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Worldwide Report
ARMS CONTROL

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19 NOVEMBER 1986

WORLDWIDE REPORT

ARMS CONTROL

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

PONOMAREV FAULTS U.S. 'DISTORTION' OF ABM TREATY

LD221129 Moscow TASS in English 1120 GMT 22 Oct 86

["Why is the USA Breaking the ABM Treaty?"--TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow 22 Oct, TASS--Follows commentary by Leonid Pnomarev, a TASS news analyst:

Answering the question why the "problem of interpretation" of the Soviet-American Treaty of Unlimited Duration of the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) systems has become the main barrier in the way of an agreement on arms control between the United States and the Soviet Union, the newspaper NEW YORK TIMES said that the Reagan administration had offered a "very free" interpretation" of the treaty. It will allow the United States to develop and test new space-based defence systems. This is precisely the aim of the White House to use all methods, down to distorting the very presence of the ABM Treaty, and given a "green light" to its plans for a militarization of outer space.

This distortion lies in the unfounded claim that the treaty in its present form does not prevent the implementation of the U.S. SDI program. It is apt to recall that the ABM Treaty concluded in 1972 proceeds from the basic agreement of the sides that they undertake not to develop, test, or deploy sea-based, air-based, space-based or mobile land-based ABM systems or components.

From whatever end you may read that paragraph, it is absolutely impossible being in one's right mind that guided by good intentions to draw the conclusion that the said provision allows the United States to develop and test an anti-ballistic missile system with space-based elements. On the contrary, the ABM Treaty is an obstacle to the implementation of the "Star Wars" programs, therefore the Washington leaders show such a hostile attitude to it.

There is more aspect to that matter. The treaty was concluded in 1972, and only in 1985-1986 the "problem" of its interpretation emerged.

The point is that it is precisely by that time that it became necessary within the framework of the SDI effort to hold tests including the launching

of craft and targets into space. And exactly at that time the Washington leaders started "freely" interpreting the ABM Treaty to justify the SDI. To be more precise, there were no divergencies in the interpretation by the USSR and the USA of the ABM Treaty up to March 1983, when President Reagan proclaimed his "Strategic Defence Initiative". Since that time the U.S. side has steadily led things to a destruction of the ABM Treaty, for undermining its fundamentals.

A proof of that is Washington's stubborn reluctance to strengthen the ABM regime through the adoption by both sides of the commitment not to use the right of abandoning it for ten years. Over that period, in keeping with mutual agreement, apart from eliminating nuclear weapons, the USSR and the USA would strictly observe all provisions of the treaty, the testing of space elements of anti-ballistic missile defence system in outer space, with the exception of those done at laboratories, should be banned. And after the expiry of ten years when there would be no nuclear weapons, the USSR and the USA could outline at special talks mutually acceptable decisions what is to be done next. That is the Soviet side's true stand on that issue. Yet in its wish to ensure military superiority, Washington is trying to preserve and legalize the SDI.

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

VORONTSOV ON SOVIET APPROACH TO ABM TREATY

LD241106 Moscow TASS in English 1040 GMT 24 Sep 86

[Text] Moscow 24 Sep TASS--We have no intention of assisting the United States in its striving to place weapons in space, Yuliy Vorontsov, first deputy minister of foreign affairs of the U.S.S.R., said here today.

The U.S.S.R. will do everything in order to make such efforts worthless and thwart them, he went on.

Let no one have any doubts that we have all possibilities for doing that, and we will use them if we have to. This is how the Soviet side reacted to the American approach to the ABM treaty set forth in President Reagan's July 25 message the contents of which he revealed.

In his U.N. speech President Reagan praised the American approach to the ABM treaty, Vorontsov went on to say.

However, it was pointed out in our reply to his July 25 message that the American stand envisioned that the ABM treaty -- which is of unlimited duration -- would exist for only 5 to 7 years more. Meanwhile operations destroying it would proceed.

For our part, we proposed that all operations in the field of space anti-missile systems be restricted to the limits of laboratories, but in reply to that "Star Wars" weapons are praised, the development of space weapons and their proving ground testing is proposed and the intention is proclaimed to start the deployment of large-scale ABM systems in 5 to 7 years and, in doing so, to blast the treaty.

The President was warned that we would not agree to that, Vorontsov said.

We regard such an approach, which is being passed off as "new", only as a roundabout way to acquiring military superiority.

In the reply to President Reagan's July 25 message, Yuliy Vorontsov disclosed, it was said that the Soviet Union firmly favored the strengthening of the ABM treaty regime.

Exactly this consideration underlies our stance on keeping the operations within the walls of the laboratories and on the strict observance of the ABM treaty over a period of up to 15 years, the first deputy minister of the U.S.S.R. said.

In such a case it would be possible -- and the President was offered that -- to reach agreement on substantial reductions in the strategic offensive arms. We are prepared to do that without delay. In doing that, the sides would demonstrate that neither of them is striving for military superiority, Yuliy Vorontsov emphasized.

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

U.S. 'PROPAGANDA' COUNTERED ON NONNUCLEAR SDI

PM231315 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 23 Oct 86 Morning Edition p 5

[L. Koryavin Washington dispatch: "The Nuclear Track of the 'Cobra'"]

[Text] "Strategic Defense Initiative" (SDI) propaganda has been combined with a carefully worked out strategic disinformation initiative in the United States.

The campaign is being waged by the mass information media, political, figures, and government officials operating in the corridors of Congress and the Washington authorities, or even simply on the streets, working on public opinion. And all this is being directed from the state council panels of government.

The main aim of this propaganda offensive is to prove the "defensive nature" of SDI and present this program to the American people as a guarantee of U.S. security against a possible aggressor and as a kind of "insurance" for the country's future. The cloud of deception regarding the "nonnuclear" nature of SDI is particularly poisonous. Here, however, government propagandists are finding themselves in difficulties. Their heaps of rhetoric are being knocked down by Americans actually involved in developing [razrabotka] "Star Wars" weapons. Thus, Lowell Wood, one of the leaders of work being done in this field at the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, says directly: "Nuclear energy will play a central role in the 'Strategic Defense Initiative.'" It is precisely Livermore that is now trying to create [sozdat] a nuclear-powered x-ray laser -- a weapon which, to quote THE WASHINGTON POST, would be able to direct lethal x-ray beams for thousands of miles as a result of a nuclear explosion in space.

The creation [sozdaniye] of nuclear power plants for the space-based ABM system is part of the SDI program. These, specialists believe, are potential sources of power for nuclear-powered combat lasers, electromagnetic guns, and other "Star Wars" components. What is more, these powerful plants will ensure means of communication and control. Therefore, strike lasers, and detection and targeting systems, and the entire process of conducting "combat operations" in space are all organically connected with nuclear potential.

THE WASHINGTON POST writes tha nuclear-powered particle beam weapons will keep the Libermore Laboratory and its Nevada test site fully occupied for "several decades to come." This is an accurate observation. What is being tested there has a direct bearing on the nuclear militarization of space, which, as the U.S. disinformation service reiterates, will be "free" of nuclear charges. American journalists Fred Hyatt and Rick Atkinson observe, however, that "it is precisely the creation [sozdaniye] of nuclear-powered lasers that is the real reason for the United States' refusal to conclude a nuclear test ban treaty with the Soviet Union.

And these tests continue in Nevada. As Paul Brown of the Livermore Laboratory has emphasized, the concept of the x-ray laser has been tested there in the course of a whole series of underground explosions with such fine sounding, exotic names as "(Dofin)," "Cobra," "Raomano," "Cottage," and "Gold Stone." Pentagon and Energy Department spokesmen do not conceal the fact that they have achieved "major success in this sphere." Even open documents from the U.S. military department point out that the period 1987-1988 will be "the point at which the full transition will be made from fundamental SDI research to the technical development [razrabotka] stage."

There are the facts. They convincingly show the absurdity of SDI's "nonnuclear nature." This is the opinion of Carl Sagan, the well-known American scientist: "It is impossible to stop the arms race while new weapons are being produced. The U.S. President's idea that SDI will render nuclear weapons 'unnecessary and obsolete' is unrealistic. On the contrary: Realization of this program will increase the danger of a nuclear war." And Paul Warnke, former director of the U.S. Agency for Arms Control and Disarmament, believes that "SDI is the main obstacle in the way of reaching accords with the Soviet Union on reducing nuclear weapons arsenals."

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

NATO COMMANDER VOICES FEARS ON INF REMOVAL

PM221421 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 22 Oct 86 Morning Edition p 5

[Own correspondent A. Krivopalov report: "NATO: General Rogers' 'Hobbyhorse'"]

[Text] London--B. Rogers, supreme commander of the NATO Allied Armed Forces in Europe, has mounted his favorite hobbyhorse again.

The general claims that the NATO military leadership he heads was not informed about the possible steps toward reducing nuclear weapons connected with the Soviet proposals in Reykjavik. He sounded the militarist alarm, saying that NATO would be left unarmed if both sides decided to really remove medium-range missiles from Europe.

Initially Rogers circulated this fabrication in the press and is now repeating it at an official level, so to speak. The four star U.S. general with a deep-rooted interest in "Star Wars" decided to raise this question with the NATO countries' defense ministers.

They were gathering at Gleneagles, Scotland, where the North Atlantic bloc's Nuclear Planning Group is meeting.

What will be the response to this diplomatic sally from the ministers, who on this occasion are guests of the UK Government? Well aware of the feelings of the population at large in their own countries, they all understand in principle the attractiveness of the idea of nuclear disarmament in Europe, which the USSR is proposing be carried out even before the end of this century. There is something else they know: The meeting in Reykjavik, which, unfortunately, did not end with a formal accord, showed nevertheless that agreements are possible. All it needs is the political will.

The U.S. military-industrial complex, whose needs are met primarily by General B. Rogers, intends to suppress that political will in the NATO countries even further. Rogers has simply been sent into the attack with the aim of preventing any deviation from the course of the further spiraling of the arms race (SDI above all).

The senior U.S. representative at NATO's Scottish rendezvous is Pentagon boss C. Weinberger, of course. Although tact is not the strongest character trait of this hawk in civilian plumage, on this occasion it seemed somewhat awkward for him to openly criticize what they were working toward in Reykjavik. Thus the role of "troublemaker" was assigned to the career soldier.

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

GERASIMOV DENIES SOVIET VERSION OF SDI

PM231031 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 22 Oct 86 First Edition p 5

[Unattributed report: "When There Is No Proof..."]

[Text] Japanese Foreign Minister Kuranari, speaking in parliament, said that "the United States is developing [razrabatyvayut] the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) in response to the threat that the Soviet Union will create [sozdaniye] a nuclear-powered laser, and therefore needs to hold nuclear tests." We asked G. Gerasimov, chief of the USSR Foreign Ministry Information Administration to comment on this report.

Something new and original has appeared in the arguments in defense of SDI, he noted. Of course, neither Mr Kuranari nor anyone else has any proof. But the very absence of proof is interpreted as proof in the distorted world of anti-Sovietism. This approach smacks of the logic of the hypochondriac who sees the absence of disease as proof that it will soon strike.

The Soviet Union, as is well know, rejects the SDI concept and does not intend to create [sozdavat] its own version. Our country warns that it will take countermeasures to neutralize U.S. efforts in this sphere -- but these measures will be wholly fitting [adekvatnyy] rather than analagous.

Apart from its distorted logic Mr Kuranari's statement demonstrated -- or rather, shed light on -- two interesting facts:

First, the statement showed that Mr Kuranari favors continuing nuclear tests. It is being pointed out in Japan itself that this position runs counter to Japanese Government statements in favor of banning all nuclear tests. Second, the statement refutes the assurances given by the Japanese prime minister -- and by the U.S. President himself -- about the "nonnuclear nature of SDI." Of course, the U.S. "Star Wars" plans contain a whole package of military-technical innovations, but foremost among them is probably Edward Teller's brainchild -- the nuclear-pumped x-ray laser -- and nuclear tests are needed in order to create [sozdat] it, and not only underground tests but probably tests in space, too.

Incidentally, since the Soviet Union is not holding nuclear tests, that fact in itself prevents it from conducting work on the creation [sozdaniye] of a nuclear powered laser.

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

PRAVDA EXAMINES BUSINESS' ROLE IN SDI

Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 29 Aug 86 p 4

[Article by N. Karasyev, candidate of economic sciences: "Under a Spell of Dollars"]

[Text] If one looks in on the headquarters of the leading US arms corporations, the fact that they are equipped with the very latest models of electronic gadgets forces one to believe that their leaders are right in step with the times. But in actuality the thinking of the owners of the "assembly lines of death," who are producing sophisticated implements of destruction, capable of leading to the death of earthly civilization, is dangerously behind the times in terms of the realities of the present day, and the profound changes which have taken place in international life and on the planet in general.

The people who occupy the offices of these headquarters are an integral part of the military industrial complex [MIC] of the United States, and they've simply gone mad with the arms race. What forces the magnates of the MIC to continue the death-dealing arms race? The lust for profits? Yes, but not that alone. I believe their interest here is threefold: to ensure that the flow of profits from arms production does not run low while guaranteeing US military superiority; to attempt to wear out the USSR economically; and, in the final analysis, to ensure themselves a commanding position in the world, realize further imperial ambitions, and continue their policy of plundering the developing countries.

The arms business, as is well known, is very voracious and ruthless. Yesterday it needed millions; today--billions; and tomorrow--trillions. Today the bosses of the MIC already have a vision of those trillions in the form of the "strategic defense initiative" of the President of the United States, known in the world under the nickname "Star Wars."

Star Wars: this expression has become a symbol of the aggressive strivings of American imperialism.

Today, many people in the USA are simply hypnotized by the idea of Star Wars. At the same time the powerful means of hypnosis is not the penetrating gaze of a psychiatrist, and not magic words. The means is the astronomical

figures, which the arms manufacturers simply cannot resist. These are figures which entail multi-billion dollar profits--which the contractors of military-space projects are counting on getting.

The West German magazine SPIEGEL justly termed the Star Wars program the offspring of the American arms monopolies. As early as the 1970's the aviation and space concern Rockwell International published a brochure under the title, "Space--the American Frontier for Growth, Leadership and Freedom." The brochure depicted heavenly battles in awe-inspiring colors. Thus, actually, the framework for SDI was designed in the headquarters of the military-industrial firms long before 1983 when the US President solemnly declared his dubious authorship of this odious project of the space age.

It is precisely the military-industrial complex that today plays the decisive role in maintaining the life and the all-round growth of its offspring. Twelve major suppliers of the Pentagon determine the rates of realization of the Star Wars program; these are MacDonnell-Douglas, General Dynamics, Lockheed, Boeing, General Electric, Hughes, United Technologies Corporation, Raytheon, Litton, Grumman Corporation, Martin Marietta, and Rockwell International. Directly oriented toward filling orders for SDI are over 240 American military-industrial firms, which have enlisted a thousand subcontractors in this business.

In the analysis of the newspaper NEW YORK TIMES, "The industry working for Star Wars is beginning to acquire a specific profile." The largest fabricators of SDI have already succeeded in casting their fate with this enterprise.

The account for contracts for military areospace production at Lockheed, for example, amounts to 85 percent of its working capital; for MacDonnell-Douglas, 69 percent; for Hughes, 66 percent; and for Rockwell International, 63 percent.

As the American press notes, these contracts are plying a sea of graft, bribery, extortion, and underhanded dealing. Those states whose representatives are ensconced in the government institutions in charge of letting contracts for preparations for Star Wars were able to get six times as much of the money allocated for SDI than the rest.

Almost half of all the money is going to California. Journalists have transparently hinted that the lobbyists of this state are situated at the very pinnacle of the government pyramid. At the same time they recall that the President of the USA himself, formerly Governor of California, steadily patronizes the military industrialists of this state. And as far as State Secretary George Schultz and Defense Secretary Caspar Weinburger are concerned, both were associates at the Bechtel firm in California, which is engaged in production of industrial and military equipment.

These and other similar circumstances permitted the West German magazine SPIEGEL to conclude that, "The overlapping of interests of the most varied groups with the ideas of SDI has become so tight that, strictly speaking, it is impossible for them to hold serious talks with another great power. For Big Business talks with the Soviet Union on SDI is a matter even more absurd than discussing the question of how to blow up Wall Street."

Was it so long ago that official Washington declared that the strategic defense initiative is something on the order of laboratory work, a certain kind of research by theoretical scientists? However, as soon as the socialist states proposed last June that work in the area of SDI be limited to laboratory research, the Western press, quoting anonymous Pentagon sources hastened to report that the USA does not agree with this peaceful proposal. And why? The reason is simple. Accepting the proposal of the socialist countries once again is in the cause of peace and security of nations and states; but it goes against the selfish interests of the military-industrial complex. The Challenger tragedy shows how strongly the MIC is striving to abandon the stuffy academic lecture halls for the boundless reaches of military-space profits. The military-political aspects of its flight its death are today widely known. The American press shed considerable light on the fact that since 1986 flight vehicles of this type have been used to place weapons for Star Wars into orbit.

American research for Star Wars was for many years confined to the laboratories. But they became extremely profitable for business affairs in and of themselves. For the past two fiscal years alone, including the present one, because of them 4.1 billion dollars has been transferred from the American taxpayers to the safes of the military monopolies and research institutes. And for the 1987 fiscal year the administration has pledged to put up an additional 4.8 billion dollars immediately.

Nuclear detonations at the Nevada test range are directly associated with implementing the SDI program. And therein lies one of the answers to the question why the US administration so stubbornly refuses to take part in the moratorium on nuclear explosions declared by our country.

What sort of profits does the MIC anticipate, should matters progress to mass production of military-space weapons? The possible dimensions of this "mother lode" are ever increasing. Thus, well-known American Senator W. Proxmire, delivering a speech in Congress, cited estimates according to which it turned out that creating a Star Wars system would cost more than two trillion dollars. And servicing and modernizing it in orbit would cost an additional 200 to 300 billion dollars per year, which would lead to doubling the annual defense budget of the USA.

The Challenger catastrophe had a sobering effect on many people in the USA. Six thousand five hundred American scientists, including 3,700 professors and prominent research scientists, and 15 laureates of the Nobel Prize, appealed to Congress to boycott SDI; and 46 US senators signed a letter demanding sharp reduction of the budget presented by the government for next year for Star Wars.

Yes, the catastrophe was sobering to many, and not only in the US military-industrial complex. As in a theater of the absurd, its representatives are trying to wrest profits from the very misfortune which befell the American people. In exchange for the manned space ship program, which was knocked out of the saddle, the Pentagon and industrialists are attempting to create a new type of giant rocket capable of placing military space loads in orbit.

According to the NEW YORK TIMES, this program in and of itself demands a revolution in the structure and operation of the aerospace industry. According to US Air Force data, the cost of implementing the entire program will amount to 2.8 billion dollars as opposed to the 1.2 billion which the exploded Challenger cost.

Other highly expensive ideas are being proposed as well, for the purpose of somehow building a springboard for mass launching of weapons into space. Among these is a project for creating a spaceship which would be able to lift off by itself from a takeoff and landing strip and reach orbit. Just for the scientific research work for manufacturing such a flight vehicle in the near future will cost nearly 3 billion dollars. In a word, the US military-industrial complex is even taking advantage of the Challenger mishap to create new major channels for getting rich.

The interests and purposes of the military-industrial complex in realizing the Star Wars program are not at all in accord with the interests and purposes of the American people, nor with the genuine national interests of that great country. This, it would appear, they are now beginning to understand in the USA. The NEW YORK TIMES warns that in trying to achieve military-strategic superiority over the USSR, "America will sink into bankruptcy." And so, the sooner this truth becomes apparent to those who are defining US policy today, the better it will be for the cause of peace.

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U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

MOSCOW: U.S. ACTIONS COUNTER PROCESS STARTED AT REYKJAVIK

LD240333 Moscow in English to North America 2300 GMT 23 Oct 86

[Vladislav Kozyakov commentary]

[Excerpts] Here is our observer Vladislav Kozyakov with his comment on Washington's reaction to the speech by Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev over Soviet television on Wednesday.

[Kozyakov] Good evening. According to press efforts from Washington, the White House has acknowledged Mikhail Gorbachev's speech and has tried to depict the Soviet leader and President Reagan as being in agreement on moving ahead in pursuit of arms control agreements. Well, at first glance such a reaction seems welcome. The thing is, however, that the Soviet leader drew attention to various facts which shows that American policy today runs counter to the process started at Reykjavik. To begin with, both the mass media and officials in America are trying to distort what really happened at the meeting in Iceland. The Soviet Union came to that meeting with constructive proposals for arms reduction that indeed are the most radical in the entire history of Soviet-American talks. As a result of their meetings, Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan agreed that the strategic weapons of the Soviet Union and the United States can and must be totally eliminated by the year 1996. [passage omitted]

What do we see in Washington today? It would be difficult even to list all the misleading statements made there by high-ranking officials of the administration. For example, some deny that President Reagan gave his consent to the total abolition of all strategic weapons of the USSR and the USA by the year 1996. Others deny that the President agreed to the Soviet proposals to reduce not only strategic missiles but also bombers and cruise missiles. They assert that some of the Soviet Union's proposals made in Iceland should be taken out of the integral package. As for the SDI program, the administration is doing its utmost to carry it out despite the fact that this is a major obstacle on the way to nuclear disarmament.

Speaking in Scotland on Wednesday, Defense Secretary Weinberger said we certainly hope to deploy SDI. Meanwhile, Washington announced its decision to expel from the United States 55 members of the Soviet Embassy and Consulate, an action that appears outrageous from the normal standpoint, and the Soviet side has been forced to take countermeasures. Needless to say, both the misleading campaign about Reykjavik in the United States and the provocative anti-Soviet actions by Washington are absolutely incompatible with the since desire to promote nuclear disarmament and international security. Until next time, goodbye.

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

IZVESTIYA: BOVIN EXPLAINS OBJECTIONS, ALTERNATIVES TO SDI

PM220940 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 22 Oct 86 Morning Edition p 5

[Political observer A. Bovin article: "The Main Obstacle"]

[Text] R. Reagan's great illusion blocked the way to the great compromise which M.S. Gorbachev offered in Reykjavik. Refusing to accept this compromise or to acknowledge the balance of concessions, the U.S. President continued with fanatical stubbornness to defend his "Strategic Defense Initiative."

Asserting that SDI as an impenetrable space shield remains a utopia, THE NEW YORK TIMES describes the events in Iceland in these terms: "Reagan had a chance to destroy Soviet and U.S. medium-range nuclear armaments in Europe, to make progress toward banning nuclear tests on his own terms, to reduce the nuclear arsenals by one-half in 5 years, and to agree on a colossal reduction at a later date. To this he said 'no'...It is probably possible to put forward arguments to support the idea that illusory birds in the bush are worth sacrificing for a Soviet bird in the hand. To date, however, the President has not proved this."

It is hard to prove the unprovable. It is much more interesting to examine the arguments which R. Reagan and his immediate entourage use to try to explain the positions of the United States and the USSR (in one case justification, in the other, naturally, condemnation).

Let us begin with the arguments which are supposed to show the Americans and world public opinion just why the White House maintains a death-grip on SDI.

First, the problem of nuclear weapons belonging to third countries. "If at some future moment," Vice Admiral J. Poindexter, the U.S. President's national security assistant, claims, "the process of the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons will be wrecked and if nuclear weapons proliferate...it is prudent and logical that not only the United States but also the Soviet Union should really want some sort of defense system..." This argument may be called the "madman's argument" since, as a rule, it is set out citing the example of the madman who may get hold of a ballistic missile somewhere and launch it.

Second, the question of insurance against the nonobservance of treaty commitments. "It is likely," J. Matlock, the U.S. President's special assistant for national security, muses, "that we shall never be able to ensure verification [proverka] to such a degree that absolute certainty can be guaranteed that no one in the world has any missiles left." And since there is no such certainty, there should be a defense system which

would guarantee complete security. Matlock expresses himself intelligently. This argument is usually accompanied by references to possible "Soviet deception" and to the effect that the Soviet Union will probably decide to conceal a missile or two so as then to be able to threaten U.S. security.

There is no point in writing for the umpteenth time that our country strictly observes the commitments it has assumed. But there is a point in reminding people that confidence (or the lack thereof) is a mutual problem. Just as the hypothesis of the madman is a mutual problem. And if you follow U.S. logic, the logic of the "insurance policy," the Soviet Union should deploy its own "insurance" system. Incidentally, the Americans do not object to that. But we do. And we object because, in our opinion, defense against every possible eventuality which may occur only once does not require fantastic expenditure or the transformation of near-earth space into an arsenal of different types of space weapons.

As for the situation that will arise if the nonproliferation system is disrupted, it may require solutions about which it is hard to say anything definite at present. In any event, all the presently feasible ways of reducing arms are based on the assumption that the nonproliferation system will continue to operate.

Third, the problem of incentives and trump cards. The White House views the continuation of work on SDI as the best incentive for keeping the "Russians" at the negotiating table, as a good trump card capable of forcing them to agree to arms reductions. "SDI," R. Perle, U.S. assistant secretary for defense on international security policy, stated, "is the locomotive which pulls the train of arms control." To prove that thesis the Americans should abandon SDI and see whether the arms control train stops. If you accept Washington's approach, we should on no account agree to a reduction of ground-based heavy ballistic missiles since it is that threat which is supposed to keep the Americans at the negotiating table....

Incidentally, about trump cards: I will quote P. Warnke, erstwhile head of the U.S. delegation to the Soviet-U.S. arms control talks. "There is no doubt that SDI is a good trump card. The question is when it will be played," Warnke said. "We will never get more for SDI than we could have gotten at Reykjavik. As the absurdity of the system comes to light we will get less and less for it. We must play this trump card now while it is still worth something." Well? Sensible advice, it seems to me.

So, there will be a trillion-dollar "Star Wars" program comprising hundreds, if not thousands, of unique ground installations and space platforms and new technological frontiers -- and all to pressure those holdouts who do not want disarmament and to defend against nuclear madmen and cunning frauds. All this hardly seems serious. Weak, fabricated, labored arguments. You get the impression they are needed to divert attention from the real, main argument. SDI is needed because hope has not yet been lost of forging ahead and acquiring strategic advantages. It was no accident the C. Weinberger noted that if it implements SDI the United States will be in the same position as when it had a monopoly on the atom bomb. That is the argument. Clear and comprehensible.

Now let us see what motives and what explanations are being advanced in the United States to elucidate the USSR's negative attitude to the "Star Wars" program.

We will start with a reexamination. M.S. Gorbachev's position is described in the following way: "derailing" SDI and "destroying our (that is, American) defense shield." But in fact M.S. Gorbachev's proposals did not go that far. Of course it would be good if SDI were abandoned once and for all. But at the present time such a demand would be unrealistic. The proposal was different. Since the President himself has repeatedly stated that SDI is exclusively a research program -- go ahead, carry out research, development [razrabotki], and even testing, but without leaving the laboratory. For at least the next 10 years.

In view of the multilayered full-scale ABM system as conceived by the President, the proposed limitations would hardly have a tangible delaying effect on research work since, as THE WASHINGTON POST claims, there is a conviction in scientific circles that "the United States can study what is needed while staying within the framework of laboratory research for 10 years."

Realistically, the Soviet proposal could hamper plans to create limited ABM systems intended primarily to protect strategic military targets and command centers. But that is precisely what we want, since the creation of such systems would change the correlation of strategic forces in favor of the United States and hamper nuclear disarmament.

But Washington is naturally putting a different slant on our intentions. Listen to P. Buchanan, White House communications director. First he asks the question, and not just a question but the "fundamental" question: "Why does this program -- which exists only in theory, will hardly defend the United States, and poses no threat to anyone in the world -- represent such a frightening problem for the Soviet Union?" The answer was: "For a whole generation the Soviet Union has invested \$1 trillion in ballistic missiles which could destroy all its enemies and against which there is no defense. The United States now wants to rely on defensive systems which threaten nobody. These defensive systems could turn that monstrous arsenal into garbage. They would mark the end of its usefulness for scaring, threatening, and blackmailing others. Reagan's SDI does not threaten Soviet citizens. It poses a threat to the possible use of that monstrous arsenal for scaring others and, in my opinion, that is precisely why Mr Gorbachev went to Iceland in order to shoot it down, and that is precisely why he failed."

It is hard to take this traditional rubbish, which boils down to the "Soviet threat," seriously. But we will try. If Buchanan is right and the Soviet Union cannot get by without its "monstrous arsenal for scaring others," then in response to SDI the Soviet Union should set about increasing that arsenal. But if the Soviet Union itself is proposing to eliminate both its own and U.S. nuclear arms, that means Buchanan is wrong. It is SDI, even though it "exists only in theory," that is preventing nuclear potentials being turned into "garbage." And Reykjavik has shown just that once again.

P. Buchanan is also wrong when he claims that the ABM defense systems which are being designed in the United States "threaten nobody." J. Poindexter puts this argument more subtly. One of the reasons for the "Russians'" concern, he says, "lies in the fact that they probably do not trust us and that they believe that we are working on a system which, when we have created it, will provide us with a first strike facility. However, the point is that if we are prepared to eliminate all offensive ballistic missiles prior to deploying it, the problem of a first strike ceases to exist." In ideal circumstances this is what is supposed to happen. However, "ideal circumstances" belong to the realm of theory rather than practice. In practice on the other hand, if

one side is intensively working on the creation [sozdaniye] of ABM systems, then the lower the levels of the offensive potentials are, the fewer delivery vehicles and charges there are, the easier it is -- by means of a sudden breakthrough in one area or another -- to disrupt the equilibrium, to outstrip the other side, to gain a strategic advantage. And we cannot fail to take this potential threat into account.

Nor can we ignore the obvious fact that defense systems can also have offensive potential. Thus, for instance, virtually all types of arms that are being developed [razrabatyvayemye] under the "Star Wars" program are capable of destroying satellites without which missile attack observation and warning systems cannot function. But this is only half the problem. [paragraph continues]

Let us examine the other half of the problem as presented by R. Perle: The Soviet Union "is worried that in the course of the implementation of SDI we may somehow come across technical solutions which could be used in the sphere of offensive arms, and the Russians are trying to prevent this." It is not often that one can agree with Perle. But this is one such occasion. We are indeed concerned at the fact that it may be possible, via the "Star Wars" program, to arrive at fundamentally new types of weapons and that an arms race in this area would wipe out all plans for nuclear disarmament.

The Americans are insisting all the time: Do not worry, believe in our good intentions, we will cause you no harm, we need SDI only and exclusively as an "insurance," as a shield.... And we would very much like to believe this. But it is not possible. Intentions are a purely subjective and changeable matter. Therefore we must consider not just what Washington wants but also what it is capable of. Objective potential rather than intentions must be the subject of analysis. And the analysis indicates that a one-sided implementation of SDI can provide the United States with the opportunity to break out of the military-strategic parity and, consequently, to sharply destabilize the world situation and intensify the threat of war.

There are two ways of preserving parity.

First: The Soviet Union embarks on the implementation of a parallel program of its own. Parity is preserved, but the arms race continues. A three-fold arms race because the rivalry embraces offensive weapons, defense systems, and countermeasure systems. The balance of fear, distrust, and suspicion is reestablished at an increasingly higher level. It is not the sides' equal security that increases but rather the equal danger to both of them.

Second: The United States abandons the development and deployment [razrabatyvat i razvorachivat] of the ABM defense system. This would make it possible to markedly lower the level of nuclear confrontation in the foreseeable future and to embark on a transition to a nuclear-free world.

The Soviet Union's choice is clear. We are resolutely against supplementing or replacing the arms race on earth with an arms race in space. Now Washington must choose. "In my view," Senator R. Byrd said a few days ago, "SDI must not be the rock on which the arms control process founders." Quite true. Reykjavik revealed the problem. The main obstacle on the path toward disarmament is the "Star Wars" program and its advocates. And this is not a problem of Soviet-American relations. It is a problem which affects all mankind.

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

IZVESTIYA: REAGAN 'CORRECTED' BY POINDEXTER ON SDI SHARING

PM221557 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 20 Oct 86 Morning Edition p 4

[A. Palladin "Ironical Notes" under the "Themes of the Day" rubric: "How the Admiral Corrected the President"]

[Text] John Poindexter, the president's national security assistant, is distinguished from other Washington officials by his admiral's rank and his dislike for contacts with the press. It is not that the head of the National Security Council (Poindexter's other title) was ignorant or at the very least lacked vanity, it is just that until recently he kept to himself and did not force his opinions on all and sundry. Now, instead, the invisible admiral is himself seeking out the company of those who christened him that way -- namely, the news broadcasting fraternity.

And all because the White House is trying to justify the deadlock at the Reykjavik meeting. Now, together with colleagues from the administration, the National Security Council chief is calling press conference after press conference, briefing after briefing where he tries to explain his government's policy or, rather, to din into journalists that while fanning up the arms race the White House is thinking only of peace.

However, either because Mr Poindexter lacks the necessary skill or because the military man in him is prevailing, it turns out that during these contacts he quite often blurts out what the administration's leaders are thinking. That is what happened during his latest meeting with foreign journalists accredited in Washington. Trying to explain the White House's approach to disarmament questions, the President's assistant stated with an admiral's bluntness that Washington continues to reject the Soviet leadership's proposal on the complete elimination of nuclear weapon stocks by the year 2000. According to Mr Poindexter there can be no question of that until: a) a balance of conventional, nonnuclear forces is reached; b) the "political climate" in the USSR changes; and c) our country carries out unilateral ideological disarmament.

That is how the "new thinking," Washington-style looks! The admiral is unoriginal, even by the Reagan administration's standards. Back in 1981, Richard Pipes -- an adviser to the present U.S. President -- issued an ultimatum to the USSR: Either voluntarily surrender to the American way of life or World War III. Thus, J. Poindexter's outpourings could be ignored but for one thing: They show the true worth of the White House head's statement that his ultimate goal and most cherished dream is the complete and general elimination of nuclear weapons.

Furthermore, at the same press conference the admiral even ventured to correct his commander in chief who, under the U.S. Constitution, is the President. As everyone knows, when trying to present the "Star Wars" program as a noble venture, R. Reagan is promising to share its secrets with our country. It goes without saying that even in the United States there are few who take this seriously. Nevertheless, Mr Poindexter considered it necessary to clarify this issue. Henceforth, he stated, the White House head's promises should not be taken to mean that the United States is offering the USSR technological documentation on SDI. That is understood: Washington views this program as an instrument not of cooperation but of confrontation.

Thank you for your frankness, admiral! Listening to Mr Poindexter was all the more interesting because it is through people like him that the military-industrial complex speaks.

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CSO: 5200/1062

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

GORBACHEV ON SUMMIT TO CULTURAL WORKERS IN KIRGHIZIA

PM211529 Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian 22 Oct 86 p 1

[Excerpts] Moscow, 20 October (TASS)--Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, on 20 October received a group of prominent cultural workers who had attended an international meeting in Kirghizia at the invitation of Soviet author Chinghiz Aitmatov.

"We have all drawn lessons from the past and, overcoming hardships and privations, have all risen to our feet again and marched forward, choosing our own roads. But only imagine what will happen if we fail to fend off the nuclear threat looming large over our common human home. If this happens, there would no longer be a possibility to rectify mistakes. Now we have really reached the critical moment in history when it is obvious that the fatal danger can only be removed by joint effort."

There is the need to speak at the top of one's voice about the concerns of our time, jointly to conduct the search for necessary solutions in consolidating the peaceful present and future, to awaken the conscience and responsibility of each person for the destinies of peace.

Man is, ultimately, what is all-important. If progress in some or other area is accompanied by human losses -- not only spiritual or political but also physical ones -- the system which allows for such losses should be called in question. Civilization with all its difficulties and contradictions should be preserved for life, for man. And if mankind lives, it will sort out contradictions this way or another.

Mikhail Gorbachev shared his impressions of the meeting with the U.S. President in Reykjavik. This meeting, he stressed, showed that it is possible to reach agreements which would set the beginning to the elimination of nuclear weapons. The program of new proposals put forward by the USSR opens rather than closes the door to the quest for mutually acceptable solutions. It provides the real opportunity to unlock the deadlock. But the meeting showed at the same time that no small difficulties should be overcome on the road towards agreements.

One of the principal lessons of Reykjavik is that a new political thinking, corresponding to the realities of the nuclear age, is the indispensable condition for breaking out of the critical situation in which mankind has found itself at the turn of the 20th century. Deep modifications in the political thinking of the entire human community are needed.

The spiritual energy of scientists and cultural personalities, their intellectual and moral authority can be instrumental in shaping this new thinking. The Issyk-Kul forum fully confirms this.

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CSO: 5200/1064

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

USSR: KARPOV 17 OCT BRIEFING ON REYKJAVIK

IZVESTIYA Report

PM201431 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 19 Oct 86 Morning Edition p 5

[TASS report: "At the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs Press Center"]

[Text] A briefing for Soviet and foreign journalists on the results of the Soviet-American summit meeting in Reykjavik was held on 17 October at the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs Press Center. Those present were addressed by V.P. Karpov, chief of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs Administration for Arms Limitation and Disarmament Problems and head of the Soviet delegation at the Geneva Soviet-American talks on nuclear and space weapons.

He drew the correspondents' attention to the story current in the West according to which the USSR went to the meeting in Reykjavik with proposals which it allegedly knew in advance to be unacceptable to the U.S. President. In other words, they are trying to create the opinion among the public in Western countries that the Soviet Union went to the talks with the intention of ruining them.

Once again reminding journalists of the basic tenets of the Soviet position in Reykjavik, cogently explained by M.S. Gorbachev both at the press conference he gave in the Icelandic capital and in his speech on Soviet television, the USSR Foreign Ministry spokesman demonstrated the totally unfounded nature of fabrications by the bourgeois mass information media and certain Western politicians who, as he observed, are resorting to these fabrications with the aim of making the Soviet Union to blame for the accords which failed to materialize and sowing mistrust of our country and its foreign policy.

The speaker also noted that the U.S. President -- who has said more than once before that the SDI program is strictly research -- nevertheless refused to sign an accord saying that this research would not go beyond the laboratory for 10 years and that it would be strictly in accord with the ABM Treaty. It was thereby demonstrated that the American Administration's words are at variance with its actions.

The USSR Foreign Ministry administration chief also drew attention to the fact that the proposals put forward by the Soviet Union in Reykjavik represent a comprehensive package. This does not mean that talks will not be conducted on each of the areas already being discussed in Geneva. That is, on the subjects of space weapons, strategic offensive weapons, and medium-range weapons in Europe. A separate agreement can be drawn up on each of these issues. However, the decision to put these agreements into effect must be a comprehensive one, taking into account all the basic elements of the nuclear problem, he stressed.

TASS English Report

LD171851 Moscow TASS in English 1823 GMT 17 Oct 86

[Text] Moscow October 17 TASS -- The Strategic Defense Initiative is in essence the main political obstacle on the road toward achieving the aims of reducing and completely eliminating nuclear weapons, said Viktor Karpov, head of the Department of Arms Limitation and Disarmament at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR.

As it became clear at the talks in Reykjavik, he said, speaking at a press briefing here today, precisely SDI prevented the talks from attaining their aims.

The Soviet side never demanded that the U.S. President renounce SDI: as such, Karpov went on to say.

What is called for, though, was that work under SDI be carried out over a period of 10 years in strict compliance with the existing ABM Treaty. Confining research and development in the SDI sphere to laboratories constitutes a certain guarantee that the strategic situation based on the ABM Treaty would be preserved in that 10-year period, the Foreign Ministry official emphasized.

We believe that the main destabilizing part of SDI is the space ABM system and its components. We, therefore, proposed to ban for 10 years the testing of space ABM elements in outer space -- the factor that creates an obstacle for the deployment of such systems right after the 10 year period expires.

If there are no Soviet offensive arms, including ballistic missiles, then what does the U.S. need the anti-ballistic missile defense for? In this context, President Reagan's pronouncement to the effect that he could not give SDI up because it guaranteed the safety of the "free world" from the Soviet ballistic missiles is becoming groundless. Something is clearly wrong with logic here, Karpov went on to say.

We believe that the agreements concluded in the sphere of nuclear and space arms should be subjected to strict verification, Viktor Karpov said. It is possible to agree those verification measures which may be necessary to give the sides complete confidence that the agreements conclude are complied with, Karpov emphasized.

The American side should get over some misconceptions, Karpov said. What the U.S. lacks at the moment is precisely the determination to do that.

The Foreign Ministry official expressed the hope that the U.S. Administration would analyze the results of the Reykjavik talks in detail, weigh the entire measure of responsibility which rest with the U.S. leadership and pass a decision that will open up the road to nuclear disarmament.

We, for our part, are prepared to negotiate, to work out agreements, relying in the process on what was achieved in Reykjavik, Viktor Karpov emphasized.

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CSO: 5200/1065

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

MOSCOW RADIO OBSERVERS ANALYZE REYKJAVIK MOTIVATIONS

LD170110 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1730 GMT 16 Oct 86

[Discussion entitled "Reykjavik -- An Indispensable Dialogue;" with political observers Aleksandr Yevgenyevich Bovin and Nikolay Vladimirovich Shishlin; and All-Union Radio commentator Viktor Nikolayevich Levin]

[Text] [Levin] Hello, esteemed comrades! Our broadcast today is devoted to the meeting of M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, with U.S. President Ronald Reagan in Reykjavik.

The CPSU Central Committee Politburo noted that the Soviet-U.S. summit meeting was an important event in international life, in the struggle against the arms race and for the banning and elimination of nuclear weapons and for the removal of the threat of war from the entire globe. This meeting has provoked a very wide response throughout the entire world. It is being much discussed now and indisputably deserves the closest and most serious attention. But before analyzing this meeting, it is expedient to say a few words about why it was necessary, why the Soviet Union took the initiative of holding an interim meeting.

[Bovin] This meeting was the result of the bad state of Soviet-U.S. relations and the wish of our leadership and Comrade Gorbachev, through the use of nonstandard, I would say, solutions and actions which were not stereotypical, to guide these relations into the channel outlined in Geneva, but which through the Americans' fault has not been filled with the fruitful lifeblood of these relations. And so, Comrade Gorbachev and the Politburo proposed a meeting, an interim meeting, a meeting prior to the meeting! In the practice of international diplomacy, this is an infrequent event: to hold such an impromptu major foreign policy meeting in this way, without preparation. Reagan agreed to it and it was held. This was the genesis of this meeting, if you like.

[Shishlin] In itself the meeting in Reykjavik -- this can be said conclusively -- was exceptionally rich and full of content. Even though, outwardly, it may appear as if the sides did not succeed in coming to an agreement, I would like to draw your attention to the fact that at the meeting in Reykjavik, even though agreement on a number of a number of very serious positions was not managed...

[Bovin, interrupting] There was no final, comprehensive agreement, but in specific areas fairly far-reaching accords were reached. That, to be precise, is how things stand.

[Shishlin] Not only that, there is also the point that Reykjavik has brought out very clearly that two ways of thinking, two different approaches, are clashing: one a modern and really bold one, in line with the realities of the nuclear space age; and another which, as a matter of fact operates in those political categories typical of the start of the 20th century. I have familiarized myself with the speech that President Reagan delivered upon his return from Reykjavik. It is curious that both in the President's speech and prior to that, in the speech of Secretary of State Shultz, it was said that the Americans had come to the meeting with very wide, interesting proposals; almost everything seemed to proceed smoothly; and allegedly the Soviet Union's uncompromising attitude in the matter of the star wars program or the Strategic Defense Initiative, as it is also called, prevented a full-scale accord which would give the green light for a new Soviet-U.S. summit meeting, this time a really wide-ranging and comprehensive one.

Here one needs to tell our listeners that this U.S. version of who brought what to the meeting is absolutely incorrect. Indeed, the Soviet Union did not come empty-handed to Reykjavik, and these proposals are known from Mikhail Sergeyevich's address in Reykjavik and on central television. As for the U.S. side, essentially not a single, literally not one independent idea was proposed by them.

Yes, the Americans said they wanted a full-scale summit. Yes, they said they were willing to stage this meeting in Washington. They did say those things. But on specific questions, be it strategic offensive armaments, medium-range nuclear weapons, the halting of nuclear tests, the strengthening of the ABM Treaty, on all these questions the Americans were only prepared to say the same old things, restating, setting out, and repeating their old positions. It really took an immense effort to get both the U.S. President and the persons accompanying him, to persuade them, to start discussing the essence of the Soviet ideas.

[Bovin] Let us pinpoint the positive aspects of this meeting; after all it is interesting. Incidentally, regardless of what happened in Reykjavik itself, these positive results will endure. Let us take the first set of questions, strategic armaments. Our idea, a framework idea, so to speak, was as follows: Launch vehicles and warheads would be cut by 50 percent. In the past, arguments have always been caused by the fact that the different elements making up our and U.S. weapons are not at all uniform. We have more of one thing and they have more of another. So we proposed the simplest solution, suggesting that each element of the triad be cut in half. Let us cut planes by 50 percent. Let us cut land-based missiles by 50 percent. The same for submarines. Let us cut each element by 50 percent. Diversity would be maintained, but even so everything would be cut by 50 percent.

[Shishlin] Yes, there would be fewer armaments but more security.

[Bovin] It was so elementary that after that all-night session on Saturday even Paul Nitze was compelled to agree with this. The Americans did agree to this. That was the first set of questions, so to speak. Now let us look at the second set of questions.

[Shishlin] Medium-range nuclear armaments.

[Bovin] Yes, intermediate ones.

[Shishlin] As you know, the Soviet Union put forward the idea, a new idea for Europe, of scrapping Soviet and U.S. medium-range missiles in Europe and then...

[Bovin interrupts] Well, Gorbachev said quite forthrightly that we were accepting the zero option which the Americans proposed some time back. We were accepting it. We told the Americans this.

[Shishlin] Yes, but there were two, even three points the Americans were bothered about, which made them say that it was difficult to reach agreement. They were left on one side. We decided not to concern ourselves with these, but to confine ourselves to Soviet-U.S. relations. The Americans went on to say: Let's take a half step forward first, in other words limit the Soviet and U.S. armaments in Europe first.

[Bovin] They were playing tricks the whole time. The Americans are terribly anxious not to withdraw their missiles from Europe. That's what they don't want to do. We'll take out half or a quarter, but let us keep something in Europe, they were saying.

[Shishlin] Yes. Then they said that this decision could only be viewed in a global context. In other words, the corresponding medium-range nuclear armaments stationed in the Asian part of the country had to be included. Eventually the Soviet delegation in Reykjavik put forward the idea that we should keep 100 warheads on armaments of this type in the Asian part of the country, while 100 warheads on the corresponding armaments, armaments of the same class, would be retained on U.S. territory.

[Bovin] In point of fact this was a big concession to the Americans. Then there was also the question of short-range missiles.

[Shishlin] Tactical ones.

[Bovin] Yes.

[Shishlin] Yes. There the proposal was that they should be frozen, quite simply...

[Bovin interrupts] ...and that talks should be started.

[Shishlin] Yes. Here too the Americans eventually accepted this option. Next there was the question of nuclear testing.

[Bovin interrupts] Monitoring. They kept sounding off about monitoring. At this point we said to them: You can have any form of monitoring you want. You can even have triple monitoring, Gorbachev said. We are prepared to discuss and accept any form of monitoring just as long as it meets the requirements of what we are talking about. So, the matter was resolved. There's no problem over monitoring now.

[Shishlin] Now what about nuclear tests? Well, our listeners all know very well that the Soviet Union has extended its unilateral moratorium for the fourth time. The Soviet Union has not been carrying out nuclear tests for 14 months now. What the Americans say -- in fact, none other than U.S. Secretary of State Shultz -- is this: When the Soviet Union advocates the cessation of nuclear tests, the Soviet Union is putting the cart before the horse, that you first have to eliminate nuclear weapons, and then to stop testing. [passage indistinct]

[Bovin] Imagine -- why have testing at all, there will be no grounds.

[Shishlin] Clearly, there will be nothing to test.

[Levin] But when they want to take the decision, they will find problems. In this case, Shultz has evidently come up with this kind of problem.

[Shishlin] But all in all the Americans have been given to understand, and Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev said at the press conference in Reykjavik, that there too, the outlines of a possible accord were examined.

[Levin] We went a long way there. We agreed: Fine, you do not want to follow our example of the moratorium; all right, you want to set up some kind of quota for tests, some kind of threshold for [passage indistinct].

[Bovin] In fact, when you speak of the positive aspect of Reykjavik, there is a very great deal that is positive. One big plus is the radical accords that overall move a long way in comparison with what there was before.

[Shishlin] It has to be noted that Reykjavik is a qualitatively new point in Soviet-U.S. relations and a qualitatively new point in respect of the resolution of all problems related to the limitation and curtailment of the arms race. Everything that came before Reykjavik concerned only the limitation of weapons, but here we were talking about radical, profound reductions.

[Levin] In virtually all aspects of nuclear weapons.

[Bovin] I would like to be more precise: In our view this 50 percent reduction should take 5 years, and the next 5 years, all in all, should take it to zero. The Americans agreed to this decade: that is, in 10 years we eliminate nuclear weapons. That is how deep it went.

[Levin] I think that one can say that all of our proposals -- and one must not forget this -- that were accepted by the United States have made up the walls from which the building of a lasting peace could be put together. It remains to top them off with a reliable roof. We -- the Soviet Union -- reason like this: Once we enter a completely new situation, when a considerable reduction of nuclear weapons and their elimination over a visibly short period is starting, it is necessary to safeguard oneself against all surprises. We are talking about weapons that up to now constitute the core of the defense of our country -- I mean strategic weapons. Therefore, everything that could undermine equality in the course of disarmament has to be excluded; any possibility of developing [sozdat] weapons of a new type which secure military superiority must be excluded. We consider this position to be perfectly natural and logical, and so the Soviet Union firmly stated the need for the strict observance of the 1972 open-ended AMB Treaty. Moreover, in order to strengthen the conditions of that treaty, Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, proposed to U.S. President Ronald Reagan at the Reykjavik meeting that reciprocal obligations be undertaken on the part of the United States and the Soviet Union not to exercise the right of withdrawal from the treaty for at least 10 years, and over that period to put an end to strategic weapons.

In this respect, we are proceeding from the fact that there will be complete observance of all the clauses of the ABM Treaty: in other words, that research [issledovaniye] and testing in the field covered by the treaty does not go outside the laboratory. That is an identical restriction, both on the United States and on the USSR.

It is here, unfortunately, that we have to say that the agreement that had virtually been achieved could not be embodied in accords binding on the sides, for the sole reason consisting of the stubborn reluctance of the U.S. Administration to create the conditions for the implementation of these accords by means of strengthening the ABM terms and undertaking relevant obligations identical for both sides.

[Shishlin] It is the SDI that is in fact, the main idol on Washington's political altar. They pray to it -- that's a favorite topic for the White House and the White House entourage. As before, they continued to say, that allegedly, why should SDI be restricted in any way at all, that as soon as they get the full complement of all these results they will share their technology with the Soviet Union, although actually the United States is refusing to sell us even washing machines, being of the opinion that electronics beyond our technical thinking are included here.

So, therefore this is a fairy tale -- and it was said perfectly correctly by the CPSU Central Committee general secretary at the press conference, that one simply cannot take this seriously.

[Identity of speaker unclear] No, one cannot. There is a gap in the logic of the U.S. position. We are moving toward the reduction of weapons. We have in view, as Aleksandr Yevgeniyevich has said, essentially a 100 percent reduction, that is, the elimination of this weapon as a class. At the same time, the Americans are saying: We will develop a shield against these weapons which are being eliminated. Why? one asks oneself.

[Bovin] Well, they have, it is true, a safety net. If suddenly some madman makes this missile and suddenly fires it -- well, that's funny because it is hardly worth building a system worth trillions, with hundreds of space stations up there, to counter this theoretically possible eventuality. Surely there must be other simpler options.

[Levin] Immeasurably simpler. In his address on U.S. television Reagan named four arguments in favor of SDI, in his view. He said that SDI is America's insurance policy, which should always guarantee us stability. The second thesis is that it is a guarantee of America's security. It is also the key to a world without nuclear weapons. Yet another argument, and I quote the U.S. President: SDI he says, has forced the Soviets to come to the Geneva talks on arms control, and this is what brought them to Iceland. That is, SDI is a cudgel with which they are driving us to the disarmament talks.

This thesis, to be blunt, is false on two counts: First, the policy of pressure is visible in it; second, it is an obvious attempt to present U.S. policy as constructive, and the Soviet one as unconstructive. The peace-loving nature of our policy is proven simply by the proposals submitted in Reykjavik, and they are so clearly expressed that there is probably no need for any more evidence here. As for U.S. pressure and their reliance on force, this is a calculation that has often been refuted by life and which, and if it comes to it, will be refuted again. The essence of this is that we do not want to play power games. It is not because we are weak that we do not want to, as the United States tries to convince itself. Perhaps someone is relying on that utterly erroneous view, but we understand the danger of these power games in the nuclear missile age. A sense of responsibility to our own people and to the peoples of the whole world dictates to us a completely different approach. This is what creates the need for a new way of thinking in accordance with the nuclear age.

[Bovin] Well, In Reykjavik I got to hear from my fellow correspondents. They were saying this: well, fine, as you wrote in your book, and others on your side are saying all the time that you are not afraid of SDI -- first, it cannot exist, second, we are not afraid -- if it cannot exist and if you are not afraid of it, why do you keep badgering those poor Americans, why are you at their throat?

There is a logic here, and it is also interesting to respond to it, because I tell them, yes, we are not afraid of SDI because we know that if the Americans start to do this, we will find countermeasures. However, we do not want to take these countermeasures, we simply want to reach agreement on the reduction of weapons, and not to spend money on those counter-measures meant to paralyze the SDI.

That's if you're speaking about the military-strategic part of this business, but what if you're talking politically? Then, if on the one hand we start to reduce something, and the Americans have already put their systems into space, then there's mistrust and suspicion. All this starts to grow, because God knows how this weapon in space could be used, and its task might be one of offense.

[Shishlin] Yes, but there is a third element here in all of this. We do not have the right to deny that, let's say, work on this new, very new, super-new, sophisticated technology will allow access to the development of so-called post nuclear weaponry, making use of new discoveries and new opportunities in physics. One could name many such ideas which are, by and large, doing the rounds of U.S. laboratories. Not to allow the start of a new spiral in the arms race, which is extremely destabilizing for the whole situation -- that is also the third argument against SDI.

[Levin] I think this may even be the most important argument, ultimately. If we are setting ourselves the task of scrapping nuclear weapons in order to make the world safe for mankind and to guarantee mankind a future, the creation of still more terrible weapons will certainly not do so. It would virtually be a case of out of the frying pan and into the fire for us. So, without question one can quite definitely draw the conclusion that SDI, which the U.S. military-industrial complex is so excited about and which the present U.S. Administration is also, is an element that is extremely dangerous for peace in general. It is extremely dangerous. That is why our position, our firm position on this question will indisputably be judged on its merits by people throughout the world. There is no doubt about that.

Many people are now beginning to think about this. I noticed that on the first day after the meeting on Monday, the first reaction, the dominant mood in the press was one of, well, disappointment. They'd been climbing and climbing, so the feeling was. They've established a base camp. They mounted their summit bid. They got to within a couple of meters of the summit, but they could not make it to the top. So there was annoyance, disappointment, a feeling that things had gone wrong. But when people started looking more closely at these materials, got a better idea of what the Soviet Union had proposed, of how the Americans had conducted themselves, in the final analysis...[Levin changes thought] After all, if an accord is to be achieved, the other side also has to move closer on specific questions.

[Shishlin] Yes. Now is the time to return to the external factors of the outside world, against the background of which this is difficult -- in some ways even tough -- Soviet-U.S. dialogue in Reykjavik took place. I think that these external factors will increase in strength and exert a growing influence. In this regard I have in mind the position of the socialist countries, which actively advocate an amelioration of

international relations and radical steps aimed at reducing and cutting back the arms race. I have in mind the position of the Nonaligned Movement, which was set out quite clearly and authoritatively at the Harare conference. I have in mind the position of...

[Bovin interrupts] U.S. Allies, of course.

[Shishlin] The U.S. allies.

[Levin] FRG Chancellor Kohl, Defense Minister Woerner, and Foreign Minister Genscher are to visit Washington this week. I noticed that in general, all the reports that have come in from Bonn indicate a kind of wariness, a quite overt wariness toward the U.S. position. I would even go so far as to say that there is dissatisfaction, poorly concealed, or rather not very carefully disguised dissatisfaction with the position taken by the United States.

[Shishlin] There's another point, Viktor Nikolayevich. The Soviet proposals take very full account of the interests of European states, and not only European states. To clear the mines from the European Continent, to rid it of the most dangerous weapons...

[Bovin interrupts] ...would be a real step.

[Shishlin] Yes.

[Bovin] A real step.

[Shishlin] A great achievement.

[Bovin] The removal of Euromissiles and subsequent agreement on tactical missiles was discussed at Reykjavik. It is all in the interests of both Eastern and Western Europe. There can be no other view about this. Surely, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's proposal on medium-range nuclear missiles in Asia, not just the Asian part of our country but also those at U.S. bases, is in the interests of our Asian neighbors.

[Bovin] But returning to Reykjavik again, we are all asking ourselves what actually happened. Why didn't the Americans move to accept these seemingly simple things? This is where the lack of new political thinking mentioned by Mikhail Sergeyevich comes in. What does this mean? It simply means the inertia of old ideas. It means the military-industrial complex, which is exerting heavy pressure, because it's not just ideas. Billions of dollars are at stake. It means the old, imperial ideology associated with anti-Communism and anti-Sovietism and the idea that the United States is biggest and best, the most important, top dog in fact -- the idea that everybody must do as the Americans do.

[Bovin] This is extremely deep-seated among the Americans: It was this that made itself felt. For the moment, these latent influences got the upper hand.

[Shishlin] We shall talk a bit now about the other problems that were discussed in Reykjavik, in particular, regional conflicts and the sides' approach to settling regional conflicts, and about the discussions which developed on humanitarian issues. It must be said that even here, even given all the difference in the Soviet and U.S. positions, some points of contact were nevertheless felt and took shape, both on humanitarian problems and on regional conflicts.

All this was to a certain degree pushed aside by the Americans' nonagreement on the main priority issue, that of curtailing the arms race.

[Bovin] It's even more narrow than that -- it's the issue of the star wars program. I think from a certain point of view what happened is useful for the enlightenment of world public opinion, for the emperor has turned out to have no clothes on. In the final analysis, it has turned out that it has all happened because the Amricans do not want to give up this idea of theirs.

[Shishlin] Aleksandr Yevgenyevich, I would like to mention an interesting detail from Reykjavik. You remember on 12 October, the U.S. services, and official ones, at that -- Speakes, the White House spokesman, started to accuse the Soviet experts of breaking the confidentiality of the talks and starting leaks, by giving interviews. In fact, there were no leaks: our comrades simply expounded the positions which had been openly declared by the Soviet Union. The Americans were frightfully displeased at this. Why? Because a direct comparison of the positions really does reveal a fact unfavorable for the Americans, namely that the emperor has no clothes on. No matter how much they say that they brought bold and diverse ideas to Reykjavik, they arrived with empty baggage.

[Levin] Well, let's sum up. We have firmly elucidated that the meeting in Reykjavik was necessary. This clearly derived from the whole atmosphere preceeding Reykjavik and from the way that Soviet-U.S. relations developed after Geneva. The question at the center of attention now is the Reykjavik meeting itself: Was it of use or not? There is a precise answer to that question. The CPSU Central Committee Politburo points out that a qualitatively new situation has been created: the struggle for nuclear disarmament has reached a higher level, from which today it is necessary to increase efforts further aimed at making a radical reduction in and at wholly eliminating nuclear weapons. In this connection, stress was laid upon the need to continue contacts and negotiations, including those in Geneva, on the whole complex of issues relating to nuclear and space weapons, on the basis of the platform put forward by the Soviet side in Reykjavik.

I would like to draw your attention, esteemed comrades, in particular to the following words set out in the document on the CPSU Central Committee Politburo session: It would be a fateful step to let slip this historic opportunity for a fundamental solution to the problems of war and peace. Everything possible must be done to make use of this opportunity.

Therefore, to summarize, we can with complete justification say that the meeting was important, interesting and indisputably useful, holding out great promise. On that note we shall close for today. Thank you, esteemed comrades, for your attention.

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CSO: 5200/055

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

IZVESTIYA ON SUMMIT: SEARCH FOR ACCORDS WILL CONTINUE

PM161735 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 17 Oct 86 Morning Edition p 1, 5

[A. Bovin, N. Yefimov, A. Palladin dispatch: "Chance Missed, Search Continues" -- capitalized words published in boldface]

[Text] Reykjavik - Moscow -- In our changeable age woven with contradictions it is not so rare an occurrence for hopeful, optimistic intentions to be nullified by the course of events. That was what happened at Reykjavik. The hopes that the talks at the "Hofdi" would give the "go-ahead" to M.S. Gorbachev's visit to Washington and the signing of important Soviet-U.S. agreements came to naught. However, this statement by no means exhausts the results of the Icelandic talks.

IZVESTIYA readers already know that both political leaders were focusing on a package of major, far-reaching Soviet proposals. On most of these proposals the gap between the sides' positions has noticeably narrowed. The fundamental framework of a 50-percent reduction in strategic arms on land, at sea, and in the air was agreed upon. They agreed on the main parameters for reductions in intermediate-range missiles. They recognized the need and opportunity for verification [kontrol] in any form. Positive developments were also recorded on the nuclear test question.

M.S. Gorbachev has termed all this "immense gains." Reykjavik has shown that agreements are possible and that, given the common will, the most complex and difficult knots can be successfully unraveled.

That is one aspect of the Reykjavik meeting. But there is another aspect, too. By insisting on the inviolability of their "star wars" program, the Americans to all intents and purposes buried the accords that had almost been reached and missed a historic chance and opportunity to initiate actual, real arms reduction.

Unfortunately, this is not the first time it has happened....

In itself the very fact of the appearance of nuclear weapons by no means meant that mankind must doom itself to self-destruction and approach the edge of the abyss. [paragraph continues]

On looking back, we cannot fail to see that there were opportunities to halt the downhill slide and stop the buildup of deadly potentials. But each time the forces of militarism and the supporters of nuclear confrontation, striving to assert imperialism's military-strategic superiority, turned these opportunities into lost opportunities and persistently nudged mankind toward the fatal brink.

So, it seems that there is nowhere left to go. A new failure could be the last. But the realization of this tragic circumstance is dawning unevenly. The inertia of the past prevents people from understanding the realities of the nuclear age. Illusions arise that by developing [sozdat] some kind of superweapon and creating some military-technical wonder such as SDI, it is somehow possible to shut oneself off from the impending catastrophe, avert it, and in the last resort save if not all mankind then at least the "worthy" part of it.

All this is empty thinking. We do not need superweapons now. We need, if you like, superpolicies. That is, policies able to rise above the restrictiveness of all private interests and make the common interest uniting all the peoples -- the interest in survival -- the basis of practical actions. As Western politicians gradually, although extremely slowly, assimilate this thought and become comfortable with it, the hope emerges that the day will come when the chance of stepping back from the brink of the abyss will not be missed. It might have been thought that such a day would dawn in Reykjavik.

The trouble, however, is that U.S. ruling circles -- and this could not fail to affect the Reykjavik discussions -- have still not made their final choice. This is borne out by the vocal campaign conducted by U.S. extreme right-wingers -- those who believe themselves to be even more right-wing and conservative than R. Reagan himself. "Realism or detente" is how they outline the choice which in their opinion faces the President and U.S. foreign policy. When counseling the President prior to Reykjavik, they proposed rejecting detente for the sake of realism. This severe juxtaposition of realism and detente reveals the exceptionally narrow limits that circumscribe the political thinking of, if not all "the President's men," then a considerable number of them.

If it is either realism OR detente, then realism means tension, confrontation, and brinkmanship; realism means a balance of fear which becomes increasingly terrible and hopeless. In actual fact, the very opposite is true. Realism, genuine, realistic realism means acknowledging detente as the only reasonable path, the only path of salvation. Realism means acknowledging that detente is inseparable from disarmament and from dismantling the monstrous mechanism which threatens all life with destruction. Realism means equal security for the sides.

The misfortune, we repeat, is that Washington just cannot grasp that. Defending the "star wars" program -- that is realism, that is the sound policy which meets U.S. interests. With such an approach the Reykjavik talks were bound to end in deadlock.

But here we can foresee a question. Why did the Soviet Union react so sharply to SDI? After all, as M.S. Gorbachev said, militarily, SDI does not frighten or worry the USSR.

Let us examine this.

FIRST. Proceeding from the view that bold and innovative decisions are needed, the Soviet Union, in search for compromise, took account of the interests and concerns of the Americans and made serious, significant concessions, in the strategic weapons sphere, in the "Euroweapons" sphere, and in the verification [kontrol] sphere. But compromise presupposes reciprocity, mutual concessions. To make progress together everyone must give way and concede somewhere. Having moved to meet the Americans, we were entitled to expect that they too would understand our interests and make moves to meet us. We waited in vain.

SECOND. To begin a radical reduction of armaments you have to create the kind of atmosphere in which no side can unexpectedly take the lead and achieve superiority. To do that you have to close off all the ways of creating [sozdaniye] new weapons and reinforce all the obstacles preventing the circumvention of the accords achieved. That is why we oppose SDI. Since whichever way you look at it, the "star wars" program presupposes the creation [sozdaniye] of a new class of armaments. Where is the logic in that? We want to eliminate weapons, not replace weapons on earth with weapons in space.

THIRD. If, as the preliminary accord with the United States envisages, there are no nuclear missiles left in 10 years' time, why is SDI necessary, why is space-based ABM defense necessary? But supposing, the Americans reply, someone manages to hide a nuclear-armed missile somewhere and launches it? Anything can happen. But the scale of the system which the Americans intend to build hardly corresponds to the hypothetical eventuality.

FOURTH. Now don't be offended in Washington, but for the time being we do not have much faith in the Americans. We cannot help thinking that they envisage the deployment [razvertyvaniye] of the ABM defense as a means of achieving strategic superiority. Hence the increased suspicion and lack of trust, which is hardly conducive to arms reduction. But do not be alarmed, the Americans tell us, you yourselves -- in parallel with us and under an accord with us -- may begin the creation [sozdavat] and, if necessary, the deployment [razvorachivat] of your own ABM system. But that is the whole point, we do not want that kind of reciprocity. We want reciprocal disarmament not reciprocal armament. They want to impose on us an even more ruinous arms race. They calculate that the Soviet Union will not last the pace: It lacks the resources, it lacks the technical potential. They hope that our country's economy will be exhausted, that we will ask for mercy and agree to terms which they will generously dictate to us from across the ocean. As you can see, the same schemes as in 1945 when a different president but essentially the same right-wing forces in the United States forced the nuclear race on us. Then too it seemed to them that the Soviet Union would "not keep pace." The lessons of history, unfortunately, have not been learned.

FIFTH. Yes, we are unafraid of SDI. Because a counteraction will be found to every action by the Americans. But the point is (see "Fourth") that we do not want to waste human and material resources on such counteraction. We want not to continue the arms race (or counterarms race) but to terminate it.

This is why we were most definitely unable to accept the Washington administration's logic and stance. We consider that this logic and this stance reflect primarily the interests of the military-industrial complex, the commitment to the old imperial views, and a deficiency of new thinking.

But one has to deal with the partner bestowed by history. The conversations in Reykjavik are one rung in a complex dialogue. This dialogue will continue. [paragraph continues]

The quest for mutually acceptable solutions will also continue. Moreover, as we hope, from the point and from the level reached in Reykjavik.

For obvious reasons, the entire world followed tensely the events in Reykjavik. Too much depends on the state of Soviet-U.S. relations. Too much can be lost if these relations reach crisis point.

Even so, detente and disarmament cannot be a matter for just two states, even such states as the Soviet Union and the United States. Two men conversed in the old "Hofdi" house on the Atlantic coast. But the whole world was in fact present there. Not only was it present, but it also spoke, insisted, and demanded. Unfortunately, the U.S. politicians did not heed these voices. So there is that much more reasons for all champions of peace to double and treble their efforts upholding the main human right, the right to live.

The improvement of Soviet-U.S. relations, growing stability in world affairs, and the reduced threat of war would no doubt help the democratization of all international life. Every people and every state has the right to speak out loudly and confidently in the world arena, to have a chance to be active and equal subjects of world politics and the world economy. The more tranquil the world becomes and the more thoroughly detente squeezes out confrontation, the fuller will be the implementation of this right of every member of the world community.

A turnabout from arms buildup to arms reduction -- and this is the main content of the normalization of Soviet-U.S. relations -- has not only political but also economic and social aspects. In order to eliminate smallpox, for example, the WHO spent 83 million dollars. The cost of eliminating malaria, trachoma, and leprosy is estimated at 500 million. At a cost of 260 million, all newborn babies on earth could be vaccinated against diphtheria, whooping cough, tetanus, poliomyelitis, and tuberculosis -- diseases which now take the lives of 5 million children before they reach their first birthday. Yet the cost of one modern nuclear-powered ship is even higher.

Spending money on weapons means depriving the ill of medicines and the hungry of food. Weapons kill even when they are not being used. The measure of responsibility here is counted in millions of lives. The Soviet Union is aware of this responsibility. This is why it has insisted and continues to insist on disarmament, on reversing the arms race.

...While in Reykjavik, M.S. Gorbachev and R. Reagan received hundreds and thousands of letters from all over the world. Their contents can be described in just two sentences which we have taken from a letter by Mickey Johnson, a fourth-grade school pupil from (Kirlend), Ohio, USA. Here are these two sentences: "I don't want a nuclear war. Because I don't want the end of the world." We think the U.S. President will find it difficult to give any sort of sensible answer to the American boy: The White House failed the test of realism, maturity, and modern political thinking.

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CSO: 5200/1062

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

MOSCOW: ADDITIONAL COMMENTARY ON SUMMIT OUTCOME

Chernyshev on ABM Treaty

LD151701 Moscow TASS in English 1615 GMT 15 Oct 86

[Text] Moscow October 15 TASS -- TASS military news analyst Vladimir Chernyshev writes:

The proposal on strengthening the regime of the ABM Treaty is part of the package of major measures which the Soviet side submitted in Reykjavik and which, if accepted, would usher in the beginning of a new epoch in mankind's life -- a post-nuclear one.

The ABM Treaty has been operating for more than 14 years now and is one of the solid foundations on which the relationships of the sides are built. The signing of the treaty became the recognition by both the Soviet Union and the United States of the objective interconnection between offensive and defensive weapons systems.

"Effective measures to limit the ABM systems would be a substantial factor in curbing the arms race and would lead to a decrease in the risk of outbreak of war involving nuclear weapons", the treaty's preamble explicitly points out.

The document is called upon to perform two extremely important functions: firstly, to be a kind of brake, a restraining factor for the arms race, and secondly to serve as a fundamental framework for the entire arms limitation and reduction process.

During the currency of the ABM Treaty the USSR and the United States twice considered it jointly -- in 1977 and in 1982 -- and unanimously agreed that it continued to accord with their interests.

Actually, such an evaluation of the treaty by the two sides confirmed again and again that the interconnection between offensive and defensive arms is of ever lasting nature irrespective of what technical level the development has attained.

The significance of the ABM Treaty has particularly grown now. It has acquired a key importance. When in Reykjavik, the sides spoke of entering a situation when deep cuts in nuclear weapons and their elimination would begin in a foreseeably short period. Under such conditions it is of particular importance to exclude any possibilities for undermining parity during disarmament and to rule out the possibility of developing weapons of a new type which would ensure military superiority for one of the sides.

This is why the Soviet leader suggested that the two sides undertake not to exercise the right to withdraw from the treaty for ten years -- a period for complete

elimination of strategic offensive arms -- and fully observe all its provisions and ban the testing of all space-based elements of an anti-missile defence system, except laboratory research and testing.

However, the U.S. side declined to strengthen the regime of the ABM Treaty and showed that it virtually sought to weaken and revise it in order to work out a large-scale anti-missile defence system for its own selfish purposes.

The U.S. President insisted that the United States should have a right to test everything relating to SDI and not only in laboratories, but outside them as well, including outer space.

Article five of the ABM Treaty forthrightly bans not only the deployment but also the development or testing of space-based ABM systems or their components. It means that the U.S. Administration tried to draw the USSR into U.S. dangerous undertaking the purpose of which was to revise and wreck the major document which ensures the possibility of maintaining strategic stability.

The Soviet side firmly stated that it would never agree to assisting in such a case with its own hands. This is a matter of principle, a matter of national security of the Soviet Union.

Thus, endeavours to achieve military superiority through the SDI--this is precisely the consideration which the U.S. Administration was guided by when refusing to strengthen the regime of the ABM Treaty--did not make it possible to make decisions which were quite near at hand and which could have become historic for the entire nuclear and space epoch. No turn in world history came about, although it was possible.

Ivanov on W. Europeans' Fears

LD152235 Moscow World Service in English 1810 GMT 15 Oct 86

[Excerpts] Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers of Holland has called on the countries of Western Europe to hammer out a common platform with regard to the SDI of Washington. More on the subject from our observer Viktor Ivanov, who writes:

The statement of the Dutch prime minister reflected mounting fears among the West Europeans demanding a clear-cut assessment of the Star Wars programme. The feeling of alarm over the American plans for space militarization has grown further after Washington blocked the agreements reached at the summit meeting at Reykjavik. The solutions, coordinated in the capital of Iceland, gave Europe a unique chance to get rid of deadly medium-range nuclear weapons; yet the United States Administration proved unprepared to use this chance and thereby actually left its West European allies in NATO in the status of nuclear hostages.

An opportunity to begin radical cuts in strategic weapons, with a view to scrapping them eventually, was not used either. Instead, Washington offered its partners a dubious prospect of relying on American weapons in space as a guarantee of their security.

It would be natural to ask: What are defense systems against nuclear missiles needed for if these missiles are to be scrapped?

There is only one answer to this question. The space plans of Wahington conceal a desire to attain military supremacy, to secure a first-strike potential, since a closer look at the SDI shows that this project has nothing to do with defense. [passage omitted]

There is another question being asked: Hasn't the Soviet Union given up its agreement not to link the issue of Euromissiles with other aspects of disarmament?

No, it has not. On the other hand, this country still insists that the principle of equality and equal security be strictly observed as a guarantee of general peace. [passage omitted]

Various factors can start a military conflict. It may be a fault in the sophisticated space systems of the SDI or an event misinterpreted by computers. Meanwhile, the Europeans know very well what wars involving even conventional weapons can lead to. Nonetheless, the work done at Reykjavik was not in vain and the chances of ridding Europe of nuclear weapons are not lost. Yet to realize them, as the leader of the opposition Labor Party of Holland, Wim Van Velzen, said, no space shield should stand in the way of an arms control accord.

Mnatsakanov on Further Effects

LD152046 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1545 GMT 15 Oct 86

[From "The World Today" program presented by Eduard Mnatsakanov]

[Text] Reykjavik, or rather what happened in that town on 11 and 12 October 1986, will remain an important milestone and one of the most dramatic pages in the history of Soviet-U.S. relations and world politics as a whole. I am setting off for Iceland, President Reagan declared the day before, with the ardent hope that we shall be able to promote peace. For this purpose, the President said, we are even prepared to go an extra mile. Of course, no one asked the U.S. President for any extra mile. To reach a constructive agreement in Reykjavik, it would have been sufficient to display good will and a sober approach toward resolving the pressing problems of today. But these were the qualities that the U.S. side did not display. The extra mile turned out to mean that the U.S. President ultimately rejected an agreement that had already been achieved and even his own proposals.

A clear and principled assessment of the results of the Soviet-U.S. meeting held in Reykjavik was given at a CPSU Central Committee Politburo session on 14 October and in the televised address by Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev. The Politburo pointed out that the meeting was an important event in international affairs and in the struggle to ban and to eliminate nuclear weapons.

Now, the struggle has entered a higher stage. A qualitatively new situation has been created, enabling a further increase of efforts to radically reduce and completely eliminate nuclear weapons.

It would be a fateful step, the Politburo session emphasized, to pass by a historic opportunity to resolve fundamentally the problems of war and peace. ~~E#~~everything must be done to make use of that opportunity. It is in the fundamental interests of the peoples of the USSR and the United States and in the interests of all mankind.

Chazov on Peace Campaign

LD160329 Moscow TASS in English 1025 GMT 15 Oct 86

[Text] Sofia October 15 TASS -- By TASS correspondent Yuriy Tyssovski:

Academician Yvgeniy Chazov, co-chairman of International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, has said here that it is very disappointing that it has not proved possible, through the fault of the U.S. side, to reach agreements in Reykjavik.

"But this also binds our movement," he said in a TASS interview, "to step up efforts to enlist more people in the peace campaign and force the Washington administration into responding to the call of reason."

"The results of Reykjavik," he added, "will give a fresh impulse to our activities to make the broad masses aware of the graveness of the nuclear danger to the planet."

Chazov said European physicians would meet in Madrid next Sunday to discuss measures to stop the nuclear arms race and keep it out of space.

Latin American doctors, he said, would also hold a series of meetings to be crowned by a major get-together in Havana.

Similar meetings of physicians campaigning for peace and against the nuclear threat would take place also in Australia and New Zealand, Chazov said.

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CSO: 5200/1063

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

USSR OFFICIALS GIVE FOREIGNERS ADDITIONAL SUMMIT BRIEFINGS

Gromyko To Visiting Swiss

LDL72026 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1805 GMT 17 Oct 86

[Text] Moscow, 17 Oct (TASS) -- Andrey Gromyko, CPSU Central Committee Politburo member and USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium chairman, received a delegation in the Kremlin today of the Federal Assembly of the Swiss confederation headed by Martin Budi, the national council chairman.

The attention of the Swiss side was drawn to the complex of initiative proposed by Mikhail Gorbachev, CPSU Central committee general secretary, the implementation of which would allow mankind to be rid of nuclear weapons by the end of the present century.

At the same time special attention was turned to the outcome of the Soviet-U.S. meeting in Reykjavik, where the solutions for the problems of strategic offensive weapons, medium range missiles, the treaty on limitation of the anti ballistic defense systems (ABM), and banning of nuclear tests was a part of the Soviet proposal package. The Soviet side has stressed that harmonized provisions were not embodied in concrete accords binding for both parties due to the stubborn unwillingness of the U.S. Administration to renounce the program for militarization of space (SDI). The task now is to double or treble efforts in the struggle for peace due to the responsibility that the two powers will bear for future conditions in the world.

The Soviet and the Swiss parties have agreed that thanks to the new approach based on political realism and the feeling of responsibility, it was possible to succeed at the Stockholm conference on the measures for strengthening trust, security, and disarmament in Europe. The successful conclusion of this conference creates a favorable ground for conducting the next meeting in Vienna in a constructive and businesslike spirit. As before, Andrey Gromyko has pointed out that neutral and nonaligned countries may play a considerable part at the new conference.

Shevardnadze at Bucharest Press Conference

PM221015 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 17 Oct 86 Second Edition pp 4-5

[Text] Bucharest, 16 Oct (TASS) -- Eduard Shevardnadze, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR minister of foreign affairs, who is on an official friendly visit here, held a press conference at which he made the following statement:

Our visit to Romania ends with our meeting with you. We have an urgent need to share with the press a number of impressions about the events of recent days. I hope they will not be without interest to you.

In the first page, we have carried out a responsible mission entrusted to us by M.S. Gorbavhev -- to inform the leadership of the fraternal socialist countries promptly about the content and results of the Soviet-U.S. meeting in Reykjavik, to expound our evaluations and to hear the opinion of our friends.

We have a meeting with Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu. During a very detailed and substantive conversation we analyzed in detail the Reykjavik negotiations and the situation that has arisen following their conclusion.

A working meeting of the foreign ministers of the Warsaw Pact member states was also devoted to the results of Reykjavik. All the ministers highly evaluated the position of the Soviet Union and the course conducted at the negotiations by M.S. Gorbachev. In the difficult and dramatic discussion on the destiny of the world the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee defended the position not just of our state alone: He was acting in the interests of all the socialist countries, of the socialist community and of all mankind.

The Reykjavik meeting raises the moral and political prestige of socialism to an even higher level. It has shown the world how great is the price we are prepared to pay for a stable and reliable peace and how unshakable is our commitment to principle in the defense of its fundamental interests.

The Bucharest session of the Committee of Foreign Ministers of the Warsaw Pact member states has deepened our cooperation. Having exchanged views on the situation in the world in the light of the results of the Soviet-U.S. talks, we coordinated our further actions and defined the priorities and directions of joint efforts, whose aim is the implementation of the initiative of the fraternal countries to create a comprehensive system of international peace and security.

I would describe the Bucharest meeting of ministers as the collective creative work of responsible and equal partners, whose coordinated work substantially promotes the strengthening of our community and its position on the world scene.

Finally, our official visit to Romania and talks with our Romanian friends. During the second meeting with Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu -- it was a very lengthy conversation -- we have a fundamental discussion of the state and prospects of Soviet-Romanian relations. It was pleasant to see that both sides' desire to develop traditional fraternal links and contacts coincided fully, and that it was the common view that the basis that exists for this is growing in strength and breadth.

The negotiations with my counterpart, Comrade Totu, proceeded in a substantive, constructive and purposeful manner. We touched upon a very wide range of issues relating to international and bilateral relations and came to the conclusion that our two countries can and will cooperate even more closely in resolving the key problems of the present day.

Despite the strenuous schedule of the Bucharest meetings and were able to feel the pulse of the Romanian people and became acquainted with their achievements in the economy, science and culture. Nicolae Ceausescu, secretary general of the RCP and president of the Socialist Republic of Romania, briefed us on this in great depth. The

hospitality and amicableness of the working people of the republic won our hearts, and we were profoundly moved by the respect in which they hold our country. The golden Romanian autumn with its generous fruits created a beautiful backdrop for our meetings.

And nevertheless, we continually return in our thoughts to what happened in Reykjavik on 11-12 October. The impressions of those days are superimposed on all today's matters, and the perception of them is all the more acute. All the more profound is the understanding of how difficult each step toward peace is. Never before has it been so broad as in those days at Reykjavik, and never before has it been severed so unreasonably as by our U.S. negotiating partners.

Why did this happen?

M.S. Gorbachev replied exhaustively to this at the press conference in Reykjavik on 12 October and in his speech on Soviet television.

However, broad discussion of the subjects continues, and, in particular, reports are coming in which distort the true state of affairs. It is essential to comment on, so to speak, certain commentaries.

Whether it is relevant or not, our U.S. partners use the President's favorite phrase: "It's not that peoples distrust each other because they have a lot of weapons, but they arm themselves because there is no trust between them."

Well, if in Washington they are so greatly concerned about the problems of trust, they themselves should not undermine trust.

This is precisely what they are doing when they now state that they, allegedly, proposed to us the elimination of nuclear weapons, but we refused.

As if M.S. Gorbachev had not made his 15 January statement describing a plan for the total description of nuclear weapons before the end of the present century.

It is as if the sides did not reach a mutual understanding on this central issue in Reykjavik by confirming that they would commit themselves to eliminate all nuclear weapons, including ballistic missiles, by the end of 1996. The mutual understanding on this issue is of historic significance.

I could reconstruct a minute-by-minute picture of how in Reykjavik we came to such an accord. However, at present, dark smears are being placed on this picture. All these insinuations as to the imaginary violations by the Soviet Union of its treaty obligations and the inventions about its secret work in the sphere of defense installations are both irresponsible and immoral. The rhetorical passages to the effect that only talk from a position of strength forces the Soviet Union to agreement are immoral.

Great, very great is the U.S. military potential, but the potential for decency of some representatives of the administration is seriously diminished.

In this regard one wishes to say the times of the Talleyrands have long passed. Petty acts of cunning with great consequences which are characteristic of the age of secret diplomacy ought by now to have been shelved. When with bated breath millions of people look you in the face with hope and faith and listen to you, be honest with them. Do not distort, for example, what exactly was discussed in Reykjavik and how. This is an elementary demand.

Electronics equipped with untruth is frightening technology, it creates interference on the screen of world public opinion. We have an obligation to eliminate it.

Distortions are already becoming apparent in the enumeration of the questions allegedly discussed at the meeting. Then they try to give the impression that the United States defended the ABM Treaty, while we demanded its revision.

Anyone with any political knowledge at all knows that the Soviet Union is in favor of preserving the accords in the area of arms limitation and reduction, whereas the United States has declared the SALT I agreement and the SALT II Treaty dead.

To claim that the strategic defense initiative does not contradict the ABM Treaty is a total distortion.

The SDI program is not just the antithesis of this treaty, but its antagonist or, to put it simply, its mortal enemy. And they want to use it to destroy the only remaining obstacle in the way of space weapons. As M.S. Gorbachev said, it is the "Star Wars" program that is inhibiting movement toward a nuclear-free world.

It was over the ABM Treaty, over the term of observance of the treaty, and over what must not be done during that term that the struggle took place in Reykjavik.

Our position is that the sides must strengthen the setup established by the ABM Treaty and pledge not to exercise the right to withdraw from it for as long as possible and not do anything in that period that might undermine the setup and the restrictions imposed by the treaty. Then, as we proposed, enter into negotiations to determine further steps.

The U.S. position consists in not withdrawing from the treaty for a maximum of 10 years, but all the time carrying out research into and tests of a new weapons system and making it ready in order to be able to embark on the deployment of new armaments the day after the 10-year period expires.

According to this plan, the elimination of nuclear armaments would be concurrent with the creation [sozdaniye] of new space weapons, comparable to and even surpassing nuclear weapons. It would be the same old arms race, but on the basis of different, new technology.

In other words, they were offering, in soft wrapping, the idea that we should lay down our arms rather than disarm, while they replace one type of weapon with another and thus leave us a defenseless target of laser installations and electromagnetic guns.

But what sensible person would agree to that?

It is hard to cope with the bitterness and bewilderment. The disinformers, who did not even manage to get close to the negotiating room, claim that it all broke down because of our reluctance to accept the formula on space weapon tests outside the laboratory. This is not a trifle, nor is it a mere formula, but the destiny, lives, and freedom of millions and billions of people, and in this case it is they who have been made hostages of SDI.

Let us suppose for a moment that we have accepted the deal offered by the United States. We start destroying nuclear weapons and, at the same time, creating space weapons. We are quite capable of doing this, we have both the scientific and the

material-technical potential. But we would then totally exhaust our ethical arsenals, share with Washington the immoral "privilege" of world domination, and betray the trust and hopes of our friends and allies and all the peoples of the world.

No, we will not agree to that. We have not agreed to that. M.S. Gorbachev has made this clear in his speeches. We are honest to our own and to the other peoples. An honest policy is our strongest weapon and we do not intend to abandon it.

In conclusion, one parallel. Loving parents give their children affectionate nicknames. Even if the children are monsters who pose a danger to those around them. The first atom bomb, dropped on Hiroshima, was christened "Little Boy" by the Americans and they said that the flash was "brighter than a thousand suns." On that August day in 1945, despite all the depth and destruction, no one could predict the consequences of that madness.

Now they are known. But the monstrous means of warfare are still being presented in the romantic clothing of myth, as the embodiment of mankind's eternal dream. This is the way the SDI program is publicized, and none of its fathers wants to talk about its unpredicable consequences for the destiny of the world and space.

Mankind does not need "stories" with uncertain endings. It needs truth, and truth is what we are telling. No matter how bitter -- we tell it. And we are still hopeful that it will triumph. The note of bright optimism that was sounded in M.S. Gorbachev's recent speeches is the Soviet Union's will and determination to continue the dialogue with the United States and to seek and find solutions to complex problems in the interests of the Soviet and American peoples and all people of the world.

Then E.A. Shevardnadze answered numerous questions put by journalists. Most of them concerned Soviet-American relations in the light of the meeting in Reykjavik, the prospects of the Geneva talks, and the upcoming Vienna meeting of representatives of the states that participated in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. The correspondents displayed a great deal of interest in the work of the Warsaw Pact Countries Foreign Ministers' Committee and in the Soviet-Romanian talks.

Demichev at SFRY Dinner

PM230935 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 22 Oct 86 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS report "USSR Supreme Soviet Delegation Visits SFRY"]

[Excerpts] Belgrade, 21 Oct--The SFRY Federal Assembly gave a supper in the USSR Supreme Soviet delegation's honor.

Yugoslavia, the president of the SFRY Federal Assembly stressed, supports the peace initiatives put forward by M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. They are aimed at freeing mankind from the nightmare of the nuclear danger and inspire the hope that despite the complexities at the recent Soviet-U.S. meeting in Reykjavik, an understanding will be reached on beginning a real disarmament process.

P.N. Demichev stated: We attach great significance to the strengthening of parliamentary ties with all countries, primarily the socialist countries.

We and all the peoples of the world are now facing the historic task of preserving world peace. The Soviet Union views the struggle for a lasting peace on earth as its sacred duty. Mindful of their high responsibility to mankind, the Communist Party and the Soviet Government are making every effort to create an all-embracing system of international security and to eliminate nuclear weapons on our planet. This was graphically confirmed once more by the meeting between M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, U.S. President R. Reagan. It was an important event in international life in the struggle against the arms race and for the banning and elimination of nuclear weapons.

The Soviet side's position at that meeting was a concrete expression of the new approach and the new thinking whose need is dictated by the realities of the nuclear missile age.

An assessment of it was given by M.S. Gorbachev at the press conference in Reykjavik and in a speech on Soviet television.

Although through the Reagan administration's fault this meeting did not produce the results which could have been expected we are not withdrawing our far-reaching proposals which, if adopted, would make it possible to use the unique opportunity to really begin ending the arms race, banning nuclear weapons, and destroying them once and for all.

We note with satisfaction that these wide-scale Soviet proposals find understanding and support in Yugoslavia. We are united with you in the view that what is now needed are the vigorous actions of all the peoples and the pooling of their efforts so as to give a resolute "no" to the policy leading to brink of nuclear war. Much can be done here by parliamentarians, the elected representatives of the peoples, expressing their will and their desire for a peaceful life.

Afanasyev to Sofia IOJ Congress

PM240749 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 23 Oct 86 Morning Edition p 5

[TASS report: "Forum of Like-minded People"]

[Text] Sofia, 22 Oct -- The 10th International Organization of Journalists Congress in progress here has developed into a forum of like-minded people discussing the burning problems of war and peace and the role of journalism in shaping new thinking in the nuclear age.

V.G. Afanasyev, chairman of the USSR Union of Journalists Board and chief editor of PRAVDA, talked about the main areas of Soviet journalistic activity.

Noting that preserving and strengthening peace is an essential condition of successfully fulfilling the ambitious programs for speeding up the country's socioeconomic development, the speaker said: Like air, peace is vital not only to the Soviet people but to peoples the world over, all mankind. Referring in this connection to the recent meeting between M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and the U.S. President, the chairman of the USSR Union of Journalists Board said: Reagan has not given up the SDI program. A historic chance was lost and the meeting wrecked as a result. Nevertheless the Soviet Union will never deviate from its policy of struggling for peace, against the arms race, and for the elimination of nuclear weapons. We Soviet journalists have been, are, and will continue to be loyal assistants to the party and the state in the implementation of this policy.

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CSO: 5200/1065

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

TASS: DOBRYNIN, INDIAN DELEGATION ON SUMMIT RESULTS

LD202133 Moscow TASS in English 1958 GMT 20 Oct 86

[Text] Moscow October 20 TASS -- Anatoliy Dobrynin, a secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, today received a delegation from the Indian National Congress [INC] (I) led by Darbara Singh, a member of the working committee and the central parliamentary council this party. The delegation is staying in the USSR at the invitation of the CPSU Central Committee.

The conversation covered the pressing issues of the present-day international situation and dynamically developing Soviet-Indian relations.

The secretary of the CPSU Central Committee explained the substance of Soviet peace initiatives, dwelt in detail upon the results of the Reykjavik meeting between Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and U.S. President Ronald Reagan and in this connection stressed the urgent need to step up efforts by all countries and peoples to safeguard peace and remove the threat of a nuclear war. Special emphasis was made on the importance of preventing the arms race from spilling over into outer space.

Anatolkiy Dobrynin stressed India's important and fruitful role in the campaign for peace and its activities in the Non-Aligned Movement and in the framework of the Delhi Six Group.

ING(I) delegation leader Darbara Singh spoke highly of the Soviet Union's efforts to protect peace, ward off the nuclear threat and preserve life on earth. He made a special mention of the fact that Mikhail Gorbachev's proposals in Reykjavik had evoked broad response and approval in India. Dabara Singh said that India maintained a consistent stand for a ban on nuclear testing and against the "star wars" plans.

The sides expressed mutual satisfaction with all-round development and strengthening of Soviet-Indian relations on the solid basis of a treaty of peace, friendship and cooperation between the USSR and India as meeting the fundamental interests of the people of both countries and the cause of peace and security in Asia and the world as a whole.

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CSO: 5200/1063

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

IZVESTIYA CITES PRC REACTION TO REYKJAVIK

PM221041 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 21 Oct 86 Morning Edition p 4

[Own correspondent Yu. Savenkov dispatch: "China's Reaction"]

[Text] Beijing -- The Chinese press, which attentively followed the preparations for and the holding of the Reykjavik meeting, has recently been discussing its results in detail.

XINHUA commentaries from Moscow and Washington and reports from Reykjavik and other capitals set out the Soviet and U.S. positions and publish reactions and assessments from various countries.

In particular, BEIJING RIBAO, which set out the content of M.S. Gorbachev's press conference most fully, shared his view that the Soviet side had brought to Reykjavik a whole package of proposals including a 50-percent reduction of strategic offensive arms, the elimination of U.S. and Soviet medium-range missiles in Europe, three-way verification [kontrol], and a commitment on the part of the sides not to exercise the right to depart from the ABM Treaty for 10 years. The newspaper stressed M.S. Gorbachev's proposal to think about the situation which has emerged since the Reykjavik meeting and return to the topic, overcoming the things that separate the USSR and the United States.

Answering journalists' questions at a press briefing about how the Chinese Government views the results of the U.S. -Soviet meeting, a PRC Foreign Ministry Press Department spokesman stated: "We have taken note of the fact that the U.S.-Soviet meeting did not lead to agreement. We have always advocated dialogue between the United States and the Soviet Union. Dialogue is always better than confrontation. We hope that the United States and the Soviet Union will continue the dialogue."

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CSO: 5200/1062

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

USSR'S ALIYEV, JAPANESE BUSINESSMAN MATSUMAE ON SUMMIT

Vremya Newscast

LD160719 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 15 Oct 86

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Excerpts] Geydar Aliyev, member of the Political Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee and first deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, received in the Kremlin Sigeshi Matsumae, president of the Japanese Association of Cultural Ties With Foreign Countries and prominent Japanese public figure.

Geydar Aliyev spoke in detail about the results of the meeting between Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and U.S. President Ronald Reagan in Reykjavik and pointed out in this connection the urgent necessity for vigorous actions of all the countries and peoples aimed at further stepping up efforts for warding off the military threat to the world.

Sigeshi Matsumae voiced full support for the intentions of the Soviet leadership to further follow the course of the struggle for peace and for the scrapping of nuclear weapons. He stressed that the very fact of achieving progress on the problem of strategic armaments and medium-range missiles gave rise to great hopes among the world public on which a further development of world events depended a great deal. Sigeshi Matsumae said that he would take steps for promoting the consolidation of peace and international security.

Comrade Aliyev dwelt in detail on the results of the meeting in Reykjavik. Matsumae spoke of his support for the intention of the Soviet Union and its leadership to continue to pursue a course of the struggle for peace and the liquidation of nuclear weapons.

KYODO Version of Meeting

OW160231 Tokyo KYODO in English 0215 GMT 16 Oct 86

[Excerpts] Moscow, 16 Oct (KYODO)--Soviet Vice Premier Geydar Aliyev was quoted as saying Wednesday that the Soviet Union is dissatisfied with Japan's slow response to improve Russo-Japanese relations.

Shigeyoshi Matsumae, president of the Japan Cultural Association, quoted Aliyev as saying Moscow is waiting for positive Japanese initiatives to expand trade, economic, scientific and cultural ties with Japan.

Matsumae's association promotes academic and cultural exchanges with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

The vice premier also expressed displeasure over Japan's decision to join the U.S. "star wars" antimissile defense research program, Matsumae said.

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CSO: 5200/1062

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

TASS: OSAKA CONFERENCE DEBATES CENTER ON REYKJAVIK

LD211539 Moscow TASS in English 1316 GMT 21 Oct 86

[Text] Osaka October 21 TASS -- TASS correspondent Vladimir Borodin reports: An international symposium which reviewed prospects for the development of world politics and the economy and East-West relations closed here today. It was attended by experts on international relations from Japan, the Soviet Union, the United States, Britain and some other countries. The debates centered on the recent Reykjavik meeting of Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and U.S. President Ronald Reagan, which, in the unanimous view of the participants in the symposium, had prepared the ground for the solution of the key problem of our age, the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons.

Former U.S. Defense Secretary Robert McNamara said in his speech that any attempt to achieve unilateral military-strategic advantage in the nuclear age could only aggravate the threat of thermonuclear catastrophe. The "Strategic Defense Initiative" imposed on the world by the incumbent U.S. Administration is blocking opportunities for arms control. It is time to cast aside anything that hampers accords on sweeping cuts in the nuclear arms arsenals, McNamara said. The former defense secretary was supported by retired Admiral James Eberly, director of the London Royal Institute of International Relations. The "Star Wars" program, according to him, is untenable militarily, politically and intellectually and it is necessary drastically to revise the existing political priorities in order to remove the threat facing mankind.

The Soviet position on nuclear disarmament and international security was presented in detail by Academician Yevgeniy Primakov, director of the Institute of the World Economy and International Relations of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Speeches at the symposium showed the popularity of the ideas put forward by the Soviet Union in Iceland. In spite of their differences of approach, speakers were unanimous that the process initiated in Reykjavik should be continued in the interests of mankind as a whole and criticised the U.S. non-constructive stand.

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CSO: 5200/1063

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

UK FOREIGN OFFICE SUPPORTS REAGAN'S ACTION AT REYKJAVIK

London PRESS ASSOCIATION in English 1322 GMT 13 Oct 86

[Article by Geoff Meade]

[Excerpt]

Britain today firmly backed President Reagan's refusal to give up his "insurance policy" of star wars research as part of an arms reduction deal with the Russians. Foreign Office Minister Mr Timothy Renton said the UK was fully behind the U.S. President's insistence on the right to go ahead with research efforts. The Russians had "tried to move the goalposts," at the Reykjavik negotiations, he said.

Mr Renton, speaking after nearly three hours of talks in Brussels between NATO foreign ministers and American Secretary of State George Shultz, refused to write off the summit as a failure. "We have taken one step down a laborious road. There are great prizes at the end of that road but details have to be reached if agreements are to be as watertight as we want them to be."

Earlier, Mr Schultz had flown to NATO headquarters in Brussels straight from the Reykjavik talks seeking renewed support from the allies.

He seems to have achieved it. A statement afterwards from NATO Secretary General Lord Carrington said: "We expressed warm appreciation to President Reagan for his efforts to achieve outstanding results at Reykjavik."

Mr Renton said Mrs Thatcher would be giving the first full British response to the outcome after talks tomorrow with the Russian negotiator at Geneva Mr Viktor Karpov. But he left no doubt that Britain was unlikely to be critical of the hand played by President Reagan at the negotiating table. He said the failure to reach agreement was despite "a great deal of ingenuity and imagination" by Mr Reagan. He said a lot of very important ideas had been produced, which would now form the basis of renewed negotiations at Geneva.

And in an interview on BBC radio Four's World at One programme Mr Renton said: "What is surprising is that President Reagan and Mr Gorbachev did get so far in discussing so many important details and a lot of serious proposals have emerged." He said he hoped that this material which had been brought to the surface would be worked on and developed when negotiations resume in Geneva — "and I trust that will be very soon."

Asked for his views on the fact that a deal on European missiles had been thrown out of the window because President Reagan insisted on pursuing star wars, he replied: "That is a bit upside down, frankly. The Russians agreed at a previous summit that a deal on intermediate weapons could and should be negotiated without reference to a further or other deal on strategic weapons and space defence with which they are connected. Now, the intermediate weapons deal may well have been in sight but Russia, unfortunately, went back on this previous agreement of theirs."

[Passage omitted] Mr Renton said America's star wars research should result in "enhanced deterrents, but at lower levels of weapons". He went on: "We understand the President's strong belief in investigating whether such an insurance policy can be achieved or not."

He described the Reykjavik talks as part of a play. "What has happened in Iceland is by no means the end of the play but one act in this extremely important series of discussions. There is an interval between the acts."

"We hope it will be a short interval and that the parties will pick up the next act in Geneva."

Mr Renton said he expected the Labour party to make "every possible piece of political capital" out of the summit's (?result), but he hoped every Briton would clearly realise the need not to dash the chances of multilateral disarmament with negotiations still going on. He admitted that not all the European allies shared President Reagan's view of the importance of Star Wars research, but pointed out that nothing had changed in the American position. He made it clear there would be no NATO split over America's position as he praised the level of consultations by Washington with its transatlantic partners.

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CSO: 5240/008

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

SOVIET ARMS NEGOTIATOR TALKS WITH THATCHER, PRESS

Karpov-Thatcher Meeting

London PRESS ASSOCIATION in English 0415 GMT 14 Oct 86

[Article by Chris Moncrieff]

[Excerpt]

Mrs Thatcher will fiercely support President Reagan's stand on star wars when she meets Mr Viktor Karpov, the Soviet chief arms negotiator, at Downing Street today for crucial talks about the Iceland summit.

The fact that the Soviet authorities have taken the rare step of ordering a top official to seek a meeting with the prime minister herself demonstrates the importance they attach to Britain's role in disarmament talks.

Normally, Britain's briefing by the Soviets would be at ambassador level. But Mr Gorbachev clearly wants to make the point directly to Mrs Thatcher that, in his view, President Reagan's refusal to budge on star wars was the cause of the breakdown at Reykjavik.

The prime minister, however, is determined to back the President to the hilt. She is expected to tell Mr Karpov bluntly that the United States could not be expected to back down on the Strategic Defence Initiative.

Her view will have been strengthened by a telephone conversation with the President a few hours before he went on television to give the American people a robust defence of his negotiating stance.

President Reagan telephoned Mrs Thatcher to give her his personal account of the summit and to discuss the way ahead. They spoke for about 15 minutes and expressed the hope they would continue the discussions in the "not too distant future."

This indicates that Mrs Thatcher will be making an early visit to Washington for talks, although no details or timings have been announced.

A statement about the summit is expected to be made in the Lords tomorrow. [passage omitted]

Remarks to Reporters

London PRESS ASSOCIATION in English 1134 GMT 14 Oct 86

[Article by Paul Cheston]

[Text]

A top Soviet official today spoke to the world's press outside No 10 Downing Street — the first time such a high-ranking Russian envoy has done so.

Chief arms negotiator Mr Viktor Karpov talked about his longer than expected 1½ hour meeting with Mrs Thatcher.

The prime minister gave full-hearted support to President Reagan's defence of his star wars programme at the Iceland summit.

But Mr Karpov emerged to say he had had "a very useful discussion" with Mrs Thatcher and talked of his hopes for new disarmament talks in Geneva.

Speaking in fluent English, Mr Karpov said: "I talked to the prime minister about the results of the Reykjavik meeting between General Secretary Gorbachev and President Reagan.

"I expressed our opinion about why the meeting failed to produce results that could mean a movement forward in resolving all the complicated but very important issues of nuclear disarmament."

Mr Karpov said that both he and Mrs Thatcher agreed that more effort was needed to break the deadlock in disarmament negotiations.

Asked about a new meeting, Mr Karpov said: "I think the results of the Reykjavik meeting should be pondered on by both sides and it could take some time."

When pressed to name a time and place for a new meeting with President Reagan, Mr Karpov replied simply: "Geneva." Later it appeared that Mr Karpov's comment about a possible superpower meeting in Geneva referred to general discussions, probably only at the level of government officials, and not a Reagan-Gorbachev summit. Mr Karpov then touched on his personal relationship with Mrs Thatcher, and when asked whether he had had a sympathetic hearing, he replied: "We had a discussion and, of course, not all our views coincide."

The top Soviet negotiator ended his impromptu press briefing in the middle of Downing Street by inviting reporters and camera crews to the Soviet Embassy later today for a full press conference.

He then walked the short distance from No 10 to the Foreign Office, where he had a meeting with Baroness Young.

Mr Karpov's meeting with Mrs Thatcher and Baroness Young, deputy foreign secretary, were arranged while he was in Reykjavik as part of Mr Gorbachev's team on Saturday.

According to officials, a message was received by the Foreign Office in London pointing out that he planned a series of European visits to discuss the summit and asking if it would be convenient to visit London.

This is seen as part of a new style Soviet diplomacy, it is assumed Mr Karpov would have wanted to visit London regardless of whether the summit was a success or failure.

The Soviets are now seen to be determined to ensure that their case is heard internationally.

Foreign Office Minister Mr Timothy Renton, who was in Brussels yesterday to hear the briefing by U.S. Secretary of State Mr George Shultz on the Iceland summit, was today in New York, where he is addressing the General Assembly on arms control.

But officials said he had reported back to London before flying to New York.

Britain is likely to support further meetings between Mr Gorbachev and President Reagan in an attempt to prevent the momentum built up from crumbling away.

Mr Karpov, who went to Downing Street as Mr Gorbachev's personal emissary, was accompanied by the Soviet charge d'affaires, Mr Gurman Gventsadze.

Both parties agreed they would not disclose details of their discussions. However, they agreed it was vital to find a way forward and that there were grounds for further negotiations.

Mr Karpov also told Mrs Thatcher that the Soviet leader was looking forward to meeting her in Moscow next year.

Mr Karpov's meeting later with Baroness Young lasted about 40 minutes. She was deputising for Sir Geoffrey Howe as the foreign secretary is in China with the queen.

Mr Karpov had nothing more to add before being driven off in a black Mercedes.

London Press Conference

London PRESS ASSOCIATION in English 2044 GMT 14 Oct 86

[Text]

The Soviet Union's chief arms negotiator tonight in London offered a glimmer of hope on an America-Soviet arms deal.

Mr Viktor Karpov, speaking after a longer-than-expected meeting with Mrs Thatcher, said a deal on European medium range nuclear arms — including British-based cruise missiles — was possible without it being linked to the U.S. scrapping their Star Wars project.

This appeared to be a significant move away from the stance taken by the Soviets at the Reykjavik summit.

Mr Karpov told a press conference: "We do not deny the possibility of finding a solution to medium range nuclear weapons in Europe separately from the space and nuclear offensive arms."

He said the Russians did not seek to exploit the differences between the U.S. and their European allies.

But the move could be seen as an attempt by the Russians in their new high-profile diplomacy to put the pressure on President Reagan.

In Reykjavik the Russians firmly linked the scrapping of star wars to the other issues.

But before the talks collapsed great strides had been made in agreeing to cut dramatically medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe and Soviet Asia.

Mr Karpov's talks with Mrs Thatcher were the second time in 24 hours that she was drawn to centre stage on international arms control.

On Monday night President Reagan telephoned her a few hours before he went on television to give the American people a robust defence of his negotiating stance.

During the 15 minute chat Mr Reagan told her his personal version of the summit and discussed the way ahead.

Then came Mr Karpov's visit.

The fact that the Soviet authorities have taken the rare step of ordering a top official to seek a meeting with the prime minister herself demonstrates the importance they attach to Britain's role in disarmament talks.

Normally Britain's briefing by the Soviets would be at ambassador level.

Mr Karpov's meetings with Mrs Thatcher and Baroness Young, deputy foreign secretary, were arranged while he was in Reykjavik as part of Mr Gorbachev's team on Saturday.

Later today he flew to Bonn to explain the Russian position to the West German Government before going on to Moscow.

After the 1½ hours of talks with Mrs Thatcher, Mr Karpov spoke to the world's press outside No 10 Downing Street — the first time such a high-ranking Russian envoy has done so.

Mrs Thatcher gave full-hearted support to Mr Reagan's defence of his star wars project.

But Mr Karpov described the talks as "a useful discussion" before ending his impromptu press briefing in the middle of Downing Street by inviting reporters and camera crew back to the Soviet Embassy for a full press conference.

At the press conference Mr Karpov was repeatedly questioned on why the Soviets in Reykjavik had insisted on linking star wars and the other issues, medium and long-range missiles.

He replied: "The Soviets suggested a complex solution at Reykjavik."

Russia had also suggested a series of test ban talks, which could also be considered separately, he said.

When pressed to name a time and place for a new meeting with President Reagan, Mr Karpov replied simply "Geneva."

He then said he was waiting for instructions from Moscow.

Later it appeared that this comment could have referred only to general discussions, probably at the level of government officials and noted a Reagan-Gorbachev summit.

Mr Karpov refused to lay down any time limit for pondering the outcome of Reykjavik, but added: "It will be a speedy deliberation."

He disagreed with Baroness Young, who said after her meeting with him that Britain regarded it as "a step backwards" by the Soviet Union in making progress achieved at Reykjavik hostage to an amendment to the Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty.

He commented: "I believe Lady Young has the right to make her own assessment of what happened in Reykjavik."

"I have my right to disagree with her."

He declined to give details of his discussions with Mrs Thatcher saying that the exchanges were "confidential." He felt that the star wars initiative "provides a false sense of security".

He said: "If one side feels it has a shield so to speak it might in that situation imagine it could strike first and start a war."

Mr Karpov felt that the complex proposals put by the Soviets in Reykjavik represented "an historic opportunity" to change the course of events.

President Reagan had said he wanted his star wars programme to be a programme of research and the Soviets had agreed. But they insisted that the programme should not go beyond research.

/9317

CSO: 5240/008

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

DAILY TELEGRAPH COMMENTS ON OUTCOME AT REYKJAVIK SUMMIT

13 October Editorial

London THE DAILY TELEGRAPH in English 13 Oct 86 p 18

[Editorial]

[Text]

IT WAS never likely that the Reykjavik Summit would produce spectacular results. Lack of success should not, certainly for the time being, be considered a serious blow to world peace. After all these occasions, time is needed to make a proper assessment of what took place and what emerged — or failed to do so. If, as seems just conceivable, Mr Gorbachev in his private sessions with Mr Reagan ever admitted how desperately the Soviet Union now needs a halt to the technological escalation of which the Strategic Defence Initiative is only an aspect, one may be very sure that no such admission would ever become public. But without at least a tacit acknowledgment of this fundamental fact, no amount of back-slapping bonhomie for the benefit of the cameras can be reassuring. A success for the President would have been a watertight deal on one of the main issues apart from arms control—human rights, Afghanistan, terrorism—in return for some temporary slackening of the pace of technological competition. As far less than that was forthcoming, Mr Reagan's commitment to SDI should have remained intact.

The deliberate breach of confidentiality by the Soviets and their talks of an offer of "historic" proportions should not surprise anyone. This is the propaganda style of Mr Gorbachev's Kremlin, with which the US Administration has had time enough to become familiar. But the fact that the Soviet Union's priority, arms control, seems to have dominated the discussions explains why the unexpected negotiations on strategic long-range missiles were proposed by the Soviets. Given that Mr Reagan cannot agree to a complete withdrawal of medium-range missiles from Europe without alarming his European allies, and that the USSR would agree to such a withdrawal

only if the short-range missiles in which it has a European monopoly were to remain, it is not illogical to introduce the question of intercontinental missiles to create more flexibility. The fact that many of the latter weapons on both sides are approaching obsolescence in any case, while new systems like Trident are in the offing, adds urgency to the need to include them at the next Summit. The highly-mobile nature of medium-range missiles means that no agreement to remove these weapons will give Western Europe complete security.

The most important ally of the United States is time. Mr Reagan may be older than his counterpart, and his remaining time in office will most probably be shorter; but it is Mr Gorbachev who is the man in a hurry. The concession which really interests the Soviet Union is that which stops the clock—anything, in fact, which impedes research. It does not matter whether some existing hardware is scrapped, so long as the free world preserves its freedom of action.

14 October Editorial

London THE DAILY TELEGRAPH in English 14 Oct 86 p 20

[Editorial]

[Text]

IT will be many weeks before the full implications of Reykjavik become apparent. But certain key points can already be made. Until Sunday night many Europeans maintained a lingering belief that President Reagan's commitment to the Strategic Defence Initiative was a bargaining weapon. When the right moment came, and every conceivable concession had been squeezed out of Mr Gorbachev, the President would suddenly announce that he had been joking all along, and the American tax-payer should look at the several billion dollars spent on SDI research as a cheap way of buying peace. Well, now we all know better.

It would be foolish for West European governments to ignore the whiff of neo-isolation that clings to the American position at Reykjavik. The Reagan Administration has declared for a strategic option whose deployment alarms its major European allies. Almost two years ago, anxieties over SDI and its potential consequences for East-West agreement (and the unity of the alliance) prompted Mrs Thatcher to visit Washington and draft a four-point agreement with Mr Reagan. Point two stated that "SDI-related deployment would, in view of (US-Soviet) Treaty obligations, have to be a matter for

negotiations." That is not what Mr Shultz seemed to be saying on Sunday night: Mr Reagan offered Mr Gorbachev 10 years more of the relevant ABM treaty and after that "we would be permitted to deploy if we chose."

Mr Gorbachev has not been entirely consistent either. He may have finally dropped the British and French nuclear forces from the intermediate range missile count, but he has again linked agreement on this category of weapon with an American renunciation of its Star Wars plans.

Yet, as we suggested yesterday, the picture after Reykjavik is by no means as bleak as at first might appear. Negotiations of this kind do not, short of war, come to an end. They may hibernate for a time when the frost is hard. But they endure. The first priority for West European governments must be to limit the damage to the alliance, which could result from a new surge of domestic anti-Americanism. Whatever the public perceptions of the desirability of the SDI, it should be possible to convey the simple message that the present American administration is committed to Star Wars and that its commitment has already persuaded the Russians to go further than they ever have before towards serious arms control concessions. Mrs Thatcher today becomes the first object of the inevitable Soviet diplomatic offensive following the Summit. The arrival of Mr Karpov, the chief Russian arms negotiator, is plainly designed as a little exercise in mischief-making, to deepen the wedge between the Americans and their allies after the Summit failure. The Prime Minister should have little difficulty in passing off the visit for what it is. Thereafter, with a deep sigh, the allies and the superpowers must go back to the drawing board.

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CSO: 5240/008

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

CANADA: REACTION IN COMMONS TO REYKJAVIK SUMMIT

Mulroney on Government Position

Toronto THE TORONTO STAR in English 15 Oct 86 pp A1, A 12

[Article by Joe O'Donnell]

[Text]

OTTAWA — Although Star Wars may have been a "stumbling block" at the weekend mini-summit in Reykjavik, Iceland, the U.S. plan to develop a space-based missile defence system is still worthwhile, Prime Minister Brian Mulroney says.

The impasse between U.S. President Ronald Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev does not mean that no progress was made during the talks, Mulroney told the House of Commons yesterday.

And he said his government still believes that research on the Strategic Defence Initiative, commonly referred to as Star Wars, is prudent.

Mulroney rejected opposition demands that the government should show "the wisdom and the guts" to convince Reagan to drop the Star Wars project as a means of reaching an arms-control agreement with the Soviet Union.

Return to Geneva

"The morning after an important meeting such as that, I think one must quite properly look at the matter constructively and see if there is a possibility of building bridges in the future," Mulroney told the Commons.

"I think that possibility exists, and Canada will do all it can to be helpful in that process as the parties return to Geneva," he said.

But Liberals and New Democrats insisted that, because the talks broke down over Reagan's refusal to meet Soviet demands that he limit testing of the Star Wars system, Mulroney should now be persuaded that he must intervene and state Canada's opposition to Star Wars.

Donald Johnston, Liberal critic for external affairs, quoted the chief U.S. negotiator of the 1977 Strategic Arms Limitation Talks on his assessment of the Reykjavik talks. Paul Warnke said the only chance for progress on arms control is for someone to show the courage to tell Reagan to bend on Star Wars.

"Will the Prime Minister tell us whether he agrees with that statement?" Johnston said. "Does he have the wisdom and the guts to send that message to the President on behalf of the Canadian people?"

But Mulroney said he endorses the view of Lord Carrington, secretary-general of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, "when he said we agree that possibilities for significant progress had emerged in a number of areas. He underlined the importance of fol-

lowing these up energetically in the appropriate negotiating forum."

New Democrat Derek Blackburn (Brant) asked Mulroney how his government could continue to support the Reagan administration when, through the Star Wars project, the U.S. would be in clear violation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty between the superpowers.

"How does the government intend to support the ABM Treaty now that President Reagan has made clear his intention to test and deploy ABM systems outside the laboratory within 10 years?" Blackburn said.

Mulroney said he could not forecast what may or may not happen in the next 10 years, "but our treaty is clear and the position of the government of Canada is clear. We have conveyed that to all parties. There has been no change in our position."

Liberal Lloyd Axworthy (Winnipeg-Fort Garry) called for an all-party resolution urging Reagan to put Star Wars on the arms-control agenda.

But Mulroney said that was pointless "when it clearly was on the agenda and it was on the agenda all weekend."

Defeat of NDP Motion

Toronto THE TORONTO STAR in English 16 Oct 86 p A 10

[Article by Joe O'Donnell]

[Text]

OTTAWA — The Mulroney government has shot down an opposition attempt to have Parliament condemn any work on the U.S. Star Wars project outside the laboratory.

The motion, presented yesterday to the House of Commons by New Democratic Party leader Ed Broadbent, would have put all parties on record as opposed to U.S. plans to gradually extend test-

ing of a space-based missile defence system beyond the laboratory stage.

Liberals were prepared to support the motion, but the majority Progressive Conservatives, led by Deputy Prime Minister Don Mazankowski, refused.

Mazankowski said the government would wait for External Affairs Minister Joe Clark to return home in a few days to respond to the "larger issue." He did not elaborate.

Mazankowski also sidestepped a proposal by Liberal Lloyd Axworthy that the three parties work out a jointly worded resolution to put pressure on U.S. President Ronald Reagan to abandon his apparent intransigence on the Star Wars issue.

One again, Mazankowski said the government would wait for Clark to respond to the issue.

It was the second consecutive day in the Commons that the opposition parties put pressure on the government to acknowledge that Reagan's position on the Strategic Defence Initiative, commonly known as Star Wars, was responsible for the breakdown of the arms control talks between Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev in Iceland last weekend.

Liberals and New Democrats have repeatedly insisted that U.S. plans for Star Wars testing over the next 10 years are a clear violation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile pact between the superpowers.

New course

But Prime Minister Brian Mulroney, as he had done the previous day, said that as far as his government is concerned, Star Wars research is prudent because the Soviets are doing the same thing. But he added that such research "must be, as it is, consistent with the provisions of the ABM Treaty."

Outside the Commons, Broadbent said Mulroney had demonstrated a clear misunderstanding of the Star Wars issue in his responses, since Gorbachev had already agreed at the Iceland talks to allow continued Star Wars research, provided it is confined to the laboratory stage.

Broadbent said the Prime Minister had also contradicted previous commitments made by Clark to respect the ABM Treaty.

"It suggests that either the government is going on a new course, or simply that Mr. Mulroney is confused.

Remarks by Clark, Critics

Toronto THE TORONTO STAR in English 22 Oct 86 p A8

[Article by David Vienneau]

[Text]

OTTAWA — External Affairs Minister Joe Clark has drawn the wrath of opposition critics for saying that the two superpowers have accepted the "legitimacy of research" into Star Wars space weaponry.

The critics said that in making the suggestion in the House of Commons yesterday, Clark came out firmly on the side of the U.S. when he should simply have condemned Star Wars.

In a review of the recent Reykjavik summit, Clark said the summit's failure to reach an agreement on the extent of research on Star Wars — known formally as the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) — was not a step backward.

Scrap deal

"There has in our judgment been some movement toward better mutual understanding, in that the legitimacy of research related to

SDI is now accepted by both sides," he said.

He added that "the issue has become, in effect: What are the limits on permissible research?"

A potential superpower deal that could have led to the scrapping of all medium- and long-range nuclear missiles in their arsenals over the next 10 years fell through at Reykjavik because of a disagreement over Star Wars.

The impasse involved the Soviet Union's insistence that research on the space-based anti-missile system be confined to laboratory work.

U.S. President Ronald Reagan declared that "this we could not and will not do."

The Liberal external affairs critic, Don Johnston, and New Democrat leader Ed Broadbent told the Commons that Clark should have condemned Reagan for foiling the possibility of a historic peace agreement.

Violates treaty

Both said that testing and deployment of Star Wars research was in clear violation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and that Clark should have made this clear in his special statement to the Commons.

"The opportunity for a historic peace accord was lost because of the insistence of the United States to continue to develop its Star Wars initiative beyond laboratory testing," Johnston said.

"We see SDI as being destabilizing and an escalation of the arms race and an incredible waste of precious resources that should be used to raise the standard of living in the Third World."

The government's position is that the treaty prohibits the development and testing of space-based weapons.

A spokesman in Clark's office, elaborating on the minister's statement, said the U.S. has committed itself only to research, which is not covered by the treaty.

Broadbent said that having criticized the Soviet Union in the past for its positions on human rights and arms control, he now had to admit that the Soviets had made the major moves and concessions at Reykjavik.

Get tough

Both Johnston and Broadbent said Clark should emulate the behavior of former prime minister Pierre Trudeau, who was not afraid to criticize either superpower when they were wrong.

"He had an appropriate sense of the role Canada could be playing," Broadbent said.

"I wish we had that kind of independent thought functioning in foreign policy, especially on disarmament, today."

Clark said that in coming close to an arms-control agreement, three lessons were reinforced in Iceland.

"The first two are: Both sides are serious and arms control is possible," he said. "But the third lesson is that arms control will not come easily. It is a difficult and deliberate process."

Clark urged the two sides to continue their negotiations and if necessary to set a date for another summit early next year should a planned summit scheduled for Washington later this year not go ahead.

/7358

CSO: 5220/3

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

CANADIAN PRESS COMMENTS ON REYKJAVIK SUMMIT RESULTS

CITIZEN: Both Leaders Miscalculated

Ottawa THE OTTAWA CITIZEN in English 14 Oct 86 p A8

[Text]

The negative outcome of the Iceland super-power summit was as disappointing as it was unexpected. But it would be wrong to term it a disaster or to let it sow the seeds of disunity in the North Atlantic Alliance.

The world is not a more dangerous place today than yesterday because U.S. President Reagan and U.S.S.R. General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev failed to agree on dramatic omnibus nuclear arms proposals. But it would have been a less dangerous one if such an accord had been reached.

This is undoubtedly the end of an era in U.S.-Soviet relations and the beginning of a new one. State Secretary George Shultz said that "extremely important potential agreements were reached" to reduce strategic nuclear arms by half and intermediate-range (INF) ones completely. But the "potential" did not become the "actual" because Gorbachev insisted that all Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) research and testing be confined to the laboratory for the next 10 years.

The impasse over strategic defence is a real one. The Soviet leader knew that Reagan would not give up Star Wars before its potential could be assessed. Shultz explained that, by doing so, the U.S. would have jeopardized the basic security of the U.S., its allies and the free world. There isn't yet enough trust.

Reagan countered that there be a 10-year delay in SDI deployment — but not in re-

search or testing on the ground or in space — in exchange for the complete elimination of all ballistic missiles on both sides. Gorbachev was intent on confining SDI to the lab.

In the cold light of dawn after the heady days of Reykjavik, what are we left with?

In their disappointment, both leaders urged a continuation of efforts to reach agreement on arms control and general relations. Although not yet agreed, the next summit should be held next year and be based on the proposals and tentative agreements reached in Iceland.

Both sides stress that everything tabled in Iceland is still there. That's a promising start. Also, both want the Geneva arms talks to continue. So, too, should all other East-West arms negotiations.

The big mistake was that the ill-prepared Iceland meeting was treated by both like a real summit. It should have been less ambitious and settled for lesser accords such as one dealing with INF instead of going for all or nothing.

Canadians should not waste too much time trying to assess the blame. Both leaders miscalculated the other's resolve. We must now hope that the propaganda outflow from Iceland will be contained and that the two will re-engage soon in arms control negotiations based on achieving an outcome considered stable by both sides. That wasn't the case in Reykjavik and that's why it failed.

Toronto THE TORONTO STAR in English 14 Oct 86 p A 16

[Text]

The world is a less safe place in the wake of the Reykjavik summit. The Doomsday Clock has moved another few minutes toward midnight.

The opportunity was there for a substantive arms-control agreement — at least in principle — between the United States and the Soviet Union. It would have significantly reduced each superpower's arsenal of nuclear missiles, both long-range and short-range. With the backing of U.S. President Ronald Reagan, the deal almost certainly would have been ratified by the U.S. Senate — unlike the last arms-control treaty between the Americans and the Soviets — and the way would have been opened for a new era in East-West relations.

Instead, we have the prospect of a heated-up arms race, reaching into space, and, likely, an escalation in superpower conflict in such regional hotspots as Central America, southern Africa, and South Asia. As a side-effect, relations within the Atlantic Alliance will be strained, perhaps to the breaking point.

Why? Because U.S. President Ronald Reagan clings to his Strategic Defence Initiative (Star Wars) and refuses to offer it as a bargaining chip in arms-control talks.

Star Wars is a dubious concept, to say the least. It is draining off billions of dollars that could more productively be spent elsewhere. It will, for the first time, introduce weapons (albeit of a "defensive" nature) to space, literally taking the arms race to new heights. And as the U.S. moves steadily from research to development to deployment, the pressure on the Soviets will be enormous. Might they panic and launch a nuclear first-strike before the Americans are rendered invulnerable by their space shield? It is a serious concern.

Reagan said after Reykjavik that he wants to develop and deploy Star Wars "for the people of the Free World." Well, he doesn't speak for the entire Free World. (In this case, it is not certain he is even speaking for the American people.) It is incumbent on the Free World's other leaders, including our own Prime Minister, Brian Mulroney, to tell Reagan that they would rather have an arms deal than Star Wars, thank you very much.

Toronto THE TORONTO STAR in English 14 Oct 86 p A17

[Article by Adam Bromke, professor of international politics at McMaster University]

[Text]

At the summit in Reykjavik, an historic opportunity to reverse the nuclear armament race and to dramatically improve East-West relations was lost. It may be several years before another chance like this will occur. Meanwhile, mutual recriminations are bound to adversely affect the climate between the two superpowers.

The meeting turned out to be an unmitigated fiasco. No agreements were concluded; no even small steps toward arms control were taken. Apparently the two leaders had little time to discuss other issues, such as regional conflicts or human rights. And no date for the next meeting was set. Mikhail Gorbachev's visit to the U.S. and Ronald Reagan's visit to the U.S.S.R. now seem to be off.

It was not that the Reykjavik summit was not well prepared. It was preceded by several years of tedious negotiations in Geneva over the entire spectrum of the

nuclear arms race, by the exchange of visits last summer by the top American and Soviet experts in this field, and by many hours of discussions in September by U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze.

Several important accords, moreover, seemed to be within reach. There was an agreement to eliminate medium-range missiles in Europe, and another to cut the number of long-range missiles by 50 per cent. There was also a

meeting of minds over gradually restricting, and eventually eliminating, nuclear testing.

It all came to naught because of the American Strategic Defence Initiative (known also as Star Wars): the plan to develop a shield against possible nuclear attack by

placing U.S. defensive weapons, which would destroy incoming Soviet missiles, in space. The Soviets insisted that a package deal on arms control should include the SDI, and specifically should ban the testing of the space weapons. And this the Americans flatly refused to accept.

The Soviet argument that the SDI represents a dangerous extension of the arms race is not devoid of substance. The prospect that it could provide an impregnable shield over the American cities is remote; yet in the near future the SDI could be used as a shield to protect American offensive missiles. In effect, then, it would become a part of the American nu-

clear arsenal, shifting the balance in its favor.

In Reykjavik, Reagan probably threw away his last chance of concluding an arms control agreement during his presidency. It now is clear that he regards the SDI not as a bargaining chip for which he can obtain substantial cuts in Soviet offensive weapons but as a project to which he is deeply committed personally. Apparently he wants to go down in history as a president who, rather than meeting the Soviets halfway, strove hard to gain the upper hand over them.

It may be that Reagan's vision will come true, but the odds are heavily against it. For all the American technological achievements, there are still immense problems on the road toward realization of the SDI, and in the end it may prove to be a mere chimera. Meanwhile, however, an opportunity to reduce the existing nuclear arsenals — and for the

first time not only by limiting but actually by reducing the number of deadly missiles — has been lost.

Reagan may pay a heavy political price for his decision. Congress has already been uneasy over the administration's new nuclear strategy, and after the November elections it is likely to become even more reluctant to support the President's visionary scheme of nuclear defence. Reagan thus may spend the last two years of his presidency having to cope with a Congress unwilling to continue to provide the massive funding necessary for his military plans.

The Reykjavik fiasco will also have adverse effects in the Western alliance. Many Europeans will not like the fact that the chance to remove the medium-range missiles from their continent has been wasted. This will play into the hands of the open critics of the American nuclear strategy, such

as the Social Democratic party in West Germany or the Labour party in Britain, improving their chances in the elections to be held soon in both of these countries.

Yet Gorbachev came out of Reykjavik a loser too. His prestige at home will not be enhanced by the defeat of his gambit to offer deep cuts in Soviet offensive weapons in exchange for the Americans' stopping the progress of SDI. Gorbachev now probably will wait for the end of Reagan's term and hope to find someone more receptive to his proposals in the White House in 1989. Meanwhile, however, the Soviet leader will be under pressure to match the American efforts by strengthening the U.S.S.R.'s own military potential.

So for the rest of the 1980s, he may not only have no arms control accords but instead a new round in the nuclear armaments race.

Toronto THE GLOBE AND MAIL in English 15 Oct 86 p A6

[Text]

The so-called mini-summit produced a major disappointment. But the failure of United States President Ronald Reagan and Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev to cut even a limited arms deal should not put paid to such hopes.

The superpowers seriously considered measures of remarkable breadth. At one point, Mr. Reagan proposed the complete elimination of nuclear missiles over a decade. On several issues, the two sides achieved points of consensus that could serve as the basis for future arms pacts.

Both sides favor elimination of intermediate-range missiles in Europe, and are prepared to restrict the deployment of short-range missiles. They are prepared to cut back the number and the yield of nuclear tests. They are prepared to trim their strategic missiles and warheads by 50 per cent in five years.

Yet for all this convergence, the summit still ended in deadlock because of disaccord over space-based defences. The tactical blame for this outcome falls on Mr. Gorbachev, the strategic blame on Mr. Reagan.

The Soviets went for broke when they insisted that all other arms accords were conditional on a pact that would restrict space weapons. This linkage contradicted the understanding reached last November in Geneva, when the two leaders envisioned in their post-summit communique an "interim" pact on Euro-missiles.

The Soviets' readiness to meet U.S. terms on offensive weapons — but only in return for a virtual freeze on space weapons — revealed how anxious they are to head off U.S. testing and deployment of "Star Wars." Mr. Gorbachev was a single-minded summiteer: either he would extract concessions from Mr. Reagan on Star Wars or he would block any limited arms measures and make the U.S. take the rap for a stalemate.

Thus, Iceland was a no-lose

summit for Mr. Gorbachev. Mr. Reagan came to Reykjavik apparently unwary of the trap Moscow had baited. Once confronted with it, he chose to disappoint the U.S. and international constituencies for arms control rather than his conservative clientele. In so doing, he bears the strategic blame for the summit flop.

The U.S. leader stuck with Star Wars despite its daunting financial and technological obstacles. He passed up an arms control bird-in-the-hand for a laser and a particle-beam in the bush. Mr. Gorbachev was opportunistic to link the two, but Mr. Reagan would have done both countries — and humanity — a service had he accepted.

It is now up to that amorphous force known as "international opinion" to persuade the two superpowers to preserve the advances made at Iceland and strive for further progress in the lower-level negotiations at Geneva. America's allies, Canada included, should press Mr. Reagan to reconsider his commitment to Star Wars.

U.S. leaders seem to think the Soviets should accept both the probability of a U.S. ballistic missile defence *and* reductions in the number of Soviet missiles that could be deployed to penetrate it. That is to define American security in terms of Soviet insecurity.

The Americans are correct to claim that cuts in the number of offensive missiles, no matter how steep, will not assure nuclear stability. As long as missiles have multiple warheads and fixed silos, the advantage this gives offence over defence may tempt either side to launch a pre-emptive strike. But the best way to preserve each side's capability for retaliation — and thus deterrence — is not to build costly, unreliable defences in space but to move back to a limited number of single-warhead missiles in each side's armory. There is still time to turn back the clock.

Windsor THE WINDSOR STAR in English 15 Oct 86 p A6

[Text]

THE SOVIET-AMERICAN SUMMIT was destined to disappoint those who expected miracles from a hastily-contrived, two-day meeting in Reykjavik.

In the first place, it was a summit that should not have taken place. Secondly, it created the assumption both in the U.S. and the world that U.S. President Ronald Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev could reach an agreement that would have assured nuclear disarmament within a given time.

That expectation was totally wrong considering that in international accords the roles of government leaders are not to negotiate but rather to ratify pacts negotiated by their officials.

U.S. officials should never have agreed to the Reykjavik summit; it was the result of Soviet initiatives rather than the consensus of the two governments. It was conceived and carried out in haste, it was exploited adroitly by the Soviets who planned to show Reagan in a bad light.

Reagan could not have agreed to Gorbachev's demand to halt the development of Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI), the so-called Star Wars defence project, in return for Soviet reductions in long and medium-range nuclear missiles. Had he agreed, Reagan would have stripped the U.S. of its most effective bargaining chip in future disarmament talks. By accepting the retention of short-range defensive missiles, he would give Moscow virtual control over the European continent and a vast area of the Middle East and Asia along Soviet borders.

North America would have been relatively safe, out of range of the defensive missiles, but Washington's NATO allies in Europe and the nations adjacent to the U.S.S.R. would have been forced to live under Soviet guns.

Reagan is the victim of policies relying on nuclear weapons for U.S. defence rather than conventional arms. If a conventional war were to break out in Europe, the most likely theatre, the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies would win hands down.

In this background, Reagan found himself in a no-win situation at the summit. He could not agree to the Soviet proposals and by rejecting them he risked being blamed for intransigence and insensitivity to the cause of peace.

To salvage what he could, Reagan left the door open to another summit, knowing that his chances for summits with Gorbachev are practically gone.

Gorbachev, who callously used the vital disarmament issue as a means to discredit Reagan, may have a lot of explaining to do back in Moscow, but in the public eye, both at home and abroad, he has won a major propaganda and diplomatic victory.

Even in the U.S. Congress and in the streets Americans are deeply divided over Reagan's performance. Tass, the government-controlled Soviet news agency, rightly blamed "imperial ambitions" for the failure of the summit, but failed to say whose ambitions really were at play. The summit was designed by Moscow to fail and Reagan was to take the fall. He did.

Had he accepted Gorbachev's demands, would the world be more secure, and peace stronger? We seriously doubt it.

But a lot of good things may still come from the failure in Reykjavik. The machines for debate and negotiations are oiled and running smoothly. Reagan may not be around to sign the accord, but his ideas and his failures may prove invaluable to his successors one day in getting a fair and secure peace.

Commentator on INF, Test-Ban Progress

Ottawa THE OTTAWA CITIZEN in English 16 Oct 86 p A8

[Article by George Grande]

[Text]

Contrary to the initial gloomy assessment of its participants, the Iceland meeting will go down in history as a great success.

Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev now have a much better understanding of each other's position on a broad range of strategic issues, and have agreed on the specifics of at least two important treaties.

As a result, the United States and the Soviet Union are likely to reach final agreement soon on an Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces accord (INF) and on gradually reducing and eliminating nuclear tests.

The snag in this optimistic view is the Strategic Defence Initiative. When the Reykjavik meeting ended, it wasn't clear whether Gorbachev would stick to his determined linkage of Soviet arms control proposals with U.S. testing of a space-based defence system. Reagan and Secretary of State George Shultz hope he won't. They want the new positions reached in Reykjavik to be on the table in Geneva, where bilateral nuclear arms talks resumed Wednesday.

Earlier this week, Soviet chief arms negotiator Viktor Karpov went out of his way to say publicly that a solution on INF in Europe was possible without linking it to Star Wars testing. If this proves correct, Reykjavik will have produced a breakthrough on the one issue that most concerns the NATO

countries of Western Europe — and, for that matter, those of the East.

Although Gorbachev was quoted Wednesday as saying his arms proposals must be taken as a package, his remarks may be more of a negotiating tactic than an indication of his true thinking, and in any event, he may not have been referring to INF.

What Gorbachev meant will only become clear as bargaining goes on. But certainly, the meeting of minds that he and Reagan achieved in Iceland will focus the Geneva arms talks as never before.

What did the two achieve? On INF — Euromissiles — they agreed that all such missiles now deployed in Europe — Soviet SS-20s, U.S. cruise and Pershing IIs — would be eliminated within five years.

An understanding was also reached on how these withdrawals would be mutually verified to give each side confidence that the other was not cheating. The details of this verification accord were not released.

Also, at U.S. insistence, the question of short-range tactical missiles in Europe was considered and the two sides conditionally agreed to cut them by several hundred. The practical effect would be to leave the Soviets with the same number of missiles as they had in January, 1983.

Even the duration of this pro-

posed INF self-denying ordinance was agreed: the pact would last indefinitely until replaced by a new one dealing with the same missiles.

Most importantly, there was a meeting of minds not only on reducing INF missiles in Europe to zero on both sides, but on reducing the number of Soviet INF warheads in Soviet Asia to 100 and the number of American ones in the continental U.S. to the same number.

At last November's Geneva summit, the two leaders instructed their negotiators to work for an interim INF agreement independently of any other nuclear reduction talks. Thus, INF progress was decoupled from all other disarmament deals, including Star Wars. If it remains so, a quick solution is in sight.

Before the Iceland meeting, the Soviets had been making much of the issue of nuclear testing. Moscow has had a self-imposed nuclear test moratorium in place since Aug. 6, 1985, and had been pressing Washington to agree to the same. Until now, the Americans refused, because they insisted on a prior agreement to verify such a measure and because the U.S. defence establishment wanted more nuclear tests apparently linked in part to the SDI research program on lasers.

But in Iceland, Gorbachev took the initiative by stating he would forego his demand for an immediate cessation of all nuclear tests. Instead, he accepted Reagan's proposal to begin with steps aimed at reducing the number and yield of nuclear tests over a period of time, provided both sides committed themselves to an eventual complete cessation.

There is not yet a detailed test-ban agreement, but, given the progress made at their meeting, the two could quickly agree on terms if this issue, like INF, is separated from the others.

That, in a nutshell, is the arms-control accord that came out of Iceland. If each set of negotiations can proceed independently of the others — and barring a political change of heart on either side — there could at last be INF and test-ban treaties. Agreement on strategic offensive and defensive nuclear weapons cuts is much less promising, however, and will remain so until the superpowers can agree on the fundamental relationship between them.

(George Grande, a member of the Citizen's editorial board, is a former Canadian arms control negotiator).

GLOBE & MAIL: Conflict Over SDI

Toronto THE GLOBE AND MAIL in English 17 Oct 86 p A6

[Text]

In the aftermath of the summit stalemate in Iceland, the leaders of the two superpowers have strived to convince Western public opinion — the only public opinion that really matters in arms control — that the *other* side was to blame for the missed opportunity.

Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev has insisted that the failure to strike any arms control deal was due to U.S. stubbornness over "Star Wars." Bite-sized accords on medium-range missiles or nuclear testing could not be expected in the absence of a deal on space-based defences, he said at the summit and following his descent from it.

But the tactical opportunism inherent in this position became clear Wednesday when Soviet arms negotiator Viktor Karpov declared that intermediate-range missiles "can be dealt with and agreed upon as a separate issue." Mr. Gorbachev contradicted his subordinate the

same day, but offered no persuasive reason for his renewed insistence that Soviet proposals "are inseparable from each other." He simply seems determined to deny the United States the limited accords in order to increase the pressure for a Star Wars moratorium.

U.S. President Ronald Reagan also has seen his rationale for the summit deadlock called into question. Mr. Reagan claimed that the Soviet demand that space weapons research be confined to the laboratory for 10 years was tantamount to a death sentence for Star Wars. But several prominent U.S. scientists have disputed this.

Norris Smith, a spokesman for Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in California, the lead facility for Star Wars research, says that no work now in progress would be prohibited by a labs-only deal. Dr. George Chapline, a top scientist at Livermore, says so many technical problems remain to be resolved within the laboratory that a

decade-long ban on tests in space would have no significant effect on the weapons program.

"There are some problems for which no solution is in sight," he told The New York Times. "I'm certain it will take a decade to clear these hurdles if they are soluble at all. A ban would obviously . . . prevent you from pursuing some things. But it wouldn't limit work on the major hurdles."

If scientists who are involved in the Star Wars effort are unperturbed by a moratorium on development work, those who are skeptics of the program are positively enthusiastic about such a ban. Dr. Richard L. Garwin, a Pentagon consultant and critic of the anti-missile program, said a ban on space tests could actually help rather than hurt the program.

"In the early stages, a ban could advance the rate at which we understand the opportunities and realities of strategic defence," he said. A decade of research on earth would help

government scientists sort out anti-missile options, separating the practical from the impractical, he added.

If a 10-year ban on space tests would be no serious scientific hardship to the Star Wars program, why did President Reagan resist such a compromise and thereby blow the chance for deep cuts in offensive nuclear weapons? The answer may be found in another comment by Dr. Garwin: "All these demonstrations are to show progress. It's publicity rather than research."

In other words, the Administration is keen to take Star Wars out of the labs because it wants to impress Congress and keep up the flow of funds. But this is a mug's game. Congress would never deny funds for Star Wars R&D if the Soviets violated the moratorium. And if the Soviets respected the moratorium, why *should* Congress appropriate the level of funds Mr. Reagan has requested?

Commentator on Gorbachev Agenda Domination

Toronto THE GLOBE AND MAIL in English 17 Oct 86 p A9

[Article by William Johnson]

[Text]

THE BUSINESS meeting in Reykjavik turned out to be the most important summit since the end of the Second World War. The scope of what President Ronald Reagan and General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev considered, negotiated, agreed to tentatively and came tantalizingly close to settling on, goes beyond what U.S. and Soviet leaders have conferred on since the Cold War divided the wartime allies.

The outcome was a personal and diplomatic triumph for Mr. Gorbachev.

When U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz made his report to the press corps, there was a gasp in the room when, after sketching out the sheer scope of the "potential agreements," he said that nothing was concluded.

A reporter asked: "Mr. Secretary, could you say, just to be clear, that you had within your grasp the possibility of eliminating all offensive missiles within a 10-year period, if there had been that ultimate, final concession by the President on SDI (the Strategic Defence Initiative)? Is that correct?"

Mr. Shultz did not like that interpretation. "That is not the way I think we must think about it," he said.

But his account of the meeting and the account conveyed by Mr. Gorbachev at his lengthy press conference pointed to the same conclusion.

The Soviet leader was masterful, partly because he was human, personal, direct — one is tempted to say authentic. Not one of the robot figures one has come to associate with the Kremlin.

Mr. Gorbachev first apologized for being six hours late.

"Now it is over. It is sometimes said that, face to face, you don't see the other's face.

"I've just emerged from the meeting that, especially in the closing stage, turned into pointed debate ... I will try now, not only to share my impressions, but also to sort out what took place. Yet it will be the first impressions, the early evaluations, the first analysis."

He conveyed a natural disturbance after the great confrontation of personalities from which he had just emerged. His own naturalness was disarming.

It soon became clear, then and in retrospect, that Mr. Gorbachev had dominated the meeting. His scenario prevailed. He led the President along his chosen

path almost to the end of their discussion. He knew what to expect. The President was taken by surprise.

He had made the encounter centre on arms control, as he had wanted. Mr. Reagan had failed to make it bear equally on human-rights issues.

Mr. Gorbachev had shown himself as a man of new ideas, ready to deal, free and innovative in his approach to old problems, willing to take a chance. Mr. Reagan seemed the more timid and rigid, the one who smelled of mothballs.

And now the Europeans, the Canadians, the Japanese, who have never been unduly impressed with SDI, will see it as standing in the way of a sweeping, grand compromise.

Mr. Reagan will now be faced with much stronger opposition in his own country, and with bitter protests in the other countries of the Western alliance.

Mr. Gorbachev has a nice smile, iron teeth, great charm and dangerous canniness. He will be a formidable adversary, if adversary he is.

Mr. Reagan had expected a low-keyed meeting, without actual negotiations, which would merely give direction to the negotiators at Geneva, perhaps for an interim treaty on missiles in Europe. And the leaders would have set a date for a real summit in Washington.

Instead, Mr. Reagan found himself on a roller coaster.

"This wasn't supposed to be a summit. We aren't supposed to be in these negotiations," he told his officials at one point.

But negotiate they did, carried by the momentum of the proposals and the concessions made by Mr. Gorbachev.

"We made more progress in the last 24 hours than we had made in six years," according to one official.

Finally, everything stopped when the leaders reached an impasse on the Strategic Defence Initiative. But by that time, Mr. Gorbachev's mastery of the meeting had been established.

CITIZEN on INF Linkage Issue

Ottawa THE OTTAWA CITIZEN in English 17 Oct 86 p A8

[Text] Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev should not be allowed to violate his own agreements. He stated Wednesday that all his arms proposals must be taken as a package. This would be a backward step that defies logic, runs contrary to his summit agreement last year, and puts in question his sincerity.

At Geneva, Gorbachev and President Reagan agreed to pursue a separate interim accord on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) quite apart from endorsing the goal of 50-per-cent reductions in strategic ones. That was a welcome departure from the Soviet-imposed linkage that had hamstrung progress at their arms negotiations in Geneva.

For some time now, the INF talks were singled out for conclusion of the world's first-ever nuclear arms reduction treaty. In fact an INF accord was forecast by pundits as the one that would enable the two leaders to meet again in Washington in Summit No. 2 this year.

The Soviet leader is backing away from another commitment made in Geneva with Reagan — to hold a second summit this year in the U.S. No preconditions were set then and Reagan says the invitation still stands.

This must not be the last word on either

subject. In fact these two undertakings go hand in hand because both leaders want a first major agreement to justify continuing their personal summitry.

Despite its precipitate ending, Iceland cut through the INF rhetoric and produced the framework for a full-scale Euromissile solution. A verification regime was also agreed upon, as were sizeable reductions in short-range tactical nuclear weapons in Europe.

This is what all European governments want and what negotiators have been seeking for the last several years. Earlier this week chief Soviet negotiator Viktor Karpov told a British audience that a separate INF agreement could be concluded without linkage to other arms accords. The stage was thus set for Geneva.

But now Gorbachev is back-tracking to an all-or-nothing approach. In these circumstances the top priority aim of Western diplomacy, including Canada's, must be to get the Soviet leader back on track in fulfilment of his past commitments.

Both sides would gain from this. Those forests of deadly SS-20, cruise and Pershing II missiles are ripe for cutting, and the cutting season may be terribly short.

Ottawa THE OTTAWA CITIZEN in English 18 Oct 86 p B2

[Text]

Canada's Disarmament Ambassador Douglas Roche struck the right note in his keynote arms control address to the UN General Assembly Thursday. He correctly gave the Iceland summit credit for creating "a renewed atmosphere of hope."

This Canadian assessment is a courageous one in the face of the gloom being spread by so many so-called experts. These blame President Reagan for sabotaging the summit by refusing to accept constraints on his Star Wars research program.

Our chief disarmament man is, of course, faithfully reflecting External Affairs Minister Joe Clark's own feeling as spelled out in Brussels after a NATO briefing on Iceland by U.S. State Secretary George Shultz. Both Clark and Roche realize the need to capitalize on opportunities as they present themselves in the delicate arms control arena.

There was indeed a dramatic change in the scale of disarmament ambitions in Reykjavik, and future East-West arms reduction talks have to reflect that. "Iceland showed that the complete elimination of ballistic missiles in 10 years is now seriously discussed at the highest levels," said our ambassador.

This upbeat mood is a must for both sides. They cannot be allowed to turn back the clock to the days of paralysis and confrontation. The stakes are too high to let the controversial concept of strategic defence distract our leaders from doing what has to be done.

Dr. Mauno Koivisto, president of Finland, cannot be accused of having inflated views about the prospects for East-West relations. He and his brave country sit in the midst of that equation and know a lot about its nuances. Yet his assessment of Iceland's impact is very similar to Roche's.

In a public address Wednesday, the Finnish leader termed last weekend's events "a dramatic leap." "Something very important has happened, to many people's surprise. The situation in arms limitation negotiations has changed fundamentally. There is no going back to the time before the meeting."

Koivisto, like Roche, will not accept the dialogue of the pessimists. "What is important is that negotiations are going on... and that there is belief that a more secure world can be built through shared efforts." That is the same message Roche gave to the UN and the one that must prevail in Moscow and Washington.

Commentator Blames Gorbachev

Ottawa THE OTTAWA CITIZEN in English 18 Oct 86 p B16

[Article by George Grande]

[Text]

The most galling thing coming out of Reykjavik is the one-sided theme in some Western circles blaming the U.S. for keeping us from a nuclear-free world. Reagan's refusal to freeze Star Wars for 10 years is cited as the reason why mankind did not go non-nuclear last weekend, and thus safe forever.

This is utter nonsense and also dangerous. It gives credence to those who always find the Americans the warmongers and the

Russians the protectors of the peace of the world. And here I'm talking about Canadian and Western critics, not Soviet ones.

The real reason why Iceland failed to produce results was that it wasn't properly prepared and it tried to tackle too much at once. Then, instead of adjourning to another day, exhaustion, frustration and basic mistrust took over and caused the two sides to part without even deciding what to do next.

If Gorbachev hadn't imposed

his Star Wars edict, the summit wouldn't have broken up. Right? Right. But the ABM treaty was still up for discussion within the context of strategic missile reductions. So the deadlock would have been reached later — in Washington, or Moscow or somewhere between.

It is manifestly unfair to blame Reagan for the summit breakdown when it was a Soviet precondition that closed the Iceland curtain. As both states have rati-

fied the ABM treaty, both must continue to abide by its terms or give notice of withdrawal and all that that implies both domestically for the U.S. and internationally for both.

The two superpowers have a problem and they must face it. They're both involved in Star Wars research and they don't quite know how to come to terms with each other on it. Common sense dictates that they hold detailed negotiations on strategic defence and not rely alone on propaganda and public opinion to cause the other to abandon it.

It's all very well for Gorbachev to poo-poo Reagan's generous offer to share his space defence technology with him but calling the president a liar really solves nothing.

It's obvious that a deal to eliminate the bulk of nuclear weapons from the East-West military confrontation cannot be made in the abstract without regard for each other's strategic defence potential. Continued stability throughout the reduction period is essential to

both. Therefore Gorbachev must lead the way to at least a shared knowledge of each other's SDI assets as a starting-point for progress toward eliminating them.

All of this is simply to point to the enormous difficulty of reaching superpower agreements on arms control. Hopefully there'll soon be one on medium-range missiles in Europe and elsewhere, thanks to the unsung heroes of Reykjavik. But what wasn't agreed — and who in his right mind expected it in two days? — was a balanced, staged plan to reduce strategic offensive weapons in tandem with reaching an understanding on future permissible quotas for strategic defensive missiles.

To ignore these realities and to accuse President Reagan of threatening international stability by allowing the unabated continuance of the nuclear arms race is nothing short of irresponsible ignorance. Yet Operation Dismantle said that and much more in a media release dated Oct. 14.

To highlight six Soviet "compromises" and not to list any American ones is, to say the least, lacking in something.

All true proponents of international peace and security should concentrate their efforts on the future with the Geneva U.S.-Soviet bilateral negotiations of prime importance, the Vienna Helsinki Review Conference and force re-

duction talks of great interest and the Geneva multilateral talks on chemical weapons of more than passing interest.

We can have meaningful arms control agreements but they won't come about through public pressure influenced by amateurish slanted assessments. They will require a co-ordinated and unified Western policy achieved in the private halls of the Western alliance, not through public debates that tend to split the West by trying to show up our superpower as an enemy of peace and stability. Just imagine a Czech or Polish peace organization doing that in reverse, and surviving.

I much prefer the Joe Clark approach. He was pleased with the U.S. decision to send its negotiators back to Geneva with instructions to build on the important consensus that emerged in Reykjavik. He welcomed the U.S. proposal for non-withdrawal from the ABM treaty for 10 years in parallel with a progressive reduction of strategic offensive forces.

You wouldn't know he was speaking about the same conference as the two Canadian organizations that took such a different tack. Fortunately we all want the same results, even the Americans, though even that isn't conceded by our cited analysts.

Toronto THE SUNDAY STAR in English 19 Oct 86 p B1

[Article by Richard Gwyn, International Affairs]

[Text] LONDON — The longest period of peace in Europe's long history spans the 43 years from the end of the Franco-Prussian War in 1871 to the start of World War I in 1914.

That milestone is fast approaching. Other than local conflicts, such as the Soviet invasions of Hungary and Czechoslovakia, not a gun has been fired in Europe in the 41 years since the end of the World War II.

This long period hasn't really been a period of peace. Throughout it, East and West have been armed to the teeth. Rather, it's been a period of non-war: Because each side possesses the Bomb, each has avoided the sort of adventures and provocations that in the past precipitated all-out wars.

Deterrent 'essential'

Last week, French President Francois Mitterand and British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher reaffirmed this seldom-questioned explanation for Europe's long tranquility. The maintenance of the nuclear deterrents of France and Britain, they declared jointly after a meeting in London, was "essential" to the maintenance of peace.

A similar view was expressed by West German Gen. Joachim Mack, who is the deputy supreme commander of NATO forces in Europe. Proposals to eliminate all intermediate-range missiles, both Soviet and U.S., in Europe "call into question NATO's flexible response strategy," Mack said.

Until now, peaceniks and nuclear disarmers have been dismissively denounced in this kind of way. Western leaders and military experts explained, usually with unconcealed contempt at such naive ignorance, that nuclear weapons deter war, and that anyway, once having been invented, the Bomb cannot be disinvented.

Today, the peacenik standing in the dock is Ronald Reagan. He was the target, although they'd never admit it, of Mitterand's and Thatcher's and Mack's declarations.

The reversal of roles couldn't be more astounding.

Yet the fact is that at Reykjavik, Reagan bargained with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev about immediately eliminating all intermediate-range missiles in Europe, about cutting U.S. and Soviet strategic warheads in half and about doing away with all strategic nuclear weapons over a 10-year period.

The deal didn't stick. Perhaps the Strategic Defence Initiative caused it to become unstuck, or perhaps sheer exhaustion did. But until the last moments of the meeting, there was Reagan discussing nuclear arms cuts on a scale never before proposed, let alone seriously attempted.

By doing this, Reagan has shattered the

great taboo of our times — which is that it's unthinkable for nuclear weapons not to be always with us, for our own good.

Reagan has also put a considerable dint into his critics' stereotype of him as a born-again Cold War warrior searching endlessly for ways to strike back at the "evil empire."

When Reagan first proclaimed his SDI anti-missile program back in 1983, he explained as its propose to "render nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete."

Almost unanimously, commentators (other than right-wingers) excoriated Reagan. His real agenda, they declared, was to achieve military superiority, both by making the U.S. invulnerable to a Soviet attack and by using SDI to develop new offensive weapons. Almost gleefully, Reagan's critics added that SDI wouldn't work anyway.

Psychological impact

The fact is that SDI is working, not technically — not yet, and perhaps never — but psychologically.

The Soviet Union now is making concessions it would never have made a few years ago. Thus, it has now half-accepted to scrap simultaneously Soviet SS-20s and

U.S. Pershing and cruise missiles in Europe. Reagan first proposed this in 1984. Critics scorned him for suggesting so unbalanced a deal. Moscow rejected it out of hand.

The scale of Soviet concessions needs to be appreciated. The Soviet Union isn't really a superpower rival to the United

States. It's a superpower only militarily; it's nearer to being an under-developed nation in most other respects — economic, financial, technological (mostly), ideological, cultural.

Gorbachev thus is potentially bargaining away his single trump card. One imperative is his need to revitalize his economy. The other imperative pressing upon him is SDI. Either he does a comprehensive arms deal, including a limitation on SDI research, or he matches SDI —

only a "madman" of a Soviet leader, in Gorbachev's own phrase, would rely on it not working — but at the cost of perpetuating his economic stagnation.

The legacy left by Reykjavik may be frittered away. Or the momentum generated there may gather up new deals on conventional force and chemical weapon cuts, as Secretary of State George Shultz has suggested.

All of this is happening so fast, is so unexpected and is so unprecedented, that anxious second thoughts are being expressed all over the place.

The confused signals out of Moscow about whether or not a deal on "Euromissiles" can be negotiated separately from a deal on SDI undoubtedly reflects the anxieties of hawks that a comprehensive arms deal would undermine the Soviet Union's international prestige — for which it can make few other claims — and, more immediately, might undermine its ability to control Eastern Europe.

Western Europeans are every bit as anxious. In private, officials here worry about "de-linkage" — that an over-all deal would cause the United States to pull back across the Atlantic leaving Western Europe to confront the Soviet bear alone.

Only Ronald Reagan seems to be ambling along equably. Maybe, as his critics charge, he isn't on top of what's happening. But maybe, in his unintellectual, uncomplicated way, he is at ease because he knows he's headed in the direction he's always intended to go — toward a world in which nuclear weapons actually are "impotent and obsolete."

Toronto STAR on ABM Treaty Support

Toronto THE SUNDAY STAR in English 19 Oct 86 p H2

[Text]

Prime Minister Brian Mulroney has been careful not to directly criticize Ronald Reagan in recent days — even though the U.S. President's refusal to put a brake on Star Wars scuttled an arms control deal at last weekend's Reykjavik summit.

Instead, Mulroney told the House of Commons that it "must . . . look at the matter (Reykjavik) constructively and see if there is a possibility of building bridges in the future. I think that possibility exists and Canada will do all it can to be helpful in that process as the parties return to Geneva." At the same time, however, in response to a question on the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty, Mulroney added: "The position of the government of Canada with regard to ABM is clear . . . There has been no change in our position." That position, although not actually enunciated by Mulroney, is one of support for the ABM treaty, which development and deployment of Star Wars would violate.

Other Western leaders took a similarly ambivalent approach to Reykjavik. British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, while publicly supporting Reagan, spent 90 minutes discussing the summit in private with Soviet arms negotiator Viktor Karpov. NATO Secretary-General Lord Carrington said "the opportunity to make progress in some areas should not be made hostage to difficulties in other, unrelated ones" — presumably a reference to Star Wars. And West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher called for more talks.

Reading between the lines of these public statements, it's possible to discern a degree of disappointment among Western allies that an unprecedented arms-control agreement offered by Gorbachev wasn't concluded because Reagan insists on forging ahead with the research, development and deployment of the space-based weapons system he calls a Strategic Defence Initiative and the rest of the world calls Star Wars.

But by being circumspect in public, the Western allies have also left open the possibility of approaching Reagan in private to try to persuade him that Star Wars can, and should, be a bargaining chip in a comprehensive arms-control agreement.

Britain's Thatcher appears ready to do her part; she's reported to be considering a trip to Washington to try to help break the U.S.-Soviet impasse. Canada, as the nearest neighbor and largest trading partner of the U.S., can also contribute. Mulroney, who spoke of building bridges, ought to join other Western allies in attempting to persuade Reagan to keep Star Wars where Gorbachev wants it — in the laboratory, and within the boundaries of the ABM treaty.

Toronto STAR on SDI Research

Toronto THE SATURDAY STAR in English 25 Oct 86 P B2

[Article by Gordon Barthos]

[Text]

In Parliament this week, External Affairs Minister Joe Clark commended the Americans and Soviets for making "remarkable progress" at the Reykjavik mini-summit and for coming "tantalizingly close" to a deal that would have eliminated thousands of long-range nuclear weapons, rid Europe of medium-range ones, and cut back even short-range ones.

Yet Reykjavik, for all the hype surrounding it, ended in a shoving-match over Star Wars.

And the key U.S.-Soviet stumbling-block never has been, strictly speaking, over a technical issue like "managing the research"

into Star Wars weapons, despite Clark's suggestion to that effect in the House of Commons on Tuesday.

Few shackles

The American-Soviet squabble is a political one, over different visions of where Star Wars research should be going in the next decade.

The Reagan administration is anxious that few shackles should be put on plans to research and develop a space-based missile defence scheme. The Soviets want to throw every block they can at such plans.

And both sides are busy invoking

obscure parts of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty — including unpublished notes on what the original negotiators intended — to justify their notions of where things should be going.

Both sides agree on the impossibility of stopping all research into Star Wars weapons, because there's no way to police such research.

Leading to the fight at Reykjavik was U.S. President Ronald Reagan's desire to get the Soviets to agree that the U.S. should have a freer hand to develop and test Star Wars machinery, provided that the

machinery is labelled "subcomponents." The treaty explicitly forbids developing and testing "systems or components."

Reagan also wants the treaty to endure for another 10 years, and no longer.

The Soviets are pushing in exactly the opposite direction. First of all, they want an American commitment to abide by the ABM treaty for 10 years — at a minimum. Not knowing when a "sub-component" becomes a "component" (and perilously close to a weapon), they are also pushing to have all testing confined to labs, rendering it pretty much harmless.

In very specific terms, the U.S. side at Reykjavik refused to commit itself to doing no more than develop and test ballistic missile defences at fixed, ground-based sites — as permitted under every interpretation of the treaty. The Soviets fear that the U.S. may insist on interpreting the treaty in a way that will allow it to develop and test space-based defences, which would be a much broader interpretation than that which is generally accepted at present.

What Clark's upbeat message to Canadians failed to mention was that the U.S. push to extend permissible Star Wars research under the ABM treaty runs in the general direction, at least, of weakening the ABM treaty and setting a date for its termination.

However you chop the logic, that's the aim of U.S. policy.

By insisting, repeatedly, on the "progress" made in Reykjavik by both sides, Clark implies that the U.S. attitude toward the ABM treaty is one that Canada should have no problems with.

Yet Clark himself has repeatedly argued — strongly — for a "re-

strictive" interpretation of the treaty — that is, one that runs in the direction of hampering the development of anti-missile weapons, not condoning them.

On Jan. 23, Clark told the Commons that "our stance toward (Star Wars) research is rooted in the need to conform strictly with the provisions of the ABM treaty."

The principles upon which those provisions rest are pretty boldly stated in the treaty preamble:

"Effective measures to limit anti-ballistic missile systems would be a substantial factor in curbing the race in strategic offensive arms," the preamble notes, "and would lead to a decrease in the risk of outbreak of war involving nuclear weapons."

Issue confused

On Tuesday, Clark seemed to reiterate Ottawa's principled stand on this issue.

"Our interest is to ensure strict adherence to that treaty and continued respect by both sides for the integrity of this fundamental arms control agreement."

What Clark's statement on Tuesday didn't explain is why the Mulroney government should suddenly feel the need to find "remarkable progress" in the fact that "the issue has become, in effect, what are the limits on permissible research." That's only the case if Canada isn't worried about the U.S. drive to extend those limits dramatically.

All this, far from clarifying where Ottawa stands, merely confuses the issue.

As the negative reaction from the opposition in Parliament showed, Clark's statement isn't likely to close off discussion here. Perceptions are growing that the U.S. position on Star Wars and the ABM treaty is at loggerheads with our own.

/7358

CSO: 5220/4

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

BRIEFS

FRG'S BAHR ON KARPOV BRIEFING--[Schwarz] You talked to Viktor Karpov yesterday. Did he confirm that the Russians feel that SDI could have left the U.S. research laboratories long ago? [Bahr] No, he did not confirm that, and he cannot confirm it. He only said that the Soviet Union will by no means accept a race with the United States on SDI. The Soviet Union considers it unrealistic and hopeless to move into space with such technology and is considering doing something simpler, less expensive, and very effective with known technology, so as to reduce any SDI weapons system in space to zero. That means, of course, that the Soviets are considering, among other things, increasing the number of intercontinental missiles, in that case. That also means that you cannot reduce intercontinental missiles and have an SDI option. [Interview with SPD disarmament expert Egon Bahr by reporter F. Schwarz; date and place not given--recorded] [Excerpt] [Cologne Deutschlandfunk Network in German 0615 GMT 16 Oct 86 DW] /12858

CSO: 5200/1062

EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

DANISH FOREIGN MINISTER OUTLINES CSCE STANCE

PMO61129 Copenhagen AKTUELT in Danish 4 Nov 86 pp 10-11

[Foreign Minister Uffe Ellemann-Jensen "Chronicle" article: "East and West Meet"]

[Text] In Vienna today the so-called CSCE followup conference begins. The foreign ministers of 35 countries--all European countries, except Albania, plus the United States and Canada--will meet to seek again to lend new impetus to the detente process between East and West.

The Vienna meeting is the first major East-West meeting since the meeting between President Reagan and general Secretary Gorbachev in Reykjavik. The general public will therefore look to the Vienna meeting to see how the climate between the superpowers is now.

There is no reason to doubt that the U.S. position--that is, that the path of negotiations must be continued in Geneva and elsewhere--still enjoys great support in the United States. Announcements from the Soviet Union have been more ambiguous; Gorbachev may have declared that he is ready to continue the detente dialogue, but Soviet spokesmen have also been very keen to lay the blame for the lack of results in Reykjavik at the U.S. door.

But there is no point in trying to allocate the blame now! We must look to the future and seek to preserve and expand the results of Reykjavik. This covers an agreement in the START field on strategic missiles and on medium-range missiles in Europe, agreement on the extension of the ABM treaty, agreement on a nuclear test ban, agreement banning chemical weapons, and ideally much much more.

But how does the Vienna meeting fit into this context? And what exactly is the CSCE process?

By way of explanation let me go back a little in time:

As far back as the fifties the Soviet Union put forward proposals for a European security conference and in the sixties, in the early phase of detente, Denmark, with Per Haekkerup as its foreign minister, was one of the countries in the West which proposed that we enter a positive dialogue with the Soviet Union about this conference idea. In the early seventies it was agreed that such a conference should be held and in 1975 this conference produced the Helsinki Final Act.

In this document agreement was reached in broad and general terms on a number of principles covering how countries should behave toward each other, including respect for human rights, on a number of military confidence-building measures, on economic and scientific cooperation, and on cooperation in the human sphere, that is, measures making it easier to travel and visit, freer reporting of news, and so on.

In 1975 the optimists thought that a foundation had now been laid for better relations in Europe, while the skeptics said that the document was merely a piece of paper which would change nothing in the real world.

As so often, the truth is to be found somewhere between these two views. It goes without saying that Europe was not changed at a stroke, but the European countries did have a few new guidelines to follow when they talked to each other.

Since 1975 two so-called followup meetings have been held at which people have tried to "follow up the Helsinki process."

The first took place in Belgrade in 1977-78 and almost proved the skeptics right in their assessment: The East and the West quarreled and accused each other of not living up to the spirit and content of the Helsinki agreements. Then, as later, an important bone of contention was the Soviet Union's special understanding of what human rights are.

But at the next followup meeting, in Madrid in 1980-1983, cooperation was good and, despite the difficult international situation after the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan and the state of martial law in Poland, agreement was reached on broadening several of the Helsinki agreements in the Madrid document.

Since the Madrid meeting a number of so-called expert meetings have been held:

In Ottawa human rights were discussed without any agreement being reached. In Budapest a cultural forum took place at which cultural figures from East and West met. And in Bern human contacts were discussed and the parties involved came very close to reaching agreement on a final document.

However, the most reported series of meetings was the Stockholm conference, at which on 22 September this year an agreement was reached extending military confidence-building measures. Now countries must not only inform each other of larger-scale military maneuvers. Countries were also given the possibility of demanding on-site inspection if they think that other countries are cheating.

Once again critics are keen to point out that the military experts set in Stockholm for more than 2 and 1/2 years and that after this length of time they only produced to a very small agreement. And this is in a way correct. But the important thing here is in the psychological sphere. In Stockholm, for the first time in many years, agreement was reached between East and West. The Soviet Union's flexibility and acceptance

of on-site inspection can be transferred to arms control agreements in other fields and the spirit of the results achieved by the 35 nations in Stockholm will now, it is to be hoped, be transferred to the work in Vienna.

So what will happen in Vienna?

First, we will discuss how the various countries have complied with the guidelines contained in the Helsinki Final Act and the Madrid final document. Here the Western nations will reproach the Soviet Union and some of the East European countries for not following the guidelines in the field of human rights, and the latter will reply that the Western countries are not living up to the guidelines covering economic and scientific cooperation.

But once these introductory maneuvers are out of the way the conference will start discussing new proposals which could inject new life into cooperation.

The Eastern side will propose a second phase of the Conference on Confidence- and Security-building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE) at which conventional troop reductions in Europe will be discussed. The Eastern side will also propose increased cooperation in the economic, trade, and scientific fields so that the Eastern nations do not fall further behind in the competition for new technology.

Some people in the Western camp will take the view that we should now stop entering into new agreements when the East does not abide by the old ones. But even though the frustration at the lack of respect for agreements is understandable, this attitude is really too sterile. We must strive toward new goals in order to advance the detente process and restore the balance within the CSCE so that there are not just proposals from the East.

That is why we have discussed with our Nordic, EEC, and NATO partners a conference on the human dimension, about which we have also taken soundings in the Eastern countries. I will mention the idea in my speech at the start of the Vienna meeting, and we will then have to wait and see whether it can win broad support.

In simple terms the idea is to restore the balance between disarmament, economic cooperation, and human affairs. This will happen at a conference which will discuss subjects such as respect for human rights and practical issues of the reunification of families, the freedom to pay visits abroad, and permission to leave a country in general. I will offer Copenhagen as the host city for such a conference.

At the conference there will be no suggestion of confrontational exchanges, but rather political progress benefiting the individual.

Disarmament and detente are not simply questions of guns and missiles, but also and perhaps to quite a large extent matters concerning the individual.

As the Helsinki Final Acts states: Respect for human rights is an important factor for peace and for friendly relations between states.

It is important that we in Denmark, the Nordic area, the Twelve, NATO, and Europe do not simply sit down and scold the United States and the Soviet Union for the absence of results in Reykjavik. In the areas in which we are involved, such as the CSCE process, we must make a contribution ourselves to preserve and extend the detente process between East and West.

And we will do this in Vienna.

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CSO: 5200/2445

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

MOSCOW: VELIKHOV ARGUES CASE FOR NUCLEAR TEST BAN

LD221327 Moscow NEW TIMES in English No 40, 13 Oct 86 pp 6-8

[USSR Academy of Sciences Vice President Yevgeniy Velikhov article: "A Matter of Politics, Not Science"]

[Text] When the treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, outer space and under water was signed in Moscow in 1963, it omitted underground tests. This was not because the sides wanted to continue them, but because they could not agree on verification measures. Nevertheless, on the insistence of the Soviet side, the preamble to the Moscow treaty recorded the desire of the parties concerned to achieve a final halt on all nuclear tests and to continue negotiations towards that end. Twenty-three years have passed since then, and it has to be said that in this time all U.S. presidents, with the exception of the present one, have officially supported a comprehensive ban on all tests. But in doing so they have cited the problems of verification as the chief obstacle.

Today there exists a real historical opportunity to end all nuclear weapon tests immediately and definitively. Ending them would facilitate the achievement of a concrete objective -- the prevention of the development of new destabilizing types of nuclear weapon -- as the experience of preceding decades shows that the development and improvement of new nuclear weapons are the main sources of instability. What happened after the signing of the above treaty offers an example in point. Continuing underground tests made it possible to develop more compact and accurate weapons and multiple warheads, and there is a consensus among scientists, experts and the military that this has undermined stability and increased the danger of still greater destabilization.

Judging from the tests the U.S. is currently carrying out on its proving ranges, the development of new weapon systems is proceeding in two directions.

First, there are the so-called third-generation nuclear weapons.

Second, there is the neutron bomb-type weapon geared to the concept of localized nuclear wars.

An end to nuclear tests would not only bring stability but would ensure a smooth and secure transition from a nuclear to a non-nuclear world along the lines indicated by Mikhail Gorbachev in his statement of January 15, 1986. This is a vivid example of new thinking in the nuclear age. The Soviet leadership has come to the conclusion that the security of the U.S.S.R. can be ensured not by the further buildup of new types of

nuclear weapon but, on the contrary, by the cessation of the nuclear arms race and the subsequent complete destruction of these weapons. This new thinking has found expression in the Soviet moratorium and its extension until January 1, 1987. The move is eloquent proof of the seriousness of the Soviet intention to make our world a safe home for man.

Among the many arguments the U.S. Administration has advanced in opposing a comprehensive test ban is that existing methods fail adequately to verify compliance with any such agreement.

This argument has now been unanimously rejected by the entire world geophysical community. The questions were discussed by a forum of scientists from 36 countries in Moscow last summer. It has been proved that all nuclear explosions essential to weapon development, including those with a yield of several kilotons, can be reliably monitored by national means. Experiments show that a seismic system deployed in Norway can detect nuclear explosions with a yield of hundreds of tons deep inside the Soviet Union. In an experiment held in the U.S., a 5-ton explosion was detected at a distance of 725 kilometres from the Kirkland test site where it took place.

The overall conclusion of the Moscow forum of scientists was that geophysical methods today make it fully possible to verify compliance with a comprehensive nuclear test ban. A concrete example is the above-mentioned powerful seismic station in Norway (NORSAR) which took measurements in conditions of high seismic activity by analyzing the signal over a wide band of frequencies, including very high frequency. As a result, the signal from a very small explosion could be identified against a seismic background. According to many scientists, the best monitoring equipment in the world is NORES, part of the NORSAR system, also deployed in Norway. The United States, too, possesses powerful seismographic instruments. The Soviet Union and other countries also have their systems. Among these countries are the Delhi Six which have said they are ready to cooperate in international monitoring of compliance with a comprehensive test ban. In short, there is a reliable network of seismic stations capable of the most effective verification.

As early as the 1960's when the draft treaty banning nuclear tests was discussed, the United States put forward the thesis that nuclear tests could in principle be concealed by creating a large underground cavern for tests. However, today, with the use of high-frequency monitoring methods, such an attempt would fail. The transition to higher frequencies in the 30-40-hertz range makes it possible to register explosions held in such caverns. Furthermore, the past 20 years have seen marked advances in the space surveillance system. The creation of such a huge cavern, involving work comparable to the building of an Egyptian pyramid, could certainly be detected from outer space. The combination of seismic methods with observation from space would be ample to ensure compliance with a comprehensive nuclear test ban.

To ensure further advance in this direction and resolve a series of other issues connected with verification and involving geographical information, Soviet scientists have discussed a proposal made by American scientists from the Natural Resources Defence Council to conduct joint geophysical research on the territory close to the Semipalatinsk testing site and in Nevada, U.S.A. [paragraph continues]

They have asked the Soviet and U.S. Governments for permission to hold such experiments. The Soviet Government has acceded to this request.

Early positive results have already been obtained with the help of seismographs installed near Semipalatinsk. This would seem to have put paid to all arguments that a test ban is unverifiable. However, the American side has promptly come up with new ones. It has suggested, for example, that very small charges could be tested in deep space outside the solar system. Specious arguments.

In general, American objections to stopping nuclear tests are extremely contradictory. They merely highlight the weakness of the Reagan administration's position in seeking to justify its policy in the eyes of world public opinion, which strongly favours an end to all nuclear tests.

Washington is trying to replace the question of verification of a nuclear test ban with the problem of verification of the Soviet-American treaty on the limitation of underground nuclear weapon tests (which are not to exceed the 150-kiloton threshold). But accurate measurement of the size of an explosion is one thing and verifying that no nuclear tests are being carried out is another. The latter is undoubtedly much easier than checking compliance with the threshold.

American officials declare that they need tests to ensure the security of the United States, by which they mean the implementation of the SDI programme (involving tests in the neighbourhood of 150 kilotons to develop a new-generation weapon).

To judge from speeches by the President and the administration spokesmen, they are trying to combine incompatibles. On the one hand, they argue that the Strategic Defense Initiative is aimed at creating defensive means that would render nuclear weapons unnecessary and obsolete. On the other, they are testing just such nuclear systems, notably the X-ray laser, for the components of a space-based anti-missile defence. The argument advanced to justify this approach is absurd: the United States wants to see what the Soviet Union can achieve by creating and testing such weapons.

Meanwhile there is a very simple way to solve the problem, and that is to accede immediately to the moratorium. After that all nuclear tests in the Soviet Union and the United States would stop and third-generation weapons would never see the light of day.

Another argument is that nuclear tests are necessary because this is the only way the U.S. can guarantee the reliability and life cycle of its present nuclear weapons. Incidentally, when this question was put to Dr Glenn Seaborg, former chairman of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, who took part in the drafting of the Moscow treaty, he said that in the 1960s and early 1970s, when he had access to all classified information, U.S. nuclear weapons were designed in such a way as to make it possible to check their reliability and usability not by nuclear tests but by other control methods which scientists already had at their disposal at the time.

But if the U.S. could control the reliability of its nuclear weapons without resorting to tests twenty years ago, what is preventing it from doing so today? Incidentally, the bulk of nuclear arsenals is not to be tested as they exceed the 150-kiloton threshold. Statistics show that while it takes dozens of tests to develop a weapon, only a few are needed to check existing ones.

Moreover, it is clear that the Soviet Union is as interested as the U.S. in keeping its weapons in reliable shape. And if one side is ready for a test ban this is proof that tests are not necessary, at least where checking the combat readiness of weapons is concerned.

Thus, all the objective facts inexorably lead to the sole logical and valid conclusion, namely, that the Americans only need nuclear tests to develop modern nuclear weapons, and offensive, first-strike weapons at that. No arguments, or rather excuses, on the part of Washington can refute or obscure this. The world public, authoritative scientists and competent specialists welcome the bold and responsible decision of the Soviet Union to extend its moratorium and urge the United States to join it. Let me remind you that an overwhelming majority of the states that signed the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in 1968 are now calling for an end to all tests in accordance with the commitments implicit in the text of the treaty, as well as in the 1963 Moscow treaty and the 1974 treaty on threshold tests.

All this shows is that a total end to all nuclear tests is a political issue. As Mikhail Gorbachev said in his interview to the newspaper RUDE PRAVO, "the attitude to the termination of nuclear tests, to the early elaboration of a treaty on their full prohibition has now become the most reliable touchstone of how seriously each of the greatest nuclear powers treats disarmament, international security and the cause of peace."

There are sufficient ways and means to verify compliance with a treaty with the U.S. banning nuclear tests. It is not a matter of technology. It is constantly being improved, and verification methods, too, may continue to improve after the agreement is signed. It is entirely a question of political will, and the international community expects Washington to offer concrete evidence to such will at this extremely difficult juncture in history.

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CSO: 5200/1061

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

USSR'S UN ENVOY EXTOLS VERIFICATION FOR ARMS CONTROL

LD222311 Moscow TASS in English 2200 GMT 22 Oct 86

[Text] New York October 22 TASS -- The comprehensive, strictest verification is the major element of the disarmament process, the USSR's permanent representative to the United Nations, Aleksandr Belonogov, has pointed out.

Speaking in the first committee of the U.N. General Assembly today, he set out the Soviet Union's approach to this aspect of the complex of problems of arms limitation and disarmament.

"The significance of this question is explained by the acute need for achieving a turn for the better in the international arena, overcoming the negative, confrontational trends that were growing in recent years, and paving the way for curtailing the arms race on earth and keeping it from outer space."

This had been confirmed by the Reykjavik meeting, Belonogov said. In expressing its readiness for deep cuts in nuclear armaments, the Soviet side favoured not only strict verification in any forms, but also the toughening of demands on it.

Verification in conditions of the post-nuclear situation should be comprehensive. It should give full confidence in reliable compliance with agreements at all stages of arms reduction.

The deficit of the new political thinking in the U.S. position, however, thwarted the meeting, as a result of which the historic chance to agree on the entire package of verifiable agreements, was missed.

While materializing the new political thinking, the Soviet Union attached special importance to the verification problem, said the Soviet ambassador to the U.N.

"We said more than once: The USSR is open to verification, we are interested in it as much as others. The attempts to use references to verification issues in order to evade arms control and disarmament agreements are immoral and unconscientious, they are destructive in their very essence.

On a broad scale, the verification problem has been removed from the agenda as an obstacle to accords. What is required is constructive solution of this problem. Precisely here one sees sometimes the absence of real readiness to strengthen verification measures and confidence."

The productivity of the new approaches, the need for their implementation were convincingly revealed in the results of the Stockholm conference.

At present, when the unilateral Soviet moratorium on nuclear explosions was in its second year, all, even those who asserted the contrary, could not fail to see that it was not the verification issue, nor the Soviet stance on this matter, that constituted the major obstacle to concluding a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty.

The problem of verifying compliance with a ban on spreading the arms race into outer space could be effectively resolved too. But the "Star Wars" programme, once it was carried out, would create insurmountable difficulties from the viewpoint of verification. The implementation of the SDI programme would cross out the verification concept, Belonogov said.

"We stand for effective and adequate verification, so that issues of disarmament and verification be examined and resolved in a business-like way, so that a dynamic approach be made to mutually acceptable solutions," the Soviet representative emphasised.

Belonogov called on other nations to give a constructive response to this approach to the solution of verification issues, of the entire complex of problems of arms limitation and disarmament.

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CSO: 5200/1061

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

TASS NOTES END OF NONNUCLEAR CITIES CONFERENCE

LD130603 Moscow TASS in English 2022 GMT 12 Oct 86

[Text] Perugia, 12 October (TASS)--TASS correspondent Alexiy Golyayev reports:

"We are resolutely opposing the arms race and demanding that concrete measures be taken to reverse the current trend towards increasing military spending, towards a qualitative and quantitative build-up of nuclear weapons", says the general political statement adopted by the participants in the Third International Conference of Non-Nuclear Cities, which closed here. The conference was attended by some 400 delegates and 100 observers from many countries of Europe, Asia, Africa and the USA.

Representatives of the municipal authorities of the cities and populated localities, which proclaimed their territories to be nuclear-free zones, have stressed that their movement is a component part of the struggle for disarmament. The authors of the statement are demanding an immediate end to all nuclear testing, are opposing the plans of a militarization of outer space. Representatives of nuclear-free cities have addressed a call to the entire peaceable public that a day of joint struggle for a ban on all nuclear weapons tests be held on 1 July 1987.

The creation of nuclear-free zones, the delegates pointed out, will contribute to curbing the weapons race, constitutes a concrete step on the way of strengthening confidence-building measures.

The decision has been taken to hold non-nuclear cities' conferences once in two years.

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CSO: 5200/1061

RELATED ISSUES

USSR'S PETROVSKIY AT UN ON NUCLEAR, SPACE ARMS, TEST BAN

LD172104 Moscow TASS in English 2033 GMT 17 Oct 86

[Text] New York, 17 October (TASS)--A general debate on disarmament and international security issues is going on at the first Committee of the UN General Assembly.

Vladimir Petrovskiy, deputy minister of foreign affairs of the USSR, emphasized in his speech that new approaches and a new political philosophy rejecting the age-old notions of admissibility and acceptability of wars and armed conflicts were particularly essential in the qualitatively new situation which had developed as a result of the meeting in Reykjavik.

He said super-strong impulses were needed to embark upon the road leading to security and to begin to advance to a nuclear-free world.

The socialist countries' proposal on establishing a comprehensive system of international peace and security serves to introduce new ideas to the practice of international relations.

The representative of the USSR drew the attention of the participants in the debate to the allied socialist countries' stand which is imbued with new political thinking and which was reaffirmed in the communique of the Bucharest meeting of the foreign Minister's Committee of the Warsaw treaty member states.

The comprehensive programme for universal security through disarmament, the programme which the Soviet Union put forward on 15 January 1986, blended new political thinking and a platform of concrete actions.

"The immense constructive potential of the programme and of the new political thinking which produced it has also found a visible embodiment in the package of major Soviet proposals tabled at the meeting in Reykjavik. If they had been accepted, the beginning of a new epoch in mankind's life--a nuclear-free epoch--would have been set".

"Of course, nuclear disarmament issues cannot be fully resolved by the USSR and the USA alone. Disarmament is the cause of everyone. Energetic actions of all countries are needed to that end".

"A priority direction of multilateral efforts, in which the United Nations organization figures importantly, is to end nuclear tests--the most simple, clear, effective, and quite-prepared-for-solution step to curtail the arms race. It is urgently essential to begin, at last, full-scale talks on ending nuclear explosions finally and for ever".

"The latest extension of the unilateral moratorium on nuclear explosions (till 1 January 1987) is a practical action which expressed the sincerity of our intentions and determination to act and urge others to do the same".

"Another major direction in the intensification of multilateral efforts is to achieve nuclear disarmament and to reach reliably verifiable accords directed towards radical reduction and complete elimination of nuclear weapons".

"The Soviet delegation has made a proposal to start without delay an exchange of views on these matters between all nuclear powers simultaneously with the Soviet-U.S. talks on nuclear and space arms".

"The USSR is for a businesslike discussion of the proposal put forward by UN Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar on setting up a multilateral centre for reducing the nuclear danger. It is quite clear that the development of nuclear weapons for outer space and the nuclear arms race run counter to the very idea of such kind of centres".

"An urgent necessity to solve without delay the question of preventing an arms race in outer space manifests itself after the Reykjavik meeting stronger than ever before. The UN voice in defence of non-weaponized outer space should be raised".

"At the Geneva Conference on Disarmament, it is essential to begin to negotiate, at last, an agreement or, accordingly, agreements to prevent an arms race in outer space in all its aspects, including the elaboration of accords on such partial steps as a ban on space offensive weapons of 'space-to-earth' and 'space-to-space' class, a renunciation of the development of new anti-satellite systems and the elimination of the existing ones, and the ensurance of the immunity of artificial satellites of the earth".

"The enlistment of everyone's efforts is essential to solve another urgent problem: To rid the world of the arsenals of chemical death".

"The imposition of a ban on the development of non-nuclear arms based on new physical principles, which by their effects approximate nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction, must become an important sphere of the application of large-scale multilateral efforts".

"In the field of conventional arms, too, the Soviet Union and its allies for the Warsaw Treaty organization are ready to go as far as other countries will be prepared to follow suit. The socialist countries' proposals on that score are well known".

"In order to tackle the question of curbing the arms race in the seas and oceans on the practical level, it is essential to start appropriate talks with the participation of all big naval powers and other countries concerned. We are for measures in this field both on a global scale, in the regions of the Pacific and Indian Oceans, and the Mediterranean".

"A comprehensive, most stringent verification at all stages of arms cuts should be an integral attendant measure of all bilateral and multilateral accords, with the use of both national technical means and international procedures, right up to on-site inspections".

"The USSR is ready to come to terms on any additional verification measures", Vladimir Petrovskiy emphasized.

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CSO: 5200/1067

RELATED ISSUES

TOKYO: ZHURKIN INTERVIEW ON SUMMIT, SDI, INF

OW131449 Tokyo NHK Television Network in Japanese 1100 GMT 13 Oct 86

[From "News Center 9" program: NHK newscaster Ichiro Kimura's interview with Zhurkin, deputy director of the United States of America and Canada Institute under the USSR Academy of Sciences and one of the spokesmen of the Soviet side at the Reykjavik summit talks; interview conducted in English with subtitles provided in Japanese; following is taken from the English -- recorded; date not given]

[Text] [Kimura] Dr Zhurkin, we were really disappointed by the outcome.

[Zhurkin, interrupting] Me, too.

[Kimura] And SDI was certainly a stumbling block, but for us who are facing the threat of SS-20's, it is terribly real. And SDI does not even exist in a blueprint, and trading these two is very impractical in our view, Don't you agree with us?

[Zhurkin] Today SDI is not on the blueprint. SDI is on the verge of being deployed -- no question here, it will take years and years to deploy -- but on the verge of components of the Strategic Defense Initiative machinery, I would say, being tested. So it is a reality, it is a reality today. And you know, if we start arguing about arms control issues, looking into some past grievances of 4, 5, 10 years, then every side will accumulate so many grievances that it will be impossible to move ahead. So, I think that it is one way of dealing with arms control, arms limitations and reductions. We should take elements of the situation and try to compare.

[Kimura] So now all the limits on strategic weapons and medium-range weapons and test bans; we lost all the limitations, and the Secretary General said at the press conference that we are coming to the turning point of going into the new arms race era. Will Russia go into unlimited arms race with the United States?

[Zhurkin] If to talk about the future really today, when everything is so much charged with emotion also, it is difficult to say, but I think that you noticed the statement in General Secretary Gorbachev's statement, the words that the Soviet Union will continue to strive for arms limitations and reductions, for nuclear disarmament, that we shall continue, and the Soviet Union will not stop its efforts.

[Kimura] Still, the outcome of these talks will bring us into, what do you say, more difficult East-West relations?

[Zhurkin] You know, really again, it is really difficult to appraise some of the results of these talks very quickly. On the one hand, certainly, it is completely an American fault. At the same time, many problems were discussed; elements of some possible compromises were discussed. There was understanding on some of these elements. And from this point of view, it is a useful experience; and from this point of view, one cannot simply say that this meeting did not produce anything.

[Kimura] Being in the Far East, the result really made things very difficult for us and probably Mr Nakasone will be in a very difficult position. He wanted to have Mr Gorbachev come to Japan so badly, but because of this outcome, the atmosphere is not that warm anymore, I feel. Do you agree?

[Zhurkin] Soviet-Japanese relations have a very important value of their own for both the nations, for Japan and definitely for the Soviet Union. So, it seems to me that they should develop through their own momentum. About Soviet-Japanese relations, or general Soviet policy in the Far East it is a pity that it was not possible to achieve the agreement on medium-range missiles.

[Kimura] But, how do you characterize future U.S.-Soviet relations? Will they be chilly, or cold, or frozen?

[Zhurkin] Certainly, the fact that nothing was achieved in Reykjavik will unpleasantly influence Soviet-American relations. How they will develop in the future is really very difficult to say. What is the fate of the Washington summit? It is very difficult to say because, as I understand, the ball is in American hands and it would be easy for the United States to move ahead and make the Washington summit a realistic undertaking. So, really, the future is rather hazy, I would say.

[Kimura] Yes, I agree. It was really very disappointing. Thank you very much.

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CSO: 5200/1067

RELATED ISSUES

USSR ARMY PAPER ON 'COMPREHENSIVE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY'

PM101409 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 9 Oct 86 Second Edition p 1

[Editorial: "For Universal Security"]

[Text] Never before has mankind been faced so acutely with the problem of war and peace. Never before in world politics has the question been resolved of whether world civilization would be able to save itself in the face of the looming danger or whether the aggressive circles nudging the peoples toward a nuclear abyss would gain the upper hand.

For the CPSU, the Soviet Government, and our entire people the fatherland's security is sacrosanct. Consistently advocating that it be safeguarded and that lasting peace be established on earth, the Soviet Union has put forward the concept of universal security. It was formulated at the 27th CPSU Congress on the basis of an in-depth analysis of historic realities and the new political thinking. Peace today, it was stressed at the Soviet Communists' forum, has become too small and fragile for wars and strong-arm policies. It cannot be saved and safeguarded unless we break resolutely and irrevocably with the type of thinking and acting that for centuries has been based on the acceptability and permissibility of wars and armed conflicts.

The USSR believes that security cannot be endlessly based on fear of retribution or doctrines of "restraint" or "deterrence." These doctrines encourage an arms race which sooner or later is liable to get out of control, not to mention the absurdity and immorality of a situation whereby the entire world becomes a nuclear hostage. Under the conditions of the existence of nuclear missile weapons and other means of mass destruction, security for a few is simply unattainable. Security can only be universal and equal for all. That is why the responsibility for its creation rests with all states together.

The Soviet idea of creating a comprehensive international security system was unanimously approved by the socialist community countries and later submitted by them for examination by the 41st UN General Assembly Session. In putting forward their proposal for consideration by the world community, the fraternal countries proceed on the basis that through constructive multilateral discussions it will be possible to work out a sort of code of conduct for states in the military, political, economic, and humanitarian spheres.

The core of the proposed universal security system is the program to eliminate nuclear and other types of mass destruction weaponry by the year 2000--a program put forward in M.S. Gorbachev's historic statement of 15 January 1986. The Soviet Union is already traveling that road, having declared a unilateral moratorium on all nuclear explosions. The Warsaw Pact states' proposals to substantially reduce conventional arms and armed forces in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals are also designed to reduce the level of military confrontation and assert lasting peace. The universal security concept organically includes the USSR's proposals on strengthening peace and confidence in the Asia-Pacific region and on eliminating regional conflicts and other worrying problems of the day.

The socialist countries' initiatives stem from the consistent policy aimed at removing the threat of war and from the defensive nature of their military doctrine. This, as is well known, presupposes maintaining equilibrium between military forces at the lowest possible level and reducing military potentials to limits sufficient for defense.

The reality and feasibility of the universal security idea are confirmed by the results of the Conference on Confidence- and Security-building and Disarmament in Europe. The success at Stockholm is a victory for common sense and an example of how the new project of building detente can and must be conducted and how new relations between states can be organized. It is a victory for all 35 countries which participated in the conference.

The Soviet-U.S. extraordinary summit to be held 11 to 12 October in Reykjavik is intended to give a powerful boost to the quest for agreement on a number of important security issues. The agreement to hold the summit was reached thanks to the realism and constructive approach shown by both sides. In this regard the peoples are hopeful that in the very near future it may be possible to achieve more significant results and create a breakthrough for the better in Soviet-U.S. relations and in the world as a whole.

The implementation of the objective opportunity for achieving progress in Soviet-U.S. relations is hampered, however, by the forces of reaction and militarism. They would like to achieve absolute security for themselves by putting everyone else in a situation of absolute danger. To that end work is being expedited on the "star wars" program, in which the United States' closest NATO partners, as well as Japan and Israel, are involved. The Pentagon is continuing an intensive series of nuclear tests, which it needs to improve its existing types of mass destruction weapons and to create new ones. Production of MX and Midgetman ICBM's, B-1B and ATB strategic bombers, "Ohio"-class nuclear-powered submarines equipped with Trident missiles, and air-, ground-, and sea-launched long-range cruise missiles is in full swing. Efforts are being stepped up to create a new generation of conventional arms.

In an attempt to weaken the peoples' resistance to the "position of strength" policy, the United States and its allies are using a whole series of false arguments and allegations. And they are spotlighting fabrications about the notorious "Soviet threat," which allegedly creates a need for measures for the "defense of the West." This is an example of deliberate disinformation exploited by imperialist circles to mask their genuine intentions.

Imperialism is to blame for two world wars which accounted for tens of millions of human lives. Through their desire to achieve military supremacy and satisfy their imperial ambitions the forces of reaction and militarism are creating a threat of a third world war. Under these conditions the USSR states that it stakes no claim to greater security but will not accept lesser security either. Our people are well aware of what they are dealing with. That is why the CPSU and the Soviet Government devote unremitting attention to the country's defense capability and to the combat might of the USSR Armed Forces.

It is socialism's ability and readiness to defend its security that is the most important factor in maintaining peace under present-day conditions. An enormous role in this respect is played by the existing military-strategic parity between the USSR and the United States and between the Warsaw Pact Organization and the NATO bloc. The maintenance of this equilibrium in the future is one of the tasks being persistently resolved by Soviet people and the peoples of the fraternal socialist countries.

In putting forward a constructive program for equal and universal security, socialism has responded accurately and clearly to the vitally important question for all peoples of ways of ensuring peace. A difficult struggle lies ahead, however. It may be successful if the whole potential for peace, reason, and goodwill is mobilized.

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Meeting Proceedings

LD141704 Moscow TASS in English 1651 GMT 14 Oct 86

[Text] Bucharest October 14 TASS -- Warsaw Treaty foreign ministers have held a meeting here.

Eduard Shevardnadze reported on the course and outcome of the Reykjavik meeting between Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and Ronald Reagan, President of the United States.

In exchanging their views, the ministers of the allied nations expressed full support to the USSR's constructive stand at the meeting and highly assessed the set of large-scale and far-reaching Soviet initiatives opening real prospects for curbing the arms race and averting the nuclear threat.

It was stressed that the U.S. Administration should give up its obstructionist stand and embark on the search for mutually acceptable solutions concerning key problems of war and peace.

The historic chance, created by bold and responsible actions by the Soviet Union, should not be missed.

The meeting's participants expressed their determination to continue the vigorous struggle for ending the nuclear arms race and establishing a comprehensive system of international security and peace.

Ceausescu Meets With Ministers

LD151027 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1000 GMT 15 Oct 86

[Text] Bucharest, 15 Oct (TASS) -- The session of the Foreign Ministers Committee of the Warsaw Pact member states, which passed in the atmosphere of friendship and comradely cooperation, ended its work here today.

Issues related to the situation in Europe and in the world in the context of the struggle for halting the arms race and for disarmament -- primarily nuclear disarmament -- and for normalizing the international situation, were examined.

A joint communique has been adopted. It is being published separately.

On the same day, N. Ceausescu, general secretary of the RCP, President of the Socialist Republic of Romania met with foreign affairs ministers of the Warsaw Pact member states. The meeting passed in a cordial and friendly atmosphere.

Ministers' Communique

AU151939 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1909 GMT 15 Oct 86

[Excerpts] Moscow, 15 Oct (TASS)--We transmit the full text of the communique of the meeting of the committee of foreign ministers of the Warsaw Pact member states:

On October 14-15 a meeting took place in Bucharest of the committee of foreign affairs ministers of the states participant in the Warsaw Treaty of friendship, collaboration and mutual assistance.

The meeting was attended by: M. Ivanov, first deputy minister of foreign affairs of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, B. Chnoupek, minister of foreign affairs of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, O. Fischer, minister of foreign affairs of the German Democratic Republic, M. Orzechowski, minister of foreign affairs of the Polish People's Republic, Ioan Totu, minister of foreign affairs of the Socialist Republic of Romania, P. Varkonyi, minister of foreign affairs of the Hungarian People's Republic, E.A. Shevardnadze, minister of foreign affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The ministers exchanged views and information on the situation in Europe and in the world, paying utmost attention to the problems of halting the arms race and of disarmament, nuclear disarmament above all, to the efforts of the Warsaw Treaty participant states for the achievement of the program proposed in the Budapest Appeal of Reduction of Armed Forces and Conventional Weapons in Europe, to the tasks of improving the situation in the world, including the international economic relations.

1. The participants in the meeting highlighted that the evolution of events in Europe and in the world confirmed the appreciations and conclusions articulated at the meeting of last June of the Political Consultative Committee. Worry was expressed about the grave situation in the world and the war danger resulting from the intensification of the arms race, nuclear above all, of the U.S. and NATO actions, that refuse to embark upon the path of halting the arms race, preventing its extension to the outer space and ceasing the nuclear tests.

The fundamental issue of our age is the defense of peace, the halting of the arms race, nuclear above all, the achievement of disarmament, the elimination of the danger of a nuclear catastrophe.

E.A. Shevardnadze, minister of foreign affairs of the USSR, informed the meeting participants about the results of the meeting held, upon the Soviet Union's initiative, at Reykjavik, between M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CC of the CPSU, and R. Reagan, U.S. President. The states represented at the meeting expressed their support to the USSR stand at the meeting, to the Soviet proposals of wide scope and perspective regarding the radical reduction of offensive strategic weapons, the liquidation of the American and Soviet medium-range missiles in Europe, in conditions of a concomitant reduction of such missiles in Asia, the freezing of the missiles having a range shorter

than 1,000 km, the consolidation of the provisions in the treaty on the limitation of the Anti-Ballistic Defence Systems, and the complete and definitive banning of nuclear tests. Support was expressed to the Soviet Union's request for the enforcement of a most rigorous control of the package of measures proposed. There should be a guarantee that in the process of liquidation of the nuclear weapons neither party will try to get military superiority over the other. The implementation of those proposals would allow for the achievement in a short lapse of time of a radical change for the better in international relations, for a change in all domains of the struggle for disarmament, for the removal of the nuclear war danger and a passage to a nuclear weapon-free world.

Regret was expressed at these proposals not being accepted.

The Warsaw Treaty participant states call on the U.S. and the other NATO countries to take account of the whole gravity of the present situation in the world and approach in a constructive, realistic, and responsible manner the Soviet Union's proposals that keep being the major theme of the Soviet-American dialogue.

The participants in the meeting expressed their countries' determination to continue the dialogue, the active struggle for halting the nuclear arms race, for the creation of a comprehensive system of international security and peace.

Resolute and responsible actions are required from all states, big or small, irrespective of social system, to put an end to the arms race on the earth, prevent its extension to the outer space, for a passage to concrete measures of disarmament and reduction of military expenditures, so as to ensure for all peoples lasting security and conditions of peace for their socioeconomic development.

The ministers noted that recently positive tendencies have been making their way through in the development of the international situation, although not without difficulty. The proposals advanced by the allied socialist states, which show the concrete and real way in eliminating the nuclear threat and ensuring general security, are ever more backed worldwide.

The Warsaw Treaty states are highly appreciative of the results of the first stage of the Stockholm conference. The unanimous accords achieved there are of great importance for the building of confidence and fulfill the aspirations of the peoples in Europe and throughout the world. The spirit of collaboration, realism, and understanding that prevailed at the conference led to an agreement on substantial confidence-and security-building measures. This proves that, when political will is shown and efforts are made by all the states concerned, a solution can be given to major security-related questions. The Stockholm Accord is a good start for negotiations on conventional arms and troops reduction in Europe and, equally, for confidence-building measures, inclusive of limitation of military activities.

The ministers welcomed the conclusion of a convention on information and aid-granting in cases of nuclear accidents, and called for the expansion of collaboration with a view to creating an international system for the highly safe use and development of nuclear energy.

Firmly declaring for nuclear disarmament, the states represented to the meeting attach special importance to implementing the program proposed by the Soviet Union regarding the total elimination everywhere of nuclear weapons and of the other types of weapons of mass destruction till the end of this century.

The ministers underlined the pressing need to stop any nuclear test. The Soviet Union's decision was welcomed regarding the procrastination of the unilateral moratorium on the cessation of nuclear tests till the end of this year, and the U.S.A. as well as the other nuclear-weapon state were called upon to cease all nuclear tests and act for the soonest possible conclusion of an accord totally banning them.

Militating for a comprehensive approach to disarmament questions, the states represented to the meeting underscored the importance of the appeal adopted at the Budapest meeting of the Political Consultative Committee for a program of cutting European troops and conventional weapons by 25 per cent until 1990, to which a proportional reduction of the states' military spending should add. The implementation of like measures would provide appropriate conditions for a further reduction of conventional arms and troops in Europe. The Warsaw Treaty states reassert they are ready to immediately pass on to a practical examination of these proposals, and constructively analyze other similar measures likely to be presented by NATO states, by neutral and nonaligned states, by the other European countries.

An account was read by Hungarian Foreign Minister P. Varkonyi of the activity for the dissemination and presentation of the appeal endorsed by the Budapest meeting of the Political Consultative Committee, and its international echo.

Romanian Foreign Minister Ioan Totu informed the participants in the meeting of the recent decision of the Socialist Republic of Romania to cut its arms, troops and military expenditure by five per cent.

The participants in the meeting underlined the need for the conclusion of specific understandings during the Soviet-American talks on nuclear and space weapons, which should take into account the interests of both sides and of all the other states. Stress was also laid on the special importance of maintaining the agreements and conventions on the limitation of arming and on disarmament, and the U.S.A. was called to rigorously observe the accords on the limitation of strategic offensive arms and the treaty on the limitation of anti missile defence system.

The ministers assess that preparations for the star war and the adherence of other states to it should necessarily stop as well as the elaboration of projects like the European defence initiative, any action for the militarization of space, which enhance the danger of a nuclear war, and reiterated their countries position on the carrying through of a program regarding all the states' practical actions for the peaceful use of outer space as an asset of the whole mankind.

Emphasis was placed on the need to urgently finalize works for the elaboration and conclusion of an international convention which should provide for the banning of chemical weapons, the scrapping of existing stockpiles and the plants manufacturing like weapons. The plans for the production and emplacement in Europe of the highly dangerous binary variant of the chemical weapon are serious obstacles in attaining such a goal.

The necessity was reasserted of dynamizing the works of the Geneva Disarmament Conference of all forms and mechanisms of negotiation on disarmament, so that they should carry on more efficient activity and be not a screen for unhampered furtherance of the arms race.

The states represented to the meeting are determined to further and deepen their political dialogue with the other states with a view to building up confidence and strengthening understanding, reaching palpable disarmament accords, and ensuring peace and call on the U.S.A. and the other NATO countries to give a positive answer to the socialist states' initiatives for the resolution of the major problems of the contemporary world.

The states represented to the meeting are for the creation of a comprehensive system of international security, to confer the military and political, as well as the economic and humanitarian areas. The ministers called for a passage at the United Nations on the basis of an initiative set forth by a number of socialist countries, to the elaboration of a fundamental document to spell out the basic principles of such a system.

The ministers reiterated their states' positions on the need for all the states to strictly observe the principles of national independence and sovereignty, nonrecourse to the use and threat of force, inviolability of frontiers and territorial integrity, peaceful settlement of differences, noninterference in domestic affairs, equality of rights, and the other unanimously acknowledged norms of international relations.

2. The ministers consider that now more than ever before the current situation in Europe calls for practical measures to liquidate military confrontation from the continent.

All efforts should be made for the urgent conclusion of an accord on the elimination of Soviet and American intermediate-range missiles from Europe, which would go down as an important step forward on the road of freeing the continent from nuclear weapons.

A substantial contribution to the cause of freeing Europe from nuclear and chemical weapons would be made by the creation of zones free of such weapons of mass destruction in the Balkans, in central and northern Europe. Support was reiterated for the proposals advanced along that line by the Socialist Republic of Romania and the People's Republic of Bulgaria and, respectively, by the German Democratic Republic and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic.

The participants in the meeting highlighted their countries' interest in the urgent conclusion at the Vienna talks of an agreement on the reduction of troops and arms in central Europe.

During the exchange of opinions on the preparations for the meeting of the representatives of the states participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, to open in Vienna in November, the ministers underscored their states' determination to contribute to the development of the all-European process in all areas, in consideration of the participating countries' vested interests, and called for the unfolding of the conference in a constructive spirit and for the adoption of tangible measures to contribute to the recovery of the political climate, the resumption of the policy of detente and the intensification of collaboration on the basis of a strict observance of the principles and provisions under the Helsinki Final Act, as a unitary and balanced whole.

The adoption by the Vienna meeting would be of outstanding importance of a resolution on the organization, in the second phase of the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, of negotiations on the substantial reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons, the building of confidence and the strengthening of security on the continent.

The ministers were for the lessening of tension in the Mediterranean, the transformation of that region into a zone of lasting peace, good neighbourliness and collaboration in the economy, science, technology and environmental protection, the renunciation of obstructionist policies and practices which are deeply harmful and bar mutually advantageous exchanges in these areas, the building up of confidence in interstate economic relations.

The states represented to the meeting declare for the expansion of exchanges of spiritual assets among nations, which are intended to lead to better mutual knowledge and understanding, to the easier access of the inhabitants of the continent to the heritage of human civilization and militate for a broad collaboration in the humanitarian area, for the full achievement of human rights, more particularly, of the right to a life of peace and freedom, in all fields, all while the sovereignty of the states is being observed.

The ministers expressed their hope that the constructive proposals advanced at the meeting of experts within the all-European process after the Madrid conference, as well as the experience of those meetings would contribute to the success of the Vienna meeting.

It was noted with satisfaction that the proposal of the states participating in the Warsaw Treaty to the effect that the Vienna conference should be attended by foreign ministers enjoyed broad support.

4. It was emphasized at the meeting that under the current international circumstances greatly important are the consolidation of the unity and cohesion of the Warsaw Treaty participant states, their defense alliance, the development of collaboration in all domains. The determination was expressed to ever more actively collaborate in international questions, for the elimination of the danger of a nuclear war, the achievement of disarmament and the consolidation of general peace. The constant position was reiterated, regarding the simultaneous dismantlement of the Warsaw Treaty and NATO and the liquidation of their military organizations to begin with.

The states represented at the meeting declare for the development and deepening of the relations with the other socialist countries, for collaboration and cooperation with them in the interests of the struggle for peace and socialism, against imperialism.

The Warsaw Treaty participant states call on all countries and peoples, peace-loving forces to rally their efforts, by acting in the spirit of the generous goals of the international year of peace, and do everything possible for the achievement of concrete measures of nuclear disarmament, the cessation of all nuclear tests, the reduction of armed forces, conventional weapons, and military expenditures. In the nuclear-space era this is the only way of building lasting security in Europe and the world over.

The meeting of the Committee of Foreign Affairs Ministers proceeded in an atmosphere of friendship and comradely collaboration. The next meeting will take place in Moscow.

CPSU Politburo Approves Results

PM240959 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 24 Oct 86 Second Edition p 1

[Excerpts] In the CPSU Central Committee Politburo--The CPSU Central Committee Politburo discussed at the 23 October session the question of training and retraining cadres for mastering new equipment and technology. The results of the latest meeting, held in Bucharest on 14 and 15 October this year, of the committee of foreign ministers of the Warsaw Pact member states were approved. The Politburo expressed satisfaction with the fact that the USSR's position at the Soviet-U.S. meeting in Reykjavik met with the full support of the allied socialist states. The need was stressed to step up the joint efforts of the fraternal countries, in the current situation, in the struggle for nuclear disarmament and the establishment of a comprehensive system of international security and peace.

Pact Document Optimistic

LD162352 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1600 GMT 16 Oct 86

[Text] The communique of the meeting of the Committee of Foreign Affairs Ministers of the Warsaw Pact states which took place in Bucharest was published 16 October. Here is our political observer Aleksandr Zholkver:

[Zholkver] The meeting in the Romanian capital took place immediately after the Soviet-U.S. meeting in Reykjavik, and it graphically reflected the position taken by the socialist community in the present qualitatively new situation in the world. The Warsaw pact countries are concerned with the fact that international tension is being maintained and with the stepping up of the arms race; yet another nuclear explosion in Nevada, incidentally, scheduled for today, being indicative of this. At the same time the ministers who met in Bucharest noted that positive tendencies in the development of the international situation have recently been clearing a path for themselves, although not without difficulties. The platform proposed by the Soviet Union in Reykjavik represents historical chance for an essential solution of the problems of war and peace, and the Warsaw Pact states voiced support for the far-reaching Soviet proposals on radical nuclear disarmament. The socialist countries have an integrated approach to the problem of disarmament. They have again spoken out for the reduction of conventional armaments by 25 percent in Europe. The need to sign a convention on a chemical weapons ban as soon as possible has also been stressed. Within the framework of establishing an all-embracing system of international security, whose draft has been proposed for discussion in the United Nations by the socialist countries, the socialist countries have offered quite a number of regional measures, ranging from the establishment of nuclear and chemical weapon free zones in central and northern Europe as well as in the Balkans, to measures on reducing tension in the Mediterranean. In this way the Warsaw Pact states combine a sober and realistic appraisal of the present complex situation in the world with a constructive attitude and a new bold approach toward international affairs.

One cannot help noting another characteristic trait of the document which has been signed in Bucharest: its undoubted optimism. It is based on both the results of the first stage of the Stockholm conference, where it became possible to come to an agreement on substantial confidence-building and security measures in Europe, and on the favorable prospects which are opening up through this for a new all-European meeting in Vienna, scheduled for November. But undoubtedly the major reason for our optimism is that we are confident in our own powers, in the unity of the socialist community which is growing stronger, something which has been confirmed again by the meeting of the Committee of the Foreign Affairs Ministers of the Warsaw Pact.

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