


108098

JPRS 82835

9 February 1983



19981105 066

# USSR Report

MILITARY AFFAIRS

No. 1740

DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 2

**FBIS**

FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

13  
114  
A06

## NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

## PROCUREMENT OF PUBLICATIONS

JPRS publications may be ordered from the National Technical Information Service (NTIS), Springfield, Virginia 22161. In ordering, it is recommended that the JPRS number, title, date and author, if applicable, of publication be cited.

Current JPRS publications are announced in Government Reports Announcements issued semimonthly by the NTIS, and are listed in the Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Correspondence pertaining to matters other than procurement may be addressed to Joint Publications Research Service, 1000 North Glebe Road, Arlington, Virginia 22201.

Soviet books and journal articles displaying a copyright notice are reproduced and sold by NTIS with permission of the copyright agency of the Soviet Union. Permission for further reproduction must be obtained from copyright owner.

JPRS REPORTS

Japan Report  
Korean Affairs Report  
Southeast Asia Report  
Mongolia Report

Near East/South Asia Report  
Sub-Saharan Africa Report  
West Europe Report  
West Europe Report: Science and Technology  
Latin America Report

USSR

Political and Sociological Affairs  
Problems of the Far East  
Science and Technology Policy  
Sociological Studies  
Translations from KOMMUNIST  
USA: Economics, Politics, Ideology  
World Economy and International Relations  
Agriculture  
Construction and Related Industries  
Consumer Goods and Domestic Trade  
Economic Affairs  
Energy  
Human Resources  
International Economic Relations  
Transportation

Physics and Mathematics  
Space  
Space Biology and Aerospace Medicine  
Military Affairs  
Chemistry  
Cybernetics, Computers and Automation Technology  
Earth Sciences  
Electronics and Electrical Engineering  
Engineering and Equipment  
Machine Tools and Metal-Working Equipment  
Life Sciences: Biomedical and Behavioral Sciences  
Life Sciences: Effects of Nonionizing Electromagnetic Radiation  
Materials Science and Technology

EASTERN EUROPE

Political, Sociological and Military Affairs  
Scientific Affairs

Economic and Industrial Affairs

CHINA

Political, Sociological and Military Affairs  
Economic Affairs  
Science and Technology

RED FLAG  
Agriculture  
Plant and Installation Data

WORLDWIDE

Telecommunications Policy, Research and Development  
Nuclear Development and Proliferation

Environmental Quality  
Law of the Sea  
Epidemiology

FBIS DAILY REPORT

China  
Soviet Union  
South Asia  
Asia and Pacific

Eastern Europe  
Western Europe  
Latin America  
Middle East and Africa

To order, see inside front cover

9 February 1983

USSR REPORT  
MILITARY AFFAIRS

No. 1740

## CONTENTS

## MILITARY SCIENCE, THEORY, STRATEGY

- Army Gen Lushev on Troop Control  
(P. Lushev; SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW, Jan 83)..... 1

## WARSAW PACT AND GROUPS OF FORCES

- History of Warsaw Pact Reviewed  
(M. Monin; SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW, Dec 82)..... 8

## ARMED FORCES

- Ogarkov Addresses Staff Aktiv  
(V. Kharlamov; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 29 Dec 82)..... 12

- Sokolov, Romanov at Leningrad Military District Party Aktiv  
Meeting  
(LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA, 10 Dec 82)..... 13

- Table of Contents: 'SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW' No 12,  
December 1982  
(SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW, Dec 82)..... 15

- Ethnic Solidarity in Armed Forces Discussed  
(F. Seiranyan; SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW, Dec 82)..... 16

- Wartime Operations: Tank Repair in Combat Discussed  
(A. Sosenkov Interview; SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW,  
Dec 82)..... 21

- Party-Political Work: The Military Collection  
(V. Drozdov; SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW, Dec 82)..... 25

Wartime Operations: Operation 'Koltso,' Jan-Feb 1943 Reviewed (P. I. Batov Interview; SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW, Dec 82).....	29
'SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW': Annual Index for 1982 (SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW, Dec 82).....	32
Table of Contents: 'SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW' No 1, January 1983 (SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW, Jan 83).....	39
Importance of Morale in Modern Warfare (V. Khorbostov; SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW, Jan 83).....	40
Ground Forces Reviewed (SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW, Jan 83).....	44
Tales of Heroism by Military Personnel Recounted (D. Volkogonov; SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW, Jan 83).....	48
Duties of Political Workers Outlined (V. Tkachev; SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW, Jan 83).....	52
Physical Training for Officers Outlined (Yu. Demyanenko; SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW, Jan 83).....	56
AIR FORCES	
Air Support of Ground Operations Discussed (M. Igumentsev; SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW, Dec 82).....	58
GROUND FORCES	
T-72 Tank: Desert Operation Discussed (D. Ryazantsev; SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW, Dec 82).....	61
Tank Battalion: River Forcing Exercise (M. Loginov; SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW, Jan 83).....	65
Preparations for Night Combat Discussed (N. Andreyev; SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW, Jan 83).....	71
Anti-Tank Artillery Discussed (G. Girjukov; SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW, Jan 83).....	74
AIR DEFENSE FORCES	
Air Defense Missile Subunit Training Discussed (A. Yakubovskiy; SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW, Dec 82).....	77

NAVAL FORCES

Sea Sickness Treated Successfully by Hypnosis  
(Editorial Report)..... 82

PERCEPTIONS, VIEWS, COMMENTS

Comments on Foreign Anti-Tank Missile Systems  
(V. Alekseyenko; TEKNIKA I VOORUZHENIYE, Dec 81)..... 83

Commentary on U.S. Foreign, Military Policies  
(Editorial; SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW, Jan 83)..... 91

Commentary on U.S., NATO Arms Build-up  
(N. Kotkov; SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW, Jan 83)..... 95

Commentary on Situation in Middle East, Asia  
(Yu. Lugovskiy; SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW, Jan 83)..... 101

Review of 'Whence the Threat to Peace'  
(G. Stefanovskoy; SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW, Jan 83)..... 105

MILITARY SCIENCE, THEORY, STRATEGY

ARMY GEN LUSHEV ON TROOP CONTROL

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 1, Jan 83 pp 9-12

[Article, published under the heading "Combat Training", by Army Gen. P. Lushev, Commander of the Order of Lenin Moscow Military District: "The Art Troop Control"]

[Text]



**The author of this contribution joined the Soviet Army at the age of 18, in 1941. During the Great Patriotic War [1941-1945] he fought on the Volkhov and Leningrad fronts as infantry platoon and company commander. Since the war he has been in command of all military units from battalion to military district. Pyotr Georgiyevich Lushev was elected a delegate to the 25th and 26th congresses of the CPSU. He is a member of the CPSU Central Committee and deputy to the USSR Supreme Soviet.**

---

## 1. THE DEMAND OF THE TIMES

---

Troop control is purposeful exercise of authority by commanders, staffs and political organs to maintain the level of combat readiness of formations, units and subunits in keeping with contemporary requirements, to train them for military operations, successful execution of missions in battle through effective employment of the available manpower and means. Such authority is exercised on the basis of the laws and principles of military art.

Troop control comprises a whole system of measures, the most important of which in our opinion are uninterrupted search, collection, study and analysis of information on the situation; adoption of decisions; planning of combat operations; organisation and maintenance of coordinated action by subordinate troops (these being the cardinal measures).


The set of most important measures which, in our view, make up troop control is shown on the diagram.

To exercise effective troop control the commander must be characterised by such qualities as ideological staunchness, devotion to his people, professional competence in warfare and military equipment, strong will power, organisational ability, reasonable initiative and ability to act on his own, a sense of responsibility for the fighting proficiency and education of his subordinates, and a self-critical approach towards the appraisal of the state of affairs.

A Soviet commander is not only a competent specialist, a master of his trade, but also a social and political worker equipped with Marxist-Leninist theory, a creator and defender of the new, socialist way of life, and a vehicle of Party policy in the Armed Forces of the USSR.

A commander who believes that his own experience in combat training and political education of troops and natural intuition constitute the cardinal factor is making a grave error. Of course, nobody denies the importance of acquired experience or of natural intuition. But commanders must not become captives of outdated experience, they should not make a fetish of it. Nor should they prevent by their authority and high position the introduction of new, advanced and promising developments. Past experience should not serve as a screen to disguise outdated views and skills. The purpose of experience is to help comprehend new phenomena, foresee the future and develop military science. To this end every commander, regardless of rank, should, in addition to acquiring experience, constantly enrich his know-





ledge, study persistently to apply the latest achievements of military science and practice in combat training and political education. This is a demand of the times.

Troop control is a most complicated, multifaceted form of activity of commanders, staffs, generals and other officers at executive level. The purpose of this activity is to ensure the troops' accomplishment of missions by the set deadline, in any situation with the least expenditure of men and equipment.

---

## 2. REQUIREMENTS OF TROOP CONTROL

---

The present conditions have infinitely raised the requirements of troop control, especially of ensuring stability, continuity, efficiency, expedition and concealment.

The high requirements of stable troop control are determined by the fact that at present it is difficult to observe from a single post the position of the troops of both sides and the results of their combat action. It appears that in most cases information from the troops and assignment of missions to them shall be transmitted by technical means of communication. It follows that both fire weapons and radar neutralisation facilities will be above all concentrated on command posts, communication centres and lines. In modern combat the role of the time factor has increased considerably. In this context the struggle to seize the initiative in battle has become a vital condition for securing success. This may result in temporary disruption of the functioning of troop control system, thus depriving the commander and his staff of the possibility to exercise uninterrupted influence on the course of the military operation. Therefore, troop control systems must be capable of functioning in the most difficult, critical conditions. To this end the commander and the staff should elaborate a whole set of measures to ensure stable control.

The commander and his staff should exercise constant influence on the course of combat. They must not let the reins of troop control out of their hands for a minute. Even temporary loss of control will be fraught with grave consequences, such as failure to accomplish the mission.

Continuity of control is ensured not only by knowledge of the situation, rapid response to changes in it, but also by foresight in respect of trends in the development of military operations. Commanders and staffs whose troop control practices are based on knowledge of the laws govern-

ing the development of combat and on skilful application of this knowledge, and not on accidental attendant circumstances, will secure victory. Continuous, uninterrupted control is also ensured by vigorous and purposeful reconnaissance and intelligence, stable functioning of communication facilities and efficiency of command posts.

During the Great Patriotic War uninterrupted control was largely determined by efficient organising the moves and deployment of command posts, communication centres and lines. The commander would move to a new command post only when it was fully deployed. While he was on the move he would, as a rule, put his chief of staff in charge of troop control. Adoption of an optimal version with respect to time of operations, efficient organisation in moving command posts, and timely transfer of control from one post to another ensured uninterrupted troop control. This experience is still valid.

Such factors as greater range and rate of fire of modern weapons, cutting of time to prepare for combat, increased rapidity of actions, frequent and sharp changes in the situation, efforts to forestall enemy manoeuvre, deployment, opening of fire and launching of attack, the greater volume of information on the situation needed for adopting a decision in minimum time determine the extremely high requirements of troop control efficiency.

These requirements can be met through an improved system of collecting and processing information on the situation, which is essential for the commander to adopt a decision, through improved methods of planning, universal introduction of automated troop and weapon control systems. Troop control will be efficient only if the time required to gather, process and assess the information, to adopt the decision and assign missions to subordinates is less than or at most equal to the time needed by the enemy for similar purposes.

It follows that efficiency of troop control is above all the ability of the commander and staff to forestall enemy action.

Troop control has to be backed by a wide variety of technical means. Without these no troop control is possible today. Large quantities of such equipment make it necessary to ensure concealment of its deployment and use. At the same time the enemy may be better equipped with facilities for troop and weapon control system intelligence. Therefore, any, even small, blunder, or poor troop control system organisation may be used by the enemy to reveal the intention behind operations,

to launch forestalling attacks and to foil a planned manoeuvre in an operation or battle.

From this it follows that the commanders and staffs should take special pains to ensure concealment of command posts, communication centres and lines, to limit the number of people involved in planning an operation (battle), to limit the number of copies of pertinent papers, and observe the regulations governing the operation of technical communication facilities.

---

### 3. ROLE OF COMMANDER AND STAFF

---

The latest Soviet scientific and technological achievements have made it possible to provide the Armed Forces with highly sophisticated equipment, especially means of mechanisation and automation of control processes. These form the scientific and technological basis for modern control. However, in practical work we proceed from the Marxist-Leninist thesis that the man, the commander is still the central figure, and his staff, the main control element, — and not that merely equipment plays the decisive role in armed struggle, in control in this particular case. The generals and officers of formations and units making up the forces of the Moscow Military District realise that one should not make a fetish out of technical equipment and mathematical methods. The command and staff personnel regard these as a means for facilitating and accelerating the control effort of the commander and his staff.

The experience of past wars and postwar exercises has shown that there is much room for improvement in the organisation and methods of work of the commander and his staff with the currently available control equipment and in the present structure of the control bodies.

For instance, one unit spent too much time on collecting and examining information on the situation. A careful analysis of the causes that gave rise to this defect prompted the superior commanders to outline and realise a set of measures to remove it. They switched over to a method of centralised gathering of information on the situation at a definite time without unnecessary details. Reports for transmission through technical communication facilities were now written out on special forms to avoid duplication. Matters gradually, though not overnight, improved. Today the staff are a competent team capable of coping with any task within a set time limit.

I maintain that the adoption of a decision is a

most complex process in control. The commanders, staffs, generals and officers of the control body must be competent in operations, must have a thorough knowledge and firm skills in working control equipment, especially computers and automated systems for data analysis and situation forecasting.

Recent exercises revealed an improvement in the performance of Lieutenant-Colonel N. Kalachnik, unit commander, in adopting a decision for combat and in planning an operation. He has clearly determined the functional duties of every officer, freed the commander from secondary matters. In adopting a decision he harmoniously combines the principle of one-man command and centralised control with initiative, creative approach and independent action on the part of his subordinates. The deputy commanders, branch commanders and chiefs of services display expedition in preparing information for the commander and confidence and competence in settling all questions confronting them.

The commander and staff determine the quantity of paper work needed for planning, make effective use of computers for calculating and substantiating decisions adopted. Proceeding from the situation they combine parallel and consecutive planning of combat. They use combined methods for informing subordinate commanders on the missions and measures designed to ensure coordination: as a rule, the commander personally issues his operations order verbally; however, in exceptional cases he sends staff officers to subordinate units. Missions are given briefly over the radio only by the commander or his chief of staff. Delivery of written papers and graphs to subordinates is widely practised. What is particularly important is that the missions are above all assigned to the subunits that play the key role, that will be the first to start action and therefore require more time for preparation.

In other words, the unit makes efficient use of the entire range of forms and methods for expeditious elaboration of an optimal decision.

To conclude I should like to state that all questions bearing on training of commanders and staffs in skilful troop control should be solved on the basis of Marxist-Leninist methodology, taking into account the latest scientific and technological achievements. They should be solved in complex and on a broad plane to meet present day requirements.

COPYRIGHT: "Soviet Military Review", No 1, 1983.

CSO: 1812/076

## WARSAW PACT AND GROUPS OF FORCES

### HISTORY OF WARSAW PACT REVIEWED

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 12, Dec 82 pp 45-47

[Article by M. Monin, D. Sc. (History) Professor: "Shoulder to Shoulder"]

[Text]

The sixty-year history of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has convincingly proved that the policy of equality and friendship between peoples is a sound and viable policy. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet Government have been consistently pursuing this policy and are continuing to do so within the framework both of the multinational Soviet state and of the entire socialist community.

A totally new type of relations, genuinely just and fraternal ones, has taken shape between the socialist countries. They are characterised by such features as friendship, cooperation, mutual assistance, equality of all countries and peoples, mutual respect of rights, customs and national traditions.

These features also distinguish relations between the armies and individual servicemen of the Warsaw Treaty countries.

The armed forces of the socialist countries serve their peoples reliably. They ensure the defence and carry out military development programmes on the basis of fraternal cooperation with strict account of the interests of each separate country and of the entire community.

The need for further closeness of the socialist countries in the field of military cooperation is dictated by life itself. World imperialism, US imperialism above all, places its stake on military strength, vigorously stepping up the strategic and conventional armaments race. The imperialists are trying to upset the existing military balance between the USSR and the USA, between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organisation in order to achieve military superiority. To this end

they have knocked together a system of aggressive military blocs, the main one among them being NATO.

Since the Second World War the imperialist states headed by the USA have constantly threatened the countries of the socialist community with a military attack. This was true of the cold war period of the 1940s-1960s, when as L. I. Brezhnev put it, they were eager "to keep us permanently on the brink of war."

In the mid-1950s, when the cold war reached its peak, the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries were compelled to take measures for collective armed defence. Sixty years ago the Soviet Republics were faced with similar aims and tasks. Then they decided to form an integral federal state — the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

In the situation after the Second World War disunity in matters of defence of the socialist countries would have played into the hands of the imperialists. To counter-balance the aggressive NATO international bloc formed by the imperialists in 1949, the CPSU and the other Communist and Workers' Parties of the socialist countries were forced to create a military and political alliance of their own.

The experience of the socialist countries' development has shown that there is only one way to continue progressing and to prevent aggression, namely to rely on mutual support, to stand shoulder to shoulder in building socialism and communism and defending the power of the working people. Already in the early period of Soviet power the people realised the need for unity in building socialism and ensuring its armed defence. The various nations and nationalities saw that there was no alternative to mutual trust and voluntary agreement in pursuance of this line. The great Lenin regarded this unity as a sound guarantee of effective military cooperation between the peoples of multinational Russia, and also between other peoples fighting imperialism for their national liberation and social emancipation.

This is the type of military cooperation that has taken shape between the countries of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation.

The defensive military and political alliance of the Warsaw Treaty countries was concluded in May 1955, i.e. six years after the USA and other imperialist countries had knocked together their aggressive North Atlantic Alliance. The Warsaw

Treaty Organisation was set up in response to NATO's preparations for aggression, to NATO's attempts to deal with the socialist countries from "positions of strength." The main purpose of the defensive alliance is to join hands in defending the cause of peace and socialism and preventing the outbreak of a new war. As L. I. Brezhnev put it, the combined military might of the Warsaw Treaty countries "serves to defend the peaceful labour of our peoples, and not to attack anyone."

The Warsaw Treaty Organisation is a really unique military and political alliance not only in respect of its aims, but also as regards its class character. It has grown out of the nucleus of the world's most advanced revolutionary society — socialism — in which the working class plays the leading role.

Socialism and peace are inseparable. Peace is needed by all peoples regardless of the countries and regions they live in. It follows therefore that the Warsaw Treaty serves the interests not only of the countries that signed it, but also of the working people and other progressives all over the world.

The strength of the defensive Warsaw Treaty Organisation, and the effectiveness of its practical steps to consolidate European security and universal peace derive from impregnable, voluntary unity of states with similar social and state systems and from their Marxist-Leninist ideology, which guides them in building socialism and communism and in organising their armed defence.

The leading and organising force of the military and political alliance of states belonging to the socialist community is the Communist and Workers' Parties. It is they that direct efforts to build up the collective defence of their countries. These Marxist-Leninist parties coordinate their foreign policy and military line within the framework of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation. All matters of principle are decided at regularly convened meetings of the Political Consultative Committee, whose basic decisions form the foundation for the entire edifice of the military and political alliance of the fraternal socialist countries in Europe.

As distinguished from NATO, which lays the emphasis on the military aspect, the Warsaw Treaty Organisation gives priority to political problems in current international life, and the ways to solve them with a view to ensuring the peace and security of all peoples. This is corroborated by the practical steps undertaken by



the Warsaw Treaty Organisation since it was founded 27 years ago.

At its meetings the Political Consultative Committee collectively drew up a broad programme of political measures that would help stave off the threat of a world-wide nuclear missile conflict, to prevent it altogether, to make the international situation more stable, and to save the peoples of Europe and the whole world from destruction in a nuclear missile holocaust.

The concerted acts of the Warsaw Treaty member countries on the fundamental issues of European and world politics contributed decisively to the detente which distinguished international development in the 1970s. It was they who succeeded in breaking the tragic vicious circle: world war — brief respite — world war.

However, at the turn of the decade US imperialism and its allies in aggressive military blocs again adopted the cold war line, launched an arms race of unprecedented scope in preparation for all-out war against the USSR and the other socialist countries.

Proceeding from the Peace Programme for the 1980s produced by the 26th CPSU Congress and supported by all the Warsaw Treaty countries, the Soviet Union has been sparing no pains to ward off the nuclear disaster which is threatening all peoples. No country has taken as many initiatives as the Soviet Union in pursuit of peace and disarmament.

As long as the USSR and the other fraternal socialist countries are threatened with imperialist aggression, they will take the necessary measures to ensure the security of their peoples and to safeguard peace on the planet. This stand was vividly manifested at the Second Special UN General Assembly Session on Disarmament and at the 37th session of the UN General Assembly.

The Soviet Union is a dedicated supporter of effective military cooperation between the fraternal socialist countries. It regards this as a reliable means of curbing the imperialist aggressors, ensuring peace, preserving the achievements of human civilisation over the centuries and promoting its further progress for the good of all peoples. This cooperation is unique in history, because the partners engaged in it are really equal. More than that, the peoples of the socialist community are free from all forms of oppression. Therefore, these factors constitute a vital guarantee of the further strengthening of socialism and further consolidation of peace. The 26th CPSU Congress pointed out that "the defensive political and military alliance of the socialist countries is faithfully serving the cause of peace. It has all the requisites reliably to defend the socialist gains of our peoples."

COPYRIGHT: "Soviet Military Review," No 12, 1982

ARMED FORCES

OGARKOV ADDRESSES STAFF AKTIV

PM201141 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 29 Dec 82 Second Edition p 1

[Report by Colonel V. Kharlamov: "Party Aktiv Meeting"]

[Text] A meeting of the party aktiv of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff has been held. It discussed the question of communists' work to fulfill the tasks arising from the decisions of the CPSU Central Committee November (1982) Plenum. Marshal of the Soviet Union N. Ogarkov, chief of the Armed Forces General Staff and USSR first deputy defense minister, delivered a report.

It was noted in the report and in the speeches of communists V. Shabanov, A. Bukov, V. Shutov, A. Belov, B. Yablokov, Ye. Kovalev, I. Novoseletskiy and Ye. Fedotov that the communists of the general staff, wholly approving the decisions of the party Central Committee November (1982) plenum and the propositions and conclusions expounded in the plenum speech of Comrade Yu. V. Andropov, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and in his report at the ceremonial session in the Kremlin devoted to the 60th anniversary of the USSR's formation, had adopted them as a combat program for their practical activity to implement the strategic course of the party's 26th Congress in the sphere of domestic and foreign policy and of further improving the armed forces' combat readiness.

The party aktiv meeting reviewed the results of the work of the communists of the general staff in the now-ending year of 1982 and directed party organizations toward the successful resolution of the tasks of further improving combat readiness, operational training and troop and naval force control and developing military science and military art in the light of the USSR Defense Ministry demands for the new training year.

The party aktiv meeting made a critical analysis of existing shortcomings and elaborated specific ways to further improve party organizations' activeness, initiative and principledness, improve communists' style of work, organization and discipline and increase their personal responsibility for the matter in hand. Great attention was paid to topical problems of ideological work in the light of the increased scale and complexity of the tasks of military building, the acuteness of the military-political situation and the aggravation of the ideological struggle in the world arena.

Taking part in the meeting were marshal of the Soviet Union V. Kulikov, USSR first deputy defense minister and commander in chief of the Warsaw Pact joint armed forces, V. Drugov, first deputy chief of the CPSU Central Committee administrative organs section, and Adm A. Sorokin, first deputy chief of the Soviet army and navy political directorate.

ARMED FORCES

SOKOLOV, ROMANOV AT LENINGRAD MILITARY DISTRICT PARTY AKTIV MEETING

PM121255 Leningrad LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 10 Dec 82 p 2

[LentASS report: "Strengthening Combat Readiness"]

[Text] An Order of Lenin Leningrad Military District party aktiv meeting which discussed party organizations' tasks for the new training year arising from the CPSU Central Committee November (1982) Plenum decisions and the results of the conference of Soviet Armed Forces leading personnel was held 8 December at the S.M. Kirov House of Officers.

Its participants observed a minute's silence to honor the radiant memory of L.I. Brezhnev.

The report was delivered by Lt Gen V.S. Nechayev, member of the Military Council and chief of the Order of Lenin Leningrad Military District political directorate.

The meeting stressed that Leningrad servicemen, as indeed all Soviet people, unanimously approve the decisions of the CPSU Central Committee Extraordinary and November (1982) Plenums, which vividly demonstrated the continuity of the CPSU's domestic and foreign policy. This policy, the meeting participants noted with great satisfaction, is an expression of the Soviet people's basic vital interests and relies on their undivided support and the real economic and military might of the state.

The servicemen of the Order of Lenin Leningrad Military District which is rich in revolutionary, combat and labor traditions, make a weighty contribution to strengthening the motherland's defense might. The troops' readiness to fulfill combat tasks promptly has been raised to a qualitatively new level. Substantial progress has been made in elaborating and mastering in practice new questions of military art. The content of combat training has been enriched and the work of selecting, placing and educating officer cadres is being improved. The district's personnel have fulfilled the socialist pledges in honor of the 60th anniversary of the USSR's formation and the servicemen's political awareness and maturity have grown.

At the same time, the meeting stressed, in the new training year party organizations must have more effective influence on units and subunits. An attempt must be made to strengthen regulation discipline. to insure that servicemen

have a profound understanding of the complexity and acuteness of the military-political situation in the world and to raise the level of combat readiness by all forms and methods of party political work. Considering the increased general educational and cultural level of servicemen, it is important to skillfully carry out work with individuals and creatively seek effective methods and forms of educating army youth.

The following spoke in the debates: Lt Gen A.N. Lezin, member of the Military Council and chief of the District Air Force Political Section, Lt Col A.P. Dudkin, Maj A.N. Melnikov, Maj A.V. Markhay and others.

Marshal of the Soviet Union S.L. Sokolov, USSR first deputy defense minister, and Col Gen B.V. Snetkov, commander of the Order of Lenin Leningrad Military District, addressed the meeting.

The meeting participants gave an assurance that they will exert all their efforts and energy to fulfill the responsible tasks to strengthen the beloved motherland's defense might and make a worthy contribution to the implementation of the 26th CPSU congress decisions.

A greetings letter to the CPSU Central Committee was adopted with great enthusiasm.

Taking part in the meeting were G.V. Romanov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and first secretary of the Leningrad Obkom; V. Ya. Khodyrev, Leningrad CPSU Obkom secretary; and Maj Gen A.I. Makunin, representative of the Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Directorate.

CSO: 1801/129

ARMED FORCES

TABLE OF CONTENTS: 'SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW' NO 12, DECEMBER 1982

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 12, Dec 82 p 1

[Text]

Communique on the Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union	2
Address of the CPSU Central Committee, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet and the USSR Council of Ministers to the Communist Party and the Soviet People	8
Source of Might by F. Seiranyan	12
Support from the Air by M. Igumentsev	22
T-72 Tank Operation In a Desert by D. Ryazantsev	24
Repair Work in the Combat Zone by A. Sosonkov	27
The Military Collective by V. Drozdov	30
Operation "Koltso" by P. Batov	34
The First Ever by N. Kurov	42
Shoulder to Shoulder by M. Monin	45
An Important Factor on the World Scene by V. Yefremov	49
In Stalingrad by I. Paderin	54
Physical Fitness in the USSR by Y. Ivonin	58

COPYRIGHT: "Soviet Military Review," No 12, 1982

CSO: 1812/72

ARMED FORCES

ETHNIC SOLIDARITY IN ARMED FORCES DISCUSSED

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 12, Dec 82 pp 12-15

[Article by Col F. Seiranyan, D. Sc. (History), under the heading "USSR 60 Years": "Source of Might"]

[Text]

The inviolable friendship of the peoples of the USSR is one of the motive forces of Soviet society in building communism. The Resolution of the CPSU Central Committee "On the 60th Anniversary of the Formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics" reads in part: "The joint struggle for the new and just world produced a great brotherhood of working people, the feeling of a close-knit family, and the indestructible Leninist friendship of peoples, these inexhaustible sources of the constructive activities of the masses."

The ideas of friendship inspired the courageous defenders of the revolution during the Civil War and formed the basis of servicemen's mass heroism during the Great Patriotic War. In contemporary conditions the significance of these ideas as a source of high moral, political and combat qualities of the army and navy personnel has increased still further.

V. I. Lenin made a profound analysis of the revolutionary essence of socialist internationalism and friendship of the peoples of the USSR, and showed their importance for the creation of the military organisation of the Soviet state. In the nationalities question, he taught, the policy of the CPSU consists in continuously drawing together and fusing the proletarians and working people of all nations in their revolutionary struggle to overthrow the bourgeoisie.

Internationalism, equality and friendship of the Soviet peoples became the most important principle for the formation of an army of a new type. With the establishment of Soviet power all peoples were granted equal rights to defend their multinational Motherland. If before the Revolution nearly 40 nationalities of the country were barred from serving in the army, Lenin's Decree

on the Formation of the Red Army stated that it could be joined by representatives of all the nations and ethnic groups, including those of the outlying districts.

V. I. Lenin displayed unflagging interest in the development of relations between servicemen of different nationalities in the Red Army, and showed constant concern for improving their internationalist education. Vladimir Ilyich called for the uniting of all military forces into a powerful international Red Army. Then, he said, no imperialist force would be able to stand up against us.

Workers of all nationalities fought selflessly in the ranks of the Red Army for the power of Soviets. At that time national military formations were being raised almost everywhere. Their primary mission was to help establish Soviet power in the provinces. Later on these formations joined the Red Army and fought the enemies shoulder to shoulder with the Russian workers and peasants. Thus, the Ukrainian working people formed several national divisions and units which successfully fought interventionist troops and the internal counter-revolution. Units of the legendary Lettish Rifles covered themselves with unfading glory defending the workers' revolutionary gains. Numerous national formations were raised in the Northern Caucasus and Transcaucasia. They included Russians, Georgians, Armenians, Azerbaijanians, Ukrainians, Ossetes, Chechens, Ingushes and representatives of other peoples of the Soviet country. The Red Army became a real embodiment of proletarian solidarity, friendship and brotherhood.

Representatives of many nationalities inhabiting the country distinguished themselves on the battlefields of the Civil War. Among them were the Russians Semyon Budyonny, Klim Voroshilov; the Ukrainians Nikolai Shchors, Alexander Parkhomenko, Semyon Timoshenko; the Moldavian Grigory Kotovsky; the Letts Robert Eideman and Jan Fabricius; the Georgians Vasily Kikvidze and Sergo Ordjonikidze, and many others.

National formations made a great contribution to creating and strengthening the army of a new type.

Underlying the great importance of the nationalities principle in building up the Armed Forces, M. V. Frunze, an outstanding proletarian military leader, pointed out that the Red Army was never considered an army of one nationality. Its might was and is made up of the joint efforts of all the country's nations and ethnic groups.

The Leninist principle of socialist internationalism and friendship of peoples found its expression in subsequent years in the creation of the

Armed Forces as a single multinational military organisation of the Soviet state. The victory of socialism further strengthened the social, political and economic basis of comradeship-in-arms and promoted cohesion of servicemen of different nationalities.

The Great Patriotic War became a comprehensive and severe test for the Soviet state and its Armed Forces. Russians and Ukrainians, Lithuanians and Kirghiz, Byelorussians and Kazakhs fought together for the honour, freedom and independence of their multinational Motherland. Here is an excerpt from a letter of Irtai Bolganbayev and Giyas Zainuddinov, defenders of Stalingrad, to their countrymen: "We have arrived at the Stalingrad Front from sunny Uzbekistan. Our fathers, mothers and children gave us a strict behest: Whenever we fight, on whatever front we destroy the hitlerites, we should rout the enemy without mercy. And we understand that in defending the Russian city of Stalingrad we also defend our native Uzbekistan." Such were the thoughts and deeds of all the glorious servicemen of the Soviet Armed Forces engaged in mortal combat with the nazi hordes.

The victory of the Soviet Union in the Great Patriotic War was of great importance not only from the military and political viewpoints; in that war fascism suffered a crushing ideological defeat. The Marxist-Leninist ideology of proletarian internationalism, friendship and brotherhood of peoples won a convincing victory over the fascist ideology of racial superiority, nationalism and genocide.

Falsifying the sources of the USSR's victory in the Great Patriotic War the ideologists of imperialism not infrequently try to prove that it was the "victory of Russian soldiers only." Some of them deliberately conceal the multinational composition of the Soviet Army. Others attribute non-existent negative qualities to non-Russian soldiers. But numerous real facts refute these lies and slander.

National formations raised during the war fought the nazi invaders successfully in the Soviet Armed Forces. They included three Guards Kazakh divisions, an Estonian corps, a Latvian, a Lithuanian, an Azerbaijani, a Bashkir, a Georgian and an Armenian division and other national units and formations. Among the Heroes of the Soviet Union there are 8,160 Russians, 2,069 Ukrainians, 309 Byelorussians, 161 Tatars, 108 Jews, 96 Kazakhs, 90 Georgians and representatives of other nationalities.



The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, a mighty socialist family uniting more than one hundred nations and ethnic groups, matured and strengthened in struggle and labour. Human history had not known such an inviolable unity of interests and aims, such a spiritual closeness, mutual trust and assistance between peoples. In the process of building socialism and communism a new historic community — the Soviet people — was formed. It is based on the indissoluble union of the working class, peasantry and intelligentsia, with the working class playing the leading role, on friendship among all the country's nations and nationalities.

The present generation of army and navy servicemen was brought up in a society whose characteristic features are social, political and ideological unity, brotherly friendship between people, Soviet patriotism and socialist internationalism.

The "Krasnaya Zvezda" newspaper narrates the following episode. A demonstration exercise carried out in the Taman Guards Motorised Infantry Division named after M. I. Kalinin was attended by military attachés of a number of capitalist states. They attentively watched the servicemen's actions and at the end of the exercises met the battalion personnel.

Foreign representatives bombarded the servicemen with questions. Quite a few of them were addressed to Guards Senior Lieutenant Sirojiddin Abdurakhmanov.

— Was it you who commanded the battery? Your nationality? Where are you from? Representatives of how many nationalities serve with your unit? How do you get on with one another?

There is no need to repeat the officer's answers, but they boil down to the following: all of us, irrespective of nationality, are sons of the Soviet Motherland, brothers in spirit and class, patriots and internationalists and all we Soviet servicemen have one common concern and aim — to defend the Motherland reliably.

Representatives of 29 nationalities of the Soviet Union serve now in the Taman Division, constituting a single united combat family. All of them are absolutely equal in rights and duties. The merits of soldiers, sergeants, praporshchiks and officers are judged here, as in any other formation, not by their nationality but by their attitude to the service and their public activity, their skill and their contribution to enhancing combat readiness. An example: among those who were awarded Orders and medals in the division during the last five years were representatives of 17 nationalities.

This division is no exception. In the Soviet Armed Forces as a whole every year thousands of officers, praporshchiks, sergeants and soldiers representing various nationalities and ethnic groups are awarded Orders and medals.

Internationalism and friendship of peoples as a principle of construction of a socialist army find their expression in the fact that under the guidance of the CPSU all the peoples of the USSR take part in developing and perfecting the multinational Armed Forces of the country. The Constitution of the USSR defines defence of the Socialist Motherland as the concern of the whole people, stipulating that in the matter of ensuring defence of the country all the nations and ethnic groups enjoy equal rights and bear equal responsibilities.

One of the most important manifestations of such equality is the multinational composition of the Soviet officer corps. In socialist society a man of any nationality can choose the military profession. There are neither direct or indirect limitations in that matter. Moreover, in laying the foundations of socialism the CPSU took special measures aimed at raising national military cadres, reserving for this purpose the required number of places for every republic in military educational establishments. Nowadays its multinational composition is one of the most distinguishing features of the Soviet officer corps which includes the best representatives of all the nations and ethnic groups of the USSR. An example of this is the national composition of the officer cadres in the Order of Lenin Moscow Military District. Command, political, engineer and other posts here are occupied by officers of more than 40 nationalities.

The socialist ideology of friendship of peoples permeates the whole life of the army and navy, unites the servicemen in a monolithic collective, helps them successfully accomplish the missions assigned and master sophisticated weapons, equipment and tactical methods, enhances their combat readiness. The servicemen of the army and navy, sons of different peoples, perform their patriotic and internationalist duty with credit and dignity, reliably safeguarding the gains of socialism and the sacred borders of their common great Motherland — the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

COPYRIGHT: "Soviet Military Review," No 12, 1982

CSO: 1812/72

WARTIME OPERATIONS: TANK REPAIR IN COMBAT DISCUSSED

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 12, Dec 82 pp 27-29

[Interview with Lt Gen (Ret) A. Sosonkov, under the heading "I Serve the Soviet Union": "Repair Work in the Combat Zone"]

[Text]

Soviet military statistics estimate that the service life of each Soviet tank was prolonged 4 or 5 times during the war. Thus, 429 thousand tanks were repaired and again brought into operation in the war period to replenish the army with dozens of tank corps. Will you give some more details about this?

Close to the end of June 1945 I was instructed to receive a group of American and British journalists. We met at the People's Commissariat for Defence and I was asked numerous questions the gist of which was: How did you manage to repair such a great number of tanks? One of the Americans supposed that our repair detachments were composed of "supermen" such as commandos. Otherwise, he thought, it would have been impossible to repair most of the tanks in the combat zone. The foreign journalists were surprised to hear that the repairmen were mainly ordinary workers aged 55 and even 60. I then told them about a legendary repair party of seven operating near Stalingrad. Carrying out their job under enemy fire close to the "Krasny Oktyabr" Works the seven fitters "formed" two tank regiments out of repaired tanks. The repairmen were equally skilful in handling tools and arms. Later, when the din of the great battles on the Volga died down, they mastered mine disposal, having at the time to recover disabled vehicles from terrain literally covered with mines.

The success of the tank maintenance service was explained by the high professional skill and courage of its specialists and by its unfailing functioning. This type of service was organised before the Great Patriotic War broke out and it had not its like in any of the then warring armies.

I still see with my mind's eye a company going into an attack to enable the repairmen to recover a knocked out tank from no man's land. More often than not the workers had not the necessary tools or spare parts at hand — only a spanner, a hammer and a chisel. When operating on

forest edges or in ravines they developed the ability to dismount tank engines without a crane, to convert a shed or a water-mill into a repair shop or to assemble 2 or 3 serviceable tanks out of dozens of totally wrecked vehicles. In this they adhered to the rule: All repairs on the spot whenever possible.

Seriously damaged vehicles were delivered to vehicle collecting points, mobile tank repair depots or plants and to stationary tank repair plants. Special enterprises were established to repair American and British lend-lease tanks. Once I accompanied British Field Marshal Montgomery visiting one such enterprise. In the vehicle park we saw laid-up "Matilda," "Churchill" and "Valentine" tanks repaired not long before the end of the war. Montgomery put on overalls and inspected the vehicles. "Splendid work!" he said. "You wouldn't think they had even been in battle."

**Although Nazi Germany regarded tanks as the main ramming force on her way to world supremacy she did not possess a well-developed tank maintenance service, did she!**

Staking on a blitzkrieg the Nazi Command presumed that most of the tanks which would cross the Soviet border, would be victorious. However, from the very beginning of their aggression the invaders sustained heavy losses. As early as August 4, 1941 Colonel-General Guderian reported to Hitler on his arrival at Army Group Centre in Borisov that the Second Tank Army needed a 70 per cent renewal to continue its advance. Hitler had to decline this request for lack of the required number of engines. And this when so many Nazi tanks lay disabled.

Nevertheless, the initial period of the war was extremely difficult for us. The Wehrmacht would replenish its tank park at the expense of occupied Western Europe. As to the USSR, its tank production was greatly reduced in 1941 owing to some of its tank plants being transferred far away to the Urals and Siberia. In the circumstance every vehicle counted and repair units had to fight literally for each disabled tank.

**Comrade General, in 1941 you were also at the head of a tank repair plant. Please tell our readers how many tanks were repaired by this enterprise during the war.**

Unfortunately I cannot cite the data for 1941 because of lack of information. But in 1942 the number of tanks restored in the field amounted to 75 per cent, in 1943, 44 and 45 to 81.7, 84.5 and 91.8 per cent respectively. The last figure is for a four-month period.

The archives of our enterprise contain quite a few documents testifying to the many privations suffered by the repairmen and also to their labour exploit. 180 tanks were repaired by our tank repair plant in the two months after the outbreak of the war. In addition, dozens of disabled vehicles were brought back into service by experimental brigades which repaired tanks directly at the front line. In October we delivered 45 fighting vehicles to Colonel Katukov's brigade stationed near Moscow. The tanks were received in Kubinka by the brigade commander himself

and in two days they proved their worth in action. In November another large party of tanks (60 vehicles) was sent to the Moscow area. It was accompanied by a tank repair brigade which restored 18 more tanks on the spot. In 1942 our plant delivered 300 tanks to the Stalingrad area. In 1943 a single plant detachment, operating in the Moscow Mint, repaired and sent to the Kursk area more than 100 heavy and medium tanks.

Here is an excerpt from the relevant document of the 1st Ukrainian Front: From May 3 to October 15, 1944 the plant brigades restored 647 tanks and SP guns on the battlefields of the front.

This is the production of a stationary tank repair plant. But to have a clear picture of the repairmen's labour exploit, you should familiarise yourself with the output of a mobile tank repair plant. Having no industrial premises, it only possessed a machine, a chrome-plating and a welding shop, a mobile laboratory, some power plants, cranes and test benches. Nevertheless, the number of tanks it repaired monthly was enough to equip one or two tank regiments.

**These are impressive figures. Will you, please, tell our readers about those who "cured" tanks and in what conditions they worked!**

The repairmen worked round-the-clock in bitter frost and scorching heat displaying the skill of a surgeon. They restored the armoured equipment of numerous tank regiments.

I have already mentioned the feats of the Stalingrad repair party of seven. I would also like to name Mikhail Ostanets, a fitter, who was admirably called "academician" by his friends. In the most strenuous days of the Battle of Stalingrad, when each tank had to be sent to the front immediately after repair, 15 fighting vehicles stood idle for lack of periscopic sight bodies. Meanwhile the front urgently needed tanks. In this critical moment Ostanets offered to manufacture welded sight bodies instead of cast ones. At first sight this might seem nonsense. But, in the final analysis, the newly-made sight bodies proved excellent and tanks provided with the "Ostanets devices" operated unflinchingly on the battlefield.

I think that the most difficult position was still that of the men who had to recover disabled tanks from the field of battle. In 1941 those fighting men who retrieved two tanks in a combat situation were proposed for award of the Order of the Great Patriotic War, 2nd class. The men carrying out this job had to deal with 30-ton vehicles, and frequently quite close to the enemy positions. Those men were fearless. One of them was Ivan Goncharov. He retrieved 211 tanks.

Sometimes, the situation forced the repairmen to lay aside their tool kits and man submachine guns or drive the tanks they had repaired.

We all remember the hot summer of 1942 when our forces held defences near Stalingrad. The repairmen had to interrupt their work at noon for 1 or 2 hours because of the scorching heat. But still more scorching was bad news received from the front. The enemy strove to break through

to the Volga and the number of shot-up tanks grew steadily. The men worked round-the-clock, till exhaustion. All of a sudden they received the order to work uninterruptedly so as to restore some extra tanks (25-30 vehicles), to man them with workers and to take up defences.

The newly formed workers' tank regiment consisting of 25 T-34 and three KV tanks set out for the steppe hot with the broiling sun, the ambient air temperature reaching 50°C. But the main evil was clouds of dust penetrating everywhere. Soon the vehicles began to seize up because their air cleaners were clogged. Our tank repair plant could not remedy the situation for lack of spare parts. This was reported to Moscow and a new lot of air cleaners was delivered by air on the same day. The tanks continued their advance. Their appearance on the battlefield was quite a surprise for the enemy. It made him retreat and give up any attempt to break through our defences in that sector.

New formidable difficulties still lay ahead. Our tank forces were to cross the Carpathians and the Transilvanian Alps. They continued their advance disregarding high temperatures (up to 40°C), great altitude, steep rises and descents and sharp turns. The Soviet KV tanks operated successfully in the Polar Region. They seemed to do the impossible as they fought their way for more than 150 km over rocky ground. And this was to the repairmen's great credit. These specialists also contributed to the famous dash from Berlin to Prague by two tank armies which coped with this task in spite of the fact that many of the vehicles were at the end of their service life. The repair units overcame unprecedented difficulties during the brilliant march of the 6th Guards Tank Army through the Gobi Desert and the Great Khingan Mountains. The tank crews had to negotiate arid sands with the atmosphere heated to 40°C and dust clouds covering the whole sky. They were forced to change air cleaners and running gear every 3 or 4 hours.

During the war the Soviet repair units became highly proficient in restoring armoured equipment in combat situations. Now the war veterans share their experience with the young specialists of the tank maintenance service.

COPYRIGHT: "Soviet Military Review," No 12, 1982

CSO: 1812/72

ARMED FORCES

PARTY-POLITICAL WORK: THE MILITARY COLLECTION

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 12, Dec 82 pp 30-31

[Article by Capt 1st Rank V. Drozdov, under the heading "The Making of a Soldier": "The Military Collective"]

[Text]

Collectivism is conditioned by man's social nature. Man has always sought to act, work and cooperate with other like him and to secure mutual assistance. Karl Marx wrote:

People "produce only by cooperating in a certain way and mutually exchanging their activities. In order to produce, they enter into definite connections and relations with one another and only within these social connections and relations does their action on nature, does production, take place."

But in society based on private ownership of the means and instruments of production people cannot have common interests. The interests of the propertied class that exploits the labour of others and appropriates its product are irreconcilable with those of the working people. This circumstance alone rules out the possibility of really collectivist relations between the proprietors and the working people.

Only in a society that is free from antagonistic classes can people establish really collectivist relations in all spheres of life. Such factors as public ownership of the means of production, freedom from exploitation of man by man determine community of interests and aims in joint activity and create the objective conditions for it. Such unity forms the basis for the functioning of the work collective under socialism.

Under the socialist system work collectives form the basic social cells, the basic micromedium in which the social potentialities of people manifest themselves in the fullest degree. As a creator of material goods and spiritual values, as a social worker the Soviet citizen exists and functions within the framework of a definite work collective.

The military collective possesses all the principal features of a work collective. Servicemen are united by a lofty purpose, namely to ensure the armed defence of the socialist achievements of the working people.

The Soviet military collective is made up of officers and men of various nationalities. It conducts combat training

and political education, it moulds the defender of the Socialist Homeland, the conscientious citizen, the bearer of communist ideology and ethics and active builder of the new society. This is a complicated many-sided process.

The life of every military collective in the USSR is governed by the service manuals and regulations, the daily routine, and the orders of the commander. At the same time the duties and functions of any unit or ship bear the typical features of the Soviet way of life in general, namely collectivism, comradeship, mutual assistance, friendship of peoples and a healthy moral atmosphere. These features contribute to the harmonious development of the Soviet warrior's personality.

The barracks do not isolate the officer or man from his people. Regardless of where a Soviet serviceman may happen to be he is always linked with his country and people by thousands of ties. The Soviet serviceman enjoys all the civil rights of a citizen under the Constitution. He takes an active part in all the activities of Party and state bodies, various public and scientific-creative organisations.

Just like the work collective the military collective opens before its members broad possibilities to manifest their creative abilities and initiative in public and political activity, in technical and artistic creation and spiritual development. Nobody will be surprised to see officers and men take part in a sitting of a Soviet of People's Deputies discussing important matters of state. After a hard day's combat training the men will go to the club to rehearse a jazz band programme or take part in the activities of various groups to develop their abilities and talents.

At the same time the military collective has features which distinguish it from the ordinary work collective. All activities and efforts, the whole life of the military collective is geared to one purpose, namely to maintain at all times a high level of combat readiness which implies immediate entry into armed struggle, if the situation requires. This purpose determines the principles of formation and organisation of military collectives, the way they are run, and the standards governing relations between servicemen.

The effort to accomplish this purpose affects all the aspects of routine of the military collective. This includes combat training to enable the personnel to master sophisticated combat equipment and weaponry so as to be able to use it in any battle conditions. It also includes ideological and political education designed to develop in the serviceman high moral and combat qualities.

The military collective is not only a school of fighting skill, it is also a school of ideological and moral education, of professional and physical training. Practically all young men go through this school. It should be noted that the period of active service is from 18 to 20, when the process of forming a man's character is most intense, when his world outlook is moulded and he develops a conscious attitude towards life.

The educational role of the military collective is determined above all by the social and political character, the



class nature and the purpose of the armed forces. The Armed Forces of the USSR are forces of a socialist state of the whole people.

Communists form the mainstay of the military body. The Party organisation is the political nucleus of the collective, the spokesman of forward-looking public opinion and the active proponent of the Communist Party's decisions and policy, which Communists spare no pains to implement.

In May 1982 an All-Army Meeting of Secretaries of Party Organisations was held. The tank company in which Senior Lieutenant L. Melnikov served was mentioned at this meeting. There are several Communists serving in that subunit. They all have excellent achievements in combat training and political education. They are master tank drivers and superb gunners. They are men of principle who are exacting towards themselves and towards others. They have a lofty sense of military duty, friendship, army comradeship and responsibility not only for their own achievements, but for the proficiency of the entire military collective. The Communists display a lively interest in everything. The other men of the subunit follow their example and heed their advice. The company is one of the regiment's most forward-looking.

Every military collective is controlled by a single will, the will of the commander. One-man command is a vital principle in the development of the Soviet Armed Forces. It is based on a firm Party foundation. The commanders work in close contact with the Party organisations and rely on their support. They take advantage of the influence the Party organisation has on the personnel to achieve the best possible results in combat training, political and military education.

All collectives in the Soviet Armed Forces have Young Communist League organisations, the majority of servicemen being members of the All-Union Leninist Young Communist League. Under the guidance of the Party, the YCL organisations devote their efforts to strengthening the unity of the military collectives.

The personal example set by the commander plays a big role in the education of the collective. Such qualities as fairness, exactingness, thoughtfulness, attentiveness to the individual needs and requirements of the men, ability to win their hearts, to talk to them in a friendly way help knit the men together, kindle the team spirit and mould them into a collective.

The crew of the nuclear-powered submarine under Captain 1st Rank D. Novikov, Hero of the Soviet Union, enjoys tremendous prestige in the Soviet Navy. Under him quite a few young officers attained maturity as commanders, gained professional proficiency and learnt the art of training and educating the men. The commanding officer of the atomic submarine made no small contribution to this. He makes a point of having a talk with everybody who comes to serve under him, to see what the new officer or man is interested in, to learn what his plans are, to inform him about the collective, the crew's traditions

and to give him recommendations. To put it in a nutshell, the commanding officer makes it clear to the newcomer that he is welcome aboard, that everybody expects him to do his best and will help when necessary. At the same time the commanding officer explains that the collective is not only a helper, but also a judge. The collective will never forgive irresponsibility or neglect of duty.

COPYRIGHT: "Soviet Military Review," No 12, 1982

CSO: 1812/72

ARMED FORCES

WARTIME OPERATIONS: OPERATION 'KOLTZO,' JAN-FEB 1943 REVIEWED

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 12, Dec 82, pp 34-37

[Interview with Army Gen P. I. Batov, under the heading "Military History":  
"Operation 'Koltso'"]

[Text]

First of all I should like to say a few words about the concept of the operation "Koltso." It was intended at the beginning to defeat the enemy in the western and southern parts of the ring of encirclement. Then, having delivered a blow at his grouping in the direction from west to east to split it into two parts and destroy it piecemeal.

By the beginning of January the strength of the surrounded enemy grouping after severe fighting in December was 250,000 men (originally it had been 330,000). We faced 15 infantry, 3 motorised, 3 tank and one cavalry division. Besides, the enemy had many separate units of different fighting arms. The nazis organised a heavily fortified defences. In the main line of defence and on the intermediate lines a great number of strong points and centres of resistance had been organised. Their network stretched right to Stalingrad. The enemy made wide use of various obstacles, and mined the approaches to the strong points. Literally everything was adapted to the needs of defence, even the railway embankments, disabled tanks, steam-engines and carriages.

The Supreme Command GHQ warned General Rokossovsky, the Front Commander, that it would not be able to spare any infantry or tank formations to reinforce his troops. On the other hand, the front was considerably reinforced with artillery. At the beginning of the offensive the strength of the Soviet forces was only about 80 per cent of that of the enemy in men and tanks, but we had 70 per cent more artillery and 3 times as many aircraft as he. With such a correlation of forces a very careful elaboration of the plan for the offensive, skilful use of men and equipment and, in particular, good camouflage were of great importance for success of the operation.

The main blow was delivered by the 65th Army reinforced with tanks and especially with artillery. The 21st Army of General I. Chistyakov cooperated with it and the 24th Army under General I. Galanin secured our left flank.


In those days our forces' morale was high, all officers and men were passionately keen on breaking through to the Volga. To reach the Volga was what every general and soldier had at heart. I remember a

conversation I had at the time with tank driver-mechanic Pavel Kostromin and turret gunner Stepan Vlasov. Kostromin said: "You ask me why I am not in the Party? I don't think I am well enough prepared. Vlasov and I have decided that when we reach the Volga we shall bow low to our Mother Russia and then we shall consider we have had our baptism of fire as Communists." Later on when the offensive began I was informed that in one of the attacks their tank was hit and caught fire. Stepan Vlasov did not leave the vehicle, he went on firing. The life of the twenty-two year old soldier was cut short with the last shell he fired point-blank at the enemy. A note was found on his chest. It said:

"If I am killed I ask you to consider me as a Communist." That was the source of our people's strength! I should like to underline that in the January fightings some 1,700 men entered the Party in the army alone.

At the time the political workers, Party and YCL organisations worked intensively. They did a lot to foster the fighting men a high offensive spirit. Officers and men waited with great inspiration for an attack signal. On January 8, 1943 the Don Front Command, in order to avoid useless

Liquidation of the nazi surrounded grouping from January 10 to February 2, 1943 .



bloodshed, sent the surrounded enemy troops an ultimatum suggesting they should capitulate. However, the enemy Command rejected this humane proposal, although it understood already that there was no hope of breaking out of the encirclement. Thus, it alone was to blame for the severe sufferings of the officers and men from cold and hunger, and for the death of 140,000 of them during our offensive.

The morning of January 10 was clear and sunny. Colonel-General of Artillery N. Voronov, a representative of the Supreme Command GHQ, and Front Commander K. K. Rokossovsky arrived at my CP. Exactly at 0805 hrs a series of signal flares soared into the sky and our artillery began to thunder. On the average we had up to 200 artillery pieces per kilometre of the break-through frontage. The earth was shaking, blast waves struck the ears and dull leaden clouds appeared over the enemy positions. It was impossible to adjust the fire, because of the dense smoke but the gunners had

no doubt as to the accuracy of the initial data.

At 0900 hrs a salvo of rocket mortar launchers — the signal for the attack — shattered the air. Tankborne troops crossed our forward edge. They were followed by infantry. The artillery barrage was planned to a distance of 1.5 km and then many guns moved in the advancing combat formations. The spotters of the heavy and rocket mortar battalions were tankborne and controlled the fire of the supporting artillery by radio. The artillery pieces could not negotiate some of the terrain, so the tanks took them in tow, the gun crews mounting the tanks. When the enemy antitank heavy fire held up the advance of our subunits, the artillerymen deployed their guns and cleared the way for the tanks and infantry. The aviation delivered bombing and low-flying attacks at the enemy concentrations and strong points.

The enemy put up a stubborn resistance. He constantly committed reserves to action, throwing them

into counterattacks with the support of tanks. Nevertheless, by the end of the day the units of the 65th Army had advanced up to 5-7 km in depth. The chief thing was the destruction of the main enemy defence zone. It had to be completed without giving the enemy any respite.

The offensive went on day and night. The enemy fought fiercely, but our men persistently moved forward. By the evening of January 12, the 65th Army and 21st Army cooperating on adjacent flanks, completed the rout of the two enemy infantry and one motorised divisions defending the so-called Marinovsky salient. The Soviet forces reached the line of the Rossoshka River. The western sector of the nazi defences was cut off. The outer defence ring had been overcome.

By that time the 57th Army of General F. Tolbukhin and the 64th Army of General M. Shumilov delivered a strong blow at the southern wing of the enemy. In this situation

the front commander decided to shift the direction of the main blow to the zone of the 21st Army. Several formations of our army and most of the reinforcements were given to General I. Chistyakov. The offensive did not stop even for a minute during the redeployment.

Now the 65th Army advanced in the general direction of Pitomnik, Gumrak, Gorodishche and the Barrikady Works. The 21st Army struck at the Voropanovo station. The other armies of the front also pressed the enemy.

As our troops advanced the situation of the enemy became worse and worse. He had lost his aerodromes and landing grounds. A strong air blockade prevented all enemy attempts to organise the supply of the surrounded troops by air. Only separate planes managed to break through.

The Soviet forces, flexibly manoeuvring, bypassed the heavily fortified enemy strong points and courageously pushed on into the depth. The artillery operating in the battle formations and from covered positions cooperated accurately with the infantry. By night assault groups, a company or a battalion strong, engaged the enemy. They gave him no rest, exhausted him and forced him to reveal his fire system. During the day the artillery destroyed the targets detected. Attack aircraft even in the most complicated weather conditions tried to support the forces, delivering blows at the centres of resistance. We often had to regroup on the move, concentrating infantry, tanks or artillery on one or another sector where the enemy was putting up a particularly strong resistance.

It was hard for the Soviet fighting men to advance under such conditions. The bitter frost reached 20 degrees below zero and snow storms became stronger. By day and by night the soldiers were in the field under piercing wind. Not always it

was possible to bring hot food, but all the same the men kept on advancing. They captured trench after trench, pillbox after pillbox. Every step cost them blood. Communists and political workers were in the lead.

Having overcome the strongly fortified middle defence line on January 17 our units approached the inner defence ring. At this stage of the operation General Rokossovsky assigned the 65th and 21st armies the mission to split the enemy grouping pressed to the city. After a short bombardment the men rushed forward. And then a moment of joy came.

On January 27 I received a report that units of the 65th Army with units of the 21st Army linked up in the area of Krasny Oktyabr settlement with the heroic 62nd Army under General V. Chuikov. That was an exciting meeting. Our soldiers joyfully embraced the defenders of the stronghold on the Volga who had withstood enemy onslaughts for several months. Thus the Paulus group was split into a northern and a southern group.

On January 31, the southern group of the 6th Army under Field Marshal Paulus ceased resistance. But the northern group refused to surrender. The 65th Army was assigned the mission to deliver the main blow at the enemy. The major role was assigned to the artillery. On the six-kilometre front we concentrated nearly 1,000 artillery pieces.

In the morning of February 1, my CP was crowded. The Front Command was there. All present kept looking at their watches. At last at 0830 hrs our artillery opened up. A few minutes later the enemy soldiers began to creep out of dugouts, basements and from under tanks. Some of them ran, others dropped on their knees, completely out of their minds, and raised their hands to the heaven. Some rushed back

to the shelters, hid among pillars of smoke and jumped out again. This violent fire attack lasted only 20 minutes. And then the offensive was launched. Our men crushed the last centres of resistance.

On February 2, the surrounded enemy grouping ceased to exist. Endless columns of POWs stretched along the roads. There were over 91,000 of them. The great battle was over.

In conclusion I should like to say the following. There are still some in the West who try to convince the public that the Soviet Command did not help the wounded and sick German officers and men taken prisoner at Stalingrad. That is a gross lie. Despite tremendous difficulties with dwelling and food the Soviet Command spared no pains to save the lives of thousands of exhausted and frost-bitten enemy officers and men. Paulus himself wrote later that "the doctors and the Command of the Red Army did all they could to save the lives of POWs." General Korfes, Commander of the 225th German Division, noted in his reminiscences that 16 Soviet doctors and nurses died at the time from infectious diseases while treating the German POWs. And the treatment on the part of the Soviet fighting men was also fair. Frequently I saw our political workers and logistical service and medical personnel take care of POWs. And they knew well enough what fascism was, having seen with their own eyes the atrocities and destruction the Nazi army perpetrated on Soviet territory. And I often thought how great was the force of our wonderful ideas that even in the sternest conditions of war the Soviet man remained a real internationalist, true to the high ideals of humanism, goodness and justice. A people educated on such ideas is invincible.

Centuries will pass but the immortal feat of Stalingrad will never be forgotten.

COPYRIGHT: "Soviet Military Review," No 12, 1982

CSO: 1812/72

'SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW': ANNUAL INDEX FOR 1982

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 12, Dec 82 pp 62-64

[Text]

**THE 26TH CPSU CONGRESS**

A Society of People of Labour by A. Plekhov	1
The Probationary Period by A. Cherkashin	1
Unfailing Morale by A. Yepishev	2
The Great October and the World Revolutionary Process	2
Vanguard of the People by M. Sobolev	3
Following Lenin's Behests by A. Shevchenko	3
The Leninist Principles of Soviet Foreign Policy	4
Vanguard of the Soviet People by M. Sobolev	3
Atomic Power Engineering by V. Nevsky	5
The Alliance in the Name of Peace	5
People's Real Incomes by Ye. Smirnov	6
Liquid Fuel from Coal: Problems and Prospects by I. Kalechits	6
Siberia's Industrial Giant by V. Viktorov	8
A road Equivalent to Centuries	11

**USSR 60 YEARS**

Fuel and Energy Complex by V. Tsvetkov	4
Amber Land's Capital by V. Sharov	5
Inviolable Unity of the Soviet People	5
Triumph of the Leninist Nationalities Policy	7
Through Cooperation to Prosperity by A. Aksyonov	8
Inviolable Union	9
Democracy under Advanced Socialism by M. Zyuzin	10
Society of Advanced Culture by V. Borisov	10
For the Good of the People	12
Source of Might by F. Seiranyan	12
The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics	12

**MARXISM-LENINISM ON WAR AND THE ARMY**

V. I. Lenin and the Soviet Armed Forces by I. Klimov	4
The Soviet Army, a School of Internationalism by I. Ovcharov	5
War Theories to Order by N. Khmara	6
Just and Unjust Wars by V. Molchanov	8

## MILITARY THEORY

Man and Equipment by V. Malkov	3
Scientific Principles of Troop Control by G. Lukava	5
Leninist Principles of Development of the Soviet Armed Forces by A. Babakov	5
Socialist Legality in the USSR Armed Forces by V. Novikov, N. Kuznetsov	7
Soviet Regular Officers by A. Agafonov	9
Officers' Marxist-Leninist Studies by V. Drozdov	9
Military Science as a Factor Contributing to Victory in War by M. Kiryan	10
The Art of Foresight by L. Saltykov	10
Unity of the Army and the People by N. Smorigo	11

## THE USSR TODAY. THE SOVIET WAY OF LIFE

Capital of Sunny Georgia by R. Chechulin	1
Baikal-Amur Railway by S. Syomin	2
Social Security for Servicemen by V. Borisov	2
Military Tailoring House by N. Blikov	2
City of Black Gold by A. Solovyov	3
Benefits for the Population by V. Vladimirov	3
Generous Souls by O. Andreyev	3
The Accomplishment of the Century by Ye. Khrunov	4
Holidays that Bring Health by A. Gashchuk	4
The Advanced Detachment of Soviet Youth	5
Capital of Soviet Moldavia by Ye. Zarodov	7
For Man's Benefit	7
Capital of Soviet Latvia	9
The Conquest of Outer Space Goes On by Yu. Vanin	9
From Generation to Generation by D. Korolyov	10
"Aurora" in People's Lives by V. Aidarov	11
Capital of Soviet Kirghizia by V. Lukin	11
An Immortal Force of the October Revolution by A. Yakushevsky	11
Red Square by I. Kuznetsova	11

## COMBAT TRAINING

Military Skill by K. Moskalenko	1
The Time Factor by I. Vorobyov	1
Complex Radar Training by V. Obukhov	1
Use of Artillery Against Antitank Weapons by V. Aleshenko	1
Servicemen's Code of Life by Yu. Ivanov	1
The Commander's Responsibility by O. Kulishev	2
Acting in Flank Guard by S. Ivanisov	2
Air Reconnaissance by L. Stasyonok	2
Tank Crews' Fire Training by S. Nikolayev	2
Town Fighting by G. Kudryavtsev	2
Destruction of the Enemy by Fire by I. Vorobyov	3
Interchangeability by M. Tsiporukha	3
Tactical and Marching Exercise for an AA Battery by A. Korytko	3
Medical Support on the Battlefield by V. Grin	3
Second Echelon and Reserve	3
Combat Training Standard of Radio-Radar Troops by N. Sechkin	4
Combat Exercises on a Ship by M. Tsiporukha	4

Communications on the March by I. Golub	4
Camouflage of Air Force Operations by Ye. Simakov	4
Peculiarities of a March and a Meeting Engagement in Mountains by L. Korzun	5
Night Artillery Survey by V. Lavreichuk	5
Training Ship's Starshinas by A. Kolesnikov	5
Tank Operation in Mountains by M. Starostin	5
Massing Men and Equipment by V. Yaremko	6
CP Crew's Tactical Training by V. Garnov	6
As in Real Battle	6
A Daring Attack by G. Baldenkov	6
A Test of Company Team-Work by V. Popov	6
Guarding Sea Frontiers by I. Kapitanets	7
Seminars in Tactics by A. Akimov	7
Operation Order and Decision	7
Pilots' Ground Training by Yu. Leonov	7, 8, 9
Airmen's Combat Readiness by P. Kutakhov	8
Modern Defence by L. Korzun	8
Engineer Support of a Mts Inf Bn on the March by V. Sobolev	8
Helicopters and Obstacles by Yu. Malakhov	8
BMD-1 Airborne Assault Vehicle by A. Beskurnikov	8
The Commander's Order by N. Gusev	8
Manoeuvr in Defence by A. Popov	8
Armoured Shield of the Motherland by Yu. Potapov	9
Training in Assault Crossing by Mr. Loginov	9
The T-72 Tank by D. Ivanov	9
Support of Combat Actions by V. Osipenko	10
Commander's Skill by V. Kudryavtsev	10
Marines in the Assault by G. Losev	10
A Movement Support Detachment by V. Kholyavko	10
Platoon Attack at Night by V. Popov	10
Technical Support of an Advanced Detachment by R. Dmitriyev	10
For Effective Combat Training by G. Borisov	11
Flying in Clouds by G. Baldenkov	11
Engagement on the Karasau River by N. Yeremeyev	11
Shattering Salvoes by G. Biryukov	11
Support from the Air by M. Igumentsev	12
Repair Work in the Combat Zone by A. Sosenkov	12
The Making of a Soldier.	
Psychological Training	
Tempering the Will by Sh. Nurullin	1
School of Life by A. Kropotov	2
Enhancing Combat Readiness by Ye. Grigoryev	2
Psychological Steeling by K. Petrov, I. Barchukov	2
The Method of Individual Approach by Yu. Moshkov	4
Psychological Readiness for Battle by L. Fyodorov	4
Guard of Honour Company by N. Panyukov	5



Ideological Basis of Moral and Combat Qualities	
by G. Karneyev	6
Emulation: Principles of Organisation by Sh. Nurullin	6
Grekovites by I. Kuznetsova	6
Based on Combat Traditions by I. Bulin	7
Heroes Are Not Born by V. Grinyov	7
In the Spirit of Friendship Between Peoples	
by A. Skrylnik	8
Propaganda Work by A. Cherkashin	9
Nikolai Bolshakov, Ten Years Later by G. Timokhin	9
Psychological Training of Motorised Infantrymen	
by N. Sysoyev	10
Will Power in the Making of a Commander	
by Sh. Nurullin	10
Central House of the Soviet Army by A. Sabelnikov	12
The Military Collective by V. Drozdov	12
Weapons and Equipment	
Fighting Mines by L. Shimkevich	1
Fighting Reconnaissance Vehicles by A. Beskurnikov	3
Test Pilot by V. Lebedev	3
Fuelling Tanks During Battle	7
Guests of Cruiser Minsk's Airmen by Ye. Alexandrov,	
V. Dedov	7
Motor Transport Troops by I. Balabai	10
Specialist's Tips	
Operating the AN-12 Rear Turret by K. Konstantinov	2
Technical Support of a Turning Detachment	
by N. Shevchenko	9
Fighting Helicopter Icing by Yu. Malakhov	11
T-72 Tank Operation in a Desert by D. Ryazantsev	12
Military History	
High Activity in Defence by Z. Alexandrov	1
Lessons of Imperialist Local Wars by V. Matsulenko	1
Unbreakable Union by S. Gusarevich	2
The Anti-Hitler Alliance: Facts and Fictions	
by N. Monin	3
An Important Condition of Success by B. Frolov	3
When the Tide Began to Turn by A. Orlov	4
Japan's Militarism. Facts of History by A. Savin	4
Legendary Commander by Yu. Idashkin	4
Moral Sources of Victory	5
Courage Recorded for Ever by F. Fyodorov	5
Loyalty to Heroic Traditions by D. Dragunsky	5
In the Name of the Peoples' Future by A. Alexeyev	5
Defence of a Town by Z. Zotov	6

Defensive Battle by Z. Shutov	7
Navy-Army Cooperation by G. Ammon	7
The Defence of the Caucasus by L. Kozlov	8
One Day in Stalingrad by V. Chuikov	9
The Battle of Borodino by I. Noskov	9
Operation "Uran" by K. Kobrin	11
Operation "Koltso" by P. Batov	12
The First Ever by N. Kurov	12

#### Our Calendar

Chief Designer by Ye. Khrunov	1
General of the Army Shtemenko by N. Kurov	2
Symbol of Patriotism by V. Mikhailov	5
Named After Great Military Leaders by V. Mikhailov	6
Marshal of the Soviet Union A. Yeryomenko by N. Larichev	10

#### International Affairs

USA: World Gendarme Concept Revived by V. Petrov	1
Striving to Attain the Unattainable by G. Viktorov	1
Curbing the Arms Race by Yu. Tomilin	2
USSR-USA: Dialogue, Not Confrontation by E. Asafurov	2
Detente, Its Friends and Enemies by V. Shatrov	3
The USSR-Ethiopia: Shoulder to Shoulder	3
The USA Steps Up the Militarisation of the Indian Ocean by Yu. Lugovskoi	3
"Well Wishers" by A. Mitrofanov	4
Peking-NATO Complicity by D. Volkogonov	5
The USA's "Unsinkable Carrier" in the Caribbean by I. Garbuzov	5
"Spiritual Food" for NATO Soldiers by V. Sedov	5
The USSR and Newly-Free Countries by Ye. Dolgoplov	6
Instrument of Terror and Sabotage by L. Korneyev	6
For Peace and Security in the Mediterranean by V. Yefremov	6
Important Soviet Initiatives	7
Dangerous Evolution of Peking's Policy by A. Vladimirov	7
A Zone of Peace, Not an Arena of Confrontation by V. Yefremov	7
Futile Strategy by N. Petrov	8
The Crisis Builds Up by I. Garbuzov	9
Dangerous Business by Yu. Basistov	9
The Great October and the World Revolutionary Process	10
Imperialist Policy — the Main Threat to the Newly- Free Countries by Ye. Dolgoplov	10
Peace to the Ocean Waters by G. Sturua	11
For a Just International Economic Order by N. Yevtropov	11
Instrument of US Imperialism by T. Belashchenko	11

**LITERARY PAGE.**  
**HEROISM, COURAGE, GALLANTRY**

Magnanimity by A. Kravchenko	1
Twice Born by A. Vasilets	1
Picture of a Lieutenant by V. Karpov	1, 3, 4, 5, 6
A Planet Named Kachuyevskaya by L. Zabavskaya	3
Partisan Family by Yu. Lesokhin	4
Frontier Routine by I. Kozlov	5
Navigator from Budapest by I. Igoshev	6
Generation of Victors by S. Gribanov	7
In the Foothills of the Caucasus by I. Safronov	7
A Family from Taganrog by Yu. Alexeyev	8
Victory by A. Chakovsky	8, 9, 10, 11
A Daring Raid by V. Bogdanov	11
In Stalingrad by I. Paderin	12

**WAR MEMOIRS**

Soldier's Duty by K. Rokossovsky	2
----------------------------------	---

**BOOK REVIEW**

A Man Esteemed by All by N. Semyonov	1
Guarding the Socialist Motherland by N. Shakhmagonov	2
Against a Nuclear Confrontation by G. Grozdov	2
Winning Immortality by M. Ogneva	3
Motor Vehicles in War by Yu. Sorokin	3
Whence the Threat to Peace by K. Valentinov	4
Born in Battle by Ye. Seryshev	4
School of Culture by V. Pimenov	4
Reliably Guarding Peace by Ya. Renkas	5
For the Sake of a Brighter Future by B. Soldatenko	6
The Most Peaceful Unit of All by L. Vasilyev	6
In the Name of Peace on Earth by S. Tikhvinsky	7
Shoulder to Shoulder by V. Kostko	7
Source of Inviolable Unity by S. Bessonov	7
From the Air into Battle by M. Bragin	8
Long-Range Bombers by S. Gribanov	8
Striking the Enemy in His Lair by N. Dmitriyev	8
On the Battlefronts of the War by V. Makeyev	9
Who Threatens Europe? by V. Chernoletsky	9
From the Planet's Hot Spot by S. Ivanova	9
Soviet Kazakhstan Today by V. Khalipov	10
Dangerous Gamble by V. Pimenov	10
Antifascist's Recollections	11
Combat Cohesion by Ye. Vladimirov	11
Moscow — Capital of the USSR by N. Shakhmagonov	12

**PHYSICAL CULTURE AND SPORT**

Rotational Training Method by N. Klusov	1
Medical Supervision of Servicemen's Physical Training by V. Gryazev	1
The Deciding Shot by M. Shlayen	2
The Ship Pentathlon by L. Popov	3
Physical Conditioning and Victory by V. Shabashov	3

The Winner Is Friendship by K. Konstantinov, I. Barchukov	4
Gymnastics Competitions by E. Lipovetsky	4
Comprehensive Exercises by N. Klusov	4
Competitive Review of Military Sports Films by V. Nikityuk	5
The Risk Formula by I. Dynin	5
Sport and Racism Are Incompatible by D. Prokhorov	6
USSR-USA Boxing Match	6
The "Will to Win" Prize	6
FASC Sports Review by V. Bragin	7
Three Times World Champion by I. Barchukov	7
Mass Participation in the Programme, a Basis for Skill SKDA Meetings	8
Training in Mountains by B. Anushkevich	9
Vital Concern of the People by V. Mosyaikin	10
Every Team Counted on Success by M. Shlayen	11
Reviews of Mass Sports Activities by V. Nikityuk	11
Tournament Useful for All by I. Barchukov	11
Physical Fitness in the USSR by V. Ivonin	12

COPYRIGHT: "Soviet Military Review," No 12, 1982

CSO: 1812/72

ARMED FORCES

TABLE OF CONTENTS: 'SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW' NO 1, JANUARY 1983

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 1, Jan 83 p 1

[Text]

A Reliable Guarantor of Peace and Security	2	Legendary General by V. Mikhailov	34
Reason Versus Insanity by N. Kotkov	4	A Life-Long Feat by T. Vasilenko	36
Dushanbe, Past and Present by L. Zabavskaya	7	Heroic Leningrad by A. Kochetkov	46
The Art of Troop Control by P. Lushev	9	In Stalingrad by I. Paderin	50
The Moral Factor in Modern Warfare by V. Khrobostov	13	Who Threatens Peace? by G. Stefanovsky	53
The Soviet Armed Forces	15	Learn to Speak Russian	56
Forcing a River on the Move by M. Loginov	19	The Country's Main Exhibition by I. Kuznetsova	60
Antitank Artillery by G. Biryukov	24	Physical Training of Officers by Yu. Demyanenko	62
Dauntless Heroism by D. Volkogonov	27	A Sport for the Courageous and Daring by G. Kulikova	63
Company Political Worker by V. Tkachyov	30		

COPYRIGHT: "Soviet Military Review", No 1, 1983

CSO: 1812/076

## ARMED FORCES

### IMPORTANCE OF MORALE IN MODERN WARFARE

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 1, Jan 83 pp 13-15

[Article, published under the heading "Military Theory", by Col V. Khorbostov, Cand. Sc. (History): "The Moral Factor in Modern Warfare"]

[Text]

The moral factor in war comprises the sum total of the moral, political and psychological traits of a people, its servicemen, which are manifest in their determination to fight and secure victory, to surmount all the hardships of war and in their resolve to perform their military duty to the end.

Marxism-Leninism was the first to reveal the social nature of morale and the role it plays in achieving victory in war, to show that it is conditioned by the socio-economic system and to establish its dependence on the policy pursued by the ruling class and the state waging war.

V. I. Lenin taught that in any war victory ultimately depends on the morale of the masses that shed their blood on the battlefield. This law powerfully manifested itself in wars fought in the contemporary period, in wars in which the Soviet people repeatedly participated to defend the freedom and independence of their Homeland. In these wars the indomitable morale of the Soviet people and their army stemmed from their political consciousness and firm ideological convictions concerning the justice of the aims they fought for.

In revealing the essence and nature of the morale of the people and their army, its effect on the course and outcome of war V. I. Lenin showed the mounting role this factor plays in wars and the ways for strengthening it. He made it clear that a people the majority of whose workers and peasants felt Soviet power as power of the working people were unconquerable.

Lenin's theses on the essence, sources and role of the morale of the people and army in gaining victory in war help the army and navy compre-

hend the complex character of the problem of morale as a factor. As in the past the main force in war is man — the man behind the weapon. Modern combat equipment, nuclear missiles in particular, far from decreasing, increase the role of the moral factor. The preparedness of people to surmount the bitterest trials of war and to retain the will for victory is embodied in their actions.

To a certain degree morale may compensate for inferiority in numbers, relatively poor equipment. Sometimes it can sap the battleworthiness of an army and even nullify its superiority in equipment and numerical strength. The important role played by the high morale of troops in war was confirmed by the outstanding victories of the young Red Army over the internal counter-revolutionaries and foreign interventionist forces. In analysing these victories V. I. Lenin wrote that the military might of the enemies of the socialist revolution, namely numerical strength, weapons and equipment, proficiency, military and technical knowledge, "was superior to our military force" many times. But the morale of the enemy was, beyond doubt, inferior to that of the young poorly equipped Red Army.

Such factors as political consciousness, moral staunchness, confidence in the triumph of the righteous cause, multiplied by combat proficiency, skill, iron discipline, mass heroism of the men and competent leadership of commanders (superiors) largely contributed to achieving victory of the socialist armies in wars for the defence of the Socialist Homeland.

The high morale of the Soviet people stems from the humane ethical standards which the working people developed in fighting social and national oppression and the corrupt ethical standards of the exploiting system.

The victory of the Soviet Union in the Great Patriotic War was indisputable evidence of the triumph of the new social and state system born of the October Revolution, the socialist economy, Marxist-Leninist ideology, the moral-political unity of Soviet society, and the inviolable friendship of the peoples inhabiting the USSR.

Soviet people heroically defended the independence of their Homeland and the cause of socialism. The victory in the war showed that V. I. Lenin's prediction that the country would be capable not only of producing individual heroes, but also hundreds and thousands of heroes, was true.

It is not fortuitous that the moral factor is referred to as a moral-political factor. It is determined by socio-economic relations, the character of

the social and state system and the political aims of the war. The moral-political factor reflects the level of political consciousness, the character of relations between the army and the people, their devotion to the existing political system and readiness to fight in its interest. This factor gives strength to the resolve of the working people, their fortitude, discipline, will for victory, it enables them to surmount the hardships of war. The political content of the moral factor is most vividly manifest in wars fought in defence of the Socialist Homeland.

As far as the make-up of morale is concerned it would be fair to say that in essence it is an ideological-psychological factor. It is made up of ideological and socio-psychological elements which form a close unity. These elements interact and affect one another. The ideological content constitutes the core of the moral factor, it cements the moral qualities of people, builds up their will power, moulds their feelings and views. The ideological content is rightly regarded as the cardinal element which ensures the moral-political unity of the people and their servicemen, expresses their profound confidence in the triumph of the ideas of communism, in victory over any aggressor. Marxist-Leninist ideology plays a decisive role in this. It has proved its viability and validity. It has determined the general political aim of the Soviet people, the scientific programme of action and methods of its accomplishment. A serviceman's communist convictions constitute the spiritual force which, when the need arises, helps him carry out his duty to the Homeland to the end. It is the bedrock of the moral factor.

The socio-psychological elements form the sum total of ideas and impressions of life, views, traditions, sentiments, experience, and habits that take shape during the period of active service. However, not all these elements are equally stable. Sentiments, impressions and views frequently vary in power of expression, whereas traditions, experience and habits are of a more persistent nature. Modern warfare imposes a far greater moral-psychological strain. Therefore, the serviceman's psychological training is of particular importance. At a critical moment in battle, when the serviceman's spiritual potential is subjected to extreme stress, he must display maximum will power, staunchness, endurance, courage, determination and initiative.

In expressing the interests of the Soviet people the Communist Party formulates a scientific programme of action for the socialist state. The Party inculcates in the Soviet people, including servicemen, the conviction that the cause they are serving is a righteous cause. It thus builds up their



morale.

Soviet military science maintains that modern weaponry enhances the role of man in war and emphasises his connections with equipment. The increased role of military equipment and the moral strength of the army form an unbreakable dialectical unity.

The more sophisticated the weaponry and the greater its destructive power the higher are the requirements in respect of the defender of the Homeland, his multifaceted performance, mentality, combat proficiency and moral qualities. In modern warfare lack of military knowledge, inadequate combat skill, faulty moral-political, educational and psychological training may result in grave consequences, even in the failure to accomplish a mission. Today the serviceman is provided with the latest equipment, often operated with the help of computers and other highly sophisticated devices. Therefore, it is vital to kindle enthusiasm in the men for weaponry and other combat equipment. Their combat and technical training should be intimately connected with the moulding of moral-political consciousness, combat and psychological features.

COPYRIGHT: "Soviet Military Review", No 1, 1983.

CSO: 1812/076

## ARMED FORCES

### GROUND FORCES REVIEWED

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 1, Jan 83 pp 15-16

[Unattributed article under the heading "The Soviet Armed Forces: "The Land Forces"]

!Text1

What is it that determines the role of morale in modern warfare? First, the political essence of war as a decisive class clash between the two opposite socio-political systems. If the imperialists manage to unleash world war, it will be characterised by uncompromising determination of the belligerents to secure the aims each has set himself. Second, the technological level of the equipment with which the army and navy are provided. The fact that modern armies are armed with nuclear missiles, sophisticated missile complexes, the latest radioelectronic equipment, computers and other devices has infinitely enhanced the requirements in respect of servicemen, their morale and combat efficiency. Third, the radical changes that have occurred in the methods of warfare. As a result, the army and naval personnel have to maintain a high level of combat readiness at all times to be able to administer a powerful rebuff to the aggressor in the event of attack.

There are other conditions that have stepped up the role of morale as a factor in war. For instance, most weapons being crew-served, special team-work, implicit obedience, expedition, discipline are required to ensure their effective employment. This is also conditioned by the exceptionally important role played by the time factor in fulfilment of the combat mission assigned.

Communist Party policy being inseparable from communist ethical standards and principles, contributes actively to moulding the moral make-up of the Soviet serviceman. This is one of the advantages of the army created by advanced socialist society.

The conditions characterising the state of affairs in capitalist armies are totally different. Playing on the selfishness of servicemen, on such

features as the desire to dominate other nations, to acquire personal wealth, etc., the bourgeoisie is able to make out of them obedient fanatical tools, men who are prepared to commit any crime against humanity. Naturally, today it is becoming increasingly difficult to achieve such ends. But we should not forget that methods of brainwashing in capitalist armies are becoming more and more effective. Despite this, in capitalist society such traits as consciousness and self-sacrifice are out of the question.

High morale is a mighty force that inspires the masses to wage a self-sacrificing struggle against the enemy and enables them to surmount all hardships and barriers in the way of victory in war.

**65** years ago, on the initiative of V. I. Lenin and the Communist Party, the Armed Forces of the first socialist state were created. Many glorious chapters have been written in their history since then. More than once the imperialist countries tried to test the strength of the new socialist system. However, each attempt of this kind ended in failure. Such was the case during the Civil War and foreign military intervention when the USA, Britain, France, Japan and other capitalist countries set out to destroy Soviet power. Such was the case during the Great Patriotic War (1941-45) when the Soviet people and its valiant Armed Forces beat off the perfidious attack of nazi Germany, upheld the freedom and independence of the Motherland, routed the nazi invaders and saved the peoples of Europe. The Soviet Armed Forces also fulfilled their internationalist duty with respect to peoples of Asia, first of all China, Korea and Vietnam, enslaved by militarist Japan.

Nearly 40 years have elapsed since that time. "Sons and grandsons of heroes of the Great Patriotic War," L. I. Brezhnev said at the 26th CPSU Congress, "are now in the ranks of the defenders of the Soviet Union. They have not gone through the grim trials that fell to the lot of their fathers and grandfathers. But they are devoted to the heroic traditions of our army and our people. Whenever the interests of the nation's security and the defence of peace require it, and when victims of aggression had to be helped, the Soviet soldier appears before the world as a disinterested and courageous patriot and an internationalist prepared to face any hardship."

In this year, the year of the 65th Anniversary of the Soviet Army, the Editorial Board begins the publications of a series of materials on the history, composition and purpose of the fighting services and arms of the Soviet Armed Forces.

The Land Forces are in strength and composition the largest fighting service in the USSR Armed Forces. They consist of the motorised infantry, tank, rocket forces and artillery, air defence units\* which are arms of the service and also units and subunits of special troops — engineer, motor transport, chemical, signal, radio, pipelaying, topographic and others. Besides, there are units and establishments of the logistical service.

**T**HE MOTORISED INFANTRY is the basis of the Land Forces. Formations, units and subunits of the motorised infantry are provided with automatic small arms, artillery pieces and mortars, tanks, powerful antitank weapons and AD complexes. Today there are more tanks in a Mts Inf Div than there were in a Tk Corps during the Great Patriotic War (1941-45). If we compare a modern Mts Inf Div with an Inf Div of 1939 we see that the former excels the latter 16-fold in tanks, 37-fold in APCs and armoured vehicles, 5-fold in radio communication means. The weight of an artillery-mortar salvo is now 37 times that of an Inf Div salvo in 1939.

**T**HE TANK FORCES are the main striking force of the Land Forces and a mighty weapon intended to carry out the most important missions. Tanks impart to the Land Forces high combat activity, manoeuvrability, offensive thrust, increase depth of blows, rates of advance and stability of battle formations. For example, a modern T-72 Soviet tank is a fighting vehicle possessing powerful weapons, solid armour, increased cross-country ability, sufficient endurance and perfect control instruments. As a whole the tank forces are capable of carrying out rapid marches over long distances, flexibly manoeuvring on the battlefield, pressing home the attack at high speed after powerful fire blows, negotiating large water barriers on the move by fording, on the river bed and on crossing means, and when necessary of organising a solid defence and then launching a decisive counterattack.

**R**OCKET FORCES AND ARTILLERY are the basis of the fire power of the Land Forces. Operational-tactical and tactical missiles, cannon, howitzer, rocket and antitank artillery and mortars possess great fire power, range and accuracy. Thanks to preserving the necessary relations of proportion between the various types and systems, the artillery is capable of destroying any targets. This arm of the service is easily con-

\* The rocket forces and artillery and air defence units which are parts of the Land Forces should be distinguished from the Strategic Rocket Forces and Air Defence Forces which are fighting services and about which we shall narrate separately.

trolled and its high manoeuvrability makes it possible to quickly concentrate the necessary forces in the decisive directions for winning and maintaining fire superiority over the enemy.

**A**IR DEFENCE UNITS are armed with highly mobile AD missile complexes of various types and are capable of destroying air targets with great accuracy at low, medium and high altitudes. If during World War II it was necessary to spend on the average 400-600 shells to destroy one enemy aircraft, today 1-2 missiles will do the job.

**E**NGINEER, MOTOR TRANSPORT, CHEMICAL, PIPELAYING, SIGNAL, RADIO, TOPOGEO-DESIC TROOPS AND LOGISTICAL UNITS also occupy an important place in the Land Forces and are intended for carrying out responsible missions.

All the fighting arms of the Land Forces develop harmoniously according to ideological and theoretical principles worked out by Soviet military science. Nowadays highly qualified command personnel, political workers and engineer cadres are trained, contemporary combat equipment and armament are mastered and methods of their combat use with due regard for the latest scientific achievements and the development prospects of military art are creatively elaborated in the Land Forces.

The Land Forces lean upon the mighty economic, moral, political and scientific potential of the USSR. They are in constant combat readiness and jointly with the other fighting services of the Soviet Armed Forces and the armies of the Warsaw Treaty countries vigilantly stand guard over peace, socialism and progress.

COPYRIGHT: "Soviet Military Review", No 1, 1983

CSO: 1812/076

ARMED FORCES

TALES OF HEROISM BY MILITARY PERSONNEL RECOUNTED

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 1, Jan 83 pp 27-29

[Article, published under the heading "The Making of a Soldier", by Lt Gen D. Volkogonov, D. S. (Philosophy), Professor: "Dauntless Heroism"]

[Text]

Two Soviet military pilots Boris Kapustin and Yuri Yanov were faced with a desperate alternative: either to abandon their falling plane which would then crash into a residential neighbourhood in Berlin, or to save the lives of many people at the expense of their own. The magnetic tape recording at the ground station confirms without bias that during the exchange the pilots displayed no vacillation. They decided to remain in the aircraft. Two Soviet warriors had always been ready for this, though the moment arrived as a tragic surprise. Millions of Soviet people know about the dialogue that took place in the plane before the two flyers performed their immortal feat.

During an exercise a platoon was learning to throw live hand grenades. A young soldier happened to drop a grenade in confusion, having extracted the safety pin. There was not a second to lose. A moment's delay was fraught with grave consequences. At the last moment Private Mirgadzov jumped onto the grenade and covered it up with his body. Though the brave man died, he saved the lives of his comrades.

These are only two (out of many) cases refuting the assertions of bourgeois historians, sociologists, and philosophers who claim that "in the age of the atom and cybernetics there is no room for heroism." The French sociologist R. Quillot writes that "regardless of the social system all heroes have been done away with. Epic feeling and noble impulses have been replaced by rationalism, business-like calculation and complete absence of romanticism." In his book "Strategy and Conscience" the US scholar A. Rapoport asserts that with the advance of military equipment the heroic component in the war disappears. A man needs far

less resolve to fire a rifle than to strike with a sabre. With the advent of artillery the gun crews ceased to see the enemy altogether. In modern warfare the very notion of bravery is void of sense, because there is no contact whatever with the enemy. The man is becoming a mere component of a weapon system. He sits in comfort at the control panel, just like a clerk at his desk. He observes signals which are totally free from the dramatic element, they are mere commands. Nor does he hear the noise of battle or calls to perform feats of valour or self-sacrifice. All he does is to obey the colour lamps. Though death can seize him any moment, the position of a hero is no different from that of a coward. A. Rapoport concludes:

"There are no heroes any more, only victims."

These words express the gist of the concept about "the disappearance of man's valorous role in war," which is rather widespread in bourgeois military literature.

Here are a few remarks on this score.

First, this concept is an outspoken attempt to palm off inflation of moral values, including the heroic component, in bourgeois society for a universal law which operates in all social systems. That this thesis is unsound is obvious.

Second, bourgeois scientists and scholars have not attempted to make a dialectical evaluation of the qualitative shifts that are occurring in the man-equipment relationship.

As a result, they have absolutised to the extreme the role of equipment to the detriment of the human moral element.

And, third, you cannot help seeing in this line of reasoning lack of confidence in the personnel of imperialist armies, a desire to develop a robot serviceman, an automaton, that would blindly fulfil the will of a superior.

Marxism-Leninism exhibits a totally different approach to the problem of heroism in modern warfare. Heroism manifests itself in full degree in just wars. The moral factor as spiritual ability and readiness of a man to endure the ordeal of the war and retain the will for struggle and victory expresses itself in heroism.

The problem of heroism is a complex, multifaceted problem. Very often people regard heroic acts as something unusual and exceptional. As a result, whether you want to or not the social aspect of this phenomenon is driven into the background. However, an act cannot be regarded as heroic, unless it is characterised by a socially significant content.

For instance, in the West broad publicity was given to an act performed by two young US parachute jumpers. One of them dived out of the

hatchdoor of a plane without a parachute. Then after a precisely calculated interval he was followed by another with two parachutes. The second parachute jumper "caught up" with the first in the air, gave him a parachute, and both of them made a safe landing. What was this purposeless risk for? Publicity, hope of fame and, hence for success in business. These were the motives behind the act of these men. Though we must pay what is due to these parachute jumpers for their personal fearlessness, we must say that their act has nothing in common with heroism.

To establish the essence of heroism it is necessary to determine its criterion. Proceeding from Marxist-Leninist methodology it would be correct to say that heroism consists in the degree in which an act of an individual, collective or mass corresponds to the main ideas of the contemporary epoch, to the ideals of communism. Only an act performed in pursuit of a socially significant aim, in the interests of progressive forces can be regarded as a heroic feat.

A person who performs a feat is referred to as a hero. It is precisely a person like this that does what should be done in the interests of human society. This idea has been profoundly and correctly formulated by Alexander I. Pokryshkin, thrice Hero of the Soviet Union, who performed numerous feats during the war. Having flown over 600 sorties he shot down in air engagements 59 enemy planes. He writes that the main element in a feat is its social significance. A feat is performed in the name of people. The element of risk to which a man subjects himself is not the most important thing. What really counts is the socially useful result produced by manifestation of courage and valour.

Among several hundred thousand feats Soviet warriors performed during the wars there are none that are exactly alike. All of them are individually distinctive. However, their essence is profoundly social, it is conditioned by the entire make-up of the Soviet way of life.

Military heroism consists in the performance of actions of outstanding social significance, actions carried out in the interests of the popular masses, the latter demanding that the serviceman should be courageous, staunch and ready for self-sacrifice. Military heroism is the highest form of combat effort and moral responsibility in armed struggle, when an individual, military collective and people undertake self-denying action which exceed the standards of everyday behaviour to secure victory over the enemy. Military heroism is actually a specific method for the settling of numerous contradictions of the war. The armed struggle is characterised by contradictions and antago-



nisms which, at this given stage, with available possibilities and means, can only be resolved through a heroic act. The experience of past wars shows that there were very many critically contradictory situations which peremptorily required solution. For instance, contradictions bred by the negative effect of the element of surprise. A sudden surprise attack launched by the enemy invariably places the victim of the attack at a disadvantage, plunges him into critical conditions, imposes a terrific strain on the moral strength of the warriors and requires that they should be ready to perform a feat of valour.

On the first day of the Great Patriotic War the Eleventh Post of the 98th Vladimir-Volynsky Frontier Guard Detachment (just like many other stations) stood up to the first enemy onslaught. Lieutenant Ye. Utkin, station commander, and Political Instructor V. Kaftarov organised effective resistance to far superior enemy forces in the most difficult situation. The personal heroism of the officers, their courage and valour inspired the frontier guards who did their military duty to the end. In the records there is a brief entry:

"Not a single soldier or officer of the Eleventh Post reported to the commandant's office or the detachment. The entire complement of the station was killed in action."

These few words reflect the boundless heroism of the Soviet warriors that performed an outstanding feat.

Here is another case of a contradiction that emerged as a result of an unfavourable balance of forces. On March 26, 1944 an amphibious descent of 55 sailors and 12 Red Army men executed a landing in proximity of Nikolayev (on the Black Sea coast) at daybreak and gained a foothold. In the course of nearly two days running a handful of braves beat off 18 enemy assaults, killed 700 hitlerites, destroyed several German tanks and carried out the mission with honour. All the officers and men of the descent — 67 altogether — were honoured with the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. On 55 of them this honour was conferred posthumously. It follows that the objective aspect of heroism is "built in" the resolution of contradictions which emerge in the course of the armed struggle.

COPYRIGHT: "Soviet Military Review", No 1, 1983

CSO: 1812/076

## ARMED FORCES

### DUTIES OF POLITICAL WORKERS OUTLINED

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 1, Jan 83 pp 30-31

[Article, published under the heading "The Making of a Soldier", by Col. V. Tkachev: "Company Political Worker"]

[Text] A company political worker has many responsibilities. The main one is to educate the fighting men in the spirit of Soviet patriotism and proletarian internationalism, to instill in them moral and political qualities necessary for victory in modern combat. He is always with the men, always ready to help them.

These qualities are inherent in full measure in V. Tsvetkov, deputy commander of a motorised infantry company and one of the finest officers of a Guards unit. The fact that the company is an excellent subunit is a great merit of Senior Lieutenant Tsvetkov \_\_\_\_\_

The most memorable period in the career of any senior political worker is the time he worked as a deputy company (or equivalent unit) commander for political affairs. The reason for this is that the company, battery or squadron are the military collective element in which success in military training is forged. It is in this subunit that the serviceman is moulded as a soldier and citizen, that friendship and army comradeship take shape. The company political worker is always in the middle of army life. Very often it is he, together with the commanding officer of the subunit, who plays the role of the first official person approached by officers and men to help settle practically any question of everyday life. When they approach him, they expect him to exhibit sincere attention, to offer a just solution and render comradely support.

The duties of the political worker are wide and varied. But he is above all responsible for the organisation of political work and for its state, political work being geared to the accomplishment of tasks in combat training and political education, to raising the level of the companies' combat proficiency and standard of military discipline. The main purpose and content of his activities are education of servicemen in the spirit of lofty ideological and political consciousness, devotion to the Homeland and the Communist Party, in the spirit of friendship of peoples and proletarian internationalism.

Here is a brief account of the work of Senior Lieutenant

P. Markosyan, deputy tank company commander for political affairs.

The political worker carries out his duties in close, friendly contact with the company commander. Working hand in hand means complete understanding, agreement in the accomplishment of tasks, concentrating the main effort on cardinal matters in training and educating the personnel. Lieutenant V. Yevstefeyev, company commander, is a few years younger, but he has a thorough grounding in military theory and is energetic. Senior Lieutenant P. Markosyan, deputy commander for political affairs, being older, has more experience in work with men. They, so to say, complete one another.

The process of instruction and education is effective. Political science classes are conducted on a high level. Lenin lectures, thematic evenings, disputes and contests are exciting and are held regularly.

Senior Lieutenant P. Markosyan critically analyses the state of Party-political work in the company. He frequently discusses matters in this field with the commander, asks the advice of Communists and Young Communist League activists. Quite often he gives the secretary of the YCL organisation advice on which questions he should concentrate his attention, on assignments for activists and on checking fulfilment of decisions adopted by meetings of the YCL organisation.

The company command pays serious attention to the socialist emulation movement for raising the level of combat readiness, excellent mastery and maintenance of weapons and other military equipment. The political worker and the commander feel that every lesson and drill should be conducted in a competitive spirit, that the results of emulation should be summed up regularly and that the experience of the men who have secured outstanding achievements should be made known to the others.

Senior Lieutenant P. Markosyan is an expert tank gunner and driver. In addition, he has good general and special military knowledge. Once, during an exercise, the commander was "disabled." P. Markosyan immediately took over. And the company successfully fulfilled the assigned mission.

Individual work with the men has always been and continues to be an important duty of the company political worker. It is based on profound knowledge of the men, their characters, individual inclinations and abilities. Senior Lieutenant P. Markosyan is a master of the individual approach to every man. Here is a case in point. When Private A. Mamedov, a young soldier, joined the company, he began to violate military discipline rather frequently. He was rather unwilling to study military subjects. The company political worker talked to him several times, but without any apparent success.

But P. Markosyan would not give up. He always remembers the words of Maxim Gorky, the famous proletarian writer, about there being more good than bad in a man. He hoped to put his finger on the stubborn soldier's good traits. He watched Mamedov attentively and found that he

was very energetic. The boy was also eager to be in the limelight. The political worker decided to give the young soldier a chance to show what he could do.

During a tactical exercise a tank, while crossing a river, proved too heavy for the ice, which collapsed under its weight. Fortunately the river was not deep. Senior Lieutenant P. Markosyan advised the platoon leader to entrust this dangerous task to Private Mamedov who was to attach a towing wire to the AFV underwater. And Mamedov justified the confidence in him. After diving twice into the ice-cold water he reliably tied the towing wire to the tank.

The deputy commander for political affairs saw to it that this exploit became known to the entire complement. He thus showed Mamedov that the positive qualities of every man are duly appreciated in the army. After that the political worker instructed Mamedov to help the sports organizer in conducting a race (he knew that the young soldier had been a field and track enthusiast before joining the army). This helped gradually to draw Mamedov into the entire range of army duties and thus enabled him to get rid of his shortcomings. When the time for honourable discharge came Mamedov had achieved excellent results in combat training and political education.

To secure success in his work the company political worker must display a creative approach. He must not only master a wide range of known forms and methods of education, but must also constantly search for new ways and means for enriching political work.

This requirement is inseparable from respect for man, from regarding every soldier as an individual with a complex spiritual make-up and displaying solicitude for him. Solicitude for the men is multifaceted. Seeing that they are properly fed, provided with medical care, supplied with clothes and other items, that their needs for recreation and cultural services are met is an important aspect of solicitude for their welfare.

The political worker must always be abreast of political developments. He often has to explain to the men the essence of development belonging to the sphere of internal and international life and to answer questions posed by the men. It is important to give convincing explanations and answers to the men, because they help educate them, develop in them a conscientious attitude towards their duties, encourage them to master their specialities properly and acquire an active stand in life.

The political worker frequently has to take measures on a wide range of matters concerning everyday life, actions and facts occurring in the military collective and affecting individual servicemen. Sometimes seemingly unimportant facts call for serious thought. In such cases it is important for the political worker to approach each concrete case from Party positions.

To carry out his duties efficiently the political worker must be well equipped for his job: he must above all be well versed in Marxist-Leninist theory, competent in orga-

nising Party-political work in various conditions of combat training, expert in combat equipment and weaponry in particular, and in methods of instructing personnel. Without this he will be unable to take effective care of all aspects of the life and combat training of his subunit.

The political worker is first formed while studying at a higher military-political school. In four years future political workers study under highly qualified instructors Marxist-Leninist theory, the fundamentals of Party-political work, Soviet military pedagogy and psychology, several other social sciences, master the necessary military-technical knowledge and acquire skills in organising political education of the personnel. However, to be successful in his work the political worker cannot be satisfied with only the knowledge acquired in the military-political school he attended. He must constantly broaden his outlook, study the experience acquired by advanced subunits and the best educators.

In this effort he will be assisted by the officer training system that has taken shape in the Soviet Armed Forces. It includes a wide range of forms, such as Marxist-Leninist studies, seminars, theoretical and scientific-practical conferences, colloquiums on fundamental problems of Party and military development. Though these forms and methods of work play a big role, they cannot replace the officer's individual work to improve his knowledge. Political workers engage persistently in self-education.

The political worker of a subunit invariably enjoys high prestige among the mass of servicemen. He helps mobilise the men for concentrated effort in combat training and ensuring a high level of vigilance and combat readiness.

COPYRIGHT: "Soviet Military Review", No 1, 1983

CSO: 1812/076

## ARMED FORCES

### PHYSICAL TRAINING FOR OFFICERS OUTLINED

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 1, Jan 83 p 62

[Article, published under the heading "Physical Culture and Sport", by Col. Yu. Demyanenko, Cand. Sc. (Pedagogy: "Physical Training for Officers")]

#### [Text]

Lessons in physical culture is the main form of physical training for officers of the USSR Armed Forces. They have three one-hour classes a week. They include exercises from the Physical Training Manual of the Soviet Army and Navy (NFP-78), and also exercises with account of the age groups: the first group comprises officers under 31, the second — from 31 to 36, the third — from 36 to 41, the fourth — from 41 to 46 and the fifth for officers over 46. Every group has to do its control exercises and show definite performance standards. Exercises in these groups are conducted by specialists in physical training or officers specially trained for the purpose. If an officer is temporarily unable to attend lessons in his age group he is switched over to a group of therapeutic exercises by order of the unit commander. Lessons in this group are conducted under control of medical officers. Upon recovery the officer is returned to his particular age group.

If an officer is on duty, while the lesson in physical culture takes place, if he is on a mission of the command, or if he is engaged in training his subordinates, he will attend an additional class or train on his own.

At the lessons the physical load

is planned with account of the physical conditions, level of physical training and age of the officer. The competence of the physical training instructor is very important for the success and effectiveness of such lessons.

Individual drills are a rational method of physical training. If an officer trains individually, he avails himself of advice from the physical training instructor and physician. The officer plans the content (exercises) and time on his own and determines the physical load.

The physical training officer briefs the officers who train individually once a month, he recommends the exercises they should carry out, the physical load they should sustain, and methods of control over the reaction of the body to the loads imposed on it.

He also helps the officers draw up a schedule of drills taking into account the type of work they are doing. It makes provision for the periods of field, sea, flying and staff exercises, periods of hard work in maintenance of equipment, instruction and other forms of activity connected with considerable physical and mental loads. In periods preceding vigorous activity in line of regular duty physical training is particularly intensive. During periods

of intensive work the physical loads are somewhat lessened. After tactical exercises and similar activities the physical fitness programme provides for drills that would remove the stress. Thus, physical training lessons reflect the general and specific aim of disease prevention.

As a rule, individual training takes place in the morning. In most cases the officers train in running and carry out exercises that help build up their endurance, quickness, strength and agility. Such drills do not normally require special or sophisticated apparatus. In addition, the officers carry out general gymnastic exercises without apparatus to develop their physique. To this end they use chest expanders, rubber cord, gymnastic stick, dumbbells of different weight, time heat, swim, go cycling, skiing or hiking.

In addition, to sum up the results of the training the doctors examine the officers to establish the level of their physical fitness. Such checkups are conducted at least once in two months. The results are then used to ascertain the type of drills to be carried out and load levels to be imposed on the trainees.

An important condition for success in individual training is keeping a self-control record. First, the officer must observe the changes in the functional condition which prompts the line to be pursued in further training, and, second, such records enable the officer to display a rational approach to the determination of optimal loads both at a separate lesson and during longer periods of drills.

Facts show that officers who regularly do physical drills to keep themselves in good physical shape are characterised by higher capacity for work and a longer "service life."

COPYRIGHT: "Soviet Military Review", No 1, 1983.

CSO: 1812/076

AIR FORCES

AIR SUPPORT OF GROUND OPERATIONS DISCUSSED

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 12, Dec 82 pp 22-24

[Article by Col M. Igumentsev, military pilot 1st class, under the heading "Combat Training": "Support from the Air"]

[Text]

**Air preparation**-means combat operations of aviation before the beginning of an attack by land forces and before the landing of amphibious or airborne parties with the purpose of destroying the enemy in the direction of the main blow. Being part of preparatory fire, it is usually carried out simultaneously and in conjunction with artillery preparation. Its duration depends on the state of the enemy defences, the character of targets to be engaged and the composition of air forces involved. Air preparation ends with the beginning of the attack.

The planning of air preparation is centralised. The objects of the attack may be targets in the tactical and immediate operational depth. They may include also targets not destroyed by missiles and artillery fire, targets capable of changing their positions and targets which can be destroyed only by powerful aircraft ammunition. Those to be destroyed first are nuclear offensive weapons, airplanes based on the nearest airfields, tanks and artillery in concentration areas and on positions, strong points, centres of resistance and crossing sites.

Air preparation is carried out by forces of the front, naval and sometimes long-range aviation.

**Short-time air preparation** may be carried out also in the course of the operation, e.g. in areas where the enemy checks the advance of friendly troops, prior to an assault crossing or breakthrough of intermediate defensive lines, when committing second echelons or reserves to action, etc. In defence air preparation precedes a counterattack. In this case it is also called **counterpreparation** as a powerful and surprise mass strike from the air against the main body of an enemy



grouping is normally delivered before the enemy starts fire preparation.

Foreign military experts consider that the advent of long-range ground fire weapons and combat helicopters has complicated the organisation of tactical cooperation. In recent local wars artillery, helicopters and tactical aircraft never used fire simultaneously in one and the same area. Sometimes air and artillery preparation coincided in time but in that case they had demarcation lines. Combat helicopters were committed to action upon completion of artillery preparation. But in this situation it was practically impossible to establish close fire cooperation.

**Air support** starts after the end of air preparation when the forces assume either the offensive or the defensive. Forces participating in air support include fighter-bombers. Use can be also made of bombers and, in exceptional cases, of fighters. The principal purpose of air support is to destroy or neutralise the most important enemy targets in the tactical and immediate operational depth in order to create favourable conditions for the operations of the land forces.

During World War II and subsequent local wars, almost one half of the total number of sorties were in support of land forces. In contemporary conditions the organisation of air support has undergone considerable changes due to the adoption of qualitatively new armaments and equipment, the increased mobility of troops and the enhanced power of air defences.

Taking this into consideration foreign military experts have come to the conclusion that air support can be successful only if air superiority (supremacy) has been gained, at least for a short period of time, over the entire theatre of operations or over a particular area and that it should include carrying out such tasks as air interdiction and direct support. Some foreign authors include in air support also tactical aerial reconnaissance, air-lift operations and some special operations.

Based on the experience of combat operations in Vietnam and the Middle East foreign experts note that air support should be characterised by coordination of air and ground operations, economical use of combat resources, proper choice of weapons, quick response, accuracy of attacks, security of friendly forces, continuity of support.

**Air accompaniment** includes combat operations of air force units attached to combined-arms formations. Its purpose is to render continuous support to advancing troops in the depth of enemy defences by attacking his reserves, tanks, missile

launchers, artillery and strong points. Air accompaniment is the final part of air support.

During the Great Patriotic War air accompaniment consisted as a rule of combat sorties by front aviation, above all assault planes, according to schedule or on CP calls. At crucial moments of battle aviation units were constantly patrolling the air over the battlefield for a certain period of time (1, 2 or more hours) periodically relieving each other.

The foreign military press notes that the increased combat capabilities of the air forces, intense use of fire support helicopters in all-arms combat and the adoption for service in the army of surface-to-surface tactical missiles have changed the methods of guiding aircraft to ground targets. Whereas formerly the forward air controller guided the aircraft from an open vehicle using only a radio set for target designation, nowadays a forward air guidance post is equipped with a portable two-dimensional radar, a switchboard for ground communication means and a wide-range radio set. Radar guidance has extended the possibilities for rendering assistance to ground forces from the air in complicated weather conditions. According to a report by the West German **Flug Review**, the US Air Force Command, Europe, has begun to form subunits of forward air controllers equipped with light aeroplanes. In the FRG Air Force special air support control centres have been organised to distribute aviation forces.

**Air cover** is one of the most important missions of fighter aviation. Its purpose is to prevent the enemy from conducting aerial reconnaissance and delivering attacks by manned or pilotless planes against troops, warships and rear installations. Another of its missions is to protect units and subunits of other fighting arms as well as the planes of other air arms against attacks by enemy fighters. To make this cover reliable the fighters should display activity and resoluteness in destroying air targets. A mission of primary importance is to intercept the target before it reaches the bombing or missile launching line. Fighters fulfil their air cover tasks in cooperation with ground and shipborne AD weapons, distributing their efforts according to zones, and within the zone according to altitudes, directions, air targets and time.

In contemporary conditions the use of ground and airborne radars and automatic control systems allows fighters to cover reliably troops and installations.

COPYRIGHT: "Soviet Military Review, " No 12, 1982

CSO: 1812/72

GROUND FORCES

T-72 TANK: DESERT OPERATION DISCUSSED

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 12, Dec 82 pp 24-26

[Article by Eng Col D. Ryazantsev, under the heading "Specialist's Tips":  
"T-72 Tank Operation in a Desert"]

[Text]

Environmental conditions considerably influence the operation and combat use of tanks. Good knowledge and due account of these conditions contribute to rational and effective use of combat equipment. This fully applies in deserts.

Dust penetrating inside the tank and settling on its units delays their cooling. Contamination of control linkage articulated joints obliges the driver to make great efforts in working pedals and levers.

In intense heat fuels and lubricants filled into the tank units and assemblies tend to expand, which is likely to give rise to leakage through gland seals.

We could give quite a few examples of this kind, for a desert makes stringent demands on the equipment and the personnel to whom it is entrusted. Let us deal with the most important (from our point of view) specifics of the T-72 tank operation in a desert.

On receiving the tank in the subunit it is necessary to study first of all the accompanying technical papers. Then units, systems and mechanisms are checked for filling with fuel, oil, coolant and special liquids. If need be, the engine hot-season air intake line is fixed. It is very important to familiarise oneself with maximum instrument readings on the basis of which the short-time standard, permissible and impermissible conditions for operation of assemblies and systems are established. In conclusion scheduled maintenance is carried out, the scope being determined by check inspection.

During tank operation constant attention should be paid to readings of measuring instruments, e. g. oil and coolant temperature, oil pressure in the engine and transmission lubrication systems at minimum engine speed, air pressure in the engine air supply system, and air cleaner resistance.

The design features of the T-72 tank predetermine its operational peculiarities.

The tank carries a B-46 type multifuel engine (B-55 modification) characterised by high power attained due to supercharging and cyclic fuel supply to the cylinders by means of a fuel pump.

The engine can operate on diesel fuel, kerosene and petrol, or their mixtures.

Correct operation of the tank in dry hot climate largely depends on care of the fuel system. During maintenance the primary fuel filter is washed, filtering elements replaced, and their sleeves washed too. It is recommended to perform these operations after a 6,500-7,000-km run, but at least after 350 and 500 hours of engine operation respectively.

The above maintenance intervals are also applicable to the air cleaner. Prior to servicing, the latter is stripped to remove dust and dirt from the felt gaskets, inner surfaces of the head, cover and central cyclone tubes. Each element is thoroughly washed in a special bath.

After washing, the lower element is impregnated with clean diesel fuel, and the upper and middle elements with fresh hot engine oil. Fuel and oil are then allowed to drip off the elements, and the air cleaner is reassembled and reinstalled.

Frequency of air cleaner servicing is determined by flashing of the warning unit lamp, after which the engine may be kept running for a maximum of two hours.

Utmost care should also be taken of the condition and fastening of the air cleaner, avoiding infiltration of contaminated air into the cylinders, for dust contained in it causes rapid wear of the cylinder walls.

Maintenance of normal thermal conditions on the basis of instrument readings assumes particular importance in a desert.

The recommended temperature of the coolant (water with a three-component additive) with the engine running on diesel fuel or kerosene is 70 to 90°C and on petrol 80 to 100°C; maximum permissible temperature is 115°C. If the coolant heats up to this latter temperature (a signal lamp to the right of the driver's vision device comes on), it is necessary to decrease the load on the engine, i.e. to shift to a lower gear and accelerate.

Before shutting off the engine the coolant temperature should not be more than 90°C when diesel fuel or kerosene is used, and not more than 80°C with the engine working on petrol.

To avoid engine overheating, it is essential to change over the centrifugal cooling fan, whose drive includes two speeds, to the higher speed as soon as the ambient air temperature exceeds 25°C.

Thermal conditions are also influenced by the level of the coolant in the expansion tank and cooler. When water is used as coolant, this level should be 65-70 mm from the top of the cooler and expansion tank filler necks.

Oil temperature in the engine lubrication system is normally maintained at 70-100°C. If ambient air temperature is below 35°C or above 35°C oil temperature should be not more than 115°C or 120°C respectively.

If the engine is operating under normal thermal conditions, it is preferable to maintain oil pressure in the lubrication system within the following limits: with an engine speed of 800 rpm, 2 kgf/cm<sup>2</sup>, 1,600-1,900 rpm, 5-10 kgf/cm<sup>2</sup>. When oil temperature is lower than 75°C, an increase in pressure up to 12 kgf/cm<sup>2</sup> is permissible. After the engine has accumulated 300 operating hours a drop of pressure to 4 kgf/cm<sup>2</sup> is permissible.

Use of oils of unspecified grades and mixtures of specified grades is impermissible.

The complicated conditions of operating combat equipment in deserts call for especial care of the tank transmission control linkage, regular checks of joints, rods and control parameters.

The control parameters of control linkages, except the stopping brake linkage, are constant. Their compliance with the standards is usually checked during maintenance No. 2, after replacing the gearbox, and distributors, or after other operations affecting linkage control parameters.

Of no lesser importance is thorough servicing of the track and suspension system, including timely replenishment of oil in the bearings of road wheels, idler wheels and rocker wheel arm housings, and checking of correct track tensioning by the sag between the second and third track return rollers. It should be borne in mind that insufficient track tensioning is conducive to their jamming or slipping-off during a sharp turn.

If track tensioning proves impossible with the idler wheel brought completely forward, one track shoe is removed from each track. In doing so care should be taken to see that the number of track shoes remaining is the same on the right and the left. When four track shoes are removed, it is advisable to interchange the position of the

right and left drive sprockets and to replace track pins. If removal of another three track shoes from each track fails to tension the latter, it is replaced together with the sprockets.

Keeping the tank in constant combat readiness in dry hot climate necessitates timely and full-scale maintenance. The following kinds of maintenance are prescribed for the T-72 tank:

- **check inspection** before leaving the park, at halts, and before and after negotiating a water obstacle;

- **daily maintenance**, every time the vehicle leaves the park;

- **maintenance No. 1**, after every 1,600-km vehicle run;

- **maintenance No. 2**, after every 3,200-km vehicle run.

Each kind of maintenance presupposes specific operations. The fuller the account taken of the peculiarities of operating combat equipment in deserts, the more effective these operations are.

COPYRIGHT: "Soviet Military Review," No 12, 1982

CSO: 1812/72

## GROUND FORCES

### TANK BATTALION: RIVER FORCING EXERCISE

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 1, Jan 83 pp 19-21

[Article published under the heading "Combat Training", by Col M. Loginov, Cand. Sc. (History): "Forcing a River on the Move"]

[Text]

When crossing rivers a Tk Bn may be a part of the main force or operate independently as an advanced detachment or advance guard.


The experience of the Great Patriotic War and subsequent exercises show that a successful forcing of water barriers is impossible without a reliable destruction of the enemy by fire. The mission of the artillery is to destroy the enemy before the water barrier, ensuring the advance of the forces to the initial line, to carry out fire preparation and fire support of the crossing and the attack on the opposite bank.

As a rule the advance of a Tk Bn to the initial line is carried out according to the plan of the superior commander.

Success of forcing a river depends to a great extent on the correct use of the AD weapons at the disposal of the Tk Bn CO. They must beat off enemy air attacks, destroy fire support helicopters, particularly at the beginning of the crossing by the companies of the first echelon.

At an exercise the following situation arose. An advanced detachment (a Mts Inf Bn) approaching a water barrier was attacked by "enemy" aircraft and sustained heavy "losses." The superior commander decided to assign the mission of capturing a bridgehead to the advance guard — the 1st Tk Bn reinforced with a Mts Inf Coy on IFVs, batteries of self-propelled howitzers and mortars, AD, engineer and tracked amphibious ferry platoons and radiation and chemical reconnaissance sections.

Moving along the Melenki-Gerasimovo highway (see Sketch) the advance guard had the mission not to allow the "enemy" reconnaissance to approach the guarded column, to destroy his





small security elements and when meeting superior forces to secure advantageous conditions for the main forces to enter battle.

At 0920 hrs the Bn CO, being some 20 km east of Melenki, received by radio an operation instruction which said: "Avoiding an 'engagement,' rapidly approach the Buraya River, force it in the sector: north-western slopes of Dlinnaya Hill-fisherman's house and capture the line: Hill 61.9-Hill 59.1."

Having specified the mission Major Melov sent forward an additional combat reconnaissance patrol consisting of a tank platoon. An advance party (1st Tk Coy less a PI) was ordered to increase speed and, bypassing "enemy" centres of resistance, to capture the bridge on the move while other subunits were to prepare to force the Buraya River on the move.

At 1015 hrs a message was received from Lieutenant Petrov, a combat reconce patrol commander. It said that the "enemy" had blown up the bridge, the width of the river being 130-150 m, speed of current 0.4-0.5 m/sec; river bed sandy, hard and descents to the river on the eastern bank gentle. The western bank was slightly steep in some places.

In the area: Ovalnaya Wood-Kvadratnaya Wood-Posyolok up to an infantry company was holding defences. An attempt to cross the Buraya River south of the fisherman's house failed. Having organised observation posts on Dlinnaya Hill and on the north-western edge of Seraya Wood the combat reconnaissance patrol began to make a turning movement through Dubovy Wood in order to cross the river in the Dmitrovka area.

At 1030 hrs a message from the advance party commander was received which said: "Having bypassed centre of resistance, reached eastern suburb of Melenki, are fighting small 'enemy' groups."

The battalion CO having charged Captain Ivanov, Chief of Staff, with leading the column, took the artillery officers and went to the advance party which had been assigned the mission to capture Melenki by this time.

In Melenki he gave instructions for a secret disposition of subunits on the southern edge of Dubovy Wood and in Seraya Wood while he himself with the commanders of Mts Inf and Tk Coys, howitzer and mortar batteries, an engineer platoon and a platoon of tracked self-propelled ferries advanced to the observation post on the north-western edge of Seraya Wood.

By 1220 hrs work on the terrain with the subunit commanders was ended. The officers studied the sector of the forced crossing and the character of the "enemy" defences from two OPs.

Having taken his decision, the advance guard commander assigned combat missions to subunits and organized cooperation. By that time the self-propelled howitzer and mortar batteries had taken up fire positions and prepared for opening fire, while the 1st Tk Coy had begun to advance secretly to the line: western slopes of Dlinnaya Hill-western edge of Seraya Wood for direct fire. Tracked amphibious ferries concentrated on the north-western edge of Seraya Wood. Engineer subunits completed clearing passages through mine fields on the eastern bank of the Buraya River.

After an unsuccessful attempt to cross the river in the Dmitrovka area, the combat reconce patrol on the order of the Bn CO moved forward to the north-western slopes of Dlinnaya Hill. By that time the 2nd and 3rd Tk Coys had reached Melenki.

The advance guard commander concept was to capture the line: eastern edge of Ovalnaya Wood-quarry with support of self-propelled artillery fire and to develop the offensive in the direction of the settlement.

Major Melov decided to assume two-echelon combat formation. The 1st echelon: on the right—a Mts Inf Coy with an engineer section was to force the river north of the highway and capture the line: north-western edge of Ovalnaya Wood-separate house. After crossing to the western bank of the Buraya River the 3rd Tk Coy was to enter battle on the right flank of the battalion and act jointly with the Mts Inf Coy. On the left the 2nd Tk Coy with a Mts Inf Pl and an engineer section was to force the Buraya River south of the highway and to capture the line: separate house-quarry.

The 2nd echelon — the 1st Tk Coy on tracked self-propelled ferries was to follow the 2nd Tk Coy or the 3rd Tk Coy along the river bed and advance in the direction: separate house-settlement and be ready to widen the bridgehead to repulse counterattacks from Zemlyanichnaya Wood.

Reconnaissance and preparation of a track for tanks to cross along the river bed in the direction: Dlinnaya Hill-Ovalnaya Wood was planned to begin after the capture of the western bank of the Buraya River.

The 3rd Tk Coy was assigned the mission to begin sealing tanks in the area of the southern edge of Dubovy Wood, while an AD Pl was to cover the crossing of tanks and fire positions of the artillery and mortars. The initial line for crossing was south-western edge of Dubovy Wood-eastern edge of Seraya Wood.

Taking into consideration the fact that cooperation while forcing a river is hampered because of actions of subunits on opposite banks, Major Melov paid particular attention to this question. He concretely designated targets at which self-propelled howitzers, mortars and tanks advanced for direct fire were to open up. Then he specified the time of the tracked self-propelled ferries' approach to the water edge. He determined the signal for tanks to start submerging. He gave concrete instructions when and how to carry out reconnaissance and preparation of the underwater track. He assigned the 1st Tk Coy the mission to cover the actions of the diver recce men, established the method of communication between them for calling fire, organised an evacuation and recovery service.

Major Melov foresaw several variants of distributing tanks for crossing on the tracked self-propelled ferries and along the river bed. It was planned to take self-propelled artillery and AD mounts across the river in the tracked self-propelled ferries immediately after the tanks and the mortars in the IFVs of the left-flank platoon.

The river was forced successfully. The artillery and mortars neutralised the "enemy" on the western bank of the Buraya and the IFVs quickly approached the river and began to force it. Tracked amphibious ferries of the first trip loaded and left after them. Meanwhile the artillery and the 1st Tk Coy continued to fire at the "enemy" positions. By a surprise attack the Mts Inf Coy supported by tanks captured the line: eastern edge of Ovalnaya Wood-eastern slopes of Hill 59.1. However the further advance was stopped because of intensive flank fire from Hill 61.9 and Kvadratnaya Wood.

During this time combat engineers, having ascertained the depth of the river and the profile of its bed in the contemplated direction began defusing anchored mines and installing signposts. Soon the underwater track for tanks was ready. By that time the tracked self-propelled ferries managed to carry out two trips and were now approaching the western bank with the 3rd Pl of the 2nd Tk Coy. The Bn CO having left his chief of staff to control the crossing of the remaining subunits of the advance guard, crossed with the 3rd Pl.

The "enemy" trying to liquidate the bridgehead captured on the western bank of the Buraya River began to advance his reserves from Zemlyanichnaya Wood for a counterattack in the direction: Hill 59.1-bridge. Two tanks of the 2nd Tk Coy were hit by flank fire from an antitank gun from Kvadratnaya Wood. The motorised infantry subunits also sustained "losses." In the given situation

the tanks' readiness to cross along the river bed was very opportune. The 1st Tk Coy (less a Pl) and the remaining tanks of the 2nd Tk Coy began to force a crossing.

The 1st Tk Bn CO, being in the area of the bridge on the western bank of the river assigned by radio the commanders of the 1st and 3rd Tk Coys the mission to bypass Ovalnaya Wood and attack the "enemy" in the direction: Hill 61.9-eastern suburb of the settlement-western slopes of Hill 59.1.

A surprise attack of the 1st and 3rd Tk Coys played its role. The "enemy" began to withdraw. At that time the 2nd Tk Coy captured a strong point in Kvadratnaya Wood and thus broadened the bridgehead. The 1st Tk Bn successfully fulfilled the assigned mission. The daring and well-grounded decisions of the advance guard commander, the sufficient training of the personnel of the tank and motorised infantry subunits as well as the competence of the combat engineers who quickly reconnoitred and organised the route for tanks to cross along the river bed considerably favoured this.

COPYRIGHT: "Soviet Military Review", No 1, 1983

CSO: 1812/076

## GROUND FORCES

### PREPARATIONS FOR NIGHT COMBAT DISCUSSED

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 1, Jan 83 pp 22-23

[Article by Eng Col N. Andreyev: "Preparing Fighting Equipment for Night Operation"]

[Text]

---

Modern forces are equipped with optical and optoelectronic devices designed for reconnaissance, observation and weapon sighting in the dark.

Providing the possibility to conduct night fighting without any hindrance these and other devices impose great demands on logistical support of forces.

---

Night fighting causes great difficulties in orientating on the terrain, observing the battlefield, using weapons and equipment or manoeuvring. Under the circumstances it is also much more difficult to maintain combat cooperation, to negotiate obstacles and so on. Therefore, men and materiel must be prepared thoroughly for night operations.

The most important measure to be taken in the anticipation of night actions is checking the availability, completeness and working order of night vision devices, illumination devices (head lamps, searchlights), black-out and identification lights. Night sights are collimated, whereas the light beams of searchlights and head lamps are aligned in the direction of sighting with the use of night vision devices. If necessary, the working of small arms provided with night sights is checked.

Luminous signs visible in the darkness are sometimes made on tanks, IFVs, APCs and other vehicles. Survey equipment is prepared for night operation. Commanders must supervise how their subordinates prepared special equipment for calculating bearing grid angles for astroorientation and celestial tables for use. If vehicles lack black-

out facilities for their head (side) lamps and clearance lights, these must be manufactured from locally available materials.

Due attention must be paid to illumination of weapons in tow and trailers. Thus, gun barrels are provided with clearance lights or at least with black-out reflectors (cat's eyes).

Subunits are supplied with extra stocks of illuminating and signal flares.

During night operations, besides fire missions, artillery subunits provide illumination support for motorised infantry and tank subunits. The former can also be used to illuminate the terrain, barrage lines, to mark reference points and range by means of illumination and also to blind enemy observers. To this end it is necessary to place the appropriate order with artillery subunits and to procure and distribute, as specified, artillery ammunition and mortar shells loaded with illuminating, smoke and marker projectiles.

By night it is difficult to determine the coordinates and heights of directing guns, CP-OPs, firing positions and artillery reconnaissance posts. Therefore, their referencing is effected in daytime, as far as possible. If this can be done only after dark, survey equipment must be used.

As the men's efficiency is reduced at night, it is especially important to provide them with normal operating conditions. For instance, fire control posts and computer stations are provided with lighting equipment which must be checked before dark.

To be ready for night operations, technical support and logistical subunits are provided with black-out devices, lighting equipment to illuminate their working places and luminous markers to designate deployment lines, supply and evacuation routes.

These forces are supplied with black-out tents under which to repair weapons and combat equipment. Proceeding from the mission assigned such tents are set up in sites permitting their camouflage.

It is advisable to use blue light bulbs for illuminating working places with headlights or portable lanterns. Depending on the mission being fulfilled the men are supplied with flash lights or headlamps (like those of miners) fed from portable power sources (storage batteries). Traffic controllers wear belts with black-out lights to avoid danger from vehicles.

Night vision devices are provided for technical observation posts, repair and evacuation parties.

To prepare the men for night operations, they must have practical training or, if time is short, be

instructed thoroughly. The trainees are familiarised with the use of night observation instruments, night sights, searchlights and other lighting equipment. They must be able to determine target range with the use of range scales and be skilful enough to determine sighting range and aiming point by moving targets or illumination devices used by the enemy.

When being trained or instructed the men are informed once more of the common faults of night sights and observation instruments and how to reveal and eliminate them. Trainees are acquainted with the maintenance procedure of this equipment and how to avoid the blinding effect of the opposite instrument illumination. Simultaneously the men learn to use lighting equipment for blinding enemy operators dealing with observation instruments and with guidance and control of ATGMs.

Vehicle crews using survey equipment and navigational aids must learn the procedure of initial orientation, how to prepare navigational aids for operation and introduce initial data. They must know driving and orientation rules and the procedure for putting the apparatus out of operation.

Great responsibility falls on commanders, their deputies for technical service and company technicians for training motor vehicle and APC drivers, tank and IFV driver-mechanics in night driving. In the course of training they deal with the following questions: night instrument driving, moving in column, orientation on the terrain, rules of black-out discipline and carrying troops and loads, etc.

To achieve success in night operations, the men must show resourcefulness and resolve, be self-confident and persistent in fulfilling the assigned mission.

It should be stressed that today night fighting is more common than ever. To cope with all the difficulties involved, night operations must be thoroughly prepared and given all-round support.

COPYRIGHT: "Soviet Military Review", No 1, 1983

CSO: 1812/076

## GROUND FORCES

### ANTI-TANK ARTILLERY DISCUSSED

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 1, Jan 83 pp 24-25

[Article, published under the heading "Weapons and Equipment", by Maj Gen Arty G. Girukov, D. Sc. (Military), Professor: "Antitank Artillery"]

[Text]

**The demand for special antitank weapons arose with the emergence of tanks on the battlefield. Modern forces are equipped with various antitank weapons, including hand grenades, grenade launchers, mines and combat helicopters. At the same time antitank artillery continues to play a great role in fighting enemy tanks.**

The fire of antitank weapons has always been and is now the backbone of antitank defence. At first the main weapon used to fight tanks was conventional field artillery, which engaged tanks by indirect and, later, by direct fire.

The perfecting of tanks and their massed use necessitated the development of special antitank artillery and airborne weapons as well as engineer and other means for fighting various armoured targets.

The first antitank guns, with a calibre of 25-37 mm, were adopted by the Soviet Army in the late 1920s and early 1930s. In the late 1930s the forces began to receive 45-mm guns. True, their armour-piercing ability was less than 50-70 mm and therefore they could engage only light and certain types of medium tanks.

The equipment of the Nazi forces with medium and, later, heavy tanks during the Second World War brought about the emergence of more effective weapons and ammunition.

In 1942 the Soviet Army adopted for service a 76-mm gun, and in 1943, a 57-mm gun with an armour-piercing ability of 100 mm. The 100-mm antitank gun developed in 1944 could pierce armour more than 160 mm thick.

Armour-piercing ability is the most important characteristic of any antitank weapon. During the Great Patriotic War the Soviet industry was continuously increasing the power of antitank ammunition. Hard-core and hollow-charge shells developed during the war had twice as great armour-piercing ability as conventional projectiles, which made them very effective against any type of Nazi tanks and



self-propelled guns, including Tigers and Ferdinands. So the competition between armour and shell by the end of the war was in favour of the latter.

Artillery acting in close cooperation with infantry, tanks and aviation constituted the backbone of antitank defence. Experience proved the expediency of locating antitank artillery in company and batallion positions and concentrating powerful antitank reserves in the hands of combined-arms commanders to ensure high stability of the defensive as a whole and the possibility of fighting enemy armoured vehicles with organic means. Antitank defence became the basis of the defensive and its organisation the most important responsibility of commanders and headquarters at all levels. These requirements underlie contemporary views as well.

The quantitative growth and qualitative perfection of antitank and other types of artillery, and wide manoeuvre with it on the battlefield made it possible to increase its operational density in tank-threatened directions. For example, during the Battle of Stalingrad the density of antitank artillery was 10-15 pieces per 1 km of frontage as compared with 3-5 km in 1941. In the Battle of Kursk the density increased to 23 artillery pieces per 1 km, and in the Balaton defensive operation it reached 30-40 pieces. The depth of the antitank defence also showed a considerable increase — from 2-3 km in 1941 to 30-35 km in the Battle of Kursk, and up to 30-50 km in the Balaton operation. Antitank defence swallowed up, so to speak, the enemy tank attack so that it could not develop.

The main method for fighting tanks was to engage them by direct fire and the most suitable combat formation for antitank artillery was a "loose" formation, best suited for organising killing grounds.

High efficiency of Soviet artillery and antitank weapons and the staunchness of Soviet servicemen shattered the myth of the invincibility of the nazi armoured hordes. In the Battle of Moscow, Stalingrad and Kursk alone the artillerymen destroyed over 4,600 tanks and assault guns. It often happened that Soviet gunners managed to destroy dozens and even hundreds of armoured vehicles in one engagement. For example, during the Battle of Moscow, on October 25, 1941 alone the 289th antitank regiment destroyed 37 tanks. At Stalingrad, on August 7, 1942 the artillerymen of the 552nd and 1183rd antitank regiments put out of action 109 tanks and self-propelled guns. In the Battle of Kursk the 1837th antitank regiment drew the enemy into a killing ground and on July 8, 1943 destroyed 36 nazi tanks and self-propelled guns in 8 minutes.

Modern combat can hardly be imagined without well-organised antitank defence. Its organisation has become the most important task of forces and a constituent part of any combined-arms operation. This explains the attention paid to developing weapons and methods of destroying armoured targets in all types of combat operations, especially in the defensive. The continuing improvement of the armour, manoeuvrability and firepower of tanks necessitated improvement of the armour-piercing ability, accuracy and range of fire of antitank weapons.

The aggressive war waged by Israel against Lebanon showed that good results have been achieved in this field. According to TASS, the Syrian troops armed with Soviet weapons inflicted heavy losses on the enemy while repulsing the aggressor's attacks, destroying 120 tanks and much other combat materiel.

Nowadays every unit has modern artillery. As to their combat characteristics, all antitank subunits can be divided into three groups: those equipped with recoilless weapons, with antitank guns and with antitank missile systems.

Each of the above-mentioned weapons has its own peculiarities.

The 1-1.5-km effective range and the 3-4 rounds/min rate of fire allow modern recoilless weapons to fight successfully APCs, IFVs and medium tanks. They proved effective on any terrain, at any time of the day and in any weather conditions.

Antitank guns are characterised by high muzzle velocity, and accuracy. This enables them to hit attacking tanks with the first or second shot at a distance of up to 2 km.

Antitank guided missiles (ATGM) can destroy any armoured target. They possess the highest armour-piercing ability — about 400-600 mm. Reliable control makes it possible to hit any target with the first or second missile before the tanks deploy into combat formation, i.e. before they can open aimed fire. The experience of local wars proved the high efficiency of these weapons, especially in open country.

The competition between tanks and antitank weapons, between armour and shell goes on. This competition determines the trends of the development of antitank weapons in all armies.

Apparently future task No. 1 will be to increase the armour-piercing ability. In any case we may assume and many foreign military experts hold the same view, that fuller use of the shaped-charge effect will result in a considerable increase of armour-piercing ability.

There will be continued improvement of accuracy of fire to ensure target destruction by the first shot in order to exclude return fire.

Fighting tanks and other armoured vehicles will always entail the problem of increasing the range of antitank weapons.

We may expect further increase in the mobility and survivability of antitank weapons by strengthening their armour protection, decreasing their mass and overall dimensions, and making them amphibious, airtransportable and all-terrain.

Summing up, we should note that the equipment of units with antitank artillery and other antitank weapons results from the necessity to counter the mass employment of armoured vehicles by massing, both in frontage and in depth, weapons which can successfully fight them.

COPYRIGHT: "Soviet Military Review", No 1, 1983

CSO: 1812/076

## AIR DEFENSE FORCES

### AIR DEFENSE MISSILE SUBUNIT TRAINING DISCUSSED

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 12, Dec 82 pp 19-21

[Article by Maj A. Yakubovskiy, under the heading "I Serve the Soviet Union": "Stronger than Any Alloy"]

[Text]

The USSR's air frontier extends over a distance of 60,000 kilometres. This invisible, unmarked line passes over mountain peaks, virgin taiga, boundless deserts, seas and oceans. The Air Defence Forces maintain a constant guard over the inviolability of this conventional, but absolutely clear line.

There is a story about the officers and men of the Air Defence unit under Major A. Berkutov.

#### CONCERN NUMBER ONE

As Major A. Berkutov registered the report on the appearance of "enemy" aircraft he took a look at his watch.

It was 0842 hours. Numerous instruments and devices filled the command post with an even, gentle hum. Reports reached Major A. Berkutov's ear. He also heard the clicks of switches and saw the shimmering green light of the displays and screens. As the scanning beam described one circle after another it bumped into air targets which immediately flashed and then slowly faded. The operator reported:

"Target speed... Height... Course..."

But even before his report ended the major saw that the "enemy" aircraft were on the remotest border of his zone, flying at medium height and maintaining a steady course without radar countermeasures. He knew from past experience that the "enemy" would resort to manoeuvre and radar jamming at a later stage, when the tension reached its peak. Meanwhile, the "enemy," realising that he was out of range, did not consider it necessary to conceal his movement.

Berkutov recalled an incident which occurred during a recent exercise. Developments had taken a totally different turn then. The "enemy" resorted to intensive radar jamming from the outset. High speed aircraft flew at low altitude and attacked the defended objective from several directions simultaneously. However, all the air defence subunits showed splendid team-work. The tactical

devices, dense radar jamming and constant manoeuvres failed to secure success for the "enemy." Every missile scored a direct hit. On that day Major A. Berkutov's subunit was highly commended for its splendid performance. The superiors expressed a high opinion of his men's proficiency. Senior Sergeant A. Lisetskis and Sergeant A. Ambrutis were awarded the "For Distinguished Services" Medal.

Yes, indeed his subunit accomplished its mission. However, neither Berkutov nor the other officers were lulled into complacency. They were well aware of the level of the men's training and saw they could do better to raise their action readiness. This gave the socialist emulation movement in honour of the sixtieth anniversary of the formation of the USSR a fresh impulse. And now, on the eve of this red letter day, the officers and men were to pass another rigorous test.

Information was flowing into the command post. The data was immediately reflected on the plotting board, summed up and systematised. The course steered by the air targets gave a clear idea of the "enemy's" intention. He was apparently eager to launch a massive attack under cover of intensive radar jamming. But Berkutov exhibited no haste in arriving at a decision. The "enemy" was overdoing it a bit: the demonstration of his intentions was too obvious. This caused Berkutov to be watchful. One more minute passed... Then another. At this moment Private A. Pshigusov spotted a new target. Berkutov wondered how the boy had managed to distinguish the blip in many splashes on the screen. It should be mentioned that Pshigusov only reaffirmed the reputation of ace spotter and tracker he had earned in the subunit.

The barely visible blip was moving rather fast. Every second it got closer and closer to the objective the subunit was defending. The threat of penetration of the air defence system was very real. Major Berkutov needed only a few seconds to designate the targets. The high speed low flying target was destroyed with the first missile. Though the "enemy" made several more attempts to reach the objective, they all failed.

When the "all clear" signal was sounded to mark the end of the exercise the clock showed 1157 hours. The more than three hour engagement with "enemy" aircraft had flashed like a single moment. Berkutov was now thinking of what he should say to his officers and men. This was only a fleeting test. More were lying ahead. The search for new ways to improve combat readiness and fighting proficiency was still concern number one. That was the way it was yesterday, that was the way it would be tomorrow.

### HONOURABLE DUTY

In summer the heat is intense here. The scorching sun heats the sand so fiercely that the men feel it through the soles of their boots. Even a breeze brings no relief, only the dry breath of the desert. There is not a single tree or grass-blade anywhere. All you can see is sand, sand and more sand.

In winter it is the other way round. A chilling wind blows practically every day. It precipitates blizzards on the area. The frosts are harsh. But no whim of nature can disrupt the established routine of military duty. The missiles on the launching pads can be set off at any moment, at any time of the day. The noses of the missiles point upward. The aeri-als rotate. The radar scopes in the rooms shimmer as the aeri-als scan the air space within a range of several hundred kilometres.

The equipment is in reliable hands. There are many excellent specialists, masters of their trade, in the subunits. Among them are Major Yu. Fadin, Senior Lieutenant A. Mi-sharin, Sergeants A. Stadnik, S. Safarov, Privates B. Gasy-mov, F. Nidoyev and S. Nikulin. You will find men of all the nations and nationalities of the USSR serving in the subunit: Russians, Uzbeks, Azerbaijanis, Byelorussians, Lith-u-ani-ans, Ukrainians, Georgians, Kazakhs and Letts. They are officers, praporshchiks, sergeants and privates living like a close-knit family. These men from the fifteen constituent Union Republics are united by a common duty, namely service in the Soviet Army. Service in the Armed Forces of the USSR is an honourable duty of every Soviet citizen. Therefore, everybody regardless of his nationality, rank, post and age does his best.

The Communists invariably set an example to the others. They are the cementing force of the subunit. Their leader is Major Fadin, secretary of the Party organisation. Yuri Alexandrovich Fadin is an excellent specialist. He is not only competent in knowledge of equipment. The young officers learn from him his methods of work with the men, he inspires them with a sense of pride in the work they do, he teaches them to see its romantic aspect and social importance. Yuri Fadin's prestige rests on his knowledge and wealth of experience. He started to serve here upon completing military school 13 years ago. Many changes have taken place since he arrived. He has been duly promoted. He completed the military academy by correspon-dence. Having been appointed to a higher post he continues to carry out his duties in exemplary fashion.

The other officers and men of the subunit are equally enthusiastic about their duties. When I interviewed them they said many kind words about their commanders, who are always ready to assist them. For instance, Private T. Ye-kubov said he would never forget how Sergeant A. Yusyavi-chus helped him master the speciality of missile guidance operator, how he "coached" him in off-duty hours, passing over to him knowledge and experience, supported him in difficulties and persistently guided him along the path to proficiency. Yekubov will always remember the day he was first commended for skillful performance at a tactical exercise and the warmth with which Sergeant A. Yusyavi-chus congratulated him on the occasion. Such events are unforgettable.

It is precisely friendship that helps the men accomplish their missions. Once Junior Sergeant A. Krivosov said:

"Our service is not easy. But it gives me a sense of pride and satisfaction to realise that we are coping with our duties. It is an honourable duty for us vigilantly to stand guard over the air frontier of our Homeland."

"See, I got a letter from home. Dad and mum send you their regards, wishes of success and an invitation to visit them after active service. It will be a real celebration when you come."

Armen cannot help smiling when he speaks of his native Armenia, the traditions and customs of his hospitable people. His comrades rejoice at the good news Armen received from home. They are Private Saidalli Namadov, Junior Sergeants Nikolai Yaroshevsky, Vakhtan Umakhanov and Vladimir Sokur. An Armenian, a Uzbek, a Russian, a Chechen and a Ukrainian. They are all members of a small but friendly collective, a team that embodies the true friendship, fraternity and immutable unity of the peoples inhabiting the Soviet Union.

This friendship has deep roots and long-standing traditions. Vladimir Ilyich Lenin stood at its source. His ideas about a voluntary union of many nations and nationalities, a union based on principles of proletarian internationalism, have stood the test of time, they have survived all tests and been implemented in life. The present achievements of every Republic prove that the course the Communist Party has been steering for 60 years is sound. This point has been repeatedly made at thematic evenings held in the subunit on the topic "At the Map of Our Homeland." They include talks, lectures on the country's history and the contribution of the peoples of the USSR to building communism. At these evenings international events, the Soviet Union's peace initiatives designed to promote detente have been discussed at length.

A few words about the men. Sergeant Alexei Stadnik, section leader, secretary of the YCL organisation, is an excellent soldier. Before entering the army he completed an agricultural institute and worked as chief zootechnician on a collective farm in Zhitomir Region, the Soviet Ukraine.

Private Grigory Silantsev, one of the best electricians of the subunit, was born in the Kalmyk Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. There he grew up, completed his secondary education and learnt the trade of tractor operator. Then he worked at a factory. Now he is serving in the army. He has been repeatedly commended for excellent results in combat training and political education. He was once awarded home leave as a record for achievements in line of duty.

The sergeants' and privates' plans for the future are very interesting. Some intend to enter higher educational establishments. Others wish to return to their factories, plants, construction sites, collective farms and state farms where they worked before joining the army. Still others, including Junior Sergeant V. Babulo and Private I. Nezhukhivsky, have decided to become regular officers.

These are plans for the foreseeable future. Meanwhile the privates, sergeants, praporshchiks and officers improve

their proficiency. This military subunit has gathered men from the fifteen Union Republics. Their strength is in unity, and there is no alloy stronger than the one tempered by Lenin's ideas about Friendship, Fraternity, Equality and Happiness of the peoples inhabiting the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

COPYRIGHT: "Soviet Military Review," No 12, 1982

CSO: 1812/72

## NAVAL FORCES

### SEA SICKNESS TREATED SUCCESSFULLY BY HYPNOSIS

[Editorial Report] Moscow SOVETSKAYA MEDITSINA in Russian No 9, Sep 82 (signed to press 2 Sep 82) carries on pages 119-120 a 900-word article by S.A. Kulakov entitled "Psychotherapy in the treatment of sea sickness." Research showed that 60-80 percent of seamen experience sea sickness in a 5-6 ball storm. A study was conducted using 22 seamen. None of this group responded to standard anti-motion preparations. Eight responded to the use of tranquilizers of the diazepam group, using a dosage of 10-20 mg/day. The remaining 14 responded to neither the anti-motion compounds nor the tranquilizers. In view of the ineffectiveness of the medication, the seamen were subjected to two-four sessions of hypnotherapy after which they were monitored over a period of 6 months to a year. For the majority, the hypnotherapy was successful. Only one or two seamen needed follow-up sessions. On the basis of these experiments, the author feels that hypnotherapy for the treatment of sea sickness merits wide application throughout the fleet.

COPYRIGHT: "Sovetskaya meditsina", 1982

CSO: 1801/127



## PERCEPTIONS, VIEWS, COMMENTS

### COMMENTS ON FOREIGN ANTI-TANK MISSILE SYSTEMS

Moscow TEKHNKA I VOORUZHENIYE in Russian No 12, Dec 81 (signed to press 17 Nov 81) pp 10-11 and rear cover

[Article based on "materials from the foreign press," by Engr-Maj V. Alekseyenko, candidate of technical sciences: "Anti-Tank Missile Systems"]

[Text] At the present time work is proceeding abroad on a wide front on the development of new antitank missile systems. In such work the main tasks assigned to the workers are: increasing accuracy and range in the launches of antitank guided missiles; increasing their armor penetrability; and increasing the survival and mobility of the systems on the battlefield.

#### Range

In the solution of this problem foreign military specialists are singling out two aspects: the creation of more powerful sustainer motors (direct increase in range) and the creation of guidance systems which will insure reliability in hitting the target in any weather conditions (day or night) at great distances. It is planned to develop powerful solid-fuel sustainer motors and install them in both existing and new antitank guided missiles. The main course for increasing the effectiveness of rocket motors is considered to be the use of new solid fuels which have higher energy characteristics. They plan to increase the maximum launch range of prospective antitank guided missiles by 5-6 kilometers with the new motors. They consider that in the process another very important task will also be resolved--increasing the flight speed of the ATGM. This will make it possible, in the view of the foreign specialists, to create multipurpose systems which can successfully destroy both ground armored targets as well as air targets.

Under consideration is the possibility of launching existing and development-stage aviation missiles from ground launchers (earlier it was assumed that they would be used only from airplanes and helicopters). They consider that the maximum launch range of such a missile would be as much as 6 kilometers. They plan to develop two ground systems with such an antitank guided missile: one to be mounted on a wheeled vehicle with two missiles, and the other on a tracked armored personnel carrier with a basic load of 8 missiles.

For more effective tracking of the ATGM over a great launch range it is planned to use new types of reflectors mounted in the tail section of the missile. Considered promising for accomplishing this are lasers, particularly a carbon dioxide laser reflector operating in the 10.6 micron wave length.

Great significance is attached to increasing the operational range of anti-tank missile systems at night. To accomplish this task it is planned to equip systems with passive thermal night sights which have a range of up to 2-3 kilometers under any type of night visibility conditions, during rain, fog, snow, etc.

There are reports on the development of a thermal sight operating in the 9-12 micron wave length with a maximum target (tank) detection range of two kilometers.

#### Accuracy

In the opinion of foreign experts it is almost impossible to increase the firing accuracy of ATGMs to any significant extent with the use of existing semiautomatic wire-guided systems. Therefore they are concentrating their main efforts on the creation of fundamentally new missile guidance systems. In particular, one of the acceptable variants they are considering is a semiautomatic system of remote guidance with the use of a laser beam, which, in comparison with existing systems, has a higher degree of guidance accuracy. Such systems are being planned for use with the new generation light and heavy ATGMs (with launch ranges of 2 and 4-6 kilometers respectively). It is anticipated that these missiles, with their substantially greater flight speeds, will effectively destroy not only ground but also aerial targets.

Considered to be the most efficient are the automatic target-seeking systems which operate on the principle of "fire and forget." When firing, the gunner carries out only the initial aiming (target acquisition) and after that he plays no part in guiding the missile to the target. It is anticipated that in the process not only will there be higher firing accuracy, but also significantly lower negative effects on the operator under combat conditions.

At the present time foreign specialists are engaged in developing two main types of automatic target-seeking systems: with thermal and with radar homing warheads.

Considered to be promising is the equipping of ATGMs which have thermal homing warheads with a mosaic infra-red receiver positioned in the focal plane of the optical system. The first models of such warheads have been produced. It is reported that the mosaic (mozaichnyy) receiver contains more than 1,000 elements (devices from a coupled charge). Employed are electronic sensing of signals from each mosaic element. Acquisition of the target by the homing warhead is carried out prior to launch--during sighting. During missile flight the homing warhead insures automatic tracking of the target and guidance to it.

The weight of one of the portable systems with such a target-seeking warhead is approximately 16 kg. The system consists of a single-use launch tube with a detachable control unit. The shaped-charge missile has a built-in guidance unit and two solid-fuel sustainer motors. It is ejected from the launching tube by an ejection charge. The first motor begins to operate at a distance of three meters from the soldier. Such antitank missile systems are planned for use against armored ground targets and low-flying air targets.

The main advantage of the millimeter wave band homing warhead over the thermal homing warhead is considered to be its high operating capability under poor weather conditions and when smoke is used; a shortcoming--lower guidance accuracy. There have been reports on the development of a target-seeking warhead operating in the 35 gigahertz wave range and intended for mounting on various guided missiles, primarily on ATGMs.

The target-seeking warhead operates in two modes--active (radar) and passive (radiometric). The first mode is used for target search and acquisition, and the shift to the second mode occurs at the final portion of the missile's flight trajectory to the target. The warhead consists of three main elements: capped antennas, gimballed reflector, and an electronic package. The diameter of the homing warhead is 152 mm, emissive power in the active mode--4 watts, beam width--4.3°.

It is planned to use such target-seeking warheads in antitank projectiles of TOE 155-mm artillery systems or of special 155-mm launchers. The build-in components of such a projectile include two radiometric sensors the viewing angles of which are positioned 180° apart and at an angle of 90° to the flight direction of the projectile. Each sensor scans the terrain under the trajectory (see rear cover). Upon detection of a target of interest (tank, infantry fighting vehicle, armored personnel carrier, etc.) the target is hit on the top side, normally the least protected part, with a shaped charge, more accurately, a shaped impact core (on the formation of such a core, see below).


### Survivability


The main direction for increasing the survivability of ground antitank missile systems on the battlefield is considered to be that of mounting them on the self-propelled platforms of modern combat armored vehicles, thereby insuring that the systems will have high maneuverability and crew protection. Anti-tank missile systems mounted on infantry fighting vehicles have already been developed. Practically in all new modifications of ground self-propelled anti-tank guided missile systems foreign specialists are planning the creation of a design which will provide for an ATGM reload capability and for launching of the missile from inside the armored chassis. Such a design will significantly decrease crew vulnerability.

Of promise, in the opinion of foreign specialists, are self-propelled anti-tank missile systems which launch tubes mounted on a detachable remotely-

# САМОНАВЕДЕНИЕ ПТУР

1. Homing-Guidance warhead of the millimeter wave band





2. Principle of operation of an antitank missile system with a homing-guidance warhead  
к статье «Противотанковые ракетные комплексы», стр. 10.

controlled platform, which would enable the crew to carry out the launch from the cover of various shelters.

It is considered that antitank guided missile systems mounted on helicopters are less vulnerable to enemy fire than are systems on the ground. At the same time, it is noted that the necessity of flying the helicopter over the protective cover at the time of guiding the missile to the target makes the carrier vulnerable to enemy ground fire. For this reason, in order to increase the survivability of helicopter antitank guided missile systems, it is recommended that the firing be initiated when the helicopter is over friendly or neutral territory, or from an altitude of less than 15 meters. The latter variant is considered to be the best because the carriers, due to the interference created by the proximity to the ground surface and to the operation of combat equipment located on the field of battle, will not be detected by enemy radar stations and will be inaccessible to antiaircraft guided missile systems.

#### Armor Penetrability

Both in the modernization of existing and in the creation of new antitank missiles great attention is being devoted to increasing their armor penetrability. This is being achieved by equipping ATGMs with more powerful warheads, which, in turn, insures an increase in the caliber and weight of the warhead (for example, from 127-mm to 147-mm on the new TOW-2 ATGM).


Foreign specialists consider that a promising direction for increasing the armor penetrability of ATGMs is the development of tandem-type shaped-charge warheads with successive detonating shaped charges (two or more) positioned one behind the other. It has been reported that several models of tandem-type warheads have already been developed. It has been noted that the most difficulties are arising in the creation of a design which will insure strict in-turn operation of the shaped charges and the formation of an aggregate cumulative blast. Required to achieve this is very high accuracy in the preparation of all components.

Also being proposed for use in antitank artillery guided projectiles and ATGMs are warheads in the form of a shaped-charge core. In their design they are similar in many respects to conventional shaped-charge warheads, but they can be distinguished by the thick casing of the shaped-charge cone made of a heavy metal (normally lead). When the warhead explodes this casing is elongated into a core of considerable mass which travels at a speed of several kilometers a second. This core is, in effect, the impact core which has significant armor penetrability at a distance of several dozen meters.

It is planned to use the shaped-charge impact-core warheads on practically all future antitank missiles which destroy tanks and other armored equipment from above. There are also plans for using the shaped-charge impact-core warheads on antitank missiles with conventional flight trajectories. According to the reports of foreign specialists, such a design solution will be used on modernized models of ATGMs, which, in their opinion, could result in a multi-fold increase in the armor penetrability of missiles.

Р и с. 1. Структурная схема полуавтоматической системы телеориентации ПТУР в луче лазера (вариант): 1 — устройство запуска; 2 — программирующее устройство; 3, 7, 9, 11 — оптические модуляторы; 4, 8, 10, 12 — оптические линзы; 5 — лазер; 6 — блок питания; 13—16 — генераторы модулирующих напряжений; 17 — рули управления; 18 — сервомеханизмы; 19 — фотоприемник; 20 — оптический фильтр; 21 — линза;

**Ground apparatus**  
Наземная аппаратура



22 — приемник; 23 — счетно-решающее устройство; 24 — гироскоп. Система наведения состоит из наземной и бортовой аппаратуры. Основным элементом наземной аппаратуры является лазер с источником питания. Световой поток от работающего лазера проходит через оптические модуляторы и оптические подвижные и неподвижные цилиндрические линзы. В результате формируется четы-

ре оптических луча, образующих своеобразный «нодидор» в направлении цели. Бортовая аппаратура ПТУР обеспечивает движение ракеты по центру коридора. При отклонении ракеты от этого направления она перескачет один из световых лучей. Бортовая аппаратура принимает оптический сигнал, после обработки которого выдвигаются команды для корректировки траектории.

Р и с. 2. Формирование взаимно перпендикулярных пучков света в системе телеориентации в луче лазера (вариант): 1 — неподвижные цилиндрические зеркала; 2 — подвижные цилиндрические зеркала; 3 — дрические зеркала; 4 — сервопривод по оси Y; 5 — отклоняющее зеркало; 6 — светоделительное устройство; 7 — модуляторы; 8 — сервопривод по оси X; 9 — плоские взаимно перпендикулярные лучи.




Illustration 1. Block diagram of a semiautomatic system of remote guidance of an ATGM in a laser beam (variant):

- 1 - launching unit; 2 - programming unit; 3, 7, 9, 11 - optical modulators;
- 4, 8, 10, 12 - optical lenses; 5 - laser; 6 - power supply unit; 13-16 - simulating voltage generators; 17 - control surfaces; 18 - servomechanisms; 19 - photo-detector; 20 - optical filter; 21 - lens; 22 - detector; 23 - computer; 24 - gyroscope.

Other technical solutions are also being employed to increase armor penetrability. For example, on one of the ATGMs with the aid of a special rod the fuze is moved forward after firing approximately 20-30 cm ahead of the shaped-charge warhead. In such a case, in the opinion of the specialists, the armor penetrability will be increased as a result of the fact that after the explosion of the warhead there will be formed a shaped-charge blast which will be in the optimal form prior to contact with the armor barrier.

The guidance system consists of ground and on-board apparatuses. The main component of the ground apparatus is the laser with power supply unit. The light flux from the operating laser passes through the optical modulators and the optical devices, consisting of movable and fixed cylindrical lenses. As a result there are formed four optical beams forming a unique "corridor" in the direction of the target. The ATGM on-board apparatus ensures movement of the missile along the center of the corridor. When there is any deviation of the missile from this direction it crosses one of the light beams. The on-board apparatus receives the optical signal and after it is processed commands are generated for correcting the trajectory.

Illustration 2. Formation of mutually perpendicular light beams in remote guidance systems in a laser beam (variant).

1. fixed cylindrical mirrors;
2. Movable cylindrical mirrors;
3. servo-drive along the Y axis;
4. deflecting mirror;
5. light separating device;
6. modulators;
7. servodrive along the X axis;
8. Mutually perpendicular sheet beams.

COPYRIGHT: "Tekhnika i vooruzhaniya", 1981.

CSO: 1801/115



PERCEPTIONS, VIEWS, COMMENTS

COMMENTARY ON U.S. FOREIGN, MILITARY POLICIES

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 1, Jan 83 pp 2-3

[Editorial: "A Reliable Guarantor of Peace and Security"]

[Text]

**T**WO LINES have taken shape and are clashing in world politics today, two approaches to the foremost problems of our time. Two poles have been created which determine the globe's political climate.

At one of them are all who advocate the prevention of thermonuclear war, the cessation of the arms race and the resolution of controversial issues through peaceful means; in other words, detente via constructive negotiations, and peaceful coexistence between states with different social systems.

At the other pole are those who, in a bid to turn back the march of history, are intent on torpedoing detente and escalating the arms race, those who, in an effort to ignore the natural laws of historical development, are endeavouring to return humanity to cold war times, to cast it into the abyss of a thermonuclear catastrophe. By embarking upon this path, the imperialists are irresponsibly toying with the destiny of mankind.

The November Plenary Meeting of the CPSU Central Committee and the session of the USSR Supreme Soviet stressed that the Soviet Union is doing all in its power to hold the nuclear peril in check. It has advanced proposals calling for mutual refrainment from the use of nuclear weapons, limitation on their production and the cessation of their testing, the formation of non-nuclear zones, and the non-use of nuclear weapons against states which do not have them and prohibit their emplacement on their soil.

The whole world is familiar with the clear-cut proposals, proposals attuned to the interests and aspirations of the world's peoples, advanced by

the Soviet Union during negotiations with the United States on the limitation and reduction of strategic weapons, as well as at the Vienna negotiations on a mutual reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe.

The USSR does not limit itself to proposals designed to improve the international climate. It has undertaken a number of unilateral steps toward this goal. The USSR has reduced the number of its military contingent in Europe by 20,000 men and 1,000 tanks, and has unilaterally halted the deployment of medium-range nuclear devices capable of reaching targets in Western Europe. The USSR's pledge not to be the first to use nuclear weapons is a truly historic contribution to the cause of ensuring international peace and security.

There is no type of weapons which the USSR would not be prepared to prohibit or limit on a mutual basis. The Soviet proposal on a quantitative freezing of strategic weapons of the USSR and USA and restrictions on their modernisation accords with the demands of sober-minded politicians in the West, the United States included. The Soviet peace policy is winning the understanding and support of broad segments of the world public at large.

The popular masses on every continent are angrily protesting against Washington's aggressive policy. The adventurism, crudeness and un concealed egoism of this policy are evoking growing indignation in many countries, including among America's allies.

The US ruling circles have openly set out to move forward in amassing armaments. Tremendous funds are being allocated for bolstering the war machine, and the weapons pyramid is towering higher and higher. All sorts of lies are constantly fabricated about the Soviet Armed Forces and the Soviet Union's peaceable foreign policy. The aim of these lies is to create favourable conditions to push astronomical arms budgets through Congress against a backdrop of deceit, hysteria and chauvinistic frenzy.

The apologists of the arms race are planning a wide spectrum of versions of nuclear war: rapid and protracted, limited and all-out, and are trumpeting the concept of a first nuclear strike, in a wild bid to justify the "legality" of their insane position. With the cold calculation of grave-diggers, the American hawks and anti-Soviet maniacs are making guesses about the losses of the sides in a nuclear catastrophe, purposely concealing the fact that in a nuclear catastrophe, if it breaks out, there will be no victors.

Washington is calling for a "crusade" against communism and is acting the role of watchdog in the fight against the national liberation movement.

President Reagan is by no means limiting himself to rhetorical promises of "putting an end to communism once and for all." These threats are accompanied by concrete measures in the political, ideological and economic spheres. The peace proposals of the USSR and other socialist countries are being countered by a maniacal attempt to change the socialist system in them, to force the Soviet Union to capitulate, first militarily and economically, and then in the ideological struggle. Washington's political lexicon abounds with such words as "boycott," "blockade," "sanctions," "bans." The invented hegemonistic concept of America's "vital interests" applies to many parts of the globe.

However, it is high time for all who, blinded by their anti-Sovietism, frenziedly slander the world's first socialist state, to realise that the Soviet Union does not recognise anyone's right to military supremacy, and will see to it that this does not happen. The USSR has never permitted, and will not permit, interference in its internal affairs. Hopes to upset the balance of forces are illusory. The Soviet Union will do everything necessary to prevent devotees of military adventures from catching the USSR unawares, to make a potential aggressor know that a crushing retaliatory strike is inevitable.

Amidst the heightened aggressiveness of American imperialism, the Soviet people, the CPSU and the Soviet Government are showing great vigilance and are taking all the requisite measures to buttress the country's defence capability and boost the combat readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces. The Plenary Meeting of the CPSU Central Committee emphasised that the aggressive machinations of imperialism force us, along with the fraternal socialist countries, to be concerned, and seriously concerned, about maintaining our defence capability at the required level.

The country's combat readiness must be upgraded constantly, extremely responsibly, proceeding from growing demands. It is imperative to work persistently for higher results in combat training on the whole, placing the emphasis on improving methods of troop control.

The tasks facing the Soviet Armed Forces today were formulated at the conference of leaders of the Soviet Army and Navy late in October 1982.

The speakers at the conference of the leaders made particular mention of the need to use widely

the latest achievements in military science and art.

The Soviet people are well aware of the fact that the struggle in the sphere of military technology has been stepped up dramatically of late. It has taken on a fundamentally new character. Lagging behind in this struggle is inadmissible. Soviet scientists, designers and engineers are assigned a place of importance in tackling this problem.

The Soviet Armed Forces are working hard to implement the important tasks set before them. A number of operative, technical and organisational measures have been carried out which have heightened the combat might of the army and navy, including large-scale exercises. All these measures have yielded positive results and have been a good foundation for important conclusions for the future.

The CPSU and the Soviet Government, the entire Soviet people love their Armed Forces, viewing them as a reliable defender, and for this reason begrudge nothing so that they might be up to their tasks, equipped with up-to-date weapons and combat equipment. The Central Committee and the Soviet Government are taking all the requisite measures to keep the army and navy supplied with everything they need. In response to the concern of the Party and Government, Soviet military men are unstinting in their efforts to justify this great trust placed in them.

Concern for officers and men, for proper conditions for the troops, should be viewed as one of the priority tasks. This question has always been and remains in the focus of the CPSU and the Soviet state.

The conference paid close attention to stepping up educational work with the personnel: a high morale has always been the most powerful weapon of the Soviet Army, and this holds true even more today.

Unswervingly pursuing a vigorous peaceable foreign policy, the CPSU and the Soviet state never forget the existing military threat and are taking the proper measures to ensure their security, to safeguard the peaceful labour of the Soviet people and the important gains of socialism and peace.

COPYRIGHT: "Soviet Military Review", No 1, 1983.

CSO: 1812/076

PERCEPTIONS, VIEWS, COMMENTS

COMMENTARY ON U.S., NATO ARMS BUILD-UP

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 1, Jan 83 pp 4-6

[Article by N. Kotkov, D. Sc. (History): "Reason Versus Insanity"]

[Text]

**In the first half of the 20th century, mankind went through history's two bloodiest world wars. The first one (1914-1918) took 10 million lives and left 20 million cripples. The second (1939-1945) cost the world over 50 million dead and 90 million crippled. The price paid by the peoples for their failure to prevent the Second World War was too high. A new disaster, which may be still more devastating, must not be allowed.**

**F**EARING THE GROWING strength of the three revolutionary forces of the world today: the world socialist community, the international working class movement and the national-liberation movement, US imperialism and the militarist NATO circles try to slow down the progressive pace of history and regain their former positions in the world. With this in mind they resort to armed interference in the home affairs of other countries and do everything in their power to undermine peace in the world. The imperialists, in the United States in the first place, whip up war hysteria in an effort to push the world back to the grim years of the cold war.

Since Ronald Reagan and his team came to the White House adventurism and militarism have become the most pronounced features in United States foreign policy. The new administration openly proclaimed a course towards confrontation with the socialist countries aiming to upset the existing military parity between the USSR and the USA, and between the Warsaw Treaty Organisation and NATO.

The arms buildup in which the US involved the NATO countries too, has assumed unprecedented

scope. According to a UN estimate the stocks of nuclear warheads have at present reached the equivalent of one and a half million Hiroshima-type bombs. Their total yield is greater than 50 thousand million tons of conventional explosive. After the nuclear and the neutron weapons the Pentagon has put on the assembly line new barbarous means of mass destruction — chemical and biological weapons. The US political and military leadership regards Europe as the most suitable theatre of a "limited" nuclear and chemical war, and it is building up stocks of nuclear and chemical weapons in the European countries. So the peoples of Europe are being turned into nuclear and chemical hostages of the Pentagon.

**T**HE MOST URGENT and crucial task today is to reduce the danger of war, to halt and reverse the process of preparation for nuclear war. To try and outstrip each other in the arms race or to expect to win a nuclear war, is dangerous insanity.

The only way to save humanity from such a disaster, the basic condition for a lasting peace and mutually beneficial cooperation is to abandon the race in nuclear, chemical, bacteriological and other mass annihilation weapons.

Complex as the present world situation is there is a real possibility to prevent a new war. This possibility and ways to realise it were set forth by the 24th, 25th and 26th CPSU congresses, and also by the November (1982) Plenary Meeting of the CPSU Central Committee, which confirmed the immutability of Soviet foreign policy.

The Soviet people look to the future with optimism. They proceed from the assumption that there is no fatal inevitability of nuclear war and that peace can be preserved and consolidated. The key task in this respect is to reduce the nuclear confrontation in Europe, which has reached dangerous proportions, and to stop further nuclear buildup there.

Europe, which has twice been the centre of world wars, should not be allowed to become the source of a real threat of a world nuclear conflagration breaking out any minute. To prevent this vigorous actions are needed on the part of all peace-loving forces, governments, political parties and individuals who cherish the future of the peoples and of mankind.

The Soviet Union and other states of the socialist community lead those who resolutely oppose the imperialist course to aggravate the world situation. The USSR and its allies are the major peace-keeping force in the world. The Soviet Union whose people suffered and lost so much in the past world war today heads the peace-lov-

ing forces, fighting in the name of life and happiness of the future generations. It was the USSR that unilaterally pledged not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. The USSR opposes to the programme of nuclear insanity and nuclear death a life affirming programme of reason and good will which can secure progressive development free from the fear of war for both present and future generations.

The USSR persistently works to curb the nuclear arms race and inspires the peace-loving forces in their struggle against the danger of war. The Soviet Union has put forward over 100 proposals directed at slowing down and reversing the production of the means of destruction and death.

Constructive Soviet proposals were advanced to counter the NATO plans to deploy in Europe about 600 US medium-range missiles. The Soviet Union stands for total elimination of medium-range nuclear weapons on the European continent. Showing a good example the USSR has been unilaterally reducing a considerable number of the medium-range missiles deployed in the European part of its territory.

Other countries of the socialist community actively support the Soviet Union's peaceful efforts, they do not dissociate themselves from the concern and anxiety of the world peoples, the first among which is to save the world from nuclear war. In an effort to prevent a nuclear catastrophe they stand for continuation of the dialogue between East and West, for a practical solution of the disarmament problem.

The newly free countries play an ever growing role in international affairs. They have ceased to be an imperialist reserve and form an independent force fighting for peace and social progress. The peaceful policy of the countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America who chose the path of socialist development grows in strength and influence. The non-aligned movement uniting the majority of newly free states makes a tangible contribution to the defence of peace and curbing the arms race, stressed the decisions of the November Plenary Meeting and the session of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

The socialist and the developing countries are not alone in their historic struggle against the danger of nuclear war. They enjoy the full support of the Communist parties in the capitalist countries and the working movement around the world. The dangers of the imperialist foreign policies are a source of anxiety for millions of people. The world witnesses mass anti-war movement of unprecedented scope in the capitalist countries.

**P**EACE AND DETENTE will not set in of themselves, they can only be established and consolidated through indefatigable and persistent struggle. An ever growing number of people in the West comprehend that the arms race can be stopped by united efforts both in the national and international struggles. Millions of people around the world vigorously oppose Pentagon plans to deploy medium range missiles on the European continent and the US decision to produce the neutron, chemical and other weapons.

The democratic anti-war movement gains greater scope and strength in Europe every day. This movement develops from the deep anxiety of the European nations concerning the US foreign policy, and owing to the peaceful initiatives of the socialist countries, which show realistic ways out of the present war dangers.

The USSR in general rejects the point of view of those who are trying to persuade people that force and weapons resolve and will always resolve everything. Today, more than ever before, the people are coming to the forefront of history. They have won their right to speak out, which nobody can now suppress. Through dynamic and purposeful action, they can eliminate the threat of nuclear war and preserve peace, which also means preserving life on our planet, stress the decisions of the November (1982) Plenary Meeting of the CPSU Central Committee.

Demonstrations, picketing of war bases, meetings of protest are sweeping Western Europe. Calls are heard ever more often in the European parliaments to stop supporting Washington's adventurist international policy.

A characteristic feature of the present peace movement is that it is gradually increasing its international scope. An example of the internationalist unity of the peace-loving forces is the "Peace March 82."

Peace March 82 was organised by the "Women for Peace" movement of the North European countries. The Stockholm-Turku-Leningrad-Moscow-Minsk march ended on July 29. In their appeal to the United Nations and to the governments, parliaments and peoples of the world the marchers urged that steps be taken to act jointly to save humanity from the nuclear holocaust.

The actions of the peace supporters testify to the existence of a profound conflict between the official policy of the governments and the feelings of the population in some countries. That is why the Western leaders, particularly those of the NATO states, are forced to consider the powerful anti-war movement which now extends far



beyond the European continent. A vivid example is the Danish government's attitude towards the nuclear buildup which the Danish leaders expressed at the talks with President F. Mitterand of France in Copenhagen. They reaffirmed their refusal to deploy nuclear weapons on Danish territory and favoured the Soviet proposal for a moratorium on the deployment of medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe.

The wave of anti-war, anti-missile, anti-nuclear demonstrations has spread over to the United States. A signature collecting campaign is under way in forty out of fifty American states to demand a national referendum on freezing rocket and nuclear weapons. The municipal councils and the congresses of states one by one pass resolutions in favour of such a referendum. Over 500 thousand Americans from all over the United States gathered in New York on the opening day of the Second Special Session of the UN General Assembly on Disarmament and took part in the Peace Support Day and in the March for Nuclear Disarmament. Never before had there been anything like that in the United States.

**T**HE GROWING DANGER OF WAR provokes a powerful wave of protest among different public circles. Along with the left forces the movement is joined by influential circles including clergy and politicians from top official quarters. A most remarkable fact is that movement has been involving in ever growing numbers prominent military figures who formerly occupied important posts in the national armed forces and the NATO staffs. The escalation of the nuclear buildup causes increasing concern among scientists, including those who work for industries directly involved in military production. The growing danger of nuclear war causes deep anxiety among representatives of the most humane profession — the medics. Recently they have been joining the struggle against the nuclear war danger in ever growing numbers, forming an international campaign "Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War."

The powerful antiwar movement, which has spread in Europe, the Western Hemisphere and the rest of the world, is making the ruling circles in the West reckon with it. This finds its expression in the position taken by some capitalist countries at international forums, particularly in the United Nations. Highly illustrative in this respect is the fact that at the current 37th UN General Assembly Session the importance of new Soviet initiatives aimed at limiting nuclear arms race and eliminating the threat of a nuclear catastrophe was stressed not only by representatives of socialist and developing countries, but also by capitalist states.

These representatives noted that concrete proposals advanced by the Soviet Union point to practical steps for solving the most important problem of present-day reality — averting a new world war.

All these forces, movements, campaigns and groups represent a powerful factor for curbing the activities of the forces of reaction and aggression so that humanity could step into the 21st century in conditions of peace and international cooperation. The growing unity and coordinated actions of all the peace-loving forces make it possible to believe that reason will defeat insanity.

COPYRIGHT: "Soviet Military Review", No 1, 1983.

CSO: 1812/076

PERCEPTIONS, VIEWS, COMMENTS

COMMENTARY ON SITUATION IN MIDDLE EAST, ASIA

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 1, Jan 83 pp 44-45

[Article, published under the heading "International Affairs", by Yu. Lugovskiy: "For Peace and Cooperation in Asia"]

[Text]

**T**HE WORLD community has been paying much attention of late to developments in the Middle East, Southwest and Southeast Asia and in the Far East. These problems were discussed, in particular, during meetings in Moscow of the Soviet leaders with the leaders of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, the Republic of India and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. The situation on the Asian continent as a whole and its individual regions was a subject of debate at the 37th session of the UN General Assembly. All the meetings of statesmen from different countries and debates in the United Nations reveal two trends in the approach to the solution of Asian problems.

The Reagan Administration stakes manifestly on military force. US militarist preparations in the Indian Ocean area are being stepped up, with the Pentagon transferring there air formations, warships and marine units from the Pacific. The United States is also spreading the arms race to Southeast Asia and the Western Pacific. This region is playing an increasing role in Washington's global strategy as an arena of US active preparations for a new world war; for the time being it is an arena of local wars waged by US imperialism against national-liberation forces.

The essence of the American strategists' concepts is to turn South Asia into NATO's flank to deal a first nuclear strike at the Soviet Union. According to the plans worked out by American staffs, the areas in Asia transformed into the theatre of military operations are to become the target for a retaliatory blow so as to divert a strike from the United States. These adventurous designs are both cynical and criminal.

At the same time US war preparations in the

area are aimed at preventing any revolutionary transformations in Asia. That is why deterrents are being prepared in good time, and methods of punitive operations against national-liberation movements are being worked out. This is evidenced by the creation of the 250,000-strong interventionist "rapid deployment force." To lift the latter from behind the Atlantic to Asia within a short period of time in the event of "crisis situations," the Pentagon is setting up a ramified network of military bases over the entire perimeter of the Asian continent, from Japan to the Persian Gulf.

At the present time the United States already has nearly 30 bases in the Indian Ocean area, with more than 140,000 American troops stationed there. For the next five years the United States has allocated close on 30 billion dollars to set up new and rapidly modernise old bases in the Philippines and Australia, on Diego Garcia Island, and in the Persian Gulf area.

In a bid to get Japan to step up its war preparations, Washington has recently heightened its pressure on that country. The Japanese navy has been regularly participating of late in the Pentagon-directed "Pacific Ring" multilateral naval exercises and other manoeuvres. Under the pretext of guarding naval communications, Tokyo is even contemplating sending Japanese warships to control the straits connecting the Pacific with the Indian Ocean. At the same time the Pentagon regards Japan as its springboard for transporting the "rapid deployment force" from the United States to South Asian countries. The "Asahi" newspaper wrote in this connection about plans to include Japan into the "US global strategy" and about its "NATO-isation."

Washington takes an undisguised interest in winning new allies over to its side and getting them to join in the US strategic plans. To this end, it tries by every means possible to aggravate the situation in different regions in Asia. Its factual encouragement of Israel's manslaughter in Lebanon attests to the extent of the US' designs. Washington has long been using Pakistan's territory to wage an "undeclared war" against Afghanistan and for its sallies against India and Iran. In Southeast Asia the United States stakes on pitting the countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), including Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, Philippines and Singapore, against Indochina's socialist states. Under the deliberately false pretext of strengthening the ASEAN countries' defence against a "threat" from Vietnam, the United States is gradually imposing on these countries a far-reaching militarisation programme with the purpose of bringing the armies of the five ASEAN countries under the Pentagon's con-

trol.

This dangerous turn of events in Asia sets before the continent's countries the vital task of pooling efforts to ensure peace and security, and mutually advantageous cooperation between peoples.

The public at large in the Asian countries has long realised that there can be no question of the Soviet Union's "rivalry" with the United States in the arms race in the Indian Ocean. Unlike the United States, the Soviet Union has no military bases on Asian countries' territories; moreover, it does not intend to set them up. The Soviet Union has no strategic forces stationed in the Indian Ocean area, nor are its naval ships present there on a permanent basis. The USSR is deeply interested in consolidating peace in Asia.

The USSR holds that there are real possibilities today for the development of relations of good-neighbourliness and mutually advantageous cooperation between all countries on the Asian continent. A sound basis for such relations is provided by the Soviet proposal on confidence-building measures in the Far East, the constructive initiatives taken by Indochinese states, the MPR's initiatives regarding a convention on non-aggression and non-use of force in relations between Asian and Pacific states, and also by other countries' proposals aimed at strengthening peace and security in Asia.

The Soviet Union is a consistent champion of turning the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace. According to a UN estimate, such a measure presupposes the creation of a system of collective security free of military bases and alliances. It is appropriate to mention here that 126 states voted for this proposal in December 1979. Nevertheless, the United States has the cheek to ignore the opinion of the overwhelming majority of the UN members, thereby laying bare its expansionist goals.

It is a known fact that the UN General Assembly adopted a decision on convening a conference on the Indian Ocean in the first half of 1983. Proceeding from this, the Soviet Union calls on all states to refrain from whatever steps likely to further aggravate the situation in the region, so as to provide favourable conditions for holding the conference. With this aim in view, it is imperative to forbear sending to the Indian Ocean large naval formations, and staging military exercises there, and inland countries must not expand and modernise military bases. The Soviet Union also proposes that the NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Commands should make a declaration not to extend the sphere of action of these alliances to Asia, Africa and Latin America.

The Soviet Union's fruitful cooperation with numerous countries belonging to the non-alignment movement is an important factor of peace in Asia. The USSR values highly the anti-imperialist potential of this movement. The Soviet Union and India, for instance, are bound by relations of confidence. The identical or close stands of the two countries on a wide range of international problems are a solid foundation for the Soviet-Indian cooperation in the name of peace.

The USSR fully supports the proposal advanced by the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, the Laotian People's Democratic Republic and the People's Republic of Kampuchea on the signing of bilateral or multilateral agreements between these countries and China.

The normalisation of Soviet-Chinese relations would also be a weighty contribution to stability in Asia. Combined with the relations of friendship and cooperation between the Soviet Union and a number of Asian states, this would consolidate considerably the foundations of peace in Asia.

An efficient vehicle for eliminating flashpoints in Asia is contained in a number of positive initiatives advanced by Asian countries, which favour dialogue and peaceful negotiations. This is also the thrust of the proposals put forward by the socialist countries in Indochina addressed to the ASEAN countries. The purpose of these proposals is to turn Southeast Asia into a zone of peace and stability. An international conference on Southeast Asia could be a suitable forum for discussing the problems facing the region.

Afghanistan's proposals addressed to Pakistan are a practicable step for normalising the situation in Southwest Asia.

All these initiatives are valuable building blocks from which the edifice of a lasting peace in Asia could be erected. It is quite evident that the settlement of outstanding issues by the Asian countries would enable them to join forces in order to safeguard and consolidate peace, and to give a resolute rebuff to imperialist sallies. Curbing aggressive forces and ensuring stable development for all Asian countries requires practical effort. This is the call of the times, and there is no escaping it.

COPYRIGHT: "Soviet Military Review", No 1, 1983

CSO: 1812/076

PERCEPTIONS, VIEWS, COMMENTS

REVIEW OF 'WHENCE THE THREAT TO PEACE'

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 1, Jan 83 pp 53-54

[Article, published under the heading "Book Review", by Maj Gen G. Stefanovskoy: "Who Threatens Peace?"]

[Text]

In issue No. 4, 1982 the "Soviet Military Review" published a review of the book "Whence the Threat to Peace," which was put out after the Pentagon had published a pamphlet, entitled "Soviet Military Power," trying to make the Soviet Union responsible for aggravating the international situation in the early 1980s. Having failed to achieve the set propagandist goal the USA, this time under the aegis of NATO, published another pamphlet — "NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Force Comparisons." After acquaintance with this new edition of the book it becomes obvious that its purpose and orientation remain the same — it is yet another attempt to prove that the present international situation is not marked by military-strategic equilibrium between the USSR and the USA and between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty, but by an alleged "overwhelming military superiority" of the USSR and the Warsaw Treaty Organisation.

Competent Soviet quarters again prepared and published the book "Whence the Threat to Peace"\* which contains some facts and figures of the London International Institute for Strategic Studies and of official US sources, none of which can be suspected of any sympathy for the Soviet Union and its allies.

What aims did the USA and NATO pursue in publishing these propaganda pamphlets?

Their goal is to frighten the public of the Western countries with the military potential of the USSR and the Warsaw Treaty countries, and convince them of the necessity to further build up military strength. These publications contain deliberate distortions of the facts as concerns the armed forces of the Soviet Union and its allies.

\* "Whence the Threat to Peace." Moscow, Military Publishing House, 1982, 2nd Edition, supplemented, 98 pp. (in English, Russian, French, Spanish, Italian and German).

Both pamphlets voice the thought that the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Treaty countries have no right to parity. It is a well-known fact that the USSR has never sought and does not seek military superiority, but neither will it allow anyone to win superiority over itself. The Soviet Union is compelled to take appropriate measures and strengthen the defence capability and combat power of its Armed Forces.

The above-mentioned publications of the Pentagon and NATO would not by themselves merit special notice if they did not reflect the political line of the United States and some West-European NATO countries to escalate the propaganda war against the socialist states, stoke up tensions in relations between countries, trigger off an unbridled arms race and unleash new local wars in which the aggressive circles may practically test modern weapons and equipment. A convincing example of the above is the Israeli aggression against the peoples of Lebanon and Palestine openly supported by the USA.

**Section I — "They Call This Objective"** — shows that the appraisals of the military potential of the USSR, its foreign policy and military strategy made by members of the US Defence Department and NATO are unobjective and biased, and that they are obviously tendentious in selecting and analysing data on the military strength of the Warsaw Treaty and NATO.

There is no trace of objectivity in the conjectures that the authors of these pamphlets make concerning the defence industry of the USSR. They declare that the Soviet Union has 135 munitions factories, yet not a word is said about the fact that in the United States weapons and equipment are produced by 146 government-operated plants and nearly 4,000 large-scale private enterprises.

Readers are given figures that produce an unobjective picture of the real military power of the sides. A mere population count in the two alliances (more than 620 million in the NATO countries and 375 million in the Warsaw Treaty countries) shows that NATO has a more than 50 per cent advantage over the Warsaw Treaty as concerns this important indicator of mobilisation capabilities of the sides.

Further, they deliberately distort the strategic forces of the Soviet Union and the USA. Thus, in the Pentagon pamphlet the US Defence Department says that the Soviet Union has 2,500 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, while the NATO pamphlet has arbitrarily increased this number by 200 units and groundlessly reduced the number of US strategic vehicles by more than 300 units.

**Section II — "The US War Machine"** — offers data on the armed forces of the USA which, already in peacetime, are deployed far away from the US national frontiers and whose strength, composition and organisation have nothing to do with a defensive war. It shows their menacing growth.



appraises the US war industry and the role of the military-industrial complex, and examines the essence of present-day US military strategy. Thus, the total strength of the US Armed Forces exceeds 3 million servicemen and 1 million civilian employees. The combat units of the US strategic offensive forces have 2,120 nuclear delivery vehicles and can lift over 10,000 nuclear weapons of 50 kt to 10 Mt each at one launch/sortie.

The most powerful overseas group of US general purpose forces is stationed in Europe. Its total strength is 337,400 men, and it has 150 tactical missile launchers, 3,400 tanks, 2,500 guns and mortars, more than 5,000 antitank guided missile launchers, and over 1,000 helicopters.

**Section III — "The East-West Military Balance"** — presents authentic facts and figures to compare the strategic nuclear forces and medium-range nuclear weaponry of the two sides, and shows the correlation of the armed forces of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organisation.

True, the USSR has more divisions in its ground forces than the USA. But this is quite natural because owing to its geographical and strategic position the Soviet Union has to maintain the balance of forces not only in Europe but also in other regions adjoining its borders. The total length of the Soviet state frontiers is about 67,000 kilometres, including more than 20,000 kilometres on land. These frontiers have to be protected from the west against the threat from the NATO countries, and in the east and south because of the American military bases and other aggressive forces.

When comparing the armed forces of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organisation, one can see that the Warsaw Treaty countries have a somewhat greater number of combat aircraft. But NATO enjoys superiority in the combat capabilities of ground-support aircraft and in the number of helicopters. The theory of the so-called tank threat from the USSR does not hold water either. In actual fact, there are more than 17,000 tanks in the armed forces of the NATO countries. About 1,500 American tanks and 6,500 tanks of the West-European NATO countries are stored in depots in Europe. Consequently, the NATO countries are not inferior to the Warsaw Treaty countries in total number of tanks (25,000).

The strength of the Marine Corps at the disposal of the Pentagon is almost 16 times that of the Soviet Marines (USA — 190,000 men, USSR — 12,000 men). The NATO countries have also a greater number of warships and submarines. Thus, the objective data contained in the book "Whence the Threat to Peace" show that there is rough parity between the sides and that the USA and NATO are not lagging behind.

**Section IV — "Two Trends in World Politics"** — demonstrates facts showing the attitude of the Soviet and US governments to the treaties concluded in the field of arms

limitation and reduction as the most important step towards detente.

USSR proposals aimed at limiting strategic offensive arms meet, as a rule, with either stubborn silence on the part of the Washington Administration or are countered by various conditions. One of them, for example, is the "zero option", which would mean liquidation of all Soviet medium-range missiles while the USA and its European allies would retain hundreds of their land- and naval-based missiles with nuclear warheads targeted against the USSR and the Warsaw Treaty countries.

The book "Whence the Threat to Peace", based on concrete facts and objective figures, will help the reader to understand better the falsity of the Pentagon thesis about a "Soviet military threat" and of assertions about the superiority of the USSR and the Warsaw Treaty over the USA and NATO, to be convinced of the defensive nature of the Soviet Armed Forces and the doctrine of their use in case of war should one be unleashed by the aggressors. The book under review expresses confidence that those who formulate US and NATO policy will assume a more objective and realistic position which would promote detente and the strengthening of peace in the whole world, and not incitement of military psychosis. This book will help the world public, people of good will to understand clearly whence the real threat to peace comes.

COPYRIGHT: "Soviet Military Review", No 1, 1983

CSO: 1812/076

END