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COBRAS Multiechelon Brigade and Battalion Staff Exercise Orientation Guide

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Armored Forces Research Unit

U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences

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This Orientation Guide acquaints leaders of armored and mechanized brigades with the Brigade and Battalion Staff Exercise that is part of the Combined Arms Operations at Brigade Level, Realistically Achieved Through Simulation (COBRAS) Program. It provides leaders with information to decide if and how to include this in their unit training program, by providing an overview, the intent, and requirements of the exercise. Additionally, it provides others interested in multiechelon simulation-based training with a description of the program, the performance objectives, and the implementation resources.

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Education and Training Technology

FOREWORD

Within today's Army, two conflicting forces are at work: decreasing resources for training, and increasing demands for highly trained and proficient personnel. Force reductions and other cost efficiencies require the Army to reduce its expenditures for high-fidelity institutional and field training. At the same time, introduction of more complex systems and equipment, changes to doctrine and organization, and a changing geopolitical landscape require that training be more committed to quality and efficiency than ever before.

To meet these challenges, Congress provided Fiscal Year 1994 research and development funding for the establishment of the Force XXI Training Program (formerly known as the Virtual Brigade Training Program) at Fort Knox, Kentucky. The intent of this program is to explore and utilize simulation technologies and instructional principles to create structured training programs that fully leverage available resources in providing efficient, effective training to brigade staffs. The focus is on both preparing and equipping the Army of the 21st century and ensuring that today's Army is sufficiently ready to provide the foundation for continuing change and modernization.

The U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences (ARI), Armored Forces Research Unit (AFRU) at Fort Knox, the Force XXI Training Program, and the U.S. Army Armor Center (USAARMC) joined forces to sponsor training research and development for one element of the Congressionally-mandated effort: simulation-based training for the conventional mounted brigade. The work was performed under a project known as the *Combined Arms Operations at Brigade Level, Realistically Achieved Through Simulation (COBRAS).* The project is an element of Research Task 2228, entitled Force XXI Training Methods and Strategies (FASTTRAIN).

This orientation guide provides an introduction to the multiechelon Brigade and Battalion Staff Exercise, the third effort under the COBRAS umbrella. It acquaints leaders with the exercise and provides them with the information to understand its intent and requirements and decide how to include the exercise in their unit training program.

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Technical Director

COBRAS MULTIECHELON BRIGADE AND BATTALION STAFF EXERCISE ORIENTATION GUIDE

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Preface

Purpose of the guide

This Research Product contains a guide designed for **the brigade commander and the executive officer (XO)** of a brigade that is planning to use the Brigade and Battalion Staff Exercise (BBSE).[1] In that context, it has three primary purposes:

- Provide an *overview* of the COBRAS BBSE for leaders of armor and mechanized infantry brigades and their parent divisions.
- Provide leaders with *information* to enable them to decide whether and when to implement the training.
- Explain the *implementing actions* and resources required to conduct the training.

As a Research Product, it also serves as an overview of the exercise for anyone interested in learning about the intent and requirements of the exercise.

Goals of the exercise

The *Combined Arms Operations at Brigade Level, Realistically Achieved Through Simulation* (COBRAS) exercise is part of a battle simulation training program that encompasses **planning, preparation, execution, and sustainment**.

By design, this **structured exercise** brings together the brigade commander, his primary staff, the maneuver battalion commanders, and their primary staffs for the opportunity to focus on Brigade Combat Team (BCT) decisions and team building.

The COBRAS training program provides a challenging training vehicle for the BCT to explore and refine their staff processes in readiness for deployment or a combat training center (CTC) rotation. It stresses vertical and horizontal integration and an intense battle rhythm.

Further, it offers an opportunity for the commander to clearly state his intent for how his organization will function. Using a simulation-based training exercise, he can then put into practice those procedures and controls.

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[1] A list of abbreviations is provided at Appendix C.

Where the BBSE fits in

The BBSE is designed for a staff which has already clearly defined and practiced its procedures for using the military decision-making process (MDMP) and made them a part of its tactical standing operating procedures (TACSOP).

After the staff has progressed to this level, the BBSE will provide a training environment where the staff can:

- train on critical collective staff skills
- experience an intense battle rhythm with concurrent handling of multiple missions
- practice planning in parallel with subordinate units in a continuous, uncertain battlefield environment

If the BCT has a new commander who has not trained with the staff, or the staff has many new or inexperienced staff members, other training may be needed prior to using the BBSE. For example, individual staff members can use the Battle Staff Training System (BSTS) to gain fundamental knowledge and skills about their position. The COBRAS Brigade Staff Exercise (BSE) and staff vignettes can be used to permit the brigade staff to work together on their decision-making procedures and other staff tasks. These programs support progressive training for the brigade staff, from individual to small group to full staff involvement.

When the BBSE fits in

The BBSE logically fits after a National Training Center (NTC) Leader Training Program (LTP). At that point the BCT will be completing its final preparations for dealing with the intensity of staff challenges which will be part of an operational deployment or an NTC rotation.

The remainder of this guide will provide you the additional details to allow you to make your final decision and proceed with planning for the exercise.

Section 1: Overview of the Exercise

1.1 Introduction

Purpose

This section provides descriptions of:

- exercise scope and scenario
- training audience and other participants
- exercise tactical scenario

1.2 Exercise Scope

Continuous operations

The scenario is designed to generate the demanding conditions for continuous operations. The staffs and all supporting elements must be prepared for 24-hour operations.

The Brigade Combat Team (BCT) headquarters and its maneuver task forces (TFs) operate from their command posts (CPs) which are linked to a simulation center with Brigade/Battalion Battle Simulation (BBS) as the exercise driver.

Training environment

Because this exercise is designed to generate some of the intensity and rhythm found in actual operations, units are encouraged to set up the CPs as they would be in field conditions. This applies to the tactical command post (TAC), main, and rear CPs of the brigade; and to the command group, main CP, and combat trains CP (CTCP) of the TFs.

This configuration will allow the staffs to train with the assets that will be available in the field and to determine how their organization and arrangement contribute to or detract from the staff processes.

To facilitate frequent feedback sessions and for other resource reasons, these CPs should be centrally located adjacent to the simulation center. There they can easily be linked to the simulation center and to the tactical communications that will support the exercise.

While locating CPs at a greater distance from the simulation center will better replicate some of the hardships experienced with fully deployed CPs, it will also complicate conduct of the exercise. It is recommended that CPs *not* be set up in the field.

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1.2 Exercise Scope, Continued

Exercise focus	A tactical scenario is presented to the BCT which causes the targeted training audience of commanders and staffs of the brigade and maneuver TFs to plan, prepare, and execute a series of missions. While most of the actions associated with those mission phases occur and are practiced, feedback is focused on a limited number of topics that are selected before the start of the exercise.
Performance objectives	These topics, called performance objectives, provide the specific training objectives for the exercise. They are collective commander and staff skills that allow the brigade to enter its next level of operations or training at a higher level. In the case of a Combat Training Center (CTC) rotation, these skills will help units be prepared to get the most from the upcoming full-up live training experience.
Feedback design	The performance objectives focus the exercise by providing topics for the scheduled and impromptu feedback sessions with the training audience. Feedback is provided by peer observers from other units or by trained observer/controllers. The observation and feedback system targets the commanders and staffs of the brigade and the maneuver TFs.
Supporting materials	The exercise is supported by a complete training support package (TSP) which includes all the instructions, materials, orders, and simulation materials necessary to execute the training. Once the brigade decides to conduct a BBSE, TSP materials will be distributed by the supporting simulation center manager.

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1.2 Exercise Scope, Continued

Unit MTOEs

The TSP has been prepared with a set of exercise modified tables of organization and equipment (MTOEs) which reflect L-series organizational tables of organization and equipment. These MTOEs make it unnecessary for the unit or the simulation site to build an MTOE file for this exercise. While there may be differences between these exercise MTOEs and the BCT's MTOE, they should be minor and will not affect the training objectives for the exercise.

Copies of the exercise MTOEs are found in the *XO Guide to Unit Preparation and Materials Distribution*. The executive officer (XO) can have the staff review the *Blue Forces TOE Authorization Document* so the BCT understands the exact MTOE that will be found in the exercise and which their battle tracking procedures must follow.

If the BCT decides to change these MTOEs, the simulation center will need to rebuild all the BBS files that are provided in the TSP, and the initial situation materials used by the units will now have inconsistencies.

For these reasons, it is strongly recommended that the exercise MTOEs be accepted and used.

1.3 Exercise Scenario

Missions

The exercise scenario provides the conditions for planning and executing three missions:

- area defense (AD)
- deliberate attack (DATK)
- movement to contact (MTC)

The missions occur in a set sequence, and are designed to be partially concurrent. For example, the DATK must be planned while the AD is being executed. The three missions are set in a background story line that provides a consistent context. The unit's combat readiness at the end of one mission determines its combat readiness at the start of the next mission. However, the outcome of one mission does not effect the starting location or enemy situation for the next.

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1.3 Exercise Scenario, Continued

Battle rhythm

Performing the missions concurrently replicates the battle rhythm found at the CTCs, where the division order for the subsequent mission is given to the brigade while they are still preparing for the current mission. The brigade's order for the subsequent mission must be ready for issuing to the battalions as soon as the ongoing mission is completed.

Adjusting the length of the exercise

The exercise is designed to run the three missions in the given sequence in a continuous operations setting. **To plan, prepare, and execute all three missions takes five and a half to six training days.** This does not include the preparation, set up and simulation system training that must go on prior to receipt of the division order for the first mission.

The exercise must start with the AD, followed by the DATK, followed by the MTC.

A useful variation is to stop training before executing the final mission, the MTC. This allows the exercise to be completed in **one week of five training days.**

The exercise could also be stopped at the end of executing the first mission; this would permit the brigade to plan, prepare, and execute that mission and develop its plan for the second mission.

1.4 Exercise Participants

Primary training audience

The brigade commander and the TF commanders are key members of the primary training audience and are full participants in the exercise.

Other members of the primary training audience are those brigade and TF staff members who operate out of the brigade main and rear CPs and the TF main CP and CTCP.

The members of the primary training audience are listed in Table 1.

Table 1. Primary Training Audience Members

Brigade Level	
Brigade commander	Brigade fire support coordinator (FSCOORD)
Brigade XO	Air defense artillery (ADA) coordinator (ADCOORD) and section
Brigade personnel officer (S1) and section	Forward support battalion (FSB) commander and support operations section
Brigade intelligence officer (S2) and section	Military intelligence (MI) company commander and headquarters section
Brigade operations officer (S3) and section	Military police (MP) platoon leader and platoon sergeant
Brigade logistics officer (S4) and section	Army aviation liaison officer (AVN LNO)
Chemical officer and section	USAF air liaison officer (ALO)
Brigade engineer (ENGR) and section	
Brigade signal officer	
Brigade fire support officer (FSO) and fire support element (FSE)	

Observed Battalion/TF Level		
TF commander	TF S3 and section	Signal officer
TF XO	TF S4 and section	TF FSO and FSE
TF S1 and section	Chemical officer and section	TF ADA platoon leader
TF S2 and section	TF ENGR	TF liaison officer (LNO)

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1.4 Exercise Participants, Continued

Supporting audience

Other participants include members of the brigade and TF subordinate and supporting units. These persons will roleplay their subordinate units and operate out of BBS workstations.

In general, these supporting audience members will not be the focus of observations or feedback. However, they may participate in feedback sessions, both to provide information and to learn from their own observation of the session.

Training support personnel

In addition, support is required to roleplay key division staff members and the opposing forces (OPFOR). Soldiers are also required to operate the BBS terminals at each workstation.

1.5 Brigade Task Organization and Tactical Situation

Brigade task organization

The exercise incorporates a brigade task organization as shown in Table 2.

The composition of these units (personnel and equipment), along with the standardized unit designations, is contained in the tactical materials.

Table 2. Brigade Task Organization

• one mechanized infantry battalion • two armor battalions • engineer battalion • field artillery (FA) battalion • multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) battery • ADA battery • forward support battalion	• MI company • MP platoon • Brigade (Bde) headquarters signal section and mobile subscriber equipment (MSE) section • nuclear - biological - chemical (NBC) reconnaissance section • smoke generation platoon • decontamination platoon

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1.5 Brigade Task Organization and Tactical Situation, Continued

Unit designations

The unit designations are fixed to reflect the exercise division's task organization. Participants frequently want to change those to their own unit designations. When they do, it requires changes in all the products and reduces the value of having the TSP already completed. Experience has shown that using the exercise unit designations is not a problem for participants. One hour into the exercise, soldiers have adapted to the exercise unit designations and the issue does not come up for the remainder of the exercise.

TF participation

Typically, TFs will participate in the BBSE by having the TF commander and staff in fully operational CPs. Company leaders support the TF by operating at simulation workstations.

The brigade commander may elect to have all three battalion TFs participate fully in this way, or may decide that only two, one, or none of the TFs will fully participate. TFs that do not participate fully will not deploy CPs. Rather, these TFs support the brigade by having TF leaders or other designated persons perform TF activities at the simulation workstations.

Section 3 contains information about resource and support requirements.

Note: In this guide, TFs that participate fully will be referred to as "observed TFs." A TF that is represented at a BBS workstation will be referred to as a "non-observed TF."

Tactical location

Although placed in the mythical country of Mojave, actual execution of all three missions is on simulated terrain of the NTC at Fort Irwin, CA, as represented in BBS.

OPFOR

The OPFOR is a Krasnovian Front Army using heavy OPFOR organization and tactics as detailed in Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Pamphlets (PAMs) 350-1 and 350-16.

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Section 2: Performance Objectives

2.1 Introduction

Purpose

This section describes how performance objectives are used to focus the BBSE and provides a list of the performance objectives included in the TSP.

2.2 Using Performance Objectives to Focus the Exercise

Purpose of performance objectives

Structured training exercises require that specific tasks, skills, or activities be chosen as the topics for practice, observation, and feedback. The selected topics (performance objectives) become the focus for the feedback sessions. Concentrating on a few critical skills should result in significant unit improvement in these key areas.

A menu of performance objectives has been developed for this exercise. Topics were selected based on recurring problems at CTCs, suggestions by units, and the experience of senior armor officers. Each performance objective has material in the TSP that describes the skill or activity, techniques and procedures show an approach to the requirement, and observation and assessment guidelines to help commander and observers provide feedback.

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2.2 Using Performance Objectives to Focus the Exercise, Continued

Selecting performance objectives

A list of the prepared performance objectives is shown in Table 3. A synopsis with more details of each performance objective is in Appendix A. Most of the performance objectives listed are multiechelon, involving performance at brigade and TF levels. Feedback sessions on those multiechelon performance objectives will involve the BCT staff and the staffs of the maneuver TFs.

From that list of performance objectives, brigade leaders will select those that will be the focus for their exercise.

Because the performance objectives have such broad scope within the exercise, the brigade commander should select a limited number. A set of 4-6 at the brigade level will allow the BCT staff and the observers to concentrate their attention. It also ensures there is enough time for substantive feedback sessions to address each performance objective at a minimum of two points during the exercise.

Although the scenario will require the BCT to perform the activities described in all the performance objectives, the observation and feedback throughout the exercise will focus on the selected performance objectives.

Once the performance objectives for the exercise have been chosen, they become the basis for published exercise objectives and commander's goals.

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2.2 Using Performance Objectives to Focus the Exercise, Continued

Table 3. BBSE Performance Objectives
Parallel planning within the brigade
Conduct clearance of indirect fires procedures
Plan and manage reconnaissance within the brigade
Integrate logistics estimates in decision-making
Manage information within the brigade command posts
Plan and implement brigade air defense early warning
Develop and execute the brigade and battalion plan for fires
Conduct a combat health support rehearsal
Decision-making in a time constrained environment
Plan and execute a decision point
Develop and execute the brigade concept of mobility/survivability
Plan for and commit a company-size reserve
Plan, integrate, and manage smoke assets
(TF) Manage information within the task force command posts
(TF) Military decision-making process in the battalion

TF specific performance objectives

The first 13 of the performance objectives listed in Table 3 are multiechelon (brigade and maneuver TF). Two of the performance objectives listed in the table are designed to deal specifically with activities at the maneuver TF staff level:

- Manage information within the TF CPs
- Military decision-making process (MDMP) in the battalion.

It is suggested that these be chosen for each of the TFs that will fully participate in the exercises with their leaders, staff, and full CPs. Those TFs will have individual feedback sessions on those two topics in addition to attending the BCT feedback sessions on the other chosen performance objectives.

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Section 3: Resource Information

3.1 Introduction

This section describes the resource requirements for implementing the exercise in terms of personnel, time, and simulation.

It also describes the TSP that will be provided to assist in implementation.

3.2 Personnel Requirements

Personnel requirements

The exercise requires personnel support in addition to the training audience (listed in Table 1). They include:

- Exercise Director
- COBRAS Coordinator
- Blue Forces Controller
- Observers
- Role-players
- BBS Interactors
- Simulation Site Manager

The number of persons in each role and a more precise description of their qualifications is provided in the *Exercise Guide for the BBSE*, a component of the TSP that is used by the Exercise Director. A brief description of each role is given below.

Continued on next page

3.2 Personnel Requirements, Continued

Exercise Director

The Exercise Director has major responsibilities both before and during the exercise. They include:

- Oversee the coordination and planning for the exercise,
- Control the flow and progress of the mission events during the exercise, and
- Roleplay the 55 Infantry Division (ID) (M) commander.

An assistant division commander (ADC), or someone of comparable operational and training experience, would be well suited to the role.

Because of his critical role in exercise planning and preparation, it is imperative that the Exercise Director be identified at least four months before exercise conduct.

It is recommended that the brigade commander not serve as Exercise Director. If he chooses to do so, he should at the very least appoint an assistant to serve as the controller during the conduct of the exercise itself. There are two reasons for this guidance:

- The commander is considered a key participant and member of the target training audience during the exercise and should be completely immersed in his role in the exercise.
- The individual who controls the flow and progress of the exercise will know too much about the planned outcomes to also be a member of the training audience.

COBRAS Coordinator

The COBRAS Coordinator assists the Exercise Director in coordinating and helping the unit prepare for the training. He will probably do most of the work to plan and coordinate resources for the exercise. The COBRAS Coordinator should be a member of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations (G3) planning or training staff.

This officer could come from the brigade being trained. However, the need to draw resources from across the division suggests assigning a coordinator who can task assets outside the brigade that is receiving the training.

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3.2 Personnel Requirements, Continued

Blue Forces Controller

The Blue Forces Controller will assist the Exercise Director during the final preparations and actual conduct of the training. This officer must have BBS expertise and must be familiar with the full range of operations at and below brigade level. The Blue Forces Controller will be in charge of the activity at the Blue (friendly) simulation workstations and will also be the primary link between the Exercise Director and the simulation workstations during the training.

Observers

The observers provide feedback to the brigade and TF staffs in training. They are probably not a permanent observation team and will likely have to be tasked from another similar unit. They should have brigade or TF-level experience.

Role-players

Role-players support the exercise from the BBS workstations by playing the roles of the brigade's and TF's subordinate and supporting units (Blue Forces role-players), division staff (exercise control [EXCON]), and OPFOR.

- The Blue Forces Roleplayer positions are best filled by the brigade's subordinate unit personnel. While there is no planned observation and feedback system for role-players, the opportunity exists for role-players to receive excellent training.
- The roles of EXCON members who will represent the division staff are best filled by staff officers or assistants who perform those function on the division staff.
- The OPFOR Controller should be someone with experience at representing the Krasnovian Heavy force.

BBS interactors

BBS interactors act as the role-players' agents in running the simulation. There will be both OPFOR (Red) and Blue interactors. They should receive the BBS training described in the *Site Manager Guide for the BBSE.*

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3.2 Personnel Requirements, Continued

Simulation Site Manager

The BBS Site Manager is responsible for configuring the site to support the exercise, planning and conducting the interactor and roleplayer training, and operating the higher control (HICON) workstation, which controls the simulation.

Key early decisions

The Exercise Director and COBRAS Coordinator will be the key action officers in planning and preparing for this exercise. There are many long lead items which need attention early in this process, such as putting the exercise on the unit's schedule and tasking for site or participant support. You should identify these individuals and allow them to get started as soon as you have committed to the exercise.

Once you have identified a COBRAS Coordinator, have him/her contact the site manager of your BBS site and get access to the remainder of the TSP. The COBRAS Coordinator will immediately need the guide which has instruction for the Exercise Director, the COBRAS Coordinator, and the Blue Forces Controller. It details the actions needed to begin preparation for the exercise.

3.3 Time Requirements

Exercise Director and COBRAS Coordinator

Preparation for the exercise should begin 12-16 weeks before implementation. This will allow sufficient time for taskings, reproduction and distribution of TSP materials and briefings.

Brigade and TF training audience

The training audience will need 2-5 days of preparation time to:

- become familiar with the scenario and tactical situation,
- prepare overlays and maps, and
- complete their set up of the CPs to be used.

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3.3 Time Requirements, Continued

Role-players and interactors

The interactors will participate in two days of BBS training and tactical situation familiarization prior to the exercise. Role-players will also need to review the tactical situation for their units and become familiar with the BBS system.

3.4 Simulation Requirements

Simulation center and staff

The exercise requires the support of an established simulation center that has run brigade level exercises using the BBS. The staff of the simulation center should be familiar with the general capabilities and characteristics of this type of exercise.

The permanent staff at the supporting simulation center should be qualified to use BBS to meet exercise requirements. They should have an existing training program which they use for training BBS interactors.

BBS configuration

The exercise requires BBS version 5.1 with the NTC 180 x 180 kilometer (km) terrain database.

The exercise requires 16 BBS workstations.

3.5 The Training Support Package

Description

The TSP supplies the scenario, conditions, and instructions needed to conduct the exercise. It includes the following:

- *Exercise Guide for the BBSE*, including how to plan, coordinate, and conduct the exercise
- BBS tapes with preloaded personnel, equipment, and supply specifications
- documentation of all BBS specifications and initialization conditions
- division orders and overlays
- OPFOR schemes of maneuver and order of battle
- guides and initial situation packages for BBS workstation teams
- guides and initial situation packages for the primary training audience
- observation and feedback guides for observers

The TSP will be provided to the Exercise Director or COBRAS Coordinator by the simulation center.

Distribution of TSP materials

The materials needed to run a BBSE are controlled by the COBRAS Coordinator. After the exact configuration of the exercise is determined, he/she will assemble and distribute the materials according to the configuration and the preparation time line.

To allow personnel to prepare for the exercise, many of the materials are distributed before the training begins; these are referred to as readaheads. Other items are issued during the exercise, in accordance with the training and the scenario.

Maps are NOT part of the TSP. The area of operations and interest will require some map coverage beyond what is usually needed during an NTC rotation. In addition, there are six 1:250,000 map sheets required for posting division overlays. These are sometimes difficult to locate and the COBRAS Coordinator should begin work on map requirements immediately.

Section 4: Mission Descriptions

4.1 Introduction

Purpose

This section of the guide describes the three missions that will be trained in the exercise, in terms of mission story line and starting conditions.

4.2 Mission Story Line

Scenario background

The brigade has deployed to the theater of operations. After building combat power and leaving the port of debarkation, the brigade conducted a field training exercise (FTX). During the FTX, tensions heightened. The FTX was terminated, and the brigade moved to a tactical assembly area and subsequently conducted limited combat operations.

The Road to War at Appendix B has a detailed history of the events that cause this operation and the specific events which lead to the hostilities.

Area defense

The exercise begins with the brigade in Assembly Area (AA) Rook undergoing reorganization. The brigade transitions from a period of limited combat operations to the AD mission. During this transition, the brigade must perform the normal combat service support (CSS) functions. Among other actions, these include replenishing the brigade's supplies, evacuating and repairing its damaged or inoperable equipment, and evacuating wounded soldiers to appropriate medical treatment facilities. The success of these sustainment operations will determine the brigade's starting condition for its AD mission.

When the brigade receives the division order for the AD, there are only 46 hours until the projected time for the Krasnovian attack. As subordinate units continue CSS reporting, the brigade order is prepared and issued. Recon and counterrecon activities go on as brigade preparation continues.

At about 28 hours into preparation, EXCON issues the division operation order (OPORD) for the next mission, the DATK. This allows the brigade to start planning for the second mission and to exercise its CTC battle rhythm processes. The enemy attacks; the brigade defends. The mission concludes with a change of mission similar to a CTC context.

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4.2 Mission Story Line, Continued

Deliberate attack

After the AD mission, the brigade moves to a rear assembly area. This provides sufficient time out of enemy contact to prepare for the DATK and to improve its combat capability to make the DATK a feasible mission. The brigade's posture reflects the AD losses. The subordinate and supporting units receive the brigade DATK OPORD and begin their planning and preparation to support the brigade DATK.

The brigade continues normal replenishment and other CSS activities in the assembly area as it plans and prepares for the mission.

At approximately the time the brigade completes issuing its DATK order, EXCON issues the division OPORD for the MTC. Again, this allows the brigade to plan for the next mission and exercise a CTC-like battle rhythm.

The brigade and TFs conduct their rehearsals and execute the DATK.

Movement to contact

After change of mission is received, the brigade issues its OPORD for the MTC and moves to a rear assembly area. This provides sufficient time out of enemy contact to prepare for the MTC and to improve its combat capability to make the MTC a feasible mission. The brigade's readiness posture reflects any losses from its DATK mission. The brigade and TFs conduct their rehearsals, refine the plans, and then move to the attack positions and conduct reconnaissance.

The brigade executes the MTC and makes contact with the enemy advance guard main body (AGMB), followed by the remainder of the regiment. The mission terminates upon success being achieved by either the brigade or the OPFOR and the Exercise Director issuing change of mission instructions.

If the MTC execution is not conducted, the Exercise Director will issue change of mission following the issue of the brigade MTC order.

Section 5: Implementing Actions

5.1 Introduction

Purpose

This section of the guide details the events and activities required in planning and preparing for the COBRAS BBSE. It includes the planning and preparation time line, commander and XO actions, and near-term implementation activities.

This information will enable the brigade commander to determine when and how to implement the program.

5.2 Planning and Preparation Time Line

Time line

Planning and preparation for the COBRAS BBSE begins months before the exercise is to be run.

The time line shown on the next page (Table 4) shows the actions leading up to conduct of the exercise. Much of the work will be the responsibility of the Exercise Director and COBRAS Coordinator. Those tasks that are likely to be the responsibility of the brigade are shown in **bold** print.

Continued on next page

5.2 Planning and Preparation Time Line, Continued

Table 4. Planning and Preparation Time Line	
Timing	**Activity**
Per SOP	**Decision is made to conduct BCT training using the COBRAS BBSE; entered on training calendar.**
Per SOP	Schedule BBS simulation site.
T-18 weeks	Designate the personnel to serve as Exercise Director and COBRAS Coordinator.
	Exercise Director and brigade commander meet to discuss roles and expectations.
T-14 weeks	**Exercise Director and brigade commander determine how many training days will be allocated to the exercise.**
	Exercise Director develops preliminary exercise schedule.
	Brigade commander and XO decide on staffing for CPs.
	Brigade commander selects performance objectives.
T-12 weeks	COBRAS Coordinator releases taskings for personnel to units.
	COBRAS Coordinator confirms facilities schedule.
T-4 weeks	COBRAS Coordinator issues guides and readahead materials to:
	Training audience (through **brigade XO**)
	Blue Forces Controller
	OPFOR Controller
	Observers
T-2 weeks	Load and try out BBS tapes.
	Provide orientation briefing for all participants.
	Commanders and staffs study readahead materials and references and become familiar with the tactical situation described.
	S2s use ISP materials to begin intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB).
T-1 week	BBS Site Manager trains and rehearses interactors and role-players.
	Role-players and training audience set up exercise area.
	Division role-players rehearse division order.
	Exercise Director conducts final readiness check of exercise support.
	Brigade commander and XO conduct final readiness check of BCT.

5.3 Brigade Commander and XO Actions

Commander actions

After reading the remainder of this *Brigade and Battalion Orientation Guide,* the brigade commander or his designated representative should:

- Determine who will be the Exercise Director and COBRAS Coordinator and bring them into the planning.
- Determine which maneuver TFs will participate with full staffing and CPs.
- Determine the length of the exercise.
- Select the performance objectives for observation and feedback (see Section 2).
- Determine the process for getting division or installation support for the exercise.
- Set suspense dates for progress backbriefs, information updates, and identification of problem areas. Include maps as an action item which must be tracked.
- Establish a time line for exercise planning and preparation.

XO actions

During preparation for the exercise, the brigade XO should follow the commander's guidance and the procedures described in the *XO Guide to Unit Preparation and Materials Distribution.* A detailed list of duties for preparation is in the XO's guide.

Generally, his tasks include:

- Conduct staff preparation for brigade and subordinate staffs to ready them for the exercise.
- Coordinate with the COBRAS Coordinator for timely receipt and distribution of training materials for the BCT.
- Coordinate the actions required to familiarize the brigade staff, observed TFs, and roleplayed units with the pre-exercise tactical and logistical situation.

5.4 Near Term Implementation Activities

Activities

Once the decision is made, even tentatively, to implement the COBRAS BBSE, there are four important next steps:

- Identify the COBRAS Coordinator and the Exercise Director.
- Place the exercise on the brigade's long-term training calendar.
- Enlist division or installation support for the planned training period.
- Provide a copy of this guide to those maneuver TFs who will participate in the exercise with their full staffs.

Appendix A: Performance Objectives Options

Contents

The materials that follow cover all of the performance objectives. For each objective, they include:

- A description of the training need
- The objective statement, describing the goals of the objective
- An overview of techniques and procedures that support the objective
- References that give more information on performance of the objective

Use the materials in this Appendix to understand the performance objectives prepared for the BBSE.

Parallel Planning Within the Brigade

Parallel planning is a doctrinal procedure which supports and fosters the initiation of planning at subordinate levels before planning and preparations are completed at the higher level. This performance objective addresses the parallel planning process that should exist between the brigade combat team (BCT) staff and the maneuver battalion task force (bn/TF) staffs. Parallel planning for a mission when the BCT is not engaged in active operations is demanding, but certainly possible. When the BCT is engaged in an ongoing mission, the parallel planning which can be done by subordinate bn/TFs must be realistically adjusted to recognize the limited size, depth, and experience of the bn/TF staffs. The staff procedures for this parallel planning between BCT and bn/TF staffs can be practiced and refined during exercises such as this. Repetitively practicing this process under increasingly difficult conditions will enable the BCT to maximize the planning time that is available for any mission.

Objective

The brigade integrates the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP) at several echelons by involving all subordinate and supporting commands in simultaneous planning activities. Integration requires frequent and timely warning orders (WARNOs) from brigade and the fusion of subordinate liaison officers (LNOs) into decision-making at brigade to maintain a continuous information flow between echelons. Subsequent WARNOs do not include conflicting information, and combined with interaction between the battle staffs, enable the bn/TF to complete course of action (COA) development prior to issue of the brigade operation order (OPORD). OPORDs at both echelons must be in agreement.

Continued on next page

Parallel Planning Within the Brigade, Continued

Overview

Parallel planning relies on the timely exchange of information between echelons to integrate brigade and bn/TF planning activities. It requires a trained, experienced staff who are familiar with the MDMP as practiced within their command setting.

For successful parallel planning, units must share information through WARNOs, utilize experienced liaison persons, and maintain awareness at each echelon of the ongoing activities and requirements of each other.

This technique and procedure focuses on those activities and interchanges that should facilitate the parallel planning requirement of the MDMP. The information presented is not intended for basic MDMP training; it assumes MDMP expertise on the part of both brigade and battalion staffs. Commanders and staffs must combine the techniques and procedures of this performance objective with their own planning methods and applications.

This technique and procedure is based on a model using four WARNOs issued from brigade to its subordinate units. Specific situations may dictate fewer or more orders.

Continued on next page

Parallel Planning Within the Brigade, Continued

References

Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP) 71-2-MTP, *Mission Training Plan for the Tank and Mechanized Infantry Battalion Task Force*, 03 October 1988

- Task 7-1-3901, Command and Control the Battalion Task Force
- Task 7-1-3902, Perform S3 Operations
- Task 7-1-3904, Operate Main Command Post
- Task 7-1-3906, Perform S2 Operations
- Task 7-1-3907, Employ Fire Support
- Task 7-1-3908, Operate Fire Support Section Operations
- Task 7-1-3912, Perform Combat Service Support Operations
- Task 7-1-3915, Operate Personnel Administrative Center

ARTEP 71-3-MTP Final Draft, *Mission Training Plan for the Heavy Brigade Command Group and Staff*, February 1997

- Task 71-6-3004, Execute Fire Support
- Task 71-6-3005, Analyze Targets
- Task 71-6-2651, Develop the Engineer Estimate
- Task 71-6-0631, Conduct Logistical Planning
- Task 71-6-0023, Conduct Strength Management
- Task 71-6-0001, Direct the Brigade Staff
- Task 71-6-0003, Direct the Brigade Staff Planning Process
- Task 71-6-0006, Establish Liaison

Field Manual (FM) 100-5 Initial Draft, *Operations*, 04 April 1997

- Part Three, The Art of Operations, Chapter 2, pp. III-2-23/25

FM 101-5, *Staff Organizations and Operations*, 31 May 1997

- Chapter 5, The Military Decision-Making Process
- Appendix H, Plans and Orders
- Appendix L, Liaison

Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL)

- NTC Trends 3 Quarter (Q) Fiscal Year (FY) 95 and 4QFY95, TA.4 Command and Control Battlefield Operating System (BOS), Section II, Engineer Battalion Staff Parallel Planning
- NTC Trends 3QFY96 and 4QFY96, No. 97-9, Section II, TA.4, Parallel Planning Between Task Force and Brigade

Conduct Clearance of Indirect Fires Procedures

To achieve the fire support system's full potential to enhance maneuver, brigade combat teams (BCT) must have effective procedures for clearing indirect fires. Timely clearance is essential to allow the BCT to engage critical high priority targets on a rapidly changing battlefield. The commander's desire for timely and responsive fire support must be balanced with the requirement to manage risk and prevent fratricide. Such balance is not easily achieved. Beyond detailed and understood standing operating procedures (SOP), it requires brigade and battalion staffs with extensive practice in all the procedures essential to facilitating effective clearance of fires procedures, from planning through execution.

Objective

The BCT implements clearance procedures that provide for the timely delivery of fires and eliminate fratricide. The BCT responds to conditions that require clearance of fires by implementing positive clearance procedures, down to company level. Fire support personnel will identify fires granted clearance within 600 meters of friendly troops as danger close missions and will warn friendly troops of these fires.

Continued on next page

Conduct Clearance of Indirect Fires Procedures, Continued

Overview

It is mandatory that the BCT establish and practice a system for clearing indirect fires. The methods employed must be both quick and effective. While the goal of clearance of fires procedures is to prevent fratricide, it must not be so restrictive, cumbersome, or time consuming that it interferes with the delivery of effective fires on an enemy force.

There are three conditions that affect the clearance of fires procedures:

- Situations where a clearance is not required from adjacent or higher units because of the use of maneuver graphic control measures (GCM) and fire support coordination measures (FSCM) (*e.g., fires delivered beyond the coordinated fire line [CFL] within the unit's zone or sector).*
- Those situations where fires are pre-cleared by the commander *(e.g., fires into a planned call for fire zone [CFFZ] resulting from a radar acquisition from that planned CFFZ).*
- All fire missions other than those defined in the previous two situations; these require positive clearance procedures in each fire mission. *(Many fires will be in this category, such as fires beyond unit boundaries, short of the CFL, etc.)*

The techniques and procedures in this performance objective outline requirements for all three conditions. Emphasis is on the staff procedures involved, not the actions involving troops on the ground. Even without that level of detail, enforcement and practice of the staff requirements will enhance later performance under full field conditions.

Effective clearance of fires relies primarily upon a command post battle drill of unit developed procedures for the positive clearance of fires. This battle drill, which involves subordinate units down to company level at the workstations, is effective only when the participants fully understand the employment of maneuver control and FSCM and the pre-clearance of fires situations.

Continued on next page

Conduct Clearance of Indirect Fires Procedures, Continued

References

ARTEP 71-3 MTP Final Draft, *Mission Training Plan for the Heavy Brigade Command Group and Staff*, February 1997

- Task 71-6-3001, Establish Fire Support Cell
- Task 71-6-3002, Plan Fire Support
- Task 71-6-3003, Synchronize Fire Support
- Task 71-6-3004, Execute Fire Support
- Task 71-6-3005, Analyze Targets

FM 6-20-40, *Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Fire Support for Brigade Operations (Heavy)*, 5 January 1990

- Appendix E, Fire Support Coordinating Measures, p. 2/20

Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL)

- JRTC Priority Trends, 4QFY94 to 3QFY96, Section TA.2 Fire Support BOS, pp. N-18/20
- NTC Priority Trends, 4QFY94 to 3-4QFY95, Section TA.2 Fire Support BOS, p. N-19
- Newsletter 97-11, *Clearance of Fires*, Captain (CPT) Samuel R. White, April 1997

Plan and Manage Reconnaissance Within the Brigade

The reconnaissance effort begins almost immediately upon receipt of a new mission and continues throughout planning, preparation, and execution. The staff must quickly focus the reconnaissance assets on the issues that the commander designates as critical to the operation. In addition, the staff must ensure that reconnaissance assets are fully supported and managed throughout the effort. This requires the staff to receive the commander's guidance, develop a reconnaissance plan that supports his information requirements, issue appropriate orders, and begin immediate and continuous tracking of progress towards satisfying those requirements. Staff responsibilities and processes to expedite this critical activity can be refined and made part of the unit's tactical standing operating procedures (TACSOP).

Objective

The brigade conducts reconnaissance to gather information that identifies the enemy course of action in time to support the commander's decision requirements. The brigade establishes reconnaissance intent, objectives, information requirements, and means. Reconnaissance is planned, managed, and integrated at brigade level, and is supported and implemented by all staff sections, incorporating all battlefield operating systems (BOS). The subordinate and supporting units integrate their objectives and information requirements into their brigade tasking to develop plans at their level. Reconnaissance management at all levels is reactive to changes in the reconnaissance forces, the enemy, and the information requirements.

Continued on next page

Plan and Manage Reconnaissance Within the Brigade,
Continued

Overview

Recognizing that the reconnaissance effort is critical to the success of the brigade mission has caused increased emphasis on the planning and execution of that effort. As a result, reconnaissance is now treated as a mission, with concentrated management and integration of activities and support throughout.

Reconnaissance management is not limited to planning, but must also include preparation activities, conduct of the reconnaissance, and post-mission requirements. Reconnaissance is the commander's tool for determining the enemy's intent in time to make command decisions. As attention is diverted to pressing operational requirements, the management of the reconnaissance cannot be allowed to lag.

This performance objective covers a method of managing reconnaissance. The method starts with the recognition of a need for a specialized reconnaissance management team, or cell to conduct the planning and preparation, and to continue to function, overseeing reconnaissance until all reconnaissance objectives are met. Much of the emphasis is on the integration of brigade and battalion efforts in the management. The brigade usually has more staff resources for management, but the battalion usually controls most of the reconnaissance tools. This performance objective outlines a method for integrating efforts at both echelons.

A time line of reconnaissance planning activities for division, brigade, and task force (TF) is attached to this guide (Attachment 2). It is not prescriptive, but it will provide additional information on one way that planning can be conducted.

References

ARTEP 71-2-MTP, *Mission Training Plan for the Tank and Mechanized Infantry Battalion Task Force*, October 1998 with changes

- Task 7-1-3033, Treat and Evacuate Casualty
- Task 7-1-3905, Perform Intelligence Operations
- Task 7-1-3906, Perform S2 Operations
- Task 7-1-3908, Operate Fire Support Section Operations
- Task 7-1-3911, Perform Air Defense Operations
- Task 7-1-3912, Perform Combat Service Support Operations

Continued on next page

Plan and Manage Reconnaissance Within the Brigade,
Continued

References, continued

ARTEP 71-3-MTP Final Draft, *Mission Training Plan for the Heavy Brigade Command Group and Staff*, February 1997

- Task 71-6-0001, Direct the Brigade Staff
- Task 71-6-0002, Analyze Mission
- Task 71-6-0003, Direct the Brigade Staff Planning Process
- Task 71-6-0009, Conduct Battle Tracking
- Task 71-6-0015, Issue Commander's Guidance to Staff
- Task 71-6-0050, Develop the Brigade Operations Order
- Task 71-6-0270, Coordinate Communications Support
- Task 71-6-0308, Synchronize Air Defense Artillery
- Task 71-6-0631, Conduct Logistical Planning
- Task 71-6-0632, Monitor Logistics Operations
- Task 71-6-1002, Coordinate the Reconnaissance and Surveillance Plan
- Task 71-6-1003, Produce a Reconnaissance and Surveillance Plan
- Task 71-6-1005, Maintain the Brigade Intelligence Data Base
- Task 71-6-1051, Process Combat Information and Intelligence
- Task 71-6-3002, Plan Fire Support
- Task 71-6-3004, Execute Fire Support
- Task 71-6-3102, Coordinate Air Defense Operations
- Task 71-6-1056, Conduct Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB)

FM 34-2, *Collection Management and Synchronization Planning*, 8 March 1994

- Chapter 2, Collection Management Support to Commanders

FM 34-2-1, *Reconnaissance and Surveillance and Intelligence Support to Counterreconnaissance*, 19 June 1991

- Chapter 2, Reconnaissance and Surveillance and Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield

FM 34-130, *Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield*, 8 July 1994

- Chapter 1, Introduction
- Chapter 2, Conducting Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield

Continued on next page

Plan and Manage Reconnaissance Within the Brigade,
Continued

References, continued

FM 71-2, *The Tank and Mechanized Infantry Battalion Task Force*, 27 September 1998 with changes

- Chapter 3, Section 3-10, Reconnaissance and Surveillance
- Chapter 4, Section 4-7, Defensive IPB

FM 71-3, *The Armored and Mechanized Infantry*, 8 January 1996

- Chapter 4, Section I, Intelligence
- Chapter 5, Section I, Intelligence

FM 71-123, *Tactics and Techniques for Combined Arms Heavy Forces, Armored Brigade, Battalion Task Force, and Company Team*, 30 September 1992

- Chapter 2, Section IV, Reconnaissance and Surveillance

FM 101-5, *Staff Organization and Operations*, 31 May 1997

- Chapter 5, The Military Decision-Making Process, pp. 5-2, 3, and 8
- Annex H, Plans and Orders, pp. H-34 and H-60

Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL):

- Trends 97-16: TA.5 Intelligence, TA.5.1 Develop Tactical Intelligence Requirements
- Newsletter 96-12, Section IV, *IPB and Collection Management*, pp. ¾
- Trends 97-9: 1QFY96 and 2QFY96, Section II, TA.5 Intelligence BOS, TA 5.1 Develop Tactical Intelligence Requirements

Integrate Logistics Estimates in Decision-Making

Only by assessing the status and impact of the components of tactical logistics can logisticians bring an informed estimate to the planning process. Tacticians must include logisticians in planning, or face periods of diminished combat power during a mission – potentially at a critical point in the battle.

The Brigade and Battalion Staff Exercise (BBSE) provides an excellent training opportunity to practice logistics estimates. The continuing operations between missions logically prompt combat service support (CSS) actions, which are a focus of this exercise.

Objective

The brigade combat team (BCT) uses the logistics estimate process to integrate CSS into planning, preparation, and execution of its mission. Accurate, up-to-date assessments are provided in time for tactical planners to include them in planning and decision-making. The logistics estimate is updated as conditions change.

- The brigade rear command post (bde rear CP) maintains a current logistics preparation of the battlefield (LPB) to define the logistics environment in which the BCT is operating.
- The bde rear CP maintains current and projected status of the BCT in the major logistical categories of:
  - maintenance
  - supply
  - transportation
- The bde S4 develops estimates of the logistical requirements of the mission, later refines them for the specific courses of action (COAs) being considered, and finally, refines them for the selected concept of operations.
- The bde S4 makes recommendations and assessments of the impact of logistical issues on BCT missions.

Note

This performance objective is developed for the logistical functions of maintenance, supply, and transportation. It does not include personnel or medical functions. Similar estimating processes and requirements exist for the personnel function and can be practiced in the exercise, but are not explicitly provided for in this performance objective.

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Integrate Logistics Estimates in Decision-Making, Continued

Overview

Particularly at brigade level and below, logistics estimates are not written products with pages of data and statistics. What is important is that logistics planners organize the information, analyze its impact on current and future missions, and share that analysis with tactical planners in a clear, succinct, and efficient manner.

Logistics estimates must cover both mission support and continuous support. Mission support operations support a specific operation. Continuous support operations provide to the brigade the routine support needed on a daily basis.

Logistics estimates are supported initially by LPB. The LPB is not mission-specific, but rather defines the logistics environment of the area of operations. The LPB contains projections and implications related to sufficiency of the area of operations, enemy capabilities affecting logistics operations, host nation support, and current and projected status.

Logistics estimates are an ongoing process. The description in this performance objective picks up the logistics estimate process with the mission analysis for a new mission. The logistics estimate is updated to generate an assessment for the commander of the status of the BCT, and to identify for him and operational planners any anticipated limitations on the tactical options available as a result of logistics.

The logistics estimate is updated for a new mission to reflect changes in the logistical condition of the BCT and changes in the LPB. During COA analysis, the logistics requirements specific to each COA are estimated and assessed. After the concept of the operation is approved, the estimate is updated to reflect the logistics requirements for that concept.

This new estimate is the basis for any future updates. The estimated logistical outcomes or end state of the current operation will be the basis for estimating the starting conditions of a subsequent mission.

A sound logistical estimate process results in COAs where the logistical implications are understood and considered, and for which sound, integrated logistical plans and instructions can be developed.

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Integrate Logistics Estimates in Decision-Making, Continued

References

ARTEP 71-3-MTP Final Draft, *Mission Training Plan for Heavy Brigade Command Group and Staff*, February 1997

- 71-6-0621, Sustain the Brigade, XO
- 71-6-0631, Conduct Logistical Planning, Bde S4
- 71-6-0632, Monitor Logistics Operations, Bde S4

Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL)

- NTC Trends Analysis 97-3, January 97, TA.7 Combat Service Support
- JRTC Priority Trends, 4QFY94, Section TA.7 Combat Service Support BOS, p. N-48
- Newsletter 97-2, January 1997, *How to Synchronize the Brigade S4 and Support Operations in the BSA*, CPT Matthew T. Higginbotham and CPT Adrian H. Haynes, Jr., pp. 6/10
- Newsletter 92-5, *Logistics Preparation of the Battlefield*, November 1992

Command and General Staff College ST101-5, *Command & Staff Decision Processes*, January 1994

Manage Information Within the Brigade Command Posts

Command posts (CPs) exist to assist the commander in fighting the brigade. Managing information is the central activity in this process. How well the brigade organizes its CPs; defines and enforces standard procedures for receiving, distributing, and processing information; and is able to sustain these activities during continuous operations over extended periods will be key to the success of the brigade's control of battlefield operations. This exercise provides practice opportunities on information management arrangements and procedures. In addition, this exercise facilitates the refinement of those arrangements and procedures in unit standing operating procedures (SOPs). This exercise is an excellent opportunity to train new personnel on their roles within the CPs and to try new solutions before conducting intense field exercises or actual operations.

Objective

Each CP will institute SOPs that support the commander's and the staff's requirements for time-constrained decision-making, accurate and timely situational awareness, and execution of continuous, sustaining, and mission-specific instructions and orders. According to those procedures, CP staff will prioritize, record, process, analyze, and disseminate routine information to specific recipients. The functioning of the CPs will permit continuous, long-term activity, displacement or loss of a CP. Procedures will separate those routine actions from those that demand command attention. Procedures will be recorded in the unit's tactical standing operating procedures (TACSOP).

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Manage Information Within the Brigade Command Posts,
Continued

Overview

A practiced, systematic method for collecting and processing information is essential to the efficient operation of the brigade. The following techniques and procedures outline methods of dealing with the vast amount of information that flows into and through a brigade's CPs. Information management is crucial to all CPs that the brigade operates: the main CP (MAIN), the rear CP (REAR), the tactical CP (TAC), and the command group. Although each of these will apply information management procedures somewhat differently, and under different conditions, each must have and use a systematic method of dealing with information.

Information management is continuous. It builds to a peak during execution of combat operations, but it is also crucial during the planning phase. During planning, the commander and staff are seeking information for mission analysis, COA development, COA analysis, and preparation and dissemination of operation orders. Information management is a critical part of the "Supervise" step of the commander's Troop Leading Procedure.

References

ARTEP 71-3 MTP Final Draft, *Mission Training Plan for the Heavy Brigade Command Group and Staff*, February 1997

- Task 71-6-0001, Direct the Brigade Staff
- Task 71-6-0003, Direct the Brigade Staff Planning Process
- Task 71-6-0006, Establish Liaison
- Task 71-6-0008, Maintain the Current Situation
- Task 71-6-0009, Conduct Battle Tracking
- Task 71-6-0260, Support CP Operations
- Task 71-6-0243, Establish a Command Post
- Task 71-6-0632, Monitor Logistics Operations
- Task 71-6-1005, Maintain the Brigade Intelligence Data Base
- Task 71-6-1051, Process Combat Information and Intelligence
- Task 71-6-2654, Supervise Engineer Operations
- Task 71-6-3001, Establish Fire Support Cell
- Task 71-6-3004, Execute Fire Support
- Task 71-6-3102, Coordinate Air Defense Operations
- Task 71-6-8015, Coordinate NBC Operations

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Manage Information Within the Brigade Command Posts,
Continued

References, continued

FM 71-3, *The Armored and Mechanized Infantry Brigade*, 08 January 1996

- Chapter 3, Battle Command

FM 71-123, *Tactics and Techniques for Combined Arms Heavy Forces, Armored Brigade, Battalion Task Force, and Company Team*, 30 September 1992

- Chapter 1, Command, Control, and Communication, Section I, Section IV

FM 101-5, *Staff Organization and Operations*, 31 May 1997

- Appendix I: Information Management

Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL):

- NTC Trends 96 1QFY96 and 2QFY96, TA.4 Command and Control BOS
- Trends 97-3: CTC 4QFY94 to 2QFY96: TA.4 Command and Control BOS
- Trends 97-9: CTC 3QFY96 and 4QFY96: TA.4 Command and Control BOS
- Newsletter 95-7, *TOC Operations*, 16 Sep 1997

Plan and Implement Brigade Air Defense Early Warning

Early warning of air attacks is a critical factor in force protection. The brigade must have a system that integrates passive and active air defense measures to ensure force protection against enemy air attacks. Subordinate units must react quickly to warnings of impending air attack. The staff procedures for rapidly disseminating air defense warnings can be practiced effectively in simulation exercises.

Objective

The brigade establishes and executes early warning dissemination procedures that identify and defeat intruding aircraft, and that cue friendly units to adopt protective measures. Early warnings include aircraft identification, directions, and specification of affected assets. Warnings are received by affected troops three minutes before visual detection of the aircraft. Missions of elements not directly affected by an air intrusion are not impeded by the warning.

Continued on next page

Plan and Implement Brigade Air Defense Early Warning,
Continued

Overview

Brigades must set up a procedure for implementing timely and accurate early warnings throughout the brigade area of operations. Early warning procedures must include all assigned, attached, and supporting units of the brigade combat team. Special attention must be directed to the brigade rear area which is highly vulnerable to air attack and that lacks the direct communication links to many elements located in the rear. Many elements in the rear area lack direct communication to early warning (EW) nets.

Effective early warning requires the rapid and complete integration of supporting air defense artillery (ADA) assets into the brigade's early warning plan. These assets are often assigned on a mission-to-mission basis and the brigade does not have an opportunity to establish a working relationship with its support. Early command emphasis is essential to ensure that the supporting air defense is fully integrated into the early warning system. Commanders and staff at all levels must make sure that the air defense role in the early warning plan is understood and rehearsed and that air defense capabilities for early warning are factored into the brigade's early warning scheme.

These techniques and procedures emphasize the requirements of the brigade and task force (TF) staffs in implementing early warning. Because of restrictions in the exercise, they do not focus on the involvement of air defense units in countering enemy air or of friendly forces actually taking active or passive air defense measures. However, the practice and refinement of these techniques and procedures will ensure better performance at all echelons when employed under full field conditions.

Continued on next page

Plan and Implement Brigade Air Defense Early Warning,
Continued

References

ARTEP 71-3-MTP Final Draft, *Mission Training Plan for the Heavy Brigade Command Group and Staff*, February 1997

- Task 71-6-0306, Coordinate Army Aviation Support
- Task 71-6-0308, Synchronize Air Defense Artillery
- Task 71-6-0309, Execute Airspace Command and Control in the Brigade Area
- Task 71-6-2750, React to Air Attack (Active)
- Task 71-6-2751, React to Air Attack (Passive)
- Task 71-6-3101, Provide ADA Input to the Command Estimate

FM 44-64, *SHORAD Battalion and Battery Operations*, June 1997

- Chapter 2, Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence, pp. 2-26/29

Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL)

- CTC Trends, NTC 97-9, 3rd and 4th Qtrs FY96, Section II TA.3 Air Defense BOS
- NTC Trends Analysis 97-3, 4QFY94 - 2QFY96, TA.3 Air Defense
- CTC Trends, NTC 1QFY96 and 2QFY96, Section II TA.3 Air Defense BOS

Develop and Execute the Brigade and Battalion Plan for Fires

Fire support plans must be integrated with maneuver plans to achieve successful fires in support of operations. The process begins with the commander's vision of the critical effects of fires that will make his plan successful. The details and methods for incorporating the entire brigade combat team are completed during the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP). The commander and staff can explore, practice, and refine the necessary decision-making procedures during simulation-supported exercises.

Objective

The commander's intent and fire support planning guidance are the foundation for the integration of maneuver and fires. The commander and his staff have a common understanding of what fires must do to support the operation. Acting on the commander's fire support planning guidance, the staff develops the plan of how to achieve the commander's vision for fires.

The brigade and battalion fire support planning process is integral to the MDMP. The result of the fire support planning process is an effective, integrated, and executable fire support plan.

The fire support plan is:

- effective in using all available acquisition and attack assets in the best combination against High Payoff Targets (HPT) to support the commander's intent
- integrated with other battlefield operating systems (BOS) to achieve the required effects
- executable in that it has time, space, and resources to achieve the planned effects
- flexible in response to enemy courses of action (COAs) to allow the brigade to fight the enemy and not a plan. It ties detect and deliver assets to the HPTs and has a plan to assess the effects achieved.

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Develop and Execute the Brigade and Battalion Plan for Fires, Continued

Overview

Fire supporters at brigade and battalion must develop fire support plans that are effective, integrated, and executable. Four imperatives provide the foundation for this fire support planning process.

- *Fire support planning must be an integral part of the unit's MDMP.* The fire support planning process does not occur separately from the MDMP, and like the MDMP, requires the interaction of the battle staff and commander.
- *Fire support planning must truly integrate the targeting process and its functions of decide, detect, deliver, and assess.* The requirements of the targeting process must be achieved within the MDMP and its integrated fire support planning without separate processes or an additional set of steps.
- *Fire support planning must support and be integrated with the R&S plan.* The R&S plan links acquisition assets to finding specific enemy formations to attack. The R&S assets are supported throughout their employment by responsive, pre-planned fire support. Named Areas of Interest (NAI) and Targeted Areas of Interest (TAI) support requirements of the fire support plan, and fire support assets can support the collection requirements.
- *Fire support planning must result in an effective, integrated, and executable fire support plan.* Fire supporters must develop the fire support plan in concert with the battle staff that they support, and tie their planning to the MDMP.

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Develop and Execute the Brigade and Battalion Plan for Fires, Continued

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- Task 71-6-3003, Synchronize Fire Support
- Task 71-6-3004, Execute Fire Support
- Task 71-6-3005, Analyze Targets

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Conduct a Combat Health Support Rehearsal

"Men, all I can say is, if I had been a better general, most of you would not be here."

-- George S. Patton, Jr. to wounded soldiers at Walter Reed Hospital, Washington, 1945

Good combat health support (CHS) rehearsals are not easy. They require a major work effort with sound preparation, discipline, and involve significant amounts of the precious commodity -- leader time.

The Brigade and Battalion Staff Exercise (BBSE) provides an excellent training opportunity to practice command and control of key medical support events. Throughout the brigade combat team (BCT), combat health planners prepare their support plans, but rarely are these plans synchronized with each other, or with the maneuver plan. Events are planned with little thought to specific information requirements and reporting responsibilities. This performance objective focuses the efforts of the BCT to coordinate these medical support plans and validate them in the *Combat Health Support Rehearsal.*

Objective

Doctrinally, the Bde Surgeon supervises preparation of the CHS plan. In reality, the planners of the brigade rear command post (Bde Rear CP) and the combat trains command post (CTCP) must prepare the plans as the Bde Surgeon's time is usually taken up by medical treatment needs. The concept for the CHS plan is developed by the brigade S4 during the decision-making process conducted at the Bde Main CP. The implementing plans are written by the forward support battalion support operations officer and the battalion task force (bn/TF) medical platoon leaders.

Prior to conducting the rehearsal, the combat health planners identify critical events and synchronize their plans. In addition to medical locations on the combat service support (CSS) overlay, these plans indicate the triggers for CHS events. At the CHS rehearsal, the combat health leaders validate their synchronized plans:

- The TF CTCP validates triggers for battalion aid station movement.
- The Bde Rear CP validates triggers for ambulance exchange point (AXP) movement.
- The Bde Rear CP validates triggers for aerial evacuation.
- BCT elements without organic medical support coordinate the location where medical support can be obtained. They also coordinate planned times those sites will be operational.

Continued on next page

Conduct a Combat Health Support Rehearsal, Continued

Overview

The CHS rehearsal is the culmination of the medical planning efforts for an operation. The brigade S4, as the officer in charge (OIC) of the bde Rear CP, has the responsibility for planning the CHS rehearsal. Though the Bde Surgeon is usually not available for planning, he/she should participate in the CHS rehearsal to validate all the CHS plans.

While the techniques for parallel planning of CHS are not the focus of this objective, the brigade, TF, and attached and supporting (slice) units must share information to conduct parallel CHS planning.

- All plans must be complete prior to the CHS rehearsal. During mission analysis, combat health planners identify the current and projected status of medical personnel, equipment, and supplies. During course of action (COA) development, the casualty estimates for each COA are developed and a concept of medical support is roughed out.
- During wargaming, the evacuation and treatment facets of the medical plan are synchronized with the maneuver plan.
- CHS rehearsals should focus on the events that are critical to mission accomplishment. A successful rehearsal will ensure explicit understanding by subordinate medical leaders of their individual missions, how their missions relate to each other, and how each mission relates to the higher headquarters plan. It is important for all medical echelons to see the total CHS concept.
- Rehearsing key CHS actions allows participants to become familiar with the operation and to visualize the "triggers" which identify the circumstances and timing for friendly actions. This visual impression helps them understand both their environment and their relationship to other units during the operation. The repetition of critical medical tasks during the rehearsal helps leaders remember the sequence of key actions within the operation.

The end result of a CHS rehearsal is a shared understanding of how the critical CHS events will be triggered and executed.

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Conduct a Combat Health Support Rehearsal, Continued

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- Task 63-1-0005, Develop a Support Operations Estimate
- Task 63-1-0014, Plan CSS in a Brigade Area of Operations

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- Task 71-6-0621, Sustain the Brigade
- Task 71-6-0631, Conduct Logistical Planning
- Task 71-6-0190, Conduct Rehearsal

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Decision-Making in a Time Constrained Environment

The military decision-making process (MDMP) is an analytical process that assists the commander and staff (battle staff) in developing a flexible, tactically sound, and synchronized plan to accomplish the assigned mission and protect the force. It is a proven process, with underlying principles that are adaptable to planning in a time-constrained environment. However, the techniques and procedures used for decision-making under time-constraints are different. The battle staff must define and practice procedures it will use to shorten the process and still produce flexible, tactically sound plans. The result of defining these procedures is a series of staff battle drills integrated into the decision-making process, driven by the commander. Command involvement, standard procedures focused on essential actions and information, and rehearsed staff battle drills are the keys to accelerating the decision-making process.

Objective

The brigade battle staff conducts an accelerated MDMP to produce a simple, flexible, and tactically sound plan within 12 hours from receipt of the division order. The commander uses directive guidance to focus the staff on his critical information requirements and limit the number of schemes of maneuver considered to produce a single course of action (COA). The battle staff wargames the single COA, with branches and sequels, against multiple enemy COAs (ECOAs) to complete the plan. The brigade uses timely warning orders (WARNOs) to facilitate parallel planning by subordinates.

Continued on next page

Decision-Making in a Time Constrained Environment, Continued

Overview

Battle staffs routinely use the MDMP when available planning time allows them to thoroughly examine a combination of COAs and ECOAs. However, many factors may limit the time the staff has to develop and evaluate numerous COAs. The MDMP is still the foundation for planning in a time-constrained environment. The commander accelerates the decision-making process through combining steps of the process and focusing the battle staff effort on a single COA. The commander is directly involved with the staff during the process, providing responsive and definitive answers to develop, synchronize, and complete the plan quickly.

This performance objective presents one technique to conduct decision-making under time-constraints. The technique consists of five steps:

- receipt of mission
- mission analysis
- COA development
- COA analysis
- order production

Parallel planning

Parallel planning is concurrent decision-making at several echelons. Although a routine procedure within the MDMP, parallel planning becomes critical in a time-constrained environment, where planning and preparation time for subordinate units is minimal.

Successful parallel planning relies on accurate and timely WARNOs from the brigade *and* a full sharing of information as it becomes available. The staff should not wait for a scheduled WARNO to disseminate information critical to subordinate unit decision-making.

WARNOs

The importance of WARNOs increases as available time decreases. Combat Training Center trends indicate the importance of standing procedures for the timing and content for the issue of WARNOs. The same procedures should be followed when the process is accelerated. This performance objective details the issue of four WARNOs as part of the decision-making process.

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Decision-Making in a Time Constrained Environment, Continued

References

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- 71-6-1056, Conduct Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield
- 71-6-1004, Produce Intelligence Products
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- 71-6-1002, Coordinate the Reconnaissance and Surveillance Plan
- 71-6-1003, Produce a Reconnaissance and Surveillance Plan
- 71-6-3002, Plan Fire Support
- 71-6-3003, Synchronize Fire Support
- 71-6-3005, Analyze Targets
- 71-6-2651, Develop the Engineer Estimate
- 71-6-2657, Prepare an Obstacle Plan
- 71-6-2652, Plan employment of family of scatterable mines (FASCAM)
- 71-6-8015, Coordinate NBC Operations
- 71-6-3101, Provide ADA Input to the Command Estimate
- 71-6-3102, Coordinate Air Defense Operations
- 71-6-3103, Command and Control ADA Operations
- 71-6-6021, Sustain the Brigade
- 71-6-0631, Conduct Logistical Planning
- 71-6-0001, Direct the Brigade Staff
- 71-6-0003, Direct the Brigade Staff Planning Process
- 71-6-0002, Analyze Mission
- 71-6-0015, Issue Commander's Guidance to Staff
- 71-6-0016, Develop Course of Action
- 71-6-0018, Evaluate Concept/COA
- 71-6-0004, Provide Operations Input into the Command Estimate
- 71-6-0050, Develop the Brigade Operations Order
- 71-6-0007, Synchronize Rear Operations with Close Operations
- 71-6-0307, Synchronize Close Air Support
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Decision-Making in a Time Constrained Environment, Continued

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- Chapter 5, The Military Decision-Making Process
- Appendix A, Mission Analysis Guidelines
- Appendix B, Commander's Guidance Guidelines
- Appendix C, Staff Estimates
- Appendix H, Plans and Orders
- Appendix L, Liaison

Plan and Execute a Decision Point

As the brigade commander and staff plan, they identify key points in the fight where major decisions must be made. These become decision points and are central to the brigade's plan for the operation. The staff must now plan for, assemble, analyze, monitor, and provide to the commander at the appropriate times, the information he will need to anticipate and make required decisions. Staff procedures that facilitate and provide positive control over this process can be practiced and refined during simulation supported training exercises.

Objective

The need for decision points and how they assist the commander's visualization of the battle is clearly communicated and understood by the staff. The commander's critical information requirements (CCIR) are specified. Priority intelligence requirements (PIR) are addressed in the reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) plan. The staff aggressively pursues satisfying these CCIR and monitors the progress of the command as it fights for that information. They seek solutions to information shortfalls and keep the commander apprised of problems. Subordinate units are aware of their roles in providing information to support the decisions and their tasks in implementing the decision options. As decision points approach, the staff assembles, reviews, and presents to the commander the CCIR required for the decisions. Staff processes supporting these decisions are described in the SOP and are a topic of routine staff training.

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Plan and Execute a Decision Point, Continued

Overview

Decision points are anticipated decisions that have potentially significant impacts on the fight. Therefore, the commander is willing to expend considerable staff effort to plan, prepare, and make these decisions.

Decision points can be identified at any point during the decision-making process. Commanders who have a vision for how they plan to develop the battle may identify them when providing their guidance during mission analysis. Those who let their staffs develop the course(s) of action, will usually have the staff recommend decision points as part of the course of action (COA) recommendation.

Whether the decision points come from the commander or from the staff, they generate the same requirements.

Planning

As he identifies or approves the need for a decision point, the commander identifies the point in the battle, the reason for the decision, and the options he will consider. He also specifies the information requirements that support the decision in his CCIR.

The staff records the decision point in the operations order. The Decision Support Matrix (DSM) summarizes the key information associated with the decision point. The CCIR and specific tasks relevant to the decision point are recorded in paragraph 3. Instructions and orders to subordinate units are included in their operations and support orders. Reconnaissance orders are issued or modified to account for new or changed PIR.

Subordinates state their role in preparing for decision points in their plans and orders.

Preparation

Rehearsals include decision points.

The staff monitors progress towards satisfying the PIR and makes adjustments to the R&S effort.

Execution

During execution, the battle staff tracks the assembly of the required information, provides it to the commander, and after the commander reaches his decision, implements the chosen action.

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Plan and Execute a Decision Point, Continued

References

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- Task 71-6-1001, Conduct Intelligence Functions for Deployment
- Task 71-6-1002, Coordinate the Reconnaissance and Surveillance Plan
- Task 71-6-1003, Produce Reconnaissance and Surveillance Plan
- Task 71-6-1004, Produce Intelligence Products
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- Task 71-6-1051, Process Combat Information and Intelligence
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FM 34-130, *Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield*, 8 July 1994

- Chapter 1, Introduction
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FM 101-5, *Staff Organization and Operations*, 31 May 1997

- Chapter 5, The Military Decision-Making Process, pp. 5-10/12, 18
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Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL):

- Trends 97-16, 1st and 2nd Qtrs FY97, TA.5 Intelligence, TA.5.1 Develop Tactical Intelligence Requirements
- Newsletter 96-12, Section IV, *IPB and Collection Management*, CPT Robert Murphy, pp. 3/4
- Trends 97-9, 1QFY96 and 2QFY96 Section II, TA.5 Intelligence BOS, TA 5.1 Develop Tactical Intelligence Requirements

Develop and Execute the Brigade Concept of Mobility/Survivability

Properly employed engineer support creates conditions essential for brigade success. Achieving this success requires organizing engineer assets properly and thoroughly integrating them with the maneuver and fire support concepts so that, at any point on the battlefield, the effects of these systems are acting in concert, not separately. Rarely will the degree of mobility/survivability (M/S) integration needed for brigade success be attained by standard or routine checklist-type solutions. Effective engineer support is extremely dependent on a refined accounting of the factors of METT-T. It must start with the commander's guidance for desired outcomes and continue with integration by a team with considerable practice in the staff process of synchronizing the M/S system with brigade operations.

Objective

The brigade employs engineers and other assets to provide M/S support to combat operations and create conditions for brigade success. The integration of M/S begins with a realistic assessment and engineer capability projection in the form of the Engineer Battlefield Assessment (EBA). The integration process continues through the remainder of brigade planning, as the engineer develops a Scheme of Engineer Operations (SOEO) designed to achieve the commander's intent for engineers. The process culminates with the engineers conducting timely and effective execution of M/S operations in support of the brigade mission. All phases of this process require interaction between the brigade engineer and engineers at other echelons for the purposes of:

- gathering critical information regarding the status of engineer units and equipment,
- amplifying key aspects of engineer related brigade guidance,
- gathering engineer unique reports, and
- conducting staff supervision activities.

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Develop and Execute the Brigade Concept of Mobility/Survivability, Continued

Overview

The development of the brigade's M/S plan begins with the EBA. The EBA provides the framework for the engineer assistance to the Bde S2 in the form of terrain analysis and identification of enemy engineer capabilities. The EBA assists the commander in identifying the commander's critical information requirements (CCIR) and prioritizes M/S tasks by quantifying the brigade's engineer potential (e.g., In the time available, the brigade has sufficient assets to dig either 40 turret defilade fighting positions for tanks and Bradleys, or construct 500 linear meters of tank ditch.). The commander uses this information to provide detailed guidance to the engineer on his M/S intent and priorities.

As the military decision-making process continues, the engineer applies the commander's guidance and information from EBA to develop and refine a SOEO to support the brigade plan. The SOEO includes all brigade M/S tasks, priorities, taskings, and task organization.

The SOEO is validated during the brigade rehearsal as the M/S related portions of the brigade plan are practiced and demonstrated. M/S actions rehearsed might include the execution of family of scatterable mines (FASCAM) in support of brigade deep operations, the re-task organization of the brigade's engineers based on the designation of a new brigade main effort, or the reporting of engineer-related CCIR.

During execution the engineer aggressively seeks information to satisfy CCIR, passes reports as appropriate, and acts on instructions from the supported brigade.

Continued on next page

Develop and Execute the Brigade Concept of Mobility/Survivability, Continued

References

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- Task 71-6-2652, Plan Employment of Family of Scatterable Mines
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FM 5-71-3, *Brigade Engineer Combat Operations (Armored)*, 3 October 1995

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Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL):

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Plan for and Commit a Company-size Reserve

Brigades frequently operate with a company-size reserve. The impact on the brigade staff of interacting with a company-size reserve, as compared to a battalion task force, is significant. The brigade serves as the company's direct higher headquarters. The company will usually no longer have access to combat support and service support. The brigade staff must now plan and supervise this support. Because the company has no staff with which to plan, the missions and tasks for the company-size reserve must be consistent with the experience levels of its leaders and their capability to plan. The brigade's support extends from the planning phase through execution of one or more of the company's reserve missions. The staff processes needed to support a company-size reserve can be developed, practiced, and refined during simulation exercises.

Objective

The brigade staff accounts for the additional requirements it assumes when a company-size element is given the mission of becoming the brigade reserve. The combat support and service support requirements for the reserve must be included in the brigade plan. Command and control channels and communications must be deliberately chosen and clearly described in warning orders and task organization changes. The staff must ensure that the company leaders are present at appropriate orders briefs and rehearsals, and are provided all the orders and instructions essential to their mission. Supply, medical and maintenance channels, and evacuation procedures are adjusted within the brigade to ensure that the company will be as well supported as it is when operating within a task force. The company's position is included in the brigade's scheme of maneuver. The company is given any warning orders issued prior to committed and receives the latest battlefield information available for the area in which it is being committed. Combat support priorities are adjusted within the brigade to ensure support is provided to the reserve.

Note: The brigade must have a company size reserve in at least one mission for this performance objective to be observed.

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Plan for and Commit a Company-size Reserve, Continued

Overview

This performance objective assumes that the brigade has designated a company-size element as the brigade reserve. There are two major ways this can be accomplished.

- First, the brigade moves the company under brigade control at the effective time for the changes to the brigade's overall task organization. At that point the company is the responsibility of the brigade headquarters.

This additional staff challenge often causes brigades to try a second method.

- The brigade leaves the company within the task organization of the task force, but creates a conditional task for the company to preclude it from being committed without the brigade commander's approval. Then, during the battle, the brigade commits the reserve and assumes the reserve's control.

While theoretically making planning tasks easier for the brigade staff, the second method often delays addressing some of the tough issues until the time of execution. This necessitates a change in task organization, command relationship and control at the most difficult time in the battle. The techniques and procedures discussed in this performance objective are based on the first method.

Planning for the reserve from the outset, as if it were a direct subordinate, forces the brigade staff to consider all the support, command and control issues that need to be addressed during planning, preparation, and commitment of the reserve. The brigade staff must work closely with the company and recognize it at the same command level as the task forces in all areas, to include items often forgotten, such as:

- distribution of the brigade order and overlays
- participation in briefings and rehearsals
- communication support in radio nets and net calls
- receipt of updated battlefield information, including intelligence updates

Normally, units should include procedures dealing with reserve forces in their standing operating procedures (SOP). This performance objective is designed to facilitate that understanding and application.

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Plan for and Commit a Company-size Reserve, Continued

References

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- Task 71-6-0308, Synchronize Air Defense Artillery

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Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL)

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Plan, Integrate, and Manage Smoke Assets

Smoke can be a significant combat multiplier on the modern battlefield, but it can also be a combat detractor to a unit that does not practice planning and integrating its use into combat operations. Selecting this performance objective allows a staff to practice the processes associated with successful employment and integration of smoke support. A brigade staff must be able to identify its smoke capabilities, then integrate those capabilities into its tactical planning to achieve the desired battlefield effects while minimizing the likelihood of negatively affecting the brigade's operations.

Objective

The brigade plans for the integrated use of its smoke assets to achieve the effects necessary to meet the commander's guidance for smoke. The staff communicates its smoke plan to subordinate and supporting units through operation orders (OPORDs), fragmentary orders (FRAGOs), and annexes. The brigade then actively manages the preparation and execution of the smoke plan by tracking smoke assets, coordinating and synchronizing support, and adapting the smoke plan to meet changes in the commander's intent and scheme of maneuver.

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Plan, Integrate, and Manage Smoke Assets, Continued

Overview

The staff's contribution to successful smoke operations begins during mission analysis. They provide the commander information on the smoke capabilities within the brigade and on any smoke-related taskings from the division. As part of his planning guidance, the commander identifies the smoke effects required by his plan. The staff then develops a concept to generate those effects. The concept is wargamed to anticipate the sequence of activities necessary to carry out the concept. The staff considers a range of likely outcomes and provides contingencies, branches, and sequels. The staff may add additional smoke tasks to strengthen courses of action (COAs).

The published plan (i.e., OPORD, FRAGO) provides for controlling, positioning, protecting, cueing, and redirecting smoke assets. The plan addresses in detail all logistical support to the various smoke assets within the brigade. Smoke trigger points, decision points and key events are topics for the combined arms rehearsal.

The staff monitors the preparation and status of smoke assets, and keeps the commander informed of progress toward completion of the smoke plan. The staff monitors and anticipates trigger or decision points associated with the smoke plan. Any problems which may affect the smoke plan receive immediate command attention.

The staff tracks trigger and decision points, initiates execution of planned smoke targets, and adjusts the smoke plan to reflect current battlefield situations and conditions. The staff monitors execution and provides support in solving problems which may arise.

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Plan, Integrate, and Manage Smoke Assets, Continued

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ARTEP 71-3-MTP Final Draft, *Mission Training Plan for the Heavy Brigade Command Group and Staff*, February 1997

- Task 71-6-0002, Analyze Mission
- Task 71-6-0004, Provide Operations Input to the Command Estimate
- Task 71-6-0050, Develop the Brigade Operation Order
- Task 71-6-1004, Produce Intelligence Products
- Task 71-6-3002, Plan Fire Support
- Task 71-6-3003, Synchronize Fire Support
- Task 71-6-8015, Coordinate NBC Operations

Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL)

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- CTC Trends 97-3, 4th Qtr, FY94 to 2nd Qtr, FY96

Manage Information Within the Task Force Command Posts

Command posts (CPs) exist to assist the commander in fighting the task force. Managing information is the central activity in this process. How well the task force organizes its CPs; defines and enforces standard procedures for receiving, distributing, and processing information; and is able to sustain these activities during continuous operations over extended periods will be key to the success of the task force's control of battlefield operations. This exercise provides practice opportunities on information management arrangements and procedures. In addition, this exercise facilitates the refinement of those arrangements and procedures in unit standing operating procedures (SOPs). This exercise is an excellent opportunity to train new personnel on their roles within the CPs and to try new solutions before conducting intense field exercises or actual operations.

Objective

Each CP will institute SOPs that support the commander's and the staff's requirements for time-constrained decision-making, accurate and timely situational awareness, and execution of continuous, sustaining, and mission-specific instructions and orders. According to those procedures, CP staff will prioritize, record, process, analyze, and disseminate routine information to specific recipients. The functioning of the CPs will permit continuous, long-term activity, displacement or loss of a CP. Procedures will separate those routine actions from those that demand command attention. Procedures will be recorded in the unit's tactical standing operating procedures (TACSOP).

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Manage Information Within the Task Force Command Posts,
Continued

Overview

A practiced, systematic method for collecting and processing information is essential to the efficient operation of the task force (TF). The following techniques and procedures outline methods of dealing with the vast amount of information that flows into and through a TF's CPs. Information management is crucial to all CPs that the TF operates: the main command post (MAIN), the combat trains command post (CTCP), and the command group. Although each of these will apply information management procedures somewhat differently, and under different conditions, each must have and use a systematic method of dealing with information.

Information management is continuous. It builds to a peak during execution of combat operations, but it is also crucial during the planning phase. During planning, the commander and staff are seeking information for mission analysis, COA development, COA analysis, and preparation and dissemination of operation orders. Information management is a critical part of the "Supervise" step of the commander's Troop Leading Procedure.

Continued on next page

Manage Information Within the Task Force Command Posts, Continued

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- Task 71-1-3901, Command and Control the Battalion
- Task 71-1-3902, Perform S3 Operations
- Task 71-1-3904, Operate Main Command Post
- Task 71-1-3905, Perform Intelligence Operations
- Task 71-1-3906, Perform S2 Operations
- Task 71-1-3908, Operate Fire Support Section Operations
- Task 71-1-3913, Operate Combat Trains CP

ARTEP 71-3 MTP Final Draft, *Mission Training Plan for the Heavy Brigade Command Group and Staff*, February 1997

- Task 71-3-0001, Direct the efforts of the Brigade Staff
- Task 71-3-2004, Manage the Intelligence Effort
- Task 71-3-2006, Process Combat Information and Intelligence
- Task 71-3-3003, Maintain the Current Situations
- Task 71-3-8005, Conduct Engineer Operations Staff Supervision
- Task 71-3-9002, Conduct Fire Support Coordination in Support of Ground Operations
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- Appendix I: Information Management

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Manage Information Within the Task Force Command Posts,
Continued

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Military Decision-Making Process in the Battalion

Battalion task forces (TFs) are not resourced to conduct a military decision-making process (MDMP) that develops and analyzes multiple friendly courses of action (COAs). They must use an abbreviated MDMP that is commander driven, consistent with the TF staff capability and available time, and results in a flexible plan that accounts for multiple enemy COAs (ECOAs). The TF must plan in parallel with the brigade, using emerging information from the brigade's decision-making process. Command involvement, standard staff procedures focused on synchronizing the commander's scheme of maneuver, and effective parallel planning enable TFs to rapidly develop flexible, tactically sound orders.

Objective

The TF abbreviates the MDMP to produce a simple, flexible, and tactically sound plan within 12 hours from receipt of the first brigade warning order (WARNO). At the earliest opportunity, the brigade and TF commanders work together to develop a shared vision of the coming brigade fight. The TF commander uses directive guidance to share his vision for the fight and focus the staff on his critical information requirements. The commander and staff then coordinate the battlefield operating systems to ensure that combat multipliers are integrated and synchronized into the commander's scheme of maneuver. The completed plan portrays a battalion fight consistent with the battalion and brigade commanders' visions and intents.

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Military Decision-Making Process in the Battalion, Continued

Overview

The time available and staff experience or depth at TF level rarely will permit using a decision-making process which literally follows the MDMP. While perhaps suitable at division or corps level, the process consumes staff time and energy, and at TF level rarely results in a plan with the needed flexibility.

An abbreviated process which does work at TF level shifts the focus of the process from the staff to the commander. The key element in making this process work is for the TF commander to tell the staff how he visualizes the fight occurring. His experience and tactical skills allow him to visualize the TF fight and turn that visualization into a COA which he describes in as much detail as he can in his guidance and intent statement. The staff provides information and helps complete the details of that visualization of the operation, integrating and synchronizing all the assets available to the TF. They then produce the plan which records the COA.

The TF does not plan in isolation, but as part of the brigade concept. The brigade commander and TF commanders often develop the concept for the brigade and TF fights in an interactive, commander-to-commanders, manner. Staffs share information early, allowing parallel planning by subordinate levels. WARNOs, liaison officers, and free interactions between staff levels allow TFs to have essentially completed their COA development before the brigade order is issued.

The TF has limited capability to handle ongoing missions and plan for subsequent missions. Parallel planning between TF and brigade depends on the TF commander and staff being able to shift their focus from current operations to the new mission. However, the TF staff should be able to use early information about the new mission to organize and prepare for the upcoming planning processes; e.g., assemble current information, prepare planning products, issue orders to subordinate elements about the nature of the following missions, anticipate repositioning requirements, etc.

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Military Decision-Making Process in the Battalion, Continued

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- Appendix B, Combat Orders

FM 101-5, *Staff Organizations and Operations*, 31 May 1997

- Chapter 5, The Military Decision-Making Process
- Appendix A, Mission Analysis Guidelines
- Appendix B, Commander's Guidance Guidelines
- Appendix H, Plans and Orders
- Appendix L, Liaison

Appendix B: Road to War

Introduction

Purpose

This section sets the stage for the COBRAS scenario. It describes the events that lead up to the missions to be conducted by your brigade.

Contents

The topics in this Road to War section include:

- Island of Terra Del Diablo
- Area of Operations
- Conflict Between the Republics of Mojave and Krasnovia
- X (US) Corps Actions

Island of Terra Del Diablo

History of Mojave and Krasnovia

The republics of Mojave and the Republic of Krasnovia, along with the Baja Republic, occupy the island of Terra Del Diablo. There are significant cultural, ethnic, and religious differences between the Mojavians and Krasnovians that date back to their colonial periods. Mojave was settled by the French in the early 15th century and then became a British colony in 1760. The population is now primarily composed of a well-integrated Anglo/French/Indian/African mix. Krasnovia, colonized by Spain in 1525, is a rigidly stratified society of Spanish, Mestizo, and Indian subcultures.

There were several wars in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, culminating in the 1924 Mojave-Krasnovia War. In that war, Krasnovia was humiliated on the battlefield, then was forced to cede almost 10% of its territory to Mojave and to pay $100 million (US) in reparations. The Krasnovians have never forgotten the war and its aftermath. Mojavian propaganda, extolling their military prowess and cultural superiority, did nothing to help heal the wounds. Unfriendly relations still exist between Mojave and Krasnovia.

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Island of Terra Del Diablo, Continued

History of Mojave and Krasnovia, continued

As Krasnovia's military strength continued to increase, so did the desire of the population to avenge the 1924 defeat. This desire has been fueled by the Revolutionary Party leadership, who have used the "Mojavian Peril" as a convenient excuse for severe internal security measures. Mojavian "spies, saboteurs, and assassins" are blamed for almost every ill in Krasnovian society. The acquisition of chemical weapons by both countries has increased their mutual fear, as each population is convinced the other would use chemical weapons as a tool of genocide.

US involvement

Mojave is a nation whose continuing independence and political relationship are of vital interest to the US. The US and Mojave have a long-standing bilateral defense agreement entered into in the late 1950s when the socialist coalition of Krasnovia attempted to rekindle a continuing feud over large mineral and oil deposits located in southern Mojave and along the international border (IB). Poorly defined borders, long-standing border disputes, and the presence of nomadic tribes who ignore the IB have continually strained the relations between the two countries.

Recently, the current President of Krasnovia stated a national aim to reclaim the mineral and oil fields in Mojave. Accordingly, the National Command Authority directed the establishment of Joint Task Force Mojave (JTF MOJAVE), with responsibility for preserving the Terra Del Diablo IBs.

US military presence and support

Previous US presence in Mojave has been limited to US Security Assistance personnel and pre-positioning of material configured to unit sets (POMCUS) maintenance and security personnel. Continental United States (CONUS)-based US forces periodically conduct task force (TF)-size exercises on Mojavian soil permitted in the terms of the US-Mojave bilateral agreement.

For the last three years, Department of Defense (DOD) has provided modernized defense weapons to the Mojave self-defense forces under foreign military sales (FMS) agreements. The US Navy has maintained a presence in the area to ensure the continued freedom of commercial shipping lanes at Port Masa. Approximately 5% of Mojave self-defense forces' officers have been trained at US command and general staff level military schools.

Area of Operations

Civilian population

The civilian population in the Irwin Province, Republic of Mojave, which is your area of operations, is very small. As most of the miners, small ranchers, and their families have departed since the outbreak of hostilities, the remainder are members of one or another of the nomadic Pahrumph tribes.

In pre-Columbian times, the Pahrumphians were the dominant native nationality. The center of their domain was located in present day Krasnovia, in the Pahrumph Valley. All that remains of the ancient splendor of their capital city is the sleepy town of Pahrumph.

Pahrumphians

In the late 1950s and early 1960s, the Pahrumphians in Krasnovia were forcibly assimilated into the main culture by the Revolutionary Party. However, those in the Irwin Province have not been integrated into the Mojavian society. Consequently, in the early 1970's, a "Free Pahrumph" movement formed in Mojave. A radical underground branch soon formed, and by mid-1975 a Phase I insurgency was in progress. Krasnovia has supported the insurgency by providing arms, munitions, and training to the guerrillas. A number of the insurgent leaders are young Krasnovian Pahrumph tribesmen, loyal to the Revolutionary Party.

There is a great deal of support for the insurgency among the tribes in Mojave. Despite the harsh treatment their kinsmen received from the Revolutionary Party 20 years ago, the chance to form a Pahrumph Homeland federated with Krasnovia is very attractive. Even those who are not active insurgents provide food, shelter, information, and other aid to the insurgents and the Krasnovians.

Irwin Province economics

The Irwin Province is rich in mineral deposits, particularly iron, copper, silver, and borax. In 1981 significant uranium deposits were discovered in the Quail Mountains. As the significance of the raw materials in the area has increased, the Mojavian economy has developed from primarily an agriculture based system to an industrial one.

In addition, the export of borax and silver has allowed the Mojavians to maintain a favorable balance of trade, despite their reliance on foreign oil. The loss of the Irwin area would be a severe blow to the Mojavian economy, one that could possibly cause significant political repercussions. Also, this loss would allow Krasnovia access to an unknown, but assumed large, quantity of uranium.

Conflict Between Mojave and Krasnovia

Recent strains on the relationship

Recent events have led to an even further deterioration of relations between Krasnovia and Mojave. Late last year, Krasnovian infiltrators posed as nomadic tribesmen and planted a car bomb in the Mojavian chief city, killing members of the Mojave economic delegation. This coincided with the sinking of a Krasnovian fishing boat by a Mojavian naval patrol boat and increased firefights between Krasnovian and Mojavian security patrols along the border. Since then, incidents of sabotage within the Mojavian infrastructure have been widespread.

Intelligence collection agencies began noticing increased Krasnovian military activity along the IB. Eventually, these Krasnovian exercises were expanded to army-level tactical maneuvers as well as the movement forward of operational-level combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) units and logistics stocks. At the same time, Krasnovian Missile Forces increased movement and deployment of improved chemical-capable SCUD surface-to-surface missiles.

The Krasnovian Republic Air Force has a recent history of violating Mojave air space with reconnaissance flights. These violations led to the sale of three battalions of HAWK air defense systems to Mojave in 1993. Mojave does not have an air force.

United Nations support

Although Mojavian forces are well trained and well equipped, their size and strength are smaller than that of the Krasnovian military force. Due to this disparity in forces, the President of Mojave appealed to the United Nations (UN) for military support when the Krasnovians began the buildup of forces along the border and increased internal subversive activities. The UN Security Council convened and subsequently passed a resolution agreeing to authorize coalition forces to use force if necessary to protect the territorial integrity of Mojave.

Four months ago, naval forces (NAVFOR) consisting of the III Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) and the *Carrier Battle Group Kennedy* deployed off the coast of Mojave as part of JTF MOJAVE. As part of the coalition, the X (US) Corps was alerted for deployment to Mojave in support of the UN resolution. X Corps, organized with the 52 ID (M), 55 ID (M), 23 AD, 201 Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR), 102 Combined Arms Battalion (CAB), and X Corps artillery, began deployment one month later.

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Conflict Between Mojave and Krasnovia, Continued

US deployment

The 200 (US) Tactical Air Force (composed of four composite wings, one tactical control wing, one airborne early warning squadron, and support squadrons) completed deployment into theater two months ago. The composite wings and their support squadrons were based across the Diablo Straits at Prescott Air Base, 150 km east of Port Masa. The tactical control wing mobile control element (MCE) was deployed vicinity of Port Masa.

The X (US) Corps closed into Mojave seven weeks ago. Political tensions between Krasnovia and Mojave continued to increase, in spite of continuing UN efforts to bring about a peaceful settlement. Given his assessment of the continuing buildup of Krasnovian forces along the IB, Commander (CDR) JTF MOJAVE increased the alert level of all US forces in Mojave.

The government of Mojave placed all Mojavian military forces under the tactical command (TACOM) of CDR JTF MOJAVE. These forces were designated I (Mojave) Corps. Paramilitary forces such as Mojavian border patrol and police remain under Mojavian control. Concurrently, the UN placed all UN forces under the TACOM of the CDR JTF MOJAVE. UN forces supporting this operation are designated the XII (Allied) Corps.

Six weeks ago

Krasnovia broke formal diplomatic relations with Mojave. X (US) Corps and 55 ID (M) forces conducted field training exercises approximately 100 km east of the IB.

Three weeks ago

Krasnovian forces attacked across the border into Mojave, supported by numerous SCUD launches targeting JTF MOJAVE logistics sites and chemical agent attacks focused on creating local penetration points. The seizure of oil and mineral deposits located in southern Mojave was the objective of Krasnovian forces, while JTF MOJAVE's objective was the expulsion of all Krasnovian forces from Mojave. Main Krasnovian attacks were in the I (Mojave) and XII (Allied) Corps' areas of operations.

X (US) Corps and 55 ID (M) forces were initially in training areas; they then deployed and conducted limited combat operations against Krasnovian attacks.

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Conflict Between Mojave and Krasnovia, Continued

Three days ago	71 and 72 Combined Arms Army (CAA) attacked across the IB into X (US) Corps area of operations (AO). 71 CAA continued to attack into 55 ID (M) with the 89 and 39 Motorized Rifle Divisions (MRDs) in the first echelon. X (US) Corps defeated the attack of the first echelon MRDs of the 71 and 72 CAA. First echelon MRDs established hasty defenses astride the IB and second echelon forces stopped in marshaling areas west of the IB.
24 hours ago	Both sides agreed to a UN-sponsored cease-fire and began peace negotiations. X (US) Corps and 55 ID (M) forces began to withdraw to assembly areas to conduct reorganization operations.
12 hours ago	Peace negotiations failed. X (US) Corps and 55 ID (M) commanders issued warning orders to begin preparations for further combat negotiations.
Current situation	X (US) Corps and 55 ID (M) forces continue reorganization operations in assembly areas. Issuance of 55 ID (M) operations order for further combat operations is imminent.

Your Brigade

Your brigade

Your brigade is currently in AA Rook (NK0660) conducting reorganization operations. Your brigade headquarters has received a warning order for the next operation, and a receipt of an operations order from 55 ID (M) is pending.

Your brigade's organization (The brigade has had a continuing relationship with its supporting units.):

- 3-5 Infantry (Mechanized)
- 1-5 Armor
- 1-7 Armor
- 4-42 Field Artillery Battalion (155,SP) (DS)
- 3 Platoon, E Battery, 20 Field Artillery (Target Acquisition)
- B Battery, 43 Field Artillery (MLRS) (Reinforcing 4-42FA)
- 33 Engineer Battalion
- C Battery, 4-441 Air Defense Artillery Battalion (DS)
- 3 Platoon, 55 Chemical Company (Decontamination) (DS)
- 5 Platoon, 55 Chemical Company (Smoke) (Mechanized) (DS)
- 2 Section, 6 Platoon, 55 Chemical Company (NBC Recon) (DS)
- C Company, 55 Military Intelligence Battalion (DS)
- 3 Platoon, 55 Military Police Company
- 3 Squad, 1 Platoon, B Company, 55 Signal Battalion
- 553 Forward Support Battalion

Appendix C: List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

AA	assembly area
ACR	armored cavalry regiment
AD	area defense
ADA	air defense artillery
ADC	assistant division commander
ADCOORD	air defense coordinator
AFRU	Armored Forces Research Unit
AGMB	advance guard main body
ALO	air liaison officer
AMEDD	Army Medical Department
AO	area of operations
ARI	U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavior and Social Sciences
ARTEP	Army Training and Evaluation Program
AVN LNO	aviation liaison officer
AXP	ambulance exchange point
BBS	Brigade/Battalion Battle Simulation
BBSE	Brigade and Battalion Staff Exercise
BCT	brigade combat team
Bde	brigade
bn	battalion
BOS	battlefield operating system
BSA	brigade support area
BSE	Brigade Staff Exercise
BSTS	Battle Staff Training System
CAA	combined arms army
CAB	combined arms battalion
CALL	Center for Army Lessons Learned
CCIR	commander's critical information requirements
CDR	commander
CFL	coordinated fire line
CFFZ	call for fire zone
CHS	combat health support
COA	course of action
COBRAS	Combined Arms Operations at Brigade Level, Realistically Achieved Through Simulation
CONUS	continental United States
CP	command post
CPT	captain
CS	combat support
CSS	combat service support

CTC	Combat Training Center
CTCP	combat trains command post
DATK	deliberate attack
DOD	Department of Defense
DS	direct support
DSM	decision support matrix
EBA	engineer battlefield assessment
ECOA	enemy course of action
ENGR	engineer
EW	early warning
EXCON	exercise control
FA	field artillery
FASCAM	family of scatterable mines
FASTTRAIN	Force XXI Training Methods and Strategies
FM	field manual
FMS	foreign military sales
FRAGO	fragmentary order
FSB	forward support battalion
FSCM	fire support coordination measures
FSCOORD	fire support coordinator
FSE	fire support element
FSO	fire support officer
FTX	field training exercise
FY	fiscal year
G3	assistant chief of staff, operations
GCM	graphics control measure
HICON	higher control
HPT	high payoff target
IB	international border
ID	infantry division
IPB	intelligence preparation of the battlefield
JRTC	Joint Readiness Training Center
JTF MOJAVE	Joint Task Force Mojave
km	kilometer
LNO	liaison officer

LPB	logistics preparation of the battlefield
LTP	Leader Training Program
M	mechanized
MCE	mobile control element
MDMP	military decision-making process
MEB	Marine Expeditionary Brigade
METT-T	mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time available
MI	military intelligence
MLRS	multiple launch rocket system
MP	military police
MRD	motorized rifle division
M/S	mobility/survivability
MSE	mobile subscriber equipment
MTC	movement to contact
MTP	Mission Training Plan
MTOE	modified table of organization and equipment
NAI	named areas of interest
NAVFOR	naval forces
NBC	nuclear, biological, chemical
NTC	National Training Center
OIC	officer in charge
OPFOR	opposing forces
OPORD	operation order
PAM	pamphlet
POMCUS	pre-positioning of material configured to unit sets
PIR	priority intelligence requirements
Q	quarter
R&S	reconnaissance and surveillance
S1	personnel officer
S2	intelligence officer
S3	operations officer
S4	logistics officer
SOEO	scheme of engineer operations
SOP	standing operating procedures
TAC	tactical command post
TAI	targeted areas of interest
TACOM	tactical command

TACSOP	tactical standing operating procedures
TF	task force
TOC	tactical operations center
TOE	table of organization and equipment
TRADOC	Training and Doctrine Development
TSP	training support package
UN	United Nations
US	United States
USAF	United States Air Force
USAARMC	United States Army Armor Center
WARNO	warning order
XO	executive officer