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Worldwide Report

ARMS CONTROL

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18 FEBRUARY 1987

WORLDWIDE REPORT

ARMS CONTROL

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

UK: SOVIET ENVOY HOPES THATCHER CAN BREAK SDI DEADLOCK

LD091445 London PRESS ASSOCIATION in English 1401 GMT 9 Jan 87

[Article by lobby correspondent Amanda Brown]

[Text] An appeal from the Soviet Union to Mrs Thatcher to break the deadlock between the Russians and President Reagan over Star Wars, came today from the Soviet ambassador in London Mr Leonid Zamyatin.

The ambassador, in a New Year message calling for goodwill between East and West in 1987, told a London press conference that Mrs Thatcher's visit to Moscow in March would be very useful. But he added: "No one can predict how the talks will go."

Asked if he could see a way for Mrs Thatcher to break the deadlock on nuclear arms reduction talks following the Reykjavik summit Mr Zamyatin said: "We can see that these talks with Mrs Thatcher would be very useful for this aspect. We are hopeful that the forthcoming visit of the British prime minister will give a serious impetus to the development of a comprehensive cooperation between the two countries on a stable basis."

Mr Zamyatin said that if the Soviets could not get any movement on the Strategic Defence Initiative they would still try to find a solution.

"There is no other way out," he said. The ambassador said Mr Gorbachev, the Soviet leader, attached great importance to the continuation of political dialogue with Britain which began with his visit to London in December 1984.

"We hope that the forthcoming visit of the prime minister Mrs Thatcher to the Soviet Union will become the next important stage in the direct talks of the leaders of our two countries.

"The main contents of such a dialogue in the opinion of the Soviets should be a joint search for a solution of the cardinal problems of international security, limitation of the arms race and disarmament."

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CSO: 5240/033

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

SDI DISCUSSED BY ITALIAN ATLANTIC COMMITTEE IN VENICE

Rome IL TEMPO in Italian 16, 17 Dec 86

[Article by Giorgio Torchia: "The 'Shield'; a Challenge To Keep the Peace"]

[16 Dec 86 p 29]

[Text] Venice, 15 Dec--The problems posed by the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), commonly known as the "Space Shield," were discussed in Venice at the 11th seminar of the Italian Atlantic Committee.

One can summarize the conclusion of this first day of proceedings as a convergence between speakers and participants on the necessity to consider the SDI issue apart from any propaganda angle and as a basic factor in evaluating the evolution of strategic thinking, the new technological frontiers, and international political stability.

The proceedings of the CINI foundation were opened by Paolo Ungari, one of the vice presidents of the Atlantic Committee and organizer of these significant Venice sessions.

Ungari then made a statement in which he focused on two basic concepts: the first was that the zero option is an absurdity in that elimination of atomic weapons could not end the nuclear proliferation among the smaller countries, which would gain a superpower position. Second, Europe has difficulty paying attention to its defense, and this is confirmed, according to Ungari, by the fact the European Act that has been approved by our Parliament substantially evades the security problem.

Today's proceedings, enlivened by numerous statements, including that of General Capuzzo, was oriented around three main addresses: by Ambassador Marcello Guidi, assistant secretary general of NATO; his Bonn colleague Luigi Vittorio Ferraris; and the Honorable Franco Maria Malfatti. Paolo Ungari and Senator Umberto Bonaldi alternated as chairman.

Ambassador Guidi placed particular emphasis on the state of the Atlantic Alliance after Reykjavik, pointing out that NATO feels the necessity to examine the new alternatives and confirm its own strategy. In the view of the assistant secretary general, there is pressure by international public opinion toward maximum reduction of the nuclear danger.

This is undoubtedly a result of the meeting between Reagan and Gorbachev,

which, in Guidi's view, must inevitably influence future thinking on strategies and the policy commitment of the Western Alliance. This same vague prospect of denuclearization, which the speakers at the seminar judged with extreme scepticism, raises again the issue of the relationship between conventional and atomic weapons being discussed in Geneva.

In the opinion of Ambassador Guidi, SDI is "new confirmation of how the strategic balance is a constantly dynamic process," and he expressed hope that the debate underway will not produce reasons for division within the alliance. In the view of Luigi Vittorio Ferraris, it is necessary to start from a realistic evaluation of the strategic relationship. It is impossible to "disinvent" the atom, either for peaceful purposes or military, and thus with this realization one must examine the new elements that have emerged during the last 20 years, in order to derive their meanings for purposes of defining the future political and strategic scenarios. Ferraris argued: Detente, as we have known it, has been superceded, and a number of questions arise to which SDI can give an answering hypothesis.

After recalling the origin of the zero option proposed by the Europeans, in a context that was, however, very different from the present one, Ferraris maintained that detente must be replaced with the concept of stability, whose pillars are prospects for a lower level of nuclear arms of both the parties, and a better relationship between offensive and defensive armament. SDI, in a changed strategic scenario, must thus be regarded as a challenge in order to assure peace in stability in Europe. However, that will be possible only to the extent that the states of the Western side of the "old continent" are capable of assuming their responsibilities. This was a theme discussed at length by Franco Mario Malfatti, who placed emphasis on a community of destiny between Europe and Europe that must be saved from the snares and temptations of Finlandization.

In conclusion, today's day of discussion in Venice placed the issue of the "Space Shield" in the broader perspective of the future of the Alliance and of East-West relations, giving a realistic evaluation of the Strategic Defense Initiative, which represents an option that had become necessary even before a political will, evolution of strategic thinking, and the new military technologies that determine it.

[17 Dec 86 p 17]

[Text] Venice, 16 Dec--"This is not the way to defend Europe," criticized German General Guderian in the 1950's, one of the most famous protagonists of the "blitzkrieg," referring to the initiation of the first defense system by the Western part of the "old continent."

From the perspective of more than 20 years later, also under completely changed conditions, the issue remains without a satisfactory solution.

And it was Robert Close, having become a senator in Belgium after polemically concluding his career as a general by denouncing the ills of NATO, who raised it again here in Venice on the occasion of the 11th seminar of the Atlantic Committee.

It is a meeting dedicated to examination of the "Space Shield," what the experts call the Strategic Defense Initiative, but it has inevitably ended up concentrating on issues of European defense.

And also the second speaker in this day's proceedings, the Frenchman Francois Heisbourg, the next director of the London Institute of Strategic Studies, developing the theme of "broadened air defense," put the emphasis on Europe by going further into the aspects of technical cooperation to develop systems of protection and response to a Soviet threat that has much more credibility on the conventional level.

Sergio Rossi of the CISDI then returned more specifically to the discussion of SDI, while Sen Umberto Bonaldi, who replaced Paolo Ungari as chairman of this second session at the CINI Foundation, concluded the addresses by serving as exponent of the concerns regarding changes in the American strategy that might put in doubt the nuclear guarantee in defense of Europe, and produce a "sanctuarization" such that the United States would leave the "old continent" exposed to the temptation of a Soviet blow.

Yet, in Bonaldi's view, joining IDS is imposed by a series of considerations, not the least of which is to avoid staying in a backward position in the encounters of the technological race.

Robert Close, the "star" of the day, also here in Venice, again raised the themes dear to him of a defense of Europe that, in order to be credible, requires a whole series of reforms and a strategic vision of NATO that cannot be limited only to the sheltered geopolitical context of the Atlantic Pact.

Seen from this viewpoint, for Close the issue of SDI loses much of its importance.

He calls himself a heretic, showing much more reserve in regard to the American Strategic Initiative, which in his judgment, relying on a high technology process, controlled by automation and not by man, involves a number of dangers.

Then there is the prohibitive cost for the Europeans and the consideration that the Soviets, who have been working for years already in this field, will not stand by watching. According to Close the IDS is a system that is vulnerable, technologically too sophisticated, economically prohibitive, and moreover distracting from the most urgent and direct problems that concern us and are reemerging: such as, under what conditions and with what means can Europe be defended.

However, Close affirmed that joining of SDI should not be rejected, because there is technological fall-out that should not be lost.

The evaluation by the general, now become senator, of the defense of Europe was definitely discouraging. Not only in the light of the current situation, but in anticipation of the problems that loom between now and the end of the century.

Close begins from the assumption shared by all the speakers, and Cappuzzo

emphasized this aspect yesterday, that the hypothesis of conflict on our continent is of a conventional one, and not so much an atomic one.

Which prompted Heisbourg, talking about "broadened air defense," to identify a missile threat with conventional warhead that poses problems of response that are more immediate and limited to the European context.

Close identified the deficiencies in the European defense as a decline in availability of forces (the result of demographic decrease), exposure of the logistics lines and their vulnerability, the organization of the philosophy and use of combat forces, the scarcity of reserves, and the limited endurance capability.

It was a system without dynamism and that would have to be completely reexamined, making it more quick, mobile, and stripped of a whole series of illusions, among them that it would be possible to assure an adequate efficiency of communications in the first days of a war.

The Belgian strategist then analyzed the loss of credibility of the American nuclear guarantee, the negative consequences of the Reykjavik meeting, and the negative impact of Chernobyl that has brought to light another Western shortcoming: lack of preparation in the civil defense area.

The second part of Close's presentation included a full examination of the indirect war conducted by the USSR in confrontations with the West, and the interdependence between NATO and the geopolitical areas outside its scope, but which are conditioning factors for the goals of survival of our Alliance.

For his part, Heisbourg, starting from the necessity to assure a "broadened air defense," pointed out that IDS has imposed on the Europeans the search for a common technological effort, and he emphasized the little that has been done and the large amount that should be done.

Sergio Rossi identified a certain political inclination on the American side to extend the space shield to Europe, and a technical feasibility, however, he maintained that to make such a prospect achievable the Europeans would have to organically combine.

Both for purposes of the possible extension of SDI to the "old continent," more specifically to its vital strategic areas, and for the development of technologically advanced weapons systems.

In conclusion, during these 2 days in Venice the reflection about the American Strategic Defense Initiative served not so much to find a furthermore impossible answer to the state of affairs, to the problems that SDI raises, as to clarify that the defense of Europe, with and without the "Space Shield," requires a political will, an economic commitment, and a versatility and adequacy of the military instrument that are still in short supply, when not actually absent.

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CSO: 5200/2482

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

USSR MILITARY OBSERVERS IN SOFIA ON MORATORIUM, SDI 'INSANITY'

AU090934 Sofia TRUD in Bulgarian 7 Jan 87 pp 1, 4

[Correspondent Raycho Radulov report entitled "'Star Wars' -- Insanity of the 20th Century," based on a discussion held in the TRUD correspondent's office in Moscow with Colonel Vasiliy Morozov, "NOVOSTI military observer," and Colonel Vladimir Chernishev, TASS military observer -- date of discussion not given; first paragraph is newspaper's introduction]

[Text] Moscow, 6 January -- The political and military aspects of the American "Star Wars" program were the theme of the conversation held at the TRUD correspondent's office in Moscow. The subject is very topical because today the world public is commenting broadly on the answers given by Nikolay Ryzhkov, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, to questions from a TASS correspondent. These answers once again confirmed the steady and peace-loving Soviet policy. The "Star Peace" concept was once again presented as an alternative to "Star Wars." Soviet specialists Colonel Vasiliy Morozov, NOVOSTI military observer, state prize laureate and candidate of military sciences, and Colonel Vladimir Chernishev, TASS military observer and candidate of technical sciences, took part in the discussion.

[TRUD] Beginning our conversation, I would like to remind you of the rather curious tirade read by President Reagan in Folston, Maryland, soon after the first Geneva summit. On that occasion he stated that "SDI is not a subject of trade at the negotiations." How would you comment on this statement?

[Morozov] The year after the Geneva summit showed that the U.S. Administration continues to adhere tenaciously to this formula and in this spirit it instructed its delegation to the Geneva talks on nuclear and space disarmament. If we look at SDI from a purely military point of viewing, we must point out that this program aims at creating the possibility of destroying intercontinental ballistic missiles and other ballistic missiles launched from submarines along the entire length of their flight trajectory. This is the difference between SDI and the regular antimissile defense schemes.

[TRUD] What correctly preceded SDI and imposed its appearances?

[Morozov] Walter Dornberg, the former Hitlerite general who simultaneously held two positions in the United States -- advisor at the Department of Defense and Air Force consultant, can be considered the father of space-based antimissile defense. The former Hitlerite, armed with V-1 and V-2 experience, launched the idea of creating space weapons which were to include satellites with nuclear bombs, and an antimissile defense consisting of many satellites armed with missiles with small dimensions.

[Chernishev] In 1958, 10 years after his arrival in the United States, this space strategist declared that the main U.S. goal in the area of space technologies must be to conquer, occupy, and use the space between earth and the moon.

Immediately after entering the White House, President Reagan demonstrated increased interest toward the so-called space shield against Soviet ballistic missiles. A report appeared in the press that in 1983 the ultraconservative "Heritage Foundation" Organization had presented a report entitled "High Frontier" [visochinna granitsa], which proved that in order to ensure a "stable" antimissile defense it is enough to launch 432 satellites into orbit, each with 50 small-dimension missiles capable of striking Soviet intercontinental missiles during flight.

[TRUD] What conclusion can we reach from the facts presented by you?

[Morozov] Only one conclusion: The work related to creating a scientific-technical basis for a broad antimissile defense has constantly been carried out. In other words, SDI in its present form "did not fall from the sky." With many concrete directives and documents Ronald Reagan opened the road for SDI and the deceptive name "defense shield."

[Chernishev] Actually, observing the activities of Reagan's administration one can conclude that the initial stage in organizing SDI has practically been concluded. Various undertakings of this program, which were implemented later, clearly demonstrated the program's aggressive essence.

[Morozov] The Soviet position on these matters remains consistent and principle-minded as before: SDI is a new qualitative stage in the arms race. With this program Washington is striving toward military superiority in all kinds and systems of weapons and combat equipment, and in all forms of military activity.

[TRUD] The Soviet Government's declaration on stopping its unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests after the first U.S. nuclear test next year [phrase as published], was received with understanding by the entire world. The USSR moratorium was extended four times and played an exceptionally great role in international life by placing the issue of stopping the arms race on a practical plane and indeed demonstrating the possibility of adopting measures able to place effective barriers in front of this race.

[Chernishev] Unfortunately, the U.S. Administration did not respond to the Soviet appeal. It did not join the USSR peace initiatives. The United States stubbornly continues to conduct nuclear tests with the goal of achieving military superiority over the USSR by creating in principle new weapons of the third generation.

In order to implement this goal the Pentagon will have to conduct some 600 space launches within a period of 3 years, in other words, to launch a missile with a deadly payload every other day. According to THE NEW YORK TIMES, some 5,000 flights by space shuttles will be needed in order to implement the "Star Wars" program.

[TRUD] We already mentioned that SDI is a component part of the U.S. military doctrine, whose essence is to reach illusory military superiority. Would you like to comment in detail on this issue?

[Chernishev] Washington's convincingly present activities show that adding the "space shield" to its "nuclear dagger" the United States is dreaming of creating a situation in which it would be able to inflict the first strike with impunity and then defend itself with this shield against the inevitable retaliatory strike. They think that the

SDI program will thus increase their strategic aggressive potential and will allow them to strike first. However, this is only one of the "Star Wars" program's planned functions.

[Morozov] Here is the place to stress that in its essence SDI is an aggressive system. The weapons included in it must make the other side "blind, deaf, and dumb" by destroying the satellites that warn of a missile attack, as well as satellites for communications and guidance. In addition, with a radius of 4,000-5,000 km they can strike targets not only in space but also on earth and in the sea. SDI can become one of the most deadly, aggressive weapons created by man. This testifies to the fact that it really is the insanity of the 20th century. It is clear that Washington's only goal is to increase the nuclear danger, diversify its nuclear arsenals, and turn space -- and not only the planet -- into the arena of confrontation.

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CSO: 5200/1262

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

JAPAN'S WATANABE TO HEAD DELEGATION FOR TALKS ON SDI

OW020741 Tokyo KYODO in English 0726 GMT 2 Jan 87

[Text] Tokyo, Jan. 2 KYODO -- The third round of Japan-U.S. negotiations for a government-to-government agreement on Japan's participation in the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) research phase will be held in Washington in mid-January, government sources said Friday.

The Japanese mission will be headed by Makoto Watanabe, the Foreign Ministry's deputy director general of North American Affairs Bureau.

The agreement is for establishing a concrete framework which will enable private Japanese enterprises to participate in the "Star Wars" research without difficulty.

Problems concerning the right to results of research conducted by the Japanese and how that right can be utilized will be focal issues in the negotiations, the source said.

The two sides agreed in principle during two previous meetings that details of the agreement on SDI participation will be made public and no new Japanese law for ensuring military secrecy will be established, the sources said.

The Japanese Government decided in September to take part in the research phase of the space-based antimissile defense system.

The U.S. has similar agreements with Britain, West Germany, Israel and Italy, but details have not been released.

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CSO: 5260/059

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

PRC PEOPLE'S DAILY ON U.S.-EUROPEAN SPACE PROJECTS

HK210245 Beijing RENMIN RIBAO in Chinese 16 Jan 87 p 6

["Jottings" by Shan Ren [1472 0086]: "It Is Necessary To Think Hard on the Matter"]

[Text] As reported by FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE, negotiations between the United States and Western Europe on the joint project of building a U.S. space station to be launched in 1993 "have come to a very difficult position," because Western Europe has drawn back at the thought of "that mistake it made" in 1973. It was "at the Americans' request" and in response to the U.S. President's proposal that Western Europe spent \$2 billion in 1973 to build on a trial basis a manned reusable space laboratory which was finally "submitted to the Americans' control": So Western Europe wasted money on nothing but arousing complaints from the public. Drawing a lesson from this case, Western Europe has taken great care this time in negotiating with the United States about who is to operate and manage the space station. This is still another example of the complicated relations of interests and contradiction between Western Europe and the United States.

The space station is a project under the U.S. "Star Wars" program. This program, which has triggered off disputes in Western Europe, has been welcomed by many countries but has also aroused misgivings among them. The reason is because the United States is influencing Western Europe to invest its intellectual and financial resources in this program, promising to let it share some technological know-how. The crux of the issue is whether the "Star War" program will make Western Europe safer or more unsafe and how many advantages it can share from the program. Based on its experience with the United States, Western Europe realizes that the United States, as an ally, always makes a lot of promises when launching a cooperative project; but it is possible that this ally will change its mind, to the surprise of Western Europe, out of consideration of its own interests. As far as the "Star Wars" program is concerned, once the United States fails to keep its promise, Western Europe will not have its security safeguarded or get the technological benefits from its investment. It would get at most some minor benefits at the cost of the control of the project. Western Europe would then be at the end of its rope. Therefore it cannot but take great pains to figure out what action should be taken in response to the U.S. proposal.

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CSO: 5200/4053

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

PRAVDA: U.S. 'LIE' ON USSR SALT, SDI ACTIONS

PM131241 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 13 Jan 87 p 5

[V. Drobkov "Commentator's Column": "In the Quagmire"]

[Text] Pentagon assistant chief R. Perle was recently caught red-handed as they say in an attempt to accuse the USSR of "testing a new heavy missile." The lie has been exposed. But Washington seems unembarrassed.

Indeed, it would be hard to expect a different reaction. After all, if you compare all the instances of what may mildly be termed insincerity on the part of the present U.S. Administration, you cannot help concluding that for this administration the distortion of truth has become a recognized and even entirely respectable means of pursuing its policy. It seems, following the state terrorism which the United States has adopted, a kind of "state swindling" is being asserted.

You don't have to go far for examples. Let's just remember the "Irangate" scandal raging in the United States; it is emerging that representatives of the highest echelons of the administration lied to the Americans. Washington also makes extensive use of deception in international affairs. For instance, it was necessary to justify the piratical attack on Libya, thus the White House's initiative the latest story about "terrorist intrigues" flies around the world.

Particularly extensive use is made of lies to conceal militarist ambitions. The Pentagon proposed to extract additional billions for the arms race -- so official reports about "the mounting Soviet threat" poured forth as if from a horn of plenty. If later even the CIA admits that many figures in these reports were blatantly exaggerated, no matter -- it already has the money. The White House has decided to wreck the SALT II Treaty and so it is making totally unsubstantiated accusations: The USSR itself is violating the limitations! The Pentagon men are undermining the ABM treaty, and we find the same picture: Again there erupts from Washington a flood of empty allegations that Moscow long ago created its own SDI. What mountains of fables, conjectures, and falsifications the Washington hypocrites erected around Reykjavik!

We could continue the list of fables concocted in Washington's political kitchen. It is not a case of quantity. It is a matter of principle, so to speak. The fact being it is wrong to liken the leaders of the great nuclear power to Baron Muenchhausen, whose fantasies were innocent and harmless to the surrounding world. Washington's propaganda stories in a spirit of international confrontation designed to accumulate mountains of weapons are another matter. That is not the only difference. While Muenchhausen, according to his own stories, once succeeded in extracting himself and his horse from a swamp, Washington will probably not succeed, so deep is the quagmire of lies it has generated.

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

USSR: REAGAN RESORTS TO 'OUTRIGHT LYING' ON DISARMAMENT TALKS

PM141311 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 14 Jan 87 First Edition p 5

["R. Reagan's Statement" -- SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA headline]

[Text] Washington, 13 Jan (TASS) -- President Reagan held a meeting in the White House with M. Kampelman, head of the U.S. delegation to the Soviet-U.S. talks in Geneva on nuclear and space weapons, and with M. Glittman and R. Lehman, members of the U.S. delegation. They are to leave soon for Geneva, where the latest rounds of Soviet-U.S. talks is to begin on 15 January.

It is quite clear from the President's statement published after the meeting that the U.S. side does not intend to renounce its course, which aims to intensify the arms race, revise the accords reached with the Soviet Union in Reykjavik, and sabotage efforts to reach agreement on determined measures to limit nuclear weapons. He particularly stressed, among other things his determination to continue efforts toward space militarization by means of implementing the so-called "Star Wars" program, which, as is well known, pursues the aim of raising the arms race to a qualitatively new level and is the main obstacle on the road to nuclear disarmament. "It is absolutely essential that the implementation of the SDI program goes ahead as quickly as possible," he stressed.

The White House boss once again restored to disinformation and outright lying to justify his destructive position. On the one hand, he asserted that his administration "believes unwaveringly in the talks and accords great importance to achieving significant, fair, and effectively verifiable [poddayushchiyesya effektivnoy proverke] reductions in U.S. and Soviet nuclear arsenals."

On the other hand, Reagan grossly distorted the Soviet Union's position when he stated that since Reykjavik, Soviet actions in the cause of achieving advances in the field of arms control [kontrol nad vooruzheniyami] have allegedly "been in no way equitable" with U.S. efforts. He even tried to accuse the USSR of "drawing back" from accords reached at the Soviet-U.S. summit. Resorting to outright invention, the President cited as an instance of such "drawing back" the legitimate and fair demand advanced from the outset by the Soviet Union that the nuclear disarmament proposals it presented at Reykjavik be regarded as a single and indivisible package.

Having disregarded the far-reaching Soviet proposals for total nuclear disarmament by the year 2000 -- which have won broad support throughout the world and take account of the interests of all sides, including the United States -- Reagan made much of U.S. "proposals" for Geneva, which look to sharp reductions in Soviet ballistic missiles while retaining the key strike elements in the U.S. nuclear arsenal, give the "green light" to pushing ahead with work for militarizing space, and give the United States the future "right to deploy the latest defense systems."

In connection with the "Iran-contras" scandal, a good deal of material has appeared in the U.S. press recently, providing documentary evidence that the Reagan administration has widescale recourse to disinformation, forgeries, and lies in its attempts to justify its shameful policies, its trampling of international law, and the laws of the United States itself. Reagan's statement on the Geneva talks goes to show that the White House has not learned its lesson. Falsification and lies continue to remain its main means of justifying its dangerous militaristic course, which promises vast profits for a handful of military-industrial high-ups, but which is in conflict with the fundamental interests of the peoples of the world as a whole.

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CSO: 5200/1237

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

USSR ENVOY STATES 'IRANGATE' NO BARRIER TO ARMS TALKS

LD132235 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2156 GMT 13 Jan 87

[Text] Lisbon, January 13 (TANJUG) -- The "Irangate" affair is not an obstacle in the way of resuming the U.S.-Soviet dialogue on disarmament, Soviet Lisbon Ambassador Valentin Vdovin told a news conference today.

Vdovin described "Irangate" as Washington's internal affair which Reagan's administration must resolve by itself.

The Soviet ambassador stated his government's readiness for "full dialogue on disarmament", but also the regret that the "U.S. side departed considerably from what was agreed in Reykjavik".

Asked how the Soviet Union would respond to the U.S. Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI), Ambassador Vdovin indicated that the U.S.S.R. was "currently elaborating its own initiative", which is, as he set out, to be cheaper and more efficient than the SDI.

The Soviet ambassador said that "an end to foreign interference in Afghanistan was desirable" so that "a process of calming, opened by the withdrawal of six Soviet regiments, could continue".

Vdovin stated his government's support to making the Balkans and northern Europe a nuclear-free zone, the elimination of chemical weapons from central Europe and making Mediterranean and the Pacific a zone of peace, and announced the Portuguese President Mario Soares and British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher are to visit the Soviet Union this year.

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CSO: 5200/1237

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

PRAVDA: U.S. ELECTIONS MAKE ARMS STANCE CHANGE POSSIBLE

PM091511 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 8 Jan 87 First Edition p 5

[Own correspondent V. Gan dispatch: "Question Marks. Changes on Capitol Hill"]

[Text] Washington, 7 Jan -- Trucks have made it impossible for people to make their way on Capitol Hill over the last few weeks. Constantly arriving at or departing from the U.S. Congress buildings, they have held up traffic while awkwardly negotiating the nearby narrow streets. The drivers have tried to keep their tempers, knowing that a "great migration" was in process. Having lost in the November elections, the already former legislators were clearing the premises while the happy victors were filling the offices made vacant for them with their own bags and baggage.

If one were looking for political epitaphs, there is perhaps no better one to be found than the statement by House of Representatives member L. Panetta. "They've stirred the pot, but so far no one knows what the ultimate result will be," this Democrat from California said a few days ago. The 1st session of the 100th U.S. Congress, which began its work 6 January, really is an "unknown quantity," even though it would seem that the very fact that both houses of the country's supreme legislative organs are controlled by the opposition Democratic Party for the first time in the last 6 years ought to indicate a different mood.

It is probably worth recalling that from the moment the Reagan administration came to power the Republicans had a majority in the upper house, the Senate. All these years the president's personal popularity, with some help from Republican senators, made the White House the center of gravity.

The Democrats -- like many Republicans, incidentally -- have reacted sharply to the new colossal appropriations requested by the White House for the Pentagon, including funds for accelerating the "Star Wars" program and the MX first strike missile program. Questions have been raised about the government's declared intention to provide a further 100 million dollars in military aid to anti-Nicaraguan counterrevolutionaries. Demands have been heard for radical review of the administration's budget policy.

In other words, there is no doubt about the existence of the potential for a political reorientation in the United States. This does not mean, however, that it will materialize. Only time will show whether the Democratic Party will manage to rally its ranks and offer Americans constructive alternatives to the "Reagan age."

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CSO: 5200/1237

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

USSR'S KARPOV ON GENEVA TALKS RESULTS

PRAVDA Article

LD05184 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 6 Dec 86 First Edition p 5

["At the Geneva Talks" -- PRAVDA headline]

[Text] A 4-day working meeting of representatives of the Soviet and U.S. delegations within the framework of talks on nuclear and space arms came to a close here.

Head of the Soviet delegation Viktor Karpov made the following statement on its results:

The Soviet side placed at the center of the discussions at the meeting the new comprehensive proposals of the USSR that were submitted at the talks on November 7 of this year on the results of the meeting between General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Mikhail Gorbachev and President of the United States Ronald Reagan in Reykjavik.

The key importance of solving the question of strengthening the regime of the ABM treaty for attaining accords on radical reductions of nuclear arms right up to and including their total elimination was pointed out and a well-argued criticism of Washington's policy of departure from the understandings reached in the Icelandic capital was made.

The attention of the U.S. side was drawn to the extremely negative consequences that the Administration's decision to put into service the 131st B-52 strategic bomber equipped with long-range cruise missiles will have. This measure, signifying that the United States has transcended the limits imposed by the SALT II treaty, contradicts the logic of Reykjavik and creates additional obstacles at the talks.

The consultations showed that no changes had occurred in the U.S. side's approach -- it is still blocking the essential [predmetnaya] work directed at achieving mutually acceptable agreements.

The U.S. side remains opposed to any restrictions on the implementation of the SDI program which, as is known, is the chief obstacle in the way of nuclear disarmament.

It actually evaded discussing the Soviet proposals of November 7, 1986, and did nothing to overcome the differences that remain between the sides.

[Moscow TASS in English at 1811 GMT on 5 December 1986 carries an otherwise identical version of the Karpov statement which here adds the following two paragraphs:

"Instead, the American representatives reproduced their previous unilateral positions, that have nothing in common with Reykjavik, the implementation of which would instigate the arms race in all directions, including its transfer into outer space.

"The meeting was in fact additional confirmation of the fact that the U.S. is continuing the course towards departing from the platform agreed upon in the Icelandic capital, towards renouncing the mutual understanding outlined there with regard to the need for a comprehensive solution to the problem of nuclear and space arms."

From the Soviet side, the U.S. approach was assessed as an attempt to revert the talks to the situation when they were actually in an impasse -- due to the U.S. stand as well.

The representatives of the Soviet delegation pointed at the inadmissibility of the course and called on the American side to adjust its position and undertake reciprocal steps so that practical work could be started at the next round of talks in January next year on translating the positive results of Reykjavik into binding agreements.

TV Statement

LD071923 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 7 Dec 86

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] A working meeting between the representatives of the Soviet and U.S. delegations within the framework of the talks on nuclear and space arms has ended in Geneva. Our correspondent met with Comrade Karpov, leader of the USSR delegation.

[Begin Karpov recording] An obvious tendency has begun to take shape, on the part of the U.S. side, to get away from Reykjavik, to get away from the positive results which have presented the nuclear disarmament problem in a new light and which have ensured the possibility of moving fast along the path of deep reductions of nuclear arms, right up to and including elimination of the offensive strategic arms of the USSR and the United States.

It has again been confirmed that the main obstacle in the way of an accord of this kind is the U.S. side's unwillingness to limit, in any way, its so-called SDI program during the period of reductions and elimination of the strategic offensive arms. Therein lies the crux of the issue. Apart from this, the United States, departing from the Reykjavik spirit, currently does not wish to engage in serious talking on complete elimination of strategic offensive arms, and wishes to reduce the question to a narrower agreement concerning the elimination of ballistic missiles and, even better -- as transpires from the deliberations that have taken place -- generally just to talk a bit about the 50 percent reductions of strategic offensive arms, without defining in advance the future possibilities for deeper reductions. [end recording]

DIE WELT Article

DW071927 Bonn DIE WELT in German 6 Dec 86 p 5

[Article by Viktor Karpov, head of the Soviet delegation at the Geneva Arms control negotiations: "They Say Something and Mean Something Different"]

[Text] The Reykjavik results have aroused many political forces in Europe and have touched off divergent and frequently conflicting reactions.

Strangely enough, certain politicians from various European countries were so frightened at the prospect of nuclear disarmament in Europe that they protested energetically. [paragraph continues]

How else can the FRG leadership's attitude be assessed which took great pains to persuade Washington not to disarm, and even tried to convince the United States that a 50-percent reduction in offensive strategic weapons would critically jeopardize the future of NATO strategy and would threaten to undermine the security of NATO countries.

Following the visit to Washington by Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and obviously under her influence a communique was published in which a statement on the talk to liquidate offensive strategic weapons was deleted from the Reykjavik complex, leaving only a statement on their reduction.

There were also strange changes of mind regarding the problem of intermediate-range missiles in Europe. Whereas previously leading European politicians stressed that they were supporting a "zero option," in other words, they agreed to the removal of all U.S. and Soviet intermediate-range missiles in Europe, they have now made a complete about-turn. The prospect held out in Reykjavik of the liquidation of intermediate-range missiles evidently has alarmed them so much that they are inventing ever new obstacles allegedly preventing such decision. It is no coincidence that problems have been pushed to the fore that are not directly related to intermediate-range missiles.

Let us consider how serious the arguments advanced against such a solution are.

First, the Soviet nuclear disarmament program envisages the removal of all tactical nuclear weapons, the problem can be resolved, and the Soviet Union suggests a solution.

Second, the Warsaw Pact countries' Budapest proposals to which NATO still owes a response, also provide for the removal of operational-tactical systems as part of the reduction of conventional armaments.

Third, the Soviet Union has repeatedly stated, that immediately following the removal of U.S. intermediate-range missiles it would withdraw its operational-tactical weapons from the territory of the GDR and CSSR, which were deployed as a countermeasure to the deployment of U.S. Pershing II and cruise missiles in Europe.

On the other hand, it should be recalled that Britain's and France's very substantial nuclear weapons arsenals as well as U.S. nuclear systems in advanced positions will stay in Europe. They will still be there for an indefinite and possibly not even short time following the removal of Soviet and U.S. intermediate-range missiles in Europe. So there is no reason to assert that the removal of Soviet and U.S. intermediate-range missiles will make NATO defenseless.

The Soviet Union also is ready to negotiate on drastic conventional arms reductions in all of Europe -- from the Atlantic to the Urals. There are no conditions on our part, whereas NATO on various pretext avoids discussing the problem. In order to justify the sabotage of nuclear disarmament in Europe, NATO even tries to tell lies about the Warsaw Pact's alleged conventional superiority.

There are other attempts as well to discredit Reykjavik. The Soviet Union allegedly has demanded "all or nothing," because it knew in advance that the United States would make no concessions on SDI. That is absolutely not correct. The Soviet Union does not ask the United States for more than has been officially stated by the U.S. side on the highest level. [paragraph continues]

The United States' official standpoint is this: SDI is merely a research program. The Soviet Union suggest that the United States should confine itself to laboratory research and carry out no test in space for 10 years. If the statement of the U.S. President and other officials are realistic, there should be no obstacle to the acceptance of the Soviet proposal. But obviously American statemen say something and mean something entirely different. They want to have the opportunity of fully implementing the SDI program in the course of the decade in which the plan on the removal of offensive strategic weapons could be implemented.

The Europeans have no reason to be afraid of Reykjavik. Reykjavik is an initial step to a world without nuclear weapons. It allows a drastic improvement of European security and in the final analysis would preclude the outbreak of a nuclear or conventional war on the European continent.

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CSO: 5200/1237

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

USSR: U.S. 'UNRELIABLE PARTNER' AT GENEVA, DERAILING TREATIES

LD121618 Moscow TASS in English 1607 GMT 12 Jan 87

[Text] Moscow January 12 TASS -- By TASS military writer Vladimir Bogachev.

When the leader of the U.S. delegation to Geneva talks was asked in a Worldnet television interview recently if the Americans were going to bring new initiatives with them to move the negotiations on nuclear and space arms forward, Max Kampelman snapped back irritably: "Somehow, we always have to come in with new initiatives. That is not the way to have a negotiation."

It remains a hard fact that the U.S. delegation to Geneva has really been most unwilling to make a contribution of its own to mounting an active search for mutually acceptable solutions to the issues on the agenda of the talks.

This has been, however, only half of the problem hampering progress at the talks.

The principal impediment has been in that over the past year the United States in Geneva has repeatedly departed from its own positions on the more important problems of limiting and reducing arms, or, more precisely, in that each time the Soviet delegation made an initiative to draw the sides' positions closer, the U.S. delegation took a step back, renouncing its own earlier proposals.

For many years the American spokesmen were telling the world, at the top of their voices, that the United States was prepared at any moment to start fulfilling its proposal for "wiping out the whole class of intermediate-range nuclear missiles".

However, when the Soviet Union in its Reykjavik package suggested scrapping all such missiles in Europe completely and slashing their numbers elsewhere drastically, self-same Kampelman said the United States would not return to the "Zero Option".

The situation concerning the problem of destroying strategic arms has been similar.

An understanding on this issue was reached in Reykjavik and the American side even proposed cutting the time limits for eliminating "all nuclear devices" to ten years.

However, the White House explained later that "all nuclear devices" meant only ballistic missiles and then said that the scrapping of ballistic missiles too was for it just a long-term objective.

The present administration describes as its long-term objectives, as a rule, those measures to reduce the risk of outbreak of nuclear war, which it wants neither to discuss nor to adopt.

So what remains, from the U.S. standpoint, from the mandate of the talks in Geneva, which are called upon to prevent an arms race in outer space and stop the arms race on earth? Virtually nothing.

Judging by statements by U.S. Administration officials, Washington is only prepared to hold negotiations in Geneva on legalizing the deployment of American strike arms, including those powered by nuclear explosions, in outer space.

It is this approach by Washington to "deep reduction agreements", it follows from yesterday's remarks by Pentagon chief Caspar Weinberger, that the U.S. Administration regards as "tractable".

The number of arms control agreements derailed by President over the past six years has exceeded the number of such agreements signed over the same period by his predecessors Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter.

The U.S. stance at the talks in Geneva has not given any grounds so far, alas, for hoping that the present administration will endeavour to mend its reputation as an unreliable partner in agreements on limiting and reducing arms and lessening the risk of outbreak of nuclear war.

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U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

MOSCOW NEWS CONFERENCE 13 JANUARY ON GENEVA DISARMAMENT TALKS

Domestic Radio Coverage

LD132120 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1830 GMT 13 Jan 87

[Press conference for Soviet and foreign journalists on 13 January at the USSR Foreign Ministry press center devoted to the anniversary of the 15 January 1986 statement by Mikhail Sergeyivich Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, with Deputy Foreign Minister Petrovskiy; Academician Velikhov, vice president of the USSR Academy of Sciences; Academician Sagdeyev, director of the USSR Academy of Sciences Space Research Institute; Karpov, member of the Foreign Ministry Collegium and head of the Arms Limitation and Disarmament Directorate -- recorded]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] [Jackson] Jackson, TIME magazine. The Soviet side has changed its team at the Geneva talks. Is this a change in the Soviet stance, a change in Soviet strategy at the talks, please? And can one count on a corresponding change in the U.S. team at the talks?

[Petrovskiy] In this connection I would like to say that our side is approaching the next, seventh, round of the Soviet-U.S. talks on nuclear and space weapons with all seriousness and responsibility. Following the Soviet-U.S. meeting in Reykjavik, the Soviet Union did everything possible to translate those agreements outlined in the Icelandic capital into the language of specific, diplomatic accords as quickly as possible. You know that on 7 November our delegation in Geneva submitted detailed proposals that precisely reflected and in full the essence of what was achieved in Reykjavik and, moreover, these proposals also took into account the stance of the U.S. side as announced by the U.S. delegation in Geneva immediately after Reykjavik and prior to the submission of the Soviet proposals. Then, at the beginning of December, there was a working meeting of representatives of the two delegations, but, unfortunately, this meeting also -- like the preceding round -- did not create a possibility for progress along the path of businesslike and constructive discussion of the Soviet proposals and of finding a possible resolution, based on them, in all aspects of the talks. Indeed, it should be stated directly that the cause of this is unambiguous: It is the unconstructive nature of the U.S. approach, the desire of the U.S. side to move away from the results of Reykjavik and to put the talks back onto the old, pre-Reykjavik lines.

During the process of preparing for the new round of talks, we have now been proceeding from the need to make this round a turning point for solving the set tasks of giving the talks additional stimulus and even greater dynamism, and targetting them on achieving a solution that will yield results.

In this connection, the Soviet side proposed to the U.S. side on 8 January that the leadership of the delegations be raised to the level of first deputy foreign ministers. This proposal proceeded from the idea of allowing the work of the delegations to take on a more active nature, to combine in the best possible form all the possibilities opened up by both official and unofficial contacts, and to more widely open the doors for seeking and finding possible outcomes. Yesterday, the U.S. side reported the head of the U.S. delegation at these talks has been appointed adviser to the U.S. State Department and thus his status has been raised.

I am authorized to inform the correspondents present that the head of the Soviet delegation, First Deputy Foreign Minister Comrade Vorontsov, will leave to conduct the talks in Geneva. In this connection I would like to stress that we proceed from the position that the new level of the leadership of the delegations will make it possible to ensure a decisive move forward at these talks, and to achieve a position whereby the Reykjavik accords become a reality of international politics and immediate progress is begun toward a nuclear-free world.

[Andrianov] Andrianov, NOVOYE VREMYA. Viktor Pavlovich, how would you comment on the recent statements by Kampelman, head of the U.S. delegation at the talks, and also by Weinberger on the question of the forthcoming round?

[Karpov] I would put it this way: Instead of concentrating attention on giving the next round, the seventh one, of the talks a concrete and businesslike direction, the head of the U.S. delegation Ambassador Kampelman in effect undertook a worldwide hook-up on the Worldnet program on 9 January which was calculated to start a sort of unhealthy discussion about the questions of the forthcoming round of talks. This discussion was aimed at disposing people in advance to believe that this round would not lead to any positive results.

The method used here was very simple but at the same time a method which, in my view, should not be used by the leader of the U.S. delegation -- to depict the USSR's position in a false light and to depict the United States' position in a rosy light. I can say with complete responsibility that the U.S. statements that allegedly the USSR should give replies to the proposals made by the U.S. and the road to accord would then be opened -- these statements do not accord with reality. The proposals put forward by the U.S. after Reykjavik do not in any way open the road to accord. On the contrary. Let us make a simple comparison:

In Reykjavik, President Reagan was prepared to undertake the obligation not to depart from the ABM Treaty for 10 years. A week later -- or a week and a half later to be more precise -- Ambassador Kampelman in Geneva said that the U.S. side could not give such an unconditional obligation on not departing from the treaty and that it could only discuss with the Soviet side the rules for departure from the ABM Treaty. On strategic offensive weapons, in Reykjavik the President agreed to liquidate all offensive strategic weapons over a period of 10 years. At the talks, the U.S. delegation was prepared only to discuss the liquidation of ballistic missiles. On medium-range missiles, there appears a complicating element in the form of the insistent U.S. demands that the United States should have the right to deploy [razvernut] medium-range missiles on its territory in such a way that they could strike the USSR.

If one talks of nuclear tests, a question which the Soviet side raises as the essential condition for moving on to a real reduction in nuclear weapons, in this regard the absence of a constructive attitude by the U.S. is even more apparent.

[Question] Bulgarian News Agency. There has been yet another statement by U.S. Defense Secretary Weinberger that he intends also to strive to achieve a partial deployment [razvertyvaniye] of SDI. Would you please comment on this?

[Sagdeyev] I think the reply to this piece of news, a very unpleasant piece of news, is fairly unambiguous. It would be a direct violation -- and I would even say a direct violation -- of the existing treaty on limitation of antimissile defense, without any quibbles to the effect that new technology, so it goes, is posing difficult questions to the lawyers concerning interpretation of the treaty. In that case it would be a matter of making use of traditional technology -- earth-based missile interceptors, and I think this, apart from a crude violation of ABM, would mean another very important thing: It would fully disavow all the statements by the present administration, repeated statements, that the SDI program is a purely research program, and the question of installing [razmeshcheniye] can be decided only in agreement by both sides over a certain number of years.

[Unidentified speaker] There are also questions from TRYBUNA LUDU and from JUNGE WELT concerning prospects for a ban on chemical weapons.

[Petrovskiy] I think these questions are extremely timely, since we are today discussing the statement of 15 January; one of the main tasks formulated in that statement is the elimination, already this century, not only of nuclear weapons but also of chemical weapons. Precisely for this reason, the Soviet Union last year took energetic action to find a solution to the most complex problems at the multilateral talks in Geneva on banning chemical weapons. The proposals included in the development of the statement of 15 January allow us to move to accord in relation to matters of monitoring the nonproduction of chemical weapons, the destruction of stockpiles, and eradicating the production basis. Moreover, in relation to such a question -- which was fairly controversial over a long time -- as the question of inspections on request, the Soviet Union has announced its readiness to work on the basis of the proposal made in July this year by Great Britain. In a word, it is our conviction there is every real prerequisite for 1987 to become the year of concluding a convention on banning chemical weapons.

TASS Report

LD131313 Moscow TASS in English 1311 GMT 13 Jan 87

[Text] Moscow January 13 TASS -- A press conference was held here today to mark the anniversary of Mikhail Gorbachev's January 15, 1986 statement advancing an array of initiatives directed at abolishing nuclear, chemical and other weapons of mass annihilation by the turn of the century.

Only one year passed, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Petrovskiy told the press conference, but a new notion, the January 15 statement, became firmly established in the international political lexicon.

"This is not surprising. The statement rests on the system of universal human values oriented at human survival and progress of civilization in the nuclear and space age."

For the first time the new philosophy of security proved for all to be organically fused with a program, clearly scheduled in time, for concrete nuclear disarmament measures under strict control and with simultaneous reduction of all armaments to a level of reasonable sufficiency.

Such a qualitatively new approach was suggested by a state possessing a big potential, specifically in the nuclear and space fields.

The proposals put forward in Moscow not only embody the ideals of socialism but also incorporate mankind's humanistic dream of a world without nuclear weapons and violence, concrete ideas and considerations of different countries irrespective of their political and ideological orientation.

The world, which is brimful of arms, has been offered a real prospect of delivering itself the deadly burden, uprooting militarism from the thinking and practical actions of countries, and renouncing the "enemy image" in their relations. Neoglobalism is being counterpoised by a comprehensive system of reliable security and the right-is-might political mentality and ego-centricity by realism and a sense of responsibility in international affairs.

For the Soviet Union, the January 15 statement has marked the point of departure for practical activities in all avenues of limiting arms and promoting disarmament, first of all in the most important area -- that of nuclear and space weapons.

Mikhail Gorbachev's recent message to U.N. Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar has encapsulated all proposals the Soviet Union has made at international forums and put on the table at bilateral and multilateral talks.

The Soviet-American summit in Reykjavik, at which the Soviet Union made a package of proposals, graphically illustrated that agreement on the abolition of nuclear weapons is practicable already today and not in some distant future.

Seeking cooperation with all states, the Soviet Union is ready to support any constructive proposals wherever they come from.

Although the past year failed to break the succession of years gripped by the accelerating arms race, it saw the emergence of new political thinking into practical fields.

Reykjavik, Stockholm, Vienna, New Delhi and Harare are not merely geographic points. They are landmarks in the assertion of a new mode of thinking and actions of states.

The Soviet Union is resolved to continue international dialogue and to look for new and fresh approaches.

We are entering now a period of talks. Multilateral talks opened in Geneva on January 12 on a ban on chemical weapons, on January 15 a new round of Soviet-American talks on nuclear space weapons is due to open, on January 22 -- talks of experts on an end to nuclear tests, on January 27 -- the Vienna meeting of representatives of the states-participants in the conference on European security and cooperation, and on January 29 -- a new round of Vienna talks on a force and arms cuts in central Europe. We are also looking forward to NATO's explicit reply to the Budapest proposal of the Warsaw Treaty member countries on a comprehensive and far-reaching cut in armed forces and conventional weapons in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals.

In face of a nuclear threat, talks can no longer be like an exercise in rhetoric. They should be effective and produce results.

This fast-moving nuclear age dictates its law. While giving a minimum of time, it requires a maximum mobilization of human mind and will to prevent an all-destructive catastrophe, to ensure an improvement in the international situation and create the fundamentals of all-embracing security equal to all.

TANJUG Report

LD132058 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1839 GMT 13 Jan 87

[Text] Moscow, January 13 (TANJUG) -- The Soviet Union did not propose a new Gorbachev-Reagan meeting, Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Petrovskiy said in Moscow today.

Petrovskiy said, however, that the Soviet Union is in favor of a summit if it were to produce concrete, positive results. At this moment, the possibilities opened at the Reykjavik summit should be implemented, Petrovskiy said. If the U.S. has the same stand, the scheduling of the summit will not pose a problem.

Petrovskiy also said that the Soviet Government has (?decided) that First Deputy Foreign Minister Yuriy Vorontsov head the Soviet delegation at the seventh round of talks on nuclear and space weapons in Geneva. The decision to upgrade the leadership of the Soviet team is explained by the desire to make the round of talks more efficient and effective.

Petrovskiy reiterated that the package of Soviet proposals in Reykjavik remains whole, and that it cannot be divided since it would lose meaning.

In other words, the new Soviet negotiating team at the Geneva talks will also insist on the four well-known aspects of the problem of disarmament, which General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Mikhail Gorbachev presented at his meeting with U.S. President Ronald Reagan in Reykjavik. The four aspects are the complex solution to the problem of strategic missiles, medium-range missiles, a moratorium on nuclear tests, and anti-missile defense systems.

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CSO: 5200/1237

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

MOSCOW COMMENTARY ON POSSIBLE PROGRESS IN ARMS TALKS

LD151239 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0350 GMT 15 Jan 87

[Viktor Levin commentary]

[Text] The next round -- the seventh -- of Soviet-American negotiations on nuclear and space weapons -- abbreviated as NSW -- opens in Geneva today. What does the Soviet Union expect of this round? Over to our commentator Viktor Levin:

[Levin] The plane which was to deliver the Soviet delegation to Geneva could not land there -- snow drifts covered the runway. They had to land in Zurich and make their way by train. That small incident did not prevent the Soviet delegation from arriving at the place of the negotiations in good time -- they had time to spare. In principle we are ready for the unexpected. We would like very much if such surprises related to weather rather than the zigzags of American policies.

So far the Geneva negotiations have not come up to expectations. It had seemed that after Reykjavik things should decidedly gone well, but the American delegation, instead of basing itself on the foundation of the Reykjavik accords, set a course for revising these, for moving away from them. The sixth round of the negotiations, of which much was expected, ended in nothing. Nor did the interim meeting in December bring any results. Another blind alley, just as prior to the Soviet-American summit meeting in the Icelandic capital? The Soviet Union is not losing hope. We are optimists and I think even in the incidental fact that the new round of negotiations begins precisely on 15 January, on the anniversary of the statement by Comrade Gorbachev, CPSU Central Committee general secretary, on proposal for total elimination of nuclear weapons by the end of the present century, even in this coincidence one can see a good omen. After all, the statement of 15 January last year is the essence of our country's foreign-policy aspirations. It is a concrete and realistic proposal -- and after Reykjavik this can be said with confidence -- for eliminating the threat of nuclear catastrophe. That is what is being discussed, or more precisely -- what should be discussed, at the Geneva negotiations.

Now the Soviet Union is striving to make the new round a turning point in the business of solving the set problems and to give a new stimulus to the negotiations. In particular, to this end we have proposed to the American side to raise the status of the leadership of the delegations. What this means requires no explanation. That the United States responded to our proposal inspires certain hope. The head of the American delegation has been raised to the status of the President's personal representative and department of state counsellor. Our delegation is now led by a first deputy foreign affairs minister. The main things depend, of course, on the baggage with which the delegations begin the negotiations. We want to go along the path of implementing the accords reached in Reykjavik. If the American delegation returns to what had been agreed between the CPSU Central Committee general secretary and the President of the United States, that is if it takes the position of the head of its own state, and overcomes the obstructions created in the United States after Reykjavik -- and these are much more serious than heavy snowfalls in Geneva -- if it does that, I think success could be achieved.

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CSO: 5200/1237

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

USSR MARKS ANNIVERSARY OF GORBACHEV DISARMAMENT STATEMENT

IZVESTIYA, SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA Reports

PM141335 [Editorial Report] Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 14 January 1987 Morning Edition carries on page 5 under the general headline "Year of Peace" a full-page feature marking the first anniversary of M.S. Gorbachev's 15 January 1986 statement on nuclear disarmament. The feature includes two chronicles of actions by the Soviet Union and the United States in 1986, contrasting the Soviet actions for disarmament with U.S. efforts to improve its weaponry, and a 2,000-word article entitled "Path to Mankind's Survival" by Gennadiy Gerasimov, who discusses and dismisses the arguments put forward in defense of the retention of nuclear weapons. He notes the case for the nuclear deterrent is based on a hypothesis "whose correctness its authors cannot prove." In theory, Gerasimov notes, the "hostile intentions" attributed by the West to the East are possible but are "in fact improbable" "unless you are paranoid." Gerasimov emphasizes the risk of relying on nuclear deterrence and the consequences of using nuclear weapons, in particular the notion of "nuclear winter" which he sees as the modern equivalent of the "doomsday machine." Gerasimov views nuclear weapons as "weapons of suicide" and argues that Gorbachev's 15 January statement "synchronizes thought and action" in the age of nuclear weapons, when "political thinking is lagging behind life."

The feature also includes an item headlined "Nonnuclear Status for the Whole World" consisting of short items from three leaders of nuclear-free zone local authorities in Japan, the FRG, and Britain, and an item under the general heading "We Believe in Common Sense" in which Eugene La Rocque, director of the Center for Defense Information, Professor Marini-Bettolo of Rome University, and Darbara Singh, Indian member of parliament and "prominent figure" in the Indian National Congress (I) Party, praise Gorbachev's statement.

Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 14 January 1987 First Edition front-pages a 2,000-word article entitled "Stepping Back from the Nuclear Abyss" by Aleksandr Mozgovoy. The article is carried under the "Our Dialogue" rubric and contrasts the U.S. and USSR attitudes to arms reduction and disarmament in the year since Gorbachev's statement of 15 January 1986, asking "Why, indeed, does the U.S. Administration oppose common sense?" Mozgovoy sees the first anniversary of Gorbachev's statement "not as a jubilee but as the first step of the ascent toward a nuclear-free world. This path is difficult and tricky. But we have the will to move determinedly along it."

Gerasimov on Disarmament Obstacles

LD160004 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 15 Jan 87

[From the "Vremya" newscast; Video talk by Gennadiy Gerasimov]

[Text] Hello comrades! A year ago Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev made a statement. Now 15 January is already a historical date -- the date of the birth of hope for mankind of ridding itself of nuclear weapons. Today foreign journalists in Moscow asked again, several times: Is anything else expected? After 15 January there has already been a great deal of anything else. There was the meeting with the U.S. President in Reykjavik, there was the Delhi declaration on the principles of a nuclear-free and nonviolent world, and there were other initiatives: Soviet ones, and those with the Warsaw Pact countries. Now, the first anniversary of the statement has given people of goodwill in many countries the opportunity to speak once again in support of the Soviet plan for ridding humanity of the nuclear threat.

True, many say -- and maybe they are not even being disingenuous, but sincere -- nuclear weapons will be with us always. Can one disinvent what has already been invented, and force the nuclear genie back into the bottle? Yes, the idea of such, of eliminating nuclear weapons is good, but it isn't realistic. Here, for example, former U.S. Defense Secretary Robert McNamara welcomes, as he puts it, Gorbachev's outlook. McNamara goes on to say this perspective, of course, is desirable, but is not realistic, because there are obstacles: the lack of trust and the possibility of deception. Of course, at the moment there is a lack of trust, but after all, if we begin a process of disarmament, the lack will certainly decrease, while trust will grow. With regard to the problem of monitoring [kontroll], is it more complex than, let's say, the creation [sozdaniye] of a nuclear-triggered X-ray laser? It is natural if those responses and talents which are now creating [sozdayut] this laser were to be turned towards monitoring [kontroll], then the problem would be solved. Regarding the fact that weapons cannot be disinvented, here one needs to find one's position.

Nuclear weapons are no longer weapons, they are means of suicide. In the far-removed days of Hiroshima, it is possible they may have played a military role, but now nuclear weapons are not weapons, but a highly-productive universal crematorium. Nuclear weapons are the latest epidemic, against which the whole world should speak out, like against the plague, smallpox, and other forms of wholesale death.

Political thinking here lags behind everyday events, and one should hurry to synchronize them. Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's statement, made a year ago, indeed synchronizes the thought and the deed, and we invite other countries in the world and peoples to unite for the sake of the interests common to all of humanity and jointly to protect our planet.

PRAVDA Editorial

PM151443 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 15 Jan 87 First Edition p 1

[Editorial: "The Path to the 21st Century. The Soviet Program for a Nuclear-Free World"]

[Text] One year ago -- 15 January 1986 -- the statement by CPSU Central Committee M.S. Gorbachev was promulgated. It contained a program for the establishment of a nuclear-free world before the end of the present century and the elimination of all types of mass destruction weapons, including chemical weapons.

This bold, historic initiative opened up a new chapter in the struggle to eliminate the threat of a nuclear catastrophe, the struggle for mankind's survival. Never before had such a concrete program, majestic in scale and noble of purpose, been put forward for examination by governments and for the judgment of the peoples. At the same time, the novelty was that it directly challenged the routine philosophy which views the world as if in a broken mirror and which advocates the "big stick" principle in international relations.

Imperialism, American above all, is obstinately clinging to a policy that has run its course. The poverty of the old political thinking manifests itself in relation to a whole range of most acute international problems. They are the arms race and the desire to spread it to space, the creation of more and more types of mass destruction weapons, nuclear tests, the buildup of conventional armaments, and the fueling of regional conflicts. One wonders how long it is possible to live in the past without hearing the demands of millions of people, to lie and pretend all this is allegedly being done for the sake of peace.

The program put forward in the Soviet statement is a call to preserve peace and defend civilization. It embodies the new political thinking and assumes the modern world is contradictory but interdependent and in many respects integral. In the nuclear-space era this dictates the need for constructive, creative collaboration among states and peoples in a worldwide scale. It is necessary to prevent a nuclear catastrophe, it is necessary to make it possible for civilization to survive, it is necessary to tackle the growing problems facing all mankind together, in the interests of all peoples.

The 27th CPSU Congress elaborated and adopted the Principles of an All-embracing System of International Security. Basically it is a matter of fusing the philosophy of the formation of a secure world with the plan for concrete and vigorous actions by our country in the international arena.

The program set out in the statement is given particular force because it has been proclaimed by a great and mighty power capable of handling any scientific-technical task. The Soviet Union's material and intellectual potential enables it to create any weapon if we are forced to do so. Our country is not aspiring to greater security than the others, neither will it settle for less. Our ideal is peace without weapons and without violence. This we see as expressing the humanism of communist ideology, its moral values.

The world situation remains complex and tense. It should be noted that last year the new political thinking did begin to materialize in international relations and is becoming part of international political practice. Our people and our country have every right to be proud of the fact that in this sense the world is not like it was a year ago.

The Soviet Union's words are not at odds with its actions. The statement was the basis, the starting point for important international actions by our country contributing to the untying of many difficult world political knots. At the same time, it was a powerful stimulus to all peace-loving forces and realistically minded politicians to embark on the specific examination and solution of the urgent, burning problems facing the international community.

The Soviet-American summit meeting in Reykjavik was the hilltop from which the world surveyed the reality of the program for a nuclear-free world. It fully confirmed that the statement was not a "utopian slogan," not a "dream, beautiful though it may be," as some in the West have claimed, but a direct guide to action, a concrete plan which can be embarked upon right away.

Whereas the United States went to the Icelandic capital effectively empty-handed, the USSR placed on the negotiating table concrete proposals on strategic weapons, on medium-range missiles, and on questions of verification [kontrol], the cessation of nuclear tests, and the nonmilitarization of space. It was a creative development of the provisions enshrined in the 15 January 1986 statement. In the course of difficult and fierce debates it was demonstrated, thanks to the flexibility shown by the Soviet side, that goodwill and a switch from words to action are needed to eliminate the threat facing mankind.

Reykjavik also confirmed the statement's prophetic words that if you keep the door shut on the solution of the space problem it means you do not want to halt the arms race on earth. An historic opportunity was missed on this occasion only because the present U.S. administration, which is in the military-industrial complex's power, had no intention or was incapable of banishing the chimera of SDI for the sake of real disarmament. With the aid of its "star wars" plan Washington is attempting to retrieve military superiority and wreck the established strategic military parity. This stance is incompatible with nuclear disarmament.

The European aspect of the nuclear problem is of great importance. Our continent has been turned into the biggest and most explosive nuclear dump in the world. There is special concern at the siting of U.S. first-strike missiles in a number of West European countries. To cut this Gordian knot, the Soviet Union has proposed, as a radical first step, the elimination, at the very first stage of the implementation of its program, of all Soviet and U.S. medium-range missiles in the European zone.

Washington and some West European capitals now want to pull to pieces the package of Soviet proposals which was placed on the negotiating table in the Icelandic capital and take from it only the items on which the Soviet Union has made concessions, without giving anything in return. Moreover, certain Western forces would not mind filing away the major achievement which the Reykjavik accords constitute and pretending it never existed. Once again they are peddling the tedious myth of the "Soviet military threat."

The opponents of nuclear disarmament claim that the USSR is in favor of eliminating nuclear weapons merely to acquire superiority in the sphere of conventional armaments. In June of last year the Soviet Union, together with its Warsaw Pact allies, put forward a proposal on comprehensive and deep cuts in armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe, from the Atlantic to the Urals. However, so far the NATO countries have not agreed to a concrete discussion of these proposals.

The total elimination of chemical weapons -- one of the most dangerous and barbaric means of mass destruction -- by the end of the century is an integral part of the Soviet disarmament plan set out in the 15 January statement. Again there has so far been no reply from the West to the concrete proposals put forward by the Soviet Union and the other socialist community countries.

The new political thinking, on which the statement is based, is running into many obstacles. But the past year bears witness that it is already becoming part of life. The Soviet Union's constructive collaboration with the other participants of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence-Building Measures and Security and Disarmament in Europe contributed to the successful conclusion of the conference. Our country has urged and is urging the results achieved in Stockholm be developed in Vienna at the next meeting of the representatives of the states that participated in the all-European conference.

The program set out in the statement applies not only to Soviet-American relations and Europe. It embraces the future of millions of people, including those living in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The statement has made an important contribution in the joint quest with all countries for a common, comprehensive approach to the formation of a system of security and lasting peace. This is also the aim of the proposals put forward by the CPSU Central Committee general secretary in Vladivostok on safeguarding security in such an important part of the world as Asia and the Pacific Ocean basin.

The Delhi Declaration, signed in November 1986 during the Soviet-Indian summit, was a major step forward in the materialization of the new political thinking. It enshrines the principles of a nonviolent world free from nuclear weapons, principles which stem from the priority significance of human values and the need for joint efforts to build a world free from nuclear weapons, violence and hatred, suspicion and fear.

The fact that the new political thinking is breaking through in the peoples' consciousness and is becoming part of the practice of international relations is evidenced by the appeal by the "six states from four continents" advocating the immediate cessation of the nuclear arms race and the prevention of the appearance of weapons in space. It is also indicated by the Nonaligned Movement's "Harare Appeal," which is a strong and firm call for an end to the arms race and the abolition of nuclear weapons and for a strong link between disarmament and development problems. The UN General Assembly's approval of the concept of an all-embracing system of international security, put forward by a group of socialist countries, should also be seen in this way.

The 15 January 1986 statement was a concrete new manifestation of the peace-loving foreign policy of the CPSU and our state. The Soviet people warmly approve and support its provisions. They regard it as an organic combination of our foreign policy course with the plans for internal restructuring and acceleration of the entire process of our society's life and they are firmly resolved through their labor to augment the power and might of our socialist homeland, which is the bulwark of world peace. At the same time, our people see the disarmament plan contained in the statement as the supreme manifestation of their international duty and concern not only for the life of the present generation, but for the earth's future inhabitants.

The CPSU Central Committee general secretary's statement was made at the very start of the International Year of Peace announced by the United Nations. When the Soviet Union entered that year silence had already reigned for 5 months at its nuclear test sites. We extended the moratorium on nuclear explosions despite the fact that the others continued to improve their weapons of death. Our country's extension of the moratorium beyond 1 January this year -- until the first U.S. blast -- provides yet another chance to place an effective barrier in the way of the nuclear arms race.

The new year of 1987 has taken over from the International Year of Peace. The Soviet Union will continue to struggle consistently and persistently to implement the complex foreign policy initiatives put forward in M.S. Gorbachev's statement that mankind can greet the year 2000 beneath a peaceful sky and with confidence in its future.

MFA Press Conference

LD151517 Moscow TASS in English 1515 GMT 15 Jan 87

[Excerpt] Moscow, 15 Jan (TASS)--The head of the Soviet Foreign Ministry's Information Department, Gennadiy Gerasimov, who spoke at the briefing in the ministry's press center today, called attention to the newsmen to the first anniversary on 15 January of Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's statement setting forth a program for creating a nuclear-free world.

Gerasimov said the statement has become a most important political document of the times.

Concretising this programme, the Soviet Union has made many important initiatives, among which a special place belongs to a Soviet proposal for meeting in Reykjavik, which has been accepted by the American side, he said.

Reykjavik has elevated the cause of nuclear disarmament to an all-time high from which there have opened fresh prospects, the Soviet spokesman said.

In the new year, the spokesman for the USSR Foreign Ministry said, we are also determined to work consistently and perseveringly so that that package of initiatives be translated into life, that the new political thinking make way in international affairs.

The spokesman for the USSR Foreign Ministry also said that today is the 528th day of the Soviet moratorium on nuclear weapon tests. That counting could be done not in days but in years. Had the United States followed the Soviet Union's good example. Various governments and public organizations are addressing a request to us that the moratorium be extended. The Soviet stand is explicit. We are prepared to extend the moratorium any time, to re-introduce it any moment, should the other side stop its tests. Therefore, the appeal for an end to nuclear testing should be addressed, above all, to the USA.

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U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

IZVESTIYA DENIES NUCLEAR-FREE FUTURE 'IMPOSSIBLE'

Soviet Proposals

PM091633 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 10 Jan 87 Morning Edition p 4

[IZVESTIYA political observer A. Bovin article under the rubric "The Soviet Disarmament Program: One Year On": "I. Our Proposal"]

[Excerpts] In the middle of January last year M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, proposed the complete elimination of nuclear weapons throughout the world in the next 15 years. Is such a proposal realistic? How does it fit in with a millenium's experience of the building of arms? Will it lead to a reduction in the risk of war? Or is it a fine-spirited utopia, useful as a propaganda act but impossible as a political solution.

Difficult questions. Looking back over the past year and looking at the year which has just begun, I would like to share with readers my thoughts about the answers.

The year which has just begun is the year of the 70th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution. Our jubilee, analysis of our experience, and study of the nature of the changes which have radically changed international life in the last 7 decades provide a wealth of material for contemplating the fact that the line separating the impossible from the possible can be extremely fluid and that under certain conditions the impossible becomes possible, correcting the incorrigible "realists" and skeptics.

Socialism has to its credit the transformation of peaceful coexistence, which emerged as the foreign policy doctrine of the first and only socialist state, into a universal principle of international intercourse. To ensure that this principle can have a full life and become ubiquitous practice and ubiquitous policy it is necessary to take the next step -- halting the race in nuclear arms, whose stockpiling has created the technical possibility of suicide for mankind.

Our logic is simple. So long as nuclear weapons exist, the possibility of nuclear war also exists. The probability of such a war can be debated. It can be demonstrated that the instinct for self-preservation makes this probability not too great. But since we are talking about mankind's existence (or nonexistence), even a minimal risk is unacceptable. Nuclear war must be made improbable. There is only one realistic path for this -- the elimination of nuclear weapons.

Comrade Gorbachev's 15 January 1986 statement posed the question in precisely that way. "The Soviet Union," that document states, "proposes that as of 1986 a start be made on implementing a program for freeing mankind from the fear of nuclear catastrophe... Here it is necessary to rise above national egoism, tactical calculations, and disputes and divisions whose significance is negligible in comparison with the preservation of the main asset -- peace and a reliable future." Within the framework of a three-phase plan for making the transition to a nuclear-free world provision was made for the elaboration of special procedures for destroying nuclear weapons and dismantling, converting, or destroying their delivery vehicles. Provision was also made for verification [kontrol] measures, including on-site inspection.

The implementation of the Soviet program would signify a real revolution in world politics. but it is precisely this so necessary radicalism, boldness, and stepping beyond the boundaries of what seems possible that has generated and continues to generate objections and doubts. Harking back to past experience, these objections and doubts do not take account of the fact that the dialectics of the historical process also incorporate the transformation of the impossible into the possible and the realization of utopias.

Objections of another kind are met with too. Aggressiveness, the arms race, and militarism are inherent in the very nature of capitalism. Therefore capitalism will never agree to disarmament. It was no accident that the detente of the first half of the seventies was not only wrecked, but also caused a mounting revanchist wave, a U.S. rejection of even minimal limitations in the strategic arms sphere, and the spurring on of the quantitative growth and qualitative modernization of arms.

This is a serious objection. The nature of capitalism is indeed scarcely predisposed toward disarmament and peaceful coexistence with socialism. But can the nature of capitalism be viewed purely in the abstract, ignoring the changing historical conditions and the social milieu in which this nature is submerged?

Let us recall the prehistory and history of World War II. The nature of capitalism and the vital social interests of the world bourgeoisie promoted the creation of a joint capitalism front against the socialist countries. But no such joint front developed. The contradictions between national and state interests proved stronger than the class and social solidarity arising from the nature of capitalism. What emerged was a combat alliance between a socialist state and one group of capitalist states directed against another such group. It is hardly necessary to prove that many people considered this to be a theoretical impossibility.

It seems to me that the nature of capitalism should be seen in the broad sociohistorical context. The general weakening of the world positions of capitalism; the increasing dangers, including the possibility of physical annihilation, which the nuclear arms race entails; the ever fuller awareness of these dangers on the part of significant strata of the ruling class -- these factors cannot fail to influence the nature of capitalism. The "nature" itself does not change. But the machinery and means of its realization change. This makes it possible to set the task of developing firm, stable, civilized relations between socialist and capitalist states. This in turn makes it possible to regard the creation of a nuclear-free world as a difficult task, a very difficult task, but one which does not go beyond the bounds of what is possible, in principle, in the late 20th century.

But the skeptics will not give way. Apart from objections of a general historical and philosophical nature, they also put forward objections of a more concrete, military-strategic order. There are two such objections.

First. Disarmament is not an end in itself. The objective is, through disarmament, to lessen the risk of war. Suppose all nuclear weapons are destroyed. Nuclear war becomes impossible. But instead, there is a marked increase in the danger of war between the leading powers using conventional weapons. The possibility of such a war is now largely blocked by fear that it could grow into a nuclear war. What if that fear was not present?

The Soviet approach takes this possibility into account. That is why we propose beginning large-scale talks, at any time, on reducing conventional arms. The Delhi Declaration, signed by R. Gandhi and M.S. Gorbachev, outlines the prospect of creating not only a nuclear-free world, but a nonviolent world. However much people may talk about "utopianism," there are moments in history when the most realistic path is to demand what usually seems impossible. We are living at such a moment.

The second objection. In a nuclear-free world, a single, solitary nuclear system, secretly created by someone or other, would radically disrupt the military balance. But as yet the technical potential to prevent such a turn of events does not exist. So the existence of a limited nuclear potential, perhaps reduced to some minimum, creates a far more stable situation than the total absence of nuclear weapons.

This objection merits attention. But what we do not have today, we may have tomorrow or the next day. The Soviet Union is convinced that world science is capable of creating verification systems to guarantee the preservation of a nuclear-free world. The sooner we begin to tackle this task in practice, the easier it will be to solve it.

The fact that any argument against a nuclear-free world can be met by a convincing counterargument does not do much to make it easier to create such a world. The real difficulties exist, as a rule, outside logic -- in the accustomed mentality of confrontation, in narrow, selfish interests, in the tradition of believing not in logic, but in strength. These are enormous difficulties. But the stakes are also enormous, vast. Doing only what seems possible means giving ground beforehand, losing beforehand. Doing what usually does not seem possible does not necessarily mean winning. But at least there is a chance of winning. That in itself means a great deal.

Western Counterproposals

PM121912 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 11 Jan 87 Morning Edition p 5

[Part Two of political observer A. Bovin article under the rubric "The Soviet Disarmament Proposals: One year on": "II. Counterproposals" -- passages within slantlines published in boldface]

[Text] /In the previous article we examined the basic objections to the Soviet idea of complete nuclear disarmament. These objections are useful. Their study and the proof of their inconsistency make it possible to clarify and supplement our own arguments, demonstrate the logic, and weigh up time and again all the possibilities and "impossibilities."/

An examination of Western counterproposals and an analysis of alternative approaches to the reduction of the risk of nuclear war are equally useful. It seems to me that these approaches can be classified within three main groups. First, each side creates [sozdayet] a full-scale and absolutely reliable ABM defense system, which neutralizes offensive nuclear potentials. Second, existing offensive potentials are maintained but supplemented by defensive ones, which enhances the deterrent effect and therefore reduces the risk of war. And third, offensive nuclear potentials are maintained (and maybe limited), but are used only and exclusively as means of deterrence. Everyone rejects the first use of nuclear weapons, and therefore they will not be used.

These are the suggested alternatives. Let us examine them in turn.

/First./ "Defense instead of offense." This is Reagan's familiar "strategic defense initiative." It is proposed to accomplish a turnaround, a revolution in strategic thinking -- to replace offensive weapons by defensive ones. If 100-percent reliable ABM systems are created [budut sozdany] by each side, nuclear attack becomes pointless and, consequently, nuclear weapons will turn into a heap of totally useless rubbish.

This proposal appears to involve something good. But, as both Soviet and U.S. scientists proved a long time ago, the advertisement does not correspond with the facts. An absolutely impenetrable ABM system is a myth, an illusion. Anything that does not contradict the laws of physics is possible. Within the limits set by these laws, man's technical capabilities are boundless. Theoretically, this applies equally to both defense and offense. Even though in practice means of offense have always "overtaken" means of defense. Consequently, the suggested "substitution" cannot take place.

Given the existing potential of mistrust, any step by one of the sides aimed at shaping [formirovaniye] an ABM system will inevitably bring about a counterstep by the other side. A defensive arms race will be added to the offensive arms race. An arms race in space will be added to the arms race on earth. Fear and suspicion will grow, and the risk of war will increase.

The "Star Wars" program has worsened the strategic situation in the world while still in its embryonic stage. The Reykjavik paradox is that a weapon which does not yet exist has come into operation. This weapon blocked accords on the reduction of weapons that do exist. But it is only an apparent paradox. Because our principled reaction is determined not by what the Americans are doing today but by what they intend to do.

What do they intend to do? No more and no less than covering the United States against the Soviet threat, we are told. But the simultaneous and parallel implementation of the "Star Wars" program and the "modernization" of offensive weapons allows a different evaluation of Washington's intentions. The implementation of SDI, in other words the creation [sozdaniye] of a space shield to protect the nuclear sword, is aimed at restoring U.S. strategic superiority and obtaining a possibility to deliver a strike and avoid retribution.

All in all, regardless of the direction from which they are approached, the attempts to bring into being an "absolute" ABM defense not only do not eliminate the threat of nuclear war but, more than anything else, increase this threat because they will render the arms race more intensive and more diversified.

/Second./ "Offense plus defense." It must be admitted that an absolutely reliable ABM system is unrealistic. But this does not at all mean that the "Star Wars" program lacks every trace of reason. It is possible to create [sozdat] ABM systems which could provide cover for command and communications centers and for strategic weapons bases. Even though this cover may not be 100-percent reliable, it could still noticeably reduce the damage from possible nuclear strikes. Given even a fragmented and limited ABM defense, a potential aggressor would find it more difficult to calculate the effect of a nuclear strike and, consequently, deterrence increases and the danger of war is reduced.

In other words, the defense of strategically important military targets is important not in itself but as an element reinforcing nuclear deterrence. [paragraph continues]

Such a defense would enhance a potential aggressor's uncertainty, hesitation, and doubts and, consequently, would increase the overall stability of the situation.

The aforementioned strategic scenario is based on the fact that the "potential aggressor" is, of course, none other than the Soviet Union. As for the United States -- "this cannot happen because it can never happen." From Moscow's viewpoint, however, the situation is not so unambiguous. From Moscow's viewpoint, the creation [sozdaniye] of a limited partial defense is interpreted as preparation for a first strike. In actual fact, a fragmented defense that is "full of holes" can hardly be expected to protect against a mass Soviet strike, against a strike to be delivered first. The defense in question cannot protect against such a strike. It is a different matter if the Soviet strategic forces were to be weakened by a first strike by the Americans. In such an event the planned defense would be fully capable of dealing with a weaker retaliatory strike, of ensuring survival and therefore "victory." This I repeat, is how the situation is perceived in Moscow.

And now about hesitations, doubts, and so on. While in legal proceedings every doubt is interpreted in the accused's favor, in strategic matters every doubt is interpreted in favor of the arms race. If a possible adversary begins to cover his offensive potential with a defense, in order to get rid of any hesitations and doubts I would be forced to restore the status quo, in other words to build up the strike potential. Balance will be restored at a higher level. But this does not mean that security increases equally. This means that the danger becomes greater.

So, there we have it. The problem of the interaction of offensive and defensive weapons in a nuclear conflict was thoroughly studied more than 20 years ago. It was established that the creation [sozdaniye] of a defensive potential (be it by just one side or by both sides) reduces the overall stability of the situation. This is precisely why the ABM Treaty was concluded. Nothing has changed in principle since that time. By revising the agreed approach and producing various options of strategic defense as alternatives to a nuclear-free world, Washington does not lead us further away from the danger of nuclear war, but brings it closer to us.

/Third/ "Neither defense, nor offense." The "Star Wars" program, in any of its options, does not improve but worsens matters. At the same time, a nuclear-free world is unattainable and unrealistic in the foreseeable future and under the foreseeable circumstances. What, then, must be done to sharply reduce the threat of nuclear war? First and foremost, it is necessary to admit and clearly declare that nuclear warheads are not weapons and cannot be used as weapons; their sole purpose is to deter the enemy; all military plans, defense budgets, and weapon development [razrabotka] programs must be based on this premise.

Furthermore, it is necessary to agree on the maximum possible reduction of nuclear forces; it is necessary to retain only as many nuclear weapons as would be required for stable deterrence, no more than that; nonnuclear aggression can and must be repulsed exclusively by nonnuclear means.

It must be noted that this reasoning is fairly close to the Soviet positions. We have been declaring for a long time now that we would never be the first to use nuclear weapons. We agree that the only rational purpose of these weapons is to deter a nuclear attack. We also agree that it would be better and safer if the level of this deterrence were as low as possible. Our plan provides for the stage-by-stage reduction of nuclear potentials.

But one must be consistent. A reduction of nuclear weapons would undoubtedly reduce the probability of nuclear war. But it would only reduce it. [paragraph continues]

We want something more. We want not just to reduce but to eliminate the danger of nuclear war. To make it not less probable but improbable and impossible. Only thus, and in no other way, will it be possible to guarantee the preservation of the future.

Halfway measures will be no good here. They only produce a semblance of a solution. They could generate illusions of security. What is needed here is an breakthrough to new political thinking, to a new perception of realism. Because, if we were to listen to our critics, even the benevolent ones, it appears that everything leading to life and salvation is unattainable, unrealistic, and utopian. Everything that threatens life and reserves the possibility of catastrophe, the possibility of death, is downright realism. It is time to change the system of coordinates. So that life may become more real than death. This is what we propose.

Soviet Proposals Not Ultimatums

PM131237 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 12 Jan 87 Morning Edition p 3

[Third and final part of political observe A. Bovin article under the rubric "Soviet Disarmament Program: 1 Year On": "Security For All"]

[Excerpts] The two previous articles showed that there is no real, sensible alternative to the Soviet proposal to eliminate nuclear weapons and create a nuclear-free world.

Nuclear disarmament is a necessary but evidently insufficient condition for a general relaxation of international tension. Insufficient because it is hard to imagine prolonged, stable detente without ending all avenues of the arms race and reducing conventional types of weapons, particularly mass destruction weapons. Therefore, while emphasizing the elimination of nuclear weapons, renounce chemical weapons and dismantle the industrial base for their manufacture, reach agreement on concerted reductions of conventional arms and armed forces, and strengthen confidence-building measures and make them more effective.

Disarmament is a comprehensive, great, and complex problem. But in itself it is just a fragment, an important fragment of the all-embracing system of international security which the 27th CPSU Congress proposed creating. It not only proposed it but also formulated the principled foundations of such a system in the military, political, economic, and humanitarian spheres.

Precisely this approach to security makes it possible to better and more clearly understand that the danger of war -- for all its scale and significance -- must be viewed among the other dangers threatening mankind at the end of the 20th century. Different authors classify and formulate these dangers differently. If we disregard details and single out only what is most important and basic, then probably two groups of dangers, two groups of problems come to the fore. On the one hand, the tension is building up in relations between developed capitalist countries and developing countries, between the North and the South, as people sometimes say. On the other hand, the tension is growing between the "second" nature and the first nature, between the technosphere created by man and the biosphere which gave rise to man.

Is it possible to cope with ecological difficulties? Is it possible to stimulate and make the development of the "third world" more balanced? I believe it is still possible. If -- and this "if" is all-important -- if the funds being devoured by militarism are switched to peaceful needs. Here are a few comparisons suggested by W. Brandt:

- the funds spent on arms in half a day would suffice to fund the WHO antimalaria program;
- the cost of a modern tank is equal to an amount sufficient to improve the storage of 100,000 metric tons of rice and save at least 4,000 metric tons of rice from spoilage annually. That is a day's ration for 8 million people;
- the same amount would suffice to build schools for 30,000 children;
- an amount equal to the cost of one military aircraft could be used to equip 40,000 rural pharmacies;
- expenditure on one new nuclear-powered submarine is equal to the spending on education in 23 developing countries with a total of 160 million school-age children.

Today militarism is not only the chief source of the danger of war but also the chief obstacle in the way of social progress and the chief force pushing mankind toward ecological disaster. Under these conditions the Soviet proposal to establish a nuclear-free world and for general and complete disarmament -- a proposal actively supported by many states -- serves as a precondition for a general radical improvement in the world situation -- politically, economically, and socially.

Reykjavik showed once again who and what is blocking the path to disarmament and the demilitarization of society. "In Reykjavik," the recent statement of the "Delhi Six" reads, "President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev were very close to reaching agreements which would have been of historic significance and scale. Those agreements could have paved the way to the total elimination of all nuclear weapons. It is a disappointing fact that, although the two leaders advanced far-reaching initiatives, they failed to reach agreements due to differences over the question of space systems." That diplomatic formulation could be translated in various ways into nondiplomatic language. We will take advantage of Senator G. Hart's translation: "The President missed an exceptional opportunity to conclude a tremendous arms control agreement and, as a result, drove us into a corner for the sake of defending a highly theoretical and extremely costly program which cannot prove its worth at least until the end of the century. I believe history will show that this was a mistake on his part."

History was not slow in doing so. The 4 November midterm elections, held under the direct impression of Reykjavik, showed the start of the erosion of Reaganism. The events which journalists designated "Irangate" shook the President's boat still more. "Ronald Reagan's long love affair with the public has lost its charm," the conservative commentators R. Evans and R. Novak write. THE WALL STREET JOURNAL foresees "colossal political consequences" of the scandal that has erupted. One of them is increasing contradictions and disagreements within the president's camp, in particular in connection with the inevitable replacement of the masters of the White House. Describing the activities of Senator R. Dole, one of the aspirants, another aspirant -- Congressman J. Kemp -- said this: Dole is "seeking to acquire popularity over the dead body of a popular President." Such is the intensity of passions.

As for the President himself, by all accounts he is behaving as though nothing has happened. The new military spending he has requested signifies a further whipping up of militarism. This means piling up more and more new obstacles on the only road leading to a secure future.

The more weapons, the more dangers. The more dangers, the less opportunity for survival. Elementary relationships. Universal threats. Everyone needs security. Therefore the course of events demands the buildup of universal protest and a broader social and class composition of antiwar and antinuclear movements. These movements have room for everyone -- "reds," "greens," and even "violets," if they turn up.

General human interest is gradually shaping up as an important factor in world politics. Although comprehending the dangers that exist in an uneven process, which takes place in different ways in the consciousness of different classes, social groups, and strata, this process is taking place, increasing elements of common sense in the policies of many nonsocialist countries.

This broadens and extends the sphere of possible agreements and facilitates the rapprochement of positions and the search for mutually acceptable compromise solutions.

The Soviet Union is open to cooperation with all who value peace who do so not in words but in deeds. Naturally, we defend our proposals. We are ready to argue then over and over again and to explain their logic. We are sure that the interests of universal security demand that we make our way through to a nuclear-free world, a world without weapons or wars.

We certainly do not regard our proposals as a set of ultimatum-like demands. We are prepared to examine any path and any proposal which brings a nuclear-free, nonviolent world closer. Very different options are possible here. From our viewpoint it is important not to lose sight of the goal -- general and complete disarmament -- and not to lose it altogether.

We understand the doubts of doubters. The proposed future is too much at variance with all the past, with all history. We ask people to think over our position and our logic. In the past the policy of strength prevailed. Its time is over, for its continuation leads to universal catastrophe. The time has come for a policy of reason. This alone promises salvation. Only a policy of reason, on which the Soviet proposals are based, unites realism, responsibility, and optimism.

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CSO: 5200/1237

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

TASS: SHEVARDNADZE-UK OFFICIAL ON NUCLEAR MENACE, ARMS CURB

LD151903 Moscow TASS in English 1847 GMT 15 Jan 87

[Text] Moscow January 15 TASS -- Member of the Political Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee, USSR Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze today received Timothy Renton, minister of state, Foreign and Commonwealth Office of Great Britain, now in Moscow for the participation in the Soviet-British political consultations arranged by the Soviet Foreign Ministry and the British Foreign Office.

During an open businesslike conversation Eduard Shevardnadze and Timothy Renton assessed the international situation that has developed after Mikhail Gorbachev advanced exactly a year ago a large-scale initiative aimed at ridding humanity of the burden of nuclear and other arms. [Moscow TASS English 151842, in a brief report on Shevardnadze meeting Renton, refers to their "frank and business-like talk."] A fundamental talk was held on how the sides, in the light of the Soviet-U.S. Reykjavik meeting, view the role and place of European states in the world-wide struggle against the nuclear menace, in the drastic restructuring of international relations on an all-embracing basis of equal and reliable security for all and equitable peaceful cooperation.

The Soviet side emphasized that the policy of those Western circles that in their dangerous delusion still hope to achieve unilateral advantages by the use of force to the detriment of the interests of other peoples has no future and can only doom civilisation to an impasse of confrontation and mutual deterrence that is fraught with catastrophe. The Soviet side expressed the hope that Great Britain, to a dialogue with which the Soviet Union attaches much importance, will be equal to the responsibility of a great power, will show genuine striving to help curb the arms race, improve the climate in relations among states and peoples.

The sides declared for a more dynamic and steady development of bilateral ties in various spheres, for manifesting cooperation in fresh important deeds.

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U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

USSR'S KARPOV WRITES ON 'NUCLEAR-FREE WORLD,' INF, SDI

AU122042 Sofia NARODNA ARMIYA in Bulgarian 9 Jan 87 pp 1, 4

[Article specially dispatched through the NOVOSTI news agency for the daily NARODNA ARMIYA, by Viktor Karpov, head of the USSR Foreign Affairs Ministry administration on problems of limitation of armaments and on disarmament and leader of the Soviet delegation to the Geneva negotiations on nuclear and space weapons; entitled: "Breakthrough Toward a Nuclear-free World"]

[Text] The Reykjavik agreements could have opened opportunities for rescue from nuclear weapons, were it not for the stubbornness of the American side. Soviet as well and U.S. medium-range missiles in Europe could have been eliminated; in the long run shorter range weapons could also have been eliminated, while U.S. and Soviet offensive strategic weapons could have been reduced by 50 percent within the next 5 years, and fully eliminated by 1996.

The limiting of U.S. and USSR strategic offensive weapons should at the same time obviously have opened the path toward the nuclear disarmament process being joined by other nuclear states, including France and the UK. Naturally, this would have meant direct progress toward a Europe free of nuclear weapons.

Unfortunately none of this happened because of the position adopted by Washington. The strange factor in all this, however, is that certain leading European political figures were frightened by the prospect, and acted dynamically to prevent this opportunity for Europe's nuclear disarmament. There is no other way of interpreting the statement that a 50-percent limitation on offensive strategic armaments is dangerous for the future of Western strategy, and that such a limit threatens to undermine the unity of the NATO member-countries and their security.

A rather strange metamorphosis also affected the question of medium-range missiles deployed in Europe. The European leaders used to assure us in the past that they are supporters of the "zero option", namely, that they are ready to agree to the full elimination of American and Soviet medium-range missiles in Europe. Today they are obviously frightened by the prospect of the elimination of medium-range missiles opened at the Reykjavik negotiations, since they concoct additional obstacles along the path of implementing this decision. It is by no means accidental that other questions are being raised today on a priority basis, questions which have no direct connection with medium-range missiles.

Nevertheless, there are convincing answers to such questions as well. They are contained in the Soviet Nuclear Disarmament Program which envisages a full and comprehensive elimination of tactical nuclear arms. The Soviet Union proposes to settle this question as well. However, as the saying goes, there is a time for everything.

Let us not forget the fact that it is not a question of the small nuclear resources belonging to the UK and France remaining on European territory but the continued stationing of forward based U.S. nuclear weapons. They will be preserved for a certain time -- and perhaps for a more prolonged period -- following the elimination of U.S. and Soviet medium-range missiles in Europe. Therefore, it is absolutely meaningless to talk about NATO allegedly being defenseless as a result of the elimination of USSR and U.S. medium-range missiles.

As to conventional weapons, the Soviet Union is ready for negotiations about drastic limitations of these armaments throughout the entire territory of Europe, from the Atlantic to the Urals. We do not pose any preliminary conditions for this, whereas NATO, under different pretexts, is avoiding such negotiations. It is even trying to invent arguments about the alleged superiority of the Warsaw Pact member-countries in conventional weapons to sabotage nuclear disarmament in Europe.

Other attempts are also made to cast a shadow upon Reykjavik. People say the Soviet Union allegedly claims everything or nothing, and is unwilling to make any concessions whatsoever, being aware of the U.S. stand on SDI. This is by no means true. The Soviet Union does not ask anything from the United States but that it fulfill the statement made by the American side on the highest level. The official American stand claims that SDI is nothing but a research project. What is the proposal of the Soviet Union in this respect? It is precisely the proposal that the United States should restrict itself to laboratory tests within the next 10 years, and not perform any tests in space.

If the declaration made by the U.S. President and by other officials corresponds to reality, then there are no obstacles to the acceptance of the Soviet proposals.

However, the U.S. officials, as the saying goes, say something and have something else in mind in their striving to preserve the opportunity of fully implementing their SDI program, including the 10-year period in question, during which the program for the elimination of offensive, strategic weapons could be implemented.

Reykjavik represents a real breakthrough toward a nuclear-free world, a breakthrough toward a drastic increase in European security and, last but not least, a breakthrough toward excluding the opportunity of a nuclear or conventional war being unleashed on the European continent.

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U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

TASS: PERLE DISCUSSES SDI PROGRAM, B-52 MODERNIZATION

LD080922 Moscow TASS in English 0751 GMT 8 Jan 87

[Text] Washington January 8 TASS -- U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Perle said that the United States planned totally to modernize its fleet of B-52 strategic bombers by re-equipping them to carry cruise missiles with nuclear warheads.

The United States is known to have violated the 1979 Soviet-U.S. SALT-2 treaty when it re-equipped the 131st B-52 bomber to carry cruise missiles last November. Responding to newsmen's request to comment on a bill which has just been submitted to the 100th U.S. Congress for consideration and demanding that the administration comply with the SALT-2 treaty terms, Perle stated that the President would veto any bill to which the similar amendment would be adopted.

Perle also stressed that the White House did not intend under any circumstances to abandon its "Star Wars" programme.

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U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

PRAVDA POLLS WESTERN NEWSMEN ON SUPERPOWER ARMS POLICIES

PMO21350 [Editorial Report] Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 31 December 1986 First Edition carries on page 4 under the headline "What People in the West Think" a 2,900-word feature comprising PRAVDA correspondent interviews with seven "prominent bourgeois commentators and publicists": Strobe Talbott, TIME magazine's diplomatic correspondent; Paul Warnke, former leader of the U.S. delegation at the Soviet-U.S. SALT II talks; Shezo Komoto, deputy chief of TOKYO SHIMBUN's foreign department; Yasuo Suzuki, deputy chief of YOMIURI's international department; Jonathan Steele, THE GUARDIAN's diplomatic commentator; Heiner Bremer, chief editor of the Hamburg weekly STERN; and Claudio Farcassi, chief editor of PAESE SERA. The reply to these two questions: "Whose foreign policy activity -- the USSR's or the United States' -- has been more in keeping with the aims and tasks of Peace Year?" And "What would you like from the two powers next year?" The interviews are followed by this commentary by Yevgeniy Grigoryev:

"We have before us seven interviews from five of the major Western countries. First of all, I wish to thank their authors for participating in PRAVDA's New Year's questionnaire. In my view, the replies make interesting reading. They are quite representative as a kind of cross section of the opinions and sentiments, as well as the omissions and assertions, that are encountered today in the West's 'big press.' Along with elements of the new political thinking, the influence of the old is also noticeable in them. For all this, I believe the published statements contain common denominator. This is concern at the situation in the world and awareness of the need to end the arms race.

"On comparing the replies, the reader will easily detect a substantial discrepancy in the assessment of the outgoing year, the events, and the problems. The majority acknowledge the significance and weight of the efforts the Soviet Union has made to improve the international situation and turn toward disarmament. For all mankind knows of M.S. Gorbachev's statement of 15 January 1986, which formulated the program for eliminating nuclear weapons on the planet. It was the basis of the USSR's innovative proposals in Reykjavik, which made the prospect of a nuclear-free world really tangible. The silence on the Soviet nuclear test sites has been not only a hymn to Peace Year but also a concrete action in the interests of nuclear disarmament.

"It is hard to say why certain replies ignore this, as well as Moscow's many other practical steps in the spirit of the ideas and aims of Peace Year. But this is what is curious. Certain authors rebuke the USSR and the United States equally for the lack of fundamental progress in the matter of disarmament. This is 'usual' and 'the done thing.' However, even they recognize directly or indirectly the great significance of Reykjavik and urge people to push off from its results and go further. But those results, like the meeting in the Icelandic capital itself, were a consequence of the initiative and the proposals of precisely the Soviet Union. That is a universally recognized fact.

"As though to 'balance' the too glaring U.S. 'omissions,' the people who answered the PRAVDA questionnaire and their colleagues in Western capitals allude to Afghanistan. This is more than dubious allusion, for it is precisely Washington that has preferred the dangerous chimera of SDI and blocked a shift toward the cardinal reduction and elimination of nuclear arms. The continuation of the undeclared war against the DRA is also primarily an American 'service.' In connection with that regional problem, too, the Soviet Union has exerted and is exerting persistent efforts and goodwill for the speediest political settlement of the situation around Afghanistan. Here words are not at variance with deeds. I would mention, for example, the return home of six regiments."

"The contradictory judgments have evidently been caused by the complexity of the situation and the juxtaposition of hopes and disappointments associated with Reykjavik, or by a lack of information. We are urged, for example, to be ready for talks on short-range missiles, although precisely the Soviet side had already enshrined that in one of the Reykjavik accords. There is a similar appeal with regard to conventional arms in Europe, as though there had not been the corresponding Budapest appeal of the Warsaw Pact states, to which precisely the NATO countries have still not made a businesslike response.

"The thoughts of J. Steele and H. Bremer clearly reveal a desire to 'eviscerate' the Reykjavik package of USSR proposals and break it up into separate parts. Look, they say, there is no connection between medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe and strategic weapons. But, with regard to us, U.S. medium-range missiles are strategic weapons, since they can reach our territory. There is also an obvious connection between medium-range missiles and SDI. On a military-technical plane there is the so-called Euro-SDI, but above all there is the participation of a number of West European NATO countries in implementing the 'Star Wars' program. On the political plane SDI is the concentrated expression of a reluctance to remove the nuclear threat hanging over mankind. For it is clear even to a number of the questionnaire participants that, by extending the arms race into space, SDI blocks the entire nuclear disarmament process.

"This and this alone is the snag today, not the Soviet package. Everything in it is precisely balanced: both the concessions and the specific steps toward nuclear disarmament. Some people in the West would like to take from it the concessions alone. Of course, none of us will agree to that, because it would violate the principles of equality and mutual security.

"Certain ideas expressed in the replies are not quite intelligible. While quite rightly pointing out that the ABM Treaty specifically prohibits the testing and development [razrabotka] of space-based systems and their components, P. Warnke proposes that the sides exchange their plans in the sphere of such tests. But if this is prohibited, why have test plans? Would it not be better simply not to make plans and to observe the ABM Treaty?

"As can be seen from the interviews, masses of complex problems also await the world in 1987. There are differing opinions as to how to reveal them. But it follows from all the published statements that no time must be lost in solving these problems. In this sense the questionnaire participants obviously reflect the strengthening realistic sentiments in their countries and in the West in general.

"The future belongs to the idea of a nuclear-free world and to actions leading to this great goal and dream of concerned mankind."

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U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

MOSCOW: U.S. 'IDIOSYNCRATIC' ARMS STANCE ASSAILED

LD072344 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1900 GMT 7 Jan 87

[Vitaliy Sobolev commentary]

[Text] Positive response throughout the entire world, including the United States, regarding the Soviet stage-by-stage program for nuclear disarmament is found to be very annoying by official Washington. In order to overcome the attraction of this program, U.S. propaganda puts forward quite idiosyncratic ideas. For example, the newspaper THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR is trying to convince its readers: At present, the main danger is that the Soviets have managed to stretch U.S. power all over the world to such an extent, that at any point of possible confrontation, the United States must almost immediately pull the nuclear trigger. Over to commentator Vitaliy Sobolev:

Well, if the Soviets are guilty of this, then their vice is truly great. They have stretched U.S. power over more or less 114 countries, and although more than half a million U.S. soldiers serve away from their homeland, considering such geographical scope, how many of them occupy each point, as THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR states? Besides, many of their military bases are found near Soviet borders. The readers of the newspaper can sympathize with the U.S. soldiers who try to understand why on these bases they have seized hold of 12,000 nuclear triggers.

Whether it is the main danger or not, as the newspaper writes, the danger is obvious. It is obvious to the people of those countries where the bases with nuclear triggers are situated. It is no accident that the slogan "Yankee, go home" has become so popular in no less than 114 countries. The paper does not pay any attention to this, nor to the repeated Soviet proposals to liquidate the foreign military bases and to reduce military activity of states beyond their borders. However, THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR underlines the importance of, and I quote: The Soviets receive an enormous political and psychological advantage by placing responsibility of being first to use nuclear weapons exclusively on the United States.

Therefore, the readers of this newspaper are given convincing evidence for the necessity of having nuclear weapons, as well as the nobility of the United States, which has not stretched Soviet power over 114 countries.

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U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

TASS CONTRASTS U.S.-USSR DISARMAMENT STANCES

LD131643 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1557 GMT 13 Jan 87

[Text] Moscow, 13 Jan (TASS) -- Military affairs observer Vladimir Bogachev writes:

U.S. President Ronald Reagan is continuing to insist that any accord at the Geneva negotiations on nuclear and space weapons must provide for the right of the United States to deploy [razvernut] at the end of 1996 a widescale space-based antimissile defense.

It emerges from his statement in connection with the next round of Soviet-U.S. negotiations which begin on 15 January that the President is in effect making the possibility of any progress at this forum dependent upon the Soviet side agreeing to revoke the 1972 treaty on restricting antimissile defense systems. In other words, the President is evidently fostering the hope of attaining military superiority over the Soviet Union by taking the race in strike weapons out into space. These plans are, despite all their illusory nature, extremely dangerous. The United States' attempts to justify militarization of space by the aspiration to make nuclear weapons "powerless and obsolete" just do not stand up to criticism.

The Soviet Union has not only "frozen" the number of its medium-range missiles, but has also reduced them in number, in particular dismantling the launch facilities for such missiles on the Kola Peninsula and a large proportion of such launch facilities in the rest of the territory of the Leningrad and Baltic Military Districts. During this period the United States has increased to 364 the number of U.S. medium-range missiles in Europe.

In 6 years, the Reagan administration has literally undertaken not a single practical measure to reduce its arsenal which it could itself describe as a gesture of good will.

The President frequently speaks of his intentions to remove the deadlock from progress at the Geneva negotiations in the future. One would like to hope for his sincerity. If Washington's intentions are genuinely serious, Washington should confirm it by practical deeds.

Against the background of the United States, practical activities in the military field, Reagan's flimsy phrases about his desire for "achieving significant, fair and effectively verifiable [poddayushchiyesya effektivnoy proverke] reductions in U.S. and Soviet nuclear arsenals" are surprisingly reminiscent of his own rhetoric over "Irangate."

"Soviet actions undertaken to achieve advances in the field of arms control [kontrol nad vooruzheniyami]," the President said, "have been in no way equitable with our efforts." Here are a few points to illustrate that allegation made by Reagan.

For over 17 months now, the Soviet Union has been observing a unilateral moratorium on nuclear explosions. Over the same period the United States has carried out 24 nuclear tests.

The USSR has announced its intention not to exceed for the time being the limits set by the Soviet-U.S. SALT-II treaty. The United States has ostentatiously exceeded those limits by deploying further bombers with cruise missiles and MX-ICBM's with multiple warheads.

It is pointless to reduce weapons on the comparatively limited area of the earth's surface while at the same time opening the "green channel" for the deployment of even more dangerous systems for the destruction of people in the truly endless outer space. However, to date Washington has had no desire to be governed by common sense. In practice, the United States in the past 6 years has demonstrated not the slightest desire to halt the growth of offensive weapons or to take account of the provisions of the accords on their inflation.

The service record of the present U.S. Administration in the field of so-called arms control in the last 6 years places in doubt Washington's readiness to observe not only future agreements, but also existing treaties. From 1981 through 1987 it has not signed a single agreement on the genuine reduction of armed forces or armaments. Instead it has derailed the SALT-II treaty, the 1974 agreement on the limitation of the yield of underground nuclear tests, the 1976 agreement on nuclear blasts with peaceful objectives, and the 1972 provisional agreement, and has broken off a whole series of talks on disarmament. Washington's reputation as a partner in an agreement has fallen sharply.

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U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

MOSCOW: U.S. VIEW OF USSR ECONOMY IMPEDES DISARMAMENT

LD141446 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0350 GMT 14 Jan 87

[Text] Will Gorbachev succeed with the reforms? Articles under this, or similar, titles can be found just now in virtually every newspaper and magazine. Our correspondent, Vladimir Dunayev reports from Washington:

[Dunayev] There is barely any reporting of our foreign policy, our initiatives or disarmament. That is sparse, but there is plentiful and generous reporting on internal affairs, openness and restructuring: There is no way of overcoming the bureaucracy, to try is futile. The Soviet economy is doomed -- the more it is reformed, the worse things will become.

What is the cause of this interest in our internal affairs, and particularly the changes in the economy? The author of an article that has just appeared in the very influential FOREIGN AFFAIRS magazine under the title "'Does Failure Await Gorbachev?'" answers the question candidly. There is little interest in the West in the truth about the Soviet Union. People are afraid of the Soviet threat. What threat is it that the author of the article -- the well-known capitalist journalist Robert Kaiser, considered an expert on the Soviet Union and for 4 years a correspondent in Moscow -- is talking about? He was talking about this threat: The one and only real threat that emanates from the Soviet Union, writes Kaiser, is the threat that the whole world will be shown it is possible to organize society better than under capitalism. Such a society produces more, is more efficient and thus more attractive to the broad masses of the population of the earth than the Western model.

That was the original Bolshevik threat which stemmed from the young Soviet Russia, the threat when the first satellite headed into space from a socialist country. The reforms, restructuring and openness, Kaiser concludes, have alarmed the West, reviving fears which had died down that in the global historic rivalry of the two systems of society, the victory might not be our Western model. Kaiser then placates his readers, predicting that the Soviet economy could not pick up sufficient speed, that the Western model, however harsh it might be, is still more efficient.

Here he is not original. They all want the book of historical problems to contain Washington's answers. I was attracted to the recently published Kaiser article because the fears of the U.S. ruling class are formulated frankly and honestly in it. It is not the military threat, but the social, historical challenge which stems from our country, from our community. That is what has always frightened them and what particularly scares them today.

Incidentally, Washington does not want to tackle disarmament because it recognizes just how dynamically our economy and the social sphere would develop in a non-nuclear, non-missile world. They study and write so much about our changes because they are afraid of them. After all, whatever hindered us, whatever (?shielded) socialism and whatever perverted it was to their advantage, because it made us weaker, more complacent, more inert, and also because it deterred from the new world those who were prepared to search for other models, who could not fit in with the old world and who felt unhappy in it. That is why they write here about our bureaucracy, which the Soviet Union is not supposed to be able to cope with, with such respect, nay reverence.

We know bureaucracy is not a gift, whatever the model of society. True enough, it is extremely far from simple to root out bureaucracy. That is true. But, all the same, in vain do the Western theoreticians hope to win the historic competition of the two systems with the assistance of Soviet bureaucracy. We shall not give them that satisfaction.

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CSO: 5200/1237

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

MOSCOW ON RELATIONS WITH U.S., CANADA, COMMON NUCLEAR DANGER

LD031839 Moscow in English to North America 0000 GMT 3 Jan 87

["Top Priority" program presented by Pavel Kuznetsov, with Radomir Bogdanov and Sergey Plekhanov of the United States of America and Canada Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences]

[Excerpt] [Kuznetsov] This is our first program in 1987, a special year for us, because in November we're going to celebrate the 70th anniversary of the socialist revolution in Russia. It's quite an occasion for us, a people of some 280 million, to take a serious look back at both our achievements and mistakes -- and I say mistakes because as the trailblazers we were the only socialist country, and while rebuilding our society on entirely new economic and social principles we had nobody to turn to for advice. As far as Soviet-American relations are concerned, we all knew that it took the United States 16 years to recognize us -- the recognition was granted in 1933 -- and several years later we found ourselves, we became partners in the glorious anti-Hitler coalition, together with Canada, France, Great Britain and some other countries. But unfortunately right after the war we again (?found) ourselves, but this time on the different sides of the barricade [sentence as heard]. My question to you: Was it a zigzag of history or just because we had a common foe? Now, in the absence of a common foe, are we going to be permanently on the different sides of the barricade? Are there the ways to dismantle this barricade or at least to lower it down so that we could do some things together?

In other words, what is this common enemy now?

[Bogdanov] Yes, and I, I just mean to, I mean that, that nowadays -- note when I say nowadays I mean a longer historical period -- we have a common enemy, maybe a more dangerous and more ominous than we ever came across in the history of our relations. Who is this enemy; what is this danger? It's a nuclear war, the danger of nuclear war. And what, what really worries me, is not the theory, or it's not the theoretical, you know, reflections or ideas, we are moving unfortunately to that brink, to that brink and the, the upper, you know, super task, if you like, is just to stop that moving to the brink. And there is only one way out -- common efforts, common efforts of USSR and USA, to stop first of all arms race, bringing us closer and closer to the nuclear brink, and to cooperate. Do you agree with me, Sergey?

[Plekhanov] Yes, I do agree with that, but I would like to touch upon another side of the problem. People sometimes say: Okay, there is a common danger -- nuclear war and other global problems which are overpowering. But what about the differences? If the differences are so great, then maybe after we've done away with nuclear danger then we will be back to fighting each other ideologically, politically, and even maybe militarily.

[Plekhanov] I think that there is that age-old tradition of viewing

differences as reasons for hostility and reasons for war. But we must view differences in a constructive manner. I think both sides should learn something from each other and concentrate their minds on what unites them, on what is common among them, and think more about the real needs and interests of common people, of citizens. They're not interested in a nuclear war; they're not interested in the nuclear arms race or any kind of arms race, they're interested in increasing contacts between each other, in improving their living standards and so on.

[Kuznetsov] I recall that in our final program last year we said something about making predictions, certain predictions for this year in Soviet-American relations. You know that our country has turned down an exchange of New Year's greetings between the leaders of our two countries; and as a Foreign Ministry spokesman said at the end of the year, such an exchange would create illusions about the current state of Soviet-American relations, which he described as being rather poor and unsatisfactory.

So where do we go from here, as I'm about to ask you about your predictions for this year?

[Bogdanov] You know, Pavel, to be frank with you, when I came to know about that news I was a little bit reluctant, you know, whether we were right or not, turning down this American offer, you know. But now I come to the conclusion that maybe we were right, because now what's going on in USA. These people sitting in the chairs of powers in Washington, they're trying to create an impression among their citizens, among their allies, that there's another fine stage in the Soviet-American relations, that nothing's happened, that after Reykjavik things are moving smoothly. And there is not a bit of truth in that; and maybe that was the real, you know, the real and very efficient step to signal to everybody that there is something wrong in the Soviet-American relations. And we have all the reasons to, you know, blame the American side for that, you know, another downgrading the level, you know, of the Soviet-American relations after Reykjavik. So now I believe, you know, it was a very, very right step, though as I told you I had my own doubts about it. Now, I'm sorry, now we -- about predictions, you know -- I hate to predict because I am.... [incomplete sentence as heard]

[Kuznetsov] Yes, my question, my next question was supposed to be: Can we see a more visible role for the United States Congress -- the new Congress, the 100th, actually, Congress -- in running foreign policy...

[Bogdanov, interrupting] You know, Sergey has been in that business for a number of years than I am, and I would like him to comment on the Congress role; he knows that much better than I do. But, you know, I believe that is American domestic business, Congress. Congress, American. [as heard] But, you know, I hate to predict, because I'm almost afraid to be fired if you have made wrong prediction. But we should not forget, you know, we should not forget that the common danger is there, and unfortunately it is growing; it is not diminishing, it's growing.

[Kuznetsov] So, Sergey, a few words about what we can expect or perhaps not expect from the new Congress.

[Plekhanov] Well, I would agree with Dr Bogdanov that this is a domestic affair, and commenting on relations between the Presidency and the U.S. Congress may not be an appropriate thing to do; but I think you've asked a very good question, because what the problem boils down to as far as we're concerned is: Is there anybody on the other side who is prepared to listen to what we're offering? Is there anybody on the other side who is prepared to think in a new way, as we are urging them to do, because, you know...

[Kuznetsov, interrupting] (?Do you mean) violation of SALT II treaty, refusal to join the (?moratorium)?

[Plekhanov] Not only that. You know, on our side there has been a very dynamic evolution of our approach to the whole fabric of foreign policy, and a key element of that has been very persistent attempt, very persistent attempts, efforts to find areas of agreement with the United States. To find mutually acceptable compromises. We've made concessions, we've made very far-reaching proposals. We've been very frustrating [as heard]; we were not provoked. We've done all and even more than we could do. Nobody expected, most people didn't expect from us to do things that we did. And yet there is virtually no practical response on the other side. There has been some maneuvering, there's been some rhetoric, but in practical terms the American -- the further we, the closer we move to the American position, the further away.

[Kuznetsov] I've brought some letters from our listeners with me to the studio, and I would like to quote from one of them sent in from Mr Vince Waterfield, who makes his home in Halifax, Canada, and I quote: If the panel members on "Top Priority" are from USA and Canada Studies Institute, then why do they only discuss the USA? There are probably many Canadian listeners who are wondering why we are never mentioned. Perhaps you should change the name from North American Service to the Service for the United States. What would you say to that?

[Bogdanov] Well, I would. I agree with our listener.

[Plekhanov] Yes, that's, that's a well deserved barb, I would say.

[Bogdanov] Yes, and I feel a little bit even ashamed that he pointed out to us very rightly that we, we miss his, his very lovely, really great country from our [incomplete sentence as heard] But I don't know how to solve this problem; do you, Pavel? You are the bosses here, not we; we are invited here.

[Kuznetsov] I'm still -- so far I'm the boss -- I'm running this North American service, and I think that much of the blame rests on me; but, well, I'd like to assure listeners in Canada that their country was not totally absent from our programs. We have many examples when Canada featured in them rather prominently; but what about Canada and its role in international relations, Sergey? Perhaps you can give us a couple of examples of what Canada did in such areas as SDI, or some other related problems.

[Bogdanov] You have visited this country?

[Plekhanov] Yes, I visited Canada I think three times, and I'm very much impressed with that country. I think it's a beautiful country with very friendly and hard-working people, and I always enjoy visiting Canada. As far as Canada's role in foreign relations is concerned, I think that there has been, there's been quite an active debate inside Canada, in Canadian public opinion among the political circles in Canada concerning its relations with the United States. That's a touchy question. Canada is, of course, an ally of the United States. On the other hand, when the United States asks them to do things which clearly create serious problems for the Canadians, and asks them to take steps the wisdom of which is at least questionable, then there are....[incomplete sentence as heard]

[Kuznetsov] What do you mean? Do you mean this refusal, Canadian refusal to take part in SDI, when Mr. Mulroney said that Canada won't be calling the shots and therefore there is no role for Canada in this program? And then at the same time, you remember they allowed the United States to test long-range cruise missiles.

[Plekhanov] That's right. They tried, they tried to, to be on both sides of the fence, because there's clearly a great concern among the Canadians, among the masses of Canadians, that Canada may be supporting policies which are very, very detrimental to Canadian security, like testing cruise missiles. There's been a lot of discussions about that. [passage omitted]

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U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

PRAVDA COUNTERS WARNKE PROPOSAL ON ARMS REDUCTION

PM090955 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 9 Jan 87 First Edition p 5

[PRAVDA Political Observer Yuriy Zhukov article under the rubric "Our Debates": "Questions to Paul Warnke"]

[Text] I read with interest the replies from a number of Western figures and journalists to a PRAVDA questionnaire that were published on New Year's Eve. The respondents included such an expert on disarmament problems as Paul Warnke, former leader of the U.S. delegation at the Soviet-American SALT II talks. I have known him a long time -- I made his acquaintance even before the start of those talks -- and I can attest that there is no doubt about his sincere desire to help end the arms race.

In a quest for a way out of the impasse that arose after Reykjavik because of the U.S. stance, Paul Warnke puts forward certain ideas (see PRAVDA for 31 December 1986) that seem to me to require clarification and further discussion.

First, Warnke proposes that the USSR and the United States implement this year the preliminary agreement reached in Reykjavik on reducing U.S. and USSR strategic nuclear arms by 50 percent over the first 5 years. In his opinion, this "would mean a reduction of approximately 10 percent per year in both sides' strategic offensive arms in all categories," although my understanding is that matters have not yet reached the point of such details. Nevertheless, proceeding from this assumption, Warnke believes that the USSR and the United States "could" start annual 10-percent reductions in their strategic offensive arms, leaving aside the question of space weapons.

Of course, Warnke realizes what a risk this would entail for the USSR -- after all, Washington is openly speaking of its intention to place its weapons in space as swiftly as possible. So he adds that the Soviet Union could issue a statement indicating that it would implement these 10-percent reductions until such time as it became dangerous to carry them out because of continuing research within the framework of the U.S. "Strategic Defense Initiative" program. In other words, if the United States began swiftly to "forge ahead with intensive tests of the SDI, the USSR would be forced to cancel the 10-percent reductions in its systems."

But the following point cannot help arising here: How can a state concerned for its own security destroy its own strategic arms, which constitute the foundation of that security, without obtaining guarantees that the opposite side will abandon the creation [sozdaniye] of new, still more dangerous arms systems? Another thing: How is the danger point in SDI work at which the 10-percent annual reduction must be stopped to be determined? How would the Soviet Union look in the eyes of the world public if it first agreed on reductions, but then stopped them?

I sought the opinion of our authoritative military circles on this score and received a clear answer: The USSR is prepared to begin the process of eliminating nuclear weapons, but only on condition that, as was clearly said in Reykjavik, a clear and unconditional agreement is reached that both sides state that they will not withdraw from the ABM Treaty for at least the next decade. This would mean that the United States could continue its researches in the SDI sphere within the laboratory framework but tests of its elements in space would be categorically excluded.

So I have a question for Paul Warnke: Does he support that realistic formulation?
[paragraph continues]

After all, strategic arms reduction is possible only if both sides remain true to the ABM Treaty, Article Four of which [as published], as he rightly notes, "prohibits the testing and development [razrabotka] of space-based systems and their components" (not only space-based systems, incidentally, but also ground-based ABM systems except for one Soviet system and one U.S. system).

It would be quite another matter if an agreement on not withdrawing from the ABM Treaty for the next decade were reached and tests of SDI elements in space were ruled out. Then it would clearly not be all that difficult to agree the purely technical question of the percentage by which the sides would reduce their strategic arms each year.

I think that the question of the unbreakable connection between the solution of the problem of eliminating nuclear arms and the abandonment of the SDI, a question that is vitally important to the success of the Geneva talks, and also the equally important question of banning tests of space weapon as envisaged by Article Four [as published] of the ABM Treaty merit further discussion. So I would be grateful if Paul Warnke would answer the questions I have asked.

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U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

MOSCOW: 'TOP PRIORITY' PROGRAM VIEWS SDI, ARMS TREATIES

LD110436 Moscow in English to North America 0000 GMT 10 Jan 87

["Top Priority" program, presented by Pavel Kuznetsov; with Professors Radomir Bogdanov and Sergey Plekhanov of the United States of America and Canada Institute of Moscow]

[Text] [Kuznetsov] Hello, this is Top Priority. I am Pavel Kuznetsov, your host. In the studio with me are our usual panel: Professors Radomir Bogdanov and Sergey Plekhanov of the Moscow-based Institute for USA and Canada Studies. After last year, the Reagan administration violated the SALT II treaty; the only remaining, and I would say major, accord still in force is the Soviet-American ABM Treaty of 1972. However, now we've seen many attempts to erode it through either what has become known as a broad interpretation or a loose interpretation of the treaty, two pledges to abandon the ABM Treaty in 7 and 1/2 years. In the meantime, Article 15 of the ABM Treaty says, and I quote: Each party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from this treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. Each shall give notice of its decision to the other party 6 months prior to withdrawal from the treaty. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary event the notifying party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests. So my question to either of you is: What are those extraordinary events perceived in Washington that have pushed the Reagan administration to this decision -- at least we heard last year a number of times the decision to withdraw from the treaty in 7 and 1/2 years?

[Bogdanov] Yes, Pavel, it's a very good question because it's a basic question: First of all, what do national interests mean nowadays, number one. Number two: What can jeopardize the national interests nowadays, and do we -- I mean we and the Americans -- we have the same notion of national interests and the event jeopardizing the national interests? So the supreme national interests nowadays is just to survive, just to survive in case that there is a nuclear holocaust, well, whatever you call it, and how to survive, just to avoid the nuclear conflict, that's the supreme national interest. So if you'd agree with my logic, then what is the highest danger, what is really jeopardizing the national interests? Americans, to my mind, and Americans have circumstances which may push both countries to the nuclear...

[Kuznetsov, interrupting] You mean a major crisis?

[Bogdanov] Yes, a major crisis which may push the parties to the nuclear conflict, that's number one. Number two...

[Kuznetsov, interrupting] But, excuses me, but such a major crisis, actually its appearance depends on what the United States or the Soviet Union does; I mean it depends on them whatever there is such a crisis or not.

[Bogdanov] Ah yes, of course I agree with you -- any crisis, any crisis. It cannot emerge just like that, you know. You have, if you like to have a proper environment for the emergency [as heard] of the major crisis -- and by the environment I mean such actions from the America or Soviet side which just leads us to, to, to that, you know. What I mean by that, that's a, a party to that treaty, and we are talking about ABM 72, may find out due to extensive research work some feasible, you know, means for a new [word indistinct] or something, you know -- which in just a moment, I mean by moment, you know, not in seconds or minutes...

[Kuznetsov, interrupting] Five to 10 years?

[Bogdanov] Five to 10 years may find out such means, you know, that the next morning you will wake up and you will find out that your counterpart a hundred times more stronger than you are.

[Kuznetsov] Are you alluding to this SDI concept, the program under way in the United States? Are you talking about a technological breakthrough?

[Bogdanov] Yes, I am alluding to SDI program, which is, you know, a very funny combination of both, of crisis, political crisis, environment, and technological breakthrough. And if you'll allow me to quote the President, who said that he would prefer to rely more upon American military technology than on treaties with the Soviet Union, then you have an answer what the USA SDI is.

[Kuznetsov] We've had no crises on the horizon, or so I think. We've already had two summits: In Geneva in 1985 and in Reykjavik 1986. We also had and still have the Soviet moratorium, and still the United States is talking about leaving the ABM Treaty. And as we've found out from Radomir Bogdanov, the SDI program emerges as a motivation, so to say, for the United States Administration to abandon the ABM Treaty. In other words, would you equate the SDI with something extraordinary mentioned in that treaty that stipulates, that allows one country to abandon it? Is SDI (?all the same part way of) an extraordinary event, or what?

[Plekhanov] Well, you know I wouldn't really concentrate too much on that article in trying to find out why the United States is so anxious to abrogate the ABM Treaty. I think that the main reason for this change of U.S. policy away from constraint of the ABM Treaty is the fact that the current administration, and the political coalition which supports it, have a different approach to the matter of nuclear weapons, to the matter of usability of military force, than the administrations which existed in Washington in the 1970s. The basis of the ABM Treaty in 1972, which was signed in 1972, was the recognition by both the Soviet Union and the United States that the continuation of the nuclear arms race had become meaningless, because there is no such thing as a meaningful nuclear superiority, that nuclear war cannot really be won; and as a result one should recognize limitations on offensive nuclear weapons. And in combination with that one should strictly limit and reduce to the minimum the antiballistic missiles, the antiballistic missile systems. You see, the emergence of those ABM weapons was linked to the idea that you can really fight and win a nuclear war. Once you recognize that you can't do that you will be prepared to constrain both the offensive and defensive weapons. Now, when this administration, the Reagan administration, came to power in 1980 it brought with it a different, a different view

of what you can do with nuclear weapons. These people do believe in military superiority. These people do believe in having a capability to fight and win a nuclear war because they think that if you have such a capability, then that strengthens your hand in all international affairs.

[Kuznetsov] Yes, but hold it. But President Reagan has said a number of times that nuclear war is unwinnable and should not be fought.

[Plekhanov] Well, you know, if we analyze what American politicians do and say on the basis of written documents I think that's, that's, you can cite hundreds of instances where people say one thing and do another. There is such a thing as a credibility gap.

[Kuznetsov] The reason why I quoted Article 15 of the ABM Treaty is this: Remember how the United States violated the SALT II treaty and why? It stood in the way of the long-term program of rearming America, so they swept it away. SDI is still in the stage of research; it is not a weapon system yet, but they hope that in about 7 and 1/2 years to 10 years SDI will become a weapons system. As some supporters of the project say, for 30 billion dollars they can have in 7 and 1/2 years three layers of SDI weapons.

[Plekhanov] Well, that's that's baloney. I mean, no serious person really believes in that. I mean these people want a lot of money to go along with their program and they see the ABM Treaty as an obstacle to both the increase in funds and to the political underpinnings of such a system. That's why they push all those scenarios, there's a lot of (?tricking) in it.

[Kuznetsov] You say that SDI cannot be done?

[Plekhanov] No. In the, in the variant put forward by President Reagan in 1983 as a three-layered defense system which would protect the United States from missile attack, I think there is a solid consensus among serious researchers that it cannot be done. The problem is that other things can be done. You see the SDI could be sold to the American people only as such a comprehensive unpenetrable nuclear shield, because then you have a support -- well, this is just a defensive thing. But actually, under the umbrella of this quote defensive unquote idea, other things are being developed, like systems to fight wars in space, ABM systems to protect the missile-launching pads in the United States, or even systems which would be, would be good for operational fighting.

[Kuznetsov] I was about to ask you a question. Now, SDI in the current situation is a far cry from what it was described, say, 3 years ago, 4 years ago, when President Reagan first came up publicly with his announcement concerning Star Wars. First, then, what I mean is this. Very few people believe that SDI can be 100 percent leak proof.

[Plekhanov] Or even 90 percent.

[Kuznetsov] Even 90, perhaps, percent leak proof. Nobody is already talking about SDI being a protective cover for the population of the United States. Experts and specialists in the military are saying that SDI weapons are good for defending selected military targets and still they are pushing ahead with it.

[Bogdanov] Let me, let me make a few remarks about all that. I would not agree with my friend Sergey when he says that the serious researchers and serious people in USA do not believe in, in SDI. Maybe they don't. How is that concern us? We, as a serious people, in that case as a serious people, of course we listen [to] what they say, but first of all you should take into account what the people in power say because they have, number one, real power; number two, money; and they have brains which they are operating to produce those weapons. So I would not very much, you know, emphasize that point; we as a serious people, we should just take into account the serious part of that story and to get ready for an answer to that, and we have an answer to that, you know.

[Kuznetsov] Before we continue with discussing SDI, I would like to play to you two segments, two recordings made by SDI supporters. They are Congressman Jim Courter, Republican, New Jersey; and (Daniel Graham), a lieutenant general, retired SDI is his baby and both of them, and both of them appeared some time ago on a major American radio talk show, [title indistinct], so let's listen to what they say about SDI:

[Begin recording] [First voice, presumably that of Courter] The words star wars does trivialize the effort. It's a sincere effort to save human beings, it's a sincere effort to move from a doctrine of retaliation and revenge to one that's designed to save human life.

[Second voice, presumably Graham] We can put up defenses that cannot harm the hair on a Russian's head, or anybody else's. All they can do is stop weapons when they once have been fired and they're on their way to slaughter millions of people. So how anybody can call that an offensive weapon. [end recording]

[Bogdanov] Here exactly, you have exactly that what I have already mentioned. What they're talking about means what Sergey mentioned -- that they are (?staking) in terms of creating a cover, you know, comprehensive cover which will protect America as a whole, and American people from nuclear danger. That's the case when I can state with the fullest (?sensitivity), it's impossible. [laughter] Even the President -- (?he) has shifted now very much away from that concept -- knows (?that).

[Kuznetsov] What do you mean by shifted away from [word indistinct]?

[Bogdanov] From the comprehensive [words indistinct] shield of America. Then you hear another gentleman, Mr (Graham), who says that Russians will be spared. It's another -- you know, when I hear this kind of talk I'm always thinking: What for they are taking us? For fools, for naive?

Maybe that's for American consumption, not for our consumption, but let me explain to our American listeners that they should not trust all that because the other side has quite a different, you know, understanding and notion of SDI. We look at that as a first strike capability which is aimed (?at) disarming us, depriving, denying us retaliation capability.

[Kuznetsov] The Pentagon's budget proposal for 1988 provides for a massive hike for heavy spending on both nuclear arms and missile defenses. Now how does it tally with this formula advanced by the White House that while building up space defenses we're going to get rid of the nukes? This is something that was discussed in Reykjavik.

[Plekhanov] Right, it was discussed in Reykjavik; but after Reykjavik, in the United States, I think there has been a ground swell of support for, for nuclear weapons. I mean a lot of people in Washington are talking in the sense that, well, no we can't do away with nuclear weapons, and in fact the reason why the United States refuses to join our moratorium on nuclear testing is exactly that they want to continue to improve, to upgrade, to increase their nuclear offensive arsenal and we have to view that in conjunction with their effort on, on Star Wars. What they're doing, as we see it from Moscow, what they're doing is increasing their offensive potential; building new, more accurate and more deadly offensive nuclear weapons. And they are trying to back it up with a program of ABM, of antiballistic missile defense, which would be effective against a retaliatory strike in case they choose to strike first. And this is actually -- we are on record refusing to ever use nuclear weapons first. We made our pledge and that's a serious pledge, and it has entailed changes in our strategy. The United States and its allies in NATO are the only ones who incorporated the first use of nuclear weapons in their official doctrine. They haven't backed away from it. So we are confronted with that. A pledge to use nuclear weapons first, if and when they find it expedient, and a whole set of military technology designed to give the West a capability to prevail in a nuclear conflict. The madness of it all is that, actually, there is no way that anybody can prevail in nuclear conflict. So it all boils down to really a triumph of madness or reason.

[Kuznetsov] As time is running out on us, I would like to ask perhaps my final question. In defending his budget proposals for 1988, Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger said that it would be premature to cut spending on nuclear weapons until there is an agreement with the Soviet Union. What can you say about that?

[Plekhanov] The whole history of the arms race and arms control gives enough evidence to the opposite proposition, namely that if you want to continue the arms race you will build more nuclear weapons. If you want to stop it, you will sign treaties. So you can't really put a cart before a horse. What the United States is doing now is running away from an agreement, from an agreement which was so close at Reykjavik, and the administration is just running scared from that.

[Bogdanov] There is no (?guarantee) and there is no accord.

[Kuznetsov] Yes. What is kind of sinister, occurs to me, is that SDI is one of the fastest growing segments of the military budget.

[Plekhanov] Yes, in fact it is the fastest, according to the budget proposal that has been put forward by the Reagan administration.

[Kuznetsov] This brings us to the end of today's edition of Top Priority. I am Pavel Kuznetsov, your host, signing off. Goodbye till next week at the same time and on the same wavelength.

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CSO: 5200/1237

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

MOSCOW TV: U.S. 'STUNNED' BY SOVIET ARMS INITIATIVE

LD112254 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1500 GMT 11 Jan 87

[From the "International Panorama" program, presented by Vsevolod Ovchinnikov]

[Excerpts] Our country has entered the year during which the 70th anniversary of the October Revolution will be marked, and that means the 70th anniversary of Lenin's decree on peace. It would be worth reminding Western politicians of this. They complain of the unpredictability of Moscow's surprises. A year ago Washington was literally stunned by our 15 January statement. Indeed, all Kremlinologists, all the special services were as one in asserting that nothing could be expected from the Soviet side by way of major initiatives before the end of February; that is, before the party congress. But then, despite all the forecasts, the USSR put forward the idea of completely eliminating nuclear weapons before the end of the current decade.

Reykjavik again repeated something similar. The U.S. side was again stunned and thrown into disarray by the boldness of the Soviet proposals which enable mankind, as it were, to look across the horizon and see the contours of a nuclear-free world. But to be sure the Soviet package which was revealed in the Icelandic capital could hardly be considered a surprise. Its main points were predefined in the 15 January statement, and the 27th CPSU Congress declared the implementation of this program to be the central trend of USSR foreign policy for the years ahead. So then, if our opponents listened more attentively to the voice of Moscow they would need to be less astounded by what they pretend is a surprise.

Examples of this were provided recently by the visits by Comrade Ryzhkov to Finland and by Comrades Shevardnadze and Dobrynin to Afghanistan. Given the variety of local individual problems, political life everywhere, in the final analysis, revolves around these general cardinal questions: Will Moscow and Washington be able to move further from the lines established by Reykjavik? What will become of the Soviet moratorium? Will the Star Wars program remain a stumbling block along the path toward a nuclear free world? There is no getting away from such questions, especially in countries which are on the threshold of elections, for example the FRG.

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U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

CPSU'S ZAGLADIN INTERVIEWED ON ARMS INITIATIVES

LD082345 Budapest Television Service in Hungarian 2005 GMT 8 Jan 87

[From the "Panorama" program; interview with Vadim Zagladin, "deputy chief" of the CPSU Central Committee's International Department, by unidentified correspondent in Moscow; date of interview not given -- recorded; Zagladin's remarks in Russian with superimposed Hungarian translation; no video available]

[Text] [Announcer] The Soviet leadership often deals with a new outlook which asserts itself in foreign policy, and in the period after Reykjavik as well it has invariably pervaded the Moscow initiatives. Vadim Zagladin, deputy chief [as heard] of the CPSU International Department, spoke to "Panorama."

[Correspondent] How far can the Soviet Union go in the sphere of unilateral measures, demonstrating its own readiness for compromise?

[Zagladin] Of course, there is a limit to the unilateral measures, but the limit of the possibilities extends so far as our own security and that of our allies are not endangered. However, there is no limit to the readiness to take the initiative, and in my opinion there cannot be. It is precisely the contrary: the more complex the situation is, a policy that takes all the more initiative is necessary. A new approach, new solutions, new paths leading to the goal must be found, because the goal must not be relinquished. Indeed, it would be a crime to do so.

After Reykjavik we have had the feeling that in Washington they are simply afraid of an improvement in the situation; they are afraid of an improvement in our bilateral relations and of an improvement in the international atmosphere in general, or that maybe the arms race may cease. There is demagogic talk of striving for an improvement in relations and for a change in the international atmosphere, but they back down immediately as soon as there is a possibility of realistic progress. [passage indistinct] I would say, rather, that it would be more suitable for Washington if we were not to adopt any kind of measure, or if in response to its moves we were to strike the table with our fists. Their striving is to provoke us, but we must not raise these two [as heard], because it would be dangerous.

Another response must be found. It would be a mistake to leave the provocations without responding to them. However, the response must serve constructive progress. That is now most important, also because it is desired by great forces not only in our countries but also in the nonaligned countries -- let me refer to the Delhi declaration -- and elsewhere, for example, in the NATO countries, indeed, in the United States itself, too.

[Correspondent] A statement was recently made in Moscow to the effect that the bridge with the United States must be built from both sides. Can this bridge be built with an administration that is as extremely conservative as the Reagan administration?

[Zagladin] I would be curious about your opinion, too, because the point is whether they are building the bridge and because they are not building it. However, that is a different issue.

First, Comrade Gorbachev has met twice with the President. That has proved that it is possible to talk with him, and that relations can be established with him.

However, it is another issue that in some cases even if the President has the purest intentions, he also has an environment, those who work with him and who profess entirely different views. That can be assumed. It is a fact that after Reykjavik precisely this environment started to backtrack, furthermore, very quickly.

Second, what does it mean not to talk with this administration? Let us speculate that we decide to wait for the next president. There will be elections in 2 years' time. Experience shows that a new president, especially if he is a new person, needs at least 1 year in order to become accustomed to his new post, to master it, so at the least it would be 2.5-3 years. However, at the present rate of technical-scientific progress 2.5-3 years is a very long time. In that time it is possible to develop such weapons that there is no point in dialogue. Therefore we must continue to work with the administration that is in power. This is determined by the U.S. people, the U.S. voters. We have no other choice, there is no other possibility. So we will continue to work with this administration, although this is no easy task.

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SALT/START ISSUES

PRAVDA: MAKSIMOV REFUTES PERLE CLAIM OF NEW 'HEAVY' ICBM

PM121747 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 12 Jan 87 First Edition p 5

[Article by Army General Yu.P. Maksimov: "Mr Perle Is Fantasizing--With Malice"]

[Text] Addressing a briefing at the USIA Center the other day, R. Perle, U.S. assistant defense secretary, touched on a "report" obviously leaked to the American press by the Pentagon itself concerning the testing of a new "heavy" Soviet ICBM. [paragraph continues]

Perle said in this connection: "The missile you are talking about, like the SS-24s and SS-25s, represents the fifth generation of missiles. The treaty renounced by the President has therefore proved to be totally ineffectual with regard to restraining the Soviet Union in its development of a fifth generation of ICBMs. Despite all the fuss in the USSR over the elimination of nuclear weapons by the year 2000, it is continuing its extremely active program to further develop [razrabotka] and deploy [razvertyvaniye] its own nuclear ballistic missiles."

PRAVDA requested Army General Yu. P. Maksimov, commander in chief of Strategic Missile Forces, to comment on the American allegations. This is what he said:

Mr Perle's statement is absolutely groundless and is intended for laymen unfamiliar with the basic provision of the SALT II treaty. His fantasy about a new Soviet "heavy" missile is nothing but more lies.

We are developing [razrabatyvayem] no new "heavy" missile. It is clear that Mr Perle would like to make out that some work we are doing on our missiles on stand-by alert, which are known as SS-18s in the West, is actually the creation [sozdaniye] of a new "heavy" missile. This is not true, however, as the work being done has a quite different purpose -- to maintain the necessary degree of readiness in these missiles -- and is being carried out while taking existing accords strictly into account.

Naturally any arms, including strategic arms, eventually become obsolete and their use can no longer be guaranteed. They have to be replaced. This applies equally to Soviet and American arms. Replacing arms means they have to be tested -- and this is what is being done.

It is important to note in this respect -- a point Mr Perle preferred not to emphasize in his speech -- that the SALT II treaty stipulates a definite procedure for this kind of replacement, which sets clear-cut limits for possible modernization. The USSR has never exceeded these limits when replacing its strategic arms. And, in our current replacement process, we continue to adhere to the provisions of this important document, as stated by the Soviet Government on 5 December 1986.

The Soviet Union has created [sozdana] one light ICBM permitted by the SALT II treaty, which is known as the SS-24 in the West. This is a counterstep in response to the United States' creation [sozdaniye] and deployment [razvertyvaniye] of a new MX first-strike missile. We have modernized -- also in keeping with the provisions of the SALT II treaty -- a missile which went into commission about 15 years ago. It has been replaced by the missile known as the SS-25 in the West. All these measures are therefore within the bounds of the SALT II treaty.

What, however, is the real aim of statements like this by representatives of the U.S. Administration? It is quite obvious.

First and foremost -- to justify the unseemly action of the United States -- an action in fact condemned throughout the world -- in violating agreements on strategic arms limitation and presenting the SALT II treaty as allegedly ineffectual in restraining the buildup of Soviet strategic arms. In actual fact, the time-honored method of diverting attention from the United States' own actions to gain strategic superiority is once again being used.

The United States has stepped up work to increase its nuclear potential: the deployment [razvertyvaniye] of new MX ICBMs, Trident-2 SLBMs, and B-1B heavy bombers, the creation [sozdaniye] of a new type of mobile "Midgetmen" ICBM, the massive deployment [razvertyvaniye] of long-range cruise missiles, and the encirclement of USSR territory with forward-based nuclear weapons. In order to clear the way for these arms and justify the increase in its budget allocations for them, Washington has had to renounce the SALT II treaty. The U.S. Administration would very much like to blame the USSR for the undermining of the SALT accords and the buildup of strategic arms.

But these attempts are in vain! Those across the ocean cannot fail to realize that this kind of provocative -- in the literal sense of the word -- action by the Washington administration, which opens the floodgates for an unlimited strategic nuclear arms race, is causing justified alarm among all honest people of the world. And so Washington is stooping to this kind of juggling with the facts in order to distract the world public from condemnation of the present U.S. course aimed at revising the Reykjavik results and eroding the accords achieved there.

The Soviet Union believes, however, that there is still sufficient political wisdom both in the United States and outside it, as well as simply a sense of self-preservation, not to allow anyone to wreck the entire structure of strategic arms limitation accords which has existed for 15 years now. The greatness of a state, particularly a big one, now lies not in demonstrating its ability to endlessly augment and support the military machine or to chase after the specter of military superiority but in finding the possibility of living together with others.

At a meeting in the Kremlin with American Senator Gary Hart, M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, stressed that talks with any administration on the problems of ending the arms race have a future only in the context of moving on from Reykjavik. Rejecting Reykjavik is tantamount to rejecting the policy of disarmament.

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SALT/START ISSUES

USSR: MISSILE FORCES POLITICAL CHIEF ON CURRENT CONCERNS

PM201613 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 19 Nov 86 First Edition p 2

[Article by Colonel General V. Rodin, member of the Military Council and chief of the Strategic Missile Forces Political Directorate: "The Fatherland's Reliable Shield"]

[Excerpt] In recognition of artillerymen's services in combat the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium decreed in 1944 that an annual holiday--Artillery Day--should be marked on 19 November, the day of the historic artillery barrage at Stalingrad in 1942 which heralded the beginning of our counteroffensive on the banks of the Volga.

Since 1964, 19 November has been celebrated as Missile Troop and Artillery Day. The holiday's change of name reflected the radical qualitative changes which had taken place in the Army and Navy in the postwar years and the creation of a new branch of the Soviet Armed Forces--the Strategic Missile Troops--as a countermeasure to the threat by the aggressive forces of imperialism to unleash a nuclear missile war against our country.

The creation of a nuclear missile shield was an outstanding achievement by the Soviet people. It demonstrated socialism's inexhaustible potential. Our enemies had banked on the USSR being unable, in the very difficult postwar years, when the economy in many regions had to be revived and the after-effects of the war against fascism eliminated, to find a swift and fitting response to the transatlantic atomic blackmail. However, Soviet people, under the leadership of the Communist Party, successfully resolved that task and cooled down those reckless fomentors of a new world war.

This year the traditional missile- and artillerymen's holiday takes on special features and has a special point. It is being marked at a time of dramatic change in Soviet society's life--change initiated and directed by the party on the basis of the 27th CPSU Congress' program directives. The party's course of speeding up the country's socioeconomic development and its call for a radical restructuring of all our work have roused Soviet people.

The Communist Party and the Soviet state are consistently and persistently pursuing their foreign policy course, distinguished by its scale, sober

realism, bold political thinking, and readiness to seek mutually acceptable decisions in the interests of ensuring peace and improving the international situation. The Soviet Union's principled stand and proposals at the Soviet-American meeting in Reykjavik are a convincing expression of this.

How, then, does the United States respond to this? It does so with the notorious SDI program. But that is not all. The other day the press published a report that four MX first-strike ICBM's had been installed on launchpads at the USAF's Warren base and made combat-ready. It is reported that a further 6 such missiles will be deployed in December and that the total will reach 50 by the end of next year.

But those who suppose it possible to dictate their will to the Soviet Union are grievously in error. And it is appropriate to remind today's aspirants to world domination of the lessons of history, which indicate that attempts to speak to us from a position of strength are doomed to failure. "The Soviet Union," M. S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, observed, "has the means to meet any challenge if need be. Soviet people know it, the whole world should know it."

In single combat formation with the Soviet Armed Forces, the Strategic Missile Forces and artillery servicemen mount vigilant and reliable guard over their people's peaceful labor. Today the units and subunits of the Strategic Missile Forces are equipped with the most sophisticated weapons and combat equipment, whose potential to destroy targets is virtually limitless in range and power. Together with the strategic forces of the Navy and Air Force, they form the basis of the USSR Armed Forces' combat might and are a powerful factor in curbing the aggressive aspirations of reaction and a reliable means for preserving peace on our planet.

Missilemen and artillerymen are hailing their holiday with new successes in improving combat training. The units and subunits in which A. Vasilyev, V. Gornostayev, I. Molozhayev, Yu. Novoseltsev, A. Perminov and other officers serve have achieved high indicators.

But it is not in the nature of missilemen and artillerymen to rest on their laurels. They realize that the process of enhancing combat readiness is an ongoing one. Demands are increasing today, particularly as the danger of imperialist wars and military conflicts being launched is entirely realistic.

Being on standby alert is basic to a missileman's service. It is a task of state importance. The whole system of his training and education and the whole of party political work are geared to ensuring that it is performed to a high standard. As always, the leading questions relate to inculcating in crew members high moral and combat qualities, martial skills, and a thorough appreciation of the responsibility vested in missilemen for the fatherland's security and of the need to show the highest vigilance and combat readiness in conditions of a growing military threat from imperialism.

We have evolved a system of work here which has stood the test of time. Life does not stand still, however, and we are therefore constantly seeking out

more effective forms and methods of influencing people. Constant liaison between commanders and political workers and those at combat posts is characteristic here. The individual approach makes it possible to develop in a serviceman in the most expedient way possible the very highest degree of inner discipline and readiness to act swiftly, competently, and skillfully in conditions of maximum physical, moral, and psychological pressure.

As is well known, firm military discipline is a very important element of combat readiness. The whole system of political, military, and moral education and legal propaganda, the daily activity of commanders, party, and komsomol organizations in introducing the requirements of the law and military regulations into the personnel's duty, life and daily round, and the efforts of the army community are directed toward strengthening it. We attach particular importance to the role of officers, to ensuring that they set an example and step up their organizational and educational work.

We cannot claim today that all the tasks facing us are being resolved as we would wish. We are particularly disturbed by the fact that a number of party organizations are proving slow to restructure their work and its effectiveness in improving the qualities of combat and political training and strengthening order and discipline is slight. The party report and election meetings now taking place in units and subunits confirm that a lot of hard work lies ahead of us.

What is at issue here is the restructuring of military cadres' psychology and thinking in the spirit of the new approaches formulated at the congress and the jettisoning of outmoded stereotypes. We are seeking to ensure that every serviceman, from private to general, really grasps the essence of the innovatory proposals put forward by the party and under no circumstances allows any disparity to occur between word and action. We are seeking to work on people's awareness and make them active and receptive to new ideas, and thereby raise the level of their intellectual activity even more.

An atmosphere of rigorous exactingness and more stringent criteria in assessing what has been achieved in being established with increasing determination in units and subunits.

We have also been governed by these criteria in drawing up the annual results. Some people were surprised and some aggrieved by this: Certain military collectives' results were below the level they had pledged. But, on the other hand, this is promoting a professional attitude: People are becoming ever more deeply aware that strict exactingness and an uncompromising approach to shortcomings are the norm and law of our life. And if people are held strictly accountable, that means that others have confidence in them.

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SALT/START ISSUES

FRG EDITORIAL REACTION TO U.S. VIOLATION OF SALT II LIMITS

Little Change Seen

Bonn DIE WELT in German 3 Dec 86 p 2

[Article by Fritz Wirth: "Artificial SALT-Commotion"]

[Text] There are affairs in politics which owe their existence to the desire for contradiction. The present lamentation over SALT II, this problem child of the detente era, is one of them. For this agreement--a fiction as a treaty since it never received the blessing of ratification by the American Senate--has become a barometer of the East-West climate: Don't rattle it, the needle could slide to an absolute low.

In other words, what we have here is a non-treaty, whose non-existence ended officially in December 1985. This was the agreement reached by President Ford and General Secretary Brezhnev in November 1974. The paradox: As long as the non-treaty officially led an empty life, it was intensively violated by the Soviets. In which there is, after all, a certain logic. They did not violate a valid law, they violated a gentlemen's agreement. Tough security policy, in the Soviet view, was never a matter of and for gentlemen.

Nevertheless, when the non-treaty had ended its empty life and during the past week was now for the first time violated--openly and with precise indication of the time--by the United States, the great public lamentation over the American spoil-sports ensued. And thus, to bring the paradox to its crowning conclusion, on the stage of world politics the Soviets stand as the SALT-gentlemen and the USA as the scoundrels.

SALT II was a well-intentioned but not a good treaty. It was well-intentioned because it sought to set limits to the nuclear arms race. It was not good because its terminology was imprecise. Thus, for example, it limited rocket launchers, but not the rockets. Moreover, the limitation of warheads set forth in this treaty is not verifiable. Finally, it permits the development of a new rocket type, without precisely establishing the criteria for determining when a rocket is new and when it is merely a development of an existing rocket.

During the past years, the Soviets have made calculated use of the gaps and imprecisions of this treaty. In addition to the new, permitted rocket, the SS-24, they built a second new rocket type, the SS-25, and called it simply the further

development of their old SS-13. In addition, in violation of the treaty, they encoded their telemetric signals during rocket tests, which made the verification of these tests impossible. All of this had been known for years. Nevertheless, hardly anyone among today's Reagan-critics breathed a word. They wanted to maintain the fiction.

Only the undemanding formula "better something than nothing" occurred to the former secretary of state, Alexander Haig, in 1982 in defense of this treaty. But precisely here lies the misunderstanding of the Reagan-critics. They insinuate that Reagan sacrificed this something in the way of a disarmament agreement to a new unrestricted rocket armament. It so beautifully confirms their "Rambo"-picture of this President. In actual fact, the only signal he sent out with his SALT-decision reads: This treaty is useless. We need a new and better one.

It is therefore time to conduct the SALT-debate more calmly and free of ideology-saturated and election-oriented polemics. For the foreseeable future, Reagan's decision will neither result in a dramatic increase of the American nuclear potential nor induce the Soviets to a new armament-orgy. During the past few decades they have always done what they regarded as necessary in terms of security policy--with and without SALT.

There remains the argument that Reagan's abrogation is a serious setback to the Geneva disarmament negotiations. The facts, however, speak against this. One recalls the fact that the decision is not of recent vintage, but was in principle already announced on 27 May of this year. Until that 27 May nothing decisive had happened in the Geneva disarmament negotiations. During the preceding 14 months, little more than hot air had been contributed to these negotiations. Notably, however, all relevant Soviet disarmament proposals came after the SALT-decision of 27 May. It did not discourage the Soviets, rather, in the words of Max Kampelman, the U.S. chief negotiator, it was "exceedingly helpful for the further course of our talks."

Whether coincidence or higher Kremlin-strategy: This past Tuesday, 4 days after the first official American contravention of SALT, American and Soviet disarmament negotiators met in Geneva for unscheduled disarmament talks. It may be assumed that Karpov lodged an official protest, as he did after 27 May as well, and then got down to business. Max Kampelman, an American Democrat, who can hardly be given the Rambo-label and who like hardly anyone else knows the motives and strategies of Soviet disarmament negotiators, declared recently: "The chief goal of our SALT-decision is to make it clear to the Soviets how serious we are about a useful and durable disarmament agreement. I believe they got the message."

Kampelman, furthermore, is the author of the maxim: "I have ceased to judge the Soviets on the basis of their words. Only their actions count for me." Those who at present are so intensively concerned about the wrath and the further goodwill of the Soviets, should comprehend their outraged words as what they are meant to be--as remote weapons without telemetric code, as propaganda.

Reagan Loses Disarmament Opportunity

Berlin DIE TAGESZEITUNG in German 29 Nov 86 p 1

[Editorial by Bn: "Exceeding of SALT-II"]

[Text] With the commissioning of its 131st B-52 bomber equipped with cruise missiles, the United States has exceeded the upper limit of the SALT-II Agreement. In so doing, for all practical purposes, an agreement with the Soviet Union is being scrapped that, along with the ABM-Treaty on the limitation of antiballistic missile systems, constituted one of the two supporting pillars of American-Soviet armament control agreements.

To be sure, this solitary step by President Reagan, which after the Iran debacle again creates insecurity among the European allies and calls into doubt the wisdom of the foreign policy currently being pursued in Washington, had already been advised in May of the past year and justified with Soviet violations of SALT-II. Nevertheless it takes place against the counsel of the other NATO-allies, who are now subjecting the United States to more or less open criticism.

It is a fact that the agreement signed by U.S. president Carter in 1979 in Vienna, which limited the number of rocket systems with multiple warheads to 1,320 each, was not ratified by the U.S. Congress because of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Nevertheless, it was agreed on both sides to observe the agreement. Violations of this set of agreements, at any rate, had up to now not been openly announced and could probably in part be explained also on the basis of the complexity of the matter. Differences in interpretation developed, say, over the question of whether a newly introduced rocket really constituted a new weapons category or merely the modernization of an already existing weapon.

With the open disregard of the established limits, an instrument of armament control is being cast aside which, in spite of all its imperfection, could possibly have been further developed. At least this is the perception of the European NATO-allies and also the Canadian government. Here again a lack of harmonization becomes obvious, which scared the Europeans already after Reagan's uncoordinated proposal in Reykjavik concerning the reduction of American intermediate-range ballistic missiles in Europe.

SALT II would prove to be superfluous only in the event that it should prove possible in Geneva to transform the existing plans for a 50-percent reduction of the nuclear arsenals into a binding agreement. If not, the abolition of this assuredly defective armament control agreement could signal an increased missile race.

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INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

RED STAR ON BRITISH PLANNING ON LIMITED NUCLEAR CONFLICT

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 19 Nov 86 p 3

[Article by Col I. Nikolayev under the rubric "Ironie Commentary": "On the Secret Herring and Nuclear Conflict"]

[Text] Say what you may, but people are wrong to accuse the British Conservatives of ignoring the realities of the nuclear age. No, the Tories are working day and night to neatly fit these realities into their own militaristic thinking.

Proof of this is an article recently published in the British newspaper GUARDIAN. It states that in October the British Defense Ministry prepared a secret report for the government, which set forth their plan for feeding the residents of foggy Albion at a time described in equally foggy terms as the period "following a nuclear war." Furthermore, specialists from the War Department have performed some mind-boggling (it can be called nothing else!) practical work: they have prepared 56 million food cards and made up instructions which establish both the procedure for obtaining these food warrants and the very procedure for using them.

You know, of course, why British military officials had to keep this astounding program a secret? God forbid that the Russians should learn such a secret as the fact that there are 56 million mouths to feed in the British Isles. Or-- horrors!--that they should learn that plans are being made for feeding them following a nuclear conflict. They might also reveal such top-secret information as whether smoked herring will continue to be an indispensable dish on the Britisher's lunch menu!

It is also better to keep this program a secret from the British rank and file. This is the only way to conceal the militaristic way of thinking, with its schizoid tendency, of those in charge of the British War Department.

It should be stated that the "secret" griffin has partly achieved its goal. Only the GUARDIAN dared to publish information on the food program. Other newspapers refrained out of fear of repression for "divulging secret plans." This is no laughing matter!

Nor were the ordinary British people who read the GUARDIAN article up to laughing. It was British scientists, after all, who calculated that it would only take four megaton-class atomic charges to end life on the British Isles once and for all,

even the isles themselves. A picture was recently shown on London television, which described what would be left of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland following the limited employment of nuclear weapons. The picture was compiled by a computer from data provided by those same British scientists. It was an extremely tragic picture: a handful of small, lifeless islands only remotely resembling the general outlines of the present British Isles.

These gloomy forecasts by the physicists, who are not inclined to joke about serious matters, show the full absurdity of the food card concept. Neither the consumers nor the food or even the cards themselves would be left. The entire secret food program was thus a foolish undertaking.

Not just the British military, however, but also their oversea "cousins," have engaged in equally foolish undertakings in the British Isles. Another London newspaper, the OBSERVER, has reported that American military pilots from the 527th Regiment, based not far from Cambridge, held "dressing-up games." During the games, U.S. combat aircraft, representing a "Soviet enemy making a surprise attack on an international airport," were repainted to resemble Soviet aircraft and employed Soviet tactics and the Soviet manner of flying.

The organizers of these games should know that such actions are regarded by international law as provocational and are absolutely forbidden, that they create the conditions for the outbreak of a nuclear conflict. One can only assume that the American airmen suddenly got the idea of seeing how the British War Department's food card system would work....

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INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

FRG'S KOHL COMMENTS ON TWO-TRACK DECISION

DW121155 Mainz ZDF Television Network in German 2045 GMT 9 Jan 87

["Excerpts" of speech by Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl at a CDU election campaign meeting in Ludwigshafen on 9 January, on the "Heute Journal" program — recorded]

[Text] Given the Soviet Union's stepped-up armament, the NATO two-track decision in 1979 was aimed at signalling to the Soviets that if they were not ready to hold real disarmament negotiations — including verification of disarmament worldwide — the alliance would deploy intermediate-range missiles in central Europe, including in Germany. The Soviets fear those missiles. Helmut Schmidt and his government failed over the issue. There was no betrayal. As on all other issues, the Social Democrats deserted the colors. They embarked on a road into a nebulous future to our country's extreme left — something I deeply regret, because we need a stable SPD as one of the strong pillars of our Republic. That is my understanding of the party landscape in the FRG.

We have deployed the intermediate-range missiles against embittered opposition, primarily from the left. You still see them — hundreds of thousands of demonstrators. Some of them are present here in the hall, ladies and gentlemen. But they can only applaud because we have the Bundeswehr and NATO. That is the point.

We began deployment, not because we were or are addicted to missiles, but because we considered it our duty to meet the Soviet challenge. I said at the time that we want to create peace with fewer weapons. I stick to that goal.

I do not see a reason for East and West to continue to intensify armament. I also do not see why our own country — specifically here in our homeland, the Palatinate — should be crammed with weapons like no other region anywhere. We want to get rid of those mountains of weapons. We all hope that we will never need them. However, the weapons have protected peace and our country's, the Federal Republic's, freedom. Every one should be aware of that. The fact that there has been peace for 40 years, which is a long time in German history, is also attributable to those weapons and to our defense readiness. You cannot have freedom with cost.

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INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

FRG'S GENSCHER ASSESSES NUCLEAR MISSILES ISSUE

LD041712 Hamburg DPA in German 1535 GMT 4 Jan 87

[Text] Bonn, 4 Jan (DPA) — West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher (FDP) has come out against a correction of the course of foreign policy desired by CSU politicians, particularly departing from the detente policy of the 1970's. In an interview with Radio Luxembourg today, Genscher also opposed demands to bring in new, short-range nuclear missiles in connection with the removal of intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe. He also called for maintaining the restrictive arms export policy.

Anyone who did not want to keep the detente policy of the 1970's was also saying no to the treaties with the Eastern bloc states. Genscher was here referring to an interview given by CSU Bundestag group leader Theo Waigel in the *Cologne Express*. The question of whether this policy should be changed or not will be more important before this general election than had been the case with many previous ones, he said. Foreign policy was going to be a decisive issue in the election. Many citizens knew that such voices as those of the CSU politician would have a greater chance of having their way if the CDU/CSU got an absolute majority in the Bundestag.

Genscher again called for implementing the zero solution on intermediate-range missiles. He hoped that the Soviet Union would abandon the linkage with SDI, and that on the other side

[the West] those voices that "now wanted to link this zero solution with other conditions" would not gain the upper hand. He answered "no" to the question on whether new short-range nuclear missiles were necessary on the western side. A balance ought to be brought about through negotiations. Negotiations should then aim at removing Soviet preponderance of intermediate-range missiles with a shorter range.

Genscher stressed that the Federal Government had never left any doubt that it would stick to the goal of a zero solution. Anyone who now wanted to break away from that was open to suspicion that he "was not serious in backing the zero solution" in the counter-arming debate in 1983, but only did so in the "sure expectation that the Soviet Union would reject it." As the Soviet Union had, in fact, not rejected it, the "hour of truth" has come.

Genscher went on to say that Bonn's restrictive arms export policy had great advantages. Because of this policy the Federal Republic had never become involved in conflicts in other regions of the world, such as in the Near East, while it had at the same time been able to increase the export of civil products to this region. He saw broad support for this approach from the coalition partner. However, anyone who wanted to turn the Federal Republic into "the No 1 arms exporter" should say so before the election.

The text of the interview was released to DPA.

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CSO: 5200/2484

EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

USSR MARSHAL KULIKOV STATEMENT ON WARSAW PACT-NATO CONTACTS

AU081226 Sofia NARODNA ARMIYA in Bulgarian 7 Jan 87 p 4

[Statement by Marshal of the Soviet Union Viktor Kulikov, commander in chief of the Warsaw Pact Joint Armed Forces: "We Are In Favor of Direct Contacts Between the Warsaw Pact and NATO" -- no further background details provided]

[Text] New prospects are opening up in connection with the solution of European security problems. They were mapped out at the Reykjavik meeting between Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan. This shows that the East-West dialogue has reached a new level and that there is a real possibility of rescuing the Europeans from the fear of being annihilated by a nuclear war.

The question now is how to make use of this opportunity.

I would like to point out that neither the USSR nor the Warsaw Pact has ever been striving, or is striving to establish hegemony in Europe or in the world. We have no other military doctrine than defense.

I do not think for a moment that people in Western Europe are unaware of this fact. People in those countries also know that the East European states have adopted considerable and energetic steps to improve the political atmosphere on the continent. These steps are in implementation of the new political thought and they show what this new political way of thinking should look like under the conditions existing in present-day Europe. These steps include the Comprehensive Program for Creating a Nuclear-Free World by 2000, which was presented in Mikhail Gorbachev's declaration of 15 January 1986. I think that the Soviet moratorium on nuclear tests, which has lasted for more than 500 days confirms this program. We must add that, in the meantime, the Americans have carried out 24 nuclear weapons tests.

The program for the limitation of armed forces and conventional arms in Europe; the proposals to free Europe from chemical weapons and establish nuclear-free zones in the Balkans, in central and northern Europe and in other areas of our continent; and the proposal to sign a treaty with the NATO member-states on the non-use of military force, on maintaining peaceful relations, and on the establishment of direct contacts between the two organizations for the purpose of pursuing the dialogue -- I think that all these measures serve as examples of the basically new approach adopted by the Warsaw Pact member-states to the problems of European security.

At the same time the West European governments and influential people within NATO pretend to be totally unaware of our proposals. They maintain their adherence to the

old approach, namely that mountains of weapons serve the preservation of peace. They continue to express their "concern" and their "lack of confidence in the future," and would like to "learn the truth about the intentions of the Soviet Union today, tomorrow, and the day after tomorrow." The question spontaneously arises: If you are in doubt, why do you not respond to our proposals? If you consider these proposals as being to your disadvantage, let us look together for mutually acceptable variations. We are ready for a sincere exchange of opinions, as long as this is to the advantage of detente.

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CSO: 5200/1260

RELATED ISSUES

GORBACHEV'S NEW YEAR ADDRESS: DOOR 'OPEN FOR TALKS'

PM011500 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 1 Jan 87 First Edition p 1

["New Year Address to the Soviet People by CPSU Central Committee General Secretary M. S. Gorbachev"--PRAVDA headline]

[Excerpt]

Nowadays, however, good wishes alone are not enough; we must also have good deeds. Our earthly home has never before been subject to such danger. Too many weapons have piled up in it; these must not be built up further, we must not permit a catastrophe.

The situation of nuclear confrontation requires fresh approaches in international politics. The Soviet Union has come forward with wide-ranging peaceful initiatives in the name of improving the international climate. We invested the maximum of goodwill in our proposals in Reykjavik. That was a moment when mankind had a look beyond the horizon, so to speak, and saw the outline of a nuclear-free world. Unfortunately, the reaction of many political figures in the West to Reykjavik showed just how strong the stereotypes of the old, conservative thinking still are, just how far the policies of some governments are from the genuine hopes of the peoples.

We sincerely stretch out the hand of friendship and cooperation to all who are in favor of immediate talks on a total end to nuclear tests, of reduction and total elimination of nuclear weapons, and of development of international relations on the principles of equality and universal security. Our door remains open for talks.

But another thing must be clear to all -- our love of peace has nothing to do with weakness. The peaceful labor of Soviet people is reliably protected. The USSR Armed Forces, mighty and equipped with all they need, stand guard over the gains of socialism.

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CSO: 5200/1205

RELATED ISSUES

SHEVARDNADZE, CSSR'S CHNOUPEK DISCUSS SPACE ARMS, TESTING, MBFR

LD202036 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1810 GMT 20 Dec 86

[Text] Moscow, 20 Dec (TASS) -- Eduard Shevardnadze, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR foreign minister, met today with Bohuslav Chnoupek, member of the CPCZ Central Committee and CSSR foreign minister, who made a short stopover in Moscow on the way from Beijing and Ulaanbaatar.

During the course of the conversation, the ministers expressed satisfaction with the dynamic development of Soviet-Czechoslovak cooperation in all spheres, its further improvement and deepening, in accordance with the decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress and the 17th CPCZ Congress, and with the principled directives of the working group of the leaders of fraternal parties that took place on 10-11 November in Moscow. The growing significance of united action by the socialist community countries in the fight for peace and social progress during the present difficult international situation was noted.

During the discussion of international problems, attention was focused on questions connected with halting the arms race on earth and preventing its spread into space, and with establishing a comprehensive system of peace and international security.

It was indicated that the complex of peace initiatives submitted by M.S. Gorbachev on 15 January of this year remains a constructive platform for the struggle of peace-loving forces to abolish nuclear and all other weapons of mass destruction in a historically short space of time. That this is a realistic program was vividly demonstrated at the Soviet-U.S. summit meeting in Reykjavik, which, however, also revealed the main obstacle in the way of a nonnuclear world: The desire of the United States to gain military superiority, to break through into near-Earth space with fundamentally new types of weapons, and to stubbornly continue its nuclear test program, including those aimed at creating such weapons.

The USSR and the CSSR stress with all certainty that they are prepared to actively continue striving for the beginning of specific [predmetnyy] talks on the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe, as set forth in the Budapest address of the Warsaw Pact participant states in June this year. The ministers expressed regret that NATO has to this day declined to respond to the proposal for contacts and the beginning of dialogue between Marshal V.G. Kulikov and General B. Rogers, commanders in chief of the Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact and NATO, between the general secretaries of the alliances G. Krolikovskiy and P. Carrington, and between the appropriate working groups. The ministers drew attention to the fact that these serious proposals remain in force and call upon all NATO member states to respond to them in a constructive spirit.

B. Chnoupek stressed that the Czechoslovak side expresses full support for the Soviet Union's decision to halt its unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests after the first nuclear blast in the United States in the coming year, for this forced measure was dictated exclusively by the security interests of the USSR and its allies due to the nuclear explosions ringing out in U.S. test areas without any respite. On the Soviet side, attention was again drawn to the fact that the Soviet Union is prepared to retain its moratorium in the future until the first nuclear blast by the United States in 1987, and is proposing that full-scale talks should be begun on the complete banning of nuclear tests.

The exchange of views showed that the proposals put forward by the CPSU Central Committee general secretary in his speeches during his recent visit to India, and the principles and ideas contained in the Delhi declaration, are at the center of attention of the governments and public of the widest range of countries, and that they are paving the way toward improving the international political climate, the settlement of conflict situations, the normalization of interstate relations, and the strengthening of the foundations of peace and security.

The conversation, which passed in a cordial and comradely atmosphere, again demonstrated the complete unity of views on all the issues discussed.

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CSO: 5200/1205

RELATED ISSUES

SOVIET GENERAL ON INTERNATIONAL TENSIONS, DANGER OF WAR

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 10, May 86 pp 14-21

[Article by Maj Gen M. Yasyukov, Doctor of Philosophical Sciences, Professor: "The Problem of War and Peace -- The Most Critical Problem of Modern Times"; passages enclosed in slantlines printed in boldface]

[Text] The documents from the 27th CPSU Congress give a deep and complete Marxist-Leninist analysis of the main tendencies and specifics of world development in modern times. This development is now at a critical point. "The arms race started by imperialism," explains the Central Committee Political Report to the Congress, "has resulted in the 20th Century in world politics ending with the question of whether humanity will manage to elude the nuclear danger or if the policy of confrontation will take precedence, increasing the probability of nuclear conflict."

The concept of an all-encompassing international security system is the key to grasping the problem of war and peace -- the most critical problem of modern times. The conclusion of our party's highest forum is well defined: international security is a political task and may only be solved by political means.

* * *

Through the centuries the exploitive classes and their apologists have advanced and disseminated views glorifying war. At the same time wars were not only unavoidable but also "profitable," that is, the goals, which were attained in them by one of the belligerents, "repaid" the expenditures in conducting them with interest. The destruction and casualties, which were inflicted on the people, were not figured into the calculations of the ruling classes. Angry protests against wars by many of the leading thinkers of the past remained voices crying in the wilderness. The moral condemnation of all wars by pacifists had no practical effect either.

Classical Marxism-Leninism decisively rejected the bias and stereotypical thinking of the non-historical approach to war. V. I. Lenin said: "War is most diverse, complex and multifaceted. It is impossible to approach it with

a universal stereotype" (Complete Collected Works, Vol. 49, p. 369). Each war should be studied within concrete historical situations. "One cannot comprehend a given war," Vladimir Ilych wrote, "without an understanding of the era" (Ibid., Vol. 49, p. 287). Lenin's position has great methodological significance in explaining the characteristics of the modern age which have moved the problem of war and peace to center stage in international politics. What are these characteristics?

First, the modern world, overloaded with dangers and contradictions, is enduring a period, as emphasized at the 27th CPSU Congress, almost as alarming as any in history. In the first half of the eighties the rightist group which has come to power in the United States and Washington's main fellow-travelers in NATO veered from detente toward a policy of military force. They are the most zealous champions of social revanchism, aggression and adventurism and these policies are constantly generated by imperialism by the force of their social nature. The most bellicose concepts and doctrines are introduced by them and the material and psychological preparations for war are being brought to unprecedented levels. The U.S. military-industrial machine is turning at full speed.

All this has sharply strained relations between the United States and the USSR and between the two opposing social systems and intensified the threat of nuclear war. The predatory appetites of overseas weapons manufacturers, military bureaucrats, mercenary economic monopoly interests as well as the fears of the imperialist bourgeoisie of the progressive process of history and the desire of socialism to solve the serious, fundamental problems are pushing the administration in Washington.

Second, the expanding scientific-technical revolution which has also deeply involved military affairs determines the character of the modern age. "A qualitative leap was registered in humanity's productive forces," noted the CPSU Central Committee Political Report. "But there was also a qualitative leap in means of destruction, in military matters, endowing man for the first time in history with the physical capacity for destroying all life on earth."

Science and technology has never played a role such as in our time. According to calculations of scholars, more than half of the total material wealth has been created in the lifetime of the present generation on the basis of the most recent scientific-technical achievements. But the scientific-technical revolution has expressed itself in different facets and results in the different socio-political systems. Under the force of class egotism and for the sake of the leading elites in the capitalist world, imperialism has turned the creativity of the minds and hands of men against themselves and given military preparation a new quality. Militarism is becoming the ugliest and most dangerous monster of the 20th Century and through its efforts the most advanced scientific-technical thought is being fused into weapons of mass destruction.

During the post-war period, by the beginning of the seventies, the United States of America had initiated the creation [sozdanie] of more than 20 major weapons systems. At the end of the seventies and the beginning of the eighties, American imperialism forced through military programs in the area of creating [sozdanie] new weapons systems and new combat methods of operation. U. S. ruling circles intensively deployed air, land and sea-based offensive

strategic forces and developed weapons based on new physical principles. Between 1970 and 1980 the number of American strategic nuclear weapons increased from 5000 to 10,000 units and in the near future they hope to reach 17,000. The administration in Washington is reorganizing its armed forces, providing for a significant increase in their combat capabilities.

Other NATO countries are also making intensive military preparations. Their armed forces in Europe now number more than 3 million men, approximately 17,000 tanks, more than 4000 combat aircraft and a little more than 7000 nuclear weapons. These are mainly mass professional armies urgently preparing for war.

Finally, Washington began moving toward realizing the so-called "Strategic Defense Initiative" (SDI) which proposes to create [sozdanie] space strike weapons based on new physical principles and to deploy an ABM system with space-based elements. Military businesses are already counting on the profits from the future production of space strike systems, various types of lasers, particle beam weapons, electromagnetic rail guns, and so forth, intended for the realization of the adventuristic "Star Wars" plans.

Intensifying the arms race, American imperialism fosters the nonsensical concept of finding an "absolute weapon" against socialism to achieve decisive military superiority over the USSR and the Warsaw Pact Organization and to economically exhaust the socialist countries to force them to submit to its will.

However, the experience of history testifies to the illusory and highly fallacious nature of similar ideas. The Soviet Union has everything necessary to respond in the area of strengthening its security and the security of our socialist allies. The arms race developed by the U.S. lead only to the fact that mountains of nuclear arms have been accumulated in the world. "Continuing such a race on earth and, still more, spreading it into space," noted Comrade M. S. Gorbachev at the 27th CPSU Congress, "step up the already critically high pace of accumulation and improvement in nuclear weapons. The situation in the world could become such that it would no longer depend on the reason or will of politicians; it will find itself in the captivity of technology and of military and technocratic logic. Consequently, not only nuclear war itself but also preparation for it -- that is, the arms race /is an inspiration to military superiority and cannot objectively bring political gain to anyone./

All this requires an in-depth reevaluation of the historical experience and a decisive break with the mode of thought and action which over the centuries have been built on the acceptability and permissibility of war and military conflict.

But the development of new concepts and new modes of operation in the international arena is a hard, complex and contradictory process. Until now, as the facts show, the reactionary circles of imperialism and the right wing of the U.S. monopoly bourgeoisie continue to follow a policy of total hostility and racheting up the danger of nuclear conflict. The nuclear explosions set off by the United States in April 1986 again clearly showed

that the U.S. administration is in reality hiding its intention to further threaten mankind with the nuclear sword and to hold the world in the trap of terror behind the words of its adherence to the goal of eliminating nuclear weapons.

Third, a characteristic of the period adding extreme sharpness to the problem of war and peace is the complication of all systems of international relations. A great and complex world of free countries have risen from the ruins of imperialism's colonial system. Imperialism leaves these states an inheritance of not only economic backwardness, but also many ethnic, border and religious problems which lead to sharp conflicts. The neocolonialist policies of the imperialist powers, the exacerbation of intra-class contradictions, mercenary interests of the tribal aristocracy and the bourgeoisie arising in many liberated countries and the lack of the necessary experience in state government -- these and other phenomena became destabilizing factors in the development of many Asian, African and Latin American states.

But main among them is the refinement of the neocolonial exploitation system. In just the past decade the profits U.S. corporations have drained out of developing countries are four times greater than their investments and in the Latin American and Caribbean region this indicator is twice as high -- 8 times. The external debt of the liberated countries has reached a trillion dollars. Militarism which wastes billions on the arms race is directly interested in maintaining and solidifying the system of neocolonial over-exploitation. The liberated peoples cannot, of course, be resigned to this. Military power, on which the U.S. places its hope to maintain the status quo, protect the interests of monopoly and the military industrial complex and prevent further progressive transformations in liberated countries, may only complicate the situation and engender new conflicts.

A serious breeding ground for military danger, created by imperialism in the Near and Middle East area, constantly threatens to expand the zone of military conflicts. The U.S. does not simply support Israeli expansionism, but constantly threatens to use its own armed forces. A clear example of this is the clearly aggressive actions of American military against Libya. Counterrevolution and imperialism have changed democratic Afganistan into an open wound. Washington is conducting more ferocious counterrevolutionary acts against Nicaragua, and giving complete support to the Somosista bands of "contras", mercenaries and bandits in Angola, Mozambique and so forth.

In short, the military threat being continued by imperialism exists on many levels, beginning with local and regional conflicts and right through to the growing threat of a general nuclear catastrophe.

Under these conditions, especially acute is the both theoretical and practical question of not only preventing a world war and eliminating it from the life of the people, but also developing a political concept and actions which would be incompatible with the ideas that in general war and military conflicts are permissible and acceptable.

* * *

It should be remembered that the problem of preventing war and strengthening peace received complete scientific treatment in the works by K. Marx, F. Engels and V. I. Lenin for the first time in history. They not only disclosed the deep-seated causes for wars but also showed the organic, natural link of social liberation for the working masses with the prospective elimination of wars as an attribute of exploitive formations. K. Marx understood the historic mission of the working class in the revolutionary conversion of bourgeois society as a complex task, in the process of which the exploitation of man by man and the oppression of one nation by another will be eliminated, will put an end to destruction of people by force of arms. In other words, the cardinal solution to the problem of war and peace have always been linked by Marxist-Leninist classics to the elimination of private property as the root source of war, to the destruction of the exploitive society and to the victory of socialism in the whole world.

The capabilities and ways to prevent concrete wars are determined by features of the same mechanism which leads to them. Wars are not natural disasters. The social causes and the mechanism for creating them are also fundamentally different than economic crises which arise from objective laws of capitalism spontaneously, in spite of the will and desires of the people. Wars are prepared consciously by certain social forces and the exploiter classes. Long before a war the highest political and military leadership develops the concepts and plans for its conduct and prepares the armed forces. In short, the direct control of the preparation and conduct of war is attributed to the sphere of the political structure and the politicians.

This makes it really possible to specifically influence the mechanisms for starting a war. This influence may come from outside as well as inside the country. The internal factors may be either spontaneous or consciously organized, but are most often in combination. As to the external influence, its effectiveness is determined by social nature as well as the fact that the opposing military potential can deprive the aggressor of any hope of success in the planned war.

Historical development has been such that in the 20th Century, especially in the nuclear age, both the danger of world war and the forces capable of preventing it have grown simultaneously. The victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution and the formation of the world's first socialist state began a new stage in the struggle by the popular masses to eliminate war from the life of society. The fact that a socialist society, by its very nature, had no reasons to continue making war was a fundamentally new development in the historical process. Also new was the fact that the Soviet State immediately burst into the international arena as an active and decisive factor in the struggle for a just and stable peace between peoples.

However, for quite a long time this new social factor for preventing wars together with other social forces did not have the economic, political and military power capable of stopping the military adventures of imperialism and preventing the new world war unleashed by imperialist reaction in 1939.

It has only been in the post-war period that there have been qualitative shifts in the correlation of forces in the international arena and a real possibility for preventing a world war, limiting the military adventures of imperialism and strengthening peace on earth. Throughout history this task has not just been presented as a historical prospect but as an objective necessity and a real possibility. "...Mankind," wrote K. Marx, "has always only put tasks before itself which it could solve, since on the the closest examination it always seems that a task arises only when the material conditions for solving it are at hand, or, as least, in the process of coming into being" (K. Marx and F. Engels, Col. Works, v. 13, p. 7).

The 27th CPSU Congress made an in-depth analysis of the new historical conditions forming the correlation of forces in the international arena at the end of the 20th Century and came to the conclusion that a situation has been created on our planet at the present such that there is no alternative to broad cooperation and mutual action between all states and that the forces capable of opposing imperialism's policy of aggression and international piracy are growing inexorably.

The highest forum of communists in the Soviet Union offered to all peoples and governments a precise program of reducing international tensions, lowering the levels of military confrontation and creating an all-encompassing international security system.

In determining the practical steps on the path toward the realization of these program points, the CPSU began with the fact that the nature of present weapons allows no state to rely on protection through military and technology. This can only be accomplished politically, on the basis of mutual security, primarily, between the USSR and the United States. All this requires a new approach in international relations: restraint, discretion, correct international intercourse and cooperation. The modern world, it was noted at the congress, has become too small and fragile for wars and power politics. Under these conditions the antagonism between capitalism and socialism may only and exclusively flow in the forms of peaceful competition and peaceful rivalry. And this, in turn, presupposes not only firmness in upholding principles and positions but also tactical flexibility, readiness for mutual compromise and an inclination not toward confrontation but toward dialog and mutual understanding.

At the 27th CPSU Congress an optimistic prognosis regarding world development was expressed: The progress of society, the life of civilization, must and will continue, for humanity already has powerful forces of self-preservation. Operating at present is /the enormous potential of peace, reason, and good will./ This is a powerful counterpoise to the aggressive imperialist policies. And within this potential the lead is occupied by the socialist world system and the commonwealth of socialist countries. "Today," stated the Central Committee Political Report to the Congress, "the destinies of peace and social progress are tied up more closely than ever with the dynamism of /the economic and political development of the socialist world system./ Today's world socialism is a powerful world formation resting on a highly developed economy, a solid scientific base and a reliable military-political potential. This is more than one-third of mankind, dozens of states and peoples. The Soviet Union and other socialist countries are unswervingly hewing to the course of

peaceful coexistence and strengthening international peace. The statement by CPSU Central Committee General Secretary M. S. Gorbachev on 15 January 1986, which was met with warm approval from all honest people on our planet, is, in essence, the fusing of a philosophy of forming a secure world in the nuclear-space age with a platform of clear, precise and concrete actions in the name of this goal of humanity.

The Soviet conception of security begins from the fact that the present levels of nuclear potential of the opposing sides are excessively high. It is necessary to first of all reduce a great deal the level of military confrontation. First nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction must be completely eliminated. Military potential must be reduced to levels of reasonable sufficiency. The Soviet Union proposes to search for a real solution which will, first of all, guarantee that the arms race will not be projected into space. Space must not be militarized.

* * *

The CPSU Central Committee Political Report to the 27th Party Congress put before world opinion the fundamental Principles of a Comprehensive System of International Security. The Principles present effective measures in all areas of human endeavor (military, political, economic and humanitarian) which could be a point of departure, a kind of framework for direct, systematic dialog by the leaders of the countries of the world community -- both bilateral and multilateral. It is important to note that the Principles flow logically from the positions taken by the 27th Congress of Lenin's Party in the new edition of the CPSU Program which upholds the principles of peaceful coexistence and strengthening the general peace in its section on foreign policy.

The documents and decisions of the congress emphasize the role of the growing economic and defensive strength of the socialist states in defense of peace and preventing a new world war. The great significance of the extension of the Warsaw Treaty under the conditions of an international situation which has been aggravated by imperialism was especially noted. The strengthening of the unit and cooperation of the socialist countries and the fraternal armies increase the defensive potential of socialism.

Under conditions in which the U.S. continues to count on achieving a decisive military superiority over the USSR and counts on resolving the historic dispute with socialism under these conditions by means of military confrontation, the role of the Soviet Armed Forces and the fraternal armies becomes even greater in preventing a new war. There is an organic combination in the policy of the CPSU and the Soviet state of a tireless struggle for peace with the readiness to firmly and decisively repel any aggression. This specific goal is served by the military-strategic parity between the USSR and the U.S. and the Warsaw Pact and NATO and is a historic achievement of socialism. In maintaining this balance is the serious guarantee of maintaining peace and security for peoples. Any attempts by the militarist circles of American imperialism to shake this parity, including by the realization of the notorious "Strategic Defense Initiative," that is, the placement of attack weapons in space, are doomed to inevitable failure. If

the militarist overseas do not halt these attempts to complete the preparations for "star wars" then the Soviet Union, as was clearly stated from the rostrum at the 27th CPSU Congress, will find an effective response. But this would not be our choice. The program documents for Lenin's Party show that the CPSU will invest all effort so that the USSR Armed Forces will remain at a level which would exclude the possibility that the forces of imperialism will achieve military superiority and improve the general defensive capability of the Soviet state.

It is very indicative that the Soviet Union and all countries of the socialist community are struggling not just for peace but also for a just peace which will eliminate the oppression of one people by another and discrimination of some nations. True to its internationalist duty, the Soviet Union will always stand on the side of the victims of imperialist aggression and is ready to render aid to them in their struggle for freedom and independence. The fraternal assistance of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries to the peoples of Vietnam, Cambodia, Angola, Ethiopia and Afganistan in the struggle against imperialism and its accomplices is well known. The forms in which this assistance has been rendered have been very different, but the essence was the same: repel the aggressor and protect the peace and security of the peoples.

An important and ponderable factor in the potential for peace, reason and good will is the policy of the overwhelming majority of the countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America which are vitally interested in the maintenance of peace and halting the arms race. Having won political independence, the peoples of these countries are waging a fierce struggle to overcome backwardness and abject poverty -- the serious consequences of their enslaved past. They are objectively interested in peace, detente and equitable international cooperation. In the struggle for peace the Soviet Union is especially closely tied to the states with a socialist orientation, democratic revolutionary parties and the non-aligned movement which now has almost 100 states in its ranks.

In the struggle for peace /the widespread popular mass antiwar movement/ on all continents has a great role. They have become a lasting and influential factor in the life of society. In the developed capitalist countries alone the number of participants in antiwar demonstrations over three years (1981 to 1983) grew from 5 to 50 million.

The working class which has grown significantly during the 20th Century and now numbers more than 700 million is conducting a consistent struggle against the aggressive imperialist policies. Directing the main strike against the capitalist monopolies and the military-industrial complexes, the international working class and its political advance guard, the communist and worker parties, more and more actively oppose the arms race and are for eliminating the danger of nuclear war.

The interests in maintaining a stable peace and international security requires further broadening and strengthening of a single antimilitarist and

antiwar front and organization of the cooperation of communists with all the social forces interested in detente, reducing the military confrontation of the states of the two opposing social systems and peaceful coexistence.

At the present time the most diverse social elements are taking a more and more active part in the antiwar movement: the intelligentsia, students, petty bourgeoisie, feminist organizations, priesthood and so on. Peace marches, picketing military bases, boycotts, getting signatures on petitions for protecting the peace -- these and many other forms of struggle for peace testify to the inexhaustible initiative of the popular masses in support of maintaining civilization and peace on earth.

One cannot fail to note the fact that a sober calculation of the correlation of forces resulting from possible nuclear catastrophe will lead many government and political figures in capitalist states to increase the danger of continuing and broadening the arms race.

The 27th CPSU Congress has ascertained that the tendency for the potential of peace, reason and good will to become stronger is a steady one, and in principle it is irreversible. Behind it is the desire of people, of all nations, to live in harmony and peaceful cooperation.

* * *

On the basis of an in-depth and complete analysis of the international situation our party has come to the conclusion that no matter how great the threat to peace created by the policies of the aggressive imperialist circles a world war is not fatalistic inevitable. It is possible to prevent a war and save mankind from catastrophe. This is the historic summons to socialism for all progressive, peace-loving forces on our planet. This is also a historic summons to the Soviet Armed Forces and the armies of the fraternal states of socialism which are an important factor in restraining and suppressing the aggressive aspirations of imperialist reaction.

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RELATED ISSUES

USSR'S PETROVSKIY ON SALT II, SDI, 6TH ROUND, MBFR TALKS

PM121546 Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 15 Dec 86 pp 109-110

[Interview with Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Petrovskiy by Juan Carlos Alganaraz in Madrid; date not given]

[Text] "The United States is behaving as it did during the Vietnam war. Hypocrisy is becoming the principal characteristic of its foreign policy. In fact for its part it has ceased real diplomatic activity, and what remains is a vast increase in military activities."

This harsh assessment was courteously provided by a gentleman from Stalingrad [as published] -- Vladimir Petrovskiy, second in command of Soviet diplomacy, deputy foreign minister directly in charge of relations with the United States, international organization, and disarmament matters.

A career diplomat with a brilliant record at the Soviet Foreign Ministry, Deputy Minister Petrovskiy is typical of the new generation of Soviet leaders led by Mikhail Gorbachev, which is committed to the USSR's rapid modernization. "The policy of reforms demands detente," he explained to CAMBIO 16. In Madrid Petrovskiy has just briefed the Spanish Government on his own government's proposals at the sixth round of negotiations in Geneva on strategic, medium-range, and "Star Wars" weapons and nuclear tests.

[Alganaraz] The SALT II nuclear weapons limitation treaty, never ratified by the United States, has just been finally annulled by President Reagan when he authorized the commissioning of a new B-52 bomber carrying cruise missiles.

[Petrovskiy] What has happened is a major violation of a treaty whose provisions we honor, even though it was not ratified by the U.S. Senate. The United Nations has repeatedly called for observance of SALT II's provisions. Even the United States made such a proposal to the UN General Assembly, and now it is violating the treaty.

But this action must not be considered in isolation, because it is in line with what the U.S. side has been doing since the end of the Reykjavik summit between Messrs Reagan and Gorbachev.

No sooner was that extremely important dialogue over than the United States began to reformulate the agreements reached at the highest political level, which opened up prospects of a world free of nuclear weapons around the beginning of the new century.

This shows that the United States does not want to tackle disarmament issues from a political viewpoint. It views the world solely from a military angle.

Such attitudes are repeated on other issues, such as chemical and conventional weapons, for instance. [paragraph continues]

In every field where progress in disarmament can be made they create all kinds of obstacles and reject the implementation of existing treaties.

In fact real diplomatic activity is ceasing on America's side, and there is a great development of military programs such as SDI and new kinds of weapons such as the MX missile and long-range bombers such as the B-1. This is a dangerous course of events.

[Alganaraz] What will the Soviet Union's stance be now?

[Petrovskiy] Events since the war show that the Americans have always created new arms developments and races. Whenever such a situation has occurred the USSR has responded appropriately.

But let us be honest: Who benefits from these confrontations? The threat of war merely increases.

[Alganaraz] What would the USSR do, for instance, if the U.S. Government were to persist with its SDI ("Star Wars") program?

[Petrovskiy] I do not believe that our response would entail a Soviet version of SDI. We will succeed in developing cheaper and more effective systems to avoid the use of SDI as a cover against a nuclear first strike.

But this is in no way a positive option for the Soviet Union, because we are optimistic and believe that it is not too late to stop this new arms race through a political solution.

[Alganaraz] Negotiations with the United States seem rather difficult at present not only because of the deadlock that has arisen over the Reykjavik talks but also because of the crisis affecting President Reagan's government. There is talk of another "Watergate"....

[Petrovskiy] I have just returned from New York where reference was made to a "contras-gate." It is a difficult situation but it is a U.S. domestic problem. Internal problems cannot hold ties between the United States and the Soviet Union to ransom. Our relations are of prime importance because they are connected with the problems of peace and war.

[Alganaraz] Is the Soviet Union hoping for a more favorable negotiating stance from the Europeans?

[Petrovskiy] The U.S. European allies are very realistic people with a great political tradition and culture. We hope that this European wisdom, historical sense, realism, and responsibility will be a great help in resolving this situation.

[Alganaraz] In other words, trying to unblock the Reykjavik process.

[Petrovskiy] Yes. We Soviets know that we are not alone in the world. In Reykjavik we reached a very advanced point in the formulation of accords. Like mountain climbers, we reached the final stage before the summit. Now we must not come down again....

Furthermore, following our experience of the Chernobyl tragedy, we are all very much aware of what nuclear weapons entail. Nobody is immune from this horror. Another of Chernobyl's lessons is that we cannot trust in the infallibility of technology and computers.

[Alganaraz] Mr Petrovskiy, you are the Soviet Government's special envoy sent to brief Spain on the USSR's proposals at the sixth round of negotiations in Geneva. What is the outcome of your activity?

[Petrovskiy] We have had a very interesting exchange of opinions. The Soviet stance is to preserve at all costs what was agreed in Reykjavik concerning strategic weapons, intermediate range weapons in Europe, SDI, and nuclear tests. These form a structured combination of accords representing a balance of concessions that will make it possible to keep the political and military situations separate during the disarmament process, without detriment to the sides' national security or sudden strategic changes.

(The Soviet proposals in Geneva envisage a 50-percent reduction of strategic weapons over 5 years and their total elimination in 10 years. Euromissiles would be reduced to 100 per side -- the Soviet ones in Asia and the American ones on their own territory, possibly in Alaska. "Star Wars" would be confined to the laboratory and nuclear tests would be banned.)

[Alganaraz] The European countries fear the Soviet strength in conventional weapons in the event of the nuclear deterrent's elimination. What is the USSR willing to do to convince the U.S. NATO allies?

[Petrovskiy] We want the Vienna MBFR talks to be unblocked. The Warsaw Pact socialist countries have made a proposal for the mutual reduction of 500,000 troops.

Furthermore we have made various proposals for creating a special working group and are willing to extend the talks to a multilateral forum, such as the CSCE, and also to develop the agreements on mutual confidence-building measures following the success in Stockholm.

The most important thing is to develop all measures that will strengthen the peace and disarmament process. We live in a world characterized by a growing awareness of interdependence. There is a greater awareness that we must all be responsible. I believe we have begun to think as Antoine de Saint Exupery did when, from his aircraft, he saw human beings as all passengers on board the same ship.

[Alganaraz] What are the repercussions on your foreign policy of the new era of reforms and modernization in the Soviet Union?

[Petrovskiy] Very major, and in the same direction as my earlier observation. Mikhail Gorbachev had a meeting with the Soviet diplomatic chiefs at which he stressed that we must look at foreign policy matters from the viewpoint of our domestic policy problems.

To consolidate and accelerate the changes we need detente, international normalization, and greater cooperation in all directions--not just political or economic. Peace can only be everyone's best ally.

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RELATED ISSUES

USSR SCIENTIFIC COUNCIL ON PEACE, DISARMAMENT MEETS

Joint Appeal

LD091754 Moscow TASS in English 1218 GMT 9 Jan 87

[Text] Moscow January 9 TASS -- Follows the text of an appeal by the Scientific Council on the Study of the Problems of Peace and Disarmament of the USSR Academy of Sciences, the State Committee for Science and Technology and the Soviet Peace Committee:

The need to prevent a nuclear war for the sake of saving modern civilization has turned into a problem of overriding importance to the whole of mankind. The leaders of the USSR and the United States agreed that a nuclear war cannot be waged, [words indistinct] there can be no victors in it, and that a bid should be pursued to eliminate nuclear weapons.

The Soviet-U.S. meeting in Reykjavik has proved that the possibility of an agreement on phasing out nuclear weapons is real not in some indefinite distant future but already at present, in conditions of the world that exists now.

The removal of the risk of a nuclear war calls for vigorous and urgent measures aimed at blocking the development of new nuclear weapon systems, at slowing down and eventually terminating completely the nuclear arms race, at getting down to abolishing nuclear weapons totally and everywhere. Certainly, this is possible only in conditions when outer space, which belongs to the whole of mankind, is preserved peaceful.

A verifiable nuclear test ban could become the first step toward attaining the afore-mentioned objectives. It could signal the beginning of a decisive turn in inter-state relations toward trust, cooperation, understanding, joint solution of the global problems of modern civilization. This historic chance cannot be allowed to slip away.

The unilateral Soviet moratorium on nuclear tests, in effect since August 6, 1985, remains in force and can be extended in case it becomes at minimum bilateral, a Soviet-U.S. one.

At the 41st General Assembly session the overwhelming majority of the U.N. member states described the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty as a matter of paramount importance and called upon all states, especially those in possession of nuclear weapons, to exert maximum efforts and display the political will to hammer out without delay and conclude a treaty on ending and banning nuclear weapons tests.

The scientific Council on the Study of the Problems of Peace and Disarmament shares this conviction and appeals to the international and national scientific organizations and also to the scientists in the United States, Britain, France and in other countries to use their influence to prevent the unique possibility to put a brake on the nuclear arms race from being slipped away and to prevent the Soviet moratorium on nuclear tests from being thwarted. [Sentence as received]

We are convinced that the stern realities of our time which are encountered by mankind call for urgent and decisive actions by all people who are concerned about the destinies of civilization.

The scientific council is ready to cooperate in this noble cause with all scientists and scientific organizations sharing the strong belief that the task of totally ending nuclear tests should be accomplished as soon as possible.

Arbatov Speaks

LD100017 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1600 GMT 9 Jan 87

[Excerpts] A general meeting of the Scientific Council of the USSR Academy of Sciences on research into the problems of peace and disarmament was held in Moscow today.

[passage omitted]

The general meeting was addressed by Academician Arbatov. He said in particular:

[Begin Arbatov recording] Comrade Gorbachev's statement of 15 January 1986 was the first result of the large amount of work done by the party and the Central Committee. In a few days' time it will be 1 year since that statement was issued. At the time, of course, the statement made a very big impression, above all through the fact that it was the first time that the dream of a nuclear-free and secure world had so convincingly been embodied in realistic, specific, and tangible proposals. These immediately made this great goal achievable, though not of course close and easy.

Subsequently, the statement was supplemented by the foreign-policy platform of the 27th congress and in particular the new concepts of security put forward at that congress, the extension of the moratorium and its establishment in international life as a powerful practical factor of policy, Stockholm and Reykjavik.

As a result of all this, for more than a year we have been able to state that the initiative has definitely been with the Soviet Union, and without in the least playing down the importance of the efforts of other countries, other movements, and other figures we may say that during the past year Soviet policy has provided a powerful impetus to the political process.

Our age is an age of a great historical paradox. On one hand it is quite obvious that it is impossible to wage war and that to do so would be suicide. It is obvious that there remains less and less room for the use of military force by the great powers. On the other hand we are seeing the most intensive ever peacetime military preparations and the most profound subordination to militarism of the economy, science, politics, international relations, and even culture and ideology. This paradox is very dramatically reflected in the clash of two types of political thinking -- the new and the old. This conflict is more complex and more profound than simply a clash between the idea of peace and the idea of war. History itself has posed in this connection the question of which way it will be. Either militarism will put an end to mankind or mankind will put an end to militarism. Marxism-Leninism with the historical optimism characteristic of its teaching has, seeing this danger, displayed faith in the reason, good sense and finally the instinct of self-preservation that is characteristic of mankind. [end recording]

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RELATED ISSUES

TASS ANALYST CALLS FOR CUTTING WORLD ARMS BUDGETS

LD221542 Moscow World Service in English 1710 GMT 21 Jan 87

["The Way We See It" program; interview with Colonel Vladimir Bogachev, military analyst for TASS news agency, by an unidentified correspondent; date and place not known; "interview in English translation" -- live or recorded]

[Text] [Unidentified correspondent] The arms race (?deploys) enormous financial, economic and material resources. Last year, for instance, worldwide military spending totalled almost \$1 trillion. Developing countries too are involved in the arms build-up. Could you give us some estimate of their military expenditure?

[Bogachev] The developing countries' share in the world military spending went up from 7.2 percent in 1970 to as much as 18 percent in the middle of the eighties. Since 1984 the young developing states spent \$117,000 million for military purposes.

[Correspondent] No doubt this caused them considerable losses. Isn't that so?

[Bogachev] Well, here are just a few calculations. The funds spent for military purposes could pay for the construction of more than 300 thermal power stations with an output of 120 megawatts each, 300 oil refineries, 1,000 fertilizer plants and 1,600 sugar refineries. I think the following comparison speaks for itself. The money spent on manufacturing a single tank would be enough to build schools for 30,000 children.

[Correspondent] The United States and its NATO partners are the biggest suppliers of arms to developing countries. What do they seek to achieve by that?

[Bogachev] Their aim is to expand and strengthen their military and political influence in the Third World, to destabilize the situation in it, to sow disunity and distrust among developing countries and to involve them in regional conflicts. In these conditions the young states of Asia, Africa and Latin America are forced to look for military aid and to reallocate their already meager resources so as to build up their defense capacity. And that's how the arms race chain reaction is set up.

[Correspondent] Do developing countries produce weapons themselves?

[Bogachev] Yes. The war fever whipped up by the Western states forces them to do that. Twenty years ago there was practically no war industry in the Third World countries. Now they have created it and it's a heavy burden on their economy.

[Correspondent] You keep mentioning the United States and other Western countries all the time. What about the Soviet Union? Doesn't it supply arms to developing countries?

[Bogachev] Yes, it does. However, the Soviet Union is not an arms supplier in the commercial sense of the terms. Soviet weapons are supplied only to enable developing countries to defend their progressive gains and for liberation struggles. Our goal is to put an end to the arms race and to achieve general disarmament. The Soviet Union believes that the resources saved by stopping the arms race should be used for the purpose of social and economic development. This is pointed out in particular in the recently signed joint declaration of the Soviet Union and India on the principles of a nuclear-free and nonviolent world.

[Correspondent] Has the Soviet Union advanced any concrete proposals on disarmament and development?

[Bogachev] Our country has repeatedly proposed reducing the military budget of the permanent member-states of the United Nations Security Council and using part of the funds thus saved for assistance to the developing countries. But this met with a lack of understanding on the part of the West. And just think of what could be accomplished if they accepted the Soviet proposal of 15th January 1986 on eliminating all types of mass destruction weapons by the year 2000 and stopping the arms race. Just think what funds this would make available for the social and economic development of the world. Disarmament would speed the solution of many global problems, of developing new sources of energy, utilizing the resources of the ocean and providing all human beings with enough food. New opportunities would open up for overhauling the entire system of world economic ties and establishing a fair, new international economic order. And above all people would be rid of the nuclear war threat.

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RELATED ISSUES

SOVIET INSTITUTE OFFICIALS ON ASIAN SECURITY POLICY

PM071532 Madrid DIARIO 16 in Spanish 16 Dec 86 p 13

[Interview with Soviet Far East Institute Deputy Director Vladimir Myasnikov and Institute official Sergey Goncharov by special correspondent Alejandro Diz; date, place not given]

[Excerpt] [Diz] It has been said that during the period when Gromyko headed Soviet foreign policy it was centered almost exclusively on relations with the West and particularly with the United States. Is it now more varied and has it been extended with regard to other continents, specifically Asia, following Gorbachev's speech in Vladivostok?

[Interviewee -- not further identified] I would refrain from identifying individuals with the country's policy, by saying that with Gromyko there was one foreign policy and that with Shevardnadze it is different. Gorbachev's remarks in Vladivostok were a natural and logical step in our foreign policy. The Asian and Pacific region are acquiring an increasing role, and this has not emerged by surprise. We have always paid attention to this region and now specifically because militarist trends are growing there.

Since 1945 there have been 139 wars in the world, 135 of them in Asia. One can deduce from this the region's importance in maintaining world peace. Moreover, it is in Asia that the United States waged the two major wars of this period -- those in Korea and Vietnam.

[Diz] But it was Gorbachev in Vladivostok that seemed to be extricating Soviet foreign policy on Asia from its stagnation with measures or specific ideas such as the examination of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the border with China, the normalization of relations with that country, or the intensification of relations with Japan.

[Interviewee] With Gorbachev's accession a very strong thrust was indeed imparted to Soviet foreign policy. We know it is difficult to achieve a system of universal security all at once. This is why it is necessary to achieve it in stages, region by region. Though there is already a conference on security in Europe, it is also very important that this process embrace the Pacific and the entire Asian continent.

[Diz] What has been done to organize this conference on Asia?

[Interviewee] In view of the scale of the proposal and the difference in development among the Asian countries, there must be a period of adaptation to the idea.

[Diz] Will the United States and Canada participate in this conference, as they do in the European security conference?

[Interviewee] Of course. We are realists and understand that the creation of a security system that excluded the socialist Asian countries, the United States, or China would be untenable.

[Diz] How long could this phase last?

[Interviewee] It is difficult to make forecasts in foreign policy. As far as I am concerned, I believe that this idea has good prospects and can be materialized sooner than its adversaries -- the representatives of militarist circles -- believe.

There is much interest in this idea because it reflects the area's vital interests. For instance, this year there have been some crucial changes in China's foreign policy. The Chinese leadership was saying 10 years ago that a third world war was inevitable. In March they said this idea was mistaken.

[Diz] What is the present status of Soviet-Chinese relations?

[Interviewee] First, the Chinese believe that in cooperation with the Soviet Union they can begin developing the Chinese border regions, which will be the areas with a future for the coming decades. Second, there are relations as a whole. Here it is possible to talk in terms of some degree of convergence and agreement on general matters.

[Diz] Of the three conditions defined by Beijing as necessary for the normalization of relations -- a withdrawal from Afghanistan, Cambodia, and the Soviet troops on the border with China -- which is the most problematical?

[Interviewee] The present extent of our relations with China is so broad that they cannot be paralyzed by these matters. This does not mean that we do not pay attention to these problems or that we refuse to discuss them with the Chinese.

To be specific, as you know, Gorbachev said in Vladivostok that discussions are going on with the Mongolian Government about the possibility of withdrawing part of the Soviet troops from Mongolia. The Chinese have reacted favorably. This can be extended to the Soviet and Chinese troops on our shared borders.

As for the recent withdrawal of six Soviet regiments from Afghanistan and the desire to seek political means for resolving the problems, China's response here was complex. It was skeptical, if not reserved. What is more important however, is that, judging from the Chinese media's analysis, it seem lately to have changed its stance on Afghanistan. They now say that the USSR is striving to seek political solutions and that it may possibly succeed.

Following Vladivostok, China said that the Cambodian problem was the main obstacle to the development of our relations. The USSR's position is clear: The countries involved in the problem must participate in its solution.

[Diz] Does Moscow view a possible intensification of Beijing-Tokyo relations with suspicion?

[Interviewee] There are trends in Sino-Japanese relations that worry us. There are reports of aims for military cooperation. The Americans are already contributing to the Chinese Army's modernization. This is not a good thing. China's allowing U.S. Navy ships to dock in Chinese ports is not reassuring. This year the United States began to penetrate the Okhotsk Sea with its warships during joint American-Japanese maneuvers simulating nuclear strikes on Soviet territory.

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RELATED ISSUES

USSR PROPOSALS FOR INDIAN OCEAN PEACE ZONE RESTATED

PM161431 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 15 Dec 86 First Edition p 6

[B. Tuzmukhamedov article: "Alarms and Hopes. A Zone of Peace for the Indian Ocean"]

[Excerpts] The joint Soviet-Indian statement adopted on the results of M. S. Gorbachev's official friendly visit to India noted the anxiety of both our countries as regards the further complication of the situation in the Indian Ocean. The USSR and India called for the liquidation of all foreign military bases existing in the region and the prevention of the creation of new ones, condemning at the same time the attempts to build up a foreign military presence in the ocean. They advocated the swiftest implementation of the 1971 UN Declaration on the Transformation of the Indian Ocean into a Zone of Peace and supported the UN General Assembly resolution on the immediate convening for this purpose of an international conference on the Indian Ocean.

The 15th anniversary of the day when the aforementioned declaration was adopted at the initiative of the nonaligned countries falls on 16 December. The essence of the idea of a zone of peace is the liberation of the Indian Ocean--which plays an important role in the world economy and in international relations--from an escalation of a military presence by nonlittoral states, and the ensuring of conditions under which it would not be a source of threat against the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of littoral and mainland countries. Its implementation could make a substantial contribution toward ensuring Asian security and peace all over the world.

Now the committee [the UN Special Committee on the Indian Ocean] has been assigned a difficult task. At its 41st session, the General Assembly instructed it to complete in 1987 the entire preparatory work on convening the conference so that it may be held no later than 1988. This task has to be resolved under difficult conditions. The tension prevailing in the world, the growing military threat in the Indian Ocean, and the financial problems besetting the world organization (it was because of these that the committee's third session this year had to be cancelled)--these and other factors which have emerged largely through the fault of the Washington administration obstruct the committee's normal work. Will it manage to cope with its set task this time?

After all, time waits for no man. The conference cannot be postponed any longer, because if it were to be held later while the present pace of the Indian Ocean's militarization is maintained, the conference could prove virtually pointless. This is why the socialist countries, which invariably advocate a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean, and many nonaligned states and primarily India are stepping up their efforts in support of convening the conference. Under the prevailing conditions, particular importance attaches to the need to achieve unity on this question among all nonaligned countries. It is on them, the initiators of the creation of a zone of peace in the region, that the fate of this proposal depends to a decisive extent. The program documents adopted at the movement's summit conference in Harare also call for persistent efforts by nonaligned movement members for its implementation.

Only persistent and joint actions can ensure conditions of peace and security in that vast region of the planet--the Indian Ocean. A considerable role can be played here by the broad movement of peace-loving public forces, which has become today a long-term and influential factor and an important component of the growing potential of peace, opposing the aggressive policy of imperialism. It was of this potential that the Delhi declaration on the principles of a nonviolent world free of nuclear weapons spoke: "The coalition of peace, which is gathering strength and unites the efforts by the non-aligned movement, the Group of Six, and all peace-loving countries, political parties, and public organizations, gives us grounds for hope and optimism."

As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, the Indian Ocean, in its opinion, can and must become a zone of peace. This stance is based on the provisions of the concept of an all-embracing system of international security, put forward by the 27th CPSU Congress. It has been reflected in the USSR's proposals on a comprehensive approach toward the ensuring of international security and peaceful collaboration in the Asian and Pacific region, formulated in M. S. Gorbachev's Vladivostok speech.

The objective of the new Soviet initiatives, outlined by M. S. Gorbachev in Delhi, is to advance the cause of the Indian Ocean's demilitarization from the present standstill. The Soviet Union, he declared, is prepared to:

- start at any time talks with the United States and other nonlittoral states having warships on a permanent basis in the Indian Ocean on substantial reductions of the numerical strength and activity of naval forces there;

- hold talks with the United States and any interested Asian countries on confidence-building measures in the military sphere, applicable to Asia and the contiguous waters of the Indian and Pacific Oceans. What is intended, in particular, is notification of movements and maneuvers by ground (amphibious), naval, and air forces of these countries;

- take part in multilateral talks between all states using the Indian Ocean's waters with a view to elaborating guarantees of the safety of sea communications, including the Persian Gulf and the Straits of Hormuz and Malacca, and

also guarantees of littoral countries' sovereignty over their natural resources;

--take part in the elaboration of a multilateral agreement, which has been urgently needed for a long time, on the safety of air communications above the Indian Ocean;

--take part in the elaboration of, and join an international convention on struggle against terrorism in sea and air communications.

These proposals, which do not cover all the problems of ensuring peace in the Indian Ocean zone, could help to improve the situation there. They, just as the entire package of initiatives to ensure security in Asia and, on the broad scale, to create an all-embracing system of international peace and security, constitute a call to all states for joint and equal foreign policy creativity. Its objective was very accurately expressed by India's Prime Minister R. Gandhi: "We would like to see the entire planet a zone of peace."

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CSO: 5200/1205

RELATED ISSUES

CPSU DELEGATION ATTENDS VIETNAMESE PARTY CONGRESS

Ligachev Addresses Congress

LD151616 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1356 GMT 15 Dec 86

[Excerpts] Hanoi, 15 Dec (TASS)--Yegor Ligachev, member of the Politburo, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and head of the CPSU delegation, was warmly received as he delivered a speech at the Sixth Communist Party of Vietnam [CPV] Congress which is taking place here. He said:

Comrades, your congress is taking place at a complicated and crucial moment in the development of the present-day international situation. Our parties are united in their approach to all the basic questions of world politics..

In the face of mortal danger for the existence of all mankind, the Soviet Union, recognizing its historic responsibility for the destinies of the peoples of the world, placed all its colossal might and enormous authority into serving the cause of preventing nuclear disaster and preserving and consolidating peace on the planet. Approval by the SRV, by the other fraternal countries, and by the world public of the 27th CPSU Congress proposal on setting up an all-embracing system of international security, and of the peace-loving Soviet initiatives aimed at eliminating arsenals of nuclear weapons and against the development [sozdaniye] of strike space armaments, has been received with deep satisfaction in the Soviet Union.

The Soviet-U.S. meeting in Reykjavik, which took place at the proposal of the USSR, has demonstrated clearly that there is a real chance of starting to free mankind from the threat of world nuclear conflagration. At the same time it has also clearly illuminated the main obstacle on this path. The essence of this is the desire of the United States for military superiority, for the possession of more destructive space armaments in order to dictate its own will to the peoples of the world and to force them to obey. To the Soviet moratorium on nuclear tests, which has been in existence for almost a year and a half, the U.S. Administration responds with nuclear explosions in Nevada. The United States tries to overturn everything positive that was marked out at Reykjavik, to deceive and to confuse the world public. Such is the will of the U.S. military-industrial complex, for which SDI, the "Star Wars" plan, promises unprecedented profits. And the United States, in no small measure, covers its expenditures on the arms race by exploiting the peoples of the developing countries.

The Delhi declaration on the principles for a nonviolent world, free of nuclear weapons, which was signed recently by M.S. Gorbachev and R. Gandhi was such a contrast to this course, this code of morals. The significance of the accords reached during

the visit by M.S. Gorbachev to India goes far beyond Soviet-Indian relations. The Soviet program put forward in Vladivostok for safeguarding peace and security and for cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region, which is becoming increasingly significant in world politics, was developed further in Gorbachev's addresses.

The USSR is not laying claim to any privileges and is not seeking advantage for itself to the detriment of others. It does not believe in safeguarding its own security at the expense of others. Displays of great power status are organically alien to our policy. As distinct from Washington, we do not knock together militarist groupings. We favor the right of each people to live according to its own choice and to have sovereignty in resolving its problems in conditions of peace and goodneighborliness.

Several new initiatives put forward by M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, during his visit to India were aimed at attaining these aims. They included a proposal on the peaceful mastery of space with all interested states participating, and on the demilitarization of the Indian Ocean.

As regards Southeast Asia, the position of the Soviet Union is clear and easily understood. A solution to the problems of Southeast Asia must be found by the countries in that region themselves on the basis of complete respect for their sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity without outside interference in their internal affairs.

The countries of Southeast Asia, particularly Vietnam, have on many occasions been the target of imperialist aggression. They have won their freedom and independence in hard and bloody battles. Their striving for peace and international security is all the more great. Your homeland is making a weighty contribution to this noble cause.

The solidarity of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, their close alliance, is an influential factor for peace and stability in Asia. Allow me to express the conviction that the fraternal countries of Indochina will continue to bear aloft the banner of peace and socialism in this important area of the world.

We welcome the reasoned and just line of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia toward a constructive solution to the problems which exist in Southeast Asia, toward a political settlement of the situation surrounding Cambodia.

An important positive influence on improving the situation in Asia and the international climate as a whole would be exerted by the normalization of Vietnam's relations with China. It is our firm opinion that a solution to this is fully attainable and mutually acceptable on the basis of direct dialogue based on equal rights. We confirm our support for the holding of a Vietnam-China dialogue with the aim of removing unnecessary suspicions and mistrust. The many proposals of the SRV on this subject are well known to all. As for relations between the USSR and the PRC, we have been and are in favor of the development of good-neighborly relations with the PRC on a principled basis without detriment to the interests of other countries.

Comrades! Today we stand on the threshold of a new year, 1987, the year of the 70th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution.

We are convinced that our joy in this notable jubilee is shared by communists the world over and by all the front-ranking people of the planet. We are convinced that it will be marked by a still greater closing of ranks in the international workers' and communist movement. Our duty is to oppose the alliance of the forces of war and

aggression with the international solidarity of communists and with interaction between public movements and organizations, whatever their orientation.

Dear friends! The sixth congress of the glorious party of the Vietnamese Communists will be making important and responsible decisions. It is beyond dispute that the results of the work of the congress will exert a favorable influence on the economic and social development of your heroic country, and on the all-round cooperation of our parties and peoples.

In your noble struggle for the bright future of Socialist Vietnam, you can always depend on the fraternal support of the Soviet people. Let us continue to preserve and strengthen the community of our parties, peoples, and states.

Long live the tested, militant vanguard of the Vietnamese people, the Communist Party of Vietnam, the party of Ho Chi Minh!

Ligachev Addresses Friendship Group

PM181120 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 18 Dec 86 First Edition p 4

[TASS report under the general heading "Meetings on Vietnamese Soil"]

[Excerpts] Hanoi, 17 Dec--The CPSU delegation headed by Ye. K. Ligachev, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, met with activists of the Vietnamese-Soviet Friendship Society--one of the biggest mass public organizations in the SRV.

Welcoming the Soviet guests, Nguyen Vinh, chairman of the society's central board, stressed that the members of the Vietnamese-Soviet Friendship Society unanimously support the foreign policy course of the CPSU and the Soviet state, aimed at ensuring peace and eliminating the threat of nuclear catastrophe. We regard it as the society's central task, he said, to propagandize this course and publicize in every way the achievements of the fraternal Soviet people and the inspiring decisions of the 27th congress of Lenin's party.

Ye.K. Ligachev spoke at the meeting. He cordially greeted the society's activists on behalf of the CPSU delegation.

Soviet-Vietnamese friendship and cooperation are an important factor in international life, whose significance is consistently increasing. And the situation in the world today is extremely alarming. International tension has reached the danger point, through the fault of the aggressive forces of imperialism, above all American imperialism. This is due to a whole series of illegal actions by the White House, which, after departing from Reykjavik, is trying to wreck the treaty basis for strategic nuclear arms limitation and achieve military superiority. Our position in connection with the flagrant new challenge from Washington is set forth quite clearly in the recent Soviet Government statement. We thank you, friends, for your solidarity with the foreign policy line of the CPSU and the Soviet state.

In our day V.I. Lenin's warning that successes and achievements in building the new society will reinforce imperialism's resistance retains its full relevance.

The Soviet Union, like the other fraternal countries, fully supports the peace-loving foreign policy course of the SRV, which together with Laos and Cambodia has put forward reasonable, constructive proposals aimed at turning Southeast Asia into a zone of peace and stability, as well as regulating relations with China. The implementation of these proposals would undoubtedly help improve the political climate in Asia.

It is well known that for every people, universal peace begins at their country's borders. That is why our countries attach particular significance to ensuring security in Asia, improving the political climate on the Asian continent, and seeking ways of establishing peace and stability here.

History has left Asia with many complex problems. Many countries here have been the target of colonial plundering and imperialist wars. The imperialists would like to continue to keep the Asian peoples subordinate to them and control their destiny to suit themselves. Pursuing their own political, economic, and military advantage, they will not reckon with the national interests of the region's countries, but seek to impose their own diktat.

A serious threat to the Asian countries' security emanates from the United States, which constantly builds up its military might in the region, encourages the militarization of other countries, and seeks opportunities to set Asian countries against each other. All this leads to destabilization of the situation on the continent and a dangerous growth in tension, and is the main cause of regional problems and conflicts.

There is much talk in the world today about the situation in the Asia-Pacific region. That is only natural, because the region has strategic significance. Our viewpoint on this matter is known; it was stated at the 27th CPSU Congress, and the USSR's detailed position on the Asia-Pacific region was set forth in Comrade M.S. Gorbachev's speech in Vladivostok.

The visit by Comrade M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, to India and the documents signed there are of extremely great significance for strengthening the cause of peace throughout the world. The Delhi declaration on the principles for a nonviolent world free from nuclear weapons, adopted as a result of the visit, is a major contribution to the positive world process aimed at securing the interests of international security and cooperation. It serves the great goal of establishing the concept of peace as the highest value for all mankind.

For revolutionary fighters, the builders of the new society, and all forces of peace and progress this jubilee will undoubtedly be a mighty stimulus to further boost the struggle for the triumph of the ideals of Great October.

The world socialist system is a decisive force in this struggle. The development of the fraternal socialist countries and their foreign policy aimed at general and complete disarmament are the main avenue in mankind's progress. Life has shown convincingly that the socialist community is the reliable bulwark of the cause of peace, freedom, and independence of the peoples in the struggle against the forces of imperialism and reaction. The success of the struggle for this great cause will be promoted by the further strengthening of the fraternal socialist states' unity, their all-around cooperation in building the new society, and the stepping up of their joint contribution to strengthening peace and the peoples' security.

Medvedev Addresses Workers

LD180031 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1530 GMT 17 Dec 86

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Excerpts] Comrade Medvedev addressed the participants of a power workers meeting on behalf of our delegation. He said in part:

[Begin Medvedev recording] Dear comrade hydrobuilders, friends: On behalf of the CPSU delegation participating in the work of the Sixth Communist Party of Vietnam Congress, I express to you a heartfelt gratitude for a warm welcome, and give my best wishes to your harmonious and international collective. [applause]

Comrades, our countries are not on the same level of socioeconomic development, but we have a lot in common in terms of realistic, critical approaches to matters: in the striving for a new way of thinking and acting; in finding ways and reserves for quick progress; making the socialist potential grow; securing the strengthening of its prestige and influence on the international arena; strengthening solidarity and unity of all democratic and progressive forces; struggling decisively for the preservation and consolidation of universal peace and the security of the peoples; and for curbing the forces of aggression and war. Today this is the most important, the most necessary concern, for in the nuclear epoch we are talking about the survival itself of the whole human race.

The Soviet program for creating a universal system of international security, the concrete proposals put forward in the speeches of M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, including his speech in Vladivostok and during his recent visit to India, have an invaluable significance for the whole world community. Putting these ideas into operation would not only allow the human race to enter the 21st century without mass extermination weapons, but would also open up tremendous possibilities for a most rapid liquidation of poverty and cultural and economic backwardness of hundreds of millions of people in the developing countries.

Medvedev Addresses Rally

PM181337 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 18 Dec 86 First Edition p 4

[TASS report under general heading "Meetings on Vietnamese Soil"]

[Excerpts] A Vietnamese-Soviet friendship rally, held at the local cultural center, was addressed by V. A. Medvedev, member of the CPSU delegation and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. The hydroproject construction workers' collective, he noted, participated actively in the international socialist competition in honor of the 27th CPSU Congress and the 6th Communist Party of Vietnam [CPV] Congress. Every success achieved in the course of the construction of the hydropower plant is vivid evidence of Soviet-Vietnamese cooperation.

The most important and most essential concern today is building up socialism's potential, strengthening its prestige and influence in the international arena, consolidating the solidarity and unity of all democratic and progressive forces, and struggling resolutely to preserve and consolidate world peace and peoples' security. The Soviet program for creating a comprehensive system of international security and the concrete proposals set forth in the speeches of CPSU Central Committee General Secretary M.S. Gorbachev, including the speeches in Vladivostok and during his recent visit to India, are of invaluable importance for the whole world community.

The U.S. authorities, however, are stubbornly opposing the efforts of the USSR and the other socialist countries, feverishly trying to extend the arms race to space, and hatching plans for "Star Wars." As for the Soviet Union, it will continue to work firmly and unswervingly to strengthen peace, secure disarmament, and deliver the world from the threat of a thermonuclear catastrophe.

The Soviet people highly value fraternal Vietnam's support for this policy. The sincere friendship and close cooperation between our parties, countries, and peoples is strengthening and developing with every passing year and its content is growing richer and richer. Their shared Marxist-Leninist ideology and loyalty to the principles of socialist internationalism, the striving of our peoples to preserve and consolidate the traditional fraternal friendship which binds them together and to contribute their share to the consolidation of the positions of the forces of peace and socialism -- this is what characterizes the relations between our parties, countries, and peoples today.

Ligachev Speaks at Reception

LD182027 Moscow TASS in English 2002 GMT 18 Dec 86

[Excerpts] Hanoi, 18 Dec (TASS)--The Sixth Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam has signalled an important turning point in the revolutionary struggle waged by the Communist Party of Vietnam and the whole Vietnamese people, Nguyen Van Linh, secretary general of the Communist Party of Vietnam, said welcoming the foreign guests. He was addressing the reception given by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam today in honour of the foreign delegations attending the Congress.

Present at the reception were also other leaders of the Communist Party and of the Vietnamese state, the CPSU delegation led by Yegor Ligachev, member of the Political Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and delegations of other parties.

The foreign guests highly evaluate and support the striving of the Communist Party of Vietnam for renovation, our party's struggle against imperialism and reactionary forces, against the nuclear weapons race, for peace, independence and sovereignty of the peoples of various regions of the world, including the Asian-Pacific region and South East Asia. Vietnam, the speaker stressed, will do its utmost to justify the trust of the comrades and friends all over the world.

Yegor Ligachev addressed the reception on behalf of the delegations of the fraternal parties.

We appreciate the fact that the problems of ensuring peace and security have occupied a central place both in the speeches by the Vietnamese Communists and foreign guests. The Vietnamese Communists proclaimed as the main direction of their foreign policy activity the fight against the nuclear danger and the arms race, for disarmament, maintaining and strengthening universal peace, including in the Asian-Pacific region. Jointly with fraternal Laos and Kampuchea the SRV intends to work further perseveringly for normalising the situation in Indochina, strives to turn it into a zone of peace, goodneighbourliness and cooperation. We are confident that Vietnam will further perform with honour the function of an outpost of socialism and peace in South East Asia, Yegor Ligachev stressed.

CPV Leaders Receive Ligachev

LD190951 Moscow TASS in English 0817 GMT 19 Dec 86

[Excerpts] Hanoi, 19 Dec (TASS)--A CPSU delegation led by Yegor Ligachev, a member of the Politbureau and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, was today received by Nguyen Van Linh, general secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam [CPV], and other party leaders.

The Vietnamese leaders stated unconditional support for the domestic and foreign policies of the USSR. They spoke highly of the Soviet initiatives to avert the threat of nuclear war and safeguard peace and appreciated the Soviet Union's principled stand at the Reykjavik talks. The Vietnamese leaders approve the Soviet Government's statement of December 18, 1986, on the termination by the Soviet Union of its unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing after the first U.S. nuclear explosion next year as a response to the actions of the U.S. Administration, which continues to go ahead with its nuclear test programme to develop and build up new nuclear weapons. The Vietnamese leaders also spoke highly of the Soviet initiatives to ensure peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region and the Delhi declaration on the principles of a nuclear weapon-free and non-violent world, signed during Mikhail Gorbachev's visit to India.

CPSU Delegation News Conference

PM191501 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 19 Dec 86 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS special correspondent report: "CPSU Delegation's News Conference"]

[Excerpts] Hanoi, 19 Dec--The CPSU delegation at the Sixth Communist Party of Vietnam [CPV] Congress held a news conference here for Vietnamese and foreign journalists covering the work of the SRV Communists' forum.

On behalf of the delegation, Ye. K. Ligachev, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, made a statement which says, in particular:

As for the present international situation, the Soviet-U.S. summit meeting in Reykjavik revealed possible accords on nuclear disarmament, but the United States came out against them. The "Star Wars" plans which it puts forward basically mean the start of a qualitatively new spiral of the arms race and the intensification of the danger of a world catastrophe. Washington is doing everything to reverse the movement toward disarmament. This is indicated by the recent irresponsible U.S. decision finally to give up complying with the SALT II treaty and by the nuclear explosions which are continuing by the will of the White House, despite the dangerous nature of these actions and their evident unpopularity in the entire world community.

Our Asian-Pacific platform, formulated in the speech by the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee in Vladivostok and vividly embodied in the Delhi declaration, is also organically connected with the Soviet Union's program for ending the arms race and eliminating the nuclear threat to mankind. Its objective is a lasting and just peace in Asia and throughout the world. "We see it as in our interest," Comrade M.S. Gorbachev stressed, "to pool efforts and cooperate, with full respect for each people's right to live by their own choice and independently resolve their problems in conditions of peace."

"We are in favor of jointly building new, just relations in Asia and the Pacific."

That, the head of the CPSU delegation stressed, is the principled position of our party and the Soviet state, which we intend steadily to put into practice.

Comrades Ye.K. Ligachev and V.A. Medvedev then answered journalists' questions.

Question: At the congress you said you "firmly believe" in the possibility of the normalization of Vietnamese-Chinese relations. What is your confidence based on, and do you think conditions are ripe for the commencement of dialogue between Hanoi and Beijing in the near future? What role could the Soviet Union play to promote talks between China and Vietnam?

Question: What is your opinion of the international significance of the Sixth CPV Congress?

Answer: We believe that the Sixth CPV Congress will be a major event in the sociopolitical life not only of this country but also of the entire international communist movement. The statements by representatives of more than 30 parties make it possible to draw a conclusion regarding unanimity in appraising the CPV congress and in showing boundless solidarity with the Vietnamese people and the CPV. This unanimity was also displayed in the appraisal of the basic problems of contemporary international life and of the importance of and need for the strengthening of peace, achieving disarmament, preventing thermonuclear catastrophe, and curbing the forces acting against the peace-loving peoples.

The CPSU delegation would like to single out two aspects in particular. First, the statements by delegations present at the congress highly appraised the Soviet Union's proposals expressed by M.S. Gorbachev on problems of universal security, disarmament, and peace. [paragraph continues]

There was approval of the stance taken by the Soviet Union at the Reykjavik meeting and of the practical measures on the implementation of this stance following the talks in Iceland. Second, we note the great harmony between the realistic, critical, and analytical presentation of problems in the CPV Central Committee Political Report and the presentation of these questions at the 27th CPSU Congress.

Question: I would ask you to describe the most important measures for the restructuring of the economic management system in the USSR. Would you also comment on the international situation since the Soviet-U.S. meeting in Reykjavik?

Answer: We attach paramount importance to restructuring in the sphere of economic relations. Not very much time has elapsed since the 27th party congress, but we have already made some achievements, above all to elaborate certain avenues in the economic sphere. In particular, we have managed to complete the organizational restructuring of management in related sectors of the national economy. We have already put in operation new organizational structures of management in the machine building, fuel and energy, construction industry, agroindustrial, social, and foreign economic complexes. We are substantially restructuring the management of science and are creating fundamentally new intersector science and technology complexes whose purposes is the elaboration, research, and swiftest possible introduction of the results of research in production. These complexes operate in the most important spheres of scientific and technical progress. In parallel with changes in the organizational structure of management, we are also engaged in the broad introduction of economic methods of leadership in the national economy. For example, many ministries and hundreds of enterprises and associations will switch to complete financial autonomy, self-financing, and self-capitalization as of January next year. We are now preparing major reform of wages and in the material production sphere. All this work is being done on the basis of democratic centralism, intensification of the center's role in the solution of strategic questions, and comprehensive expansion of the rights and obligations of enterprises and associations -- in other words of primary production cells -- and of their responsibility for the achievement of end results.

We evaluate the international situation as alarming and explosive. People in the USSR believe that not a single country, government, political party, public movement, or person on our earth must remain outside the struggle for peace and international security. [paragraph continues]

The mass news and propaganda media must do some active work to ensure that each and every person understands and appreciates this. Allow me to express confidence that you will be active in mobilizing the world public for the preservation of peace on the planet.

CPSU, CPV Delegations Confer

PM191741 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 20 Dec 86 First Edition p 4

[TASS report under general heading: "Meetings in Hanoi"]

[Excerpts]

At the invitation of the Communist Party of Vietnam [CPV] in the work of the Sixth CPV Congress, a meeting took place 19 December in Hanoi between the CPSU delegation headed by Ye.K. Ligachev, member of the Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and Nguyen Van Linh, general secretary of the CPV Central Committee. Taking part in the meeting on the Soviet side were delegation members V.A. Medvedev, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, V.I. Sitnikov, first secretary of Irkutsk CPSU Obkom, and D.I. Kachin, USSR ambassador to the SRV; and, on the Vietnamese side, CPV Central Committee advisers Comrades Truong Chinh, Pham Van Dong, and Le Duc Tho; Politburo members Vo Chi Cong, Vo Van Kiet, Do Muoi, Nguyen co Thach, and Tran Xuan Bach; CPV Central Committee Secretary Nguyen Khanh; CPV Central Committee member Dinh Nho Liem, SRV ambassador to the USSR; and CPV Central Committee member Dau Ngoc Xuan, deputy chairman of the SRV State Planning Commission.

The Vietnamese leaders stated their full support for the Soviet Union's domestic and foreign policy as elaborated at the 27th CPSU Congress. The Vietnamese side rates highly the Soviet initiatives aimed at averting the threat of a nuclear war and in defense of peace, and the Soviet Union's principled position at the Reykjavik talks. The SRV leadership endorsed the Soviet Government Statement of 18 December 1986 on the Soviet Union's cessation of its unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests following the first U.S. nuclear explosion in the new year, in response to the actions of a U.S. Administration which is stubbornly continuing to pursue its program of nuclear tests with a view to creating [sozdaniye] and building up new nuclear armaments.

The CPV leaders made a high assessment of the Soviet initiatives on questions of ensuring peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region, and of the Delhi declaration on the principles of a nonviolent world free of nuclear weapons signed during M.S. Gorbachev's recent visit to India.

The Soviet Union expresses solidarity with the efforts of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia to strengthen the three countries' unbreakable alliance, which guarantees socialist building and the defense of the revolutionary gains in each of these countries, and to transform Southeast Asia into a zone of peace, stability, and cooperation.

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CSO: 5200/1205

RELATED ISSUES

PRC FOREIGN MINISTER ON DISARMAMENT STANCE

Beijing BEIJING REVIEW in English Vol 30 No 2, 12 Jan 87 pp 14-15

[Excerpt] Wu Xueqian, Chinese state councilor and foreign minister, in an interview with reporters on December 31, 1986, answered questions concerning the international situation and China's foreign policy. The full text of the questions and answers follow.

Question: Would you comment on the outstanding features of the international situation in 1986 and the achievements China has made over the year in following its independent foreign policy for peace?

Answer: There are both gratifying new developments and worrisome elements in the 1986 international situation. On the one hand, the world's people were calling ever louder for peace, disarmament, co-operation and development and were engaged in various activities towards this end. Smaller countries, while becoming more independent, had a greater influence on major international issues affecting the world's future. Reforms and readjustments for accelerating scientific, technical and economic development and international co-operation have become a current world theme.

On the other hand, it must not be overlooked that the international situation was very unstable. The superpowers are engaged in a continuous arms race which is extending to outer space. The United States and the Soviet Union, who have held

frequent dialogues including the summit in Iceland, have failed to reach any substantive agreement on major issues as they are still unable to bridge their differences. Conflicts continue in various "hot spots" as efforts for political settlements have so far proved to be fruitless. The world economic situation is not stable either. What should be pointed out particularly is that many developing countries have had greater difficulties as a result of falling prices for their major products and trade protectionism. Contradictions between the north and the south have become more acute.

Taking an overall view of the international developments over the year, it can be said that the forces working for world peace were growing faster than the factors for war and the efforts defending world peace have a brighter future.

In following a peaceful and independent foreign policy, China further developed in the past year its relations with many countries and economic and technical exchanges have expanded. We have taken active steps and put

forward reasonable proposals with the purpose of relaxing the tense situation and promoting disarmament and international co-operation, and our actions were welcomed by the international community. In today's world, China exerts a growing influence and its prestige is on the rise.

Q: The two Chinese proposals on nuclear and conventional disarmament have been adopted by the United Nations General Assembly at its 41st session. How do you evaluate the two proposals? What is China's basic stand on disarmament?

A: The basic idea of China's proposals is that the United States and the Soviet Union have a "special responsibility" for the arms race and therefore disarmament, and they should "take the lead" in drastically reducing their nuclear and conventional arsenals. The adoption of the two proposals by the United Nations General Assembly through full consultations shows that China's stand is in accord with the common wishes of the people of all countries for arms reduction and world peace. The adoption also proves that it is a reasonable and realistic stand.

It is applaudable that both the United States and the Soviet Union endorsed the two proposals. But what we hope to see is that they will truly respect the common wishes and demands of the people of various countries and take action to implement the two UN resolutions.

The basic stand of the Chinese government on disarmament is that it opposes the arms race and the expansion of this race to outer space. We stand for final realization of a total ban and destruction of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons as well as a drastic reduction of conventional arms. We also maintain that countries, big or small, should have a say on disarmament, that bilateral and multi-lateral efforts for disarmament should complement and promote each other, that any disarmament talks and agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union should not harm the interests of other countries, and that at the same time efforts are made for disarmament, "hot spots" in the world should be eliminated and aggression and expansion stopped.

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