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Worldwide Report

ARMS CONTROL

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20 MAY 1987

WORLDWIDE REPORT

ARMS CONTROL

CONTENTS

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

USSR: Fourth Anniversary of Reagan SDI Speech Marked (Moscow PRAVDA, 24 Mar 87; Moscow TASS, 24 Mar 87)	1
'Sad Jubilee', by Tomas Kolesnichenko	1
Reagan Statement Hit	2
TASS Views U.S. Bid to 'Whitewash' SDI, ASAT Programs (Moscow TASS, 3 Apr 87)	4
TASS Says U.S. Eager To Deploy ASAT System (Moscow TASS, 21 Apr 87)	7
TASS Cites NEW YORK TIMES on Pentagon Space Station Role (Moscow TASS, 7 Apr 87)	9
TASS: U.S. Accelerates SDI 'Nuclear Shotgun' Project (Moscow TASS, 23 Apr 87)	10
Soviet Officers on Importance of Air Defense Forces (Various sources, 11, 12 Apr 87)	11
Article by Commander, by A. I. Koldunov	11
Talk on TV, by Aleksandr Ivanovich Koldunov	12
Deputy Commander on Improvements, Yevgeniy Sergeyevich Yurasov Interview	13
Chief of Staff Interviewed, I. M. Maltsev Interview	14
PRAVDA Article, by V. Sosnitskiy	16

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

Argentine Paper Urges Nuclear Arms Reductions (Editorial; Buenos Aires CLARIN, 27 Mar 87)	18
--	----

SALT/START ISSUES

TASS Notes Pentagon Call for New ICBM Warheads
 (Moscow PRAVDA, 17 Apr 87) 20

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

USSR: Gerasimov Foreign Ministry News Conference 16 April
 (Various sources, 16 Apr 87) 21

INF, ABM Issues 21

Shultz 'Unprepared' for Proposals 22

U.S. 'Unable' To Respond 23

Need for Missiles in Asia 24

Moscow Stresses Need for Mutual Verification
 (Yuriy Solton; Moscow World Service, 20 Apr 87) 25

Soviet INF Delegation Arrives in Geneva
 (Moscow TASS, 21 Apr 87) 26

Moscow to North America on Western Objections to Agreement
 (Pavel Kuznetsov, et al.; Moscow in English to North
 America, 10 Apr 87) 28

PRAVDA Surveys Response to Recent Gorbachev Statements
 (Moscow PRAVDA, 17 Apr 87) 32

USSR: U.S. Response to Gorbachev Offer Viewed
 (Various sources, 20, 23 Apr 87) 34

Arbatov, Karpov on U.S. TV 34

Reagan's 'Optimism' Questioned, by Yuriy Rostov 34

'Polarization of Forces', by V. Gan 35

USSR: West European Reaction to INF Progress Viewed
 (Various sources, various dates) 37

'Lack of Logic' in UK Stance, by B. Ostrovskiy 37

Chirac 'Against' Nuclear-Free Europe 38

'Threat' to NATO Doctrine 38

'Shortage of Common Sense' 40

NATO Nuclear Planning Group, by Aleksandr Zholkver 41

'Abstract Optimism' 42

PRAVDA Demands Response, by Tomas Kolesnichenko 42

Coupling Doctrine Challenged, by Pavel Kuznetsov 43

TASS: U.S. Continues To Build Asian-Pacific Nuclear Arsenal
 (Moscow TASS, 6 Apr 87) 45

USSR Said Ready To Initiate Asia INF Talks (Tokyo KYODO, 17 Apr 87)	47
USSR: FRG's Bahr Interviewed on U.S. INF Stance (Moscow APN DAILY REVIEW, 18 Apr 87)	48
TASS: Luxembourg Foreign Minister Visits Moscow (Moscow TASS, 21 Apr 87)	50
Meets Premier Ryzhkov	50
Meets Shevardnadze	51
Thatcher Reports to Commons on Talks With Gorbachev (London PRESS ASSOCIATION, 2 Apr 87)	52
UK Paper Views INF, SRINF, CW Proposals on Table (London THE DAILY TELEGRAPH, 14 Apr 87)	54
Dutch Foreign Minister on INF, Defense Policy (Hans van den Broek Interview; Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD, 2 Apr 87)	55
XINHUA Analysis: U.S. Cautious About Arms Proposals (Shi Lujia; Beijing XINHUA, 16 Apr 87)	58
XINHUA Analyzes Differences Over Euromissiles (Wang Xianju; Beijing XINHUA, 16 Apr 87)	60
XINHUA on NATO Reluctance To Accept USSR Proposal (Xiong Changyi; Beijing XINHUA, 17 Apr 87)	62
XINHUA on U.S. Optimism Over Soviet Proposals (Shi Lujia; Beijing XINHUA, 18 Apr 87)	64
PEOPLE'S DAILY on INF Talks Entering 'Key Stage' (Zhang Yunwen; Beijing RENMIN RIBAO, 18 Apr 87)	66
PEOPLE'S DAILY on Unresolved INF Problems (Cang Lide; Beijing RENMIN RIBAO, 18 Apr 87)	68
Argentine Paper on European Response to Gorbachev Initiative (Buenos Aires LA PRENSA, 5 Apr 87)	70
CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS	
TASS: Agreements Prohibiting Chemical Weapons 'Possible' (Moscow TASS, 21 Apr 87)	72
EUROPEAN CONFERENCES	
Warsaw Pact Commander Interviewed on European Military Balance (Viktor Kulikov Interview; Zagreb DANAS, No 269, 14 Apr 87)	73

Soviet Gen Tartarnikov Interviewed on CSCE Session (Moscow Domestic Service, 16 Apr 87)	82
Soviet Weekly Interviews Swedish CD Delegation Head (Moscow NEW TIMES, No 15, 20 Apr 87)	83
NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS	
USSR: Underground Nuclear Tests Reported (Various sources, various dates)	85
Military Test 17 April	85
'National Economy' Tests 19 April	85
Comment by Scientist	85
Engineer on Explosions, by I. Sadriyev	86
TASS Reports on U.S. Tests in Nevada (Moscow TASS, various dates)	87
Delamar 18 April	87
Presidio 23 April	87
XINHUA Reportage: U.S., USSR Agree to Exchanging Nuclear Tests (Beijing XINHUA, 18 Apr 87)	88
USSR's Petrovskiy on Central Europe Nuclear-Free Corridor (Moscow TASS, 8 Apr 87)	89
Copenhagen: USSR Offers To Withdraw Subs From Baltic (Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE, 28 Mar 87)	90
Soviet Press Assails U.S. Refusal To Sign Rarotonga Treaty (Various sources, various dates)	92
PRAVDA Commentary, by Yu. Shtykanov	92
Far East Scholar Comments, by A. Krushanov	93
TASS: Japan Allows U.S. Nuclear Ships in Port (Moscow TASS, 10 Apr 87)	96
TASS: Further on U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Japan (Moscow TASS, 15 Apr 87)	97
RELATED ISSUES	
USSR Computer Center Official on Study of Nuclear Consequences (N. Moiseyev; Moscow IZVESTIYA, 14 Feb 87)	98
PRAVDA Interviews Perez de Cuellar on 1987 UN Tasks (Perez de Cuellar Interview; Moscow PRAVDA, 15 Jan 87) ..	102

/9987

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

USSR: FOURTH ANNIVERSARY OF REAGAN SDI SPEECH MARKED

'Sad Jubilee'

PM241649 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 24 Mar 87 First Edition p 5

[Tomas Kolesnichenko "Commentator's Column": "A Sad Jubilee"]

[Text] The starry sky... For thousands of years people have gazed at the mysterious motions of the distant planets, trying to find answers to the innumerable questions about their earthly existence. The time came for mankind to venture into space. Reason had triumphed, it appeared. But not everywhere...

On 23 March 1983, U.S. President R. Reagan put forward the now notorious "Strategic Defense Initiative" which was immediately christened the "Star Wars" program by the U.S. press. As the 4 years since that day have shown, SDI fully deserves that name. What was at first glance a harmless presidential "dream" -- creating an "impenetrable shield" against ballistic missiles, "destroying weapons, not people," and so forth -- turned out in practice to be the most dangerous military program in human history, a program for the militarization of space, for transforming it into a boundless arena for the arms race, which ultimately means a worldwide nuclear catastrophe.

Enough has been said and written about SDI over the 4 years to fill entire volumes. Let us look at a few of the main conclusions characterizing this supreme madness of our age. First and foremost, SDI is a chimera. An "impenetrable" shield cannot be created, 15-20 percent of the target area will always be hit by missiles, not to mention the fact that an asymmetrical response by the other side could turn the "shield" into a complete illusion. Something else is clear too -- an extensive ABM system with space-based elements cannot be seen as purely defensive but represents a new type of weapon primarily intended to conceal a preemptive first strike.

If anyone doubts the purpose of the seven-tier system which the Pentagon intends to "suspend" above us, then here is what General Abrahamson, leader of the "Star Wars" program, said in connection with the SDI "jubilee." "In 1994 or 1995," he said, "the United States could deploy the first tier of SDI, which envisages placing "between 300 and 400 satellites equipped with strike missiles in a low orbit above the territory of the Soviet Union." And this is called "defense"? An another question: Who is actually going to authorize Washington to install space "pillboxes" for the purpose of oblique fire at Soviet territory, and who gave the militarists the right to take over near-earth space?

More and more people are coming to realize that SDI does not replace nuclear weapons at all, but, in fact, is an incentive to create increasingly destructive types. Indeed,

we will never permit the main idea of SDI -- to wreck strategic parity and secure military superiority over the Soviet Union -- to be implemented. In the end SDI leads to a quantitative and qualitative spurt in the buildup of strategic nuclear armaments.

It is SDI, as Reykjavik demonstrated, that is the main obstacle in the way of talks on reducing and eliminating nuclear weapons, and it is SDI that is undermining the Soviet-American ABM Treaty, which is the main barrier to the militarization of space.

It is time Washington realized that you can fool one person for a long time, but you cannot fool all the people all of the time. The sad SDI jubilee is a reminder of this.

Reagan Statement Hit

LD241013 Moscow TASS in English 0834 GMT 24 Mar 87

[Text] Washington March 24 TASS -- TASS correspondent Igor Borisenko reports:

President Reagan marked the 4th anniversary of his unveiling of the "Star Wars" program by issuing a special statement to heap praise on the project.

He lauded "remarkable progress" made toward the aim of the effort, which is officially called "Strategic Defense Initiative" (SDI), and claimed that it "truly serves the purposes of offensive weapons reduction" and "can help us move toward a safer world."

The President also asserted that "SDI capabilities will never be used for offensive purposes".

Four years ago Reagan declared just as forcefully that the proposed missile defense would be "non-nuclear". The SDI advocates today prefer not to remember that. Neither did the President say one word about that in his statement.

This is only understandable: Along with other kinds of space weaponry, U.S. laboratories are busy developing X-ray lasers powered by nuclear explosions.

It followed from a recent statement by Energy Secretary John Herrington in Congress that his department, which engages in nuclear weapons manufacture, alone would increase appropriations for SDI-related efforts to 481 million dollars in the next fiscal year from 349 million this year.

Millions of dollars have also been allocated for devising nuclear reactors which could be deployed in orbit.

The President's statement was meant not just as a way of marking the 4th anniversary of the SDI proposal. A White House spokesman said the broader aim had been to stress his commitment to the program once again.

The praises of SDI are being sung not only in the White House. The extreme right-wingers' thinktank, the Heritage Foundation, is also a loud member of the chorus.

In a special report timed for the 4th anniversary of the "Star Wars" program, it has urged a phased deployment of a missile defense starting from the mid-90's.

The report said it would probably take five to seven years to deploy both land-based and space-based components of an SDI system.

The authors of the report are not at all embarrassed by the deployment of a partially space-based missile defense being a direct violation of the ABM treaty.

They suggest either scrapping the treaty altogether or "supplementing" it so as to emasculate this document which is the last impediment to outer space militarization.

SDI proponents stint no effort to make their compatriots believe that it is "essential" and even "inevitable" that space arms be developed.

Calls for pressing on with the "Star Wars" program in spite of everything have been made at a news conference held by rightist organizations on Capital Hill.

Speakers there said bluntly their goal was to make certain that the first components of a multitier SDI system with space-based elements be in place as early as 1995.

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CSO: 5200/1429

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

TASS VIEWS U.S. BID TO 'WHITEWASH' SDI, ASAT PROGRAMS

LD031121 Moscow TASS in English 1003 GMT 3 Apr 87

["The Threat From Space Should Be Averted"--TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow, 3 Apr (TASS)--The newspaper KRASNAYA ZVEZDA published today the following commentary by TASS military writer Vladimir Bogachev:

A spokesman for the Reagan administration said in Washington 31 March that, according to the information available to the American side, the British prime minister during her visit to Moscow had set forth with her own variations the stand on SDI that came in line with the U.S. approaches.

These approaches are well-known. In a bid to whitewash its "Star Wars" program, the U.S. Administration is interpreting very tendentiously facts concerning the state of the American and Soviet anti-missile defense, distorting the stand of the sides on anti-satellite weapons and simply waving away the plain provisions of the Soviet-American treaty on the limitation of ABM systems under the pretext of its allegiance to "common sense."

"Common sense" which motivates Washington's actions in evaluating the American "Star Wars" program is in essence a product of petty forgery the purpose of which is to undermine the treaty on the limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems.

For instance, the 1972 agreement prohibits the deployment of a large-scale ABM defense and the testing of anti-satellite weapons in space, whereas Washington's "common sense" permits that. The U.S. "Strategic Defense Initiative" calls for the breach of virtually every important provision of the ABM Treaty. SDI and the ABM Treaty are incompatible, mutually exclusive things.

The Reagan administration spokesman often emphasize with the air of significance about them that the Soviet Union has an anti-ballistic missile defense around Moscow. What they prefer not to mention, however, clearly aiming for people with little, if any, knowledge on the matter is that the Soviet defense has been deployed in full compliance with the quantitative and geographical limitations set by Article III of the 1972 treaty.

It is common knowledge that the United States has an anti-missile defense deployed in the area where U.S. offensive missiles are stationed. The fact that the U.S. defense is partially mothballed does not change anything. The difference between a mothballed and an active weapon systems is about the same as between a dollar in his owner's pocket and his dollar deposited in a bank.

The British prime minister maintained that American ABM systems being developed under SDI are non-nuclear, whereas the Soviet anti-missile missiles, as Mrs Thatcher said contrary to facts, were allegedly equipped with nuclear warheads.

It seems that Washington's "common sense" can take one too far! For the United States is making no secret of the fact that the purpose of a majority of nuclear tests conducted in Nevada is to develop ABM laser systems with nuclear pumping.

The United States, moreover, is the pioneer in the development of anti-satellite systems. Back in the 1960's the Pentagon deployed two anti-satellite systems on Kwajalein Atoll and on Johnston Island in the Pacific.

According to the American magazine BULLETIN OF ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, for some time those systems were equipped with high-yield nuclear warheads. At present the United States is intensively developing a second generation of anti-satellite systems.

The United States torpedoed the talks on anti-satellite systems and is turning down to this day the Soviet Union's proposals for their resumption. The Soviet Union declared its readiness to conclude an agreement with the United States--the agreement that would ban the testing of all anti-satellite weapons, preclude the deployment of new and provide for the destruction of all existing anti-satellite weapons. The United States rejected that proposal.

The Soviet Government decided not to be the first to deploy any anti-satellite systems in space. In other words, the USSR instituted a unilateral moratorium on such launches and it will last for as long as other states, the United States included, refrain from the emplacement of anti-satellite weapons in outer space.

The stand of the White House on that issues is obstructionist, too.

Washington strategists are pretending that they are gravely concerned over Soviet anti-satellite weapons (of which only one unit exists)--the unit which, by the way, the Soviet Union is prepared to destroy on the basis of a bilateral agreement with the United States. At the same time the Reagan administration is confronting the world with the prospect of thousands of U.S. weapons appearing in space--a factor which would dramatically heighten the threat of an all-out nuclear war that may break out as a result of malfunctions in the warning and communication systems.

Washington is now declaring its readiness to embark on a bilateral reduction of strategic offensive arms on a comparatively limited area of the land surface and at the same time is about to begin the deployment of far more dangerous weapons in truly boundless space.

In such circumstances the link between the reduction of strategic linkage. The Soviet Union will never agree to undo that package.

Some time back Sir Geoffrey Howe, the British secretary of state for foreign and commonwealth affairs, said that research work (under the SDI program) could gather such momentum that it would be impossible to stop it even if there were serious grounds for trying to do so.

One cannot but agree with this view. At present U.S. research into the development of space strike arms approached a critical line beyond which one will have to decide whether to comply with the 1972 ABM Treaty, and in doing so to maintain stability in the world, or to renounce that agreement and open up a road to the militarization of outer space and face a dramatically-grown risk of a nuclear war unfathomable in its disastrous consequences.

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GSO: 5200/1429

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

TASS SAYS U.S. EAGER TO DEPLOY ASAT SYSTEM

LD211639 Moscow TASS in English 1455 GMT 21 Apr 87

[Text] Moscow April 21 TASS -- By TASS military writer Vladimir Bogachev:

The Pentagon is opening a new channel for the arms race in space by deploying an air launched anti-satellite (ASAT) complex starting with 1987. In a letter to THE WASHINGTON POST, U.S. Undersecretary of the Air Force James McGovern asserts that "the need for a U.S. ASAT is more compelling than ever." "We cannot afford to wait," he writes.

What is it that prompted this letter of a Pentagon representative? As is known, the United States is a pioneer in the creation of anti-satellite systems. Back in October 1959, a U.S. missile launched from the B-47 bomber intercepted the "Explorer-6" satellite. In the 60s the United States (?was the first) to deploy anti-satellite systems, on Kwajalein and Johnston Islands in the Pacific. Those systems were equipped with large yield nuclear (?warheads). Those warheads were removed from the anti-satellite systems in 1975, after hurricane Celeste inflicted considerable damage on the missile bases and experts pointed out that the explosion of those nuclear charges can throw into disarray the U.S. communications system in the Pacific. But work to create anti-satellite systems has not been stopped in the United States if only for a single day. The Pentagon held two test flights of the ASAT complex in 1984 alone. The new generation of U.S. anti-satellite systems is to be deployed on 36 F-15 planes.

The United States broke off the talks on anti-satellite armaments in 1979 and has so far been rejecting all Soviet proposals to resume them. The Soviet Union proclaimed its readiness to conclude with the United States an agreement banning tests of all anti-satellite systems, calling for renunciation of the deployment of new anti-satellite weapons and destruction of all the existing such weapons. The Soviet Government has adopted a decision not to be the first to put into space any anti-satellite systems as long as other states, including the U.S., refrain from deploying such armaments in space. The Soviet Union's proposals to resolve the question about anti-satellite systems are constantly rejected by the Washington administration.

In conditions of the unilateral Soviet moratorium on the launching of anti-satellite systems, the U.S. Congress, over the past two years, has been refusing to appropriate funds for the holding of the tests of anti-satellite arms. It is precisely this stand of the U.S. Congress and not the alleged Soviet military menace that now causes the Pentagon's concern.

The case of anti-satellite arms offers a patent example of the speculation of the Whi House and the Pentagon on the allegations about "the Soviet military advantage", th fabricated themselves, in order to build up the U.S. military arsenals and to justi the demands for the spending on war preparation of ever more funds of the Americ taxpayers.

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

TASS CITES NEW YORK TIMES ON PENTAGON SPACE STATION ROLE

LD071146 Moscow TASS in English 1104 GMT 7 Apr 87

[Text] New York, 7 Apr (TASS)--Tass correspondent Yuriy Kirilchenko reports:

While scientists are pondering how a proposed U.S. space station could be used to advance science, the Pentagon is planning to take it into its own hands.

It was, THE NEW YORK TIMES said today, eyeing the orbital platform for a bevy of projects and missions that "would propel the Department of Defense into a new era of space operations."

The Air Force and the Army had prepared studies enumerating every possible use for the space station, including as "a fueling depot for 'Star Wars' weapons, a staging area for reconnaissance and battle management and a service station for repairing arms and turning space junk into decoys and armor," the paper said.

The prospects seem to have taken the U.S. military's breath away. It is viewing the station as a possible important part of the Pentagon's array of space arms in the 21st century.

"Early in the next century, manned military operations in orbit might be so extensive that they would require an altogether new space station of their own," the paper said, pointing to the studies.

THE NEW YORK TIMES report indicates that the Pentagon is replacing the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) as the chief space agency in the United States.

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CSO; 5200/1429

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

TASS: U.S. ACCELERATES SDI 'NUCLEAR SHOTGUN' PROJECT

LD230736 Moscow TASS in English 0710 GMT 23 Apr 87

[Text] Washington April 23 TASS -- The Pentagon has accelerated a secret project, code-named Prometheus, under the U.S. "Strategic Defense Initiative". The project's purpose is to develop a "nuclear shotgun", a space weapon fueled by an atomic explosion.

"The weapon might be ready for deployment in the initial phases of Strategic Defense Initiative", THE WASHINGTON TIMES reported Wednesday. The paper said that the project "has been supported by at least one underground U.S. nuclear test."

"While President Reagan, in announcing SDI in March 1983, stressed a non-nuclear defense, the 'Star Wars' program has been investigating several so-called 'third generation' nuclear weapons," THE WASHINGTON TIMES went on.

Addressing an American physical society symposium Wednesday, Engineer Stevan Aftergood, director of a Los Angeles-based group that monitors SDI's nuclear aspects, said that in addition to Prometheus the development of two more types of space weapons has "advanced to the stage of explosive testing."

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CSO: 5200/1429

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

SOVIET OFFICERS ON IMPORTANCE OF AIR DEFENSE FORCES

Article by Commander

PM161653 Moscow TRUD in Russian 11 Apr 87 p 3

[TASS-attributed article by Twice Hero of the Soviet Union Chief Marshal of Aviation A. I. Koldunov, commander in chief of Air Defense Forces and USSR deputy defense minister, pegged to Air Defense Forces Day: "Guarding the Fatherland's Skies"]

[Excerpts]

The chief feature of our forces is that they are performing a combat task in peacetime. In accordance with the Law on the USSR State Border, the Air Defense Forces guard the motherland's aerial frontiers. It is an exceedingly complex task in present-day conditions because, in the first place, the combat capability of the likely enemy's air attack facilities is constantly increasing and, second, its aggressive aspirations are by no means abating. So we must constantly maintain a level of combat readiness that will deprive an aggressor of any possibility of violating USSR airspace.

The guardians of the skies have all they need to do this. In the first place, the air defense missile forces are the foundation of Air Defense Forces' firepower. They are armed with a variety of missile complexes whose effectiveness depends neither on the time of day, nor on the weather, nor on the altitude and speed of the target. Practically any means of air attack belonging to a likely enemy can be destroyed by a missile, as occurred, for example, in the case of the Lockheed U-2 aircraft. Those who sent Powers on his spying mission were confident that such a high-altitude aircraft would not be detected, let alone shot down. They were mistaken. There have been other attempts to test the strength of our aerial frontiers. Their outcome is well known.

Air defense aircraft have equally effective equipment. Modern, supersonic, all-weather, missile-carrying aircraft can fly at high or extremely low altitudes and have the ability to hit the most difficult targets -- at long distances, what is more, from the object they are protecting. I flew fighters during and after the Great Patriotic War, including supersonic aircraft. I can confidently say that there has been a veritable technical revolution in Soviet aviation.

Our radio technical forces are also splendidly equipped. Their job is to support the combat actions of missile men and airmen. The modern radar station is a whole complex of highly sophisticated automatic devices. We can rightly take pride in the fact that it was here that radar equipment came into being.

In short, the equipment used by the Air Defense Forces corresponds to the very latest achievements of scientific and technical progress. We have never fallen behind a likely enemy in this area and we will not do so in the future. This was made quite clear at the 27th party congress: "The USSR's defense might is being maintained at a level which will make it possible to reliably protect Soviet people's peaceful labor and peaceful life."

Yet our forces' main strength lies not in equipment, no matter how ultramodern. After all, the military technology of the Soviet Union and the United States is among the best in the world. Whereas the people, their utter devotion to the homeland and the party, their ideological toughness, their fine instruction, and excellent professional training -- I am sure no capitalist army has such people. This is the chief "secret weapon" we have had since the victory of October.

Incidentally, the Air Defense Forces actually go back to the historic year of 1917. [paragraph continues]

Restructuring is currently taking place in the Air Defense Forces, as it is throughout the Armed Forces. Consequently, demands on personnel training are being resolutely increased and the search is under way for new, more effective forms and methods of training military specialists.

Unfortunately, we have officers who in this sense are not exacting enough when evaluating their work, who fail to bring it into line with the revolutionary transformations taking place in society and the army. A restructuring of human consciousness is needed. And this is a far more complex matter than, say, learning to use new equipment. Moreover, we have accumulated vast experience of assimilating new equipment, whereas it is the first time we have set about so seriously and profoundly restructuring our own thinking. Difficulties there are and will continue to be. Will we be the only ones to balk at them?

.. Our forces are a "nonoffensive" category of the Armed Forces. But for that very reason we are obliged to be in constant combat readiness. So we will be on the job guarding the fatherland's skies, even on Air Defense Forces Day.

Talk on TV

LD121721 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1045 GMT 12 Apr 87

["Talk" on the occasion of Air Defense Forces Day by Chief Marshal of Aviation Aleksandr Ivanovich Koldunov, commander-in-chief of Air Defense Forces, USSR deputy defense minister, and twice hero of the Soviet Union; date not given--live or recorded]

[Excerpts]

Dear comrades, this year Air Defense Forces' Day is being observed at a time notable for its spirit of revolutionary transformation and the creative work of Soviet people. The struggle to fulfill the historic decisions of the 27th congress and the January plenum of the party Central Committee is being waged on a broad front. The footsteps of restructuring are distinctly to be heard at the present time in all sectors of our society's life. The Central Committee appeal and the CPSU Central Committee decision on preparations for the 70th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution have given the Soviet people a fresh burst of energy and enthusiasm.

The victory of the Soviet people and its armed forces in the Great Fatherland War was an historic frontier in the destiny of the whole of mankind. Socialism is developing and getting stronger as a world system.

The reactionary circles of imperialism, however, did not learn the proper lessons from World War II and have not given up the policy of social revenge-seeking and crusades. Through the fault of militarist forces, the international situation continues to remain complex and tense. There is no end to the military conflicts in different parts of the world. The arms race is being pushed ahead and there is a build-up of the strategic offensive potential of the United States and its NATO allies. Third-generation nuclear weapons are being created [sozdayetsya], and space strike complexes are being developed [razrabatyvayutsya]. The U.S. strategic air force is being equipped with fresh means for air attack.

The Communist Party and the Soviet state are doing everything they can to halt a dangerous development of events. All our country's political authority and all its international influence have been turned to the struggle for peace. Life in conditions of security, independence, and progress can and must be ensured for all people.

At the end of February, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, announced a fresh, major initiative on the elimination of medium-range missiles in Europe. This is yet another step toward a nuclear-free world. However, as long as there is a threat from the aggressive forces the CPSU and the Soviet State will do everything necessary to keep the defensive power of the country and the countries of the socialist community at a proper level. The appeal to the people by the Communist Party Central Committee says quite definitely that Soviet people may rest assured that we shall never permit military superiority for imperialism under any conditions whatsoever.

In the system of ensuring the country's security an important role is played by the Air Defense Forces. Thanks to the constant concern of the Communist Party and the Soviet Government and the brains and talent of our scientists, designers, engineers, and workers in the defense industry there has been an immeasurable increase in the combat potential of the Air Defense Forces. Not only has there been a rise in the level of technical equipment of the forces, but also there has been a considerable development of our people -- the military cadres. They are tirelessly mastering to day's military equipment and weapons and raising the level of their combat training, moral and political tempering, organization, and discipline. Like everywhere else in the country, active work is under way in units and subunits to fulfill the decisions of the 27th party congress, the Central Committee January Plenum and the decision of the CPSU Central Committee on preparations for the 70th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution.

Deputy Commander on Improvements

LD121248 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0815 GMT 12 Apr 87

[Interview with Col Gen Yevgeniy Sergeyevich Yurasov, first deputy commander-in-chief of the Air Defense Forces, by Editor Yuliy Semenov, in the "Time, Events, People" program, on the occasion of Air Defense Forces' Day; time and place not given--recorded]

[Excerpts] [Semenov] Yevgeniy Sergeyevich, I think the first question is this. How would you briefly characterize the role and place of the Air Defense Forces in ensuring the country's defense capability?

[Yurasov] In the past 10 years the role of the Air Defense Forces within the system of ensuring the country's defense capability has been continuously growing, and their tasks have been getting larger in scale and more responsible. This has been brought about primarily by the fact that in their striving to achieve advantages in the military sphere aggressive imperialist circles have been intensively building up their strategic offensive forces, continuing to deploy medium-range missiles in a number of countries in Western Europe and feverishly pushing ahead the launching of the notorious SDI systems into space orbit. The Air Defense Forces, which perform complex and responsible tasks in guarding the homeland's air borders, are entrusted with particular responsibility for foiling possible aggression by the imperialists.

[Semenov] How could the level of technical equipment of the present day Air Defense Forces be characterized?

[Yurasov] The CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet Government show constant concern for the development and improvement of the Air Defense Forces. The latter have been provided with the most modern equipment, which has been developed on the basis of the latest scientific achievements. It comprises automated control systems based on high-performance electronic computers, multichannel ack-ack missile complexes protected against interference, interceptor fighter aircraft, and superb radar and communication facilities.

[Semenov] But of course this complex equipment makes very high demands on personnel. I am asking you about this because I am aware that the idea is gaining ground in Western literature that modern military equipment is to a considerable extent taking the place of human beings. Apparently this is not so.

[Yurasov] Of course it is not so. The complex armaments of the Air Defense Forces and the increase in their automation are considerably enhancing the human role.

Chief of Staff Interviewed

PM221607 Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian 11 Apr 87 p 3

[Interview with Colonel General I.M. Maltsev, chief of the Air Defense Forces Main Staff, by unidentified TASS correspondent for SELSKAYA ZHIZN: "Sentries of the Celestial Borders; Col. Gen. of Aviation I.M. Maltsev, Chief of the Air Defense Forces Main Staff, Answers the Correspondent's Questions" under the rubric "12 April Is Air Defense Forces Day"]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] [TASS] The war ended for everybody with victory. Only the Air Defense Forces remained as before in combat readiness.

[Maltsev] Yes, it became much more difficult to protect the air borders in the post-war years. Scientific and technical progress developed rapidly. In every possible way the imperialists used it for their foul purposes. Let us remember May 1960. The Americans had specially created the Lockheed U-2 high-altitude aircraft. They were sure that nothing would manage to detect or bring down this aircraft. They miscalculated. Bitter disappointment has always befallen others, too, who are fond of prying into someone else's secrets. The USSR air borders have been and remain inviolable.

[TASS] Your confidence is understandable. But all the same let us look at a hypothetical example: A massive raid by enemy aircraft has been made against a particularly large installation of ours. How will the Air Defense Forces act?

[Maltsev] Our eyes and ears -- the servicemen of the radio technical troops -- will be the first to embark on combat work. They will issue a comprehensive and full description of all targets, however many there may be: altitude, speed, course, and coordinates. The radar stations using modern electronics are capable of tackling all tasks successfully.

This will be followed up by scrambling the necessary number of our supersonic all-weather fighter-interceptors fitted with the latest interception missile systems. Our modern aircraft are an amalgam of the most advanced scientific and technical thought. Their electronic equipment makes it possible to rebuff an airborne enemy at the most distant approaches to the targets we are protecting.

Simultaneously the anti-aircraft missile troops will also be put into a state of combat readiness. These constitute our main fire power. The troops are armed with powerful systems with a high kill capability encompassing the entire range of altitude and speed at which the airborne means of attack may fly.

Control of all the facilities will be implemented from command points that are also equipped with the most modern technology and electronics.

[TASS] Let us be objective; the probable enemy will also be armed with the most modern technology. His aircraft, for example, can fly at supersonic speed both in the stratosphere, and at the lowest altitudes -- 25-30 meters. And the enemy has very powerful radioelectronic countermeasures....

[Maltsev] We assess the probable enemy extremely objectively. On this question not one of us -- from the ordinary soldier to the commander in chief -- can be different. That's the first thing. [paragraph continues]

[TASS] Even as I talk to you, antennas are revolving and aircraft are taking off and landing. It is difficult even to imagine how many of them have been brought into action to protect the more than 60,000 km of air borders.

[Maltsev] I can only say: Exactly as many as are essential for the reliable protection of the motherland's sky. Our radar posts, anti-aircraft missile battalions, and airfields are located at times in the most remote and inaccessible places but are able to fulfill their combat tasks unconditionally.

[Correspondent] Igor Mikhailovich, you dwelt on the high level of technical equipment of the forces, and you stressed this level is rising and being improved continuously. And what about the men? Do they conform to the high demands of service in the air defense units?

[Maltsev] Our men are truly remarkable. I could name dozens, hundreds of soldiers, sergeants, and officers who have excelled in executing combat standby duty, on exercise, and in fulfilling other responsible tasks in peacetime. I know many of them personally, and I have seen them in action.

In most of our units all the servicemen have secondary education, and many have VUZ diplomas. The most complicated systems with which our Soviet industry supplies us are

within the grasp of their young, inquisitive, and flexible minds. It is not difficult to imagine what the standard of training and intellectual skill of the training officers must be so they can effectively influence the awareness of their subordinates.

Our officer corps largely conforms to their lofty calling. What I have said does not mean there is no need for us to restructure in accordance with the spirit of the changes spreading and intensifying in society and in the Army. Restructuring is needed, and it is going on in the Air Defense Forces.

We have a lot to do to strengthen individual work with servicemen, giving it a specific direction and meaningfulness.

To maintain equipment in exemplary condition, prepare it to a high standard for combat, and use it effectively, it is also essential to constantly raise the technical skill and the degree to which personnel are instructed and trained. There are a number of other problems that must be solved in the course of restructuring. We know about them, and we will solve them. [passage omitted]

PRAVDA Article

PM221348 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 11 Apr 87 Second Edition p 6

[Report by special correspondent Major V. Sosnitskiy under the rubric "Tomorrow Is Air Defense Forces Day": "The Border Sky"]

[Excerpts] The shape of a cowboy's lasso is formed by the route of the U.S. SR-71 supersonic reconnaissance plane into areas adjacent to our northern regions. The "guest" is drawn toward our borders, as if by magnetic force, from somewhere in the British Isles. Its contents "probe" the air, sea, and land of the Soviet north. Not from scientific curiosity. At one time foreign pilots tried actually to break through this sector of air border. As is well known, this was not done with impunity.

That is evidently why the SR-71 is so careful. I "see" it on the remote indicator, on the VDU screen. This caution is presumably built into the program of the on-board electronic robot, in view of the sensitivity of the Soviet border.

The radar operator points -- the advance posts of the Air Defense Forces radioengineering troops -- are "scattered" along the border without consideration for worldly comfort, usually on cliffs battered by all the winds.

On the hunched "back" of one of them, Captain Aleksandr Zavadskiy, son of a frontline fighter, serves with his subordinates. Capt Zavadskiy is a master of his trade. He makes the apparatus work, as the saying goes, beyond the parameters.

An affection for equipment is easily explained here: People are inseparable from it for most of the day and night. When NATO's supersonic reconnaissance planes appear near our border, the signals concerning their flight pass not only through the radar fields and twists and turns of electronic diagrams, but also through human nerves, stretched to their tautest pitch.

That is the combat work of the radar operators. The result is the highest possible readiness of missile complexes and accurate initial positioning for the fighter-interceptors.

Sergeant Yan Batura is a kind of champion among the radioengineering company operators. Many times he has been the first to "catch" an SR-71 at extreme range. At the first fix, as they say. The "shining hour" for the operator is the instant when the electronic ray speeds across the indicator circle. This is comprised of the eyes, red with sleeplessness, of the officer who ensures the stations' finely honed sensitivity, the oily hands of the mechanic who keeps watch at the diesel electricity station. It is for the sake of these seconds for Sgt Batura that Lance Corporals A. Vitkus and P. Shved, Private A. Sheriyev, and other specialists work in the crowded compartments of the combat posts.

In their work the laws of electronics and the laws of human relationships are layered one upon the other, so to speak, becoming interwoven into a formula for the reliability of the air border.

Senior Lieutenant Viktor Bozin does not have to rack his brains to find visual aids for political studies. The radar operators have often seen squadrons of F-16's proceeding along the border -- and they have seen them on the plotting boards, not on training diagrams. "Shift" the map by just a fraction, and our radar posts and anti-aircraft positions, near where the Soviet servicemen's families live, would find themselves in other people's sights. [passage omitted]

Outwardly they are ordinary military airmen. But the time they have to prepare for takeoff is extremely short. Moreover, they must be constantly ready to take off not on a training task but on a combat task. That is the "privilege" of being an airman in the Air Defense Forces.

The arc from Alaska to Greenland covered by the B-52 bombers was christened the "Great Spear" by someone or other. It does not take much imagination to foresee possible evolutions in the flight of this "spear." That is why the Air Defense Forces' missile-carrying aircraft are prepared to take to the skies from the Arctic airfields. Day and night, in any maelstrom of weather.

The American reconnaissance man was playing on nerves, so to speak. He kept changing course, shying in the direction of our border. Guards Majors V. Panichkin and V. Antonov took off in two supersonic interceptors. Two F-16's immediately appeared. They impudently came closer. A very strange aircraft formation took shape in neutral skies: MIG's alternated with NATO fighters.

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CSO: 5200/1429

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

ARGENTINE PAPER URGES NUCLEAR ARMS REDUCTIONS

Buenos Aires CLARIN in Spanish 27 Mar 87 p 12

[Editorial]

[Text] The U.S. Department of Defense has just published its annual report on the Soviet Union's military power, which confirms the introduction or development of new weapons, some of which would have been unimaginable not long ago, and which seem to form an arsenal for some science-fiction future. There is a new generation of mobile ground-to-air missiles which can intercept tactical ballistic missiles, aircraft at any altitude, and perhaps even strategic ballistic missiles. There are laser rays launched by a weapon capable of blinding hostile spy aircraft and ships; strategic submarines equipped with 16 intercontinental missiles with 10 warheads each which are capable of striking different targets; air-cushioned landing ships with no counterpart in western fleets; and intercontinental missiles installed in modified railway cars or hardened silos.

The Pentagon claims that this deployment exceeds the Soviet Union's defense needs, and therefore demonstrates that it is steadily continuing to increase its offensive capability. So the document indicates that Mikhail Gorbachev's arrival in power has not altered Moscow's policy line in the area of military preparations.

This view is interesting, for it stands in contrast with the opinion of some analysts, who say that the USSR is suffering from an obvious technological lag, which would make it possible to step up the policy of containment until it becomes a sort of encirclement. According to this viewpoint, the Soviet modernization attempt provides additional evidence of the magnitude of the USSR's backwardness in some vital areas of modern industry.

Other specialists say, though, that in the past the USSR has shown that it is capable of catching up to its potential even when it was definitely behind, as it did when the United States had the atom bomb before anyone else, and tested it in the Pacific during World War II against the targets of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. So difficulties in major areas of its economy do not prevent a superpower from concentrating its efforts in areas it considers

vital for its defense, even though this may cause the quality of life for society as a whole to decline. What is hard to foresee is a rupture of parity.

Naturally it can be assumed that the United States is not sitting back doing nothing about the increase in many qualitative aspects of the USSR's fire-power. There can be no doubt that its military leaders and its labs will be working on modern weapons that can neutralize the threat represented by the Soviet innovations which the Pentagon has revealed, in some cases lifting a real veil of secrecy.

Nor can the political changes in the USSR automatically be considered a symptom of weakness. The impression they are sending is that a new generation in the Kremlin is trying—not without serious difficulties—to bring about a revitalization of the Soviet economy which has been burdened by an inefficient bureaucratic apparatus, which has grown smug in its own ideology and is reluctant to undertake the tasks of democratization and modernization in an objective way. This shift in Soviet foreign policy is not a demonstration of kindness or affectionate feelings toward the capitalist world. It is simply an attempt to allocate resources for economic remodelling by taking these resources away from the arms race. That is a universal necessity, and for the USSR it has become quite compelling. Finally, there is no weakness in such an attitude (as there would be none in a symmetrical attitude on the part of the west), since the option of accelerating military preparations is an alternative that must still be reckoned with.

So in today's world which has 4 times more nuclear warheads than during the frightening days of the Cuban missile crisis, a balanced reduction in nuclear weapons, confirmed by adequate verification, would not in the end alter the threat of apocalypse, but it would introduce a certain amount of relief into international relations. That would help to create a climate in which regional conflicts could be eased or resolved and the major problems of war and peace could be discussed rationally, with the certainty that the first option could be ominous for all of humanity.

The certainty of the continuation of the arms race leads us only to the conviction that it is essential to turn this trend around. Not only do the superpowers bear the responsibility, but they also have the sole possibility of doing this. If they are successful, they will be able to shift significant resources toward their own economic growth, and then the issue of the underdevelopment of two-thirds of the world's population could also be seriously addressed. That seems the only rational way to preserve a hope of civilization's survival.

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CSO: 5200/2004

SALT/START ISSUES

TASS NOTES PENTAGON CALL FOR NEW ICBM WARHEADS

PM200901 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 17 Apr 87 Second Edition p 5

[TASS report: "They Are Developing a New Warhead"]

[Text] Washington, 16 Apr -- Within the walls of the U.S. military department voices can be heard calling for work to be accelerated on the creation of a new nuclear warhead for ICBM's capable of altering its flight trajectory. This is reported by DEFENSE NEWS, which is close to military-industrial circles.

It is planned that these warheads will be able to accomplish a series of preprogrammed maneuvers before delivering a strike to a target and thus avoid interception. In-flight tests of their prototypes have already been conducted in the middle and at the end of the seventies, and in particular the U.S. Navy has tested the MK 500 Evader warhead.

According to the DEFENSE NEWS report, Laurence Woodruff, U.S. deputy undersecretary of defense for strategic and tactical nuclear forces, recently stated that a "demonstration of the technology" of the new warhead is planned for 1990 and 1991.

According to Richard De Lauer, until recently undersecretary of defense for research and engineering, the maneuvering warheads could be installed either on MX ICBM's or on submarine-based Trident-2 (D-5) ballistic missiles.

/9274

CSO: 5200/1433

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

USSR: GERASIMOV FOREIGN MINISTRY NEWS CONFERENCE 16 APRIL

INF, ABM Issues

LD161530 Moscow TASS in English 1518 GMT 16 Apr 87

[Text] Moscow April 16 TASS -- "The Soviet side was receiving U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz in the spirit of new thinking, with taking into account the role the United States is playing in world politics, with taking into account the experience of our dialogue with the U.S. Administration, also at the summit level," said spokesman for the USSR Foreign Ministry Gennadiy Gerasimov. He spoke here today at a briefing for Soviet and foreign journalists.

Questions central to international security, to Soviet-American relations were thoroughly discussed. All this promoted understanding of the positions of the sides, created conditions for bringing these positions closer in future, Gennadiy Gerasimov said. Questions of nuclear, space arms, other aspects of arms reduction and elimination were in the focus. A fundamental agreement has been achieved to speed up jointly the work on the Reykjavik arrangement on medium-range missiles. We would like the agreement to be drawn up within a short period of time, and we are prepared to be resolving constructively questions of shorter-range missiles for this purpose. We proposed to embark on the working out of key provisions for the further talks on strategic offensive arms, the ABM treaty and nuclear weapon tests.

Alongside the signing of a treaty on medium-range missiles, these key provisions could become the subject of arrangement at the summit level, the spokesman for the USSR Foreign Ministry said. The upshot is such: The Soviet Union came out with important, and as many in the West noted, unexpected initiatives, while the U.S. side actually proved to be unprepared to discuss them in essence, Gerasimov said. We showed the readiness to give additional time to the United States and its allies, an additional opportunity to ponder on the Soviet proposals.

The discussion of questions of security and disarmament will be continued at various levels with taking into account the exchange of opinions held in Moscow, the spokesman for the USSR Foreign Ministry said.

Gennadiy Gerasimov said that the very fact of George Shultz's visit to the USSR is very positively assessed in the Soviet Union. Positively assessed is also the fact that a dialogue was held on many problems. But it is noted that Shultz gave no answer to Soviet proposals, explaining this by the need to consult allies. It would be undesirable if the process of the United States consultations with allies were very

extensive. This process should have time frames, the spokesman for the USSR Foreign Ministry said. A summit meeting will be possible only if a constructive answer is given to the Soviet proposals.

Answering questions of reporters, Gennadiy Gerasimov made a remark about George Shultz quoting in an interview to Soviet television a statement by the late USSR Defence Minister Grechko. George Shultz said that during the ratification of the ABM Treaty at the meeting of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet on September 29, 1972, Andrey Grechko made the following statement: "It (the ABM Treaty) does not set any limits to research and experiments aimed at resolving the problem of protecting the country against nuclear missile strikes."

This statement is now used in the United States for speculative purposes in order to prove that the USSR has allegedly been declaring from the very start in favour of so-called "broad interpretation" of the ABM Treaty, even though this statement has nothing to do with the new interpretation which the U.S. Administration adopts now.

The spokesman for the USSR Foreign Ministry said that Andrey Grechko's statement dealt with fundamental provisions and restrictions envisaged by the provisions of the ABM Treaty. These restrictions now have to be mentioned again and again for the reason that they in the United States are now prepared to reject them. "I must note that the ABM Treaty deals only with stationary land-based ABM systems and components and only applicably [as received] to just one area of the ABM systems deployment, agreed upon by the sides. Andrey Grechko's statement on research should be viewed in the context of these restrictions," Gerasimov said.

Shultz 'Unprepared' for Proposals

LD161738 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1630 GMT 16 Apr 87

[Text] Today at the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs Press Center a briefing for Soviet and foreign journalists took place at which Gennadiy Gerasimov, head of the Information Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, spoke. He said, specifically:

[Begin Gerasimov recording] The official visit to our country by U.S. Secretary of State Geroge Shultz has ended. We received him in the spirit of the new thinking, taking into account the role that the United States plays in international politics, taking into account the experience that has been accumulated in our relations and in the dialogue with the U.S. Administration, also on the highest level. A reasonably detailed discussion of the key questions of international security and of USSR-U.S. relations took place. All this has had a certain importance, has been useful, and has contributed to a better understanding of positions. We hope that it has contributed to bringing these positions closer in the future.

One has to say that the baggage the secretary of state took with him to Moscow -- of course, if we exclude the specialized baggage for communicating with Washington -- was not very large. We made proposals; the U.S. side listened to them and reserved its position. Despite the fact that the U.S. delegation was fairly large, one had the feeling that the head had not too many possibilities for maneuvering. We had the impression that the U.S. side is not prepared to reply in a constructive way to the concrete Soviet proposals. On the other hand, it recognized the need for resolving the

cardinal problems of security. Yet the discussion of the issues of security and disarmament will be continued at various levels taking into account the exchange of opinions that took place in Moscow.

However, we think that this exchange of opinions has revealed new possibilities for developing and enriching bilateral cooperation. In particular, an agreement was signed on cooperation in space research and exploitation for peaceful purposes. In general, in our opinion, the result is as follows: The Soviet Union came out with important and -- as many people in the West commented -- unexpected initiatives; the U.S. side appeared unprepared to discuss them in essence, while we, for our part, showed our readiness to give additional time and possibilities to the United States and its allies to think over our Soviet proposals. [end recording]

U.S. 'Unable' To Respond

AU161521 Paris AFP in English 1511 GMT 16 Apr 87

[Text] Moscow, April 16 (AFP) -- U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz brought to Moscow few "new proposals" and was unable to "respond positively" to Soviet disarmament offers, Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Gennadiy Gerasimov said here Thursday.

But Mr. Gerasimov agreed, however, with the U.S. view that progress had been made during Mr. Shultz's three-day visit that ended Wednesday, echoing statements made in Brussels by Mr. Shultz that an accord to eliminate intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) stationed in Europe was "possible."

He said Moscow evaluated "positively" the talks which centered on the proposed elimination of medium-range nuclear missiles from Europe.

Mr. Shultz, however, "did not come to Moscow with many new proposals," the spokesman charged.

He criticised Mr. Shultz for being "unable to respond positively to Soviet proposals" and said Washington was hiding behind its European allies.

This, Mr. Gerasimov said, was not a problem because Moscow "has always indicated to the United States and its allies that it was willing to give them the necessary time to reflect upon the Soviet proposals."

He warned, however, that U.S.-European consultations should not drag indefinitely, although he stressed that Moscow had not set a deadline for a response.

But he added that U.S. elections were two years away and President Ronald Reagan, whom he described as a "lame duck," needed to exert staunch efforts before that date.

He also reiterated that an eventual summit meeting between Mikhail Gorbachev and U.S. President Ronald Reagan was pegged to the positive outcome of negotiations on European disarmament.

In Brussels, where he briefed North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies on his Moscow talks, Mr. Shultz stressed the need for a prompt accord on the Soviet offer to scrap shorter-range missiles (SRINF), adding, "we have before us the prospects of a good INF agreement."

Elsewhere, Mr. Gerasimov said the Soviet Union does not on the so-called "zero option" -- which calls for eliminating from Europe, American and Soviet missiles with a range of more than 600 miles (about 970 kilometers). [sentence as received]

He said the proposal was strategically unbalanced because of U.S. "nuclear presence in Japan and in South Korea," adding that the United States had 48 F-16 combat aircraft in Japan equipped with nuclear weapons.

Mr. Gerasimov said the planes were equipped with nuclear bombs that had a span of 600 kilometers (about 372 miles), capable of reaching the Soviet city of Khabarovsk in the eastern Soviet Union.

He did not, however, allude to China. The Soviet Union, which is trying to improve its ties with China, does not wish to sign a separate agreement with the U.S. that might hinder its relations with its neighbour.

Need for Missiles in Asia

LD161513 Moscow TASS in English 1507 GMT 16 Apr 87

[Text] Moscow April 16 TASS -- The need to retain a hundred Soviet nuclear warheads in the Asian part of the USSR is determined by the strategic situation in the Asia-Pacific region forming as a result of the presence in South Korea and the Japanese islands of American nuclear forces capable of reaching the territory of the Soviet Union, a briefing here was told by Gennadiy Gerasimov, head of the Information Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Reykjavik formula that formed the basis of the current work to conclude an agreement on medium-range missiles, he said, provides for retaining 100 warheads in the Asian part of the USSR and 100 warheads on the territory of the United States.

When defining its position the Soviet Union proceeded from the fact that the United States has a large number of forward-based systems in the Pacific area capable of reaching the territory of the USSR and its allies. Major American naval bases servicing nuclear-capable planes and ships are located in direct proximity of Soviet borders. The deployment of American "Lance" missiles in South Korea has been officially announced.

If the United States responds to the proposals made in Vladivostok and Delhi on turning the Pacific Ocean into a zone of peace, on liquidating Soviet and American military presence abroad then there will be no need for the presence of Soviet medium-range missiles in Asia, the Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman said.

/9274

CSO: 5200/1431

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

MOSCOW STRESSES NEED FOR MUTUAL VERIFICATION

LD201653 Moscow World Service in English 1310 GMT 20 Apr 87

[Commentary by station correspondent Yuriy Solton]

[Text] It would seem that the Soviet Union's consent to dismantle its tactical missiles in Europe within 12 months if the Soviet and American medium-range missiles are scrapped has removed the fears in the West and cleared the way for a real disarmament. But the NATO military quarters are in two minds again: They keep claiming verification may prove a problem, and often distort the Soviet position into the bargain. Radio Moscow's Yuriy Solton comments:

Equality and equal security is the key principle underlying the Soviet disarmament proposals. It's well-known here in Moscow that plans for delivering a nuclear attack on the Soviet Union have not been given up. Also suspicious is the fact that both the United States and its nuclear allies in NATO keep flatly refusing to follow the example of the Soviet Union and China and pledge not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. So you see, the Soviet Union takes a greater interest in a reliable verification than the NATO countries.

What are you afraid of? Mikhail Gorbachev kept asking the United States Secretary of State George Shultz this question at the recent meeting in Moscow. We would like to sign a reliable agreement for a most stringent and comprehensive verification. And since a whole class of nuclear arms is to be scrapped the questions of respecting a future agreement are taking on a qualitatively new significance. Verification is a major lever to ensure security, so the Soviet Union will demand verification and on-the-spot inspection everywhere missiles will be dismantled and destroyed, at proving grounds and bases, including those in third countries, and also where missiles are stockpiled and manufactured by any companies, both private and government owned. And mutual verification is a must. The Soviet Union has lately suggested establishing adequate control over a stop to nuclear tests, a ban on chemical weapons, a reduction in conventional weapons and nondeployment of weapons in space.

None of these Soviet proposals have drawn a positive reply from the West. The question is what accounts for the present NATO's concern in connection with verification? Do they really want to help get reliable verification for a nuclear disarmament agreement; or do they hope, which seems more likely, to block approaches to such an agreement with the talk about difficulties of verification?

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CSO: 5200/1431

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

SOVIET INF DELEGATION ARRIVES IN GENEVA

LD211322 Moscow TASS in English 1303 GMT 21 Apr 87

[Text] Geneva April 21 TASS -- A group of Soviet representatives arrived here today to continue talks with the United States on intermediate-range nuclear missiles within the framework of talks on nuclear and space weapons. In this connection Soviet ambassador at large Aleksey Obukhov made the following statement at the Geneva airport:

"The Soviet delegation arrived in Geneva so as to continue working together with the U.S. representatives on the preparation of a joint draft treaty on the elimination of Soviet and U.S. medium-range missiles in Europe.

"By mutual agreement it was decided that the group on medium-range missiles would begin the current negotiating round on April 23, that is, somewhat earlier than the groups on space and strategic offensive arms. It was done to provide as much working time as possible for agreeing upon formulations to be included in a joint draft treaty on medium-range missiles which is under preparation.

"Now it is precisely in this area of the negotiations on nuclear and space arms that prerequisites for decisive progress towards agreement emerged due to the far-reaching initiatives put forth by Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, in the statement of February 28, as well as in his speech of April 10 in Prague.

"The Soviet side favours immediate conclusion of a separate treaty on the elimination of Soviet and American medium-range missiles in Europe in accordance with the formula worked out to this end at the Reykjavik meeting.

"We are in favour of agreeing on the problem of medium-range missiles in a linkage with operational-tactical missiles and are prepared -- as soon as a treaty on medium-range missiles is signed -- to withdraw our operational-tactical missiles from Czechoslovakia and the GDR. In so doing the Soviet Union agrees to eliminate in a few months or within about a year all the remaining operational-tactical missiles.

"The new Soviet initiatives on the question of eliminating medium-range missiles and operational-tactical missiles in Europe open the way to lowering the level of military confrontation on the continent and are fully in keeping with the interests of European as well as other countries of the world. The above mentioned proposals of the USSR represent an example of new political thinking and provide yet another chance for a drastic turn for the better in international relations. The task is that this chance is not to be missed.

"During the recent negotiations in Moscow with U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz the Soviet side also proposed elaborating 'key provisions' relating to strategic offensive arms and the ABM issues. It is our assumption that together with the signing of a treaty on medium-range missiles they could become the subject of an accord at the highest level and the basis upon which legally binding agreements between the USSR and the United States would be prepared.

"In this connection the Soviet side proceeds from an indispensable linkage between solving the question of strategic offensive arms and complying with the ABM Treaty. At the talks in Moscow compromise solutions ensuring progress were proposed to the U.S. side in the ABM area.

"All that creates a good and promising basis for constructive progress in the Geneva negotiations. It is necessary to make use of the opening opportunities and to work vigorously with a desire to look for and quickly find mutually acceptable solutions in the interests of putting an end to military rivalry and radically lowering the level of nuclear confrontation. It is possible to have a treaty on the elimination of medium-range missiles in Europe already this year. It is with these instructions that the Soviet delegation has arrived in Geneva and we are entitled to reciprocity from the U.S. side".

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CSO: 5200/1431

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

MOSCOW TO NORTH AMERICA ON WESTERN OBJECTIONS TO AGREEMENT

LD112113 Moscow in English to North America 2300 GMT 10 Apr 87

["Top Priority" program with host Pavel Kuznetsov and Professors Radomir Bogdanov and Igor Molashenko of the United States of America and Canada Institute -- live or recorded]

[Excerpts] [Kuznetsov] How do you do, ladies and gentlemen. I am Pavel Kuznetsov, your host on "Top Priority." Together with me in the studio are Professors Radomir Bogdanov and Igor Molashenko, both from the Moscow-based Institute for United States and Canada Studies. Mikhail Gorbachev's visit to Czechoslovakia, his talks with the nation's leaders and a major speech at a rally in Prague have highlighted the issue of European security which is inseparable from world security. We have been very close to a major breakthrough in this area when we broke down our package of proposals, the Reykjavik package, and agreed to treat the INF question separately. Over the past days the issue seems to have been complicated. What is the general assessment of this situation? Professor Bogdanov, could you give us your [passage indistinct].

[Bogdanov] You mean, you mean the general assessment of the situation with the nuclear weapons, or INF [words indistinct].

[Kuznetsov] I would like, I would like you to treat it in a broader sense: the situation in Europe, conventional... [sentence as heard]

[Bogdanov] You know, I believe first of all that this visit of the Soviet leader to Czechoslovakia is of very great importance.

[Bogdanov] By 25 percent.

[Molashenko] Yes, 25 percent -- it's a great figure, and it would be for the first time. But the problem is that there is no clear response from NATO countries, which are presumably so concerned with the problem of conventional balance in Europe.

[Kuznetsov] The traditional Western approach to the Soviet Union has been that of an invitation to us to set an example or call our bluff. So we've tried many approaches on such issues as, say, British and French nuclear deterrents, I mean whether to count them in the overall East-West balance, or not, on nuclear testing and now on the INF issue. At the same time the, er, more approaches we try the stronger the impression may be with some people that the Western line of getting tough with the Soviets does work.

[Bogdanov] You know I hear that for many, many, many, many times, and I believe that is so, you know naive, and so unexciting but I would like really to stress one point. Such a great country, such a powerful country as the Soviet Union is, it is not an object for a pressure. The problem is who is responsible and who is not responsible in this world, and Pavel, believe me, that if we reach a disarmament, substantial disarmament agreement and if we make substantial steps towards the non-nuclear world I'm quite ready at least to share, (?you know) the glory for that with America, with anybody else and I believe that we have more serious things to talk about than all this childish, you know, business which, which already sounds very...

[Kuznetsov, interrupting] But we ourselves openly admit that we want limits on the arms race to be able to channel our resources into the economy; and this is being presented as a sign of weakness because the Soviets cannot cope with this burden of the arms race forever, so they will buckle down.

[Molashenko] I think it is not a sign of weakness but a sign of wisdom and you know I'm always puzzled by all this conversation about the position of strength, after all, what is a position of strength? For example, the Soviet Union has even now more nuclear warheads on its SS-20 missiles. According to the Western estimates, it has a superiority in shorter-range missiles and still the Soviet Union is willing to sacrifice so to say all these advantages and this position of strength. There is a position of strength on the Soviet side and it is not a sign of weakness but a sign of wisdom, I mean the Soviet willingness to have a major nuclear arms reduction.

[Kuznetsov] The changes in the Soviet Union have generated a debate in the West with opinions being rather split from what I would say is blindness to the depth and the vitality of the changes to claims that it is all window dressing. However, there are a group of people, very serious people, who are, who do believe that we mean business. I'd like to go back to an issue that we raised in our last "Top Priority" which dealt with this spy scandal. A non-binding resolution adopted in the Senate on Thursday urges Secretary of State George Shultz to delay his visit because of what is being said the Soviet penetration of the American Embassy building. At the same time both President Reagan and his chief of staff, Howard Baker, are terribly evasive when pressed by reporters about the scope of American spying on the Soviets and our buildings in America, our property in America. In our last program you said, Professor Bogdanov, that some forces there may be out to derail Soviet-American talks on the INF. Could it be that the stakes are higher than that and that perhaps the whole Soviet policy is, er, they try to compromise the whole Soviet policy?

[Bogdanov] I agree with you, Pavel. There is, in any case try, you know, to compromise the whole policy. [sentence as heard] But that's not the end by itself, you know. You are witnessing, you know, the domestic fight within the United States Administration between administration and the Congress, but at the same time, of course, the main target is the Soviet Union, you know. And they are trying by settling their domestic accounts, you know, to harm the Soviet-American relations to such an extent, if possible, that again there is no point of return and again we are back in our relations for another maybe decade or so. There are bad guys at the Soviet end and there are benign good guys at the American end -- angels!

[Kuznetsov] They never bug anybody, they (?do not) listen to anybody.

[Bogdanov] They never bug anybody, they never listen to anybody.

[Kuznetsov] They don't send spies.

[Bogdanov] They don't send spies, they don't sell arms for, exchange arms for hostages, they don't do anything -- they're angels.

[Molashenko] Yes, and at the same time there was a press conference yesterday in Moscow.

[Bogdanov] Yeh, I was about to raise this issue because in connection with this, President Reagan and Howard Baker, er, saying quite flatly, refused to answer a reporter's questions on the scope of American spying on the Soviet Union and the scope of American penetration of our property and so on and so forth and the reason is that they said they could not and would not comment on United States intelligence efforts. Well how would you... [sentence unfinished]

[Molashenko] Yes, some other people in Moscow yesterday tried to answer some of these questions and the Soviet security experts displayed a number of American equipment, very sophisticated bugging devices which were installed and later found. [passage omitted] So there is a proof of these kinds of activities on American side and it doesn't make a lot of sense for Reagan administration officials to be so evasive.

[Kuznetsov] No, I think it makes a lot of sense to be so evasive because the scope of spying is outrageous in my view.

[Molashenko] Well, yes maybe so if the opposite side can't call your bluff and our experts to some extent can do that. Well, anyway, I think it doesn't make a lot of sense to exchange those accusations and I think that the reason you mentioned, as a matter of fact, it's just another attempt to influence the political atmosphere in a very crucial moment in U.S.-Soviet relations.

[Kuznetsov] Okay, let's go back to the issue of European security which is going to be on the agenda during Secretary of State George Shultz' visit here. According to an administration source in Washington, this is the latest information I got. Secretary of State George Shultz will be under orders from the White House to stiffen the American stand on arms control issues and spurn the Soviet proposal for new limits on underground nuclear tests.

The President went to Los Angeles where his speech to the World Affairs Council has to be seen as an overview about his policy on East-West relations and a preamble to the visit by Secretary Shultz. What is it that they seek to gain from getting tougher and tougher with Moscow?

[Bogdanov] You know, I, I don't know really, but I have a feeling...

[Kuznetsov, interrupting] I am asking for a guess, perhaps.

[Bogdanov] My guess is that -- maybe my guess is not very far away from the truth -- but still my guess is that, that usually before they start serious talks they, they really try to raise the stakes, you know, and not only they do it, not only for the tactical reasons, trying to bargain more from us, but they do it for their domestic, for their domestic consumption, to demonstrate to their own political buddies, pals, you know...

[Kuznetsov, interrupting] Perhaps also to the European allies.

[Bogdanov] To European allies, how tough they are with these Russians, but I believe, you know, again, and I would like to come back to that, that the responsible behavior

of nowadays, it's a common sense behavior. We've been wasting a lot of time on all these kind of tactical, you know, tricks, moves, and I am absolutely sure that the Soviet Side, the Soviet Union is beyond that. We are so serious about nuclear disarmament and we believe in nuclear disarmament and we are ready to do whatever is possible. Maybe it's a high time really to become serious and to come down to business. I have a feeling that from the Soviet side, as on many other occasions, the flexibility, the good will, the common sense will be the slogans of the day.

[Kuznetsov] As time is running out on us, I'd like to ask my final question. Would you agree that their tough approach to the USSR could be explained in part by the fact that SDI is likely to become in their view a major trump card, a major means of pressure on the Soviet Union that will make us surrender some of our positions in the long run?

[Molashenko] Well, yes, I think that they put a lot of hope on SDI because there are all those signs of crisis, for example, in American nuclear strategy, crisis in a sense that now it's very obvious for many people that all that attempt to put a lot of political and psychological pressure with the help of nuclear strategy, just, just failed, for many years, for many reasons, but it's a fact. And now the reason you attempt to, you know, to have another technical wonder which will solve all these problems it will create new leverage of political and psychological pressure on the Soviet Union. [sentence as heard] It will create a tool of economic pressure and in this sense, yes, it is a manifestation of this old tough approach to the Soviet Union and at the same time it, it's an attempt to find new means...

[Kuznetsov] Of this approach. I'd like to sum up today's program with the new proposals made by General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev in Prague. He once again emphasized this country's readiness to seek mutually acceptable agreements on nuclear disarmament, among them 50 percent cuts of strategic offensive arms over the next 5 years and their total elimination in the next decade under condition that the ABM Treaty is observed.

To speed up accord on INF, the USSR proposes to start talks on reductions and elimination of shorter-range missiles with a radius between 500 and 1,000 kilometers without linking this issue with medium-range missiles. The elimination of both medium- and shorter-range missiles should be carried out under strict control. Another major proposal by Mikhail Gorbachev is to convene a meeting of foreign ministers of the participants in the European conference on security and cooperation to decide on the beginning of large-scale talks on deep radical cuts in tactical nuclear arms, armed forces and conventional weapons. Deep cuts, you know, they should be carried out under international control and with on-site inspection. In our next programs we'll be discussing these problems in greater detail. Thank you, gentlemen, we've come to the end of "Top Priority." I am Pavel Kuznetsov wishing our listeners the best of everything. Goodbye until next time, a week from now on the same wavelength.

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CSO: 5200/1431

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

PRAVDA SURVEYS RESPONSE TO RECENT GORBACHEV STATEMENTS

PM171105 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 17 Apr 87 Second Edition p 4

[Roundup of own correspondent and TASS 16 April reports: "Time for Specific Decisions; International Responses to Soviet Proposals"; first paragraph is PRAVDA introduction]

[Excerpt] The speeches by M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, during his official friendly visit to the CSSR, his talks in Moscow with U.S. Secretary of State G. Shultz and U.S. congressmen, and the bold constructive proposals put forward by the Soviet leader are the focus of the international public's attention.

Washington -- J. Wright, speaker of the U.S. Congress House of Representatives, has assessed the Soviet proposals on medium-range missiles as "a positive step in the right direction." "The Soviet Union," he said, "is clearly signalling that it is seeking to conclude an agreement on medium-range missiles before President Reagan's term in office expires."

A statement by U.S. President R. Reagan disseminated here notes that during the Soviet-U.S. talks in Moscow "progress was achieved" and that these talks "make it possible to hope that in the not too distant future an agreement will be reached on medium-range nuclear forces. Reaching agreements on reducing strategic arms and on space and defense will be more difficult," R. Reagan states. His statement claims that "achieving equitable, stabilizing agreements subject to effective inspection" has for a long time been "one of the main aims" of Washington although it is well known that it is the U.S. Administration who, by retreating from its Reykjavik positions, has been hindering progress in resolving nuclear disarmament problems.

But it is clear from U.S. press items that Washington's official reaction to the peaceful Soviet initiatives was varied and there is much that attests to the United States' reluctance to act vigorously and to travel its part of the road. "Although White House representatives, like Shultz, are publicly describing the Moscow talks as positive," NBC television notes, "in private they are admitting that during the meeting they did not succeed in getting what they had been counting on."

"The initiative put forward by the Soviet leader for eliminating medium-range weapons in Europe was initially proposed by the West itself," CBS television notes. "No one expected the Russians to agree to it. But Moscow has accepted the proposal. And now that it is saying: Let's eliminate these missiles, now that the USSR is also suggesting resolving the question of the hundreds of tactical nuclear armaments, the practical implementation of these proposals will face the U.S. allies with a problem:

If they oppose the arms control agreement they will look like warmongers in the eyes of the public."

As a result of the Soviet proposals, NBC notes, Washington has been obliged to "move to the defensive."

Brussels -- This morning a special session of the NATO council was held at the NATO headquarters building at which G. Shultz informed the U.S. allies of the course and results of his talks in Moscow. A report for the press issued in the name of the NATO secretary general states that those taking part in the session noted the importance of the Soviet-U.S. talks and welcomed the fact that during the secretary of state's visit advances had occurred in vitally important fields of arms control.

During the news conference that took place after the session ended, G. Shultz made a brief statement. He assessed positively the results of his talks with the Soviet leaders and noted that opportunities have now opened up for achieving progress with regard to an accord on the medium-range missiles stationed in Europe. "We now have the prospect of a good agreement on medium-range missiles in Europe," the U.S. secretary of state said. "All basic elements exist for a future agreement. We now have to make a decision on our position -- whether it should change for decreased range missiles [rakety ponizhennoy dalnosti]. We are approaching this decision cautiously and on the basis of consultations."

Shultz said that he was informing U.S. President R. Reagan of his talks. Answering journalists' questions, the secretary of state refused to name the deadlines within which an agreement on medium-range missiles might be reached. As for other aspects of the reduction of nuclear missile weapons, G. Shultz called for caution and the cohesion of the allies within NATO. [passage omitted]

/9274

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INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

USSR: U.S. RESPONSE TO GORBACHEV OFFER VIEWED

Arbatov, Karpov on U.S. TV

LD201018 Moscow World Service in English 0900 GMT 20 Apr 87

[Text] The Soviet Union believes that an agreement with the United States on freeing Europe from nuclear weapons is possible, but that depends on the stand of Washington. That was stated in an interview for American television by a prominent specialist on Soviet-American relations, Dr Georgiy Arbatov, and a high-ranking official of the Soviet Foreign Ministry in charge of disarmament, Viktor Karpov. Dr Arbatov said that no other president of the United States had had such a chance to help end the arms race as Ronald Reagan now had. Viktor Karpov stressed the possibility of reaching an agreement, following recent initiatives of the Soviet Union. Agreement would be a reality if the United States didn't put up artificial obstacles on its way. One such obstacle is the assertion of the West about Soviet superiority in conventional arms. The Soviet Union said Viktor Karpov is ready for any talks on radical reductions of not only nuclear but also conventional arms in Europe.

Reagan's 'Optimism' Questioned

OW220022 Moscow Television Service in Russian 2305 GMT 20 Apr 87

[From the "Novosti" newscast: Yuriy Rostov commentary]

[Text] President Reagan, speaking on the radio, announced the USSR and the United States have opportunities to achieve progress in talks about nuclear weapons.

[Rostov] Hello comrades. Certainly, the President's guarded optimism can only be welcomed. But is this really an indication that an agreement on the intermediate-range package is close to fruition?

Let us remember what efforts were needed to achieve even this small breakthrough in the U.S. position. At first, the West objected to its own zero option, maintaining Moscow has a manyfold superiority over NATO in operational and tactical missiles. Washington estimates this difference to be sixfold. Even more indicative is London's opinion estimating the difference to be nine times that of the NATO forces.

The USSR then offered to completely eliminate these missiles. The West declared that we were not to be trusted and that destruction of these missiles would take decades.

Last week, the Soviet Union offered to destroy the short-range nuclear missiles within a year, and to do so under strict supervision.

It would appear that, under these circumstances, it would be difficult to take exception to the Soviet proposals. Even George Shultz, as is known, was impressed by the Soviet Union's position. But, unfortunately, the Republican administration itself is divided. There, the moderate Shultz is being opposed by such hawks as U.S. Defense Secretary Weinberger. Moreover, the unstable position of the President, whose prestige, as is known, has plummeted, is a contributing factor. This, on the one hand, increases the White House's aspiration to achieve an impressive foreign policy success, and on the other, leaves it open to pressures from the ultraright wing.

Congress' position is also hard to determine. Generally, it is impossible to give an accurate prognosis on the future of the INF agreement -- the forces in the United States, who see the agreement as detrimental to their interest, are far too powerful.

Foreign factors also play an important role in this question; it is not an accident that, immediately after the President expressed his guided optimism, a campaign against the agreement began gathering force in the West. At the heart of this is that a nuclear-free Europe is not in the interests of NATO.

'Polarization of Forces'

PM221819 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 23 Apr 87 First Edition p 4

[Own correspondent V. Gan dispatch: "Will Common Sense Prevail?"]

[Text] Washington, 22 Apr -- President Reagan held a conference in the White House today with the Republican leaders of the U.S. Congress at which the results of Secretary of State Shultz' recent talks in Moscow were discussed. As White House spokesman M. Fitzwater announced, the secretary of state briefed the legislators on the new Soviet proposals for the elimination of medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe. According to Fitzwater, the President told those present that he was "optimistic but also realistic" regarding prospects for an agreement between the USSR and the United States. "The Soviets are displaying a desire to move forward, but many details still have to be worked out. We will follow this very closely," Reagan said.

For all their generally positive tone, the President's statements and the legislators' remarks after the meeting attracted observers' attention due to their relatively abstract, not to say ambiguous, nature. Talking to journalists, the congressmen, on the one hand, supported Reagan's "optimism" with regard to possible accords, while on the other hand the Republican leaders hastened to "balance" their remarks by expressing doubts. "It is too early to say whether there is support in Congress. I know that many people are expressing certain reservations and at the same time feeling optimistic," said Senator R. Dole, leader of the Republicans in the Senate, for instance.

A similar situation is observed in the ranks of the Democratic legislators. J. Wright, speaker of the House of Representatives, who has just returned from a visit to the USSR, spoke highly of the Soviet proposals, declaring: "It seems that there now exists an excellent opportunity to achieve an arms control agreement. We gained the impression that both sides are relatively close to an agreement." But at the same time

many people here were surprised by the statement made by Senate Democratic leader R. Byrd, who said: "I would advise the administration not to rush into an agreement that is cosmetically attractive but that essentially works against the cohesion and consistency of the Atlantic alliance."

Comparing the politicians' remarks, Washington observers speak of a "polarization of forces" that is assuming increasingly distinct outlines. The Soviet initiatives have created a qualitatively new situation by posing point-blank the question: Is there to be an agreement or not? The approaching "moment of truth" is forcing Washington politicians to reflect on their stance toward arms control. Clearly, it will not be possible to remain on the sidelines.

This process is becoming the target of pressure by right-wing, militarist forces who would like to channel it into obstructing accords with the USSR. It is hardly coincidental that the Pentagon organization for the elaboration [razrabotka] of the "Strategic Defense Initiative" has submitted its annual report on the status of the "Star Wars" program to Congress right now, with a 3-month delay. The voluminous file contains the whole range of anti-Soviet fabrications borrowed from the CIA and the Pentagon. The authors spare no eloquence in order to describe the "virtues" of the plans for the militarization of space. They are proposing a "phased" deployment of SDI in order to blackmail the Soviet side. The writing between the lines reads: Don't rush into an agreement but instead allocate some more money for SDI, and in a while we will give you a most powerful weapon with which to force the USSR to accept U.S. terms.

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INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

USSR: WEST EUROPEAN REACTION TO INF PROGRESS VIEWED

'Lack of Logic' in UK Stance

PM071425 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 7 Apr 87 p 3

[APN Observer B. Ostrovskiy article: "London's Strange Position"]

[Text] The visit to the Soviet Union by British Prime Minister M. Thatcher revealed a fundamental divergence between the sides in their approach to the problems of nuclear disarmament and security. And although the lofty British guest named medium-range missiles in Europe, the 50 percent cuts in Soviet and U.S. strategic systems, and the banning of chemical weapons among the priorities in the sphere of strengthening security, this does not mean that she seeks a way to achieve a nuclear-free world. The British prime minister is not prepared to agree to that idea.

She made her position utterly clear: A world without nuclear weapons will be less stable and more fragile and dangerous for all. Thus, one of the leading NATO countries seemingly advocates reducing and controlling arms, but at the same time does not want to go whole hog, since official London turns nuclear weapons into a guarantee of peace.

It is hard to agree with this logic. If one follows it, the Soviet Union should not have adhered for 18 months to a unilateral moratorium on all nuclear explosions, it was not worth its while to put forward a program for eliminating nuclear weapons by the end of the 20th century, and there was no point in going to Reykjavik and "untying" the Reykjavik package, freeing medium-range missiles in Europe from any conditions. True, in such a case the question of ridding the European Continent of nuclear weapons would not have been made a practical reality. There would have been no turn toward the implementation of even some of the preliminary accords reached at Reykjavik by the USSR and the United States.

The lack of logic in the British position on nuclear systems affects not only that NATO power. A lack of logic in the Western approach was also seen in connection with the 28 February Soviet initiative on medium-range missiles. The United States and its allies were "suddenly" frightened of the "zero option" in Europe, for which they themselves had once militated.

The Soviet doctrine of a nonnuclear world and ways of achieving it are diametrically opposed to the official British approach to the problem of security. We proceed on the basis that "nuclear deterrence" is not trouble-free and is not only a dangerous source for the arms race, but also governs political decisions.

Under the current conditions of strategic nuclear parity "nuclear deterrence" can be described as yesterday's thinking: It does not conform to the realities of the nuclear space age. By keeping mankind in its old positions, it could lead it to catastrophe, since it not only fails to rule out arms buildups but presupposes them. The Soviet Union urges all countries to reject this dangerous concept.

As a result of Mrs M. Thatcher's visit another contradiction has also emerged in her approach to security problems. Despite claiming Warsaw Pact superiority over NATO in conventional arms and armed forces, the British side (together with NATO) has not responded to the specific June 1986 Warsaw Pact initiative to cut both alliances' conventional arms and armed forces by 25 percent (compared with current levels) at the start of the nineties from the Atlantic to the Urals.

NATO is silent, which leads us to believe that in fact the bloc does not feel threatened by the Warsaw Pact since, naturally, no such threat exist. Even Western specialists admit that the asymmetry in the sides' conventional force components in recent years has not led to any violation of the approximate equality between the blocs. But NATO headquarters is striving for the kind of reduction that would give that bloc military superiority over the Warsaw Pact.

It is worth recalling that W. Churchill, Mrs Thatcher's "outstanding predecessor," referring to the terrible might of atomic weapons, warned the West that a time might come when the lights of science would return us to the Stone Age.

Chirac 'Against' Nuclear-Free Europe

LD080820 Moscow TASS in English 0455 GMT 8 Apr 87

[Text] Paris, 8 Apr (TASS)--Prime Minister Jacques Chirac of France has come out against the idea of a nuclear-free Europe.

He raised the question of confidence in the government. During yesterday's debate in the National Assembly on the issue, he voiced concern, in particular, over the possibility of complete removal of nuclear arms from Europe.

The prime minister also pointed out that the French Government would not agree to such a situation.

In this connection Jacques Chirac argued that such a move would substantially upset the balance of forces between the countries of the West and the Warsaw-Treaty member states in the field of conventional and chemical arms.

'Threat' to NATO Doctrine

LD162205 Moscow in English to Great Britain and Ireland 1900 GMT 16 Apr 87

[Text] [Announcer] According to reports from Brussels, the NATO allies have welcomed the progress made by the Soviet Union and the United States towards a medium-range missile accord, but the alliance foreign ministers have withheld endorsement of the new Soviet offer to eliminate shorter-range missiles

in Europe. Nikolay Gorshkov has been watching West European reaction to the Soviet offer and is with me in the studio right now. So, Nikolay, what in your view is impeding arms control progress right now?

[Gorshkov] It appears that the very readiness of the Soviet side to get down to the business of arms reductions is now perceived in NATO headquarters as the main threat to the NATO doctrine of flexible military response. The remark of THE TIMES of London that Moscow has gone more than halfway to effect a compromise on arms control appears to have promoted Sir Geoffrey Howe to warn the allies that the swiftness of the Soviet hand on arms control could deceive the Western eye.

[Announcer] But the latest Soviet offer seems to me to be along the lines of what NATO has long sought.

[Gorshkov] Exactly, that's the position NATO recently maintained. Mr Shultz was quoted as having told the allies in Brussels this is the kind of decision we have been wanting to make, and the Soviet proposed deal creates a great opportunity for the alliance. Meanwhile in an interview in Moscow the House of Representatives' speaker, Jim Wright, said that Congress believed this was the best opportunity since World War II to make real peace.

[Announcer] But why then, in the words of Mr Shultz, are the allies not going to jump to any quick conclusions?

[Gorshkov] Well the Western allies insist they need time to reflect and to consult each other on the implications of a zero option for Europe.

[Announcer] Is this the only problem that remains to be solved?

[Gorshkov] Let me refer you to today's briefing at the Soviet Foreign Ministry held by its chief spokesman, Gennadiy Gerasimov. He didn't see any problem here to give the NATO allies the necessary time to reflect upon the Soviet proposals, but it would be unfortunate he added, if this led to protracted discussions, and he had a point (?with) such a warning. A senior member of Mr Shultz's delegation was reported by UPI as saying that it could take 2 months to get an answer from NATO.

[Announcer] Now it appears that the alliance is now facing the big decision it would so much rather avoid. Do its members really want to rid Europe of nuclear weapons or not?

[Gorshkov] I have a nice quotation from a leading article in today's GUARDIAN which seems to me to reflect public feeling on the subject. If Soviet desire to rid Europe of nuclear weapons is true, says THE GUARDIAN, then there is no need for a European defense pillar to adopt the grotesque nuclear postures from which both existing alliances now have a chance to escape. That will be a hard line to sell to governments and defense buffs who have inherited 40 years of fixed thinking about the Soviet threat. No such opportunity for detente in Europe has arisen within most peoples' lifetimes.

'Shortage of Common Sense'

LD171953 Moscow TASS in English 1745 GMT 17 Apr 87

[Text] Moscow April 17 TASS -- TASS military writer Vladimir Bogachev:

The Western press says that the Soviet Union's latest initiatives for reductions in nuclear weapons in Europe have "confused" the European NATO governments and that the meaning of the Soviet proposals has proved a "surprise" for London, Bonn and Paris.

It is yet hard to understand why the NATO leaders raise alarm whenever the Soviet Union comes up with proposals for nuclear disarmament in Europe. It is yet harder to say why they think the latest Soviet initiatives surprising. It appears that whenever the Soviet Union inches closer to the stand of the NATO countries on disarmament, the Western leaders take a step back from their own proposals.

As soon as a prospect for a positive solution on disarmament emerges, the NATO leaders strain every effort to find fresh pretexts to hold back improvements in the military-political situation in the continent.

The Soviet Union is engaged in talks on nuclear weapons, conventional armaments and armed forces in Europe. But the United States strongly refuses to bring into talks those weapons in which they have an edge over the Soviet Union, for instance, on the American forward-based systems, U.S. bases around the Soviet Union, the naval forces, etc.

The Soviet Union makes concessions at the talks not because it succumbs to U.S. pressure or fears the United States but because it honestly wants to reach accord and push away the threat of nuclear war.

The European Atlantists were unhappy when the medium-range missiles, strategic offensive weapons and non-militarization of space were tied into a package. Yet the Soviet Union's decision to detach the medium-range missiles from the package and immediately to conclude a separate agreement on them evoked no enthusiasm either in Paris or in Bonn. Moreover, NATO officials back-pedalled and began arguing that the "zero option" of medium-range missiles, which they themselves had once formulated, now meant bagfuls of trouble for Western Europe.

New myths about a "Soviet military threat" due to a "Soviet superiority" in shorter-range INF missiles were made. The Soviet Union voiced readiness right after the conclusion of an agreement on medium-range missiles to withdraw from Czechoslovakia and the GDR its longer-range INF missiles and enter talks on shorter-range missiles with a view to their reduction and total abolition. The Atlantists, however, came up with the demand for an immediate solution on shorter-range missiles in a package with longer-range ones.

The Soviet Union said it was ready to abolish unilaterally those nuclear weapons, too, within several months, roughly one year. But the Atlantists were not happy. They resorted to "topsy-turvy logic," according to which NATO was to build-up its shorter-range missile force while the Soviet Union would unilaterally destroy her own.

Receiving U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz recently, Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, called for even more radical progress towards

the abolition of battlefield missiles. The Soviet initiatives have "horrified" Bonn, Paris and London, which view them as "dangerous progress towards ridding Europe of nuclear weapons."

The NATO foreign ministers who met in Brussels on Thursday hastily reaffirmed their commitment to the maintenance of nuclear weapons in Europe. British Foreign Secretary Geoffrey Howe commended George Shultz for not having replied immediately to the Soviet proposals on shorter-range missiles.

NATO Secretary General Lord Carrington, warning against the hopes for a nuclear-free world, fuelled by the latest Soviet initiatives, said outright that it was far easier to preserve unity in the alliance when all were afraid. According to him, it is human nature to band together when you are afraid.

Commenting on the negative reaction of NATO politicians to the Soviet proposals, former French President Giscard d'Estaing noted "the weakness of the West European political system before the force of the Soviet initiatives."

The position of Bonn, London and Paris can hardly be explained by NATO's weakness or by the genuine fear of some Atlantists in the face of the prospect of nuclear disarmament in Europe.

NATO Nuclear Planning Group

LD21234 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1445 GMT 21 Apr 87

[From "The World Today" program presented by Aleksandr Zholkver]

[Text] Another meeting will start tomorrow at Kirtland Air Base in New Mexico: a conference of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group. These are the consultations on the question of NATO's nuclear policy after Secretary of State Shultz' talks in Moscow. The U.S. delegation at this meeting is headed by U.S. Assistant Defense Secretary Perle. As we have already reported he intends to retire in the near future; meanwhile, however, he still continues in his position.

It is noteworthy that in an interview with American television Perle rejected recent statements alleging that Western Europe will be defenseless in the event of the elimination of medium-range and short-range missiles. Even after getting rid of the weapons being talked about, Perle stated, we can still keep 4,600 nuclear ammunition stocks in Europe, so it can hardly be said we are leaving the allies defenseless. This is the stage it has now reached: Even one of the Pentagon's leaders is reassuring the United States' NATO allies.

The issue is this: The constructive Soviet proposals that open up the possibility for the elimination of a whole class of nuclear weapons in Europe have disconcerted certain West European politicians who have quite recently made assurances that they too support disarmament.

'Abstract Optimism'

LD221601 Moscow TASS in English 1507 GMT 22 Apr 87

[Text] Moscow April 22 TASS -- By military writer Vladimir Chernyshev:

Humanity now has a unique opportunity to take an important step toward a nuclear weapons-free world. The Soviet Union that created this real opportunity by its proposals on medium-range missiles, shorter-range missiles and theatre nuclear weapon systems in Europe has a right to expect a constructive, adequate answer to its initiatives from the United States and its allies. But abstract optimism expressed in some Western countries and particularly debates on afore-mentioned questions that were started in Washington, London, Paris and Bonn, clearly give rise to concern. Even U.S. officials have to admit that there are leaders who, far from wishing to conclude any arms control agreement, press stubbornly for the continuation of the cold war and of the arms race.

The openness about the Soviet stand that enables the world public to see its reasonable and compromise nature is clearly not to the liking of the opponents of the easing of international tensions. In these conditions there is no room for misrepresentation of the Soviet initiatives. This is why, as the Western mass media note, there is confusion among certain circles in some NATO countries.

NATO chose a new method of opposing the Soviet Union's peace drive by distributing functions in the bloc: The Western European leaders declare that talks about the reduction of nuclear arsenals are the concern of the USSR and the USA, that the main thing for themselves is that Britain's and France's nuclear forces should not be affected. Meanwhile the Washington administration is justifying its inaction, to say the least, by references to "fears" of the Western European allies and to "Atlantic obligations."

Certain persons clearly hope to resolve in this way two tasks that do not go together: To conceal from the world public their unwillingness to end the arms race and at the same time not to accept the very proposals for which they have been declaring over a long time.

But in the present situation this is hardly possible. The essence of every politician and statesman is clearly seen now. It is judged by whether he is guided by egoistic interests of some groups or whether he really adheres to the cause of peace, of the survival of humanity. History, peoples will not forgive those who will put artificial barriers in the way of ridding Europe of all nuclear weapons, who will reject an opportunity to start the process of Europe's demilitarisation.

PRAVDA Demands Response

PM221533 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 23 Apr 87 First Edition p 5

["Commentator's Column" by Tomas Kolesnichenko: "What They Are Afraid of..."]

[Text] A situation that at first sight is strange has been taking shape in West Europe in recent days. Millions of Europeans approve and welcome the new Soviet initiatives and regard them as a real step toward purging our continent of all nuclear weapons. At the same time, there is obvious confusion in NATO capitals and even overt panic in some places. Things have reached the point where NATO Secretary General Lord Carrington in

an interview called our proposal to simultaneously eliminate Soviet and U.S. operational and tactical missiles in Europe a "catastrophe."

A paradox? Yes, but with an underlying cause, as the saying goes. It turns out that the process of Europe's demilitarization and the lowering of national defense levels to minimal and sensible proportions on a completely equal and honest basis are not to the liking of the NATO bloc itself, above all. And yet, how many times its leaders have publicly vowed that NATO is just a defensive alliance, a "response," so to speak, to the growing "Soviet threat," which, they say, forces West Europeans to "upgrade arms" all the time and to huddle together increasingly closely beneath the American "nuclear umbrella."

But now that the myth of the "Soviet threat" is melting away like snow in spring, it has turned out that the basic NATO concepts -- the "flexible response" policy, the "deterrence" doctrine, and so forth -- are also crumbling. Indeed, who is there to "deter" and what is there to "respond" to when the Soviet Union is proposing virtually a "nuclear zero" in Europe, as well as, on the basis of the Budapest initiative, a reduction in armed forces and conventional arms on the continent -- from the Atlantic to the Urals?

The Soviet proposals, as the British newspaper THE INDEPENDENT emphasizes, "have forced the NATO countries to feverishly seek an acceptable response that will enable them to avoid possible charges that the West is trying to sabotage the arms control process."

This is why there is alarm and bustle in the NATO house and loud moans about how they are to preserve the "unity of the alliance" under the new conditions and respond to the Russians' "perfidious" initiatives. This line is openly encouraged by extreme right-wing U.S. circles. What is the worth of yesterday's statement by Senator Dole that "it will take long weeks and months of discussion" before the USSR and the United States are able to reach an agreement?

Hasty draft "counterproposals," "amplifications," and "additions" have already appeared for the purpose of keeping nuclear arsenals on the continent under the flag of "preserving NATO unity."

Quite frankly, that is a thankless policy. For it is sharply at variance with public opinion not only in Europe but also in the United States. So they have to twist and turn, think up nonexistent arguments, and delay making a reply. But one is awaited. The USSR's proposals clearly define the outlines of a nuclear-free peace on our continent.

Clear proposals demand a clear reply. The sooner the better.

Coupling Doctrine Challenged

LD202131 Moscow World Service in English 2300 GMT 20 Apr 87

[Station observer Pavel Kuznetsov commentary]

[Text] A question that lies at the heart of arms control talks these days and that will be intensively discussed by the NATO alliance in the weeks ahead is whether security is better served with more or fewer weapons. Our observer Pavel Kuznetsov makes this comment.

In his weekly radio address from Santa Barbara, California, President Reagan said on Saturday that, quote: An actual reduction in the number of nuclear weapons would be a historic first, an accomplishment both sides could build upon for future progress, unquote. The Soviet offer on shorter-range missiles made during a recent visit here by Secretary of State George Shultz was another step to remove the roadblocks toward an INF agreement. (?That, topped by) stringent verification, it could, among other things, become a major contribution to the growth of mutual trust. True, an INF accord is in sight. Yes, it may be close at hand, but having it in sight is not the same as being 100 percent sure that we will have it. In the West there are already strong complaints that a removal of medium-range missiles together with a bringing to zero of shorter-range rockets is going to make life even worse. Strategic nuclear arms and conventional forces would be thus left with no coupling in between and therefore the risk of an outbreak of a conventional conflict in Europe will be even higher than now.

In most countries there are long prison terms or even capital punishment for a premeditated murder. Not so with premeditated nonsense, spread by politicians. First of all, detonating a nuclear device in Europe will not deter an attacking side, but will lead to an escalating exchange of blows and counterblows.

Not a single pundit, including Supreme Allied Commander General Rogers, knows how this madness, should it start, can be controlled. Secondly, a conventional war in Europe, with its numerous atomic power stations, chemical depots and facilities, will lead to the destruction of both sides and, as experts say, radioactive fallout will reach over to other continents. And thirdly, if there is an imbalance in Europe, why not do something about it by way of cutting down on those components of conventional forces in which the opposing alliances have a slight edge over each other? In addition to big disagreements in the NATO, there are people both in the Reagan administration and the Congress who believe that denuclearization of Europe is not a smart idea. The sad paradox is that there is a good deal more unity in the West on how to keep arming under the guise of a Soviet threat.

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CSO: 5200/1431

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

TASS: U.S. CONTINUES TO BUILD ASIAN-PACIFIC NUCLEAR ARSENAL

LD061502 Moscow TASS in English 1426 GMT 6 Apr 87

[Text] Moscow, 6 Apr (TASS)--TASS political news analyst Askold Biryukov writes:

The U.S. nuclear-powered attack submarine "Los Angeles" today called at the Japanese port of Yokosuka where one of the United States biggest naval bases in the Far East is situated. Los Angeles belongs to the class of submarines which under the decision of the U.S. administration are armed with "Tomahawk" cruise missiles with nuclear warheads.

The submarine's call attests to Washington's continued efforts to build up its nuclear arsenal in the Asian-Pacific region. It is no secret what is the purpose of this build up.

It is openly stated in the Pentagon's publication SOVIET MILITARY POWER 1987 that new Tomahawk missiles are being installed on board U.S. surface ships and submarines to enhance considerably the United States' capability of dealing strikes at ground and naval targets at a large distance. It is also no secret at whom the Pentagon brass hats intend to deal strikes with nuclear "Tomahawks." It is clear, too, what threats this militaristic activity of the Pentagon poses to the cause of peace in the region and the whole world.

It is noticed, however, that the country whose destinies, it would seem, are affected by Washington's confrontational strategy in the nuclear age most of all disregards the possible consequences of such a polity. Moreover, they in Tokyo seem not to notice the fact that the present call and, naturally, all the previous calls of U.S. nuclear powered ships to Japan over many years have been made with utter contempt for the three non-nuclear principles officially proclaimed by Japan. The reason for this is that there has long been existing a secret arrangement between the country that was the first to create nuclear weapons and test it on Japanese and the country that was the first to suffer from those weapons. Under that arrangement U.S. ships and submarines freely call at Japanese ports without asking for the permission of the Japanese authorities.

In an interview published today by AKAHATA, prominent American expert, director of the Center for Defense Information, retired Rear Admiral Gene Larocque said that tests of "confidential arrangements" between the United States and

Japan dating from 1960, the year when the present Japanese-American "security treaty" was concluded, are kept in Washington's and Tokyo's secret archives. These were the arrangements about the secret transportation of U.S. nuclear weapons to Japan. Representatives of the Japanese Communist Party last week revealed a secret directive of former U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk, dating from 24 February 1966. The directive contained a reference to "confidential arrangements" on undelayed delivery of U.S. nuclear weapons into Japan, concluded six years earlier.

The message also contained the instruction to the embassy to prevent the United States Far Eastern ally from supporting the Soviet Union's proposal on non-use of nuclear weapons against countries that have no nuclear weapons of their own and refuse to deploy them on their territory.

These publications confirm again that the United States and its "junior partner" in the military alliance have long been violating a ban on the delivery of weapons of mass destruction to Japan, have been deliverately misleading the Japanese public that declares for a nuclear free world. The United States and Japan sabotage the conclusion of effective agreements which are called upon to check the spread and build up of nuclear arms in Asia and the Pacific.

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CSO: 5200/1431

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

USSR SAID READY TO INITIATE ASIA INF TALKS

OW171133 Tokyo KYODO in English 1128 GMT 17 Apr 87

[Text] Tokyo, April 17 KYODO -- The Soviet Union is ready to start negotiations on removal of intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) from Asia, a Soviet diplomatic source here said Friday.

Asked why 100 SS-20 intermediate-range nuclear missiles should be kept in Soviet Asia after an agreement is reached with the United States on removal of INF from Europe, the source said the Asian SS-20s are intended to counter U.S. F-16 fighters, deployed at Misawa Air Base, Northern Japan. F-16 fighters are capable of carrying nuclear weapons.

The SS-20s in Soviet Asia are also intended to offset cruise missiles deployed on U.S. warships and surface-to-surface Lance missiles deployed in South Korea, the source said.

Dialogue between Japan and the Soviet Union is necessary to establish a reliable relationship between the two countries, the source said.

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CSO: 5200/1431

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

USSR: FRG'S BAHR INTERVIEWED ON U.S. INF STANCE

Moscow APN DAILY REVIEW in English 18 Apr 87 pp 1-3

[APN item under the rubric "News and Views": "New Package--A Deception of Peoples"]

[Text] Leading FRG politician, Presidium member of the Board of the SDPG, deputy to the Bundestag and chairman of the Bundestag Disarmament Commission Egon Bahr stayed in Moscow recently. Our correspondent Yevgeny Korolyov met with Mr Bahr and took an interview from him,

Question: How do you assess the prospects of signing a USSR-USA agreement on destroying medium-range missiles in Europe in the light of the 28 February Soviet proposal?

Answer: Moscow played host to the Forum for a Nuclear-Free World, For the Survival of Humanity at the end of February. It produced a great impression on all. At this forum I presented a sum-up of the results of our working group (of political scientists--Y.K.) and said: "Europe should not suffer because the two great powers cannot reach mutual understanding." This meant the need to unbundle the package, to separate from it the medium-range missiles. The Soviet side has agreed to this. The proposal of the Soviet Union is a great relief, a great step forward. All welcomed this proposal.

The package is unbundled. Now it is no time to create a new package. The new package is a deception. In fact, it is impossible. For if I now start tying short-range to long-range missiles, then later I can also raise the issue of dual-use systems. If I got a decision on completely freeing Europe from nuclear weapons, then you could ask: Yes, but how do matters stand with the conventional types of arms? This means that the new package is an attempt to torpedo the zero option. I made this point in the FRG and am making it here. This is my firm belief.

And I hope that the federal government will stick to its opinion. The chancellor issued a government statement recently and said in no uncertain terms that first the zero option, then talks on shorter-range systems. I hope that the federal government will keep its word and adhere to this stand.

Question: And how do you assess the U.S. proposal to turn Pershing 2's into theatre missiles by removing one rocket stage and to rebase cruise missiles?

Answer: If the Americans want to do this, then there will be no zero option. Then all will remain as it was, with just one difference: the U.S. administration will no longer be able to take decisions. As a result of this, serious talks could at best begin in the second half of 1989. This means that we would lose practically three years. And during the three years, new types of arms would be produced. Under certain conditions with changed strategic consequences. And this would be awful for the world. Strictly speaking, this is the topic of current discussion.

Question: Some circles in the United States and NATO express doubts whether it is possible to reach an understanding between the Soviet Union and the United States on verification of the missile elimination agreement observation. What do you think about it?

Answer: It is certainly necessary to reach an understanding on the verification mechanism. Each party must be sure that the other observes the agreement. I no longer think that the question can't be settled. I see that the Soviet side is no less interested in what U.S. firms manufacture than the American in what Soviet firms produce. Or both sides might choose not to allow representatives of the other party to its projects.

But I think the problem is open to practical settlement as a technical, not a political one. On my part, I should like to add that verification must be on site, and the best thing is to set up mixed groups of both sides' representatives.

Question: In Reykjavik, the U.S. President agreed to eliminate medium-range missiles in Europe. Why new obstacles to the agreement?

Answer: It's no secret that there are differences, for instance, in the Pentagon and the State Department approach to the issue. It matters most whose influence is the strongest on Presidential decisions. That question is widely discussed in the United States. I hope the president will undergo the right influence to make the right decision.

Question: How do you evaluate the prospects for an agreement to eliminate medium-range missiles in Europe?

Answer: Objectively, such an agreement is possible. I can't say, for the time being, if it is also practically tangible.

(APN, April 7, In full.)

/9274

CSO: 5200/1431

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

TASS: LUXEMBOURG FOREIGN MINISTER VISITS MOSCOW

Meets Premier Ryzhkov

LD211311 Moscow TASS in English 1055 GMT 21 Apr 87

[Excerpts] Moscow, 21 Apr (TASS)--Nikolay Ryzhkov, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, received in the Kremlin today Jacques Poos, deputy chairman of the government and minister of foreign affairs of Luxembourg, who is staying in Moscow on an official visit.

In the course of the conversation Nikolay Ryzhkov and Jacques Poos devoted much attention to the latest Soviet initiatives on the elimination of Soviet and American intermediate-range missiles in Europe, on shorter-range missiles, on chemical weapons and other topical problems connected with the limitation and reduction of armaments.

Nikolay Ryzhkov drew the attention of Jacques Poos to the fact that many NATO countries which favoured in general the reduction of nuclear armaments in Europe attached a lot of strings to its practical implementation which, in their opinion, were brought about by their concern for the maintenance of the balance of forces in Europe.

However, these reservations are groundless, because both the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Treaty member countries demonstrate in action their readiness to reach agreements on any questions connected with the curbing of the arms race, and with disarmament on an equitable and mutually acceptable basis.

"The allied socialist countries come out in favour of a stage-by-stage lowering of the level of military confrontation in Europe with continuous maintenance of military balance at an ever lower level".

He recalled the respective proposals put forward by the Budapest meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty member states concerning cutbacks in the armed forces and conventional arms in Europe. NATO countries have not given a specific reply to the proposals up to now.

The Soviet side emphasized that West European countries could and must contribute, through specific and constructive moves, to strengthening all-European security and peace throughout the world.

The sides set out their respective points of view on a number of other international issues. Both similarity of positions and difference of approaches to a number of issues were pointed out.

Confidence was expressed that the visit to the USSR by Jacques Poos would serve to deepen mutual understanding between the two countries in the interests of improving the international situation.

Meets Shevardnadze

LD211751 Moscow TASS in English 1709 GMT 21 Apr 87

[Text] Moscow April 21 TASS -- Talks have opened today between Eduard Shevardnadze, member of the Political Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee, USSR foreign minister, and Jacques Poos, deputy prime minister and minister of foreign affairs of Luxembourg.

The sides discussed in a constructive spirit problems of European and international security and disarmament.

The talks centered on the qualitatively new situation created by the recent initiatives, including on medium and shorter-range missiles in Europe, which were put forward by Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee in Prague and during the recent Soviet-American talks in Moscow. It was pointed out that the Soviet proposals, the agreement in principle reached between the USSR and the USA to intensify efforts in that direction have opened up real opportunities for practical steps to eliminate whole classes of nuclear missiles in Europe.

Eduard Shevardnadze stressed that now the Soviet Union has the right to expect from the West constructive and sufficiently speedy, specific return steps. The resolution of the task of lowering the level of nuclear confrontation in Europe directly concerns the security interests of all the European nations. In view of that it takes active practical steps by each European state to resolve it.

The ministers have agreed that to keep up the momentum on all aspects of disarmament, special significance attaches to reaching agreement on a cut in the armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe, elimination of chemical weapons.

The ministers stressed the need for developing and deepening the all-European process, dynamic progress in all of its areas -- in the field of security, in the political, economic and humanitarian fields. In common opinion, successful completion of the Vienna meeting of representatives of the states -- participants in the European conference on European security and cooperation will be an important contribution to progress of all-European cooperation and raising it to a qualitatively new level.

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CSO: 5200/1431

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

THATCHER REPORTS TO COMMONS ON TALKS WITH GORBACHEV

LD021732 London PRESS ASSOCIATION in English 1459 GMT 2 Apr 87

[By PA Parliamentary staff — quotation marks as received]

[Excerpts] Enthusiastic Tory cheers greeted the prime minister in the Commons today as she reported to MPs on her visit to the Soviet Union — and promptly unveiled a 400 million pound trade deal with the Russians.

She spoke warmly of her meetings with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev and added: "Wherever I went, I was struck by the spontaneous warmth and friendliness of my reception by the people of the Soviet Union. I believe that this augurs well for our future relations."

The two had been "largely in agreement" on the priorities for step by step approach on arms control.

There were Tory protests at opposition leader Neil Kinnock's "welcome" to Mrs Thatcher's Soviet visit.

Mr Kinnock said he welcomed the way either "chemistry or travel" has broadened Mrs Thatcher's mind on Russia.

But he then went on to suggest that "achievements" of the trip were limited.

Mrs Thatcher whose statement was interspersed with loud Tory cheering and waving of order papers, said the most important aspect of her visit "was of course the very extensive talks which I had with General Secretary Gorbachev."

These had covered:

- :: Prospects for agreements on reductions in nuclear, chemical and conventional weapons
- :: The fundamental differences between our two political systems and their wider consequences
- :: Mr Gorbachev's programme of restructuring of Soviet society and the Soviet economy
- :: International regional problems
- :: Human rights.

Mrs Thatcher said: "In our talks on arms control we agreed that priority should be given to an agreement on intermediate

range nuclear weapons, with strict verification, with constraints on shorter-range systems and with immediate follow-on negotiations to deal more fully with shorter-range systems.

We did not reach agreement on NATO's belief that the West should have a right to match Soviet shorter-range systems, or over the precise systems which should be covered in the follow-on negotiations.

"I made clear to Mr Gorbachev that the United Kingdom would not be prepared to accept the denuclearisation of Europe, which would leave us dangerously exposed to Soviet superiority in conventional and other forces."

She added: "We also agreed that priority should be given to negotiating a ban on all chemical weapons."

"The United Kingdom has made important proposals on this in Geneva and Mr Gorbachev indicated that the Soviet Union could broadly accept our approach. "We agreed that there should be early negotiations on reductions in conventional forces. As the House knows, the Soviet Union has a substantial preponderance in these forces."

Mrs Thatcher: "I expressed our support for a 50 percent reduction in strategic nuclear weapons."

"Mr Gorbachev made clear the Soviet that this matter was linked to agreement on SDI. I made a number of proposals for achieving creating predictability in this field, which Mr Gorbachev will consider."

Deployment of an advanced strategic defence system would of course be a matter for negotiation, as President Reagan and I agreed at Camp David in December 1984.

"I do not underestimate the differences which remain between us on these matters. But it was nonetheless clear from our talks that we do agree that progress on arms control requires a step-by-step approach with clearly identified priorities, and that we are largely in agreement on what those priorities shall be. This is a useful and positive step."

"I am hopeful that a satisfactory agreement can be reached on intermediate nuclear forces by the end of this year."

She recalled that the Foreign Secretary Sir Geoffrey Howe and the Soviet Foreign Minister, Mr Shevardnadze, signed intergovernmental agreements and a memorandum of understanding.

One was on space co-operation, providing for co-operation between our scientists in a wide range of space sciences and one on information and culture.

She went on: "My visit took place at a most interesting and crucial moment in the development of the Soviet Union.

"I firmly believe that it is in our interest to welcome and encourage the course on which Mr Gorbachev has embarked.

Our political systems will remain very different and we shall continue to hold widely divergent views on many international problems.

"But Mr Gorbachev and I were able to discuss these differences frankly in a spirit of friendship.

"When I took my leave of him, Mr Gorbachev expressed the Soviet Union's willingness for wider co-operation in every field with the United Kingdom.

"That was a positive end to a most constructive and valuable visit."

Opposition leader Mr Neil Kinnock rose to criticise the agreements signed in Moscow — faced with scores of jubilant Tories still waving their order papers in delight at the prime minister's statement.

"I'm surprised you are not prepared to give credit where it's due," she told Mr Kinnock.

On the elimination of nuclear weapons, Mrs Thatcher hit back: "That may be a distant dream. I do not think it's a practical one and you do not found your defence policies on dreams. You found them on security."

She went on: "For the next 20 years at least, the security of this country and the West will be founded on a nuclear deterrent.

"That's accepted by the United States as well as by us, and I think you'll find that they have abandoned any suggestion of a second 50 percent reduction of their inter-continental ballistic

missiles, and in any case they were thinking of replacing those with cruise missiles and other weapons.

"They would not abandon the nuclear deterrent like you," she told Mr Kinnock. "You would give up all our defence and security."

For the Alliance, Liberal Mr Alan Beith said there would be "general and genuine welcome" for what Mrs Thatcher achieved in Moscow.

"The personal rapport you achieved with Mr Gorbachev will also be genuinely welcomed."

But the real test would come at the Geneva arms talks.

"What signal are you now giving to the US about how those talks should go?"

The totalitarian system still remained in the Soviet Union.

"There are many people still praying, some of them in secret and in psychiatric hospitals, that Mr Gorbachev will continue to be willing and able to continue the pace of change so remarkably achieved so far."

Mrs Thatcher replied that Britain was not talking to the USA about the areas of agreement about intermediate nuclear weapons and areas that still needed "thrashing out".

Shorter range missiles remained the main problem.

"We would like the right to have equal limits on warheads. That is not yet agreed by the Soviet Union. We think that would be the right way to go."

Former Labour leader Mr Michael Foot attacked what he called Mrs Thatcher's rejection of a "de-nuclearisation of Europe," and insisted that her policy would cause a proliferation in nuclear weapons, leading to the "destruction of the universe".

Mrs Thatcher said NATO agreed there should be a 50 percent reduction in inter-continental ballistic missiles between America and the Soviet Union, Mr Gorbachev had refused to accept the reduction.

She stressed: "Conventional weapons have never been enough to stop war. In the last war, the race was on as to who got the nuclear weapon first. Had it been Hitler we would not be sitting here now."

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CSO: 5240/073

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

UK PAPER VIEWS INF, SRINF, CW PROPOSALS ON TABLE

PM151349 London THE DAILY TELEGRAPH in English 14 Apr 87 p 12

[Editorial: "Confusing the Issue"]

[Text] There is a great deal to be said for negotiating from a position of strength. The West's insistence on deploying Cruise and Pershing-2 while sustaining the offer to withdraw them should Russia remove the SS-20 missiles from Europe is excellent proof of that. There is also a great deal to be said for negotiating from a position of complexity. That seems to be Russia's current tactics and the West must take great care to see that Mr Gorbachev does not thereby win piecemeal advantages which, taken together, will amount to a diplomatic victory.

Three proposals are now on the table. One concerns the central issue of INF — SS-20 for Cruise and Pershing-2. The second is short-range INF (SRINF) missiles with ranges of between 300 and 500 miles, in which the Soviet Union has a four-to-one superiority of numbers in Europe. The third is chemical weapons, in which it has an unquantified but large advantage. The West as a whole has an interest in seeing all these weapons systems reduced or eliminated. But different countries have a stronger or weaker interest where any one is concerned. The United States, for example, is particularly concerned to clinch the INF deal, since thereby its commitment to guarantee Europe's security with its international missiles is put on a less immediate footing. The Germans are the most anxious of the NATO populations to see SRINF reduced, since it is on their territory that most would impact were they ever fired. And Britain is particularly alarmed by the threat of chemical weapons.

Mr Gorbachev's orchestration of his offer in each of these related negotiating areas is beginning to look like a model of diplomatic divide-and-conquer policy. Thus he has now conceded that talks should be started on the elimination of SRINF, but he continues to reject the proposal that agreement on INF should be linked to an SRINF agreement also. On the SRINF issue itself he proposes only that the Soviet Union will not increase its stocks if NATO promises likewise, thus assuring continued Soviet superiority. And on chemical weapons he makes the wholly unverifiable announcement that a plant has been built to destroy the Soviet stocks once a comprehensive ban has been agreed. Before the West responds to any of these proposals, it must make its own negotiating position consistent and watertight. Treaties made in haste are regretted at leisure.

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INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

DUTCH FOREIGN MINISTER ON INF, DEFENSE POLICY

PM140931 Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD in Dutch 2 Apr 87 p 9

[Interview with Foreign Minister Hans van den Broek by J.M. Bik and W.H. Nieuwenhuis: "Van den Broek's Somber Weather Report"; date and place not given]

[Text] The minister really cannot understand the West European agitation after the Reykjavik summit between Reagan and Gorbachev. Last fall in Reykjavik the Americans did not leave Western Europe out in the cold. He does not agree with the criticism that the United States did not sufficiently consult with its European NATO partners about the most far-reaching missile proposal ever discussed between Washington and Moscow. The sort of criticism which came from former Federal Chancellor Schmidt, who linked it with a plea for a Europe under French leadership. "I do not share this fear of Reykjavik," Hans van den Broek said emphatically.

He pointed out that the West Europeans first urged proper consultations because they doubted U.S. honesty in the the missile talks with the Soviet Union in Geneva. And that there is now criticism again because some people in Europe think that United States is going too far. By pointing to this contradiction in a conversation about West European nervousness in some quarters, the Netherlands foreign minister gave a first hint of where he stands. Voice-raising or any other show of emotion were not to be expected, nor we expected them.

But does he not think that the West Europeans must now try, in whatever forum, to speak with one voice about their security? That is: After the prospect which Gorbachev held out at the end of February of a separate accord on the withdrawal from Europe of all intermediate-range missiles (INF)?

Many people — in the United States too — ask for one voice from NATO's European pillar. Through the WEU or through political consultations held within the EEC framework, as proposed (in vain) by the French Socialist Delors, president of the European Commission.

In early February Prime Minister Lubbers was already calling in an interview in Germany's *Die Welt* for "intelligent responses" from the West to Gorbachev's policies. On the subject of the Europeanization of security policy he said, probably reacting to Schmidt, that he does not have any direct faith in a leading role

for France. "We must jointly strengthen the European pillar within NATO. The WEU could be a tool here."

What does his foreign minister think 6 weeks later, after Gorbachev's INF offer?

Van den Broek: "I'll begin with a confession of faith in the Atlantic alliance, and in so doing I find myself in the good company of President Mitterrand and Prime Minister Chirac, who also realize the need to maintain the U.S. nuclear and conventional guarantee. What is at issue here, and this is an issue that is also raised by SDI, is how Europe can retain the security of the U.S. guarantee. We then have to confirm that in the field of security policy Europe has a number of interests and priorities which, simply because of Europe's geographical position, are different from those of the United States. I would mention the division of Germany, which is a tangible issue here, but is not so in the United States.

"Europe itself must do more about the conventional imbalances. Here Europe's own voice would not weaken the Atlantic link, but would strengthen it. We should also play a role of our own in the field of research, production, and acquisition of defense materiel," Van den Broek said. He is also in favor of a greater division of labor and specialization within NATO (more defense for the same amount of money), but did not want to trespass in his remarks on the territory of his colleague, Defense Minister Van Eekelen.

"Europe could also play a role of its own in improving relations with the Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Pact countries." The minister was alluding here to the CSCE. However, he said that he was speaking without any illusions about the possibility of certain European substitutes for subsidiary parts of the U.S. guarantees.

"There are disagreements in France, but if the French said that they accept one allied and integrated command in Europe — even with reservations about the use of French nuclear arms — the situation would be very different. Only then would there be any suggestion of a more homogeneous and credible European contribution."

This is a difficult obstacle: This is something that is impossible with today's France. It is the only France that Europe has, and so does this mean that it is impossible for Europe? "No, now you are moving too quickly; I have said where the dividing lines are at present, but have also indicated where I would see other possibilities in more of a European posture and in greater European responsibility, namely on the condition of French military integration in NATO, but this is perhaps a completely unreal condition."

The Netherlands foreign minister said that he is a supporter of more consultations in Europe. He pointed to the Netherlands initiatives in the WEU and said that he has "de ju" [meaning unknown] in these if there are any doubts about them, as there have been even in the Netherlands. But he is unmistakably skeptical about the varied European choirs who are currently singing (again) the desirability or possibility of some degree of European military independence.

And precisely because he disputes the assertion that the consultations between the biggest NATO member and its partners are unsatisfactory, he thinks that Europe should not enter talks on such a basis. "For in that way you confirm such an assumption," he objects.

"If there was anything to put right after Reykjavik, Mrs Thatcher did so directly in her lightning visit to Washington. But 'that's it' [preceding two words in English]. From this conclusions for the alliance have been drawn; namely, that we should not strive for the unreserved abolition of all ballistic missiles." (As Reagan proposed in Reykjavik. Namely, after the withdrawal of INF weapons from Europe and the scrapping of 50% of land-based strategic missiles over 5 years, all remaining land-based intercontinental missiles would be simply dismantled over the subsequent 5 years — *Nrc Handelsblad* editor's note)

The communique made public by Reagan and Thatcher after her visit to Washington stressed agreement — an "Atlantic accord" — on the two major points in Reykjavik. The minister was here referring to the halving of land-based strategic missiles over 5 years and the principle that an INF accord can only be reached if parity is guaranteed in Europe in the field of short-range missiles (SRINF, with a range of up to 1,000 km).

From his desk he took a map to show that Western Europe, with the exception of Spain and Portugal, lies within the range of these missiles. And, pointing to the map, he said that the withdrawal of such mobile Russian missile systems (SS-22's and SS-23's) from the GDR and Czechoslovakia does not mean that Greece and Turkey, for example, would remain outside their range.

The controversial third point in Reykjavik — the dismantling of the remaining strategic land-based missiles over the subsequent 5 years — can only be discussed if in connection with it the imbalance in the field of conventional and chemical weapons is removed. "I look at this in exactly the same way that the French and British look at it. I also agree with them that they should be unwilling to discuss their nuclear arms until the first 50% of intercontinental ballistic missiles have been dismantled by both sides."

In fact, for Van den Broek, Gorbachev's most recent proposal on a separate INF agreement for Europe without an agreement in

principle on short-range weapons is "a retrogressive step." For years the Soviet Union has accepted the principle of interdependent treatment for weapons systems with different ranges — that is, for strategic missiles, as well as intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles.

Even in Reykjavik, the minister explained, it did this by proposing that in the event of an INF accord it would freeze its shorter-range missiles and after a further 6 months would discuss reductions in such weapons. On the Western side the United States offered to respect the principle of equal levels — also in the field of shorter-range missiles. "Nothing new here — that was the case as long ago as 1981, when President Reagan first put forth the zero option for intermediate-range missiles."

However, at the end of February Gorbachev only offered the European zero option for intermediate-range missiles, with the understanding that he was also proposing to withdraw shorter-range missiles (SS-12's, SS-22's, and SS-23's) from Eastern Europe. "Well, this offered no solution to the West; the mere withdrawal of such mobile systems gives no guarantee — it is the undermining of an INF accord, and I would call it a retrogressive step," Van den Broek said.

Thus this is no sunny story. But the European "weather report" in the medium term is even less cheerful. One unfortunate point — "about which I am pessimistic" — is the West's inferiority in the field of chemical and conventional arms to the Warsaw Pact if the first missile accords are reached quickly — within 5 years — (50% strategic ballistic missiles cuts, an INF zero option, and balance in the sphere of shorter-range missiles). This inferiority in the field of conventional weapons will not be made up in a couple of years. After the disappearance of INF and SRINF missiles as a deterrent this inferiority would be even more serious.

"This inferiority in the field of conventional arms will play some pretty nasty tricks on us in the years to come. I say that not only has nothing happened in 13 years of negotiations in Vienna on troop reductions (MBFR). But I also see obstacles in the new CSCE framework in Vienna, where we are having unbelievable difficulties in reaching agreement on a framework for the negotiations on troop reductions."

And if the "drastic asymmetrical" concessions that have been requested do not come from the Soviet Union and if the political-economic tide remains unfavorable for conventional reinforcement on the NATO side, this will, Van den Broek said, put an end to the possibility of limiting deterrent nuclear arms. "The lower limit for the denuclearization of Western Europe," as he put it, will have been reached.

This sounds a little like a warning to his fellow members of the Christian Democratic Appeal [CDA], although Van den Broek did not say so straight out.

After long resistance, the CDA minister was able to accept at the end of 1985 social-political reasons for ending the nuclear role of the Netherlands F-16 and Orion aircraft if cruise missiles are deployed at Woensdrecht at the end of 1988. This decision was made unilaterally by The Hague and announced to NATO. In fact the decision was made unilaterally within the highest circles of the CDA; the People's Party for Freedom and Democracy simply had to look on in anger. Van den Broek simply smiled

when he was asked if he remembered that that was how things happened.

If deployment in Woensdrecht does not take place — as a result of an INF accord — the government accord states that the Netherlands nuclear role must be discussed again within the coalition. But Van den Broek has definite views on this and wants to add a footnote. Just like a NATO footnote in the context of European deliberations: "If we are spared the cruise missiles, the unilateral unloading of our existing nuclear role onto our allies is something with which I would have more than average difficulty. The ending of a nuclear role can really only come as a result of consultations within the alliance."

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CSO: 5200/2520

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

XINHUA ANALYSIS: U.S. CAUTIOUS ABOUT ARMS PROPOSALS

OW161110 Beijing XINHUA in English 1051 GMT 16 Apr 87

["News Analysis: Why [Is] U.S. Reluctant About Latest Soviet Arms Proposal? (by Shi Lujia)" XINHUA headline]

[Text] Washington, April 15 (XINHUA) -- Two days after Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev offered to eliminate all short-range missiles in Europe, the United States still has not given a formal response, arguing that it would have to consult its allies first.

In a statement read to reporters today, President Ronald Reagan expressed a cautious welcome to the progress made in Secretary of State George Shultz' three-day talks in Moscow that focused on arms control, but he withheld any direct comment on Gorbachev's proposals.

It seems that in face of the vigorous peace offensive launched by Moscow, Washington finds itself in a dilemma on whether to accept or reject the Soviet proposals.

The United States faced the same situation only one and a half months ago when the Soviets placed at the Geneva negotiating table a proposal on eliminating all medium-range missiles in Europe.

The Western alliance was reluctant to accept that proposal based virtually on the same "zero option" idea put forward by NATO and the Reagan administration themselves. They feared an agreement to that effect will expose Western Europe to the Soviet superiority in shorter-range nuclear missiles and conventional forces.

For quite some time, the United States has insisted that an agreement on eliminating intermediate nuclear forces (INF) in Europe should be related to the issue of short-range missiles.

It has demanded that Moscow reduce its short-range weapons while Washington reserve the right to build up those weapon systems in Europe to the Soviet levels.

"We have never proposed elimination of short-range missiles -- only reductions and the right to build up to Soviet levels," one U.S. official said.

But now, Gorbachev proposed a zero [as received] on short-range missiles, thus yielding no ground for the U.S. build-up.

The Soviet leader has gone even farther by declaring that Moscow was prepared to eliminate, together with NATO countries, all tactical missiles, the weapons with a range under 550 kilometers.

These proposals have posed new, if not unexpected, problems for President Reagan who has repeatedly pledged that, in seeking an INF agreement with the Soviet Union, Washington will not sacrifice the security interests of its NATO allies.

Nuclear weapons are considered by Western Europe as an important counterthreat to the large Soviet superiority in conventional arms and forces.

NATO leaders fear that elimination of both short-range and tactical missiles would undermine the alliance's fundamental strategy of "flexible response" and leave Western Europe vulnerable to huge Soviet conventional forces.

Many European governments also worry that expanding the withdrawal of American nuclear weapons would weaken the long-standing U.S. link to Western Europe's defense.

Although the NATO alliance has not yet developed a formal position on reductions in short-range weapons, France, Federal Germany, Britain and other NATO countries have already made it clear to the United States that they oppose total elimination.

Meanwhile, in deference to the European concerns, a number of influential personages in the United States like Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski also opposed complete denuclearization of Europe.

In these circumstances, will the United States accept Soviet proposals for a quick conclusion of an INF agreement, or will it reject them to postpone or even doom such an agreement?

President Reagan is awaiting a report from Shultz on the results of his consultations with NATO leaders in Brussels. What's the final U.S. response will remain to be seen.

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CSO: 5200/4090

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

XINHUA ANALYZES DIFFERENCES OVER EUROMISSILES

OW161825 Beijing XINHUA in English 1813 GMT 16 Apr 87

["News Analysis: Still a Way To Go to Euromissile Deal (by Wang Xianju)" -- XINHUA headline]

[Text] Moscow, April 16 (XINHUA) -- Although the Soviet Union and the United States are closer to an accord on medium-range missiles in Europe, they still are far apart after a three-day visit by U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz.

Before leaving Moscow last night, Shultz said his talks with Soviet leaders left the superpowers closer to removing the Euromissiles. Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze said an agreement could be reached this year. But both told reporters that hard work and creative efforts remained before the Kremlin and the White House could sign an agreement.

A Euromissile deal, which has been taking shape since last October's superpower summit in Reykjavik, Iceland, would mean removing Soviet SS-20 and U.S. Cruise and Pershing-2 missiles from Europe. Each side would retain 100 warheads elsewhere.

On February 28, the Soviets dropped their demand of a link between Euromissiles and the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative. Despite the change, the U.S. insisted a Euromissile pact be linked with a deal on short-range missiles. The U.S. said the removal of Euromissiles would leave the Soviets with a great advantage in shorter-range weapons.

On April 10 in Prague, three days before Shultz's arrival in Moscow, Gorbachev proposed immediate Soviet-U.S. talks on "reduction and eventual elimination" of short-range missiles in Europe.

In his talks with Shevardnadze soon after arrival, Shultz treated the proposal with some reservations. He insisted the U.S. retain the right to match the number of shorter-range missiles remaining on Soviet soil after Soviet missiles were removed from Czechoslovakia and Democratic Germany.

To resolve that difference, Gorbachev agreed Tuesday to limits on shorter-range missiles in any Euromissile agreement if the U.S. did not increase its shorter-range arsenal.

"We are ready to liquidate our battlefield tactical missiles," Gorbachev said, adding the shorter-range weapons could be removed within a year.

Gorbachev said he is willing to accept U.S. President Ronald Reagan's invitation to the U.S. for a new superpower summit, contained in a letter delivered by Shultz, if there is a treaty on medium-range Euromissiles, or intermediate nuclear forces (INF), to sign. Gorbachev also wants an agreement on other "key principles" of disarmament.

Both sides agreed to leave Euromissile reduction and verification issues to their negotiators at the Geneva talks. The talks on cuts in strategic (long-range) weapons, medium-range missiles and space-based weapons will resume on April 23.

Observers here noted the U.S. must still get support for a Euromissile pact from its wavering European NATO allies. Western European countries fear a medium-range deal would leave them exposed to Soviet shorter-range missiles.

Shultz left Moscow yesterday for Brussels to seek NATO support.

There are still significant differences between Moscow and Washington over details of verification.

Although the talks also covered regional conflicts, human rights, trade, spying and other arms control issues, significant progress was only made on Euromissiles. But there is still a long way to go for an agreement.

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INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

XINHUA ON NATO RELUCTANCE TO ACCEPT USSR PROPOSAL

OW171611 Beijing XINHUA in English 1554 GMT 17 Apr 87

["Roundup: Gorbachev's Offer, a Bitter Pill for NATO Allies To Swallow -- (by Xiong Changyi)" -- XINHUA headline]

[Text] Beijing, April 17 (XINHUA) -- While openly expressing welcome to Moscow's offer to eliminate short-range nuclear missiles in Europe, Washington's NATO allies fear that a deal in this area would affect NATO's nuclear deterrence and flexible response strategy.

The offer was made by Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev during U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz's three-day visit in Moscow in a bid to give an impetus to the Euromissile negotiations between the two superpowers.

Following his meeting in Brussels yesterday to brief allied foreign ministers on his Moscow mission, Shultz told reporters that the Soviet offer was "broadly along the line of what the alliance has long sought," and "we have a hard decision to make, but it is the kind of decision we have been wanting to make."

However, allied ministers were cautious over Gorbachev's offer to eliminate Soviet short-range missiles within a year as part of an INF [intermediate nuclear forces] deal.

British Foreign Secretary Sir Geoffrey Howe, after his meeting with Shultz, told reporters yesterday, "If Mr. Gorbachev is now ready to abandon this Soviet claim to monopoly, that will of course be very welcome."

But, he indicated, "What has to be done now, and has been set in train urgently by today's meeting, is an overall assessment of the implementations of Gorbachev's proposal, and our response."

NATO says there is no U.S. equivalent to the Soviet short-range missiles mentioned by Gorbachev. But the alliance has a German-made weapon with a U.S. warhead called a Pershing 1A which is roughly equivalent.

Pressed by reporters, Howe said imbalance in Moscow's favor in other categories of weapons, such as very short-range weapons, dual-capable aircraft, sea and air-launched missiles, provided an "insight" into why the alliance had to think carefully about the Soviet short-range missile offer.

He stressed, "The harsh facts of life -- geography and Soviet advantages in conventional and chemical forces -- make nuclear deterrence and flexible response indispensable for the foreseeable future to the security of the West and of Western Europe in particular."

Federal German Foreign Minister Hans Dietrich Genscher also told reporters in Brussels yesterday that the Soviet offer on short-range missiles would have to be studied very closely because of its enormous impact on the security situation in central Europe.

He stressed it was essential to continue and push ahead with talks on reducing conventional forces and banning chemical weapons but added, "I am not creating a link but we must follow up these talks."

Why the West cautious about the Soviet offer on short-range missiles? [sentence as received]

Helmut Sonnefeldt, a former U.S. National Security Council member now with the Brookings Institute, said, "The Europeans for some time have been uneasy about the possibility of breaking up the nuclear element of their deterrent force because they feel quite vulnerable to the Soviet conventional force."

"The more there is a tendency toward denuclearization, the more they seem to have concern about decoupling (the European nuclear force)," he added.

Kim Holmes, deputy director for defense policy studies with the Heritage Foundation, also shares the same view, saying Shultz's talks in Moscow "clearly present some problems for NATO, which has traditionally relied on battlefield nuclear weapons to offset Soviet battlefield superiority."

"The Soviets are aware of this," he added.

As some Western analysts well put it, although negotiations towards an INF treaty in Europe marked a "significant step," the Soviet new proposals would nonetheless represent a bitter pill for NATO allies to swallow.

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INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

XINHUA ON U.S. OPTIMISM OVER SOVIET PROPOSALS

OW180819 Beijing XINHUA in English 0809 GMT 18 Apr 87

["News Analysis: U.S. Sounds More Optimistic About Soviet Arms Proposals (by Shi Lujia)" -- XINHUA headline]

[Text] Washington, April 17 (XINHUA) -- The United States seems to be singing a more favorable tune about Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's latest offer to eliminate short-range missiles in Eastern Europe, although it is still short of a formal endorsement of the Soviet position.

After meeting with NATO foreign ministers in Brussels, Secretary of State George Shultz told a news conference yesterday that his talks in Moscow had "created a great opportunity for the alliance" to ease tensions between the East and West.

Without mentioning Gorbachev's proposals, Shultz said, "We have the basic elements in place for a good agreement on eliminating medium-range missiles in Europe."

With such an agreement, he said, "We can bring this whole pattern of Soviet deployment we've objected to back under control, and from our point of view, that's good."

These statements appear to be more optimistic than those he had made at a press conference in Moscow where he stressed "hard negotiations ahead" although "a lot of progress" had been achieved.

Observers here noted that Shultz, as a team player within the Reagan administration, is unlikely to have sounded so approving about the prospect and nature of an INF [intermediate nuclear forces] agreement without encouragement from President Ronald Reagan.

In fact, Reagan himself, after hearing a detailed report from Shultz on his Moscow trip and the subsequent consultations with NATO allies, spoke hopefully of a U.S.-Soviet arms control accord by the end of the year.

"It's my hope that the process now under way continues to move forward and that Mr. Gorbachev and I can complete a historic agreement on East-West relations at a summit meeting," the President said.

He even predicted that he and Gorbachev can meet later this year to sign a treaty on Euromissiles.

Asked whether he was trying to sell Gorbachev's proposal to the NATO allies, Reagan said that was what he and Secretary Shultz were working on.

Apparently bearing in mind the West Europeans' concerns about "decoupling" of American and European defenses as a result of the withdrawal of U.S. nuclear missiles, Reagan said, "I think the assurance (to NATO allies) comes from the fact that we have troops there. We behave like an ally. We have the same security concerns."

Previously, the United States, while eager to have an INF agreement, insisted that it reserve the right to match the Soviet deployment of short-range weapons in Europe after its Pershing 2 and cruise missiles are withdrawn.

That demand largely aims to allay the NATO allies' concerns that without the American nuclear umbrella, Western Europe would be vulnerable to the superior Soviet conventional forces.

Now that Gorbachev has offered to eliminate all Soviet short-range weapons, it seems to be even more difficult politically for West European governments to permit U.S. deployment of new missiles on their territory.

In the case, analysts say, the United States probably sees no point in further pressing the Soviets for the right to build up the American short-range arsenal to the Soviet level, now estimated at 130 missiles.

The United States has its political need to reach an arms agreement as soon as possible and get it ratified in the remaining time of Reagan's presidency.

However, after hearing Shultz' briefing in Brussels, some NATO countries have misgivings about the idea of zero settlement of short-range missiles in Europe, worrying that it might be a step toward the "denuclearization" of Europe.

Meanwhile, within the U.S. Government itself, there are critics who say that the issue, if not properly handled, could be a source of contention between the United States and its NATO allies.

Reagan said he personally will consult with NATO allies and U.S. congressional leaders next week on further negotiations before offering "new ideas" to the Soviet Union.

Reports from Brussels said some Europeans fear the Reagan will now press them to accept an agreement based on the latest Soviet offer in the hope of bolstering his administration with a major arms control accord at a summit meeting later this year.

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INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

PEOPLE'S DAILY ON INF TALKS ENTERING 'KEY STAGE'

HK180758 Beijing RENMIN RIBAO in Chinese 18 Apr 87 p 6

[Commentary by correspondent Zhang Yunwen (1728 0336 2429): "U.S.-Soviet Talks on Medium-Range Missiles Enter the Key Stage"]

[Text] Washington, 16 Apr -- Secretary of State Shultz announced at a press conference on 15 April, after meeting the Soviet foreign minister and Gorbachev, that the United States and the Soviet Union have made very great progress on the medium-range missile issue, and they are very close to reaching an agreement on eliminating such missiles in Europe.

The White House has responded positively to this progress. Chief of Staff Baker expressed optimism over the prospects, holding that a "historic opportunity" for reaching agreement had appeared. Arms control experts believe that although difficult negotiations still lie ahead, the possibility of a breakthrough on the medium-range missile issue has greatly increased, because both sides need one.

Shultz' visit to Moscow took place after Gorbachev proposed on 28 February decoupling the talks on medium-range missiles from the talks on space weapons and a turning point had appeared in the U.S.-Soviet arms control talks. Before last October's meeting in Iceland, the two sides had held many talks on the medium-range missile question without making any headway. During the Iceland meeting, the two sides actually reached an identity of views on the question, but there was a deadlock because of the space weapons issue, with the Soviet Union demanding that the medium-range missile question be linked to the space weapons question. As a result, no specific agreement was reached. Gorbachev's February proposals sped up the pace in the medium-range missile talks. However, new differences arose in the draft agreements submitted by the two sides, the main ones being over how to carry out strict verification of the destruction of medium-range missiles, and how to deal with the problem of short-range (or medium-short-range) missiles with a range of 500 to 1,000 km. The United States demanded that a clause on short-range missiles be included in the agreement on medium-range missiles; the United States held that since the Soviet Union had absolute superiority in short-range missiles, the United States should demand the retention of power equal to that of the Soviet Union, and even said that it would modify the Pershing-II medium-range missiles into Pershing-IB short-range missiles. The Soviet Union opposed this position, stating that short range missiles should be discussed after agreement was reached on medium-range missiles. Later, Gorbachev stated in a speech in Prague on 10 April that talks could be held immediately on cutting and eventually destroying short-range missiles, and that such missiles would be removed from the GDR and Czechoslovakia immediately after reaching agreement on medium-range

missiles. During his talk with Shultz, Gorbachev went further by stating that the Soviet Union could eliminate all of its short-range missiles in Europe, and that this should be written into the agreement. This kicked the ball into the court of the United States and its allies.

The key to the medium-range missile question at present is the attitude of the countries of Western Europe. Ever since the U.S.-Soviet summit in Iceland, these countries have been worried that the talks on eliminating medium-range missiles in Europe would eventually lead to the "denuclearization" of Western Europe, hence, they have been between the devil and the deep blue sea. The "zero option" was first raised by the NATO countries themselves, and if they opposed it, these countries would give people the impression that they were obstructing a disarmament agreement; yet if they agreed to the elimination of all medium and short-range missiles in Europe, then Western Europe would be at a disadvantage in conventional arms and troop strength; hence, they demanded that the Soviet Union greatly reduce its conventional forces, or else that a certain number of nuclear weapons be retained in Western Europe.

At present, although the two sides will continue to bargain over an agreement on medium-range missiles, according to White House Chief of Staff Baker, the interests of the United States and the Soviet Union have already "converged," and the prospects for reaching agreement are better than at any time previously. As far as the West is concerned, the Soviet Union will dismantle about 1,300 medium-range missile warheads, while the United States only needs to dismantle some 300 warheads. The long-standing worries of the Western countries over the SS-20 medium-range missile will be eliminated. Reaching a disarmament agreement with the Soviet Union will also demonstrate that the Reagan administration still has a leadership capability following the Iran incident. Also upcoming will be a Gorbachev visit to the United States, which will help the Republican Party in the 1988 presidential elections. As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, eliminating the threat of the fast and highly accurate Pershing-II's and thus paving the way for talks on other weapons will assist the Soviet Union's domestic economic reforms and will strengthen its status on the international political stage. Hence, as far as both sides are concerned, there is a feeling of urgency for reaching a disarmament agreement. [paragraph continues]

It is precisely because of this that during the Moscow talks, the two sides were unwilling to allow the embassy spying incidents, which caused a big noise for a time, to affect the talks on medium-range missiles.

However, hard-to-predict setbacks are often cropping up in U.S.-Soviet disarmament negotiations. Due to their relationship of both confrontation and dialogue, plus factors related to America's allies and its hard-liners at home, the possibility of new problems arising unexpectedly in the medium-range missile talks cannot be completely excluded.

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CSO: 5200/4088

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

PEOPLE'S DAILY ON UNRESOLVED INF PROBLEMS

HK180848 Beijing RENMIN RIBAO in Chinese 18 Apr 87 p 6

[Commentary by Cang Lide (0221 4539 1795): "The Complex U.S.-Soviet Foreign Ministerial Meeting"]

[Text] U.S. Secretary of State Shultz visited the Soviet Union from 13 to 15 April. Both the United States and the Soviet Union have attached great importance to the visit. The international community also closely followed it and held that this is a visit with "special significance" at an important moment in the relations between the two countries.

During the 3-day visit, Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze had talks that lasted as long as a dozen hours or so. Soviet leader Gorbachev, and Ryzhkov, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, met with Shultz on separate occasions and had long and "frank" conversations. The topic that occupied a dominant position in all these talks was the question concerning U.S.-Soviet arms control, and the effort to reach an agreement on medium-range missiles in particular.

The question of the medium-range missiles is one of the focuses of Soviet-U.S. relations. After the Soviet Union put forward on 28 February this year a solution on the medium-range missiles separate from the "package" plan, the U.S.-Soviet arms control talks in Geneva took a favorable turn in a certain aspect. However, because of new differences between the two sides in questions such as the relations between medium-range missiles and medium-short range missiles, their inspection, and ways of destroying the medium-range missiles, progress in reaching an agreement on this issue between the two sides is again in a complex and delicate state. In order to promote an agreement on the middle-range missiles, Gorbachev announced in Czechoslovakia on the eve of Shultz' visit to the Soviet Union a new proposal for solving the problem of medium-short range missiles. In meeting with Shultz, he again expressed the readiness to write down in an agreement on medium-range missiles in Europe that the Soviet Union will "undertake the duty of eliminating its medium-short range missiles within a relatively short and clearly stipulated time." The Soviet move attracted much attention from the Western press and the latter held that this will help remove the chief obstacles to reaching a compromise between the United States and the Soviet Union on the question of the medium-range missiles in Europe. The United States also expressed its "interest" in this. Viewed from information disclosed by the meetings, both the U.S. and Soviet sides have been quite optimistic about the progress of the medium-range issue, but at the same time, they have also expressed that there are problems that remain unsolved and that much work has to be done and arduous efforts have to be made before an agreement can be reached.

The problems that remain unsolved are: First, the United States continues to stress that both sides should completely destroy the medium-range missiles, but the Soviet Union favors that each side should keep 100 warheads of the medium-range missiles. Second, the Soviet Union wants to add on the agreement "strict inspection provisions," that is, both sides can carry out inspection at any site, including sites where missiles are removed and destroyed, military bases set up in a third country, and sites for the storage and manufacturing of missiles owned by individuals or states. On the one hand, the United States wants to have reliable inspections, but on the other, it fears that the extensive inspection proposal put forward by the Soviet Union will be harmful. Third, the United States has to coordinate its stand on the new Soviet proposal with its allies in Western Europe.

To hold a second U.S.-Soviet official summit is also an issue with which both sides are concerned. In meeting with Gorbachev, Shultz gave him a letter from Reagan. In the letter, Reagan officially invited Gorbachev to visit the United States this year and to hold a summit meeting. On the one hand, Gorbachev said that he cannot go to the United States "without good reasons," but on the other hand, he expressed his willingness to meet Reagan to work out some "crucial provisions" on arms control and reach a treaty on medium-range missiles. However, the press held that Gorbachev's attitude is actually to urge the United States to make a decision on the medium-range missile as soon as possible. If the U.S.-Soviet summit meeting can be held this year, this can only be considered a fruitful result.

As for other U.S.-Soviet arms control issues, such as reducing the number of strategic nuclear weapons, and the Strategic Defense Initiative, each side continued to sing its own tune. Although Shultz and the Soviet side reiterated the notion of halving the number of strategic nuclear weapons, the differences between the two sides remained as before on the issues of space weapons and the observance of the anti-ballistic missile treaty. The Soviet Union even accused the United States of having taken a step backward in this respect. Gorbachev stressed to Shultz that if the United States clings obstinately to its course and deploys the Strategic Defense Initiative, the Soviet Union and the United States will be unable to reach any agreement on offensive strategic weapons. As for the conflicts in Afghanistan, Cambodia, and Central America, and the "human rights" issue, there was no change in the positions of the two sides. The two sides expressed hope for cooperation in bilateral economic and trade ties, but no fresh progress was made.

Shultz made his trip to Moscow at a key moment in U.S.-Soviet relations. Since the Iceland summit last October, there have been ups and downs and great instability in their relationship. On the one hand, both of them want to ease the tension, pursue dialogue, and seek a breakthrough on certain issues; on the other hand, quarrels keep breaking out between them, with mutual accusations flying around. Despite this, the foreign ministers of the two countries went ahead with their talks on schedule. In short, U.S.-Soviet relations are developing amid the turbulence and setbacks. It appears that this situation will persist in the future.

/9604

CSO: 5200/4088

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

ARGENTINE PAPER ON EUROPEAN RESPONSE TO GORBACHEV INITIATIVE

Buenos Aires LA PRENSA in Spanish 5 Apr 87 p 6

[Text] Unlike the "approval" with which Washington has viewed the Soviet proposal for nuclear disarmament in Europe, known as "Zero Option," which calls for the elimination of Moscow's SS 20 missiles and the U.S. Cruise and Pershing II missiles, the reluctance that has been observed simultaneously in France, West Germany, and Great Britain gives an indication of what the position of the NATO members (either separately or jointly) will be in the end. And it should not be overlooked that NATO's commanding general has already spoken out, predicting NATO's rejection of the plan.

So little still remains to be revealed, especially after the abrupt interruption of the negotiations which the Soviet and U.S. delegates had been holding in Geneva prior to an indepth study of the "Zero Option" proposal. Some observer will certainly have already pointed out that Washington's silence on this issue stands in contrast with the forthright and energetic comments which have come from London, Paris, and Bonn in recent days. On this topic, we should mention the significance of the joint position adopted by the German Chancellor Kohl and France's President Mitterrand, that Europe should not totally give up nuclear weapons so long as Soviet supremacy continues in medium-range missiles.

Using very precise terms, they have expressed their fears about the possibility of a withdrawal of U.S. missiles from Europe. At a time when all of the Kremlin's propaganda and the efforts of its diplomats at international meetings have been designed to stimulate some discord, even minimal, between the United States and its European allies, the Franco-German statement could not have been more meaningful--especially as it coincides with another similar statement issued after the meeting in Normandy between Chancellor Kohl and President Mitterrand. That statement covered, we should recall, "independent deterrent forces which are not included in those negotiations," said Mrs Thatcher. Moreover, Mr Mitterrand told the press that on the issue of independent nuclear forces, "Thatcher can speak in the name of the two nations." He added that "although we did not take part in those negotiations (the Soviet-American talks), all of Europe and the western world

will be affected by the negotiations, and it is important for our future that they be properly conducted."

The Soviet nuclear disarmament proposal lacks the seriousness and responsibility which should be sought in such issues. It is not just that the Kremlin--whose "iron curtain" is barely any distance away from Europe, while the immensity of the North Atlantic separates it from the United States--has remained silent on medium-range missiles. If these missiles stay, Europe would never be free from the threat of nuclear aggression from Moscow, unless Gorbachev's "peace initiative" is nothing other than the appropriation of a similar proposal made by the United States and NATO 5 years ago, when the Soviet Union initiated the deployment of its SS 20 missiles at the rate of one per week.

With Moscow so obviously altering the European nuclear equilibrium, and given the need to block this move, the west proposed that the Kremlin give up its plan. That was the true "Zero Option" at that time. The Kremlin closed its eyes and ears and so opened up the way toward the general nuclearization of Europe. Everything worked in favor of the communists. To install their missiles in their satellite countries they had only to order their puppet governments to give the corresponding "authorization." But on the other side, the installation of the western missiles was held up for 3 years, not for technical reasons, but because they had to wait for the parliaments of the NATO member countries to approve the missile deployments by a specific vote. In the meantime, Moscow jolted Europe with its "pacifist" demonstrations against nuclear armament--western, but not Soviet nuclear armament.

If Europe is sure of anything, it is that it does not have the right to commit suicide.

7679

CSO: 5200/2004

CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

TASS: AGREEMENTS PROHIBITING CHEMICAL WEAPONS 'POSSIBLE'

LD212154 Moscow TASS in English 1520 GMT 21 Apr 87

[Text] Moscow April 21 TASS -- Follows commentary by Leonid Ponomaryov, TASS political news analyst:

On April 22, 1915, German troops for the first time used war gasses in the area of the Belgian city of Ypres. It was only in 1925 that their use, but not production was prohibited by the Geneva protocol. The USA used that loophole and started building up the arsenals of war gasses and for many decades refused to ratify the Geneva protocol. In the course of the Second World War the Nazi command was planning to use chemical weapons against the Soviet troops and civilian population on one of the fronts. Chemical weapons were particularly broadly used by special U.S. troops during the U.S. aggression against Vietnam. A total of 100 thousand tons of toxic agents were dropped on the provinces of southern Vietnam alone. More than two million Vietnamese fell victim of the U.S. chemical warfare. Three and a half thousand of them were killed. Thousands of U.S. soldiers were affected by their own weapons.

The practices of the application of war chemicals as a combat weapon have shown that toxic agents rank among such mass annihilation weapons as nuclear, neutron and biological ones. For many decades the Soviet Union has sought full and unconditional ban on the use and production of combat toxic agents, that an effective international convention be drawn up on that issue. The United States and its NATO allies have evaded a resolution of that problem, continuing the development of new types of chemical mass destruction weapons. Now the Pentagon has developed the so-called binary, multicomponent, chemical nerve gas. Considerable arsenals of the Pentagon's war chemicals are outside the territory of the USA in the territory of Washington's allies.

The Soviet Union has chemical weapons, but they have been created in answer to the chemical threat stemming from the Western countries. At present, especially after Reykjavik opportunities have opened to reach agreement on radical reduction and elimination of destruction types of nuclear weapons as well as chemical weapons.

The Soviet Union and its allies declare for freeing Europe not only from nuclear but also from chemical weapons, for creating zones free from such weapons. The USSR consistently comes out for drawing up a relevant international convention at the earliest date, already this year. To facilitate agreement on that issue the USSR has ended the production of chemical weapons and started the construction of a special plant for the destruction of war chemicals. The Soviet Union has no chemical weapons outside its territory. The Soviet initiatives on the prohibition of chemical weapons take into account the interests and constructive steps of the other sides, in particular Britain's stand on inspection at request. All this combined gives ground to believe that agreements on full prohibition of chemical weapons everywhere are quite possible already this year.

EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

WARSAW PACT COMMANDER INTERVIEWED ON EUROPEAN MILITARY BALANCE

AU161341 Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian No 269 14 Apr 87 pp 47-51

["Exclusive" interview with Marshal Viktor Kulikov, commander-in-chief of the Warsaw Pact Joint Armed Forces, by Miroslav Lazanski, DANAS special correspondent -- in Moscow on 2 April -- first three paragraphs are newspaper's introduction]

[Text] Moscow -- The headquarters building of the Warsaw Pact Joint Armed Forces is situated in Leningradskiy Prospekt near the CSKA Sport Club [Central Army Sports Club] and from the street one can see the blue painted palace of the Russian czars in the distance. In no way do the high iron fence, the park with trees, and several guardsmen give the impression that the headquarters of the East's military alliance is situated here in the center of Moscow. I arrived at the main entrance about 1030 on 2 April, with Sergey Fedorovich Mikhaylov from the Information Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Slava Serebryakov from NOVOSTI. A car with headquarters officers to show us the way to the main building was already waiting at the entrance. What one cannot see from the road is in fact a block of buildings, pathways, car parks, in brief all the amenities that such a high military headquarters is suppose to have. In the main hall are the flags of the Warsaw Pact countries in the following order: Bulgarian, Hungarian, East German, Polish, Romanian, Soviet, and Czech. They are lit by neon lights and surrounded by marble and red carpets.

Officers of the Polish, Czech, and Hungarian Armies pass by. I wanted to take a picture of them but this is not permitted. No photographing; only flags could be photographed. I used the roughly 10 minutes before 1100, the time of my appointment for the interview with Marshal Viktor G. Kulikov, commander-in-chief of the Warsaw Pact Joint Armed Forces, to pay a brief visit to a book and souvenir shop in the main headquarters building. From Yugoslav authors they had Ivo Andric's "The Bridge Over the Drina."

We enter a special elevator that takes us directly to Marshal Kulikov's office. The elevator is fitted with a red carpet. In the room where the Marshal's adjutants work the central place is occupied by a raised desk with eight telephones. Can I call the DANAS offices from here? Officers smile at my inquiry. At exactly 1100 an adjutant opens the office door and I enter a rectangular room with walls covered in wood panelling and baroque wallpaper. Crystal chandeliers, pictures of Lenin, Gorbachev, and Sokolov, a long conference table, a big globe in the corner. Viktor Georgiyevich Kulikov, marshal of the Soviet Union, first deputy to the minister of defense, and commander in chief of the Warsaw Pact Joint Armed Forces, gets up from behind his work desk, approaches me, and cordially squeezes my hand. He is big and has a wide, typical, Slav face, gray hair, and a surprisingly mild look. After the greeting I present the marshal with a DANAS badge, pen, and calendar. He presents me with a Warsaw Pact medal and badge. [paragraph continues]

We start the informal part of our talks. What is the weather like in Yugoslavia, how many copies of DANAS magazine are published, who reads it.... Marshal Kulikov is interested in current Bulgarian-Yugoslav relations. I tell him that they have been burdened for a number of years by the Bulgarian stance on Macedonia. The marshal then reminds me of Todor Zhivkov's statement that "Bulgaria has no territorial pretensions." I say that statements are one thing and actual activities in the mass media are another. We turn to the formal part of our talks. Marshal Kulikov first expresses his satisfaction at the opportunity to meet Yugoslav readers via DANAS magazine and points out the combat cooperation between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union during the last war.

DANAS: Comrade Marshal, you mentioned Bulgaria earlier on. Can I ask you something in connection with this?

Kulikov: The marshal of the Soviet Union is ready to answer all your questions. I am at your disposal.

DANAS: All right then, how do you, as commander in chief of the Warsaw Pact, view the fact that a military cooperation agreement between Albania and Bulgaria still exists?

Kulikov: This is a purely formal thing. There is no military cooperation between the two countries at present.

DANAS: But it is very interesting that the only agreement about military help and cooperation that Albania did not break off is in fact the agreement with Bulgaria. Why with Bulgaria?

Kulikov: I do not have any other information except that trade between the two countries exists. We are talking about economic ties. There are no military ties, but if you have some information about this please tell me.

DANAS: I have information that the Chinese are slowly returning to Albania, this is primarily in connection with military equipment and hardware [operma i tehnik], spare parts.

Kulikov: I have read about Albania's problems regarding spare parts for the army. I have data on Albania's purchase of arms. They have old models of Soviet arms and are now trying to master the production for some of those models.

DANAS: The Greek-Turkish dispute is also one of the problems in the Balkans. What is your comment about this?

Kulikov: How do you as a Yugoslav journalist see that?

DANAS: I think that this is a small "quarrel at home." Something that stays in the family.

Kulikov: Yes, yes, the Aegean is a sea made for hiding small navy ships. There are many islands.

DANAS: You recently had a public offer on expanding membership in the pact. Libyan leader Colonel al-Qadhafi said that he will bring his country into the pact if the U.S. confrontation toward Libya continues. Would you like to have another member?

Kulikov: I do not see it that way. This is a question of politics and not of military leadership. I think that it is not realistic now.

DANAS: The question is what the pact would gain with Libya as a member. You already have your experts and bases in Libya.

Kulikov: We do not have bases there, but our experts train Libyan soldiers and offer aid in securing some installations [objekat].

DANAS: When talking about military alliances one usually asks why the Warsaw Pact was formed so much later than NATO.

Kulikov: Yes, the formation of the Warsaw Pact was dictated exclusively by external circumstances. The socialist countries were forced to make that step because after World War II the imperialist countries, the United States in particular, started threatening their security. The "cold war," slanders, and provocations also started against the countries of socialism. The United States started surrounding the Soviet Union and the countries of the socialist community with a whole chain of military bases. The West consolidated its forces and in 1949 that resulted in the formation of NATO as an aggressive, anti-Soviet, and antisocialist organization, both in content and in character. Since the first days of its existence, NATO has been the initiator of the arms race and of the policy from the position of force.

In fact an aggression against European socialist countries was being prepared. Various plans for nuclear attacks on the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, such as Trojan, Bravo, Charioteer, and Dropshot had already been elaborated in the United States. Western countries rejected the socialist countries' initiative from 1954 on collective security in Europe. Finally, the FRG was also accepted into NATO and immediately, openly, and clearly presented its territorial pretensions toward the GDR, Poland, the Soviet Union, and other socialist countries. Later, according to the 1970 Moscow Agreement, the FRG recognized and accepted the principle of the inviolability of borders in post-war Europe. The FRG's joining NATO under such conditions was interpreted by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries as support for revanchist forces. Therefore, the fraternal socialist countries had to do something with a view to protecting revolutionary achievements, consolidating the world socialist system, and creating collective security. This is why leaders of the Governments of Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR, Poland, Romania, Soviet Union, and Czechoslovakia signed an agreement on friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance in Warsaw on 14 May, an agreement which went down in history as the Warsaw Pact. The agreement was also signed with Albania which, by the way, has not taken part in the pact since 1962. When now observing the time and the road that has passed, we can bravely say that the Warsaw Pact has fulfilled and is still fulfilling its basic task, and that is peace and the inviolability of borders in Europe, and ensuring the peaceful work of the community of socialist countries.

DANAS: They say in the West that Warsaw Pact doctrine is distinctly offensive, that is, that the pact is aggressive in nature.

Kulikov: One can assert anything, especially if one is not willing to prove that assertion. The Warsaw Pact is absolutely a defensive organization which is not endangering anyone nor will it endanger anyone. We do not have any aspirations to territories belonging to others and we do not interfere in other countries' internal affairs. We have never started a war and we have never played the role of an aggressor. That is alien to our ideals and to the socialist cause. We will continue to act in such a way that no one will have reason to be concerned about his security. This is why we are building the entire system of operational and combat readiness of the Warsaw Pact Armed Forces, and in doing so the Soviet Union has taken up the obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, and it is closely observing this. At their meeting in Budapest in June 1986 the Warsaw Pact countries proclaimed their decision that they will never start military operations against anyone in Europe or in any other region unless they themselves become the target of aggression.

The Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact countries do not strive for military superiority, but they will not, of course, allow the superiority of the other side. We do not ask for greater security, but we will not agree to a lesser one. These are the facts. It is absurd to treat this as "aggressiveness." Accusations that we are aggressive are NATO's attempt to discredit us before the world public. Behind slander and deceptions they are trying to hide the real truth about NATO, a source of threats to European and world peace.

DANAS: Western experts base the thesis about the aggressiveness of the Warsaw Pact on the overall forces of the pact that you command, on the way operations are carried out on the European territory, and particularly on the speed of your units. One can often hear it said in the West that Marshal Kulikov and his troops can reach the English Channel in only 48 hours.

Kulikov: I do not want to see the English Channel, at least not under such circumstances.

DANAS: All right, but what is the situation with the relations of conventional forces of the two alliances? Western analysts say that the Warsaw Pact has advantage in armored troops, and in saying so they "forget" that NATO has the advantage in helicopters, that is, that while one side has the advantage in one kind of weapons, the other side has it in another kind. What is your comment on this?

Kulikov: Observing this on the whole, there is no advantage on the part of the Warsaw Pact over NATO. There is an approximate balance in conventional weapons between the two alliances. The West is trying to create a myth about the Soviet military threat and talks about the advantage of the Warsaw Pact without any evidence. For this reason they misrepresent the real correlation of forces. They do not take into consideration the two sides' human resources, do not include the Armed Forces of France and Spain in this relation, and do not fully include into that correlation of forces either the information on the U.S. Armed Forces, or data on the armies under national commands. They also do not take into consideration the U.S. and NATO reserve formations, and the stocks of armament and military equipment. They deliberately overestimate the power of the Warsaw Pact and at the same time minimize the power of NATO. They tendentiously take advantage of the objectively existing differences between the structure of the two sides' armament. What is the realistic picture of the correlation of forces? Objectively speaking, NATO and the Warsaw Pact have approximately the same number of people under arms and approximately the same quantity of artillery. The Warsaw Pact has a certain advantage in armored forces, primarily tanks, but NATO is superior as regards the number of combat-ready divisions, anti-tank weapons, and fighter-bombers. However, on the whole, there is a balance in conventional arms. In order to reduce the level of military confrontation in Europe, one would have to establish a balance at a much lower level, and that is an urgent task. "Let us observe all this in a new way," M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, has said, "Let the West carry out appropriate reduction in those types of armament that it has more of, and we will liquidate the surplus of those armaments in which we have an advantage." We have already proposed a number of initiatives both concerning conventional armaments and in connection with nuclear missile power. You will remember that a few years ago, we withdrew some forces from the GDR, 20,000 men and 1,000 tanks.

DANAS: Comrade Marshal, there are some estimates in the West that you have brought all this back through an increased number of tanks in platoons and companies, through a change in the organization of armed units. A return by the back door?

Kulikov: This is not true. If we speak about the organizational structure of any armed forces, it does change everywhere through time. Changing the organizational structure is a legitimate process. I was the commander of the Soviet Group of Forces in the GDR and I know how it is in the armed units. For instance, the rifle regiments used to have no tanks, and there were anti-tank weapons in some units, and none in others. All this is a normal process. Look, for instance, the Hungarian People's Army was organized in a divisional system and now it has changed over to a brigade system, because this suits their conditions better. Even our possible adversary on the other side, the United States, constantly experiments with the organizational structure, searching for a better solution. Their divisions, as you know, number 18,000 to 20,000 men. There are also differences in serving in the Army. There are professionals and soldiers doing their regular service. All these matters are different.

DANAS: The USSR criticizes the positions of some U.S. strategists about the possibility of waging a limited nuclear war in Europe. Can such a war be waged in Europe without escalating into a general nuclear conflict?

Kulikov: A "limited" nuclear war is a pure illusion. What does it mean, "limited?" in fact this means several dozen nuclear strikes. Can you imagine that the other side would remain sitting and would count: "They hit me with 50 strikes, and therefore I must retaliate with 50 nuclear strikes, too"? Theoretically, of course, one may speculate, but in practice this is impossible, especially since the communications system would also be damaged in a war. It is unrealistic to expect that the adversary would hit me exactly the same number of times as I hit him. If a nuclear conflict were to break out in Europe, or somewhere else in the world, it would immediately and inevitably [odmah i neizbježno] escalate into a general nuclear war. The American theory about a "limited" nuclear war proceeds from the false comprehension of the essence of the matter and from the striving to make the essence of a nuclear conflict acceptable to the public at large. Such a theory has nothing to do with reality and is therefore dangerous.

DANAS: What do you think about the new NATO concept, the "airland battle 2000?" Is it offensive, which is to say aggressive? To what extent can this concept affect the possibility of starting a war or expanding a crisis? Do you in the Warsaw Pact have an answer to this doctrine?

Kulikov: The concept of the "airland battle 2000" is a Pentagon invention, and NATO took it over under the name "deep echeloned strike" or the "Rogers Plan." Western propaganda tries to present this concept as defensive, calling it "defense in the rear of the enemy with conventional weapons." What is the essence of the concept of the "deep echeloned strike"? First, it is based on new weapons systems, the so-called "smart weapons." There are homing missiles, reconnaissance strike systems, and other weapons of high destructive power. These weapons are intended for attacks on targets deep in the territory of the Warsaw Pact countries: on commands, airfields, communications, missile bases, concentrations of armed forces. Second, the new NATO concept implies preventive operations as a part of the common Western offense strategy. This is a strategy that counts on surprise, deep strikes, so-called "disarming strikes" on the territories of the Warsaw Pact countries, or rather the ultimate aim is victory in war. All this increases the NATO's aggressiveness, raises the level of confrontation, accelerates the arms race, and increases the danger of a military conflict in Europe. Under such circumstances, the USSR and other Warsaw Pact countries must take appropriate measures to preserve the military equilibrium of the two alliances and to ensure their own security.

Danas: What are the proposals of the USSR and the Warsaw Pact regarding conventional weapons of either military alliance in the European theater?

Kulikov: The Warsaw Pact presented its proposals on reducing conventional weapons in the proclamation addressed to NATO and all the European countries, published in Budapest on 11 June 1986. These proposals refer to Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals. We propose an essential reduction of all land forces components and of the tactical strike air force of the European countries, of the respective units of the USSR and Canada stationed in Europe, and of the nuclear systems of operational and tactical nature with a range of up to 1,000 km. As a first step we propose the reduction of the number of NATO and Warsaw Pact soldiers by 100,000 to 150,000 on both sides within 1 or 2 years. In the nineties, we propose a further reduction of the land forces and the tactical strike air forces by 25 percent each, or more than 500,000 men on both sides in comparison with the present situation. Such a reduction of the military forces of the two military alliances would make it possible for other countries, too, to reduce their armed forces. The reductions should be carried out at various unit levels, together with their equipment and weapons, through disbanding units and demobilizing the personnel. The arms and equipment should be destroyed, or stored on the national territory, or used for peaceful purposes. Nuclear warheads must be destroyed. The reduction would be controlled through national technical means, through the means of international verification [kontrols] including on-site inspection, exchange of information on troops being disbanded or reduced, information about the beginning and end of the reduction process, and the creation of an international consultative commission. The units that would remain after the conclusion of the reduction process should be embraced by a process of checking [kontrols] their activities. We have not yet received any answer to these Warsaw Pact proposals sent to the other side 10 months ago. We are waiting for an official answer from NATO.

DANAS: Does the Warsaw Pact agree to the principle of asymmetry in the process of reducing conventional forces in Europe, as is demanded by NATO?

Kulikov: No, we do not agree to any asymmetry. We demand complete equality in the reduction of forces. As much as one side reduces, the other should also reduce.

DANAS: Is this the Warsaw Pact position?

Kulikov: Absolutely. We said that in Budapest.

DANAS: How do you regard the change in the NATO position on medium-range missiles in Europe? In their time, they installed their Pershing-2 and cruise missiles as a response to your SS-20 missiles, and now they tie the withdrawal of these missiles to your increased short-range missiles. Why this change of attitude in the West?

Kulikov: Even in Iceland, Comrade Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, said that all the forces should be reduced, and he especially stressed the question of medium-range missiles. We are prepared to remove and to eliminate these missiles, after which we would start negotiations on operational and tactical missiles. They in the West demand first the elimination of operational and tactical missiles, and only afterward the removal of medium-range missiles. This is a change in position. Our possible adversary, NATO, possesses better artillery for launching nuclear-charge shells. These are 155- and 203-millimeter guns, self-propelled guns, and they also wish to create new short-range missiles. They are working on a new short-range Pershing, adapting the existing Pershing-2 missile. We propose a general liquidation of medium-range missiles and the transfer of 100 of these weapons systems to Asia.

DANAS: Do you possess any advantage in the short-range missiles than NATO. You have "Frog," "Scud," SS-12, SS-21, and SS-23, and NATO only Pershing-I and Lance missiles.

Kulikov: No, we have no advantage. Negotiations should be conducted on the elimination of medium-range missiles.

DANAS: How much have U.S. Pershing-2 and cruise missiles influenced the changes in the Warsaw Pact military doctrine?

Kulikov: There have been changes. After the stationing of the U.S. medium-range missiles in Europe and appropriate Soviet measures, the quantity of nuclear warheads directed at targets on both sides has increased. The time necessary for reaction to a nuclear attack or in case of a crisis situation has also been essentially reduced. In other words, the stationing in Europe of U.S. missiles intended for a first strike increased the probability of a nuclear war. The changes in the Warsaw Pact doctrine refer above all to strengthening of combat readiness for response and for preventing an attack from any side.

DANAS: As Warsaw Pact commander, do you believe that an armed people determined to fight may be defeated? Can they be defeated by a bloc?

Kulikov: What do you mean?

DANAS: Theoretically and practically, if a country lacks an operative army as big as, for instance, the Warsaw Pact or NATO, but possesses an armed people willing to fight and wide concept of defense, can such a country be defeated?

Kulikov: Which country?

DANAS: Any country.

Kulikov: A victory may be attained. Indeed, only for a time, for it is something else to rule such a country. World public opinion, other factors, all that is present. It is very difficult to defeat a people determined to defend itself.

DANAS: Do you, as Warsaw Pact commander, value guerrilla warfare? What do you think about it in the context of modern war?

Kulikov: It is a very active form of combat operation. It is based on the principle of patriotism. In World War II we had experiences in our country, in Belorussia and the Ukraine. I highly value and I know the methods of the partisan war in Yugoslavia. Then there is also Vietnam.

DANAS: Yes, but what would partisan warfare be like in a modern conflict in Europe?

Kulikov: There is room for guerrilla fighting, too. It is another matter whether this would be the dominant form of warfare. It is less probable, especially with the appearance of very modern combat means.

DANAS: Has Afghanistan brought any new perception in Soviet military doctrine?

Kulikov: This is a special question, a special problem. We are there at the invitation of the Kabul government, but there is no war in the conventional sense there. In general it is difficult to apply the experiences of Afghanistan to a modern war such as could be waged in Europe. The Afghan Army, which basically fights there and bears the brunt of the fighting, probably has some perceptions. But I tell you that war in Afghanistan is very strange.

DANAS: Comrade Marshal, do you have problems with youth pacifism in the Soviet Army?

Kulikov: I must say that there are several types of pacifism. Not all of them are the same. In the Soviet Army about 80 percent of our officers are members of the Communist Party.

DANAS: In Yugoslavia about 99.9 percent of them are members. How is it that it is only 8 percent in your country?

Kulikov: It is 100 percent in the Air Force.

DANAS: Do you have a single colonel who is not a member of the party?

Kulikov: We do not. But let me return to pacifism. Pacifism means a struggle for peace, and you can fight for peace with political means, although fighting with arms to protect one's own country is no less significant. This is a struggle for peace too. Learning, training to defend the country, strengthening combat readiness, this is also a form of a struggle for peace.

DANAS: Are there criticisms in the Soviet Army?

Kulikov: There are, at party meetings, but there are no discussions about commanders' and commanding officers' orders. Criticism and carping are not the same. What matters is a struggle for the quality of work in the Army.

DANAS: To what extent do the Soviet Armed Forces support the "restructuring" [preceding word published in Russian -- "perestroyka"] of Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee?

Kulikov: We fully support "restructuring." This is not only a civilian question but concerns military matters too. "Restructuring" is, above all, thinking in a new way; this is the intensification of combat training, new forms of training and learning, the question of punctuality and discipline. Democratization in the Army is of special importance for the soldiers' life, everyday life.

DANAS: Have you ever intimately thought, dreamed of becoming commander-in-chief of the Warsaw Pact forces?

Kulikov: No, I had never thought about it.

DANAS: Which soldiers and officers in the Warsaw Pact Joint Forces do you value most professionally?

Kulikov: As commander I say that they are all good. They all operate and work toward peace and the protection of socialism.

DANAS: But if in a war you had to be in trenches, which soldiers would you like to be with most? With the Poles, Hungarians, Germans, Bulgarians....

Kulikov: God forbid that a war may occur.

DANAS: Do you think that disbanding both military alliances in Europe could happen in the future?

Kulikov: We have always been and remain against divisions in Europe. This is why we are striving for the simultaneous disbanding of the Warsaw Pact and NATO. This proposal was also confirmed at the meeting of the political-consultative committee in Budapest in 1986. Now it is the other side's turn to say what it thinks. If we both want it, then mutual disbanding is possible. But as yet there is no answer to our offer.

DANAS: Do you as commander-in-chief of the Warsaw Pact wish to meet with your colleague on the other side, U.S. General Bernard Rogers, commander-in-chief of NATO? In your opinion would this meeting lead to a better understanding between the two blocs? Could an agreement on lowering the thresholds on nuclear danger in Europe be reached on such an occasion; or on reducing the military power of both sides?

Kulikov: Not only do we want a meeting with General Rogers, but we have already sent him a letter with proposals about such a meeting. I think that on an occasion like that we could discuss the military-strategic situation in Europe and explain many questions that worry both of us, remove mutual suspicions and mistrust. Of course, at a meeting like this it would be difficult to solve all problems, but it could serve as the beginning of a dialogue between military leaders of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, which is as necessary as a dialogue between politicians and diplomats. With the joint efforts of generals and diplomats we could succeed in speeding up the process of converting Europe into a continent of peace, good-neighborliness, and mutually useful cooperation. Unfortunately NATO has rejected the possibility of such a meeting, although I personally think that General Rogers was in favor of a military summit but was probably not given permission by Washington.

DANAS: To conclude, Comrade Marshal, do you believe in the possibility of a nuclear war?

Kulikov: No, I do not, but there are fools in this world....

/9274

CSO: 5200/1434

EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

SOVIET GEN TARTARNIKOV INTERVIEWED ON CSCE SESSION

LD161604 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0330 GMT 16 Apr 87

[Text] As has already been reported, the second stage of the Vienna meeting of representatives of states participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe ended a couple of days ago in the Austrian capital. In particular the question of reducing armed forces and weapons on the European continent was discussed there. Our correspondent in Vienna, Viktor Mikheyev, asked Major General Tatarnikov, member of the Soviet delegation, to talk about the course of these discussions.

[Begin Tatarnikov recording] First and foremost I must say that ideas of disarmament, particularly in the area of nuclear disarmament in Europe and conventional weapons in Europe, are here [word or words indistinct] more and more [word or words indistinct]. At the same time it must be admitted that certain NATO countries are conducting work at the Vienna meeting in such a way as to drown the dangerous aspects of the increase in weapons in (?empty) discussion, in order to bury ideas about disarmament. While these at times long debates are being conducted, the deployment [ravertivaniye] of more and more new weapons is continuing in Europe. For some reason the U.S. delegation and NATO countries are bashfully failing to mention this. The impression is being created that they would like to bury ideas of disarmament under piles of this lethal weaponry, and in general to remove the arms problem from the European process. First and foremost they are trying to reduce the matter down to the fact that supposedly an imbalance exists in Europe in the area of conventional weapons and that superiority, of course, supposedly lies with the Warsaw Pact. Therefore the main problem at the moment consists of, so-to-speak, unmasking this problem, of showing that the version about an imbalance in favor of the Warsaw Pact does not exist, that it has been artificially thought up.

At the Vienna meeting we introduced a proposal on reducing armed forces and conventional weapons. Poland put forward this proposal, and we substantiate it. This proposal also includes such problems as the further development of measures for strengthening trust and security. These are very important aspects, and careful attention is being paid to them. At the same time it has to be said that with regard to some aspects NATO countries have not contributed even one proposal. They are simply ignoring discussion of the proposal at the Vienna meeting. NATO would like to see long talks about imbalances and to draw out these talks for years and years. Of course all of these problems are making us watchful. We act clearly and directly. We have a proposal. It has been submitted, and this proposal is on mutual, stage-by-stage, substantial reduction of armed forces and weapons, and all Europeans understand it.
[end recording]

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CSO: 5200/1434

EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

SOVIET WEEKLY INTERVIEWS SWEDISH CD DELEGATION HEAD

Moscow NEW TIMES in English No 15, 20 Apr 87 p 12

[Text]

This year marks the 30th anniversary of the opening of the conference on disarmament in Geneva. Although the results of the cooperation of 40 countries over such a period could have been more substantial, the conference has succeeded in elaborating a number of important international treaties. A significant contribution to reaching these agreements was made by neutral and non-aligned countries. It should be noted that their weight in world politics has been growing in recent years.

Our special correspondent Dmitry Pogorzelsky interviewed the head of the Swedish delegation at the Geneva disarmament conference, the prominent public figure, ambassador Majbritt Theorin.

I should like to begin by reminding you of your comment that "Sweden is a great power in questions of disarmament." Indeed, your country's contribution to the cause of strengthening peace is well known. It is sufficient to say that Stockholm was the venue for the first phase of the conference on confidence and security-building measures and disarmament in Europe—a phase that was crowned with considerable success. Proceeding from this experience, what, in your opinion, can neutral and non-aligned countries do? How do you assess the prospects of the ECSC process?

First of all, I believe it to be extremely important for us to advance in all directions, and not deal with the strengthening of confidence-building measures alone, though these are, of course, important in themselves. Our future; the future of Europeans, is at stake. That is one of the reasons why at the Vienna meeting the Nordic countries made joint proposals on the protection of the environment.

Speaking of confidence-building measures and disarmament, I am an optimist. I hope we will manage to advance to

the phase outlined by the mandate of the Madrid meeting.

It is very important for the ECSC process to develop on a multilateral basis, with the participation of all states on the continent. Neutral and non-aligned countries can make a weighty contribution to it.

I realize that I am running somewhat ahead of developments but, still, what is your attitude to the idea of Stockholm again being the venue for a discussion of key disarmament issues?

My government has already expressed its readiness, through the Minister for Foreign Affairs Sten Andersson, to play host to the participants in the conference again should they be interested in this. It is clear that we must await the outcome of Vienna, and see if the discussion there produces a concrete result.

It is indisputable that the Stockholm conference was important, if only because it showed that when they want to, the European countries, the United States and Canada can reach agreement in such a sensitive area as disarmament and confidence measures. It was there that a sort of breakthrough in thinking

took place. Many problems can be solved if there is political will, the desire to do so and a positive contribution from neutral countries.

What do you think of the SDI programme, which has become the main obstacle in the way towards accords in Reykjavik?

SDI blocked Reykjavik. I would like to mention a proposal from the Palme Commission because, I think, it merits consideration. I would put it this way: let us sit down and calmly get to the root of the matter, what is the Soviet point of view, what is the American, what is prohibited by the ABM treaty and what is not. Thereby it will be possible to identify current differences. I hope that at the Soviet-American talks in Geneva the sides are pursuing just this course.

At the Geneva conference we are also discussing banning space weapons and have even formed a special group to deal with the problem. Unfortunately, however, we failed to advance any distance here. I think more countries could be enlisted in this effort. We probably ought to concentrate on certain specific questions such as the banning of anti-satellite weapons.

It goes without saying that from the Soviet point of view the "star wars" project is the main obstacle to accords. But I will emphasize that the proposals made in Reykjavik by both sides remain on the negotiating table.

You returned recently from Moscow where you had talks with your Soviet counterparts. What were your impressions of the visit?

It was a very constructive and useful dialogue. I was conscious of openness, in the way the talks were conducted and the frankness with which we exchanged views.

Of course, I expressed the Swedish

point of view, including that on the problem of nuclear tests. The U.S.S.R. conducted its test several days after my return from Moscow. I told my Soviet counterparts that it would be best if the U.S.S.R. refrained from testing and extended the moratorium, as otherwise public opinion, which is growing stronger not only in the United States but worldwide, might react with disappointment: we're back to square one. Moreover, the "hawks" in the United States would then have an argument: you see, they've conducted a test, so why should we not continue ours? I said all this in Moscow. My counterparts accepted some of what I said. I very much hope that the Soviet Union will resume its moratorium.

Speaking of the Geneva conference, we tried to talk the U.S. representatives into stopping tests, and convince them with the Soviet example in particular, but all our efforts came to nothing, I am sorry to say.

The Soviet Union has put forward a new proposal on medium-range missiles....

During my recent stay in Moscow I said that the question of these missiles should be taken out of the Reykjavik package because, unlike the strategic intercontinental missiles, they are not directly linked with SDI. And it is very good that the Soviet Union has taken this step. There is hope of agreement, because Reagan has also made a counter proposal. The changes that have taken place lately in Geneva can only be characterized as positive.

You spoke of the positive reaction worldwide to the Soviet proposal on medium-range missiles. But again we hear contentions that if nuclear weapons are removed from the continent, Western Europe will be at a disadvantage because the Warsaw Treaty supposedly has superiority in conventional armaments.

The main thing is that the Soviet Union is prepared to reach agreement on this problem as well. The latest studies have shown that there is indeed an imbalance in the field of conventional armaments. The extent of this imbalance is open to debate. This balance should be attained not by NATO building up its armaments, but at the lowest possible level. The important thing is, I repeat, that the USSR is prepared to discuss this problem, and reach agreement with due account taken of the West's concern in this matter.

Stockholm.

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CSO: 5200/1438

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

USSR: UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR TESTS REPORTED

Military Test 17 April

LD170212 Moscow TASS in English 0211 GMT 17 Apr 87

[Text] Moscow, 17 Apr (TASS)--The Soviet Union conducted an underground nuclear test within the range between 20 and 150 kilotons at its test site in the Semipalatinsk region at 5:05 Moscow time today.

The test was carried out with a view to perfecting military technology.

'National Economy' Tests 19 April

LD190500 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0450 GMT 19 Apr 87

[Text] [no dateline as received] TASS report--Two underground nuclear explosions with the capacity of up to 20 kilotons were conducted in the Soviet Union in Perm Oblast on 19 April 1987, at 0800 Moscow time [0400 GMT].

The explosions were performed in the interests of the national economy.

Comment by Scientist

LD201412 Moscow TASS in English 1306 GMT 20 Apr 87

[Text] Moscow April 20 TASS -- The two small-yield nuclear explosions detonated in the Soviet Union yesterday were exclusively for civilian purposes, Academician Vitaliy Goldanskiy told a TASS correspondent today.

"They have nothing in common with the nuclear tests conducted by Soviet specialists at the test site near Semipalatinsk and by Americans in Nevada.

The blasts near Perm were carried out not at a military test site, although they were underground."

Explosive devices of all sorts were used for construction of roads, mines and water reservoirs, the academician said. "They made construction much easier and cheaper."

"There is nothing new, the less so essential, when nuclear explosive devices are used for civilian purposes," Goldansky said. "They are used, as a rule, when it is necessary to blow up especially heavy rock or a large mass of rock.

Civilian nuclear explosive devices normally feature small yields. The yield of yesterday's explosions in the Perm region was, as the announcement said, less than 20 kilotons.

They were conducted underground which is the only similarity with explosions at military test sites."

Engineer on Explosions

PM201915 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 21 Apr 87 First Edition p 2

[I. Sadriyev report under the rubric "Answer Requested": "Command to the Atom"; first paragraph is SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA introduction -- quotation marks as published]

[Text] On 19 April TASS reported two underground nuclear explosions carried out in Perm Oblast. The editorial office asked N.I. Kobayakov, chief engineer of the "Permneft" Production Association, to relate the details.

"The underground nuclear explosions detonated in the north of our oblast are yet another example of the utilization of the energy of the atom for peaceful purposes. For the first time in the world such explosions have been carried out for the needs of the petroleum industry.

Previously, the extractors of the 'black gold' were aided by the energy of explosive substances. The 'slow explosion' method was employed -- the thermo-gas-chemical effect of burning powder on the oil-bearing strata. In the 11th 5-Year Plan the association obtained an additional 60,000 tonnes of oil using this method. And now the time of atomic energy is here.

The petroleum formation in one of the northern deposits at which the reacton was produced by these two explosions has a particular characteristic -- it is separated into local seams from which it is extremely difficult to extract the liquid fuel. Normally, only 20 percent of the oil can be removed from such formations. An explosion, by creating a system of fissures, unites the 'miniformations.' Subsequently the oil is forced out by pumping gas into the mixture [splay] under pressure.

Research is now in progress and the preliminary data are being collected -- which will enable us to acquire a clear idea of the efficiency of the new method. At the same time the designing of a special compressor station which will pump gas into the deposit is under way. The explosions carried out did not harm the ecology of the territory.

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CSO: 5200/1430

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

TASS REPORTS ON U.S. TESTS IN NEVADA

Delamar 18 April

LD181703 Moscow TASS in English 1646 GMT 18 Apr 87

[Text] New York April 18 TASS -- The United States conducted another nuclear test, code-named Delamar, at its test facility in Nevada today.

The ASSOCIATED PRESS news agency reported, quoting a Department of Energy official, that the yield of the device had been 20 to kilotons.

The official disclosed that the test was related to the development of new types of weapons.

The explosion was set off at a depth of 550 meters at the point of 170 kilometers north-west of Las Vegas.

ASSOCIATED PRESS recalled that it was the fourth announced nuclear test in the United States in the current year.

Presidio 23 April

LD230634 Moscow TASS in English 0632 GMT 23 Apr 87

[Text] Washington April 23 TASS -- Another underground nuclear test, codenamed "Presidio", was conducted at the testing range in Nevada.

According to wire services, the blast was staged in a vertical shaft 300 meters deep under a program for developing nuclear weapons, which is pursued by the atomic laboratory at Los Alamos.

The previous underground nuclear test explosion on April 18, which was codenamed "Delamar", was also connected with the development of new kinds of nuclear arms.

The latest blast was the fifth nuclear test announced by the United States this year.

It brings to 664 the number of tests conducted by the United States at the nuclear testing range in Nevada since 1951.

9274

CSO: 5200/1430

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

XINHUA REPORTAGE: U.S., USSR AGREE TO EXCHANGING NUCLEAR TESTS

OW181752 Beijing XINHUA in English 1743 GMT 18 Apr 87

["Superpowers To Improve Verification by Exchanging Nuclear Tests" -- XINHUA headline]

[Text] Washington, April 18 (XINHUA) -- The United States and the Soviet Union have agreed to improve each side's verification measures by conducting an underground nuclear test in the other's territory.

Improved verification measures, as demanded by the Americans, may lead to progress on limiting or banning such nuclear testing.

U.S. arms control negotiator Kenneth Adelman said a proposal for the tests was made in Moscow this week to Secretary of State George Shultz by Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and was later discussed by Soviet officials and American arms experts traveling with Shultz. Under the agreement, the Soviet Union would set off a nuclear device at the American test site in Nevada and would take measurements of the size of the blast. The Americans would do the same at a Soviet test site.

The two superpowers have long been at odds over nuclear testing. Moscow has emphasized its desire for new limits on the number and size of nuclear tests as a step toward a comprehensive test ban. Washington has stressed the importance of first improving its ability to verify Soviet compliance with the existing test limitation treaties.

The unusual Soviet suggestion was seen as a move aimed at addressing U.S. concerns on verification and has been welcomed by U.S. officials.

"It is a very positive development," said Adelman, director of [the] Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. "We've wanted better verification for six years, and they have said yes now."

Officials noted that since the exchange of nuclear tests would allow each side to calibrate its seismic monitoring systems, they could set the stage for U.S. Senate ratification of two existing test treaties -- the 1974 threshold test ban treaty and the 1976 peaceful nuclear explosions treaty. The two treaties never received Senate ratification because, the U.S. said, they lack adequate verification measures.

At the Geneva arms talks last month, the Soviets suggested the two sides lower the ceiling on the size of tests or limit the number of tests. But President Reagan directed Shultz not to discuss the suggestion during his visit to Moscow early this week until the Soviets agree to improved verification measures.

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CSO: 5200/4089

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

USSR'S PETROVSKIY ON CENTRAL EUROPE NUCLEAR-FREE CORRIDOR

LD080956 Moscow TASS in English 0954 GMT 8 Apr 87

[Text] Moscow, 8 Apr (TASS)--Talks to discuss a proposal by the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia for setting up a nuclear-free corridor in Central Europe would be of great importance for ensuring a fruitful dialogue on security problems, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Bladimir Petrovskiy told a press conference here today.

"This would be of great importance from the viewpoint of reducing military confrontation and improving the overall situation," he said.

"Regrettable, no response has as yet come from those to whom it was addressed."

A strange situation has recently emerged in international relations," Petrovskiy said. "Sometimes, a certain proposal is being put forward, is being nurtured by various people, including sober-minded representatives of the West,

This happened with the idea of the (nuclear-free) corridor that was originally advanced by Sweden. But when the proposal becomes an official proposal of the socialist nations, attempts are made to put a blind eye to it.

This reveals the relapse of the logic from the times of confrontation, when they do not even care to look at essence of the proposal."

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CSO: 5200/1430

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

COPENHAGEN: USSR OFFERS TO WITHDRAW SUBS FROM BALTIC

PM011453 Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 28 Mar 87 p 3

[RITZAUS BUREAU, AP, 'Kim' report: "Soviet Offer: "Submarines Out of the Baltic"]

[Text] The Soviet Union is prepared to withdraw its six nuclear-armed submarines from the Baltic if an agreement on a nuclear-free zone in the Nordic area is achieved, CPSU Central Committee Secretary Anatoliy Lukyanov said at a press conference in Copenhagen yesterday. The withdrawal would be "a new expression of good will," he said.

Anatoliy Lukyanov is visiting Denmark as the guest of the Social Democratic Party, and the press conference took place after he had held talks with Social Democratic Party Chairman and former Prime Minister Anker Jorgensen.

The six submarines he alluded to are old, diesel-powered Golf II submarines. In NATO circles the view is taken that the Soviet Union keeps them in operation so it can use them in a negotiating situation. They are each armed with three short-range and fairly inaccurate nuclear missiles. They were transferred from the Soviet Northern Fleet to the Baltic Fleet in 1976, probably to prevent them from being covered by the SALT agreements.

A Nordic nuclear-free zone was also a topic when Anatoliy Lukyanov met with Foreign Minister Uffe Ellemann-Jensen later yesterday. The hour-long meeting at the Foreign Ministry took place at the Soviets' request. But it gave the foreign minister the opportunity to point out that it is the government and not the Social Democratic opposition which shapes Denmark's official foreign policy.

Uffe Ellemann-Jensen used his meeting with Lukyanov to stress that under no circumstances can Denmark's membership of NATO be called into question in talks on a nuclear-free zone in the Nordic area. The foreign minister also affirmed that sea areas and adjacent territories must be included in all "realistic talks" about a nuclear-free zone.

Human rights were also discussed, and the foreign minister criticized Lukyanov for the Soviet Union's continued refusal to allow Soviet chess journalist Bladimir Pimonov, who has a Danish wife, to leave the country.

Some Danish newspapers have called Lukyanov "Mr Glasnost" and the Soviet representative clearly found the name amusing. He explained that the phenomenon of glasnost is part of a wide-reaching democratization of Soviet society.

"Glasnost means a freer existence for Soviet citizens--a feeling that the way has been cleared for initiatives," he explained.

Resistance to the policy of reform will be overcome by the Soviet people.

"They will be encouraged to combat the bureaucrats. All the floodgates will be opened up for criticism and self-criticism. Democratization is partly a tool, partly a guarantee that there will not be a backlash," Lukyanov went on.

He stressed that the "profound renewal" of life in the Soviet Union is in order to make better use of "the potential of socialism." It is not a break with "our political system."

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CSO: 5200/1430

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

SOVIET PRESS ASSAILS U.S. REFUSAL TO SIGN RAROTONGA TREATY

PRAVDA Commentary

Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 12 Feb 87 p 4

[Commentary by Yu. Shtykanov under the "International Commentary" rubric: "Washington Against Rarotonga"]

[Text] Lost in the vast Pacific Ocean, the island of Rarotonga has become widely known in connection with the treaty on a nuclear-free zone in the southern part of the Pacific Ocean. Having gone into effect in December of last year, it provides that its participants will renounce the production, acquisition and stationing of nuclear explosive devices in their territory and forbids the conducting of any nuclear blasts.

The initiative of the countries of the South Pacific Forum signing the treaty received a positive response in various parts of the planet. For it is a matter of reducing tension in one of the most militarized regions. From the very beginning, however, this evoked the obvious displeasure of Washington. A few days ago, they responded from there with an official refusal of the appeal to observe the conditions of the treaty, inasmuch as it, as they say, does not correspond to the "interests and obligations" of the United States "in the area of global security."

It will become clear what "interests" and what "security" are referred to here if one recalls that American military bases are located around the entire periphery of the Pacific Ocean. The United States views the Pacific Ocean as an "American lake." Military ships with nuclear weapons on board ply it regularly and aircraft with nuclear bombs fly over it.

A Pentagon representative declared cynically that the refusal to agree to the conditions of the treaty is explained by the "antipathy toward the spread of nuclear-free zones in general" experienced by the administration of President R. Reagan. According to the official Washington version, the growing number of proposals on regional nuclear-free zones can potentially "undermine the policy of restraint." In other words, imperialist strategists would like to have their hands free to continue the arms race and intervention in the affairs of other countries.

No matter how Washington has sabotaged international efforts to lessen tension, however, the Treaty of Rarotonga has already become a political reality in today's world. This document, declared Australian Foreign Minister William Hayden, was dictated by our striving to keep the South Pacific Ocean from being converted into an arena for a nuclear conflict. Speaking of the "profound disappointment" in connection with the step by Washington rejecting the idea of Rarotonga, David Lange, prime minister of New Zealand, the country that was the first in the region to come out against American nuclear ambitions in the Pacific Ocean and was subjected to gross blackmail for this, stressed: "We do not want to stand at the nuclear barrier."

In counterbalancing the American position, international public opinion pointed with approval to the constructive approach of the Soviet Union, which on 15 December of last year was the first of the nuclear powers to sign protocols 2 and 3 to the treaty. In this way, the USSR again proved that it is a consistent supporter of nuclear-free zones in different regions of the world.

On 10 February in Suva, the capital of Fiji, the ambassador of the PRC signed these protocols in the name of the Chinese Government. In his message, member of the State Council and Minister of Foreign Affairs Wu Xueqian expressed the confidence that the implementation of the Treaty of Rarotonga will favor peace and security in Asia and in the Pacific Ocean region.

The Treaty of Rarotonga, meeting the order of the day, must be observed. This is the demand of the people.

Far East Scholar Comments

Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 13 Feb 87 p 5

[Article by A. Krushanov, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences and first deputy chairman of the presidium of the Far East Science Center, under the rubric: "The World Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow": "The United States Against a Nuclear-Free Zone in the South Pacific"; first paragraph is SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA introduction; boxed material as indicated]

[Text] Vladivostok--C. Redman, representative of the American State Department, reported that the United States does not want to support the conditions of the treaty on a nuclear-free zone in the South Pacific Ocean (Treaty of Rarotonga). "In our opinion, he asserted, "the growing number of proposals on regional nuclear-free zones can potentially undermine the policy of restraint that has been the cornerstone of the security of the West since the time of World War II."

[Boxed material: Treaty of Rarotonga]

On 6 August 1985, on the 40th anniversary of the nuclear bombardment of Hiroshima, at the session of the states of the South Pacific Forum that took place on the island of Rarotonga (Cook Islands), a treaty on a nuclear-free zone in the South Pacific was approved. On 15 December 1986, the Soviet Union

signed protocols 2 and 3 to this treaty and thereby obligated itself to observe the status of the zone. A few days ago, the PRC signed protocols to the treaty. The United States and France refused to join in the treaty and England declared that it is studying it.]

[Boxed material: Verbatim]

"In making its decision, the United States apparently did not give sufficient consideration to the hopes of the states of the South Pacific. The treaty reflects the true, profound and long-standing concern about nuclear tests, the disposal of radioactive wastes in the ocean, and the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. The treaty is basically aimed at preserving a favorable situation in the politics and security of the South Pacific region. It reflects the resolve of the countries of the region to ensure that the South Pacific, in contrast to other parts of the world, does not become an arena for nuclear conflict."

From the declaration of Australian Foreign Minister William Hayden in connection with the refusal of the United States to join in the Treaty of Rarotonga.]

The countries of Oceania are living through a complex period. Today 10 million people live on 10,000 islands. During all of the years after World War II, they have been carrying on an unequal struggle against the great colonial powers United States, Great Britain and France. The struggle is not yet over but it has already resulted in new independent developing nations-- Western Somoa and Nauru, Tonga and the Solomon Islands, Tuvalu and the Cook Islands....

Far East experts are following the changes taking place in the region with special interest. Expeditions of the Far East Science Center of the USSR Academy of Sciences have long been investigating different zones of the Pacific Basin, including in Oceania. Links are being established with foreign scientific organizations. Far East experts have made very useful contacts with scientists from Australia and New Zealand. In 1979, scientists from Papua New Guinea, Western Somoa, Tonga and Fiji took part in the work of the 14th Pacific Ocean Conference in Khabarovsk and, in 1981 and 1984, in the work of seminars of young scientists in Nakhodka. The meetings of Soviet researchers with colleagues from Oceania show convincingly that the uniting of all progressive forces of the basin in a joint struggle for the peace and security of peoples is quite realistic.

This is why I was so pleased to learn the news of the taking effect of the treaty on a nuclear-free zone in the South Pacific Ocean (Treaty of Rarotonga). The countries of the South Pacific Forum decided to renounce the production, acquisition and stationing of any nuclear devices in their territories as well as the conducting of nuclear blasts and the burial of radioactive wastes. What can one say about the importance of this document? After all, the military departments of the United States, Great Britain and France have been using the islands of the Pacific Basin for more than four

decades for nuclear tests, the installation of military bases and the stockpiling of weapons. Here they are stationing warships and aircraft and subdivisions of marines.

Such a policy evokes the active opposition of the countries of Oceania and the legitimate indignation and alarm of millions of peaceful inhabitants. It is no accident that the idea of the unity of the peoples of the southern zone of the Pacific Ocean arose in the 1960's. The political foundation of the idea has now become even stronger.

The Soviet Government was the first among the nuclear powers to support this action. This step by our side was natural, logically flowing out of the strategic line of the Soviet state for a complete stop to the arms race on earth and for not allowing it in space. In his Vladivostok speech, M.S. Gorbachev spoke frankly and constructively of the necessity of lasting peace in the region of Asia and the Pacific Ocean. At that time, he called upon the nuclear powers to guarantee the nonnuclear status of the South Pacific Ocean on a unilateral or multilateral basis. Once again world public opinion was given the opportunity to be convinced in practice of who is who in the resolution of the key question of the day--war and peace.

In signing the protocols to the Treaty of Rarotonga, the Soviet Union confirmed once again its loyalty to its peace-loving course. I am certain that this step will help to strengthen our contacts with the countries of the South Pacific Forum and to develop mutually beneficial cooperation in the most varied areas of life. But will the nonnuclear status of the declared zone actually be guaranteed? I scanned the newspapers with impatience, waiting to see what would be the reaction of the other nuclear powers to the peaceful initiative of the Soviet Union. The People's Republic of China signed the protocols to the treaty this week. But the United States has refused to support the Treaty of Rarotonga. This is still another indication of the dangerous policy of Washington, pushing the world to the brink of the nuclear abyss.

9746

CSO: 5200/1330

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

TASS: JAPAN ALLOWS U.S. NUCLEAR SHIPS IN PORT

LD102128 Moscow TASS in English 1921 GMT 10 Apr 87

[Text] Tokyo April 10 TASS -- TASS correspondent Vladimir Kuchko reports:

A U.S. naval group dropped anchor at the Japanese port of Sasebo today in defiance of protests by people and authorities there, who demand that Tokyo and Washington meticulously comply with this country's proclaimed non-nuclear principles.

The group, which is involved in a U.S.-South Korean exercise codenamed "Team Spirit '87", includes the aircraft-carrier ranger and the nuclear-powered cruiser Long Beach which carries nuclear-capable Tomahawk cruise missiles.

The visit drew the special attention of democratic organizations in Japan, which are alarmed about the real danger of their country being drawn still more deeply into the Pentagon's nuclear strategy.

Archive documents of the U.S. State Department, which became public knowledge several days ago, testify to confidential arrangements between Tokyo and Washington, allowing the American command secretly to bring nuclear systems into this country. This includes visits by U.S. ships with nuclear weapons to Japanese ports.

The newspaper AKAHATA said today that the conservative government, while verbally renouncing the introduction of nuclear weapons into the country, had in fact been acting as an accomplice to Washington in its aggressive policy.

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NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

TASS: FURTHER ON U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN JAPAN

LD152235 Moscow TASS in English 1311 GMT 15 Apr 87

[Text] Tokyo April 15 TASS -- A secret understanding on the introduction of American nuclear weapons into Japan was sealed in a special "working memorandum" which exists in two copies kept in Washington and Tokyo. Arthur Barber, a former U.S. deputy assistant secretary of defense for international security, told the newspaper AKAHATA.

He said he had personally seen the classified document during his service at the Pentagon in the '60's.

Barber said the "working memorandum" gave U.S. nuclear-armed warships the right to use Japanese port facilities freely and also provided for possible talks on U.S. nuclear weapon deployments on Japanese territory.

He said Tokyo was well aware of the Japanese-American agreement.

That gave AKAHATA grounds for accusing Japanese authorities of deliberately misleading public opinion when claiming they had meticulously enforced a ban on the entry of nuclear arms in this country.

Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone and Foreign Minister Tadashi Kuranari said in parliament in response to a query from Mitsuhiro Kaneko, chairman of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Japan, that there were no bilateral agreements on the issue.

The government of the Liberal Democratic Party denies the secret understanding with Washington contrary to hard facts.

The press last week published a secret directive by former U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk, dated February 24, 1966, which spoke bluntly of confidential arrangements between Tokyo and Washington on the introduction of American nuclear weapons into Japan.

The authenticity of the directive was confirmed by Edwin Reischauer, at the time U.S. ambassador to Tokyo.

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CSO: 5200/1430

RELATED ISSUES

USSR COMPUTER CENTER OFFICIAL ON STUDY OF NUCLEAR CONSEQUENCES

Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 14 Feb 87 p 5

[Article by academician N. Moiseyev, deputy director of the Computer Center of the USSR Academy of Sciences: "New Thinking--Institute of Agreement"]

[Text] [Boxed material: Nikita Nikolayevich Moiseyev (born 1917) is deputy director of the Computer Center of the USSR Academy of Sciences.

The world scientific community knows him as an active adversary of war. His name is linked with the investigation of the consequences of nuclear war. A system of mathematical models making possible the study of large-scale influences on the biosphere and their consequences was worked out at his initiative and under his guidance. With the help of this system, it was clearly shown for the first time in the world that a nuclear war will result in a "nuclear night" and a "nuclear winter," in which all of humanity will perish.]

Throughout all of history, conflicts and disputes between people, countries and classes were resolved in some way or another, although they very often led to destructive wars. Now, when it has been shown that the consequence of war will be the destruction of all of humanity, it is essential to seek new ways to overcome conflicts.

Proceeding from the tasks facing mankind, we in the Computer Center of the USSR Academy of Sciences began the systematic study of conflict situations, trying to develop a theory that could combine the study of this problem with the creation of a set of mathematical tools capable of providing quantitative evaluations of the strategies of those involved in the conflict.

Why did we, mathematicians, take on this task? There are several reasons here. Above all, a common language is needed to organize collective efforts. Without it, the "Tower-of-Babel" effect cannot be avoided. Such a common language can only be the language of mathematical models. This is why we consider the creation of large-scale computing systems the sign of the times.

The theory that we are developing for the analysis of conflict situations turned out to be useful for the creation of a mechanism that could, using the term of the French economist F. Perrou, be called the "institute of agreement."

If science learns to give such formulas to politicians and creates the necessary technology for the development of compromise solutions, then this will be a step forward on the way that prevents the crossing of the Forbidden Line.

The tasks in the preservation of peace are considerably more complex than, let us say, the problem of the purity of a lake whose water is needed by several enterprises at once, whereas mankind needs its purity. But certain steps have been taken here as well and we see ways that make it possible to utilize science in what would seem to be the most critical and difficult situations and to show that "institutes of agreement" can become a reality even prior to curbing the arms race. For the interests of peoples and countries are not strictly antithetical. All of us live on the same planet and, besides our own interests, are interested in the preservation of the earth itself.

Every country has the goal of not falling into the abyss, that is, of not perishing in a nuclear war, and this is enough not only to seek but to find a mutually acceptable compromise. Relying on these considerations, we made an attempt to use mathematical methods to analyze the structure of the current conflict situation and to create an abstract mathematical model of what is called the nuclear arms race.

In using the term "abstract model," I want to stress that no specific information relating to special features of the economy, and especially the arms of one country or another, are used in the model. Only the most general characteristics of "special functions" are assumed. And precisely this permits the revelation of the most significant features inherent in the situations under consideration, features that one can easily miss when they are hidden in the forest of specific details.

Why is such an abstract model needed?

I see the basic difficulty in utilizing the existing traditional methods primarily in ambiguities, in the inertness of stereotypical thinking, and in the absence of a precise mutually understandable language. Indeed, when we read materials relating to disarmament problems, we immediately encounter those basic concepts (key words) with which military people, politicians and diplomats operate: balanced arms, provision of equal security, etc. Thanks to the fact that these terms are not defined unequivocally and cannot be formalized, each of the countries gives them the interpretation that appears to correspond best to its own goals. This engenders additional difficulties in translations.

In global problems, one cannot get along without the language of abstract models that makes it possible to give precise unequivocal definitions and to indicate the limits of permissible actions.

The basic conclusion following from the analysis of the model is that in such an extremely complex and dangerous situation a mutually advantageous compromise still exists and "institutes of agreement" can be established. And this conclusion is very important for practice. It is now necessary to proceed to more specific investigations and to know how to determine the

levels of arms acceptable for the countries involved in the arms race. The answer to this question requires substantially more detailed information and many quantitative characteristics as well as the ability to uncover existing contradictions.

The new direction of scientific investigations of global problems is, of course, taking only its first steps. But they are already impressive, inasmuch as new alternative views have become apparent on the way to the further development of civilization. Success can be ensured only when scientists of different countries are united in their striving to avert the danger.

In this joining of efforts of scientists, a tremendous role is played not only by mathematicians, geophysicists, biologists and other natural scientists but also by our humanitarian colleagues.

To ensure its own future, humanity faces a change in moral principles just as profound as that which took place at the dawn of the formation of society, when the behavioral norms in the herds of neanthropos were replaced by the foundations of human morality, when the principle "do not kill" arose.

One must remain a realist and understand that on the planet in the future as well there will be countries with different political and economic structures and with different scales of values determined by tradition, geographic conditions and, of course, the social organization. Under these conditions, agreement can be found only when there is a well-defined system of prohibitions.

"To think in a new way"--this appeal of the 27th CPSU Congress is timely in all areas of our work, not just in economic management. The new epoch of human history into which we are entering is dictating its new demands. These demands primarily involve the imperative of life. Scientists are gradually understanding them more and more profoundly and fully and the limit of what is allowable, the "forbidden line", is becoming more and more tangible. The emergence of new moral principles is impossible without a clear understanding of their necessity by all inhabitants of our spaceship! This knowledge, the knowledge of common dangers, will give rise to a feeling of a human unity on the planet. All of us must learn to feel that we are members of one family whose fate depends upon all its members. This, certainly, is the first principle of the moral imperative. And for us to be able to achieve this, we need a broad international program of enlightenment. I think that under current conditions the problem of enlightenment is beginning to take its place among the most important tasks that people are now facing.

Among these tasks, I especially single out that which is now called telematics, a symbiosis of television, space communications and computer science. Distance bridges, which are becoming more and more widespread, are an example of telematics.

In contrast to television, one of the most important means of mass information, telematics makes it possible to carry on an active discussion, to hold a discussion between people who at a given moment are in very different

parts of the planet. I think that with time, when the resources of telematics become just as inexpensive as the resources of computer technology, it will become one of the most important means of enlightenment and the mass dissemination of essential knowledge.

The combination of centralization and the independence of the means of mass information and enlightenment and the increased role of international organizations will help spread the new morality and the new thinking that must be established in the interests of the new community of people and in the interests of the preservation of the planet.

9746

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RELATED ISSUES

PRAVDA INTERVIEWS PEREZ DE CUELLAR ON 1987 UN TASKS

Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 15 Jan 87 p 4

[Interview with UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar, by PRAVDA New York correspondent V. Sukhim under the rubric: "For a Nuclear-Free World, for the Survival of Mankind": "A Goal for Each and Every One"; date, place, and occasion of interview not given]

[Text] [Question] What problems face the UN during 1987 in the area of creating a nuclear-free world and peaceful collaboration in space?

[Answer] "Beginning with the resolution passed by the General Assembly in 1947, the United Nations Organization has approved many documents calling for negotiations on questions of nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war, and also supporting bilateral efforts by the leading nuclear powers to achieve the quickest possible results in solving these problems. At the First Special Session of the UN General Assembly on Disarmament in 1978, the states comprising international society unanimously agreed that only when first-priority importance is assigned to problems of nuclear disarmament will ways open up to totally do away with these dangerous weapons within the shortest possible time. The UN must continue in the future as well to apply its efforts to realization of this most important of concepts.

The leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union have repeatedly stated that not only can there be no winners in a nuclear war, but also that one can never be waged. These declarations support the view that negotiations aimed at a considerable reduction in nuclear arsenals are not only desirable, but are also vitally necessary. Creative efforts are needed to provide consistent motion to processes which are capable of leading to the working out of concrete agreements concerning those important disarmament questions on which a coming together of positions was noted in Reykjavik.

A great number of possibilities for success are opening up before the United Nations Organization. Questions of nuclear disarmament are the central points on the agenda for the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, which presents a unique opportunity for serious negotiations. If, during the discussions which take place there, all the participating countries will be guided by the higher interests of freeing mankind from the threat of nuclear catastrophe, then

considerable progress, I am certain, can be and will be achieved in the matter of limiting nuclear armaments. Such progress would be to the benefit of both the nuclear and the non-nuclear nations.

Until that time when nuclear arms are eliminated, the UN is called upon to do more in the area of reducing the risk of their use. With the support of all the nations which comprise it, especially of the permanent members of the Security Council, the UN can be an effective instrument in settling disputes and actions, occurring in various parts of the world, which threaten to develop into a large, world conflagration. I believe that the creation of a multilateral center on nuclear danger within the framework of the UN would reduce the risk of inadvertent use of nuclear weapons or of their use by irresponsible elements.

With regard to space, the UN General Assembly has called upon all countries, particularly those which possess a powerful space potential, to actively promote the use of outer space for peaceful purposes and to take immediate steps to prevent the spread of the arms race to it. The 1967 Treaty on Space, which was born under UN auspices, forbids the stationing of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in outer space. There is now discussion of broadening international legal norms to have them prohibit the stationing in space of other kinds of weapons as well. The Conference on Disarmament is directly concerned with the development of effective agreements which also would include provisions on the demilitarization of space, and the UN Committee on the Peaceful Utilization of Outer Space is continuing its own efforts to organize broad international collaboration in space. Although progress in this activity cannot be quick because of the complexity of the problem itself, of the tensions which have built up in the world, and of existing distrust among nations, I nevertheless believe that there is increasing evidence that nations are more clearly aware of the pressing need to collaborate in questions of disarmament. Indeed, such collaboration responds both to the interests of the international world, and to the needs of world-wide development."

[Question] It is almost a year since CPSU Central Committee General Secretary M. S. Gorbachev presented a declaration, which set forth a program for eliminating nuclear weapons, for doing away with all types of weapons of mass destruction by the year 2000, with a simultaneous demilitarization of space. What influence, in your view, has this declaration had on the development of the international situation?

[Answer] "The statement by CPSU Central Committee General Secretary M. S. Gorbachev was disseminated among the UN member states and became one of the most important documents examined at the recent session of the UN General Assembly during its discussion of questions relating to disarmament and space.

Concerning nuclear disarmament and the demilitarization of outer space, then the most important event of 1986 was the summit meeting in Reykjavik, where these problems were discussed. Although, unfortunately, it turned out to be impossible to achieve specific results during this meeting, I think that the initiatives taken by the CPSU Central Committee General Secretary and the US President have stimulated the development of new thinking and have facilitated

discussion of these difficult and urgent problems within the framework of international society.

New possibilities are now opening up for continued useful work in Geneva regarding these proposals. I think that revitalized international discussion, both within the framework of the UN and also outside this organization, is capable of slowly but steadily narrowing the area of disagreements and of engendering very specific and constructive solutions. Frank discussions and the desire to participate in a serious dialogue are one of the most important conditions for creating a world free of nuclear weapons. Today, all countries have reached agreement that just such a world is their common goal."

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END