


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JPRS Report



Soviet Union

Military Affairs

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Readers Respond on 'Protectionism'; Col Gen Arapov Comments

90UM0802A Moscow *KOMMUNIST*
VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 13, Jul 90
(signed to press 25 Jun 90) pp 8-20

[Letters from readers and commentary by Col Gen V. Arapov, first deputy chief of the Main Cadres Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense, under "Response" rubric: "So Is It a 'Ghost' or Reality?"]

[Text] "Protectionism: A 'Ghost' or Reality"—it was under this heading in the first issue of our journal for this year that we published a conversation with Col Gen V. Arapov, first deputy chief of the Main Cadres Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense. The editor's office received many responses to the publication. We offer some of them and a commentary on them by Col Gen V. Arapov.

"Do Not Rub Salt in the Wounds..."

Comrade chief editor! I saw you in a television broadcast. And I am offended that you, a grown man, participate in such hypocritical measures as a conversation about protectionism. Do you really consider officers to be blind people, who see nothing around them?! Through this conversation, you essentially legitimize protectionism, referring to military dynasties. Name me just one example of a general's child who was pensioned at the rank, say, of major or lieutenant colonel.

Through the journal, you suggest to us that all children of generals are talented. Excuse me, but we all laugh at the "talented" people and how they serve! By the way, to be serious, many of them are just pitiful. Is a person really at fault because he is incompetent, if 5 years after graduation from a particularly civilian VUZ [higher educational institution] he is "placed" in a battalion? And then they send him to an academy for training, where this person again understands nothing about military disciplines. But he receives the cherished "crusts." But there is a regiment or a division. And a tremendous amount of work, although everything gets done. For their papas again send some boards and hence they get good marks.

I ask you to understand me correctly. There are, of course, people even among the "little sons" who make their way in life through their own efforts. But there are not many of them. I draw this conclusion on the basis of my own observations. Do not think, however, that I am complaining about the service. No, I am satisfied with everything. I am 31 years old and command a company. I hope that within a year or so they will give me a position from which I will go to my pension. I ask you just one thing: that there be no boards or inquiries after this letter. The only thing that the inspectors will do is confront me with a team of officers of the unit and begin to turn my company inside out and to seek a kompromat [expansion unknown] for me, although the subunit did not fall below third place in recent years. What I wrote about is not the fault of my senior superiors, whom I

greatly respect. This is a system, from which there is no escape in the near future, because there are still no interested persons among those upon whom the solution of the question depends.

So, comrade chief editor, "do not rub salt in our wounds" with such conversations.

Capt of the Guard A. Zykov, Red Banner Turkesan Military District

Is There a Right to Make a Mistake?

In the conversation, Col Gen V. Arapov noted that "the absolute majority of our officers receive the next posts and military ranks as well as the well-deserved rewards of the Motherland for their difficult labor on time." I agree but with a reservation. The fact is that all of this is correct when we are referring to the category of officers up to major (captain third rank) and at best up to lieutenant colonel (captain second rank). But then other laws go into effect.

For subsequent advancement up the rungs of the career ladder, the officer essentially needs not decorations and medals and not competence and organizational ability but merely academic "crusts" with a "float." It seems to me that it makes sense here to talk about the very process of selection to the academies. Here indeed is where there really is a "personnel" secret behind seven seals! How do they make up the lists of candidates for schooling? Is there screening competition for this? These would seem to be simple questions but unfortunately there has not yet been a clear answer to them.

Another reason for the tenacity of protectionism in the work of the Cadres agencies is seen, in my opinion, in the fact that not a single military VUZ prepares specialists of the given profile. Hence their low competence and lack of the proper experience and professionalism. It frequently happens that they appoint to officer cadre posts people who have not coped with people in "living" work or dubious "people promoted from the rank and file." Such people, as they grow into the personnel structure, successfully advance along its steps, reaching the position of "executors" of the fate of others. How they will (and do!) manage them does not, I think, require any special deciphering.

Also worrisome is the fact that the Cadres agencies are basically guided in their activities not by specific knowledge of specific people but by formal documents presented to them by different levels. But there is no paper that with a high degree of reliability would convey the true "face" of some personality or other. One has to admit that at times even a careless word expressed by an officer to the corresponding superior may be such a "devastating" attestation of a "free thinker" that there is no use in dreaming of a further career. And then find me the simpleton who would believe the reference, for example, for a ship commander that states that "he has not had any reprimands." In the cadres, however, for

some reason they believe. Although I have not met such people in the navy; they simply do not exist!

Tell me, who among us has not made mistakes in life and in the service? Does this mean that a person has a right to make mistakes? Yes. True, not all mistakes are equal. The question is something else: the cost of some mistake or other. It happens, and rather frequently, that it is incommensurably high, sometimes so high that it completely knocks the ground out from under your feet. But everyone ought to have at least one chance for another try after any mistake. All the more so for an officer, for he is dealing with the most difficult "material"—people.

But everything is to the contrary in life. Is it not so that the presence, let us say, of a party reprimand in the service-record card of a communist officer crosses out all of his future prospects? But this is what is most offensive. It is one thing when such a reprimand has been declared to a communist officer, for example, for personal lack of discipline and the like. Here, as they say, everything is clear and there must be no pretensions. But life shows that for officers the overwhelming majority of such "strict reprimands" have to do with the offenses of their subordinates. Here there is even an inherent law. The more subordinates one has, the more chances there are to suffer from the unworthy actions of any of them. As a result, the advantage in career development (enrollment in an academy) is obtained by the officer without subordinates. Here is the next paradox: as a rule, those officers who do not know how to and sometimes do not want to work with people become leaders. As a result, the service and our common objective suffers. Officers are now avoiding work with people like the devil holy water. Excuse me for my frankness. And all because of that same infamous social "justice," which is not accomplished without the participation of Cadres agencies.

Usually, when I encounter some high official who lacks any authority at all with his subordinates, I ask myself the same question over and over: Why does it happen this way? Possibly because those who know how to "use tricks" are the ones who are "promoted" to superiors? And it does not matter what other people think about this. The main thing is to stay in the chair, that is, afloat and at the "feeding trough"! Is this not the reason why there are many commanders and superiors who have forgotten about the demands of morality, having lost it on the way "forward and up"? And how can one establish that powerful mechanism that will become an insurmountable barrier for different kinds of smart operators and careerists, overly cautious individuals and timeservers?

Certain hopes are being put on the Assembly of Officers in this connection. But what is its weakness? It has only been granted the right of a consultative voice. According to the provisional statute, the Assembly of Officers discusses proposals on the possible awarding of state decorations and the conferment of honorary and military ranks and presents its opinion for review by the standing certification board of the unit for the making of

a decision by the commander. By the way, the certification board is also appointed by the commander. Thus, in fighting against the arbitrariness of the commander, the Assembly of Officers and the certification board cannot change anything of substance. Nor are they in a position to put a resolute end to protectionist actions.

In my opinion, however, the main reason for the ineffectiveness of the fight against protectionism has to do with the monopoly of the Cadres agencies in resolving personnel matters. Despite certain positive changes, the role of party and Komsomol organizations has not become decisive in this. How can one achieve fundamental changes here? Obviously that is a subject for a separate conversation. But one thing is clear: we cannot completely defeat protectionism without working out an effective mechanism for the strict influence and control of the public over the resolution of personnel matters.

The problem at hand is closely linked with still another problem. The fact is that it is often much easier to get rid of a negligent officer by recommending him for a higher post in another unit. In life, such a system operates practically without interruption. So those who should long ago have been dismissed from the army migrate from post to post. They migrate with the blessing of "personnel specialists."

I will tell about the specific situation in the navy. I will probably not be wrong in saying that the greatest complications for our personnel workers are now caused by appointments to responsible command positions, above all in the selection of candidates for the positions of ship commanders. Today there are very few who want to bear this difficult load not compensated by any substantial moral and especially material privileges. And it turns out that there really is no one from whom to choose. By the way, this is not so much a problem of cadres as it is a problem of our entire army system, for I am sure that something similar is taking place with the ground forces as well."

Capt Third Rank A. Riskin, Twice Red Banner Baltic Fleet

"I Am Paying for Someone Else's Heartlessness"

Col Gen V. Arapov asserts that the absolute majority of officers receive the next posts and military ranks and decorations for their difficult labor on time. I will allow myself not to agree with this assertion. For the reasonable question arises: Why are not all deserving officers obtaining posts, ranks and decorations on time but only a certain amorphous majority? And does this not represent protectionism?!

I, of course, am far from the thought that Vitaliy Fedorovich is purposefully smoothing out the sharp corners of the problem at hand. On the contrary, it is apparent from all of his answers that he stands firmly in favor of the total elimination of this abnormal phenomenon from the practice of Cadres agencies. And indeed, everything that involves the interests of the service must be put on the

firm foundation of legality. I would very much like for this rule to be applied more boldly and more fully. Alas, it is still being ignored by many personnel workers.

There is a current phrase that says: previously cadres, that is, service members, resolved everything and now, they say, everything is taken care of in the "cadres," that is, the Cadres agencies. Vitaliy Fedorovich says, however, that things are different now. I would very much like to believe him. But in the Cadres agency of the Siberian Military District, where people like Col V. Kolykhalov, for example, serve, nothing has changed for the better even today, in the time of perestroika. But let us take everything in due course. Since 1982, when I took the boldness to appeal the illegal actions of Maj Gen B. Stesenko, having written about them to Gen of the Army A. Yepishev, chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy at the time, this "personnel specialist" has been stubbornly obstructing my advancement in the service and my next military rank, apparently because I "washed some dirty linen in public."

Such counteraction was manifested especially graphically in the second half of September 1989, when I lost a recommendation from the unit for a higher position, that of deputy chief of the Novosibirsk Combined-Arms Higher Military-Political School on Armament. And what do you think! A few months had passed when the commander, having signed the recommendation, suddenly changed his opinion about me drastically. In other words, he blindly believed Col Kolykhalov, who has been firmly prejudiced against me since we were both majors. And the matter began to pick up speed abruptly, as they say. As early as 12 February of this year, the commander gave me a strict reprimand, for it is possible to find something to use against anyone. Thus, in the 25th year of service, an "account was opened" for reprimands in my own personal case (prior to that, I had no reprimands in the service or party lines). This is why, Vitaliy Fedorovich, I earnestly ask you to help restore justice.

You mentioned in your talk that last year military ranks a step above the position held were conferred for 1,995 officers. In this connection, I am interested in whether, after all the positive fitness reports that I have been given in 24 years of service, I might receive my next rank of colonel (I have been a lieutenant colonel since 7 May 1983), that is, a step higher than the position held, and continue to serve just as conscientiously as before? Otherwise I will begin to think that I am paying for someone else's callousness, specifically for the heartlessness of the worker of the Cadres agency of the Siberian Military District Colonel Kolykhalov.

Lt Col I. Gupzor, deputy commander of a unit for armament

"Who Will Put in a Word?"

Dear editor's office! Alas, most communists in our unit do not yet believe in social justice, in actively fighting against protectionism. You ask what my personal point

of view is on this problem as secretary of the party bureau? I will not generalize but will try to show this through my personal example. I have been secretary of the party bureau for 7 years. I have been serving in military units for 13 years and do not have a single reprimand. Three times I made a written request for admission to the academy but each time they said "wait," your turn has not come yet. So until now I have been waiting. I waited during the time of stagnation and now during the time of perestroika.

In January 1989, they offered me a tour of duty on Kamchatka. The request for a specific post in a specific unit was drawn up and dispatched on time. And again—wait! But again, as it turned out, my waiting was not crowned with success. Why? Primarily because in all moves there was, and apparently still is, protection and telephone calls rather than the conscientious labor of the officer. I am surprised and amazed how it is possible to decide matters involving human fate so simply in the upper echelons of the personnel agencies. They offer something in one hand and take it away with the other. They have been given such immense power over people with no responsibility at all.

There is only one way that I can explain this refusal: I am the son of a worker and am supposed to continue the dynasty of "workers" and not military people. Who will back me? Who will put in a word? No one. The party organization of the unit and the chief of the political section of the combined unit assess my work positively but I sense that there is nowhere for me to go.

Understand that such cases of injustice under the conditions of democratization and glasnost are taking on more and more of a political tone. People see who serves how and how personnel matters are decided. This is why they are not really inclined to believe the higher echelons of administration, where much is still decided by protection.

On behalf of the communists of our party organization and myself personally, I ask you, comrade colonel general, to help in correcting this personnel mistake and in the positive resolution of my question about further service on Kamchatka (in a political or command position).

Maj A. Lunkov, Red Banner Volga-Ural Military District

"I Disagree With the Conclusion"

I fundamentally disagree with the conclusion of Col Gen V. Arapov that the absolute majority of our officers receive their next posts and ranks on time. Just take our unit. The absolute majority of my colleagues do not have any real prospects in the service. I personally, for example, was certified four times—in 1978, 1982, 1986 and 1989—for a post in the staffing category of lieutenant colonel. And I was even awarded the medal "For Combat Merits" for my successes in combat and political training. But this changed nothing in my fate. I am

still occupying a major's position, just as I have been since 1974. And I have held the rank of major since 1979.

The people with whom I serve are in just about the same situation. And none of us is making rosy plans, although we are all working honorably in our units. And then you read the conclusion that I mentioned and you are offended—why were you not included in this “absolute majority”? You are either a loafer, untalented, a drunk or something similar. But I personally do not consider myself to be any of those things. Nor do I consider my comrades in service as such. This is really all I wanted to write.

Maj I. Starikov, Red Banner Carpathian Military District

No Promotion for a Mere Mortal

There is a popular saying that silence is golden. But it is also wrong to keep silent when it is necessary to speak. I say this because, having read in the journal the conversation on protectionism, I decided to analyze my almost 22 years of service. And I came to the disconsoling conclusion that, as sad as it may be, protectionism is a reality. Today I see it as precisely the main curb on perestroyka.

Why have the true fighters for perestroyka not yet been put in leading positions? It is because protectionism does not care for them, seeing them as its adversaries. Protectionism is not suicidal and essentially does not allow chance people to reach the command and political heights. This phenomenon exists as a system, thanks to which our body of officers has “broken down” into castes. And it is very difficult for a “captain's” son (even if his father served in the Workers and Peasants Red Army from 1930) to go to an academy and advance in the service. For it is no secret that now there are even notorious age barriers for schooling and cadre development, which “move” some and impede others.

I know all of this not from hearsay. And I once even declared to my former superior Colonel Sanayev that the son of a captain will never become a colonel. I had to pay for such insolent frankness.

Everyone now knows how the military's bureaucratic machinery worked in the years of stagnation, although, alas, they do not by any means know everything. But until now no one has sought to deal with those who at that time were illegally hindered in the service and with those who were in charge of this. So it is too early to talk about social justice. And as long as the official ladder exists, it continues to be very difficult to fight against protectionism.

Col Gen V. Arapov had a lot to say that was correct. But today the personnel system itself is in need of fundamental restructuring. Only if this takes place will protectionism suffer a serious blow. Otherwise everything will

remain as it is. And protectionism, being criticized in words, will in reality quietly flourish and grow stronger....

Maj O. Dorogan, Red Banner Volga-Ural Military District

Subordinate to His Papa

We paid close attention to the conversation of Col Gen V. Arapov and we want to say that in the Carpathian Military District protectionism is not a ghost but a reality. Let us refer to the following example. The chief of the medical service of the district is Maj Gen of the Medical Service N. Savchuk. His son graduated from the Lvov Higher Military-Political School in the department for cultural and educational work. After that, he never left the district. Why should he leave his father?! He has now become an instructor of tactics in a department of the Chernovtsy Medical Institute. That department is under his father. Interesting, is it not?

A group of officers from the Chernovtsy garrison of the Red Banner Carpathian Military District

A “Museum” of Stagnation

Protectionism is the chief scourge of the army, the source of all of its misfortunes. Let us take the Vasilkovskoye Military Aviation Technical School, for example. This is a “museum” of stagnation, where out-and-out protectionism is thriving. They know about such “outstanding” representatives of it as the officers Seryy, Matirka, Pedko and Pechura in many units of the air force. They are careerists appointed under protectionism. Such a depraved system has been introduced here in a quite “talented” manner by comrades Sinyavskiy and Gordeyev and their accomplices. “Plowmen” without a “tine” such as Captain Budko are, frankly, the “common people” in the school, although everything depends precisely on them. Can it be that they do not know about this “at the top”? And if they know about it, why are they not taking any measures?

Officers O. Shestopalov, I. Kanizhskiy, S. Starostin, S. Oliferenko, G. Yurskiy and N. Ternavskiy

“You Will Not Publish My Letter...”

The article “Protectionism: a ‘Ghost’ or Reality?” ends on an optimistic note: “In the future, there must be no place for protectionist tendencies.” All of us, of course, believe in this future but, alas, we live in the present. Unfortunately, everyday life is such that all areas of our military activity are permeated with ugly manifestations of protectionism. There are innumerable examples of this, including in the article.

If my letter does not end up in the wastebasket of the editor's office, I will allow myself to continue. Everyone, of course, knows the anecdote that is going around the army, where one officer asks another: “Can a general's son become a marshal?” And the other officer answers: “No, because the marshal also has a son!” And there is a

good deal of truth in these words. Perhaps the following proposal of mine makes sense in such a case. To dispel the "myths" about protectionism in the families of generals and marshals, the journal should publish material on the service careers of the sons and other relatives coming out of those families. I have no doubt that officers will read it and be reassured. But the editor's office will hardly do this, because, alas, there are almost no positive facts here.

Take, let us say, the section of the journal that is called "Appointments." In issue No 2 for this year, I read there that three generals received promotions and that the sons of all three are officers, two of them political officers. I am certain that their service will be without problems. If I am wrong, prove that in all three cases there was no protectionism. Hence my answer to the question that they put in the heading of the discussion: protectionism is not a myth but a reality and no one is really fighting against this reality. Nor do they intend to, because protectionism is nourished primarily by those who are calling for its eradication.

What, in my view, is the solution to the existing situation? It seems to me that it is very simple: make all positions of political workers (without exception) elective. And then protectionism among political officers will really become a ghost. I am not about to judge for all command personnel, because the elective nature on an alternative basis would undermine one-man management. And then: it seems to me that it is much more difficult to fight against protectionism among commanders.

I am sure that you will not publish this letter of mine for reasons that I understand very well, so I will leave the second example to my own memory. In conclusion, I would like to stress: I am not against generals and not against having their children become military people and hold high posts. But, in calling for a campaign against protectionism, I am in favor of having high-ranking military people establish order in their own house.

Maj N. Tsyganov, Western Group of Forces

"Is It Nice...Only on Paper?"

My entire family read the article "Protectionism: a 'Ghost' or Reality?" with great interest. Everything written in it is very interesting and correct but it just does not correspond with reality. I will explain using the example of my husband. In 1974, he graduated from the Orenburg Higher Surface-to-Air Command School. He was assigned to the Far East to an ordinary "point." There we experienced 8 years of "adventure" in swamps, among the mosquitos, on imported water (of the water supply, not for drinking) and in an unheated apartment, where the temperature never rose higher than 5 degrees Celsius.... But we did not complain, for everything is easy to take when you are young. And later we lived on the hope of a better future.

This future smiled on us, when in 1982 my husband entered the air defense academy. I will note that no one ever exerted himself on his behalf—he did everything himself. Three years after my husband graduated from the academy, our family went to Latvia, where we are still living. I wrote about this in detail so as to compare everything with that place in the discussion where it is pointed out that now the places of service for officers and warrant officers are conditionally divided into five zones.

It is not difficult to count the zones where we were: 4 years in the Volga-Ural Military District; 8 years in the Far East Military District (a region, I note, that was not then preferential, whereas a year there now counts for one and a half); 3 years of schooling in the military academy; 5 years in the Baltic Military District (once again a "point" 15 km from the nearest town).

I say this because they recently suggested to us that we "restation ourselves." But where? To a nice region, you think? By no means. Again, a region that is not preferential—Kazakhstan. Many think that it is. My husband tried to turn down the suggestion but for some reason the unit commander thought that service in the Far East Military District cannot be a reason to reject the kind of alternative in question. But many officers in our combined unit begin and end their service without moving beyond its borders. So everything is nice for us only on paper? Please do not think that we are people who have attached ourselves to the Baltic District and will never want to leave here. No, we are not against a move but let it be a preferential region so that it would be fair, as in the discussion. In essence, after all, our family has not seen anything but "points" (again, without receiving anything in exchange).

We left for the Far East expecting a child. Our daughter is now studying in the ninth grade already (she has changed schools three times). And this year, she is also graduating from music school and intends to study further. My husband talked with the unit commander about this. He agreed that it is tough for our daughter to travel every day to two schools 15 km from where we are stationed. He promised that in 1990 it will be our turn to get a passenger car and then, he says, it will be easier. But it was not 6 months after his promises when they suggested that we move to Kazakhstan. When will our trials finally be over? Even our daughter is surprised at the fact that for some reason some people stay in one place permanently and others, people like ourselves, are always moving. Where is the fairness that was talked about in the discussion?

G. Denisova, wife of a serviceman in Red Banner Baltic Military District

In the "High" Rank of Junior Officer

While serving at the Higher Military Engineering Command School for Missile Forces imeni Chief Marshal of the Artillery M.I. Nedelin in Rostov, I pointed out one senior lieutenant who had been in the same military rank

for many years (about 7 years, I think). With the passage of time, unfortunately, I have forgotten his family name. But I remember very well how I asked my colleague Col V. Petrov, head of one of the departments, under whom this officer served:

"What is the deal, why is Senior Lieutenant (I will arbitrarily call him N.) been in the same military rank for so many years? Are there serious shortcomings in his service record?"

"No," was the response, "this officer serves well and is a good rationalizer. The difficulties in raising his military rank have to do with a lack of vacant posts...."

A few years later, I again met N., this time at the rank of captain...of the reserve. N. gave almost 27 years of service to this "ascent!"

It seems that the example indicates that not all officers are being promoted normally. Among them are many people who finish their service at the rank of captain and even senior lieutenant, not through their own fault but on the basis of a whole series of circumstances. What is the matter here and what reasons frequently hinder the promotion of some comrade or other in the service? It will primarily be a matter of junior officers, that is, precisely that category from which there has recently been the largest number of reports on the early discharge to the reserves.

Perhaps the following thought of mine will seem somewhat banal but still I cannot fail to emphasize that the service development of officers is linked above all with concern and attention to them by commanders and superiors. For the sake of objectivity, it is also necessary to note that in the army and navy, unfortunately, there are still many leaders at different levels that do not show such concern and attention. Otherwise how can one explain, let us say, the fact that many junior officers of the tactical echelon are at one military rank for 7 to 9 years or more?

Experience shows that most often the ones suffering from such injustice are precisely those comrades who serve in remote garrisons and who are continually moved from one place to another. In other words, they have no protection and because of their nature do not bother superiors with requests for promotion. The question arises as to whether there are any real possibilities to improve the service development of officers. This task is certainly complex but in my view its positive resolution is of fundamental importance, especially at the present time, when the armed forces are undergoing major reductions.

It seems to me there are certainly definite possibilities here. To illustrate what has been said, I will allow myself a little historical digression. After the end of the Great Patriotic War, it was incomparably more difficult than now to provide the conditions for the service development of officers. Then as well, however, they found rational ways for the timely advancement of deserving

people, especially in the lower echelon of the officer corps. In particular, they established reduced-strength units and subunits, in which they foresaw the raising (by one or two steps) of the official job categories with an increased number of officer positions in them. This helped to keep the best officer cadres in the army and to bring about their timely promotion in the service.

By analogy, there would be nothing wrong with applying just an approach at the present time as well, especially in the establishment of raised (by at least one step) or bracketed (senior lieutenant—captain, captain—major) official job categories for officer personnel. It seems to me that in general it is necessary to raise the level of many official job categories in the strategic missile forces, air defense forces and several other service branches and arms.

Clearly, the following proposal makes sense: it has become necessary to establish a system for the service of junior officers that would provide for the awarding of the next military ranks to a step higher than the position held (up to and including major) to them every 5 years, if there is no possibility of promoting some comrade or other in the usual manner. It seems that this will make it possible to keep many deserving junior officers in the ranks of the armed forces and will help to improve the combat readiness of units and subunits.

To a considerable extent, the strict observance of the maximum established periods of service by all officers and generals regardless of the positions held would help in service development. For it is a fact that there are still many people serving in the large staffs, main and central directorates and military educational institutions for whom the maximum established periods of service have long since passed. But it is well known that there are no indispensable specialists. Practice shows that the timely replacement of officers and generals taking into account the maximum established periods of service removes many related expenditures of the army and navy for the improvement of combat readiness.

Retired Col I. Kulikov, candidate of military sciences and lecturer, Red Banner North Caucasus Military District

Commentary of Col Gen V. Arapov, First Deputy Chief of the Main Cadres Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense:

Reading with attention the letters from officers, which are a response to my discussion with the Maj Gen N. Koshelev, chief editor of the journal, I wish above all to express my satisfaction with the fact that the discussion did not leave people indifferent and that they are trying to delve more deeply into the essence of the problem raised. The letters include approval of my thoughts as well as a lack of confidence in them and a striving to argue with the questions raised. In my view, this is good. After all, people are guided by the desire, on the one hand, to correct the situation and, on the other, to show through their own example and own personal observations that in some places social justice in personnel work

does not, to put it mildly, correspond to the requirements of today. I would like to clarify some individual questions, because some of the authors are examining them only from their own positions, seeing the problem within the limits of their own unit or combined unit and generalizing it for the armed forces as a whole.

First of all, I cannot fail to respond to the criticism against Cadres agencies, which is expressed in a number of letters, for example in that of Captain Third Rank Riskin. I will note that this criticism is fair only with respect to some Cadres agencies. Clearly, however, it is hardly fair to generalize it and especially to extend it to all. Cadres agencies together with commanders, political workers and party and Komsomol organizations are doing important, responsible and difficult work—they study, select and propose cadres for placement. This work has attained particular importance now, when the restructuring of all aspects of our life has begun in the country and is proceeding at full speed. The armed forces are also undergoing perestroyka and it is people who are carrying it out—honest, responsible and conscientious people who think beyond the ordinary. It is precisely such people whom we must find and put in key positions, upon which the success of perestroyka depends. The Cadres agencies are also involved in this work. This is why I personally consider the workers of the Cadres agencies to be political workers above all. For we work with people, study them and select and propose them for assignment. Once again, I stress that this is done together with commanders and political organizations. In this sense, figuratively speaking, the Cadres agencies are standing in the rapids of perestroyka.

This is why the selection of workers of the Cadres agencies is very exacting. And here I cannot agree with the conclusion of Comrade Riskin that the duties of "personnel workers" are being performed by temporary officers who are not very competent, with insufficient experience or unable to cope with people in "live" work. Possibly he encountered such a thing somewhere but from a single case one must not draw such a categorical conclusion about all officers of Cadres agencies. Basically they are competent and learned people, with sufficient experience in line positions. Of course incompetent people do sometimes get into personnel work. But again, this depends upon the commanders, political workers and secretaries of party organizations who promote them. The overwhelming majority of workers of Cadres agencies, I say, are conscientious and honest people who have gone through the good school of the army service. Working in the Main Cadres Directorate, for example, are officers who commanded regiments, divisions and armies. Experienced military jurists, journalists, etc. also work here.

As for the trite phrase that "they decide everything in personnel," it ought to be time for people to stop exploiting it. Now, under the conditions of glasnost, democracy and the existence of such institutes as the standing certification boards and Assemblies of Officers, it is hardly fair to make this assertion. Taking into

account these new conditions, the conclusion on the supposedly flourishing "monopoly of Cadres agencies in deciding all personnel matters" is clearly not very well founded. I want to emphasize once again that the main conditions for the promotion of an officer on the career ladder are his attitude toward the work and his competence and ability to unite and lead people.

And now as to "why not all deserving officers receive posts, ranks and decorations on time but only a certain amorphous majority?" Lieutenant Colonel Guptor, in particular, writes about this. What can be said here? Unfortunately, real possibilities do not yet always exist for the placement or promotion of all those who are worthy. But there is a system under which, on the basis of the results of the certification of officers, each Cadres agency prepares a reserve list for promotion confirmed by the appropriate military council and commander, a list which is subsequently realized.

A few words about ranks and decorations. The next military ranks are awarded to officers in accordance with the regulation on their years of service and people are presented for awards on the basis of the achieved results in combat readiness and combat and political training or feats accomplished in performing their military duty.

Does it happen, many readers ask, that an officer with a positive certification does not advance in the service for a long time and does not receive the next military rank in time? Unfortunately it does happen and not infrequently. There are various reasons for this. Sometimes a commander wants to hold on to a good officer and the latter then suffers, because his time has passed. Sometimes there simply is no possibility to place an officer, because there is no vacancy. Unfortunately, however, such things frequently happen at the fault of some unconscientious workers of Cadres agencies. This is why the standing certification boards as well as the Assemblies of Officers of the units must watch closely for this.

As for the specific situation in regard to Lieutenant Colonel Guptor, who wrote a letter, the Main Cadres Directorate is making a careful investigation of all the facts presented and the proper measures will be taken in accordance with its results.

Several letters also raise the question of the imperfection of the selection to military academies. Thus, Captain Third Rank Riskin writes: "For the subsequent advancement up the rungs of the career ladder, the officer needs not combat decorations and medals and not competence and organizational ability but merely academic 'crusts' with a 'float.' Here, it seems to me, it makes sense to talk about the very process of selection to the academies. Here indeed is where there really is a 'personnel secret' behind seven seals."

Let us leave these statements to the conscience of the author. In the discussion and before that, I repeatedly talked about the criteria for evaluating people in their service advancement. I will also say that at a certain duty level to the indicated requirements is added the necessity

for more knowledge and a broader horizon, which the officer can acquire only in study at an academy. In addition, there are many positions in the army and navy today that are determined by the USSR minister of defense, which are filled exclusively through people with an academic education.

Nor is it possible to agree with the letter's author that the questions in the selection to military academies "are a secret behind seven seals." This selection is made on the basis of the plans for their manning, which are given to all commanders, chiefs of staffs, combat (service) arms and political and Cadres agencies. The candidacies are then extensively discussed at the standing certification boards and Assemblies of Officers. And here attention is paid to the opinion not only of commanders but also of party and Komsomol organizations. In addition, candidates going to command faculties of military academies are confirmed at military councils of formations.

Thus, the selection is made in an atmosphere of extensive glasnost. The work takes place in two stages for the purpose of revealing the most worthy candidates. In the first stage, three candidates are proposed for each space in the academy and, with the participation of instructors from military academies, the boards of formations for the preliminary professional selection choose three people for two academic places from the presented contingent of officers on the basis of the results of an interview on special subjects and combined-arms regulations and an examination of physical and drill training.

The final selection of candidates is made by examining boards directly in the military academies. Their enrollment as students occurs on a competitive basis by means of a comprehensive study of the moral-political and practical qualities of the candidates, their individual psychological data and the results of entrance exams. On the whole, the conditions and system for the planning and conducting of the professional selection are reflected in detail in the rules for acceptance to the military educational institutions of the USSR Ministry of Defense that went into effect by order No 90 of the USSR minister of defense in 1989. For this reason, the declaration of Comrade Riskin to the effect that the questions in the choice of the candidates for instruction are unknown can hardly be considered well founded.

Several authors write in their letters about specific cases of social injustice in the deciding of personnel matters. Unfortunately, this is still encountered and we are looking carefully into the facts and investigating the culprits. But sometimes the circumstances are such that one simply cannot fail to consider them. Thus, the political officer Lunkov wrote that it was planned to send him to Kamchatka but the replacement did not occur. "Why?" asks the officer. And he answers: "Primarily because in all moves there was and clearly is still protection and telephone calls rather than the conscientious labor of the officer."

We communicated with the Cadres Directorate of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy. After looking into this case, they told us the following. Yes indeed, it was planned to send Major Lunkov to Kamchatka as a replacement. But the officer who was serving there requested that he be replaced closer to his seriously ill parents. The request was well founded and this replacement took place. But with an officer from another district. They offered Major Lunkov a post in his own district, to which he agreed. So the author of the letter exaggerated, to put it mildly.

As for the letter of the group of officers from Carpathian Military District, I can report that the facts stated in it were confirmed. The district Cadres agency was given instructions on the transfer of Capt E. Savchuk to a post where he would not be subordinate to his father. Maj Gen A. Savchuk of the medical service was given a strict warning.

But an investigation of the letter of another group of officers (O. Shestapalov and others) revealed the complete groundlessness of the arguments in it. Col I. Sery, who was mentioned in the letter, was dismissed to the reserves back in 1984. Another comrade who was mentioned, Lt Col V. Matirka, has not served there since 1987. Lt Col P. Pedko commanded an officer candidates' company for more than 13 years prior to his appointment as a battalion commander. Lt Col S. Pechura, deputy commander of a battalion of officer candidates, cannot be accused of promotion through protectionism and careerism. By the way, he was certified for promotion and has been serving in the Vasilkovskoye Military Aviation Technical School since 1985. As for Capt A. Butko, this officer, who commanded an officer candidates' platoon, was given a negative efficiency report, felt oppressed by the service and repeatedly requested dismissal from the armed forces. In November 1989, they complied with his request. But something else was discouraging: the letter with the signatures of six officers was actually anonymous, for there are no such people in the USSR Air Force. And this gives rise to gloomy reflections on the immorality of the one (or those) who "composed" it.

The mail evoked by the discussion was rather plentiful. So I will hardly be able to answer all the letters, especially since I already gave an answer to many of the questions raised in the course of the discussion itself. And I do not intend to retract what I said at that time. But I do want to single out one thought. I fully share the alarm and concern of all the authors for our officer corps and for the purity and orderliness of interrelations with it. I also think that the fight against manifestations of protectionism is the common cause of commanders, political workers, party and Komsomol organizations and Cadres agencies. An atmosphere of benevolence, respect and fairness must prevail in officer collectives.

From the editor's office. In publishing the discussion on protectionism with Col Gen V. Arapov, first deputy chief of the Main Cadres Directorate of the USSR

Ministry of Defense, we did not doubt that it would evoke a broad response among our readers. And we are pleased that we were not mistaken in this forecast, for the problem at hand is very current! Clearly, this collection was also incapable of exhausting its entire depth. For this reason, the editor's office is not "closing" the subject and is awaiting new letters from you, dear readers.

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Moscow Military Commissar V. Bespalov on Draft Evasion Issues

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VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 14, Jul 90
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[Interview with Moscow Military Commissar Major General Vladimir Aleksandrovich Bespalov by Our Non-Staff Correspondent Reserve Master Sergeant O. Petrenko: "Would You Not Become a Soldier, Vanek?"]

[Text] A significant number of persons decided, under one pretext or another, to evade the draft during the course of the 1990 spring draft for active military service. An especially alarming situation developed in the Baltic Republics, Transcaucasus, Moldavia, and in a number of the country's other regions. What pushes young men down the path of draft evasion and refusal to serve? And what measures are needed to eliminate the present negative trend?

Moscow Military Commissar Major General Vladimir Aleksandrovich Bespalov answers these and other questions posed by our Non-Staff Correspondent Reserve Master Sergeant O. Petrenko.

[Petrenko] Today it is obvious that this year's spring draft has generated a mass of problems connected with so-called draft evaders. Is this typical for Moscow?

[Bespalov] Unfortunately, Moscow is not an exception here. We expected an increase in the number of people who are trying to evade the service based on the experience of conducting last year's draft. Our prediction was confirmed: This year, more than 1,500 young men born in 1973 did not appear at Rayvoyenkomats [rayon military commissariats] to register for the conscription registration districts within the period prescribed by law. And this despite the fact that this year's spring draft was announced for the first time not by a Minister of Defense order, but by a resolution of the country's Council of Ministers.

[Petrenko] What is the reason for this?

[Bespalov] In my view, it is not enough to adopt a fine legal document, it is still necessary to comprehensively implement it. This is why the resolution has not worked properly, having left everyone in their former positions when it seems as if many people are formally responsible

for the draft but they only ask Military Commissariat workers about it. In other words, we need to provide precise legal responsibility for the organized conduct of the draft by all levels of authority that participate in it.

[Petrenko] You said that you foresaw a possible negative development of the situation with the draft. On what basis?

[Bespalov] We develop the appropriate statistics and can make a prediction. If you could previously count draft evaders on your fingers, we have already noted an increase over the last two to three years and last year more than a thousand people did not appear at induction centers in a timely manner. That is, it has become a mass phenomenon.

[Petrenko] If you foresaw this, clearly you did something about it?

[Bespalov] We formed an entire system of activities directed at rallying and coordinating all forces against draft evasion. It provides for the timely exchange of information between departments and working together to suppress blockades of the draft. But, naturally preventive and explanatory work is its foundation. We conduct it both at the draftees' place of residence and at enterprises and educational institutions. We are trying to involve lawyers, doctors, and other experts in it. But alas for now the results are not encouraging. And speaking frankly, it seems to me it is all because the local authorities are only formally participating in it. And our repeated appeals for help to the Moscow City and Rayon Soviets of Peoples' Deputies result in nothing but the usual promises.... And so we had to form special Military Commissariat teams together with representatives of the militia to go to each address and, as if using a snare, to "chase" young men to the induction centers. Naturally, such measures do not make us popular. Although, putting it bluntly, we are at the same time saving the fellows from criminal prosecution.

[Petrenko] If it is not a secret, how many such "criminal" cases have there been?

[Bespalov] More than 250 criminal cases have been brought due to draft evasion in the Moscow area just during the last year! And there could have been a significantly greater number...

[Petrenko] How do you explain this situation?

[Bespalov] First of all, we directly associate the increase of draft evaders with a general weakening of our young people's military-patriotic education and with their legal nihilism. Of course, Military Commissariats, assisted by activists who are functioning under their committees of cooperation, are trying to somewhat improve the situation in this regard. However, under the current circumstances, believe me, it is frivolous, to say the least, to basically count on the raw enthusiasm of pensioners.

[Petrenko] But, you certainly are not sitting idle?

[Bespalov] In December 1989, Moscow City Military Commissariat conducted a coordinating meeting with the leadership of the procurator's office, the court, city internal affairs administration, and also the city soviet's ispolkom in order to rectify the situation. At this meeting, we worked together to develop a system to prevent violations of the USSR Law "On Universal Military Obligation," investigation of people who evade the draft, and a procedure for practical application of Statute 80 of the RSFSR Criminal Code to bring criminal charges against those who set out on this slippery path.

[Petrenko] Why that statute in particular?

[Bespalov] Because, unfortunately, until recently the law has not defined the moment when criminal liability occurred. As a result, internal affairs organs still do not have the appropriate legal levers to influence young men who do not wish to appear at the induction center. And hence there are frequently delays in legal support for this process that is important for the State. Evidently, this is something for our legislators to mull over.... But for the time being only 10 of the 250 criminal cases of which I spoke have been carried out. In particular, K. Shvechkov, A. Mochalov, R. Chabanenko and V. Orlov received two year suspended sentences, M. Rybin received 18 months, and A. Shegai and V. Ivanov have been sentenced to two years of corrective labor.

[Petrenko] We use the term draft evaders which is utterly "preposterous" from the point of view of the USSR Law "On Universal Military Obligation." Who are these people: Are they deliberate criminals or victims of circumstance? And anyway, in your opinion, what has provoked the increase in their numbers?

[Bespalov] I personally associate the appearance of such a category of young men as draft evaders first and foremost with the malicious defamation of the Army as a whole by a number of mass media elements. They frighten our young men today with every conceivable and inconceivable difficulty of service, dedovshchina [hazing of conscripts], and the possible remote location of a soldier's unit far from his induction location. Various informal organizations also have a hand in this and submit demands to create local military formations and for an immediate transition to the principle of voluntary manning for the Armed Forces, etc.

[Petrenko] I assume these irresponsible actions introduce chaos and turmoil into the draft campaign.

[Bespalov] Absolutely. Weakened executive authority in rayons and throughout the city as a whole is also currently complicating the situation with the draft. This is reflected by the fact that many enterprises ignore ispolkom decisions on allocation of technical workers to support normal induction center operations and do not provide motor transport to transport draftees to their duty locations. In a majority of the city's rayons, this situation has resulted in the fact that raysoviet ispolkoms are not able to even assign representatives to participate

in rayon draft commission sessions. That is why we are anticipating with high hopes the USSR Supreme Soviet's adoption of the Law "On Defense." We hope that all issues associated with Armed Forces manning will find precise legal reinforcement in it and that all the "i's" will be dotted, as they say.

[Petrenko] Many of our readers note that the well known USSR Supreme Soviet decision on releasing VUZ students from active military service has also caused quite serious social tension among young men.

[Bespalov] Yes, this premature and ill-considered decision placed in doubt the very principle of universal military obligation for all the country's citizens. Now it is no accident that even those young men who previously were probably not planning to obtain a higher education are now trying with all [their] might, using any truth or lies, to "force their way" into any institute or university. Even if for many the road to this lies through draft evasion.

Recently more and more of the draftees' parents are expressing demands that their sons not be sent to serve in the Transcaucasus and Central Asian rayons. Of course, this is peoples' natural reaction to interethnic conflicts. And although we can understand parents' fears for their sons, really somebody has to serve even there. You know, it is like the well known song, "Would you not become a soldier, Vanek...."

[Petrenko] According to USSR Armed Forces Deputy Chief of the General Staff Colonel General G. Krivosheyev's report, up to 60 percent of the draft contingent are receiving deferments for a number of reasons. As USSR Minister of Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union D. Yazov has pointed out, throughout Moscow a total of just 32 percent of the draftees end up serving. So, currently, fewer than half of the young men "become soldiers." But is this social justice?

[Bespalov] Unfortunately, for the present we are only making more declarations about it, but we need to ensure that....

[Petrenko] Vladimir Aleksandrovich, could you not list the number of draft evaders recorded throughout Moscow during recent years' drafts? Who helps you, how do you investigate them, and what measures are being used as a result?

[Bespalov] As I have already noted, the number of draft evaders increases each year. It is particularly alarming that many stop at nothing so long as they evade service. They have even resorted to conscious self-mutilation and to feigning psychological illnesses. If I may say so, this is a latent (hidden—O. P.) form of draft evasion. But it has become widespread of late. Judge for yourself: In 1986, over 200 such cases were recorded, in 1987, nearly 250, in 1988, over 600 and, in 1989, already nearly 800! And this alarming trend continues to increase.

But today we are talking about straightforward or open draft evasion when young men evade without any pretense of registering at the draft office; they are "on the run," hoping that this will help them dodge the draft. So, in 1987 46 draft evaders were recorded throughout the city. In 1988, there were already 67. In 1989, there were more than 250 and we presently expect even more of them. In short, we are also observing a growth trend here. A trend, I might say, that is becoming more and more serious.

Naturally, the majority of draft evaders are "conscious" lawbreakers. But many are also victims who have been "hooked" by demagogues and various types of slanderers who disguise themselves under the mantle of perestroika "radicals." In many respects, this situation can be explained because unfortunately for the time being there is no mechanism [to ensure] the inevitability of [criminal] liability both for draftees and for leaders of soviet and State organs, enterprises, organizations, institutions and educational institutions for violating or not fulfilling the full scope of the requirements of the USSR Law "On Universal Military Obligation." We also have many complaints against internal affairs organs that conduct themselves in a formal manner, as a rule, when investigating people who are evading the draft and they remain aloof from work to prevent this type of law violation. How long will this continue? This is not a rhetorical but a practical question. And I pose it to the country's Supreme Soviet through your magazine...

[Petrenko] During the fall of last year alone, more than 6,500 persons evaded the draft for military service throughout the entire country. Every third Muscovite young man, generally speaking, does not see the need for it. For every 100 school and PTU [vocational technical school] graduates in the capital, only one person wants to become an officer. In all, the number of young men who want to study in military schools has decreased by 2.5 times in Moscow. The situation in other cities is no better. For example, many young Tbilisi residents prefer to become "thieves in the [eyes of the] law" than to end up in the Army. Today one more alarming phenomenon has appeared. Many lads do not want to serve in military construction units. As a rule, the motivation for this is that they are supposedly ready to honorably and conscientiously fulfill [their] military obligation but not to serve a labor sentence....

[Bespalov] I am deeply convinced that it is necessary to train specialists with engineering-construction profiles in the Army. Experience has shown the importance of troop capabilities to restore bridges, erect defensive works, and build other special military facilities. As for the utilization of cheap soldier labor to construct civilian buildings, in my view "stop gap" mismanagement of a whole series of ministries and departments is intolerable. The law on universal military obligation says nothing about a labor obligation if a young man is not in radiant health.

[Petrenko] Within the context of our conversation, it is legitimate to raise the question on the possibility and

even the necessity to introduce alternative military service in our country. How do you see [it]: Is such an innovation realistic or not under present conditions?

[Bespalov] I think it is possible and permissible to introduce alternative military service in the country. However, we need to precisely define the category of citizens who have the right to perform this service. I think it is advisable to entrust ispolkoms of local soviets of peoples' deputies with the responsibility to send [people] to it (while determining a specific location to perform it depending on the requirements for it). In my view, there will be an unquestioned benefit from it.

[Petrenko] Draft evaders are not the only "difficult" category of draftees that you are forced to handle today. It is no secret that among the people who are subject to being drafted into the service today there are also an increasing number of individuals who have prior convictions or arrests by the militia, drug addicts, alcoholics, etc. Would it not be better for the State and the Army, generally speaking, to refuse the "services" of these types of "patriots"? And then we must inevitably resolve the issue of the transition to the hired manning principle for the Armed Forces. What is your attitude toward this problem?

[Bespalov] I completely agree with you. As for a hired Army, I am entirely for it. But this is what I am worried about. Right now we are conducting too many conversations on the prospects of creating such an Army. But there is no action. I stress that this is a serious matter. I think it is time to earnestly approach this problem: To appeal to scholars, economists, and lawyers for help and to already begin discussing it not in general terms but in specifics with numbers on hand.

It is no secret for anyone that our Army services itself and it does so to the detriment of combat training and frequently combat readiness. If it is placed on a hired-professional track, a large contingent of servicing personnel will be needed and what is more they will also need to be paid. Nothing can be done hastily or without serious study. Today and in the near term, while proceeding based on the country's capabilities, ours should be a regular Army formed on the basis of universal military obligation along extra-territorial principles. But I hope that all of this will find reinforcement in the Law "On Defense." Right now this law is simply a vital necessity.

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'Roundtable' on Role of Press in Conveying Army Image to Society

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[Roundtable report by Col Ya. Renkas, candidate of historical sciences: "The Press and the Army"; materials are published with certain abridgments]

[Text] Society and the army, the role of the press in shaping public awareness of the Soviet people, the Army and Navy personnel, in strengthening the Armed Forces and national security—these questions were the subject of a roundtable which was held in the Moscow Higher Party School [MVPSH]. It was a sort of continuation of the discussion between military and civilian journalists, party and political workers and students of the MVPSH held last year (see *KOMMUNIST VOORUZHEN-NYKH SIL*, No 23).

Participating in the debate this time were the following: Deputy Chief of the Journalism Chair of the Military Political Academy imeni V.I. Lenin, Candidate of Historical Sciences, Col S.M. Agababyan; Deputy Editor-in-Chief of the journal *KOMMUNIST VOORUZHEN-NYKH SIL*, Candidate of Philosophical Sciences, Col N.N. Belyakov; graduate student of the Academy of Social Sciences under the CPSU Central Committee, A.G. Besov; First Secretary of the Military Artistic Studio of Writers under the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, V.N. Gastello; Deputy Chief of the Directorate for Ideological Work at the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, Candidate of Historical Sciences, Maj Gen N.A. Grebenkin; Senior Instructor of the journal *AGITATOR ARMI I FLOTA*, Lt Col V.B. Demin; Department Head of the newspaper *MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA*, G.P. Dugovoyko; member of the Journalists Union, R.T. Izmaylov; Instructor on the Journalism Chair of the MVPSH, Honored Cultural Worker of the RSFSR, N.G. Kanishchev; Deputy Leader of the Journalism Chair of the MVPSH, S.V. Layne; Editor for Military-Philosophical and Sociological Problems of the journal *VOYENNAYA MYSL*, Candidate of Philosophical Sciences, Col B.V. Molostov; Senior Instructor at the Department for Mass Information Media of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, Candidate of Philosophical Sciences, Capt 2d Rank L.V. Mrochko; Instructor on the Journalism Chair of the Military Political Academy imeni V.I. Lenin, Lt Col V.S. Pavlov; Senior Instructor on the Chair for Social and Military Psychology at the Military Political Academy imeni V.I. Lenin, Candidate of Philosophical Sciences, Capt 2d Rank A.G. Piliponskiy; student of the Correspondence Department of the MVPSH, political worker, Maj Yu.V. Rudenkov; Deputy Battalion Commander for Political Affairs, Maj A.S. Slepencov; Editor of the journal *SOVETSKIY VOIN* for the Department of Military Education, Maj V.A. Sosnitskiy; Deputy Editor of the newspaper *KAMCHATSKAYA PRAVDA* and student at the Academy of Social Sciences under the CPSU Central Committee, G.L. Treumova; student at the Correspondence Department of the MVPSH, political worker, Maj A.L. Tkhor; and leader of the Journalism Chair of the MVPSH, Doctor of Historical Sciences, Prof V.V. Shinkarenko (roundtable leader).

The Army Is Not a 'Closed Zone'

[Shinkarenko] At present, we are continuing the discussion commenced last year on the subject "Society. The

Army. The Press." Let us focus our attention primarily on the processes of democratization and glasnost occurring both in the nation as well as in the armed forces and let us examine how they are reflected in the press.

For a start, let us take the following question of how the discussion is going on of the drafts of the new combined-arms regulations. For example, I do not completely understand why they have not been put up for public discussion. What are we concealing here? Certainly this question involves the interests of all our youth and the parents who are sending their sons to serve in the army.

Incidentally, another question also arises: What army will adopt the regulations, the current reforming one or the army of the 21st Century? Understandably, the military specialists are completely engaged with the given problem. But public opinion has also evolved certain models of our future military organization. Everywhere, including on the pages of the newspaper *KRASNAYA ZVEZDA* and the journal *KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL*, various judgments are being made on a mercenary army, the principles for manning the troops and naval forces and so forth. What position is held by the press here?

[Belyakov] The rebuke directed at the military that they supposedly are working out the new regulations secretly and that there is no glasnost on this question, we feel, is unjust. The drafts were published in the newspaper *KRASNAYA ZVEZDA* for a discussion, as they say, by the entire world. Why they were not published by other organs of the press I do not understand. Moreover, I find it hard to name one or another organ of the civilian press which might commence a discussion of them. How can we explain this? By a reticence or an ignorance of those processes which are occurring in the Army and Navy? I feel that this discussion should involve all the people and not only be among the military so that later it is not said that the latter have created antidemocratic regulations. In a word, I am in favor of our civilian colleagues taking up this problem.

Of course, the draft regulations require the corresponding work. But it must be said that in the Army and Navy press there were very many critical articles on this question. But it would also be very beneficial if these basic documents of military life were also examined by outsiders. The same is true, incidentally, of the Defense Law which is being drafted. We must adopt the regulations of a renewed army. An army which will function on a legal and democratic basis. An army of constant combat readiness, strong discipline and a high political and moral state of the personnel.

[Shinkarenko] Clearly, we, the civilian journalists, must listen closely to these proposals and take an active part in a discussion of the draft combined-arms regulations. Here the spectrum of questions will be rather broad. At present, such formulas as "democratization and the army," "glasnost of the military department" and "one-man command and democracy" are not mere words.

This is real life, the clash of opinions and still far from untied knots of contradictions.

[Greibenkin] The new combined-arms regulations the drafts of which are now being discussed in the military press are aimed, in particular, at raising the role of the human factor for the sake of the main thing, the high combat readiness of the Armed Forces. Without having raised the role of man, without having broadened the limits of democratization, we can scarcely raise the quality of military and political training to a new level.

It must be said that the military regulations—both the old ones as well as those guiding us at present—have never denied but, on the contrary, have always commended initiative, creativity and the boldness of the servicemen. And it is no accident that in the drafts of the new regulations provisions are widely represented on further expanding the role of the public organizations and each serviceman as well as commending personal initiative.

However, in speaking about the democratization of the army, we frequently forget to emphasize the necessity of a simultaneous rise in responsibility for the assigned job and for strict observance of the prescribed standards of conduct. The press also often overlooks this. Such "forgetfulness" of course does not benefit our common undertaking.

[Izmaylov] The activities of the press have played an important role in the processes of democratizing the Armed Forces. But at present, we can evermore clearly see an obvious excess in criticizing the army. It seems to me that, in using military language, we must conduct a reconnaissance of our public affairs forces and clarify the zone and density of fire. Do these correspond to the chosen target, are we not going too far with the massed attack on the army, where are we sending the critical projectiles and generally are we not hitting our own positions, are we not destroying our own bastions?

[Rudnikov] At present, many officers are profoundly aware, of how much we have lost by not assimilating the ideas of democratization. We can still encounter those who are against the unleashing of these processes. They warn against democracy not ending up as disorders; the army and democracy they say are incompatible. Attempts are being made to divert glasnost into a convenient channel for them and to act without considering the opinion of the collective. Certain leaders "suppress" subordinates for criticism, they infringe on their rights, they ignore the opinion of the collective, and approve decisions which run counter to the interests of the servicemen. Because of such years-long "commanding," we have lost a great deal and we continue to lose. As a result, it has not been possible to unleash the initiative and creativity of the personnel. And what is a shame, the press has often remained silent about these negative phenomena.

[Drugoveyko] As for the democratization of the army, it seems to me that we are approaching the stage when

many acute, very painful questions in military life should be solved by the public. At present, the appropriate structures have already come into being for this both in "civilian society" as well as in the military collective. But in order for democracy to "work" in the army, it is essential to have a very high degree of the development of the individual who thinks independently and has his own view on what is happening. In the Armed Forces, as is known, the entire system of educational work is aimed at this.

Here it has been said that not a single civilian newspaper has responded to the drafts of the new combined-arms regulations. That is not the case. MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA has informed its readers.

Are Democracy and One-Man Command Compatible?

[Belyakov] At present, democratization is the most important direction of perestroika in the Armed Forces and this is reflected also in the mass information media. One can already speak about changes in this area. The sociopolitical activeness of the military is growing. New democratic institutions have begun functioning, such as certification commissions, Officer Assemblies, sergeant councils and councils of soldier honor. Rights have been broadened for certain sociopolitical organizations. Thus, the primary party organizations at their meetings can hear reports by unit commanders and hold them responsible to the party for oversights in service or for amoral conduct. Here certainly is the very time to mention the confusion of certain journalists who feel that democracy and one-man command are incompatible in the army.

In my view, democratization does not run counter to one-man command, but is dialectically related to it. Such an understanding is very important, as it assumes that one-man command is carried out on a legal basis and is permeated with a spirit of collectivism and socialist democracy. And this means that the commander in his activities is obliged to rely on the forces of the community.

Among the leaders there are those who feel that they have been given executive power and they do not need to consider the party organization, the forces of the community or the opinion of the servicemen. They, supposedly, are obliged to be concerned with the authority of the commander and help him in all his undertakings. Such a view, and this has already been stated on the pages of the journal KOMMUNIST VOORUZHEN-NYKH SIL as an objective basis beneath it, that is, the absence of the legal status of democratic institutions and the social and legal lack of protection of the servicemen.

[Molostov] Sociological research conducted by the press organs in a number of troop units has shown that 62 percent of those questioned do not link the successes of the collectives with the democratization process. Voices are heard that it is incompatible with one-man command, and contradicts this principle of Soviet military organizational development. In this regard, it is wise to

recall the words of V.I. Lenin: "As collectivism is essential for the discussion of the basic questions, so one-man responsibility and one-man management are necessary so that there be no red tape and so that it is impossible to avoid responsibility."

[Grebenkin] One cannot help but voice regret over the fact that in certain press organs, the stereotype is very widespread that in the army the freedom of the individual is suppressed and initiative is stifled. This is far from the case. In a military collective there are broad opportunities to prove oneself, primarily for capable, thinking persons. The path to creativity is open to all of them. Of course, it is not always so simple. Particularly for those who, as they say, speak the naked truth. There are some defeats but still justice gains the upper hand and honesty, industriousness and talent win out. There are many examples of this in the press.

Who Protects the Armed Defender?

[Demin] Today's discussion on democratization and glasnost in the Army and how this is reflected in the press has a number of constructive ideas. But this is only one side of the problem. The other, equally important, in my view, consists in the need to strengthen the social protection for the servicemen. In the press, there have been numerous discussions on this question, particularly those concerned with the officer personnel, the warrant officers ["praporschik," "michman"] and their families who are experiencing an acute need for housing, for purchasing consumer goods, cultural values and so forth. Here for some reason they completely overlook another category of serviceman, the soldiers and sergeants. Here, as the editorial mail shows, in particular for our journal, the picture is even more depressing.

[Morochko] Unfortunately, such things happen. I would like to mention the following. Frequently, the army in the press is presented as one of the most conservative institutions, as a bulwark of all that is democratic. Here are some examples. In one of the issues of SOBESEDIK, the reader was informed that psychological science equates an army community to a prison one. The magazine SMENA asserted that the very system of Army and Navy service excludes the manifesting of personality qualities. Subordination reaching the point of groveling, the cult of the order reaching absurdity—this, in the opinion of the author, is army education. The Armed Forces are presented as a closed organism which threatens the individual.

The editors of the designated publications, and certain others as well, steadily have overlooked the positive changes in the Army and Navy although they are very significant.

[Slepenkov] A majority of the Soviet people at present reads a great deal and they carefully follow events in the nation. Against the background of general interest, even the slightest hint of a negative sort about the army and particularly a letter from a heart-sick mother whose son in one manner or another has been harmed (in truth, we

do not know how and under what circumstances) evokes a negative attitude toward the army.

In childhood we all played "nonworking telephone." In terms of army life, this appears in the following manner: a soldier who in civilian life has adopted a negative attitude toward military service, has already complexes about the injustice and the placing of elementary demands on him and punishments for a minor infraction, informs home that he is being harmed and injustice is being shown to him. The parents in their own way view this announcement...and a letter flies off to a higher level.

[Rudnikov] In the Armed Forces, as in society as a whole, the processes of democratization have begun to develop actively and much is changing. But at present, they speak and write about the army only on the negative level. At one time I happened to see the newspaper VAKHTA published at the Chernobyl AES. On the second page they printed an interview given by a salesperson at one of the stores. The correspondent asked: "Why is it so dirty in the salesroom?" and the salesperson replied: "Very many military come here and they always track in dirt." With such flippancy they send off poisoned arrows against the persons working under emergency conditions.

Or let us take the material on the fourth page of this same newspaper. Here they have printed a photograph of two officers playing billiards in their free time. Below the picture is the inscription: "On the battle watch." It seems to me that this is not only unpleasant on the part of the newspapermen but also simply dishonorable. Is it really possible to treat the life of the servicemen in that manner?

[Sosnitskiy] Once I happened to meet with the Kaunas activists of Sajudis and answer their questions. A majority of them was cocky and some were simply evil. In virtually each of these questions you could hear the idea: supposedly the Soviet Army has long been intending to suppress the democratic processes in the Baltic and it supposedly maims young persons.

Each time I was interested in where these activists had gained their information. Most often they mentioned the publications of the Kaunas Sajudis Council KAUNYU AYDAS. This newspaper has more than enough attacks on the military. To my good luck, one of the authors of the "revealing" materials, Andris Razutskis, was in the audience. I asked him to answer one of the frequent questions about the oppression of the Lithuanians in the army. He spoke emotionally, vividly and without reference to sources. But most often as arguments you would hear: "as is known," "in the opinion of many," "as one person said," "they say that," "from reliable sources" and so forth. When I asked Razutskis to describe how he had worked on the article about a suicide soldier and in which all the facts had been turned upside down (I happened to participate in the investigation of this decades-old case), we did not hear an intelligible reply.

Something similar happens frequently in discussions with colleagues who are authors of "revealing" materials in the youth press.

I feel that the new Press Law should put up obstacles to such journalistic procedures.

Indoctrinate Readiness for Military Service

[Layne] At present, there are many problems confronting the mass information media in the sphere of military patriotic education of the Soviet people. As is known, the historical path is not the sidewalk of Nevskiy Prospect. Our army, together with its people, has marched and is marching along this difficult path, where there have been, are and will be contradictions, achievements and errors. It has helped preserve the independence of the Soviet state, and has held out in the most difficult times, when the socialist fatherland was in mortal danger. Our army is an army of mass heroism and self-sacrifice. Who if not the press is to analyze its heroic path, and educate the current defenders of the motherland and all Soviet youth in the courage of the older generation?

[Piloponskiy] I have repeatedly been involved in inspecting the state of the military patriotic education of young men and women in various regions of the nation. It is striking but all this work, including that of the Komsomol, comes down to the following parameters: the number of shooting ranges, whether the children keep within the standards for putting on and removing gas masks. I exaggerate somewhat, but basically this is the truth. Incidentally, the press also treats military patriotic work from this viewpoint.

However, in order to form the readiness of a young person to defend the motherland, it is important not only to teach him to shoot or put on a gas mask. Good physical conditioning is also necessary. Recently, Central Television announced that only 25 percent of the nation's inductees are actually healthy and fit for military service. Here, in my view, is to where we should shift the accent of the press in dealing with military patriotic work.

[Agababyan] Our press, I feel, must inculcate in the future military a respect for military work and a desire to test one's strength. The military press has been doing this, possibly, not so actively but still it has carried out the military patriotic theme at the very least. But a certain portion of the civilian press and primarily the youth has rarely responded to the given problem. Moreover, at times it has eroded the correct notion about the military duty of the defenders of the motherland. Even now, this tells on the attitude of the youth to the army. Thus, in Georgia, one out of every three young men questioned stated his reticence to serve.

[Kanishchev] In speaking about the problems of military patriotic education, it seems to me that we have wrongly forgotten such a form of work as the sponsorship of the military by the labor collectives and this the press does not even mention now.

The war veterans always recall with warmth and sincerity not only the concert given by the frontline brigades, outstanding artists or meetings with writers, composers and artists, but also the arrival on the front of worker delegations from the Union republics, industrial centers and rural rayons. They brought their own humble gifts to the fighters and commanders. And take the packages for the frontline veterans. I know one former sniper who even now keeps a cotton handkerchief which he received on the forward edge. But it is not even a matter of gifts or parcels but rather attention and the possibility of hearing a kind word from a compatriot and a just assessment of one's difficult military service.

[Besov] Military patriotic education, unfortunately, was divorced from the concrete tasks related to mass defense work and the strengthening of the Armed Forces. And the only category to whom the educational effect was directed was the youth of preinduction and induction ages, that is, the students of schools, PTU [vocational-technical schools] and technical schools. Even students in higher institutions did not fall into this category.

Of course, in N.G. Kanishchev is right when he asserts that recently the ties have been weakened between the labor collectives, representatives of the local party, soviet and Komsomol bodies and the command of the troop units and political bodies. While in the 1970s, the army provided a great aid to the labor collectives in organizing military patriotic work, in the 1980s, this help has become less substantial. For example, let us take the activities of the military sports and sports-defense camps. While in 1981, there were 400 camps in operation in the Moscow Military District, at present there are just a few. As a result, the attitude of the children toward their military duty is changing. While in 1980, approximately 60 percent of the young men went to serve in the army with interest and desire, at present this figure has dropped to 40 percent and in Moscow to 12 percent.

Clearly, there is a decline in the prestige of military service. This has led to a situation where in Moscow the number of young men desiring to be admitted to military schools has declined by 2.5-fold.

We also questioned 249 inhabitants of Smolensk who this year were discharged from the army. A paradoxical situation was disclosed: the civilian press was criticizing the army while 90 percent of the young persons took a positive view toward their service as a beneficial and necessary matter. To the question "What do you remember most in your years of service?" there was the reply: "Friendship, military comradeship." Here are the improper relations for you!

At the same time, 50 percent of those questioned complained of the unsatisfactory attitude of the officers to subordinates, their low pedagogical skills and weak professional training. Hence, we feel, the need to focus the attention of the press on analyzing the activities of military personnel.

[Treumova] Yes, but for this there must be the corresponding information available for the press workers. Certainly, the editors cannot obtain a pass for the military compounds for months to investigate complaints from servicemen on domestic shortcomings or violations of social justice. And it is interesting that when the "hazing" and thievery in the barracks were observed more rarely, sponsorship ties with the civilian population and contacts with journalists were much stronger. In other words, the army has decided to combat the increase in negative phenomena not with the aid of the people from which it emerged and on which it relies but, on the contrary, in concealing and hiding everything it can. We now know to what result this has led. And so the civilian press has had to organize columns of the type "I serve the Soviet Union" with the aid of military journalists whose hands are also "tied," for they cannot "wash the dirty linen in public," or link the position of troop units to specific places. That is, such publications are rendered very superficial, high-gloss and these do not evoke interest in the reader.

[Sosnitskiy] There is a great temptation to look at the door where even yesterday there hung the placque "Top Secret." Particularly young journalists have been susceptible to such an enticement. In truth, they do this in a somewhat strange manner as this through a keyhole, although the entrance is right there, all you have to do is put out your hand and it turns out that the door is not locked. You go in, take a look around and study all yesterday's secrets. All too simple. Here there is no smell of sensation. And without it your name will scarcely ring out on the newspaper page? And then the "keyhole" syndrome is felt again. And incidentally not without success. Mikhail Pasternak from MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLET, for example, "made" his name using this journalistic stratagem and began to be recognized, as they say. Even the frank slips of the tongue committed by him in his work he was able to use in the interests of his own "repute."

It is precisely at this point that I would like to say a word about honor. The honor of people in a spiritual profession. The teacher, the lawyer, the priest—the people of these professions have chosen a path of spiritual tutelage. I would not put a journalist in the rank of the spiritual or possibly human professions, but at present it does have the right to take a prominent place in this rank. Because he carries in himself and for himself those main guarantees of changes in our nation such as glasnost and justice. Hence, he does not have the right to forget the honor of his human profession.

[Tkhor] At present, it has been correctly pointed out that the link between the troop units and the political bodies with the local population has been disrupted and military patriotic work, if it is carried out, is done only with the youth.

For this reason, we feel, the representatives of the press, particularly the army press, when they travel to remote garrisons, should first of all ascertain whether or not

there is an interaction between the local authorities, the public movement and the military. And without fail, they should help organize such contact. This would help to strengthen trust and mutual understanding.

[Gastello] I would like to take up how the press teaches the people to love the army. For example, let us take MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLET which runs a heading entitled "The Oath." Many articles in this newspaper express disrespect for the Armed Forces. I might mention the article "Amnesty." It praises those who neglected their military duty in Afghanistan and appear here as heroes. Understandably, there were negative phenomena among the international soldiers, but during the years of the Great Patriotic War there were no fewer as million-strong armies were fighting. However, we did not extol those who violated their oath to the motherland.

Moreover, in a number of the mass journals, and in particularly in OGONEK, it has become a tradition in each issue to "tweak" the army without fail. And harder for the Afghaneer or the veteran of the Great Patriotic War. Do the journalists of OGONEK really not understand that they are insulting not only those who remain alive but also the memory of those who have fallen?

Undoubtedly, we must view the problems of the army on the pages of the press but I am convinced that alternative opinions should be provided and not just the flogging of shortcomings. This concerns both the newspapers, the radio and television.

[Pavlov] In the treatment of the problems of the Army and Navy, the military and civilian journalists must initiate an active dialogue, having abandoned primarily group interests and then build bridges of cooperation. I recall at one time upon a specific assignment from KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, a military and a civilian journalist went on assignment simultaneously. They wrote the material with "two pens." And the result was good! Is it worth developing this youthful experience?

[Shinkarenko] Today in these walls we have exchanged opinions on very important and timely problems and have reached interesting judgments and conclusions. In my view, we now will better understand one another and have closer contacts. May I hope that the army theme after our discussion will come to hold a proper place on the pages of the civilian press as well. Certainly, we are doing a common thing and each of us should proceed from the view that the USSR Armed Forces in the future be the pride of the people and securely protect their peaceful labor.

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Estonian Anti-Army Sentiment Viewed

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[Article by *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA* correspondent S. Tarakanov: "Instigators and Deserters—Who Is Stirring Up Anti-Army Hysteria in Estonia?"]

[Text] Tallinn—*A powerful explosion broke the silence. The track wheel of the tank which was mounted on the pedestal at the entrance to the Estonian city of Valga flew off far to the side, but the "34" remained in its place. As the military commissar for the Valga District, A. Veselov, said, the experts' opinion is that an old German aircraft bomb had been used to demolish the heavy machine.*

This explosion was one more act in the powerful campaign being waged in Estonia against everything in any way connected with the past and present of the Soviet Army.

Some 10.2 percent of the cooked sausage, 29.5 percent of the frankfurters, 48.5 percent of the canned milk, 88.9 percent of the seafood delicacies... No, dear reader, this is not a printing error which has caused the material from one article to end up in another. These are the percentages of the overall volumes of food products allotted to Tallinn stores that are consumed by disabled veterans of the Great Patriotic War. There are heroes of the Soviet Union, platoons of soldiers, Afghan war veterans, and several other categories of beneficiaries. These figures which, in my opinion, are shameful, represent what the Tallinn City Soviet had to take away from the people who deserved their attention. The usual applications for out-of-turn service for veterans of the Great Patriotic War disappeared from the stores. But more and more voices are being heard calling for manna from heaven to be strewn on the heads of veterans of the 20th Supreme Soviet Division. This, for example, is what *EESTI EKSPRESS*, which calls itself an independent newspaper, writes on 9 March of this year: "...and if misfortune ever befalls Estonia and her people, the German people are always ready to extend a helping hand."

"The agreement signed by thousands of Estonian youth ends with these words. Germany and the German people will soon regain their borders. We hope that when we gain our freedom, the struggle against our common enemy will not be forgotten. The old people in Estonia are waiting for their military pensions."

The article cited above discusses one of the former SS members who was trying to take a bite of the FRG pension pie. He was shown the door after being told that pensions are paid but not to former military servicemen who were residents of occupied territories. True, the author of this article regarded the response as "inspiring hope in the future"—he probably had in mind the present situation in Estonia. It does not seem to me that the bureaucrats in the FRG military department have any intention of paying for the sins of Hitler, who

trampled on international law and particularly on the appendix to the Fourth Hague Convention of 1907 concerning laws and customs of infantry forces. This legal act points out the inadmissibility of enlisting the population of occupied territories in military operations and defense jobs.

Here we have arrived at one of the most crucial problems around which swords have clashed for almost two years, and the duel has now moved inside the walls of the republic parliament. This is the problem of Estonia's legal situation and the dilemma related to it: Whether or not Estonian youth should serve in the Soviet Army. This is why the aforementioned Hague document and the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949 have become handbooks for the parliamentarians. Its 51st Article states that the occupying power does not have the right to force individuals on the territory it has conquered to serve in its armed or auxiliary forces. This article was the "legal" basis for the Geneva-49 movement which originated on 30 October of last year. Its initiators were activists of the Christian Democratic Union, the Society for the Protection of Monuments of Antiquity, the People's Front, the National Independence Party, the "Greens," and several other small groups. The logic of their ideas was this: Since in 1940 the USSR forcibly occupied the independent and autonomous Estonian Republic, it must therefore support the Estonian youths who refuse to serve in the Soviet Army. The mechanics are simple: A young chap comes to the committee, most frequently accompanied by parents or friends, and says that he does not wish to serve in the Army. They take his draft card from him and ask him to fill out a form and three copies declaring his refusal to serve and addressed to the USSR Ministry of Defense. The military document and one copy are sent to the republic military commissariat, the second remains with the draftee, and the committee keeps the third.

This committee and its local representatives are working by the sweat of their brow. The number of people refusing to serve is increasing not by the day but by the hour. Geneva-49 and its proponents in various social organizations boldly refuse to let their passions cool. Typical in this respect was the "anti-military" rally in Ratushnaya Square in Tallinn. Emotions grew to extremes. The epicenter of the rally's force was one T. Khallik. With a tiny baby in her arms she gave an impassioned speech calling for Estonian mothers not to let their sons go into the service of the "occupiers." One must understand that the baby was a symbol of these sons, although the "threat" of his ending up in a military uniform was fairly remote. The real threat was pneumonia: There was a drenching cold rain that day.

On the eve of the rally in the newspaper *VECHERNIY TALLINN* there was an article by Liym, one of the leaders of Geneva-49, in which he suggested regarding as occupiers not only the military servicemen and reservists but also the entire "large civilian garrison that followed the Army in." As they say, is this not what this is all about? Be that as it may, there are plenty of gullible

chaps being taken in by the "Geneva people." And it is especially alarming for those who have deserted. There are 57 of them in the republic. One of them, A. Sostalu, was arrested and is under investigation.

This is what the military prosecutor, Colonel A. Gladilin of the judicial corps, had to say about this:

"Civilian officials should think twice before calling for military servicemen to go absent without leave—there is no point in subjecting their compatriots, brothers, and sons to the threat of punishment. It would be much kinder to convey to them through the mass media how dangerous and illegal such actions are..."

Geneva-49 goes far beyond what is allowable for a social organization and interferes with government organs, and the "legal" basis for their actions is questionable, to put it mildly, since for some reason their functionaries forget that in the convention in addition to Article 51 there is the Article 6 where it clearly states: "The applicability of the convention on the territory of the sides that are in conflict ceases after the general termination of military activities."

Well, God be with the Geneva-49! It is much more difficult to understand many city and district soviets which hastily adopted a decision concerning refusing to serve in the ranks of the Soviet Army.

The anti-Army hysteria—I am not afraid to use that word—has a negative effect on the mutual understanding between the local population and the military servicemen. It is no accident that the previous Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, the government, and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Estonia this winter were forced to appeal to the residents of the republic to be tolerant of the enlisted men and officers of the Soviet Army.

A sober evaluation. It would seem that the concrete actions should also be sober. But, unfortunately, this is not always the case. On the one hand, when meeting with K. Kochetov, USSR first deputy minister of defense, it was requested that point two of the decree of the USSR Council of Ministers on calling citizens up for active military service not apply to the Estonian SSR but that its citizens be given the opportunity to volunteer. As an experiment they could do labor service as an alternative to active duty in the USSR Armed Forces. Physically or psychologically wounded military servicemen should be granted the opportunity to finish out their terms in military units located on the territory of the republic and several of these units should be manned by recruits from Estonia.

On the other hand the first session of the republic Supreme Soviet of the first convocation adopted the decree "On the State Status of Estonia," which asserts that "the occupation of the Estonian Republic by the USSR on 17 June 1940 did not halt the existence of the Estonian Republic de jure: The territory of the Estonian Republic has been occupied up to the present day."

And in the decree of the Supreme Soviet "On a Historical-Legal Evaluation of the Events in Estonia in 1940," it says that foreign economic and military acts taken by the Stalinist leadership of the Soviet Union against the Estonian Republic in 1940 are regarded as aggression, military occupation, and annexation of the Estonian Republic. The elections to the State Duma of the Estonian Republic on 15 and 15 July 1940 are considered to have been conducted in violation of the Basic Law of the Estonian Republic and the law on elections, and the parliament formed this way was invalid and not authorized to make decisions changing the state status of Estonia. The Supreme Soviet draws the conclusion that the inclusion of Estonia in the Soviet Union in 1940 was wrong and recognizes the decision of the State Duma of Estonia of 22 July 1940—"Declaration of the Entry of Estonia into the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics"—as legally invalid since it is not based on the free expression of the will of the Estonian people.

Hence it naturally follows that our army is an occupation army and it is not mandatory to serve in it. This is the reference from which the republic Supreme Soviet proceeded on 11 April when adopting the law on the service of Estonian SSR residents in the USSR Armed Forces.

All the Union normative acts pertaining to universal military obligation were declared illegal on the territory of Estonia. Articles of the republic criminal code that envision punishment for evasion of military service are abolished and individuals convicted under these acts are rehabilitated. Institutions and organizations are ordered to halt work for recruitment into the Army and they are also forbidden to demand military documents upon registration.

In the military encyclopedic dictionary "occupation" is interpreted as a temporary occupation of enemy territory by the armed forces and the assumption of control over it. Personally, I do not find these indicators in relations between the Estonian Republic and the USSR, nor did the group of deputies who disputed their status and their law on the service.

Can draft evaders and deserters feel safe from now on while legal guarantees remain reliable for other youths? I do not think so. In the first place, the legal act that was adopted contradicts the USSR Constitution and the law on universal military obligation. In the second place, the transition period declared by the Supreme Soviet, which it intends to end "with the formation of constitutional organs of state power of the Estonian Republic," is not only an unconstitutional phenomenon but it is also difficult to predict. And thus: "Every person must be well aware of what he is risking personally. In general it is risky to serve in the army but it is also risky to evade the service: One can be subjected to repressive measures. There is also a risk for the Supreme Soviet since it is not known whether the laws it adopts will be recognized. So far it is impossible to guarantee immunity for anyone. Today people frequently ask the question about guarantees, but the transition period per se includes very few

guarantees of any kind. This is its specific nature: There is a political struggle going on and its outcome is unclear."

Common sense. But here is the rub—does the chairman of the permanent commission of the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet for state defense, R. Tamme, have it? This is the commission that should mainly ensure the legality of norm setting in military matters. Has it not responded to inflamed public opinion in submitting to parliament a draft law which it knows to contain a constitutional conflict?

An alarming situation has developed today. The bitter attack on the Soviet Army, the politicization of military servicemen, and the revolt in the minds of recruits—these are still not all the components. Add to this the spreading of the wings of the eagle with the sword in its talons—the symbol of the Estonian Defense Union. Today there are about 1,400 people in its ranks. Its founder, K. Eller, in a recent interview with a correspondent of the ESTONIAN TELEGRAPH AGENCY, declared that the Defense Union "sees the goal of its activity primarily in being prepared to protect the citizens and develop skills for protecting the homeland. And only after that comes the protection of the residents of Estonia and their property." "Such a mass organization as the Defense Union cannot put police functions at the top of its list," he said.

Against whom does the Defense Union intend to defend the homeland?

There is the opinion that when the people do not want to feed their army they will be feeding someone else's. Let us ask the question: To whom is it advantageous to consider the Soviet Army someone else's?

Report Details Congress Delegate Data

90UM0749A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in Russian No 29, 21-27 Jul 90 p 3

[Report by the Main Political Administration of the Soviet Army and Navy: "Whose Generals Are They?"]

[Text] Communists of the Armed Forces were represented at the 28th CPSU Congress by 269 delegates. All of them had been nominated by local party organizations and were elected on a competitive basis (out of 5,794 candidates). The body of delegates included 170 generals and admirals, not 241 as was reported by USSR People's Deputy Colonel A. Tsalko to the INTERFAX press agency (ARGUMENTY I FAKTY No. 28 of this year), 93 senior officers, one junior officer, two warrant officers and one ensign, an employee of the Soviet Army, and a worker.

About 50 percent of the delegates were representatives of the command personnel, 32 percent—political workers, and 12.5 percent—communists of the staffs, rear organs,

and engineering and technical personnel. Also elected were four workers of the military commissariats and a legal expert.

Almost 40 percent had been elected delegates of preceding CPSU congresses and the 19th All-Union Party Conference.

In the first round of voting, 87 percent of the delegates were elected. The support of the majority of participants in the party conference was given to Comrades D.T. Yazov (94 percent), M.A. Moiseyev (80 percent), N.I. Shlyaga (85 percent), and V.N. Chernavin (91 percent).

As compared to the preceding party forums, at the 28th CPSU Congress in the body of delegates from the Army and Navy the representation of the central staff of the USSR Ministry of Defense decreased by a factor of three, management personnel of the main and central administrations and branches of the Armed Forces—by a factor of two, division commanders—by a factor of three, and chief of division political sections—by a factor of seven.

At the same time the representation of secretaries of party committees increased by 63 percent.

OFFICIAL STATISTICAL DATA OF MILITARY RANKS AMONG DELEGATES TO THE 28th CPSU CONGRESS (Soviet Army and Navy, Ministry of Internal Affairs, KGB)

Marshals of the Soviet Union—two, Marshals of branches of the service—one, Army generals—16, colonel generals—50, lieutenant generals—73, major generals—71, admirals of the fleet—one, admirals—six, vice admirals—seven, rear admirals—four, colonels—79, lieutenant colonels—48, majors—26, captains—one, captains first rank—four, captains second rank—four, senior lieutenants—three, warrant officers—one, ensigns—two; TOTAL—399.

Letters Illustrate Impact of Nationalism on Military, Country

90UM0774A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 24 Jul 90 p 1

[Article by Capt 3d Rank V. Yermolin: "Who occupied Siberia?"]

[Text] I admit that in past times I had a certain distrust of collective letters. Probably an allergy acquired to various kinds of mass manifestations of both "ferveant approval" and "angry condemnation" had its effect. And always in the listing of titles and names that followed one saw a certain structure, which observed regulation closedness toward the pace-setter. Today there are also numerous collective letters in our mail. But in their lines there is so much anger and pain, and so many vital, genuine feelings and thoughts arrived at through great suffering, that collective co-authorship is received truly as a united spiritual upsurge.

In front of me is a letter from an officers' meeting of a unit deployed in Armenia. Officers A. Zelenskiy, A. Shinkarev, L. Zubkov and A. Kuznetsov signed it on behalf of their comrades. Here is what it says: "Instead of the mission of ensuring the security of the borders of our homeland, we have been forced to protect the lives of our soldiers, our families, and ultimately our own lives. Military personnel are constantly subjected to moral degradation from a segment of the population. About what officer's honor, what honor of the greatcoat, can one speak if an officer, by order of his superiors, is forced to appear in the city only in civilian clothing, so that it not cause 'nervousness' on the part of the fighters (they stroll about in their uniforms freely) and resentment in the local population?" Such letters from Armenia are along the same lines as those that came, and to this day continue to come, from the republics of the Baltic region, Georgia, Moldova and Azerbaijan. And it must be taken into account that these are not whimperers seeking ways of ridding themselves of the army burden who are writing, but frequently officers and warrant officers who have been through the crucible of the Afghan War, and in this case even endured the tragedy of the earthquake along with the Armenian people.

How could it happen that soldiers, defenders of the homeland, the first bulwark and hope in the hour of tribulations, whether a natural disaster or other calamity, could they fall into the sights of people's enmity and become the targets of such naked slander? The question is, of course, rhetorical. For example, for Mordovian Aleksandr Koshkin everything is utterly clear: "You are occupiers," he writes, "and, as you know, occupiers are hated." And one is no longer surprised when Koshkin is seconded by a Siberian, who signs his name Aleksey Angarskiy, and who presents the USSR a bill for... the campaigns of Yermak Timofeyevich. See how easily the universal "golden key" of nationalism came into use from the "occupied" Lithuanians, and opened up dungeons of the most vile and evil thoughts.

See how easily here the tongue really will criticize yesterday's brother as an occupier, having dug into the "legends of the distant past." Only here, it seems to me, we are not concerned at all with the fact that at one time our forebears "by fire and sword" confirmed the borders of the Russian state. And those who put into circulation the idea about "occupation" know its true cost perfectly well. In my view, those military transport aviation officers O. Sivukhin, Yu. Malin, V. Sorogin, and others, write correctly when they assert in assessing the events in Lithuania: "This is a well thought out spectacle. First anti-army hysteria is rehearsed, then anti-Russian, and finally, that for the sake of which everything was ventured—open anti-Sovietism." Events are also now developing according to the same scenario in other regions, with the addition of local coloration.

The choice of techniques in the political struggle for power is a matter of the honesty and conscience of the politician. It would be seem to be a personal matter. But, today we have seen with our own eyes enough examples

of when this "personal matter" turns into a threatening confrontation among people. And here and there the confrontation has already been replaced by active hostility. Destinies are crippled. People are crippled and perish. And those for whom everything has already been decided, who have been drawn into the maelstrom of fanaticism only have time (if they have time) to cast a cursory glance at themselves from the side and say in horror: "Is this me?" An elderly woman from Baku, Z. Valiakmetova, wrote to us: "When in January soldiers drove my neighbor, an officer's wife, to the airport, I shook a threatening fist at her from behind. You see, they almost shot my grandson. That is how terrible it was. But time passed and I came to my senses—what are we doing? How could I let hatred into my heart? How could this happen?"

And here is the voice of another woman, already from Lithuania, from Panevezhis: "I want to write about something that I am embarrassed to write about. Our leaders and many citizens call the military 'occupiers.' I, as a simple worker, do not understand how we can insult a military man. I have always lived on good terms with military people. I never saw anything bad from them." The letter has a complete address, and name, including family name. But this Lithuanian woman requested that her name not be used. And it is a pity, after all one will find, both in Lithuania and other corners of the country, many such steadfast "national-patriots," who are unable to believe in the display of such natural feelings toward someone close, even if he is of another nationality, and especially one who is in the military.

For some these two letters are a detail that essentially does not mean anything. They would say that for each such example today one can cite dozens, hundreds, and thousands of others, which prove the opposite, namely that there lives in the people hostility both toward the Soviet army and toward its representatives. Well, let such letters as those from Baku and Panevezhis still be few in our mail, and these voices still speak shyly, and their innermost feelings be said cautiously, so that they may not be easy to catch, but the truth is found in the fact that people, millions of people, do not want to threaten one another with their fists, to see one another as enemies, or to carry in their souls and hearts hatred toward an "alien" and fear for their loved ones. And it is not the Lithuanian or Armenian people who are presenting to the army, Russia, and the state system the historical accounts, but it is the "priests" of the idea of national rebirth who are doing so in the name of the people. These are wonderful and noble ideas that have fallen into the snares of ordinary anti-Sovietism.

I would like to end this survey not with a beautiful appeal for agreement, but with a quote from a letter, again a collective letter. It was signed by Retired Lt Col A. Zaryadyev, Reserve Maj Yu. Burtovoy, and others, on behalf of a group of armed forces veterans. "Every decision of the people's deputies of the union republic that provokes anti-army moods (and such decisions, unfortunately, exist)," write the veterans, "is a blow

tasks and conditions. Particular attention is being imparted to democratization of internal Party relations and to creation of a new moral atmosphere, a high level of discipline, law and order, and military comradeship.

The charter reflects the fact that the CPSU acts as a nationwide political organization. There are common interests among the Soviet peoples besides professional, national, age, and other specific needs. While reflecting the people's interests as a whole, the CPSU will henceforth rely on the working class, peasantry, and intelligentsia. This situation was convincingly confirmed at the Congress where the speeches of representatives of all social strata of our society were heard outright.

The CPSU advocates friendship and interethnic unity of all of the country's nations and nationalities. It proposes numerous variations of political and legal ties and the diversity of their political and economic interrelations based on economic independence of enterprises. During the process of renewal, the USSR will ensure the independence of the union republic communist parties that dialectically go well together with Party unity based on the CPSU's fundamental programs and charter principles.

[AGITATOR ARMII I FLOTA] Gennadiy Aleksandrovich, you participated in the work of the Congress's ideological section. The press reported that although not everyone managed to speak at it, no one there kept silent....

[Stefanovskiy] The unprecedented outburst of emotion and passion was characteristic not only of the ideological section's work but also of all of the Congress' plenary sessions. And this is understandable: People are tired of uncertainty, empty discussions, lack of discipline, and irresponsibility. They are striving to introduce proposals and to express their attitudes toward some problems. Therefore, we need to restore people's faith in perestroika and in our socialist values and ideals. Really if man's consciousness has been "shattered," then chaos will enter into his causes. And a society, deprived of an ideal and spirituality, will disintegrate.

The theme that worried everyone sounded the Congress' leitmotif: What do we need to do for the Party to regain and increase the people's trust so that it becomes the reliable ideological and political force and the true organizer of all the workers? The directions for the solution of complex and acute ideological problems were precisely indicated. One of them is to overcome the crisis of theoretical thought. It is also having an extremely negative impact on practical work of the Party's ideological personnel and all Party organizations. The Congress decisively opposed authoritative thinking and advocated the creative development of the legacy of Marx, Engels, and Lenin and socialist theory. It condemned attacks on V.I. Lenin's character. The duty of each communist and honest man is to protect him both as a politician and thinker from slander, disparagement, and also from bureaucratic honors and glorification.

Another direction of ideological and political education work is cleansing it of dogmatism, ideological zashorenost [translation unknown], and doctrinairism. The Congress' materials arm our personnel and each of the Army and Navy's ideological activists with the skill to act using methods of persuasion and motivate [them] to defend their convictions and principles in dialogue and discussion. We need to more persistently master the art of political work among the masses: To attract people with the force of truth, with arguments, and with the expressive word and specific deed. And after the Congress, ideological and political educational work will not be simple or easy. The onslaught of the opposing and frequently openly anti-communist forces and the wave of rally elements will not subside. Therefore everything developed by the Congress in the sphere of ideological work must be taken into the inventory and skillfully used by them.

[AGITATOR ARMII I FLOTA] Please comment on some military problems. They were quite sharply and frequently contradictorily discussed at the Congress.

[Stefanovskiy] First of all, I would like to direct the attention of ideological activists to an important political document—the Congress' resolution "On Primary Directions of the Party's Military Policy at the Current Stage." It is very timely under current conditions and it has been subjected to unfounded and at times malicious attacks in certain mass media organizations and at other Army and Navy mass meetings. They are attempting to present the Army as nearly the main threat to democracy and are forcing the idea of a military coup d'etat.

The Congress gave a high rating to the Armed Forces which are fulfilling their constitutional duty to defend the socialist state in a worthy manner. The Army is committed to its people and to the socialist choice. However, many acute problems have accumulated among the troops and in the fleets. One of them is the fulfillment of functions that are not characteristic of the Army: Let us take this same gathering of the harvest. This year 30,000 motor vehicles performed extra hard work at harvest time and many were removed from emergency reserve depots and from important Army transportation movements. Or, let us say, there is a critical housing situation in the Army—the [housing] debt of local organs totals nearly 900,000 square meters. Legislative acts have been adopted in a number of republics that provoke evasion of service and desertion.

Resolution of these and other problems is linked with the conduct of comprehensive military reform which includes perestroika of the Armed Forces themselves, transformation of the entire military production with its conversion, and reduction of defense appropriations. This first of all assumes that the portion of men and equipment released at this time will be directed toward realization of a purposeful state program of social support and legal protection of servicemen and members of their families.

Those who call for depoliticization and de-Party-ization of the Army and Navy were given a convincing rebuff at the Congress. The CPSU will strive to consolidate its role as political leader in the Army and Navy and to consolidate all healthy and progressive forces in the interests of increasing the country's defense capability. Under current conditions, political work in the Armed Forces acquires a still greater significance. Its goal is education of servicemen in the spirit of loyalty to socialist ideals, unity of the Army and the people, patriotism, friendship of Soviet peoples, interethnicity, vigilance, and constant readiness to defend the Homeland.

[AGITATOR ARMII I FLOTA] Gennadiy Aleksandrovich, you spoke about important problems in the Congress' work. And what are your personal impressions?

[Stefanovskiy] I had the opportunity to participate in the work of the 27th Party Congress and the 19th All-Union Party Conference. The situation at the current highest Party forum was completely different. Previously, sedate unanimity reigned in the hall and this same sedateness was observed even during breaks. Today passions boiled on the podium, yes, and even in the foyer of the Palace of Congresses—discussions of problems were not interrupted. This permitted a broad comparison of opinions and discovery of the most tested solutions. And, in my view, there is still one very important observation: New people arrived at the Congress and brought new, fresh ideas. The Party leadership was also significantly renewed as a result of collective thinking. And this instills confidence that the resolution of large and complex tasks that the Party and the country face will be provided and that resolutions will be embodied in specific, results-oriented actions.

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Role of Navy Propagandists Appears Unnecessary

90UM0808A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
1 Aug 90 First Edition p 2

[Article by Capt Lt P. Lysenko, correspondent of the Northern Fleet newspaper NA STRAZHE ZAPOLYARI: "Agitator-Dilettantes. Do We Need Them Today?"]

[Text] It would seem that the "revolutionary" situation arose out of nothing. The conference of political workers of the nuclear missile cruiser "Kirov," which was on a long cruise, was already coming to its conclusion when Senior Lieutenant O. Kolosov, the deputy commander for political affairs of one of the divisions, offered the following heated reply to a question from the "big dep"—that's what they call ship deputy commanders for political affairs in the navy—Captain 2d Rank A. Pugachev, concerning plans for lessons with subunit agitators:

"Aleksandr Yuryevich, the hell with these plans, we agitators don't need them, there's no benefit in them—

all we do is create paperwork. Let's forget about this busy work, let's not waste our time and effort on it...."

Kolosov was supported by a few more officers. And referencing information he received during a recent training at a course for political workers, the ship propagandist added that a directive which, among other things, would abolish the unofficial position of subunit agitator had already been drafted and was to be published by the beginning of the training year.

It seemed to me—I was present at this conference—that Captain 2d Rank Pugachev was about to agree with Senior Lieutenant Kolosov's radical proposal when the senior political worker aboard the cruiser took the floor. Good-naturedly scolding the disturber of the peace for his passion and his not entirely parliamentary expressions, he recalled that no one had yet abolished the agitators, and whether or not such a decision would be made was still up in the air. Moreover the higher staff and political organ were going to inspect the ship soon. In a word, the "revolution" never happened.

A few days later the "Kirov" successfully passed inspection. The political workers aboard the cruiser who felt that agitators picked from among first-term servicemen were no longer needed did not press their point of view—they rendered an accounting as required. In turn, the inspectors didn't immerse themselves in the subtleties, or try to determine any specific details as to who was agitating whom, why, and how. Was the documentation there? Was it all in order? Fine, you pass.

After that the way the situation developed vividly recalled a classical episode in *Dead Souls*. In one case a briefing given to a party meeting by the party committee secretary contained this statement: "The adopted decision to develop the practice of having agitators speak in political lessons has not been fulfilled.... The agitators themselves are not showing any eagerness." In another case the weekly party political work plan contained this statement: "Organize exchange of the work experience of agitators concerned with mobilizing the personnel to fulfill exercise objectives." These statements were a documentary confirmation—albeit indirect—that agitators did exist on the ship. But there was not a single living, breathing agitator to be found.

For example when seamen, petty officers and even officers of the navigation division were asked who their agitator was, they couldn't answer.

"We don't have any agitators, and we don't need them," said Captain Lieutenant A. Zabolotnyy, deputy commander for political affairs of the missile fire control division in response to my request to meet one.

"Seaman Aanayev is an agitator on paper," said Senior Lieutenant A. Barabanov, deputy commander for political affairs of the communication division. "But he barely knows it himself."

As far as I was able to gather, what lay behind the frankness of the replies of the political workers aboard the "Kirov" was not stupidity and not neglect of official duties, but the certainty that they were right. Red Army agitators, they told me, looked completely natural in the foxholes of the civil war, when out of every dozen soldiers who signed their name with a cross, there was but one capable of reading a newspaper article or bulletin aloud, and explaining it. The existence of agitators and reinforcement of that institution were also justified during the Great Patriotic War. But even then, reliance was placed on official—read that as professional—agitators, slots for whom were established in political organs at different levels. As an example the group of official agitators in the political directorate of a front consisted of 7-10 persons, the group in an army political department consisted of five, and a group in the political department of a division consisted of two. In response to a decision of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army Main Political Directorate around 500 qualified political workers were assigned to agitation work in the troops in the first period of the war. That is, even during those difficult times they tried to organize agitation on a fully professional basis. But what need is there today for agitator-dilettantes?

Aboard that same cruiser, the "Kirov," there are as many as 10 official political workers, there is one officer or one warrant officer for every two or three seamen, and three-fourths of the officers are communists. During the cruise, broadcasts of Moscow Radio's world service were transmitted each day aboard the ship, "News of the Planet" information bulletins were posted each day, political briefings were conducted four times a week, and political lessons were conducted weekly. So where is there room for a seaman-agitator in this already complex system?

For the sake of objectivity I should say that not all political workers aboard the "Kirov" agree that the institution of agitators was a nuisance. Senior Lieutenant R. Berezin, deputy commander for political affairs of the traffic division, solidly defended its necessity and usefulness. He cited as an example the work of seaman Sh. Talybov. But what specifically was the doubtlessly diligent seaman accomplishing? In the words of the political worker himself, he was successfully performing the duties of binding the newspapers, filing the news bulletin leaflets, snipping articles out of periodicals and pasting them up in agitator files. But when it came to conducting discussions with the personnel, even Berezin called this a "cosmic" duty, meaning that it was not within the seaman's capabilities. In such a case, what relationship does the activity of the seaman-agitator have to agitation per se, which is defined by the dictionaries as oral and printed activity among the broad masses having the purpose of spreading certain ideas for the political indoctrination of the masses?

We all know quite well that sometimes it is not easy for even people with much greater knowledge and life experience than 18 or 19 year old seamen to understand

today's whirlpool of domestic and foreign political events. In the best case, such an "agitator" could only relay information that had been gathered, prepared and "digested" for him by a political worker.

By the way, the situation with subunit agitators is not the only thing that steers us to the conclusion that the approaches of yesterday, if not the day before yesterday, still prevail in ideological work. Take for example the frequently formal nature of the work of agitation and propaganda groups of ship party committees and party bureaus.

Mention should also be made of so-called counterpropaganda groups. They have not yet been abolished, but for that matter, the task of developing a critical attitude and a weighted approach to the policy and ideological conceptions of the West in army and navy soldiers has not outlived itself at all yet. However, we seem to have forgotten about counterpropaganda groups in recent times. And probably not only because the word itself "counterpropaganda" disappeared recently in one fell swoop from the lexicon of ideological workers. Apparently also for the reason that the work of the groups is still regulated by a document that had been written in a time when in the absence of truthful information by which to prove the real and imagined advantages of socialism, there was more than enough of "classical sentiment" and mindless repetition of passages from the classicists. Today, understandably, such things don't work.

I heard from several political workers of different ranks that, fortunately, inspectors from higher levels have begun assessing the work of agitators, agitation and propaganda groups and agitation and propaganda collectives soberly and realistically. What they meant, it turns out, is this: The inspectors might of course have suggested that the actual state of affairs was inconsistent with the requirements of the guidelines still in effect, or even meted out punishment for it, but they didn't—it was all too obvious that these requirements were out of touch with real life.

Can it be, then, that the issue has resolved itself?

Journalists Visit Nuclear Submarine Base in Kamchatka

*90UM0848A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 12 Aug 90
Second Edition p 2*

[Article by special correspondents A. Androshin, V. Fedotov and G. Yastrebtsov, Pacific Fleet: "The Bay Beyond the Boom"]

[Excerpts] It just so happened that we flew in to Kamchatka just when the submariners were celebrating a remarkable date in the history of the Soviet fleet—the 85th anniversary of the Tsushima engagement.

During a solemn ceremony, not only the blue-and-white Soviet naval flag familiar to all, but also an ancient

symbol of Russian military glory—the banner of St. Andrew, white with a blue diagonal cross, was raised before the formation of warship crews.

The brass band played. In accordance with the old tradition the seamen dropped a wreath onto the leaden waves of Krashennnikov's Bay in honor of the crews of the battleship "Emperor Alexander III," the cruiser "Vladimir Monomakh," the battleship "Prince Suvorov," the cargo ship "Kamchatka" and other ships that sank heroically rather than surrendering to the mercy of the victor in that remarkable battle.

It was a pity that the inhabitants of Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy, especially the young, were unable to see all of this, even though the submariners' city is only a stone's throw away from the oblast center. And they were unable to see this because, using the language of the military, it was off limits. Both the city and the bay, where the black whale-like humpbacks of the nuclear submarines float high above the piers, are tightly closed off from unauthorized persons. It is as if this satellite-city doesn't exist at all. A secret facility, a mystery behind seven seals. Although as it was explained to us, it is closed not so much to keep secret the fact itself that the menacing seafaring craft were based there, as to ensure elementary security.

But as fate would have it, one way or another we, it seems, were the first journalists to go beyond the forbidding striped boom.

What sort of people were they, that settled down beside Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy? The submarine formation under the command of Vice Admiral O. Faleyev does not have that long a history, although it does contain many dramatic pages.

In September 1942 the submarines L-15 and L-16, led by captain lieutenants V. Komarov and D. Gusarov, set off for the Northern Fleet via a circuitous route. Only one reached the Arctic and fought there. The second, the L-16, was torpedoed and sunk at the approach to the Panama Canal.

In '45 the war was raging at our Far Eastern borders. Submariners took part in the combat operations.

And today, even though the long-awaited political and military detente has begun to settle over our planet, the nuclear submarine crews are on alert, like before. They continue serving around-the-clock alert duty.

"We are military professionals," Vice Admiral O. Faleyev explained briefly, "which means that we are obligated to fulfill our military duty unflinchingly. I am convinced that the navy must be combat ready even today. All the more so because things are not at all as pacific and tranquil as we would like them to be on the Pacific Ocean. The Americans conduct large-scale maneuvers in this region. Their ships are constantly in direct proximity to Soviet territorial waters. How can we relax under these conditions?"

In our visit to the nuclear submarines we persuaded ourselves that the crews had not even given a thought to relaxing. The seamen know how to function competently and coolly, even in complex, unforeseen circumstances.

Take for example the incident that was related to us. The valve rod of a machine unit on which the forward progress of the ship depends became damaged due to wear and deviations from ideal centricity, measured in the microns. Such a fault needs to be eliminated ashore, where the necessary equipment is at hand and plenty of time is available. But neither are available on the ocean. Nonetheless the submarine was not yet on the return leg of its voyage. Senior Seaman Aleksandr Selivanov took on the hard job, requesting but one assistant to help him. The youngsters worked at maximum effort. The broken-down machine unit was disconnected from the electric network for a very short time. After completing the repairs proficiently, Aleksandr gave the O.K. for a trial start-up. Everything was done as well as it could have been at home port. The submarine went on with its assignment.

Many examples of such routine but somehow extraordinary, selfless work can be cited. The people who go out on the ocean are experts who have devoted their life to the submarine fleet and who deal fully consciously with risk.

"We submariners are often called seamen times two or seamen squared," said the formation commander, Captain 1st Rank V. Dorogin. "This is probably because the work is so very difficult. Even aboard an ordinary surface ship, a long cruise is hard for the crew to endure—fatigue accumulates over the weeks and months, and nervous tension grows due to the cramped living conditions and constant communication with the same people. And it is far worse aboard submarines, where seamen live and work in crowded compartments, breathe regenerated air, drink desalinated saltwater, and most importantly, never see the shoreline—they don't even see the gulls above the waves. When we take a cruise, it is entirely in the pitch-darkness of the oceanic abyss. You would certainly agree that not everyone can endure such a thing. [passage omitted]"

"Anything can happen on a long cruise. There are special situations against which no one is insured. In this regard we have, to be frank, severe and even brutal unwritten laws governing the actions of the crew in response to an unforeseen situation. For example if an accident occurs in one of the compartments which could affect the fate of the entire submarine, the 'sick' compartment is sealed off, and it may so happen that the people in it would never get out. But the men are consciously ready for the most extreme measures in order to save their comrades."

"Today at congresses of people's deputies, in labor collectives and simply in families as well, there is much discussion and debate as to what our army and navy should be today—manned as before on the basis of

compulsory military service, or on the basis of contracts?" Rear Admiral V. Rodionov, the formation's military council member, joined the conversation. "This question has no meaning to us. The nuclear submarine fleet consists in its majority of professionals, of specialists of a high class—officers, warrant officers and petty officers. The complexities that do exist involve the enlisted ranks. As you know, students have been discharged, and they are no longer called up. The replacements that we receive, especially from the republics, are not always trained. But at any rate I would advise you to talk with the crews. I think that the submariners will themselves tell you about their work, and about the many problems faced by the garrison."

Here are excerpts from our reporters' notebooks.

Petty Officer 2d Class V. Nashchinets:

"Of course I am not about to paint a rosy picture of navy life—there was a time in the beginning when the older seamen talked harshly to us, and worked our butts off. There were times when your pride suffered, but you knew from the bottom of your soul that if you didn't master your specialty well enough, and were unable to learn to do everything quickly and smartly, you could jeopardize the crew and yourself.

"It goes without saying that cruises are hard, and the monotony is suffocating. But there are bright, happy days as well. How can we ever forget, for example, the traditional Neptune's holiday? My memory of my initiation as a seaman will stay with me forever. All of the men aboard our submarine began preparing for this holiday long before it. Warrant Officer B. Antonov cut an impressive figure as the king of the sea. The agile 'devils'—Warrant Officer A. Steblyanov and Senior Seaman S. Simenov—brought on laughter and jokes. 'Pirates' danced through the compartments to the tune of songs of daring exploits. In a word, it was a real holiday. What was good about it was that the men had organized this break for themselves—the next day, you see, it was back to the exhausting training and the important exercises."

Senior Lieutenant E. Odzhagov:

"It would have been nice if submariners had to face burdens and severe trials only at sea. Unfortunately, because we live in such a mysterious city, shut off from unauthorized eyes, we sometimes have to deal with elementary bungling, mismanagement, and amazing indifference to people. Take for example last winter, when the heaters in the seamen's barracks didn't work for almost three months. Water froze in the wash basin and in the pipes and taps. The men, who were not much on complaining to the higher-ups, tried to correct the mistakes of the builders themselves, but you must agree that everyone should be held responsible for their own work. The seamen patched the cracks in the window frames with plywood, they spread their overcoats and pea-jackets over their blankets, but even so, some of

them couldn't avoid catching colds. Some had to be sent to sick bay. Now there's combat readiness for you!"

Warrant Officer I. Pustoshkin:

"I'm 23 years old, and I have a wife and two children. We lived in the Ukraine. I worked at the plant. I was on the housing list, but with no real prospects—my name wouldn't come up for 20 years. It was then that an acquaintance of mine who had re-upped came for a visit while on leave from Kamchatka. It was he who advised me to go there, and to join the navy. I took the next plane with my whole family. They gave me an apartment in the garrison, and things are incomparably better for me now from a material standpoint. I now sail submarines."

Senior Seaman E. Khamidullin:

"Although I have served almost all of my term, to be honest I find the service tiresome, and I don't get any satisfaction from it. I'm sorry to have wasted all those years. What was there that was good about it? Nothing! We work harder than the officers, but what do we get in return? Leaves are passed out not to everyone but only the brown-nosers. In a word, I'll be going home, and then I'll never think about Kamchatka again!"

Lieutenant A. Bugrov:

"I came here to Kamchatka right after graduating from school in Sevastopol. We have a remarkable, friendly crew. The work is hard, but it's interesting, and I don't think there is anything to compare with nature on Kamchatka. I'm still a bachelor, but if I ever get married, I would like my children to be born and live on Kamchatka—a fabulous land."

Such, then, are the different opinions about life and work in the navy. And is there anything amazing about that? Each is free to say and think what he wants. And even we reporters, who were guests of the naval seamen for but a short time, arrived at varied and in many ways contradictory impressions of what we had seen. On one hand we were astounded by the might, the gigantic dimensions, the electronics and the most sophisticated armament of the nuclear missile submarines, while on the other hand we were simply dumbfounded by the amazing personal contrasts and the poor living conditions of the seamen and their families.

No, we have no intention at all to put everything in a bad light. There were many attractive things that we were able to see in the closed satellite-city of Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy. The well equipped apartments in which some officers and their families were lucky to live were a pleasure for the eye to behold. We also visited clean, well-kept dormitories (it's hard to call them barracks) for the first-term seamen. But alas, we also noticed some other things: the almost impassable road leading to the wharf where ferries from the oblast center moor; the houses long overdue for overhaul; the stores in which sellers languish for hours due to the absence of even the most basic necessities. [passage omitted]

What does Vice Admiral D. Komarov, first deputy chief of staff of the USSR Navy, think about all of this?

"I served a long time on Kamchatka," said Dmitriy Mikhaylovich, "and even my son is serving as an executive officer aboard a nuclear submarine. Meaning that I am close to and well aware of the problems of serving there. The fact is that Soviet government organs were established in the closed city in order to free the military of things not in their line of work. It's now 'fashionable' to say that our outlays for defense needs are inordinately high. But on the other hand seamen almost everywhere have to build their own housing and solve other house-keeping problems themselves, and I can understand their anger—what appear to be plausible excuses are given for the fact that resources allocated to the closed city sit idle in the oblast center: The military department, they say, is rich, and the seamen can do everything themselves."

And so it happens that military and civilian executives are never able to find a common language, as a result of which it is the people, the city dwellers that suffer. Our main mission, military personnel feel, is combat training, and not repair of housing and schools. The Soviet government, as represented by the oblast executive committee, objects: The city on the other side of the bay has nothing to do with us—it's the private domain of the seamen, so let them worry about its socioeconomic development.

Such debates have been going on for years. And no one knows who is going to win. This is perhaps the main mystery of the closed city on the bay by the ocean, a mystery which we weren't able to solve.

Transbaykal MD Commander Discusses Military Reform

*90UM0858A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
14 Aug 90 First Edition p 2*

[Interview with V.M. Semenov, Central Committee member, commander of the forces of the Transbaykal Military District: "Pluralism of Opinion and Party Discipline"]

[Text] [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] You were elected CPSU Central Committee member. What did you feel when that happened? How did you start working for the implementation of the congress' resolutions?

[Semenov] I would be lying if I were to say that I did not feel proud for the confidence shown me. Nonetheless, I clearly realize that the time of so-called honorary Central Committee members has vanished forever. The communists expect of us not a thoughtless "rubber stamping" of documents drafted by the apparat, as was the case in the past, but intensive work and really influencing the activities of the Politburo and the Central Committee Secretariat in accordance with the will of the party masses. Henceforth, naturally, stricter demands will be placed on the members of the Central Committee and their work will be controlled much more strictly. Today no one can

hide behind the previously salutary "collective responsibility" screen. Incidentally, the reports submitted by the members of the country's political leadership at the 28th CPSU Congress on their personal contribution to perestroika mark the start of good changes.

As to work on the implementation of the congress' resolutions, I consider propaganda as my prime task now. If we are able to mobilize the people and to lead them, the plans of the congress metaphorically speaking, will begin to acquire flesh and blood. Otherwise we shall have to pay the highest price—loss of authority by the party and its political leadership.

I have already visited several garrisons and, as USSR people's deputy, have met with my electorate in labor collectives in Buryatiya. I am not exaggerating when I say that the majority of the people positively rate the results of the congress and its resolutions. This is a very satisfactory fact. Despite the view expressed in some mass information media, the working people and the military personnel believe, as in the past, in the party. Naturally, there are concerns and fears because of the situation in the country.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] One of the important documents passed at the congress and directly applying to us, the military, was the resolution "On Basic Trends in the Party's Military Policy at the Present Stage." Are you entirely satisfied with this document?

[Semenov] The very fact that such a resolution was passed is satisfactory, for no document of such nature has been passed at a party forum since 1921. Now, after nearly seven decades, the party has deemed necessary to express its view on the basic trends of military policy. I believe that the resolution answers all the main problems related to military building. Some people may consider this document excessively declarative. Yet the task of the party is to express its viewpoint on the future of the armed forces, which it did. The specifics will be worked out by the legislative and executive authorities.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] The resolution has been passed and, therefore, has become a manual for action for the party organizations and all party members. Now it is a matter of its implementation. However, it is precisely at this point that cautioning aspects have begun to appear. In particular, the resolutions stipulate that the armed forces must be structured according to the principles of exterritoriality and of a multinational cadre army. The party members, who constitute the majority in the Ukrainian and Belorussian Supreme Soviets, however, have voted at their sessions (let us note, after the congress) in favor of creating their own republic armed forces. The Ukraine has even raised the question of recalling Ukrainian military personnel to the territory of their own republic. What is your assessment of these facts?

[Semenov] The resolutions passed by the Supreme Soviets of the Ukraine and Belorussia conflict not only with the congress' resolution on military matters but,

above all, the USSR Constitution and the Law on Universal Military Service. At this point, I believe, the president and the USSR Supreme Soviet must say something. The sovereign Union republics neither should nor could be strengthened at the expense of lowering the defense capability of the entire country. The dispersal of the army by national billets leads precisely to this. This makes even more puzzling the views of the party members of these two republics. The principle of democratic centralism has been retained as part of the CPSU Statutes despite efforts to delete it. This being the case, the resolution approved by the congress must be implemented by all party organizations and party members. Pluralism may be pluralism, but party discipline must be observed. Incidentally, this does not apply exclusively to the resolution on military policy but also to all other documents adopted at the party forum. If the communist parties of Union republics begin to revise them and make them subordinate to their local interests the congress' resolutions will become meaningless.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] The problem of separating the functions of political authorities from those of the party organizations has already been resolved, as stipulated in the CPSU Statutes. What do you think about the work of the party organizations under such conditions and about their relations with one-man commanders?

[Semenov] I do not believe that relations between a commander and the party organization must be radically changed. As in the past, the commander-party member will rely in its activities on the authority, and the wisdom of the party collective which, in turn, by influencing the members of the CPSU, will help him in solving problems of combat readiness, strengthening the discipline, educating the personnel, etc. The fact that such relations must become maximally democratic and must exclude firmly any whatsoever diktat on the part of the commander is a different matter. The party agencies, it seems to me, must firmly react to any abuse of power by a communist leader, arbitrariness, and willfulness, and struggle against such evils. No single member of a party collectives must be humiliated and insulted or deprived of his legitimate human rights. It is a question, if you wish, of the fact that the party committee and party bureau must have a sharply developed sense of their own dignity. They must be inflexible when it becomes a question of defending the honor of the communist.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Until recently CPSU membership was an important prerequisite for career promotion. Today the overwhelming majority of commanders and chiefs, from the battalion level up, are party members. Soon, however, members of other parties may appear in the ranks. Possibly, the number of nonparty people may increase. Could they be discriminated against in career promotions?

[Semenov] Yes, until recently it was indeed difficult for a nonparty member to hope to assume a somewhat higher position. Let us openly admit that there seemed to have existed some unwritten rules. The people knew this

and sometimes joined the CPSU not for ideological considerations but in order to advance their careers. Today, naturally, the time has come to revise these stereotypes. In promoting a person we must be guided not by his party affiliation but his professional, practical and moral qualities.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Vladimir Magomedovich, of late some mass information media have directed their concentrated fire on the general corps. Charges have been leveled that the generals have distanced themselves from the masses of military personnel, that they have privileges, live a life of luxury, etc. What can you tell us on this account?

[Semenov] Only that such charges are being made by people who have a poor idea of the real taste of the bread the generals eat. I would not like to speak about myself but I must.... I began my military service like anyone else, as a lieutenant, a squad commander. I have not skipped a single grade and in the course of my career I have been served in at least 10 different garrisons. If labor is considered a privilege, I make full use of it, for I have to work 15 to 16 hours daily. Rare is the day that I do not "travel," for I have a big district with many garrisons. I have an official car and an official apartment. I have no other housing. If I were to be dismissed from the army today I would have to wait for my turn like anyone else. That is all.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Final question. The country is experiencing a period of political instability, fraught with sociopolitical difficulties. As a CPSU Central Committee member, how do you see today the party's main role?

[Semenov] Briefly, the party's main task is to become, not in words but in deeds, the party of civil consensus. This means that we must organize constructive cooperation among different sociopolitical forces interested in the success of perestroika. At the same time, we must block the forces which are pushing society into chaos and divisiveness among nations and peoples. These thoughts imbue the programmatic declaration of the 28th Congress and are consistent with my beliefs.

Defense Ministry Department Handles Hazing Complaints

90SV0015A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 31 Aug 90
First Edition p 2

[Interview with the Chief of the Reception Office of the Ministry of Defense, Col. of Justice G. Zolotukhin: "The Facts Were Not Confirmed"]

[Text] The editor of the Letters and Mass Work Department of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, Col. A. Garavskiy, talks with the chief of the Reception Office of the Ministry of Defense, Col. of Justice G. Zolotukhin.

[Garavskiy] Gennadiy Aleksandrovich, first please tell us about the work of the reception office and the nature

of its dealings with the Ministry of Defense. I have heard that in the Great Patriotic War the Headquarters, Supreme High Command was in this residence. At that time the fates of the country and the world, and the outcome of the war, were decided here. But now, behind each letter and visitor are the fates of specific individuals.

[Zolotukhin] In the first six months there were 87,600 letters to the Minister of Defense of the USSR, 16 percent more than in that same period last year. In that time was received ten thousand five hundred visitors, also more than in the six months of 1989. Behind these numbers and the nature of the appeals one can clearly see the growing politicization in the country and Armed Forces. Everything that concerns our society and the soldiers of the Army and Navy does not leave uninvolved those who came or wrote to this address: City of Moscow, Kirova, 37, Reception Office of the USSR Ministry of Defense.

The increase in the number of appeals to the reception office occurred basically with respect to questions such as reform in the Armed Forces, the elimination of Army participation in prevention of inter-ethnic conflicts, and social protection of service members and members of their families and veterans of the Army and Navy. Here also we may include the negative attitude of many citizens to the decision not to call up students to service, and the demand to halt the draft of persons with poor health. Many complaints are also about personnel, pension, and housing questions. Also characteristic is the increase in appeals of people's deputies. While in 1989 the reception office considered 834 of them, in the last six months there have been 1,231. Of them 728 were reported to the Ministry of Defense.

[Garavskiy] And, apparently, taken under control?

[Zolotukhin] Here we do not follow a principle of the authorship or service or social status of those who turn to us, but the importance and timeliness of the questions raised, and the seriousness of the facts which are cited, which alas as a rule are negative, at times simply crying out for decisive intervention. Of course, our "deputy" mail bears this imprint to a significant extent. Thus in the six months our associates have prepared 27 reports and briefings presented to the leadership of the ministry and sent to commanders of districts, groups of forces, and fleets. Consideration of some of them is monitored by the reception office. Almost 60 percent of such letters were positively decided, as we say.

But I cannot fail to mention also the fact that, unfortunately, not everywhere are such appeals considered in the established deadlines at the local level. At times this does not allow us to make objective findings—someone is on detached duty or leave, or most often, there is irresponsibility and misunderstanding of the importance of the work with the appeals of service members and other citizens. Just in the considered period we sent 760 reminders to various officials...

[Garavskiy] Name the most "forgetful" authorities in this context.

[Zolotukhin] Not for the first year these included the Transcaucasus, Turkestan, and Kiev military districts. The military councils of these districts considered the status of work with complaints, but there were practically no changes for the better.

[Garavskiy] We have not yet touched on the problem which certain mass media have deftly "ridden" in speaking of the life of the Army and Navy, often provoking their readers, listeners, and viewers to turn to the very highest authorities. As you can guess, I am speaking of the state of discipline in the military collectives, the notorious "hazing."

[Zolotukhin] Although the percentage of such letters—and their authors in the overwhelming majority are parents and relatives of compulsory service members—is insignificant in the total flow (about 1.5 percent), attention to them, and the attitude toward them, are special. Just the fact that 154 complaints of such a nature have been considered in the six months by the Ministry of Defense, and that most of them have been taken under control, tells you a great deal. In comparison with others, perhaps the highest "level" of consideration has been established recently in work with this category of letters. They are handled by the leadership of the ministry, all deputy ministers, commanders-in-chief, commanding generals, chiefs of combat arms, etc.

Here, for example, is the reaction to the letter of Lyubov Romanovna Golovaya from Ivano-Frankovsk, which reported the beating of her son Pvt. R. Petchenko. A group of generals and officers of the Main Commissariat of the Air Forces traveled to the site to investigate. From the results of a most careful check, a criminal proceeding was brought against the guilty parties (and the fact was confirmed). Regarding this particular case, the military council and the political directorate of the Air Forces took a whole group of specific measures to strengthen discipline, and the commander-in-chief issued an order for the punishment of officials of the unit and the tactical and operational formation.

In general I should note that there is such a principled and responsible approach in the consideration of other similar signals too. Life demands this. In a report to the reception office, Marshal of the Soviet Union D.T. Yazov issued an instruction to the members of the collegium of the ministry: Concentrate special attention on the strengthening of military discipline..., resolute eradication of indifference and bureaucratism in the resolution of legitimate requests of service members and other citizens."

[Garavskiy] "In the resolution of legitimate requests." Legitimate! We are moving toward a state of laws, and behind this term, Gennadiy Aleksandrovich, one must assume there is some point, some specifics?

[Zolotukhin] There is a most attentive and serious attitude toward every complaint and signal. But...

In a letter from L.A. Ivanova addressed to the defense minister, for example, there was a demand to "establish order" in the unit of her son Pvt. A. Ivanov, who was allegedly beaten. The reason for this assertion was a photo that was sent home showing her son with a bruise on his lip. A bruise? This meant he had been beaten! But a check showed that it was a cold sore that had been treated with medication.

And then there was seaman G. (I won't give his full surname, for reasons which will become clear from the following story) himself complained of barracks hooliganism to his parents. After this "signal" the parents reacted with a telegram to the ministry. An investigation showed that this seaman, a projectionist in a club, had committed repeated incidents of drunkenness and absences without leave, in addition had been hospitalized for treatment of venereal disease, was involved in the reselling of minor items for purposes of making money, extorted money from fellow soldiers, and had received a warning from the military prosecutor. Naturally he had not told the parents a word of this. But they were convinced themselves that there is not even a hint of "hazing" there after visiting the unit. To their credit they apologized to the command both for their shiftless son and for the problems that had been caused.

Nor do I want to reveal the name of the mother of the "hero" of the next letter. Her son, tired of service and an inveterate violator of discipline, swallowed two metallic objects to simulate illness. Later while in the hospital, now with gastritis, he stole documents and 70 rubles from the man in the next hospital bed. And then he was in fact beaten. Only not in the unit, but in Mozhaysk, where he had gone AWOL with Pvts. V. Kozyrev and A. Mikhaylov. And the cause of this was his refusal to take part in an apartment burglary.

But these are probably enough examples. They may be cited and cited. Even from these three, taken randomly,

one can see a variety of true reasons for submission of complaints, the common denominator of which is the same: the facts were not confirmed. It would be nice these were isolated cases. But in the six months less than half of such appeals have been confirmed—49 percent.

What is the underlying cause of many of them? It is the desire to serve in favorable climatic conditions, closer to home. And the refusal of the soldiers from the Transcaucasian republics to do "women's" work in the barracks and mess hall—to wash the floors, clear tables, peel potatoes. Some of the compulsory service members also are responding to the calls to desert and to serve in local military formations. By their complaints of barracks hooliganism, some of the soldiers are trying to escape responsibility for infractions that they have committed, often military crimes...

[Garavskiy] You know what I think of when yet another answer is put on the table with the summary: "Facts Not Confirmed"? About the cost. About the man-hours spent by many people to investigate. About the money spent to say these three words—the trips, the payment for travel, for hotels. And the cost of what was not done by these officials in their work. In the law being developed regarding the appeals of workers, we should introduce a paragraph on compensation for costs for such investigations. But that is by the way. The question of strengthening military discipline remains, such is the reality. The 49 percent of well-founded appeals to the Ministry of Defense which you mentioned do not give grounds for complacency. But Gennadiy Aleksandrovich, how much time is required to consider the letters? In some of them, as in ours, there apparently are threats to commit suicide, to declare hunger strikes, and others...

[Zolotukhin] Three to five minutes. After you become acquainted with the contents, of course. You pick up the phone and briefly inform a particular official about the essence of the matter. But the official inquiry goes by turns. Frequently you sign it when the preliminary result is already reported, again by telephone.

Maj Gen Zaika on Need for Legal Regulation of Military Status

90UM0760A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
22 Jul 90 p 2

[Interview with Maj Gen Justice L. Zaika, first deputy main military procurator, by Maj I. Ivanyuk: "The Army Needs Laws"]

[Text] Maj Gen Justice L. Zaika, first deputy main military procurator, answers questions for KRASNAYA ZVEZDA.

[Ivanyuk] Leonid Mikhaylovich, I would like to begin our conversation with a letter recently received by the editors from Col V. Rasskazov: "In August of last year I was appointed to a post in Moscow," he writes. "Two months later my wife died of cancer, leaving me with three children. I asked the command element for an apartment. I was told that I did not have benefits. At the present time my family is scattered over the entire nation. My son is in the army. My eldest daughter is completing the school year in Khabarovsk. My youngest is living in Novokuybyshevsk with my parents, who are 70 years old and need looking after themselves." The letter goes on to say that the officer cannot obtain an apartment, cannot register at the unit address, receive reimbursement for the rent he pays for housing or resolve a number of other problems. All of his requests are refused.

[Zaika] It is painful for me, a military man, to talk about this, but the situation described is more the rule than an aggravating exception. The difficulties which have developed in the nation today with respect to social and living conditions have immediately shown that the officers, seagoing and shore-based warrant officers and their families clearly have less legal protection than other groups of the population. Many of them do not have their own place to live. We can add to this problems of medical and trade services, employment for the military wives and the placement of their children in preschool establishments and schools.

These were problems even in the past, but of late they have thoroughly complicated the life of military personnel. I would point out that we are not talking about some special privileges or benefits but about rights proclaimed in the Constitution of the USSR and specifically defined in the Law on Universal Military Duty. And just what is the situation? The state is supposed to provide the homeland's defender with housing and with possibilities for recovering financial outlays and opportunities for rest and health protection, but in fact the regular military personnel have to do it all themselves: to put a roof over their heads, find food and see to the needs of the family and their children. This accounts for the fall in prestige for the military service and for efforts to be discharged into the reserve, particularly among the young officers, those least well provided for materially.

The resolution of many urgent matters has been complicated by their inadequate legal regulation, as a result of which it is extremely difficult for the military procuracy to file complaints against specific officials. For example, the military regulations define only the duties of officials with respect to meeting the material requirements for the vital functioning of first-term servicemen. And what are the officers, warrant officers and extended-duty personnel to do? Who specifically is required to provide them with permanent or temporary housing and to feed them? Who is responsible for recovering their physical and emotional outlays, for providing them with normal opportunities for rest? The laws in effect today do not contain the answer.

[Ivanyuk] What is hampering the passage of such laws?

[Zaika] The legislative process is in motion, but, unfortunately, it is moving slowly and with inadequate focus. First of all, I believe that we need to accelerate the theoretical scientific definition of the actual concept of improving military legislation and precisely establish the legal status of all categories of servicemen. In my opinion, the Law on the Status of Servicemen presently being drawn up must cover the entire aggregate of duties and rights of the servicemen—not just in the area of their service activities but also in their daily lives—and provide real guarantees that these will be implemented. Among other things, it must define also the reciprocal responsibility of the officer and the state for the proper fulfillment of the obligations specified.

The development of the Law of the USSR on Defense has clearly been dragged out. Furthermore, as improvements are made—if they can be called that—more and more important standards are being removed from the draft law. For example, a fairly extensive article, "Agencies of Military Command and Control," which included the general terms of their structure, functions and tasks, existed in the original versions. It was removed from the subsequent version. And the military regulations themselves do not go into the duties of command elements, from the formation on up, with respect to directing subordinates.

We have submitted corresponding provisions also in the discussion of the draft Internal Service Regulations of the Armed Forces, but they have yet to receive proper support. This vagueness apparently suits many high-ranking officials.

[Ivanyuk] One should probably also take into account the fact that these processes have been developing rapidly of late....

[Zaika] That is what it all comes down to. We need to keep up with life. I believe it is now clear to everyone that, given the exacerbated internal political situation in the nation, the need is upon us to establish additional guarantees of the personal inviolability of servicemen.

The same can be said of the socioeconomic area, in which life is bringing out situations no less acute. For

example, we need legislative resolution of the matter of state life and health insurance for servicemen in peace time. The presently established amounts of assistance for loss of breadwinner do not at all make up for the family's losses in standard of living. The state's care must be such that an officer, as well as other categories of servicemen, is always confident as he fulfills his service duty that if anything should happen to him, his wife and children will always be assured a dignified human existence. Certain steps in this direction were taken in the new Law on Pensions for Servicemen, but it is not enough.

In the situation of developing market relations and the worsening shortage of food, it has become a problem to provide a balanced diet for officers not entitled to eat in the unit mess hall. There is hardly any need to discuss whether or not an officer should stand in line for food after completing his workday. Such problems have been solved even during the nation's most difficult times. Today, however, whenever a ration supply system is not set up, the officer is issued a symbolic 20 rubles as compensation. I understand that, due to the limited funds allocated, the military commissary system can clearly not cope with the job of providing the necessary assortment of products for the officers and warrant officers and their families. This situation needs to be changed, however.

[Ivanyuk] Additional difficulties in this area are created by the existing procedure for registering servicemen and their families. Do you feel the time has come to revise it?

[Zaika] That question has been discussed more and more extensively by the public of late. And this is understandable. The problem is that the question of whether an individual is to reside in this or that place is actually decided not by local authorities but by internal affairs agencies. This was the case back in the '30s, when departmental rules were above all the normative enactments in effect, and this is how it is still being done. But then the laws defining the procedure for allocating housing say nothing about registration.

The time has come to switch to a simple written registration. The functions of the police should be limited to this and should not include authorizing or forbidding residence. I propose that the command element of the military unit also be authorized to register servicemen and their families, with subsequent submission of the necessary information to the police. This would make it possible better to resolve many social problems in the army and navy created precisely by the registration restrictions.

[Ivanyuk] All of these and other relations with local authorities should apparently be regulated in that Law of the USSR on Defense, should they not?

[Zaika] Of course, but specifically and not in a generalized manner. For example, we must specify which officials and executive agencies of Union and autonomous republics and of the ispolkoms of soviets of people's deputies are charged with responsibility for performing

the functions under their jurisdiction, including providing housing for discharges from the military service, finding them jobs and other matters.

We obviously need a precisely defined legal mechanism for providing reimbursement out of the state budget for expenses borne by local agencies in the provision of apartments for individuals discharged into the reserve or pensioned with the right to such benefits. This would eliminate any unhealthy talk about discharges as some special group of people provided with housing to the detriment of other citizens and would help to enhance the prestige of the men in the shoulderboards.

[Ivanyuk] We are probably also going to have to define the military induction procedure more precisely. Today, justified criticism is being leveled at the supreme soviets of republics which have passed laws in conflict with the Constitution of the USSR. And is it not contrary to our Fundamental Law to send many thousands of draftees each year to work in civilian ministries and departments with the status of military construction workers?

[Zaika] Indeed, the law does not authorize either the government of the USSR or the ministries and departments to use this work force under the guise of military duty. Unlike military construction workers of the Ministry of Defense, who are members of the Armed Forces and perform jobs involved in strengthening the nation's defense capability, the military construction workers of other ministries, who essentially serve out a labor term, frequently lack the very essentials of life. Nor can we ignore the fact that this kind of "military service" damages the army's prestige in the society, even though the army has nothing to do with it.

This matter was discussed last year at a meeting of the Board of the Main Military Procuracy, which indicated that the matter must be resolved legislatively. And then a recent session of the Committee for Defense and State Security of the USSR Supreme Soviet considered our proposals and decided to petition the parliament for a gradual disbandment of the military construction units assigned to the national economy. It is now up to the lawmakers.

[Ivanyuk] A final question: Even if the proposals you have been discussing are realized, this still does not mean that everything will change overnight, does it? It is a matter of how the laws adopted are actually implemented.

[Zaika] You have touched a sore spot which exists not just in the army and navy but for the nation as a whole. This is legal nihilism. Last year, in the exercise of oversight by the procuracy, we uncovered 5,500 orders issued by a command element with violations of current laws. Violated rights were restored for more than 7,000 servicemen, blue- and white-collar workers following intervention by military procuracies. The financial losses from violations of the law committed in the forces amount to tens of millions of rubles.

Take the indiscriminate punishment applied in the units, for example. Gds Col S. Dokuchayev, a formation commander, punished a regimental, battalion and company commander and their deputies for an incident involving Pvt K. Saaya, and ordered the regimental commander to use his authority to punish other subordinates. The military procuracy protested this order as unlawful.

More than once we have had to defend the rights of female military personnel discharged from the service in violation of existing laws following the birth of a baby. This matter was justly resolved quite recently. It is a known fact that many officials are so accustomed to exceeding their authority, they even begin interfering in the personal lives of subordinates: forbidding them to leave the garrison in their own automobile, to park it next to their residence or even to drive up to their residence. This can be called nothing other than independent rule and despotism.

In order for the law to exist and be effective, of course, proper conditions must be created to assure its execution. In addition, I feel that an important role should be played by the introduction of deputy commanders (OICs) for legal work in the large military formations. Universal legal education is being developed in the forces for the same purpose.

The comprehensive accomplishment of the two interrelated tasks of improving military legislation and enhancing the legal knowledge primarily of the commanders and OICs, their legal sophistication and efficiency will unquestionably help to strengthen lawfulness, law and order in the forces and increase the social protection of servicemen. And the prestige of the military service as well.

Explanation of Implementation of New Pension Law

90UM0770A Moscow VETERAN in Russian No 30
23-29 Jul 90 pp 14-16

[Article by V. Babkin: "On Pensions To War Participants and Invalids"]

[Text] "Today, after publication of the text of the USSR Law "On pension support to citizens in the USSR" and the decree of the USSR Supreme Soviet on procedures for its implementation, pensioners and those who will receive a pension in coming years are trying to determine the amount and time when they will receive the pension in accordance with the new Law.

The legislators tried to create a law which was extremely clear and understandable. But of course they did not manage to avoid certain complexities in the regulation of various pension legalities. This is quite explainable. Considering the specifics of the legal language and the document itself, it was impossible to create a Law for immediate action, i.e. one without any intermediate legal documents. This is why the Law assigned 20 separate provisions and terms of its application to the

jurisdiction of the USSR Council of Ministers. So today it is still impossible to give an exhaustive answer to a number of questions. To do this it is necessary to have the entire package of documents, which should be adopted in the near future.

The Law goes into effect on 1 October 1990 and will be fully introduced starting on 1 July 1993. The USSR Supreme Soviet determined that "invalids of war and other war participants" should receive the preferential right to a pension in the new amount first and in the full volume. Thus, starting in October of this year, pensioners who are invalids or participants of war will be paid all types of pensions in the new amount.

But before starting to acquaint the readers with the rules for defining the sizes of the pension for this category of pensioners, it would be helpful to again clearly enumerate who exactly are counted as "invalids of war and other war participants."

Invalids of war include:

Former service members and officer and enlisted personnel of organs of internal affairs acknowledged to be invalids due to wounding or concussive or crippling injury received in defense of the USSR or in the accomplishment of other duties of military service (service obligations), or due to illnesses related to their presence at the front or accomplishment of international duty in countries conducting combat actions;

Service-obligated personnel called up for training or musters who became invalids due to wounding or concussive or crippling injury received in accomplishment of service obligations during the period of the training or musters;

Blue and white collar workers of the corresponding categories who became invalids in connection with wounding, crippling injury, or illness received in regions of military actions (in front sectors of railroads, in construction of defensive lines, naval bases, airfields, etc.);

Persons who became invalids in connection with wounding, crippling injury, or illness received during service in hunter battalions or people's defense platoons and detachments.

Other war participants include:

All service members and persons who where voluntary paid personnel serving or working as part of an active-duty army;

Individuals in partisan detachments and formations or involved in underground activity, and also those participating in combat actions in performance of their international duty, and also persons working during the blockade of the city of Leningrad at enterprises, institutions and organizations of the city who were awarded the

medal "For defense of Leningrad," and also those awarded the badge of "Resident of Blockaded Leningrad."

Starting on 1 October 1990, pensions will also be revised for those who receive them:

As members of families of service members and officer and enlisted personnel of organs of internal affairs who died due to wounds or concussive or crippling injury received in defense of the USSR or in accomplishment of other obligations of military service (service obligations) or due to illness related to their presence at the front or to accomplishment of their international duty in countries conducting combat actions;

As members of families of deceased invalids of war and their equivalents, regardless of the cause of death of the breadwinner;

As members of families of service-obligated personnel called up for training or musters who died as a consequence of wounding, concussive or crippling injury received during accomplishment of service obligations during the period of the training or muster;

As members of families of blue and white collar workers of the corresponding categories who died due to wounding, crippling injury, or illness received in regions of military actions (at front-line sectors of railroads, during construction of defensive lines, naval bases, airfields, etc.);

As members of families of citizens who died due to wounding, crippling injury, or illness received during their service in hunter battalions or people's defense platoons and detachments;

As members of families of service members missing in action during the period of military actions.

As is known, the overwhelming majority of participants of war (including invalids of war) are old-age pensioners, who achieved the necessary length of service in the postwar years.

How will pensions be recalculated? Let us illustrate this with answers to specific questions which the readers have sent to the All-Union Council of Veterans of War and Labor and to the editors of VETERAN.

Today, when the size of the pension is directly related to the length of service and earnings (Art. 20—So the corresponding articles of the Law on Pension Support of Citizens in the USSR will be designated) it is important that all periods of work and other activity to be included in length of service (training at an institute, technical school, professional technical academy) (Art. 67) are considered in determination of the pension. However, considering that the maximum length of service for women has been set at 40 years, and for men at 45 years, there is no need to search for documents confirming the duration of work beyond these time periods.

One should know that in addition to the work booklet of the blue or white collar worker or kholkhoz employee, confirmation will be based on certificates issued from the work place by the higher organizations of the same system in which the labor activity was performed or by archival institutions, and on other documents containing information about the period of work (excerpts from orders; personnel accounts and lists for the issuance of pay; certifications; evaluations; written labor contracts and agreements with entries regarding their accomplishment; labor, honor, and official lists; membership booklets of members of cooperative small producers' artels and cooperative artels of invalids; trade unions membership cards, and others).

To confirm service in the USSR Armed Forces, in the organs of state security, or in troops of the organs of internal affairs, and also time spent as a prisoner-of-war, the following are used:

Military identity cards; Red-Army booklets; certificates of military commissariats, of higher units, staffs, and institutions of the USSR Ministry of Defense, of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, and of the Committee of State Security of the USSR; certificates of archival and military medical institutions; notations on military service entered in the labor booklet and based on documents. The time of service in partisan detachments and formations during the Great Patriotic War is established from certificates of staffs of the partisan movement or party archives of the CPSU oblast committees (depending on the location of the activity of the partisan detachments and formations).

Military service as part of an active army during a period of combat actions, including during accomplishment of international duty, is counted in length of labor service on preferential terms, on the basis of certificates of military commissariats.

The time of training in higher and secondary special and profession-technical academic institutions; in postgraduate and doctoral studies and clinical residency; in schools and courses for cadre training, professional improvement, and retraining are confirmed by diplomas, attestations, certifications, and also by certificates and other documents issued on the basis of archival information and containing information on the periods of training.

Time spent caring for a class-one invalid, a child invalid before age 16, or an elderly invalid who has reached his 80th year, is established from documents confirming the age (excerpt from passport, birth certificate, certificate of housing organs, and others) and the time they have been an invalid (excerpt from VTEK [disability review board] certification, medical findings, pension certificate, certificate of recipient of aid, certificate of department of social welfare, and others) and also on the basis of a document of investigation of the factual circumstances of care provision compiled by the department of social welfare on the basis of information obtained from

housing organs, and rural (village) Councils of People's Deputies; questioning of persons to whom care was provided and of their neighbors.

The time of care of minor children by a non-working mother is established from documents confirming the birth of the child (birth certificate) and his attainment of age three (excerpt from passport, death certificate, certificates of housing organs, and others).

The period of residence of wives of officer personnel, warrant officers, naval warrants, and extended-service members with their husbands in locales where there was no opportunity of employment in their specialty is confirmed by certificates issued by commanders (chiefs) of higher military units, institutions, military educational (training) facilities, and organizations.

For service members discharged from active military service before January 1990, the period of residency with husbands in locales where there was no opportunity of employment in specialty is confirmed by certificates issued by military commissariats.

The time of residency in occupied territory is confirmed by references of executive committees of rural (village), regional, or municipal Councils of People's Deputies.

The duration of periods spent under guard and time of punishment in places of incarceration and exile are confirmed by certificates of investigatory (labor-rehabilitation) institutions or organs of internal affairs and counted in length of service when there are documents indicating rehabilitation (references of court organs, organs of the procuracy, [documents] of inquiry and investigation regarding an acquittal or decree (determination) of termination of the criminal proceeding).

It is also permissible to establish the work period from witness testimony if documents have not been preserved in connection with military actions, mass disorders, or natural calamities (fire, flood, earthquake, etc.). In this case, along with the document on the loss of archives for the above reasons, two or more witnesses should be presented who know the applicant from working with him in the same enterprise, institution, organization, kolkhoz, or system.

The length of service in a kolkhoz before 1965 (the year of introduction of the uniform work booklet of the kolkhoz member) shall be established in the same way in cases when it is impossible to obtain documents on the existing length of service due to the absence of archival data.

In all other cases (elimination of the enterprise, institution, merger or division etc.), if the archives were not preserved, the work period may be established from testimony of no less than two witnesses who worked with the applicant and who have documents attesting to their employment during the time for which they are confirming his work.

The duration of length of service established from the testimony of witnesses should not exceed half of the length of service required to assign a pension. One should know that the right to evaluate documents regarding length of service and the decision to accept or reject individual periods of labor activity, and also to establish the time of care of a class-one invalid, child invalid up to age 16, and an elderly invalid who has reached age 80, and the length of service from witness testimony are solely within the jurisdiction of the pension-fixing commissions (Art. 100) formed by regional (municipal) Councils of People's Deputies.

Now, let us explain how the wages on which the pension is based are determined.

The Law (Art. 20 and Art. 76-83) details the procedures for determining the wages to fix the old-age pension.

One must understand that the minimum wage established in the country in the given, specific time is the virtual universal unit for determining the average wage (Art. 76) for calculating the pension; the minimal amount of the pension (Art. 20); social pensions (Art. 120); and additions (Art. 22, 35).

At present the minimum amount of wages in the USSR is 70 rubles, and therefore (Art. 20) the minimum pension is equal to this sum. The maximum wage is limited to ten times the minimum wage, i.e. 700 rubles. For wages over 280 rubles (4 times the minimum wage) every additional 70 rubles or parts thereof are drawn at diminishing percentages. Therefore a wage not exceeding 280 rubles is drawn fully, while, for example, for a wage of 350 rubles, the pension will be calculated at 339 rubles 50 kopecks; for wages of 420 rubles, 388 rubles 50 kopecks; for wages of 490 rubles, 427 rubles; for wages of 560 rubles, 455 rubles; for wages of 630 rubles, 472 rubles 50 kopecks; and for wages of 700 rubles, 483 rubles.

If the subsequent part of the wages is less than 70 rubles, it is correspondingly reduced by that percentage which is provided for this seventy rubles.

Thus if the average wage amounted to a total of 360 rubles, then to calculate the pension we should take 280 rubles + 59 rubles 50 kopecks (from 70 rubles x 85 percent) + 7 rubles (from 10 rubles x 70 percent). The total of the wages for calculation of the pension will be 346 rubles 50 kopecks.

For the new fixing of the pensions after 1 January 1989, the old-age pension will be calculated from the average wage for any 5 years of the last 15 years.

However those who are already pensioners, and in particular those who participated in the war (including war invalids) are given the right to calculate their pension from one of the following variants of the average wage (Art. 126):

a) For any 5 consecutive years of the last 15 before the introduction of the Law (for war participants, including war invalids and families of deceased, before 1 October 1990);

b) For any 5 consecutive years of the last 15 years before the pension was fixed (each has his own date);

c) The wage from which the pension received today was fixed. In this case that sum of the wage is taken which is indicated in documents in the pension file, without the need for any additional data.

When necessary, pensioners who are war participants (including war invalids) receiving an old-age pension may clarify everything related to their length of service and wages directly at the department of social welfare. As we have already said, if the work time is maximum (40 years for women, 45 years for men), there is no need to add to it. At the same time, if that work time is not on file, but the pensioner worked after fixation of the pension or has documents which give him the right to a preferential calculation of the work period (Articles 68, 69, 70, 72), they should be sent to the corresponding department of social welfare.

For the majority of pensioners, generally it is more beneficial to use that wage previously submitted for fixing of the pension (that is, variant c) for calculation of their pension. However there may be cases when the wage will be greater by variants a and b. In this case it is necessary to request documents on this and to submit them.

Now let us examine several specific questions which readers of VETERAN has asked in their letters.

"I am a participant of the war," writes N. from Voronezh. "I have a green book granting the corresponding benefit rights, and on the 40th Anniversary of Victory I received the Order of the Patriotic War. I receive an old-age pension of 132 rubles. When I was pensioned in 1971 my length of service was 43 years. I was given an average wage for the last year of work of 247 rubles. After retirement I worked another six years, but at much lower pay, and in 1977 I quit working entirely.

In what amount and at what date will I receive my pension according to the new pension Law?" he asks.

From N.'s story it is clear that the total length of service together with the six years of work after fixing of the pension amounts to $43 + 6$ years = 49 years. This length of service gives him the right to figure his pension according to the new Law in the amount of 75 percent of his wage (55 percent for a 25-yr work period and one percent for each subsequent year, but no more than 75 percent (Art. 20)). Since his wage is within four minimum wages ($70 \text{ rubles} \times 4 = 280$), 75 percent of his entire wage of 247 rubles is 185 rubles 25 kopecks. As a war participant who was a service member serving in an active army (as indicated by his "Certificate of Participation in the War," and the fact that he was awarded the

Order of the Patriotic War), he has the right to a pension increase of 25 percent of the minimum old-age pension (70×0.25). Thus the new amount of N.'s pension will be 202 rubles 75 kopecks, and it will begin on October 1990.

Pensioner S. from Saratov oblast tells a different story. He reports that after his return from the front, where he was continuously for 3 years, he worked for 21 years in a fishing kolkhoz, then the kolkhoz was converted to a sovkhoz and he moved to the city, where he worked as a plumber in a housing construction cooperative and then as a worker in a dining hall. In 1979, he retired at age 60 with an old age pension based on a wage of 131 rubles. "My kolkhoz work time was not counted, that wasn't done at the time, but 25 years together with the army gave me the right to a pension..." Now his pension is 72 rubles and zero kopecks. If S. confirms his work in the kolkhoz with an archival document or testimony of witnesses, and obtains a document from the military commissariat showing that he spent three years in the active army, then his total work time will be 9 years (3 years in the active army $\times 3$) + 12 years (in the kolkhoz) + 22 years (as a worker in the housing construction cooperative and dining hall), for a total of 43 years. With this length of service and a wage of 131 rubles, according to the new Law he will receive 113 rubles 13 kopecks ($131 \text{ rubles} \times 73 \text{ percent}$) = 95 rubles 63 kopecks + 17 rubles 50 kopecks (as a war participant).

Here is what class-II war invalid K. from Novosibirsk writes: "My wage was low, and I could not work where I wanted. Therefore on 1 September 1970 I retired on an old-age pension, having a continuous length of service of 27 years and a total of 35 years. My wage was 80 rubles. Now I receive a pension of 105 rubles 14 kopecks."

On 1 October 1990, K. will receive of pension of 240 rubles 14 kopecks.

Here is how it is calculated.

Of 80 rubles, 65 percent (for 35 years of work) is 52 rubles, but since this sum is less than the minimum established by the Law, the pension must be set at a sum of 70 rubles (Art. 20). But that is also less than that which K. receives today, so his former pension of 150 rubles 14 kopecks is retained.

Because the new Law did not increase the received pension, a rule goes into force which was discussed in paragraph 3 of the decree of the USSR Supreme Soviet "On procedures for the implementation of the USSR Law 'On pension support of citizens in the USSR.'"

By this rule, when "old" pensions are recalculated, in all cases they must be increased depending on the amount of time the pension has been in effect, by no less than 5 to 40 rubles. This increase for war participants is made without allowance for those additions which were defined in accordance with Art. 22 for old-age pensions and Art. 35 for pensions for invalids.

In this case K. has been pensioned for more than 20 years (by 1 October 1990) and therefore 30 rubles should be added to his pension of 105 rubles 14 kopecks. Thus his pension will be 135 rubles 14 kopecks. But as a class II war invalid, he has the right to an increase in his pension by a sum of the minimum size of the pension for invalids established by the USSR Law "On pension support of service members" for war invalids who were compulsory-service soldiers and seamen, in accordance with the invalid classification (Art. 22). According to this law, for class I and class II invalids, the minimum is 105 rubles, and for class III invalids, 52 rubles 50 kopecks (Art. 24 of Law "On pension support of service members."). Consequently, 105 rubles should be added to the 135 rubles 14 kopecks. The total is 240 rubles 14 kopecks.

It should be pointed out that in the two preceding examples the rule on raising pensions for length of pension was not used, since the recalculations of these pensions in accordance with the new Law increased them more than they could have been for length of pension.

Let us look at another example.

Invalid M., a class-III war invalid from the Krasnodar kray tells us: "I was discharged from the Army when I was wounded, as a lieutenant. I received a pension from the Defense Ministry and worked. In 1964, with 26 years of work I switched to a pension in accordance with my second record, at age 55. Now my length of service, including time at the front will be 30 years (Art. 70). Based on a wage of 190 rubles, I now receive 119 rubles 50 kopecks.

My disabled wife is dependent on me. She has no accumulated work time. What will we receive from the new law?" he asks.

Here is the calculation: 190 rubles x 60 percent (for 30 years of work) = 114 rubles, and to this sum we should add 35 rubles (addition for disabled family member in accordance with articles 22 and 120(b), for a total of 149 rubles.

The new sum of the pension exceeds the old (149 rubles vs. 119 rubles 50 kopecks) by a total of 29 rubles 50 kopecks, and paragraph 3 of the above decree of the USSR Supreme Soviet "On procedures for implementation of the USSR Law 'On pension support of citizens in the USSR'" provides that pensioners who have been pensioned for more than 25 years receive an increase of 40 rubles. Therefore the size of M.'s pension is 159 rubles 50 kopecks (119 rubles 50 kopecks + 40 rubles). And in addition to this sum, as a class-III war invalid K. receives a pension increase of another 52 rubles 50 kopecks. Thus the total sum of the pension will be 212 rubles.

It should be pointed out that an increase in the pension of 17 rubles 50 kopecks (25 percent of the minimum

old-age pension) (Art. 22) is made to those war participants who served as service members in an active army, or as partisans in partisan detachments and formations, and to service members who participated in combat actions in performance of their international duty. Other pensioners whose pensions will start after 1 October 1990 do not have the right to receive this addition.

Complaints on Reserve Training Call-Ups

90UM0771A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 24 Jul 90 Second Edition p 2

[Article by V. Makarov: "Who Should Pay?"]

[Text] The telegram sent to the editors said: "The Tobolsk military commissar is summoning 79 workers of a leasing enterprise, the "Tobolskzhilstroy" design and construction association [PSO], to two weeks of inactive duty training. Workers of the main professions are being taken: mould operators, installers, surveyors." It went on to say that such actions paralyze the construction site and may roll back the housing construction program and do significant material harm to the leasing enterprise.

The telegram was signed by the chief of "Tobolskzhilstroy," V. Kolmykov.

The Tobolsk military commissar V. Kryuchkov told me at a meeting that back in February the oblast military commissariat had ordered that inactive duty training be conducted by the start of summer, two weeks for reserve officers and ten days for enlisted and NCOs. Viktor Vladimirovich did not expect any special trouble; after all, the men were not called for one and a half or two months, and the changes were evident. The chairman of the municipal council, A. Yelfimov, and other city leaders were informed as required. The matter was coordinated. At the end of April the administration of the enterprises and organizations of Tobolsk was given written notice of who they planned to call up when.

And this is when the requests came in for the release of a particular worker. They all had the same reasons: extremely necessary in the plant.

"We tried to make compromises," says the commissar. "We discussed each candidate with representatives of the enterprises, and tried to find a replacement if possible. Twenty-one workers of "Tobolskzhilstroy" were released from the training. Not 79 men as planned, but 42 were summoned. But not even this satisfied the builders."

"I am not against the Army or service in it," was how my talk began with the chief of "Tobolskzhilstroy," V. Kolmykov. "My own father is a former officer, he fought and was wounded. But I am against us industrial workers being bossed around by anyone who feels like it."

You can understand him too. Many people have been waiting for housing for years. Since 1986 the builders have started a campaign for profitability. In the last five

years the income from the association has grown by a factor of almost ten, and the workers' pay has also increased. Today the builders are working in several shifts, at times even without days off, benefitting themselves and the city.

"And in this situation, I am confronted by the fact that some of my specialists will be taken," Kolmykov continued. "What does it mean to take away even one mould operator for ten days? Welders, installers, and finishers will be left idle... Enormous losses. And when the men come back from their training, by law I will have to pay them for... unperformed work. With what?"

At the design and construction association, I could see that everything had been figured down to the kopeck. No subsidies come from the state. If an item is not produced, they get no money. And again and again I heard that the military commissar refused to understand this, that he has his own interests. The city suffers, losing hundreds of square meters of housing.

Perhaps I could accept the viewpoint of Kolmykov without qualification if I didn't know that today's inactive duty training, to which "his people" have been called, is also for the city. The goal is to support the civil defense subunits, which, if some sort of emergency should occur, would be the first to arrive at the petrochemical combine.

Along with the municipal military commissar and the deputy chief of "Tobolskzhilstroy" V. Lupandin, we ourselves later visited the site of the inactive duty training.

"These few days brought more than any month-and-a-half meetings," said Res. Lt. A. Seleznev, a worker of SU-931. And even we have to acknowledge their need."

Are we perhaps finally beginning to consider the lessons of Chernobyl and Ufa? Of course we are not saying that the petrochemical combine is a direct threat to the city. But still there should be this sort of "quick-response" team.

I had a chance to discuss this with many people. And all the time to look at tomorrow. How will this "interdepartmental" controversy be resolved when the market mechanism more and more is beginning to unwind? Many if not most state enterprises are taking the path of leasing arrangements.

Will this problem not be reflected, for instance, in the draft Law on defense, which should be discussed by the USSR Supreme Soviet?

Major General V. Spitsyn from the General Staff, with whom I talked after returning from Tobolsk, agreed: there is indeed a problem. How may it be resolved? This is not the first year that the Ministry of Defense, Gosplan, Minfin, Goskomtrud, and other allied departments have been working at this. Often one hears the opinion that the military should pay for the training.

"But this is not the best solution," the General argued. "Judge for yourself. The country is reducing the Army and expenditures for its maintenance. And we are again asked to increase the military budget and the numerical strength of the Army at the expense of those who are involved in financial operations, for the military commissariats do not have their own resources for this. Do our fellow countrymen understand us?"

The argument is a weighty one. We cannot but agree with V. Spitsyn also that it is hardly worth while to shift the money from one pocket to another. After all, the defense department has nowhere to get the money for the inactive duty training except from the state budget, i.e. from the same enterprises. And indeed, why, frankly speaking should the national defense be a narrow departmental concern, rather than a general state concern? It is no accident that the idea has been included in the draft Law that precisely the local organs of state authority and control should organize, finance, and monitor the accomplishment of measures in the defense area. This also applies to the conduct of inactive duty training. But the details, who, should begin to finance them, in what order and volume, should be considered and specified by the corresponding allied ministries and departments.

All logical. And since the draft Law exists, it seemed to me there should be at least preliminary calculations in these departments. However, Minfin USSR hastened to disabuse me of such illusions. The chief of one of the directorates of the Ministry, V. Vechkanov, who knows this problem thoroughly due to the nature of his work, noted that given the current internal political situation, when practically every republic is expressing its own view on Army service, it is generally premature to speak of adoption of the defense Law.

So what should we do?

"Follow the current compulsory service Law," V. Vechkanov says. "According to it, there should be resources at each enterprise to pay for inactive duty reserve training. And if the lessors do not create such a fund, do not provide for it their enterprise regulations, then they are breaking the law."

And perhaps, without waiting for the Defense Law, each time, without exacerbating the situation, seek a reasonable compromise? For instance, the military department should have agreed to sharply reduce the duration of the inactive duty training, and even earlier initiated the protection of blue and white collar workers in shortage specialties, thus making life easier for the workers. Why should other allied ministries and departments not follow this example and revise their normative documents regulating the financing of defensive measures?

This is a wish. But now... When this material had already been prepared for press, Tobolsk again contacted the editors. A whole delegation of workers of the PSO "Tobolskzhilstroy" visited the military commissariat at the conclusion of the training: the leadership of the leasing enterprise refused to pay them for the time spent

in training. And a telegram, this time from Kaliningrad, stated: "The state production cooperative "Zhelezobeton" is outraged by the fact that the military commissariats are summoning reservists for economic work while reductions in the Army are taking place. As a result the production output has been sharply reduced..."

Can a compromise be found there??

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Opens New Rubric on Military Economics

90UM0765A Moscow *KRASNAYA ZVEZDA* in Russian
24 Jul 90 p 2

[Article: "The Economy and We"]

[Text] At first glance everyday army life would appear to be far removed from the economic problems being experienced by the nation. That is not the case, however. What is more, these problems have been exacerbated in the situation of economic reform, conversion and reduction of the Armed Forces.

We are starting a new rubric today, under which we shall print articles on urgent management, financial and production issues pertaining to army and navy life, as well as commentary, advice and information on new normative documents. We invite our readers to join in our newspaper discussion.

Not Just With the Force of an Order

"The economy must be economical." This formula, which replaced an entire science, has disappeared into the past along with a large slice of our history which became known as "stagnant." It is recalled today only as an absurd tautologous slogan.

It was replaced by new prescriptions: The economy must be a planned market, a regulated market or simply a market economy. Definitions fall into decay so rapidly in the ferment of political passions that someone even thought up something entirely original: The economy must be a truly market economy.

Although all of this is for now most reminiscent of ritual incantations uttered from speaker's platforms in the hope of awakening the sleeping god of abundance, life is not standing still.

Once again, what is occurring at the crossroads does not fit into the conventional patterns and is particularly acutely felt in the so-called uneconomical structures, which can at best count on certain guarantees by the state. This totally applies also to the nation's Armed Forces. The need for social protection for the nation's defenders is another subject. There is something else equally important. We have proclaimed our abandonment of the system of administration by command in the economy—and not just that. We have also abandoned the methods upon which, incidentally, all army life is based. One could pretend that the one thing has nothing to do with the other. It does, though, and most directly.

Let us begin with the fact that the Armed Forces not only consume but also produce hundreds of thousands of pairs of shoes and items of military clothing and build tens of thousands of apartments annually, and fully meet their needs for certain kinds of food in 3-4 months. They also help the nation, building railways and roads, helping with the harvest and so forth. Like it or not, the troops are forced to manage in the new situation in which an order is not exactly law.

That the methods of administration by command will not disappear for a long time was the opinion recently voiced at a party conference of military construction units by Lt Gen L. Kotov, chief of the Ministry of Defense's Main Military Construction Directorate. What were his reasons? Not a single construction ministry fulfilled its plan last year, but, as usual, they were not let down by the military construction workers.

There are many supporters of this point of view, and their reasons are convincing at first glance. Following the earthquake in Armenia those same military construction workers completed dozens of apartment buildings and other projects almost on schedule, while civilian agencies asked the government to return them to their previous construction sites because things had come to a halt there. Did everything proceed without a hitch at the military construction sites? Not everything. Planning, organization and discipline played their crucial role, however.

I do not know whether people who take this stand are inwardly convinced that they are right. Even if we do not ask at what price the plans are fulfilled, we cannot avoid another question: Precisely what plans are we talking about? About itemized lists of construction projects issued almost in the middle of the year? And can we talk about planning in the annual spurts of effort in which one third of the projects are completed in the last quarter? The workers at military construction sites and enterprises have never operated precisely according to plan, after all, as do the enterprising Japanese, for whom planning is a real force.

In short, it is all a myth to which people are trying to impart realistic features. This is no doubt why market relations are so frightening. They are already mercilessly real, after all, and do not loom somewhere in the future. Incidentally, they existed even in the past. There was a sort of military labor "exchange," and the tent cities paid their various tribute in kind for planned deliveries from the national economy. Today, however, in the situation of universal shortages, it has taken grotesque forms. A carload of fryers is requested for constructing apartment buildings, motor vehicles for the fryers, something else for the motor vehicles....

The barter stakes are high, for it is believed that the army has tons of everything. And if it is difficult for economically accountable enterprises of the Ministry of Defense, it is far worse for the military units. With the reduced

cost estimates and limitations set by all sorts of instructions and with the store shelves empty, buying what is needed is almost an impossible dream. The soldiers' labor is the only currency at the commander's disposal. Everything sponsors previously gave the military collectives out of love, so to speak, they now provide on account—or more accurately, on economic accountability. Today, in their heightened zeal, they can disconnect the electricity to the military post or economize on the "parasites" in some other way.

The fact should be mentioned that even sectors of the national economy are not yet trying very hard to get state orders for the Ministry of Defense. Last year the tailors, for example, fulfilled the plan by only 21 percent for winter suits for tankmen; 28 percent for enlisted men's uniform jackets and trousers; 11 percent for underwear; 8.4 percent for thermal fatigues. It is not profitable, it appears, to clothe the army.

The dilemma is that the Armed Forces themselves are presently "not interested" in becoming a part of the national economic system, even though they are rapidly developing their own construction industry, building up the capacities of their repair industries, including capacities for the production of consumer goods, and increasing the number of military sovkhozes. But these are more in response to objective supply difficulties and are apt to result in greater self-isolation and the establishment of a sort of "subsistence farming" in the army.

Many new problems of an economic nature are arising today as a result of the reduction of the Armed Forces underway and of the military reform. Most of them stem from the dilemma of whether to earn money, including currency, or not. What do I mean? I have in mind, for example, the effective use of secondary resources, including those containing precious metals, and the conversion and sale of written-off military supplies, gear and equipment. Finally, I refer to whether we can lease military transports to other nations or set up joint enterprises.

For now none of this can be done to the benefit of the Ministry of Defense. On the one hand, it does not befit the military to engage in such things, and on the other, it simply cannot be done. Honestly, though, can we manage things the way we are presently doing it? For example, the Navy has maintained 120 written-off ships and vessels afloat without any use for many years now. Each year some of them sink, adding to the 238 vessels already scuttled or sunk near the coast during the war. It is planned to write off more than 100 ships and vessels this year. And how can we use timber the way it is being used by the military construction workers? According to figures from the State Evaluation and Inspection Commission of the USSR Ministry of Defense, every third cubic meter of lumber procured by them ends up as waste.

To count on eliminating the mismanagement with orders alone is an empty dream, even though the potential for

organization is greater in the army than in the nation. This does not mean that it is time for the Armed Forces to take on yet another load by engaging in entrepreneurial activities. They are already impossibly overburdened with functions not their own. They are obviously going to have to "range" more vigorously and purposefully on the new management conditions, however. The market is increasingly making itself felt. We need effective economic tools for enhancing the effectiveness of interaction between the defense complex with other sectors of the national economy, and more diligent management of financial and economic affairs.

Whether it be planned, market or regulated market, the economy must first of all be....

—Maj I. Ivanyuk

Military Property Sold for Next to Nothing: Why?

"A sale. Who benefits from it?" was the title of an article published in the 14 April issue of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA. An inspection conducted soon thereafter by the People's Control Committee of the USSR provides a partial answer to this question.

Many people are interested in the possibility of purchasing something or other from the written-off military property. It would not appear to be so difficult to realize this desire. In connection with the reduction of the Armed Forces, quantitative assignments have been issued to the Ministry of Defense for putting the freed material resources into the national economy. Unfortunately, however, it fell short of the assignments by one third last year. And things are not going any better this year.

What is the problem? On the one hand, the goods offered for sale are clearly "stale." In January, for example, the Ministry of Defense located more than 120 million rubles worth of unneeded property, but Gosstab [State Committee for Material and Technical Supply] agencies did not accept for sale even a tenth of what was offered.

At the same time, inspections have revealed a lot of goods gathering dust at military depots which could meet the most demanding tastes.

None of this prevents certain people from demonstrating ingenuity when it comes to scarce goods. Last year, for example, the engineering service of the Moscow Military District removed from storage and sold to various organizations and officials 30 table-saws, 202 motorcycles, 37 boat motors, 243 portable electric generators, 16 excavators and a lot of other property worth a total of 2.5 million rubles. What is more, there is a disastrous shortage of this equipment. One aircraft repair plant sold 60,000 rubles worth of scarce construction and other materials, most of it at wholesale prices to cooperatives and private individuals.

The property transferred to USSR Gosnab agencies is universally lowered in price. The fact is that representatives of the finance services of military units and territorial supply agencies ordinarily do not take part in its appraisal.

This year, for example, two Volga GAZ-24s with a fairly low mileage at the Central Military Hospital imeni P.V. Mandryk were appraised at 1,500 rubles each, which is 10 percent of their list price. The price was knocked down for colleagues in the profession. They were acquired through the commercial center of the Mosgorglavsnab [Main Supply Administration for the City of Moscow] by a hospital worker and a member of the medical department at a medical institute. The vehicles were actually worth four times that amount. Last year servicemen acquired 32 motor vehicles involving similar infractions through that same center.

The sale of trucks and passenger cars under the guise of radio-relay units has become widespread. Once again, the price is far less than that set by the USSR State Committee on Prices for transport equipment. For example, the communications directorate of the Turkistan Military District let the Kompyuternyye Igry have 16 radio-relay units on 48 ZIL-131 vehicles for 162,000 rubles. Their actual value, given their wear and tear, was actually 1.2 million rubles. The enterprising cooperative workers have already sold some of them for 23,000 rubles each, that is, seven times more than what they paid. Losses amounting to many thousands [of rubles] have been suffered in similar operations in the Moscow, Leningrad, Baltic, Carpathian and Belorussian military districts.

USSR Gosnab agencies also proved unprepared for the job of selling military property. They lack the necessary credit for purchasing it in the military units, at the bases and depots, and have been placed into a position of dependency in the matter. Everything is actually handled in the military districts, finding buyers and formalizing the deals, while local Gosnab agencies serve as middlemen and receive up to 30 percent of the price of the property sold in many cases.

An inspection has uncovered numerous abuses on the part of officials with USSR Gosnab agencies. The funds which the state could receive frequently end up in the hands of speculators and second-hand dealers.

Through the efforts of the commercial center of the Main Supply Administration for the City of Leningrad, for example, the Carpathian Military District allocated 60 trucks to the Kompleks youth center in Leningrad. It sold them to the Sankt-Peterburg cooperative, and the latter sold them to the Effect cooperative near Moscow, which finally "settled" the equipment in various organizations. The remarkable thing is that the vehicles were parked at district military units during all that time, their paper value increasing many times over.

I would like to point out that most of the guilty parties have been punished, but we feel that immediate steps are

needed to halt such infractions and to achieve the main objective of giving new life to military property, while also adding to the state treasury. We need to place the matter onto a more solid material foundation and authorize the USSR Ministry of Defense itself directly to sell freed material resources, including its sale to state enterprises and organizations, to kolkhozes and cooperatives, and to set up permanent, economically accountable subdivisions for this purpose.

—V. Ryndin, section head of the People's Control Committee of the USSR, and V. Simakov, chief inspector for the People's Control Committee of the USSR

For You Gardeners

Dear editors, our military enterprise has been converted to complete economic accountability and autonomous financing. We know that the council of a labor collective is authorized to dispose of the social development funds—among other things, to use them to develop communal gardens for the workers. We would like to know what documents regulate this matter and how it is actually done.—S. Khmel'nitskiy, chairman of the 70 Let Oktyabrya gardening association

The editors contacted the Central Finance Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense. This is what we learned.

The procedure for setting up and using material incentive and social development funds for all of the nation's enterprises which have converted to complete economic accountability and autonomous financing is defined in a standard statute. Its application at military enterprises was announced in a directive from the deputy minister of defense for construction and billeting on 2 November 1988. Among other things, it states that the bulk of the social development funds is to be used for building apartment buildings, children's facilities and other social development projects. The funds are also used for health improvement, cultural and educational measures, for reducing the cost of meals in dining halls, and for other measures.

It also contains a point which reads "for developing communal gardens," which includes electric power and water supply facilities, road construction, the fencing off of common-use areas, and the like.

One has to begin by estimating the cost of all the different jobs. Construction organizations have a ceiling of 25 percent to be spent under this article. No ceiling is set for the others, the decision being made by the administration together with the labor collective council and the trade union committee. The estimates must be based not on the total number of workers at the enterprise, however, but only the number who are actually members of the gardening association.

A Photographed Fact [photo not reproduced]

This aircraft graveyard was discovered by workers from the military procuracy in an air formation of the Far East

Military District. A total of 108 planes and helicopters and 100 aircraft engines were written off and dumped there without oversight, and this combat equipment, having done its duty, has been pilfered for 10 years now.

What Are Potatoes Going For in the Kurils?

It costs the Ministry of Defense 16,000 rubles to rent a motor ship like the *Vitus Bering* for one day, and this very ship was used last fall for delivering vegetables to military subunits stationed on the Kuril Islands.

Last year the potatoes were rendered unsuitable for anything except livestock feed while the *Vitus Bering* was en route, while it took shelter in bays from powerful storms and waited in roadsteads to be unloaded. Simple calculations show that they cost 36 rubles... per kilogram.

Would it not be easier to raise potatoes locally? It can be done. Or at least to procure vegetables in the settlement? Unfortunately, the commander does not have the funds, and procurement prices are higher here than on the continent, a fact not covered in any normative documents.

This causes more than just the rotting of potatoes en route. Maj A. Gabidullin, company commander, told me that their depot contains flour hauled in 7 years ago, and it keeps coming. They have butter in stock from 1985 and a 7-year supply of hardtack. The personnel do not see candy, smoking items or fruit for years on end, however.

—Captain I. Fatayev

Finance Directorate Chief on Military Pension Law

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[Article by Ministry of Defense Central Finance Directorate Chief Col Gen V. Babyev: "New Pension Law"; first two paragraphs are KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] Our readers, both those who have been discharged into the reserve and those on active duty, write us to ask: "When will we finally be provided complete information on military pensions?"

The article below is a response to the editors' request for information on implementation of the USSR Law on Pensions for Servicemen and the method used to determine amounts of payment. Our source is Colonel General V. Babyev, chief of the Central Finance Directorate, USSR Ministry of Defense.

It is generally known that on 28 April, the USSR Supreme Soviet passed the USSR Law on Pensions for Servicemen and a decree implementing the law. The law takes full effect on 1 January 1991. As of 1 October of this year, coverage will be extended to persons who saw war service, including persons who worked in military

units in a civilian capacity, servicemen that took part in combat activities in fulfillment of their internationalist obligation, and persons who worked and resided in Leningrad at the time of the siege. The law also applies to families of servicemen killed in action at the front, while discharging their internationalist obligation, or while carrying out other military duties, if the families receive a pension on the basis of loss of a breadwinner. The law also applies to families that receive a pension for loss of a deceased breadwinner who was in a disability status at the time of his death, regardless of the cause of death.

In accordance with the new law, pensions paid to commissioned officers and their families will be reckoned on the basis of a total of base pay and allowances for the particular position held, the rank, and additional payment for number of years served in commissioned status.

For warrant officers of the Army and Navy and persons who completed extended service, for whom—in contradistinction to commissioned officers—pay is determined by length of service, the pension will be figured on the basis of the indicated pay, plus 20 rubles in place of the food ration, with Army and Navy warrant officers to be paid additionally on the basis of their rank.

An important provision of the USSR Law on Pensions for Servicemen, similarly to the all-union law, is the setting of a higher rate of pension payment for length of service. Thus, a pension for 25 years of service will be figured at 55 percent of pay and allowances instead of the present 50 percent. The rates in general are set at 40 percent of pay and allowances for 20 years of service, with three percent for each additional year, to a maximum of 75 percent of pay and allowances.

To enhance the pension status of retirees who served in line units, the law decrees that length of service pension payments comprising less than 200 rubles a month are hereby increased by 20 rubles (up to a total payment of 200 rubles).

For personnel who took part in combat activities, including actions in fulfillment of the internationalist obligation, payments for the length of service pension are increased by 25 percent of the minimum payment for age, i.e., the increase amounts to 17 rubles 50 kopeks. In the case of war veterans who have been certified as disabled as a result of action at the front or while carrying out other military duties, payments for length of service are increased by the minimum pension payment set for the particular disability group established for war veterans who at the time of service were members of the Army and Navy in compulsory military service. With a minimum pay of 70 rubles, the amount of this increase is 105 rubles for group I and group II disability, and 52 rubles 50 kopeks for group III disability.

The law provides for larger pension payments under certain other conditions. In particular, entitled to this increased benefit are family members that are unable to work and are dependents of a pensioner who does not

work. In this case, each such family member will receive the amount of the social pension established for the particular category of persons unable to work. For example, each child and each wife 55 years of age and older is to receive 50 percent of the above-indicated minimum amount of pay; children in disability groups I and II who have been disabled all their lives will be paid 100 percent of the minimum pay. Also increased is the length of service benefit, which gains an additional amount for care rendered single pensioners who are 80 years of age and older or who have been certified as group I disabled as a result of common causes, in the amount of 50 percent of minimum pay (35 rubles).

As does the present legislation, the new law allows for augmentation of the length of service benefit paid to former commissioned officers who have retired by reason of age, illness, reduction in force or state of health and who were 50 years of age or older as of the day of retirement. The augmentation is based on recognition of number of years worked as a civilian before entry into active military service. To qualify for this benefit, the retiree must have a total of at least 25 calendar years, of which military service must account for a minimum of 12 years and six months. This pension is also calculated at a higher rate: 40 percent of pay and allowances for a total credit of 25 years of labor, with one percent of pay and allowances added for each additional year.

The law introduces changes in the method of reckoning the length of service of retirees, so as to enhance their pension situation by allowing credit for certain conditions under which they served.

In particular, the law requires that persons who served during the Great Patriotic War as members of military units, staffs, and installations that were not a part of the army in the field be credited on favorable terms, at the rate of two months of service for each month of actual duty. In the case of service in military units, staffs, and installations that were a part of the army in the field, there will be no change in the present practice of allowing three months' credit for each month actually served.

In addition, also to be reckoned on favorable terms (credit of three months of service for each month actually served) is the amount of time servicemen were kept under guard, in confinement and internal exile, served time on the basis of unjustified criminal charges, or subjected to repression and subsequently rehabilitated.

Under the new law, in the case of officers called for active duty from the reserves, the time they devoted to education in civilian higher and secondary specialized schools before entry into military service, up to a limit of five years, is to be included in length of service calculations, with one year of study considered to be equivalent to six months of service.

Worthy of special note is the following provision. The USSR Supreme Soviet, acting on numerous suggestions,

made a ruling effecting a change in the existing requirements governing pension coverage for former servicemen who are engaged in gainful employment. With the introduction of the USSR Law on Pensions for Servicemen, pension payments as stated in the law are made available to all pensioners without reduction, regardless of whether the retiree receives another income or not.

The USSR Law on Pensions for Servicemen also authorizes the payment of larger benefits for disablement.

In the case of former military personnel who have suffered a disablement due to causes unrelated to military service, the norms to be applied in calculating the particular benefit are the same as those pertaining to group I and group II disablement: 55 percent of pay and allowances. For group III disablement, the rate is 30 percent of pay and allowances.

Higher rates of payment are specified by the USSR Law on Pensions for Servicemen in the case of war veterans and persons judged to be in an equivalent disability status. The rate for disability groups I and II is 75 percent, and for disability group III, 50 percent, of pay and allowances.

In this connection, disability payments presently amounting to less than 150 rubles are hereby increased by 20 rubles (to a maximum of 150 rubles). Pension payments to unemployed disability group I or II pensioners whose family includes unemployable members are to be increased, with each such member raising the eligibility by the amount of the social pension set for the respective category of unemployable persons: 50 percent or 100 percent of the minimum age-related pension entitlement. Also now authorized is increased payment for care rendered a group I war veteran or group II single war veteran who requires physical assistance, in the amount of the minimum age-related pension payment. In the case of group I disablement resulting from a service-connected illness or a single group II retiree suffering a service-connected illness and requiring physical assistance, the new payment is 50 percent of the minimum age-related pension. For former military personnel who are war veterans and receive a pension for disability that is not connected with duty at the front or any other aspect of military service, the increase amounts to 17 rubles 50 kopeks, i.e., to 25 percent of the minimum age-related pension payment.

Many changes are effectuated relative to pension payments for loss of breadwinner. The major change pertains to payment for children who have suffered a loss of breadwinner. In contradistinction to the existing legislation, which generally provides for payments to children 16 years of age and younger and students 18 years of age and younger who have lost their breadwinner, the new law extends entitlement to children until they attain the age of 18 years and to students until completion of a secondary specialized course of education or higher education, until attainment of the age of 23 years.

In accordance with the new law, pension payments for loss of breadwinner are set as follows: Families of servicemen who lost their lives while carrying out military duties are to receive 40 percent, and families of servicemen who died of causes unrelated to military duties will be due 30 percent of pay and allowances, for each unemployable family member.

The pension payments for each unemployed family member, as calculated in the above-indicated manner, cannot be lower than the following: In the case of families of Army and Navy warrant officers and men who lost their lives while performing extended service, the payment will be 120 percent; for families of officers who died in the line of duty, 130 percent, of the minimum pay. For example, with a minimum pay of 70 rubles, the minimum pension payment to families of Army and Navy warrant officers and men who performed extended duty will be 84 rubles; in the case of families of officer personnel, 91 rubles, per family member. In the case of families of deceased servicemen, the payment will be 75 percent of the above-indicated minimum amounts intended for families of men killed in line of duty. (For families of Army and Navy warrant officers and men who performed extended service, the amount is 63 rubles; for families of officers, 68 rubles 25 kopeks per family member.)

The law stipulates that pensions paid for loss of breadwinner to dependent families are to be calculated on the basis of the same pay and allowances used to compute pensions intended for servicemen themselves.

Article 64 of the USSR Law on Pensions for Servicemen and the USSR Supreme Soviet decree implementing the law provide that all the pensions previously paid to servicemen and their families are to be recalculated on the basis of the norms specified in the law. Recalculation will be performed on the basis of the norms and types of pay and allowances—that are used to compute pension amounts—in effect on the day of effectuation of the law, i.e., proceeding from base pay and allowances for the particular position and rank held on the day the new law takes effect, with the base pay and allowances augmented by the additional payment for length of commissioned service.

The decree implementing the new law provides that pensions as recalculated under the new method are to be increased by amounts of at least 5 to 40 rubles, depending upon the length of time a retiree has been receiving the pension. The increase will be 5 rubles for a pension length of up to 5 years; 10 rubles, from 5 to 10 years; 15 rubles, from 10 to 15 years; 20 rubles, from 15 to 20 years; 30 rubles, from 20 to 25 years; 40 rubles, 25 years and more (before addition of the length of service and disability benefits provided for war veterans). Age-related pensions previously paid commissioned officers are raised by at least 40 rubles.

In addition to the general increase in amounts of pensions paid for loss of breadwinner, parents and wives of

men killed in action and persons who fell victim to war activities in childhood and have suffered a life-long disability as a result of wounds, concussion, or dismemberment during the Great Patriotic War are to receive payments increased in the amount of 10 rubles 50 kopeks (which is 15 percent of the minimum age-related pension).

The law stipulates that there be an annual increase in pension payments in line with the cost of living index and rise in average wage as determined by the USSR Supreme Soviet, with the increase amounting to at least two percent of the pay and allowances used to calculate the amount of pension payment.

To compensate for expenses associated with living in remote areas, it has been decided to augment the pension payments, including minimum payment pensions and additional amounts paid as an area differential, that are made to former servicemen and members of their families who reside in areas that qualify for an wage expanded by an area differential.

In conclusion, it should be noted that, under the new law, pensions set by the USSR Ministry of Defense are paid to former servicemen and their families by branches of the USSR Savings Bank located in the area in which the pensioner actually resides, regardless of the information provided in the residential registration document. Let me remind the reader that, under the existing legislation, to receive a pension payment, the recipient must present a passport bearing a notation attesting to the fact of registry in the present place of residence.

The law does not effectuate any changes in the manner in which the pension system is organized. All questions relating to determination of entitlement to a pension or assistance and designation of pensions for commissioned officers, Army and Navy warrant officers, and extended-duty servicemen and their families are the responsibility, as before, of oblast, kray, and republic military commissariats; in Moscow, Leningrad, and Kiev, of city military commissariats. The forms required to apply for pensions and assistance are available at rayon military commissariats. As before, compulsory-service personnel and their families are to apply for pensions in their respective social security organs.

Implementation of the USSR Law on Pensions for Servicemen requires that military commissariats prepare for the task of handling, in a short period of time, the extremely large volume of work associated with recalculation of present pensions. The Central Finance Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense, in addition to preparing the necessary guidance for implementing the law, will exercise supervision and render practical assistance to military districts and military commissariats to insure that all pensioners receive everything due them.

It may be said without exaggeration that implementation of the USSR Law on Pensions for Servicemen will effect a considerable improvement in material welfare of all persons who draw a pension as compulsory-service

personnel, commissioned officers, Army and Navy warrant officers, extended-service personnel, and their families, and that it will enhance their social protection. There also can be no doubt that the law will promote improvement in the prestige of the difficult military labor.

Military Reform: Transition to Market Economy

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[Article by Col V. Pekar in the column: "Military Reform—Problems, Ideas": "Let Us Not Become a 'Rara Avis'"]

[Text] It is clear that the time has arrived to change to a market economy. There is no doubt that this transition will exert a direct influence on the military economic mechanism. As a matter of fact, officials of military units are already experiencing the effect of embryonic market transactions in their requisitioning of various supplies, especially construction materials, fuel, and, recently, even food rations. Therefore, we service personnel must prepare without delay to work under new economic conditions so that we are not caught unawares when the present economic ties and ways of interacting common in the country come to a decisive end.

As of the present time, budget-run units obtain their supplies by submitting annual requisition reports and orders signed by senior commanders (superiors). The documents involved in movement of supplies include the order, invoice, order certificate, coupon, and payment request. In this connection, these papers hold virtually no monetary significance as far as the commander is concerned. They serve the function of a certificate guaranteeing payment for a commodity without exchange of cash at the point of transaction. For this reason, few persons appreciate the costs represented and the relationship the documents bear to supplying the individual soldier with his needs. This kind of thing paves the way for dependence and sets the stage for falling into the psychology of condoning unlimited expenditures.

It is no secret that most unit officials purposely overstate their established norms when they submit their annual and other requests; in compiling their reports, they attempt to write off as much as they can. This practice is also often followed by superior officers, who may approve the use of excessive amounts of resources to prepare a unit for a demonstration, permit unwarranted write-offs, issue inspection certificates, etc. The result of this practice, as pointed out by a number of orders issued by the Ministry of Defense, is line unit overconsumption of established limits, resources, and funds. How could this be otherwise? It is the district or central directorate that actually disburses money in payment for supplies received. Every military unit has more than enough

papers in the form of payment requests, order certificates, coupons, orders, invoice forms, work tickets, and statements of service.

I see no other way but to proceed in the spirit of military reform to abolish once and for all the existing practice of employing the above-mentioned documents, supplanting it with a payment system employed in the economy and compatible with the coming market system.

First and foremost, it is necessary to set down clearly the tasks facing the unit for the forthcoming year (period) and use that as a basis to compile the unit's annual budget, taking into account the table of organization and equipment, limits, norms, prices, estimated price increases, local and other conditions, without dividing the budget into sections and subsections. The budget could be adjusted once a year, to reflect the situation as of 1 July.

Any unplanned activities levied on the unit should be financed by the organ that issues the order for the particular activity, as the organ in a position to do so. In this connection, if a task necessitates sending a line unit official on temporary duty, the chief issuing the order is obligated to pay not only the costs of the trip, but also expenses incidental to temporary replacement of the official. In this case, many chiefs may think twice before they assign tasks "downward."

When the above system is installed, it will become possible to effectuate the many seemingly utopian ideas presented by Major I. Sergeev in his article "Enthusiasts and the Regimental Treasury" (KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 27 February 1990). For example, the monies saved in a year (or other period) should not be turned over to the state treasury, but instead used in the unit to reward excellence, render assistance to needy servicemen (large families, victims of misfortune), support kindergartens, schools, other facilities that promote the welfare of military personnel and dependents, and fill common needs (amelioration of state losses, development of subsidiary farms, etc.).

No funds should be spent without holding a discussion at the officers' assembly. Then, in my opinion, commanders and other unit officials will exercise a high degree of conscience in determining the financial outlays associated with providing supplies for the military collective; exercise greater economy in military management; look for maximum economies; and seek contacts with truly reliable and advantageous business partners. However, most important here is that they will demand the same of their subordinates. Otherwise, to accomplish the assigned tasks, the unit will be forced to borrow money from its superior organ or a bank, to be paid back with interest, of course. Since no one will have the authority to saddle a regimental commander with an order that lacks funding, the one who does so will bear full responsibility for committing a financial blunder.

You will agree that this will effect discipline and force a look far into the future. If he cannot measure up to the task, well, ...

The results attained at the end of the year (or other period) will be an indication of the organizational abilities, competence, and business qualities of the unit commander and his "team" that will be considered by the officers' assembly in making an assessment and adopting the necessary remedy.

Thus, if mere printed transaction slips for all kinds of items are supplanted by "live" money in the unit, the following advantages will be gained:

- clearer planning of tasks for the fiscal period; greater interaction between services; tighter internal accounting;
- a minimum of unplanned tasks and diversion of personnel away from their primary duties;
- a substantial decrease in round-robin jobs;
- an attempt to lengthen maintenance intervals and depreciation periods, economize on resources, fuels, construction materials, etc.;
- more effective subsidiary farming;
- long-term economic agreements with military and civilian suppliers of proven reliability, with the possibility of immediate dissolution of ties to partners that fail to live up to their promises and seeking a replacement;
- greater independence, initiative, competence, and decisiveness on the part of leadership and other unit personnel; less patronage exercised by superior organs.

There is more. All the unit officers will be economically literate, thus enabling their effortless entry into the economy after discharge.

There is of course the danger attending such system that a unit's leadership will ignore combat readiness in favor of concentrating on commercial activity. This can be prevented by introducing a suitable mechanism. In the event official and ancillary tasks are not completed satisfactorily, drawing a poor rating, a possibility that can be employed is withholding of promotion for the responsible party (primarily the unit commander and his "team") or—better yet—levying fines on them. Let this be another instance of applying the ruble's regulating power.

I am in complete agreement with Colonel V. Aksenov (KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 19 May 1990) when he writes that the transition to the regulated economy will necessitate a complete restructuring of economic thinking on the part of military cadres and abandonment of the attitude of dependence. This restructuring should be instituted as soon as possible. In my estimation, officials of line units (and other persons) should acquire at least

the rudiments of economic knowledge by the end of this year, so that they can organize the economic activity in units in the new way next year. The point is that the country will soon make the change to a market economy. Military units should by that time be provided with the necessary information in the form of excerpts of laws and statutes and handbooks providing prices and data of an economic, commercial, banking, and legal nature. This, so that military cadres operating under the new economic conditions do not become a "rara avis."

Impact of New Pension Law on Chernobyl Veterans

90UM0796A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
29 Jul 90 First Edition p 2

[Article under the "Social Panorama" rubric: "Benefits for Chernobyl Personnel"; first two paragraphs are KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] In effect as of 1 July 1990 are benefits provided in the decree of the USSR Council of Ministers and All-Union Central Trade-Union Council dated 31 March 1990, No 325, entitled: "Measures for Improving Health Care and Social Security of Persons Involved in Cleanup Operations at the Chernobyl Atomic Electric Power Station."

The following is the text of a discussion the newspaper held on this subject with Major of Justice B. Lozbinev, a senior legal adviser of the Legal Department of the Administrative Directorate, USSR Ministry of Defense. The newspaper was represented by Major I. Ivanyuk.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] The main question asked by our readers is: To what extent will military personnel who served at Chernobyl be affected by this decree? The question was included in letters from G. Besstrakhov, I. Alekseyev, B. Tishchenko, and many others.

[Lozbinev] On 14 May 1990 the USSR Ministry of Defense issued an order that served as guidance for writing the decree. Military personnel, the same as all Soviet citizens that participated in cleanup operations following the accident at the Chernobyl AES [atomic electric power station] and were subjected to radiation effects, are entitled to receive a number of benefits.

The benefits can be placed into three groups. The first is intended for those persons that have fallen ill with radiation sickness as a result of the accident at the Chernobyl AES and as a result of cleanup operations, and military personnel who participated in cleanup operations after the accident occurred at the Chernobyl AES, working within a 30-kilometer zone, and those who were engaged in maintenance and other activities at the station at a time following the accident, for whom a causal relationship can be established between the ensuing disablement, the accident proper, and carrying out of duties associated with cleanup operations.

The above persons are entitled to receive, cost-free, doctor-ordered medication, annual health resort therapy, and transportation (other than by taxicab) to and from the place of therapy or examination. It is recommended that Councils of Ministers of union and autonomous republics, ministries, departments, and ispolkoms of local councils of people's deputies provide housing for these persons, starting with the day these persons apply for same. They are also to be accorded priority status for entry into ZhSK [housing construction cooperatives], garage cooperatives, and small garden associations; access to high-demand manufactured products; installation of a telephone; and provision of consumer services. In addition, members of small garden associations may be granted an interest-free loan for the purpose of the purchase or construction of a small house located at a small garden plot and for the improvement of small garden plots. Cost-free loans are also extended to those persons who intend to build their own house.

Also in effect is a 50-percent reduction in the established price of heating, water, gas, and electric utilities. Persons who reside in buildings that are not fitted with central heating are entitled to a 50-percent reduction in cost of fuel acquired within the limits of norms established for sale to the public.

The second group of benefits is intended for military personnel that participated in the years 1986-1987 in cleanup operations after the accident at the Chernobyl AES within the 30-kilometer zone, and those who engaged in maintenance and other activities at this station in that period of time.

The above persons are to be accorded priority status for issuance of travel authorization by their place of employment to health resorts for therapy and rest; assignment of housing; installation of a telephone; and entry into a ZhSK, garage cooperative, and small garden association. They are also to be offered purchasing and consumer privileges. They are entitled to interest-free loans under the same conditions as military personnel included in the first group.

The third group covers military personnel that participated in cleanup operations at the Chernobyl AES in 1988 within the 30-kilometer zone, and personnel that engaged in maintenance and other activities at the station at that time.

The above persons are to be accorded priority status for issuance of travel authorization by their place of employment to health resorts for therapy and rest, and they are to be treated preferentially upon application for membership in garage cooperatives and small garden associations.

In addition, all military personnel that participated in cleanup operations at the Chernobyl AES are authorized to take their allotted annual leave at any time convenient to them; they are also to receive priority treatment in medical care facilities and pharmacies.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Senior Lieutenant V. Bertovskiy asks whether it is permitted to take the 2-week unpaid leave provided for in the decree. As we all know, there is no such provision in military service.

[Lozbinev] Indeed, there is no provision for that.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] In the course of the above-mentioned medical examinations, a determination will be made of a causal relationship between illnesses and disablement on the one hand, and involvement in cleanup operations on the other. This cannot be done without a clear legal basis. Who in the Ministry of Defense will be vested with the authority to make proper assessments?

[Lozbinev] The determination of a causal relationship between illnesses and disablement on the one hand, and involvement in cleanup operations at the Chernobyl AES on the other, has been made the responsibility of a military medical board of the USSR Ministry of Defense.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] What will serve as proof of entitlement to the particular benefits? That is the question posed by Major V. Likhanov.

[Lozbinev] All military personnel that participated in cleanup operations at the Chernobyl AES are to be issued both a certificate attesting to their entitlement to the particular benefits and an emblem to be worn on the chest. The items are being designed by the USSR Ministry of Atomic Power and Industry.

For the time being, entries in servicemen's personnel files will serve as proof of their entitlement to benefits.

Draft Charter of the Federation of USSR Armed Forces Blue and White Collar Trade Unions

*90UM0805A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
2 Aug 90 First Edition p 2*

[Text] General Provisions

The Federation of USSR Armed Forces Blue and White Collar Trade Unions (hereinafter the Federation) is a public formation bringing together, on a voluntary basis, blue and white collar workers of the armed services, and trade union associations equal to them, in order to consolidate their actions to protect the rights and interests of laborers and labor collectives, and provide mutual support to attainment of common goals.

The Federation performs its activities in correspondence with the Constitution, with laws of the USSR, with the constitutions and laws of union republics determining the rights and powers of trade unions, and this Charter.

The Federation is an inseparable part of the country's trade union movement, it actively assists its reinforcement on the basis of the shared professional and socio-economic interests of laborers, and it supports formation of a legal state based on democracy and social justice.

The Federation organizes its activities on the basis of the following principles:

- voluntary entry into the Federation and free departure from it;
- equal rights of Federation members;
- independence of Federation members in organizational and financial activities;
- collectiveness and glasnost in the work of the Federation's executive bodies, and their accountability to member organizations;
- respect for the opinion of the minority, and of its right to protection and to explanation of its position, including by way of the mass media.

In its activities the Federation is independent of state administrative bodies and the military command, and of political and public organizations, it is not accountable to them, nor is it under their control, and it cooperates with them on an equal basis.

The Federation represents and defends the interests of member organizations in the USSR Ministry of Defense, in statewide government and administrative bodies, in the country's supreme trade union body, and in other public organizations.

Federation Members

Federation members are professional unions of blue and white collar workers of the armed services of the USSR Armed Forces, and of trade union associations equal to them.

Members are admitted to the Federation by a congress or plenum of the Federation Central Council on the basis of a decision of the trade union's supreme body and a written petition from it to the Central Council.

A decision is binding if not less than half of the congress delegates or two-thirds of the members of the Federation Central Council voted in favor of it.

An organization is said to have departed from the Federation 3 months after submitting a declaration to the Central Council Executive Committee informing the Central Council of the motives of its departure.

Member organizations:

- maintain complete independence in accordance with the Charter of their trade union;
- elect their own representatives to the Federation Central Council, and recall and replace them;
- participate in the work of Federation bodies through their representatives;
- refer all issues concerning trade union activities to executive bodies of the Federation and receive corresponding assistance and support;
- submit draft documents for examination by congresses and executive bodies of the Federation.

Member organizations support the activities of the Federation, carry out decisions of the Federation and its

bodies adopted in accordance with this Charter, and keep executive bodies of the Federation informed on their activities.

Member organizations that do not comply with the Federation Charter may be expelled from the Federation. The decision to expel is adopted at a plenum of the Central Council of the Federation by secret ballot, by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the votes of council members participating in the voting, in the presence of a quorum. A member organization expelled from the Federation is entitled to appeal to a congress of the Federation.

The Federation's Supreme Bodies

The congress of the Federation, which is convened by the Central Council of the Federation not less than once every 5 years, is the supreme body of the Federation. Notice of convocation of a congress and its agenda are announced no less than 6 months prior to the congress. The representation norm and the procedure for selecting delegates to the congress from among the member organizations are established by the Central Council of the Federation.

A congress:

- hears reports on the activities of the Central Council of the Federation and the Federation's inspection committee;
- determines the Federation's program of activity;
- approves and amends the Federation Charter;
- confirms the powers of members of the Central Council of the Federation elected by the member organizations on the basis of the principle of direct representation;
- elects the chairman of the Federation and his deputy, and the Federation's inspection committee.

The congress is said to be competent if not less than a third of the elected delegates are in attendance.

Decisions of the congress are binding if they are supported by over half of the votes of delegates taking part in the voting, in the presence of a quorum.

Extraordinary congresses of the Federation are convened by the Federation Central Council or at the demand of not less than one-third of its member organizations. The decision to convene it and the agenda are announced no less than 3 months prior to the congress.

The Central Council of the Federation, which is formed in accordance with the principle of direct representation from member organizations, is the supreme executive body of the Federation in the period between congresses. The representation norm is established as being equal for every member organization. Member organizations delegate, recall and replace their representatives in the Central Council of the Federation at Congresses or plenums of their central bodies. The competency of newly delegated council members is confirmed by the Central Council of the Federation.

The Central Council of the Federation:

- unites and coordinates the activities of member organizations in pursuit of the Federation's common objectives;
- defends the rights and interests of blue and white collar workers of the armed forces in the USSR Ministry of Defense, in state government and administrative bodies, and in the central bodies of public organizations; participates with the USSR Ministry of Defense in the drafting of plans for socioeconomic development, orders of the minister of defense and other standards pertaining to production, labor, wages, personal conditions and culture, and when necessary, submits alternative drafts of such documents;
- conducts negotiations and signs agreements with the USSR Ministry of Defense on organizational matters, on labor protection and wages, on observance of labor legislation, on employment, on price setting, on ecological safety and on medical, housing and personal services to blue and white collar workers, and ensures timely publication of orders of the USSR minister of defense;
- participates at the level of the USSR Ministry of Defense in distributing centralized capital investments for housing, cultural and personal service construction; monitors observance of the principle of social justice in determining the procedure for distributing passes for health resort treatment and for vacations in departmental health resorts;
- gives audience to ministry officials in matters of production organization, wages, labor protection, observance of labor law, personnel job training, fulfillment of collective contracts and agreements, plans for housing, cultural and personal service construction, and other matters affecting the interests of blue and white collar workers;
- submits demands to state, military, economic and other bodies to repeal, suspend or amend decisions infringing upon the rights and interests of laborers and conflicting with legislation on the rights of trade unions;
- supports valid demands submitted by member organizations, raises the question of conducting referendums, appears in the mass media, utilizes other legally foreseen resources for defending the rights and interests of laborers, and publishes printed materials of the Federation;
- coordinates with public associations and movements acting in the interests of laborers of the armed forces;
- keeps member organizations regularly informed on its activities;
- performs other functions delegated to it by member organizations.

The Central Council of the Federation conducts plenums as necessary, but not less than once a year, and a plenum is said to be competent if more than two-thirds of the council members take part in its proceedings.

Decisions of the Central Council of the Federation are adopted by a majority of votes of council members participating in voting, in the presence of a quorum.

The Central Council of the Federation forms the executive committee of the Central Council in order to map out coordinated actions of member organizations in the period between plenums and organize execution of decisions adopted by the Federation. The executive committee consists of the Federation chairman, his deputy, and one representative delegated by each member organization.

Meetings of the executive committee are conducted as necessary, and they are said to be competent if not less than two-thirds of the members of the executive committee participate in them. In the event that it is impossible for a member of the executive committee to take part in one of its meetings, the member organization is entitled to send another competent representative who is a member of the Central Council of the Federation.

The Federation chairman and his deputy are accountable to the Central Council of the Federation in the period between congresses.

The Federation chairman and his deputy may be released from their duties at the demand of not less than half the member organizations, or on the initiative of the executive committee of the Central Council. The issue is examined at a plenum of the Central Council of the Federation. A decision is binding if it is supported by not less than two-thirds of the votes of the council members.

The decision to release the Federation chairman or his deputy from their duties on their own initiative is approved by a majority vote of the members of the Central Council of the Federation taking part in the voting, in the presence of a quorum.

The form of voting (open or closed) at congresses of the Federation and plenums of its council is determined by congressional delegates and council members.

Elections of the Federation chairman and his deputy are conducted at a congress of the Federation by closed (secret) ballot, as a rule with at least two candidates.

Decisions of elected bodies of the Federation may not contradict the rights and interests of member organizations.

Assets and Property of the Central Council of the Federation

Assets and property belonging to the Central Council of the Federation are at its disposal.

Assets of the Central Council of the Federation are formed out of the dues paid by member organizations, income from economic, commercial and publishing activities, and other sources, and they are spent on the basis of estimates approved by a plenum of the Central Council of the Federation. The amount of the dues and

the procedure of their payment are determined by a congress of the Federation on the basis of preliminary consultations with member organizations.

The Federation's inspection committee operates in accordance with a Statute approved by a congress of the Federation.

Rights of the Central Council of the Federation as a Legal Person

The Central Council of the Federation of Armed Forces Blue and White Collar Trade Unions is a legal person, and it possesses its own seal and bank accounts.

The location of the Central Council of the Federation is the city of Moscow.

Termination of the Federation's Activities

The activities of the Federation may be terminated at the decision of its congress. The decision is binding if it is supported by not less than two-thirds of the votes of congressional delegates taking part in the voting, in the presence of a quorum.

In the event that the Federation ceases its activities, its assets and properties are used for purposes determined by a congress.

'Army and New Union Treaty'

91UM0018A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in Russian No 40, 6-12 Oct 90 p 2

[Interview with Igor Petrovich Novoselov, consultant of USSR Supreme Soviet Secretariat Defense and State Security Sector, by ARGUMENTY I FAKTY Correspondent N. Nikolayev; date and place not specified]

[Text] *The USSR Armed Forces have approximately 42 million hectares of land.*

[Nikolayev] Igor Petrovich, you are working on a draft protocol on military aspects of the Union treaty. Outline what is important and new that it contains.

[Novoselov] The main thing that managed to be worked out through joint efforts (representatives of the majority of Union republics with the exception of the Baltic republics are taking part in the work) is that the Armed Forces should remain unified. In addition, each sovereign republic will delegate its representative to the Defense Council with the right of a deciding vote, which previously never was the case.

Union republics also will be given the right to take part in working out military policy and deciding questions on troop stationing and on determining the number of draftees, the numerical strength of the Armed Forces as a whole, the Army and Navy budget and much more.

[Nikolayev] I know that despite demands of some republic representatives that servicemen perform duty within their republics, it was decided to retain the principle of exterritoriality.

[Novoselov] Well, how can one say that Tajiks should serve in Tajikistan and Uzbeks in Uzbekistan? The fact is, it is not even a question of the USSR as an enormous country, but as a state having a considerable nuclear potential, a Navy (including oceangoing submarines), Strategic Missile Forces, Long-Range Aviation, and so on. Does this mean the Strategic Missile Forces will be manned only from Kazakhs, whose territory contains most of them? Or only by residents of the RSFSR, who also have enough of such "sites"? And why do the Tajiks not have the right to serve in the Navy?

[Nikolayev] But the objection could be raised: Why does a Tajik need the ocean if he is also comfortable in the mountains?

[Novoselov] I fully agree with this; the principle of voluntariness is needed. A draftee's wishes definitely should be considered. But in general many (of course not all) problems similar to this should disappear when our Armed Forces shift to the principle of contract manpower acquisition.

[Nikolayev] Today the Army being drawn into the resolution of interethnic conflicts is being condemned almost everywhere. The Union of Soldiers' Mothers is actively protesting the fact that Russian lads intervened in conflicts similar to the Armenian-Azerbaijani one. What can be said on this question?

[Novoselov] It is written in our draft that the Armed Forces are intended for protecting the Union against attack from outside. With respect to domestic conflicts, I believe that public security forces or force elements should be established for their resolution in each republic which citizens of every specific republic will join on a voluntary basis.

[Nikolayev] The draft protocol has points devoted to questions of land being used by the troops.

[Novoselov] This is occasioned by the fact that the USSR Armed Forces now have approximately 42 million hectares of land. And today an acute question arises about the conditions under which local soviets will give up their land: will the USSR Armed Forces pay for it, how much, and so on? On the one hand, if the Army is required to pay for land like everyone else, its entire budget will go for this. But on the other hand, payment also is necessary—then it will not take more land than necessary and responsibility will be higher. I think different forms are needed in this situation: one cost for construction of residences and dachas, and another for ranges.

[Nikolayev] Leadership of the Army from the center will remain?

[Novoselov] Naturally, for if each person directs the Army in his own republic, rayon or city, what kind of Armed Forces are they? Any military conflict under present conditions simply will not provide a minute of time for holding any talks, and for now no one is insured against conflicts. Now we have normal relations with practically all world countries, but if a change should take place in some state's

government for a more reactionary government, then what? The fact is that France and China did not sign the agreements on nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, which Pakistan and Israel soon will have, by the way, and the number of such countries is increasing. As a sovereign state we must be able to defend our people, and this can be done only in the presence of a single center.

Operations Problems of TU-160

90UM0688A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
26 Jun 90 First Edition p 1

[Article by NIIVVS [Scientific Research Institute of the Air Force] Test Navigator Lieutenant-Colonel R. Sadykov: "On a Test Flight: A Report on the TU-160 Long Range Bomber and Not Only About It"]

[Text] The TU-160 aircraft on the take-off runway is more like a newcomer from the depths of outer space than an aircraft. This time test pilots from NIIVVS [Scientific Research Institute of the Air Force]—the oldest institution in the country that teaches pilots how to fly aircraft—are flying it.

"Take off, 687!" The voice of the flight controller sounded over the airwaves.

The nearly 300 ton aircraft sharply left the ground after a several hundred foot long take off run.

Aircraft Commander and Distinguished USSR Test Pilot Colonel M. Pozdnyakov directed his first question to the navigator:

"How is the navigation system?"

This question was not at random: The goal of this test flight which will last more than 10 hours is to research navigation system operations in various geographic latitudes. This flight is only a small portion of our total research program: Many thousands of kilometers will flash under the wings and testers will spend hundreds of hours in the air before placing a period on the final document. Only then can we transfer the very complex aircraft to combat units for operation with a guarantee.

Today all airframe, engine, and control system flight performance characteristics are calculated, modeled, and verified at design bureau computer centers, in wind tunnels, and in displays. In the air, we primarily verify design data and we also assess the accuracy of weapons system performance characteristics. The achievements of at least 40-50 branches of science, technology, and production have been combined into one in this modern aircraft.

Several minutes later, the TU-160, having gained altitude, assumes the assigned course. Colonel Pozdnyakov has turned on the autopilot and the flight continues without the pilots' interference. We began recording system operational characteristics. Later, designers and engineers will assess the performance of all system elements and crewmember activities while analyzing each minute of the flight on the ground.

NIIVVS test pilots and navigators have already devoted quite a bit of effort to make the TU-160 stable and easy to handle in all flight modes, operationally reliable, and combat capable. Colonels M. Pozdnyakov, V. Smirnov,

N. Sattarov, S. Popov, and V. Neretin, and Lieutenant Colonels P. Petrov, S. Martyanov, and others have done quite a bit for this.

The TU-160 completes a turn in autopilot mode over the turning point and assumes a new course. The pilots' task is to monitor various system operations and to maintain the assigned speed and altitude.

"The crew can refresh themselves and relax," says the commander. But for now this does not apply to the 2nd test pilot, Lt Col Vladimir Pavlov who relieved the commander. One of our leading test pilots, he participated in the August 1988 demonstration for the U.S. Secretary of Defense. He successfully handled the task....

Navigator-Operator Lt Col Sergey Martyanov enters the alternate route parameters into the system and simultaneously maintains contact with the ground-based command post.

"I congratulate' the crew on the failure of the astro-inertial [navigation] system," Col Neretin's voice rings out.

What has occurred does not impact flight safety—all of the TU-160's systems have multiple redundancy. But on the ground, we must fundamentally sort out why various assemblies are failing in flight since their reliability indicator must be brought up to the prescribed standard during the testing process. But how much additional time will be devoted to this!

For many years, the institute's navigator personnel have been conducting an unequal dialogue with navigation system and missile weapons developers. The practice of relations that has developed allows industry to do what they want and not what is required for the TU-160's practical operation in the air. Monopolism and the lack of competition is one of the primary causes of why we lag behind on this issue. Industry's dictates impede raising the design level of new models of equipment and weaponry. Imperfect interdepartmental relations and the existing financing system compel purchasing organs to sometimes resort to compromises that in the end also impact on the quality of the equipment being accepted into the inventory.

In my view, the situation needs to be corrected. I will name only two primary directions. First, we need a new interdepartmental document that would define a systematic approach on a competitive basis when designing and developing aircraft.

Second, purchasing organs must be afforded the entire complement of rights in selection of developers, designers, and their financing right up to selection of the preferred version that answers the aircraft's designation and concept and basic achievements of science and technology....

Radio contact was established with the flight controller. The navigators are completing their work. Behind them are hours of difficult physical and intellectual work. A

great deal of practical scientific material has been collected and experience has been accumulated. The airfield is ahead. The TU-160 enters the pre-landing maneuver zone. The commander switches off the autopilot and completes the landing. Several minutes later the missile carrier's wheels touch the runway. The flight has been completed.

The designers and engineers, navigation system experts, crowd around Colonel Neretin, the TU-160's lead test navigator. There is preliminary analysis for now. The test team will compile the main report and decision about the flight. The test navigator's system and equipment performance report will fall within further research plans of design bureaus and many firms and enterprises.

Yes, a tester of any rank—is an expert who decides the fate of an aircraft or of one of its systems. Successes or

failures—economic, technical, and even social—depend on his professional level and his conscience.

This year the Scientific Research Institute of the Air Force marks its 70th Anniversary. Without exaggeration, the weight of its contribution is that our country has become one of the world's leading air powers, although the institute's path is not only studded with victories. But, the enthusiasm and purposefulness of our scientists, engineers, and testers has always prevailed over passiveness and indifference in the collective. Right now this is particularly important for strengthening our defense capability when emphasis is being placed on qualitative indicators since, according to my firm conviction, aviation has not lost its role.

Officers View Lessons of 'Komsomolets' Disaster
90SV0011A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
30 Aug 90 First Edition p 2

[Discussion led by Capt 3rd Rank P. Ishchenko, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Northern Fleet correspondent: "The Shore Is Indebted to Us - Views Held by Nuclear-Powered Submarine Crew After Cruise"; first paragraph is KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] Almost 18 months have passed since the nuclear-powered 'Komsomolets' was lost. Sufficient time has gone by to learn a lesson from the incident and effect technical and organizational measures for the purpose of improving survivability of our submarines. This was the subject of a discussion in which the participants were Captain 2nd Rank B. Lasuta, ship commanding officer; Captain 3rd Rank V. Smirnov, executive officer; Captain 2nd Rank A. Shestakov, engineer officer; Captain-Lieutenant A. Lusic, mine and torpedo department officer; and Captain 3rd Rank A. Nishtalenko, damage control division officer. The newspaper was represented by Captain 3rd Rank P. Ishchenko, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent, Northern Fleet.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Let me start off by asking this question: How did the equipment behave during the cruise? I understand that your vessel has "come of age."

[Lasuta] Yes, our ship is 18 years old already. In spite of that, there were no equipment breakdowns. Much of the credit is due the crew, who is quite skilled in operating and repairing the materiel.

[Shestakov] I consider that the kind of design we have to be the most successful as far as reliability is concerned. This type of ship offers a high degree of survivability, in that it is capable of withstanding substantial combat and non-combat damages. However, it is unfortunate that our ship's qualities are being adversely affected by regular extensions of maintenance intervals. For example, the vessel was to have undergone the second medium-level maintenance procedure as far back as two years ago, but it is still sailing the high seas. Then there is the problem of shortage of spare parts. As far as the engineering department is concerned, industry has discontinued manufacturing virtually all the assemblies and mechanisms. The point is, the Navy consists of more than new ships.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Tell me about training for sea duty. Has anything new been introduced as a result of the investigation of the 'Komsomolets' loss carried out by the state commission?

[Lasuta] We have been especially interested in refining the crew's skill in using individual protective and life-saving gear. We carried out training in liferaft employment. Also, in past years we were limited to a mere theoretical understanding of how to blow through the missile launch tubes in the event of a possible missile accident, but have had hands-on training. We were able

to do so thanks to the availability of a nuclear-powered missile-carrying submarine that was prepared for decommissioning. (This kind of training cannot be carried out aboard a vessel still in service.)

I believe that another result of the tragic occurrence was equipping submarines, including ours, with heaters for wet suits (although of course it was high time to have heated wet suits). Nevertheless, probably the most valuable aspect of it all for me - as ship commander - was the fact that complete information on the loss of the "Komsomolets" was made available. I was able to extract information from the numerous documents and make a detailed analysis of the course of events and see how the situation may apply to me. I came to look at many aspects of the organization of the survivability effort in a new light. For example, I was always convinced of the universality of the LOKh shipboard fire-fighting system. However, the accident that occurred aboard the "Komsomolets" was an indication that the system was ineffective in the event of very high pressure in a space. I drew my own conclusion: In the event of fire, everything possible must be done to prevent significant pressure build-up and extinguish the flames before this can occur.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] From what I see, lessons are being learned from the past. But does this mean that everything necessary has been done?

[Shestakov] If we are to speak of our ship, much effort is required to maintain the equipment. I have already mentioned the longer times between maintenance procedures. There undoubtedly are objective reasons for this, such as insufficient repair yard capabilities and lack of means. However, this is not something you can explain to the equipment so it would exercise patience and hold on for awhile. With our crew's resources we accomplish 50 percent of the repair operations usually performed by the yard. For example, just recently the kingston valves in a diesel generator cooling system malfunctioned. We were refused a slip at the dock. Several warrant officers worked in a pressurized compartment (that is, one in which the pressure is made greater to prevent entry of seawater) to remove the valves and install shims.

[Smirnov] What are we to think of the reduced norms for expendables issue? The driving force behind this is considerations of economy, but for some reason it is not realized that this kind of economy may be worse than wastefulness. Three engineering divisions are allotted a total of 20 kilograms of alcohol. Six kilograms are needed to charge only one storage battery! Servicing of the gas analysis system requires 200 grams of alcohol per sensor, but there is virtually no alcohol available for this purpose. No wonder the sensors give false warnings during a cruise.

[Nishtalenko] Incidentally, when the vessel does pull into a repair yard, a process of correspondence worthy of an office is set into motion. About 10 years ago, only one

order was required by the yard, but now on order must be filled out for each department, as if we had a typing pool aboard. On top of that, we must collect about six signatures for the order to be accepted. This wastes time and occupies people who should be preparing the material for quality repair.

[Lusis] Not enough time has passed since the loss of the "Komsomolets" for tangible changes to have come about. However, the situation will not change for the better if there is continued proliferation in designs of our submarines, if they continue to be built in the same way - in small series. There is a reason why the Americans have only a few submarine designs, in which they are continually making enhancements and improving reliability. We, however, have virtually no standardization; the concept of small series "escapes" us, with the thinking being: Let us just come up with another design.

[Nishtalenko] In my 12 years of service, only once did I see a representative from the NII [scientific research institute] that works in our area of interest. He spotted one of the pumps that we keep squeezing service out of by hook or crook and said with surprise: "Can it be that it is still working for you!?"

It is time that both the Navy and industry realize that more than half the sealing hardware used on these boats is made of rubber and fluoroplastic, which possess little resistance to flame. These materials should be replaced, at least by graphitized carbon, as soon as possible. To do this, the submarines must be laid up so that extensive work can be accomplished. But this is not being done.

[Shestakov] After the "Komsomolets" incident, we were finally issued lifejackets. But what kind - the ordinary small-boat type. In the event of fire, they burst into flame like a match. Must we wait for an accident to occur for research organizations and industry to create the kind of lifejacket required by submariners?

[Lasuta] In addition to tactical and technical data on a particular piece of armament, I would like to obtain from science and industry an estimate of what will happen to the armament if I were to subject it to service more severe than that intended. Industry is in no hurry to provide this, for either new models of armament or, especially, old models.

What we have been discussing certainly does not include everything that is being done at this very moment to effect greater equipment reliability and improve the means and methods of attaining survivability aboardship. For this reason, I shall add to that which has been said for the benefit of those present. Without waiting for recommendations of our learned colleagues (if we do receive them) based on the loss of the "Komsomolets," our unit has been developing new procedures as guidance for personnel in the more serious emergency conditions. We have enjoyed some success in devising a new damage control technique applicable to a general emergency, when it is necessary to counter a variety of shipboard threats at the same time. One of our initiatives

was to abandon the uninhabited compartment concept in one class of submarine. Now, (as a departure from instructions written even before 7 April of last year), one or two men will stand watch in what previously were uninhabited spaces. All compartments will be fitted with ultrashort-wave radio sets, which should solve the problem of communications between compartments during the most threatening of emergencies.

However, the force of inertia is still strong, unfortunately, and the assault on susceptibility to accidents is not being mounted on united front. The conversation has made it clear that the spare parts supply has undergone considerable reduction, in spite of ageing of equipment. The electric equipment of submarines, as attested to by Captain First Rank V. Panteleyev, engineering service chief of the unit, was and still is vulnerable to short-circuiting when subjected to moisture. The LOKh firefighting system, the same as before, has no automatic controls. Individual lifesaving and breathing gear is still bulky and inconvenient. The shoreside training system does not allow for teaching submariners how to perform damage control under threat of both fire and flooding in a compartment.

As we can see, the debt owed to those at sea by science, industry, and Naval rear and technical organs remains as large as ever. It must be paid as soon as possible.

Public Opinion Versus Nuclear Submarine Fleet

90SV0020A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
2 Sep 90 First Edition p 2

[Article by Captain First Rank A. Pilipchuk, deputy editor of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA's naval military training department, under the rubric "The Nuclear Fleet Is at the Crossroads of Public Opinion": "What the Stars Are Made Of"]

[Text] This year KRASNAYA ZVEZDA published a number of articles which were, in our view, of principal significance. For instance, on 27 January a floating workshop designated for reloading the fuel cores of nuclear reactors aboard nuclear-powered submarines [APL] was mentioned for the first time in the open press. The article "How Much Do the Stars Cost" concerned military sailors who serve on "nuclear refuelers," their potentially dangerous work, and the dissatisfaction with work conditions. On 6 April the paper published the article "Nuclear-Powered Submarines—Headed for Scrap?" which raised the question of the need to create a government program encompassing the whole system for salvaging APL's leaving the Navy at the end of their term of use. The Navy had never revealed this aspect to the mass media before. The newspaper addressed the same subject on 28 June in an interview with Rear Admiral D. Alpatov, deputy chief of the Navy's Main Directorate for Use and Repair in "Where to 'Bury' Nuclear-Powered Vessels"...

Articles on a theme which might be called "Man and Atomic Energy" may now be found in many newspapers

and journals. The mass media are vying with one another to address that theme as though hurrying to have their say after a forced silence. However sometimes the conversation becomes one-sided and goes to the other extreme. Submarines of the Navy and ships of the Ministry of the Maritime Fleet with nuclear propulsion units have been declared "personae non gratae," and nuclear power plants, the nuclear test range, and other facilities (by which, incidentally, one may judge which century we live in) fall into the category of "undesirables." Of course those sailors who work with nuclear energy have had their problems and shortages, but they are able to distinguish criticism from clamorous attacks and amateurish judgments. In order to better understand the current situation of the Navy and people's attitudes toward it, we must address the sources of the creation of our nuclear defense on the seas...

It is amazing that construction of the nuclear submarine fleet and the infrastructure that accompanies it, which took place in the fifties and which was so impressive by its scale, passed by the consciousness of the majority of Soviet people and left in it over time only a political stereotype—the country has become the possessor of a nuclear missile ocean fleet. No less an amazing phenomenon is the fact that when nuclear-powered vessels were leaving the ship-building factories in great numbers, it seems that no one in the country was giving serious thought to that time when the APL's would one after another chart a course to their last harbor. In essence, to this day a great naval power still has no modern material and technical base and technology for salvaging ships and vessels in general and those with nuclear-powered propulsion units in particular. Data received by the Navy's department of material funds and production planning speak eloquently about the lamentable condition of this "sector": The remains of approximately 700-800 ships and vessels of various ship-owning departments (many left over from the war) are abandoned along the banks of oceans, seas, rivers, and lakes. Many dozens of ships and vessels (including nuclear vessels) of the Navy are at moorings awaiting scrapping. Such was the reverse side of an extradepartmental style of making decisions of state importance and arms and defense programs: A thick curtain of secrecy lowered before the eyes of its own people.

Now that this curtain has been raised, the third phenomenon in succession which we would like to talk about has come to life. Today a self-confident public opinion is directly invading every single sphere of Navy activity and is beginning to give ultimatums in its conversation with the latter (which is almost unprecedented in world practice in relations between society and the military). For instance, in Khabarovsk Kray a Navy plan to shift fuel cores from several nuclear-powered vessels that were decommissioned to a floating workshop gave rise to a storm of protest and a shock wave that travelled from Sovetskaya Gavan to Moscow.

The people's alarm is understandable (I speak as a man who served several years in one of the "nuclear city"

garrisons of the Northern Fleet). Especially because from the very first that alarm was roused by the publication of doubtful, frightening "information," for example, of the dismantling of the reactors themselves and the scrapping of nuclear-powered vessels practically within view of population centers. But even possession of all the facts is hardly able to allay the severity of reaction of the local public—man's undivided power over the split atom seems illusory to many after Chernobyl. And efforts to explain the situation are seen as nothing more than a manifestation of the corporate-bureaucratic optimism of nuclear specialists. The consciousness of a portion of the people has been influenced in such a fashion that they do not wish to believe the real situation.

Yes, times have changed, but in the process their cause-and-effect connection is not broken. Yesterday's logic of states opposing each other on the seas has materialized today in superpowerful navies and thousands of ships which are equipped with "eternal" power plants. (For your information: Nuclear-powered submarines exist in the navies of the USSR, the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, and France. In addition, the navies of the United States and the USSR have nuclear-powered surface vessels at their disposal as well. According to data from the organization "Greenpeace," 530 nuclear reactors exist on the sea, which is 106 more than those that exist on land.) Even if all of them were to be scrapped at once, many years and tremendous amounts of funds would still be needed for an ecologically clean "beating of swords into plowshares."

But he who tries to convince society that the time for this has come is either mistaken or is playing a suspicious game for his own ends. Not a single one of the measures for mutual verification has yet been extended to naval forces. And the unprecedentedly quick and mighty concentration of those forces in the Persian Gulf should finally open one's eyes to the significance the leading powers give to their fleets and to the chance that in the near future they will make any substantial reductions in them. Especially because Iraq's aggression against Kuwait is the latest demonstration of the delicacy of the balance between peace and war, which in some instances can only be maintained through collective efforts within the bounds of the United Nations. However paradoxical it may be, such is the logic of our idea today of armed forces—as a force for the maintenance of peace.

Many decades and the consistent implementation of several ship-building programs are needed for the creation of a navy adequate for the position of a country such as ours. It is just these programs which frequently undergo directed attacks. And in the process, these blows hit at the most sensitive spot. The country's first in command decided at the end of the fifties that the USSR did not need battleships and battle cruisers. And the program was canceled, and the ships, both built and uncompleted, were carved up into needles. Now one hears assertions that aircraft carriers are not needed for the defense of the country. And one hears the following "weighty" argument: One aircraft carrier equals so many

square meters of housing. I would like to ask whether we had plenty of housing when we no longer had battleships and we still did not have aircraft carriers. Apparently our primary task is to learn to live and manage our affairs the same way that they live and manage their affairs in those countries where there are battleships and aircraft carriers and housing. A great state does not have to choose between defense and well-being.

With regard to this we will again return to the problems raised in the article "How Much Do the Stars Cost" (many of the crews of refueling ships have a tradition: After reloading a reactor, a crimson star is drawn on the bulkhead). The editorial board received responses from the Navy's Main Directorate for Use and Repair [GUER] and from the Navy's financial services. A telephone conversation also took place with several officers of the GUER. The problems of sailors serving on ships for refueling nuclear reactors are, of course, well known by the central authorities. For example, the case of the floating workshop commanded by Captain Second Rank A. Palkin which has not been in for maintenance in many years of use. The repairs are planned. But something else is also clear from the responses: Many such ships will quickly be reaching the end of their term of service, and in general the Ministry of the Shipbuilding Industry has given no firm guarantee to build the required number of new ships. A report has also reached the editorial board to the effect that next year an increase in the job assignments for officers' posts on these ships may occur. And now proposals by the Ministry of Defense concerning the introduction of additional monetary allowances to servicemen refueling nuclear reactors and working with nuclear fuel and radioactive waste which were submitted to the Council of Ministers back in September 1989 will only be examined by the government at the end of this year. Will they be adopted? Will the privileges be extended to compulsory service personnel? Will food quotas for refueling crews be made equal to the quotas for personnel aboard APL's? Will there be provisions for personnel to live in barracks on shore and not aboard their own nuclear "refuelers"? Are there plans to create a special training center to prepare reloading specialists? Will they be provided with guaranteed vouchers to sanatoriums and rest homes? These and many other questions trouble the sailors of the nuclear tenders. Their letters continue to reach the editorial board. And they have the right to be heard at the highest levels. And how well the government listens affects not only the condition of the Navy but also the truth of society's evaluation of its significance.

Fitting Out of Experimental Ship Delayed

91UM0014A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
4 Oct 90 First Edition p 2

[Article by Captain 3rd Rank V. Yegorov, Pacific Fleet, and commentary by Captain 1st Rank V. Kanashin, chief of shipyard military mission, and O. Poltavskiy, responsible order deliverer: "Lengthy Torment"]

[Text] *A crew was formed for a new-construction ship two years ago, but to this day the ship and crew are separated by thousands of kilometers...*

They call themselves the crew of the "Flying Dutchman" for the simple reason that they serve... aboard a ghost ship.

When the order came to the ASW formation commanded by Captain 1st Rank N. Temerev two years ago to form a crew for a ship being built at one of the Leningrad yards, events at first developed in the ordinary way. They selected candidates for positions and painted for them the prospects that were opening up (all officers without exception were appointed with a promotion). It remained only to await the signal to depart.

In November of last year, when the majority of officers and warrant officers already were sitting on their suitcases and some even had managed to order containers and sell their furniture, the news came that the ship was not ready to be accepted from industry and the crew was to remain in place.

In March of this year the crew had to continue to wait as the ship continued to be not ready.

"Now they are orienting us toward December," says Captain 3rd Rank A. Timoshenko, the crew political officer, "but those of our officers who traveled to the yard doubt the reality even of this date. For now, the ship essentially is a floating hull."

And that is how they have been living all this time. Seamen and petty officers are accommodated aboard a tender and officers and warrant officers are scattered among formation ships. They rarely see each other. If they do manage to feel themselves to be one collective, it is for the most part during all-hands work taking in the harvest in the military sovkhos, berming the arsenal, and similar "activities."

The nine lieutenants sent to this crew immediately after graduation from higher naval schools were especially unlucky. For the time being they basically have to reinforce theory in practice in the potato fields. It is probably difficult to blame the formation command for this. It does not want to take people away from operating ships.

And it must be said that in this situation the formation itself also turned out to be in an ambiguous position, if only because the new ship will have nothing at all to do with it and therefore this crew is an "outsider." On the other hand, however, the people recruited for it were its own. For example, during the protracted waiting for the move, those whose turn came up for housing received it, and this at a time when the formation soon was to receive a replacement, the missile cruiser "Chervona Ukraina," which is why this same housing problem took on additional acuteness.

True, there also were optimists here. No matter what, they told me, service goes on, and on preferential terms.

Some officers managed to receive ranks according to the new table of organization categories, and there were no ship-type training tasks for you...

"There are those sentiments," confirmed Captain 1st Rank S. Rasskazov, chief of the formation political department, "but it is still worse when the interest of officers afloat toward shipboard duty dies away entirely because of the lengthy torment. They also gradually lose professional skills. Why do so many problems always arise with making new ships operational and finishing them? Well because dampened, played-out crews usually come aboard raw ships."

I was told in higher headquarters that the story of the crew's two-year ordeals probably is unique in its way, that nothing of the sort had ever happened here before. Poor consolation. Life constantly proves that for some reason deviations from the norm in the final account have the trait of developing into stable phenomena for us.

Captain 1st Rank A. Zlydnev, our permanent correspondent at the Leningrad Naval Base, met with Captain 1st Rank V. Kanashin, chief of the shipyard military mission, and with O. Poltavskiy, responsible order deliverer. Here is what they told him:

"As of the present time the object has been launched and is at the yard quay. The engine has been installed, the

shaft line has been assembled and installation of equipment is going on slowly, but nevertheless going on. The enterprise is being let down very seriously by suppliers.

"Difficulties with putting the ship in operation are explained by the fact that the object fell under conversion inasmuch as she is experimental. Insignificant funds were allocated for her and all attempts by the enterprise to obtain additional appropriations have failed for now.

"The question essentially had not been decided at all up until July of this year. Only in August was a decision made by the USSR Council of Ministers to accelerate construction. Relying on this decision, the heads of the enterprise sent a memo to the Ministry of the Shipbuilding Industry which contains a request to seek opportunities for accelerating construction.

"The situation as of today is as follows: mooring trials are set for the summer of 1992. The crew is to be settled aboard during February-March 1992. Enterprise workers are not at fault for the ordeals of the crew without a ship. The culprits must be sought rather among those who drafted and redrafted plans for placing the object in operation..."

There is no denying that the news is little comfort for the crew of the "Flying Dutchman." In all likelihood another one and a half years will have to be added to the two years spent in uncertainty and sitting "on suitcases." It is really a unique instance and clearly is subject to serious analysis on the Navy Main Staff and at other echelons.

Lt Gen Masenko Accused of Misusing Awards

90UM0807A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
2 Aug 90 First Edition p 2

[Article by Capt 1st Rank S. Turchenko, special correspondent: "In Defense of Our General..."]

[Text] The article "Self-Purification" published on 17 March discussed in particular the fact that Lieutenant General V. Masenko, deputy troop commander for civil defense of the North Caucasus Military District, signed orders awarding bonuses to his subordinates and chiefs (and even himself) that were protested by the district's financial service and military procuracy.

The first responses to the article were from Lieutenant General Masenko's subordinates. Colonels N. Klemenov and L. Barmuta, lieutenant colonels B. Dagoyev, V. Dekhtarenko, A. Tkachenko, V. Saidov, V. Zakatalov, T. Pulatov, A. Gorin and V. Yefimtsev and many others wrote lovingly and respectfully of their chief, and asked for an attentive analysis of the situation that evolved in regard to the unfortunate bonuses.

I must admit that I left on my trip regarding these letters with a certain amount of doubt: Are they really sincere, might they not be a deliberate conspiracy? The fact cited in the article, you see, was obtained from documents which I personally held in my hands. And these documents portrayed the author of the bonus orders somewhat differently. But as we know, the true face of a person cannot always be seen on paper. After visiting the civil defense units and talking with many of the people, I developed a sincere respect for this general.

Colonel O. Shturbin. I would very much want to rise to the defense of our general. Viktor Fedorovich gave 87 years of his life to the army. Of them, he served in the Far East, at the far edge of the earth, for almost a quarter of the century. He has been decorated with four orders. Two of his sons are also officers, and they are serving fabulously. There is one fact that reveals rather eloquently that our general has not even the shadow of a desire to capitalize on his official position for personal ends: He has neither a *dacha* nor a private automobile, which I'm sure you understand is not a problem considering his position. As far as the bonuses for work done in Spitzak are concerned, if you looked into the matter you would come to understand whether Viktor Fedorovich is guilty of any wrongdoing. But let me say something about some other "bonuses": In Chernobyl, our general was exposed to 35.6 rem, which is almost twice the permissible norm for accidental exposure. His thyroid failed as a result. In Spitzak, during the earthquake recovery operations, he suffered a minor heart attack owing to the incredible stress. Such is the price of the selflessness of this currently "disgraced" person.

Lieutenant Colonel A. Tabakov. I had the fortune of being together with Masenko both in Chernobyl and in Spitzak. Meeting such a general is a rare event. Wherever the personnel were, he was always with them. He ate with

the soldiers from the same cooking pot. And he managed the work not through messengers, but personally. I remember when a train carrying gasoline was derailed in Spitzak. The track had to be cleared quickly. It was February. Fifteen degrees of frost. We worked in shifts, and the general remained at the accident site for over 24 hours. From here, he maintained radio contact with city officials, and ordered equipment, tools and oxygen for cutting torches. We could not understand why he spoke so hoarsely, until we learned later that the general was suffering the worst kind of angina.

Lieutenant Colonel B. Garmayev. What astounded me at Chernobyl was this. Lieutenant General Masenko was extremely careful to see that servicemen working in the radioactive zone would be relieved every 10 days. But he stayed in it for months on end. The events troubled his soul deeply, and he did not spare himself.

Lieutenant Colonel A. Kravchuk. I don't know why all of this commotion arose around the bonuses, but I can never believe that Viktor Fedorovich could be improper, mercenary or self-interested. He often visits us in the unit. But believe you me, he's not one for hotels—he always lives in the barracks. He eats only in the enlisted mess, and he always pays the finance chief for his food with vouchers even though what he takes is next to nothing—a bowl of soup from the common cooking pot. But he is scrupulous even in relation to little things such as this.

* * * *

I listened to the officers, and I thought sadly that I had been too hasty in March to make public the "documented fact." Things were not as clear as appeared at first glance. What did happen, then, with those bonuses?

The civil defense operational group of the North Caucasus Military District successfully completed its missions in the earthquake recovery efforts in the city of Spitzak from December 1988 to October 1989. By tradition, the soldiers carried out the most complex, laborious and dangerous jobs. They removed more than 35,000 tons of scrap metal from beneath the ruins and surrendered them to the Ministry of Ferrous Metallurgy, and dismantled and saved millions of rubles' worth of valuable construction materials. This was all in addition to carrying out the principal tasks of clearing the ruins. In this case the pay they received was several times lower than that of civilian specialists participating in the earthquake recovery efforts. In order to correct this injustice and raise the material interest of the personnel, the Statute on Payment of Bonuses to Servicemen From Assets Allocated by Enterprises was drafted at the initiative of local party and soviet organs by the disaster control headquarters of the city of Spitzak. It was signed by N. Muradyan, the first secretary of the Spitzakskiy Rayon Committee of the Armenian Communist Party, and by O. Grigoryan, chairman of the Spitzak City Executive Committee, and it was approved by V.

Kuramin, chief of the Spitak disaster management headquarters. The statute charged the city executive committee and directors of enterprises and institutions with deducting up to 25 percent of the value of surrendered scrap metal and lava stone construction blocks for bonuses, and the chief of the civil defense operational group and military unit commanders with paying bonuses to the servicemen equaling up to 2 months' pay depending on their contribution to the overall result.

It was in compliance with this document that Lieutenant General Masenko and the civil defense unit commanders went into action. Everything went smoothly at first. The operational group was inspected by Lieutenant Colonel Yu. Resenkov, chief of the USSR Civil Defense Financial Department; by Colonel Makarov, senior inspector-auditor of the financial service of the USSR Armed Forces Central Financial Directorate, and by many other officials. They invariably confirmed the lawfulness of the money expenditure. The thunderbolt came in late 1989. The district's financial service suddenly espied a conflict between the aforementioned statute and Order No 255 of the USSR Minister of Defense dated 1984, "On the Procedures for Submitting Scrap Metal and Paying Bonuses to Workers." An order of the district troop commander was published in this connection (of course, for some reason it was signed by Major General S. Todorov, deputy commander for combat training), in keeping with which Masenko, his deputies and the civil defense unit commanders were held materially responsible for the complete amount of the "loss suffered by the state."

From a letter from the minister of ferrous metallurgy to the troop commander of the North Caucasus Military District: "The management of the Ministry of Ferrous Metallurgy expresses its gratitude to the officers and generals of the civil defense operational groups and units that organized an around-the-clock effort to collect, load and remove scrap metal from the earthquake zone in Armenia on the basis of a decision of the USSR Council of Ministers and the USSR minister of defense. In correspondence with an agreement drawn up on the basis of orders of the USSR Council of Ministers and the USSR Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Ferrous Metallurgy deducted 25 percent of the total value of the collected scrap metal for bonuses to the distinguished units in accordance with the 'Statute on Rewarding Personnel of Civil Defense Troops Participating in Armenian Earthquake Relief Efforts'."

From a letter from USSR People's Deputy O. Lobov to Army General V. Govorov, USSR civil defense chief: "As one of the directors of the Armenian earthquake relief efforts, I confirm the high effectiveness and suitability of rewarding the servicemen...for safeguarding material valuables—scrap metal, stone, carpentry articles, glass etc. Until this principle was introduced, all valuables were dumped in ravines and barbarically destroyed...."

From a telegram from USSR People's Deputy N. Muradyan, first secretary of the Spitakskiy Rayon Committee of the Armenian Communist Party, to USSR Minister of Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union D. Yazov: "In connection...with termination of bonuses to personnel, the pace of the work and its quality have decreased sharply. After buildings and structures are dismantled, valuable construction materials are once again being taken to the dump. Please issue instructions not to block payment of bonuses out of funds of the Ministry of Ferrous Metallurgy and the USSR Gosstroy to personnel distinguishing themselves in civil defense units."

So, what do we have? On one hand payment of bonuses to the servicemen provided an indubitable benefit to the state. On the other hand the documents on the basis of which they were paid were in conflict with another document drawn up for ordinary and not extraordinary conditions. It seems as if the Central Financial Directorate needs to determine more clearly the mechanism of material stimulation of troops participating in natural disaster recovery efforts, so that the executors wouldn't have to reinvent the wheel every time.

As far as the "delicate" issue of V. Masenko's payment of bonuses to the higher chiefs and himself is concerned, I must bitterly admit that I had put my trust in documents of the financial service and the district's procuracy. What really happened? Officers and generals came from Moscow on lengthy tours of temporary duty, and they worked in Spitak under the same conditions as all the men, but because a special statute on payment of bonuses to them did not exist, their names were included in the orders of the chief of the operational group. And as far as V. Masenko's name is concerned, Colonel V. Suzdaltsev added his name to the document after it had already been signed, as was confirmed in writing, to the procuracy.

I understand how much Viktor Fedorovich had to undergo after the documents mentioned above and the articles based on them were made public. I ask him to accept my apologies.

Gosplan's Kotov Interviewed on Conversion Program*90SV0021B Moscow SOYUZ in Russian No 34, Aug 90
p 6*

[Interview with USSR Gosplan Department Deputy Chief Viktor Kotov by Dmitriy Khrapovitskiy: "Farewell to Arms?"]

[Text] The initial hopes passed unnoticed, and conversion has now become one of the most painful subjects of public attention. Today, we interview Viktor Kotov, a USSR Gosplan department deputy chief and one of the leaders of the collective that is working on the country's domestic conversion program.

[Khrapovitskiy] We often see pieces in the press written by the leaders of our defense production facilities, or by general designers, who two years ago were assigned the task of developing and producing processing and packaging lines in the interests of the agroindustrial complex and public catering. But they have been totally unable to come to terms with this change and act to accomplish conversion "by specialty," that is, for the production of military equipment and selling it in the world market.

[Kotov] Let me start by saying that the arms trade is amoral. If we have announced to the whole world that we are reducing our defense spending and cutting back on military production and at the same time increase our sales of weapons abroad then it is obvious that this does nothing for our prestige.

Other proposals on "conversion according to specialty" are being voiced primarily by representatives of the aviation industry: allow us to sell civilian aircraft, because with the incomes thus derived we shall be able to purchase considerable quantities of other civilian products that we now have to make. But this never gets any further than general talk. At one time the Ministry of the Aviation Industry was told that if it was able to sell aircraft abroad it should, even perhaps to the detriment of the domestic market. But it is one thing to make a declaration and quite another to start trading. For the level of our aircraft, and here I have in mind even the new generation of commercial aircraft—the IL-96, the TU-204, the IL-114—do not meet world standards in all respects. Moreover, the world market is saturated and it is simply that no one is allowing us to penetrate it.

Now I would like to clarify the question of the schedule of allocations to produce equipment for the agroindustrial complex and light industry, which today many people regard as the first stage of conversion. The fact of the matter is that in 1988, in connection with the inability of our former Ministry of the Light and Food Industry to develop the equipment needed it was disbanded and its 250 enterprises were transferred to the defense complex together with their functions.

[Khrapovitskiy] Was it possible to achieve what was wanted?

[Kotov] There has undoubtedly been some advance. At least, it was obviously intended. For essentially, we did not have that kind of industry. Both the government and the Gosplan were well aware that in order to assimilate new kinds of articles any collective of scientists and designers, even the most highly skilled, needs time, perhaps longer than a year.

[Khrapovitskiy] But again it seems to me appropriate here to repeat the call from the general designers of the Ministry of the Aviation Industry: let us sell up-to-date aircraft and we shall be able to buy all we need.

[Kotov] Well, why not? Moreover, no one is forbidding Simonov, general designer at the Sukhoy Special Design Bureau, to sell aircraft. For example, permission has been given for sales of the Su-26 sports trainer and the MiG-29.

[Khrapovitskiy] And the Su-27?

[Kotov] This question must be reviewed at the state level. We cannot sell our most advanced military equipment.

[Khrapovitskiy] What do you think of the draft conversion program drawn up under your leadership?

[Kotov] Well, that is a bit high-flown. What I really did was work as the coordinator. The program is a series of clearly defined priorities and control figures. Take, for example, the main priority in conversion, namely, the production of consumer goods. Last year goods worth R29 billion were produced at defense enterprises, and this year the figure will be R39 billion. And in 1995 it will be R71 billion. The second priority is equipment for the agroindustrial complex, light industry, and trade. And then medical equipment: by 1995 production should increase by a factor of 2.5 at defense enterprises. In all, 13 conversion priorities have been identified: commercial aviation, computer equipment, shipbuilding, communications facilities, equipment for ecological purposes, new materials and equipment, and others.

[Khrapovitskiy] It seems that the priorities include almost all the avenues of scientific and technical progress where we are behind. If this is so, we can only welcome the desire to gather together what only yesterday was the classified potential of military technologies. But this is the question: it is true that production conversion here is being organized "behind the fence" of military production facilities, without affecting them, and that no military plant has lost its defense potential, is this not so?

[Kotov] Yes, the opinion is being expressed that conversion is taking place not within the defense complex but, as it were, as a makeweight to it. They say that the production of civilian output in defense shops is being carried on in a kind of semi-handicraft fashion. Talk is cheap, but our opponents do not really have any concrete arguments to show that the production of civilian output is inefficient.

The fact is that the volumes by which military production is being cut back have been determined by the country's political leadership. And likewise, it is not our task to analyze whether or not these volumes are correct or incorrect.

[Khrapovitskiy] So what about this opinion, which is now also current: counting only on the disarmament treaties already concluded means a loss of dynamism in the conversion program? And if we try to extrapolate the present level of relaxation and jump ahead two or three years then this may represent a noticeable gain for all of us. The opinion is also widespread that along this path much is also predicated on the absence of the doctrine of defensive sufficiency that has been worked out.

[Kotov] You know that there is the General Staff, which is responsible in this matter, to which the country has entrusted the task of determining the adequacy or inadequacy of our defense capability. And you will agree that it would be laughable if you and I tried in our discussion to replace the judgments of the General Staff.

As far as the conversion program is concerned, we are implementing it by proceeding from the volumes of reductions in military production set by the Ministry of Defense. Together with it we are defining how much to cut production of particular kinds of weapons.

With respect to subsequent possible steps to cut back on military production, here, too, the calculations are being done.

[Khrapovitskiy] We would be interested in knowing by whom.

[Kotov] So would I. We had planned to make those calculations but could not include this in the program. It is like a prediction. For alas! no one can anticipate the nuances of tomorrow's disarmament treaties. However, it is very important for us to have a prediction for the "scenarios" of the talks. But despite our proposals, the scientists are shying away from making these kinds of predictions. Today they are more handy at criticizing us and saying that the conversion program has been inadequately drawn up, and that a new alternative is needed.

[Khrapovitskiy] Surely secrecy is an obstacle on the road to an alternative conversion program, is it not?

[Kotov] It may be! But we have asked for virtually no secret data to draw up our program. We need to know what production potential is being freed up, the numbers, the stocks, the equipment. But the scientists are perfectly well aware that to draw up an alternative program is no simple matter.

[Khrapovitskiy] By how much have we reduced military production today?

[Kotov] 19.5 percent.

[Khrapovitskiy] Is it true that the conversion program requires the allocation of tens of billions of rubles from the budget?

[Kotov] There is a great deal of talk on this subject. But unfortunately, those who engage in the arguments do not take into account the calculations of national economic efficiency. Yes, the conversion program does envisage the allocation of considerable amounts for capital investment. This amounts to R9 billion for specific refitting of enterprises and about R30 billion to develop capacities at defense enterprises to produce nonmilitary output. Opponents are reproaching us about this figure. But they are failing to take one thing into account, namely, that we are providing support for a colossal increase in the production of non-military output—an increase of R58 billion in 1995 compared to 1990. There is a concept in planning known as specific capital investment. This shows how much must be invested to derive R1 of increased output. During the current five-year plan this indicator in the defense industry is R1.50 for the production of non-military output. In civilian machine tool building it is R1.70. The conversion program provides for capital investments of about 90 kopecks.

That is, if it were not for conversion and our program, we would have to invest not R40 billion but R55 billion to achieve the same increase in output.

[Khrapovitskiy] Do you not have the impression that the conversion plan that you have submitted is ideal?

[Kotov] Any plan can be improved when new information becomes available. It is difficult to accept only non-constructive criticism.

[Khrapovitskiy] Is it possible that perhaps a law on conversion would help to bring proper order to your present work?

[Kotov] Even in the United States conversion legislation has been in the pipeline for about 10 years. But they still do not see any light. Now, despite the fact that no special resolution has been issued, we do want to make preparations for this kind of legislation. And here it is already quite clear that we shall not manage this without joint creativity by all those who have an interest in conversion.

Freight Contracting by Military Air Transport

90SV0021A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 4 Sep 90 Morning Edition p 6

[Interview with Chief of Military Transport Aviation Lieutenant-General of Aviation V. Dyrdin by V. Litovkin: "An Attempt at Competition. How Military Aviation Is Transporting the Harvest"]

[Text] A USSR Council of Ministers resolution has given the Air Force Military Aviation the right to charge for

shipping national economic freight. How is this, Aeroflot's first and up to now only competition, working, and how efficient is its commercial activity?

Our correspondent talked about this with Military Transport Aviation Chief of Staff Lieutenant-General of Aviation V. Dyrdin.

[Dyrdin] Each day Military Transport Aviation is allocating the shipment of national economic freight to 60 to 80 aircraft, Vyacheslav Aleksandrovich said. They are flying from Rostov, Nikolayev, Gyandzhu, Fergana, Tashkent, Bukhara, Namangan, and Krasnodar to airfields in Magadan, Tiksi, Anadyr, Yelizova, Norilsk, Mirnyy, Monchegorsk, Murmansk... In short, to places in Siberia, the Far East, the Far North, and the Polar regions to where it is very difficult to deliver fresh vegetables and fruit and berries.

To date we have entered into 67 contracts to carry fruit and vegetable products for sovkhozes and kolkhozes, enterprises, consumer cooperatives, trade-and-marketing associations, and other organizations. We have completed 536 flights and carried 13,000 tons of freight.

Of this total, fruit and vegetables alone account for about 12,000 tons. And it includes cherries and peaches from Hungary and Bulgaria and strawberries and cherries from Poland. To Moscow and to the Far East. This was almost 4,300 tons.

Is this a great deal or only little? Work it out for yourself. The average payload for an IL-76, depending on the dimensions of the freight, is 25 to 30 tons. The AN-22 can carry a little more, but we have rarely used them. The AN-12 can carry 10 to 15 tons. But they are flying only to places where there are dirt runways, as in Mirnyy and Cape Providence.

[Litovkin] Are all these freight movements bringing you large profits?

[Dyrdin] No. First, Military Transport Aviation is not working in the national economy for money. And believe me, this is not just some noble sentiment. Commercial activity represents only 10 percent of the overall business of providing support for combat readiness, carrying out tactical exercises, cooperating with airborne troops and carrying purely military freight... And we are making flights using fuel that has been allocated for military training according to the cost-accounting rules. True, crew training and training for military pilots do take place during those flights. For bulky freight we are using the AN-124, a unique aircraft that only we still have.

Second, we are providing help absolutely gratis for the victims of disasters. For example, we have made seven flights to Chita Oblast, which is suffering from flooding, and have delivered 170 tons of food and other equipment. It was the same thing in Ufa. We made at least 10 flights there.

But the main thing is that we are a budget organization, not a cost-accounting one, and 70 percent of the money we make goes to the state. We use what is left to pay for our own general overheads.

Look. As of today we have made R16 million. Of that, R12 million have gone into the state budget, and the other R4 million have nominally left for ourselves. But we have to spend it for aircraft maintenance, the purchase of spare parts and assemblies, social, cultural, and everyday needs, and the services provided at the airfields. The profit from carrying fruit from Tashkent to Norilsk is about R500, while the same freight carried to Magadan results in a loss of R300 to R400. Why is this.

Well, we are being paid only 30 percent of the cost of carrying the freight, and only from the loading point to the unloading point. And no one pays for the flight to the pickup point or the return flight home, which is usually empty. To be candid, for Military Transport Aviation, carrying fruit and vegetables is a losing proposition.

[Litovkin] I am aware that your problems are also being exacerbated by the fact that the monopoly holder in air transport—Aeroflot—has certainly not welcomed competition from you. What must be done in order to start to operate on an equal footing?

[Dyrdin] For Military Transport Aviation commercial activity is an entirely new field. We have neither the experience, nor the experts, nor the appropriate equipment. I am thinking of computers, teletype machines, and facsimile. Our only means of communication is the telephone. And just try to use it, for example, to call Moscow from Kamchatka. But even that is not it.

Without Aeroflot we could do virtually nothing today. Both we and Aeroflot have a common complaint—lack of fuel at intermediate airfields. Here, for example, is a letter from the chief of the Ministry of Civil Aviation Directorate for Fuels and Lubricants I. Shishkov: "Because of the limited supplies of aviation fuel at USSR Ministry of Civil Aviation airports we cannot provide refueling facilities during July and August for aircraft of Military Transport Aviation carrying fruit and vegetables to the northern regions." But the Ministry of Civil Aviation is obliged to provide us with fuel in accordance with a USSR Council of Ministers resolution.

There are also other problems. The "least" of which is that the military pilots must be met and provided with accommodations and food... But who needs these outside cares? Even though we are paying a great deal of money for this. And it also happens that they charge "top" prices totally without justification, and we have to pay.

What can be done here? I think that the airfields should be transferred to the subordination of the local soviets and this monopoly broken once and for all. And then both we and other departments will be able to lease hard standing areas on a contractual basis and pay for services... The assets thus derived could go for the city

budgets. They will be interested in accepting and dispatching as many aircraft as possible, and in creating good conditions for rest for pilots and passengers, and in unloading freight more quickly.

Of course, all the calculations for this must still be done. Perhaps some particular city will not "rank" a project like an airfield. But then perhaps a joint stock company can be set up in which the local soviet, the Ministry of Civil Aviation, Military Transport Aviation and the owners of private aircraft can buy stock; they will be appearing today or tomorrow, as will other organizations...

[Litovkin] But what is Military Transport Aviation's potential? I think that the 67 contracts that you mentioned are by no means the limit for it. What must be done in order to make the "conversion" of military aviation and its contribution in resolving national economic problems more efficient?

[Dyrdin] We will be able to conclude new contracts only when we are provided with everything we need. We have only aircraft and fuel allocated for combat training. That is all. I am not sure that we shall ever have anything else. I am not sure that our pilots will be accepted at other airports or our aircraft serviced. Without this kind of assurance it is mere empty talk to consider expanding our operations. We are receiving many applications but we are being forced to reject them.

Any economic initiative must be underpinned by reliable legal and economic foundations. We still do not

have these. And one more circumstance is pertinent. Today there is no clear agreement between the various transport departments—civil aviation, Military Transport Aviation, the railroad workers, sailors, river boatmen, the highway transport. We need a single coordinating organ.

I have already said that our aircraft sometimes return from their destinations empty, carrying just air, but they could take, for example, railroad or seagoing container freight and shorten the route, for example of from Kamchatka to the Urals by two or three months and—just as important—no one would lose, but... The commander of the crew is the only representative of Military Transport Aviation in that remote region and it is virtually impossible for him to know about freight that needs to be moved in the direction he is going.

The Air Code must also be changed. The Minister of Defense has given us permission to carry passengers from the groups of forces—officers and members of their families. This has become possible because of the withdrawal of troops. BUT we still cannot carry people aboard flights coming from the Far East, even though this would greatly reduce pressure on the airline, particularly during the summer months. Why is this?

The main obstacle is that military aircraft and our passengers are not insured. An Aeroflot passenger who buys a ticket is automatically "worth" R10,000. Ours are not worth a kopeck. This issue, too, must be resolved if we are to enter the era of commercial relations. And there is a mass of other issues.

Lebedev 1924 Book on 'State Defense' Published**Book Reviewed**

90UM0842A Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY
ZHURNAL in Russian No 6, Jun 90 pp 3-4

[Introductory article by Col Gen Yu.A. Gorkov: "At the Sources of Defensive Doctrine"]

[Text] "It is scarcely worth spending time and paper on trying to prove the need for each state, and particularly for our Union to have an early and complete preparation of its defenses." Reflect, respected reader, on the meaning of these words. They were drawn from the work of the First Chief of the RKKA [Worker-Peasant Red Army] Staff, P.P. Lebedev, "Gosudarstvennaya oborona" [State Defense] which was written in 1924. [Published in Moscow by the State Military Publishing House, 47 pages] Is it apt to recall them now? In our opinion, it certainly is. Particularly now, when the core of our military doctrine continues to remain the defensive and the strategic troop grouping in Europe has sharply changed and the question has even been raised of separating the USSR Armed Forces along nationality lines.

These campaigns are not new in relation to the army. Almost 70 years, after the Civil War and before the military reform, there was a sweeping reduction in the RKKA. Upon the insistence of L.D. Trotskiy (the former chairman of the RVSR [Republic Revolutionary Military Council]) and his followers, the size of the army was reduced by 10-fold, from 5.5 million men to 562,000. And this was at a time when per 1,000 persons of the population in the European nations there were: 200 servicemen in France, 127 in Estonia, 95 in Romania, 41 in Russia and 80-100 in the other countries. Incidentally, this is one of the indicators of the militarizing of the population.

At present, for many reasons on the pages of the press and in the TV and radio broadcasts, like 70 years ago, a sharp discussion is again underway on the question of the size of our Armed Forces, their purpose, the military budget, the principles of military organizational development, military doctrine and the theory of military art.

Very many "experts of military affairs" have appeared endeavoring to demonstrate their erudition. Of course, each is permitted to express his personal viewpoint. But all of this will scarcely be of any benefit to the matter if the participants in the discussions and debates and the authors of the various platforms do not possess an elementary understanding of military affairs.

In order that the revolutionary restructuring be carried out not superficially in the Armed Forces but rather delve deeply into those complex processes of transformation which are essential for their further development, there must be definite theoretical preparation.

This is particularly essential for the professional military, for political and state figures, journalists and writers. In actuality, the changes going on in the Army and Navy are not a simple cosmetic overhaul, not a shake-up of the TOE, not a simple change in officials, but rather processes which must be well worked out.

Of interest is a statement on the given question by a specialist in the area of strategy A.A. Svechin: "In Germany in 1910, of the 260 military writers, 143 had completed the General Staff Academy, 83 had gone through probation on a major general staff and this third included all the most authoritative writers."

On the pages of VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL this year we have published a series of articles on military doctrine, strategy and operational art and there has been a discussion of the lessons and conclusions of the Great Patriotic War, particularly its initial period. This has been beneficial. In turn, I am offering the journal's readers to become acquainted with the work of P.P. Lebedev "Gosudarstvennaya oborona" written on 1 August 1924 and published the same year, in truth, in an issue of just 1,000 copies. Now, as they say, this very important work is nowhere to be found.

The work was written after the Civil War. At the same time, it was a program for action.

Since then there have been several generations of Soviet people, the years of the harsh testing of the Great Patriotic War and the postwar years of improving the Armed Forces are over and colossal changes have occurred in the military equipment and weapons.

But the book, as strange as it seems, has lost its importance now. Such is its intellectual potential.

The international situation is now extremely complex. The unilateral proposals and practical actions by the CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet government to reduce the Armed Forces and limit nuclear weapons testing have not encountered real support from the United States and the NATO countries. New military programs are being worked out and implemented (under SDI and the strategic offensive forces). Under these conditions we need Armed Forces within the limits of sufficiency and capable of protecting our motherland.

In the small but deeply informative work "Gosudarstvennaya oborona," P.P. Lebedev has disclosed the questions of preparing the nation's defenses and this corresponds to the defensive military doctrine adopted in our state, on the one hand, and on the other shows the peace-loving nature of our foreign policy from the moment of its inception.

P.P. Lebedev was the first chief of the RKKA Staff. He completed the Alexander Military School (1892) and the Military Academy of the General Staff (1900). He was a participant in World War I, a major general in the Russian Army and one of the first to take the side of the Great October Socialist Revolution.

During the period of the Civil War, he was the chief of the Mobilization Directorate of the All-Russian Main Staff, the chief of staff and commander of the Eastern Front and the chief of the Republic Field Staff. From 1921 through 1924 he was the chief of the RKKA Staff and simultaneously from March 1924, a member of the USSR Revolutionary Military Council. He took an active part in working out and conducting the operations to defeat the troops of Kolchak, Yudenich, Denikin, Wrangel and bourgeois Poland.

Excerpt: Civil, Military Means for Waging War
90UM0842B Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY
ZHURNAL in Russian No 6, Jun 90 pp 4-9

[Excerpt from the book by P.P. Lebedev: "State Defense"]

[Text]

General Organization of the Preparations for Combat

One need scarcely spend time and paper on proving the necessity for any state, and particularly for our Union, for an early and complete preparation of its defenses. We are surrounded by wide-open mouths with sharp teeth and lupine appetites. And the other countries are scarcely under any noticeably better conditions. The fact that we live in an era when the class struggle is gradually changing into an open armed combat of classes makes to an even greater degree the preparation for this combat acutely necessary. And we, of course, must not remain idle on the threshold to this decisive struggle for the fate of mankind. For this reason, I will proceed from the notion that for everyone there is the obvious inevitability under present-day conditions of struggle for a need to prepare for this struggle, and move directly on to the questions as to just how this preparation should be expressed and how it should be organized. People have been concerned with these questions for a long time but they still have not gained complete clarity. For this reason, a new discussion of them in the press seems very beneficial to me all the more as a delay in carrying them out is inadmissible as this can lead to irrecoverable misfortunes.

The aim of preparing for defense, or what is the same thing, for combat, is probably also clear to all and can be formulated in approximately the following words: to ensure maximum success in the combat by planned and complete preparation for it.

For this, it is essential:

—To prepare the nation for the possibility of diverting from it for the required time the maximum number of means (human, material and spiritual), without violating the bases of its existence;

—To be able to use these means in an organized manner and with the greatest productivity during the combat and

—Prepare the most favorable situation for combat.

But the means required for war are just as diversified as the means for the nation's life itself. For this reason in preparing the nation for combat, it is inevitable that all the administrative bodies in charge of all aspects of its life be involved. In order that the work of the individual agencies and their bodies involved in the preparation gain the required purposefulness and planning and in order that this develop into a form of unified and organized effort by the entire nation, it is essential to have a constant unifying leadership over these activities of the individual departments. This unifying leadership naturally rests on the higher establishments of governmental power in each state, including our Union. But the greatest importance, complexity and diversity of the question of preparing for inevitable combat cannot help but raise for the state power of any country the main question of whether it can with proper success carry out the leadership over this undertaking through the superior general establishment existing in the nation or does this require the establishing of a special superior body which is particularly in charge of this aspect of the people's life. With an affirmative answer to this, the question arises of how, in what form this body leading the defense should be established and with what facilities it should be equipped for carrying out its mission.

Life has already provided certain answers to these questions. The two largest bourgeois states, France and England, long ago established for themselves such leading, unifying bodies preparing for war (the Superior Council of National Defense in France and the Committee for the Defense of the Empire in England). We also established such a body in our Soviet republic during the time of the greatest intensity of combat in the form of the Labor and Defense Council and one of the most important tasks of it was to unify and direct all the forces of the young republic to fight for its existence.

But these examples, no matter how serious their importance, are not sufficient for drawing final conclusions and particularly in terms of what organizational forms should be given to this apparatus directing defense, if this is judged necessary, particularly as these forms should conform to the uniqueness of the conditions of life in each state. It seems to me that the vital answers to the posed questions can be drawn solely from a careful analysis of just what should comprise the nation's preparations for defense, what tasks it raises for the government as a whole, for the individual departments and groups of them, and in what order these tasks can be carried out and resolved. When it is clear what is to be done and how this is to be done, then the very organization which best ensures a successful undertaking will also be clear. We will now move on to this analysis of the tasks involved in the preparation for combat and the order of implementing them.

In order that the preparations be effective and planned, it is essential to establish first of all for what we are

preparing. In other words, it is essential to have a definite and firm assignment.

This assignment, naturally, should stem from the conditions of the struggle of classes being lived through by mankind, from the historical tasks of the state, its international situation and domestic state and at the same time should correspond strictly to the real material possibilities of the nation.

Clearly, the compiling of such an assignment should be preceded by a thorough and profound study of all these conditions. Here it is essential not only to study the current conditions and the means determining the current political and material capabilities of the state but also an elucidation of what must be and can be changed in the political situation, what means must and can be developed in order to bring the preparations for combat up to the limits corresponding to the historical tasks of the state.

As a result of this study, the following should be clarified:

- Against whom and under what conditions combat is unavoidable as an obligatory state on the path to resolving the historical tasks of the state.
- Against whom and under what conditions can the state be forced to fight. Is the state capable of this combat? What measures are necessary and possible for escaping from an undesired or unequal fight?

The resolution to these questions ultimately should establish the basic portion of the assignment: Under what conditions must we prepare to fight against whom?

A correct solution to this basic question presents, of course, exceptional difficulties. It is easy to anticipate that many would be inclined to equate the attempt to solve these to the reading of tea leaves and would assert that without any readings we must simply prepare in order to be able at the necessary time to provide the maximum force for the struggle and which the nation is capable of providing. And to a certain degree they will be right, as in the form of a general rule it must be recognized that the forces of any state are always significantly less than what is needed for carrying out its historical tasks in the form that the state itself understand them and for this reason the maximum possible preparation for combat will never be recognized as excessively great. Conversely, it will always be recognized as insufficient.

Nevertheless, this oversimplified view cannot be recognized as merely shortsighted. Material preparation for a war always is carried out at the expense of developing other aspects of the people's life and primarily at the expense of developing its productive forces. Very usual is a situation where vitally important for the state is the greatest possible reduction in the scale of its military production in order to develop its productive forces and thereby create the necessary base for broader and stronger military preparations in the future.

Or it is easy to imagine that often and possibly even always a state will follow the more successful and easier path of attaining its historical goals by splitting them into stages where the fostering of the stages will be within its power and will not threaten a complete exhaustion of forces.

Often it would be better for a state to protect itself against enemy strikes by various and sometimes very major sacrifices than guarantee itself against these strikes using such broad and great preparations which would be capable of stifling its productive forces. In a word, a rectilinear or oversimplified formula in the form of an obligatory maximum straining of military preparations in many instances can be fatal for the life of the state and for this reason it is essential to have a more complex, flexible and viable solution to this question. And a correct solution to it will depend, on the one hand, of the level of the genius of the people standing in superior power and, on the other, how the handling of these questions is organized, that is, their positing, study and procedure for taking decisions on them.

Modern warfare and particularly class war is waged not only by the armies of the belligerent states but also involves in combat all their forces and encompasses all aspects of the life of the peoples. Nevertheless, the struggle itself, once it reaches open warfare, that is, until the overcoming of enemy resistance by force, is carried out by the state's armed forces. For this reason, the next specific given of the overall assignment in preparing the nation for war should be to set the size of its armed forces in wartime and their personnel in peacetime as well as the strength of the various services (land army, navy and air force).

The following conditions should underlie the setting of the amount (number and composition) of the armed forces:

- The political tasks of the nation, its international situation, that is, the above-indicated decision as to what combat one must be prepared for, under what conditions and against whom.
- The forces and internal political state of the probable enemies.
- The nature of the forthcoming combat as a consequence of the two preceding points.
- The geographic position of one's nation.
- Its vital and material means and inner state.

The 1st four conditions determine the necessary (desired) size and composition of the armed forces, while the 5th limits them to the constraints of real possibility.

The size and composition of the regular peacetime armed forces in turn are determined by the following conditions:

- By the possibility of the strong deployment of the personnel into the wartime armed forces of the established size.
- By the possibility of conducting correct military instruction.
- By the possibility of taking through military instruction that entire number of persons required for deploying the armed forces in mobilization and replacing them during the war.
- By the internal state of the nation and
- By the monetary and material forces of the nation.

In this instance, the 1st four conditions determine the necessary amount and composition of the regular armed forces, while the 5th restricts them to the real possibility.

But the setting of the size of the armed forces does not exhaust the necessary basic data for the assignments related to preparing the various national economic sectors for war. Of equally important significance for this is at least a rough determination of the length of the war as well as the time by which preparations for combat should be complete or brought to a certain level of development. For determining these data one must again consider all the above-listed conditions, political and material, as well as the purely military ones based not only upon a professed and thorough knowledge of military affairs and the modern conditions of waging war but also considering their ongoing progress.

Only after the above-listed basic provisions of the general assignment have been worked out is it possible to draw up effective particular and specific assignments for all sectors of the people's life and the fulfillment of these should bring the nation to a readiness to fight as a whole.

Even from this brief sketch of compiling the general basic assignment for preparations, it is seemingly clear that this, so to speak, introductory part of the preparations is scarcely within the power of those usual superior state establishments which are already normally overloaded with their enormous governmental work. Only a body specially concerned with this undertaking and possessing the proper apparatus for studying and working out these questions can handle them with the success needed for the undertaking. Only with such a body available does superior power in the state actually find a sound basis for its final decisions.

This will become even clearer after we have examined the particular tasks for the individual sectors of the people's life and the procedure for carrying them out and we ascertain to what degree they are intertwined, depend upon one another and for this reason require constant authoritative and excellently coordinated, combined leadership.

We will now turn to a review of these particular tasks.

The Organization of Management

The organization of superior administration in the state during a war has certain essential features and for this reason it should be thought out, worked out and prepared for ahead of time. Improvisation in this instance is extremely harmful, as mistakes in the superior administration are felt in the entire apparatus of state administration, to its entire depth, and at the same time during the war its clear and continuous work is particularly necessary.

The entire nation is involved in a decisive struggle, and not just its armed forces. Naturally, the war will be managed by that supreme government which runs the nation in all other regards and not by the superior military power in the state. Moreover, it would be harmful if supreme power in its managing of the war was guided by considerations of military power alone. Conversely, it is completely essential that the supreme leadership of the war be based on a broad generalization of all the conditions of national life. For this reason, the supreme power in wartime should have a special apparatus of a nondepartmental nature capable of concentrating in itself and working out all diverse material needed for a solid grounding for the superior management of the war and the nation in wartime. Such an apparatus is also needed to unify the work of all departments, as success in a decisive struggle is possible only in the instance that this decision becomes the single goal of the entire nation which dominates over everything and if its united and planned efforts are concentrated on achieving this success. The organization of this apparatus and the procedure for its work should be worked out and prepared for in peacetime in order that it could commence its activities without any delay, as soon as it is needed. If such an apparatus for preparing for the war exists in a nation as described above, then it will be the natural cadre or even an almost ready apparatus for managing the war.

In the same manner it is essential to have the early preparation of organizing the superior command with complete operational power concentrated in its hands and the command of all the state's armed forces united here.

The military organization within the country during a war naturally remains in the hands of that apparatus which was in charge of this undertaking in peacetime. But the relations of this apparatus with the bodies of the high command should be determined and expressed in concrete forms. The interests of the war make the most desirable form of these relations the complete subordination of the internal apparatus to the high command, since the internal military organization is the ready-made base of the armed forces and their link with the entire nation, as their main basis. The work of the internal military organization has in the full sense a service character in relation to the operational armed

forces and only with its subordination to the high command can one be certain that it most completely meets the needs of the army.

Even with the well-known dictatorship of the German Supreme Command over the entire nation during the World War, it frequently and not without reason complained of the failure to satisfy its demands by the war ministry not subordinate to it and in those instances when actually this ministry was able to carry out these demands and did not do so merely because it was under the influence of the other superior establishments of the state which were of equal authority as the High Command.

But, on the other hand, the subordinating of the internal military organization to the high command undoubtedly greatly encumbers the work of the latter. For this reason, another form of their relationships is possible, namely: their cosubordination to superior military power, as was the case in our army during the Civil War in the form of the Revolutionary Military Council. In any event, in one way or another this question should be resolved and embodied in clear, previously elaborated provisions.

Finally, other bodies should be conceived of and worked out ensuring the correct relations of the military department with those civilian ones which determine the satisfying of the army's most important needs; examples of the need for such bodies can be found in our Civil War which brought to life the Extraordinary Commission for Army Supply and the Main Army Food Supply Administration (Chusosnabarm and Glavsnabprodarm).

To an equal degree, it is essential to organize certain wartime bodies within those civil administrations which are involved in servicing the needs of the war. All of these organizational measures should be worked out in peacetime and the mobilization of the corresponding bodies should be prepared for in the same manner as the mobilization of the army itself.

Foreign Policy

Foreign and domestic policy under the conditions of the class struggle are inseparable, and even outside these conditions the link between them is very close. Nevertheless, for convenience of research let us examine both these factors separately.

The linkage between foreign policy and war, particularly a class war, is such that they are simply inseparable from one another both in the period of preparation for the war as well as during the actual fighting. The influence of them on one another is ongoing. And hence, the constant disputes as to which of them should be dominant when and which in a subordinate position and the constant complaints that one is confusing the other and impeding work. These problems are not eliminated by attempts at theoretical definitions such as that was is the continuation of policy by other means and so forth. And they cannot be eliminated until it is firmly established that

policy and war are not separate, independent self-contained factors but merely indivisible aspects of one common undertaking and as long as the managing of this common undertaking is not actually united. This unification is equally essential both in the period of preparing for the war and during it.

But such unification will be healthy and beneficial only in the instance that it is based upon such a profound understanding of both these undertakings and a knowledge of the situation in which events are to develop and what is accessible for the bodies directly in charge of them; for this it is essential that this unification be carried out within the apparatus possessing the corresponding forces and free from other pressing work; in other words, for this there must be within the state an apparatus specially in charge of national defense in the broad sense of the word in peacetime and wartime. The attempts to dispense with such an apparatus and to unite policy and defense in the ordinary work-encumbered higher governmental establishments, without a preliminary thorough study in the body which exists specifically for this inevitably lead to a situation where the decisions will often be of an accidental, insufficiently sound nature or will simply be wrong, causing just dissatisfaction among the bodies bearing the full burden of responsibility for the job assigned to them.

The tasks which can be entrusted by the body in charge of preparing for the war to the bodies in charge of foreign policy can be expressed in the following:

- A study of the political conditions of one's own state and all foreign states.
- Participation in the elaboration of that basic assignment for preparing for combat which was mentioned above and which to a significant degree is based upon the political international situation of the state.
- The creation of political conditions beneficial to the combat; eliminating the possibility of involving the state in a disadvantageous or unwinnable struggle.
- During the war, easing the conditions under which the combat goes on and using the results of this combat.

(To Be Continued)

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Khrushchev's Wartime Career, Military Policies Examined

90SV0016A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
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[Article by Capt. 2nd Rank O. Odnokolenko: "Lieutenant-General Khrushchev"]

[Text] "...You military can't forgive Khrushchev that he discredited Stalinism and, hurt your interests by reducing the Army."

"The paper writes of 'blank spaces,' but more and more they are of the prewar and war years. Why do you remain silent about the 'blank spaces' in more recent years? Why not tell, for example, about how Khrushchev ruined the Army and Navy?" (From readers' letters.)

I realize that from these fragmentary sketches you will not get a complete idea of the military activity of N.S. Khrushchev. Especially since I will concentrate on what is closer to me as a naval officer: the attitude of N.S. Khrushchev to the Navy.

Quite recently Khrushchev was spoken of only as a 'voluntarist.' But today in many publications he is spoken of chiefly in a positive key. One thing is inarguable: Khrushchev was certainly out-of-the-ordinary. And it would be incorrect to belittle or even "ridicule" all his activity as a whole. I believe it quite fair to give him his due now for the role which he played in the struggle with the consequences of the cult of personality, for his attempts to begin economic reform and for certain positive steps in the international arena aimed at disarmament. We cannot fail to note that it was precisely in his era that the first artificial earth satellite was launched and the first spacecraft with a human on board, and the Missile Troops were formed.

N.S. Khrushchev became a Lieutenant-General in 1943. He did not have any special military training, but as is pointed out in the encyclopedia, he was a participant in the civil war and went through the entire Great Patriotic War. He was appointed a member of the military council of the Southwest Sector and of a number of fronts. However to compare his military merits with the merits of truly prominent military leaders would scarcely be appropriate. Certain artists' canvases of the 50's and 60's exalted the military courage and the generalship of Nikita Sergeevich. However, neither documents of the military times nor the recollections of fellow soldiers, nor even Khrushchev's own memoirs, confirm this. The canvases testify only to the fact that, like many state figures, he did not escape the temptation to be preserved in heroic form. Rather this was a man who strove conscientiously and to the best of his ability to meet his obligations, but who did not exert a vital influence on the course of events.

It was another matter in the 50s and 60s, when fate raised Khrushchev to the apex of the pyramid of power...

1955, Sevastopol

The tenth anniversary of Victory. Basically the country had healed the wounds inflicted by the war. But now there was another war—the "cold" war. Khrushchev understood that detente measures and initiatives aimed at restraining the arms race were necessary. Later he would try to undertake them, but plans which in principle were correct would frequently acquire distorted forms, and all of it ultimately would result in a new spiral in the arms race...

The Americans were developing a nuclear navy and equipping aviation with nuclear weapons. In our country preference was given to missiles. The first tests confirmed their great combat might. A cruise missile sank the cruiser "Krasnyy Kavkas," which had been turned into a target. Nor could the armor of the unfinished heavy cruiser "Stalingrad" stand up to it.

Testimony is preserved in the archives of Fleet Admiral of the Soviet Union N.G. Kuznetsov: a missile shot on a target was demonstrated to N.S. Khrushchev in 1955, and it left a great impression on him. But at a meeting in Sevastopol, held at the same time, a more vital question was decided—the prospects for development of the entire fleet. The program—calculated for a decade—proposed the construction of ships of various classes, including nuclear submarines and aircraft carriers. It had been submitted to the government the first time while Stalin was still alive. It was then that a conflict took place between the People's Commissar of the Navy Kuznetsov and Khrushchev, who at that time still held a secondary role in the leadership. According to the testimony of witnesses, Nikita Sergeevich's remarks were dilettantish in substance and insulting in form. The People's Commissar of the Navy did not restrain himself and in front of everyone advised Khrushchev not to interfere in questions of which he knew nothing.

Admiral B.Ye. Yamkova (at the time deputy chief of a Directorate of the Black Sea Fleet) recounts:

It should be noted that the decades-long Naval development program devised by N.G. Kuznetsov was the more sophisticated, but it did not enjoy popularity with the government. Then the idea arose of listening to everyone. In addition to members of the government and the leadership of the Defense Ministry, scientists, unit and formation commanders were invited to the conference. Kuznetsov did not speak. The Commander of the Black Sea Fleet, Vice-Admiral V. Parkhomenko, was assigned to express the views of the sailors. N.S. Khrushchev was in the Presidium. By habit he constantly interrupted the speakers. He himself gave a very short speech.

But even before the start of the meeting it was clear that Nikita Sergeevich was greatly prejudiced in his attitude toward the Navy. Once after a ship visit he stated loudly: "All of this is fit only for parades."

But in one of the episodes of the meeting, Khrushchev appeared convincing. One of the formation commanders had just spoken and insisted on the construction of amphibious warfare ships like the Americans had. Khrushchev stopped him: "What do we need amphibious warfare ships for?"—"What do you mean, why? We want to raise the Soviet flag in America too." Then Khrushchev turned to Zhukov: "Georgiy Konstantinovich, do you have plans to conquer America?" Zhukov answered briefly: "No." Khrushchev concluded: "There, you see. Since we aren't thinking about conquering America, we will not need amphibious landing ships."

Only years later was it understood that it was not a matter of expansion or export of revolution. And that the Navy, a part of whose forces were deployed in enclosed seas, still required amphibious warfare ships and marines. The old enmity of Nikita Sergeyevich for N.G. Kuznetsov also negatively influenced the future of our Navy. As a result many effective proposals of the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy were not adopted.

From a letter of N.G. Kuznetsov to the USSR Defense Minister: "According to rumors reaching me, Khrushchev and other military leaders with him have been hurling accusations at me at every convenient moment regarding the following questions.

Underestimation of submarines. Nonsense. One need only look at the ship-building program I proposed, and you will see that the number of boats is sufficient and they are in first place. More submarines were planned there than are presently in service.

Missile weapons for the Navy. The importance of missiles was understood under my leadership. In 1955 I demonstrated a missile shot to Khrushchev against a target, and submitted drafts for solutions in this area..."

In short, at that time in Sevastopol questions of policy, strategy, and personal relationships were tangled up in a tight ball. Unfortunately reason did not predominate, but the ambitions and viewpoint of N.S. Khrushchev, who had already become infallible. One cult replaced another. While assuming the highest posts in the party and government, Khrushchev continued to remain the Lieutenant-General of the war years. With this baggage he also resolved the questions of the nation's defense capability.

1957, Moscow

The next important conference involving N.S. Khrushchev was held in the Defense Ministry immediately after the October (1957) Plenum of the Central Committee, CPSU, at which Marshal of the Soviet Union G. K. Zhukov was removed from the post of Minister of Defense and expelled from the CPSU Central Committee Presidium. Just a month before, at a similar meeting of activist ranks, timed to coincide with the disclosure of the anti-party group of Malenkov, Kaganovich, and Molotov, almost all the speakers had glorified Georgiy Konstantinovich. In October the tone of the speeches changed. They accused Zhukov of immodesty and bonapartism. By way of example they cited the book about Zhukov's visit to India and a number of pictures on a frontline theme in which the Marshal was depicted.

N.S. Khrushchev took the floor during the debates. He noted that the leadership of the Army was proceeding incorrectly, especially in the field of party and political work. Why did the leadership not intervene earlier, if it saw all of this? Because it looked and got accustomed to looking. And if Vas'ka (meaning G.K. Zhukov—author) listened and ate as before, it was necessary to intervene.

From the transcript of a speech by N.S. Khrushchev: "Now they say that the Stalingrad operation was devised by Zhukov and Vasilevskiy. But where were we? They cannot confuse everything again. Yeremenko (commanding general of the Stalingrad front—author) and I knew what was done there, and offered our own solutions. I always supported Zhukov, but one cannot overestimate good relations.

...Then there are the pictures (about the depictions of the marshal). Of course a toady painted them. But the subject himself was delighted with them..."

A few paragraphs later, the topic turned to the role of the military councils and the collegiality of the leadership of the troops. Khrushchev suddenly recalled Fleet Admiral of the Soviet Union N.G. Kuznetsov, who was removed from his position. He spoke of him as a military leader who did not listen to the opinion of others: "Two years ago Kuznetsov introduced a draft for naval construction for ten years. We declined it, and he raised a fuss... We do not need cruisers with artillery. The Americans are building aircraft carriers because it is their business to conduct their affairs across the ocean. But Kuznetsov didn't know anything, and made a great many claims. We thought about it, and removed the fool! (Life later fully confirmed the rightness of the views of N.G. Kuznetsov: we had to urgently get to work on shipboard artillery, and also construct air-capable ships.—author).

...In the near future we must assemble a small military council... we must decide what to do with aviation and air defense artillery. I do not belittle our weapons, but we must know what we have, and not fall in love with what is. We must know what new weapons give us. The missile is better than the aircraft, more accurate..."

After this blessing, tens of unfinished ships went directly from the building ways to the knife, hundreds of millions of the people's rubles were reduced to ashes. New planes were destroyed in regiments and divisions...

The unilateral reduction in the Armed Forces again was a reasonable initiative, but what did it cost!

1964, Moscow

Seven years later, Nikita Sergeyevich was himself "thought about." It is understandable that we cannot treat everything that was said there as the truth. In that October Plenum of the Central Committee, which as is known brought L.I. Brezhnev to power, the criticism sounded made to order, so to speak. But much of it was not said without grounds. It was noted that in concentrating all the fullness of power in his own hands, Khrushchev lost his sense of reality. He made uncontrolled and irresponsible speeches abroad. He surrounded himself with toadies, etc.

In the field of military affairs, "With incredible ease, like a drunken merchant, he had his own way." Once Khrushchev was shown an infantry fighting vehicle, to

which he responded: "If there is a shell that penetrates armor, make simple automobiles." In his expression, a ship should become "winged, diving, amphibious." Even his very rich imagination could not imagine a ship that possessed all of these qualities simultaneously.

From a speech of the USSR Ministry of Defense, Marshal of the Soviet Union R.Ya. Malinovskiy: "In discrediting the cult of Stalin, Khrushchev created his own. He ceased to consult and rejected all objections out of hand. Therefore people began to avoid expressing their own opinion. ...We created the Caribbean crisis ourselves and barely wiggled out of it. As a result we lost much here and our prestige was damaged... The reorganization and reduction were done without consideration. We did not get a million two hundred thousand. Later there was a campaign against aviation as an anachronism. Here he (Khrushchev) acted against logic and did immediate harm. Those who did not agree with him he called conservatives. All that hurt our combat readiness.

The Navy. The program of construction was approved for ten years. But even today we cannot say all that all was settled. And quite recently tanks came under attack...

Missile technology. Chelomey (Academician of the USSR Academy of Sciences, designer of cruise missiles—Author) through Serezha (the son of Khrushchev, he worked with Chelomey—author), handled papa as he wanted, he pushed his "little missile" with all his might. But Serezha made the difference with his first-hand reports to father... The "item" of Makeyev (the creator of ballistic missiles—author) advanced with great difficulty, and even through deceit."

Probably someone will ask, why stir all this up? Of course not out of any "grudge." Today when we are undertaking a profound military reform, we must also recall these "fragments of the recent past," and the harm which may be done by high-handed incompetence which refuses to consider anyone or any thing. And also by arrogating enormous power to make decisions in a complex and specific sphere such as national defense.

PRC Military Attache on PLA Reforms, Conversion

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[Interview with Maj Gen Ning Wenyan, army, naval and air attache at the PRC's embassy in the USSR, by Col V. Markushin: "Maj Gen Ning Wenyan: Closing the Past, Opening the Future"]

[Text] Maj Gen Ning Wenyan, army, naval and air attache at the embassy of the People's Republic of China, recently visited the editorial office. We were already acquainted. We had met at receptions and exchanged greetings and the latest news. Now he was visiting KRASNAYA ZVEZDA. This fact itself is yet another indication of the breakthrough in relations between the armies of the two nations.

The guest spoke Russian fluently, but he sometimes paused in order to express a thought precisely.

[Markushin] First of all, Comrade General, please accept our best wishes on China's People's Liberation Army Day. Our nation knows that it has to do with the events of August 1927.

[Ning] Yes, our people consider 1 August 1927, the day the first shot of the armed uprising against Kuomintang reaction was fired in Nanjing, to be the birthday of the Chinese Red Army. The leadership of the uprising included Zhou Enlai, Zhu De, He Long, Ye Ting and Liu Pezheng, who, implemented the decision of the party CC and led the armed people in protecting the gains of the revolution and against the right-wing faction of the Kuomintang, which had a compact with imperialism.

Those were the great days when the PLA [People's Liberation Army of China] set out on its journey. The path was not an easy one. There was the difficult civil war, the war against Japan, the war against the American aggressors and that fought in support of the Korean people. Tactics and strategy were perfected in the battles and engagements. The army learned how to fight not with numbers but with ability. It became steadfast and unshakeable in its morale and fighting spirit. The PLA has always remained a true people's army, however, which shares the nation's problems and economic needs. It has participated in the construction of roads and bridges, the taming of rivers and lakes, the opening up of virgin lands, assisted the victims of natural disasters, and all of this reveals the army's linkage with the people.

[Markushin] China has been conducting a military reform in recent years. What is the objective?

[Ning] The reform of the PLA is inseparably linked to the new historical period which China has entered and to which the nation's modernization is tied. In view of the changes in the international situation and based on the developing national economy, we are going to have to turn our armed forces gradually into a modern, regular, revolutionary army.

What have we achieved? In the first place, we have reduced the army and altered its structure. The railway troops and capital construction troops were eliminated in 1982, for example. In 1985 a government decree was passed to reduce the forces by 1 million men. This decision resulted in a reduction of the number of main departments of the armed forces by half. Seven of 11 districts were left, 31 formations were disbanded, and the district and city military commissariats were placed under the jurisdiction of local authorities.

In the second place, we have modernized our weaponry. The conventional weapons have been improved. The strength of the strategic, numerically limited nuclear forces has grown.

In the third place, the military has begun to take into account the nation's economic needs. The result has been perceptible. Since 1983, 5.5 million soldiers have acquired civilian job skills, and, since the demobilization, they have had an opportunity to obtain work in the national economy in the field of their acquired specialty.

In the fourth place, political work in the PLA has been renewed. Having inherited the best traditions, it is called upon to support absolute leadership on the part of the party, to help improve the combat readiness of the forces and indoctrinate the personnel in a spirit of loyalty to the people.

In the fifth place, military organizational development is more attuned to economy and thrift and to making more efficient use of the funds allocated in the military budget.

[Markushin] Obviously, one could also mention the conversion of the defense industry in this respect.

[Ning] Yes, of course. You know that more than half of the capacities of defense enterprises are geared to the production of consumer goods. Bicycles, motorcycles, refrigerators, color television sets of excellent quality are all produced by the defense industry. We launch communications satellites for other nations without ballistic missiles on a commercial basis. Chinese artificial satellites are used to fill orders which are a part of the programs of a number of nations in the West—the USA, for example. This provides a considerable income.

Another important thing is that economic accountability has been established at the defense enterprises, which is helping greatly to increase labor productivity and improve the material situation of the blue- and white-collar workers.

[Markushin] The large reductions of the army entail the resolution of difficult social problems. Does China have any positive experience in this area?

[Ning] I would like to note that problems stemming from the discharge of servicemen from the PLA are receiving extremely serious attention from the state. We are talking not just about people close to pension age but

also about young men and their families. The government is allocating special funds to get the former servicemen established in specific areas of the nation and attempting to see that they receive all the benefits coming to them. Joint commissions are being set up locally for this purpose, which include, among others, the deputy secretary of the city party organization, the deputy mayor, the person in charge of housing distribution, and so forth. The main thing is to involve in this work officials capable of resolving the problems of demobilized personnel on the spot.

[Markushin] The army and politics. Depoliticization of and removal of the party from the army. How do you regard these concepts?

[Ning] The CCP's absolute leadership of the army is not to be questioned. This is a firm principle for us. The Chinese people have faith in their party today, since improved well-being from the economic reform is evident.

[Markushin] What can you say about the PLA's current prestige among the population?

[Ning] The people of our nation have special respect for the man in the uniform. They associate stability in the state with him. The military have demonstrated their loyalty to the people splendidly in recent years. They have operated skilfully in the performance of the most diverse missions, including missions involved in maintaining order in the society.

[Markushin] Let us discuss the fact that Soviet-Chinese relations have normalized and we have become good neighbors. Has this auspicious fact affected the training of the Chinese army and the political indoctrination of its personnel?

[Ning] Naturally. Trust between the two nations is growing, and this process could not fail to affect army life and the morale of the soldiers and officers. Military contacts have been renewed. Col Gen Liu Huaqing, deputy chairman of the Military Council of the PRC, recently made an official visit to the Soviet Union. The chiefs of foreign relations of our military departments have exchanged visits. Reciprocal military visits will continue also during the second half of this year. All of this pleases us. In light of Comrade Ding Xiaoping's instructions to "close the past, open the future," we foresee bright prospects for relations between the armies of China and the Soviet Union.

Comment on Planned Shipment of U.S. Chemical Weapons to Johnston Atoll

90SV0022A *Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 1 Sep 90 Morning Edition p 5*

[Article by V. Mikheyev (Sydney): "Heading for Johnston Atoll"]

[Text] Dangerous cargo which belongs to the U.S. Army is being evacuated from the storage facilities near Klausen (FRG): about 100,000 units of ammunition stuffed with toxic substances. It is intended that in September transport ships will deliver this batch of NATO "weapons of deterrence" to the Pacific Ocean's Johnston atoll, 1,100 kilometers southeast of the Hawaiian Islands. The work for constructing seven new crematorium bunkers for burning chemical agents (BOV) is in full swing there.

The sentence for a "silent death" was signed during the course of the summit meeting between the USSR and the United States in June of this year. The powers agreed to begin destroying their chemical war arsenals even before the conclusion of the general international convention in order to give a push to the process of disarmament in this strategically important section and provide an example to others. The United States intends to destroy from six to seven percent of its BOV's right here on the Johnston atoll.

Why precisely here? In keeping with the program for destroying chemical weapons, eight complexes are being constructed in the continental part of the United States and they are quite capable of handling this task, the more so since the solid wastes remaining after the burning will be sent there from the atoll—for burial. The official explanations amount to the following: Congressmen in Washington have arrived at the opinion that it is too risky to ship this deadly cargo to the United States. Yet according to the 1986 agreement with Bonn, the United States must relieve its ally of this heavy load. A quite important proviso is added to this: On the Johnston atoll there are already "production capacities" for deactivation or, rather, destruction of the chemical ammunition.

The prospect of delivering a large batch of weapons of mass destruction to the atoll from Europe could not but evoke energetic and vigorous opposition from the countries of the region.

First. Even if Washington admits that shipping chemical ammunition across the Atlantic is not without danger, what can it say about the southern part of the Pacific Ocean where the hurricane season lasts from July through October? True, the Army command asserts that even if the ship sinks the design of the charges will enable them to withstand the pressure of the sea water to a depth of 2,500 meters, and if they become unsealed, the leaking will be in small portions, which will not lead to significant pollution of the environment.

The next "risk zone" is the unloading. The ammunition will be on the dock for a long time, up to 120 days, until it is placed in the storage bunkers that are now being constructed. Military specialists see a real threat in this stage. As a result of fire, detonation, or other things the toxic substances could be released (some in liquid, others in gaseous form) into the water or air. If one accounts for the prevailing winds, their force, and their direction, the

deadly fumes could be carried over a distance of from 23 to 123 kilometers, destroying every living thing in their path.

Second, how reliable is the technology? The eternal question. And it is not an idle one in this concrete situation since beginning on 30 June, when the first trial charges were started in the furnace, this complex has already been shut down twice. After they got rid of 15 missiles stuffed with nerve gas there were signs of its leaking into the atmosphere. The shutdowns lasted from 4 through 14 July and then from 21 July through 2 August. In principle, in order to check the reliability of a system it is necessary to perform these tests, and the very fact of the rapid reaction of both the corresponding monitoring equipment and the service personnel must be regarded as a merit rather than a shortcoming. But the small failures only reinforce the probability of a larger emergency. What then?

Third, although the State Department assured all interested parties that the program for eliminating chemical ammunition was strictly limited in volume (only the arsenals that are now on the atoll plus the cargo from the Klausen region) as well as in terms of time periods (only up until 1994), skeptics—and there are many of them in the region—do not rule out a “long future” for the crematorium located right next to them. They ask how they can make sure that the United States, not wanting to throw money to the wind, will not preserve a complex that is so convenient for them, on whose expansion they have already spent \$310 million.

Fourth, after the August recess the U.S. Congress will begin discussing legislative changes proposed by the member of the House of Representatives from the State of Maryland, Roy Dyson, who is proposing that they revoke the decision to destroy the chemical weapons

stored at the present time in Aberdeen. The proposal goes further: The Aberdeen arsenal should be shipped to another place, an “alternative,” but the main thing is to get it out of the territory of Maryland. According to calculations of the team of experts with whom the congressman consulted, in the event of a mishap during the burning of the ammunition up to 50,000 Americans could suffer.

The opponents of transforming the southern Pacific Ocean into a chemical weapon arsenal have influential allies—the international ecology organization Greenpeace, the Institute for Studying Problems of the Hawaiian Islands, and the World Council of Indigenous Peoples of the Hawaiian Islands, who have filed a joint suit calling the U.S. Defense Department and the U.S. Army to account.

Greenpeace, which is actively looking out for the Asian-Pacific Ocean region, as one of the least spoiled by the “costs of civilization,” is seriously criticizing the method of eliminating chemical ammunition selected by the Americans. The Greenpeace expert in these problems, Doctor Paul Johnston, who shares the same name with the atoll, considers the following methods to be more ecologically reliable: chemical neutralization, an electrochemical operation, and photo- or simply biodegradation. Their main advantage over burning, the expert asserts, is the possibility of containing these processes within an enclosed space, avoiding even small discharges into the atmosphere.

As we can see, the problem is not simple but it can be solved. One can agree only that the furnace pipes in on the Johnston atoll should not poison the lives of the residents of this “sparsely populated region.”