficulties make their appearance in society--it is a fact that this has been occurring precisely at those places where the subjective forces are not acting in an organized way, where they are not creating, as it was put by Stanko Stojcevic, member of the Presidium of the Croatian LC Central Committee, a revolutionary and militant disposition in the people, especially in the young generation. Stojcevic also wondered why it was that the leadership of the Zagreb youth organization had not debated the occurrence of nationalism among university students, especially since its existence had been known earlier.

That is, back in July of this year tasks were specifically assigned in the presidium of the city committee concerning manifestations of nationalism in particular dormitories, concerning personnel and other problems in the dormitories, concerning the underdevelopment of social self-protection and violation of dormitory rules, concerning the incompleteness of the self-management mechanism for participation of the students in the management, activities and operation of the Student Center, and concerning problems of the standard of living of university students.

In that context there was criticism of specific places, among them the Ivo Lola Ribar university dormitory on Lascina, which the Presidium of the Maksimir Opstina Committee of the Croatian LC evaluated very unfavorably and demanded effective measures for social self-protection. A working group was formed in the Maksimir Opstina Committee of the Croatian LC for activity on Lascina; it began its work on 21 September of this year and set forth its tasks, but it did not have a real picture nor assessment of the situation, and it did not develop appropriate action in preparation of the electoral meeting of the aktiv of the dormitory's Socialist Youth League. It would turn out, however, that the most serious political demonstration by the small group of nationalists would occur precisely in those elections. That is, in the electoral conference itself, on 19 October, a list of candidates for leadership of the aktiv which had been prepared in advance in meetings held in the wings of the dormitory was presented, and this aroused the resentment of some of the students, the nationalists, and led to an uproar and undemocratic atmosphere in a meeting of 221 students. The nationalists imposed another slate through pressure. It is indicative of the situation in the dormitory that the most vociferous noisemakers were not residents of the dormitory at all, nor were they members of the Socialist Youth League.

concerning Lascina--that the situation is critical--cannot be adopted concerning them. The more favorable situation has certainly been favored by the better organization and activity of the residents themselves, especially in the dormitories on the Sava, as well as by the cooperation of dormitory aktivi of the LC with the Tresnjevka Opstina Committee of the Croatian LC, which maintains regular monthly contacts, and that has proved to be a good method. In the Stjepan Radic dormitory three action conferences have been held and always attracted a large majority of the students, and in both dormitories the students have accepted responsibility for discipline, order and the situation on their floor, in their wing, in short, for peace in their dormitory. It was their own opinion that they had not been active enough and that an effort had to be waged against passivity, and they themselves showed initiative and a willingness for collaboration with the Tresnjevka Opstina Committee of the Croatian LC. "We are not acting as firefighters, coming only when the problem flares up," said Dragan Kolic of the Tresnjevka Opstina Committee of the Croatian LC. "We have won the confidence of the students and achieved good cooperation, though not always or everywhere satisfactory--since the attitude toward the effort and responsibility must be tightened up still more--precisely out of our interest in the work and problems of the students even in a relatively normal situation not burdened with excesses, so that it is logical and normal that only in that way can one become aware of the larger problems in good time and begin to solve them promptly."

[Account by Jadrenko Sinkovic] The Strategy of the Nationalists

In the meantime intensive sociopolitical activity has continued in the dormitories and schools of the university, a part of which was the meeting of the presidium of the city party organization at which newsmen were given information about the events.

The discussion in the presidium carefully emphasized a few indicative characteristics of the political situation involving a minority of university students. The seriousness with which the subsequent analysis and concrete action of all the subjective forces is being entered into clearly reflects the desire to give the manifestations of nationalism their precise dimensions and their real political importance in order to avoid, as has already been said, superficial dramatization which could only make it more difficult to carry out a resolute showdown with the nationalists. The presidium, then, feels that the entire problem lacks the dimensions of a mass nationalistic movement, but that it is a question of quite small groups of militant and aggressive nationalists who should be thwarted uncompromisingly.

In that debate the present situation was compared several times with that in 1971 (by Vjekoslav Koprivnjak, Celestin Sardelic and Zoran Krilov). Celestin Sardelic, executive secretary of the Presidium of the Croatian LC Central Committee, presented, for example, a very interesting personal outlook on certain recurring features and patterns which can be recognized in these nationalistic manifestations, allowing one to suspect the organized activity of small groups of principal troublemakers. It is a question, then, of three phases, as he put it, in the strategy of their political activity, phases which were also part of their political strategy in 1971.

Three days later, on 22 October, a meeting was held of the working group of the Maksimir Opstina Committee of the Croatian LC with the nationwide defense committee and secretariat of the LC aktiv of the dormitory, which was attended by representatives of the city committee of the Croatian LC, the city committee of the Croatian Socialist Youth League and Student Center, and on 25 October the presidium of the city committee of the Croatian LC was informed of this event, which was judged to be politically provocative and harmful and indicative as a part of a broader strategy of assaulting our sociopolitical system and the achievements of the revolution. A program was drafted for subsequent action and joint tasks. The subsequent activity and greater political-ideological unity thereafter made it possible to speak out critically and to politically assess the excesses which had been occurring occasionally even before that in the dormitory. Encouraged by that atmosphere, the student Dusan Celar declared in the aktiv of one dormitory wing on 1 November that on the night between 23 and 24 October he had been brutally mistreated by clerical-nationalistically oriented individuals because of his intention to oppose and to report the singing of nationalistic songs. Misdemeanor and criminal proceedings were taken against the participants in those events, most of whom were not legal residents of the dormitory, and those residents who had furnished them accommodations were also expelled from the dormitory.

[Account by Vlatka Volaric] Lascina Is an Exception

More or less everything is already known about the nationalistic outbursts of a small group of students in the dormitory on Lascina.

Over the last 3 years neither the youth nor the party organization in the dormitory have debated even once the evident nationalistic outbursts, nor have they even discussed a disciplinary violation! Yet this does not mean that party members and other students did not know about the nighttime nationalistic drinking parties and arrogant provocations. What is more, there had been reports filed--quite a few of them in fact--but they were not signed; that is, when the students were supposed to sign them, we were told by the secretary of the LC aktiv in the dormitories and by certain other students as well, they refrained.

The deplorable events understandably aroused interest in the question whether there had been similar excesses in other Zagreb dormitories which have been kept silent for one reason or another and which the public had not been informed of. After all, were that not the case, it would be very wrong to do what many are now doing in their panic or out of a desire for sensation--identifying the situation in Zagreb dormitories or--still worse--the situation among all Zagreb university students, with the situation on Lascina.

The student dormitory on Lascina is relatively small, and most of the students housed in dormitories are in Tresnjevka Opstina and in the Stjepan Radic dormitory on the Sava, the largest one in Zagreb (about 3,500 students), while there are nearly 1,000 in the Nina Marakovic dormitory. The people in the Tresnjevka Opstina Committee of the Croatian LC say that except for minor verbal outbursts no sort of sizable or organized nationalistic incidents have been recorded in those two dormitories, which means that the assessment which has been adopted

It is above all a question of an attempt to legalize the presence of the nationalistic forces, and that through the persistent singing of nationalistic songs, which has gone unhindered (!) for several years, and creation of confusion concerning national symbols and messages (for example, the Ustashoid reworking of the national revolutionary song "Marjan, Marjan"). The purpose of this kind of behavior in the first phase is to make the singing something which is not at all exceptional, that is, something everyday and normal.

Then it is a question of a characteristic strategy for taking power in the youth organization, involving the use of the central thesis that the student and youth leadership do not reflect the interests and needs of the rank and file students and young people, and that they have been imposed by the regime. In this connection there has also been a long-lasting attempt to blunt the sharp ideological and political edge of the League of Communists, to which, in Sardelic's opinion, party members have themselves contributed by offering assessments which were not precise or clear enough: for example, reducing the stabilization to a short-term policy and pure "economism." Along with the current difficulties, especially in material development, this makes it possible to create a certain tension and feeling of helplessness, a feeling that the party members are not offering and cannot offer the right political-ideological answers to those situations and processes. That problem imposes on the party the question of modern activity in the masses and on the spot, especially in the ideological battle for young people, among whom one must recognize a new political sensibility. Activists of the League of Communists must not be left as an isolated nucleus in such situations, and in particular they must not tolerate negative manifestations, since it then appears as though they are sympathizing with.

Ideological Preparation

The strategy of demonstration of force, of intimidation, is also characteristic. It took the student Celar 7 days to report the abuse, and other young people as well, including party members, have openly admitted that they were afraid.

It seems, then, that one can truly speak about certain patterns in the emergence of nationalistic escalations. It is also obvious that the action of the League of Communists has not been equally successful at first in all places. There have also been cases of routine handling, and specific actions were not resolute or practical enough. Aside from that the public has once again not been informed or informed at a somewhat late date.

In short, it seems that the political arena of the events can be described this way: on the one hand there are small hostile groups which are militant and aggressive, and on the other there is the passive mass of students with signs of "a new political sensibility," and then on a third side there is the active nucleus of the subjective forces which has been known in some places to lose the battle. The League of Communists, however, must be creative, determined and specific in organizing itself in the objectively clear political situation, not only at the university, not only in Zagreb and Croatia, but indeed throughout Yugoslavia, where it is evident that there exist various

oppositionist forces which have been endeavoring to put the system of socialist self-management in the defendant's box because of all the current difficulties, and that is actually ideological preparation for an attempt to restore bureaucratic centralism or the bourgeois capital relationships in society.

[Statement by Damir Grubisa] Nationalism of the Eighties? Technocracy Is Seeking an Ally in Nationalism

The recent orgyings of Croatian nationalists in the Zagreb university dormitory on Lascina have acted like a shock on the public. Especially since the disturbing events were made public several weeks after the fact, while in the meantime the news traveled by word of mouth, that channel we are so familiar with, causing numerous accompanying reactions--from disbelief to coffeehouse commentary. This would provide STUDENT of Belgrade the occasion for a malicious remark on the tardiness of the information. Nor could an allusion to the events in Kosovo be avoided, since this event was unfortunately not isolated: there have also been similar disturbances in other places--from the throwing of stones by soccer fans to outbursts in rock concerts.

Are we confronted by a new phenomenon which might be referred to as the "nationalism of the eighties"? Have the historical lessons of 10 years ago not been sufficient? At that time there were also many who doubtfully shook their heads and used the term "panicky" for those who warned of the possibility of a fascist explosion. Is history repeating itself here?

The "nationalism of the seventies" was not alone: it found its powerful ally in the technocracy, which was at first silent, but then later was also out in the open. The evaluation of the nationalism of that time speaks about a struggle for power by technocratic and bureaucratic groups which had usurped social property and wished to "disassemble" the Federation in order to "set up" its own state and its own feudal domains in which it would be able to run rampant: from the enterprise to the opstina and the republic.

Let us recall what Veljko Vlahovic said at the time: in the well-known New Year's interview for BORBA (1973) he warned that the battle had been won against the technocracy, but that the war had not been won and that that war would be waged for at least 10 more years, and that a war against a technocracy which would again seek a suitable class ally.

A "Concurrence of Events"

Thus the resistance of the technocracy was crumbled and broken on the "battlefield of self-management" by the new constitution and then by the Law on Associated Labor, which was supposed to be the most powerful weapon in breaking down the technocratic monopoly and its informal power. If indeed the technocracy did withdraw from the semipublic scene, today we already have indications that it has like a chameleon successfully adapted to the new "historical conditions."

To be sure, it has had help in this not only from errors in micro- and macro-economic policy, but also from what lawyers would refer to as a "unique concurrence of events": the world energy crisis, the crisis of the world system of "unequal exchange," the monetary crisis, inconsistency and slowness in carrying out self-management....

Little by little the country has slid toward autarkization of its elements: republics, opstinas, large business systems, organizations of associated labor, and all the other cells of the organization of society. The "concurrence of events" has favored development of the mentality: what do I care about the rest of the world, just so I get along well! What many people were hankering for behind the scenes did occur and on the surface seemed almost entirely spontaneous and they merely displayed subsequent amazement and recovery of consciousness. The objective circumstances were joined by manifestations of "self-management irresponsibility": the sharing of income which had not been earned, rigged borrowing, reliance on government intervention and neglect of productivity and competitiveness. How did this happen? It would be too bold and also inaccurate to say that a part of the working class was not up to its "historical task" and that to the detriment of others it attempted to affirm its self-management interest, heedless of the consequences. The truth is that we have all been in some measure coparticipants in tendencies of this kind, which have been disguised or have come about spontaneously: we have all taken credit when we knew that we never would have taken it if we had to return its real rather than nominal value, which as a consequence of inflation and poor monetary policy has been dropping all the time. We would be closer to the truth if we said that along with technology and credit the consumer mentality has been imported into the country and has infected the entire society.

Preserves and Reservations

By the logic of its economic interest, as though made of steel, the consumer mentality has contributed to the disintegration of the consciousness of collective, joint interests of society and affirmed instead of the general interest, the particular and individual and private interest. The disintegration of the socialist citizen and associated worker into the private consumer found a point of support in a strengthening of local and ethnic egoism.

No better "concurrence of events" could have been found for a strengthening of nationalism, whether it takes the form of ethnocentric and separatistic interests or localistic interests. Parallel to the closed markets closed cultural horizons, not going outside the republic or local framework, were also created. Eight markets have found their correspondence in eight cultures, eight educational systems, eight news complexes. "Cultural preserves" and reservations have been created, deliberately in some places, and in some places unintentionally.

The parcelization and atomization of everything that was held in common has had the result that schoolchildren of certain communities can hardly reach an understanding any longer with their comrades in other republics (this was even written about in the newspapers recently), the powerful mass media have been working hurriedly to close the borders of awareness, and succeeding: television broadcasting is on a republic basis, while the radio is local.

Recent studies of history syllabi have shown that the differences are so great that new generations are being educated who have only a very general idea about what is meant by community consensus (zajednistvo) in Yugoslavia. In addition to that, even in the area of ideology new "value systems" are being established. The conventional slogan "Brotherhood and Unity," which has had--and does have--a profound class and revolutionary meaning, has been replaced little by little by the political formulas of "community consensus" as something which is supposedly more suitable at this moment. I think that this constituted yet another unconscious step toward disintegration and atomization of the awareness of unity and the close ties of our nationalities and ethnic minorities.

Recently that disintegration has also been favored by nationalistic manipulation of the language and the hypertrophied development of separate variants of one and the same Croato-Serbian language, with insistence on the differences and on all those things which divide us, almost to the point of absurdity. Thus the various "language trials" seem like farces, and the excessive purity a typical expression of provincialization and of the consciousness that has been shut off and which is afraid of influences "from outside," since it is insecure.

No Passaran

And even the spontaneous reactions, aside from those organized ones whose protagonists were mainly members of the young generation, show that at the level of impressions this kind of artificial separation is felt and some sort of resistance is being offered to it. Without enumerating the many constructive examples, we can note that the recent population census also demonstrated this. I believe that such a large number of young people chose to refer to themselves as Yugoslavs not in order to renounce their own nationality, nor so much because of the mixed marriages from which they come, but out of a spontaneous revolt against the atomization of the sentiment of belonging to the community which is occurring in many domains of our society. The fact that this is a spontaneous protest, perhaps a bit awkward, but a sincere one, was unfortunately not spotted even by certain prestigious political scientists, and they became worried because of it. Indeed, there are grounds for being worried, but not because of that fact, but rather because of the accumulated causes which led to that kind of demonstration.

Even today, after living in the same society for 37 years, not even a member of the middle generation, much less a member of the new generation, knows any of the other languages of the nationalities and ethnic minorities living in this community. Is this not absurd? Is it not absurd that neither I nor my daughter can learn Slovenian or Macedonian or Albanian or Hungarian or some other language in our school? Is it not absurd that among schoolchildren in Croatia (according to a survey conducted by the Center of the Croatian LC Central Committee for Ideological and Theoretical Work and the Educational and Pedagogical Service of SR [Socialist Republic] Croatia) all of about 15 percent have a more or less pronounced ethnocentric attitude, which in other words is a synonym for exaggerated emphasis on membership in their own nationality?

All these figures indicate a large number of oversights in the ideological sphere, in the domain of the struggle for "men's souls," in which by the force of inertia and belief in spontaneous acceptance of progressive values the danger of manifestations of nationalism was underestimated, a nationalism this time in a somewhat new fleece, but again with the same old fascistoid order of values. Are we again threatened by the danger of the Ku Klux Klan, which is what the nationalistic warriors resemble? There are always, here as elsewhere, dangers from exaggeration. But it seems to me that at this moment--confronted with the large number of difficulties which many people are trying to cram into their Procrustean bed of an "ever more universal and total crisis"--we are quite clearly committed, in both thought and deed, to preventing nationalism from becoming, as it was put 10 years ago, "our destiny."

There is an obvious need to correct many things that have been overlooked and to radically change the consciousness of our belonging to a collective which is not only multinational, but also socialist and self-managing. The message to all the nationalists must be clear, once again as was the case 10 years ago: no passaran!

[Statement by Vladimir Jovicic] Always the Same Chameleon: The Spirit of Nationalism Is Riding on the Back of the Working Class

A few years ago I blurted out that I would no longer utter a single word about nationalism. I blurted it out not because I was convinced by those who were asking me from various quarters whether I wasn't exaggerating a bit with that nationalism, didn't it seem to me that I was hunting witches, but precisely because I was convinced that nationalism is not a witch by any means and that in that case it was better to fall silent and not to support such impressions.

It has been drastically shown in the meantime that the spirit of nationalism was not anyone's apparition, that it was not a phantom out of a book, nor a windmill, that it was not riding on a broom, but on the back, first of all, of the working class of Yugoslavia. Today it must be clear to everyone that the warnings about the dangers of nationalism were neither superfluous nor exaggerated.

But have we gotten it straight that we do not have before us an enemy who stands before us in the pose of a knight, but a chameleon difficult to recognize which at one point expresses demands for a republic and on another appeals for saving the purity of the language, on a third proposals that the blood shed in the revolution be sold for vegetable oil and detergents, in the fourth interpretation to the effect that being master of one's own house signifies surrounding one's patrimony with barbed wire?

Divisions and Exclusiveness

Even today, at the height of the fight to overcome the difficult economic situation, there is no topic more urgent or in fact more acute than that of nationalism, since it was above all nationalisms that bogged us down in the debts and shortages. It was they which caused not only the standstill, but indeed the retreat of self-management. This is now more than obvious, but it

was also clear earlier where the divisions and exclusiveness were pushing us, but we did not always have the political courage to admit it in public and recognize those nationalisms in their transformations. Unfortunately, even now that we are pushed to the wall of economic dependence and political blackmail we are not showing enough boldness or we do not know how to expose the nationalisms that stand behind the commodity and capital markets that are barely open or are closed, that stand behind the padlocks that have been put on textbooks, on traditions, and on spiritual values of all types and sizes.

We look on as regional economies shut themselves off within their own territories, as the so-called "national" economies take up places of ambush behind republic and provincial shutters. Even if it is not nationalistically motivated, this behavior is nationalistic in its consequences. In front of our eyes nationalists are glorifying specific national features and thereby pushing their own nationality into provincialism, into narodnikism, into complacency and conceit. They have for the culture of their own nationality separate criteria, value systems and certainly a great deal of bias which impedes, and sometimes even makes "traitorous" any critical evaluation of works with pronounced ethnic coloring. That is why nationalists do not see any advantage whatsoever in a multinational community, but only dangers.

We are prepared to fight the nationalists if they go into the streets with their slogans, if they sign their pamphlets, we are ready to wage war against nationalism as a concept, as an ideology, but we turn our head away when, say, a mistaken investment project motivated by local patriotism and nationalism needs to be described for what it is in political terms, when the blinded advocates of narrow interests have to be confronted, when the interest of the nationality is delegated as something inviolable and is stubbornly defended at the cost of all other interests, including that common interest in which the real interest of every nationality must also be represented.

Everything that has happened to us unambiguously shows that the interests of the nationalities in Yugoslavia, with all due respect paid to them, cannot be viewed nor realized as independent interests, that they are unfeasible within the exclusive limits of the republics, the provinces and regions. Every aspiration to self-sufficiency and autarky is suicidal not only in economic terms; it imparts all the poverty of the provincial spirit, all the narrowness of the slumber of the last century, which has been figuratively expressed in a little poem by one of my famous countrymen, in which he said that God gave everything and enough to the Serbian "land":

"Both the wise and the powerful, the meat days and the days of fasting,
When you look, we are sufficient unto ourselves."

As things now stand, it is really a wonder how those lines of poetry failed to become a hit of the parade of contestants in shutting off the national economies and cultures.

But what stands behind that? And what else could it be but a lack of confidence in the future of Yugoslavia, a lack of confidence in the firmness and lastingness of community on the foundations of associated labor and the

liberation of labor, a lack of confidence in this communist alternative of ours, which by no means rejects, nor does it exclude community consensus of the nationalities, but excludes exclusiveness in that community. At times there stands behind it the intention to break up Yugoslavia both economically and spiritually to the extent of reducing it to constitutional words on paper, to a mere political concept without a real social content. Leave to one side the fact that we firmly believe that that will not occur, the question remains where all the forces come from to support this mania for exclusiveness and this antagonization of interests when this is not good for anyone....

"Sacred Rights"

Several acceptable answers have so far been offered to this question, but most of them are only a paraphrase, only a statement in specific terms of one basic thing: a cultish and mythomaniacal attitude toward the nationality as toward the only natural thing and accordingly the only lasting form of community is still deep-seated. Since that attitude is cultish, it is no wonder that it displays a whole series of completely irrational characteristics, that it overlooks economic logic and the general human component of culture. In the space of Yugoslavia such a spirit is all the more anachronistic and reactionary because there is a more realistic alternative to it, the alternative of community consensus on the foundations of national equality, that is, an alternative which does not reject and does not belittle simply because human values and freedoms go beyond the nationality aspect.

If the present troubles and difficulties have at least one good side, then that is certainly that it is compelling us to be sober, the necessity of a self-critical examination of the sterility of having a verbalistic showdown with nationalism. The main body of nationalistic destruction does not display itself in coffeehouse songs and curses, nor even in street demonstrations. Nationalism is most destructive in the new forms it has assumed, when it waves national flags with the dagger (kama) held behind its back, when it pathetically hides behind national symbols, holding back the cocarde and the skull, when it fills in holes in the system of socialist self-management, when it verbally swears allegiance to community consensus, but in its deeds feeds the bureaucratic ambition of the chosen ones of the nationality.

This economic crisis has been a price worth paying for the lesson that is already tangible now: not only can Yugoslavia not progress, it cannot even survive unless there prevails in it an awareness that nationalism here and now is not the same thing as it was yesterday, that nationalism is not a mere legacy, but above all a factor in and a product of current relations, that nationalism is not only a strictly political term, but a vigorous and resilient part of man's entire makeup, that nationalism is not only an ideology, but also a cockle in our daily bread, that it is not merely a verbal attack on our freedom and independence, but an attack that is altogether material.

It is especially important to reject once and for all the error that the roots of nationalism lie in the strictly political consciousness infected by inheritance with the germs of national rivalry, vanity, ambition and aggressiveness....

Truly we are too often inclined to look at national consciousness and the national sentiment almost exclusively in the political sphere. However, the national consciousness and national sentiment are very complicated, their content is in large part subjective, and they flow over from the field of ideology and politics into psychology. By no means does this signify that none of that content is ideological and political, but it does signify that it cannot be thoroughly examined solely from the ideological standpoint nor fully expressed solely in the language of politics. National consciousness and the national sentiment are founded on an existential human need much older than the nationality itself, are based on the human need for community, or association, and for security in the group. In order to satisfy that instinctive need man sometimes, when he has no better choice, is willing to overlook many moral principles and to join even a nationalistic horde.

History has so far recorded a multitude of examples of moral blindness and narrowed collective consciousness evoked by the "sacred rights" of militant nationalism, but it has recorded as well a multitude of morally great collective acts which would have been impossible without the elevated temperature of the national sentiment and indeed at one time even of nationalism. It is true that nationalism is evoked most frequently by interests of dubious value, but by no means has this morally compromised its basis, that deep passion for the closest and strongest community consensus possible. Even reactionary nationalistic impulses, then, if they have not originated, they have in most cases been broadly accepted out of man's deep inability to authentically, creatively and humanly express the felt need for human community.

Silenced Consciousness

If such times are behind us, and if the self-managing socialist society offers association and community on the foundations of national equality and in a humanistic spirit, then it is only in the cracks and contradictions of this social system of ours that an answer can be sought to a really logical question: How are we to account for nationalism here and now? In other words, nationalism can be eradicated here and now only by respecting national sentiments and national equality, by improving the relations of socialist self-management, through association on the foundations of working class interests, and not solely on the principles of blood and soil.

The ideal of community consensus changed its historical models even in the past, but mainly it stayed within a national framework, embracing man with the need to broaden and perfect his national community, to protect and improve all forms of its freedoms. And it is partly for that reason that through various (mainly nationalistic) manipulations that same ideal could also be used to enflame national selfishness and violence as supposedly the only way toward its realization. At such times critical consciousness was silenced, and the authentic national sentiment, an ethically pure enthusiasm and morally controlled elan were replaced by bloodthirstiness toward the member of another nationality, the member of another religion, another country, as the party bearing sole guilt for all the domestic troubles and evils. The Yugoslav community of nationalities and ethnic minorities has been given a historic occasion to give life to the idea and ideal of community even beyond national boundaries, to

get beyond the bourgeois experience in which every national boundary marker was inevitably a stumbling block as well.

As it has taken place through constant conflicts of local, tribal, national, state and class interests, history has never allowed the ideal of community to retreat from the strictly political plane. (That is why there are a few even among the artists who have died without "voluntarily" leaving to their nationalities lines of poetry, pictures, and partitas that can even be used for propaganda purposes ... but also works which in their motivation are usually not devoid of the sense of the insufficiency of historically recognized ideals, works which illustrate the movement of man's primeval aspiration to absolute freedom within community.) Expressions of ethnocentrism and intolerance have usually been signs of every sort of historical coercion to which every man is subject, including the artist, and has not been a case of his inherent programming to scorn or hate others and things which are alien out of his love for himself and "his own." "I feel love for my own people as one of the most precious blessings of life. Nevertheless, in my opinion, everything that is national comes under the head of our human limitations. This is a part of our mortality." (Konrad Lorenz)

Even though the passion for ties with other people has been proclaimed in a great variety of ways--as lyrical exaltation and as the call of the trumpet of war, there is always alive in it, even when it has been transformed into hatred toward others, a need to get beyond selfishness and self-sufficiency. Egoism within tribal and national boundaries may objectively be less humane than personal egoism, but still it is ultimately derived from an unrealized aspiration to broader community. Which is why that egoism is condemned to profound internal dissatisfaction which has been aggressively manifested on the historical plane.

When, then, one bears in mind that nationalism can have a profound mental underpinning and a broad space to maneuver, common sense argues that we should refrain from the illusion that nationalism is a strictly political error and that we can enter the struggle against political opponents interpreting nationalism solely as a reactionary political consciousness. Nationalism is equally necessary to all political opponents precisely because it is not predetermined in strictly political terms and because it can be distorted with equal ease into dogmatism as into petit bourgeois liberalism. Counterrevolutionaries put on the cloak of nationalism primarily because under it they can rally even those who are not in favor of the counterrevolution, who still read nationalistic slogans naively and nostalgically as something romantic, who do not recognize in them the evil spirit of division, exclusiveness and hatred....

The Power of Tradition

Precisely for that reason the enemies of self-management socialism can still reliably count on a mass response to their always "Nationalized" programs if they have not been promptly exposed in those demagogic games of theirs. The nationalists, then, are a potential army for blows from the left and from the right, not only against Yugoslavia as a community of equal nationalities and ethnic minorities, but also against self-management socialism in all the

constituent parts of this community. In this connection it is altogether unimportant that members of all sorts of political convictions, even certain crazed advocates of self-management socialism itself, find themselves mixed together in that army. That is why we do not dare for a moment to accept the division of the nationalists into the bad ones and the well-meaning ones even though there are quite a few of those who have been deliberately misled.

It is certain that no one reliably knows all the roads down which history will take us, but even if we hold the reins in our own hands and if we do not allow it to throw us from the saddle, will we be ready to preserve our presence of mind and to confront the unanticipated things which happen in interethnic relations without a burden of the past. I am afraid that precisely in this area we are to some extent still within the power of tradition. Recently, for instance, we were witnesses of people expressing public horror, even certain party members, at the fact that more than 1 million people declared themselves to be Yugoslavs in the population census. The savers of the souls of holy Serbianism and holy Croatianism were horrified at this betrayal of the national patrimony, at the millions of parishioners without the ancient identity who had "gone astray" and become "heretics."

In our revolutionary society, which desires to think in critical terms, to be open to new values and to create them, why should only the domain of interethnic relations be a dogmatic preserve, why should only the nationality be spared the dialectics of history, and mythomaniacally proclaimed a timeless absolute? It is not that, and it never was.

The national consciousness which the young bourgeoisie developed was revolutionary at the time when feudalism was breaking down and during the liberation wars of individual peoples. But the bourgeois class was unable to permanently keep that consciousness in the liberative spirit, nor was it in its interest to do so. So long as it played a revolutionary role, the bourgeoisie had reasons to nurture the national consciousness with real social content. When it created the nation state as an instrument for defense and an institution where it could pursue its own class interests, it no longer dared to impart social and liberative content to the idea of national community, since in that way it would be undermining its own privileges.

That is why a critical attitude toward nationalism as an anachronism of the contemporary consciousness must not, as has already been noted, use the same yardstick in judging the ethnically overheated consciousness from the time when national freedom had not yet been achieved. That kind of critical attitude would be essentially irregular.

The Danger of Underestimation

Because of all this the decisive thing is not whether the consciousness of community will nominally bear national attributes tomorrow, but what sociohistorical values that consciousness is inspired with is of decisive importance. That is the central problem of relations toward the entire national complex and it must not be replaced by problematical issues so long as the nationality lives in history and in human consciousness.

All of this is well known and would not deserve repetition had the national consciousness toward which the bourgeoisie was oriented as a class been disenfranchised along with the bourgeoisie. Unfortunately, that is not the case. That consciousness is still alive, although under other names and auspices. It still survives by virtue of superseded national symbols, still bows down before national idols which have long ago been "demoted" by history, it is still susceptible to reactionary ideas, and, what is most dangerous, it is still managing, although in new shapes, to falsely portray itself as a patriotism from which it is further today than it ever was. Although that consciousness was in the past and is even more today essentially pseudonational, although it has always deceived man's ethically indubitable need for community--we must not underestimate it regardless of whether it manifests itself spontaneously or tendentiously. Nationalistic consciousness remains dangerous both potentially and really, not only because there is no love of humanity in its "patriotism," because it is obstinate (since in the heads of quite a few people it has in time identified itself with the very need for community), but above all because in the context of ethnic equality it is today reactionary in more ways than one.

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CLOSING OF PLAY 'PIGEON PIT' CAUSES UPROAR

Context, Course of Events

Belgrade NEDELJNE INFORMATIVNE NOVINE in Serbo-Croatian No 1668, 19 Dec 82
pp 31-33

[Article by Teodor Andjelic: "The Case of the Political Theater"]

[Text] Jovan Cirilov began his criticism of the performance of "Pigeon Pit" ("Golubnjaca") with the sentence: "It seems that there are no longer any taboos in the Yugoslav theater."

This observation, uttered after the premiere of "Pigeon Pit" (10 October 1982) had a quite natural ring: the politicization of Yugoslav stages--which began back in the seventies (to be quite precise: in 1968 and the closed performance of "When the Pumpkins Bloomed") when Georgije Paro became selector of the Sterija Theater and which continued during the 5 years that Vladimir Stamenkovic was selector--has now just been rounded off right there in Novi Sad, where the world premiere of "Pigeon Pit" was held.

One might somehow have even anticipated that all that would take place in the capital of the Province of Vojvodina: Novi Sad is the domicile of the Sterija Theater, and that in turn is Yugoslavia's only theater competition. It was here that Paro and Stamenkovic opened the dialogue between the theater and politics, between art and history, and Novi Sad cultivated "views in dispute" natural to the political theater.

The dialogue with history continued this season: from the world premiere of "Croatian Faust" in Split by way of, say, "Flattown" ("Ravangrad") in Sombor, to the Belgrade premier of "Croatian Faust." Among all of them "Pigeon Pit" received the greatest praise, in some places even panegyric theater reviews, all over the country, just as it was supposed to have--already agreed--guest performances in Gorica, Celje, Ljubljana, Maribor, Zagreb and Belgrade.

The theme of "Pigeon Pit" is the Ustasha pit. There have already been treatments on the stages of Yugoslav theaters of the Cominform theme (Zarko Komanin and Dusan Jovanovic), the theme of collaboration (Slobodan Snajder), antidogmatism in the National Liberation Struggle and afterward (Primož Kozak), the theme of interethnic discord in the Balkans (Goran Stefanovski), the theme of

the collision between the patriarchal and the petit bourgeois done in the spirit of sociological sarcasm (Slobodan Selenic).

To be sure, the fuss over "Pigeon Pit"--the conflict over it reached its culmination just last week--might have been suspected even earlier. Not only because the council of the "Bosko Buha" Children's Theater in Belgrade rejected one version of this production--feeling that it was not for children, but also because of changes that have come about--precisely this year--in the domicile of the Sterija Theater.

No one has forgotten the storm which its transformation this year caused in the theater community. Under the cloak of addition to the "self-management structure" to accommodate social influence on the Sterija Theater, Yugoslavia's only theater competition has been "localized," and this resulted in a number of refusals to participate in the competition--from the decision of the work community of the Zagreb KPGT (KPGT stands for Kazaliste--Pozoriste--gledalisce--teatar [all meaning "theater"]) which is doing the production "The Karamazovs" to the decision of Slobodan Selenic, who more than a decade ago was also selector of the Sterija Theater, not to participate in its proceedings.

Two Incompatible Decisions

The eighth version of the dramatization of "Pigeon Pit" (author Jovan Radulovic, directed by Dejan Mijac), taken from the short story collection of the same name which was at one time awarded the "Seven Secretaries of SKOJ [Yugoslav Communist Youth League]" prize, was performed in Novi Sad. Dejan Mijac spoke to NIN, quoting directly from the petition of the author and actors addressed to the expanded Workers' Caucus of the Drama Center of the Serbian National Theater--which had adopted the ban, "since the principal and central insinuation concerning our production is the assertion that it shatters the brotherhood and unity of our nationalities and ethnic minorities, we call upon you to make it possible for us to show the production to the public of all our nationalities and ethnic minorities. If in any part of our country it turns out that the assertions of our critics are correct, we are prepared to close the production and to take all the political and administrative consequences which follow therefrom."

The body which adopted the decision mentioned--this is the same body which decided to put on the production after watching two rehearsals--responded to the petition of the author and actors with the announcement: "The expanded Workers' Caucus of the Drama Center of the Serbian National Theater, after a thorough debate of the production 'Pigeon Pit' has unanimously decided not to perform the production 'Pigeon Pit' any longer as part of the repertoire of the SNP [Serbian National Theater].

"This decision is being taken on the basis of judgments to the effect that the performance and the events concerning it are an expression of approaches, endeavors, political messages and goals which cause adverse social reactions, as well as because of the unacceptable treatment of interethnic relations in the production.

"The decision is also being taken because of the possibility of manipulation of the production with a view to its abuse by enemies of our present-day socialist reality of self-management."

Statement by Party Members

The atmosphere of "ideological suspicion" of the production has been created step by step. It did not exist either at the time when the production was accepted (June 1982) or in the rehearsals, or in the debates of the competent public bodies, or in the meetings of parents (children have roles in the play), or during the review performance (kontrolna predstava). However, in time that atmosphere took the form of a kind of parallel drama without persona dramatis: none of the persons harboring suspicion appeared on the stage, although the public had an almost detailed knowledge of the content, dramaturgy, and protagonists of this parallel drama.

The plot supposedly began to deepen when a group of young people still unidentified even today called political figures in Novi Sad to inform them that the production was not suitable, that it was causing unrest, that it should be reassessed, that proceedings should be conducted to close it down. Those are the facts presented in a public hearing concerning the production--the discussion held by members of the League of Communists of the Drama Center of the Serbian National Theater, which was held on Friday, 3 December.

Up until the moment when the party meeting took place in the Drama Center neither the author nor the director wanted to make any sort of statements for the public, since they did not know what the play had been accused of, and the authors of the drama-atmosphere say privately--even today they are not willing to speak about this publicly--that the play is a piece of sabotage, a kind of "minefield."

The first man bearing a full first and last name who saw in the production "that" of which it is accused--the first to formulate "that" in public--was Bogdan Ciplic, mainly known in the theater community as the author of "Sweet Orthodoxy" which was put on in the seventies by Atelje 212 [Studio 212]: Bogdan Ciplic wrote an article in the Novi Sad DNEVNIK which was subheaded "Great Serbian Chauvinists in the Serbian National Theater" and entitled "Political Hawks Dressed in the Pigeon's Feathers of 'Art.'"

Two days after Ciplic's commentary, DNEVNIK of Novi Sad carried an article from the provincial edition of KOMUNIST--the article was not signed, but it appeared in the very next issue of KOMUNIST. It referred to the party meeting of the actors as a "rigged 'epilogue.'"

At the next meeting the members of the LCY in the Drama Center--this time the meeting was closed to the public--the actors who are party members, stuck by their guns. Just 3 days later the decision was taken to remove "Pigeon Pit" from the repertoire.

Now at the end of this epilogue we ask Jovan Cirilov if he had not been too early with that criticism of his?

Here is his comment: "That same morning when the astounding news came from Novi Sad that after several weeks of pressure a wonderful, politically pure and honest production 'Pigeon Pit,' which pleads for the noblest ideas of unity in our country, but in a meaningful and elevated way, was being removed from the repertoire, I received material from the Belgrade City Committee of the League of Communists which read as follows: 'The League of Communists is resolutely opposed to administrative intervention in matters of art and creativity. Bans are an implicit recognition of social and theoretical weakness, often the result of ideologized decisions which have not been thought through. Such moves of a restrictive or some kind of dogmatic nature do more harm than good.... The League of Communists feels that all disputes in creativity should be resolved through open debate and criticism backed up by argument. Ideologically unacceptable opinions and works can be best opposed by Marxist theory and artistic criticism.'

"I go along with that," Cirilov says.

Professor Vaso Milincevic, one of the many public figures who managed to see the production--it was really very difficult to get in, the theater was always full, and every performance brought tumultuous applause--told NIN: "I do not feel that there are nationalistic elements in the production. The production does speak about hatred, but its principal message is humanistic: it does not favor new pigeon pits--it is absolutely opposed to them. The production makes it quite clear: the Ustashi are to blame for the Pigeon Pit, not the Croats. It deals with a story and the world under Mount Dinara, a world which is rather craggy anyway, where tenderness is lacking even in the most intimate relations. This is a play that is opposed to evil, a good play based on gifted prose."

Suspicion of Flattown

Professor Milincevic recalls the words of Mustafa Magyar (the character of Ivo Andric): "The world is full of evil!"

The story about the political theater, however, was resumed this week again when in the Serbian National Theater in Novi Sad the Novi Sad premiere was to be given of the production "Flattown 1900," which the people from Novi Sad are doing together with the Sombor Theater. This is a dramatization by Djordje Lebovic motivated by the stories of Veljko Petrovic. This play was also directed by Dejan Mijac. This play also received a number of plaudits from theater critics, but the critics of SOMBORSKE NOVINE, DNEVNIK of Novi Sad and MADJAR SO received it with suspicion....

To be sure, the phrasing was not so severe as in the case of "Pigeon Pit." It is criticized on the grounds that all the negative heroes "of this dramatic panorama have sunk in the mire of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy," while "the only positive hero, a schoolboy (a real true-blue Serbian), who for that very reason was not corrupted by the monarchic champagne bath, the debauched nature of monarchical times, nor by a masculine attention to business which is incapable of respect...." (taken from the review in the newspaper MADJAR SO, a portion of which was also printed by the Novi Sad DNEVNIK).

When it comes to political theater, there is hardly any production of this kind which all Yugoslav "communities" look on in the same way or even a similar way. This is natural in view of the differing traditions, cultural levels, and the diversity of directors, of actors, of organizers, and indeed of personnel in general. Some productions ("The Karamazovs," say) began their life in one community only to dry up very quickly, but resume a full life in another community.

The two premieres of "Croatian Faust," in Split and Belgrade, are actually two productions. The one in Split (it has also had a guest appearance in Zagreb) is much more specific and localized in the so-called Independent State of Croatia, while the one in Belgrade is turned more to the metaphysical problems of Faust-Europe. As a matter of fact, they are not merely different productions, but indeed different conceptions of history, of drama, and of art.

The well-known moves which have been made by "The Karamazovs"--one of which, the Sarajevo production, was also put on in the Sterija Theater--began with nonperformance in Belgrade. Today "The Karamazovs," which is being put on in the Student Cultural Center (not, that is, in a so-called institutional theater!), is one of the best "Belgrade" productions.

... It seems that the politicization of the theater has begun to be accompanied by a politicization of drama criticism as well--which probably is in fact necessary. However, the incident created concerning "Pigeon Pit" also raises other issues important not only to the theater, but also in a broader area. They have to be spoken to, but we do not wish to wither once again the valuable politicization of the theater.

Commentary Critical of Decision

Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian 16 Dec 82 p 10

[Article by Sava Dautovic: "Why Bans Again"]

[Text] We live in a time when we are trying to solve many contradictions and accumulated difficulties in our economic and political life by means of administrative measures. Adopting them involuntarily, as a necessary evil, we console ourselves with the fact that they are temporary and with our expectation that nevertheless they will have a constructive effect in mitigating the crisis that has seized us and that ultimately they will contribute even as such to faster stabilization of society and will make it easier for it to turn to self-management solutions.

But, if we are prepared to agree along those lines that in that area we did not at this moment have any other choices available to us, when it comes to art and culture, where matters are quite different, there is no justification, however, for the simultaneous occurrence of administrative pressures.

Nevertheless, we are witnesses that from time to time the roll is called of people and works by judgments adopted by forums and by arbitration proceedings before courts and that critical opinions are suspended unceremoniously though

they come not only from those who are professionally responsible for rendering judgments about art, but also from working people and citizens who also have a right which we cannot deny to make judgments about the esthetic and ideological message and content of a particular book, exhibition, theater production or any other artistic creation.

The criteria which might apply in other domains of life are nevertheless being applied in the domains of culture and art as well, though their nature, as we have said, is quite specific and though this is an area where no one, not even the critic, should have the last word, least of all political suspicions of the author and the work, which as a rule result in a ban, which is the most unpopular measure.

The logic of this kind of restrictive thinking not uncommonly results in ideological confusion and nonuniformity of criteria, and, to put it mildly, the effect is confusing when a work of art is proclaimed to be unacceptable in one community, but is gladly welcomed and even awarded prizes in another community. This has been the destiny, for example, of "The Karamazovs" by Dusan Jovanovic, which was banned in Belgrade at the National Theater, and later, arrived on another stage in Belgrade from Zagreb; before that it was performed without problems in Celje and Sarajevo.

This summer's trumped-up proscription of "Anthology of Contemporary Serbian Poetry" in Struga (after publication in Belgrade without any sort of consequences at all), the ban on the collection entitled "Slucaj Gojko Djogo--dokumenti" [The Gojko Djogo Case--Documents], a prosecutor's meddling as to the final makeup of Esad Cemic's book "Politika kao Sudbina" [Politics as a Destiny] (the throwing out of two chapters from a book already printed), and prevention of the appearance of the biographical study by Vjenceslav Cencic entitled "Enigma Kopinic" [The Kopinic Enigma], accompanied by the observation by certain political factors that it aimed at revising the history of the National Liberation Struggle and the role of certain individuals in it, have come together on the register of everything that has recently come into unnecessary conflict with similar bureaucratic and dogmatic-conservative conceptions and actions.

And, not to go on with the list, since our main purpose in undertaking this awkward little inventory was to show the kind of social climate in which the most recent case occurred of the banning of "Pigeon Pit," written by Jovan Radulovic and directed by Dejan Mijac, from the stage of the Serbian National Theater in Novi Sad.

In this case, however, something altogether unexpected occurred. When this production, after almost panegyric reviews in the Yugoslav press, all of a sudden, at the wink of someone's eye from outside, came under suspicion as ideologically unacceptable, for the first time we had a situation which is almost ideal in the light of the commitments of the League of Communists. Members of the basic organization of the League of Communists immediately met in order to render their objective and responsible assessment of the work in dispute. Unfortunately, the clear and unambiguous statement made by the party members of the Drama Center of the Serbian National Theater in Novi Sad to the

effect that "Pigeon Pit" contains no ideologically and politically unacceptable messages was disavowed, we have seen, by pressures behind the scenes which resulted in a mysteriously adopted decision by some sort of hybrid workers' caucus that the production would no longer be put on.

To be sure, this outcome might have been suspected back at the moment when the article by the writer Bogdan Ciplic, entitled "Political Hawks Wearing the Pigeon's Feathers of 'Art,'" appeared in the Novi Sad DNEVNIK (9 December of this year). From the belittling of the judgment of the critics already uttered and from the discrediting of the opinion of the party members of the Drama Center of the Serbian National Theater one might even then have suspected that behind the author of "Sweet Orthodoxy" and his article in DNEVNIK--overflowing with apologetic tirades concerning "our glorious Vojvodina"--stood a force over and above the party organization of the Serbian National Theater, with the decision taken in advance that "Pigeon Pit" would be taken off the stage.

After all is said and done, after such an action--when all dialogue is broken off and when bans are resorted to under the transparent front of self-management--it might seem out of place to allude to the fundamental positions taken by the League of Communists in culture and art, with which something like this is incompatible. After all, the League of Communists, as we know, even in its Program renounced the role of arbiter and the practice of conducting public trials and auctions of works of art. It should be said, however, that responsibility for the incident with the Novi Sad production--in which arbitrary interpretations have been elevated to a principle of political merit--is not this time the fault of the basic organization of the League of Communists. It has been clear and consistent in this case. This unfortunate case appears to have been the product of a mentality outside culture and of an arbitrariness which resorts to administrative orders even where dialogue and critical penetration of the real esthetic and political components of the "suspected" work was the only direction in which a way out could be sought. It was that way out that was advocated by Miroslav Krleza when Esad Camic once appealed to him in connection with the ban of his book "Covek na Raskrsu" [Man at the Crossroads]:

"As for the ban, it constitutes a methodological oversight. That would be the case even if we were dealing with things which are ideologically problematical. Polemics or critical confrontation, but not administrative bans."

That is Krleza's message (on page 170 of Camic's book "Politika kao Sudbina"), which these past few days has suffered a defeat as a method in Novi Sad, although the work involved is one which cannot be said to have any hostile content whatsoever. That is why we are afraid that an action like this, were it to remain in force, could be the pretext for still more serious misunderstandings.

Protest by Performers

Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian 17 Dec 82 p 12

[Article by V. M.: "Protest of Belgrade Actors"]

[Text] The audience in the large auditorium of the Serbian National Theater in Novi Sad, which has 1,000 seats and yet was packed, was more than surprised when before the beginning of last night's performance of "They Killed the Prince" by the National Theater from Belgrade the actor Predrag Manojlovic, who plays the lead in the play being put on by the guests, appeared in front of the curtain. Only when Manojlovic began after a slight pause to read a text which had no connection whatsoever with the performance the people from Belgrade were supposed to perform at that moment for the Novi Sad audience did those present realize that this was a way of expressing public disagreement and protest by the Belgrade actors against the removal of "Pigeon Pit" from the repertoire of the Serbian National Theater in Novi Sad.

When the theater became silent, Manojlovic said this to the audience in a measured voice:

"Out of respect for the art of the theater and for you who did not remove the production of 'Pigeon Pit,' but who supported it with your applause, we will put on tonight's performance. However, we actors protest the bureaucratic pressure and administrative meddling with the production of 'Pigeon Pit,' the belittling of our art and our profession, which has brought about the closing of that production.

"We call upon you," Manojlovic continued his speech to the audience, "to help us in defending against administrative and bureaucratic bans of productions. The decision on how long a production will run, once it has already begun, can be made--perhaps--only by those who created it."

The audience greeted these words with lengthy applause.

Protest by Students

Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian 21 Dec 82 p 10

[Protest against removal of "Pigeon Pit" from the repertoire of the Drama Center of the Serbian National Theater in Novi Sad signed by 54 students of the School of Dramatic Art belonging to all nationalities: "Who Is Suspicious of Us"]

[Text] The news that the production of "Pigeon Pit" has been removed from the repertoire of the Serbian National Theater is for this generation of students at the School of Dramatic Art in Belgrade more than news in the cultural section of the newspaper. This is an unprecedented case in our modest experience as theatergoers and future professionals. It is natural that in a situation that is completely new and unknown to us we should feel called upon to make our judgment and to have a duty to communicate it to the public. We have seen

the production. We are revolted by the decision of the Workers' Caucus of the Drama Center of the Serbian National Theater--and also astounded by the vague, undocumented and arbitrary justification of their action.

That communication reads, and we quote:

a) "in the production and the events around it there have been expressed approaches, efforts, political messages and goals which result in adverse social reactions and also because of the unacceptable treatment of interethnic relations in the production."

Ten performances have been put on. They were attended by more than 3,000 people. As far as we know, there were no incidents, demonstrations, outbursts, conflicts, provocations or any other disruption of the peace before, during or after the performances. There was no walking out of the theater (which we have otherwise become accustomed to in our theater), nor was there any whistling or protests out loud. But there was tumultuous applause (which we hear more and more rarely in our theaters) and shouts of Bravo. So we, then, ask to be told what are those "negative social reactions." Is it possible that "aggressive Great Serbian nationalism, all puffed up with ethnic egoism and exclusiveness" (B. Ciplic) could have succeeded in arousing the enthusiasm, the pride, the admiration and deep emotions of a large number of us who are not Serbs?

It seems that we saw some other production. For us this is not a story about interethnic relations and fratricidal war, but, as Krleza would have put it, a story about "plebeian misery and poverty" of that time in our country that gave rise to hatred of every kind, and not merely ethnic enmity.

b) The communication goes on to say:

"The decision is also being made because of the possibility that the production might be manipulated with a view to abusing it by enemies of our present-day socialist self-managing reality."

We claim the right to assert that it is much easier to manipulate something which the public has not been allowed to see. We believe that it should be made possible for this production to be staged all over the country, from Nova Gorica to the Dalmatian Zagorje and that the people of present-day, socialist, self-managing Yugoslavia should be allowed to see it, to evaluate it, and to express their judgment publicly.

Do not be suspicious of us.

Statement by Performers' Group

Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian 21 Dec 82 p 10

[Statement by the Presidium of the Belgrade Section of Independent Dramatic Artists: "Against Removal of the Production From the Repertoire"]

[Text] The Presidium of the Belgrade Section of Independent Dramatic Artists took up the most recent events concerning the production "Pigeon Pit" in a meeting on 15 December.

Not wishing to enter into a political discussion of this production, the section as a matter of principle, in the name of freedom of creativity, opposes removal of this production from the repertoire of the Serbian National Theater in Novi Sad and joins the protests which have already been publicly expressed.

That is, we feel that it is ridiculous, to say the least, for the same artistic council which placed the production on the repertoire to now remove it, and we ask what has happened to the creators of the production, who invested their work, their time and their talent in it!? What is happening with the resources invested in the production?

Removing a production from the repertoire is the same as burning books.

Should this go on, we will soon be able to perform only vaudeville from the last century which does not concern anyone.

At the same time creative people in the theater are called upon to be contemporary and committed. How?

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