

BACK TO THE FUTURE: THE BRITISH SOUTHERN CAMPAIGN, 1780-1781

**A MONOGRAPH
BY
Major W. David Brinkley
Corps of Engineers**



19981207 068

**School of Advanced Military Studies
United States Army Command and General Staff
College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

Second Term AY 97-98

Approved for Public Release Distribution is Unlimited

INTC QUALITY INSPECTED 4

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188), Washington, DC 20503.

1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)

2. REPORT DATE
21 May 1998

3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED
Monograph

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE

Back to the Future
3-47 EARN
The British Campaign, 1790-1791

5. FUNDING NUMBERS

6. AUTHOR(S)

Major William J. Brinkley

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)

School of Advanced Military Studies
Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027

8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION
REPORT NUMBER

9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)

Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027

10. SPONSORING / MONITORING
AGENCY REPORT NUMBER

11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE.
DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED.

12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE

13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words)
SEE ATTACHED

14. SUBJECT TERMS

15. NUMBER OF PAGES

60

16. PRICE CODE

17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
OF REPORT

UNCLASSIFIED

18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
OF THIS PAGE

UNCLASSIFIED

19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
OF ABSTRACT

UNCLASSIFIED

20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT

UNLIMITED

SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES
MONOGRAPH APPROVAL

Major W. David Brinkley


Title of Monograph: *Back to the Future: The British Southern Campaign, 1780-1781*

Approved by:




Robert H. Berlin, Ph.D.

Monograph Director



COL Danny M. Davis, MA, MMAS

Director, School of Advanced
Military Studies



Philip J. Brookes, Ph.D.

Director, Graduate Degree
Program

Accepted this 21st Day of May 1998

ABSTRACT

BACK TO THE FUTURE: THE BRITISH SOUTHERN CAMPAIGN, 1780-1781.
By Major W. David Brinkley, USA, 75 pages.

This monograph analyzes the British campaign in the Carolinas during the War for Independence from December 1779 through March 1781. The monograph also examines British use of force and the ramifications of the use of force against the southern people and the southern Continental Army. Finally it investigates British attempts to control and mitigate the unconventional threat posed by American partisans and the British attempts to restore civil order and control.

The British campaign's complex environment displays marked similarities with several U.S. Army operations conducted since 1990, particularly operations in Panama, Haiti, Northern Iraq and Somalia. As the United States conducts more complex operations, the British campaign in the Carolinas can provide perspectives for today's U.S. Army campaign planner. Current U.S. policy and Army doctrine provide a framework for planning and executing civil-military operations and understanding this complex environment is crucial to their successful execution. Given the complex nature of military operations in the late 20th Century, ignorance of the environment could potentially lead to a future American military disaster. The British achieved several stunning military successes in the southern campaign, but their inability to stop the civil war and reestablish a functioning government for the people of the South proved their ultimate undoing. For these reasons, the British experience in the Carolinas from 1780-81 provides a useful case-study of complicated and complex military operations.

CONTENTS

APPROVAL PAGE.....	i
--------------------	---

ABSTRACT.....	ii
---------------	----

Section

I. Introduction.....	1
Applicable Doctrine.....	1
The Strategic Situation.....	3
II. The Combatants.....	5
The British.....	5
The Rebels.....	7
III. British Success in South Carolina.....	9
The Capture of Charleston South Carolina.....	9
Destruction of the Southern American Army.....	10
Cornwallis Takes Command.....	14
Clinton's Orders to Cornwallis.....	15
Cornwallis' Campaign Plan.....	15
IV. Cornwallis' Campaign Begins.....	17
The Battle of Camden, South Carolina.....	17
The Southern Guerrillas.....	20
V. The British Move North.....	23
Operations into North Carolina.....	25
Greene Takes Command.....	24
Ferguson Invades Western North Carolina.....	26
The Battle of Kings Mountain.....	27
VI. British Operational Setback.....	29
The British Second Campaign into North Carolina.....	30
The Americans Regroup And Split Their Army.....	31
Morgan's Mission.....	31
The Battle of Cowpens, South Carolina.....	32
VII. British Operational Collapse.....	35
VIII. Analysis.....	37
Centers of Gravity.....	37
Objective.....	40

Section	Page
Unity of Effort.....	41
Legitimacy.....	42
Restraint.....	43
Security.....	43
IX. Conclusions.....	45
X. ENDNOTES.....	48
XI. BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	57

Introduction

The British initiated the last significant North American campaign of the Revolutionary War 26 December 1779. Their aims were subjugation of the southern colonies, re-establishment of royal government, and ultimately the destruction of the Continental Army. Their campaign sought to build upon the successful capture of Savannah, Georgia and the return of Georgia to royal control in 1778.¹

The British southern campaign is little studied and largely unknown by current U.S. Army officers. However, the campaign offers a fascinating case study in the complexities of executing an expeditionary, civil-military campaign. This monograph analyzes the British campaign in the Carolinas from December 1779 through March 1781. The monograph also examines British use of force and the ramifications of the use of force against the southern people and the southern Continental Army. Finally it investigates British attempts to control and mitigate the unconventional threat posed by American partisans and the British attempts to restore civil order and control.

The British campaign's complex environment displays marked similarities with several U.S. Army operations conducted since 1990, particularly operations in Panama, Haiti, Northern Iraq and Somalia. As the United States conducts more complex operations, the British campaign in the Carolinas can provide perspectives for today's U.S. Army campaign planner. Current U.S. policy and Army doctrine provide a framework for planning and executing civil-military operations and understanding this complex environment is crucial to their successful execution.

Applicable Doctrine

The May 1997 National Security Strategy states that:

The U.S. Military conducts smaller-scale contingency operations to vindicate national interests. These operations encompass the full range of military operations short of major theater warfare, including humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping, disaster relief, no fly zones, reinforcing key allies, limited strikes, and interventions. These operations

will likely pose the most frequent challenge for U.S. Forces and cumulatively require significant commitments over time.²

The September 1997, National Military Strategy defines vital interests as “those of broad, overriding importance to the survival, security, and territorial integrity of the United States.”³ In 1780, the southern colonies were certainly “vital national interests” of England. Additionally, the colonial royal governments constituted “key allies” as well. Current U.S. strategic policy might drive today’s government to military intervention just as it drove King George III. British military intervention in the southern colonies made strategic “sense” as these colonies, particularly North Carolina contained large concentrations of loyalists.

Field Manual 100-5, *Operations*, states that stability and support operations “may ...occur simultaneously with war in the same theater.”⁴ The British faced a similar situation in South Carolina. They conducted what current doctrine describes as peace enforcement operations, support to counter-insurgencies, and support to domestic civil authorities. The United States military primarily sees these types of operations as typically post cold war missions. The British Army conducted these very same missions in 1781, South Carolina. Field Manual 100-5 also provides the imperatives for these type conflicts. The stability and support imperatives; objective, unity of effort, legitimacy, restraint, and security constitute the analysis criteria used in the monograph.⁵

The Commander in Chief of British forces in North America, Lieutenant General, Sir Henry Clinton,⁶ contemplated the pacification of South Carolina and the southern colonies of North Carolina and Virginia as early as 1776.⁷ Clinton’s campaign planned to return the rebellious colonies to the control of King George III of England. The capture of the port city of Charleston, South Carolina, the richest city of the South, was their first objective and its investiture represented the first phase of their campaign.

British experience in the southern colonies provides a useful case study of the complexities of a civil-military, expeditionary campaign. As the world's remaining "super-power," the United States faces similar challenges in the late 20th Century. Like the British in 1780, the United States currently relies on sea-based sustainment and potentially could contend with civil war, guerrilla war, and conventional war simultaneously. The British faced all three challenges in their campaign to subjugate the rebellious southern colonies.

The Strategic Situation

Between 1776 and 1780, the southern colonies had generally escaped the heavy fighting and campaigning that characterized British operations in New England, New York and New Jersey. British operations in the North ground to an operational stalemate as the Continental Army became more adroit and professional. The British sought an avenue for continued offensive operations and stymied in the North defaulted into the southern campaign. However, before analyzing the southern campaign, a strategic overview of the rebellion would prove useful.

The American War of Independence started on 19 April 1778 with the Battle of Concord. However, rebellion had brewed in the American Colonies since 1763 when Parliament enacted legislation taxing the colonies for the cost of their British Army garrisons. The British national debt in 1763 was 122,603,336 pounds and they looked to the colonies to provide 200,000 pounds a year for maintenance of the British Army. This led to the Sugar Act of 1764 and the infamous Stamp Act of 1765.⁸ Taxation, lack of representation in Parliament, and increasing use of the British Army to enforce royal law fermented in New England until boiling over into warfare. With the Declaration of Independence in 1776, the Revolution was at hand for the British.

By 1779, the British were operationally stalemated in the American Colonies. LTG Sir Henry Clinton's thinly spread force of regulars ranged from Canada to the British East Indies.

He retained control of the major American population centers in the North. Most notably, New York City and the Colony of New Jersey were firmly under royal control. However, Clinton faced a well-trained force of Continentals under General George Washington as well as threats from the French Navy along the length of the Eastern Sea Board.⁹

In England, the cost of putting down the American Rebellion became staggering in both men and material. At war with Spain and France, Parliament increasingly called for the King to end the war in the colonies. Pressure from Parliament forced Clinton to consider a decisive campaign to bring the American rebellion to its knees. Additionally, England's primary economic ties were with the agriculturally rich South. Britain could afford to loose New England, but not the South.¹⁰

The Combatants

One cannot fully understand the complexity of the British southern campaign during the American War of Independence without an appreciation for the combatants. The British organized their southern army around a core of highly trained regulars. Yet, their campaign's success depended upon loyal militia to garrison and maintain order in the reclaimed provinces. Likewise, the American Army organized around a core of regular Continentals, albeit a much smaller core than the British enjoyed. However, the majority of the rebel army was militia, both regular and irregular. Both combatants' organizations were similar but subtly different. The differences require understanding because they provide important insights to the capabilities and predilection of each army.

The British

The British Army of the late eighteenth century was "small but very professional."¹¹ Their professional army complimented their navy, arguably the best in the world. However the British did not send their entire army nor navy to suppress the American rebellion. Britain, during the revolution, also maintained garrisons in Canada, the West Indies, Europe, Africa, and Asia. War with Spain and France tied down substantial British forces in England, Gibraltar and her other colonies. The British required these troops to protect England and her other colonial holdings.¹²

In 1775, the British Army numbered 48,000 men and officers of which 8500 were in North America.¹³ However, by 1781, the British North American Army numbered 48,647 men.¹⁴ Even with this substantial amount of troops available, Clinton only mustered 8500 men for the southern campaign. This disparity is largely due to the large number of troops tied down garrisoning Canada, the West Indies, New York, New Jersey, Rhode Island, Georgia and West

Florida.¹⁵ Occupying reclaimed colonies proved to be extremely expensive in terms of the manpower required and limited Britain's ability to conduct large scale operations.

The British employed ground forces from three primary sources in the American Revolution. The British Army included both American and British regulars, loyalist militias, and foreign mercenaries. The British also employed several squadrons of the Navy to protect their extended sea lines of communications, the American coast, and to support littoral army operations.

The British Regular Army units fighting in the southern campaign included the following infantry regiments; the 23rd, 33rd, 42nd, 63rd, 64th, and 71st Regiments of Foot. Loyalist American Regular Army units included the British Legion, a New York loyalist infantry and cavalry force commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Banastre Tarleton; the Volunteers of Ireland, a Philadelphia regiment commanded by Lieutenant Colonel, Lord Francis Rawdon; Brown's and Hamilton's Corps, Major Patrick Ferguson's American Volunteers, the Prince of Wales American Regiment, and two other northern Tory battalions. A detachment of the 17th Dragoons and small elements of the Royal Artillery, Royal Engineers, and Royal Navy completed the regulars available to the British in the South.¹⁶ These forces were generally well trained and well equipped at the beginning of the campaign. All the British regulars were battle-hardened from extensive campaigning in the northern theater.

The Loyalist southern militia was not particularly well equipped nor trained. They were raised from the loyalist population of Georgia and the Carolinas and organized into local companies and county regiments. The British campaign plan envisaged the regulars defeating the continental and rebel forces and loyal militiamen performing police and occupation tasks. Both Clinton and Cornwallis planned for militia to free the regular army of garrison duties. However, neither Clinton nor Cornwallis placed great faith in the non-regular militia of the Carolinas. Most

British officers believed the loyalist militia “lacked the patriots’ enthusiasm... and could seldom bring up competent leaders from their own ranks.”¹⁷ It is insightful that the British Campaign centered on the use of untrusted militia.

Two German Regiments fought with the British in the Southern campaign. These troops were very well trained. Called Jagers, the German troops were elite soldiers hired by George III from their Hessian princes. German light infantry troops served as skirmishers, scouts, and on foraging parties. All were expert shots and experienced in fieldcraft.¹⁸ Overall, the British had a well-trained core of British, American, and German regulars and a semi-dependable force of southern loyalist volunteers with which to pacify the Carolinas and Virginia.

The Rebels

The Continentals were American rebel regulars. Initially, American forces were drawn up as local and state militia. However, the Continental Congress commissioned officers and stood up “line” regiments forming a conventional European like army.¹⁹ Early in the revolution, the quality of the Continental soldier was poor. However, by 1780 “the Continental Army was no longer the ill-trained, ill-disciplined force that had taken the field in 1775.”²⁰ Washington sent the cream of the Continental Army south to fight the British in 1780, the Maryland and Delaware lines. These two brigades, commanded by Major General Jean, Baron de Kalb, were as well trained and disciplined as any British or Hessian infantry in the campaign.²¹ Following the fall of Charleston, these brigades formed the foundation of the American Army in the South.

The rebel southern militia constituted the majority of the American troops fighting the British in the South. These soldiers formed into locally raised companies and regiments like their loyalist foes. They typically armed themselves with private weapons or those captured from the British and enlisted for three to six months. The militias elected their own officers or were led by detached, Continental officers. The militia, generally were not effective in close fighting and

very susceptible to breaking under the British bayonet. However, when properly led the militia provided an adequate fighting force.²²

Rebel irregular militia and guerrilla forces also fought the British during the southern campaign. The irregulars formed and fought typically for only one or two battles. The battle of King's Mountain provides an example of this. Over a 1000 irregular soldiers, the "over the mountain men", formed and fought Ferguson's American Volunteers. This battle and its impact on the British campaign will be discussed at length later. Following the battle, the majority of these men went home to their farms. Typically, the irregular militia were armed with excellent rifles, horse mounted, and superior shots.²³ They, like the other militia, elected their own leaders.

Guerrilla forces harried the British lines of communication and ambushed foraging parties and message couriers. Their actions forced the British to extensively patrol and garrison the interior of the south. Two of the most notable guerrilla leaders, Brigadier General Thomas Sumter (1734-1832) and Colonel Frances Marion (1732-1795) led very effective guerrilla units that continually harassed the British rear and made it increasing difficult for the British to resupply and communicate. Both of these officers were southerners and Continental officers of the line. They raised their own forces and fought in concert with the Continental Army. Guerrilla bands provided extremely valuable reconnaissance of British movements and intentions. They allowed the rebel army to frequently avoid the British or fight the British at the place of their choosing.²⁴ In all, the rebels fielded an adequate and capable fighting force in the South.

British Success in South Carolina

The Capture of Charleston, South Carolina

The British sailed with 6000 men from Sandy Hook, New York, 26 December 1779, initiating the southern campaign.²⁵ The Royal Navy convoyed the troop transports and remained on station to provide the army support during its assault on Charleston. The British planned to capture Charleston, drive the rebels from South Carolina and raise loyalist militia regiments to garrison the colony's interior. With South Carolina secure, British regulars could then repeat this procedure in North Carolina and Virginia.

John Buchanan writes that, "Clinton's primary objective was Charleston, the most important southern port and then the richest city in North American."²⁶ Sir Henry Clinton, Commander in Chief of the British Forces, stated;

I had long determined... on an expedition against Charleston, the capital of South Carolina, which every account I had received from Georgia convinced me was necessary to save that province from falling again into the hands of the rebels.²⁷

Clinton believed that Charleston was the key to the south. The British attempted to seize Charleston in 1776. Then, a force under Commodore, Sir Peter Parker, with Clinton (then Major General) and 2,200 British regulars attacked Fort Sullivan, 28 June 1776.²⁸ Fort Sullivan, on Sullivan's island, guarded the entrance to Charleston's harbor. Their attempt to take Charleston failed under the spirited rebel artillery fire from Fort Sullivan. With Parker's squadron repulsed, Clinton reloaded his troops and the British returned to New York.

The British successfully seized the port of Savannah, Georgia in November 1778 returning Georgia to royal control.²⁹ They successfully defended Savannah from a combined French and American attack the following year. Charles Stedman, a loyalist American officer, related,

the assailants [French and American] were repulsed, driven out of the ditch and redoubt, and routed with redoubled slaughter, leaving behind them, in killed and wounded, six hundred and thirty-seven of the French troops, and two hundred and sixty-four of the Americans.³⁰

The Franco-American attack on Savannah temporarily delayed the British attack on Charleston. However, with Georgia secure and the French temporarily defeated, Clinton initiated the southern campaign.

Lieutenant Colonel Banastre Tarleton wrote that South Carolina was picked as the initial objective because of “the mildness of the climate, the richness of the country, its vicinity to Georgia, and its distance from George Washington.”³¹ Clinton wanted a quick victory in the south without seriously eroding the British strength in the northern colonies. He feared an offensive by General George Washington in New York.³² In order to field the army for the southern campaign, Clinton retired from Rhode Island and assumed defensive postures in New York and New Jersey. The sooner the campaign was successfully terminated the sooner Clinton could return the preponderance of his regular forces to New York.

Clinton, as well as Lord George Germain, believed the south full of loyalists eager to return to royal rule.³³ King George III and Germain, impressed by reports from southern royal governors, “had always believed that most Americans, given a chance to choose freely, would support the Crown.”³⁴ Clinton and Germain envisaged southern loyalists forming the militia regiments required to fully restore the King’s order the southern rebellious colonies. Thus, with a faulty assessment of southern loyalty, Clinton embarked on the southern campaign.³⁵

Destruction of the Southern American Army

In 1777, Sir William Howe, then Commander in Chief of British Forces in North America, estimated that the reduction and investiture of Charleston would require 15,000 men.³⁶ Clinton sailed from New York with less than half that number largely based on Germain’s mistaken belief that the majority of the southern population remained loyal to the crown. Also, as

previously mentioned, extensive garrisoning requirements restricted the amount of British troops available for this campaign.

The British attack force was hammered and scattered by two severe storms while in transit to South Carolina; the first between 27 and 30 December 1779 and the second 2 through 6 January 1780.³⁷ Clinton's force lost the majority of its artillery and all of its cavalry horses, plus many other stores in the rough seas. The loss of their horses to the storm severely restricted Clinton's mobility initially in the campaign. The battered British invasion force finally landed near Savannah, in late January 1780.³⁸

Following the landing, Clinton ordered Brigadier General James Paterson, with 1400 men, to Augusta, Georgia as a diversion. Following the diversion, Paterson marched overland from Augusta to Charleston. With Paterson went the majority of the cavalry, now dismounted because of the storm. Clinton then sailed from Savannah with his remaining 5000 men to North Edisto Sound, approximately twenty miles south of Charleston.³⁹

The British landed on Wadmalaw Island, 11 February 1780, and proceeded overland seizing the ford across the Stono River. They then quickly established a depot near the ford on the Hudson Plantation. The British Army continued their march northwest through swamps and plantations and crossed the Ashley River north of Charleston, 30 March 1780. By crossing the Ashley River to the Charleston Neck, the British were now positioned to cut the land line of communication to Charleston. Established behind Charleston, the British started the construction of three siege parallels at sunset, 2 April 1780. British siege works completely cut Charleston Neck by 8 April 1780 encircling Major General Benjamin Lincoln's besieged force.⁴⁰

Major General Lincoln (1733-1810) commanded all American forces defending Charleston. A Massachusetts native trusted by George Washington, he was appointed to command the Southern Department by Congress in 1788.⁴¹ Lincoln was severely wounded in

the ankle at Saratoga and as a result had one leg two inches shorter than the other. He also "undoubtedly suffered from narcolepsy, in which periods of sleep are brief but deep."⁴² However, though not a brilliant officer, Congress selected Lincoln because it felt he could effectively lead both regulars and militia.

The British Navy, through a daring maneuver, entered Charleston Harbor 8 April and forced passage by Fort Moultrie with the minimal loss of one supply ship grounded and burned by her crew. Fort Moultrie, an improved version of Fort Sullivan, was named for its commander, Colonel William Moultrie (1730-1805).⁴³ The Naval blockade coupled with the Army siege-works completely sealed off Charleston from the sea and land. The only avenue to Charleston remaining to the rebels was the Cooper River, flowing from the north to the city.⁴⁴

Clinton ordered Lord Cornwallis to seize crossings along the Cooper River and prevent rebel resupply or reinforcement of Charleston. Cornwallis was also ordered to defeat American cavalry detachments guarding the Cooper River line of communication. Cornwallis dispatched LTC Banastre Tarleton, commanding the British Legion, a detachment of the 17th Royal Dragoons, and a detachment of mounted infantry to attack the American cavalry at Monck's Corner, South Carolina. On the night of 13-14 April 1780, Monck's Corner was defended by 500 rebels under the command of Brigadier General Isaac Huger. Huger's mission was to hold open the Cooper River line of communication to Charleston allowing reinforcement, munitions, and supplies to flow into the beleaguered city.⁴⁵

Tarleton attacked with approximately 1400 British soldiers on the night of 13 April 1780 taking the American garrison completely by surprise. The Americans were scattered and their stores, horses, ammunition, and other supplies captured by the British. This was the first of many of Tarleton's victories in the south, however, it also marked the first of his excesses with prisoners.⁴⁶

During this same two day period, Tarleton's Legionaries assaulted several women of the local area, including the wife of Sir John Collinton, an ardent local loyalist.⁴⁷ The troops in question were apprehended and remitted to Charleston under guard. These incidents of cruelty against foe and friend alike would become the rule for Tarleton's troops during the campaign. British war crimes caused the local population to fear the British occupation forces as well as hardened rebel resolve to resist.

Excesses aside, Tarleton's cavalry action closed the last line of communication open to the rebel forces in Charleston. Clinton continued to progressively move his siege lines closer to the American defenses while continually bombarding them with his battered artillery. The siege continued through 21 April when Major General Lincoln requested a parley with Clinton.⁴⁸ On 8 May, Clinton formally requested that Lincoln surrender the garrison of Charleston. On 11 May, Lincoln signed the conditional twelve articles of capitulation.⁴⁹ Lincoln surrendered Charleston the next day. With his surrender, the southern Continental Army was taken.

The surrender of Charleston represented the greatest military defeat for the Continental Army in the Revolution. The Continental Army lost seven general officers, ninety-three other officers, 5175 men, and over 300 guns and mortars. Lincoln surrendered eighteen Continental regiments "including the entire South Carolina and Virginia Lines and one-third of the North Carolina Line."⁵⁰ Lincoln's surrender effectively destroyed the southern Continental Army. Rebel militia and armed civilians were paroled to their homes and Lincoln was allowed to send his final sealed dispatches to Washington announcing his surrender.⁵¹

During the final stages of the siege, Clinton ordered Cornwallis to cover the British rear and to prevent the Charleston garrison's escape north along the Cooper River. Cornwallis therefore ordered Tarleton to pursue the rebel cavalry north. Cornwallis also cautioned Tarleton strongly to "...use your utmost endeavors to prevent the troops under your command from

committing irregularities...⁵² Tarleton pushed man and horse alike on a forced march of 105 miles in fifty-four hours cornering the rebels at the Waxhaws, 29 May 1780.⁵³ However, Tarleton choose to liberally interpret his orders. The British Legion attacked and Tarleton's horse was shot from under him. The rebels attempted to surrender, but were instead caught and slaughtered. The Americans suffered 113 killed and 203 captured of which 150 were wounded.⁵⁴

The British Legion (all American Loyalists) started killing their prisoners immediately following their surrender. The American commander sued for quarter and sent forward an Ensign under a white flag. This young officer was cut down by British Legion soldiers. The Legionaries bayoneted any wounded rebel who showed signs of life.⁵⁵ Tarleton attributes this brutality to his soldiers' "vindictive asperity." They believed their commander lost with the first volley.⁵⁶ The Battle of Waxhaws demonstrated to the rebels that the British Legion offered no quarter and led to the savagery that ultimately characterized the war in the South. This was particularly true of the fighting between American loyalists and rebels.⁵⁷ Waxhaws also introduced another term into the American Revolution's lexicon; "Tarleton's Quarter", a signal for no prisoners. This battle also provided Tarleton with the sobriquets that would follow him the rest of the war; "Bloody Ban" and "Bloody Tarleton." The Battle of Waxhaws effectively ended the first phase of the British Campaign by defeating the major rebel forces around Charleston.⁵⁸

Cornwallis Takes Command of the British Southern Army

Following the Battle of Waxhaws, Cornwallis moved his command to Camden, South Carolina. His orders from Clinton were to send detachments into the interior of South Carolina continuing the British pacification effort. Clinton appointed Major Patrick Ferguson as the Inspector of Militia and ordered him to initiate the formation of loyalist militia regiments.⁵⁹ Finally, on 3 June 1780, Clinton issued a series of royal proclamations "denouncing the severest

punishments against those who should still persist in their reasonable practices and promising the most effectual... protection and support to the King's faithful and peaceable subjects."⁶⁰

Significantly, the proclamations ordered all rebels on parole be released, required to pledged allegiance to the King, and required to serve in the King's militia.⁶¹ Clinton's error in judgment enraged the recently paroled rebel militia causing many to rearm against the British. Clinton relinquished command of the southern theater to Lord Cornwallis, 4 June 1780, and sailed back to New York.⁶²

Clinton's Orders To Cornwallis

Clinton gave Cornwallis seven tasks to achieve in the south. First, he was to reestablish the royal government of South Carolina. Second, he was to organize loyalist militia to garrison the colony. Third he was to "deal with the disaffected." Finally, he was to post garrisons into the back country of South Carolina, supply his army, prepare for an American counterattack from North Carolina, and maintain contact with the British garrisons in Georgia and Florida.⁶³ Most importantly, Cornwallis' primary responsibility was protecting Charleston and South Carolina. Clinton discouraged an attack into North Carolina before South Carolina was fully pacified, particularly if that move jeopardized the British Army.⁶⁴ Ultimately, Clinton gave Cornwallis wide and independent powers to fight the southern campaign as he saw fit.

Cornwallis' Campaign Plan

Clinton left Cornwallis with seven under-strength British infantry regiments and very little cavalry. Cornwallis also commanded two Hessian regiments and six regiments of American loyalist regulars. Collectively, Cornwallis' forces numbered about 4000 soldiers of all ranks.⁶⁵ Cornwallis' initial plan foresaw the consolidation of British gains in South Carolina followed by a refined campaign strategy for the continued subjugation of the remaining southern colonies. He

kept his regulars in the Charleston area and established a large detachment at Camden with smaller detachments at Ninety-Six, Hanging Rock, Rocky Mount, the Cheraws, and Georgetown.⁶⁶ Thus, Cornwallis established a strong line of forts in the interior and along the coast of South Carolina.

Cornwallis rapidly established British interior garrisons and then set to work establishing the necessary communications to these remote garrisons. Clinton left Cornwallis with little cavalry and no heavy wagons. This forced Cornwallis to use the mounted British Legion to patrol the interior and protect his communications. This crippled Cornwallis' ability to conduct mounted reconnaissance of the enemy.⁶⁷

Cornwallis was dependent on logistical resupply from New York. Clinton supplied little money to buy supplies and services in South Carolina. Therefore, the British were forced to "appropriate" their supplies, clothing, horses, lodging, and wagons from the local population, loyal or not. Unfortunately for Cornwallis, this method of resupply further antagonized the population.⁶⁸ The process of foraging supplies alienated the loyalist population from the crown and severely detracted from Cornwallis' ability to restore royal government and prosecute his campaign.

Cornwallis' Campaign Begins

The Battle of Camden, South Carolina

Following the American Army's defeat in Charleston, a second Continental army marched south encamping at Hillsborough, North Carolina. The regulars from Maryland and Delaware, some of the best Continental soldiers available and ably led by Major General "Baron" Jean de Kalb, were ordered south, 16 April, 1780, to prevent British attacks further north. However, short of food and supplies, de Kalb stopped his army to rest and refit at Hillsborough, 22 June, before moving further south.⁶⁹

General de Kalb planned to move his force circuitously southwest towards Charlotte, North Carolina and there resupply and recruit new soldiers. His regulars were sick from bad food and many suffered dysentery. The population around Charlotte supported the rebellion and could resupply, feed and hospital his army. Also, the route to Charlotte linked the Continentals with the North Carolina militia under Major General Richard Caswell. As de Kalb made preparations to move, he was replaced as commander by General Horatio Gates (1727-1806). Gates had different plans for the second southern army.⁷⁰

Gates, an ex-English officer, retired to Virginia in 1772. When the Revolution started Gates was offered a commission in the new Continental Army as the Adjutant General. He excelled at staff work, but eagerly sought field command. On 4 August 1777, Gates took command of the Northern Department from General Philip Schuyler.⁷¹ Gates was ably assisted by two of the best field commanders of the Revolution, Daniel Morgan and Benedict Arnold.⁷² Together, they won a stunning victory over the British at Saratoga, 13-16 October 1777. Saratoga represented the largest British defeat of the American war through 1777. This critical victory ensured France's entry into the war on the side of the Americans.⁷³

General George Washington hoped for a similar victory in the south against Cornwallis and recommended to Congress that Major General Nathanael Greene replace the captured Lincoln as commander of the Southern Department.⁷⁴ However, Congress selected the "Hero of Saratoga" over Greene and Gates assumed command on 13 June 1780.⁷⁵

Gates immediately countermanded de Kalb's orders and against the advice of his officers ordered a forced march by the most direct route to Camden. Gates wished to attack the British garrison there before reinforcements could arrive from Charleston. The route Gates selected was devoid of forage or food and increased the suffering of his sick army. Nonetheless, Gates consolidated his 1400 regulars and over 2500 militia at Rugeley's Mills, South Carolina on 7 August 1780 and prepared to attack Camden.⁷⁶

Lord Cornwallis was far from idle during this period. Lord Rawdon, commander of the large British garrison at Camden, alerted Cornwallis of Gate's approach. Cornwallis immediately forced marched with reinforcements to Camden and took personal command. Cornwallis assessed the situation; should he stay and fight a larger army of Americans or retreat with the Camden garrison to Charleston.⁷⁷

Cornwallis had 800 of his own troops sick and hospitalized at Camden with a great store of supplies neither of which he wanted abandoned to the Americans.⁷⁸ A loyalist spy, posing as a Marylander, entered the American camp and enjoyed a long conversation with Gates. This spy's intelligence proved vital to Cornwallis. Cornwallis learned that the majority of Gates' regulars were sick and that the balance of his army were green militia. Cornwallis' own force was nearly all regular. For these reasons, Cornwallis chose to fight Gates.⁷⁹

With the stage set, both Cornwallis' and Gates' advanced guards collided 15 August 1780 near Saunders Creek, South Carolina. The next morning they arrayed their respected forces north of Saunders Creek, across the road to Rugeley's Mills. Cornwallis placed his provincial

regulars, under Lord Rawdon, west of the road and his British regulars, under Webster, to the east of the road. He kept the 71st Regiment and Tarleton's cavalry in reserve. Gates placed his untried North Carolinians and Virginians to the east against the British regulars and his Continentals west against Rawdon's provincials. Gates kept a brigade of Maryland Continentals in reserve behind the North Carolinian militia.⁸⁰

The advancing Virginian militia began the battle in the east. The Virginians commenced a bayonet charge against Webster's British regulars. Webster counterattacked the militia and the untrained Virginians immediately broke and fled. Seeing the Virginia militia running for their lives, the majority of the North Carolinians quickly followed suit. Only one North Carolina militia regiment stood and fought that day, the regiment closest to the stalwart Continentals from Maryland.⁸¹

Cornwallis' attack devastated the American line. Gates, seeing two-thirds of his force break and run, joined them and fled the battlefield. Only the Continentals under de Kalb stood their ground. They repulsed Rawdon's Provincials repeatedly, but were ultimately overrun in the east by Webster's regulars and in the rear by Tarleton's cavalry. Ultimately, they too broke and fled leaving their commander, General de Kalb, and over half their number dead or wounded. Cornwallis' victory was complete.⁸² He had destroyed the second southern American Army and believed South Carolina now all but secure.⁸³

The British captured the Continental lines of South Carolina, North Carolina and part of Virginia at Charleston. They destroyed the remaining Virginia Continentals at the Waxhaws. Now, following Camden, the Continentals of Maryland and Delaware were beaten. The British also had killed, captured or dispersed, thousands of rebel militia men. Camden destroyed the integrity of the southern patriot army and, except for guerrilla activity, seemingly gave the British control of South Carolina.⁸⁴ However, all was not well for the British in South Carolina.

The Southern Guerrillas

The southern guerrilla war was also a civil war. Partisan battles tended to pit American against American. In fact, Tarleton's notorious British Legion was almost wholly American and primarily directed against the partisans. The majority of the rebels were Scotch-Irish settlers from lowland Scotland, Ireland or emigrants from Pennsylvania all arriving between 1650's and 1750's. The Scotch-Irish hated royal rule because of excessive royal taxes and illegal fines.⁸⁵

The loyalists were predominately first generation Scottish Highlanders and poorer English emigrants. "The Scottish Highlanders constituted an important and a disturbing element" very loyal to the King. Many of the Scots settled on royal land grants in the Carolinas following their military retirements. They were typically staunchly loyal to King George III.⁸⁶ The upland and back-country Scots represented the primary troop source for the loyalist British militia.

The Scotch-Irish formed the Regulators, a pre-revolution rebellious organization, and revolted against the North Carolina colonial government. The Regulators were put down 16 May 1771. The royal governor of North Carolina, William Tryon, ravaged and looted Regulator farms and homes. Ultimately, royal courts tried twelve Regulator leaders and hung six. The Royal Governor's policies toward the Scotch-Irish caused thousands to flee over the Appalachians into the Tennessee Valley to setup a state independent of the British King.⁸⁷ Most of those who fled would ultimately support the revolution and these people formed the nucleus of the "over the mountain" men.

The Revolution provided a fertile plain for the explosion of a terrible, partisan civil war between the Scots and Scotch-Irish. The savageness displayed on both sides shocked both British and Northern Americans alike. The pre-existing southern prejudices, hatreds and conflicts fostered organized partisan warfare that flourished as nowhere else in the Thirteen States.⁸⁸ John Shy writes that even the Royal Governors of Georgia and South Carolina "...were

appalled by the brutal spectacle of civil war, the very opposite of what Americanization was supposed to bring.”⁸⁹

There were three key southern guerrilla leaders, Brigadier Generals Sumter, Marion, and Pickens. Their partisan bands continued to fight following Camden and the fall of Charleston, taking British supply trains, ambushing British patrols and couriers, and impeding British foraging. Most importantly, the partisans kept loyalist sympathizers cowed and uninvolved in the war.⁹⁰

General Francis Marion (1732-1795) started the Revolutionary War as a captain of the South Carolina Line, became a colonel of a partisan regiment, and finally a Brigadier General of states troops. He led a combined force of horse and foot soldiers. Marion proved “...quick in conception and equally swift in execution, unrelenting in the pursuit of his purposes, yet void of ruthlessness or cruelty to his victims.”⁹¹

General Thomas Sumter (1734-1832) also was a captain of the South Carolina Line when the revolution began. “Later he commanded his own corps of irregulars as a Brigadier General.”⁹² He was more inclined to take risks and “trust the boldness of the attack and the sheer fighting ability of his men.” Sumter fought on his own terms and was less likely to coordinate his operations with those of the Continental Army.⁹³ However, he was very effective in cutting British lines of communication, harassing British garrisons, and providing useful information to the Continental Army.⁹⁴

Like his fellow partisans, General Andrew Pickens (1739-1817) started the revolution as a captain in the South Carolina militia. Later he became a colonel and finally a Brigadier General of the South Carolina militia. However, for the majority of the war he commanded irregulars. Buchanan writes that Pickens was “a stereotype of the lean, dour, long-faced Scotch-

Irishman.”⁹⁵ His exploits were less spectacular than Marion’s and Sumter’s, but his partisan fight equally vigorous and successful.⁹⁶

All three harassed the British and their Loyalist allies, encouraged the rebellion and kept the resistance to the King alive during the darkest days following the destruction of the Lincoln’s and Gates’ armies. Clyde R. Ferguson writes that both sides sought:

to perform similar functions: suppression of political dissent and maintenance of an orderly society. In the civil war that was waged in the South, the two functions often were indistinguishable... the combination of patriot persecution of Tories for three years and the virtual British abandonment of them during the same period [1775-1779] proved disastrous... essentially the [British] southern strategy depended on counterrevolution.⁹⁷

South Carolina’s partisans fought in thirty-six engagements in 1780, twenty-six without Continental support. By all accounts, the partisans of South Carolina acquitted themselves well in their engagements with the British. Cornwallis stated this best, “I will not say much in praise of the militia of the Southern Colonies, but the list of British officers and soldiers killed and wounded by them since last June (1780), proves but too fatally that they are not wholly contemptible.”⁹⁸ The partisan forces led by Marion, Sumter, and Pickens held their own against British regulars utilizing classic guerrilla warfare techniques and most importantly reduced pressure on the Continental Army as it regrouped in North Carolina.⁹⁹ Cornwallis’ failure to adequately control the southern partisans had serious consequences on the second phase of the British campaign.

British Move North

The British campaign's initial phase proved largely successful. Operationally, Cornwallis achieved the majority of the tasks assigned him by Sir Henry Clinton. He reestablished the royal government of South Carolina and successfully raised loyalist militia regiments to garrison the colony. With these troops, the British posted garrisons into the back country of South Carolina, with a major garrison at Ninety-Six. Additionally, Cornwallis crushed the American counterattack from North Carolina at Camden. However, British military success did not pacify the rebellion in South Carolina.

Clinton's initial suspension of militia parole, coupled with the required oaths of loyalty to the Crown, actually increased the insurrection of the southern population. This single civil-military act caused far reaching and unintended consequences effecting the entire British campaign. The Revolutionary War custom of parole freed both sides from supporting large numbers of enemy prisoners and in the South would have rendered many ex-rebels noncombatants. Clinton inadvertently fostered great resentment with the ex-rebel militiamen and created an entirely new group of "disaffected" citizens.

Cornwallis' own predilection for severity combined with Tarleton's actions at the Waxhaws and Camden hardened rebel resolve and fostered growing guerrilla activity in South Carolina.¹⁰⁰ From the British perspective, with Gates' defeat at Camden and an active counter-guerrilla campaign, the subjugation of South Carolina appeared to be well in hand.¹⁰¹ Unknown to Cornwallis, however, Camden turned the back-country of South Carolina into a partisan sea and word of British cruelty and excesses quickly spread to North Carolina.

Operations into North Carolina

Solidly based in South Carolina, Cornwallis initiated the second phase of the campaign, the subjugation of North Carolina. Cornwallis envisaged a three pronged advance into the

colony. Ferguson, with the newly raised South Carolina militia, would move north along the Allegheny Mountains and pacify the frontier. Ferguson also would protect the western flank of the main army. Simultaneously, a smaller force under Major James Henry Craig, with the 82nd Regiment, sought to seize Wilmington, North Carolina.

A coastal base at Wilmington was vital to British operations in North Carolina. Such a base, secured the eastern flank and reduced British reliance on tenuous land communications for resupply.¹⁰² Craig's action secured Cornwallis' eastern flank as well as provided a forward supply base and port for the army. Cornwallis planned for the main army, in the center, to strike toward Charlotte, North Carolina and the remnants of the Continental Army located there.

Cornwallis sought to establish a large garrison at Charlotte similar to the British garrison at Camden. He ordered Ferguson to establish a series of forts along the North Carolina frontier. These, like the line of forts in South Carolina, intended to contain partisan activity and garrison North Carolina's western frontier. Cornwallis reserved Tarleton's mounted British Legion as a mobile corps to actively pursue the horse mounted guerrillas or react to any major American or French ground force threat.

Cornwallis indicates in his correspondence with Lord Germain and Sir Henry Clinton that an extension of the campaign north fulfilled the British strategic vision of the domino-like campaign.¹⁰³ However, where Clinton massed British forces against Charleston, Cornwallis decided to split his army into three attacking arms, none supporting the another. Cornwallis choose to ignore the American guerrilla threat believing the defeated Continental Army could not defend North Carolina. The British assumed that conventional military victory against the main rebel army would automatically restore political control of the province.¹⁰⁴ With South Carolina militarily "secure," Cornwallis crossed into North Carolina, 25 September 1780.¹⁰⁵

Greene Takes Command

Following the debacle of the Southern Continental Army, General George Washington again recommended Major General Nathaniel Greene to Congress as commander of the Southern Department and on 14 October, 1780, he replaced the bungling Gates. Greene busied himself the first month of his command arranging for the reconstitution of his army. Finally on, 2 December 1780 he arrived at Charlotte, North Carolina and took command from Gates.¹⁰⁶

Greene immediately petitioned the Governors of Virginia and North Carolina for replacement troops, arms, supplies and materiel. More tellingly, he inspected his forces, firsthand, and determined them unfit for service without resupply and replacements. Writing to Thomas Jefferson, Governor of Virginia, 16 December 1780, Greene explains,

I find the troops under his [Gates'] Command in a most wretched Condition, destitute of everything necessary... It is impossible that men can render any Service, if they are ever so well disposed whilst they are starving with Cold and Hunger. Your Troops may literally be said to be naked...¹⁰⁷

Without a fit field army, Greene directly corresponded with the guerrilla leaders in South Carolina.¹⁰⁸ His orders to General Marion are indicative of Greene's appreciation for the southern conflict as well as his own assessment of his army. He wrote Marion, 4 December 1780:

... until a more permanent army can be collected than is in the Field at present we must endeavor to keep up a Partizan [sic] War and preserve the Tide of Sentiment among the People.... Spies are the Eyes of an Army... It is of the highest Importance that I get the earliest Information and any Reinforcements which may arrive at Charlestown [Charleston] or leave the Town to join Lord Cornwallis. I wish you therefore to fix some Plan for procuring such information and for conveying it to me with all possible Dispatch.¹⁰⁹

Cornwallis focused his main operational effort directly against what he saw as the major American threat in North Carolina, the fractured Continentals at Charlotte. Greene's

correspondence shows that the main American Army was incapable of conventional operations. In truth, the only American's capable of offensive operations proved to be the partisan brigades operating in North and South Carolina. The lack of concentrated British emphasis on the partisans and the disaffected population would prove to be fatal at Kings Mountain.

Ferguson Invades Western North Carolina

While Greene labored to rebuild the third American Southern Army, Major Patrick Ferguson and 1000 loyalist militiamen marched into western North Carolina. Ferguson aimed to crush the resistance along the frontier and ferret out the guerrilla bands operating there. He issued a proclamation stating that if the local inhabitants "did not desist from their opposition to the British arms, he would march over the mountains, hang their leaders, and lay their country waste with fire and sword."¹¹⁰

It is well to remember the objects of this proclamation, the "Regulators", originally fled over the mountains to escape similar royal oppression. Ferguson's proclamation did not intimidate these people. Indeed, it served to galvanize the mountain people causing over 1600 "mountaineers" to rendezvous at Sycamore Shoals, North Carolina (now Tennessee) 26 September, 1780.¹¹¹ Their aim was to "hunt" Ferguson and destroy the British threat to their homes and families.¹¹²

This large force of irregulars formed into regiments and with a single purpose moved southwest searching for Ferguson. Ferguson had established a temporary garrison at Gilbert Town, North Carolina, but abandoned this post after intelligence warned him of the large force of irregulars marching toward Gilbert Town from the mountains. He withdrew his corps towards Charlotte seeking to link-up with the main British Army and safety.¹¹³

The Battle of Kings Mountain

However, Ferguson decided to stop at Kings Mountain, North Carolina and defend there 6 October 1780. Ferguson believed his well trained militia, in suitable defensive terrain, more than a match for an untrained band of irregulars. In his final message to Cornwallis, Ferguson stated that "three of four hundred good soldiers, part dragoons, would finish the business. *Something must be done soon.* This is their [the Americans] last push in this quarter."¹¹⁴ In an earlier message to Cornwallis, Ferguson relates that, "I have taken a post where I do not think I can be forced by a stronger enemy than that against us."¹¹⁵ Evidently, Ferguson decided to defend and await reinforcement by Tarleton's dragoons.¹¹⁶ Thus, the contest pitting disciplined British muskets and bayonets against irregular American long rifles was set.

The Americans irregulars were joined by Virginia and North Carolina state militia on 1 October 1780, near Quaker Meadows, North Carolina. This brought the force to a strength of almost 1400 men.¹¹⁷ To speed their pursuit of Ferguson, the Americans selected 700 mounted men bidding the remainder to follow as soon as they could. This fast moving mounted force was joined on 5 October near Cowpens, South Carolina by 400 mounted partisans.¹¹⁸ American scouts discovered Ferguson's corps at Kings Mountain on 6 October and attacked the following morning.

In just forty-seven minutes the western flank of Cornwallis' Army was completely annihilated with over 300 British casualties and almost 700 taken prisoner by the Americans.¹¹⁹ It was a stunning defeat for the British. Ferguson's defeat, coupled with increased guerrilla activity in South Carolina forced Cornwallis to abandon Charlotte and withdraw the British Army back to South Carolina for the winter. With the western corps destroyed and the remainder of the British Army sick, the second phase of the British campaign ended in failure. The marble

monument erected at Kings Mountain presents the state of the British campaign best, "this brilliant victory marked the turning point of the American Revolution."¹²⁰

British Operational Setback

With the British defeat at Kings Mountain and their subsequent withdrawal to South Carolina, Cornwallis lost the operational initiative to the Americans. For the remainder of the campaign the British reacted to Greene's Americans. The American victory at Kings Mountain had several significant operational effects. Most importantly, it effectively stopped any significant recruitment of Southerners into British Service.¹²¹ Southern British success depended on successfully recruiting loyalist militia to garrison the subjugated colonies and enforce royal civil authority. Without loyalist militia, the British Army could not achieve its objectives in South Carolina or retake North Carolina.

The partisan brigades, encouraged and emboldened by Kings Mountain, threatened the major British garrisons in South Carolina. Cornwallis could not rightly continue operations in North Carolina with South Carolina threatened. Partisans, under Marion, forced the British to evacuate their coastal garrison at Georgetown, South Carolina, a key British resupply base. Additionally, Lieutenant Colonel John Harris Cruger, the commander of the vital British frontier garrison at Ninety-Six, South Carolina, feared his mostly militia garrison would break under a determined American attack. Ultimately, the royal militia around Camden disintegrated after hearing news of the British disaster at Kings Mountain. Major James Weymss best stated the bleak British situation in South Carolina, it "cannot be kept by militia."¹²²

Extensive campaigning into North Carolina physically weakened the British Army. The British took winter quarters with Cornwallis, Tarleton, and many of their soldiers sick, undernourished, and few in numbers.¹²³ Without a capable militia, short supplies and horses, and with strained and contested supply lines, Cornwallis settled into winter camp near Winnsboro, South Carolina, 29 October 1780, and awaited reinforcements.¹²⁴

The British Second Campaign Into North Carolina

Cornwallis fervently believed British control of North Carolina vital to the security of South Carolina and Georgia. His first foray into that province ended in disaster with the loss of Ferguson's corps. However, even with Ferguson's loss, the British operational goal continued to be the subjugation of North Carolina. Cornwallis wrote Sir Henry Clinton as early as 6 August 1780 that,

It may be doubted by some whether the invasion of North Carolina may be a prudent measure; but I am convinced a necessary one, and that if we do not attack that province, we must give up both South Carolina and Georgia, and retire within the walls of Charles-town.¹²⁵

As he rested in Winnsboro, news that Greene split the American Army "mystified" both he and his subordinates.¹²⁶ Greene's separation of his army defied 18th Century doctrine, but Cornwallis clearly saw Greene's intent.

The American Army's actions dictated a change to Cornwallis' campaign plan. Cornwallis determined that massing against the American force along the frontier freed Greene to advance his main Army into South Carolina, against Charleston. Similarly, facing only Greene hazarded the British base at Ninety-Six. Also, he continued to face a significant French threat along the coast.¹²⁷ Therefore, Greene's split army forced Cornwallis to adopt an unorthodox campaign plan to re-attack into North Carolina. Cornwallis posted General Alexander Leslie at Camden; with 1000 men detached to reinforce the garrison at Wilmington, North Carolina. He dispatched Tarleton to destroy the American force in western North Carolina and he marched slowly and carefully north, back into central North Carolina.¹²⁸

New Year's Day 1781, a courier rode to Cornwallis with news from a British spy. General Daniel Morgan and the American light forces were bivouacked west of the Broad River in North Carolina. The spy's report inferred Morgan's objective as the British garrison at Ninety-

Six, South Carolina. This proved wrong, however Cornwallis could not have know this at the time and with “alacrity” dispatched Tarleton “...to push him [Morgan] to the utmost...”¹²⁹

The Americans Regroup And Split Their Army

General Greene’s campaign plan was very simple; protect his small army in the near term. He divided his army “partly from choice and partly from necessity.”¹³⁰ Greene did not want his under-strength army surprised and destroyed. Furthermore, separating the army allowed it to better support itself. There was not enough forage and food at Charlotte to support the entire American Army. He also wished to maintain a force west of the Catawba River to bolster support for the rebellion along the frontier.

With this in mind, Greene wrote, 2 November 1780, to Samuel Huntington, President of the Continental Congress, that until the

Southern Army can be collected and equipped in sufficient force to contend with the Enemy... upon equal ground....it will be my first object to endeavor to form a flying army to consist of Infantry and horse. It appears to me that Cavalry and Partizan [sic] Corps are best adapted to make of the Country and state of the war in that quarter, both for heading and encouraging the Militia as well as protecting persons and property of the Inhabitants.¹³¹

The “flying corps” Greene envisioned was placed under the command of a tough, seasoned Virginian named Daniel Morgan. Greene ordered Morgan into western North Carolina with the “cream of his army” 16 December 1780.¹³²

Morgan’s Mission

Morgan’s command left Charlotte, North Carolina 21 December 1780 with 320 Continentals, 200 Virginia militia and eighty Continental dragoons. Morgan established a camp sixty miles west of Charlotte and was reinforced by General Pickens’ South Carolina partisan brigade and General William Davidson’s North Carolina militia.¹³³ With these reinforcements, Morgan’s force of 940 men encamped on the Pacolet River, in South Carolina, 24 December

1780.¹³⁴ Morgan immediately started to forage supplies and raid British garrisons in western South Carolina.

General Daniel Morgan (1735-1802) was a rough frontiersmen from Western Virginia. He served as a wagoneer in Braddock's Army during the French and Indian War where he was severely whipped for striking a British Officer. Buchanan describes him as having a "commanding presence combined with valor, a natural high intelligence, and a stirring capacity to lead men."¹³⁵ One hundred and forty miles from the main American Army, Morgan's light corps appeared vulnerable and its destruction became the primary aim of Banastre Tarleton's British Legion. At 0500, 12 January 1781, Tarleton initiated one of the greatest pursuits in American military history as he marched after Morgan.¹³⁶

The Battle of Cowpens, South Carolina

Tarleton's British Legion chased Morgan's riflemen from 12 to 17 January 1781. Morgan's light forces moved with great speed, but under a constant threat from Tarleton. Morgan's greatest fear was that Tarleton would catch him attempting to cross one of the many swollen rivers in the area. Morgan avoided battle on British terms because Tarleton's reinforced British Legion outnumbered his own force.¹³⁷ Morgan deployed Pickens' partisan scouts along all of the fords in the area and employed Washington's Cavalry as his rearguard. Morgan just escaped the British Legion and crossed the Pacolet River, under pressure, on 16 January making his camp at Harrah's Cowpens. With the Broad River behind and to the east of his force, he chose to face Tarleton.¹³⁸

Morgan choose his ground wisely. He anchored his defense on a low hill and arrayed his infantry to the south. Washington's cavalry were placed to the North of the hill, in reserve. Morgan understood the militia and its tendency to run when forced to fight too long against disciplined British regulars.¹³⁹ Therefore, Morgan, in a act of sheer genius, arrayed his militia

in the first rank with a line of forward skirmishers. His Continentals constituted the third rank. Morgan's orders to the militia were simple and clear; fire two or three well aim shots then move to the rear and flanks as a reserve. Morgan also personally reassured the militia that Washington's cavalry would protect them as they fell back. Militia had never been employed by either side in this manner before. Morgan's asymmetrical use of his forces dramatically effected the British attack.¹⁴⁰

The British attacked at 0700 17 January 1781 and ran into Morgan's militia skirmishers. As Tarleton had done in the past, he sent the Legion cavalry to disperse the militia and gain information of Morgan's dispositions. Fifteen dragoons fell to the rifle fire and the cavalry broke and returned to the British line. Tarleton immediately ordered his infantry forward. The American militiamen carried out their orders and only fired two rounds. However, their fire killed or wounded many of Tarleton's officers and noncommissioned officers. Per their orders, the militia fell back as the reserve. Tarleton attempted to rout the militia with his cavalry, but was again repulsed by American rifle fire and Washington's cavalry.¹⁴¹

The British main line trotted toward Morgan's regulars as the Americans held their fire. At fifty yards the Continental's fired and devastated the British infantry. By 0745, the American's had conducted a double envelopment of the British and the remaining British cavalry, with "Bloody Ban," fled from the battlefield. Tarleton lost eighty-six percent of his force. In one horrific hour, a significant piece of the British Army was lost. The annihilation of the British Legion crippled Cornwallis' ability to rapidly pursue the rebels or more importantly react to unforeseen American actions. Though Cornwallis pursued Morgan for another two weeks he ultimately retired to South Carolina again.¹⁴²

The Battle of Cowpens was the decisive point of the British campaign and their failure to destroy the American western wing effectively sealed their fate in the South. Had Tarleton

destroyed Morgan's fast moving corps, the British would have regained the campaign's initiative. However, the result was the destruction of Cornwallis' premier light corps and the humiliation of his most aggressive field commander. The loss of both Ferguson's militia corps and Tarleton's British Legion crippled the British Southern Army. Even with reinforcement by General Alexander Leslie's 2500 regulars, Cornwallis' second effort to subjugate North Carolina failed. As the British Army continually shrunk in size due to disease, desertion, and battle loss, Greene's American Army continually grew stronger and finally "...gave Greene his chance to exercise his strategic genius."¹⁴³

British Operational Collapse

The campaign, from January through mid-March 1781, was characterized by small indecisive engagements as Cornwallis doggedly pursued Greene across North Carolina into Virginia and back to North Carolina. At one point, an exasperated Cornwallis burned his entire baggage train in order to increase his army's mobility.¹⁴⁴ However, even with drastically reduced baggage and supply trains the British could not maintain the same tempo of operations as the Americans nor force them into a decisive battle favorable to the British. Finally, on a battlefield of American choosing, the last major battle of the campaign took place at Guilford Courthouse, North Carolina, 15 March 1781.

Through campaign's end, Greene was "obliged to practice by finesse which I [he] dare not attempt by force."¹⁴⁵ He purposefully avoided direct combat with Cornwallis to preserve his army until it was fully regenerated. By March 1781, Greene's Army numbered about 4440 troops.¹⁴⁶ Cornwallis, his army reeling and ragged from heavy campaigning and with serious logistical shortages fielded only 1900 soldiers. Contrary to current and 18th Century doctrine, Cornwallis attacked Greene's defending army 15 March 1781.¹⁴⁷

Greene arrayed his forces similar to Morgan at Cowpens. His forward line and flanks forces were mostly militia. His second and third lines were made up of primarily Continentals or militia composed of discharged regulars from Virginian and North Carolina. Lee's cavalry constituted the reserve. Unlike Morgan's dispositions at Cowpens, Greene's three lines could neither see nor mutually support each other.¹⁴⁸ However, this tactical deficiency was partially mitigated by the extensive American reconnaissance conducted prior to the battle.

True to form, the American militia "fired once or twice"¹⁴⁹ then fled the field. However, their fire was extremely effective. Captain Dugald Stuart said that "one half of the Highlanders dropt [sic] on the spot."¹⁵⁰ Fighting remained fierce as the British fought through

the second and finally faced the third American line. The advantage swayed between both sides until Cornwallis forced the Americans to leave the field through the draconian measure of firing grapeshot into "the mass of struggling men, friend and foe alike."¹⁵¹ Cornwallis' action scattered both forces.

The Americans conducted an orderly retreat leaving the field to Cornwallis. Moreover, the Americans left the field unbroken, with relatively light casualties, ready to fight again. For the British the victory was truly Pyrrhic. Cornwallis' aggressive, ill-conceived offensive reduced the British to only "1400 effectives, and they were no longer fit to campaign. Charles, 2nd Earl of Cornwallis, had ruined his army."¹⁵²

Cornwallis limped his tattered army to sanctuary at Wilmington, North Carolina. Greene, a superior strategist, but only an average tactician, chose not pursue and destroy the remnants of the British Army. However, he understood that he could not hazard destruction of the Continental Army. This lapse, though minor, allowed Cornwallis time to resupply and rest his troops. He then slipped past Greene, marched north, and was finally cornered and annihilated at Yorktown, Virginia by a Franco-American force under General George Washington. Meanwhile, Greene had attacked south forcing the British into their coastal bases thus largely liberating the Carolinas and Georgia. With Cornwallis' surrender and Greene's containment of the British, the southern campaign ended.

Analysis

The British started the campaign clearly superior to the Americans in almost every measurable category. Given this, how did they lose? Largely it was their failure to understand the American's key capabilities and their own critical vulnerabilities. British failure can not be tied to any one decisive mistake, rather it evolved from a system of failures. Eliot Cohen and John Gooch write that "...events can be connected in unexpected and even unforeseeable ways to create the conditions in which disaster can occur."¹⁵³ Overall, the British failed to understand the complex environment the southern Colonies represented. To understand the significance of Britain's failure and its implications for today's Army planner, the tenets of stability and support operations and the concept of center of gravity provide a useful lexicon to analyze this complex campaign.

Centers of Gravity

Dr. James Schneider writes that "...the first step in the design of any campaign or major operational plan is to identify the enemy's center of gravity - his main effort."¹⁵⁴ Therefore, it is important to discern both combatant's centers of gravity and more importantly, determine if each combatant successfully attacked the other's while defending his own. The American center of gravity proved to be the resilience of the southern people. To quote John Shy, the Americans were a "people numerous and armed." Shy states that:

For the first time, the civilian population came to be the major factor in planning... it was seen that Loyal and neutral civilians had to be organized and protected before any lasting results could be achieved and that the great pool of civilian manpower largely accounted for the surprising resilience of the rebel main armies.¹⁵⁵

The American commanders believed that their center of gravity was the organized Continental Army¹⁵⁶, but in actuality it was the ability of the southern states to repeatedly raise

new militia regiments and partisan brigades. These forces continually harassed British lines of communication as well as sapping British strength through repeated engagements, skirmishes and occupation duties. The southern militia were never trained to the high standards of the British Army. However, both Morgan and Greene knew how to employ them. Britain's two worst defeats in the campaign, Kings Mountain and Cowpens, came largely at the hands of state militia and irregulars. Even at Guilford Courthouse the militia's two shoot volley decimated several regular British regiments. Cornwallis could not afford to sustain these losses and maintain a successful offensive campaign.

Cornwallis incorrectly believed that the American center of gravity¹⁵⁷ was the Continental Army. Therefore, the British typically focused their efforts on the Continental Army and the organized militia. Cornwallis pursued Greene into Virginia hoping to pin the Americans between himself and an expeditionary force under Benedict Arnold. However, "...he knew from previous experience that rebel militia who ran from an open fight with regulars delighted in attacking foraging parties, gobbling up supply trains, and intercepting dispatch riders."¹⁵⁸ Also, a complete lack of unity of effort between Cornwallis and Arnold rendered this course of action void even at its inception.

Unfortunately for Cornwallis, even though he understood the American irregulars were threats to his lines of communication, he never clearly saw the militia and their partisan cousins as his army's most significant military threats. He also never understood the key to his success was the control of the southern population. Even though he dispatched both Ferguson and Tarleton into the interior of South Carolina and established a series of frontier garrisons, Cornwallis viewed these as military expedients instead of vital civil-military actions. Additionally, the brutality of the British to the southerners exacerbated discontent in an already "disaffected" population. However, the reappearance of Greene's reconstituted Continental

Army freed Cornwallis from his concentration on troublesome occupation and police duties. Undoubtedly, pursuing Greene's army provided Cornwallis with a clear, unambiguous objective much more in line with British training and doctrine. He immediately stopped actively subjugating the population and redirected his efforts on the destruction of Greene. The British "principle objective became [again] the destruction of the rebel army through maneuver, battle, and pursuit."¹⁵⁹

The southern militia proved extremely effective protecting the back country and providing critical information on British troop movements to the American command. Rebel guerrillas and militia routinely achieved local superiority against bodies of Loyal self-defense militia and sometimes even against mobile detachments such as Ferguson's at Kings Mountain.¹⁶⁰ The British viewed the rebel militia as one of the most troublesome elements of a confused war, but they never developed a comprehensive strategy to deal with this group of rebels. The militia and partisans forces nullified every British attempt to impose royal authority short of using massive armed force¹⁶¹ and as the British were not sufficiently manned, massive use of force was never a viable nor prudent option.

The mere existence of American partisans forced the British to divert large bodies of troops simply to garrison subjugated areas. These troops were not available for campaigning nor able to move rapidly from one troubled area to another. Similar to the American experience in Vietnam, the British owned the cities and towns, the Americans the countryside. The partisans made British resupply efforts and loyalist security a tenuous task, at best. Franklin and Mary Wickwire write that, "in all, they [the garrison requirement for South Carolina alone] came to five thousand rank and file whom he [Cornwallis] entrusted to Lord Rawdon."¹⁶² By 1780-81, most Americans, though weary, unhappy, or apathetic toward the rebellion, were fairly sure of

one thing: the British government no longer would maintain its presence, and sooner or later the rebels would return.¹⁶³

The British campaign's success was predicated on the successful recruitment of militia and the re-establishment of the royal government. The partisan forces precluded the British from effectively establishing royal government or protecting the loyalist population. Following the destruction of the loyalist militia at Kings Mountain and the disintegration of the militia at Camden, the British were never again able to recruit significant numbers of southerners to fight for the crown. As such, increasing numbers of regulars were tied down in police actions. As an example of this, of Leslie's 2500 British reinforcements, 1000 were detailed to Wilmington, North Carolina to strengthen the garrisons there. Garrison requirements and lines of communication security kept significant numbers of British troops detached from the main army. This precluded the British from effectively massing on Cornwallis' overriding objective, the smaller Continental Army.

Objective

Direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective. ¹⁶⁴

The British southern campaign had one overriding objective, restoration of the royal government in the southern colonies. However, the British did not have a cogent strategy for this complex task. Cornwallis regularly switched from one aim to another generally focused on any organized rebel force presenting itself. Initially, the British saw the investiture of Charleston as decisive. The remaining colonial army then became the British objective. However, even after the destruction of the remaining Continentals at Waxhaws and Camden, royal government "thrived" only where the British extensively garrisoned troops. Following Camden, suppression of the South Carolinian partisans became the primary British objective until Cornwallis decided to invade North Carolina. Following the destruction of both Tarleton's and Ferguson's

Corps by mostly American militia troops, Cornwallis paradoxically shifted focus to Greene's regulars rather than the militia force that had destroyed over half of his army. This eclectic series of objectives are only chronologically linked. None dealt with the thorniest problem of reestablishing a government, that of convincing the people that the existing government provided the best avenue for domestic tranquillity. The British largely ignored the wants, needs, rights, welfare, and security of the very people they were attempting to coerce back to the Crown. As the southern campaign was really a civil-military operation, the British ignored the civil side of the problem and ultimately turned the majority of the Southern population against them.

Unity Of Effort

*Seek unity of effort toward every objective.*¹⁶⁵

Strategically, the British southern campaign was not linked to any all encompassing plan. Cornwallis independently operated unsynchronized with British operations in New York, the Mid-Atlantic provinces, nor the West Indies. Furthermore, British naval and ground operations were rarely synchronized. Clinton took the majority of the regular British troops, the artillery and all of the regular cavalry back to New York following the siege of Charleston. Clinton garrisoned these forces rather than fielded them against the Continental Army. Because of the partisan threat, Cornwallis also garrisoned large contingents of British troops eroding his ability to actively pursue the rebel army. Clinton never undertook any operations to tie down the Continentals in New York while Cornwallis concentrated against the southern rebels. Clinton did send Benedict Arnold on a foray into Tidewater, Virginia, but this raid was not coordinated with Cornwallis' pursuit through North Carolina. Ultimately, British lack of unity of effort allowed Washington to trap Cornwallis at Yorktown while Greene attacked south into South Carolina. Greene's and Washington's distributed operations forced the British out of the interior and into their coastal fortifications freeing the south of British domination.

Legitimacy

*Sustain the willing acceptance by the people of the right of the government to govern...*¹⁶⁶

Cornwallis used the British Legion as his unconventional warfare force against the partisans but through “the course of its operations [it] acquired a reputation for inhumanity that drove apathetic citizens toward the rebels for protection.”¹⁶⁷ Cornwallis, ever the warrior, never made any significant effort to reestablish the royal civilian government. In fact, he advocated the use of terrorism and fear to cow the citizenry. The British policy of “Fire and Sword” enflamed the back-country and precipitated the destruction of a third of the British Army at Kings Mountain.

The British shortage of supplies and the money with which to procure them also reduced their legitimacy. They were frequently forced to take what they needed without regard to whether the provider was reimbursed or not. Though Cornwallis tried to control the rape, pillage, and plunder of North and South Carolina, he was unsuccessful. Tarleton’s, Ferguson’s, and the loyalist militia’s systematic stripping of the land denuded it of forage, fodder, and more importantly popular support. Ultimately, the accumulating pressure of logistically supporting numerous British garrisons further embittered an increasingly recalcitrant population.

In direct contrast, Greene frequently coordinated with the rebel governments and where required, established military governments until legitimate civil ones were established. Though he at times quarreled with the Governors of Georgia, the Carolinas, and Virginia, Greene both advised and accepted advice from these gentlemen. He also protected civilians in rebel areas, made significant inroads at reducing Tory persecution, and at times ordered the army to forage for the local population. Greene sought never to alienate the population that provided his army with a steady flow of supplies, recruits and information.

Restraint

Apply appropriate military capability prudently.¹⁶⁸

The British never applied restraint in their southern operations. Tarleton routinely slaughtered both combatant and non-combatant alike. Following the Battle of Cowpens, Tarleton even killed loyalist militia guarding the British baggage trains mistaking them for rebels. Banastre Tarleton embodies the colonial British ethic that the majority of the citizenry were merely chattels to be used and discarded as required. The British never realized that the southern people settled there originally to remove themselves from these very prejudices. Cornwallis and his subordinates continually threatened to put the provinces to "fire and sword." Procedures based on military brutality killed what little support the population offered. The rebels frequently answered atrocity with atrocity, particularly in the ugly partisan war fought in South Carolina and Georgia. Cornwallis' army could not protect the few remaining loyalists from this rebel aggression, he could only punish those perceived supporting the rebellion. The British contempt for the population and the brutality and coarseness of their civil intercourse ultimately turned the southern people against them.

Security

Never permit hostile factions to acquire an unexpected advantage.¹⁶⁹

The British were forced to extensively garrison the interior of Georgia and South Carolina to subjugate these provinces. Even then, the British only controlled the territory they physically stood upon. Cornwallis was forced to leave over 5000 troops under Lord Rawdon just to garrison South Carolina. Cowpens, Guilford Courthouse, and Yorktown might have turned out differently had those 5000 soldiers been available for offensive verses defensive operations. British interior security would have fared better had they been able to effectively recruit a standing loyalist militia to undertake these interior police and security duties. However, their

civil policies, inability to protect loyalists, and the destruction and disintegration of the royal militia following Kings Mountain, caused many potentially loyal subjects to remain neutral or worse join the rebellion. All in all, British security was never adequate in the south.

Conclusions

The British Army proved disciplined, stoic, and capable throughout the southern campaign. It also, at times, was brutal, poorly led, misused, and ultimately ravaged by an ill-conceived pursuit of a larger, better supplied army. In the end the British made two military mistakes, "they failed to digest their acquisitions before gulping down more territory, and they neglected to give the Tories adequate protection."¹⁷⁰ British operational planning never adequately addressed either problem. Cornwallis moved into North Carolina before South Carolina was completely pacified. He moved north to Yorktown, Virginia with only coastal North Carolina secure. British failure to adequately secure their rear and protect their loyal citizens left their lines of communication in shambles and robbed them of the popular support they required to successfully regain the colonies.

The tenets of stability and support operations delineated in Field Manual 100-5 provide a useful framework to address many of the complexities associated with civil-military operations. The British never understood that the people were the key to successfully subjugating the southern colonies. They never fully trusted their militia to garrison the colonies nor saw fit to properly equip or train them. As the loyal militia was vital to British success, these actions remain paradoxical and are one of the self-induced failures the British suffered.

The British also never understood nor much cared that their actions caused great suffering and generated bitter hatred in the local population. The alienation of the southern people proved to be Britain's most glaring failure of the campaign. Several times during the earlier part of the campaign, thousands of colonists came forward and swore oaths to the King or enlisted in the royal militia. This support largely evaporated following the British militia's defeat at Kings Mountain. Without the peoples support, the British campaign was doomed before it started.

Modern military operations increasingly are conducted in littoral, densely populated areas of the world, areas similar to the American South. Countries such as Kuwait, Bosnia, Haiti, and Somali all share these traits. Therefore successful future operations require a careful consideration of this complex environment. The U.S. Army partially recognizes the importance of the civil dimension of this environment with its increased emphasis on Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs, though the majority of these units remain in the reserves. These type units have mobilized and become part of every major operation conducted by the U.S. Army since 1990 but, it remains the “soldier of the line” that ultimately directly deals with the population. As the southern campaign points out, the average soldier’s actions can also lead to unintended consequences. British failure to understand the complex fabric of the southern revolutionary civil war soured southerners to British occupation and precipitated their loss of popular support. Similarly, the United States’ failure to understand the complex environment of Somalia precipitated the U.S. withdrawal from the Horn of Africa.

Given the complex nature of military operations in the late 20th Century, ignorance of the environment could potentially lead to a future American military disaster. The British simultaneously fought three distinctly different “wars.” They fought the Continental Army in a conventional fashion. This was the war that they were trained for and the one they were most comfortable fighting. Additionally, the British also fought a guerrilla war with southern partisans using a “fire and sword” policy and were largely unsuccessful. Finally, the British “fought” to reestablish royal government while the southern civil war raged. Britain neither quelled the civil war nor established the royal government in the South. The British achieved several stunning military successes in the southern campaign, but their inability to stop the civil war and reestablish a functioning government for the people of the South proved their ultimate undoing.

For these reasons, the British experience in the Carolinas from 1780-81 provides a useful case-study of complicated and complex military operations.

Endnotes

¹ Buchanan, *The Road to Guilford Courthouse*, pp. 26-28. Buchanan has written the most recent (1997) history of the southern campaign. His history provides excellent background on both the forces and the people involved in the revolution in the south.

² Clinton, William J. *A National Security Strategy For A New Century* Washington DC May 1997. p 12.

³ Shalikashvili, GEN John M. *National Military Strategy*, September 1997, p. 5.

⁴ Field Manual 100-5 *Operations* p 13-1.

⁵ Ibid. In the Army's continuing flip flop on what to call "things that are not war" several names have come and gone. Currently, these type operations are know as "Stability and Support" operations. The British had both a stability and support operations as well as a conventional war to deal with in the American South.

⁶ Sir Henry Clinton (1730-1795) was the Commander in Chief of the British Army in North America. He also became the British scapegoat for the British loss of the American colonies. Clinton was the grandson of the 6th Earl of Lincoln and the son of Admiral George Clinton, a former Royal Governor of New York. Clinton was high-born and well connected and served with distinction and gallantry with his regiment in Germany during the Seven Years War. Clinton preferred to cut off the enemy's retreat and fix them between two strong forces. He had recommended this tactic to General Thomas Gage at the Battle of Bunker Hill but this maneuver was not accepted and the British opted instead for a concentrated frontal attack. This basic tactic became the primary basis for Clinton's strategic plan; fix the Americans between himself in New York and Cornwallis attacking north from the southern colonies. He preferred the indirect approach when and were possible and in this tactic was viewed as unorthodox in a time period characterized by the frontal attack. However, Clinton was an extremely cautious general and indecision would plague him throughout the war. Clinton became generally ignored following the Revolution and spent his last years continually writing missives explaining his actions during the war largely for his own consumption. See Buchanan, pp. 29-33.

⁷ Ibid. p. 25.

⁸ Higginbotham, Don, *The War of American Independence, Military Attitudes, Policies, and Practice 1763-1789*. pp. 29-36.

⁹ Ibid. pp. 352-355. By 1779 Britain was at war with Spain, France and American and increasing under military pressure globally.

¹⁰ Shy, John, *A People Numerous and Armed*, pp. 198-199 and 230-232. The British contemplated cutting loose New England and retaining the richer lands of the South in 1778, but never pursued a negotiated settlement with the Continental Congress.

¹¹ Buchanan, p. 157.

¹² Ibid. p 28.

¹³ Hogg, Ian V. and John H Batchelor, *Armies of the American Revolution*. p 15.

¹⁴ Ibid. p. 15.

¹⁵ Carrington, Henry B., *Battles of the American Revolution*. p 483. Carrington reports that British records show 28,756 soldiers in New York, 3460 in what is now Maine, 3930 in Georgia, 1787 in West Florida, and 636 in Bermuda. Approximately 1600 British soldiers garrisoned Canada. Interestingly, Clinton was forced to abandon Rhode Island to strip enough forces to conduct the southern campaign.

¹⁶ Ward, Christopher, *The War of the Revolution*, pp. 695-705. Wickwire, *Cornwallis: The American Adventure* pp. 135-137.

¹⁷ Wickwire, p 185.

¹⁸ Buchanan p 35-38. Buchanan has a very interesting section in this book about the Hessian troops serving in the British Army. They proved to be outstanding light troops and provided the British superior service.

¹⁹ Carrington, p. 8. Wright, Robert K. *The Continental Army*, pp. 146-152 overviews the 1778-79 reorganization of the Continental Army. This reorganization led to a competent organization that fought well in a variety of situations.

²⁰ Carrington, p 126-127. See Wright, 153-165 for Continental unit organizations, manning, and training status's 1780-1781.

²¹ Baron de Kalb (1721-1780) was neither a baron nor a noble. He was born in Huettendorf, the son of Bravarian peasants. He initially came to America as a French officer and was renowned for his physical endurance and a proved a competent leader. See Buchanan p 128-129 for a complete description of this fine officer.

²² Hogg, *Armies of the American Revolution*, pp. 27-30 describes in great detail the raising, equipping, and training of the rebel militia as well as its performance on the battlefield. Buchanan p 190-192 also describes the capabilities of a well trained militia.

²³ Dykeman, Wilma, *With Fire and Sword*, pp. 40-45. Dykeman gives a fascinating overview of the "over the mountain boys". Mostly frontiersmen, they likely would have stayed out the war had Major Ferguson not threatened them, their families and farms. Also see Buchanan pp. 205-224.

²⁴ See Buchanan pp. 115-121 for an in-depth discussion of Sumter and pp. 151-152 for the same about Marion. Marion became know as the "Swamp Fox" and continually tied down great numbers of Lord Rawdon's force in and around Camden, SC. Sumter, frequently shifted from guerrilla organization to militia regiment when the battlefield required it. He lead a very agile force through North and South Carolina made up mostly of volunteers from these two states.

²⁵ Wickwire, p. 125.

²⁶ Buchanan, p 4.

²⁷ Clinton, LTG, Sir Henry, *The American Rebellion*, p. 151.

²⁸ Buchanan, pp. 3-16. Buchanan provides a detailed account of the British attempt to take Charleston in 1776. The British force was mauled by the heavy fire from Ft. Sullivan. The British ships *Bristol* and *Experiment* were heavily damaged with sixty-three killed and 127 wounded between them. The *Actaeon*, *Syren*, and *Sphinx* were also damaged and run aground. The *Actaeon* was abandoned and burned by her crew. The *Syren* and *Sphinx* re-floated and repaired. Clinton's land force was mis-landed and could not find a ford to Sullivan's island and ultimately withdrew. The expedition was a complete failure for the British.

²⁹ Carrington, p. 459-260.

³⁰ Stedman, Charles, *The History of the American War*, Volume Two, p. 131. Charles Stedman, an American Tory, was a commissary officer for the British during the Revolutionary War and wrote an extensive history of the war based on his dairies in 1794. During the southern campaign he was Cornwallis' Commissary General.

³¹ Tarleton, LTC Banastre, *Campaigns of 1780-1781 in Southern American*, p. 4.

³² Clinton, p 152. In fact Clinton's move into the southern theater forced Washington to order the Virginia, North Carolina, Maryland, and Delaware lines south to support Lincoln's defense of Charleston. This weakened an already weak Continental Army in New York. See Ward, *The War of the Revolution*, pp. 695-701, and Buchanan pp. 127-128.

³³ Shy, John, *A People Numerous and Armed*, pp. 197-212. Lord Germain was Britain's wartime Secretary of State and responsible for returning the colonies to royal rule. The deposed royal governors of the Carolinas and Virginia lead him to believe the south housed a large population of loyalists eager to return to the King's Standard. Germain ardently believed a small force of regulars could pacify the south augmented by the "large population" of loyalists. In fact, this assumption ultimately proved fallacious.

³⁴ Ibid. p. 230.

³⁵ Gruber, Ira D. *Britain's Southern Strategy*, from a collection of essays in *The Revolutionary War in the South: Power, Conflict, and Leadership*, edited by W, Robert Higgins, pp. 210-215. Lord Germain and King George III were swayed by the views of the disposed royal governors of South Carolina, North Carolina and Virginia. All three trumpeted their state's large and loyal populations would raise to the King's standard if only the British Army could come an protect them. Early in the conflict this was probably true in North Carolina, the state with the most loyalist. In South Carolina and Virginia the rebel forces were already too well established to support large scale loyalist support.

³⁶ Clinton, p 158. Clinton replaced Howe as Commander in Chief in 1778.

³⁷ Buchanan, p. 27.

³⁸ Stedman, p. 178.

³⁹ Buchanan, p. 28.

⁴⁰ See Ward, pp. 696-703; Buchanan, pp. 34-57; Stedman, pp. 177-189; and Carrington, pp. 493-497. All provide the same basic account of the siege of Charleston. Stedman, as an eyewitness, gives an in depth view as one of the combatants. The other three histories offer a more studied and mature view of the battle.

⁴¹ Buchanan, pp. 48-50.

⁴² Ibid. p. 49.

⁴³ William Moultrie went on to be a General in the American Army commanding nearly 2000 soldiers.

⁴⁴ Buchanan, pp. 54-57.

⁴⁵ Buchanan pp. 61-63. Tarleton's memoirs, pp. 15-17. offer his personal view of the battle as the British Commander. Tarleton's account, though truthful, seems rather antiseptic. This was Tarleton's first of many daring raids through the South.

⁴⁶ Buchanan, p. 63. Stedman offers a first hand account of Tarleton's excesses during this engagement in his memoirs on p. 183. During this battle, Major Chevalier Pierre-Francois Vernier, a French volunteer and commander of a detachment of American cavalry, was severely wounded and taken captive. Instead of the normal courtesies of eighteenth century warfare, Major Vernier was hacked and slashed by sabers attempting to surrender. He then lay in agony, tormented by British Legionaries until he died hours later. Interestingly, Tarleton, p. 16, only mentions in his memoirs that Vernier was killed. He states that "Major Vernier... [and others] who attempted to defend themselves, were killed.

⁴⁷ Stedman, p 183.

⁴⁸ Buchanan, p. 66; and Clinton, p. 168. Tarleton, pp. 33-84, includes copies of the official dispatches, reports, as well as the correspondence between Clinton and Lincoln discussing Charleston's capitulation. Also included is the instrument of surrender for the conditional surrender of the Continental garrison.

⁴⁹ Tarleton, pp. 59-64.

⁵⁰ Dykeman, Wilma, *With Fire and Sword, The Battle of Kings Mountain 1780*, National Parks Service, 1991, p. 23.

⁵¹ Stedman, p. 186.

⁵² Buchanan, p. 68. Tarleton acknowledges the receipt of this letter from Cornwallis in his memoirs on page 38.

⁵³ Buchanan, p. 82.

⁵⁴ Buchanan, p. 84. Again, Tarleton's personal account is truthful yet glosses over the excesses of his own troops.

⁵⁵ Buchanan, p 84.

⁵⁶ Tarleton, p. 31.

⁵⁷ Buchanan, p. 85.

⁵⁸ Ward, pp. 706-707. Ward offers yet another view of Tarleton's slaughter of unarmed, surrendering Americans at Waxhaws, South Carolina. He writes that "this little affair extinguished the last flickering flame of resistance in South Carolina."

⁵⁹ Wickwire, pp. 130-132. The authors discusses briefly all of the activities the British under took following the fall of Charleston. However, they focus on those directly involving Lord Cornwallis.

⁶⁰ Clinton, p. 174. Clinton still fully believed that after the fall of Charleston the loyalists would flock back to the Crown. In his letter to Lord Germain, 4 June 1780, he states that "inhabitants from every quarter... declare their allegiance to the King..." See Tarleton, pp. 79- 81 for the full text of Clinton's letter.

⁶¹ Buchanan, p 72.

⁶² During the Revolution it was quite common to release soldiers on parole. While in this status paroled soldiers could live at home, but under pain of death could not return to their old units until exchanged. This arrangement was beneficial to the British who could not sustain large amounts of American prisoners of war. Conditions of parole had never before require a pledge of allegiance to the King and the enrollment into Tory militia units. This aspect of the proclamation potential would have American ex-rebels fighting their old comrades. These proclamations galvanized southern support to the rebels and caused many to risk execution by reforming into rebel units in violation of their British paroles.

⁶³ Wickwire, p. 133.

⁶⁴ Buchanan, p. 72. The biggest requirement for the militia Ferguson busily raised was to free the British regulars for just such an incursion into North Carolina. At this stage of the campaign the guerrilla activity was just starting to have some effect. Cornwallis took command thinking he had more than enough troops for the tasks he was given.

⁶⁵ Wickwire, p. 136.

⁶⁶ Wickwire, p. 136, Ward, pp. 704-705.

⁶⁷ Wickwire, p. 137.

⁶⁸ Wickwire, pp. 139-141

⁶⁹ Ward, pp. 712-716. General de Kalb's force was ordered south to check any British move northward and to provide the nucleus for the North and South Carolina militia to rally around. However, de Kalb arrived with a force of Continentals that were short food, horses, weapons, and supplies. Most of the troops were sick with dysentery. De Kalb actively sought assistance from the governor of North Carolina as well as the North Carolina militia, but little help was forth coming. The second southern Continental Army culminated at Hillsborough, North Carolina for want of supplies.

⁷⁰ Ibid. p. 715. Buchanan, p. 129. Buchanan writes that "had he [De Kalb] not been a foreigner and had he friends with influence, he might have been given command."

⁷¹ Buchanan, p. 147. Gates was a politically connected general. He conducted a "long campaign of intrigue" against Schuyler in order to obtain command of the Northern Department. His Congressional sponsor was none other than John Adams, future President of the United States. Adams believed that Gates' talents as an ex-British officer were being wasted in administrative duties. See Buchanan pp. 143-147 for more background on Gates' earlier life and career.

⁷² Ibid. p. 149. General Benjamin Lincoln was also one of Gates' subordinate commanders responsible for militia raids into the British rear. Lincoln was very successful in cutting the British lines of communication hastening the British defeat at Saratoga. Lincoln was also severely wounded in this fight. His reputation and wound at Saratoga, in part, convinced Congress that he should command the Southern Department headquarters at Charleston. Benedict Arnold was arguably one of the best American field commanders of the Revolution and like Lincoln severely wounded in this battle. Today, he is better known as the most famous American traitor of the war. He ended the revolution as a British Brigadier General and participated on the periphery of the southern campaign raiding Tidewater Virginia and burning Petersburg, Virginia in 1781.

⁷³ Ward, pp. 532-542. Buchanan pp. 148-151. Mitchell, 123-133. The greatest effect of England's loss at Saratoga was France's entry into the war on the side of the American. The British lost five general officers and their aides and staffs, 299 other officers, 389 noncommissioned officers, and over 4800 soldiers. The Americans also took twenty-seven guns and 5000 small arms. The immediate effect of Saratoga was the British withdraw into Canada of their forces in northern New York and New England. Strategically, Saratoga caused great alarm in England. Britain now had to defend her shores. The Revolution had become a world war involving England, France, Spain, and America.

⁷⁴ Ward, pp. 714-715.

⁷⁵ Wickwire, p. 156. Buchanan, p. 150. Gates' political friends in Congress supported his selection over the more capable and proven Greene or de Kalb. Baron de Kalb, acting commander following Lincoln's surrender, was never seriously considered for command because he was French and had no Congressional patron.

⁷⁶ Ward, p. 718.

⁷⁷ Buchanan, pp. 157-161. Buchanan details the days before Camden from a British perspective as well as a detailed discussion of the state of training of the British regulars before this battle.

⁷⁸ Ibid. p. 157.

⁷⁹ Ibid. pp. 154-158. Buchanan's description of the state of affairs of both combatants prior to Camden is very insightful. He also provides his own analysis of the decisions made by both Gates and Cornwallis.

⁸⁰ Mitchell, pp. 163-168, Ward, 722-730, Buchanan 157-172, Tarleton pp. 100-110. Ward provides a detailed account of the Battle of Camden including the effect of many of Gates' decisions on the American Army's preparation and state of readiness. Tarleton's view of the battle is more accusatory. He goes to great lengths to show Gates as the inferior commander to Cornwallis as well as highlight his own

contributions to Britain's victory. Buchanan offers a section on Gates' use of Marion's guerrillas to gain information as well as Gates' distaste for irregular soldiers.

⁸¹ Buchanan, p. 168.

⁸² Ibid. p. 170.

⁸³ See Wickwire, pp. 160-165. The British crushed the second southern American Army at Camden. The Virginia militia fled north to Hillsborough, North Carolina without their weapons, but with few casualties. The North Carolina militia was scattered with many killed or taken by the British. The core of the southern American Army, the Maryland and Delaware Continentals, was destroyed. Only 400 of 1400 Continentals limped back to Hillsborough. General Gates fled the battlefield at full gallop reaching Hillsborough days before his shattered "Grand Army". As with previous battles, Tarleton's pursuit again proved savagely successful. Stedman, *The American War*, pp. 210-211 relates that "the road for some miles was strewn with wounded and killed, who had been overtaken by the [British] legion in their pursuit." Tarleton's legionaries once again offered little quarter on the battlefield. Major General de Kalb was himself bayoneted eight times and shot three. This fine officer died of his wounds three days after the battle.

⁸⁴ Clodfelter, Mark A., *Between Virtue and Necessity: Nathanael Greene and The Conduct of Civil-Military Relations in the South, 1780-1782*, p. 170.

⁸⁵ Ward, p. 659.

⁸⁶ Ibid. p. 658.

⁸⁷ Ibid. pp. 658-664.

⁸⁸ Buchanan, 104-141 discusses the "making of a rebel" and the social-economic environment that allowed the rebellion to flourish in the south. Ward, p. 660, describes the situation of the South's first civil war as well. The factional fighting between patriot and loyalist troops in the South was some of the bitterest fighting of the Revolution.

⁸⁹ Shy, p. 211. Lord Germain believed in the concept of Americanization. This concept envisioned loyal militia relieving British regulars from occupation duty allowing them to pursue and destroy the remaining rebel army.

⁹⁰ Shy, pp. 238-239.

⁹¹ Ward, p. 661. Buchanan, pp. 394-397. Marion, "The Swamp Fox", was a classic guerrilla fighter whose force excelled in hit and run tactics and ambushes. He always worked in close concert with the Continental Army and frequently teamed with Colonel "Light Horse Harry" Lee's dragoons. He was also noted for forbidding the persecution of loyalists, particularly the practice of immediately executing captured Tory leaders. Following the Revolution, the Swamp Fox served in the South Carolina State Senate. Interestingly, he refused the protection from plunder lawsuits given Sumter and Pickens following the war. His policy of vigorously opposing the confiscation of Tory property served him well. Unlike Sumter, property owners never sued the Swamp Fox.

⁹² Ward, p. 661. Buchanan, pp. 115-121 and 390-393 offers detailed narratives of Thomas Sumter. Sumter proved long on courage but short on tactical capability. He was universally condemned after the war for "Sumter's law". Under this statute each militiaman received one or more slaves and a cut of any loot taken. This encouraged extended slave traffic and the plunder of civilians. Following the war, Sumter faced lawsuits over property plundered under this statute but was saved by favorable legislation enacted by the legislatures of North and South Carolina. Sumter served South Carolina in both the House and Senate and died in 1832, the oldest surviving Revolutionary War General.

⁹³ Ward, p. 662.

⁹⁴ Buchanan, p. 192. Buchanan provides an excellent account of the little known partisan operations in South Carolina. See Chapter 13, *The Partisans Fight On*, pp. 173-193 of Buchanan's work. He covers in great detail the guerrilla warfare that occurred between the fall of Charleston and Ferguson's defeat at King's Mountain.

⁹⁵ Buchanan, pp. 298-300. Buchanan provides a short narrative of Picken's early life and career. He is most notable as one of Daniel Morgan's most trusted officers. He would today be called a "maneuverist". In 1778 he effectively slipped 300 men around a British force of 700 and followed them to Kettle Creek, Georgia where he defeated them with "great slaughter".

⁹⁶ Ward, p. 662.

⁹⁷ Ferguson, Clyde R. *Carolina and Georgia Patriot and Loyalist Militia in Action, 1778-1783*. p. 175.

Edited by Jeffrey J. Crow and Larry E. Tise in *The Southern Experience in the American Revolution*.

⁹⁸ Ibid. p. 186. The original letter may be found in *Correspondence of Charles, First Marquis Cornwallis* edited by Charles Ross, 3 volumes. (London, 1859).

⁹⁹ Buchanan, p. 193.

¹⁰⁰ Dykeman, p. 37. Cornwallis gave orders "that all the inhabitants of this province, who have subscribed and taken part in this revolt, should be punished with the greatest rigor, and their whole property taken from them or destroyed... and that every militia-man, who has borne arms with us, and afterwards joined the enemy, shall be immediately hanged." The concept of "punishment" of the rebels was prevalent in British operations, their treatment of prisoners, and their treatment of the general population. It ultimately drove many neutrals to draw arms against the British and fostered many acts of rebel retribution against loyalists.

¹⁰¹ Ward, p. 737.

¹⁰² Massey, Gregory De Van, pp. 388-389. Massey provides a detailed account of the British coastal campaign in North Carolina. Major Craig imposed strict rule over coastal North Carolina resulting in harsh treatment of captured rebel leaders. He, like other British officers, also took few rebel militia prisoners. As an example, after encircling sixteen rebels in a farm house, Craig's soldiers set the house on fire, then bayoneted all sixteen as they fled the fire. Like Tarleton and many other British, Craig mistakenly believed fear and severity were the keys to subjugating rebel areas.

¹⁰³ Wickwire, pp. 339-340.

¹⁰⁴ Shy, p. 205. British experience in New York and New Jersey tended to confirm this British assumption. Their tactical successes through the summer and fall of 1776 secured New York's port area and, with little British effort, led to the collapse of the local rebel militias in New York and New Jersey. Almost 3000 Americans accepted a royal offer of free pardon in exchange for a royal oath of allegiance, including a signer of the Declaration of Independence. Clinton and Cornwallis based their southern campaign on this assumption.

¹⁰⁵ Ward, p. 739.

¹⁰⁶ Greene, p. 507.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid. Volume VI p. 530. He wrote a similar letter to Governor Abner Nash of North Carolina on the same day stating that "On my arrival here I find nothing but the Shadow of an Army in the midst of Distress. The small Force which we have in the Field is very incompetent to give Protection to this State...." p. 533.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid. pp. 530-535.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid. p. 520.

¹¹⁰ Buchanan, p. 208.

¹¹¹ Stedman refers to these rebels as "mountaineers" on p. 222. The British view of the rendezvous was as Stedman states "a great deal accidental". Stedman goes to great lengths to lionize Ferguson and the loyalist operations in the western Carolinas. However, Stedman fails to explain the reasons these people banded together to fight Ferguson in the first place. See pages 221-224 for the British view of the engagement.

¹¹² Dykeman, pp.

¹¹³ Stedman, pp. 221-224. Also See Buchanan pp. 208-224 for a detailed portrayal of both British and American activities between 26 September and the Battle of Kings Mountain, 7 October 1780.

¹¹⁴ Buchanan, p. 224.

¹¹⁵ Messick, p. 124.

¹¹⁶ Messick, p. 166.

¹¹⁷ Buchanan, p. 217.

¹¹⁸ Ibid. p. 222. Given the various accounts, the British strength at Kings Mountain was 1,125 against between 900 to 1,000 American rebels. Interestingly, only Ferguson was British. One hundred of his soldiers were American provincial regulars, the rest loyalist militia. Though frequently couched as British verses American, this fight was more truly part of the civil war being waged in the back country.

¹¹⁹ Buchanan, p. 235. The British lost 157 killed and 163 wounded too badly for evacuation. The Americans captured 698 "British" soldiers. This action destroyed the American Volunteers, one of England's best provincial regiments as well as Patrick Ferguson. The British lost their best militia recruiter

along with the cream of their loyalist militia at Kings Mountain. Never again would large numbers of Southerners rally to the King's standard.

¹²⁰ Messick, p. viii. The tactical defeat of the British right wing by irregular partisans resulted in a serious operational set-back for the British campaign.

¹²¹ Wickwire, pp. 219-222. American loyalists fled the back-country following Kings Mountain fearful of rebel retaliation for earlier Tory atrocities. Major James Weymss of the 63rd Regiment stated that "every inhabitant has been or is concerned in Rebellion & most of them very deeply. Wherever I have gone the houses are deserted by the Men..." p. 220.

¹²² Ibid. p. 220. See Buchanan, pp. 242-245 for a detailed account of the situation facing the British Army following Kings Mountain.

¹²³ Wickwire, p. 221. Cornwallis was so ill that he temporarily turned command over to Lord Rawdon who led the British to Winnsboro. Winnsboro proved an excellent position located mid-distance between the British garrisons of Ninety-Six and Camden.

¹²⁴ Buchanan, p. 243. Stedman, pp. 316-318. Ward, pp. 753. Stedman writes that 2500 reinforcements under General Alexander Leslie arrived at Charleston, 13 December 1780. Cornwallis ordered Leslie to march to Winnsboro immediately.

¹²⁵ Buchanan, p. 306. Buchanan writes that "Cornwallis never deviated from the strategy outlined in this letter."

¹²⁶ Ward, p. 753.

¹²⁷ Ibid. pp. 753-754.

¹²⁸ Ibid. p. 754.,

¹²⁹ Buchanan, pp. 308-309. Buchanan reprints Cornwallis' entire order to Tarleton. Cornwallis emphasizes that "Ninety-Six is of so much consequence, that no time is to be lost".

¹³⁰ Ibid. p. 292. Greene, *Papers of Nathanael Greene*, Volume VII: p. 11. This passage comes from a letter from Greene to Baron Von Stueben 28 December 1780. As an interesting aside, Greene picked an officer of superior qualities and capabilities to serve as his Quartermaster General, Colonel William Richardson Davie. Davie was responsible for the materiel resurrection of the southern Continental Army and is most known today as the father of the University of North Carolina. Buchanan, p. 294.

¹³¹ Greene, Volume VI: p. 459.

¹³² Buchanan, pp. 292-293.

¹³³ Ibid. pp. 296-302. Morgan's subordinates included many future leaders of the United States. The Continentals were commanded by Lieutenant Colonel John Eager Howard a future Governor of Maryland and US Senator. His deputy, Robert Kirkwood became the 2nd US Infantry's oldest captain in 1791 and this officer was killed fighting Miami Indians November 1791. William Washington commanded Morgan's Cavalry. A distant relative of George Washington, he served in the South Carolina legislature following the war.

¹³⁴ Moncure, LTC John, *The Cowpens Staff Ride and Battlefield Tour*, p. 24.

¹³⁵ Buchanan, p. 276-277. Buchanan devotes an entire section of his key leaders appendix to Morgan. Morgan was a strong man who survived extreme hardship and physical depredation. He was a strong leader as well and perfectly suited to command both regulars and militia. He led the volunteer Virginian riflemen during the invasion of Canada in 1775 as a Captain. He was captured at Quebec and remained a British prisoner until January 1777 when he was exchanged for a captured British officer. He proved the best battlefield commander that the Americans had during the Revolution.

¹³⁶ Buchanan, pp. 296-318, provides an interesting and detailed account of Tarleton's pursuit of Morgan through western North and South Carolina. This pursuit was extremely difficult for the British. Because of an extremely wet winter nearly all fords in the area were too deep to cross. It is important to note that in 1780-81 there were no bridges in the Carolina back country. The pursuit devolved into a race for ownership of the fords. Morgan won every race.

¹³⁷ Moncure, pp. 26-27. Also see Thomas Fleming, "The Cowpens", in *Military History Quarterly*, 1989 1(4): pp. 56-67. Morgan received intelligence from Andrew Pickens' scouts that Tarleton's Legion numbered between 1000 and 1200 men. This was very close to the truth. Morgan's force numbered slightly over 900.

¹³⁸ Ward, pp. 755. Morgan's decision to defend at Cowpens has been critiqued in the past. Morgan states that "I knew my adversary, and was perfectly sure I should have nothing but down right fighting."

¹³⁹ Ibid. p. 759. Ward's book shows an excellent sketch of the battlefield with the associated forces for the battle of Cowpens.

¹⁴⁰ Buchanan, pp. 320-326. Buchanan gives an excellent "play-by-play" of the battle in this section.

¹⁴¹ Fleming, pp. 63-65.

¹⁴² Moncure, p. 31. Ward, p. 762. The British lost 100 killed, including thirty-nine officers, 229 wounded and 600 taken prisoner. Additionally, the British lost two field guns, their entire baggage train, 100 dragoon horses, and a large quantity of ammunition. Greene would put these captured stocks to good use as the campaign progress. Interestingly, because of the great showing of the militia in this battle, Andrew Pickens was promoted to Brigadier General by South Carolina.

¹⁴³ Ward, p. 762.

¹⁴⁴ Buchanan, pp. 340-341. Though Cornwallis' unorthodox act was full of bravado it was logistically nearly suicidal. He retained four wagons for ammunition and four to haul the wounded. The supplies each man carried on his back quickly ran out forcing the army to near starvation.

¹⁴⁵ Greene, Volume VII, p. 420. Excerpted from a letter to Thomas Jefferson dated March 10th, 1781.

¹⁴⁶ Buchanan, p. 372. Of Greene's over 4000 troops roughly half were militia. Though he had a parity with the British in regular troop strength, less than 500 of Greene's regulars were battle-hardened. The rest were newly recruited Continentals from Virginia, North Carolina, and Maryland. Cornwallis' soldiers were all battle-proven regulars with extensive service. Greene's large but inexperienced army should really be judged as "equal" to Cornwallis' army, even though over twice as large.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid. p. 374.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid. p. 373. Morgan's genius at Cowpens was due to the tight placement of his battle lines as well as his effective use of the militia. Excessive separation of forces during the Revolutionary War frequently led to routs as the first lines broke and ran through subsequent lines of soldiers. Morgan's soldiers could see the entire battlefield and this reduced the tendency to panic. Greene's first line could not see the second and therefore most broke and ran fearing they were cut off and alone. Morgan cautioned Greene to make the militia fight. He wrote to Greene 20 February 1781 reference the militia. Morgan wrote "If they fight, you will beat Cornwallis; if not, he will beat you, and perhaps cut your regulars to pieces." See Buchanan, p. 370.

¹⁴⁹ Buchanan, p. 375. Greene harshly criticized the militia following Guilford Courthouse for not standing and fighting longer. However, the evidence shows that the militia did exactly what they were ordered to do; fire twice then fall back. The absence of Generals Morgan and Pickens from the battlefield, Greene's best militia fighters, was acutely felt. Morgan was forced home to bed recovering from sciatica and "piles;" both so bad that he could not ride a horse. Pickens, regretfully, could not convince his South Carolina partisans to continue operations in North Carolina and Virginia while their homes went unprotected. Pickens' brigade detached from the main army and returned to South Carolina about the same time as Greene crossed the Dan River into Virginia.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid. p. 378.

¹⁵¹ Ibid. pp. 378-379.

¹⁵² Ibid. p. 380. The Americans lost seventy-nine killed and 184 wounded. They also lost over 1400 militia who after firing their two shots simply ran home. Even so, this left Greene with nearly 3000 soldiers. Cornwallis suffered ninety-three killed and 413 wounded. Cornwallis started the pursuit of the American Army with approximately 3200 soldiers. The Greene's "bump-and-run" tactics effectively reduced Cornwallis force by over 1200 soldiers between January and March 1781. Similarly, Greene "ate" his way through North Carolina and Virginia leaving little forage or fodder for the pursuing British. Following the Battle of Guilford Courthouse, the British logistical system collapsed and Cornwallis was reduced to requesting American aid to treat his wounded.

¹⁵³ Cohen, Eliot A. and John Gooch, *Military Misfortunes*, p. 23.

¹⁵⁴ Schneider, James J., *Operational Paper Number 3*, School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, 1 March 1988, p. 27.

¹⁵⁵ Shy, p. 229.

¹⁵⁶ Buchanan, p. 267. Greene wrote in September 1776 that "there must be a good army established: men engaged for war, a proper corps of officers, and then, after a proper time to discipline the men every is to be expected." Greene, like most professional officers of his time, disliked and distrusted the militia. Greene's militia Connecticut Brigade panicked and was routed 15 September 1776 at Kip's Bay, New York leaving him with a distaste for militia troops.

¹⁵⁷ A note to the reader, the concept of "center of gravity" was not known during the American Revolution. Therefore neither Cornwallis nor Greene would have been able to articulate the concept directly. Generally, 18th military doctrine dictated that decisive battles between conventional forces were the primary aim of the army. Therefore, the defeat of the enemy's army was the paramount objective of any campaign of the period. However, Greene understood the importance of protecting the southern population and reestablishing local and state governments as soon as possible. Cornwallis, on the other hand, detested civil-military operations and focused the entirety of his efforts on destroying Greene's army.

¹⁵⁸ Shy, p. 251.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid. p. 233.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid. p. 232.

¹⁶¹ Ibid., p. 237.

¹⁶² Wickwire, p 251.

¹⁶³ Shy, p. 234.

¹⁶⁴ Field Manual 100-5, *Operations*, p. 13-3.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid. p. 13-4

¹⁶⁶ Ibid. p. 13-4

¹⁶⁷ Shy, p 232.

¹⁶⁸ Field Manual 100-5, p. 13-4

¹⁶⁹ Ibid. p. 13-4

¹⁷⁰ Higginbotham, p. 355.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Government Publications

U.S. Department of the Army. Field Manual 100-5 *Operations*. Washington DC: Government Printing Office, June 1993.

_____. Field Manual 7-98 *Operations in Low Intensity Conflict*. Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 19 October 1992.

_____. Field Manual 100-23 *Peace Operations*. Washington DC: Government Printing Office, December 1994.

Clinton, William J. *A National Security Strategy for a New Century*, The White House, May 1997

Shalikashvili, GEN John M. *National Military Strategy*, September 1997.

Books

Bowler, Arthur. *Logistics and the Failure of the British Army in America*, Princeton University Press, Princeton New Jersey, 1975.

Callahan, North, *Royal Raiders, The Tories of the American Revolution*, Bobbs-Merril Company, Publishers, New York City, New York, 1963.

Carrington, Henry B., *Battles of the American Revolution; Battle Maps and Charts of the American Revolution*, The New York Times and Arno Press, New York City New York, 1877.

Clinton, LTG Sir Henry, William B. Willcox, editor, *The American Rebellion, Sir Henry Clinton's Narrative of his Campaigns, 1775-1782, with and appendix of original documents*, Yale University Press, New Haven, Connecticut, 1954.

Cornwallis, LTG Earl Charles, *An Answer to the Part of the Narrative of Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Clinton, K.B. Which relates to the Conduct of Lieutenant-General Earl Cornwallis during the Campaign in North-America, in the Year 1781*. Burlington-House, London 1783.

Crow, Jeffery J., and Larry E. Tise, editors, *The Southern Experience in the American Revolution*, University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill North Carolina, 1978.

Davis, Burke, *The Cowpens--Guilford Courthouse Campaign*, J.B. Lippincott Company, Philadelphia, 1962.

Dederer, John Morgan, *Making Bricks Without Straw: Nathanael Greene's Southern Campaign and Mao-Tse Tung's Mobile War*, Sunflower University Press, 1983.

Higgins, W. R. Editor, *The Revolutionary War in the South: Power, Conflict, and Leadership*, Duke University Press, Durham, North Carolina, 1979.

Higginbotham, Don. *The War of American Independence*, Northwest University Press, Boston, 1983.

Hogg, Ian V. and John H. Batchelor, *Armies of the American Revolution*, Prentice-Hall Inc., Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1975.

Greene, Francis V., *General Greene*, Kennikat Press, Port Washington, New York 1893, Reissued 1970.

Greene, Nathanael, *The Papers of General Nathanael Greene, Volume 5*, The University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill North Carolina, 1976.

Greene, Nathanael, *The Papers of General Nathanael Greene, Volume 6*, The University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill North Carolina, 1976.

Greene, Nathanael, *The Papers of General Nathanael Greene, Volume 7*, The University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill North Carolina, 1976.

Gruber, Ira D. *The Howe Brothers and the American Revolution*, The University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill North Carolina, 1974.

Gruber, Ira D. *Britain's Southern Strategy*, edited by W. Robert Higgins, Duke University Press, Durham, North Carolina, 1979.

Lee, Henry, *Memoirs of the War in the Southern Department of the United States*, University Publishing Company, New York City New York, 1869.

Lambert, Robert S. *South Carolina Loyalists in the American Revolution*, University of South Carolina Press, Columbia South Carolina, 1987.

Messick, Hank, *King's Mountain*, Little, Brown, and Company, Boston, 1976.

Mitchell, LTC Joseph B. *Decisive Battles of the American Revolution*, G.P. Putnam's and Sons, New York City New York, 1962.

Moncure, LTC John, *The Cowpens Staff Ride and Battlefield Tour*, Combat Studies Institute, US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1996.

Palmer Dave R. *The Way of the Fox, American Strategy in the War for America 1775-1783*, Greenwood Press, Westport Connecticut, 1975.

Royster, Charles, *A Revolutionary People at War*, The University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill North Carolina, 1979.

Shy, John, *A People Numerous and Armed*, The University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor Michigan, 1990.

Stedman, LTC Charles, *The History of the Origin, Progress, and Termination of the American War, Volume II*, The New York Times and Arno Press, 1969. Originally published by J. Murray, London, 1794.

Tarleton, LTC Banastre, *A History of the Campaigns of 1780-1781 in the Southern Provinces of North America*, T. Cadell, London, 1787, Reprinted by The Reprint Company, Spartanburg, South Carolina, 1967.

Trinquier, COL Roger, *Modern Warfare, A French View of Counterinsurgency*, Pall Mall Press, London, 1964.

Ward, Chistopher, *The War of the Revolution*, Volume II, MacMillan Company, New York, 1952.

Wickwire, Franklin and Mary, *Cornwallis, The American Adventure*, Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, 1970.

Unpublished papers, Thesis', Monographs

Hoffer, MAJ Edward E. *Operational Art and Insurgency War: Nathanael Greene's Campaign in the Carolinas*. School of Advanced Military Studies Monograph, Fort Leavenworth KS, 4 April 1988.

Bennett, MAJ Thomas B. *Early Operational Art: Nathanael Greene's Carolina Campaign 1780-1781*. School of Advanced Military Studies Monograph, Fort Leavenworth KS, 13 May 1993.

Periodicals and Articles

Berg, Richard H. "The Southern Campaigns: The British Effort to Retake the South, 1778-1781," *Strategy and Tactics* 1985, pp. 14-23.

Clodfelter, Mark A. "Between Virtue and Necessity: Nathanael Greene and the Conduct of Civil-Military Relations in the South," 1780-1782," *Military Affairs*, 1988, pp. 169-175.

Massey, Gregory De Van, "The British Expedition to Wilmington, January-November, 1781." *The North Carolina Historical Review*, 1989, pp. 387-411.

Fleming, Thomas, "The Cowpens," *MHQ: The Quarterly Journal of Military History* 1989, pp. 56-67.

Huffsteler, Joel W. "Henry Lee and Banastre Tarleton: How Historians use their Memoirs," *Southern Historian* 1985, pp. 12-19.

Reed John F. "Wistful Thinking," *Valley Forge Journal* 1988, pp. 123-129.