


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POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

No. 2105

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8 February 1983

EAST EUROPE REPORT

POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

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INCREASE IN MARRIAGES BASED ON LOVE HAILED

Tirana RRUGA E PARTISE in Albanian Oct 82 pp 41-51

[Article by Vito Kapo: "Strong Family Unity Is Defined by the Nature of the Marriage Bond"]

[Text] Just as in every area of life, in all matters which concern the creation and strengthening of our socialist family, our party has always worked out and implemented a correct Marxist-Leninist policy. It has held and continues to hold firm to the principle that the problems of the family are the problems of the whole society, not only because of their complex nature, but, especially, because of the fact that family unity reflects and, at the same time, defines, to a great extent the unity of all our society.

The important revolutionary, political, economic and social transformations which have taken place during the era of the party have greatly influenced changes in our family unit in shape, size, social and class structure, material and cultural level, and have made it an important and stable cell of our society. A hearth in which to educate and mold members of the family, especially the younger generation, with the valuable moral and patriotic qualities of our people and the communist ideals of our party.

Comrade Enver Hoxha's speech on 6 February 1967, together with the important materials from the Second Plenum of the Central Committee of the Party in 1967, marked important events in the great struggle that the party has developed and continues to develop against old psychologies, ideologies and concepts regarding the family unit; against old customs and conservative and liberal norms and practices which prevent its normal creation and activity. The important educational work that has developed in the spirit of these materials, and the massive discussions that have been organized recently to deal with these problems, have given a new stimulus to the struggle to strengthen, democratize and revolutionize the family and fully emancipate the woman, so as to increase the influence of her personality and role in society, and especially within the family. The new Family Code approved this year by the People's Assembly of the RPSSH (People's Socialist Republic of Albania), after massive discussions with the people, is another victory for our society which will further consolidate the socialist relations in the family and raise to a higher level the interest of the party levers and public opinion in these problems.

What stage of development has our family unit achieved so far? On what fundamental direction should the party organs and organizations, and the party levers concentrate their attention to further strengthen our socialist family?

The rapid revolutionary transformations, the development of industry, the growth of the working class, the collectivization of agriculture and the strengthening and perfecting of socialist relations in production have influenced improvements in the social and class composition of the family, which is expressed, among other ways, in the growing number of families among blue-collar workers, from 37 percent in 1969 to 45 percent today. As a result of the rapid economic and cultural development of the country, the full development of industry and agriculture, and the increase in the number of intellectuals among the people, one can find in many families in country areas, workers, cooperative farmers and white-collar workers working together to influence the rapid progress of the family unit.

As a result of these changes and the important educational work undertaken by the party and all its levers, a series of results have been achieved in strengthening and consolidating the family and making family life more democratic. The changes that have taken place as far as the size and the quality of family life is concerned are very important. A special characteristic of our country is the dynamic growth of the number of families, at a rate of growth which exceeds the rate of growth of the population, which is the result of the break up of the old patriarchal families, consisting of a large number of members, and the creation of new, smaller families where socialist norms are finding fuller implementation. Thus, in 1979, as compared to 1969, while the population grew by 25 percent, the number of families grew by 34 percent. The fact that in 1979 families of one or two related couples made up 96 percent of all the families in the country is a positive indicator of what is happening.

The tendency toward the simplification of our family structure, as far as size is concerned, has nothing in common with that regressive unrestrained break up and loss of vitality of the family, with all its dangerous consequences, which is seen in the bourgeois-revisionist countries. In our socialist society the family has shown great vitality; it has assured a fast rate of population growth in accordance with the needs of our economic and social development and the needs for the defense of the country.

Nevertheless, this generally positive tendency in the development of our family unit must not be allowed to create euphoria, because, among certain village people in some districts, such as Diber, Kukes, Mata, Puke and Tropoje the tradition of many related couples living together is still strong. For this reason, the party organizations and the mass organizations, especially the women's organizations and the front organizations still have much work to do.

Another positive characteristic in our country is the fact that the process of establishing a family is taking place among young people. Our young people, in general, get married between the ages of 19 and 25 years of age, with an age difference of three to five years between the boy and the girl. In

lengthening the period of childbearing, and keeping in mind the tendency of our population to have many children, these early marriages influence the number of births and our country holds the record for having one of the highest birthrates in Europe.

Revolutionizing relationships within the family, especially, deepening democratic tendencies, has places our new family on a stronger and healthier position. Increasingly, the conservative and petit-bourgeois concepts within it, which were a burden on the woman, are disappearing, and the spirit of the times, the debate on the problems of life in the country, the need to devotedly serve the socialist fatherland, whenever it is necessary, are being felt more and more.

Among the most important achievements of the Albanian family is the growing authority of the woman within it. More and more, Comrade Enver Hoxha's recommendation is being implemented--"All the doors of employment, study, production and management must be opened for the Albanian woman and girl; they must be protected against the dangers and sources of backwardness, and they must be helped to create their own personalities on sound foundations; gain confidence and believe that there is no sex monopoly that everything is created, earned and refined in life, by study and work." (Enver Hoxha, "On the Problems of Women," 1973 edition, p 259) In our country the working woman by her work, her words and her actions receives respect and love, and holds an honorable position in the family.

All these achievements have created a new understanding of the rights and duties of family members towards each other; in the relationship between parents and children, and in many other matters regarding other family relationships. Keeping in mind these achievements, and the overall development of our society, and the great importance of the education of the new man at the present time, the Eighth Congress of the Party stresses the need to further strengthen the family unit and the complex structure of family relationships.

In order to analyze this party directive, which deals with a very important social problem, the BGSJ (Union of Albanian Women), as a party lever, has concentrated its attention on a series of important problems, which were discussed at the BGSJ July Plenum this year and dealt with the affirmation of new norms in marriage, with the relationships between couples and the generations within the family, as well as with the role of the family in the education of the new generation; looking at these matters in their moral, psychological, judicial and ideological aspects.

Our socialist family submits to the revolutionary process, not only as a result of the influence society exercises upon it, but also as a result of the changes themselves which take place in the construction and the functioning of the family. Life has taught us that an important role in family unity, and in realizing the duties and responsibilities which arise within it as a cell of society, has been played and is being played by the new nature of the marriage ties. Marriage ties which are based on sound ethical and moral standards increasingly consolidate the socialist relationships within the

family, strengthen its steadfastness and, at the same time, influence and strengthen the unity of all our society.

The character of the marriage ties, as part of the process of creating and consolidating a family, is defined by the kind of concepts its creators have in mind.

The socialist construction of society in our country has taken place, but, due to the fact that changes in society are reflected more slowly in the family, it is natural that within it there are still some regressive concepts and vestiges of a conservative and liberal nature, which negatively influence the family unit. And feudal, bourgeois concepts, of a patriarchal or liberal nature, which are still preserved among certain people, are reflected in their family relationships, and are manifested from the beginning of the marriage and through the process of starting a family. For this reason, in all the work that is being done in our country to revolutionize our family, make it stronger and more democratic, the party and its levers here emphasized the process of creating a family on sound and correct socialist foundations as the most important.

The active participation of girls alongside boys in the production process, and in all our political and social life; in actions at school and in different cultural and sports activities has created conditions for people to become closer and get to know each other better; and has made it possible for the number of marriages based on love to increase. As a result of this objective factor, as well as the educational work of the party and its levers, whereas in the 60's arranged marriages were the rule, and in the 70's marriages were made through the recommendation of an intermediary, now the number of marriages based on love are gradually increasing. Many of these marriages are made between young men and women who participate in the great works of the five-year plan, especially in the local and national activities organized by the BRPSH (Union of Working Youth of Albania). In the "5 May" district in the city of Elbasan, for example, where the number of working families is predominant, of 410 marriages that have taken place during these last few years, 320 were love matches. Thus, in the city of Korce 60 percent of love marriages were made by young working men and women. Marriages based on acquaintance and love are on the increase even in the most remote areas. From a survey of women, with a middle and high school education, in the northern areas of the country it was found that 75 percent of them married for love, and the rest by acquaintance after having been introduced.

The important popular discussions of the Family Code showed that everywhere a correct concept is being created regarding marriages of love. These marriages are becoming typical of our socialist family, which is why the article of the Family Code which said "a marriage is made with the free will of the couple, based on acquaintance and love" was accepted. (Family Code of the RPSSH, article 13)

The sense of community and the spiritual, political and moral closeness of a woman and a man; their pure acquaintance and love, free of all narrow material interest, today are the principal characteristics for creating our family unit,

and are an affirmation of its progress. In our case this progress is proving what Engels foresaw, that in the socialist society a new generation will be born, "a generation of men that will never in their lives have to buy a wife with money or by any other means of social power; and a generation of women who will never have to give themselves to a man for any other reason, except for true love...." (K. Marx-F. Engels, "Selected Works," 1975 edition, vol 2, p 251)

The increase in marriages that are based on acquaintance and love is borne out by the rate of increase in marriages in general. Emancipation on the socialist road of our society, together with the economic and social progress in our country, create the proper conditions for an increase in marriages and population growth, a phenomenon that is not seen in capitalist, bourgeois-revisionist countries. While in our country, between 1960 and 1980, marriages increased by 72.8 percent, in Italy, for example, during the same period, this indicator decreased by 40 percent.

In the capitalist, bourgeois-revisionist world in general, the number of marriages are in the decrease; the family and society as a whole is heading straight for degradation. Over there, healthy marriages that are based on love and healthy human ideals are fast being replaced by "free" cohabitation, "contract marriages" of 5-10 years. The fast growing rate of marriages in this category is being accompanied by an increase in the number of children born out of wedlock, by the further extension of this great and acute social problem.

The liberal characteristics expressed in these types of marriages are expressed by the degraded bourgeois society in the simplification of their dissolution, a process which is achieved, according to the laws in those countries, through an understanding between the couples, outside of any state or social control. The same thing is happening in the revisionist countries, where the family is becoming more and more liberalized. Now, in the revisionist Soviet Union, couples who do not have minor children are allowed to annul their marriages at the registrar's office. Whereas, in Bulgaria the dissolution of a marriage is allowed even when there are minor children in the family.

Contrary to what is happening in the capitalist, bourgeois-revisionist world, where the family is included in the general crisis which has overtaken them, in our country the creation of the family and its dissolution, when it is absolutely necessary, take place under the control of the state and society.

While emphasizing the new aspects in marriage, our attention is drawn to the fact that the positive changes do not present themselves in the same way in all districts and areas within them, or even within the different categories of our population. A new trend has more acceptance in the cities and the agricultural plains. In Gjirokaster District, for example, during the last five years 60 percent of the marriages have been love marriages. The greatest number of them were in the cities and the plains, whereas, in the mountainous regions they only accounted for 36 percent of the marriages. The same is true for the Pogradec District. In the city 60 percent of the marriages were love

matches, and in the villages, only 21 percent of them were. A number of other noticeably negative aspects which are found in marriages are not always evident and do not always express themselves with the same intensity.

Therefore, the party recommends that in marriage, as in all the process of creating, consolidating and making a family more democratic, at every stage and in every district, in every area and village, we must define those aspects that are most typical and most troublesome, and we must organize more skilled work in these areas. It is from these positions that the BGSJ begins its activities.

But what are those important aspects in marriage which need our attention? How do they present themselves and how should we confront them?

In the last fifteen years marriages by recommendation, especially in the villages, have predominated. We come across these marriages in almost all the districts, mainly in the mountainous areas such as in Baldushk, Zalldaj and Vaqarr in Tirana District. In Piskal, Qnam, Radovicke, Clirim, Helmes Shqer, and in Pasterak in Kolonje District; in Cerme, Germe, Golem, Gzjan, Ballagat and in Shega in Lushnje District..

These marriages, compared to the ones where the wishes of the young people, especially the women, were not considered at all, must be regarded as a bridge which leads directly to love marriages. Nevertheless, experience has shown that these marriages, especially in the villages, often conceal and preserve a number of conservative concepts which result in the formal introduction of the couple and the implementation of the old standards under the mask of the new. Such marriages express a lack of confidence and a certain fear on the part of the parents about the choice of a lifetime companion by the boy or girl. On the one hand, this sometimes happens because there is a weakness in the work that should have been done to create everywhere a healthy social opinion on the right of young people to choose their marriage partners; on the other hand, it happens because marriages based on acquaintance and love are not considered by everyone as absolutely necessary for a sound family.

In order to overcome these weaknesses, the women's, the front and the youth organizations need to undertake more systematic, educational work, relying on the tradition of the pure moral life of the young Albanian men and women; they must argue against the fear and the doubts our young people have in their own ability to choose the right marriage partners. Again and again, our daily life has shown that our young people not only are capable of choosing a partner who is fit to create a good and strong family, but also by working together they will learn to keep their dignity and honor according to Albanian traditions.

The need to intensify educational work in this field is dictated by the necessity to isolate the kind of problems which lead to "elopments," which takes place when young people are not able to convince their parents to accept marriage to a partner of their choice. These marriages have undergone a relative increase lately compared to the past. Thus, in the last few years in Lushnje District, 103 marriages of this kind have taken place, in Novosele, in

Flore District, 47, and in Menkulas, in Korce District, 18 such marriages have taken place.

This aspect, although not widespread, must be of concern to us. It is true that it demonstrates the deep love that exists between the young people, as well as the possibilities that exist to create a sound family, but, it also demonstrates the conservatism of those parents who want their children to marry according to the old traditions, however, there are instances when parents, for justifiable political and social reasons, do not approve of the marriage of their son or daughter with this or that young person, and the children, in order to present their families with an accomplishment fact "elope" and get married. This aspect should be disturbing because of the negative consequences which accompany it, such as the complications it creates in the parent-child relationship, which very often leads to complications in relations between families and relatives, and a broad-scale dissolution of unity. Facing the youth in married life, as a result of the complication of relations mentioned above sometimes even lead to the break-up of the marriage.

To prevent negative aspects, it is the duty of all the family, especially the young people, to communicate better with their parents, to discuss their problems calmly and in a democratic manner; to convince their parents of the benefits of a love match. When it becomes impossible to convince the parents, then it is necessary to ask society for help, especially the Front, the women's and youth organizations, who, on their part, must and should work with the parents and the young people to create a warm communicative atmosphere within the family where the young people can speak freely with their father and mother. The times demand that parents create such a relationship with their children that the children, in the same way they discuss studies and jobs with their parents, will discuss their personal lives, their feelings and aspirations; the manner in which they conceptualize society and love; the manner in which families should be created and how they should function.

The absence of such a discussion permits the preservation of old practices and concepts in marriage, which do not consider the feelings of the young people and are inspired by correct ideas such as marrying far from the village and outside the so-called "tribe," and for improper motives, such as absolutely having to marry someone from the city. Under these circumstances, it happens that young women from the village marry older city men or city men that are physically handicapped, on other occasions young men from the village will marry older women from the city with some physical handicap, because, and only because, they want to live in the city. Generally, in the making of these types of marriages, parents do not stop for long to consider the age, character or health of the young man or woman or their motives; they do not think of the social, legal and economic or other problems which are created under these circumstances and which become causes of the instability of the new family.

The popular discussions on the draft Family Code showed that the tendency to marry outside the village, especially in young women, is more pronounced in the districts of Korce, Tropoje, Lezhe, Lushnje, Elbasan, Durrës, etc. In

the north this is justified by the mistaken and unscientific concept of so-called "kin," according to which people from the same village are considered of one "blood," even when this applies to the fifth or sixth generation, even when it is not known whether a relationship actually exists at all. It has become almost a rule that marriages between young people who belong to this so-called "kin" are made outside the village, and sometimes outside the district, without considering the attributes or values of these people from far away, who are known superficially, which make them fit to marry their son or daughter. And this happens at a time when it has been scientifically proven that marriages after the third generation have no negative biological effects on the progeny.

Marriages outside the village are accompanied by both social and economic consequences. They create the unnecessary movement of the labor force, especially the movement of labor from the village to the city, or from the mountainous regions to the plains, a working force which is badly needed in the village and particularly in the mountainous regions. In the course of 1981, for example, in the usual mechanical movement of the population, two-thirds of it was caused by the movement of people from the villages to the city, principally for matrimonial reasons, and mainly in the 15 to 30 age group. In Korce District, 13.4 percent of the marriages contracted in recent years involved young people who moved from the villages to the city. In Maliq, 45 percent of the young village women, married to city boys and boys who work in agricultural enterprises, have come from the highlands of Zvarrisht and Moglice.

The inclination of the village girls to marry in the city has created a disproportion in the ratio of males to females in the villages, which has made it necessary for the males too, to marry outside the village. According to the data for the general registration of the population, this ratio is more disproportionate in the districts of Gjirokaster, Gramsh, Kolonje, Permet and Skrapar. In the distant highland villages of these districts, this disproportion, which has a direct influence on the decrease in the number of marriages, is even greater.

During the public discussion of family problems, as well as during the discussion on the Draft Family Code, these kinds of marriages, which are calculated and made for benefit, were submitted to strong criticism for being expressions that are not compatible with the norms of our morality.

The contracting of such marriages which cannot guarantee strong families, and, at the same time, which results in the useless mechanical movement of the labor force happens, among other reasons, because of the indifference of certain mass organizations, in the villages and the cities, which, as far as one can see, continue to consider the matter of creating a family as a problem which concerns only its creators. These mistaken attitudes should be condemned. When marriages are placed on improper foundations, and the participants insist on patriarchal, petit bourgeois or liberal concepts, public opinion has the right and duty to intervene.

The mass organizations, as organized units of sound social opinion, must be and should be more influential in overcoming difficulties which are created in healthy marriages by divisive and religious remnants of the past. The rapid development of the country, the construction of the great works of the five-year period, and of the new housing centers, where there is a mixing of the population, should be very helpful in this direction. This phenomenon will help overcome that difficulty arising in marriage, formerly quite acute, of marriages between young people of different former religions..

Of the total marriages that took place in the second half of 1981 in the city of Tirana, 44 percent of the young women from the former-Orthodox religion married young men from the former-Moslem religion. There are also good indicators in the districts of Lushnje, Berat, and Durres which prove that concepts which did not permit young people from different religions to marry have been dislodged.

Nevertheless, certain expressions which are still noticeable in some districts show the need to further strengthen educational work, especially in certain northern regions. In the districts of Shkoder, Puke and Lezhe there still are parents who pressure their young people not to marry boys and girls who come from families who practiced a different former religion at one time. It is easy to understand that under these circumstances feelings and concepts, rooted and encouraged by clerical backwardness, still continue to be preserved. But how are we to fight them? Naturally marriages are not made by prescription or premeditation. When two young people, whose families at one time belonged to different religions, fall in love, they must, first of all, learn how to persuade their parents by themselves, and when they do not succeed they must seek help from the mass organizations, which have a duty to clearly explain to the families that these attitudes are as old as they are harmful. This view should prevail not only in the northern districts, but also in the districts of Korce, Sarande, and Pogradec, as well as in some other districts where in villages, hamlets and special blocks they still maintain incorrect attitudes regarding this problem, especially since within these same areas there are quite a number of progressive examples.

However, it is necessary to struggle against one more foreign aspect in marriage, which is expressed in the form of a so-called material "condition" for an engagement or marriage. This is nothing more than a camouflage of the old harsh, reactionary custom of selling and buying girls. In order to be very successful in this struggle it is necessary to treat the problem concretely with deep, broad and convincing ideological, political, social and economic arguments; emphasizing the negative results that have accompanied, in fact, instances of engagements, or marriages made when material "conditions" in kind or in leks have been used.

Life has shown that the creation of a family and all other problems, no matter how important or how delicate, that deal with its function and activity as a cell of our socialist society must be viewed and dealt with on a political and ideological basis. The internal and external situations on which our people are building socialism, demand a sound and stable family and society.

Our internal and external enemies, imperialists and revisionists, knowing that the unity of our strong socialist society has at its foundation, among other things, the sound unity of our family, have tried and are still trying, in different ways and by different means, to destroy its stability from its very source, by striving to inject a spirit of indifference, carelessness and spontaneity in all matters that have to do with the creation of our family. This is why they worry when they see the care and attention the party and society as a whole are giving to the matter of strengthening the family. They consider our Family Code, as do the Yugoslav revisionists, an "intrusion" in the intimate life of a human being, and as an "absence" of freedom and democracy. Our "intrusion" in matters that deal with the creation of the family is done mainly in the interest of those who decide to get married and then in the interest of society. By obstructing the path of marriages which create unstable families, society gives young men and women great assistance; it prevents them from making mistakes which may become a burden to them for many years to come and even for the rest of their lives.

Aware of the necessity to maintain an active revolutionary position, many mass organizations, among them some women's organizations, in certain groups and villages in the districts of Elbasan, Lezhe, Fier, Lusnje and others, have tried to turn the people's courts, in cases of divorce, into educational meetings to prove that marriages made through a third party or by recommendation; for material or comfortable work conditions are not a guarantee of a strong family, and that in the breakup of a marriage it is the children who suffer the most.

The concern of our society in regard to certain negative aspects, which are still observed in marriages, is explained by a number of reasons. First of all, in our country all the conditions have been created for marriages everywhere to take place with the free consent of young men and women after they have come to know one another. Secondly, the creation of a strong family, according to the norms of our proletarian morality, gives the family the ability to confront the tasks in our socialist society, especially the task of educating the new generations with the sound morality of our people and the revolutionary ideals of the party. Thirdly, a family founded on love is more stable and is less likely to break up.

The breakup of a marriage is the most eloquent indicator that expresses its instability. In our country, as a result of the increasingly more skilled educational work undertaken by the party and its levers to create the conviction of the necessity to respect the norms which guarantee a strong family, the incidence of broken marriages is continually decreasing.

A close examination of the reasons for broken marriages proves that, in the majority of cases, it happens in marriages that are contracted for unsound reasons, motivated by interest and made through intermediaries, or are encouraged by conservative concepts and religious remnants.

Although, in our country the incidence of broken marriages is many times lower than that in the capitalist, bourgeois-revisionist countries (in a thousand marriages in our country only 86 break up, whereas in the United States the

incidence is 504.0, in Sweden 508.7, in Denmark 407.1, in England 350.6, in the Soviet Union 381.5, in the German Democratic Republic 119.9, and in Hungary 179 per thousand, etc.) we cannot allow ourselves to underestimate the situation. Every broken marriage, as an expression of the instability of that family, must create concern. The reason for every broken marriage must be found, and from every one of them conclusions and lessons must be drawn, so that in every village and district, according to the need, work must be done individually to prevent marriages which will create unstable families.

It is absolutely necessary that all the mass organizations, under the leadership of the party, intensify and improve their educational work to create a sound revolutionary outlook in the matter of creating a family, and set up and affirm the new family norms in order to best fulfill the family's important educational role. We emphasize this because family conflicts affect not only the unity of each individual family, but they also affect all our society as well. A broken marriage creates a series of economic, social, legal and family problems: problems of housing, work and the education of the children.

The years of the people's power have proved that socialism creates conditions for a stable family, and this stability is influenced by the desire of the family unit itself to advance and strengthen the progress of socialism. Our reality is very convincing. Based on this reality and on the experience gained in the field of education in creating a new and emancipated family, we must from now on rely more on consolidating and advancing the successes in this field just as everywhere else.

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CSO: 2100/16

'UTOPIAN' EXPECTATIONS FROM REAL SOCIALISM FLOUTED

Leipzig LEIPZIGER VOLKSZEITUNG in German 13 Jan 83 p 7

['Theory and Practice' feature article by Prof Dr Kurt Schneider, Karl Marx University, Leipzig: "There Is No Substitute for Real Socialism: History Has Confirmed Our Social Theory." For items of related information see translation of an East Berlin TRIBUNE article published under the heading, "Academician Warns Against Misinterpreting 'Communist Equality Ideal,'" in JPRS 82376, 3 Dec 82, No 2081 of this series, pp 4-8]

[Text] We are living no doubt in an age of profound political, economic, social and spiritual-cultural change. It is becoming more and more evident that the challenges of the eighties have not slowed down the dynamics of socialism but have in fact substantially strengthened them. "Especially in our age in which human civilization is threatened as never before by the arms buildup policies of imperialism and in which capitalism is less able than ever before to find ways out of its crisis, socialism is proving to be the one social order capable of solving the fundamental problems of society and of man." This finding is part of the theses put out by the SED central committee on the occasion of the Karl Marx anniversary year of 1983. More and more people throughout the world are coming to realize that socialism has in fact introduced qualitatively new factors into the historical process.

Crocodile Tears Shed over Socialism

For this reason the ideologues of imperialism are stepping up their attacks on the theory and practice of real socialism. Some time ago, for example, a reputable bourgeois weekly in the FRG said that it was now time "to confront real socialism (which is a sham) with unrealized socialism (which is real)." There is method to this absurdity. The idea is to voice hypocritical "worry about socialism" in hopes of thereby restricting its power of attraction and helping bourgeois policies and ideologies achieve their counterrevolutionary ends. Real socialism is falsely termed "a sham" and at the same time a "real socialism" is propounded which is the exact opposite: it is not socialism but a return to capitalist power structures and property relationships.

The concept of "real socialism" has attained a firm place in the scientific-theoretical and political-ideological activities of the Marxist-Leninist parties. Real socialism is the only conceivable materialization of the teachings of scientific communism in accordance with concrete historical and nation-specific conditions. In other words, real socialism was born at the time of the great socialist October Revolution and its history is the history of the socialist world system.

Socialism Not a Rigid Model

Both the history and the present practice of real socialism prove that there is nothing rigid or immutable about it. Freed from the shackles of exploitation and oppression based on private ownership of the means of production, it is a development process of great dynamism which brings about profound changes in all of society. An analysis of real facts, processes and trends proves that every socialist society—whatever the undeniable specifics of this or that nation may be—is characterized by universal qualitative traits.

This has nothing to do with a rigid socialist model but in fact points to the objective inherent creation and development of socialism as a lower stage of the formation of a unified communist society. Socialist society is not a happy dream of noble spirits but above all the result of the working class struggle for political power and the socialization of the means of production—the result of conscious, scientifically based creativity of the working class and the entire labor force under the leadership of the Marxist-Leninist party. In this very sense, the theses put forward on the occasion of the Karl Marx anniversary year of 1983 underscore the fact that real socialism was born of the most vehement class struggles and that it is and will continue to be the decisive force in the revolutionary world process.

Playing Tricks with Ideals and Reality

Bourgeois ideologues often think they are very smart when they try to portray the present stage of development of real socialism almost as the final goal of communism. They can talk as smoothly as they like; their ears betray them every time. They portray the shortcomings of present-day reality as shortcomings of the ideal in order to defame reality "in the name of the ideal" as well as the ideal "in the name of reality." And they think nothing of grossly distorting statements by Marx, Engels or Lenin pontificating all the while in a tone of scientific inerrancy.

Let us therefore make something clear: Marx, Engels and Lenin never idealized socialism. On the contrary; they always came out resolutely against utopian conceits, petty bourgeois expectations and impatience. Marx called this cheap rudeness, gross abuse and even more gross lack of comprehension. Lenin drastically warned against using socialism in the manner of colorful icons. All of them always spoke of the tremendous historic potential of socialism even while pointing to its historically conditioned shortcomings

and deficiencies which, however—since they are not conditioned by society—can be overcome step by step on the path toward communism.

Real socialism made its entrance into the life of mankind more than 60 years ago. 60 years—that is a long time in the life of an individual human being but for the formation and development of a new social order it is not. As Marx emphasized, the working class does not introduce "a prefabricated utopia." It knows that it "has to go through a long series of historical processes which work a complete change on individuals and circumstances." In many ways, an important key for understanding the policies of our party consists in the realization that the socialist countries are in the midst of the process of forming and developing the new society and that this process has by no means yet run its course. At all times and in all places the development of socialism and communism goes through a number of stages none of which can be skipped. The solution of many problems—such as increasing economic efficiency and productivity, improving working and living conditions further and so forth—depends on objective factors which cannot be chosen or changed at random.

It has been and will always be the position of our party that the political leadership of a socialist society must at the same time stand ready to provide scientific leadership. It is a fundamental principle of party activity to make a consistently sober assessment—free of wishful thinking—of the potential of our country and, by taking all aspects into consideration, to decide on realizable goals and necessary measures. We can only have long-term steady growth, Erich Honecker said some years ago, "if every successful step prepares us for the next step; if every step brings out the forces and advantages inherent in socialism more fully and effectively. This can only be based on a policy which takes its lead from the objective laws on which the social process is founded." Thus, real socialism can be understood as the stage of development socialism can reach under concrete-historical conditions as the lower form of communist society.

Real Socialism—Clear Guidelines

But this also means that real socialism has nothing to do with any form of pseudo-socialism; of para-socialist conceits and models however beguiling their trappings may be. Real socialism is the only proper political, ideological and social orientation for the progressive forces in the world. This applies above all to the activities of the Marxist-Leninist parties in the capitalist countries but in equal measure to the countries of the national liberation movement a large number of which has chosen the path toward socialism.

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EDITOR OF DISSIDENT 'BESZELO' COMMENTS ON HUNGARIAN SYSTEM

Paris COMMENTAIRE in French, Winter 82-83 pp 605-613

[Article by Miklos Haraszti: "Miracles in Hungary?" Translated from Hungarian by Ibolia Virag.]

[Text] Four Hungarian Miracles

Socialist Hungary has always been an example for its neighbors to follow.

Immediately following World War II, it was in Hungary that parliamentary democracy was eliminated in the cleverest way. This Hungarian method has gone into the international Machiavellian dictionary under the title "the salami strategy." The communists cut up and swallowed, slice by slice, each democratic party with which they were co-member in the governing coalition. In each case they attacked the "rightwing" of the party, and when the party removed the targeted individuals from its ranks they began again until the party totally disintegrated. In Central Europe, only Hungary has formally excluded noncommunist parties: the one-party system must not be disturbed, even by phantom parties.

The master of these maneuvers, Rakosi, ruled supreme after 1948. He earned the title of "Stalin's best pupil." It was in Hungary that the most bloody, Moscow-type, false trials were staged, where there was the most violent collectivization of agriculture, and where industry was developed in the most unbalanced way, at the most insane pace, directly producing the most extreme misery of the people. It was also in Hungary that probably the most laudatory paeans were composed to the glory of the leaders.

Then, in October 1956, it was there that the first antitotalitarian revolution in history broke out. In a period of 15 days, everything that democrats of all kinds had dreamed of became reality. Spontaneously, a dozen parties, hundreds of autonomous organizations, armed resistance groups and free papers were established. Only the workers councils survived--for a short time--the November invasion of the Soviet tanks: the general strikes, which lasted several weeks, could be stopped only by the imprisonment of their leaders.

However, this glorious adventure is recorded as a tragedy in the nation's memory, and with justification, because the crushing of the revolution was made easier because of its impulsive nature: this inadequately organized revolt inevitably provoked an organized response.

When the disturbances broke out, it was the leading intellectuals, those who had composed the paeans of yesterday, who were the most surprised. Before the revolution they had been content with making prudent criticism and their boldest dreams did not envisage more than a modification of censorship, a benevolent economic reform, or a reduction in violence. All that did come about a few years after the crushing of the revolution, after they had abandoned their stance of opposition and accepted again the role of loyal collaboration. They are also the ones, these creators of public opinion, who today regard the 1956 events as nothing more than an ancient "aberration." The fourth and latest Hungarian miracle developed later, "Kadarism," from the name of the man who has held power for 25 years. J. Kadar succeeded in earning the world's admiration by eliminating the Stalinist past, while preserving his authority within the monocentric system. He brought the industrial society eager for democracy from a crisis situation into an enduring equilibrium. He based the system's survival no longer on fear but on conformism. Until recently, he had succeeded in preventing formation of an opposition in this society that was perfectly aware of what it had lost. It thus remains a sad miracle, a humiliating and drab miracle.

"Alliance Policy"

Kadar is far from being a disguised democrat, as the Western press is saying currently. He has already proved in a ruthless way that power belongs to the party, and through it to Moscow. He hung Imre Nagy, the former prime minister, that Eurocommunist before his time, as well as the city guerrillas who fought against the Soviet tanks. He used terror precisely when necessary to cow into silence a country that had been totally overwhelmed. He communicated his certainties to a hierarchy of officials that had been disrupted.

In doing so, his goal was not to restore Stalinism, rather he was guided by a bold vision, though a simple and common basic idea, bold especially in comparison with the ineffectiveness of the neighboring communist systems. Kadar recognized that the party apparatus alone was incapable of preserving power in a reliable way; he reached the conclusion that what should be done was to ally with all the professional and intellectual hierarchies resulting from a collectivized society by assuring them advancement compatible with the monolithic policy. He rightly judged that the power would be strengthened by sacrificing insistence on only one kind of loyalty, by not regarding the slightest deviation as disobedience, and even by encouraging the emergence of a diversity of loyalties.

Kadar's astuteness lay in his faith in the capacity for integration of a state-controlled society. After demonstrating in a ruthless fashion that reforms were only going to come about from the top, and furthermore could not go so far as demands for political rights, he brought into association with the government a number of reformers--at the side of the bureaucrats.

Kadarism found an original solution to the problem of the proper balance. The exclusive ruling principle could be neither immobilization nor reformism. Each of these principles has its risks; the thing to do is therefore to limit both, if possible simultaneously.

A "two-front struggle," that is the name given to this principle, which is to some degree the use of the "alliance policy." At the outset, these labels were assigned sometimes to the political mythology of the right and sometimes to that of the left, but it very quickly became clear that in a state-controlled society the distinctions lose all significance.

How is right or left involved in the issue of abortion, for example? Do we need many workers in the future, or more women at work now? This is an issue for the planners, not one between pro- and anti-feminists. The resulting compromise permits abortion freely outside marriage or after the third child in a marriage; the era of single interest campaigns is over.

The leaders' main task at all levels is creation of "dual aspect" approaches of this nature. They must be at the same time liberal and firm; they must find solutions to all problems, to the degree that they are soluble.

The advocates of "progress" or of the "status quo" have had to accept the fact that they will never again be able to win out entirely. On the other hand, they no longer have to fear that they will be eliminated from the scene in case of failure.

The "New Middle Class"

During the Kadar era, the country has become progressively richer; one could even exaggerate a little and talk about creation of a bourgeoisie. However, the beneficiaries are not at all motivated by historical or spiritual aspirations. Those who are made richer only work to repair the deficiencies of the state-controlled economy, and the state no longer demolishes their stalls set up at the base of the monument. Those who have a certain freedom of movement are grateful for the relatively longer length of their leash, but would be panicked if the leash broke.

Indeed, the communist revolution continues, that of the security which frees individuals from their unsettling independence and distressing freedom. The Kadar era thus truly achieves the real communist utopia: the possibility of becoming "contented" officials. The intellectuals get by with the word, officials by influence, and workers by their energy to improve their situation. They are given a chance of doing so. We have not yet seen the emergence of the kind of discontent that, by its very existence, would make the system an "ancien regime." In popular parlance the country is called "the most cheerful barracks" in the huge Soviet concentration camp. Do we detect a certain pessimism in this boastful epithet? Despite their self-congratulation, the Hungarians are aware in a confused way that the Poles are ahead of them by several years in the most important reform: self-respect.

No one should blame the Hungarians for the weakness that causes them to seek consolation in this backwardness. We greet with consternation the chauvinistic view presenting the Polish strike movement as a "hunger revolt" and identifying the reason for this food shortage as the "laziness" of

the Poles. There are many, even among the workers, who persist in saying that the strikes were only a manifestation of this laziness. Let us be generous and imagine that they are secretly ashamed at not standing at the side of the Poles. These ludicrous ideas are not the product of national pride but rather of fear.

Twenty-five years after the crushing of the revolution, it is still not possible to forget this great defeat. The new generations inherit in turn this anguish, which prevents them from making demands.

The society sees with astonishment, or even with gratitude, how easy it was to subject it to conformity. Its bourgeois nature, like that of the Prussians in the past, is very respectful of the established order. The new socialist citizen lives in peaceful coexistence with the world of the ceremonies of power and with the subsequently Americanized police. The regime can afford to withdraw from numerous sectors, since its absolute authority has been transferred to the officials and technocrats.

Naturally, it would be wrong to see as behind this behavior only anguish and satiety: there has also been a social metamorphosis. Large elements of the population enjoy advantages that it is in their interest to maintain as status quo. In the Kadar era a significant middle class has developed, perhaps the largest the country has ever known.

This new middle class is no longer composed of independent individuals, but of officials who are involved with the economy and the state-controlled culture. It is not in their interest to see state supremacy disappear. They hope that the state recognizes that they are its supporters. Indeed, Kadarism does give them this recognition.

One kind of criticism is approved, even encouraged by Kadarism. You often hear: "Devoted labor, merit and talent are not adequately appreciated." Kadarism has openly abandoned the equality ideal; in its place, it is trying to instill among the people of kind of social justice that is easier to achieve and more useful: it honors every contribution to the vitality of the system. It permits criticism calling for respect for service rendered, for in this way the upper classes can also speak frankly about themselves. It makes possible the growth of paternalism of the elite: those at the top no longer need to wear the mask of the proletarians.

More than ever, and as in the capitalist era, the ideology of the upper classes is "meritocratic": the latter are convinced that their position is the result of their abilities. In reality, this elite--which we could call the upper middle class of educated people--is the product of an educational system set up by that elite itself. In principal, anyone can study, the only criteria being individual abilities; however, in reality the schedule for progress toward the top is well determined, since the elite now seeks only to reproduce itself.

There is a strict separation between university people and the "common man." A severe "numerus clausus" prevents training of "intellectual proletarians" and the dispersion of the power of knowledge. The possession of a diploma almost automatically brings with it income from numerous sources and the opportunity to make a career.

This element of society also dictates a certain life-style. It reflects Central Europe, particularly the bureaucratic Central Europe of the 19th century, amidst the "plebeian" rest of Eastern Europe. Its culture is not up to the classical level, but it does retain a classical ennui; stripped and emptied of any quality of its own, it is full of glorified folklore elements. It is all conducted with the self-consciousness of those trying to educate the people. By contrast, their consumer habits are patterned on the Western model.

Currently, even the members of the party apparatus come from this higher middle class of educated people. There are strong ties between the political elite and the professional elite. The disputes between lobbies are only family quarrels.

Secret Parliamentary Government

In its operation, the new regime has come to foster a new official ideology. Kadarism is a kind of "management science" [in English]. Its central theme is a rather vague public asset called the common interest of the society. We do not know much about what it really is: only the party command is authorized to explain. However, that leadership itself recognizes that the ideology does not deal with the future. Its only wisdom lies in harmonizing the divergent interests. Under the new ideology, the party's leading role derives from its intrinsic disinterestedness. It is essential that the party command be very visible. If there is no command giving orders, it will be the private and selfish interests that will dominate instead of the common interest of the society.

No one has the right to openly express divergent interests. Divergencies can only be expressed, even if only between the lines, if they are "in good faith," that is, when they are awaiting a decision by the Central Bureau Committee. The public good is thus constantly evolving in relation to the struggles of the informal lobbies within the party. The final decision is announced by the Politburo, that shrouded mini-parliament.

There is the lobby of the big enterprises, the "labor vultures." They oppose decentralization, the market, and workers' freedom to transfer. They call for subsidies for the products of major enterprises and for more subsidies for the wages of their workers. They continue to use, with a menacing tone, the fiction of the "dictatorship of the proletariat."

Their opponents are proponents of the market, and constitute the economists lobby. Their ultimate goal--some claim--is conversion of the Hungarian forint to a convertible currency. They favor small enterprises, decentralization, and close relations with the West. They would prefer to impose discipline on workers by the threat of unemployment rather than communist chauvinism.

These are the two "big" lobbies; the others try to line up between them. The agricultural lobby is rather "flexible," the policy lobby rather "hard." The cultural lobby clearly plays politics: sometimes it supports one, sometimes the other. One day it will say: "Culture can never become a commodity; materialism corrupts; the intelligentsia must serve as the educator of the people so they can survive." Then another day it announces: "We must be prudent with administrative methods, we must protect our liberal image."

As for Moscow, although it has accepted the new decision-making process, it is not just a lobby. If the Politburo is a parliament, Moscow is the senate, with right of veto.

The core around Kadar maintains its power by alternately favoring the lobbies of the conservatives and the reformists. However, these lobbies must constantly keep in mind that the era of utopias is over. The economists must demonstrate consistently that their proposals do not extend too far the range of well-being, do not incite a new class struggle, do not divide society in an irreparable way, and do not stimulate desire for autonomy in all elements of the whole. On the other hand, the proponents of strictness must confine themselves to strengthening their power within the new context. This is how the "slow progression" that characterizes the Hungarian system comes about.

Thanks to Kadarism, the communist civilization has finally found its physiological rhythm. By the constant alternation of "decentralization" and "recentralization" the permanence of the concentration of power is assured, while at the same time avoiding putting society in a catastrophic situation.

The Culture Between the Lines

Gyorgy Aczel, the party's top official for Hungarian culture, boasts justifiably during his trips to Western countries of the fact that in Hungary no writer is in prison and only a few manuscripts are not published. Conversely, when he is in Moscow he brags about a situation in which culture is faithful to the regime and the artists voluntarily comply with the directives.

In this field as in others, the principle is the educational effect of alternating the carrot and the stick. In 1956, intellectuals who opposed Kadar, particularly writers, were sent to prison. In the same period, however, creators who had previously been suppressed into silence were being brought into the culture "factory." Hence in the early 1960's when the amnesty was issued, the writers who came out of prison realized that the chariot of culture was moving ahead without them and that the journey was now a little more pleasant than previously.

An important decision was taken to create a mass culture of a commercial character alongside the "serious" culture. However, this did not mean a freer artistic life, only a culture on an inferior level. The petty bourgeois avant-garde culture was revived so that the profits would promote "real" art. By this measure of separating, within a directed culture, the distraction of the elite from that of the plebeians the experimentation could proceed more calmly.

Soviet realism was relegated to the museums, and in its place was adopted Georges Lukacs' proposal for an official aesthetic principle. This theory, expounded in thousands of pages, can be summed up in a single sentence: Realism must not be a set of formulas, but rather must include all the methods that are compatible with the reality of a guided society. Gyorgy Aczel says: "What reality is, I will define," adding "You can portray my reality as you wish, as long as we stay in touch by phone."

This aesthetic is no longer the military one but the aesthetic of the factory employees. It no longer regulates by instructions, only by taboos. Prohibition of a neat finality, that is the supreme command. The art of the "state-establishment" cannot be a separate world, it must be useful in one way or another to the existing world. Art can express a degree of ill-humor, but cannot, on any occasion, be irresponsible. It can be frivolous but not enraged. It can be incomprehensible but cannot foster misunderstandings.

The artists' confidence was regained by the permission given to them to engage in a degree of criticism, previously banned. From banner carriers, artists and writers were thus converted to advisers. As for the taboos: repetition amounts to discreetly pointing out the problems that might threaten the advance of the society establishment.

The "space between the lines" was left open for criticism and suggestions. Naturally, the privilege of making illusions is not reserved to the artists. Officials do it to the same degree. A loyal citizen cannot keep his bearings without glasses to read between the lines. Real communication is carried out between the lines, just as in the eras of the great state religions and long-enduring empires.

It would be wrong to believe that the artists engage in this "double talk" unwillingly. Quite to the contrary, to them this is the proof of their professionalism. They jubilantly indulge in this freedom reserved for the elite, and it is worth the whole world to them.

The repertoire of nuanced meanings in this space between the lines is the antechamber of loyal innovation, the laboratory of consensus. Certainly, even in the form of allusions, the only opinions that can be expressed are those that might be approved sooner or later by the command. Artists become the spokesmen for the lobbies, artistic creations become disguised case presentation files.

In viewing the films produced in the Kadar era, noting the ellipses and the symbolism, observing that they are meaning to say something entirely different from what they actually say, one should certainly not conclude that censorship is asleep. The space between the lines is just as well controlled as the lines themselves.

The freedom between the lines has no dynamic and no direction. It fluctuates like all the rest of our state-controlled civilization: going from decentralization to centralization and back, in a continuous fluttering. This "ersatz" freedom can only struggle for itself, and can only reproduce itself.

The Kadarian censorship no longer promotes the vision of a perfect society; it requires a sincere willingness to adapt to the system. This censorship no longer defends an ideological message; its only directive is that the writer and artist seek harmony between leaders and led. Its limit of toleration is not infinite, but it is adaptable. It depends on the qualities of minds oriented toward cooperation. It is an empty sack that artists enjoying a high prestige and tranquil life can fill with anything they like, as long as that does not risk making a hole in the sack.

Opposition in Hungary

Finally, let us look at the opposition. We should not put much hope in it. Other socialist systems much less well-functioning than the Hungarian system succeed without great difficulties in making their youth, raised by them, adapt to the system.

The Hungarian system is more seductive because it makes an effort to seduce. Not satisfied with fully organizing its workers, it also fills their stomachs. As for other elements of society, it does not offer them only a single path to success; in addition to the role of bureaucrat there are also those of manager and petty bourgeois. In the technical, scientific and artistic professions there are fewer ideological guidelines, but the taboos remain the same.

Those who are prepared to compromise, to adapt, suffer here as elsewhere from the incurable malady of this kind of political system: they are forced to limit their creativity. Our country is more gifted than is reflected in what it produces. Kadarism acknowledges this by acceding to self-satisfaction in certain limited areas. This concession becomes a point of convergence for those who, under similar regimes and operating under conditions hardly less favorable, would instead opt for resistance.

Several of my "normalized" friends believe, with reason, that by respecting the taboos one is subject to hardly more restrictions than by choosing to stay on the fringe. Inside this society, there the danger that our imagination and language will degenerate; outside the society, the personal relationships wither. Whether to be in the silent majority or the ghetto: that is the meager choice.

Furthermore, two very widespread ideological arguments have helped intellectuals in following the counsel of prudence by seeking their happiness within the framework of the existing institutions. One argument proposes that those who seek to enjoy nonexistent and unachievable freedoms in reality deprive themselves of any possibility for action. The second argument, closely related to the first, regards radicals as too active: they provide excuses for repression, mobilize the police, and prevent evolution. "It is not a good idea to provoke the regime just at the time when..."--that has been the opening argument for decades.

It is true that you find these two ideological arguments under all well-established dictatorships. In fact, it is individual temperament--or, if you prefer, the childhood influence--that causes someone to choose opposition,

thus putting himself outside the institutions. The number of dissidents is equivalent to the number of "non-normal" people. In centrally oriented cultures, whether democratic or totalitarian, this is a relatively small number. Kadarism is the only system in Eastern Europe that is governed at the center. It has found counterbalancing forces in the state-controlled society, and has cut the ground from under the feet of the radicals.

It can be predicted that those regimes in Eastern Europe that are bothered by dissidents will sooner or later adopt the course of Kadarism, unless they are totally obsessed by pursuit of the dissidents. Kadarism applies a more effective pursuit. Usually, it is the great leader himself who speaks to those suspected of dissidence, and they are encouraged, not to be quiet, but to make "constructive criticism."

I tend to think that the dissidents in Hungary are those who are in some way predisposed by nature to be incapable of adapting. There are very few politicized individuals among them. The "opposition" is in reality the ghetto of all the cultural deviations, or sometimes a single individual will represent attitudes that elsewhere would reflect large subcultures. The cement of this variegated ghetto is the common attitude of negation, and this promotes understanding among different individuals: a philosopher living in the libraries, a lesbian actress, a Christian preacher, a rock musician, and a Maoist poet, to cite only a few examples selected from my own circle of friends.

During the 1960's and 1970's, political dissidents, most of them sociologists and writers, constituted a small and negligible group. They wandered at length in Marxist heresies. Some of them were radically soft, other radically hard. The young people of the Lukacs school were dissatisfied with the rate of de-Stalinization, while the Maoists called for a "mass line" and "attack on the establishment." They disputed ferociously among themselves until 1968. As long as they appealed to the conscience of the officials, the officials respected their Marxist identity. Sometimes the latter permitted them to speak openly in order to prove the existence of a real danger from left or right, thereby confirming the legitimacy of the command.

However, the situation underwent an important change in 1968. Czechoslovakia's defeat emotionally affected the dissidents. They had to recognize that they had common hopes. They had to comprehend that they were interested in all individual freedoms--the freedoms denounced as "bourgeois" by the communists, who condemned restrictions imposed on these freedoms by capitalism while themselves totally suppressing them.

The dissident movement was accelerated by the economic reform of 1968, as much by its "success" as by its "failure." The implementation of the reform showed them that they could not hope for the political changes that were to have resulted from the reform in regard to freedom of speech and assembly. In 1973, with the reform in difficulty, they had to conclude that the Sisyphus of progress, trapped by the system, could not climb even

even half the slope without seeing the stone roll back again toward the abyss. They became tired of seeing the system, thanks to their commitment to Marxism, able to keep possession of their hopes, which fluctuated depending on the system's mood for decentralization or recentralization.

Beyond the Fear Culture

It was under these conditions that Marxism died in Hungary. The last "unconditional" faithful to Marxism were in fact the "deviationists." Instead, a new, independent culture was born. Also, the ghetto did not disperse significantly, since its inhabitants no longer felt like changing residence. However, from that time on, we were able to write without censorship and to distribute our manuscripts by our own means.

In accordance with long-standing radical tradition in Hungary, the "samizdat" began not with a list of rights violations but with long and unreadable works.

Nineteen seventy-three was the year of searches. The dissidents of various tendencies were put in their place, which greatly increased their feeling of solidarity. However, the punishments were relatively light, for the government had only wanted to demonstrate to the intellectuals that strong-arm methods had not yet been entirely forgotten.

Since the door had been left open for loyal criticism, this wave of repression was successful in isolating the dissidents for several years. Some of them emigrated, and the government did not try to stop them.

Nevertheless, in 1977, following the example of the Polish KOR and the Czechoslovak Charter 77, there developed a new surge of samizdats that it was no longer possible to calm.

The initiative again came from the ranks of former Marxists, encouraged by the new generation. The samizdat movement was joined by youth who had experienced neither the terrorism of 1956 nor the advantages of Kadarism. These young people regard the Kadarian "double-talk" not as a success achieved through lofty struggle, but merely as lies. They take advantage of the official relaxation, which was instituted to counter the success of the samizdat. However, they refuse to make concessions, and if anyone tries to limit them they choose the samizdat.

The growth and solidarity of this element make more difficult the regime's aim to exercise control by the old method, while maintaining the relative freedom of the opening up initiative toward the public. Currently the greatest penalty is loss of job. Stronger repression would now produce large-scale protests and put the regime in an escalating situation that could threaten the fragile equilibrium of Kadarism as a whole.

In potential form, everything now exists for formation of a structured counter-society. The first independent organizations have been formed. People who were dismissed for political reasons, for example, as a result

of protesting after the Prague trial, have organized mutual help associations and an employment agency. Since 1979 there has been an Aid Fund for the Poor (SZETA) with the stated purpose to rectify the state's "discriminatory social policy." It organizes fund collections and provides legal protection to individuals lacking official recognition. The SZETA fund was founded by angry young people, sociologists who were joined by writers, priests and economists. Their greatest success thus far has been an auction art sale. The artists and other creators would doubtless not have dared to organize such an exhibition and sale on their own initiative, bypassing the censor. However, 200 artists contributed their works for the poor of the SZETA fund.

Every week, 200 to 300 people attend lectures held in private apartments. This independent university is also attended by students of the state universities, who enthusiastically take notes. Apparently, they consider it a perfectly natural thing.

In all areas of the country, many people organize aid to the Hungarian minorities of Slovakia and Transylvania. Their activities are modest and appear not to upset the upholders of the system; they send books and organize emigre marriages. However, the most promising feature of the evolution of Hungarian thought in the 20th century is expression of national sentiment not in terms of territorial demands but civil rights. The majority's ideal is no longer that of an expanded Hungarian state but of a democratic Eastern Europe.

This change is very evident in the samizdat, which has just produced a work that is notable not only for its scope but also its substance. The work is dedicated by its 24 authors to the memory of Istvan Bibó, who died in 1979. From 1945 to 1948 Bibó had argued in his brilliant ideological writing for a "third course," simultaneously criticizing both the communists and the reactionaries. He called for autonomous local governments. In 1956, he was one of Imre Nagy's ministers and the only one to wait in Parliament for the arrival of the Soviet troops. He had prepared a memorandum proposing the "Finlandization" of Hungary. After having served his years in prison, he worked as a librarian and no one was interested in his ideas until 1977, the year that he was rediscovered by the youth, who began to gather round him.

As soon as they read the list of authors of this volume, one can predict that the antagonism of the "opposition people," "cosmopolitans," and "populists" will soon disappear. Along with authors who are not published officially, the authors of the book include a large number of famous writers of the cultural establishment. The prevailing impression is that the entire intelligentsia supports the Bibó ideal of radical tolerance and the Polish radical reform program, at least in theory. In reality, each one returns to his habitual occupations.

The latent opposition has the remarkable ability of succeeding in finding forms of activity that stay on the borderline between loyalty and independence. This noncategorical position also attests to the vitality of

Kadarism. We often receive unexpected benefits. Some, however, see clearly that Kadarism's progress resembles that of a squirrel in a turning wheel. Yet, the wheel is still turning and is not near to stopping.

The Polish events have revived the activity of the Hungarian opposition. The first mimeographed independent reviews appeared at the end of 1981. These will considerably increase the number of readers of the samizdat literature. The review entitled LE PARLOIR is signed by its editors.

Until the Jaruzelski putsch, the Hungarian opposition thought that Poland was going to take over from Hungary first place in the competition for liberation. That can no longer be hoped for, however it is today more certain than ever that Hungarian democracy needs its own strategy. It can count neither on a weakening of Moscow nor aid from Warsaw. It is possible that the Polish military dictatorship may have the effect of producing stagnation in opposition activity in Hungary. However, one can also envisage this new situation as compelling the opposition to present concrete demands for reforms and to protest systematically against human rights violations.

Come quickly to Hungary if you want to see a stable communist system where only workers are imprisoned for political mistakes, and where, nevertheless, the number of suicides among intellectuals is the highest in the world.

9920

CSO: 3619/25

PANEL FINDS YOUTH WANTING MORE POLITICAL INPUT

Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 24 Dec 82 p 5

[Interview with Eva Ancsel, university professor, Gyorgy Kaszas, deputy branch director of the Gyongyosdomoszlo State Farm, Jeno Kovacs, secretary of the KISZ's Central Committee, Imre Nagy, secretary of the Lorand Eotvos College of Sciences' KISZ committee, Sandor Nagy, secretary of the State Youth Committee, Janos Ternai, non-ferrous metal technician at the Danube Metallurgical Works, by Janos Berecz]

[Text] The situation, present, and future of youth is still among the most important socio-political questions. They involve both youth and the older generation. What is youth's relationship to our social system, our policies, what does society want from youth, what are the chances of youth in their teens and twenties at the beginning of their careers? These questions were discussed in the editor's office. The following people took part in the discussion: Eva Ancsel, university professor, Gyorgy Kaszas, deputy branch director of the Gyongyosdomoszlo State Farm, Jeno Kovacs, secretary of the KISZ's Central Committee, Imre Nagy, secretary of the Lorand Eotvos College of Sciences' KISZ committee, Sandor Nagy, secretary of the State Youth Committee, Janos Ternai, non-ferrous metal technician at the Danube Metallurgical Works; the editor's office was represented by Janos Berecz.

[Question] What are the factors that determine youth's future, how familiar is youth with the problems of our times, how do they want--and can--take part in their solution? What is it that determines their place in society, what is the situation in today's social mobility and equal opportunity?

[J. Kovacs] It was generally thought in the seventies that social mobility has slowed down, especially in comparison with that during the forties and fifties. However, statistics prove that social realignment is continuing. But it is also a fact that in certain intellectual fields we can witness symptoms that are almost dinastic, not always resulting from talent and ability.

Participating in the Decisionmaking

[S. Nagy] If we want to be concise about our youth's relationship to our society, it will be worth it to mention a few figures. At present, almost every second citizen of Hungary is under thirty years of age. One million students are minors; a million and a half are students; 1.7 million are working; the rest are dependents. The majority, i.e., 60 percent of those working are workers. The proportion of intellectuals among them is larger than among the older generation: it is 24.7 percent. Eight and a half percent of them are working in farming, more precisely, in cooperatives. These figures also make it clear what it means to deal with youth. I also think that mobility exists. Statistical data proves that one-step mobility is dynamic in the middle classes; however, the most disadvantaged and most advantaged strata have become more closed.

Can youth take part in social and political changes according to their place in society's producing and non-producing spheres? I think not. This is, of course, too blunt a statement, for there are very different situations in the various levels. All in all, I still feel that young people who are ready and willing are not always given enough opportunity for making use of their talents.

Young people make their picture of the future according to the situation they experience. The majority of youth identifies with the general political goals, but becomes insecure if it does not see in its environment the realization of these goals. Alongside with the many positive aspects that are apparent today, we are also faced with the problems of our development. If, in the more difficult economic situation, youth will not get enough opportunity in the solution of emerging problems and in the planning of the things to do, then there may be tension. In other words, youth policy is also a question of their part-taking in decisions and changes, it cannot be considered only as a pedagogical or educational question.

[I. Nagy] Really, the social strata became more closed at the peripheries; it could be said that the more difficult situation is being inherited, youth coming from disadvantaged families must make huge efforts to come out of it, and society does not always help them. At the other end, two "elite" strata have developed that are not identical in all respects. One comprises the intellectuals who have a better prestige, the other comprises the most affluent people. It causes tension in some youth when they see that this can be attained in Hungary, but it is actually hopeless unless they are born into it. Our social policies are unable at this point to substantially diminish the unequal opportunities resulting from family backgrounds.

[E. Ancsel] The point is not only mobility. For it is not total social dimensions or statistics how youth sense their opportunity for mobility. They work or study somewhere, thus for them, equal opportunity, or taking part in decisions, is being--or not being--realized where they live. Youth feel that the hierarchic setup is too rigid. Democraticism takes it for granted that taking part in decisions and social control are independent from the pecking order. If youth feel that they are stuck in one point of the hierarchy, then their expectations of the future suffers.

[J. Ternai] I think, too, that the best yardstick is local politics. The situation at our enterprise is far from being easy; it does not help if I read or hear: produce better, produce more; I cannot increase my income, for our enterprise is in the red. However, it is mostly income that determines which job is worth taking. Advancement is not easy, one must fight hard for it. There is hardly any mobility in the other direction.

Justified Impatience

[Question] It is apparent from the things said that youth's picture of socialism is much affected by everything they directly experience and live through. Do they simply accept the situation or do they want to change it?

[Gy. Kaszas] We live in peace, in a socialist society. We have not experienced war but know what it means. We consider peace the natural situation, the only one in which we can imagine our future. Youth have two pictures of socialism. One is theoretical, i.e., the political principles of our party, and the other is the one which they directly experience and which is also characterized by the fact that the fighting for their cause sometimes takes more energy than their daily work. Local politics do not affect their lives entirely the way they would want it to.

[I. Nagy] Not even the theoretical picture of socialism is so clear. Our development was steady for the last twenty years, or, if you please, daily practice corroborated our ideas of socialism. On the long run, the competition between the two world systems will be determined by economic efficiency. Our development now has slowed down, and the future has become uncertain. How can the economic superiority of socialism be implemented in practice on the long run? Youth have a tremendous need to solve the dilemma, to find out how we can get ahead, how we can make our future nicer, what the future should be like. And they have the need, of course, to take part in finding the answers. They do want to participate although some of them do not believe in the possibility when they see reluctance.

[E. Ancsel] The slow-down of economic development is an incomplete explanation. In the mid-sixties, economic growth and the increase in living standards were not yet significant, but society's capability for reforms was already apparent. And this attracted youth. If there is such a perspective now on a higher economic level, dynamism will now also elicit the same response. The trouble is that at some places not even those rights are observed which are specified in juvenile law. It is strange that a young person must have the courage to say what is laid down as his right. In today's Hungary, one is allowed to do many things unto youth that would not be allowed to do unto adult citizens.

[J. Ternai] It is often said that youth are impatient. But what is the source of this impatience? Is this impatience not justified when, for instance, he hands in a proposal for reducing overhead costs and his proposal is tabled? He must fight for a good idea, then he is against his superiors, in other words, he is risking his future. If the KISZ or the union stand behind him, then it is easier for him. I think it is a very bad practice

that discussions take place between chiefs of departments, between directors and so forth, and that it does not matter how well the employed engineers and skilled workers know the area of specialization, they simply cannot step over these obstacles. As a skilled worker, I cannot set the price of metallurgical products. But I can determine, indeed, how the enterprise's activity and the various regulations affect my life.

[J. Kovacs] Every decent person wants his child to be better and more cultured than he is, to know more than he does. But this same person does not think the same way about his employees. He does not always find it natural to make his successor smarter than he is. In the last decades we have regularly proven that socialism is a sensible and humane society, but this is contradicted by the fact that youth find obstacles in front of their plausible initiatives. We should add, of course, that one always must fight for the new, and we cannot expect, not even today, that our new idea will be implemented automatically, not even if it would be in the interest of society.

[E. Ancsel] I am not against fighting but I do not like to advise youth to fight. Because what happens actually when someone has been fighting for ten years to implement a sensible proposal? What happens is waste. Youth's ability to work and think is being wasted. We consider people at the beginning of their career for an unbelievably long time; a 35-year old person is often still beginning his career. Although the period between the ages of 20 and 55 is the most productive one. We must be economical with it.

[Question] The youth policy resolution and the juvenile law was based on the realities of the sixties, and are serving the purpose of resolving future tensions. How can the contradictions be resolved which emerged since then?

[S. Nagy] I think the most essential feature of the youth policy resolution and the juvenile law is that they changed our attitude. The most important thing is, perhaps, that it made us recognize that the questions of youth are socio-political questions. These documents are also significant because they solved some characteristic problems associated with this age group. They brought new benefits, and expanded social, cultural and touristic benefits. In spite of all this, today's model is not really good regarding the existential questions. For example, young people's income is insufficient for buying a home, thus home acquisition must be subsidized by the state. A good solution would be to pay young people enough, according to their performance, to cover living expenses.

Changing Attitude

[J. Kovacs] It would not be just to blame the youth policy resolution and the juvenile law for today's contradictions, for this would not advance the case or, in other words, this would divert the attention from the point. The key question will continue to be to give youth the opportunity for action and to help them find their places. This will include, of course, a necessary

degree of change in the institutional system, in the activity of the youth organization and in many other things.

[I. Nagy] The realization of the juvenile law can hardly be measured on the basis of an examination of its paragraphs. There has been much talk about attitude. This is where I see the problem. It has not become conscious enough that youth is not the subject of the juvenile law. The juvenile law cannot be implemented with youth as something, only as somebody. Youth policy must be incorporated in all political decision and political step.

[E. Ancsel] It is my opinion that society's objective needs and the majority of youth's subjective needs correspond but do not meet with one another. This is the most painful contradiction. We are repeating it to boredom that this society needs initiatives, risk taking and fresh attitudes, and youth need support for knowledge, talent and performance. These are inseparable but they do get separated from time to time. Why? Because in the everyday life, where they should meet, they are faced by conservatism and concern for interest. In many places practice expects youth to adapt to their environment quietly and rapidly, just like a bolt in a machine. But people are not bolts!

[Question] There have been several comments about youth's opportunities and the problems of their beginning careers. Of course, we cannot go through every factor that aids or stalls professional advancement, and material and moral recognition. The same way as we cannot give a complete picture of starting a family, acquiring a home, or of problem-alleviating benefits; however, we can limit ourselves to the most important aspects.

[J. Kovacs] There are many blames youth--and the youth organization--must face: they are demanding, nothing is enough for them, they would like everything ready-made. This may be the case from time to time. But it is not true that today's youth do not know what the situation was ten, twenty, thirty years ago. They know how much development took place in our society. But it is also true that one lives his own life only once. And if he wants more, it is not ungratefulness toward past efforts but he simply wants to improve his present lot.

The Recognition of Talent

[S. Nagy] What were the changes since the juvenile law came into effect? In the Fifth Five-year Plan, 57 percent of homes owned or sold by the councils have gone to young people. This is a much higher ratio than the earlier one. With the KISZ's initiative, there has been a new, gradual form of home acquisition. But, according to some estimates, young people must wait an average of 10.2 years for a home, and the nature of the problem is also revealed by the fact that while 36 percent of today's 50-year old people had their own home before they reached the age of 30, it is 27.8 percent of today's 29-year olds and younger who can say the same. The average income of young people is 80 percent of that of the older ones on a national basis. Physical workers reach the average pay by the age of 30; this takes much longer for those in intellectual fields.

[J. Ternai] It is true, skilled workers are faced with a more open community than intellectuals, and their work can also be more precisely measured. It is also true that they begin their careers earlier, at the age of 18, but their work is not 100 percent right away. They must make themselves accepted professionally, and when it takes a young skilled worker two shifts to fix a mechanical malfunction the cause of which an older worker can determine only by listening to the machine, the difference in professional competence becomes apparent.

[Gy. Kaszas] If the skilled worker begins working in a plant and does well, he will be accepted right away, for good skilled workers are needed everywhere. People with degrees are more likely than not expected to handle management tasks as well. And not all of them can do that, at least not in the beginning, not all of them can face the three-fold responsibilities of a manager. It is also thought-provoking that young people with degrees do not apply to about 400 cooperatives that are disadvantaged or are poorly managed. Here they would not have to wait for ten years to prove themselves.

[I. Nagy] I divide the existential questions into two groups. One is professional advancement, the other is the establishment of one's own life. The basic requirement for professional advancement is a good training. In the last ten years, there have been some changes in our school system, but I think the problems are more difficult than 10-15 years ago. The young intellectual wants to establish his own life in the first ten years of his career. If he wants more money, he must give up some of his professional ambition; if he considers only his profession, he will get into a financially disadvantaged position.

Ideals, Examples

[Question] It is apparent from this discussion how many different things affect youth's attitude. As a final question, let me ask what responsibility the family and the immediate environment have in developing young people's consciousness, what are youth's ideals and examples, what can cause disturbances in their thinking and behavior?

[S. Nagy] The main cause and source of disturbances in youth's thinking and behavior, of the large number of endangered children and of many other things is that the family puts in less energy and pays less attention than ever before to the generations that grow up one after another. The family does not have enough time to spend with the children. It was mistaken to think that the school can, or will take over the family's responsibilities. The key to the solution of this problem is, perhaps, to find such forms of work for women that would make it possible for them to spend more time with their children.

[J. Kovacs] The main function of education is the preparation, at least in tendency, for an ability to find the right one among several alternatives. In the school and in the youth movement, the young person seldom has to make a choice, he is not hardened by successes and failures, does not acquire an experience and self-confidence. If we want to deal with youth's education

in a responsible way, we must create, from the elementary school through college, possibilities of choice.

[Gy. Kaszas] It is not difficult to find examples, not even today. Hard-working, decently living older ones are readily followed by the young ones. Understandably, it is mainly people in higher offices that they view with critical eyes. They would be glad to find examples among them. But many people change as they get higher. Their job would be to protect the interests of others, but they forget this and look out only for their own benefit. This creates antagonism and the rejection of the example. Or, which I think is even worse, it creates a kind of indifference.

[E. Ancsel] Consciousness is not a soft wax which we can freely mold. Such a direct effort emulates resistance, and this is what we often call indifference. Young people's consciousness is bombarded by nightmarish things such as the thermonuclear danger; this is why one cannot think about this only within the borders of our nation. I could also say the world which is looking, with its happenings, for a place in youth's consciousness, could be encompassed only by a giant compass. In relationship to this span of compass, the other one, defining the circle of possible actions, is extremely small. This contradiction is objective, and one--a mistaken--reaction to this is indifference. But it is not the result of some kind of evilness. We must also reckon with the fact that young people themselves, often even as children, sense a lot of indifference. They are not listened to, no real attention is given them. The young person is also an individual who takes it as a manifestation of indifference when he is dealt with only as a member of an anonymous mass. Indifference must not be attacked, instead the causes must be found, for indifference is not a natural human condition, much less a natural condition for young people.

[Question] The situation of Hungarian youth of the eighties is full of questions and contradictions. So much is certain: their solution is inseparable from the changes of our society as a whole and from the development of the coming years.

9414

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EMIGRE SEBASTYEN COMMENTS ON HARASZTI ARTICLE

Paris COMMENTAIRE in French, Winter 82-83 pp 613-614

[Article by Tom Sebestyen: "Comments on the Preceding Article"]

[Text] The Haraszti article inspired in me some rather contradictory thoughts. This is certainly a totally fascinating outline of a sociological analysis of current Hungary. The study of the ebbs and flows of decentralization and recentralization deserves further analysis. It is clearly evident that these phenomena are caused by social forces that have a degree of freedom of action, but since the party remains the sole decision-maker they cannot develop into counter-powers.

On the other hand, the conclusions that Haraszti derives from these analyses seem to me to be too close to the familiar "harnessing" thesis to win my hearty approval. It seems to me that it is possible to criticize the view of unquestionable progress by Hungarian society (Haraszti acknowledges this) from three aspects:

1. Despite unprecedented freedoms with respect to the norms of "real socialism," political freedom in Hungary remains limited: the major advance is the disappearance of the crime of opinion, however the opportunity to express divergent opinion still does not exist: the single party system is still in operation and hence elections do not offer any real choice;
2. Even the economic freedoms (so remarkable in a bloc country) are hedged with constraints as to number of employees, opportunity to accumulate assets, and even in the restrictive definition of approved activities (a trivial example: a private restaurant that is not permitted to serve dessert or coffee, these two functions being reserved for the nearby state pastry shop);
3. The results achieved on the economic front are due not to implementation of communist principles but to very widely anticipated official evasions leading to nonofficial evasions, and hence the flourishing black markets in labor and goods and a rather systematic diversion of assets of the nationalized companies.

Haraszti concludes, strangely, that thanks to Kadar "communist civilization has finally found its physiological rhythm." However one may ask about the apparent incompatibility between the rigidities of democratic centralism and a "physiological rhythm." Indeed, if this expression has a meaning, I suppose it implies opportunity for initiative to be better shared among the various social elements.

Curiously, Haraszti echoes the official statements that (for understandable reasons) constantly affirm Hungary's unfailing faithfulness to the communist system, merely supplemented by practical measures to meet specific problems. However, in fact, the remnants of the communist system in Hungary are the existence of a single party and the alignment of foreign policy with that of the USSR. If you regard these two features as adequate criteria for considering a system communist, then you could arrive at the remarkable conclusion that, among others, Nazi Germany was communist between August 1939 and June 1941.

The fact that Hungary belongs to the Soviet system remains an indisputable fact. Not only did Hungary learn in 1956 that the West cannot, or does not want to, run the risks to help it leave the Soviet bloc, but there is a Soviet army estimated at 80,000 men permanently stationed in that country of 10 million people. Should self-respect, which, Haraszti argues, the Hungarians have sacrificed, dictate that the Hungarians devote their energy to a hopeless struggle against those troops, or rather that they try to make the best of a situation of which they are victims and not the architects?

9920

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SWIRGON MEETS YOUTH WORKERS, ANSWERS QUESTIONS

PM141036 Lublin SZTANDAR LUDU in Polish 17-19 Dec 82 pp 1, 3

[Report by Sztandar Ludu: "Waldemar Swirgon Answers Questions From Young Employees of Swidnik Transportation Equipment Plant"; first paragraph is editorial introduction; footnote states that notes of the meeting were taken by Wojciech Kraczyk; editor's note states that the report is not authorized]

[Text] As we already reported, on 13 December PZPR Central Committee secretary and chairman of the National Board of the Rural Youth Union [ZMW] Waldemar Swirgon visited the Transportation Equipment Plant in Swidnik. He took part in a public discussion with the representatives of the young employees of the plant. The discussion, which ran into many hours, was very lively, often touching on controversial topics, since it centered around the most vital problems of the country and its young generation. Below we publish a resume of the discussion. It is unauthorized, but we have retained the original meaning of all utterances as closely as possible.

Swirgon: This is my first meeting with young members of the Socialist Union of Polish Youth since I was elected to the function of secretary of the PZPR Central Committee. Let me add a personal reflection here: Only a few weeks ago I myself was in a position from which one refers to the authorities as "they"; where one often believes that "they" are unable, or unwilling, to solve many simple problems--in short, I was among people like yourselves, one of the young generation. And here I am now, a young man not yet 30, having found myself among "them" with the task of representing your interests before "them," of answering for "them" before you, of being one of "their" delegates. I wish to state that "they" do not exist, that there is no one else but ourselves, and that it is we alone who can and must solve our problems by our own efforts.

Today in Poland a discussion is taking place on the subject of our young people, a discussion which is in effect about their future. Ours is a generation which has a chance of shaping a good future for itself. We must, however, first answer, in a thorough way and in precise terms, our own question: What should we do to help ourselves best? And we should also realize that the state can only give us as much as it has earlier received from us. I do not think that it is our young people who have suffered most from the crisis. The impact of the crisis has been taken largely by our parents: it is our parents who mostly provide the roof over our heads, it is our parents who more often than

not foot the bill for us. On the other hand, the discussion about the young generation is brimming with mistrust, prejudiced judgment and ill will. Let us by all means criticize concrete examples of wrong behavior, but let us refrain from indicting all young people. The nation which condemns its young generation is cursing its own future.

Let us now talk about this: What barriers obstruct the way to our making a better life for ourselves? Why are we unable to remove those external and internal barriers? What is it that we lack? We do, after all, have large mineral resources, factories, forests, fertile land and excellent specialists.

And we are young. So why are things getting worse instead of better? Let us reflect on all this here in Swidnik, where August 1980 began really in July [reference to early strikes leading to the August 1980 events], where the workers' healthy protest had begun, where--without any help from KOR or KPN--the first loud voices were heard in the important social debate. Let us, then, talk: The resolution of the Ninth Central Committee Plenum gives us another excellent starting point for a discussion.

Voice from hall: Toward the end of the 1940's our parents regarded the world in a way different from our view today: They were full of enthusiasm and believed that their lives would improve once they had rebuilt Poland. We do not get this impression. Let us, for instance, take reform. Its course fills us with disappointment: first stage, the prices went up; second stage, the prices are still going up; in the third stage of the reform, they will in all probability go on rising.

Voice from Hall: I have brought to today's meeting a history textbook dating from the first years of this century. Among other things it discusses the model methods with which Germany was governed then (the speaker reads out an extensive excerpt).

I do not intend to praise Frederick William, but I want to stress the idea that there can be no credible authority and no strong state without general compliance with the law, and I doubt that there is anything more important in Poland just now than arriving at a just legal system that would be respected by everyone. But all I see around me is the way people persist in trying to sidestep each and every legal regulation, even the best-justified one, and I do not know whether this phenomenon is an inherited one or whether it has arisen in our times. Martial law gave us the hope that these practices will be curbed. When it was first introduced there was indeed general compliance with the law, but as time went on it began to change and the law became ineffective. It has also become apparent that various inspectors and custodians of the law have also got sticky fingers.

Swirgon: I do not think our aim here is for me to prove something to you, or vice versa. What, then, do you want me, Central Committee Secretary Swirgon, to do so that some concrete case could get settled to your satisfaction, as a young guy from Swidnik?

Same voice from hall: I was only expressing my concern that, in the situation where the needs are greater than the possibility of satisfying them, cases of corruption and bribery may often arise. I am talking about it because such cases do occur and they are not always effectively countered. The authorities do not always effectively oppose them. And at the same time we are told that we ought to put our trust in the authorities.

[PM141039] Swirgon: We must tackle things in such a way that we are able to reach agreement. For me right now the essential question is what concrete case you have in mind, what method of dealing with it has been chosen, whether it has been successfully dealt with and, if not, whose fault it is, and what was the involvement of the party organization in the case. If we are to reach agreement we must talk in concrete terms.... One of our colleagues is saying he would like to buy a "baby Fiat" without waiting, another that he should be allocated an apartment right away. But our material status has dropped very considerably. For years the West granted Poland credits, with the aim of destroying our political and economic system, and when this did not succeed, it stopped them. In the meantime we became accustomed to relatively high living standards, and it has been hard to give them up--but we have had to. And so, what should we do now to regain the earlier standards?

In the first place, we must build many new apartments. There are opportunities to do this. We have surplus stocks of cement, we have the building materials, the electric power and the specialists. The government is creating financial and legal foundations for the development of apartment building schemes for the young people and by the young people; youth organizations are running open courses in housing construction, and securing building sites, with no utilities laid on, for one-family housing schemes. So the foundations are being laid for the development of a social movement for young people's housing construction schemes. But what are the young people waiting for? What is stopping them from joining this movement?

About the reform. It is not possible to base it wholly on mere economic calculation, to implement the reform by means of unemployment and drastic wage differentials, for our sociopolitical system guarantees wide-ranging assistance to people afflicted by circumstances beyond their control and those who are sick, offers free medical treatment and free schooling and opens up unrestricted access to culture, sports and tourism. Maintaining and strengthening these attainments of our system must be taken into consideration in the implementation of the reform. And so, if you maintain that you do not earn enough because prices continue to rise (here Swirgon directly addresses one of the participants of the meeting), then point your finger at the person from whom money should be taken so that you could get it. Show me, all of you who do not have enough money--and there are none among you who have enough--whom we should take it from. And this is the point at which we could start a real discussion among the citizens. Let us go back a little: You say you are short of money, but, after all, you have the right to form self-budgeting units [jednostki budzetowe], cooperatives or service workshops. You can earn money in the same way students do--the ones who want to work.

Voice from hall: With the students, most of their earnings goes into their pockets, but we have the FASM [Youth Social Action Fund] and most of what we make gets remitted to that account.

Swirgon: And who is stopping you from setting up a cooperative?

Voice from hall: We have difficulties with extending the scope of sponsored construction schemes. There is no shortage of people or materials, but the authorities are finding it very difficult to take any decisions.

Swirgon: Let us know the concrete facts of the case. We will sort it out.

Voice from hall: About the reform again. It is a bad state of affairs when wages are increased by a mere 1,000 or 2,000 zlotys while prices go up by 300 percent. Perhaps it would be advisable to introduce the reform first and price increases later?

Swirgon: And then we would have ration cards for anything and everything. Let us go back to the question of housing, as this is causing everyone's emotions to run high here. I can quote examples of cases where young people somehow succeed in building apartments for themselves, not even necessarily with prefabricated elements. They simply know what they must do to achieve success. You are also bound to succeed, with all this preferential treatment that is being offered.

Voice from hall: But who can afford to build a one-family house? Where are we to find building sites: Right now in Swidnik there are only 18 such sites.

Swirgon: It is possible to obtain construction credits for up to 80 percent of construction costs. The only requirement is to provide some money of one's own, say 40,000 or 50,000 zlotys, for we cannot have the situation where a person who has got nothing at all wants to have everything. If there are no building sites in Swidnik, go and build your houses outside Swidnik. Find the will to build. We will create favorable conditions for you to get on with it. The young people's construction scheme must become a movement, a social process, and not just another government resolution.

[PM141057] Voice from hall: My parents have been saving for 26 years to build a house for themselves. You said that there are credits available. True. That there is enough cement. True, but there is a lack of other essential materials.

Voice from hall (referring further to previous speaker's theme]: And in any case you have been talking about our parents' cash reserves which they had already accumulated, but you should be talking about us. We do not have any money. How can we build anything?

Swirgon? But we cannot give you higher credits than those granted to other age or professional groups.

Voice from hall: Young people's housing cooperatives do not solve the problem. We have a building site, but all we can build on it is fewer than 20 apartments. The fact that we got it at all proves that we are not throwing our hands up, but it still solves nothing.... And as to earning the same sort of money that the students do.... When a student comes to our factory to clean the windows he will get 20,000 zlotys a month. But if a worker came to clean them, he will only get 20 zlotys per hour.

Voice from hall: How is the cooperation between youth organizations shaping up?

Swirgon: Such cooperation is a fact, and its further strengthening and development are a vital necessity. After the cessation of the activity of the union of Democratic Youth [ZMD], the Communist Union of Polish Youth [ZMP] and the Polish Students Union [SZSP]; the youth movement returned to its historic form. The "partisan" activity on the left of our youth movement has also come to a stop. While we are on this subject I would like to mention the Volunteer Labor Brigades [OHP]. A reform based entirely on cost accounting would threaten the existence of the Volunteer Labor Bridges since it would have to question the costs of maintaining them. And yet they must be kept going because of their class character as well as the moral and social goals they realize.

Voice from hall: We suffer from a lack of university-level graduates with a particular specialist training. There is above all a shortage of specialists in every field of the medical sciences, and of experts in the so-called exact sciences. At the same time, study courses are maintained which are, in my opinion, useless. Why should we not eliminate those and direct young people to take up those courses which, once finished, will bring direct benefits?

Swirgon: To train a specialist in, shall we say, the art of repairing our teeth, requires a large material outlay; philosophy, on the other hand, can be taught even in a coalshed: It does not cost much. But that is not the point. For we have a question here: Can we dictate to people what social function they are to carry out and direct those who are, for instance, passionately interested in philosophy to study dentistry? No, we cannot. The question is to train and instruct all our talented people in all the fields they show talent for, and we must create a system which would bring to light as many talents as possible. The problem which you have just suggested might be solved by separating the education policy from the employment policy so that employment would be guaranteed to those persons who have received training in the professions which are of most use to the economy, and at the same time study courses would be open to all who are interested in them at "open" universities, with the state not carrying an obligation to guarantee work to their graduates in the particular field in which they have trained.

Voice from hall: What do you think about the cadre policy?

Swirgon: Its basic principles have been worked out. Their aims are, on the one hand, to help the older people get rid of their routine, fossilized approach to the exercise of power and, on the other hand, to create promotion chances for the young. But, of course, youth cannot in itself constitute

a reason for promotion: It has to be backed by qualifications and ability. In the matter of cadre policy we have grown accustomed to great caution in decisionmaking. This approach to decisionmaking goes back to the traditions of the revolutionary party acting in opposition. But the position of the party in our country has changed since then, whereas we are still using the old methods of promotion. I think the time has come to encourage rapid promotions, even those involving a rise by several grades. It will, however, not do to fall into extremes: The changes will only make sense if they are made with a view to advancing whole causes, not just people's positions. Let us remember that a bad chief could be followed by an even worse one.

Voice from hall: Tell us more about the situation in the Polish theater.

Voice from hall: Why are we still given so little information about the authors of the boycott? Why are we not told about it? The boycott hits us most of all, because our access to culture depends on radio and television.

[PM141105] Swirgon: I have been entrusted by the Central Committee with the matters of youth and culture. As regards culture, the situation is extremely difficult and it is all too easy to form oversimplified judgments and take hasty decisions. Nevertheless, if we talk about social democracy in addition to political democracy, this means that we have the widespread accessibility of culture: That culture is meant to be at everyone's disposal, not just serve select groups or milieus. But suddenly it so happens that television and radio are boycotted by a group of several dozen or so persons from the ranks of actors, people who enjoy more or less deserved fame, who hold highly profitable positions in the state's employ and whose living standards are--at a conservative estimate--not bad. The ZASP [Union of Polish Actors] was dissolved first and foremost because, despite the 11 months of patient, conciliatory talks initiated by the authorities, that association was exploited by a minority to intimidate the majority and had transformed itself from a creative association into a political organization. I want to declare that we will act with similar firmness and consistency in all similar cases. We will not enter into any negotiations with anyone, no matter what their social position and mission might be. To digress: I do not wish to be suspected of taking an anti-intelligentsia stand, but before members of KOR and KPN infiltrated our shipyards, coalmines and steelworks, the opposition was already hatching out within the universities, creative arts associations, theaters and cabarets. It was there that the nerve center of the counterrevolution was born, it was there that the anticommunist psychosis found its foothold.

Voice from hall: Will the persons who had been interned really be able to take up work again?

Swirgon: There are no general objections to their return to work. As to those persons who had come into conflict with martial law, in some individual cases they will probably be granted a pardon since the motives for their actions had not always been dictated by willful antisocialism: They were often ruled by their emotions, their poverty, the threatening specter of hunger. But it is out of the question to talk about a pardon for Kuron, Michnik, Moczulski or Jurczyk. Those professional antagonists who created the danger of civil war in Poland must suffer the consequences of their actions.

CSO: 2600/277

EMIGRE DAILY PUBLISHES UNDERGROUND DECLARATION

London TYDZIEN I DZIENNIK POLSKI I DZIENNIK ZOLNIERZA in Polish 8 Jan 83 p 5

[Text of the declaration by "Solidarity"; boldface by the staff of the daily]

[Text] In the face of the planned moves by the regime aiming at convincing the people to give up further struggle for their rights in exchange for concessions that the regime has to make in order to survive our solidarity resistance--we, participants of the current struggle and representatives of various factions and institutions of the people that have been pushed into underground by the totalitarian system--we unite our efforts within the framework of the "Solidarity" Movement for Social Liberation and we state the following:

--the objective of our activities is to achieve freedom and self-government by Polish people and by the Polish state. In a country that is not sovereign, the continued existence of legal and sovereign social organizations cannot be assured;

--the path to fulfilling these objectives will be long. The totalitarian system, inflicted by the USSR, has been maintained by force for 38 years by our own enslaved ruling caste. This system is not able to reform itself and will never give us either social freedom or independence. We will not be able to attain freedom and independence with one burst. We do not intend to either reform or overturn this system. For today, it is our objective to build a free society, capable of defending its rights and its solidarity;

--the effectiveness of social action depends on freedom of expressing various attitudes and views. We must free ourselves from censorship and persecution of the regime. In these conditions this means "underground" activities. For the regime all manifestations of social life that it is not able to control belong to the "underground." In a country in which the authority itself is illegal, the scope of our manifested freedom is dependent on our clandestine activities. Thanks to the underground "Solidarity" social ties have not died out, and we were able to live through the successive time of scorn with dignity. We will reject all calls to come out of the underground. This would be equivalent to sentencing the nation to interdiction. We call on all Polish people and also on the Polish emigration to build independent social institutions. Our freedom depends, every day and in every matter, on all of us. The totalitarian system will not fall as long as we agree to its existence;

--we continue activities that led to founding of the Independent Trade Union (NSZZ) "Solidarity," the movement that expressed aspirations of the whole of the Polish people. We are the heirs of ideas promoted by "Solidarity" and we will fight to make them a reality;

--we will fight to free thousands of those imprisoned for their views and for union-related activities. We will also fight to curb lawlessness and to stop persecution and all political repression;

--we will fight to restore pluralism in the trade union movement in order that workers and all employed persons can fully express their social and economic postulates;

--we will fight to reestablish independent agricultural, student, journalists' and actors' organizations--to enable all scientific and creative societies to function freely;

--we will continue activities on behalf of free education, press, and publishers and on behalf of free cultural life. Free flow of information, opinions, and values is especially important because it shapes critical consciousness of the society;

--after martial law is either suspended or abolished, there may also be an opportunity for undertaking effective activities on behalf of social liberation in organizations and institutions controlled by the regime. We should take the advantage of it. However, we support our previous categorical condemnation of collaborating with the organizations and institutions that serve to strengthen and defend the totalitarian system;

--we realize that our attitude will cause repression just as it did before. And just as before, we will defend ourselves. The use of force is against our principles. However, we do not deny ourselves the right to active defense when the situation requires it. We continue to name and socially isolate those persons that are especially active in strengthening the totalitarian regime and who cooperate with the repression apparatus. Social self-defense does not consist only of direct reaction to repressions, but above all, in creating social and political situations that would make it impossible to apply repressions. We will actively rise against the breaking by the PRL regime of international pacts and agreements protecting human and citizen's rights that were ratified by that regime;

--the situation in our country does not concern only Poles. We appeal to the people of democratic countries for continued support in our struggle for human dignity and freedom so that our "today" does not become their "tomorrow." We declare our solidarity with all the people and nations held captive by Soviet totalitarianism and imperialism. We endorse these countries' struggle for national independence, social liberation, and citizen's and religious freedoms. We will not be able to effectively fight for Poland's independence within the camp of captive nations. At the same time, we declare solidarity with other nations and peoples of the world that struggle for their identity and sovereignty as states. The existence and activities of the

"Solidarity" Movement for the Social Liberation is, and will be in the future, a practical implementation of the right of Polish people to freedom and self-determination.

Warsaw, December 13, 1982

The following signatures were put down that day under the "Solidarity's declaration:

The Committee for People's Defiance (KOS);
The Publishing House "CDN";
The Editorial Staff of the Journal "KOS";
The People's Publishing House--"KOS";
The Independent Literary Journal "WEZWANIE";
The Warsaw Independent Printing House for Poets and Painters;
The Publishing House PRZEDSWIT
The Movement for Independent Education
The Editorial Staff of the Political Quarterly "KRYTYKA";
The Editorial Staff of "TYGODNIK WOJENNY"
The Editorial Staff of the Literary Quarterly "NOWY ZAPIS";
The Regional Executive Committee of the Independent Student Union;
The Interplant Coordination Committee "Solidarity";
The Editorial Staff of "TYGODNIK MAZOWSZE".

9959

CSO: 2600/230

WEEKLY PUBLISHES STATISTICS ON CATHOLIC CHURCH

Warsaw POLITYKA in Polish No 45, 25 Dec 82 p 5

[Article by Jacek Poprzeczko: "The Church in Poland"]

[Text] According to the latest available statistics, there are 20,288 priests in Poland, of whom 15,908 are diocesan and 4,380 monastic.

In addition, the men's orders (according to the same statistics, dated December of last year [1981]), numbered 1,390 brothers, 1,898 post-novitiate clerics, 713 novice clerics, 158 novice brothers, and 209 postulants. There were 855 religious in the foreign missions. The women's orders numbered 26,520 nuns.

The Catholic clergy is a larger group today than before the war. In 1937 there were 11,394 priests in Poland, of whom 9,654 were diocesan and 1,740 were monastic. There are fewer men's orders (51 in 1937, 45 in 1981) but the number of religious is larger (6,874 in 1937, 9,603 in 1981). There were 91 women's orders in 1937 and 101 in 1981, while the number of nuns was 15,725 and 26,520, respectively.

Unfortunately, there are not many scientific reports dealing with the clergy as a social group. Interested sociologists, both the nonbelievers as well as those connected with the Church, point to the need to study these problems more widely, and they also point to the difficulties that appear in regards to this. In any case, they are not peculiar to Poland only. The Dutch sociologist, H.P.M. Goddijn, in 1965 wrote as follows: "Not much has been written about monasticism as a form of collective living. This is not caused by difficulty in applying, in this case, sociological theories and methods. On the contrary, convents and monasteries are the highest form of community living, so extreme and pure that it would be hard to find anything equivalent to them in modern society. In a monastic community, from the standpoint of structure and application, all of the social phenomena that sociologists talk about can be observed. They appear in very understandable forms and there is no fear that the future will bring any results that would be totally at variance with those that are envisaged (...). What then are the reasons for ignoring such a "paradise for sociologists"? Several reasons can be named. Monastic life embodies higher religious values, and experience teaches that this type of life does not willingly submit to empirical, objective or analytical research (...) In closed communities, where noble motivations come into play, and assessments are made almost entirely in terms of good or evil, it is very hard to admit that any kind of difficulties exist. To do so, would be, by implication, a debasement of authority, and in a church community this

is a very serious matter. Furthermore, in a community where all of the authority stems from God, valuable and revelational actions of science are noted with reluctance and suspicion. The ethos of the scientific world says that every fact, without exception, is disputable, while monastic persons tend to regard every criticism of the status quo, or deviation from it, as something sinful.

If Polish sociologists concerned with the social aspects of religion and the religious life take up the problem of the clergy, it is rather from the standpoint of the relationship of this group with the broader groups of people. But there are exceptions, as for example, interesting works pertaining to the motivation for entering into the ministry. Statistics are also available, compiled by secular institutions (Office for Religious Affairs) as well as by the church, which, although not always complete or the latest, provide a certain store of information on the clergy itself, its place and forms of activity.

In Poland there are 27 dioceses and 7,299 parishes, including 68 founded in 1981. According to the 1979 Diocesan and Monastic Clergy Census in Poland, published by the Pallotinum Publishing House, most of the priests (insofar as place of birth is concerned) come from the Krakow, Przemysl and Tarnow dioceses (1,600-1,800 from each), followed by the Katowice, Poznan, Chelm and Sandomierz dioceses (over 1,000 from each). Insofar as the place of residence at the time of performing priesthood functions is concerned, the numbers are as follows (diocesan and monastic clergy combined): the Krakow diocese, 1,562; Warsaw, 1,408; Wroclaw, 1,235; Poznan, 1,097, Tarnow, 1,089; and Przemysl, 1,047. In each of the remaining dioceses--still according to the 1979 census--there were fewer than 1,000 priests.

A certain pattern appears here--namely that the southern dioceses supply the most candidates for the priesthood, and that they also head the list as regards the number of priests residing there. This may be connected with the fact that according to other studies, conducted in 1979, religion is practiced most strongly in the Tarnow and Przemysl dioceses (to a lesser degree in the Krakow diocese). The indicator here is the ratio of the so-called "dominicanos" (those attending Sunday mass) to the estimated number of faithful in the parishes. Thus, in the Tarnow and Przemysl dioceses, the percentage of "dominicanos" was 75-78, by far the highest in the country. In the Krakow diocese the indicator amounted to 51-63 percent. For comparison, the lowest indicators were recorded in the Lublin and Szczecin-Kamien dioceses (30-40 percent).

Insofar as the number of priests per 10,000 inhabitants, according to voivodships, is concerned (1979 data), it was highest in the Tarnow voivodship (9.6 percent) and lowest in Zielona Gora (2.8 percent). After Tarnow are the following voivodships: Nowy Sacz, 9.2 percent; Przemysl, 8.8; Krakow City, 8.6; and Krosno, 8.0. Thus again, southern Poland is at the top. The average for the country was 5.7 percent. There are no accurate data on the priests' social origins. It is generally known, however, the most of the candidates for the priesthood are recruited from the countryside. (For comparison, we have 18 physicians per 10,000 inhabitants).

Data from the 1979 census pertaining to age of priests show that percentagewise the 40-49 years-old age group was the largest (30.6 percent); 1.7 percent of the priests were 80 years old or more; and 5.5 percent were 25-29 years old.

According to early 1982 data there are 45 men's orders in Poland, of whom seven have superiors general in the country (Albertynian, Sacred Heart Brothers, Society of Christ, Dolorist, Michalite, Paulist and Assembly of Servants of the Blessed Virgin Mary). The superiors general of the other orders are abroad, mainly in Rome. According to a 1979 census, the following orders numbered most of the priests: the Salesian (633), Jesuit (418), and Conventual Franciscan (340).

The religious are to a large extent in the parish ministries (2,160, of whom 464 are parish priests. They also conduct specialized ministries (state-vocational, youth, university pastoral centers), and organize retreats and foreign and domestic missions. The foreign missions are organized principally in the Third World countries, especially the African countries. The most active mission work abroad is conducted by the Verbists.

As to missions and retreats within Poland, the Jesuits and the Dominicans play the leading role. The religious not only conduct ministry activities themselves, they also prepare these activities for the needs of all of the clergy from the theoretical and organizational standpoint. A large part of their work is of a general educational nature. In Warsaw, for example, there is the Dominican Thomist Institute, and also the Jesuits' library, located on Rakowiecka Street, which is known for its rich collections. The religious comprise over half the teaching staff in two Polish Catholic educational institutions--the Catholic University in Lublin and the Warsaw Academy of Catholic Theology. Both of these institutions now have a total of 4,081 students, of whom 1,728 are in the ministry. Let us add that in addition to these institutions, there is also the Papal Theological Academy in Krakow and three Papal Theological Faculties: in Warsaw, Wroclaw and Poznan. There are also 46 higher seminaries which prepare for the priesthood in a 6-year course of study (26 diocesan seminaries and 20 monastic). Furthermore, there are 10 lower monastic seminaries which offer a secondary general education in addition to a religious one. The men's orders also conduct 10 schools (8 general-education and 2 vocational), which are of a general and not a seminary character.

Other work performed by the religious orders is publishing (the Pallotines, Jesuits and Dominicans). It should be mentioned here that there are 51 ecclesiastical periodicals published in Poland, for a total print run of 1,005,674 copies.

The religious also conduct activity among the Poles abroad. In the postwar period, approximately a thousand priests from Poland, mainly monastic, worked in the Polish communities.

There are 101 women's orders, including 11 contemplative demanding strict observance. According to January 1981 data, there are 26,520 nuns, of whom 24,827 are professed, 1,043 are novices, and 650 are postulants. There are 2,632 convents, of which 58 are contemplative cloisters. Approximately 6,000 nuns work in parishes. About 200 work in schools, of which there are 12--10 general education and 2 vocational--and in 22 welfare institutions. Approximately 2,500 nuns work in the "Caritas" institutions (which are not under the Church), and about 2,000 work in state institutions (hospitals, shelters). Some women's orders also conduct economic activities, such as sewing ecclesiastical garments, vestments, and standards.

Church statistics for 1971-1981 show an increase in the number of calls to the priesthood. In 1971 there were 4,088 seminarians and 480 newly-ordained priests. In 1981, the respective numbers were 6,714 and 688. During the entire 11-year period, the number of seminarians grew successively with each year, while the number of newly-ordained priests fluctuated.

There are at present in Poland 10,256 churches and 4,404 chapels. During 1971-1981 1,072 permits were granted for construction, reconstruction and expansion of churches, 331 of which were issued in 1981. The question of permits is now controlled by the order of the president of the Council of Ministers, dated November 1981, "on the planning and implementation of sacral and church investments". The order provides that: a) sacral construction plans are being instituted for 5-year periods for buildings with a total surface area of over 600 square meters; b) territorial development plans should also cover sacral and church investments; c) applications for construction of sacral and church buildings will be submitted by the applicable episcopal curia and the final form of the sacral construction plan will be the result of coordination of the curia with the governor or the mayor; 2) in the event of differences during coordination of 5-year plans, the matters at issue will be investigated by the Office for Religious Affairs in consultation with the episcopate; e) permits for construction of buildings of less than 600 square meters surface area are issued by the head of the gmina, town, or district.

The sacral construction plan for 1982-1985 has already been basically closed. The reports on agreements cover permits for construction, reconstruction and expansion of 300 churches and chapels. The reports on differences cover matters at issue involving construction of 42 churches, one higher priesthood seminary and one retreat house.

There is a lack of data on the Church's income and expenditures, which is partially explained by the fact that its finances are to a large degree decentralized. In a rather extensive work entitled "The Church in Poland", prepared under the direction of Prof Andrzej Swiecicki from the Academy of Catholic Theology, one can read the following: "The Church is not subsidized by the State, which it regards as a principal. The Church's expenditures are covered for the most part from offerings of the faithful, put into the "plate" on Sundays and holidays, or obtained for services from the clergy (weddings, christenings, funerals, and mass intentions). These funds are supplemented by some assistance from Polish emigrants and from the universal Church".

9295

CSO: 2600/233

ROMANIAN CONTINUITY IN DACIAN LANDS STRESSED

Bucharest ANALE DE ISTORIE in Romanian No 4 Jul-Aug 82 pp 58-71

[Article by Mircea Musat and Florian Tanasescu: "Ancient Dacia - A Bountiful Romanian Land"]

[Text] The Carpathian-Danubian-Pontic area represents the homeland for the formation and development of the Romanian people, one of the oldest European peoples who, confronting the trials of time and its own historical destiny with strength and dignity through its own forces, created its own uninterrupted advance on the path of material and spiritual progress.

The variety and proportions of the topography of the Romanian land, distributed nearly concentrically in climbing steps towards the lofty peaks of the Carpathians and then smoothly descending towards the Transylvanian plateau, the mild climate and the richness of the soil and the earth favored the early binding together of numerous human communities having well-defined, distinct characteristics and an advanced level of civilization.

Incontestable archeological proof that is recognized and appreciated abroad attests to the fact that on the current territory of Romania is one of the first European regions involved in the process of anthropogenesis where, more than 1 million years ago, conscious human activities took place.

The direct descendents of the great Thracian peoples, the Getae-Dacians, grouped in powerful political formations, were the founders and bearers of an original material and spiritual creation which placed them definitively among the ranks of the most developed peoples of antiquity. More than 2,050 years ago, they laid the bases for an expansive kingdom headed by one of the most prominent political and military personalities of those times - Burebista. Burebista was "the first and greatest of the kings in Thracian and the ruler of all the lands over and beyond the (Danube - ed.) river,"¹ as the renown inscription in Dionysopolis notes.

The tradition of the state organization of the ancient Romanians was later continued by kings Oroles, Dapyx, Cotizo, Scoriylo and Decebal, with this last one being the "hero king" of the great second-century Dacian kingdom. In the battles against the Roman armies led by Emperor Trajan and after a tough and long resistance, Decebal selected the path of ending his own life rather than facing the dishonor of being a prisoner.

Right from those times, the distinct traits of the direct forefathers of the Romanian people were created, traits that were preserved and perpetuated even after the blending of the Dacians with the Romans within the framework of the Roman province of Dacia, adding other new ones to these traits. These traits were expressed both in the process of material creation and periods of peace and in the long and bloody confrontations with the foreign invaders, especially with the armies of the most powerful empire of antiquity - the Roman Empire. Diligence, ingenuity, friendliness, modesty, generosity and hospitality towards strangers, hardiness and courage and bravery in battle - all these are in the fundamental characteristics of the Romanians.

The Roman Empire's entrance into its period of political and military decline, as a result of the powerful internal contradictions that were grinding it up and the blows unleashed by the peoples who were rising up in battle to be free from the domination of the Empire, caused the Roman legions and administration to withdraw from Dacia in 271. "Under these circumstances, the Romanian people were left alone to face the waves of migrating populations that were to cross its territories. This flow of peoples could not dislodge from the homeland of ancient Dacia the Romanian people, who were to develop here for more than 2 millennia. It is known that these migrating peoples did not bring along a higher civilization, but rather they found here an advanced civilization which they accepted, with this constituting a basic factor in their development and raising them to a high social level."²

The durability of the native Romanian element and the superiority of its material and spiritual life were fundamental factors in the resistance against the migrating peoples and being assimilated by them, as happened to the Slavs. The American historian Paul Mac Kendrick correctly states: "'The Slavic Conquerors!'" This formula is in error, since the Slavs did not conquer the Romanians, but were absorbed by the Romanians. The proof: the Romanian language, a Latin island in a Slavic sea."³

Archeological evidence of great value that, especially, has been brought to light in the wake of recent discoveries can be added to the existing evidence, attesting to the permanent existence of the Romanians in their ancient homeland, including during the period of the Roman withdrawal from Dacia. Thus, in Caras-Severin County during the period between the beginning of the migrations and the creation of the pre-statal formations, the Romanians continued their existence in an uninterrupted manner in places such as Gornea, Berzasca, Pescari, Moldova Veche, Insula Decebal, Bocsa, Caransebes, Mehadia and so forth; in Timis County, in Remetea Mare, Jebel and so forth; in Arad County, in Nadlac, Zadareni, Pecica, Feleac, Vlaimirescu and so forth; in Maramures County, an uninterrupted continuity has been found for the sixth through the tenth centuries in Sarasau, Cacilesti and so forth; in Mures County, during the period of the fourth through the 14th centuries, in 54 rural and urban locations; in Neamt County, at the ancient location of Petrodova an important economic, political and military center was built during the 12th to 13th centuries; in Dolj County during the period between the third and fourth centuries there were 50 localities, between the fifth and eighth centuries there were 25 and between the eighth and 11th over 30, and so forth.⁴

The older or newer of the opponents to the continuity of the Romanian people have tried and are trying to contest that which the facts and logic have long ago proven: the continuity and permanence of the existence of the Romanian people in the area within the Carpathians, the Danube and the Black Sea - and beyond them - after the withdrawal of the Roman administration and its armies from Dacia. Recently, in particular some apologists of the theory of the discontinuity of the Romanian people - in an effort to "demonstrate" that which in fact cannot be demonstrated - are throwing into the balance of the "arguments" certain new aspects,⁵ which are useless and have no effect upon historical scientific data.

Even under the especially difficult conditions of the waves of migrating peoples, the Romanians held steadfastly to their ancient homeland. Their existence was assured under these circumstances, as well as later during the periods burdened by the weight of foreign invaders, by their centuries-old mountains and forests that were friendly only to them and by their fertile and rich land whose "secrets" were known only to them. This phenomenon is as explainable as it is real, being quoted even by the eyewitnesses of the Romanian withdrawal into the mountains. Such was the case of the guide Rogerius who, captured by the Tatars, found his shelter among the Romanians living on a "high and miraculous mountain whose peak was made up of terrifying rocks," located about four miles up the road from the village of Frata.⁶

After the passage of the barbarian migrating peoples, the Romanians returned to their homes, resuming their existence and their normal pursuits as farmers, shepherds, fishermen, hunters and craftsmen - the traditional occupations of a sedentary, stable population in the homeland of ancient Dacia. Thus, we have the explanation for the rapid development of the Romanian people during the period immediately following the end of the migrations and its organization into administrative-territorial units having state functions. Although these units had different names, such as lands, principalities, voivodeships, vlachs, valachs and so forth, they developed in a unified and synchronous manner over a vast territory whose limits were: the Pannonian Plain - beyond the Nistru River, the Carpathian Mountains - Thessalia and Epir in Greece.⁷

At the end of the ninth century, when the nomadic tribes of Hungarians - a population of Asian origins, arrived and settled on the Pannonian Plain, the Romanians had already attained an advanced level of material and spiritual development, had a nearly 1,000 year-old tradition of state organization and were promoting broad political and commercial relations with the surrounding areas. The Romanians would have initiated and developed peaceful relations with the Hungarians as well, their new neighbors to the west. However, being used to holding the sword and spear, the Hungarians selected the path of weapons in order to acquire the fruitful land and wealth of the Romanians that had been accumulated through work and wisdom over so many years.

After the defeats suffered in their attempts to extend their rule to the west into Europe, the Hungarian kings turned their attention to the east, looking

directly at the ancient lands of our ancestors. At the beginning, because of certain personal initiatives of local leaders and, later, efforts of an organized and permanent nature, the aggression of the Hungarian kings against Transylvania encountered the firm and long resistance of the Romanians, who were led by brave voivodes having a love for the ancient land. "For neither love nor fear will we give you even a handful of our land,"⁸ said the Transylvanian voivode Menumort to the emissaries of King Arpad, expressing in fact the will of an entire people to be free and masters in their own country.

The chronicles of the time, especially those of the Hungarian kings, note the existence of the Romanian pre-statal formations, as well as the bravery of the voivodes at the head of these formations. Thus, in "Gesta Hungarorum" at the beginning of the tenth century there is mention of the formations headed by the voivodes Gelu, Glad and Menumorut who fought with daring against the policies of plunder and conquest of the Hungarian king Arpad.⁹

In referring to these events, the Hungarian historian Istvan Losontzi pointed out that "King Stefan I the Holy, having defeated the Transylvanian voievode Gelu, annexed the Ardeal to the Hungarian Crown... after that, the Hungarian kings ruled over it through captains (military chiefs - ed.) or through Ardelian voivodes until the death of King Ioan Zapolya in 1540."¹⁰

For nearly 3 centuries - from the beginning of the 10th century until the beginning of the 13th century - the Hungarian kings waged war with the Romanians to rule over their lands, which clearly demonstrates a sharp resistance put up by the native inhabitants against the foreign conquerors.¹¹ These circumstances made it possible to maintain for a long time the traditional forms specific to the administrative-political and statal forms of the Romanians. Thus, Transylvania and its rulers retained their ancient names of voivodeship and voivodes, respectively, with the latter being among the ranks of the first four senior feudal lords of the Hungarian kingdom. Thus, until the 16th century, one cannot speak of the Hungarian kingdom's rule over Transylvania, with it being an autonomous voivodeship which depended, however, upon this kingdom and having relations of dependency specific to the feudal system and Europe of this period. Furthermore, this status was recognized even by some Hungarians chroniclers and historians, such as Laszlo Kovary, Francisc Fargach,¹² and Sandor Szilagy, with Szilagy stating that "Transylvania and Hungary, never being fully merged, remained two separate countries."¹³ For his part, the great historian N. Iorga stated: "Among all the provinces ruled by the Hungarian Crown, the only one that retained a voivode as its chief was Ardeal; the many provinces in the Hungarian kingdom were usually named in many different ways, but there was only one that, in the end, remained a Voivodeship, until 1526, after the destruction of the unified Hungary, when the voivode became the prince who resumed a life free of the Hungarian people."¹⁴

Due to the conquest of Transylvania by the Hungarian feudal lords and, later, by the Habsburg Empire, the pressures of the great ancient empires on Wallachia and Moldavia, the conquest of the northern part of Moldavia, known in Romanian chronicles under the name of the Upper Land and named by the Austrians Bukovina in 1775, as well as other eastern parts of Moldavia between the Prut and Nistru rivers, which were given the name Basarabia in 1812, the normal, historical, objective process of creating a centralized and independent feudal Romanian state was delayed. Despite all this, there were permanent and broad ties between the Romanian countries of an economic, political, military and cultural nature, a fact which contributed to constantly maintaining an alert awareness in the Romanians to their origins and their desire to be united, free and independent in the ancient homeland of Dacia.

This reality is also demonstrated by the Hungarian political and economic circles which, more than once, as noted by the newspaper PESTER LLOYD in the 29 November 1886 issue, stated that "industry in Transylvania suffers today since it lost its sole sales market..." Numerous protests from industrialists and businessmen in Transylvania and the Banat attest, for their part, to the vital economic interdependence between the Romanian provinces and the fact that they were able to develop harmoniously only in a unified framework.¹⁵

In order to consolidate their rule in Transylvania and the Banat and with the obvious intent of isolating the Romanians in this province from those in Wallachia and Moldavia, the Hungarian kings resorted to a policy of massive colonization using people of other origins, especially in the border regions. At the end of the 12th century and until the modern era, they lived as a separate, distinct nationality. In the middle of the 12th century, they started to bring Saxons into Transylvania, followed later, in the 18th century, by colonies of Swabians and Landlenders in the Banat and the region of Satu Mare.¹⁶ Over the course of the centuries, Jews¹⁷ also settled and lived alongside the Romanians, as well as small groups of people of other ethnic origins.

As a result of the disestablishment of the Hungarian state in 1526 and the transformation of Hungary into a pashalik in 1541, the largest part of the Hungarian nobility took refuge in Transylvania, which had become an autonomous principality, increasing the numbers of the Hungarian nobility in this Romanian province - a fact that was to have a negative influence on its development, accentuating the policy of national oppression over the Romanians and their struggle for unification with the other Romanian provinces. In referring to this, Nicolae Iorga stressed: "And, I believe that our role in Ardeal would have been even more important if the Hungarian kingdom had not lost in the Battle of Mohacs in 1526. Then, because of the destruction of the kingdom, Upper Hungary was occupied by the House of Austria, the Turks settled in at Buda and Timisoara, as well as along the Tisa River,

and all the nobility of Hungary took refuge in Ardeal, which wanted to lead an independent and national life. Under the Zapolya dynasty, the dynasties of Bathory and Rakoczy and up to Mihail Apaffy, to the end of the 17th century, Hungarian nationalism was created in the Ardeal."¹⁸ On the other hand, Transylvania became an autonomous Principality under the suzerainty of the Ottoman Porte, as did the other Romanian provinces.

After the conquest of Transylvania, the Hungarian kings and feudal lords proceeded with the massive colonization of the urban localities with Hungarians, pushing the Romanians into the rural areas. A dual exploitation - social and national - was exercised over the Transylvanian Romanians, one accentuated after 1688, when Transylvania came out from under Ottoman suzerainty and became a province of the Habsburg Empire. Ottoman domination was replaced by Habsburg domination.

The immense majority of Transylvanian, Bukovenian and Basarabian Romanians were part of the peasantry, which harshly bore the weight of the yoke of foreign oppression and ardently carried out the social and national struggle to preserve the existence of the Romanian people, its language, beliefs and traditions.

The Romanian population, especially the peasantry in Transylvania, the Banat, Bukovina and Basarabia, was gradually and violently deprived of its ancient rights and freedoms. Illustrative of the deplorable material status of the Romanian peasants in Transylvania was the fact that the number of workdays without pay for working on the estates of the nobility had reached five per week. In the urban centers, noblemen or aristocrats who had arrived from the conquering empires set themselves up. This accelerated the religious and cultural intolerance practiced against the Romanians. The Romanians were considered as "tolerated" and "wandering foreigners" and, as a result, lacking any rights in their own country. In referring to this state of affairs, Karl Marx wrote that "by 1848 the Romanians in Transylvania... were considered a 'tolerated nation' on their own land" and that "they were named the vagabond people, although they represented two-thirds of the population and the Hungarians, Saxons, Szecklers, Greeks and Armenians formed only the other third." Actually, despite the denationalization policy carried out by the great empires, according to the data provided by the statistics of that past era, in the Banat in 1770 there were 317,928 inhabitants, including 181,639 Romanians, 78,780 Serbians, 43,301 Germans¹⁹ and so forth. Similarly, in accordance with the data of the census on the Transylvanian population in 1781, the Romanians numbered over one million inhabitants, while all the other nationalities together accounted for a little over 200,000.²⁰ At the level of a single community, Arad, the demographic situation in 1848 was the following: 180,208 Romanians, 36,061 Hungarians, 18,107 Germans²¹ and so forth.

Noting these realities, the Austrian statistician J. A. Demian noted at the beginning of the 19th century: "Among the older nations, the Romanians are,

without a doubt in first place with regards to their numbers. Their numbers can be correctly estimated at four-sevenths of the entire population."²²

The situation of the Romanians in Transylvania, the Banat, Bukovina and Basarabia, historical Romanian lands that were conquered by the ancient great empires, continued to be equally difficult in the 19th century and at the beginning of the next century, when, as a result of this situation, their struggle for national emancipation continually developed, approaching the moment of unifying all the Romanian people within the natural borders of a unified national state.

The policy of oppression promoted against the Romanian people was followed by an accentuation of measures and a campaign of forced denationalization of the Romanians, in the context of the insistent affirmation of the ideals of a Greater Hungary "from the Adriatic to the Black Sea,"²³ as well as a Russia ruling the mouths of the Danube, the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. Aspects of this policy were also revealed by the General Conference of the Romanian National Party in Transylvania, held at Sibiu on 27 and 28 October 1890, which showed "the general dissatisfaction" of the Romanians that had been caused by the impossibility of taking part in political affairs, being actually taken from "the frameworks of constitutional affairs... and restricted to passive resistance;" "the draconian persecution of the press;" "the vexing persecution of the people... devoted to the national cause;" "illegal, incompetent and harmful interference of the government in our church affairs"²⁴ and so forth.

There was also a similar situation for the Basarabian Romanians. According to the remarks of the politicians of the time, the province "does not have Romanian schools. All Romanian national affairs are represented by one monthly magazine published in Slavonic characters. The office workers are Russians and the Romanian nobility has been russified... National life is dead and endangered in Basarabia. A Romania oppressed by Russians awaits the same fate."²⁵

All these offenses, pressures and threats and the adoption of certain repressive measures were occurring within the context where the leading politicians in the oppressing empires recognized the superiority of the Romanians in ruling these provinces as the direct descendants of the brave Geto-Dacians. Thus, the emperor of Austria, Josef II, pointed out that "the oppressed Romanians... are without a doubt the oldest and most numerous inhabitants of the Ardeal," and the Hungarian Count Teleki stated in 1791 that "the Romanians are the oldest inhabitants of Transylvania."²⁶

There were other realistic recognitions on the part of certain Hungarians politicians and intellectuals who realized the evil consequences of the policy of forced Magyarization and the denationalization of the Romanians, especially as practiced by the Hungarian authorities. The sociologist Janos Oszkar emphasized: "The people need good schools, good administration

and good justice. But, a people cannot have good schools, administration and justice except when these three fundamental institutions function in their own language. Any other school, administration or justice, even if it operates according to the most modern principles, will be imperfect, bad and unacceptable if they do not satisfy this supreme requirement."²⁷

Janos Hetenyi, in two studies of an economic nature, recognized the deplorable state of the Romanians in Transylvania when he stated that over 1,200,000 slaves "are vegetating in misery."²⁸

Such recognition is also encountered in some of the leading representatives of the German nationalities in Transylvania and the Banat. Addressing the Hungarian nobility, Stephan Ludwig Roth warned: "If in 10 years, as called for in the proposal put forth to the Diet, you want to impose the Hungarian language into the church as well and to even call upon forced measures, you know that nonetheless you will not attain your goal..."²⁹

The warning of this great German scholar was not taken into consideration by the reactionary Hungarian oligarchy. Worse, it accentuated its intolerance towards the nationalities, especially the Romanians, and it maneuvered to block the unification of the Romanians and their obtaining national independence. On the eve of the unification of Moldavia with Muntenia in 1859,³⁰ as well as during the Russo-Romanian-Turkish War of 1877-1878, Hungarian diplomacy carried out an intense activity to impede the attainment of the political objectives pursued by Romania. According to an evaluation by George Baritiu, "Over 100 Hungarian newspapers were making a single case to unanimously combat the independence of the Romanian state."³¹ They qualified Romania's war for independence as an "act of rebellion" and, even worse, some called for the dualist monarchy "to suppress Romanian independence."³²

Some measures of a military nature were also taken. Troops of the Austro-Hungarian army were concentrated on the border with Romania and there was an intensification of intelligence actions of the secret services and diplomatic personnel of Austria-Hungary on the territory of the Romanian state in favor of Turkey. The organs of the Ministry of the Interior, the prosecutor's office and the courts in Romania arrested numerous spies and agents of Austro-Hungarian nationality who were collecting intelligence regarding Russo-Romanian military preparations.

While Romanian troops were fighting to the south of the Danube alongside the Russian troops and the Bulgarian patriots against the Ottomans for the liberation of their country and the other peoples under foreign domination, in the summer of 1877 the leading circles of Austro-Hungarian dualism sought to strike in the combat potential of the Romanian state, which caused the Romanian government and the other appropriate authorities not to lose sight of the secret actions put into action by its neighbor to the north. Thus, the Hungarian minister A. Trefort, the landowner Ugron Gabor and the cavalry

colonel Sandor Medhyanski moved to prepare a diversionary group in the southeastern region of Transylvania, for which they recruited 1,200 former military personnel. The diversionary group was to penetrate into Moldavia where it was to blow up the bridge at Adjud and, then, to carry out acts of sabotage from Adjud down into Muntenia, thus disorganizing the rear of the Russo-Romanian troops that were operating in Bulgaria.³³

The subversive actions of the reactionary elements were shattered, however, by the Romanians in Transylvania who informed the authorities on the other side of the mountains. In turn, the Romanian government informed Gorceakov, the foreign minister of Russia, who made an energetic protest to the cabinet in Vienna. So as not to complicate relations with Russia and thus not lose the territories that had been promised to it as a reward for its neutral attitude, the Austro-Hungarian government proceeded to arrest and put on trial the organizers and participants in this plot, protecting, however, the initiator and organizer of this conspiracy - minister Trefort - and some of the co-conspirators.³⁴ The failure of this action was also due to the worthy behavior of the popular masses of Szecklers and Hungarians who refused to serve this odious cause designed to strike at the interests of the Romanian people who were involved in a heroic struggle to gain its national independence. Furthermore, the progressive circles in Hungary took positions in favor of Romania's cause in the press and in public meetings.

After the outbreak of the first world war, the dualist authorities brutally repressed all the demonstrations of the Transylvanian Romanian patriots in favor of achieving the national-state unity of Romanians, and they brutally rejected any attempts of resistance against the abuses committed upon the non-Hungarian peoples. The draconian measures, directed especially against the Romanians, were motivated directly by the intention to annihilate the "traitorous" nationalities. Law XVIII established the material responsibility of the "traitors" and, by virtue of its wicked provisions, the Romanians accused of treason were punished with prison terms, confiscation of property, arrest and so forth. The Hungarian state decided upon a new assignment to the land: the border counties, inhabited by a compact Romanian majority, were colonized by border Hungarians. Other draft laws, prepared by the most sinister people of the Austro-Hungarian domination, were to strike the last remains of Romanian lay and denominational education and the Romanian Orthodox Church, in parallel with the forced Magyarization of the Romanians in the Austro-Hungarian army.

In order to complete these "works," the Hungarian government named Ugron Gabor, a fiery partisan of Apponyi, as the governor of Transylvania. Under his "rule," the Transylvanian cities and villages were emptied of all intellectuals and their political leaders. Entire convoys of people were directed to deportation places or filled the prisons of the rulers. In just the prison at Cluj, over 2 years more than 26,000 Romanians³⁵ were incarcerated, with many of them losing their life. Thus, in the summer of 1916, members of a patriotic

resistance organization in Brasov, one headed by Spiridon Boita and David Pop, were executed by hanging.

Despite all these draconian measures, the Austro-Hungarian authorities could not stop the course of historical evolution: the destruction of the multinational empires and the creation or unification of national states upon their ruins.

In this historical context, in the fall of 1918, while the Romanian people were carrying out powerful actions to eliminate Austro-Hungarian domination and to be united with Romania, chauvinist-nationalist Hungarian elements from the personnel in the administrative and police apparatus and in the army formed diversionary and terrorist groups seeking to stop the national liberation movement of the Romanians in Transylvania. On 8 November 1918, a group of 65 Hungarian military personnel armed with machineguns, a group created in Budapest by the Hungarian magnate in Transylvania, Ion Urmanczy, and having the approval of the Hungarian minister of war, barbarously assassinated over 45 Romanian peasants at Belis and ended the lives of dozens of Romanian patriots in the Apuseni Mountains. At Arad, "the Steel Helmets" of the Hungarian counter-revolution assassinated in November 1918 over 300 Romanian citizens who had demonstrated for the unification of Transylvania with Romania, and airplanes sent by the sub-prefect Issekutz of Lugoj machinegunned 14 Romanians at Faget. Armed groups led by Hungarian barons descended upon villages inhabited by Romanians in Transylvania and the Banat, killing hundreds of innocent people during these raids. At the same time, groups from the former Hungarian army, commanded by nationalist officers who had not adjusted to the laws of history and who could not understand the unification of Transylvania with Romania, organized true raids of retaliation in the counties in this Romanian province, located on the new border with Hungary as established by the Trianon Treaty of Peace in 1920. During this entire period, there also were victims among the ranks of the Hungarians, Germans, Jews and so forth, especially among the ranks of the peasantry that had participated alongside the Romanians in dividing up the lands of the Hungarian counts. An evil role was also played by the "Szeckler Division," commanded by General Karoly Kratchew, whose members were to, later, be part of the paramilitary and terrorist group known as the "Szeckler Division." This group committed numerous crimes against the Romanian population in the period of Horthyst domination over northwestern Romania, occupied by Horthyst Hungary following the fascist Diktat of Vienna in August 1940.

In order to meet this situation, the political leaders of the Romanian people moved to create certain of their own organism for administration and defense: national councils and guards. In referring to the behavior of these bourgeois-democratic organisms, the former governor of Transylvania, Dr Lajos Varjassy, wrote in his memoirs: "We must recognize objectively that the Romanian guards obtained exceptional merit regarding the maintenance of order."³⁶

The creation of the unified Romanian national state in 1918 through the unification of Basarabia, the Banat, Bukovina and Transylvania with Romania, the conclusion of an objective historical process for which the Romanian people had fought over entire centuries and the 100,000 citizens present at Alba Iulia, the fortress where, in 1600, Mihai the Brave had solemnly proclaimed the unification of the three provinces into a single state, decided once and for all the unification of Transylvania with Romania, an act that was to mark the achievement of the unified national Romanian state. The "Declaration of Unification" adopted by the Grand National Assembly at Alba Iulia contained the democratic rights and freedoms for all the inhabitants of Transylvania regardless of their nationality or language. Thus, the "Declaration" solemnly proclaims: "1. Full national liberty for all the coinhabitating peoples.³⁷ Each of the peoples will teach, administer and judge in its own language through its own people and each of the peoples will receive the right of representation in the law-making bodies and in the government of the country in accordance with the number of individuals belonging to that people.

2. The complete carrying out of a democratic system in all areas of public affairs. The public, direct, equal and secret vote by towns in a proportional manner for both sexes at 21 years of age, for representation in the towns, counties or parliament.

3. Equal rights and complete denominational autonomous freedom for all the religions in the state.

4. Complete freedom of the press, association and meetings, and free propaganda for all human thought.

5. Radical agrarian reforms..."

Mirroring the Romanians desire for peace, the "Declaration" addressed a solemn call to all states for understanding and cooperation. It also echoed the Romanian's brotherhood with the formerly oppressed people who had won their freedom: "The national assembly salutes with love and enthusiasm the freedom of the nations that had been subjugated until today within the Austro-Hungarian monarchy: Czechoslovak, Austro-German, Yugoslav, Polish and Ruthenian, and decides that its salute should be made known to all these nations."

In the meeting at Medias on 8 January 1919, the Saxons in Transylvania also gave their adherence to the decisions at Alba Iulia. Rejecting the maneuvers of Hungarian reactionaries to maintain the integrity of the Hungarian state, the Swabians in the Banat and in Crisana also adhered to this document in the summer of 1919. In other words, the population of German nationality which occupied third place behind the Romanians and Hungarians, recognized the justice of the legitimate rights of the Romanian people for placing them within the framework of a unified national Romanian state, warmly greeting the Alba Iulia decisions and the content of the Unification Declaration.

The representatives of the Hungarian bourgeoisie and landowners in Transylvania could not, however, accept this situation, placing themselves in solidarity with the governing circles in Hungary, that is, of not recognizing the national rights of the Romanians. At the suggestion of certain nationalist circles in Budapest, the Hungarian National Council in Cluj convened a meeting for 22 December 1918, a meeting which, in contradiction with the will expressed at Alba Iulia by the representatives of the Romanian population in Transylvania, who constituted the majority in this province, stated in an adopted motion that "the peoples in Transylvania want to live in a state community... with Hungary," spreading a false illusion among the Hungarian public opinion in Transylvania.

The powerful national liberation movement of the Romanians at the end of 1918 and the decisions of the democratic and popular meetings at Chisinau, Cernauti and Alba Iulia had a broad international echo, including among the ranks of the Hungarian population in Transylvania. The progressive forces among these people saluted the historic act of 1 December 1918, which finalized the unification of Transylvania with Romania, justly evaluating the nature of the Romanians' national liberation struggle. They wanted the creation of a democratic system and the assurances of rights recorded for the coinhabitating nationalities in the "Declaration" of Alba Iulia. Numerous Hungarians participated alongside Romanians at the Grand Popular Assembly at Alba Iulia on 1 December, being alongside them on the day of the proclamation of the unification of Transylvania with Romania.

The completion of the unified national Romanian state through the historic act of 1 December 1918 and through the energetic struggle and unanimous will of the Romanian popular masses throughout the country obtained, as would be normal, international recognition, being finalized in the peace treaties that were concluded at the end of the first world war. On the occasion of the peace negotiations at Partis, the representatives of Hungary attempted to sway certain political and diplomatic circles from the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy and other countries in favor of maintaining the territorial integrity of Hungary and not recognizing the historical rights of the Romanians. After long discussions, the Peace Conference signed the Treaty of Trianon on 4 June 1920, between Hungary, on one hand, and the allied and associated powers on the other. By the Treaty of Trianon, Hungary recognized the independence of the new states that had been created or that had completed their state unity as a result of the fall of the Habsburg Empire, including the unification of Transylvania with Romania.

After 1918, populations from other peoples entered Hungary: 600,000 Germans, over 500,000 Jews, 300,000 Slovaks, over 60,000 Romanians, other hundreds of thousands of Ruthenians³⁸ and so forth, against whom the Horthyst authorities carried out an intense denationalization and Magyarization action. Hungary - which had become a member of the League of Nations - had pledged that in the future it would give the nationalities the right of national survival by granting citizens rights without any type of discrimination. In reality, what was the situation? In addition to the methods and instruments used

over past centuries - the school, church, administration, justice, army, press and publications - and those resulting from the new progress in science on the worldwide level - the radio, movies and so forth, the fascist-Horthy Hungarian regime resorted to the use of revisionist associations and societies, paramilitary and terrorist formations, and fascist and profascist parties and political groups for the denationalization, Magyarization and repression of the national communities. Among these, an evil role was played by those named: the Guard of the Beggars, the Turanian Hunters, the "Tower" Association, the Union of Riflemen, the "Levente" Association, the "Cross With Arrows" Party and the extreme right organization MOVE. Through such means, the Horthy regime succeeded in assimilating, so quickly, the populations of other nationalities, including the Romanians, that they could no longer be noted in census-taking. Istvan Pal states that "even if they no longer speak (Romanian), the old people understand this language up to today," in order to later say: "The assimilation process was sufficiently intense right from the first decades of the last century."³⁹

Revealing the continuation of the Magyarization policy against the other peoples in Hungary after the Trianon Peace Treaty by Horthy's fascist regime, the German writer Rudinger noted, on the occasion of a conference held at Munich, on the basis of the data collected on-the-scene in Hungary, Yugoslavia and Romania that Romania "is the most liberal country with regards to the treatment of minorities (Rumanien ist das freiste Land der Behandlung der Minderheiten),"⁴⁰ while in Hungary the Magyarization continued its course with an even more accentuated intensity. At the same time, he noted the situation of the Germans in the Banat, which, from an economic, political and cultural point of view, were better off than during the time of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy.

Revealing the policy employed by the Horthy regime against the Romanians and the other nationalities in Hungary, a letter published by the newspaper UNIVERSUL on 13 December 1933 stressed among other things: "...From the greatest battle (the first world war - ed.) on back, we have been without any help; we have no one with us. Our writers and priests were changed to Hungarians... From our churches, they removed the ancient language, today only in Hungarian is the service preached. Books to read and newspapers in Romanian, there is no way we can have them... All this is so, and the trouble is that we do not get a word of encouragement from anyone. Perhaps it is thought that we are few in number, but we are many and very angry." After it pointed out the repressive measures that were being taken against the Romanians to renounce their nationality, the Romanian peasant, who wrote the letter, concluded his letter in this manner: "but we would take things more easily if we would feel that our brothers would encourage us a little."

The Romania that was completed in 1918, which the ill-willed tendentious and aggressive propaganda of Horthy Hungary contested with regards to

Romania's right to exist, offered another framework of expression for the coinhabiting nationalities, who were considered to be good sons of the same country with equal rights and obligations.

FOOTNOTES

1. Mircea Musat, "Foreign Sources and Data About the Ancestors of the Romanian People. A Collection of Texts," Publishing House of the Academy of the Socialist Republic of Romania, Bucharest, 1980, p 36.
2. Ion Popescu-Puturi, "2,050 Years Since the Creation of the Centralized and Independent Dacian State - A Fundamental Event for Our Historiography," in ANALE DE ISTORIE, XXIV, No 4 of 1978, p 10.
3. Paul Mac Kendrick, "The Rocks of the Dacians Speak," Scientific and Encyclopedic Publishing House, Bucharest, 1978, p 8.
4. Gheorghe Blaj, "The Communists of Maramures, The Heirs and The Ones Who Continued an Heroic and Glorious Past," in ANALE DE ISTORIE, XXII, No 2 of 1976, p 21; Andrei Cervencovici, "Arad - A Multimillenia Romanian History Book," in ANALE DE ISTORIE, XXII, Nos 5-6 of 1976, p 24; Mihai Telescu, "Timis County at the Key Points of the History of the Romanian People," in ANALE DE ISTORIE, XXIII, No 4 of 1977, p 79; Nicolae Busui, "Caras-Severin County in the Context of the Country's History," in ANALE DE ISTORIE, XXIV, No 6 of 1978, p 105; Nicolae Veres, "Mures County in the Context of the Country's History," in ANALE DE ISTORIE, XXIV, No 4 of 1978, p 87; Petre Preoteasa, "Dolj County in the Contest of the History of Romania," in ANALE DE ISTORIE, XXV, No 1 of 1979, p 67; Gheorghe Manta, "Neamt County in the Context of the History of Romania," in ANALE DE ISTORIE, XXV, No 6 of 1979, p 56.
5. In this regard, some publications and works that have appeared abroad, in taking up older "theories," attempt to credit the idea that the Carpathian-Danubian-Pontic region after the Aurelian withdrawal of 271-273 was penetrated by Slavic and Bulgarian tribes that populated this region until the 12th-14th centuries, when, suddenly, the Romanians returned to their homeland, crossing over from south of the Danube. Another "theory" is that of the creation of the so-called valach population which, following its own path of development, separated from the Geto-Dacian people over time and acquired distinct traits that thus differentiate it from the current Romanian population.
6. A. D. Zenopol, "The History of the Romanians From Trajan's Dacia," Vol 1, Publishing House of the Library of the School of the Saraga Brothers, Iasi, 1896, p 24. A later evaluation of this phenomenon that is so specific and so necessary to the continuity of the Romanians is found in the writings of the French historian Ubicini. Thus, he stated: "Over this long period

of time (of the migrations - ed.), the Romanians took refuge in the mountains, a shelter from the stream of invaders... Time was not able to weaken their power nor to weaken the hope of the Daco-Romanians. This same rare, patient resistance had remained so that it could always be said: The Romanian does not perish - a popular addage in all the regions of Romania. There is also another one that is nearly as wide spread: The water flows by, the rocks remain. The water was the barbarian invasion, the Romanians were the rocks" (Abdolonyme Ubcini, "Les origines de l.histoire Roumaine," Paris, Ernest Leroux, 1886, pp 116-117).

7. See: Gheorghe I. Bratianu, "Historical Tradition About the Founding of the Romanian State," Eminescu Publishing House, Bucharest, 1980; Mircea Musat, op cit, pp 123-133.
8. Dumitru Almas, "The Struggle for the Defense of the Romanian People's National Independence and Existence. The Traditions of the Joint Struggle of the Romanian People and the Coinhabitating Nationalities for Freedom and Social-Political Progress Until 1848," in ANALE DE ISTORIE, XIX, No 5 of 1973, p 102.
9. "Files From Chronicles. A Reader," Military Publishing House, Bucharest, 1973, p 10.
10. Istvan Losontzi, "Harmos kis tukor" (The Triple Small Mirror), edited by Mihaly Lauderer, Pzosny, 1781, p 174.
11. Some Hungarian historian have maintained and still maintain that the Romanians came late into Transylvania "in isolated groups" and that "only in the 14th century was there a more serious immigration towards Hungary from the Balkans..." (Nicolae Stoicescu, "The Continuity of the Romanians," Scientific and Encyclopedic Publishing House, Bucharest, 1980, p 185).

A similar idea is also maintained by Gyula Kristo in the study "The Romanians and Vlachs of Nestor and Anonymus" (SZA ZDOK, No 4 of 1978) which, opposing the conclusions of the historian V. D. Koroliuk of the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic, conclusions which support Daco-Romanian continuity in the Carpathian basin, states that: "Analyses referring to Nestor and medieval Hungarian sources do not in the smallest way prove the theory of Daco-Romanian continuity." The same author tries to credit the "thesis" regarding "the infiltration of Romanian shepherds into Transylvania" during the 12th-14th centuries from the Balkans.

Other authors, placing themselves in the same position, try to demonstrate that "there is a 5,000 year-old existence of the Hungarian population in the Carpathian basin, as Tibor Bartha attempts to do in the Hungarian-language Canadian magazine KRONICA in the February 1977 issue. According to this author, during the Stone and Bronze ages the population of all of

Europe, including the Carpathian-Danubian-Pontic basin, was of Hungarian origins, stemming from Mesopotamia. The same author states: "In the West, the Indo-Europeans destroyed and exterminated the population of the Stone and Bronze ages..., but in the Carpathian basin the ancient population of Hungarian language was more numerous than in western Europe."

12. I. Lupas, "Historical Relations in the Voivodeship of Transylvania in the 12th to 16th Centuries," Bucharest, 1938, pp 54-55.
13. Sandor Szilagy, "Eredelyorsagtortenete" (The History of Transylvania), Vol 1, Budapest, 1866, pp 66-67.
14. N. Iorga, "Romanians and Slavs. Romanians and Hungarians," Publishing House of the Southeastern European Institute, Bucharest, 1922, p 48.
15. Victor Axenciuc and Ioan Tiberian, "Economic Premises for the Creation of the Unified National Romanian State," Publishing House of the Academy of Romania, Bucharest, 1979, p 21.
16. L. Banyai, "On the Path of Brotherly Relations," Bucharest, 1971, pp 17-19; Carol Gollner, "Work and Common Hopes. From the Past of the German Population in Romania," Bucharest, 1972, pp 9-14, 47-51.
17. Constantin C. Giurescu, "The History of the Romanians," Vol III, Part II, Bucharest, 1946, pp 527-529; "The Origin and Aspects of the Jewish Problem in Romania With Regards to the Romanian Nation, Europe and America," Bucharest, 1925.
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20. "The Encyclopedia of Romania," Vol I, p 774.
21. I. D. Suci, "The Revolution of 1848-1849 in the Banat," Publishing House of the Academy of Romania, Bucharest, 1968, p 130.
22. Gheorghe Platon, op cit, p 121.
23. D. P. Matianu, "The German Colonists and Romania," Bucharest, 1871, p 54.
24. "The Documents of the Conference of the Romanian National Party Held on 27-28 October 1890 at Sibiu," Sibiu, 1891, p 27.
25. Ladislau Studnicki, "Raison d'Etat de la Roumaine et la Cause polonaise," Lausanne, 1915, p 9.

26. Ilie Ceausescu, "Transylvania From the Dacians to 1918. Two Millenia of Struggle and Work To Maintain and Affirm National Being and Dignity," in ANALE DE ISTORIE, XXIV, No 6 of 1978, p 72. A similar statement was also made by the geographer E. A. Bielz in 1857: "It is a certain fact that we feel that the Romanians are not only more numerous, but also the oldest inhabitants today in Transylvania..." ("From the History of Transylvania," Vol I, Publishing House of the Academy of Romania, 1961, p 216).
27. VIITORUL, IV, No 1,170 of 8 April 1911.
28. Similar evaluations were also made by Kakob Alexiu, a member of the Hungarian Academy of Science, who, in 1846, warmly and with understanding described the deplorable status of the Romanian peasantry in Transylvania: "Transylvania does not have to account for any other people to the same degree as it does for the Romanians, since no one else is in a more unhappy situation that they are. From the beginning they served the Hungarians and only when they could no longer bear the oppression did they turn against them. So it was in 1437, 1514 and 1784. It is sad when a people making up two-thirds of the country's population are separated from constitutional affairs..." (Stefan Metes, "The Romanian Emigration From Transylvania in the 12th-20th Centuries," Scientific Publishing House, Bucharest, 1971, pp 279-280). In the context of the revolutionary events of 1848-1849, it should be remembered that as a result of the Romanians' intolerable situation some representatives of the Hungarian revolutionaries recognized that Transylvania's population itself would decide whether it would belong to Romania or to Hungary. In a meeting of Hungarian emigres in Paris, Count Teleki, "with regards to Transylvania and whether it would be independent or alongside Hungary or Romania, stated that "they do not recognize anyone else's right to decide other than 'Transylvania's'" (Fr. Pulszky, "Eletem es Korom" (My Life and Times), Vol I, second edition, Budapest, 1958, p 484).
29. Carol Gollner, op cit, p 55.
30. Unlike the Hungarian reactionary elements that were inflexible in their position towards the Romanians, the Hungarian revolutionary emigres abroad took into consideration the Romanians' just demands and initiated treaties of understanding with the Romanians through Count Teleki and General Klapka, with both of them present in 1859 at Iasi and Bucharest to deal with the new ruler of the united principalities - Alexandru Ioan-Cuza. In the understanding between the Romanian ruler and General Klapka, concluded on 29 March 1859 and later completed with the 20 May 1859 understanding, in reference to the Transylvanian Romanians the following rights were outlined, rights which, according to the promises of the emissary of the Hungarian revolutionary emigres, were to be in the new Hungarian constitution: "The same rights, the same freedoms for all the inhabitants of

Hungary, regardless of race or religion." "Autonomy of communities and councils. The inhabitants of the councils with a mixed population will reach friendly understandings between them with regards to the official languages that will be adopted (Hungarian, Serbian or Romanian)." "The Serbian and Romanian troops will have a special organization and will be commanded in their national language. Complete equality in all the armies in order to achieve all the functions, titles and awards." "After the end of the war, there will be a meeting in Transylvania to deliberate over the administrative unification of this province with Hungary and, in the case that the majority decides that Transylvania's old administrative autonomy should be re-established, the Hungarians will not oppose this" (M. Kogalniceanu, "Speech in the House of Deputies on 11 February 1886 Relative to the Expulsion of the Romanians Over the Carpathians," Bucharest, 1886, pp 12-13.).

31. George Baritiu, "Selected Parts of the History of Transylvania Over Two Hundred Years Ago," Vol III, Sibiu, 1891, p 490.
32. Augustin Deac, "The Moral and Material Support Given by the Romanians Under Foreign Domination to the War for Romania's Complete Independence," in ANALE DE ISTORIE, XXIV, No 4 of 1978, p 53.
33. Adrian Hamzea, "A Failed Conspiracy," in MAGAZIN ISTORIC, III, No 12 (33) of December 1969, p 76 and after.
34. "The History of Romania," Vol IV, Publishing House of the Academy of Romania, Bucharest, 1964, p 368.
35. Const. Kiritescu, "The History of the War to Unify Romania. 1916-1918," Second Edition, School House Publishing House, Bucharest, p 362.
36. Dr Lajos Varjassy, Karoly Kun, "Horthy oktoberi forradalom... 1918-1919," p 23.
37. In the sense of nationality.
38. TIMPUL, IV, No 1,240 of 13 October 1940.
39. Istvan Pal, "Szabolocs-Szatmar megye roman lakasaga a XVIII-XIX szazdban," (The Romanian Population in Szabolocs-Szatmar in the 18th-19th Centuries), Gyula, 1981, p 7.
40. Milton G. Lehrer, "The Ardeal - Romanian Land (The Problem of the Ardeal as Seen by an American)," Bucharest, 1944, p 257.

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CSO: 2700

CONTINUITY OF ROMANIAN PRESENCE IN MOLDAVIA DISCUSSED

Bacau ATENEU in Romanian Nov 82 p 10

[Interview with Mircea D. Matei and Emil I. Emandi by G. Damian; "The True Age;" date and place not specified]

[Text] The Academy of the Socialist Republic of Romania recently received an important work entitled "The Medieval Rural Environment in the Moldavia Valley and in the Greater Somuz Basin in the 11th-17th Centuries," signed by Mircea D. Matei and Emil I. Emandi and presented within the framework of the seventh edition of the Suceava Book Exhibit (1-10 October 1982).

We present, below, portions of the conversations conducted with the authors of this book on this occasion.

[Question] You are the authors of this important work, that, up to now, is unique in our country. For that reason, please, give us a brief outline of the subject.

[Answer] The research in the north of Moldavia regarding the Middle Ages has resulted in, as you know, remarkable progress in understanding certain basic problems in the history of our country. In this regard, the archeological and other types of research carried out between the Moldavia Valley and the course of the Greater Somuz have permitted the creation of a sufficiently accurate picture of certain historical phenomena, as well as the recreation of them in an overall view, deeds that became possible through the investigation of not only the written sources, but also especially archeological, cartographic, toponymic, paleobotanical and, not in the least, metalographic research.

Such an approach to the problems required and permitted the analysis of the evolution of the settlement-population-economy relationship, both in the local area of the two river valleys and in the context of a broader, Carpathian-Nistorian area inhabited by Romanians. A geographic-historical analysis of the region was, in this case, the basic method in discovering the interference of the natural environment with the human one, with both of these being in a continuing, albeit slow, transformation. Among the problems pursued, those related to the continuity and age of the Romanian places in the region that was investigated, to their dynamics and to their consequences upon the evolution of aricultural and handicraft technology, upon the incipient forms of social-political organization (including their continuity until the eve of the moment of creating the

independent feudal state of Moldavia) and upon the structure of the region represented the essential items in our concerns during the process of completing this book. The opportunity to create an encompassing picture of this period of time - not a superficial picture, but rather an "in-depth" picture, abandoning the "single-event" tradition and the factological approach - required a multidisciplinary approach in the research (with this also involving archeology, geography, historical demography, the history of technology and so forth) and, especially, an approach to the problems from the point of view of historical ecology. The slow evolution of the social-political and economic processes, an evolution in which tradition elements played an especially important role, required research into phenomena during a sufficiently long period of time (11th-17th centuries), with this being the only means of reconstructing the historical processes and events that occurred in this region (population-homeland-village borders) and in this geographic zone that more than once has been characterized as "the heart" of Moldavia.

Initially conceived as a research that would look into obtaining certain material data capable of showing the evolution of the local Romanian society on the levels of material and spiritual culture, our research effort sufficiently quickly also took on the nearly obligatory nature of a study that was to look into important political aspects of the existence of these collective groups. Beginning with a reality that is too little known and still not well documented, in our opinion, regarding the fact that Romanian archeology in the Middle Ages accumulated a sufficiently large amount of documents, during the period in which it was well-defined branch of Romanian historical research, so as to serve as the basis for certain judgements concerning the political affairs of native Romanian groups, we felt it was not only possible, but also obligatory for us to try, for our part, to place our research into the problems of the forms of political organization known to the Romanians east of the Carpathians on bases other than the traditional ones offered by written sources. In this manner, if the conclusions or, at least, the working hypotheses that we formulated in our work are to be accepted by specialists, it will be possible to show in other future research by us or our colleagues the possibility and, at the same time, the necessity to place all the data presented by archeology (as well as by other related sciences) on the basis of certain judgements with a political content, which should not ignore pursuing the same problems that we researched: the social, economic, demographic and political premises of the process of creating the independent feudal state of Moldavia.

[Question] Prior to writing this book, you were involved in important archeological digs that offered you a broad area of interpretation. As a conclusion to our discussion, what is the importance of the data that has come to light and what does it demonstrate?

[Answer] Very synthetically speaking, our archeological research in the region between the waters of Moldavia Valley and the course of the Greater Somuz tried concomitantly to give an answer to two questions, both equally important: How old is the Romanian presence in this region and, especially, to what degree

are the characteristics of these places capable of illustrating the structures of Romanian society prior to the middle of the 14th century, structures that constituted the premises for the creation of the independent feudal state of Moldavia.

As far as we are concerned, we feel that the results of this research led to the formulation of certain answers that are at least satisfactory for both questions, with these answers being found, in one form or another, in our book, which has just appeared. Specifically citing some of the discoveries, we can mention, first of all, the necropolis from the 11th and 12th centuries at Vornicenii Mari, whose attribution to the Romanian people - sedentary, agrarian and Christian - cannot be questioned. Together with other discoveries that were made in numerous places in the region that was researched, which attest to the virtually uninterrupted continuity of the Romanian presence there, beginning with the middle of the first millenium A.D., the discoveries at Vornicenii Mari were capable, among other things, of also showing the centuries-long continuity of the human groups in this area in certain settlements, which just now are showing their true age, an age that would have been very difficult to establish solely on the basis of written sources.

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CSO: 2700

MUHIC SCORES 'NEW LEFT' CRITICISM OF PARTY

Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian 14 Dec 82 pp 14-15

[Text] Dr Fuad Muhic: What kind of fatal sin has the LCY committed that a small group of intellectuals constantly seeks its abolition.

Among a few critically formulated, scientifically articulated, sometimes even a little biliously but nevertheless extremely seriously composed texts which in the 2-3/82 issue of SOCIOLOGIJA deal with contemporary Yugoslav society, with the causes of its present crisis and possible solution, for sharpness of radicalism and the obvious wish that matters be brought to a forced break, Zagorka Golubovic's, "The Crisis of Yugoslav Society: Its Nature and Roots," stands out in relief. For those acquainted with the way of thinking of our ultraleftist intellectual circles, Z. Golubovic has said nothing new. She has only condensed some basic assumptions as a theses with which the public has already been acquainted due to the activity of a few of her like-minded friends.

Z. Golubovic has elaborated her presentation in the form of a "research sketch", but, in truth, it is about a programmatic platform which is far from the principle research theses announced. According to the spirit of the aphorism which runs through her article, positions are first talked about for which the eventual research project would have to serve only as a superficial sanction. Because her position, as well as that of her colleagues from our new left group, is really crystal clear. Our political structure, "which as a type belongs to the systems of the Eastern European societies" (p 325), inaugurated self-management as a simple ideological facade deprived of any kind of historical substance. It could not be different when, according to the view of Z. Golubovic, our party was already genetically infected with Stalinism from the first moment of his arrival on the international scene, and when in 1948, it was mainly a farce without any kind of further real cover in a truly new form of socialism. Indignant with the hypocrisy contained in this "farce", Z. Golubovic poses the question whether it is possible to prevail over Stalinism if a critical revaluation of Yugoslavia's interwar and post-war history is not simultaneously performed, because their roots are the same. The opposite tendency is noted, she adds, that the official critique of Stalinism is moved historically to before 1948 in order to prove that in truth no need exists to reevaluate our own Stalinist past (p 327, emphasis, F.M.).

Not waiting to begin the desired research, Golubovic immediately draws the necessary conclusions and from all of this confirms only her own superfluosity. According to her opinion, self-management for us from the beginning was accompanied by an internal contradiction which had no perspective for resolution, but could only be reproduced poorly and endlessly. The state "octroyed" it in 1950 by a law as a typical legal state act. Even today the state determines its limits (which starts with the workers' council and ends up with the OOUR), and the neologism about self-management is the typical "contradicto in adjecto". In order to obtain the original historical sense, according to such a manner of deduction as this, it would have to be chosen from the "mass social movement," and if this chance was not exploited three decades ago, it is high time that it be realized today and open the horizons of a new "democratic alternative."

A farce with riddles: It is not, therefore, incomprehensible why Z. Golubovic bases the sketch of her presentation on a critique of the "ruling conception" which even further offers a "metaphysical conception of the party - as an infallible possessor of the historical truth, as the only legitimate subject of history which is the embodiment of correct, moral principles, independent of the activity and behavior of its members and leadership" (p 327). An out-of-context quotation of Lazar Mojsov is cited as proof. Immediately afterwards, sincerely upset, Z. Golubovic poses new questions: Whom in fact does the existing organization of the League of Communists represent and in accordance with that, whose interests does it mostly support and in the name of which part of society does it act? The more justifiable question, she thinks, is that not yet posed although statistics offer data on the basis of which it could be answered. Z. Golubovic, however, has immediately endeavored to fill the gap which has arisen by the present failure to pose the mentioned question. She has not only placed it on the agenda but just a moment later, answered it with a suggestive question which, in the entire context of her article, leaves no doubt about the nature of the final answer: Whether the policy which the LCY carried out, leads to the achievement of the workers' interests, with regard to whether it solves or offers solutions to the questions which are most acute for the working class: The question of unemployment (where over half is made up of society's most threatened sector, the unskilled workers, and the unemployment rate is the highest in Europe); of the constant drop in the standard of living, especially that of the working class, of the decrease of workers' influence even on the enterprise level, et al? (By the way, we would remind Z. Golubovic that by her questions, she has really entered into the illusion of a game whose end, at least for those who think like her, is already known: Ljubomir Tadic has answered all her questions precisely by a short statement in the journal AUTOGESTATIONS that the LCY erroneously and incorrectly represents the working class." Even her farce with riddles, therefore, is completely superficial and would have a rational function only if she intended to create illusions of scientific reality.)

But, independent of this, it is more than obvious that Z. Golubovic's "research sketch" is filled to such a measure with one basic idea that only the most ordinary person, blind to sociology, could not identify it or an inexperienced researcher to whom it would not be clear from the very beginning that the potential research is conceived only as an empirical cover for an apriori

hypothesis. And, she says; since the CPY/LCY is genetically tied to Stalinism from its very inception as a historical phenomenon, and since, even today, we have a type of Eastern European political structure, from the beginning, self-management could be nothing else but an organized ideological lie, without any relation to reality which is hopelessly installed in the manipulative function of the ruling political group.

Known postulates: For critics of this opinion it is not a particularly interesting view of the history of the CPY/LCY as a political organization whose eventual evolution could move from classical Stalinism toward a specific type of neo-Stalinism, but no way from a Marxist-Leninist type party toward the modern forms of a political organization. Milovan Djilas, Franjo Tudjman and some of our right-wing oriented historians, most of whom today live abroad, have attempted to carry out this business much more meticulously than our ultra-radicals. It is difficult to discern similar thesis among Marxist oriented historians (regardless of whether Z. Golubovic wishes to consider them as such). Among philosophers, Milan Kangra has supported it recently in radical form, and now we have Z. Golubovic.

Differing from the majority of our sociologists, who have given their own contributions for this issue of SOCIOLOGIJA, and who besides the sharpness of their criticism jointly consider that solutions must be sought inside of the existing institutional framework, with those modifications prescribed by actual conditions, Z. Golubovic, without any specific reservations, has supported its elimination. Striving to translate the old new-left postulate: "Self-management, but without the party," "self-management; yes: The party; no," into the language of theses for sociological research, she has also worked out in a bitter and unsolicited manner a program which would in practice replace that framework. The basic precondition, according to her belief, is the replacement of the LCY by a "mass social movement," and the abolition of any form of state intervention. The dichotomy between "commanding and anarchy" would, hence, be eliminated. All the remaining instrumentation of change is well known from a combination of various anarchic ideologies: The organization of society from the bottom up, the free association of producers without any relation to the state organization, the elimination of the "ideology of self-management" (under which, among the rest, is understood even the system of Marxist education in secondary and higher institutions of learning), absolute freedom in the self-determination of individuals and social groups, and an entire series of other modalities which we will not cite since they are already widely known. The most interesting of these, of course, is that which is related to the replacement of the LCY by "a mass social movement."

The constant forcing of this demand, intensified in domestic and foreign organs especially after Tito's death, imposes the necessary question: What kind of fatal sin has the LCY committed in relation to this society, that one small, but well organized and militant group of intellectuals unceasingly seeks its abolition? It seems to this group, that no critique is sufficient which the LCY performs for a long tie inside its own structures in order to eliminate the series of accumulated problems, which often hinders its very functioning. It is enough only to remember the critique of the federalistic and unitaristic tendencies, of the opening of the LCY to the public of even the most delicate

questions of internal party life, of the stormy debates at sessions of the highest forums and the activization of the party's "bases" in a series of the most sensitive problems. It must also be seen that the "metaphysical myth about the party's infallibility," of which Z. Golubovic speaks with a glibness that borders upon intellectual impertinence, is especially far behind us and today cannot be used as an argument for the LCY's abolition.

Irresponsibility: Z. Golubovic's text, in this sense, is not free of methodological perfidies. By citing individual critical places from sessions of LCY forums, she even pits out-of-context quotations of individual leaders against each other in order to give the public the impression of the existence of "dogmatists" and "liberals" and of their potential clash (for example, as if Lazar Mojsov and Kiro Gligorov think differently about the role of the LCY in our society, and to one of them can be ascribed an inclination toward "the mythomania of the party"). But even these safe methods would help if they can serve for a "useful" political intrigue.

Z. Golubovic holds a specific caricature-like idea about a "statistical revolution". There exists, she thinks, determined statistical data which speak about the loss of the worker character of a revolutionary party, and are sufficient motive to demand the abolition of that very organization. But the "statistical revolution" is not only Z. Golubovic's joke. Immediately after Tito's death, some extremist circles in the West fired a "statistical shot" according to which only 0.5% of Yugoslavs support the policy of the LCY, and according to which (a scientific prediction on the basis of "anonymous polls" is spoken about) the LCY would easily be defeated in the first free elections. Z. Golubovic also says nothing about the character of the "mass social movement" as an alternative to the LCY. She does not deal with the experiences of one such "mass movement" about which we have already had a series of discussions on its subjects (whether, for example, it would be the lumpen proletariat according to the anarchist model of the "destruction of all which exists" or does she insist further on a "new historical bloc" et. al.) It is important, it seems, to abolish the LCY in the name of one's own wounded vanity and "unsettled scores" from 1968, and after that, it would be seen "where further to go". After all, according to the conception of our ultraleftists, the intellectual is not responsible for the results of his own critique.

On the other hand, the LCY seems sometimes to belong to that small number of parties which tolerate even the most open discussions about their abolition. How Z. Golubovic and her new left group comprehend this fact, is a matter of their own interpretation. But, it would be interesting, even if only as an experiment, to imagine how these thinkers would fare in the structure of some Western political parties which fight for power and feverishly strive to maintain themselves in it. Would the "party whip" (to use an English expression) sweep them away before they could realize the consequences of their reflections. Would they be able still only to peddle their "free hanging philosophizing" in some Hyde Park on a soap-box, without any danger to the existing "democratic establishment?" For us, it is a somewhat different matter: Everyday people are probably accustomed to political exhibitions of this type, and are occupied by problems of another kind. They pay attention to them as they would to any similar sensationalism--it is interesting when hear the first time, boring when listened to the second time and laughable when mentioned a third time.

YUGOSLAVIA

ADMINISTRATIVE, EDITORIAL CHANGES IN 'KOMUNIST,' 'SOCIJALIZAM'

[Editorial Report] The 28 December 1982 issue of the LCY weekly KOMUNIST (Belgrade, page 14), as well as other major papers in reporting the 24-25 December 1982 meeting of the LCY Central Committee, noted that the Central Committee named Dimce Belovski new president of the publishing council of the KOMUNIST News and Publishing Work Organization and Marko Lolic president of the publishing council of all the editions of KOMUNIST. Also named was Vljeko Krivokapic as deputy editor-in-chief of all editions of the paper, as well as manager of the Editorial OOUR of all editions of the paper. (KOMUNIST as of 14 January 1983 continues to list Veljko Miladinovic as "director and editor-in-chief" of all editions of the paper and Djuro Djuraskovic as deputy editor-in-chief.)

Of more significance may be the staff changes of SOCIJALIZAM, the LCY monthly journal, where Veljko Milatovic was named president of the publishing council, replacing Jure Bilic; and Stipe Suvar was named editor-in-chief and Milija Komatina deputy editor and manager of the "Socijalizam" OOUR, replacing Aleksandar Grlickov and Jovan Raicevic, respectively.

The new publishing council is composed of the following members: Augustin Papic (Bosnia-Hercegovina); Zdravko Grebo (Bosnia-Hercegovina); Branislav Soskic (Montenegro); Milija Komatina (Montenegro); Stipe Suvar (Croatia), Milan Rakas (Croatia); Vjekoslav Koprivnjak (Croatia); Jakov Lazaroski (Macedonia); Trpe Jakovlevski (Macedonia); Miran Potrc (Slovenia); Ivan Kristan (Slovenia); Vladimir Sruka (Slovenia); Djordje Popovic (Serbia); Radoslav Ratkovic (Serbia); Ali Dida (Kosovo); Zivan Berisavljevic (Vojvodina); Milan Mali (Vojvodina); Miroslav Simic and Stanimir Petrovic (the LCY in the Yugoslav People's Army)-- (Zagreb VJESNIK 27 Dec 82 p 5).

The former publishing council (Izdavacki savet) was as follows: Jure Bilic (president), Dusan Bilandzic, Zarko Bulajic, Zdravko Grebo, Aleksandar Grlickov, Trpe Jakovlevski, Slavojka Jankovic, Neca Jovanov, Bogdan Kavcic, Petar Kostic, Ivan Kristan, Ivan Lavarac, Milan Mali, Milenko Markovic, Milan Matic, Augustin Papic, Branko Prnjat, Ivica Racan, Jovan Raicevic, Sulejman Redzepagic, Kurtas Salju, and Georgi Stardelov.

At the same time the following were named as members of the new editorial board: Zdravko Grebo, Vjekoslav Koprivnjak, Trpe Jakovlevski, Ivan Kristan, Djordje Popovic, Milan Mali, and Miroslav Simic.

The former editorial board of SOCIJALIZAM was as follows: Aleksandar Grlickov (editor-in-chief), Jovan Raicevic (deputy editor), Dusan Bilandzic, Zdravko Grebo, Neca Jovanov, Ivan Lavrac, Milenko Markovic, Boris Nonevski, Sulejman Redzepagic, Ljubisa Ristovic, Kurtess Saliu, and Georgi Stardelov.

CSO: 2800/119

EXPRESSIONS OF NATIONALISTIC SENTIMENT EXPLORED

Book by Hadzi Vasilev

Belgrade NEDELJNE INFORMATIVNE NOVINE No 1664, 21 Nov 82 pp 19-20

[Article by Teodor Andelic: "An Unexpected Renaissance?"]

[Text] Instead of the expected requiem, an unexpected resurrection! One could say this of the renaissance of national sentiments and movements--on various continents, especially in Africa, nationalism is a favorable omen, while in Yugoslavia, as we shall see below, such aspirations also exist--and this, taken as a whole, completely negates the dogma that nations are something sick and are bound to die out after the revolution.

Such concepts have long had their stronghold in Marxist theory and of course in Stalinist practice. Now they are negated not only by contemporary political life but also by contemporary Marxism. At least this appears to be the case, judging from the brisk, at times extremely polemical, 3-hour debate in the Belgrade Youth Center regarding Kiro Hadzi Vasilev's book "Socialism and National Relations I." In addition to the author, participants in this debate included Dr Stipe Suvar, Dr Janko Pleterski, Dr Najdan Pasic, and, on behalf of the "Komunist" Publishing Center, its editor-in-chief David Atlagic. The polemical tones came the most from the audience, which at the same time reacted with relieved applause to individual replies by the guest speakers to exceptionally sensitive questions. We should mention right away that most of this applause was for Dr Stipe Suvar, who, as the most politically involved participant in the debate, was the target of the most delicate and specific questions.

As Many Classes as Nations?

The term "renaissance" was used by Professor Najdan Pasic. Among other things, he linked this revival of national sentiment to the growth of various bureaucracies, each of which is seeking to justify its own power on the basis of national interests. This leads to national conflicts, which often reflect the conflicts of the ruling elites of the class of professional politicians and administrators.

Professor Pasic also spoke on the common shortcoming of our Marxist way of viewing the entire course of history as being predetermined, with a final stage of "pure" optimism-communism in which nations will live in love and will assimilate.

We frequently lack specific analyses, Dr Pasic told us: "The consciousness of our peoples should certainly be freed from various myths, but we cannot deny the existence of different national ideologies. For example, we cannot produce a Yugoslav encyclopedia, for these ideologies are in direct conflict."

Professor Janko Pleterski asked whether, if the working class is always constituted as a national class, there is one working class in Yugoslavia or as many such classes as there are nations.

"I think," Dr Pleterski stated, "that the unity of the interests of the working class exists regardless of nationality."

This does not, however, mean that we should "flee from" affirmation of anything national. Dr Pleterski said that even if we retain a negative attitude toward the concept of "nationalism," we must find some expression with a positive connotation for national affirmation.

This prominent Slovenian historian also reminded us of certain changes in the policy of the Yugoslav Communist Party as regards the national question.

In the 20's the party line was to support national movements, not to lead them. This policy changed in the 30's, following Tito's directive that the party should take the lead.

Dr Pleterski also recalled that as early as the summer of 1942, Kardelj was stating that in some, but not all, areas the working class was already at the forefront of its nation.

What is involved is uneven development. Dr Stipe Suvar is of the opinion that some nations of Yugoslavia developed earlier, citing the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, while other nations were delayed in their development.

When asked by this reporter what consequences this has for our sociopolitical life, Dr Suvar answered a tempo: "None!"

Dr Suvar also considers that the development of socialism does not automatically lead to the solution of the national question, just as it does not automatically lead to the solution of other major issues.

/Deeply-Seated Egotism?/

The author of "Socialism and National Relations I" (the second volume is to deal with the specific analysis of Yugoslavia) "admitted" that in his book the concept of "nationalism" is ascribed a negative connotation, primarily in the sense of national egotism.

But, Kiro Hadzi Vasilev said, even this egotism has had a beneficial effect in certain periods, especially during the rise of the bourgeoisie. Viewed from this aspect, it serves as the driving force for the development of a specific nation so far as that nation is concerned. Of course, this is not the case for other nations, Vasilev told us: "In the long run, historically speaking,

nationalism will doubtless crack its own skull, along with that of the nation of its origin. By the way, during the period of the "positive effect" of national egotism, it proved useful not only to the bourgeois upper classes but also, at least to a certain extent, to the masses of these nations."

In his book, Kiro Hadzi Vasilev cites only five other authors: Marx, Engels, Lenin, Kardelj, and Tito. Dr Rastislav Petrovic, who participated in this discussion from the audience, said that the book would certainly have been more specific if it had contained more empirical facts instead of knowledge of theoretical texts.

The audience also asked whether the book mentioned Marx's and particularly Engels' views on the so-called historical nations and the "non-historical" Slavs and Balkan peoples.

As we know, this refers to such texts as were written by Engels in the NEUE RHEINISCHE ZEITUNG, of which Dr Karl Marx was editor-in-chief.

Just one example: "In contrast to backward Germans," writes Engels, "we have always acknowledged the rights of the great historic nations of the West, the English and the French," which give them the moral right to declare a "merciless life-and-death fight against Slavdom, which is betraying the revolution," and a war against the "Slavic nations (Czechs, Slovaks, South Slavs)" which are opposed to the German national interest and the interest of the revolution.

Hadzi Vasilev stated that, as regards the positions of Marx and Engels, we must above all make use of the immense strength of their scholarly method. By the way, the author said that--all things considered--only a few Marxists are completely free of that facile historical optimism. However, Marxism remains a science which deals with the regularities of the development of society. Marxism's allegedly necessarily teleological approach to history is, incidentally, a favorite topic and weapon of its critics.

Against "Cultural Autonomy"

The debate now shifted to the area of demographic policy. Many of the questions from the audience were answered by Professor Suvar, who had for a time taught demography, drawing on statistical data from the most recent census. He stated that both Croatian and Serbian nationalists were "greatly concerned," since, according to these data, Croatia has suffered a decline, in comparison with the previous census, in both the number of Croats and the number of Serbs.

Dr Suvar stated that he was among those opposed to separate cultural institutions for any nation whatever in any Yugoslav republic or part thereof. For example, this would mean having at least three academies of science in Bosnia and Hercegovina, at least two in Croatia, five or six universities, in Vojvodina, and separate cultural institutions for Serbs, Montenegrins, and Muslims in the Sandzak area.

"I am against a policy of assimilating or separating the Serbs in Croatia, not only for the sake of Croatia but for the sake of Yugoslavia, of all of us," Dr

Suvar said. "It is true that, by a decree of the Secretariat for Internal Affairs, 'Prosvjeta' [Serbian cultural institution] was abolished in Croatia, but this is true also for the much stronger rival institution 'Matica Hrvatska' [Croatian cultural institution]. The latter existed and functioned for 140 years, involving at times communists, at times nationalists, and before the war even fascists in clerical garb. 'Prosvjeta' aspired to become the political and cultural headquarters of the Serbs in Croatia, representing the interests of a thin stratum of intellectuals. On the other hand, we have the example of a textbook ignoring the history of the Serbs in Croatia, calling them 'newcomers.' We withdrew this textbook from use.... Let us not play games, or count heads, or our common house will catch fire," [Audience applause].

Dr Stipe Suvar interpreted the percentage decrease in the number of Serbs and Croats in Croatia as being due to their "transformation" into Yugoslavs, the number of which rose more than ten-fold in Croatia between the two censuses.

This reporter's question as to how to interpret these facts was answered by Hadzi Vasilev. He mentioned migratory movements, mixed marriages, and a belief that the larger number of Yugoslavs serves to express a protest against nationalist quarrels.

In any case, Yugoslavs are not a new nation, and Dr Suvar noted that they are officially recorded in the statistical data in the column of "Yugoslavs undeclared as to ethnic affiliation."

An interesting statement from the audience was Dr Koca Joncic's reminder of the need to distinguish between the concepts of "people" (narod) and "nation" (nacija).

He recalled that the Constitution talks about "people" and our theories about "nation."

This complex question of course belongs in "Socialism and National Relations II," which Kiro Hadzi Vasilev is already preparing for publication, for it is also of specific value for Yugoslavia. We are also familiar with the phenomenon of two or more "nations" arising from a single "people." This is the case with the Serbian "people," which has in modern Yugoslavia constituted two "nations," Serbian and Montenegrin.

Since this mainly Marxist debate was conducted for 3 hours in the packed hall of the Youth Center, we must recall that Marx spoke of how the expository mode must differ from the research mode, just as the description in our condensed report has had to depart from the chronology of the debate.

Letter to Editor

Belgrade NEDELJINE INFORMATIVNE NOVINE No 1666, 5 Dec 82 pp 3, 6

[Letter to the editor from Prof Dr Rastislav V. Petrovic, of Belgrade: "Supplement From the Audience"]

[Text] The most recent issue of NIN contained an article by Teodor Andelic on the discussion conducted in the Belgrade Youth Center regarding Kiro Hadzi

Vasilev's book "Socialism and National Relations I." Although this article is rather extensive, it is nevertheless not sufficiently informative, since it does not indicate the content of the discussion from the audience, and the reader is for these reasons justified in asking what happened at this thoroughly respectable gathering to compel Dr Stipe Suvar to give the answers which are presented in such great detail in your reporter's text.

Those present that evening could, for example, interpret the position of the Serbian people in Croatia in two ways. Someone in the audience mentioned that the Serbian people in Croatia, for the purpose of attaining full equality with the Croatian people, had formed a number of cultural and political institutions during the national liberation struggle and immediately after the liberation. In 1943, the Serbian Councilors' Club of the Antifascist Council for National Liberation of Croatia [ZAVNOH] was formed, and in the following year, on the ashes of the Glina church, the "Obilic" Serbian choral society and the "Prosv-jeta" Serbian cultural and educational society. Immediately after the war, the first congress of Serbs in Croatia met in Zagreb and established, as a permanent body within the National Front of Croatia, the Main Committee of Serbs in Croatia.

In 1948, the Museum of Serbs in Croatia was founded in Zagreb, along with a central Serbian library. It is worth mentioning in addition to all this that in September 1943 the national liberation movement appealed to Serbs in Croatia via the newspaper SRPSKA RIJEC, printed in cyrillic script.

All of the above facts were formulated as a question to Dr Suvar: "Why do none of these Serbian organizations exist in Croatia today?"

I was surprised by the reply of Dr Suvar, who claimed that ethnic institutions of this type had been created by the bourgeoisie for the purpose of achieving class goals, since (as I stressed in my remarks) as a historian I know quite well that these institutions of the Serbian people in Croatia were created on the initiative of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. These institutions of the Serbian people in Croatia are therefore the heritage of our socialist revolution and I consider that, as such, they ought to be preserved.

One more thing. Teodor Andelic cited part of my remarks having to do with Hadzi Vasilev's book. On the basis of the interpretation given, the reader could conclude that I spoke negatively about the book, which I find highly unpleasant, all the more so in that I praised it because it deserves praise in my opinion and because I assume that the author will, in the second part which he is preparing for publication, provide answers to several of the questions which were posed, e.g., how the Serbian people in Croatia can maintain itself in the future as Serbian if there are no ethnic institutions to sustain it.

Second Letter on Subject

Belgrade NEDELJNE INFORMATIVNE NOVINE No 1666, 5 Dec 82 p 6

[Letter to the editor from Momcilo Kosovic: "A National Right, Not a Head Count"]

[Text] Dr Stipe Suvar is opposed to separate cultural institutions for any people whatever in any Yugoslav republic whatever, and in particular is explicitly

"against a policy of assimilating or separating the Serbs in Croatia." The context of the overall report on the recent discussion of Kiro Hadzi Vasilev's book "Socialism and National Relations I," this means that he is opposed to the ethnic separation of Serbs in Croatia in relation to the majority Croatian people, so Dr Suvar appears to be questioning both the historical bases of interethnic relations in Croatia, formed during the national liberation struggle, and the explicit constitutional guarantees of ethnic rights and freedoms in this Yugoslav republic.

Specifically, on 9 May 1944, in Topusko, ZAVNOH proclaimed full equality for the Croatian and Serbian peoples in Croatia, and Mosa Pijade, as one of those in the highest positions of leadership of the national liberation movement, in November 1944, advised the Serbs regarding this proclamation "that they have rights equal to those of the ruling nation" of their federal unit and this precisely "as component parts of the totality of their nation, which goes beyond the boundaries of their national state," asserting that the federative structure of Yugoslavia "in no way disrupts the ethnic unity of all Serbs and the ethnic unity of all Croats." Once more, at the so-called 1st Congress of Serbs in Croatia, held in liberated Zagreb on 30 September 1945, it was stressed that: "We must preserve the unity of the Serbian people in political and cultural life as the guarantee of survival and progress. The borders of the federal units neither break up nor divide the Serbian people, rather they are firm links which bind all Serbs in Yugoslavia."

The revolution thus formulated quite specifically its own principled standpoint as regards the national question of the Serbian people in Croatia, providing the basis both during the national liberation struggle and after the liberation for constructing interethnic relations in Croatia as Serbs organized their own national life within the framework of numerous political, cultural, and educational institutions. This national life, to be sure, gradually died out over time with the extinction of the ethnic institutions thus established, which eventually lost their broad public support. Never, however, was this principled standpoint as regards equality and ethnic unity revised, and no justifiable reasons for such a move are evident even today, for there is no doubt that this would touch on the very foundations on which our multiethnic society was constructed during the national liberation struggle.

The Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Croatia directly confirms the historical and contemporary fact that the Serbs in Croatia are a national entity in relation to the Croats and other peoples and ethnic groups in Croatia and explicitly guarantees them all by name full mutual equality, and in particular even guarantees "to each people and ethnic group the right, in accordance with the requirements of common life, socialist development, and the solidification of brotherhood and unity, to use, freely and with equal rights, its own language and script, to call its language by its own name, and to enjoy other rights established by the Constitution." The Constitution thus guarantees to all peoples and ethnic groups in Croatia ethnic uniqueness and corresponding cultural autonomy, and the Serbs in Croatia cannot without violating the Constitution be disputed their right, in relation to the Croatian people and all other peoples in Croatia, to consider themselves as and to behave as a separate ethnic entity as well as part of the Serbian people as a larger entity.

In addition to the fact that the Croats and the Serbs in Croatia have a shared history and culture, there is the additional and no less significant fact that each of these peoples has, outside of these shared features, just as many of its own specifically separate historical and cultural features, and this is precisely what makes them two different ethnic identities. Hence, neither Serbs nor other Yugoslav peoples and ethnic groups can be disputed the right to their own cultural institutions without questioning their constitutional right to the development of their own national culture. In spite of the fact that the Croats in Croatia and the majority and the Serbs the minority nation, and that in addition SR Croatia was established by the Constitution as the national state of the Croatian nation, the Serbs cannot be referred to exclusively joint cultural institutions.

Latest Incidents Described, Analyzed

Belgrade NEDELJNE INFORMATIVNE NOVINE No 1666, 5 Dec 82 pp 16-18

[Article by Aleksander Tijanic: "Dangerous Games"]

[Text] In Yugoslav circumstances, ethnic fanaticism is mental rabies: the incubation period is long, a definitive cure unknown.

Where is the evidence for this assertion? The somewhat colder days in Belgrade have compelled our youth to dress more warmly. At their favorite gathering places, one can now occasionally see a group of boys in jeans, wearing Serbian soldiers' caps on their heads!

In late summer, boys were seen in our capital city wearing T-shirts with the traditional Serbian coat-of-arms printed on them--with four letter S's [standing for "Only Concord Saves the Serb"]. This T-shirt is, as far as we know, not manufactured industrially in any textile plant, which means that it is handmade. The same coat-of-arms has also been sprayed with automobile paint onto several buildings in the center of town. Just like the graffiti "Serbia--a Republic."

Two weeks ago, a concert by a Zagreb rock group in the Belgrade Student Cultural Center was disrupted by a mob, composed mainly of teenage boys in black jackets, which persistently chanted of [the Serbian folksong] "The heroes were dancing in the land of Serbia," provoking interruptions and fighting. Earlier this same group, with the same scenario, had interfered with concerts by visiting groups.

Abuse of a Symbol

On Sunday, in front of the Palas Hotel, a massive fistfight broke out between fans of [Zagreb's] "Hajduk" and [Belgrade's] "Partizan" [soccer teams]. The bus rented by the Hajduk soccer players for the match was peppered with stones. This happened not after the match, when tempers are supposed to flare up, but before it, when tempers are calm.

The youth newspaper NASI DANI [of Sarajevo] wrote that in Duvno one teacher had ripped up the notebooks of pupils who had written their assignments in Cyrillic. This was followed by an unofficial denial from this city.

When the political and security situation was being evaluated in the Brezice opstina, it was judged to be the worst since the liberation in terms of the relations between the Slovenes and the population of neighboring Croatia.

In the Zagreb student dormitory at Lascina, a group of youths repeatedly sang nationalist songs accompanied by shouts of "Long Live the Independent State of Croatia!" Somewhat later, one of the dormitory residents was beaten up in the traditional fascist way--to the accompaniment of insults, threats, and mentions of Ante Pavelic and [the Serbian] Tsar Dusan. This same group led one unwilling girl up to the Ustasha coat-of-arms and forced her to declare whether she was on their side or not.

At dormitory meetings, the organizers of this event were condemned, but it was stated that "a tendency exists to react to Croatian nationalism from the positions of Serbian nationalism, along with a tendency to combine Croatian and Albanian nationalism." The situation was reminiscent, say former residents of these dormitories, of the time of the nationalists' reign of terror during the mass-movement era [1971] and, somewhat later, of the terrorism or organized grouplets of Albanian nationalists, which several years ago culminated in the death of one of them. After that incident, two of the then higher-up party leaders of the Kosovo Executive Council flew in from Pristina to seek the release of those arrested and meet with Albanian students and restaurateurs from Kosovo working in Zagreb.

It would be difficult to reduce the majority of the above phenomena to any sort of common denominator--and they therefore constitute nothing more than pure illustrations. The real question is: why do some of these youths feel the need to declare themselves, in a primitively symbolic--or in any other--manner, as nationalists? In addition, can analysis of their behavior lead us to the true cause for such events? So far as we know, in Belgrade and elsewhere, there has been no rational and critical discussion with the wearers of these caps, T-shirts, or badges. Such a conversation would demonstrate that no one has anything against soldiers' caps or the folk song "The heroes were dancing" if they are not abused. In addition, a discussion in which nothing happened to these boys would remove the illusion of "heroism" from their gestures, and this would give us all a chance to find out what they really know about Ante Pavelic, Draza Mihailovic, or Enver Hodza. For a good part of these youths are not the sort of opponent about whom we are used to saying that "one cannot converse with enemies."

If we bear in mind that nationalism in Yugoslavia is a kind of constant, we also know that there are times when it is on the defensive or offensive. Our correspondent Veljko Rus of the Institute for Sociology in Ljubljana does not consider nationalism to be on the offensive.

"From my Ljubljana perspective," says Rus, "the national question is now a sensitive issue only in Kosovo. I do not sense any changes in other regions. On the contrary, my experiences indicate the exact opposite. Maybe I am not correct, but I think that nationalism is not on the offensive. Some texts appearing in the newspapers on this topic are far more the consequence of unfair interpretations of the causes for the state of the economy in individual republics."

Other NIN interviewers, from Zagreb and Belgrade, do not share his opinion. Dragutin Lalovic, instructor at the Faculty of Political Sciences in Zagreb, tells us that pan-social as well as individual reasons exist for the flare-up of nationalism, in that certain social processes are favorable to such development. Lalovic considers that there are always nationalistic public declarations when these forces judge that it is the proper moment to make a public appearance and to gain public support.

Isolated Incidents

Zarko Puhovski, instructor at the Faculty of Philosophy in Zagreb, says that, in critical situations, people always look for something different, and in our case there is only one thing that can be organized overnight, and that is nationalism.

"It was revealed," Puhovski says, "that the leadership entities in Kosovo were completely independent and did what they wished. These symptoms are present in other jurisdictions as well. In Kosovo, they began to take a head count and to drive out another nation, a symptom which exists, although to be sure on different levels, elsewhere in our country, and right in Slovenia if you will. Kosovo is unique only in that they had the Albanian hinterland as a factor of some influence on the whole situation."

Of interest is his opinion that a whole series of topics which were typical of nationalists became, 5 or 6 years after they were defeated, a legitimate method of political communication in Yugoslavia. He is referring to the hard-currency balances of republics, republic-wide markets, etc.

"This, in my opinion, lasted until the republic-level and province-level leaders were shown the consequences of such a situation, viz, the disintegration of the republics and autonomous provinces into opstinas. In this situation, we had a sort of eight-party legal system, where parliamentary fractions functioning in a manner similar to that of fractions in multiparty systems were known to exist."

Puhovski adds that there were some additional elements that led to a radical decrease in the study of history and its reduction to elements of national history.

"This was in my judgment," Puhovski tells us, "a consequence of the fact that the Yugoslav community has been in reality, both politically and legally, reduced to the Yugoslav People's Army. Not a living soul has attempted to analyze fundamentally the sole attempt at Yugoslav identification, as can be seen from the census figures. Instead, we read demographic nonsense such as: 'these are children of mixed marriages.' For me this, was a type of protest against the actual disintegration of the Yugoslav idea. What will we do if, because of an increase in the proportion of 'Yugoslavs undeclared as to ethnic affiliation, the question comes up of representing them in province-level and republic-level parliaments and the Federal Assembly? Every attempt to view things from the Yugoslav angle has been proclaimed as a unitarian stance, and we have extended this attitude to the party and the state and areas which in a technical sense require

centralization: the railroads and the electric power system. We have reduced Yugoslavia, as a result of all this, to the territory which we defend and within which different sovereign units are developing, with their own political, cultural, ethnic, and--in the final analysis--ideological differences. For Yugoslavia, in my opinion, a certain level of centralism must be accepted if we want a Yugoslavia at all. But what we always find in parallel with centralism is the public; in other words, decision-making on centralizing part of resources or functions while respecting democratic centralism."

These isolated incidents are for Puhovski no more cause for concern than earlier ones, of which we were ignorant but which were constantly occurring nonetheless. This is the reason, he says, why for years he has not been attending even basketball games.

Commentary by Pasic

Belgrade NEDELJNE INFORMATIVNE NOVINE No 1666, 5 Dec 82 pp 16-17

[Article by Dr Najdan Pasic: "Painful Lessons"]

[Text] We must admit that even today, even in our own society (we must not close our eyes to this), there are operative a number of different processes that encourage a revival of nationalism in its old and reactionary forms. And this is by no means accidental. What is happening in society, what we are criticizing and fighting against, cannot help but be reflected in the consciousness of people--and the consciousness of the younger generation, which is the most sensitive and which always resonates most clearly in response to all social pressure and movements.

When we speak of the negative effects of the different processes which are operative in society, then I think primarily of disintegrative processes in our economy, in cultural life, disintegrative processes in relation to the Yugoslav community as a whole. We are faced with the appearance of territorial encapsulation in the economy, encapsulation of the economy within an ethnic group's own limits, as well as overemphasis in everyday life on the importance of territorial affiliation, meaning affiliation with a specific socio-political and ethnic community. Under our present conditions, much can depend on the emphasis on such criteria as ethnic affiliation. For example, the possibility for enrolling in schools or universities depends on which republic or autonomous province a person is from. Such things have occurred in Kosovo, but also in Belgrade. Even residents of Vojvodina and Bosnia could not enroll in Belgrade University under the same conditions as local applicants. I will not enter into a discussion of the causes or the justifications for this, but these are generally known facts. Ethnic quotas and various sorts of head counts may make it difficult for individuals to find employment or to satisfy certain other needs such as medical care, etc. Social mobility has in general declined considerably on an all-Yugoslav scale.

All this must, if not directly then indirectly, have an effect on consciousness. Through encapsulation, fence-building, and special cultural and other barriers, we are narrowing the field of social identification for a young person. A person is coming to identify increasingly with some narrow circle and not with the broader community of which he or she is also a member.

I think that we frequently lose sight of the long-range effects of some of the measures which we are taking for the purpose of mechanically ensuring some sort of equality of ethnic communities--and this at times turns into inequality for individuals. These divisions are frequently very dangerous and have far-reaching consequences. In the case of Kosovo, segregation and encapsulation in relation to the Republic of Serbia and Yugoslavia as a whole were confirmed very clearly to be the consequence of a narrow-minded and short-sighted pan-Albanian nationalism. We have permitted in some milieus a sort of spontaneous segregation in that young people of different nationalities do not associate with each other. There is no sense in waging only verbal ideological struggle and propaganda against nationalist phenomena; we must struggle against the deeper social causes for these phenomena.

How much trouble we went to in order to reconcile views on certain entries in the Encyclopedia, to what an extent our thinking is still burdened with separate national myths and viewpoints, how difficult it is to surmount all this! And it would be very naive to think that this will not have any consequences, to which we never give enough thought. The fact that things have come to such a point that all writers are now rigidly divided according to ethnic affiliation and that the national heroes of the various peoples are studied in different ways--these being at the same time our shared Yugoslav heroes--may negatively affect our sense of community as well. Lack of information is unacceptable, as is overemphasis on uniqueness and self-sufficiency.

One hears talk of, among other things, "economic nationalism." This is natural. A great battle is now being fought over whether the working class will succeed, within the framework of Yugoslavia (for this is the only possible way) in truly gaining control of the processes of extended reproduction, so-called "social capital." However, very clear expressions of territorial encapsulation reveal the aspirations of the ruling administrative-political stratum in individual areas of the country to place the means for extended reproduction under its own control.

This pressure of political pragmatism, of these direct short-sighted interests, may however sometimes blur our vision, and this may be abused, as has happened in the past. This is one underhanded method of operation by both the class enemy and the enemy of self-management, this constant prompting that your milieu or nation is faring worse than the others. All guarantees exist in Yugoslavia that no one can be outvoted by a majority in the distribution of the national surplus product. And, in the final analysis, if integration is based on self-management principles, then the possibility for exploitation is thereby excluded. On the contrary, the danger of exploitation, the danger of deep-seated conflicts exists when there forms what Kardelj termed (in his book "Contradictory Social Ownerships") "republic-level and province-level capital," and when economic policy begins to form through the collision of and struggle between these sets of capital. This is what possesses great destructive potential.

Illusions about nationalism exist, but they will always be paid for dearly. Those who wish to manipulate nationalism, and to yoke it for their own purposes, usually burn their fingers. Very soon nationalism outgrows them, very soon it escapes their control and strikes those by paths that lead to serious crisis and trouble, which may not have been the aim of those who wished to play with it at

all. This is a great and painful lesson of the past. In the final analysis, this is not only our own experience but a confirmed great historical truth and a lesson which we must reckon with.

Interview with Suvar

Belgrade NEDELJNE INFORMATIVNE NOVINE No 1666, 5 Dec 82 pp 18-19

[Interview with Prof Stipe Suvar: "The Silent Rise of Chauvinism"]

[Text] Stipe Suvar, professor at the Faculty of Philosophy in Zagreb and member of the Presidency of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Croatia, has since 1967 published a number of texts on the national phenomenon and on nationalistic events. He has also published three books on the subject: "Nations and Inter-ethnic Relations in Socialist Yugoslavia," "The National Question in the Soviet Union," and "National and Nationalistic."

In his opinion, there is no reason for surprise over these occasions for our discussions about nationalism. This confirms for Suvar only that nationalism is powerful among young people in all our ethnic milieus, since not a single nation of ours, neither the smallest nor the largest, is free of nationalist sentiments in all its generations.

"Our tales of how youth can be a priori pure as regards the national question have no solid foundation," Suvar says. Some sociological works on so-called "ethnic distance" show that there is still significant sentiment of this sort among our young people, more so among blue-collar youth than among secondary schoolers or university students. "Ethnic distance" involves guardedness and a feeling of remoteness towards members of another ethnic community.

[Question] Recently you stated at a meeting in Belgrade that you have long been fighting with Croatian nationalists but that you find it difficult to fight with Serbian nationalists, since you have "no training."

[Answer] Well, I can also say something about Serbian nationalism without fear of being labeled, since I have always come out against nationalism in my own Croatian nation. The average Serb 5 or 6 decades ago was schooled in the spirit of St Vitus's Day [anniversary of the battle of Kosovo], the ethics of the battle of Kosovo, of special merits for the liberation and unification of the South Slavs in a common state, and the feeling that the Serbs were the main people in this state. For this average Serb, a Montenegrin was also a Serb, as was a Macedonian--Macedonia being South Serbia. Bosnia, in the interpretation of the young bourgeoisie, was an original Serbian land. And to Croatian nationalists, Bosnia is an original Croatian land, and the Muslims of Bosnia and Hercegovina are the purest Croats. The Croatian nationalists simply cannot understand why the Serbs in Croatia have not become Croats, after 400 or more years of living together with the Croats, and they wonder if the religious difference between them was enough to keep them ethnically separate. They cite the fact that among the Germans it is not important who is a Protestant and who is a Catholic. In the 70's one talented Croatian author wrote a book "We Are All Responsible" in which he publicly indicted the Serbs in Croatia. This average

nationalistic consciousness, which has its historical "why and how," has continuity, and socialism by its political victory alone does not bring perfect relations among nations.

/Nationalism is Right Here/

[Question] Is there nationalism in our society today?

[Answer] As regards whether or not there is nationalism my opinion is--there is, it is right here! As regards Croatia, I must confess that it is silently on the rise. Of course, it is a bit frightened and would not dare to be particularly aggressive in the absence of serious crises within Yugoslavia. But it is ready and is counting on its own people, which it deploys throughout various spheres of public life, especially in some of the most sensitive organizations of associated labor and in cultural and educational institutions. It has increased support also in a part of the Catholic sphere, which wishes to play the role of the nation's savior.

[Question] Where, in your opinion, are they looking for their chance?

[Answer] The present social situation in Yugoslavia, as we all know, is less than perfect. As a matter of principle, this offers a certain chance for nationalism of every sort to revive. These symptoms are warning signs of that. However, nationalism in Yugoslavia, regardless of whose it is and what sort it is, is the main platform of every counterrevolution. In 1971, Croatian nationalism was even deluded into thinking that it could take over political power in this republic, despite the existing ratio of forces, not only in Yugoslavia but in Croatia as well, where by the nature of things the majority was never in favor of nationalism. Among other things, a current of bourgeois antinationalism even existed in the Croatian nation. The strongest political party of old Yugoslavia among the Croats, the Croatian Peasant Party, never erased from its program the first sentence written into the 1905 program by the Radic brothers: "The Croats and the Serbs are one nation, but politically two." The nationalism that showed so much political ambition 10 years ago is, as far as I can see, silently on the rise, with all its traditional theses. Today it pretends to be humane, and it speaks through proclamations published abroad of a socialist Croatia. It is even setting up a league of Croatian communists abroad. But they are opposed to any Yugoslavia. They are obsessed with a governmental formula of rallying Croats, as they say, on the unified ethnic and historical area of the Croatian people. What does this mean in practice? This always leads to genocide in relation to Serbs, Muslims, and all other non-Croats.

[Question] Why is it that we always see a problem more clearly in other milieus than our own?

[Answer] As regards inter-ethnic relations, these are at present characterized by the fact that we are merciless in suspecting others of nationalism and blind when we are supposed to analyze and mercilessly expose nationalism in our own nation, in our own milieu. Many of those who wage a verbal battle for socialism fall short when it comes to action. Such a mentality can be found among our political representatives and even our leaders. Some of our leaders see the

shortcomings of others but are not prepared to say mercilessly what is wrong with their own nation and social milieu. On this basis, we are prone to sniping at each other and quarreling over petty disputes, losing sight of broader mutual interests. In this sense, our daily political life is highly charged with nationalism.

[Question] Does every nationalism always stir up other nationalisms?

[Answer] It seems to me that we must be especially subtle in speaking of whether there is a fair amount of anti-Serbian feeling in each of our nations and nationalities today, a feeling which is of course nationalistic. When you stress that something is wrong with some nation, that it is not enjoying full equality, you ask who is at fault. Of course the more numerous nation is "guilty" in that it has by tradition assigned to itself (and others have assigned to it) the main role in the earlier phases of social development, both pre-socialist and socialist. Thus all nationalists give vent to their feelings at the expense of the Serbs. When you follow events more carefully as concerns Albanian, Croatian, Macedonian, and--if you will--Slovenian nationalism, you will always find a nationalist anti-Serbian note. Don't get me wrong, all our nationalists have some accounts to settle with all the other nations. I only want to stress that this thing about Serbs is today a characteristic phenomenon.

Contrariwise, in the Serbian nation, in that part of it which is burdened with nationalism, you still find a kind of nostalgic melancholy--the frustrated reflex of identifying the fate of the Serbian people and Serbia with Yugoslavia; the idea that Yugoslavia is an enlarged Serbia, and that only on this basis can it be organized and maintained, has not yet disappeared. Of course, the irredentist onslaught in Kosovo strengthens revanchist sentiment in the nationalist part of the Serbian nation. This phenomenon may also be used to explain some symptoms of everyday life. Serbs are being pushed out of Kosovo, the special historical link between the Serbian and Montenegrin nations is being negated, monuments from the Balkan wars and World War I are being destroyed, monuments to various voivodas and to the liberator king are being destroyed. Then there is the position of the Serbs in Croatia, which is historically tragic, no matter to what extent the socialist revolution produced a positive outcome. In World War II, the Serbs were exposed to Ustasha genocide, and in 1971 the feeling of impending danger was revived. Serbian nationalists point a finger at census data, which show that the number of Serbs in Croatia is decreasing; they refuse to see that the number of Croats in Croatia is also decreasing. A decrease here, a decrease there, we're moving out. Everyone has something against the Serbs, everyone is finding fault with them.

Thus all these nationalisms encourage each other. They send each other messages, and these messages can captivate us as well, even when we are fully convinced that we are socialistically and communistically oriented. This is why we bicker about what is wrong with others and do not even begin to analyze the same problems in our own milieu. I can repeat for you some of my positions from a text which I recently sent to DELO. I read somewhere the assertion that cultural relations between Zagreb and Belgrade are worse in 1982 than they were in 1971. But 10 years ago there were excellent relations between the nationalists, for they encourage each other: they quarrel, and one cannot survive without an opponent in another nation.

Being together presupposes conflict (there is no idyll and there never will be), presupposes differences, which differentiate without separating. In this sense, a multitude of nationalities, of languages, of cultures ought to mean wealth. The average person, the Yugoslav of average mentality, has not yet sufficiently grasped this fact.

Yugoslavdom and Yugoslavs

[Question] Do you think that the phenomenon of Yugoslavdom could play some role in this?

[Answer] One cannot consider as particularly advanced, in either the human or the political sense, a person who considers himself a Yugoslav according to the official definition, i.e., not as a member of some new nation which is being born and which is gradually going to absorb the existing nations but rather as a Yugoslav undeclared as to ethnic affiliation. Yugoslavdom and the Yugoslav are different concepts. You have different types of Yugoslavdom, but at the same time we are all Yugoslavs--as members of the Yugoslav federative community of peoples and ethnic groups. I find it amusing when some people say that, since ethnically we are not South Slavs, we are not Yugoslavs [literally South Slavs]. We are all Yugoslavs, as members of the Yugoslav community, and I want socialist Yugoslavia to keep going. This country can continue to exist as a modern community only on a platform of socialism and socialist progress. No other Yugoslavia is possible. Therefore, if we are not Yugoslavs in that sense, then we are dubious characters. In any case, it is a natural right of an individual to list himself as undeclared as to ethnic affiliation, which must not be considered as a handicap or as an advantage. Personally, I think that it is to our advantage for there to be as many Yugoslavs as possible undeclared as to ethnic affiliation--but under normal conditions, without any pressure and with no presumption that these are more conscious and more advanced communists and builders of socialism than the rest of us who declare ourselves as Croats, Serbs, Macedonians, etc.

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