OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR-- ALBATROSS OR TWENTY-FOUR HOUR FLU ON FORCE READINESS

A MONOGRAPH
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ABSTRACT

OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR: ALBATROSS OR TWENTY FOUR HOUR FLU ON FORCE READINESS by MAJ Bradley K. Nelson, USA, 60 pages.

With the decline of the Soviet Union, the United States Army has become engaged in a multitude of operations that are different and more complex in nature from those of the Cold War. While still needing to train for full scale conventional war, the Army has the additional mission of OOTW. Since 1990, the Army has conducted 27 deployments within the peace and conflict spectrums. Can the U.S. Army continue to perform numerous OOTW missions and maintain a level of combat readiness that ensures it is capable of winning the nation's wars?

This monograph examines the effects of OOTW missions on the readiness of U.S. Army forces. Section I discusses the emerging role of the U.S. military during the Post Cold War era. The basis for this discussion is the reemergence of the United Nations in promoting stability and security in the present international environment and its influence on the United States to achieve this goal. Additionally this section examines the United States National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy to understand the future implications of both policies for the military. Section II focuses on recent U.S. Army OOTW historical experience in order to develop criteria for evaluating the effects of OOTW on the combat readiness of Army forces. Section III takes the criteria developed in the previous section and evaluates the effects of OOTW missions on U.S. Army forces and their ability to recover to a combat ready status. Section IV synthesizes the analysis from the previous sections and provides conclusions and recommendations on reducing the effects of OOTW on the readiness of active Army forces.

Conclusions from this study indicate the United States Army's combat readiness is adversely affected by the increased number of OOTW missions in the Post Cold War era. This monograph proposes recommendations that would lessen the degrading effects of OOTW missions on the readiness of U.S. Army active forces.

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PREFACE: NORTHEAST ASIA

At a little past eight on the morning of 1 July 1950, Lieutenant Colonel Brad Smith, commander of 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry reported to his division commander, Major General William Dean at Itazuke Air Base [in Japan].[1] General Dean, commander of the 24th Infantry Division, had just received word from 8th Army Headquarters that United States President Harry Truman had given his approval to send two Army divisions from Japan to Korea in response to a North Korean invasion into South Korea. General Dean's 24th Division would be the first to deploy from Japan to the Korean peninsula. Dean anticipated difficulties in deploying his forces as the 24th was scattered throughout the island of Kyusha, Japan. Although his forces were located adjacent to six separate ports, they were unable to move quickly due to the lack of ships available to transport the 24th. As LTC Smith received final instructions from his division commander, Smith's task force began loading C-54 transport planes for Pusan, South Korea. General Dean's instructions to LTC Smith were simple and brief. Smith's task force was ordered to stop the North Korean advance as far north as possible. With little else to provide to Smith, General Dean returned to the task of deploying the remaining units of the 24th to Korea. Dean knew he would be committing his division piecemeal into Korea, trying to stop the enemy advance south.

Scattered across Japan, the 24th Infantry Division resembled a constabulary force more than a combat division. As part of the Eight Army

in Japan, the primary mission was as an occupation force to bring stability to the country in the aftermath of World War II. It's secondary mission was to train.[2] Assigned a geographic sector on the island of Kyusha, Japan, the 24th performed duties in accordance with the occupation policies established by the Truman administration and the U.S. military following World War II. The [soldiers'] primary duties were to act as military police, supervise reform and provide humanitarian assistance activities.[3] While the occupation of Japan was going exceedingly well, the unit's combat skills [were] eroding.[4] The 21st Infantry regiment, one of the three infantry regiments in the 24th, had yet to conduct a live fire exercise with artillery and tank support. Serious deficiencies in training combined with personnel shortages across the division impaired the combat readiness of the 24th. From 1945 to 1949 it was not equipped and did not train for battle.[5]

At 0730 hours on July 5 [LTC Smith] spotted a column of North Korean Peoples Army (NKPA) tanks advancing south on the highway toward his position.[6] As the lead tanks came within 700 yards of the 1/21st positions, Smith ordered his men to commence firing. Recoilless-rifle and bazooka teams volley fired on the tanks, achieving minimal effects on the armored attack. To the defenders' amazement, the NKPA tanks continued down the highway almost oblivious to TF Smith. NKPA infantry soon followed and, after dismounting from trucks, quickly encircled Smith's perimeter. With little or no chance of maintaining his perimeter, Smith ordered a withdrawal

while in contact. The NPKA infantry overwhelmed the American defenders trying to escape. In a little more than a few hours, TF Smith ceased to exist as a fighting force.

The remaining battalions and regiments of the 24th Infantry Division would meet a similar fate during the first three weeks of the Korean War. General Dean's 24th Infantry Division fought a heroic yet futile battle in attempting to halt the North Korean invasion of South Korea.[7] In seventeen days of combat, the 24th had been driven back one hundred miles, Dean himself was captured, and the division had more than 2,400 men missing in action. Veterans of the division are quick to admit failure, but in truth, the poor performance of the 24th was more the result of inadequate preparation during the prewar years in Japan than of any specific lapse on the battlefield.[8] The only consolation for Dean and his 24th Division was they had allowed time for sufficient forces to arrive to avoid complete disaster on the peninsula for the United States. The price in American blood was high.

In time, they rebuilt the regiments of the 24th division and it would return to fight with distinction and honor.[9] But to a man they regretted the wasted years in Japan.[10] There were no stronger advocates of a combat–ready, peacetime army than the veterans of Task Force Smith and their comrades in the 24th division.[11]

After World War II, the United States had demobilized to conform to the desires of the American people and government policies.[12] A combination

of demobilization and international commitments had stretched the U. S. Army thin. Austere fiscal support... forced the Army to defer equipment modernization and extensive training in favor of meeting manpower costs.[13] The occupation of Japan was a big drain on Army resources in the post war years.[14] The 24th Infantry Division, one of four U.S. divisions stationed in Japan as an occupation force in the late 1940s and early 1950s, paid dearly in lives for its unpreparedness for combat in the early days of the Korean War. Government policies, international commitments, and declining resources played a significant role in this decline in combat readiness. The tactical defeats endured by the officers and men of the 24th division were rooted in the failure of the Army—and not just the divisions in Japan—to prepare itself during peacetime for battle.[15]

The United States Army is once again faced with difficult challenges in preparing its forces for the next war. The fall of the Berlin Wall and the demise of the Soviet Union have fueled the desires of the American people and their elected leaders to reevaluate the role and use of its military. Occupation duty no longer exists as a current mission for U.S. Army forces. Instead a new term, Operations Other Than War (OOTW), is used to define police and humanitarian functions performed by the military. The Clinton adminstration's National Security Strategy stresses using the U.S. military to shape the international environment in support of U.S. policy objectives. The commitment of military forces to Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia are

examples of this strategy; however, this strategy has stretched the U.S. Army's ability to accomplish the OOTW and wartime preparedness missions. Will the future provide another case study of unpreparedness by a U.S. Army unit in the next major war?

INTRODUCTION

> *The prime focus of the Army is warfighting yet, the Army's role in operations other than war is critical. FM 100-5 OPERATIONS*

Recent changes in the international security environment, led by the collapse of the Soviet Union, is redefining the role of the U.S. military.[16] The decline of the Soviet threat has refocused U.S. military planning toward major regional contingencies (MRC's) and Operations Other Than War (OOTW) missions. The U.S. military now finds itself engaged in a multitude of operations that are different and often more complex in nature from those of the Cold War period. While still needing to train for war, the military now has the additional mission of OOTW operations. In the past seven years, U.S. military forces deployed 27 times on various combat and noncombat missions.[17] Army forces have contributed 60 percent of the force participating in those deployments.[18] This increase of OOTW missions is deepening the commitment of U.S. military forces to OOTW training at the expense of combat training.

Operations Other Than War are certainly not a new phenomenon to the military and, specifically, the U.S. Army. Over its entire history, the Army has participated in operations such as disaster relief, humanitarian assistance, response to riots or insurrection, peace enforcement, military operations to restore order in foreign countries, refugee settlement, and other limited military operations referred to as OOTW.[19] What is new is the frequency and depth of OOTW missions have increased significantly for the U.S. military throughout the 1990s and is expected to continue increasing for the foreseeable future.

The U.S. Army has shouldered the heavy lifting for the U.S. military on OOTW commitments around the world and at home. Since 1990, the U.S. Army has provided 80 percent of all Department of Defense (DOD) contingency missions; in turn, these have increased by approximately 300 percent within (DOD).[20] More than 40,000 soldiers have deployed on peacekeeping and humanitarian missions in places such as Haiti, Rwanda, Somalia, and Bosnia.[21]

This increased involvement in OOTW missions, coupled with a declining force structure within the Army, has called into question the capability of the U.S. Army to meet its primary mission of fighting and winning the nation's wars. The U.S. Army is clearly caught in the middle of a dilemma; it is the service most likely to provide [OOTW forces] and be the instrument of last resort if U.S. interests are endangered and deterrence of

conflict fails.[22] Can the U.S. Army continue to perform numerous OOTW missions and maintain a level of combat readiness that ensures it is capable of winning the nation's wars?

This monograph will concentrate on the effects of OOTW missions on the combat readiness of U.S. Army forces. There is mounting evidence that the conventional combat skills are being eroded throughout the Army by a combination of downsizing, budget cuts, and widespread commitments to noncombat operations in Bosnia, the Middle East, and elsewhere.[23] This monograph will limit its focus to the OOTW aspect.

This study is organized into four sections. Section I examines the emerging role of the U.S. military during the post–Cold War era. The basis for this discussion is the reemergence of the United Nations (UN) in promoting stability and security in the present international environment, and its influence on the United States to achieve this goal. Additionally, this section examines the United States National Security Strategy (NSS) and National Military Strategy (NMS) to understand future implications of both policies for the U.S military. Section II is focused on recent U.S. Army OOTW historical experiences in order to develop criteria for evaluating the effects of OOTW on the combat readiness of Army forces. This section will examine the U.S. Army's participation in the Multinational Force Observer (MFO) mission in the Sinai, Operation Restore Hope in Somalia, and Operation Joint Endeavor in Bosnia. Section III takes the criteria developed in Section

II and evaluates the effects of OOTW missions on U.S. Army forces and their ability to recover to a combat ready status. Section IV synthesizes the analysis from the previous sections and provides conclusions and recommendations on reducing the effects of OOTW on the readiness of active Army forces.

It is essential to establish a common definition of two key terms to understand the context of the research question for this monograph before proceeding further. Operations Other Than War is defined in the 1993 version of FM 100-5 as military activities during peacetime and conflict that do not necessarily involve armed clashes between two organized forces.[24] These [activities] range from support to U.S., state, and local governments, disaster relief, nation assistance, and drug interdiction, to peacekeeping, support for insurgencies and counterinsurgencies, noncombat evacuation, and peace enforcement.[25]

The DOD terminology list defines combat readiness as: the capability of a unit, weapon system, or equipment to perform the missions or functions for which it is organized or designed for in combat operations. The Army does not have its own definition for combat readiness but does use the term force readiness instead. Force readiness, as it is defined by the Army, is the readiness of the U.S. Army within its established force structure, as measured by its ability to station and train its forces in peacetime, while

concurrently planning to call up, mobilize, prepare, deploy, employ, and sustain them in war to accomplish assigned missions.[26]

SECTION I: POST COLD WAR REALITY

UNITED NATIONS

A new chapter in the history of the United Nations has begun
UN Secretary General, Boutros-Boutros Ghali

Effective multilateral approaches are in the American national interests. By sharing the burdens with other countries—through the UN and in other ways—we can save both lives and money. The key is to give the UN tools to move in quickly to defuse tensions before they escalate.
William Jefferson Clinton, 1992

When its charter was written in 1945, the United Nations was expected to become a major force for international order and stability.[27] The Cold War prevented this from occurring as the two superpowers (U.S. & USSR) dominated and overshadowed the UN in world affairs. UN involvement was limited to special situations in which peacekeeping troops were called into monitor cease fires (in Lebannon, Syria, Jordan, Palestine, and Israel, for example) or to help preserve law and order (in the Congo, in 1960–1964, and in Cyprus, until 1974).[28] The bipolar world, split between East and West lines, essentially restricted the UN to periphery conflicts. This changed with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the bipolar world, fostering the reemergence of the UN on the world stage. This resurgence of the UN can be described by the Secretary–General from 1991–

1996 Boutros–Boutros Gahli, who saw historic opportunities to strengthen the world body. In his words,

> The new era has brought new credibility to the United Nations. Along with it has come rising expectations that the United Nations will take on larger responsibilities and a greater role in overcoming pervasive and interrelated obstacles to peace and development. Together, the international community and the UN Secretariat need to seize this opportunity to expand, adapt, and reinvigorate the work of the United Nations so that the lofty goals, as originally envisioned by the charter, can begin to be realized.

To a large degree this has occurred. Between 1988 and 1995, twenty–six peace operations were authorized and controlled by the United Nations, compared to thirteen UN operations from the end of World War II to the U.S. invasion of Panama.[29] Accounting for a portion of this increase is the acceptance and intent to expand the reach of the UN. Boutros–Ghali's "Agenda for Peace" broadens the meaning of peacekeeping to encompass humanitarian assistance, as well as peace enforcement operations, with the aim of defusing and resolving future international disputes.[30] The growing number of regional conflicts resulting from ethnic and religious rivalries have created new demands for UN peace missions.[31] The UN is accepting the new challenges in the post–Cold War era.

The United States' response to the United Nations reemergence has been mixed and often uncertain. The Bush administration initially signaled its commitment to the UN by offering U.S. training support for UN peacekeeping forces, in an effort to enhance UN capability. At the same time, President Bush ordered the training of U.S. combat, engineering, and

logistical units for future peacekeeping contingencies. The Clinton administration continued to support these initial efforts by the previous administration. The aftermath of the failed Somalia operation has, however, cast considerable uncertainty on the participation of the United States in UN peacekeeping operations. In an effort to clarify the U.S. position on UN military support, President Clinton's Presidential Decision Directive 25 set forth guidelines to guide the U.S. decision–making on participation in UN operations. This directive outlines possible U.S. military involvement in UN peacekeeping on a selective basis—when UN involvement advances U.S. and international interests. This directive slowed the trend toward U.S. involvement in UN peacekeeping operations. The absence of U.S. forces is likely to deter others from participating in UN operations, as a result.

In spite of the existing uncertainties in U.S. policy, an important lesson from Yugoslavia demonstrated that the leadership of the United States is indispensable to any collective action in the post–Cold War era,[32] regardless if it falls under a NATO or a UN–flagged peacekeeping operation. The U.S. military can frequently make the difference between success and failure for both conflict prevention and peacekeeping operations.[33]

The new international security environment generated by the post–Cold War era is likely to expand vastly the deployment of UN peacekeeping operations.[34] If the UN continues to take on a larger role in collective security in the future, the U.S. will be pressured in dedicating additional

defense resources to further UN operations. U.S. participation in such activities will undoubtedly absorb some degree of U.S. readiness and warfighting capability.

National Security Strategy

> *American leadership in the world has never been more important. If we exert our leadership abroad, we can make America safer and more prosperous—by deterring aggression, by fostering the peaceful resolution of dangerous conflicts, by opening foreign markets, by helping democratic regimes and by tackling global problems. Without our active leadership and engagement abroad, threats will foster and our opportunities will narrow.*
>
> *President William Jefferson Clinton, 1995*

The United States National Security Strategy is submitted each year by the President in accordance with Section 603 of the Goldwater–Nichols Defense Department Reorganization Act of 1986. This annual document outlines the national security strategy of the United States and serves as a blueprint for establishing the policies and objectives for diplomatic, political, economic, and military components of national power. The military component of the NSS assists in clarifying the [formulation] of military strategy, planning for contingencies, and setting of priorities among major military missions.[35] This document serves as the strategic compass for DOD and, specifically, the military, providing the basis for all potential operations.

The Cold War National Strategy of containment demanded the presence of a modern, highly trained U.S. military, maintenance of its readiness for combat, and help to friendly and allied countries around the

globe to develop stronger national defenses.[36] This was the reality of the Cold War and precluded serious consideration of other activities. This is not to say that some actions were conducted. During this period, the United States military did engage in limited, low–level political activities in regions throughout the world. These initiatives included humanitarian assistance and advisory assistance. Yet, these initiatives remained marginal in the Department of Defense (DOD) resource allocation process and the military doctrinal thinking.[37] For years, the armed services minimized these nonstandard programs and criticized them for diverting resources and undermining force readiness.[38] However, by the mid 1990s, the situation began to change considerably. DOD's past reluctance to employ military combat forces on non–combat missions is changing. The difference is a shift in the post–Cold War national security strategy.

The 1997 National Security Strategy recognizes the potential role of the military in shaping the international environment in ways that support U.S. interests. President Clinton has outlined three broad categories which help define what the U.S. national interests are and this in turn translates into the type of missions that the military can expect to perform in the future. The three categories include:

The first category includes *vital interests*—those of broad, overriding importance to the survival, safety, and vitality of the nation. The second

category includes situations where *important national interests* are at stake. The third category involves *humanitarian interests* of the United States.

The first category (vital interests) encompasses the military capability to win our nation's wars, to protect the lives and safety of Americans, to maintain the sovereignty of the United Sates and its allies, and our economic well–being. The regional threats to peace that currently exist in Korea and in the Middle East are examples of this category. This is the foundation on which our current force structure and military capabilities are based.

The second category includes important national interests that do not affect our national survival but do impact our national well being and the character of the world we live in.[39] This category includes the non combat, non–traditional missions that fall under the spectrum of OOTW. The U.S. intervention into Haiti and Bosnia serve as excellent examples of this category.

The third category entails military involvement to reduce the hardships incurred by natural or man–made disasters or extreme abuses in human rights. Humanitarian relief operations, which includes both domestic and international, fall within the OOTW context. The U.S. military's involvement to reduce the death rate in Rwanda in 1993 is a prime example of humanitarian interests requiring military involvment.

While fighting our nation's wars remains the Army's principal mission, peace–time engagement presents a new approach for the military to

assist in meeting the nation's peacetime objectives.[40] Army soldiers and units, with their rifles, tanks, and attack helicopters, are strategically relevant far beyond the combat power they represent.[41] They provide the low level influence and versatility that are key to most OOTW missions.[42] A national security strategy of engagement and enlargement demands forces for OOTW.[43] Thus, for the foreseeable future, the Army's operational missions will consist of or [include] a rapid succession of contingency operations that are neither war nor peace.[44] They will often safeguard vital national interests, but they will sometimes simply advance the goal of world peace.[45]

National Military Strategy

> *You will be called upon in many ways in this new era to keep the peace, to relieve suffering, to help teach officers from new democracies in the ways of a democratic army and still... win our wars.* — *President William Clinton's address to the West Point graduating class, 29 May 1993*

The National Military Strategy is derived from the guidance and content of the NSS. The NMS integrates the military element of national power, in conjunction with other elements, to achieve national security objectives and remain the basis for future DOD programs.[46] It outlines the strategic principals necessary to ensure readiness of U.S. forces to accomplish a wide range of missions, under a variety of situations.[47] The 1997 National Military Strategy embodies three core concepts: shape, respond, and prepare.

The shape concept envisions the U.S. military as an active player in the international arena to create conditions which are favorable to U.S. interests and world wide security. The second concept, respond, requires the military to prepare for the full spectrum of crises to safeguard national interests. The third concept, prepare, now entails taking measures to ensure military superiority to react to an uncertain future. These three concepts clearly indicate that the services have a larger focus than just warfighting, and must be capable of functioning across the full spectrum of conflict.

The NMS recognizes that future challenges to our interests will likely require use of our forces in a wider range of concurrent operations, short of major theater war. A dichotomy exists within our NMS. It fundamentally recognizes that the services must ultimately fight and win the nation's wars. On the other side, maintaining readiness for this core mission is essential; however, is it achievable, given the demands of the increasing tempo of OOTW missions? A leaner force structure and declining budgets further complicate the answer to this question. This strategy effects the U.S. Army more than any other service as the larger burden of OOTW activities fall on its shoulders.

In 1994, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General John Shalikashvili, expressed his concern over the ever–increasing emphasis by remarking, "My fear is we're becoming mesmerized by Operations Other Than War and we'll take our minds off what we're all about."[48] This is only

part of the issue that confronts the military. The [critical] issue is whether or not such operations are becoming the central focus of our military efforts and how much they may be draining the capability of our forces to accomplish missions for which they were created.[49]

The United States National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy underline the commitment of military forces responding to potential crises across the entire spectrum of military operations. This spectrum includes peace operations; humanitarian operations; and fighting and winning two major theater wars simultaneously.[50] The Army must be fully prepared for situations of war, conflict, and peace.[51] Both of these critical policy documents clearly indicate that the U.S. military can and should expect an increased role in Operations Other Than War in the future.

The greater majority of these operations center upon the control of the people and territory.[52] Thus, the Army is the most prepared service to deal with the variety of situations that can occur in a world [engulfed with instability].[53] The United Nations will continue to request and depend on the U.S. administration for substantial U.S. participation in OOTW missions (principally, peacekeeping) when U.S. commitment is essential and in the collective interest of both. OOTW missions have become a reality for the United States Army in the post–Cold War era.

SECTION II U.S. Army OOTW Historical Experience

OOTW in the Sinai: U.S. Participation in the Multinational Force Observers (MFO)

Following years of armed conflict, Egypt and Israel formally signed a Treaty of Peace in 1979. The Treaty of Peace officially terminated the undeclared hostilities between the two nations and established security measures to demarcate the disputed Sinai territories into military limited sectors. Unable to resolve the multinational force requirements outlined in the treaty, the UN Security Council failed to produce a multinational force to supervise the security arrangements established in the treaty. The United States offered a formal commitment of military forces, as an alternative, to ensure stability in this disputed region of the world. This proposal would later manifest itself into a separate protocol between Israel and Egypt, authorizing a predominantly U.S.–led multinational force to implement and supervise the security arrangements found in both the treaty and attached protocol.

Since inception of the MFO, the United States has provided the largest contingent of multinational forces to this peacekeeping operation and a significant portion of the costs. The total costs of U.S. participation in the MFO mission for fiscal year 1993 exceeded 64 million.[54] The U.S. Army has comprised the overwhelming majority of total U.S. forces to the MFO operation. Since 1982, the U.S. Army has maintained one infantry battalion

and a support battalion in the Sinai.[55] Each infantry battalion is tailored to the MFO mission and is predominantly drawn from active duty units of the XVIIIth Airborne Corps every six months.[56] This [infantry] battalion operates observation posts and checkpoints and conducts patrols in the southern sector of the Sinai, which runs along the Gulf of Aquaba, from the Sharmel–el–Sheikh to Taba.[57] The logistical support battalion, which numbers approximately 425 personnel, performs a myriad of functions in sustaining the infantry battalion during its six month peacekeeping rotation in the Sinai.

Prior to the deployment of the infantry battalion, it must first undergo extensive training focused on the MFO mission. Up to six months before deployment, units begin some preparation and training in conjunction with its normal peacetime training activities.[58] At about four months, the unit will begin focusing almost exclusively on MFO training.[59] This focus includes individual, collective, and specialized tasks that are developed specifically to support the MFO requirements. Individual tasks include peacekeeping skills and procedures; MFO rules of engagement, observation, and reporting procedures; desert operations and survival; aircraft, vehicle, and uniform recognition, and Arabic customs and language.[60] Collective training includes vehicle patrolling, outpost operations, and squad level operations.[61] Specialty training includes food handling and cooking, generator operation, and remote field sanitation operations.[62]

Upon arrival in the Sinai, orientation training is conducted, lasting approximately one week. During the execution of the actual operation, units sustain their peacekeeping skills by conducting periodic training on specific Sinai procedures, weapons qualification, and night vision techniques. U.S. forces returning from MFO duty must receive post–deployment training in individual and collective skills before returning to their normal military functions.[63] Training becomes the first criteria used in this research.

While one U.S. infantry battalion is on duty in the Sinai, another infantry battalion is removed from routine training cycle and readiness status in order to train and prepare for its deployment to the Sinai. According to DOD, this commitment of two battalions, when combined with other Army global commitments and recent downsizing, contributes to a cumulative negative impact on Army operations.[64] Each commitment imposed on the U.S. Army detracts from its ability to focus on other operations. A smaller force requires multiple activities with fewer resources.

OOTW in Somalia: Operation Restore Hope

In late November 1992, then U.S. President George Bush ordered the U.S. military,... to embark on an unprecedented mission—to militarily intervene in a sovereign state, Somalia, in order to alleviate widespread famine and starvation precipitated by a brutal, two–year war.[65] After days of open debate and discussion on the intentions of the United States, the United Nations Security Council granted its approval and authorized the U.S., along

with other UN member states, to proceed with the planned military intervention into Somalia. The U.S. Army selected the 10th Mountain Division as the main effort of Army forces and began deploying forces in December 1992. The 10th Mountain Division, along with multiple logistical units, and the 7th Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) of the I Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), would form into Joint Task Force Somalia (JTF-S).[66]

The objectives of JTF-S military operations would be to secure ports, airfields, and major humanitarian relief centers, to provide a secure environment so relief operations could proceed, and to disarm potential troublemakers only as necessary to permit relief operations.[67] In short, the intent was to assist relief operations by ensuring uninhibited movement of relief supplies over ground routes within Somalia.[68] Once this objective was achieved, the United States would hand over control of the operation to the United Nations.[69] As U.S. forces quickly established a presence in Somalia, they began to establish a secure environment for relief agencies and organizations to distribute food and medical supplies. By 4 May 1993, Operation Restore Hope ended with positive results. There was wide agreement that the U.S.–led Unified Task Force had succeeded in bringing an end to starvation and allowing near–normal conditions to resume in Somalia.[70]

The UN Security Council Resolution 814 formally transferred the responsibilities of protecting humanitarian relief deliveries from a U.S.–led force to a UN peacekeeping operation. The UN objectives expanded during this new phase of the operation to include rebuilding Somalia's economy and government. The emerging objectives included: stability operations, nation building, and disarmament, along with continued humanitarian intervention.[71] The transfer of control to the United Nations and the expanded mission proved to be disastrous for UN forces. After a Pakistani military convoy was ambushed by Somalia militia in June 1993, the U.S. Army deployed additional Special Operation forces to capture the leader of the militia (Mohammed Farah Aideed). The 3 October 1993 battle in the streets of Mogadishu between U.S. forces and Aideed's militia would result in the phased withdrawal of all U.S. forces from Somalia. Although the Somalia operation did not significantly stress the number of ground combat units within the U.S. Army, it did, however, expose a potential weakness in certain aspects of key Army support capabilities.

In Somalia, the U.S. Army faced extreme environmental conditions and a depleted infrastructure, which provided little of any basic life support for military forces. With the absence of a presidential call–up of reserve forces, the Army had to draw upon its smaller number of active support forces and reserve volunteers to meet logistical requirements for the humanitarian relief and peacekeeping mission. In some cases, nearly all of

the active duty support units for a particular support capability deployed to [Somalia during the duration of the mission].[72] Critical support assets, such as general supply companies, air terminal movement control detachments, and medium truck–POL cargo transfer companies from the active Army, deployed to Somalia to provide logistical support. This could have effected the U.S. Army's ability to respond quickly to a potential MRC without an immediate presidential call–up of the reserves.

Without a presidential call–up, Army planners are restricted to selecting active duty support forces and reserve volunteers for essential support capabilities. For some capabilities, like civil affairs and psychological operations, most of the Army capability is in the reserves, and reliance on volunteers from these personnel has not been fully successful in the past.[73] The result is OOTW missions effecting key support capabilities within the U.S Army and its ability to deploy quickly to a potential conflict. Peacekeeping operations will typically require a heavier concentration of combat support forces than is the case for combat operations.[74] Future OOTW requirements may call for additional units and stress the active support force to the point of rendering them unable to respond on short notice to an MRC.[75] The effect of OOTW on key support capabilities becomes a key issue in assessing the combat readiness of forces and thus becomes the second criteria used for this research.

OOTW in the former Yugoslavia: Operation Joint Endeavor

> *"The task of the NATO Implementation Force is to ensure freedom of movement under the terms of the Dayton agreement. We are not set up as a police force." William Perry, Secretary of Defense quoted in the Washington Post on* 1/4/96

> *"This [i.e; assisting in the civilian effort] is not mission creep. This is carrying out the mission we have started from the beginning. Which is, we would assist with the civil efforts as we had the capability and as we had the resources available, but not the interference[sic] of the military effort." William Perry, DOD News briefing on 3/26/96*

On 27 November 1995, U.S. President Bill Clinton announced the commitment of American ground troops to Bosnia for the purpose of conducting peace enforcement operations, in accordance with the recently signed Dayton Peace accords. This announcement triggered the movement of elements from the 1st Armored Division stationed in Germany to war–torn Bosnia–Herzegovina. Unlike previous OOTW missions, which required the commitment of light infantry forces in Haiti and Somalia and the ongoing commitment in the Sinai, the principal forces deployed on this operation would come from a U.S. Army heavy combat division.

In early October 1995, [1st AD] began preparation for certification and deployment as the U.S. contribution to the newly created Implementation Force (IFOR).[76] This deployment training included gunnery training, command post exercises (CPX), fire coordination exercises (FCX), and combined maneuver training (CMTC) rotations focused on peacekeeping

tasks in a series of situational exercises (STX) and field training exercises (FTX). This predeployment training for Bosnia lasted for approximately three months.

Built around elements organic to the 1st Armored Division, Task Force (TF) Eagle deployed to Bosnia with two heavy brigades, its division artillery, and one reinforced engineer brigade. Additionally, TF Eagle received an entire Corps support package to augment its own 1st AD support command. This unit included a corps support group, a military intelligence brigade, medical brigade, signal brigade, and a military police brigade. This considerable augmentation stripped the U.S. Army V Corps of its capability to conduct a potential MRC mission.

Bridging the Sava River on 31 December 1995, TF Eagle elements began immediate movement into their area of responsibility. As part of the NATO–led, multinational Implementation Force (IFOR), TF Eagle's initial missions were to separate the warring factions along a 310 kilometer line in their assigned zone, establish the zone of separation, and begin the difficult task of removing minefields. Once these missions were accomplished or near completion, in the case of the minefield removal, TF Eagle would begin enforcing the withdrawal of combatants to containment locations and supervising the movement of heavy weapons to designated storage areas.

To minimize conventional warfighting decay, TF Eagle rotated elements from its mechanized and armor units to Hungary for live fire

training as mission requirements eased in Bosnia. TF Eagle's decision to conduct combat–oriented training demonstrated that senior officers were concerned with combat readiness of the force. This effort to conduct live fire training would later enhance the 1st AD's ability to return to an appropriate level of combat readiness during its post deployment training.

The presidential decision to send additional forces to replace 1st AD units signaled the continued commitment of U.S. forces to the Bosnia peacekeeping operation. This continued commitment contradicted statements from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff quoted in *The Washington Post* as saying: "I'm absolutely convinced that America will not participate with military forces after the conclusion of this year [96]. I cannot imagine circumstances changing in such a way that we would remain in Bosnia."[77] After almost one year in the former Yugoslavia, 1st AD transferred authority to the 1st Infantry Division on 10 November 1996, which assumed responsibility for the OOTW mission. The 1st AD began its redeployment back to Germany. The 1st Infantry Division became part of the Stabilization Force (SFOR) as it began performing missions under Operation Joint Guard.

The Bosnia peace enforcement mission provides three criteria in which to evaluate the effects of OOTW on combat readiness. TF Eagle (1st AD) deployed to Bosnia for approximately 11 months before being replaced by units from the 1st Infantry Division. Redeployment of a heavy division's

combat power takes considerable time due to the high density of vehicles and equipment, combined with a limited infrastructure found in most OOTW environments. This translates into an extended time period before the combat power arrives back to its garrison locations. Operations over an extended period mandate an extensive maintenance effort to return a unit back to an acceptable operational readiness status required for a MRC deployment. Redeployment of equipment and maintenance recovery are a factor in evaluating combat readiness on a unit returning from an OOTW mission and becomes an essential criteria for this research.

Secondly, the Bosnia operation provides an example of a unit deployed for almost one year without rotation of its personnel. Upon its redeployment back to Germany, 1st AD experienced considerable personnel readiness problems. A large increase of change of commands, at battalion and company throughout the division, added to the personnel turbulence. Additionally, officers and noncommissioned officers were sent to military professional development schools in order to maintain their career progression along with their peers. Personnel readiness is another criteria which will be used in this research to evaluate the effects of OOTW on the combat readiness of the Army.

Finally, the monetary costs associated with the Bosnia operation are substantial. The costs to the American taxpayers of this operation has nearly doubled initial cost estimates and is estimated at 2.8 billion for 1996.

Extending the commitment of U.S. Army forces will continue to drain some of the Army's operation and maintenance funds and result in some decreased readiness. Budgetary effects of OOTW missions is another criteria that will be used in evaluating the effects of OOTW on the combat readiness of Army forces.

The five criteria established in this monograph for evaluating the effects of OOTW on the combat readiness of Army Forces are:

a. training, which includes the predeployment and post deployment activities of an OOTW mission;

b. key support capabilities effected by OOTW missions and their impact on combat service and combat service support forces;

c. equipment maintenance and recovery associated with OOTW missions;

d. personnel readiness effects of OOTW;

e. budget impacts of OOTW on Army forces.

Section III: The Effects of OOTW on the Combat Readiness of Army Forces

Warfighting is a perishable skill. The requisite skills necessary to kill the enemy in high intensity conflict are complex and demanding. They are skills that need to be practiced on a recurring basis in an environment that best simulates the combat environment. Training for combat must be a continuing action

House Security Committee Report, 1997

Training

The Secretary of Defense and others in DOD have stated that it is difficult to estimate the amount of time required to restore a unit's combat effectiveness across the full range of missions after a unit participates in [OOTW] operations.[78] There is information, however, that does provide considerable insight to this question as it pertains to training for Army ground forces.

According to one DOD report, the greatest impact of participating in an [OOTW mission] comes from removing a unit from its normal training cycle and its focus on METL tasks.[79] The MFO peacekeeping mission is an excellent example of unit's training cycle and wartime focus disrupted by an OOTW deployment. The training and deployment timeline for a MFO deployment requires units to focus on peacekeeping training tasks approximately four to six months before deployment. At the six month mark, units begin to initiate activities associated with the deployment. This involves primarily the staff in long range planning activities and coordination

for logistical requirements. Approximately four months before assuming the MFO mission, the training for the entire infantry battalion is focused almost exclusively on MFO requirements. The selected unit does little, if any, training that is part of their normal METL tasks during this period.

The 1st AD experienced a similar disruption in their training cycles and training focus while preparing for the Bosnia deployment. TF Eagle required three months of intensive training to prepare units for deployment on this particular mission. Training conducted included media training, establishing a zone of separation between warring factions, minefield awareness, gunnery, and joint military commission exercises. With the exception of gunnery training, these tasks are normally excluded or limited in emphasis from the 1st AD commander's standard wartime METL training plan.

The reality of OOTW missions is causing commanders to rethink their training plans. OOTW missions are requiring commanders to adjust their normal training strategies to ensure their units are fully prepared to meet OOTW mission requirements. Leaders at all levels consistently agree that a unit that is well trained in its warfighting tasks can rapidly transition from warfighting to an OOTW focus.[80] Nevertheless, there is some amount of training and preparation required before a unit can deploy on an [OOTW] operation.[81] The length of the preparation training does delay the ability of a unit to regain their combat readiness. This factor must be considered along

with the duration of the actual in–theater operation in the unit's training plan to restore combat readiness.

The increase of OOTW missions has caused units in Europe to broaden their training focus in peacetime at the expense of their combat training. The major Army combat units in Europe—the 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized) and the 1st Armored Division—have incorporated peace operations as a regular part of their collective training events because of their current involvement and likely future involvement in peace operations.[82] This will undoubtedly reduce combat readiness, to a degree, over the long term as units try to maintain a balance of proficiency between the OOTW and MRC spectrums.

The 10th Mountain Division's deployment to Somalia differs from the prior two examples in that they received less preparation training time for the OOTW deployment. Ninety percent of the units from the 10th Mountain Division deployed to Operation Restore Hope received one month or less to prepare for this operation.[83] Within this one month window, the preparation of unit equipment consumed the majority of available training time. The 10th Mountain Division maintained their traditional focus on wartime tasks longer than the units deployed to Bosnia and the MFO mission. This is one of the factors that enabled the 10th Mountain Division to have a shorter recovery timeframe in regaining a combat ready status.

Another factor that effects a return to readiness is unit training during the actual OOTW deployment. During a unit's deployment on an OOTW mission, providing quality training opportunities is one method to help reduce the deterioration of combat training skills.[84] OOTW environments, in most cases, have limited resources available for units to conduct combined arms fire training and training areas suitable for maneuver activities. In the case of the MFO, certain restrictions are imposed on the unit performing in the operation. The Treaty Of Peace discussed earlier in this monograph restricts peacekeeping forces from conducting collective live fire exercises, thus limiting units to primarily individual skill training.

In Haiti, 10th Mountain Division (L) and the 25th Infantry Division (L) rotated regularly to a sophisticated training facility constructed at a former Haitian military firing range.[85] This facility enabled units to conduct live fire training and maneuver training. Within the 25th Infantry Division, company–sized units rotated to this facility an average of three days, every three weeks. This prevented skill loss, particularly for [infantry soldiers] assigned static security missions where they could not utilize all their combat capabilities.[86]

While in–theater training facilities enable light forces to maintain some of their combat skills, these facilities developed in theater have not provided training opportunities for artillery and mechanized infantry units that participated in these OOTW missions. Armored and mechanized forces

face a greater challenge in finding suitable facilities for training in OOTW environments than light forces.[87] During the Bosnia operation, U.S. Army units established live ranges in Hungary to train platoon level gunnery skills. While adequate for gunnery, these temporary facilities are small and minimally instrumented and do not allow for meaningful maneuver training.[88] A senior commander of one of the two European–based divisions reported that "attack and defend tasks at company level have not been exercised since September 1995," and concluded that the division is not trained to standard in high intensity conflict tasks.[89]

Each OOTW mission represents its own challenges and unique conditions that effect the return of a unit to a combat ready status. The length of the mission and the types of forces involved are two critical variables in determining the amount of time required to retrain combat skills after an OOTW mission. In the MFO–Sinai example, the returning infantry battalion has not trained on its wartime METL for almost 10 months. Typically, a unit returning from the MFO will immediately go on block leave for a 30–day period. Following personnel restructuring and maintenance recovery, units are ready to begin collective training. It takes three months of intensive individual and collective training before the unit is combat ready, based on the CALL findings. According to the CALL study on the Effects of Peace Operations on Unit Readiness, units should schedule field training between three to five months after returning from the OOTW mission.[90] This

equates to a six to eight month recovery period for MFO returning units to a combat ready status.

With the Somalia and Haiti OOTW missions, combat units returned to a combat ready status within two to four months. This return to readiness is based on an infantry unit having served approximately three to four months on the OOTW mission with less than a month dedicated to preparation. Units remaining beyond that time experienced more significant combat skill degradation, according to unit commanders.[91] Combat support units and combat service support units required less training to regain readiness. Combat support units required a minimum of two weeks and a maximum of two months of training to reach full combat ready status. In the case of combat support units and combat service support units, equipment redeployment and maintenance issues were bigger variables in returning to normal readiness. Both of these variables will be discussed later in this section.

Of the ground combat forces, mechanized infantry, armored units, and units heavily equipment–dependent (artillery), face the greatest skill erosion when they participate in a OOTW mission.[92] One of the reasons is crew stability. For the U.S. Army in Europe, crew stability has been difficult to maintain due to the heavy burden of the Bosnia deployment. An Army staff analysis revealed that numerous infantrymen and tankers are working in battalion support platoons [instead of their assigned M1 tank or M2 Bradley

fighting vehicle].[93] This problem is exacerbated in unmanned or partially–manned crews, and units, which ultimately equates to a loss of effective combat power, as no Army tactical unit is designed with a redundancy of personnel.[94] Although this may be primarily a personnel issue, it does effect training.

Crews are formed in an adhoc manner as the deploying units are forced to take individuals from non–deploying units. Units stripped of personnel to support or augment deploying units are left with little to train with. The non–deploying unit simply cannot train as they would fight. This is a secondary effect created by OOTW deployments that degrades the readiness of non–deploying units. Long duration OOTW missions require up to three times the actual troop strength in theater. One unit is in the process of training for its deployment, while one is conducting the operation, as another unit recovers at home station following redeployment. Both the Sinai and Bosnia operations validate this.

General Ronald Griffith, Army Vice Chief of Staff from 1994 to 1997, stated "the 1st AD would need at least 90 to 100 days of training alone after withdrawing from Bosnia, before it could be ready for deployment on a combat operation."[95] Given the ten month deployment of TF Eagle, it could be six to nine months before this unit returns to a combat ready status after returning to home station.

The cumulative effect of OOTW on training readiness is showing across the force. The overall impact of training shortcomings are apparent when units participate in the most demanding training events at the combat training centers like the National Training Center (NTC), the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) and the Combined Training Maneuver Center (CMTC).[96] The widespread belief of trainers interviewed at the Army's premier high intensity training site, the NTC at Fort Irwin, California, is that units are arriving less prepared than they used to and are not as proficient when they complete training.[97] Many trainers have expressed the belief that the demands of OOTW have reduced both opportunities for and the quality of unit training at the home station.[98]

In a survey conducted at the Army War College in 1997, of 57 active duty officers with OOTW experience, 65% responded that participation in OOTW missions degraded combat readiness.[99] OOTW is placing an ever increasing burden on the training readiness of Army forces and their ability to maintain readiness for war.

OOTW: Effects On Key Support Capabilities

The Army's capacity for providing unique support capabilities exceed that of any other military service or nation.[100] This may appear somewhat misleading, given the fact that the majority of support capabilities are vested in the reserves and not in the active force. Access to the full range of support forces is restricted for Army planners on most OOTW missions. Without a

presidential decision to call up reserve forces, the Army has had to draw upon the smaller number of active forces and reserve volunteers to meet OOTW support requirements.[101] Only the Haiti and Bosnia operations received significant reserve support forces due to the presidential decision to exercise a selective reserve call–up.

The Army has not considered reserve volunteers adequate for many of its missions, since it [requires] entire units and could not rely on receiving entire units or even large portions of a unit.[102] When the Army planners needed a postal unit for operations in Somalia, they created a unit from available volunteers.[103] This process proved to be time consuming, taking one month to create a 49-person postal unit.[104] The nature of an OOTW mission and duration often does not simply permit adequate lead time for citizen soldiers to make necessary preparations with their families and employers.

The net effect is the active force deploying a significant portion of its support capability on OOTW missions in the absence of a presidential call–up. The Somalia operation provides an example of the effects of OOTW on selected active duty support capabilities. For example, 75% of the petroleum supply companies in the active force structure deployed to Somalia.[105] Similarly, 67% of the medium truck companies and 100% of the air terminal movement control teams deployed to Somalia.[106] Table 1-1 depicts selected Army Support units deployed to Somalia.[107]

Table 1.1: Selected Army Support Units that Experienced Heavy Deployments to Somalia

Type of Unit	Number of active units	Number deployed to Somalia	Percentage of active units deployed to Somalia
General supply company	4	5	100
Air terminal movement control detachment	1	1	100
Petroleum supply company	4	3	75
Medium truck company (petroleum)	3	2	67
Cargo transfer company	3	2	67
Light-medium truck company	10	6	60
Fire-fighting truck detachment	7	4	57
Water purification ROWPU detachment	4	2	50
Perishable Subsistence Team	2	1	50

Another factor in stressing critical support capabilities is the fact that most active units are manned and equipped at less than 100% and in most cases between 80% to 90%. This causes Army planners to task non–deploying units for additional equipment and manpower to meet OOTW mission requirements, further eroding nondeploying units' capability and readiness. Again, a secondary effect of OOTW.

In the case of the Bosnia deployment, reserve forces deployed in accordance with the Presidential Selected Reserve Call Up (PRSC) process. As the Bosnia operation continues as an open–ended commitment of forces, the legal requirements imposed by the PRSC limits the use of critical reserve units over the long term. The 270 day window becomes a matter of timing for

the use of essential reserve support forces. Continued reliance on active support forces for the Bosnia Operation is a consequence of the Army's policy of vesting the majority of support capabilities in the reserves. This will have a negative effect on readiness.

OOTW Effects: Equipment Maintenance and Recovery Operations

Equipment maintenance and post–deployment recovery operations are a critical component of combat readiness. OOTW environmental conditions tend to be often harsh and, combined with increased mission requirements incurred during the operation, result in significant equipment and vehicle degradation. An extreme example of this fact occurred to the aviation brigade of the 10th Mountain Division. Upon return from Somalia, the 10th Mountain Division's UH-60 helicopters required depot level maintenance as a result of the harsh desert environment and the extensive use of these [assets].[108]

Due to OOTW mission requirements, routine maintenance is often performed substantially less frequently than it is at home station. Additionally, scheduled services and deferred maintenance is oftened backlogged during the OOTW mission and requires the unit to play catch up at home station.

OOTW missions may not require a unit to deploy all of its modified table of organization and equipment (MTO&E). Equipment that remains at home station may deteriorate during the unit deployment due, in part, to a

lack of supervised maintenance and decreased standard useage. This further exacerbates the restoration of MTO&E back to pre–deployment combat readiness levels.

Another factor which delays the recovery process is the priority of support dedicated to the returning unit. The CALL study on unit readiness reported that the high priority dedicated to units earmarked for deployment is switched to normal priority for recovery.[109] This also contributes in delaying the recovery process.

A RAND study on Army forces for OOTW estimated that it required three months for light combat arms units to recover and four to five months for combat support and combat service units to recover from the Somalia deployment.[110] Some Somalia related maintenance problems were reported even 10 months after units returned.[111]

Another factor in recovery is the transportation time for equipment and vehicles on redeployment. Based on the same RAND study, transportation of equipment to home station took from one to six months. Some shipments took as long as eight to 18 months, due to extreme delays or outright loss.[112]

OOTW: Personnel Readiness Effects

The 1996 CALL study on the effects of peace operations on readiness points out that personnel readiness is enhanced when a deploying unit is assigned an OOTW mission.[113] This occurs primarily based on a deploying

unit receiving individual augmentees from non–deploying units and receiving priority of new personnel arriving into the parent Major Subordinate Command (MSC). Units preparing for an OOTW deployment often post–postponed changes of command to minimize leader turbulence and delay inter–unit transfers, which helps stabilize units before deploying. This same study also acknowledges that the readiness of units that do not deploy on the OOTW mission suffer some loss of personnel readiness.

The deployment of the 10th Mountain to Somalia validates this point. The U.S. Army supplemented the personnel–deficient units deploying to Somalia by borrowing from other units throughout the Army force structure. This is frequently referred to as cross leveling. Cross leveling in turn effects the ability of non–deploying elements to meet their operational responsibilities. Cross leveling occurred in Bosnia, as well, as non–deploying units backfilled deploying units. The 1st Armored Division and the 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized) backfilled each other during the first 18 months of the Bosnia Operation.

Upon return from an OOTW mission, units experience significant leader turn over as units immediately change command and a large number of officers, noncommissioned officers, and soldiers attend Army professional development schools. Recognizing that school attendance is essential for units to promote and develop subordinates, it actively seeks additional school slots. Units habitually push for a large quota of schools after a deployment.

The cumulative effect causes units to begin their collective training cycles without continuity of personnel.

Personnel readiness problems cross over into other areas which adversely effects readiness. The House Committee on National Security released a report in April 1997 on military readiness which noted the impact of undermanned units on training. The report stated, "Some combat support and combat service support units now arrive at the NTC at 50 percent strength in medic's, supply, and maintenance personnel.[114] As a result, where maintaining 90 percent operationally ready rates for equipment used to be the norm for a unit at NTC, now the average rate is between 78 and 83 percent."[115] This is not entirely due to OOTW deployments, but it is a substantial factor in this increasing problem noted at the NTC.

As during the Cold War, shortages of authorized personnel [is] still the norm throughout the Army.[116] With an active army force numbered under 495,000 instead of the 780,000 at the peak of the Cold War, the U.S. Army must now factor in OOTW commitments into the personnel equation. These personnel drains affect the training efficiency and combat readiness of units already short of personnel.

OOTW: Budget Costs and Effects

> *In recent years, countless peacekeeping, humanitarian and ongoing contingency operations have cost billions of dollars, and exacted significant opportunity costs on the U.S. Military.*
> *Floyd Spence, Chairman House Committee on National Security*

Until the 1990s, DOD did not keep a central accounting of figures on peacekeeping [OOTW] because these "incremental" costs (i.e; the amount spent on peacekeeping over that which would have been normally spent on regular salaries, routine training, equipment repairs, and replacements) were minimal.[117] This has changed in the last seven years as U.S. forces have deployed around the world to perform a wide variety of operations that force DOD to spend more than planned in DOD budgets.[118] This wide variety of missions is, in reality, a preponderance of unfunded OOTW missions effecting each service's budget. These peacekeeping, peacemaking, humantarian relief, and similiar contingency operations have cost over 15 billion dollars from 1991 to 1998.[119] The traditional method of funding the costs of OOTW missions is done by absorbing the expenditures within the existing DOD budget, first by transferring internal funds to meet incurred deployment costs. As Congress approves supplemental appropriations, DOD pays itself back for the funds it borrowed from initially. In theory, this appears to be a logical approach. In reality, it is not and is a factor in reducing readiness.

The cost of contingency funding in fiscal year (FY) 1994 provides an excellent example of OOTW missions effecting the readiness of Army forces. During FY 1994, funding for operations in Rwanda, Cuba, Haiti, and Kuwait required DOD to divert funds from planned training activities to pay for the costs incurred on these missions. This shifting of funds to pay for the ongoing OOTW missions comes directly out of each service's operations and

maintenance (O&M) accounts. The U.S. Army provided 544 million dollars during FY 1994 out of its O&M account to help pay for these operations. The delay in Congress in approving a supplemental appropriation forced the Army to cancel training exercises and delay vehicle maintenance for several divisions.[120] Eventually, Congress did approve two emergency supplemental appropriations totaling 1.5 billion dollars, however, it came too late to repair the damage to readiness. This delay, in part, accounted for three heavy divisions within the Army dropping to a C3 readiness rating. This marked the first time in 12 years that three Army divisions had been classified C3 simultaneously.[121]

The U.S. Army continued to fund OOTW deployments in FY 1995; approximately 629 million came from O&M accounts to pay for the continuing OOTW missions. Thus, the Army, along with each service, continued to absorb OOTW costs out of its normal operating funds. It is a classic example of robbing Peter to pay Paul. The problem only continues in FY 1996, as the operating tempo of OOTW missions like Bosnia divert O&M funds. The cost of the Bosnia operation in 1996 exceeded an estimated 3.3 billion dollars. The O&M cycle will continue to repeat itself as this mission and the costs associated with it continue to climb.

Until funding is approved in advance, funds needed to deploy forces on OOTW missions will require the Army to redirect programmed funds from training and maintenance accounts. The amount of the supplemental

appropriations and the timeliness of Congressional approval will continue to disrupt military budgets. The end result is impaired readiness.

Section IV: Conclusion

> *There is no question that more frequent deployments affect readiness. We are beginning to see anecdotal evidence of readiness issues in some units, particularly at the tactical level of operations. At the operational and strategic levels, however, we remain capable of conducting operations across the spectrum of conflict.*
> *General Henry H. Shelton, Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff*

OOTW missions will continue to extract readiness from Army forces in the future as these operations will continue to dominate military operations into the twenty–first century. The impact of OOTW on the readiness of Army forces must be considered over the long term and not a short–term problem. OOTW will slowly erode at the core of the Army's warfighting capabilities. Equally, the effects of OOTW on the Army's force readiness cannot be viewed in isolation. It is a significant factor in shaping the current readiness posture of the present U.S. Army and equal to the effects of the force drawdown and declining budgetary cuts.

The challenge for the U.S. Army in the future with OOTW is to conduct these operations as efficiently as possible in order to preserve critical resources for warfighting readiness. The U.S. Army can obviously afford to relax the hair trigger posture that became the norm for over 40 years during the Cold War.[122] It remains a question of achieving a balance between

maintaining the readiness to fight and winning our nation's wars, and executing the engagement and enlargement policy of the Clinton administration. The indicators of declining readiness are surfacing throughout the U.S. Army in the late 1990s. The readiness of the U.S. Army is infected with a potentially life–threatening flu. Ultimately, the next war will be the final arbitrator in determining the effects of OOTW on the preparedness of the United States Army. We may again relive the lessons from the Korean War.

VII: Recommendations

To reduce the effects of OOTW on the Army's combat readiness, the following measures should be implemented:

1. Restrict the tour lengths of OOTW deployments to a maximum of four months for each unit. Units conducting OOTW missions in excess of four to six months are more likely to experience a significant degradation of combat readiness and require extensive restoration periods than shorter deployments.

2. Army units returning from OOTW deployments need substantial support from their parent headquarters to return to a pre–deployment level of readiness. Returning units need to become the priority of effort and support until their readiness is restored. Increased attention must be directed in this area.

3. The increased use of U.S. Army reserve components on OOTW missions is paramount. Many of the recent OOTW contingencies have become sustained operations rather than short–term deployments. Army planners must phase in reserve component forces units on these missions to prevent overburdening active forces.

4. The Army needs additional force structure in critical support capabilities in the active force. General supply companies, cargo transfer units, and air terminal movement control units are essential to maintain the capability to deploy forces to OOTW missions and MRC contingencies quickly. The risk is simply too great in exhausting the present capabilities within the active force.

5. The U.S. Army must continue to develop training support packages to assist units in preparing for deployment on OOTW missions. This will ensure units receive critical pre–deployment OOTW focused training and have minimal disruption to their normal METL training cycles. The Center for Army Lessons Learned is making substantial progress in this area. In the future, units will undoubtedly need to train more effectively and efficiently for OOTW missions.

6. Funding for OOTW missions needs to be allocated upfront and coincide with the decision to deploy forces. The Army, as well as the other services, can ill–afford to drain their O&M accounts, anticipating a supplemental appropriations that may never materialize. Senior civilian and uniform

defense representatives must initiate efforts to persuade elected officials to change the current method and timing of supplemental appropriations. This is one area where readiness is needlessly degraded.

7. Providing quality in–theater training opportunities for units deployed on OOTW needs emphasis. Developing the capability to bring in training resources quickly into an OOTW environment will slow the loss of combat capabilities. Army heavy forces typically experience the biggest problems in this area.

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